alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF**

**CHIEF EXECUTIVEOFFICER**

**OF**

**WORLD FINANCIALNETWORK NATIONAL BANK, AS SERVICER OF**

**WORLD FINANCIALNETWORK CREDIT CARD MASTER TRUST**

 

This certification is provided pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and accompanies the annualreport on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the “Form 10-K”)of World Financial Network Credit Card Master Trust (the “Registrant”).

 

I, Ivan Szeftel, the Chief Executive Officerof the Servicer of the Registrant certify that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(i)  the Form 10-K fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

 

(ii)  the information containedin the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Registrant.

 

 
| Dated: March 30, 2004                                       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                             |
|                                                             |
|                                                             | /s/ Ivan Szeftel |   |
|                                                             | Name: Ivan Szeftel |
|                                                             | Chief Executive Officer of the Servicer |
|                                                             |
|                                                             |
| Subscribed and sworn to before me  this 30th day of March, 2004. |
|                                                             |
|                                                             |
| /s/ Notary                                                       |   |
| Name:                                                            |
| Title: Notary Public                                             |
| My commission expires:                                           |
|                                                                  |  |  |  |

 

----
<PAGE>
                                                                  Exhibit 23.2



                        INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT




The Board of Directors and Stockholders
Sipex Corporation:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(Nos. 333-06123, 333-32329, 333-61560 and 333-73880) on Form S-8 and the
registration statements (Nos. 333-33152, 333-61562 and 333-87350) on Form S-3
of Sipex Corporation of our report dated February 18, 2003, with respect to the
consolidated balance sheet of Sipex Corporation as of December 31, 2002, and
the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders' equity and
comprehensive income (loss), and cash flows for each of the years in the
two-year period ended December 31, 2002, which report appears in the December
31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of Sipex Corporation.

                                        /s/ KPMG LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 15, 2004
#### § 168.10-5 Civilian nautical school.

The term *civilian nautical school* means any school or branch thereof operated and conducted in the United States, except State nautical schools and schools operated by the United States or any agency thereof, which offers instruction for the primary purpose of training for service in the merchant marine.

[CGD 84-069, 61 FR 25312, May 20, 1996]
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

481 

TP 14-01811 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF RICARDO RICHARDS, PETITIONER, 

V ORDER

THOMAS STICHT, SUPERINTENDENT, GOWANDA 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, 

ACTING COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 

RESPONDENTS. 

 

RICARDO RICHARDS, PETITIONER PRO SE. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (PETER H. SCHIFF OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS. 

 

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial

Department by order of the Supreme Court, Erie County [M. William

Boller, A.J.], entered June 17, 2014) to review a determination of

respondents. The determination found after a tier III hearing that

petitioner had violated various inmate rules. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously

confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed. 

Entered: May 1, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.187    Page 1 of 7

Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.188    Page 2 of 7

Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.189    Page 3 of 7

Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.190    Page 4 of 7

Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.191    Page 5 of 7

Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.192    Page 6 of 7

Case 2:15-cr-20336-RHC-RSW   ECF No. 35   filed 10/04/16    PageID.193    Page 7 of 7
Editorial Note on Part 2
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear by USCG-2009-0702, 74 FR 49223, Sept. 25, 2009, and USCG-2013-0671, 78 FR 60144, Sept. 30, 2013.

§ 2.01-3 Notification of inspection. ( a ) At least 30 days prior to the expiration of the Certification of Inspection, a vessel's owner, charterer, managing operator, agent, master or individual in charge shall notify the Coast Guard if the vessel will be required to be reinspected for certification or will be operated in such a manner as to not require a Certificate of Inspection.
( b ) The notification required by paragraph (a) shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection for the Marine Inspection or Sector Office of the port that: ( 1 ) Will be reinspecting and Certificating the Vessel;
( 2 ) Issued the vessel's current Certificate of Inspection if the vessel's schedule is such that it is not known where the next reinspection will take place; or
( 3 ) Issued the vessel's current Certificate of Inspection if the vessel will not be requiring reinspection for the issuance of a Certificate of Inspection.
[CGD 85-015, 51 FR 19340, May 29, 1986, as amended by USCG-1999-4976, 65 FR 6498, Feb. 9, 2000; USCG-2006-25556, 72 FR 36329, July 2, 2007]
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Pop N Go, Inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Melvin Wyman, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





|                             |                                                    
|---------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------
|Dated:  

September 18, 2008 | By: /s/ Melvin Wyman                               
|                             | Melvin Wyman                                       
|                             | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer



This certification accompanies each Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 169.685 Electric heating and cooking equipment. ( a ) Each electric space heater for heating rooms and compartments must be provided with thermal cutouts to prevent overheating. Each heater must be so constructed and installed as to prevent the hanging of towels, clothing, etc., on the heater, and to prevent overheating of heater parts and adjacent bulkheads or decks.
( b ) All electric cooking equipment, attachments, and devices, must be of rugged construction and so designed as to permit complete cleaning, maintenance, and repair.
( c ) Doors for electric cooking equipment must be provided with heavy duty hinges and locking devices to prevent accidental opening in heavy seas.
( d ) Electric cooking equipment must be mounted to prevent dislodgment in heavy seas.
( e ) For each grill or similar type cooking equipment, means must be provided to collect grease or fat and to prevent spillage on wiring or the deck.
( f ) Where necessary for safety of personnel, grab rails must be provided. Each electric range must be provided with sea rails with suitable barriers to resist accidental movement of cooking pots.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6838

SAL BART SIRACUSA, Petitioner - Appellant, versus R. C. LEE, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CA-02-167-5) Submitted: July 21, 2004 Decided: August 16, 2004 Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Sal Bart Siracusa, Appellant Pro Se. Sandra Wallace Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Sal Bart Siracusa has filed a motion for a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Siracusa has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF DEC-31-1998 AND THE CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DEC-31-1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001007800
<NAME> SIPEX CORP
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> USD
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          26,871
<SECURITIES>                                    23,182
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,311
<ALLOWANCES>                                       449
<INVENTORY>                                     16,682
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                84,344
<PP&E>                                          37,954
<DEPRECIATION>                                  27,648
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  99,496
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,786
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           180
<OTHER-SE>                                      92,530
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    99,496
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                65,557
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   32,213
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                18,127
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   449
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,263
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,029
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (2,801)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             19,830
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    19,830
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.06
        

</TABLE>
§ 32.35-15 Installation of air compressors on tank vessels contracted for on or after June 15, 1977—TB/ALL. No tank vessel, except an oil pollution clean-up vessel, that carries petroleum products grades A thru D contracted for on or after June 15, 1977 may have an air compressor on an air compressor intake installed in any of the following cargo areas: ( a ) A cargo handling room.
( b ) An enclosed space containing cargo piping.
( c ) A space in which cargo hose is stowed.
( d ) A space adjacent to a cargo tank or cargo tank hold.
( e ) A space within three meters of any of the following: ( 1 ) A cargo tank opening.
( 2 ) An outlet for cargo gas or vapor.
( 3 ) A cargo pipe flange.
( 4 ) A cargo valve.
( 5 ) An entrance or ventilation opening to a cargo handling room.
( f ) Except for tank barges, the cargo deck space. For the purpose of this paragraph, *cargo deck space* means the volume bounded by the open deck over the cargo tank block, including all ballast tanks within the cargo tank block, extending to the full width of the vessel, plus three meters (about 10 feet) fore and aft of the cargo tank block and up to a height of 2.4 meters (about 8 feet) above the deck.
( g ) An enclosed space having an opening into a location described in paragraphs (a)-(f) of this section.
( h ) A location similar to those described in paragraphs (a)-(g) of this section in which cargo vapors or gases may be present.
[CGD 75-017, 42 FR 25735, May 19, 1977, as amended by CGD 75-017, 42 FR 45677, Sept. 12, 1977]
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2473 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2473

   To improve Department of Defense policies relating to body armor.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 19, 2009

 Ms. Tsongas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To improve Department of Defense policies relating to body armor.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. IMPROVEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICIES RELATING TO 
              BODY ARMOR.

    (a) Dedicated Program Element for Body Armor.--Effective for the 
budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of 
title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2011 and each fiscal year 
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that within the 
research, development, test, and evaluation account for each of the 
military services a separate, dedicated program element is assigned to 
the research, development, test, and evaluation of body armor.
    (b) Dedicated Program Element for Procurement of Body Armor.--
Effective for the budget of the President submitted to Congress under 
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2011 
and each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure 
that within the procurement account for each of the military services a 
separate, a dedicated program element is assigned to the procurement of 
body armor.
    (c) Research and Development of Lighter Body Armor.--Of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for research, development, test, and 
evaluation, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such sums as may 
be necessary are available for--
            (1) the research and development of lighter body armor 
        while maintaining equivalent level of threat protection to the 
        improved outer tactical vest and enhanced small arms protective 
        inserts; and
            (2) the creation of a task force to carry out the research, 
        development, test, and evaluation of lighter body armor.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF TOKOS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           6,930        
<SECURITIES>                                    17,710          
<RECEIVABLES>                                   55,654          
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (26,198)          
<INVENTORY>                                        867       
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                56,591          
<PP&E>                                          33,213
<DEPRECIATION>                                  17,993           
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 223,188
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           34,566          
<BONDS>                                          2,499
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           363    
<OTHER-SE>                                     172,815    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   223,188        
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               130,806 
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   55,911
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               119,383
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 7,591
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (353)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (51,121)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (51,121)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (51,121)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (1.58)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (1.58)
        





</TABLE>
Argued and submitted May 10,

affirmed December 13, 1995

#### Robert “Bob” THOMAS, *Appellant, v.*STATE OF OREGON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, aka “OSP,” a state agency; Gilbert Jerry “G.J.” Russell, an OSP official, *Respondents.*

(93CV3189; CA A84997)

907 P2d 262

James B. Ehrlich argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Green, Elliott & Ehrlich.

*210Pamela G. Wood, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.

Before Deits, Presiding Judge, and De Muniz and Hasel-ton, Judges.

DEITS, P. J.

*211DEITS, P. J.

Plaintiff brought this action pleading a claim for inverse condemnation and a claim under 42 USC § 1983. The defendants are the state, the Oregon State Police and a state police officer. Plaintiff contended that the 1991 enactment and subsequent enforcement of ORS 167.164 constituted an uncompensated taking of plaintiffs property, in violation of Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

ORS 167.164 prohibits and criminalizes, *inter alia,*the manufacture, distribution in various specified ways or possession of “gray machines” *(i.e.,*privately owned machines usable for video poker).1 Before the statute was enacted, plaintiff was in the business of conducting some of the activities that the statute made illegal. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss both claims pursuant to ORCP 21 A(8). Plaintiff appeals and assigns error to the dismissal of his taking claim.

It has been clearly and repeatedly held that legitimate governmental regulations that are aimed at preventing or correcting public hazards, nuisances or unlawful activities cannot give rise to a taking under either constitution. *Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis,*480 US 470, 491-92 & n 22, 107 S Ct 1232, 94 L Ed 2d 472 (1987); *Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton,*294 Or 254, 258-59, 656 P2d 306 (1982); *see also Eckles v. State of Oregon,*306 Or 380, 398, 760 P2d 846 (1988). The prohibition of producing and trafficking in a device usable for gambling is a regulation of that kind. Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the action.

Affirmed.

1

 The term “gray machine” derives from the fact that, before 1991, state law did not prohibit the possession of such devices for purely amusement purposes, but prohibited the use of the machines for gambling. In addition, before 1991, localities had the option of banning the devices altogether.