J-S09001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.S., A MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3238 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered October 31, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): No. CP-23-DP-48-2019

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2020

Appellant, K.S., a minor,1 appeals from the October 31, 2019 order that

denied his application to file a private petition for dependency pursuant to 

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1320. After review, we affirm, albeit on separate grounds.

2

The record reflects that on March 25, 2019, Attorney Daniel G. Anna, 

counsel for K.S., filed a petition for dependency pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 1330

(“the Petition”). The Petition requested that the trial court adjudicate K.S., a 

native of India, who was born in November of 2001, a dependent child. On 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As noted in our discussion and relevant to our decision, although K.S. was 

a minor when the underlying proceedings began, he has since attained the 

age of majority.

2 We may affirm the trial court’s disposition “on any correct basis.” Rambo 

v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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April 9, 2019, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the matter. In the interim, 

Attorney Anna recognized that the Petition was improper. Because 

Attorney Anna did not represent the Delaware County Children and Youth 

Services (“CYS”), he was required to file an application to file a private 

petition. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1330, cmt. (“Any other person, other than the 

county agency, is to file an application to file a petition under Rule 1320.”). 

On July 22, 2019, Attorney Anna filed an application to file a private 

petition (“the Application”). In the Application, Attorney Anna alleged K.S. 

was a dependent child pursuant to Section 6302 of the Pennsylvania Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375 (“the Juvenile Act”). The Application, 7/22/19, 

at ¶¶ 2-4. Attorney Anna noted that a cousin, B.S.,3 was K.S.’s caretaker 

while K.S. was in the United States. Id. at ¶ 5. Nevertheless, in the 

Application, Attorney Anna expressed concern that K.S. could potentially fall 

victim to “human trafficking.” Id. Attorney Anna averred that K.S. comes 

within the jurisdiction of the trial court under the Juvenile Act because K.S. 

was abandoned by his parents and is without a parent, guardian, or legal 

custodian under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. Id. at ¶ 3 (incorporating the Petition by 

reference). However, Attorney Anna requested that B.S. remain K.S.’s 

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3 Throughout the record, B.S. is referred to both as K.S.’s uncle or cousin. 

Order, 10/31/19, at ¶ 2. However, B.S. testified that K.S.’s paternal 

grandmother and B.S.’s mother are sisters; thus, K.S. is B.S.’s first cousin 

once removed. Id. at ¶ 9 (citing N.T., 9/12/19, at 23).
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caretaker and that placement remain with B.S. Id. at ¶ 3 (incorporating the 

Petition by reference) and ¶ 6.

On September 12, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the 

Application. In its order disposing of the Application, the trial court found that 

K.S. and B.S. testified credibly at the hearing. Order, 10/31/19, at ¶¶ 4-11. 

The trial court also credited the affidavit completed by K.S.’s parents in which 

K.S.’s parents attested that they are the natural parents of K.S., and they 

authorized B.S. to care for K.S. Id. at ¶ 12. Finally, the trial court noted that 

although counsel for CYS was present during the hearing, CYS’s counsel did 

not present testimony or question K.S. or B.S. Id. at ¶ 13. 

In denying the Application, the trial court concluded as follows:

[K.S.] has not been “abandoned by his parents, guardian or other 

custodian” because he is under the care of [B.S.] and [B.S.’s] wife 

who are taking care of all of [K.S.’s] needs, including providing 

food, shelter, clothing and education and the Petition requests 

that upon a finding of dependency, [K.S.] be returned to [B.S.]. 

See Petition, page 2; Interest of L.E.A-M., a Minor, 156 A.3d 310 

(Pa. Super. 2017) and 42 Pa.C.S. §6302 (3). The [c]ourt 

concludes that [B.S.] credibly testified that he “agreed to the 

provisions set forth in the Sponsor Care Agreement, pertaining to 

[K.S.’s] care, safety, and well-being, and the sponsor’s 

responsibility for ensuring [K.S.’s] presence at all future 

proceedings before the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Department of Justice/Executive Office for Immigration Review 

(ROIR)[,]” and [K.S.] was released to him on January 26, 2019. 

N.T. 9/12/19, pp. 23-24. See Verification of Release and 

Acknowledgement of the Sponsor Care Agreement, dated January 

26, 2019. The [c]ourt concludes that [B.S.] credibly testified that 

“they told me make sure he not work and make sure he goes to 

school. Make sure you give him food, clothes, everything .... They 

said make sure you hire a lawyer to do this political asylum case 

and make sure that he goes to school. ... So he can stay here or 

whatever you can do.” N.T. 9/12/19, p. 25. The [c]ourt concludes 
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that [K.S.] has not been abandoned by his parents since they have 

not cut off relations but they have attempted to fulfill their 

obligations by ensuring that [K.S.] had an opportunity to travel to 

a more desirable location and was placed with [B.S.], his cousin 

(uncle) in the United States. ...

Opinion, 11/25/19, at 6-7. On November 12, 2019, K.S. filed this timely 

appeal. Both K.S. and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, K.S. raises the following issues:

1. Is [K.S.] a “dependant child” under the statutory definition of 

“dependent child” under the ... grounds specified in the 

dependency petition?

2. Should the legal doctrine of in loco parentis be expanded to the 

point that it is forced upon an individual who has not sought it and 

has not accepted its rights and obligations?

3. Should the dependency court allow administrative efficiency 

and other con[c]erns to generate a result that sacrifices the best 

interests of the child to the extent that the child is seriously 

harmed in the process?

K.S.’s Brief at 2 (full capitalization omitted).

Our review is governed by the following principles:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but [it] does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re E.B., 83 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). Section 

6302 of the Juvenile Act defines “child” and “dependent child,” in relevant 

part, as follows:

“Child.” An individual who:
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(1) is under the age of 18 years;

(2) is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of 

delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years; or

(3) is under the age of 21 years and was adjudicated dependent 

before reaching the age of 18 years[.]

* * *

“Dependent child.” A child who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary 

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A 

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or 

control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, 

guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s, 

guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled 

substance that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at 

risk; ...

(3) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other 

custodian;

(4) is without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian[.] ...

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (Definitions).

In light of these definitions, we are constrained to affirm the trial court’s 

order. As noted above, K.S. was born in November of 2001. Accordingly, 

K.S.’s eighteenth birthday occurred in November of 2019. Herein, K.S. was 

never adjudicated dependent, and he is now eighteen years old. Accordingly, 

K.S. is not a child and cannot be a dependent child under the Juvenile Act. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6302; see also Commonwealth v. Iafrate, 594 A.2d 293, 295 

(Pa. 1991) (holding that under the Juvenile Act, a juvenile attains age of 
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majority on the eighteenth anniversary of his birth date). The Juvenile Act 

does not apply to an individual who does not meet the criteria of a “child”

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 630 A.2d 47, 49 

(Pa. Super. 1993). 

As we stated in Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 A.2d 1041 (Pa. 

Super. 1984), the benefits of the Juvenile Act are “only [for] those 

children who come within the provisions of the Juvenile Act.” Id.

at 558, 479 A.2d at 1045 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1)). The 

Davis court recognized that § 6303(a) of the Juvenile Act 

describes its limited scope as applicable exclusively to four 

enumerated scenarios. Id. The only relevant applicability of the

Act in this case would be those “[p]roceedings in which a child is 

alleged to be delinquent or dependent.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1). 

In Interest of M.A., 529 A.2d 31, 33 (Pa. Super. 1987). K.S. was never 

adjudicated dependent or delinquent, and he is not eligible for relief under the 

Juvenile Act. Id.

Assuming, arguendo, that K.S. had not attained the age of majority, we 

would nevertheless affirm the trial court’s order. In denying the Application, 

the trial court relied on L.E.A-M., 156 A.3d 310. Opinion, 11/25/19, at 6. In 

L.E.A-M., we held that a child who left El Salvador to come to the United 

States could not be deemed “dependent” under the Juvenile Act because the 

child was not “abandoned.” L.E.A-M., 156 A.3d at 312. This Court concluded 

that the child was under the care of his maternal uncle, who was child’s 

guardian under the Juvenile Act, and the uncle and his wife took care of all of 

child’s needs, including providing food, shelter, clothing, and education. Id. 
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Similarly, in the case at bar, K.S. never was a dependent child. As the 

trial court discussed, K.S.’s parents completed an affidavit entrusting B.S. to 

care for K.S. K.S.’s parents are still alive and never abandoned him. 

Moreover, there was no evidence that K.S. was subject to any victimization. 

To this end, the trial court noted the Assessment Report, completed by Kelly 

J. Ace, Ph.D., J.D., dated October 20, 2019, which stated that K.S. was 

interviewed, and “[t]he interview did not yield information that suggests 

[K.S.] has been the victim of labor or sex trafficking. [K.S.] is not at high risk 

of commercial sex exploitation at this time, due to his connection to [his] 

family and the local Sikh community.” Opinion, 11/25/19, at 19-20. Were 

we to reach the trial court’s rationale, we would conclude that the trial court 

committed no abuse of discretion in finding that K.S. is not a dependent child. 

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude K.S. is not eligible for relief 

under the Juvenile Act. Therefore, no relief is available to K.S., and there is 

no basis upon which to disturb the trial court’s order. Accordingly, the 

October 31, 2019 order denying the Application is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2020
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