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52–666 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–43] 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: 

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN 

MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FULL COMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 23, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 23, 2009, Effective Counterinsurgency: The Future of the 

U.S.-Pakistan Military Partnership ................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 23, 2009 ........................................................................................ 35 

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.- 

PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Barno, Lt. Gen. David W., USA (Ret.), Director, Near East South Asia Center 

for Strategic Studies, National Defense University .......................................... 4 

Kilcullen, Dr. David, Partner, Crumpton Group, LLC, Senior Fellow, 

EastWest Institute, Member of the Advisory Board, Center for a New 

American Security ................................................................................................ 7 

Nawaz, Shuja, Director, South Asian Center, The Atlantic Council of the 

United States ........................................................................................................ 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Barno, Lt. Gen. David W. ................................................................................ 39 

Kilcullen, Dr. David ......................................................................................... 49 

Nawaz, Shuja .................................................................................................... 54 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE FUTURE OF 

THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 23, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:28 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. Today, we have with us an outstanding panel of experts to discuss the future of the United 

States-Pakistan military partnership. 

I am pleased to welcome our friend, General David Barno, Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, a National Defense University; Dr. David Kilcullen, former advisor to 

General Petraeus, and author of the recent book, ‘‘The Accidental 

Guerrilla’’; Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at 

The Atlantic Council. And we certainly welcome you. 

I might mention at this outset—I said that the next hearing we 

would begin, and have our questioners come from the bottom row, 

backwards, using the same general format. However, I will take 

advantage of asking a question or two, as Mr. McHugh will, and 

then we go to the bottom row, and come back. 

Our hearing could not be more timely. This Congress, this Administration, are committed to developing a mutually beneficial 

long-term and consistent relationship with the country of Pakistan. 

Pakistan may well pose the most complex security challenge facing us. The terrorist havens continue to thrive in Pakistan’s border 

area, providing refuge to Al Qaeda, and negatively impacting stability in Afghanistan. Terrorist and insurgent forces on Pakistan’s 

territory also contribute to Pakistan’s own internal instability, 

which is further compounded by the country’s economic crisis, and 

civilian government, with limited powers. 

At the same time, Pakistan continues to possess enough fissile 

material for about 55 to 90 nuclear weapons, and tensions with its 

nuclear-armed neighbor, India, have increased. 

So how do we strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership 

to better address these challenges? In my opinion, the Administration’s recent Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is a step in the right 

direction. However, the strategy alone does not guarantee success. 

Implementation of the strategy, benchmarks to measure progress, 
2 

and accountability are all critical, as well as close cooperation with 

our Pakistani partners in all of these areas. 

Accountability is particularly important, given the significant resources the Administration is requesting from Congress and the 

American people for efforts in Pakistan. Following 9–11, Pakistan 

has received almost $12 billion from our country, including about 

$6.4 billion in the Department of Defense Coalition Support Fund 

reimbursements and $2.3 billion in security-related assistance. 

The recent supplemental budget request for the fiscal year 2009 

also includes $400 million for a new Pakistani counterinsurgency 

capabilities fund. 

Does the current U.S. approach regarding reimbursements and 

security assistance for Pakistan make sense? Or does need to 

change in a way to better achieve its objectives and ensure a measurable return on investment? And do we have the right balance between security assistance and assistance for economic development? 

You should know there is legislation pending in Congress that 

seeks to increase U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on security matters by 

specifically conditioning U.S. assistance for Pakistan on such cooperation. 

I look forward to your thoughts, your recommendations. 

Now, I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, John 

McHugh, for comments he may wish to make. 

And then we will hear our panel, and then go to questions. And 

as I said before, we will begin our questions after Mr. McHugh and 

I ask our questions, with the bottom row, using the same procedure 

as we have from the top row, in recent days. 

Mr. McHugh. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join 

you in welcoming—a belated welcome, I might add, to our distinguished panelists. And knowing some of you personally, and all of 

you professionally, and admired your work, we are deeply appreciative of your effort to be here, and your efforts to stay here. We 

all apologize for the timing involved. But I know you understand 

we really had no control over that. 

As the chairman correctly noted, Washington—in fact, much of 

the United States—has been, shall we say, abuzz over this Nation’s 

Pakistan policies. Certainly, the President helped to increase the 

discussion on this very urgent issue when he introduced a strategy 

for both Afghanistan and Pakistan just a short time ago. 

And a fundamental element of the plan is its call for expanding 

our partnership with the Pakistani military, through building 

counterinsurgency capabilities, and promoting closer cooperation 

across the Afghan-Pak border. 

Right after the legislation was dropped, the House had a bill introduced before it, calling for an increase limitation and conditions 

on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, to include Title 10 reimbursement, and building partnership and capacity programs. 
3 

And some have expressed—I think understandably so—concern 

that this proposal would unnecessarily constrain the Department of 

Defense amidst what is already a very fluid and dynamic situation, 

to say the least, in Pakistan. 

That was capped off, during our recently concluded Easter recess, 

when the Administration submitted its fiscal year 2009 Wartime 

Emergency Supplemental Request, which includes funding to reimburse the Pakistan military for its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. As I understand, the measure also includes a 

new authority and funding stream that would build the capacity 

and capabilities of Pakistani security forces, called the ‘‘Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund,’’ or the PCCF. 

Clearly, there has been a lot of activity. And we appreciate our 

panelists’ efforts here, today, to help us sort through all of it. 

And let us just start for a moment, briefly, with the President’s 

new strategic direction for Pakistan. It would seem to me there is 

little debate that Pakistan rests in a critical region, and is a central front on the War on Terror. They are an essential partner. 

But it is a complex nation, with its own set of challenges, including internal political uncertainty; an economic crisis; a rugged 

western border area that provides sanctuary to Al Qaeda, Taliban 

and other extremist groups, who are expanding very dramatically, 

in some instances, their reach eastward; and ongoing tension with 

India, which was reignited following the Mumbai attacks. 

In this light, in my opinion, I believe the President’s strategic direction understandably focused on Pakistan. While I agree that 

Islamabad must be part of the solution in the region, I disagree 

with some who have implied that solving Pakistan necessarily 

solves Afghanistan. 

We can help make a true partner—will require elements within 

Pakistan to make the strategic choices necessary to sever ties with 

extremist groups who threaten both their own internal security, as 

well as stability, in Afghanistan, and the region as a whole. And 

a key to accomplishing this aim will depend on our ability to understand and exploit Pakistan’s regional concerns, motivation and 

interest. 

To that end, I believe Pakistan requires a strategy that employs 

goals and requirements which support a long-term respectful strategic partnership, instead of one that is merely transactional in nature. This is where Congress must play an important role. 

As I stated earlier, I am concerned that efforts to limit and condition existing security assistance in building partnership-capacity 

efforts are counterproductive and, in fact, cut against our overall 

long-term strategic objectives in Pakistan. Moreover, such initiatives send mixed signals to Islamabad. 

Let me be clear: These programs demand oversight and scrutiny. 

Still, I believe that intelligent application of funding conditions 

should complement, not restrain, our strategic interests. 

And, finally—which leads me to the current security environment 

in Pakistan. I am of the opinion the traditional peacetime framework for security assistance—I am—sure, I am. 

I am of the opinion the traditional peacetime framework for security assistance is inappropriate and no longer works. The scale, nature and frequency of violence in Pakistan, whether it be the Red 
4 

Mosque incident, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, or the conflict raging against Al Qaeda and the Taliban on its western border, makes that nation more appropriately comparable to a combat 

zone, like Iraq and Afghanistan, than like a Central European 

country seeking foreign military financing. 

That is why, in response to a question from Chairman Skelton 

during a recent hearing, General Petraeus said, ‘‘The correct analogy for our train-and-equip forces in Pakistan should be what we 

are currently executing in Iraq.’’ The general further testified, ‘‘We 

need an organization similar to our security-transition command in 

Iraq.’’ And I would remind everyone that this is organization that 

successfully built the Iraqi security forces. 

In short, the Administration is militarizing foreign assistance to 

Pakistan very rightfully, because the enemy has a vote. The conflict, as the Administration’s strategy concludes, is in Pakistan, too; 

for our Pakistan partner requires—is military capability for counterinsurgency and more. 

As such, I feel that advocates of using peacetime paradigms to 

deal with wartime problems simply fail to recognize the profound 

security challenges Pakistan face, and the scope and tools required 

to solve those problems. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. With 

that, I would yield back to balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman very much. 

A word of apology to our panel: We got here just as quickly as 

we could, after the series of votes. We thank you for your patience. 

We look forward to your testimony. 

Without objection, any written testimony you may have is reserved for the record. We will remind the members here that they 

were strictly under the five-minute rule. 

And, General, we will start with you. 

And, again, we thank you all for being with us. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID W. BARNO, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

General BARNO. Thanks, Chairman Skelton, and Congressman 

McHugh, and members of the Committee on Armed Services. 

Thanks very much for the invitation to speak on the future of the 

U.S.-Pakistan military partnership. 

As the chairman noted, I am still working for the Defense Department. But the views that I will offer today will be my own. 

In addition to my 19 months serving as the overall commander 

of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan from late 2003 to 2005, 

I stayed very engaged on these issues in my current job, taking approximately two dozen trips to Pakistan over the last five or six 

years. And I recently returned from a trip earlier this year, to Afghanistan, to the southern part of the country, and visited several 

provinces there. 

On a more personal note, my youngest son just returned from a 

12-month combat tour in Afghanistan, where he served as an air 

cavalry scout platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division. So we 

are very proud of him. We are grateful to have him home safe. And 
5 

we pray every day for his fellow young Americans that are still in 

harm’s way. 

So this is a personal issue for me, as it is for so many of the 

members, I know, and for those that have young ones serving in 

harm’s way there. 

I would like to summarize some of my written comments today, 

as briefly as I can. First, I would note that I believe Pakistan, 

today, presents the United States with its greatest global strategic 

challenge. 

As the second-largest Islamic country in the world, with a population exceeding 160 million people, and a nation armed with nuclear weapons. A meltdown of the government and society in Pakistan would rapidly become the preeminent national security threat 

facing the United States. 

Events in Pakistan today are spiraling out of control. And our options in reversing this downward trend are limited, at best. I would 

say that a struggle for the very soul of Pakistan has begun. And 

the state of Pakistan has a very weak hand to play in this conflict. 

A key role that the United States and our international friends 

and allies has to play is to help strengthen this hand. 

Compounding the challenge in the Pakistani state is the internally conflicted nature of Pakistan, regarding this extremist threat. 

The Pakistani military and intelligence services are no longer the 

secular organizations that they were 10 or 15 or 20 years ago. In 

many ways, they have become much more anti-American in their 

internal dynamics, and they have growing sympathies, culturally, 

with the insurgents in this fight. 

Moreover, I think that the security services remain convinced 

that their prime enemy continues to be India. No experienced senior Pakistani military or, I believe, political leader, truly believes 

in the depth of their heart, that the U.S. is a long-term partner in 

this region, much less a long-term partner to Pakistan. 

The U.S.-India nuclear-power agreement cemented this mistrust 

in Pakistan. And reversing this widely held belief in the country 

will be difficult, if not impossible. 

From this perspective, all decisions in Pakistan now tend to be 

based upon the idea of what the region will look like the day after 

the United States leaves—their so-called lack of confidence and 

trust in a future that includes the U.S. 

I believe that the senior Pakistani military leadership remain 

convinced that soon after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and the U.S. give up on Afghanistan, that their long-term 

struggle with India will resume once again, and that they have to 

maintain capabilities for that next phase of this war. 

That is a very controversial outlook. But I think it underlies 

much of the Pakistani decision-making. 

I believe there are few realistic positive outcomes that are imaginable for Pakistan over the next several years. But I can outline 

three possible scenarios. And, of course, there are others. 

One scenario would be a state-failure scenario. This is the worstcase option, where a combination of accelerating economic decline 

and terrorist violence, fueled by ineffective governance, could destroy the economic and political viability of the country. 
6 

Some movement towards an internal revolution, led by the hardline Islamist factions could take place in this setting. And, of 

course, this would be the most dangerous scenario for us, given the 

nature of the military capabilities that Pakistan has today. 

A second option might be a continued stalemate, where the military and intelligence services restore some amount of control over 

the insurgents, and gain more proficiency in counterinsurgency, but 

there is continued weak political leadership, as governance capacity 

grows; but the same approach to cutting peace deals with the insurgence continues. This is essentially a continuation of what we 

see today. 

And then a third—perhaps a more optimistic scenario—would be 

a scenario of gradual improvement, where Pakistan achieves some 

sort of political rapprochement with India; its economy reaches 

some degree of precarious stability; and the civilian leadership that 

is still new in power gains a foothold, and is supported and buttressed by U.S. and international aid. 

This, of course, is an outcome that we all seek. And we are looking for remedies to move towards. 

Some possible prescriptions in moving in this direction: I would 

argue, first of all, that Pakistan requires its own strategy with the 

U.S., and it is not simply part of a single so-called Af-Pak strategy—that there are distinct differences culturally, politically, economically, socially, between the nations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And Pakistan deserves a full-forced, focused, strategic appropriate in U.S. thinking for that nation alone. 

The U.S. must assist Pakistan in managing change—economically, militarily, perhaps even societally, as it deals with these 

huge problems that have been brought on by a deadly combination 

of factors. 

I think the U.S. has to assess what factors are required to cause 

positive change in Pakistani decision-making, to abandon this socalled double game—this hedging approach that is expecting a future without the United States, and without the international community; this idea that the resumption of the cold war with India 

will be the long-term paradigm for the region. 

And I think a key part of that is that the U.S. has to build a 

vision of a long-term strategic partnership between Pakistan and 

the United States; one that is not simply based upon fighting terrorists in the tribal areas, but is a parallel to the emerging strategic partnership that many in the region point to, between the 

United States and India; that we have to grow this long-term, confident, mutually respectful strategic partnership between the U.S. 

and Pakistan in the same way we have begun to do that with their 

next-door neighbor, India. 

And regarding Pakistan’s relationship to the conflict in Afghanistan, reversing the decline of our fortunes there, and achieving success, would leverage our ability to influence events in Pakistan. 

I think the Pakistani approach to Afghanistan, which, in some 

ways, is schizophrenic, would be changed if the U.S. demonstrated 

success there, and that we move towards a resolution of that conflict on our own terms, to meet our policy objectives there. That 

would give us immense leverage against our mutual adversary and, 

I think, with the Pakistani government. 
7 

And, finally, continued and expanding resources for the civil government of Pakistan and their security sources, conditioned—although, perhaps, lightly conditioned to performance, but also respectful of Pakistani sovereignty, I think, is an essential step. 

Pakistan, as a state, is on a trajectory heading towards failure. 

And the U.S. must prevent this outcome, perhaps, at almost all 

costs. That said, American aid that is not connected to performance 

by the Pakistani government and military has proved relatively 

fruitless. 

Reasonable benchmarks of Pakistani progress in using American 

aid is a reasonable price for the willingness of American taxpayers 

to underwrite the future of Pakistan as a state, and as a partner. 

Pakistan is not fighting for the West. It is a nation fighting for its 

own survival. And we cannot allow it to fail at this task. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of General Barno can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Kilcullen. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KILCULLEN, PARTNER, CRUMPTON 

GROUP, LLC, SENIOR FELLOW, EASTWEST INSTITUTE, MEMBER OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me. 

I have submitted written testimony on the details of the bill that 

you are currently considering, which includes benchmarks. I won’t 

go through that testimony again, unless you want to ask me about 

it. 

What I thought I would do is briefly outline why I think the— 

we are facing the problems we currently are facing in Pakistan, 

which is—if you would like a diagnosis of the problem—which is 

going to allow us to, then, move forward toward a solution. 

After 9/11, the United States pushed Pakistan to do more in the 

Fatah, and on the frontier against Taliban and Al Qaeda. And this 

was largely an enemy-centric approach, which saw the Pakistani 

army moving into areas where it had never operated on a war-footing before, and conducting armed activity against tribes and the civilian population, in order to find and deal with a small enemy element. It was an approach that was focused on chasing and killing 

bad guys. 

Since that time, 90 percent of U.S. assistance to Pakistan has 

been military, and even within the realm of military assistance, 

about 99.4 percent of our assistance has gone to the Pakistani military, rather than the Pakistan police. 

So, for example, in 2007, we spent about $730 million on the 

Pakistani army, and $4.9 million on the Pakistani police. I will 

come back to that as an issue, in a moment. 

The Pakistani military have taken a highly kinetic and coercive 

approach in what they have done in the Fatah, and on the frontier. 

That kinetic approach has alienated local populations, tribal 

groupings and communities, and has empowered local extremists, 

and also foreign extremists. 
8 

Those extremists, in turn, have leveraged popular anger and 

alienation to create a large and diverse movement that you could 

describe as a coalition of the angry in the western part of Pakistan. 

That movement has now contributed to a pulling-back of Pakistani 

civilian authorities away from large parts of Pakistan’s population 

and territory. And we have seen the spread of violence and instability through most of Pakistan, including its largest cities. 

And in my written testimony, I have given 24 examples, over the 

last 5 years, of egregious breakdowns in security, and of complicity 

by certain elements of the security forces, with efforts to seize control of Pakistan’s people and territory to extremists. 

What I am saying here is that the whole approach has been 

flawed right from the outset. Doing more of the same will not make 

things better. It will make things worse. We need a fundamental 

change of approach if we are going to turn the situation around. 

We need to focus on protecting the population, not on chasing the 

bad guys. And we need to do a much greater amount to build up 

civil authorities and the police service, rather than the military. 

Now, I say ‘‘we,’’ but, of course, we can’t do that. And what we 

are looking for is a search for leverage, which is why we are having 

this discussion about benchmarks. 

As Bob Comer wrote after the end of the Vietnam War, ‘‘No 

amount of know-how and motivation on the part of an outside intervening partner can substitute for lack of motivation on the part 

of a local government.’’ And that is the situation that we are dealing with now. 

I support the use of benchmarks and accountability measures to 

ensure that the people that we are assisting are actually doing the 

job that we have paid them $12 billion to do. But I think I support 

the idea that we need to move well beyond a transactional approach here, and make a long-term commitment. 

But I think American taxpayers and legislators are entitled to 

ask, you know, ‘‘Why should we give more money, and keep throwing good money after bad to the same people, until we get a firm 

commitment to actually stop supporting the enemy, and start protecting the Pakistani population?’’ 

I will save the rest of my time, because I am sure there will be 

questions that will come up in relation to that. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kilcullen can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, thank you very much. 

Mr. Nawaz. 

Please flip the—— 

Mr. NAWAZ. Chairman Skelton—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get a little closer to the microphone, 

please? 

STATEMENT OF SHUJA NAWAZ, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIAN 

CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. NAWAZ. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McHugh, members of the committee, I am honored to be here to speak about this 

important issue before your committee today. 

We, at The Atlantic Council, recently produced a report on Pakistan that offers very detailed suggestions on aid for that country. 
9 

The United States and Pakistan have had a rollercoaster relationship, marked with highs of deep friendship, and followed by estrangement. 

The two countries now are partners again in an attempt to roll 

back the tide of obscurantism and militancy that grips Afghanistan 

and Pakistan today. 

Yet, a deep distrust marks this relationship, arising out of the 

pattern of engagement. And this distrust is rooted in both perceptions and reality. 

The United States befriended Pakistan most often when it had 

autocratic rulers, and provided the most aid to Pakistan during periods of autocratic rule, when Pakistan was seen as an ally of U.S. 

strategic interests in the region. 

The intervening periods of civilian rule often were marked by 

distance and coolness. And the strong perception was created over 

time, in Pakistani minds, that the United States did not understand or care for Pakistan’s domestic needs or security concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan lives in a tough neighborhood. It is in 

the shadow of India, a major nuclear power to the east, and powerful neighbors such as China, Iran, and an unstable Afghanistan. 

Internally, it is racked by a rising militancy that is attempting to 

force its convoluted view of Islam on a largely moderate population. 

Pakistan has suffered repeated military rule and corrupt civilian 

governments that, often, were in the hands of the feudalistic elite 

or family-run political parties. 

Today, the United States and Pakistan are at a new crossroad. 

There is an opportunity to forage a new relationship between the 

people of the two countries, and to overturn the historical patterns. 

Civil society in Pakistan is on the rise, and deserves support. 

The chief of army staff of the Pakistan army is publicly committed to withdrawing the army from politics, and the new administration in Washington is committed to a strategy to help build 

Pakistan via a long-term assistance program that will strengthen 

its defense, while improving the economy. 

If Washington succeeds in these efforts, it will help break the yoyo pattern of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But, Mr. Chairman, 

there are challenges to overcome. 

The U.S. must ensure that its aid is not seen solely in support 

of its battle in Afghanistan, and directed largely towards the border region of Pakistan. This aid must not be seen by the people of 

Pakistan as short-term, and aimed at propping up any single person, party or group. 

The U.S. and its allies must attempt to reduce the causes of regional hostility between India and Pakistan. Pakistan needs to ensure that its government prepares viable and practicable plans for 

using economic aid effectively and efficiently, and controls corruption so aid reaches the poorer segments of society. 

The government of Pakistan also needs to craft a broad consensus in support of a strategy to fight the militants, and strengthen the hands of the silent and moderate majority. 

Pakistan also needs to accelerate the doctrinal shift from conventional military thinking to counterinsurgency, and build its capacity to reclaim the areas of militancy. The civilians can then hold 

and rebuild those areas. 
10 

In this regard, certain key elements of U.S. aid will be needed. 

First, there must be a focus on building up police and paramilitary 

capacity to isolate militants from within the communities. Second, 

community-based assistance and a heavy investment in infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, are needed to help aid reach target 

communities directly. The current system of aid flows must change 

so aid money is not soaked up by expensive overheads in Washington, Islamabad, or provincial capitals. 

Third, the ability of the Pakistan army to fight a mobile militancy should be enhanced by providing it more early lift capability, 

helicopter gun ships, transport and night-vision goggles. 

Fourth, the International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) program for Pakistan’s military needs to rise dramatically. 

And additional training needs to be organized in the country, and 

in the region, to expose larger numbers of officers at all ranks, to 

new thinking on counterinsurgency. 

Finally, I suggest strongly that the current coalition support fund 

model of reimbursement for Pakistani operations in the border region should be ended. This is a cause of deep resentment in the 

army and civil society, since it makes the Pakistani army ‘‘hired 

force,’’ and makes this America’s war, not Pakistan’s own war. 

Let both sides agree to the objectives, benchmarks and indicators 

of success, and let the U.S. provide aid for those broad objectives, 

without detailed accounting. We need to rebuild trust between 

these two allies; questioning reimbursement claims has the opposite effect. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe in blank checks. Mutually agreed 

conditions of aid, rather than unilaterally imposed conditions, are 

the best way of endangering trust. We have to make sure that we 

set targets that help Pakistan achieve its potential, while ensuring 

its security and integrity. Creating a safe neighborhood in South 

Asia will help towards that end. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am prepared to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask one question to each of you, please. 

Reference was made to Pakistan becoming a failed state. Briefly, 

what must we do to help ensure that it does not become a failed 

state, and that it be a strong partner in the fight against those terrorists that occupy its border region? 

General. 

General BARNO. I think a comprehensive whole-of-government 

look at the needs of Pakistan, and how the U.S. could assist in 

meeting some of those needs would be a first step. 

I think the primary one may be—counter-intuitively—to begin 

with—would be ensuring that the economic health of Pakistan remains solid. Because an implosion of the Pakistani economy, a— 

really, a dissolution of the middle class, you know, widespread 

shortage of electricity, a breakdown of the economic order, I think, 

would upend the country and threaten its potential failure quicker 

than anything else. 
11 

I think we have to ensure that Pakistan remains on a solid economic footing first. And then, I think, beyond that—to look at— 

along the lines of what some of my colleagues have just suggested—how we can improve the security capabilities of the Pakistani military, their frontier core, their intelligence services, so that 

the encroachment of the Taliban from the remote areas, into the 

urban areas, does not continue. 

So I think those are two areas I would suggest. 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think we need to step back from the frontier, 

where we are currently conducting a military-focused operation of 

the bad guys, back to the east of the Indies, and start focusing on 

police work and civil-authority work to secure the parts of Pakistan 

that still remain under government control, which are shrinking 

week by week. 

We need to stop the rot and hold that area, which we are currently in danger of losing. And, then, once we have stabilized—then 

start expanding back out. 

What we are doing in the frontier region now, particularly with 

drone strikes and some of the other kinetic activity that is going 

on, is creating such outrage that it has led to a huge spike in 

Punjabi militant activity, both in the Punjab itself, and in the western part of Pakistan. 

The current path that we are on is leading us to loss of Pakistani 

government control over its own population. So we need to step 

back, control what we can control; and, then, once we have stabilized, being a process of moving forward again. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the U.S. can help by 

creating an enabling environment, because Pakistan has a strong 

civil society. It has a middle class of 30 million people, with a per 

capita income of $10,000 on a purchasing-power parity basis. And 

it has the institutions that can pull the country back from the 

brink. 

We shouldn’t confuse a state of chaos in a fledgling civilian government with the failure of the state in Pakistan. I believe that the 

military still is a disciplined and an organized institution. But I 

agree with my colleagues on the panel today that building up civil 

capacity and building up policing capacity to protect the communities and—so that when the military does clear the areas where 

it is used, that those areas can be held. It is very critical. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentleman, I mentioned in my opening comments about H.R. 

1886, which is a bill that has been introduced that, from my perspective, conditions and limits security assistance to Pakistan that, 

I think, from the administration perspective, is unnecessarily limiting and, certainly contradictory. 

I think, as well, that if you look at the kinds of processes that 

are put into place under that legislation—that it tends to further, 

rather than limit, the transactional nature of the relationship, 

which, I think, most of us could agree, is not the proper way. 
12 

Still—and as a number of you commented—the American taxpayer does deserve some sort of benchmark, some sort of metric, 

by which to measure where the money is going, and how it is being 

utilized, and how effectively. 

How can we find a path forward that allows this long-term commitment—not an overregulated, over-pontificated approach by the 

U.S. government upon the Pakistanis, that makes it less transitional—but we can still have some sort of accountability? Have any 

suggestions as to how we could, perhaps, construct those measurements? 

General, you want to start? 

General BARNO. I am not sure I can give specifics, but in broad 

terms, I think we have to be very careful that we don’t instill this 

idea that, somehow, this is a pay-for-performance partnership. The 

transactional performance—that we are paying the Pakistanis to 

do this, therefore, they should deliver. 

I think that is utterly wrong in terms of the psychological outlook 

there, and it undercuts any notion of mutual respect between the 

two nations, and the idea of developing some sort of a long-term 

partnership beyond what is required out there today. 

So, I do think that some conditionality is appropriate. I would 

suggest that there would be some value in having more private 

conditionality and less public conditionality, whether that is done 

through closed hearings or done through some mechanism between 

the U.S. government and the Pakistani government that is done 

behind closed doors, as opposed to being an overt, perhaps even 

legislated in part, of any approach to, you know, the aid that is 

falling into Pakistan. 

I think that will simply undercut entirely the idea that this is 

a respectful partnership between two nations that have many mutual interests out there. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you. 

Doctor. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I actually think that the emphasis on benchmarks and accountability in H.R. 1886 is not necessarily a bad 

thing. In fact, I quite support that. 

The part of the bill that gives me a little bit of concern is where 

it essentially pretends that Pakistan is a weak-but-willing ally 

against extremism. Whereas, the fact is that fairly substantial portions of the intelligence service, smaller elements within the army, 

and some other elements, are actively or passively supporting the 

enemy. 

So I don’t think it is in anyway unreasonable to expect Pakistan 

to make a commitment to cease supporting the enemy, before we 

give it more of the same money that has resulted in no improvement, and, in fact a dramatic deterioration since 2001. 

I agree with you that we shouldn’t be taking a transactional approach. But I don’t think that the solution is to take off any constraints, and just keep on handing over money. I think that we 

need to push for a genuine change of heart among certain elements 

within Pakistan. 

I think it is also pretty clear that the Pakistani civilian democratically elected leaders do not enjoy full control over their own 

national security establishment. And that is another reason why, 
13 

I think, challenging funding to the military, through elected civilian authorities, is a positive step, because it strengthens the groups 

within the Pakistani government structure that support the United 

States, and do have a genuine relationship of trust. And it limits 

the power of some of those elements that have, in fact, been working against that relationship. 

So it is a pretty complex picture on the ground. But I think it 

is relatively straightforward in terms of assistance. If we keep pretending that Pakistan is a weak-but-willing ally, we are going to 

get the wrong answer. We need to recognize that some parts of the 

Pakistani state are on our side, and others are not. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. In my view, it is not a good idea to frontload conditions, as much as getting to a discussion on indicators of success 

by defining the end goal—mutually agree upon those end goals. 

In that sense, a lot of what my colleague, Dr. Kilcullen, has said 

makes sense—that you agree on the objectives. And, then, I personally believe in what is known as a results-based budgeting, where 

you give the money to people who decide what the metrics will be. 

And then you agree upon those metrics, rather than imposing conditions up front. 

I think it will be much more effective that way, and won’t create 

the impression that this is a pay-for-hire scheme, as General Barno 

said. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

By virtue of the previous agreement, we will begin toward the 

front. 

Mr. Kissell, you will lead off. And I will ask the gentleman from 

Mississippi to assume the gavel. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel for 

being here today. There is so many questions that come to mind, 

and—as we look at this issue. 

How do we get the forces within the intelligence community, 

whatever, in Pakistan, that are working for the enemy—how do we 

get them either through their government cracking down or whatever—how can we get that to stop? And whoever feels free, jump 

in on this one. 

General BARNO. I think I would, maybe, re-characterize that a 

little bit. My judgment is not that there are elements inside the 

Pakistani intelligence service and military that are working for the 

enemy. I think there is very strong evidence that the intelligence 

service, especially, has maintained contacts with the enemy for various reasons over the last many years—has a relationship with 

many of these groups, and has significant influence, at a minimum, 

with any of these groups. 

That is the least—I think I would say—and there is, potentially, 

a lot more there. But I think it is done out of what is perceived 

as national interest. 

There is a belief that if the ultimate enemy of the state of Pakistan is India, next door, that these groups provide a weapon in that 

toolbox to use against India—not today, but for the day after tomorrow, when the front in Afghanistan opens up again, when there 
14 

is not necessarily an international force there, or to use as an irregular force in other parts of the conflict with India. 

So I think, ultimately, that many of these decisions aren’t made 

for reasons that we might suspect. They are made in what are 

viewed as the national interests of the people that are making the 

decision; that they are hedging against a different future than the 

one that we see. 

Mr. KISSELL. If we have success in Afghanistan—and I have just 

returned from over there. And I heard so many times that, ‘‘We 

could do everything perfect in Afghanistan, and that could be all 

negated by what happens in Pakistan.’’ 

If we have success in Afghanistan—General, you mentioned 

something about that—that could help bolster Pakistan. I could 

see, perhaps, it might hurt Pakistan if the Taliban is forced to stay 

over there, and they start looking for success there. 

I wonder if you could elaborate on that possibility. 

General BARNO. It is my belief that if we defeat the Taliban insurgency inside of Afghanistan—if that is a inhospitable place for 

them, and if the population is dead-set against them—if there is 

economic growth, if the security forces are much more effective, 

and that we are winning two years from now in Afghanistan—that 

that is going to be a very difficult pill to swallow for the Taliban 

inside of Pakistan. 

It is going to weaken them considerably. It is going to take away, 

in effect, their rear area—if you want to look at Afghanistan as 

their rear area. 

So I think that we do have the ability to turn the situation 

around in Afghanistan. And we actually have far more tools at our 

disposal in Afghanistan, because of all the forces we have there, because of our access to the Afghan army, and all the territory and 

all their security forces there, and the amount of international support. 

So we have a huge range of things we can do in Afghanistan to 

turn that around. And I think doing that will put us in a much better position vis-a-vis Pakistan, and put the enemy in a much worse 

position. 

Mr. KISSELL. The other two gentlemen—do you all disagree with 

that? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think I would just offer some guiding points, 

out of my written testimony, about the behavior of certain elements 

within the Pakistani military, and intelligence services. 

July 2008, the India embassy in Kabul was destroyed in a large 

bomb attack. Afghan intelligence concluded that it was sponsored 

and supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani intelligence service, and carried out by the Haqqani Network, 

which is an organization that has close ties to ISI. 

In November last year, there was a very large-scale terrorist attack in Mumbai, in India, launched from the Pakistani port of Karachi, and carried out by terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba 

(LeT), which was sponsored and set up by the Pakistani intelligence and military service. 

The only surviving attacker claimed that he had training for 

more than a year from retired members of Pakistani special forces, 

and the intelligence service. 
15 

There have been numerous incidents where Pakistani forces on 

the frontier have fired on our troops as they attempted to prevent 

the Taliban from withdrawing back into Pakistan. Last year, we 

lost over 400 NATO vehicles on a route through Pakistan that is, 

supposedly, protected by the Pakistani military. 

So I agree that we shouldn’t be paying for service. If we are paying for service, we are not getting anything for our money, anyway. 

What we should be doing is stepping back, and trying to recreate 

this relationship on a completely different basis, because it is simply not working as it currently stands. 

Mr. NAWAZ. If I could add, sir—there was a relationship between 

the ISI and the LeT. And this has been written about and spoken 

about quite often. 

There doesn’t seem to be any evidence linking the ISI or the government of Pakistan to the Mumbai attacks. And if that evidence 

had been available, it would have been provided to Pakistan by 

India, where an exchange is taking place. 

Indeed, the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-eJhangvi—have all now aligned themselves with the Tehreek-eTaliban of Pakistan, as well as with Al Qaeda, as a kind of franchise arrangement. And in a substantial number of the attacks 

that occurred in 2008, inside Pakistan, through suicide bombings, 

the targets were the Pakistan military themselves. 

So if anything, this kind of a break off the Frankenstein’s monster that was created at one time, by the ISI, for use against India 

and Kashmir, is likely to, now, turn the military into rethinking 

that relationship. The question is how soon that thinking can 

begin. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Fleming, for five minutes. 

Mr. FLEMING. Can you hear me? Oh, okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, I have a question for the general. 

What type of government would Pakistan end up with if there 

was—you mentioned how unstable things are there. Obviously, we 

worry about an Islamic theocracy, such as what we have in Iran 

today. 

What is your understanding, based on what you see and the elements you observe, that we may end up with if that were to occur? 

General BARNO. Well, again, this is a worst-case scenario. And 

we all absolutely hope nothing like this transpires. But I think 

there is some risk of this happening. 

My guess would be it would look somewhat like what we saw 

when the Taliban took over Afghanistan—that they would simply, 

you know, seize all the organs of power. Afghanistan and Pakistan 

are two very different nations. They have got very different levels 

of development. They have very different kinds of militaries on— 

it is not clear in my mind how that would lay out in Islamabad— 

again, just a horrific scenario. 

But I think that this idea of a popular uprising—someone suggested that it might look something like the Iranian revolution in 

1979—that that type of a nationwide uprising could sweep across 
16 

Pakistan. Again, I don’t think that is a high-probability outcome, 

but I think it is possible. 

And—and I think the outlook at that, at the end of the day, 

would look very much like what the Taliban rules—their mechanisms of ruling Afghanistan—that same philosophy of rule, I think, 

would be in effect, if they were to take power. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Could I just add—I just want to say, whatever 

the political characteristics of that regime, that it would be a nuclear-armed regime, with about 100 ballistic missiles. And that is 

a factor we should be considering, irrespective of its politics. 

Mr. FLEMING. And the reach of that ballistic missile would be 

what? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I don’t have the technical details, but it covers 

the bulk of South Asia, and out into Iran. So we would have to ask 

ourselves what India’s response would be to that circumstance. 

Mr. FLEMING. Right. 

Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. Kilcullen, you mentioned that you feel like it would be better 

to assist the police, or provide aid to police, rather than military. 

And, of course, the police vary in terms of locale, as to what level 

of corruption may exist, what their sentiments might be— 

Taliban—pro or against. 

Do you see problems there, you know? Or would we really get 

into the same kind of problems we have in Africa today, where we 

provide aid and it ends up in the bad guys’ hands? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. There are a number of different police forces in 

Pakistan. The principal police service is run at the provincial level. 

But there is also a Pakistani police service, and the Rangers, which 

are a paramilitary organization operation. It is in Singh and the 

Punjab. And then, there is the Frontier Constabulary, and the 

Frontier Corps, in the Northwest Frontier Province in Balochistan. 

So there are a number of different police forces. 

There has not been the same level of complicity between the police and militants, as there has been in the history of Pakistan, between the military and the intelligence services, and militants. 

They have a number of problems, as you rightly said: corruption; 

lack of equipment; lack of evidentiary capability, like forensics; lack 

of protected mobility. They are intimidated. Their families aren’t 

protected. They are not unconnected with the fact that we have 

hardly given any assistance to the policing and judiciary sector in 

Pakistan. They are one of the weakest elements of the Pakistani 

Security Service. 

But, you know, as a counterinsurgency specialist, I can tell you 

there has never been a successful counterinsurgency in which there 

was not a very substantial role for a capable police force. We can’t 

expect to defeat these insurgents until we have a police force that 

actually protects, and lives with, and looks after, its own population. 

I would also say that, from a policy standpoint, increasing our 

age of the police would actually have four substantial benefits, 

which are listed in my written testimony. It would improve the protection we are giving to the Pakistani people, which is one of the 

big weaknesses we have. It would improve counterinsurgency per-
17 

formance. It would enhance the rule of law. It would also weaken 

the political power of the army vis-a-vis the civilian leadership. 

The police are the only element of the Pakistani national-security 

establishment that is more interested in preventing state collapse 

and extremist takeover than they are in fighting India. So they 

have got to be a prime candidate for our assistance. 

Also, it is much more difficult to turn police assistance against 

us than it would be to turn military assistance against somebody 

else. So it is a safer form of assistance than providing high-tech 

military assistance. 

I just think that you could double or triple the amount of assistance we are giving to the Pakistani police, and it still would only 

be 1.5 percent of what we are giving to the army. 

So I think, you know, there is scope there for doing a lot more, 

without necessarily cutting back on other forms of assistance. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Chair thanks the gentleman, now recognizes the 

gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, for five minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I seemed 

to have heard a lot of common threads; the basic one being, I think, 

that we need a change in strategy, and how America approaches 

this part of the world and, in particular, how America approaches 

Pakistan. 

And I couldn’t agree more. And I do want to echo a concern that 

Mr. Kline had at our last hearing on these issues, where he—and 

I don’t know if any others feel this way—but to refer to what we 

have there now as an Af-Pak strategy might be somewhat insulting 

to many in Pakistan. If you want to comment on that, that is fine. 

But I do want to ask you, General Barno—you mentioned that, 

really, what we need—and I think everyone probably agrees on 

this—at least, on the panel—is some kind of a long-term strategic 

partnership with Pakistan. 

And all of you have been kind of addressing that without, perhaps, laying out three or four or five aspects to what that strategic 

partnership ought to be. And I would like to ask each one of you 

to do that. I know, maybe, I am catching you a little unawares. 

Maybe you have all this in your written testimony already. And 

that is fine, if you want to repeat it. 

But what is that strategic partnership? What should that strategic partnership, in your view, look like, taking into account not 

only our relationship with Pakistan per say, but India and any 

other countries’ interests in that region as well? 

General, would you like to start? 

General BARNO. That is a very good question. And I have not 

thought this through all the way; so just, perhaps, some initial 

thoughts about it. 

I think one of the parallel elements that has to be part of this 

idea of a long-term U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership is that we 

have to—without directly getting involved, we have to encourage 

both Pakistan and India to continue their confidence-building to reduce the tensions between those two countries. 

In my judgment, the biggest factor that undermines any of our 

goals and objectives with Pakistan right now—and would undermine a long-term partnership—is their almost, you know, funda-
18 

mental, unalterable belief that India is their permanent enemy, 

and that enemy is an existential threat to Pakistan, and India will 

always be a force that they have to be postured against. 

If we can break that down, if we can help that cold war to go 

away, much like our own Cold War with the Soviets went away, 

then all things from that point are possible, and all changes are 

possible. It changes the entire paradigm in the region. So I think 

that has got to be a parallel effort. 

In terms of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, I think we 

have got to have an approach that has a—and an economic interdependence. And there may be some things we can do with trade, 

there, to facilitate the two nations being linked better together in 

that department. 

I think exchange of educational opportunities would be very important. And, you know, we have got the best university system in 

the world that is the envy of every country in the world. Having 

more Pakistanis come to that and, perhaps, eventually, more Americans going to Pakistan, would be very useful to break down some 

of those barriers. 

There is currently a military dimension. I think we could do 

much more in terms of international military education and training with Pakistanis. We had a nearly 10-year period, where we had 

no Pakistanis at all coming to the United States for training. That 

lost generation of Pakistani officers, now, are among the most antiAmerican in their military, because they had no exposure, you 

know, to our schools and our war colleges, and our service schools, 

here, which is a terrible thing, a terrible mistake; and we have to 

try and rebuild that. 

Then, I think, clearly, there is an equipment and doctrine-andtraining correlation there, on the military side as well. 

So, those would just be some preliminary ideas. But I think all 

of these help instill some confidence that we are not just interested 

in Pakistan for the next three years. That is the outlook right now. 

It is all about killing terrorists and going after Al Qaeda, in their 

view of our relationship with them. And we have got to deepen that 

far beyond what it is today. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Right. And everyone seems to agree that the 

whole transactional approach, as you call it, that we had in the 

past—it is not the right way to go. 

Dr. Kilcullen. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I agree with the general. But I want to comment 

on another category of issue, which is the multilateral security 

guarantee, or the regional security architecture. 

A number of other original players have very substantial interests in the stability of Pakistan. China has a very substantial port 

facility at Gwadar, in the southern part of the country, and plans 

to open a north-south route in to Western China, which will be extremely important to the future economic development of Western 

China. They have had a very strong economic and geopolitical interest in a stable Pakistan not owned by extremists. 

Iran—there were 30 million Shia in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 

and other militants in Pakistan are currently carrying out what I 

would call a slow-motion genocide of Shia in the western part of 

Pakistan, with men, women and children being killed in an incred-
19 

ibly gruesome fashion. If you go talk to Pakistanis, there is imagery of this being passed around Pakistan day by day. The Iranians have as strong interest in preventing that kind of killing. 

The Russians are extremely worried about the situation in Pakistan, and its possible effects on the former Soviet Central Asian 

Republics. The European Union (E.U.) has millions of Pakistani 

citizens living inside of its borders, and has an interest in a stable 

Pakistan. 

India and the U.S., obviously, have interest. So it is entirely possible that we have a relationship with the Pakistanis, where there 

is not a lot we can do. But multilaterally, there is an enormous 

amount that we can do, diplomatically, to give the Pakistanis a 

feeling of security that allows them to feel they can stop using support for militancy as sort of a unconventional counterweight to Indian regional influence. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman, now recognizes the 

gentleman—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. From Colorado, for five minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me make a statement, and would love your response to it. 

In just an observation of our current situation—and it seems to be 

that the United States finds itself, at this time, stumbling into an 

ever-widening war. 

And when we look back at the policy, it seems that the first 

phase was brilliant in Afghanistan. President George Bush gave air 

advisory logistical support to the Northern Alliance, who defeated 

the Taliban on the ground. And, then, we pushed them aside and 

superimposed a political process that gave the Afghan people the 

government that we wanted them to have. 

And now, in fighting for stability for that government, that 

doesn’t have a lot of legitimacy outside of Kabul—that, perhaps, 

our policy is destabilizing Pakistan in recruiting the Pakistani government to fight the Taliban, who are not their natural enemies— 

and now they are enemies. 

And so we are there now. We have to do our best to, obviously, 

make this policy work. I think extricating ourselves is going to be 

difficult from this. 

In terms of support for Pakistan, it doesn’t seem that there are 

any initiatives by the United States to be an honest broker in the 

situation with Kashmir, which is the focus of the Pakistani military. 

And I certainly like the idea of, instead, giving aid, perhaps, to 

the police, civil elements, and the Frontier Corps, that could, hopefully, contain the spread of militancy from the Fatah. 

And so, could you—anybody—respond to those observations? 

Yes? 

Mr. NAWAZ. If I may—just to go back to the broad issue of what 

conditions would help stabilize Pakistan to begin with, and prevent 

it from being destabilized has an unintended consequence of the 

war in Afghanistan. 

There are key roles that the region can play as an economic unit. 

There are plans already on the drawing boards that were discussed, and in very advanced stages of preparation for linking Cen-
20 

tral Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and also for linking 

Iran and Pakistan and India—the IPI pipeline. Then, there is the 

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-and-India pipeline. 

We have covered a lot of these possibilities, as the practicable 

measures, in the report of The Atlantic Council. So I would definitely refer the members to that document. 

But the key point in all of this is that if you create vested economic interests on both sides of the India-Pakistan border that see 

it to their advantage to trade, and for there to be a traffic of populations across that border, it will make it impossible for the two 

countries to go to war. 

The two countries, according to Economics 101, should be each 

other’s major trading partners. But the U.S. is a major trading 

partner of Pakistan, and also of India. They don’t trade much with 

each other. 

The United States sanctions against Iran also imposed an impediment to the creation of the IPI, the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, because Indian multinationals do not want to run afoul of U.S. 

laws. 

So there are these other conditions that the United States can 

quite seriously change in the region, which would allow the region 

to prosper by itself, without the infusion, necessarily, of large 

amounts of aid. And I think that is the critical part, because both 

India and Pakistan have a youthful population, very productive. 

They will be very productive for the next 20, 30 years. They can 

take advantage of these opportunities, also, by lowering tariff barriers to textile imports from these regions. 

You can help them help themselves. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I would just pick up something you talked about 

in terms of our success in Afghanistan in 2001, and build on that. 

The last Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan to fall was Kandahar. 

It fell on the seventh of December, 2001. At that time, there were 

110 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers, and about 400 coalition special forces operating in the south of Afghanistan. But we 

had 50,000 Afghans, fighting on our side, against the Taliban. 

The reason we defeated the Taliban so swiftly in 2001 wasn’t the 

sheer brilliance of our air power or our high-technology weaponry, 

or anything like that. It was the fact that we had Afghans on our 

side. 

We still have the bulk of the Afghan population on our side. The 

approval rating for U.S. forces in Afghanistan is 64 percent, which 

is about 5 percent better than President Obama’s approval rating, 

here in the United States. So there is a lot of support for our presence in Afghanistan. 

We don’t have anything close to that kind of support in Pakistan. 

But large parts of the Pakistani population do not like the extremists, are opposed to them. We have tribal leaders in Swat and 

Waziristan raising their own groups to fight the Taliban. We have 

community leaders turning against them. 

A friend in Pakistan told me that 70 percent to 90 percent of people in the Swat Valley are appalled by the Taliban takeover of the 

area. There is a lot of groundswell against the enemy. If we can 

successfully build a partnership with the Pakistani people—not 

necessarily the government, or the army, or the intelligence serv-
21 

ices that we have been talking about, but the Pakistani people— 

I think that is the key to turning some of this around. 

You know, as Mr. Nawaz said, it is not a matter of aid and paternalistic development. It is a matter of equal partnership. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Massachusetts, 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all very much. 

And I have appreciated your testimony. And I have heard several 

themes from all of you, one of which is the trade deficit that we 

have with the country of Pakistan, and also an emphasis on sort 

of development—the economy, civilian capacity—all of which takes 

time to address. 

And my sense is that we are running out of time; that we are 

trying to change the dynamic on a dime, when we really—it will 

take much longer than that. 

So I am really wondering: Are there some strong signals we can 

send that would communicate that message while we go about the 

long-term process of addressing these very complicated issues? To 

all of you—whoever wants to go first? 

General BARNO. Well, I do think there is a recognition with a 

new U.S. Administration that there is a tremendous amount of energy being put on thinking through revamping our relationship 

with Pakistan right now. 

I think Pakistanis recognize that. You know, we have—Admiral 

Mullen is back out there this week, the second time in two weeks. 

You know, we have had senior delegations going through there. It 

is on the front page of American newspapers. And there is a lot of 

money being looked at, not only here, in terms of legislation on the 

Hill, but what the Administration is proposing. 

So I think there is an understanding that this is a time of major 

focus and change, and that it is moving at a relatively rapid rate. 

We are still only in—right at the edge of the first 100 days of this 

Administration. So there is quite a bit going on. 

I think we could probably communicate that better in our information strategy inside of Pakistan. I do think we do very badly 

communicating to the Pakistani people. That might be an area, 

whether it had done here, from Washington, or done better in the 

region—that we would see something successfully, because we are 

doing that, I think, quite poorly right now. And it could better convey what our real goals are, and how much interest we have in this 

partnership with Pakistan, over the long haul. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think one of the things we could do that could 

send a strong message right now is we could call off the drone 

strikes that have been mounted in the Western part of Pakistan. 

I realize that they do damage to Al Qaeda leadership. Since 

2006, we have killed 14 senior Al Qaeda leaders using drone 

strikes. In the same time period, we have killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. 

They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they have 

given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around 

the extremists, and leads to spikes of extremism well outside the 

parts of the country where we are mounting those attacks. 
22 

Inside the Fatah itself, some people like the attacks, because 

they do, actually, target the bad guys. But in the rest of the country, there is an immense anger about them. And there is an anger 

about them in the military, and the intelligence service. 

I realize that it might seem counterintuitive, but we need to take 

our foot off the neck of these people so they feel that there is a degree of trust. Saying we want to build a permanent relationship of 

friendship with them, whilst continuing to bomb their population 

from the air, even if you do it with robot drones, is something that 

they see through straightaway. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

Mr. NAWAZ. I would suggest that something that can be done 

rapidly and visibly is heavy investment in infrastructure, starting 

off with Fatah, where, if you—the United States will support, first, 

the Pakistan army, engineering battalions, as well as their Frontier Works Organization, in building roads and bridges and small 

dams, and erecting tube wells, to get the economy going and integrated into the rest of Pakistan. 

It would be seen visibly as something useful to the local population; then, you will see a spontaneous growth of the information 

sector of the economy around those roads. And in economics, the 

most immediate and maximum returns are to roads, in terms of 

rates of return. 

The U.S. could also consider helping with some of the major infrastructure projects, similar to what China has done in Pakistan. 

That would show that it is there to stay, that it is building for the 

long run. And one idea is to look at the right bank of the—a highway that could connect Gwadar, all the way up to the north of the 

country, and then through Afghanistan, a road-and-rail link to 

Central Asia. 

These are the kinds of heavy, long-term investments that would 

yield some immediate employment, as well as a clear signal that 

the U.S. was there to stay. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentlewoman. 

And we now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, for five minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Could you go into a little bit—Dr. Kilcullen mentioned it over 

and over—why don’t we copy the success we had in—I understand, 

in Iraq and Pakistan and Afghanistan—are totally different places. 

Why don’t we copy the success we have in the Sunni triangle, with 

the Marine Corps, working at the tribal level, in both Afghanistan—and I understand, too, all the different things we are talking 

about—Pakistan—they have to allow us to do that. 

If we want to do certain things in Pakistan, the one thing that 

they—they have to let us do it, because we haven’t invaded Pakistan, obliviously, and we can’t do what we want to do. So they have 

to allow all of these different things that you are talking about. In 

a perfect world, they would have to allow us to do all those things. 

So how do we get down to that tribal success that we had in Iraq, 

because Afghanistan and Pakistan are very tribal? And there are 

certain areas cut off from other places, and they are very family 
23 

and tribally oriented there. So how do we really bypass that top 

level, and start pushing from the ground up, as opposed to the top 

down, and copy the success that the Marine Corps had in the 

Sunni triangle. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I might pick that up initially. 

Pakistan and Iraq and Afghanistan, as you said, are very different. And we don’t have the leverage in Pakistan that we had in 

Iraq, or that we have in Afghanistan. But I think the history of the 

Pakistani army’s relationships with the tribes is instructive here. 

The Pakistani army first went into the tribal areas during the 

tour of Zawar Kili campaign of 2002. That was the first time the 

regular Pakistani military had ever operated on a war footing inside the Fatah. The reason they hadn’t been there before was because there was, basically, an agreement that had been in place 

since the British period, whereby the tribes essentially agreed to sit 

down quietly, under the political agents—the Maliks, the Frontier 

Corps, and the other elements of the Frontier Crimes Regulation— 

and provided they were quiet, they would be left to govern their 

own affairs. 

The unstated section was, ‘‘If you step out of line, the army will 

come in and kick your ass.’’ In 2002, the military went into the 

Tirah Valley, and lost. 

And so they called their own bluff. And the tribes lost respect for 

the army. The army, then, negotiated the Shakai Agreement in 

2004, where Nek Mohammad, who was then the leader of the local 

Taliban, was essentially treated as an equal by a Pakistani general. And the tribes further saw the extremists being empowered, 

the traditional tribal leaders being sidelined, and the army looking 

powerless. 

So the basic system of how the frontier was governed has broken 

down. 

Mr. HUNTER. I appreciate the history of it. And you know a lot 

more about it than I do. But you also said in Swat, for instance, 

90 percent of the people there don’t like Taliban. 

And I am not talking about the Pakistan army coming in and 

trying to assert authority with each tribe. I am talking about us 

helping them, or them allowing us to work with them on a tribal 

level, where we go in and empower the actual people to want to 

get the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of their area. 

And they will understand that we will protect them if they do 

that. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Last year, we started to see the Pakistani army 

do that, and we saw a lot of success in the campaigns in Malukan 

and Abuja, where they started to actually work with the tribes, instead of against them. So we know the Pakistani military, or some 

elements of it, is capable of that. I don’t think that we have the 

leverage to directly engage with the tribes at this time. And the environment is probably too dangerous for Western Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or civil authorities to operate in 

there. 

I think we are going to have to work on the ability of Pakistani 

civil servants and the political agents, and the elements of the Pakistani civil service, and their local law enforcement, doing a sort of 

similar tribal bottom-up approach. 
24 

Mr. HUNTER. But let me ask you this, then: All of these things, 

that included, requires the Pakistanis do what we would like them 

to do. So how do you make that happen? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I don’t think you can. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. So there is a whole—the whole crux of all 

of this—all these are great ideas, but how do you make them do 

it? I don’t understand how you make them do what we want them 

to do, without doing pay-for-play, right?—which you said we don’t 

want to do. 

There is no way to make them do anything. 

General BARNO. I think we have to convince them that this is in 

their best interest, and this is the only way to solve the encroaching threat of the Taliban seizing control of even larger parts of the 

country. 

You know, there is never going to be American Marines in Swat 

Valley, and American soldiers in Swat Valley that—to do what occurred in Anbar. And the reason, in large measure, that Anbar 

worked is that the tribes finally believed that the Americans were 

staying. And the Americans, rightfully, convinced the tribe—I had 

an American brigade commander tell me that the tribes came with 

us when we changed our message from, ‘‘Don’t worry; we are leaving,’’ to a message that said, ‘‘Don’t worry; we are staying.’’ 

We are not going to be able to give that message in Swat, or anywhere else in Pakistan, I don’t think. But the Pakistanis can. And 

they can do it, probably, best, in some ways, through their Frontier 

Corps. Now, Swat—it is a bit outside of that territory, but the rest 

of the Fatah in the Northwest Frontier Province—that could be an 

approach that the Frontier Corps could take, and the U.S. could 

very much help advise that, provide information on how to approach that, help them work with the tribal structures, and understand the tribal structures, from a bit of a distance. 

We have some ability to do that today, although the Pakistanis 

are very resistant to having us present out there. But it is never 

going to be—I don’t think American forces—they can do that there. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. 

Davis—five minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you all for being here. 

You were talking about this change in strategy—I think, the 

message that we have to send. And I am just wondering, are there 

some things that you see right now, that are not being helpful, 

that, somehow counter this change in approach, that we should be 

thinking about? 

General BARNO. Let me jump into that, because I disagree with 

my good friend, David, here, on this. And he has mentioned one, 

which I think he will bring up again—the drone attacks. 

But I have a different perspective on that. And I think my judgment is that even though that is disruptive in the minds of many 

Pakistanis right now, I think that that has to continue, in some 

ways, because it is the only pressure that the insurgent groups in 

those denied areas, in those tribal areas, are feeling—you know, I 

have seen open-source reports that say that there is people living 

in orchards, now, because they are afraid to live inside of com-
25 

pounds, and they are constantly on the move. And it is having a 

very significant disruption effect on the terrorist organizations that 

are there, because they are not feeling any pressure from any 

ground component from inside of Pakistan. 

And I have heard, off the record, some Pakistanis say that, ‘‘If 

that is the only way that we can strike at the elements that are 

out there, and have success, then it should continue, even though 

it is painful.’’ 

So I think there is mixed reporting on that. From my perspective, I think that there is value in continuing that. 

I think the public proclamations of the Pakistani government on 

that are not terribly helpful for us. So I would like to throw a preemptive counter in front of Dave on that one, first. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. 

Dr. Kilcullen, could you also comment on—I think, in your book, 

we talk about our not understanding the environment. Or, at least, 

one of the experts that you spoke to had said that. 

And do we understand the environment? Clearly, it is a multifaceted environment. And I am just wondering whether we are taking the state—the steps to understand what we are really working 

with today. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I would make two points. One, on the joint 

strikes: I agree that they are doing a lot of damage to the bad guys. 

It is us doing that damage. So, let me just review. We are paying 

the Pakistani military to protect our vehicles, which they are not 

doing. We are paying them to conduct counterinsurgency in the 

Fatah. And the only damage we are doing to the enemy is to our 

own strikes, which they are being able to say, ‘‘Oh, the bad Americans are striking the Pakistani population.’’ 

It is not a sound way to do business. There are other ways to disrupt the terrorist movement than using robots from the air. And 

I would suggest that, in a tribal culture like the Pashtun culture— 

that, to a certain extent, looks both cowardly and weak. There are 

other ways to do it. 

I don’t want to talk about that in an open hearing, but it is pretty clear that drones are not our only option. 

Secondly, in terms of understanding the environment, I don’t believe that we have listened enough to local people in Pakistan. And 

I think one of the clearest examples of that is that we have had 

a tendency to look back to how things used to be under the Raj, 

and try and recreate a structure of sort of paternalistic, internal colonialism inside the Fatah. 

And we have repeatedly pushed back on the idea of elections. 

And we have said, ‘‘Well, we support the idea of the political parties not being able to operate up in the frontier, and the local people not having a vote.’’ 

I spoke in detail with a Darabandi religious leader up in the 

Fatah, who said, ‘‘Look, why are you supporting this anti-democratic stance towards the people of the Fatah. Just let us vote for 

our own leaders.’’ And, of course, the counter to that is we say, 

‘‘Well, extremists will be elected.’’ 

And that is maybe true. But if they do a bad job, they will be 

unelected, as Mr. Nawaz just said earlier. And, also, in the elections that we had in 2008, up in that area, it wasn’t extremists 
26 

who were elected. It was the Awami National Party, which is a secular group. 

So I just think we overstate our ability to influence, and we don’t 

listen enough to local people. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Nawaz, would—do you want to concur with that, 

or do you have—— 

Mr. NAWAZ. I agree with that. And, in fact, there was a commitment by the prime minister of Pakistan to change the local legal 

system, as well as to integrate the Fatah into the rest of Pakistan. 

And we are still waiting for action on that. 

But quite important, I think, is the fact that a lot of the discussions between the United States and Pakistan that are now taking 

place through the media need to take place behind closed doors. 

And on the drones, there is clearly a Kabuki theater, of sorts, 

going on, because there is some kind of tacit understanding. And 

the people of Pakistan haven’t been brought into it. So it is very 

important to bring them into the picture. 

One way of continuing the drone attack, because they are successful, is by allowing Pakistan to sit side-by-side with the U.S., 

and take credit for the actual kill shots—then let that be the approach; although, I agree with David, that there are much better 

ways of doing it on the ground. And you can train people to do it 

much more effectively, without the kind of publicity that drone attacks generate. 

Mr. THOMAS. The chair thanks the gentlewoman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Wilson, for five minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all, for being here. 

General Barno, thank you very much for your leadership at Fort 

Jackson, your success in Iraq and Afghanistan, your son’s service 

in Afghanistan. 

As we consider Pakistan, I know we all want the best for the 

people of Pakistan. 

I had the opportunity to visit and see firsthand, near 

Muzaffarabad, the earthquake recovery and relief efforts—the U.S. 

Marines working with the Pakistani military. And I was very, very 

impressed by the talented military—the very professional conduct 

that they had. 

Additionally, very sadly, I had breakfast at the home of Benazir 

Bhutto a month and a day prior to her murder. And so, again, I 

am just so concerned for the country. 

And, General, you have indicated that we need a long-term strategic partnership. How can that best be shown to the people of 

Pakistan—that we have a long-term interest in their success? 

General BARNO. We touched on a few points to that, I think, earlier, but I think it has to be a—not simply a military relationship. 

And it can’t be a relationship that is focused on the crisis of the 

moment, which is terrorism in the tribal areas of Pakistan, on the 

border areas, with Afghanistan. 

It has to be a serious—looking across both governments, and how 

both governments and the United States, and in Pakistan, can find 

shared interest in the areas of trade and the area of economics, and 
27 

the areas of justice, perhaps in border, perhaps in counter-narcotics. 

There is a huge range of common interests that we could bridge 

between the two governments of Pakistan and the United States, 

to develop some type of a framework relationship that really 

projects for the people of Pakistan that we are going to work with 

them in multi-dimensions—not just a security dimension, but in a 

multiple of dimensions to connect these two nations together over 

the next 20 or 30 years. 

That just simply doesn’t exist today. And everything is focused 

on this morning’s newspaper headlines. So I think that there would 

be a lot of utility in having enterprise that looks at how we can 

pull that together into—whether it is a formal agreement, or simply, you know, a series of meetings that begins to bridge the two 

nations together. I think we would make a lot of money by doing 

that. 

Mr. WILSON. And Mr. Nawaz, I appreciate you pointing out that 

Pakistan is an advanced country, with 30 million persons in the 

middle class. This is not at all comparable to Afghanistan. And in 

my visits there, the people I have met are—it has just been very 

hopeful. 

And the young students—I mean, it is just a positive experience. 

I have concluded four years as the co-chair of the India Caucus. 

I made it very clear that it is my view the country that benefits 

most from a stable Pakistan—and you have alluded to this—is 

India. 

And, then, as I have tried to work with the people of India—one 

of the biggest criticisms is they feel like the United States has been 

a strong ally and supporter of Pakistan for 60 years. So there is 

a disconnect there. 

But how can we promote the relationship between India and 

Pakistan? 

Mr. NAWAZ. I think the United States, obviously, now, is a friend 

of India. And, for the first time in six decades, of life of India, for 

the first time, we actually had Ambassador Holbrooke pronounce 

India one of the major allies with the United States on his last 

visit. 

At the same time, the United States is a major ally of Pakistan. 

And these are not mutually exclusive. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. NAWAZ. So it is very critical for the United States, now, to 

use this leverage on both sides of the India-Pakistan border to help 

them see the possibilities that exist for peace, rather than war, in 

that region. 

In effect, the U.S. has to take the lead, now, in helping wage 

peace in the region, rather than siding with one country against 

the other. And, in that, the economic relationships between the 

countries of the region—and not just India and Pakistan, but, as 

I said earlier, with Central Asia and Afghanistan—the whole region has a network that needs to be established, in which U.S. 

firms can play a huge role, because many of them already have 

plans on the books for setting up pipelines, for setting up rail links 

or roadways and so on. 
28 

All this can be done to pull these countries together, which would 

make it impossible for them to go to war. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate your point. And I would even extend it. I have been to Western Siberia, in Novosibirsk, 

Chelyabinsk. 

It would seem like, to me—and through the ‘‘Stans,’’ too—that 

that whole region of Central Asia should be doing very well economically, socially, and—so I appreciate your positive view, and— 

however, I can be hopeful. I see great hope throughout the region. 

So I now yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from South Carolina. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I was here for your very illuminating testimony. Thank you very 

much. 

I had to be gone for part of the question-and-answer period. 

Maybe it is the scientist in me, but when I am dealing with options, I am always more comfortable when I have some probabilities associated with those options. 

And so, if you would humor me, and each take a piece of paper 

and write down the three potential outcomes that the general mentioned—a failed state; a status quo or stalemate, for number two; 

and gradual improvement, for number three. And so that you are 

not influenced by others’ prognostications, if you would write down 

some percentages there that add up to 100—what probability do 

you think that it would be a failed state? What probability do you 

think that it will simply continue the status quo, or a stalemate? 

And what probability do you think that there will be gradual improvement? 

General, do you have your prognostications? 

General BARNO. I actually did this before we started, because I 

thought I might get that question. It is a very interesting question, 

and, of course, one that we can’t really give good answers to. 

Here is the way I would key it up, Congressman. I said: Failed 

state, 15 percent—one-five percent—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. 

General BARNO [continuing]. Stalemate, six-zero—60 percent—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. 

General BARNO [continuing]. And gradual improvement, 25 percent. And I really hope those add up to 100. I didn’t do my math 

check, here, so—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. They do. 

Okay. 

Dr. Kilcullen. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I am afraid I have a slightly different view. I am 

making the assumption that there is no change in U.S. policy, and 

there is no change in the attitude of the Pakistani state. On that 

assumption: 75 percent, failed state; 0 percent, status quo—things 

simply cannot go on as they are; 25 percent, turnaround. That is 

on the assumption that we don’t change anything. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Very interesting, thank you. 

And Mr. Nawaz. 
29 

Mr. NAWAZ. In my book, the failed state would be 15 percent 

probability. The stalemate, or what I would call ‘‘muddling 

through,’’ would be 55 percent. And gradual improvement, 30 percent. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much. That is very helpful. 

I kind of have the feeling that unless we get halfway through 

number three—and there is a fairly low probability that we are 

going to get halfway through number three, if your prognostications are correct—that what we are doing in Afghanistan is the ultimate exercise in futility. 

Even if we are able to do there what no one else has ever done— 

Alexander the Great failed, the British Empire failed, the Soviet 

Empire failed—and even if we are able to do what no one else has 

ever done, it will amount to nothing, because the bad guys will 

simply go to Pakistan, unless we are at least halfway through 

number three, gradual improvement. 

Is that not true? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think—— 

General BARNO. Go ahead, David. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Well, I think there is quite a good chance that 

we will do better in Afghanistan, because we do have something 

that none of those other empires—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. But, sir, even if we are completely successful—I 

am allowing that we will be completely successful in Afghanistan, 

and do what no one else has ever done. Even so, I don’t think we 

will accomplish anything, because our goal is to get rid of the bad 

guys. And the bad guys will simply go to Pakistan, unless we get 

halfway through number three. And you, collectively, believe there 

is a fairly low probability we are going to get halfway through 

number three. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. If you articulate the sole goal as ‘‘dealing with 

the bad guys,’’ then I would agree with you. But that is not our sole 

goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The fact that we have treated that as our sole goal is one of the 

problems that we have had since 2001. 

General BARNO. I think I would agree with that. And I would say 

that the growth of success in both of those states eventually 

marginalizes the bad guys. 

I watched, during my time in Afghanistan, increasingly, for a period of time, the Taliban becoming more and more irrelevant to the 

people of Afghanistan. No one had any interest in being in the 

Taliban, after the Afghan presidential election. The economy was 

doing better, security was improving significantly. No one had any 

interest in that outcome. But that is certainly not the case today. 

So I think if we can set those conditions so that the—becoming 

a terrorist and insurgent is an irrelevant long-term goal for any 

reasonable Pakistani of Afghan, then we have established some enduring prospects for success. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Congressman, I would choose an analogy from economics. After all, I spent 31 years at the International Monetary 

Fund. And this is called the J-curve hypothesis, which is when 

things grow worse before they start getting better. 

And so what may appear to be a 70 percent probability, in David’s view, may be those kind of exogenous shocks that will turn 
30 

the population and the government and the leadership of Pakistan 

around, into concentrating their efforts so that they can, then, use 

the resources of the country, the inherent strengths of the society, 

and the institutions that exist, to pull the country out of the hole 

that it seems to be heading into. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I hope, sir, that that is the outcome. My hopes 

and my expectations are frequently different. In this case, they are 

different. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from Maryland. 

Gentlemen, I very much have found this very enlightening. 

On the near term—and I forgot which of you mentioned the large 

number of casualties that the steam-ship companies that the American military has contracted with to transport goods through Pakistan, going to Afghanistan—it is my understanding, about 130 

drivers for one of the contractors have been killed, about 15 drivers 

for another contractor. 

Entire convoys have been hijacked, and entire convoys have been 

destroyed, just transiting Pakistan. 

It is my understanding that we will get sending about 130 to 150 

trailer-equivalent units a day, just to re-supply the troops we have 

now. Safe to assume that will be increased by at least half again, 

with the additional troops on their way to Afghanistan. 

I say all this, and that you all have done, I think, a really good 

job of telling us some of the things we need to be doing, and what 

you expect could happen—hopefully, favorably. 

My question to you, given the immediate escalating of American 

troops, and the need to re-supply them, is: What is the probability 

in your minds that, during the next three years and nine months 

that President Obama has been elected by the American people to 

serve—that the Pakistani government, either bowing to pressure 

from the Islamic fundamentalists, or because of a change in their 

attitude themselves, within the internal government—what are the 

chances that they deny passage through Pakistan of goods bound 

for the American troops in Afghanistan, in the next three years, 

nine months—— 

General BARNO. I think my perspective would be, unless there is 

a state failure in Pakistan, that that is—that won’t happen. And, 

again, we are—my handicapping of that was in the 15 percent 

range. So I think as long as the state of Pakistan remains functioning and remains, you know, in, essentially, alliance with the 

U.S., and we are mutually supporting each other’s goals and objectives—if those lines of communications can stay open. 

As you know, there are also a series of other possible lines—the 

Northern Distribution Network—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. None of which are very pretty options. 

General BARNO. So, at least there is some redundancy in that. 

But I don’t think there is an extraordinarily high risk to the Pakistan supply lines, unless there is a major change in the state situation there. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Doctor. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I would just say it depends on what you are actually talking about. 
31 

Those supply lines were cut and closed six times last year already, and—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. I would talk about a hard closure. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. As in ‘‘permanent closure’’? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think that is reasonably low, unless the Pakistani state loses control of that main north-south route from Karachi, up into Peshawar, and west, to the Khyber Pass. 

It is very, very hard to keep that open permanently. But having 

it closed permanently, I think, is a reasonably low possibility. 

But I don’t share the positive prognosis of, you know, a low 

chance of state failure. I actually think, unless we turn around the 

policies that we have in place, and unless the Pakistani military, 

rapidly, gets a lot better at doing this, we are going to see an increasing loss of control. 

So, over three years and nine months, you know, that probability 

drops away. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mister—I hope I would say this properly—Mr. 

Nawaz? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, you did, sir. 

I agree that the probability is low. I don’t agree that even, given 

the further attacks within the country, as well as the challenges 

faced by the military—that the military, as an institution, would 

collapse to the extent that it would allow a permanent stoppage to 

this. 

However, there is always a possibility of a serious breakdown of 

relationships between governments, in the U.S., and in Pakistan. 

And if that were to occur, for whatever reason, then, of course, we 

would face this possibility. 

I have, unfortunately, like many of my colleagues—have not been 

able to get clearance to go to Pakistan. I have flown over it a number of times going to Afghanistan. 

I am amazed that on the western side of the country, it just 

strikes me as amazingly sparsely populated. 

And, again, I am going to open up to you, General. Would there 

be any value to trying to route the traffic through the western part 

of the country, where there are fewer people and, therefore, fewer 

people to shoot at you? 

Would there be any value of trying to work with the Pakistani 

government to establish such a route, or would that be—how would 

that be perceived, and is it even necessary? 

General BARNO. To clarify, Congressman, are you thinking 

through Balochistan, or toward the Iranian border? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Over closer to—— 

General BARNO. Well, there is obviously a route up through Karachi, through Spin Boldak, that comes out of Kandahar, and then 

could come in that way. And there is some traffic there. But my 

understanding is the majority of the traffic does come through the 

Khyber Pass. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Right. 

General BARNO. So my sense would be that it—that is an excellent second option to have, in that route coming up through the 

south. But that is also an area where most of the military analysts 

are saying—and I agree—is the center of gravity of the fight right 
32 

now—the southern portion of Afghanistan, on the Afghan side of 

the border. 

So there is no particular good answer on this, in terms of security for our route right now, I don’t think. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Is there anything—and, again, I am asking this in 

the form of a question: Is there anything from the Pakistani government’s point of view that would make that beneficial for them? 

Mr. NAWAZ. We have talked about the port of Gwadar. It was 

also featured in a long article in the Atlantic Monthly this month. 

And that was one of the ideas that I had presented, which was to 

have a very heavy investment in infrastructure development, linking Gwadar to Afghanistan and, potentially, to Central Asia. 

That kind of investment would yield immediate benefit in providing employment for people in Balochistan, because they have 

very little chance of employment otherwise. And you could also 

bring into safeguarding that, because of the benefits of transit fees 

that—and other economic benefits arising from a road and a rail 

link that could link up to the Afghan border first, and then, perhaps, beyond that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Do you think a significant number of Pakistani individuals would think that is for the better for their country? 

Mr. NAWAZ. If you were to give ownership to the provincial population, yes. If it were done as a central, federally controlled enterprise, and contractors brought from outside, then, no. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Would any of you—either gentleman—care to comment on that? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I agree with that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, the 

ranking member, Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to be very brief. These folks have been extraordinarily 

patient. And I should preface my comment by saying that, in most 

ways, I am a supporter of the Administration’s recently released 

plan for Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

I do think there are some concerns with respect to questions— 

vacuums—that exist in it, that can be filled in less-than-helpful 

ways. But, nevertheless, I do think that, to his credit, the President 

and his advisors have laid out a plan forward. 

As we have heard here today, obviously, there are other things 

we can and can, perhaps, should be considering. 

But, nevertheless, I have to ask, Mr. Nawaz: This week on National Public Radio, you gave a very interesting interview regarding the Administration’s recent engagement in Pakistan. 

I am going to read your quote. And I just would be very interested in your refinement of these very—I guess it is fair to say— 

strong words. 

And I quote, ‘‘This is probably the worst-ever visit by an American team. It was a complete disaster. And if this is how you want 

to win friends, I just wonder how you want to create enemies.’’ And 

that is the end of the quote. 

Can you help those of us who, obviously, we’re not privy to the 

details of that visit—what so concerns you about what went on? 
33 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir. To paraphrase Orden, ‘‘Words have no 

words that are out of context.’’ The discussion was about the leadup to the visit. This was a very critical visit, following the release 

of the bill in the House, as well as the release of the strategy. 

And so there were tremendous expectations. And I began by saying that the heart was in the right place, meaning that the United 

States was saying and planning on doing a lot of very good things 

for Pakistan. 

Unfortunately, the public message that was conveyed before the 

visit, through newspaper articles and leaks, created a very serious 

public backlash within Pakistan. 

So it ended up overshadowing whatever positive results may 

have emerged in the closed-door meetings. And so the public commentary in Pakistan, as well as private feedback that I received, 

and many others received, was that, you know, ‘‘The U.S. is only 

focused on destroying the Pakistan army, and destroying the ISI.’’ 

And these are very powerful assets of Pakistan. 

It just totally took away from the positive message that was contained in the strategy, as well as the many great attributes of the 

bill that is now being looked at by Congress. 

So it was in that context that the opportunity was missed. And 

I, in fact, compared it to the visit of Prime Minister Nehru, to the 

United States, in the 1950s, which was also, you know—it was preceded by tremendous expectation. And it didn’t come through. And 

then, the result was many years of estrangement. 

And as a supporter of U.S.-Pakistan friendship, as a supporter 

of the President’s new approach, I feel that somehow that message 

got lost. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir. 

Unless one of our other two panelists want to comment on that 

question, I would yield back, with a final word of deep appreciation 

to our three distinguished guests, both for their endurance, but 

more importantly, for their perspective and expertise. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

Gentlemen, it is the tradition of Chairman Skelton to limit our 

witnesses to five minutes. That was in an effort to give every member an opportunity to ask their questions. Since we are still shy of 

the appointed 4:30 hour that we said we would adjourn, if there is 

anything that any of you would like to say for the record, before 

we adjourn, I would welcome your thoughts. 

General BARNO. I think the only thing I would add would be 

that, I think, in the dialogue today, it is clear to everyone in this 

room that this is a very serious problem—perhaps, the most serious security problem that the U.S. is facing over the next several 

years. 

If things go awry, if any of these perspectives on worst-case scenarios begin to accelerate, and become more probable, then there 

is a great risk that we are going to have an extraordinarily dangerous situation in this part of the world. 

And I think, based upon that alone, that the amount of attention 

that the U.S. is giving this across the government right now, needs 

to be extraordinarily high—that this could become a crisis very 

quickly, and I think that, even though we are—and I have person-
34 

ally been highly engaged in the Afghanistan side of the—the 

drawn-line aspect here—this particular challenge with Pakistan 

could escalate into an extraordinarily serious crisis in a very short 

period of time. 

And I think it deserves very, very serious attention. And I am 

seeing indications that it is certainly getting that right now. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General. 

Doctor. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Nothing to really add, sir. But I just want to 

summarize, I guess, briefly—my main points. 

I think we need to develop, rapidly, a sense of urgency. I am very 

encouraged by this hearing, and I think that is a good sign. We 

need to put somebody in charge of Pakistan policy, one person, and 

give them the right staff and authorities to actually come up with 

a comprehensive plan. 

And that may seem like an obvious statement, but we haven’t 

yet done that. 

We need to hold the Pakistani military and intelligence service 

accountable. And I think benchmarks are part of that. But they are 

not the full story, because we don’t want to get into that pay-forperformance approach. 

We need to dramatically increase support to policing and rule of 

law in Pakistan, including civil authorities. And, finally, we need 

to call off the drones. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir. 

I would reiterate the issue of partnership; that it is very critical 

that there be discussions; that if there are differences, that they be 

resolved privately; and that Pakistan understand that it will receive assistance; that it must be prepared to do its bit to make sure 

that it has policies and plans that are not only workable, but that 

it will follow through on, so that there are results that it will 

achieve for its own purposes, and not solely because the U.S. wants 

it to, or the U.S. Congress is looking for those results. 

I think this is part of the critical friendship between the two 

countries. And in the long run, the more the U.S. is seen as an ally 

of the people of Pakistan, and not allied with any single group or 

individual, the better it will be for the relationship. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, we want to thank all of our witnesses. I 

think you all have done a really great job this afternoon. We appreciate that you have traveled some distance to be here. 

The committee now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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