UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RICKY BILLS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11414

Honorable Matthew F. Leitman

v. Magistrate Judge David R. Grand

PAUL KLEE, et al.,

 

Defendants. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR INJUNCTION 

AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [82]

I. REPORT 

a. Factual Background

Pro se plaintiff Rickey Bills (“Bills”), a prisoner at Lakeland Correctional Facility

(“LCF”) in Coldwater, Michigan, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to conditions

of confinement at Adrian Correctional Facility (“ARF”) and Macomb Correctional Facility

(“MCF”). (Docs. #79, #83). Bills filed his complaint against the following Michigan

Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) employees: Paul Klee, Warden of ARF; Lee McRoberts,

Deputy Warden of ARF; Virgil Webb, Administrative Assistant at ARF; James Eaton, Grievance

Coordinator at ARF; Renee Diver, Business Office Manager at ARF; Vaughn Stewart, employee

of the accounting office at ARF; and Krisopher Steece, Deputy Warden of MCF. On July 8,

2019, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation to grant in part and deny in part the

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #79). In short, the Court recommended that

Bills be permitted to proceed with his denial of access to the courts claims against Defendants

Diver and Stewart and his retaliatory transfer claim against Defendant Steece (in their individual

capacities), but that all of his other claims be dismissed. (Id.). None of the Defendants objected

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to the Report and Recommendation. Bills was given until September 9, 2019, to file any

objections, but to date he has not filed any. (Doc. #81). 

On August 22, 2019, Bills filed a motion for injunction and temporary restraining order

to enjoin the following LCF staff (none of whom are Defendants in this action1) from

transferring him to another correctional facility: Noah Nagy, Warden; Bryan Morrison, Deputy;

Russell Rukka, Administrative Assistant; Robert Autl, Assistant Warden, and S. Cline, Resident

Unit Manager (collectively, the “LCF staff”). (Doc. #82). Bills claims that such a transfer will

adversely affect his heart condition. (Id.). On September 3, 2019, the Defendants in this action

filed a response. (Doc. #83). Bills has given no indication that he served a copy of his instant

motion on the LCF staff, and they have not appeared in this action or filed a response to his

motion. 

b. Legal Standards

“Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies

designed to preserve the relative positions of the parties until further proceedings on the merits

can be held.” Koetje v. Norton, 2013 WL 8475802, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2013). Whether

to grant such relief is a matter within the discretion of the district court. See Certified

Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 540 (6th Cir. 2007). 

The same factors are considered in determining whether to grant a request for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) or a preliminary injunction. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner,

543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008). Those factors are: (1) whether the movant has a strong

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm without

the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and

1

 Despite this, in the caption of Bills’s instant motion, he identifies these individuals as party

defendants in this action. (Doc. #82 at 1). 

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(4) whether the public interest is served by issuance of the injunction. Id. (citing Ne. Ohio Coal.

for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, a TRO is an

extraordinary remedy, “which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of

proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty.

Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). 

In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) states that a TRO may be issued without written or

oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies to the court in writing any efforts made

to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Furthermore, an ex parte TRO is only appropriate where the applicant “would face

irreparable harm so immediate that it would be improper to wait until after a preliminary

injunction hearing to enjoin the non-movant's conduct.” Erard v. Johnson, 905 F.Supp.2d 782,

791 (E.D. Mich. 2012). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the extremely

limited availability of ex parte TROs “reflect[s] the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs

counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be

heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415

U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

Finally, the Court notes that where, as here, an inmate seeks an order enjoining state

prison officials, it must proceed with the utmost care and be cognizant of the unique nature of

the prison setting. See Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438 n.3 (6th Cir. 1984); see also

McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 37 (2002) (“‘Running a prison is an inordinately difficult

undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are

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peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.’ To

respect these imperatives, courts must exercise restraint in supervising the minutiae of prison

life.” (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (internal citations omitted)). Courts

must accord prison administrators “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline

and to maintain institutional security.” Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1995).

c. Analysis

Applying the above factors to this motion, Bills is not entitled to a temporary restraining

order. First, Bills has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his

underlying request. As the government points out, none of the individuals Bills seeks to enjoin

are parties to the instant lawsuit, and it does not appear that he has provided them with notice of

his motion which asks the Court to enter an order restraining their conduct. (Docs. # 1, #79,

#83). However, “the Court will not enjoin non-parties, and will not issue injunctive relief that is

entirely unrelated to the Plaintiff’s underlying claims.” Huber v. Nolan, No. 1:19-CV-224, 2019

WL 2314630, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 2019) (refusing to enjoying prison officials who were

not parties to the litigation) (citing Sidiq v. Champion, 2006 WL 1275403 at *2 (W.D. Mich.,

May 8, 2006) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).

Second, although Bills asserts that a transfer will adversely affect his heart condition, his

own filings show the speculative nature of his concerns. In his motion, Bills states that LCF

health services previously blocked a scheduled transfer due to his rising blood pressure, stating

that they found it was “too dangerous” to allow him to travel with his blood pressure being as

high as it was at the time. (Doc. #82). In other words, Bills admits that those charged with his

care at LCF monitored his medical condition and appropriately took it into account in terms of

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his placement. Bills’s claims of an unsafe transfer are also speculative in another sense. It

appears from a recent filing by Bills that subsequent to filing his instant motion, he was

transferred to the Chippewa Correctional Facility, and “will [again] be transferring [back to

Southeast Michigan] this week.” (Doc. #84). Yet, Bills does not allege that the transfers have or

will cause him to suffer any specific irreparable harm. (Id.). Moreover, while the Court takes

seriously Bills’s allegations regarding his heart condition, his mere assertion that he may be

injured if he is transferred in the future is insufficient to obtain the extreme form of injunctive

relief that he seeks. See Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog,

945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1991). Rather, to obtain an injunction, “the harm alleged must be

both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical.” Id. See also Cooper v.

Bower, 2017 WL 3389521, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2017). Clearly, Bills has not shown that

absent the requested injunction the risk of harm is certain and immediate. 

The remaining factors also weigh in favor of denying Bills’s request for injunctive relief. 

Issuing a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order prohibiting Bills’s transfer to a

different prison would result in harm to both the MDOC and the public, because providing

appropriate supervision of Michigan’s large inmate population necessarily requires the ability to

transfer prisoners between facilities when the need arises, as determined by appropriate MDOC

personnel. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, “problems of prison administration are

peculiarly for resolution by prison authorities and their resolution should be accorded deference

by the courts.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774, 779 (6th Cir. 1997). Moreover, “[w]hen an

injunction is sought by an inmate against state prison officials, the Sixth Circuit has noted that

findings of fact in support of any granted relief are ‘especially critical’ since such an order would

necessarily intrude ‘significantly into the prerogatives of state correctional officials.’” See

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Huber v. Nolan, No. 1:19-CV-224, 2019 WL 2314630, at *3 (citing Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d

277, 284 (6th Cir. 1988); Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438, n. 3 (6th Cir. 1984)). Here, Bills

has failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence from which it could find that the

requested injunction is warranted, and that request, by its very nature, intrudes on the MDOC’s

ability to make decisions regarding the care and custody of its prisoners. Such an order would

affect not only Bills’s safety, but the safety of MDOC staff and other prisoners. 

Taking all the foregoing considerations into account, Bills simply has not shown

entitlement to a temporary restraining order. Accordingly, his instant motion should be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons discussed above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Bills’s Motion for

Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. #82) be DENIED. 

Dated: September 16, 2019 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation and

Order, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations and the order set forth above. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1). Failure to timely file objections constitutes a waiver of any

further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, (1985); United States v. Sullivan, 431

F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005). Only specific objections to this Report and Recommendation will

be preserved for the Court’s appellate review; raising some objections but not others will not

preserve all objections a party may have. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829

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F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th

Cir. 2006). Copies of any objections must be served upon the Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Mich.

LR 72.1(d)(2).

A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with

a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any such response should be

concise, and should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the

objections.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 16, 2019.

s/Eddrey O. Butts 

EDDREY O. BUTTS

Case Manager

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