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i 

57–700 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–142] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE 

CLOSURE, FACILITIES OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 18, 2010 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

TOM HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

KATY BLOOMBERG, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 18, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Military Construction, Family Housing, Base Closure, Facilities Operation and Maintenance ...................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 18, 2010 ...................................................................................... 35 

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, 

BASE CLOSURE, FACILITIES OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Calcara, Joseph, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations and 

Housing, U.S. Department of the Army ............................................................. 6 

Ferguson, Kathleen I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations, U.S. Department of the Air Force ............................................................ 8 

Natsuhara, Hon. Roger M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Environment, U.S. Department of the Navy .................................... 7 

Robyn, Dr. Dorothy, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and 

Environment, U.S. Department of Defense ....................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Calcara, Joseph ................................................................................................. 68 

Ferguson, Kathleen I. ....................................................................................... 112 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 42 

Natsuhara, Hon. Roger M. ............................................................................... 84 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 39 

Robyn, Dr. Dorothy ........................................................................................... 45 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 127 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Holt ............................................................................................................. 128 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 127 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 137 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 131 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE CLOSURE, FACILITIES OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 18, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The hearing will come to order. And we are sorry that 

we are a little late in beginning this hearing, because we had a series of votes. And in about an hour, 15, 30 minutes, we are going 

to have some other votes. 

But I thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before this 

committee today. And today the Readiness Subcommittee will hear 

about fiscal year 2011 military construction and BRAC [base realignment and closure] programs. 

Overall, I continue to be pleased with the level of investment 

that the President has proposed in the BRAC and military construction programs. It provides a good balance among the various 

priorities and does an excellent job of supporting the warfighters 

in areas where they need the most help. But there are many areas 

that can be improved. 

In BRAC, I indicated during this same hearing last year, to some 

of the same witnesses here today, that I was concerned about the 

apparent rush to meet the BRAC deadline and to avoid wasting 

taxpayers’ money. That is why I am surprised this Administration 

has decided to double and triple-shift construction workers at 

BRAC projects instead of requesting relief on the 2011 BRAC statutory deadline. 

I don’t consider it to be in our government’s best interests to 

spend several hundred million dollars above normal construction 

costs to artificially accelerate contracts, to move organizations into 

temporary trailers as a long-term solution, or to create traffic congestion with little thought given on how to alleviate local community concerns. 

We owe the men and women of our armed services, and the taxpayers of this Nation, the very best BRAC implementation plan 

that smoothly relocates forces. 
2 

Let me turn to another subject that is equally concerning. The 

United States, and I think the government of Japan, are committed 

to moving 8,000 Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam. I support 

this move and believe it is in our two nations’ best interest. 

However, it is becoming obvious there are many aspects of this 

plan that need to be improved. First and foremost is the inability 

of this Administration to pull together a comprehensive federal response that links the Department of Defense with the Department 

of Transportation, the Department of Interior, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], and other federal agencies. In the end, 

I believe our ability to relocate these Marine forces will be negatively affected due to the lack of an interagency response. 

I think it is time for the Department of Defense to take a leadership role, and possibly a fiscal role, in ensuring that this realignment is done correctly. 

I am also concerned about a lack of a comprehensive effort for 

housing and providing medical care for the construction workforce, 

the feasibility of completing the realignment by 2014, and the large 

destruction of coral reefs to support naval assets. 

This committee has steadfastly supported this realignment effort, 

but I think it is time for the Department of Defense to assess what 

further steps we need to take to get this realignment done in the 

right and proper way. 

I would be remiss if I didn’t also mention that the Army Base 

Operating Services account for fiscal year 2011 appears to be underfunded. I hope the Army witnesses will be able to discuss the 

impacts that this budget request, if enacted, would have on daily 

operations at Army installations. 

I do want to conclude my opening statement by mentioning that 

I continue to have a significant concern about the Department’s implementing the overall realignment of the Walter Reed Medical 

Center. This Congress is not willing to risk a potential disruption 

of wounded warrior care. 

I am deeply troubled by the lack of a comprehensive plan to address the organizational and facility requirements to achieve the 

department’s vision of a world-class medical center. As this committee evaluates fiscal options, there is no doubt we will fully support this vital mission, even at the expense of other services’ priorities. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I think that we have a lot to discuss 

today. We have a lot to discuss today, and I look forward to hearing 

you address these important issues. 

The chair recognizes my good friend from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, 

for any remark or statement that he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

I also thank all of our witnesses for being here. 
3 

We appreciate their efforts and for them being here. I had hoped 

that this year’s military construction budget request would provide 

more clarity on a number of significant issues, but I am disappointed to find that once again we are presented with a host of 

unresolved issues. 

Last year we were frustrated by the lack of a Future Years Defense Plan, promises that the then-ongoing Quadrennial Defense 

Review would resolve strategic force basing decisions and uncertainty in our strategic direction for Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the 

passage of a year has not helped. Indeed, the situation may be even 

more muddled than it was previously. 

Although we now have an FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] 

and QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and an Afghanistan plan, 

significant questions remain on how we allocate our military construction dollars. The QDR did not provide specific guidance on 

whether Army brigade combat teams and Air Force fighter squadrons should remain in Europe or return to the United States. Despite ongoing military construction to support those moves, we do 

not know whether the intended units will occupy these buildings 

or not. 

The QDR took one decisive stand that would have been better if 

it had not been made. The document recommended a second East 

Coast nuclear carrier homeport, and the budget before us contains 

only preliminary funding to initiate this controversial and very expensive move. 

Spending any money at all on this venture is wasteful, in my 

view, considering the large number of unmet ship, aircraft and infrastructure needs of the Navy, which as of December 2009 included a shortfall of more than $36 billion in restoration and modernization for shore installations and a $3 billion shortfall for the 

four public shipyards. 

In addition to projects that remain unfunded, other critical construction is being deferred, such as the replacement of the controlled industrial facility at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, which was 

deferred from this year’s budget to fiscal year 2012. 

In other cases the budget proposed a certainty where we may 

need to pause. For example, the budget contains substantial funding for Joint Strike Fighter bed down, even though Fighter production has been delayed because of acquisition difficulties. 

The move of Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam is fully funded, while the new Japanese government is increasing serious resistance to honoring our bilateral roadmap, which could place the 

whole plan in jeopardy. 

Lastly, the budget contains over $1 billion for military construction in Afghanistan. I have no doubt that these projects are worthwhile and necessary for long-term operations, but as a Nation we 

are not yet committed to long-term operations. The President has 

committed to beginning our withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 

2011, and none of the requested projects could be completed before 

then. While I hope that our drawdown will be measured, expending 

$1 billion for projects that neither we nor the Afghans may use is 

too much to ask of the American taxpayer. 

Since the department must finish base realignment and closure 

moves by September 2011, this budget contains the final BRAC 
4 

projects. To date department officials have consistently testified 

that extending the statutory deadline for any particular BRAC recommendation was unnecessary. Even so, the chairman and I are 

aware of several cases where a tailored extension may make sense 

and save money. 

I encourage the witnesses to discuss pending BRAC deadline difficulties, especially in the case of medical facilities. We all understand the great sensitivity and complexity of closing Walter Reed 

and consolidating operations at Bethesda and Fort Belvoir. Although at heart a BRAC directed action, the implications of the 

consolidation go well beyond the technical dictates of the BRAC 

law. 

Once again, I urge the department to let us know of the difficulties not just in meeting the minimum BRAC recommendations, but 

of any issue that may negatively affect the delivery of world-class 

care to our wounded warriors, other beneficiaries, and their families. 

Once again, we are asked to approve the expenditure of several 

billion dollars for a number of unsettled propositions. I think we 

need more before we act favorably on this request. 

Mr. Chairman, once again, thank you for holding the hearing. 

Gentlemen, ladies, thank you for being here. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Today we are very fortunate to have with us very outstanding 

witnesses. And with us today is Dr. Dorothy Robyn—— 

Doctor, good to see you again. 

She is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

and Environment, Department of Defense; Dr. Joseph Calcara, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations and Housing; and Dr. Roger Natsuhara, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Environment; and Ms. Kathleen Ferguson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. 

We are happy and very fortunate to have you with us and the 

expert testimony that you are going to give us today. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statement—testimony 

will be accepted for the record. And hearing no objection, so ordered. 

Madam Secretary Robyn, you are ready? 

Dr. ROBYN. I am ready. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, ma’am. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DOROTHY ROBYN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. ROBYN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairman Ortiz, 

Ranking Member Forbes, other distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to present the 

President’s budget for military construction. 

My written statement includes a great deal of detail on our $18.7 

billion budget request for military construction, family housing, 

and BRAC. This is a decrease of $4.6 billion compared to last year’s 
5 

request due largely to the fact that we are nearing the end of the 

BRAC process and most of the military construction was funded in 

previous years. 

Our request for pure military construction exclusive of BRAC 

and family housing is actually up by $1.2 billion, and that includes—and let me highlight just two things—two key quality-oflife investments: $1 billion for new medical infrastructure and 

about half that much to initiate Secretary Gates’ initiative to overhaul or replace two-thirds of our DODEA [Department of Defense 

Education Activity] schools over the next five years. 

But let me focus on two of the issues that the chairman and the 

ranking member both raised in their opening statements, Guam 

and then BRAC. I have been deeply involved in the Department’s 

efforts to move 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa to 

Guam. Like any international effort this large and complex, the 

buildup on Guam faces an array of challenges, but no single realignment has a higher profile. Very few issues have a higher profile within the department, and the Deputy Secretary is personally 

overseeing this effort. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $452 million for 

military construction on Guam. These projects will yield long-term 

benefits for all the military forces on Guam, including the ones that 

are there now. They will also demonstrate the department’s commitment to working with the governor of Guam, whose strong support has been absolutely critical to our effort there. 

I appreciate the support that this committee has given us in the 

past on the Guam buildup, and I look forward to working with you 

closely as we move forward. 

Let me just briefly address the BRAC issue. We are committed 

to concluding, to finishing, completing all 220 actions by the deadline of September 15. My staff briefed your staff two days ago on 

the six challenges that we have, ones that where the construction 

or the move-in will be completed very, very close to the deadline. 

We are watching this closely. We are working very closely with the 

services. 

We believe we can meet the deadline in every case, and in those 

cases where we are spending a little more to meet the deadline, we 

think it is worth it. We don’t believe this is a place where one 

should do a narrow cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of meeting 

a BRAC deadline, BRAC being a mechanism where the process is 

extraordinarily important, we think those benefits are great, so in 

the last four rounds we have never missed a deadline. I will do everything possible to make sure that we keep that record on my 

watch. 

Let me close my statement there. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Robyn can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Calcara, go ahead. You can begin your testimony, 

sir. 
6 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CALCARA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Mr. CALCARA. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Forbes, other 

members. Thanks again for giving me the honor to testify before 

the committee. I, too, would just keep my remarks brief at the 

entry here and just highlight some of the top line data points from 

our budget submit. We have got about an $8 billion budget in front of you this year. 

That is down to reflect most of our BRAC construction under way, 

with the remaining portion there just the human capital moves and 

the IT investments needed to hit the date. If you adjust for about 

50 projects in OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations], that leaves 

us with about 230 projects and $5.8 billion this year. And it is kind 

of fun to say that that is a little bit compared to what we have 

been doing in the last four years, but it is still a pretty big program. 

Of that amount of cash, about one-quarter of it is tied to barracks. I know we continue to listen to guidance from the committee, and we also thank you for last year’s acceleration of training barracks. We have got about a quarter of the resources this 

year plugged into barracks. That will result in new barrack spaces 

for over 8,000 soldiers. If you count what we are also spending on 

the SRM [Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization] side, we 

are upgrading another 5,000 spaces for soldiers, so that is over 

13,000 barrack spaces that we are bringing a better quality of life 

to. 

Another quarter of our budget is tied to the Army modular force. 

That is to keep consistent with our commitment to complete the 

Grow the Army transformation by fiscal year 2013. 

The remaining half of the budget is spread amongst the usual activities and family housing, the housing assistance program, which 

we are having a lot of positive success with, wounded warriors, and 

other unspecified minor construction. 

I would like to just touch on BOS, the base operating support account. I know you have been following that, as I have. We had a 

purchasing challenge this year of about $1.5 billion. We are working that very aggressively. It is one of my top three on my list. I 

will tell you that our fiscal year 2011 budget, while it is based on 

this year’s budget baseline, we are working really hard to achieve 

that target, and I feel comfortable with it. 

There will be no cuts to the Army Force Generation, to the Family Covenant or to Life Safety. We have identified about a third of 

the savings from this year’s budget that would help adjust that 

baseline last year. We also plan to do a midyear review this year, 

and I think on the surface we have got about a four to five percent 

challenge point for the remainder of the year. So I feel pretty comfortable, as we get into the base operating support area, that we 

will have enough resources to deliver what we need. 

The last B I would like to touch on is brigades. I know I had a 

lot of fun with you last year talking about brigade configurations 

after the reduction, where we are in thickening the force. We are 

looking at the force structure tied to the populations that are still 

in the Army not in those brigade combat configurations. We expect 
7 

in the next several weeks to finalize our decision on stationing and 

come out with the final stationing plan for where that thickening 

of the force will go. 

I understand your comments on the QDR. We, too, are waiting 

for information to come out of that. I would just close by telling you 

that none of the projects in our fiscal year 2011 budget are impacted by that QDR decision. We have no investments that will be 

implicated by the decision to keep those brigades in Europe, and 

we are looking forward to a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty organization] conference, I think, is the next opportunity to bring some clarity to that issue in November, at which time we would inform POM 

[Program Objectives Memorandum] 1217. 

So, believe it or not, I am looking forward to your questions, sir. 

And that concludes my opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Calcara can be found in the Appendix on page 68.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Natsuhara, Mr. Secretary, whenever you are ready, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER M. NATSUHARA, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Good afternoon, sir. Thank you, Chairman 

Ortiz, Representative Forbes, and members of the subcommittee. I 

am pleased to appear before you today to provide an overview of 

the Department of the Navy’s investments in its shore infrastructure. 

The department’s fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $14.9 

billion in investment in our installations. Our request for base operating support is $6.9 billion, which includes $450 million for environmental programs. The military construction request of $3.9 billion remains at a historic high. Our program continues the efforts 

to ensure facilities are in place to support the Marine Corps end 

strength of 202,100 active duty personnel. 

We are investing over $700 million in funding for the construction of unaccompanied housing to support single sailors and Marines. These funds support requirements associated with the Marine Corps Grow the Force initiative and the Chief of Naval Operations commitment to achieve Homeport Ashore by 2016. 

The MILCON [military construction] request also provides further investments to relocate Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The 

projects funded by this level of investment provide the enduring infrastructure necessary to enable the construction program for fiscal 

year 2012 and beyond. The governor of Japan in his fiscal year 

2010 budget has requested a comparable amount of $498 million, 

and we expect to receive their contribution in June. 

Regarding the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] for the 

Guam relocation, as it is designed to do, the National Environmental Policy Act process and associated studies are helping us 

identify and address environmental issues and constraints and develop effective mitigation strategies. To that end we are currently 

analyzing all public comments, including those received from other 

resource agencies, in developing strategies for addressing concerns 
8 

raised in the final EIS. We are committed to developing effective 

and appropriate mitigation. 

The family housing request will provide for the recapitalization 

of overseas housing as well as additional privatization to address 

the Marine Corps’ Grow the Force initiative. 

Regarding prior BRAC, we do not foresee much potential for 

large revenue from land sales. Thus, we again seek appropriated 

funds in fiscal year 2011 in the amount of $162 million. The BRAC 

2005 budget request of $342 million supports outfitting, realignment and closure functions as the necessary construction projects 

were funded in prior years. We are on track for full compliance 

with statutory requirements by the September 15, 2011 deadline. Finally, the department is investing an additional $174 million 

to support the Secretary of the Navy’s aggressive energy goals to 

increase energy security, reduce dependency on fossil fuels, and 

promote good stewardship of the environment. 

In closing, your support of the department’s fiscal year 2011 

budget request will ensure the department is able to build and 

maintain facilities that will enable our Navy and Marine Corps to 

meet the diverse challenges of tomorrow. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Natsuhara can be found in the 

Appendix on page 84.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Sir. 

Secretary Ferguson? Thank you. Good to see you again. Thank 

you for joining us. 

Ms. FERGUSON. Good to see you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Whenever you are ready. 

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN I. FERGUSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTALLATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Ms. FERGUSON. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, and distinguished members of the committee, good afternoon. And thank 

you for inviting me here today to address the Air Force’s military 

construction, family housing, and BRAC implementation programs. 

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for its continued 

support of our Air Force and the thousands of dedicated and brave 

airmen and their families serving our great Nation. Today more 

than 26,000 airmen are deployed in support of ongoing operations 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and many other locations. 

The ability of those airmen to perform their worldwide missions is 

directly affected by the quality of resources at their disposal, access 

to quality facilities, a robust logistics infrastructure for 

sustainment, and a confidence that while they are deployed their 

families are well taken care of. 

Air Force MILCON, family housing, and BRAC programs form 

the foundation of our installations support infrastructure and provide the direct support responsible for meeting the needs of our airmen and their families. Our fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request contains $5.5 billion for facility maintenance, military construction, military family housing, and BRAC, and is a 3.8 percent 

increase above our fiscal year 2010 request. 
9 

Our facility maintenance and repair account represents the largest portion of the request, with $3.1 billion to maintain Air Force 

installations, including the six installations recently transferred to 

the Air Force through joint basing. 

The $1.5 billion military construction request ensures that construction is aligned with weapon system deliveries and strategic 

basing initiatives while we continue to accept some risk in aging 

infrastructure recapitalization. 

We also request a total of $252 million to continue implementing 

our BRAC 2005 program requirements as well as our legacy BRAC 

programs and environmental cleanup. 

I would like to close by briefly mentioning the Air Force’s efforts 

in executing BRAC recommendations. To implement the assigned 

recommendation, the Air Force’s plan calls for execution of nearly 

400 separate actions, utilizing a budget that has been and remains 

fully funded at approximately $3.8 billion. Two-thirds of this budget went towards military construction. 

Our BRAC MILCON program will make its last contract award 

before the close of this fiscal year, and in total we will execute 231 

BRAC MILCON projects on 54 installations in 36 states. I am confident in telling you the Air Force will complete implementation of 

BRAC 2005 on time and within budget. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes, this concludes my remarks. 

Thank you and the committee again for your continued support of 

our airmen and their families. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferguson can be found in the Appendix on page 112.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

After consultation with the minority, I now ask unanimous consent that Mr. Rush Holt from New Jersey be authorized to question 

the panel members at today’s hearing. Mr. Holt will be recognized 

after all House Armed Services Committee members have had an 

opportunity to ask questions. 

Is there any objection? 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

We will recognize you when the time comes, Mr. Holt. 

Let me ask a question, but I would like to allow members to have 

time to also ask questions. 

But, Secretary Robyn, I have been briefed on the implementation 

of BRAC 2005, and I am concerned about a recent proposal by the 

Administration to continue to accelerate contracts, you know, at a 

cost of several hundred million dollars. And I am also concerned 

that this Administration considers putting organizations in trailers. 

And we discussed this a little bit a few moments ago. 

As long as a long-term BRAC solution, considering the numerous 

issues that are facing the Department in implementing BRAC, 

maybe you could elaborate on some of the problems that you are 

facing and provide some perspective as to whether BRAC should be 

legislatively extended as well for certain BRAC recommendations. 

If you can touch on those two questions about the trailers and 

BRAC. 

Dr. ROBYN. Good. Thank you for the opportunity to answer that. 
10 

First of all, let me say no trailers. There are no trailers. And I 

will let Joe Calcara talk about what relocatables mean, that they 

are very different than trailers. This is a modular construction that 

is used widely and can be very high quality. 

Let me just say a word about why BRAC is important and why 

I think it doesn’t lend itself to a narrow cost-benefit analysis when 

you get down to this stage, why achieving the deadline, why meeting the deadline is so important and why the Department has 

worked so hard to avoid missing a deadline in the last four rounds 

of BRAC. 

First of all, it means that we are achieving the benefits that 

BRAC brings sooner rather than later. It marks an end of the turmoil that the transition represents. You get the contractors off the 

base. It is the end of all the turmoil that goes with BRAC. It preserves the discipline on us, and that is probably the single most important reason. 

The nature of BRAC is that we tie our hands. You tie your 

hands. We all agreed to tie our hands. It is like putting a lock on 

the refrigerator door. It is a conscious decision we make, knowing 

that we need discipline. And we have got to maintain that discipline. 

And finally, it provides communities with a sense of certainty 

about when this is going to be over. So for all of those reasons, 

meeting the deadline takes on an importance beyond the letter of 

the law or a narrow cost-benefit analysis. And it is in that spirit 

that we are opting to spend some additional money. I don’t think 

we are sacrificing quality. 

BRAC has been an engine of recapitalization for our facilities. 

Seventy percent of the cost of this BRAC has gone to military construction. In contrast to previous rounds, it was about half—less 

than half that. So we have used the opportunity of BRAC to do an 

enormous amount of construction beyond what we initially envisioned, building new high-quality buildings rather than doing a 

band-aid approach. 

So I don’t think there has been a trade-off on quality at any 

point, and I think that that is also the case for the ones that are 

going to come close to the deadline. So we think we can make the 

deadline. We think it is worth spending a little bit more money. We 

will keep you all posted regularly on the progress of implementation at those spaces, but we think we are in good shape. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Secretary Calcara, I have another question. I know 

you expanded on it a little bit a few moments ago, but maybe you 

can give us a little more input. I understand that the Army is reviewing options to reprogram funds into the Army base operating 

services account for 2010. Absent this reprogramming, I understand that the Army would need to reduce services at Army installations by about 20 percent. I would encourage you to expeditiously 

reprogram those funds. You touched a little bit on it a few moments ago. 

I am also concerned about the apparent shortfalls of funds in the 

President’s budget request for 2011. Can you explain the impact to 

Army installations if funds are provided at the requested amount 

for 2011? And what additional funds would be needed to sustain 
11 

the current level of service in both 2010 and 2011? Can you help 

us a little bit on that? 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. And I am glad we start with 2010, because that kind of tees up the context and the point of reference 

for 2011. We have a $1.5 billion purchasing power shortfall as a result of some more discipline in how we are using OCO funds. I 

know you have heard the sound bites on this before, but as we 

were growing the Army, we needed to use all our accounts. We had 

some flexibility to get resources in place to support Grow the Army, 

and the base operating support account benefited from the ability 

of the overseas contingency account. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget went to the Hill. The doctrinal 

change was to be more pure like it used to be and not access those 

dollars, so what we essentially found ourselves doing was looking 

at how much money we had and what was our purchasing shortfall. I know you have heard the number $1.5 billion. 

We quickly decided what was going to be a must-fund and what 

areas we would explore savings and efficiencies with. And it is important to note that base operating support is a huge array of services. It is 49 functional areas, 267 products and services, 364 functional specialties inside those products and services. It is a wide 

array of products and services that feed off of that. 

What we have done is we have essentially developed a strategy 

that we have already achieved one-third savings in those without 

a loss in provision of the services, so $500 million off the top. We 

already have identified about a third of it that we can achieve suggest savings without any reductions to the things that I mentioned 

before, ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation], Family Covenant, as 

well as Life Safety. 

Another third of the issue we will need help on, and we don’t think we will be able to get there, and that is what the $500 million request is about. 

The remaining third, which would constitute roughly about five 

to six percent of the overall BOS account, we think it is a manageable risk at this point. We are going to address it at midyear, and 

it is probably no different than we have had every other year at 

this point going into midyear or five percent challenge. 

Now, all that information as it relates to 2011, I told you we 

found one-third of the efficiencies we will be able to carry those forward to next year. We also have built a budget with one-third of 

the migration that was needed from the contingency account into 

BOS next year. So going into next year, a lot of numbers I threw 

at you were basically looking at that same five to seven percent 

risk target that we would address again at midyear with the covenant that we will not cut anything in Army Force Generation, the 

Family Covenant or the Life Safety. 

So put another way, we are taking a five percent risk going into 

midyear, not unmanageable, not unprecedented, sort of what happens every year due to unavoidable circumstances, tornadoes, electricity increases, things of that nature. 

Mr. ORTIZ. So you to feel comfortable with the strategy that it 

is going to work and the families and the soldiers will continue to 

receive the services that we have been providing in the past to 

them. 
12 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. As a career civilian, 27 years in the installation business, yes, I rattled off the 364 products and services 

in the functional areas, I have looked at every one of these very, 

very in tune to this issue since it arose last few months, so I think 

we are okay. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

My good friend, Mr. Forbes, for any questions he might have. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions, but 

as long as our witnesses are going to be here, I would like to defer 

mine to the end so that the other members can get theirs in, since 

they have five-minute limits. Is that okay? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir. We can do that. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

And thank you, guests, for being here today. 

Madam Secretary, this question would probably be directed to 

you, and if anybody else can help me on this. I represent the 8th 

District of North Carolina, and the base, Fort Bragg, while it is not 

in our district, the reservation is, and vast numbers of the troops 

that work out of the base are living in the district. We are exceptionally fortunate in that BRAC is bringing in a lot of command 

and new operations to Fort Bragg, and once again we are exceptionally appreciative of that, glad of that, and looking forward to 

that. 

One area of opportunity that that presents for our part of the 

world is education. And while you mentioned about the upgrades 

in the schools on base, which we once again are very glad that it 

is happening, we do have outlying areas that we are seeing significant increases in populations that are already here and that are 

coming. 

I went to an elementary school on base—excuse me, in my district. I was talking to fourth graders and asked them how many of 

them had at least one or both parents in the military, and probably 

three-fourths of the young people raised their hand. This was a 

school that did have trailers on it, is overcrowded. It is a poor county, and for them to have all of the things ready in terms of water 

and sewage and transportation, fire, police, and to build new 

schools is a significant challenge. 

So what do I tell this county that is wanting to provide the best 

of facilities for the children of our warriors? And we of course know 

the soldiers want the best facilities for their children when we have 

these overcrowded situations and hard-pressed to find funds to 

build the schools for them. What do I tell these people? 

Dr. ROBYN. I don’t know that I have an answer that will satisfy 

you. This is a new problem as far, as I am aware, to the 2005 

round. When I worked with BRAC communities in the 1990s, they 

were communities where we were closing bases. And when I met 

with the Association of Defense Communities in August shortly 

after I got on the job, I was surprised to see how many of the communities who came to meet with me were ones like the communities you are describing that were faced with too much of a good 

thing, one might say. 
13 

In the transportation area I can say that we, of course, have historically funded projects that set the DAR criteria, the defense access roads criteria. Those criteria probably are outdated. The National Academy of Sciences is actually looking at that question of 

should the DAR criteria be updated to take account of the fact that 

the old criteria don’t meet today’s situation. 

In the area of schools, we simply don’t do construction outside of 

the fence. We don’t have that authority. There have been times 

where we have been directed to pay for schools, the upgrading of 

schools, but that is not something that we take on. 

The theory is that the Impact Aid that the department provides 

to the community, together with the increase in property taxes for 

at least for families that live off the base, will provide revenue, 

which can be used to—or the promise of which can be used to float 

bonds. But I recognize that there is a difficult transition there, and 

sometimes the troops show up before that can happen. 

The Office of Economic Adjustment—I know I met with folks 

from around Fort Bragg. I know that OEA [the Office of Economic 

Adjustment] is working with them to provide planning grants and 

technical assistance, but, unfortunately, not construction. 

Mr. CALCARA. Sir, if I may, there are two schools in the fiscal 

year 2011 program for Fort Bragg. I am sure you are aware of 

that—$45 million. I would also tell you that 50 percent of our service members who are living off post are homeowners in and around 

Fort Bragg and are, in addition to getting Impact Aid, are paying 

property tax as well, which would generate, obviously, revenues for 

the local school district. 

I would also tell you that in our RCI [Residential Communities 

Initiative] project, our privatization project on post, that the developer is paying property taxes on the improvements as well. So, you 

know, you have to sort of cobble together all the sources that are 

out there to help with the school issue in addition to the $45 million that we have in DOD [Department of Defense] projects. 

And I think, really, when you get into it, the issue with the 

schools is that the Impact Aid is paid in arrears after the students 

are through a school year. And my understanding of the challenge 

is to try to get Department of Education to pay that Impact Aid 

prospectively to get out ahead of the requirement. So perhaps there 

is, you know, a legislative approach there to try to—to help that, 

but it would be a Department of Education sort of approach. 

Mr. KISSELL. And that is an issue, and I appreciate your answers, and we will continue to look, because the property taxes do 

help, but once again, you have the challenge of meeting this ready 

to go now, and some of this is coming to us. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

Thank you for being here. 

This question is about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. It is the 

oldest continuously operating shipyard in the Navy. It was opened 

by John Adams 210 years ago. This is a shipyard that does terrific 

work by everybody’s standards. Its primary mission is the overhaul, repair, and the modernization of submarines, and they do 

complex assignments well, especially considering the antiquated fa-
14 

cilities and the lack of support from the Navy over the last three 

decades. 

Since 1971, for 39 years, the MILCON projects have not been 

provided through the Navy. My question is why. The new Virginia- class subs have begun arriving at the shipyard. This is very critical. We have had to rely on earmarks, and I would like to know 

why the Navy keeps leaving the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard off 

the MILCON list. Thank you. I look forward to your answer. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Thank you, ma’am. 

The Navy programs several accounts, as you know. How do we 

revitalize and sustain our bases? It is true that we have not had 

MILCON program for Portsmouth recently, but there are in the fiscal year 2010 budget. We do—— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. May I just add ‘‘recently’’ is 39 years? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. In 2010, as an example, we have six special 

projects for $35 million that is going to go into the shipyard to help 

sustain it, revitalize it, and some of those are revitalization and 

modernization projects. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. You are aware, I am sure, that the waterfront support facility was built 68 years ago, that there are a 

large number of buildings that are now 100 years old. There are 

electrical code violations, environmental violations, et cetera. And 

do you have any hope of providing some funding here? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I am not aware of a project directly related to 

those. I will find out about those and get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. I would appreciate that. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The chairman of the Seapower Committee, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of the witnesses. 

Mr. Calcara—is that proper pronunciation? 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is a question more in generalities than in specifics, but it has struck me that the neighborhood of Camp Shelby, 

Mississippi, near Hattiesburg, the Army has been renting an extraordinarily high number of homes since 2001. At what point does 

someone in the Army take a look and say, ‘‘Wouldn’t we be better 

stewards of the taxpayers’ money if we built additional housing on 

Camp Shelby rather than—‘‘ 

And again, I have mixed feelings on this. Obviously, it is great 

for the hotels in Hattiesburg. On the flip side, I have a Nation with 

a trillion-dollar annual operating deficit, and I would hope that 

someone in the Army—and I realize that is probably two different 

slices of the pizza; everybody worries about their slice and not 

reaching in the other ones—but at some point who in the Army 

looks at things like that? Because I am sure that is not unique to 

Camp Shelby. 

So who in your organization that is out there and says, ‘‘You 

know what? We would be better off building additional barracks on 
15 

property we already own rather than every month paying, boy, literally every day paying for hotel rooms?’’ 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. The actual Defense Department policy is 

to rely on the private sector first for provision of the housing solution. That is only to invest in government-owned assets where the 

private sector cannot respond. 

And every two years we do something called a housing market 

analysis, which is the study of the available assets that are in the 

economy, on the economy, that are suitable and can meet our 

needs. And the needs are tied to, you know, allowances or leasing 

controls that we have in the program, with the thought being that 

it is always, while it appears cheaper in upfront costs to build 

housing and manage it, over the lifecycle it is an operating liability, 

which is partly the reason why we go to privatization projects. 

A lot of words there, but the issue revolves around do we have 

a requirement that is large enough that cannot be met through the 

use of off-post solution, and if it is large enough, is the project 

financeable? Is there a business case for it to work in either our 

Residential Communities Initiative or through a lodging type solution? 

I am not aware of the Camp Shelby analytics for the requirement. I will certainly look into it for you and—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. And again, I have mixed feelings on this, that I think your per diem is approximately $90 a day. 

Mr. CALCARA. Correct. 

Mr. TAYLOR. It has made a heck of a lot of hotel owners very happy. On the flip side of this, $2,700 a month, and even in Washington, D.C., you can rent a very nice apartment for $2,700 a 

month. And I have got to believe that someone in the United States 

Army is clever enough to say, ‘‘You know what? We could build a 

building for less than that.’’ 

And I am just—again, we have a—and I am—— 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am picking on you individually. I am sure each of 

the services is doing this because of the surges required for the 

war. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But that is a specific that I am aware of, and that 

is why you are on the receiving end of this. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes. We do have a project in the FYDP that one 

of my lifelines in the back just passed me a note. We do have a 

project in the fiscal year 2012 program that we are currently looking at to accommodate that need. So my sense is we have in fact 

done that market analysis that I mentioned, and it appears that, 

at least at this point in time, sizing up a project for Camp Shelby 

in 2012 may in fact happen. 

I do want to make sure you see the full picture, though. It is not 

just the per diem. You know, we then have the lifecycle management and recapitalization. So when you see that per diem rate that 

we are paying, that gives us the flexibility to avoid carrying that 

long-term, you know, recap issue. So that is why, you know, part 

of the business case decision is to look at that. But—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, let me ask you this. Could someone brief me 

at some point, or possibly the committee? I would like to see your 
16 

business plan on this. What is your threshold? And how and when 

do you make that decision? Because I think it is something that I 

would certainly like to know about, and I believe the committee 

would like to know about. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. We will certainly do that as we queue up 

these projects. I would tell you, not to be curt in the answer, but 

it is sort of a site-specific ‘‘it depends’’ kind of an answer. You 

know, how much is the construction? What is the size of the 

project? Projects have to be a certain size to put them in a privatization model. They have to be a certain size to be efficient to get 

funding through a MILCON solution, but we can do that for you. 

We will certainly schedule that and come over and see you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I think Mr. Taylor has raised a very important point 

there, and thank you for responding to this question and meeting 

with him. 

Now I will yield to Mr. Holt, and then from then I will go to my 

ranking member, Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to direct my questions to Dr. Robyn. But first of all 

calling my colleagues’ attention to Dr. Robyn’s biography, I noticed 

the association with the Office of Technology Assessment, and I 

hope that another time in a different forum, she would join me in 

pointing out the excellent work that the OTA [the Office of Technology Assessment] did in the past and the continuing need we 

have today for the kind of excellent work that OTA did. 

Dr. ROBYN. Sir, you are a hero to all OTA alums. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you. As you may be aware, I and other members from the New Jersey delegation wrote to the President last 

year urging him to re-examine the decision to close Fort Monmouth, whose personnel are absolutely critical to our ability to provide proper intelligence and communications support for deployed 

troops. 

I know this Administration did not make that ill-advised decision, but since we now know that the cost estimates were bogus, 

that although the data manipulation and to support a foregone conclusion and the stacked deck and the information improperly withheld from the commission may not have been criminal, nevertheless they were surely regrettable. 

I want to ask you about it. A number of people associated with 

Fort Monmouth, both on the giving and receiving end, those who 

are doing the work there and those in the field, who depend on the 

C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] services, goods and services, coming from there, tell me, well, in the words of one retired 

Army colonel, ‘‘How can the Army continue to support a move that 

is flawed, way over budget, and cannot justify any cost savings at 

all?’’ 

But well beyond the financial and fiscal concern, what bothers 

many of us is that the soldiers in the field are not getting and will 

not get the C4ISR support they need, with deadly results. 

Well, just to elaborate on that, the Government Accountability 

Office has reported that if Fort Monmouth closes on schedule, the 
17 

Army will be short, perhaps, 2,200 personnel. Now, these are very 

specialized personnel—engineering, procurement, and so forth— 

2,200 personnel that it will need to properly support our deployed 

troops. 

So my question is, will the Administration be revisiting the closure decision? 

Dr. ROBYN. I really want to hand that one off to Joe Calcara. I 

feel certain the answer is no, but I can’t—I know there is a long, 

long history, painful history surrounding the Monmouth closure, 

and I can take it for the record. I should probably also give—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. HOLT. If you would, please. 

Dr. ROBYN [continuing]. Joe a shot at it. 

Mr. HOLT. I am not alone in this. And as I say, you know, this 

retired colonel writes me and says, ‘‘How can you do this when 

there are no cost savings at all?’’ What people will not say on the 

record, but will say to me, is because the men and women in the 

field don’t have somebody on the other end of the—or will not have 

somebody on the other end of the line when they call back and say, 

‘‘We need an upgrade for IED [Improvised Explosive Device] detection; we need this week’s upgrade,’’ and there won’t be anybody on 

the other end of the line, they believe this is not just a financially 

flawed decision. 

Mr. CALCARA. Sir, if I may—— 

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CALCARA [continuing]. And I am also from New Jersey, so 

hopefully you will be easy on me as well. 

Mr. HOLT. Okay. But let me say right up front this is not a New 

Jersey parochial interest. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOLT. And I resent it if people say that is what it is about, 

sir. 

Mr. CALCARA. And I was going to actually answer and comment 

on it in a larger BRAC concept as we talk about cost growth at a 

location for additional capacity or a feature that was not included 

or the other sundry reasons that the budget grows for a move. 

But my comment is the payback period is still there. Now, it may 

not be as it was in—— 

Mr. HOLT. Does for decades count? 

Mr. CALCARA. Well, I will tell you the numbers that we have on 

Fort Monmouth, even with additional growth, are justifying maybe 

an eight to nine-year payback versus six. 

I would also tell you that on a monthly basis, on a monthly basis, 

we get together the entire Army staff, command by command, and 

go through each of these locations from a human capital realignment standpoint, as well as the construction piece, which is kind 

of my lane. 

And in each individual base case, base location, we have the 

human resources people tracking the recruiting, the movements. 

And I guess I have not heard yet that there is a loss or there is 

a dramatic concern for intellectual capital at the APG [Aberdeen 

Proving Ground] receiver site. The job market is tough. There are 
18 

people who are changing their minds to move from New Jersey. I 

left New Jersey. There is life outside of New Jersey. 

Mr. HOLT. Yes, Mr. Calcara. Indeed, it was predicted that 25 percent of the people would move to Aberdeen. It now looks like 50 

percent. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. And growing every day. 

Mr. HOLT. That means 50—no, no, it is leveling off at that, at 

50 percent. And you will not find the other 50 percent, and specialized engineers who can do communications in a noisy environment 

or IED detection or whatever it may be, you will not find them 

from temporary service employers. So the Government Accountability Office was very clear it will be mid-decade before the shortfall will be filled in. 

With the gentleman’s permission, I would just like to ask one 

more question of Dr. Robyn. 

The Army Materiel Command has repeatedly resisted any effort, 

so if the answer is no, this will not be revisited, the Materiel Command has repeatedly resisted efforts to create a backstop capability 

for the services that Fort Monmouth currently provides. 

The State of New Jersey has created a nonprofit technology solutions center that could help provide precisely that capability using 

the talent in the area, especially the current Fort Monmouth employees, who have chosen for various family and personal reasons 

not to move. 

We know that the McAfee Center, which is barely a decade old 

and has been a nerve center for the Army’s key intelligence and 

communications programs, is still a very usable facility and will be 

for years to come. Can I have your commitment that you will work 

with me on this issue for, one, to ensure that the no-cost conveyance is available for the McAfee Center and that the department 

will work with this technology solutions center to see that the 

Army does have the technical backstop capability that the men and 

women in the field really, really need? 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes, no, absolutely I would work with you. I don’t 

know if it is a no-cost or another kind of, you know, cost EDC [Economic Development Conveyance], but yes, I specialize in EDCs. I 

would love to work with you on that, as well as the other issue. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you. 

Thank you for your generous consideration, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And once again, thank all of you for being here. 

And, Mr. Natsuhara, I would like to ask you a question. It is 

kind of a follow-up for what Congresswoman Shea-Porter was talking about with the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the fact that 

the Navy has not had a major MILCON project, I think, you said 

for 39 years there. 

How does the Navy view that shipyard? Is it a priority? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. The Navy only has two shipyards on the East 

Coast, Portsmouth and Norfolk, and, yes, both shipyards are a priority to the Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. Wouldn’t you say it would be a critical priority? 
19 

Mr. NATSUHARA. They are a priority of the Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. And would you say the Norfolk Naval Shipyard’s 

also a critical priority? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. They are both critical assets. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Robyn, thank you for being here again with us. 

And we appreciate your willingness to and patience to put up with 

us as we fumble through these questions, but we have had a lot 

of questions about BRAC. What was the purpose of BRAC? 

Now, in full disclosure most of us were against BRAC, but what 

was the purpose for BRAC in a capsulized 60-second version, if you 

could give it to me? 

Dr. ROBYN. The early BRAC rounds were—— 

Mr. FORBES. The last one. 

Dr. ROBYN. The last one was focused on enhancing military capability as opposed to getting rid of excess capacity, which was the 

traditional rationale. 

Mr. FORBES. So it was enhancing our capability. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. Was that by expanding facilities, the number of facilities we had, or by consolidating facilities? Or where was the emphasis there? 

Dr. ROBYN. I think both. I think the individual service representatives can probably give you better examples, but it was focused on 

military capability. Jointness was a major component. I mean, 

there are a number of focus areas, but certainly, consolidation has 

been a big issue, as you have heard from some of the communities 

that are suffering from too much of a good thing, but also the expansion of the receiving facilities. 

Mr. FORBES. So would it be fair to say—and again, don’t let me 

put words in your mouth; I know you won’t—but it was designed 

to increase our capability. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. We were looking—— 

Dr. ROBYN. That was the overarching—— 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Where we needed to increase our capabilities and the needs we had to increase those capabilities. Consolidation not for consolidation’s sake, I would take it, but for the 

purpose of increasing our capability and perhaps efficiencies. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. And then jointness. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. And then also cost efficiency. Fair that we would do 

that. 

Mr. Natsuhara, you agree with Dr. Robyn? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. The reason I want to ask you that is tell me 

why, if we were looking during BRAC at increasing our capabilities, at consolidation for efficiency’s sake, at jointness, why was the 

transfer of a carrier from Norfolk to Mayport not even raised in 

that process? 

And tell me what has happened from the time that BRAC started to today why the Navy considers that now a greater priority 

than spending money at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard or spending money at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard or for that matter any 
20 

of our other shipyards that have about a $3 billion backlog right 

now. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I am not sure—— 

Mr. FORBES. What happened different? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I am not sure why or what went through the 

process of the BRAC 2005, Navy BRAC 2005. The Navy BRAC 

2005 was one of the smallest BRAC rounds we have had. We did 

quite a bit of BRAC in the earlier rounds, especially 1991, 1993, 

1995 timeframe, so we didn’t have many major bases closing. We 

had a lot of realignment in that during that round, especially of our 

reserve bases. 

As far as why we are moving a carrier to—— 

Mr. FORBES. That is not my question. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. My question is what happened between the time of 

BRAC, when those kinds of issues were being considered and looking at, and today that changed so that the Navy is now considering 

doing that? Has anything changed in that time period? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I am not aware of those discussions and 

what—— 

Mr. FORBES. So then when we looked at BRAC with our goal, 

stated goal—Dr. Robyn is, I think, absolutely correct—looking at 

the capabilities we needed, consolidation that should take place, 

jointness, cost efficiency, the carrier wasn’t even on the radar 

screen. But something happened between then and now to not just 

put it on the radar screen, but to put it above the Portsmouth 

Naval Shipyard and the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. 

And the reason I raise that is because I understand from Admiral Roughead’s testimony in the Senate for the fiscal year 2009 

budget testimony, he said that future shore readiness is at risk. 

And we know that there is now a backlog for installations of $36.6 

billion. 

So my question to you is if in fact the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a critical shipyard, which I believe it to be, if the Norfolk 

Naval Shipyard is critical, what is it that makes spending either 

$590 million or what many estimates are up to $1 billion to move 

a carrier to Mayport more important than funding projects at 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, which 

the Admiral has said is putting us at a place right now where our 

shore readiness is at risk? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. We tried to balance all the critical needs of the 

Navy, of the Department, across multiple years. So it is not that 

we are placing it more important than Portsmouth or—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am not—Mr. Natsuhara—and I don’t want to interrupt you, but if my friend and colleague down here is correct, 

and I know she would not say something that she didn’t believe to 

be correct, 39 years is a long time to balance or to stretch over 

years. 

And when we have this major process of BRAC taking place, 

where we were supposed to look at all this, whether we make good 

decisions or not at Monmouth, I mean, you know, that is open to 

argument, but we all know that is when it was all put on the table. 

The carrier wasn’t a blip on the screen. Nobody mentioned it. No-
21 

body said, ‘‘Oh, let us look at that, not at look at it.’’ It wasn’t even 

done. 

These projects have been on the screen for 39 years, and all of 

a sudden the Navy is coming up and saying, ‘‘Oh, all of a sudden 

it is so vital that we do this’’, even though all the evidence suggests 

it is a very, very small risk. It has some of us up here scratching 

our head and saying, ‘‘Why, when you said you needed so much 

money and you have got future shore readiness at risk, you can’t 

put a dime for these MILCON projects in shipyards that you admit 

are critical?’’ 

And by the way, in the Norfolk Shipyard, which I think is critical, just like Portsmouth, you have bumped a facility from 2011 for 

controlled industrial facility—well, now you want to do one at 

Mayport. And yet Admiral Greenert the other day said all the 

docking availabilities for the carrier were going to be done in Norfolk. Explain why that is smart allocation of dollars. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. From a critical infrastructure we look at—and 

I am not sure what happened during BRAC—but we continually 

evaluate all the risk to the fleet, and after 2005 it was determined 

by the Navy that the critical infrastructure, the consequences of 

losing the only nuclear repair capability, was too great of a risk to 

the Nation, not that whether it is Portsmouth, Norfolk aren’t important, but—— 

Mr. FORBES. Now, tell me what are you talking about—the only 

repair facility? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Nuclear carrier repair facility. 

Mr. FORBES. Where are those carriers built? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. At Newport News in—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So you are talking about the only one. You 

have got Norfolk Naval Shipyard—— 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Right. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. And you have got Newport News, 

which is just down the river. So you wouldn’t lose them both at one 

time. You would still have the very place that you built the carrier, 

wouldn’t you? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. They are in the same geographic location that 

our nuclear capability—repair capability, so from a critical infrastructure, the consequences of losing the carrier, that repair capability in the Hampton Roads area, I look at it from the facilities 

of if we were to lose that repair capability in the Hampton Roads 

area, what would be the impact? And how would we recover? It is 

a—it is a large risk to the—— 

Mr. FORBES. But none of that risk was raised during BRAC, was 

it, at all? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I am not—— 

Mr. FORBES. Let me just say it wasn’t. Let me ask you this question. I have a letter here from Senator Jim Webb, as you know, 

former Secretary of the Navy, now on the Senate Armed Services 

Committee. And he says this. He said, ‘‘Stewardship of taxpayer 

dollars demands that the Navy first maintain its existing facilities 

properly before investing what could be up to $1 billion to build a 

new controlled industrial facility in Mayport to support a nuclearpowered aircraft carrier.’’ 
22 

You just disagree, and you think Senator Webb is wrong on that, 

don’t you? Or do you? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I think that in order for this country to be able 

to live with the risk of the consequence of losing that capability in 

the Hampton Roads area is just too great of a risk, if we were to 

lose that. 

Mr. FORBES. The last thing I want to ask you is this, and this 

is something you are going to need to get back to me on. In the 

QDR, were any lobbyists involved in the QDR and the decisions 

that were put in the QDR? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. I am not aware of any, but I will take that for 

the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. FORBES. Would you think it would be inappropriate if there 

were? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. I am going to ask you, if you would, and this is 

based on Senator Webb’s letter to Secretary Lynn on December 

23rd, 2009, when he asked for this information. I am going to ask 

that you get this back to us. He asked at this point in time if— 

he said, ‘‘If you could give us information if whether or not in the 

past two years Admiral Natter has’’—let me get his exact wording, 

because I want to read this to you exactly. 

What he has asked is this. He says that ‘‘during the past two 

years, Admiral Natter has firmly advocated the Navy’s carrier 

homeporting proposal for Mayport. Unfortunately, press reports 

quoting his views do not generally reveal that he is a paid lobbyist 

for the state of Florida and the city of Jacksonville, Florida. In addition to his Department of Defense contracts in the Four-Star for 

Hire mentor program, USA Today reported that he is also defense 

consultant and a board member of weapons maker BAE Systems. 

From 2004 through 2006, his firm received $1.5 million from the 

state of Florida to lobby the Navy and Congress on base closing decisions, federal lobbying records show.’’ This is Senator Webb’s letter. 

And the question he asked is whether or not you could give information as to whether or not Admiral Natter had any contact with 

anyone regarding the QDR when that was brought forward. So I 

just ask in compliance with Senator Webb’s letter, if you would follow up and give us that information, if any of it exists. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

I would like to go back to Dr. Robyn. And, Dr. Robyn, these are 

questions I just don’t have answers for. I would just ask, and if you 

don’t know, I mean, you can get back to me with them. 

But the President’s budget didn’t include more than $1 billion for 

MILCON in Afghanistan. As you heard in my opening remarks, 

none of those projects are going to be completed by July 2011, the 

date the President said we would begin our drawdown of forces 

there. Explain. 
23 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I think it is sort of implicit in what you just 

said. That is the beginning of the drawdown, not the end of the 

drawdown. And as Secretary Gates has said, the transfer of security responsibility to the Afghans will be based on conditions on the 

ground, so we are not leaving on the—I mean, we will begin that 

process, but we won’t end. And these are facilities that will provide 

support. 

Mr. FORBES. The curves, though, just seem to be going the wrong 

direction. I mean, and maybe just explain, if you would, to me, you 

know, we have got a curve where our constructions aren’t going to 

be done, and about $1 billion, and we are talking about leaving. Is 

that because we are just having a few people leave, and we are still 

going to have a large number there, or—I mean, I would just think 

we would want to make sure we were going to have a pretty sizable 

force there, if we were going to spend $1 billion in these MILCON 

projects. 

Dr. ROBYN. I definitely don’t want to be speaking to our policy 

in Afghanistan and how—— 

Mr. FORBES. No, no, I am asking you to speak to the budget. 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. No, I think the answer is we start leaving then. 

The pace at which we leave is to be determined. There are military 

construction needs for the time that we are there. 

Mr. FORBES. Would it be fair to say, though, if we were going to have $1 billion of MILCON for Afghanistan and not a single one 

of those projects completed before July of 2011, we were planning 

on having a fairly significant number of people there to use those 

projects, or else we wouldn’t be building them? 

Dr. ROBYN. I would not want to speculate on that. 

Mr. FORBES. Would it make good economic sense from a budgetary matter for us to be spending $1 billion for projects when we 

have—— 

Dr. ROBYN. It could well. I mean, we are, you know, we are at 

war. We are trying to win a war, and MILCON is—— 

Mr. FORBES. But if we are going to spending them after we leave 

that war, that wouldn’t make too much sense, would it? 

Dr. ROBYN. I don’t think that is the plan, but I think it is to— 

we need support while we are there. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Help me with this one, then. The President’s 

budget also—and this I said in my opening remarks, too—includes 

funding for facilities in the United States for Army and Air Force 

units currently based in Europe, even though the QDR was silent 

on whether or not the Army brigade combat teams or Air Force 

fighter squadrons were indeed returning to the United States. 

If we are spending money here for them, are they coming back? 

Or are they staying there? And if we don’t know, why are we 

spending money—— 

Dr. ROBYN. My understanding is that decision on how many will 

stay versus come here is to be made this fall in a NATO forum. 

Mr. FORBES. And I understand that. I am not arguing that. I am 

just saying shouldn’t I know that decision? Am I getting the cart 

before the horse? Shouldn’t I know that decision before I spend the 

money for the facilities to put them there, if I don’t even know 

whether they are coming back? 

And anybody can—Mr. Calcara? 
24 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, Mr. Forbes. I would just make two points. 

You know, we are kind of hamstrung without contingency construction authority over there to respond to emerging needs on the 

ground. So to the extent that we don’t have the access to that authority, we have positioned these projects in the budget. 

I would suggest to you that at some point, if in fact we did not 

need them, we would cancel the projects. So we are sort of between 

a rock and a hard place here. Without the CCA [contingency construction authority], you know, we had to go down this programming approach. 

The second thing I would suggest to you is that once we get out 

of the warfighting business over there, I do believe there is a value 

in having facilities there for the train and sustain, the peacekeeping mission for the Afghan forces. 

Mr. FORBES. So just to make sure I am clear, we are back on Afghanistan. You kind of switched horses on me there. That is okay. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. But I understand—and fair, good analogy. 

Mr. CALCARA. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. Are you going to take a bite? I am sorry. I will pass 

on some notes. I guess you got the last one on it, and that is fine. 

But tell me about the Europe situation. 

Mr. CALCARA. Well, you know, the Europe situation, you start 

looking at it in terms of, you know, business case and the value of 

relationships in theater and having strategic assets in a geographic 

location. 

Mr. FORBES. No, no. Got you there. I understand that. But if we 

are going to make that decision, shouldn’t we know whether we are 

going to change that dynamic before we spend money for the facilities? That is all I am asking. 

Mr. CALCARA. I think, you know, I am hesitating with a yes or 

no answer, because it is a dynamic situation. You make the best 

decision when you have to develop the budget at this point in time 

that gives us the maximum flexibility. There are—— 

Mr. FORBES. But let me—and again, forgive me for cutting you 

off. I am just trying to get an answer. And somebody else will give 

you some more notes. Read them. Take your time with looking at 

them, because this is open book. It is okay. I mean, we want to 

get—— 

But I come back to what my friend, Ms. Porter, would say. You 

know, we are not building something there for 39 years when we 

say it is a critical need. And now we are saying we are going to 

build these facilities, and I am not saying we don’t need them. It 

would just seem to me that common sense would say from an accounting point of view that I ought to know whether we are going 

to bring the units here. 

Mr. CALCARA. Well, and none of our fiscal year 2011 investments 

are at risk, pending the QDR decision. That is my understanding. 

I mean, we can go through—— 

Mr. FORBES. No, no. Our problem is you haven’t made some of 

your investments. I think that is what Carol would say, you know. 

Mr. CALCARA. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. And I would agree with her. And I am not arguing 

where you are allocating your dollars. I am just simply saying it 
25 

is hard for me from an economic point of view when the chairman 

and I have to sit up here and we have to say, ‘‘How are we just 

doing our oversight to make sure we are making efficient decisions?’’ 

It would just seem to me, from all the Economics 101 classes that 

you have, I would want to know, okay, I am going to bring these 

assets here before I built facilities to keep them here, since I could 

always use that money somewhere else if I wasn’t. Where am I 

wrong on that? 

Mr. CALCARA. Well, you know, we have to almost go location by 

location, but, you know, in terms of Europe in the Army budget, 

we do not have any investments in fiscal year 2011 that will be impacted by a decision to pull out of there or to stay. And the requirements that we have there today include some housing at 

Baumholder and that is about it. 

Mr. FORBES. But you are still not—I am not questioning investments you have made before or decisions you made where you are 

not spending money. I am saying am I not right that the President’s budget does include funding for facilities in the United 

States for Army and Air Force units that are currently based in 

Europe? And yet from what testimony we are hearing today, we 

don’t know whether they are going to be returning to the United 

States. Am I wrong on that? 

Somebody is trying to give you help back there. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, I guess I am stuck, because I know this budget backwards and forwards. The only dollars I know that we have 

invested in CONUS [Continental United States] for projects in Europe are in fiscal year 2010 at Fort Bliss. And those two facilities 

are being used by our Fires Brigade and our AETF [Army Evaluation Task Force] configuration down there. 

I don’t know of any other capacity that has been built that is tied 

to a migration back, nor any investment that is made in 2011 for 

retaining. You know, we are kind of in a pause period. So I guess 

I need clarity on the question. 

Mr. FORBES. Why don’t we do this, then, so you don’t have to 

keep passing those notes and I don’t have to keep—— 

I will give you a written question—— 

Mr. CALCARA. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. You know, because I don’t want you to 

just have to just come off the cuff and do it, so that you can just 

tell me if I am wrong on the question or maybe trying to get your 

arms around the answer. 

And when I do that, also I am going to throw in this one. The 

President’s budget also includes a substantial MILCON funding for 

basing the Joint Strike Fighter and yet, you know, we know that 

the fighter production has been delayed because of acquisition 

delays, and just kind of an explanation of that. And you can give 

me that now, or you can give me that when you respond to the 

other one. 

You want to point that down to Ms. Ferguson? 

Ms. FERGUSON. That is actually me. 

Mr. CALCARA. Kathy’s turn for solidifying. 

Mr. FORBES. We have left you out of some of this. 

Ms. FERGUSON. I get to join the fun here a little bit. 
26 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

Ms. FERGUSON. You are right. There has been a decision that reduces the Joint Strike Fighter, but it really doesn’t affect delivery 

of any of the aircraft until fiscal year 2015. The projects that are 

in our fiscal year 2011 budget request are to support the delivery 

of the first airplane to the first operational location and the first 

airplane to the second training location, the first training location 

being Eglin. 

As we have gone back and re-looked at the delivery schedule, the 

delivery of those two airplanes slips by just three months from this 

summer to the fall of 2013. And backing that up, we need to have 

MILCON in 2011 in order to have those facilities available for 

when the aircraft comes on the ground. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Ms. Ferguson, thank you. 

Mr. Calcara, I owe you a question that I will send to you to respond. 

And, Mr. Natsuhara, if you could just get me the answer to that 

one about Admiral Natter, if you would, based on Senator Webb’s 

question. 

And again, Dr. Robyn, thank you again, and all of you for being 

here. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Sir, I do have a response from Secretary Lynn 

that went back to Senator Webb. 

Mr. FORBES. Oh, good. Can I just get a copy of that? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Did it include in there any information on that? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, he specifically answered that question. 

Mr. FORBES. That is great. Thank you. If you will just give me 

a copy of that, that will be great. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. All right. 

Mr. FORBES. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, I have been here through all the base closures—five of them. And just between you and I, I hope I never see 

another one. We just came back from Puerto Rico. They shut down 

all the bases in Puerto Rico. And now we see all the problems that 

we have—Central America, South America, Mexico, and it pains 

me to see us leave 12,000 feet runways and a lot of facilities. 

And the problem that I have seen is that when we give something away, we might need it, but we will never get it back. But 

I know this is not your decisions. It was made by a base closure 

commission, and so I think that the members had some very legitimate questions to ask, you know. And I understand. I understand. 

But now I have several questions from Congresswoman Bordallo, 

little questions about Guam, little problem in Guam. But I am just 

going to ask one, because I know that we are going to have a meeting—I mean, votes—and I have a meeting at the White House in 

the next few minutes. 

But if you all have some other questions—— 

I am going to ask one question, and this is what—— 

Mr. Bishop is just coming in. He might have a question. 

This is her question, and she says, ‘‘First, I would like to thank 

you for all the work that you do to provide the best quality of life 

for all our service members. And my first question,’’ she says, ‘‘is 
27 

for Dr. Robyn. I want to follow up on the outcomes of the Economic 

Adjustments Committee that met several weeks ago at the White 

House to discuss the Guam military buildup. And as you know, the 

Port of Guam did not receive critical Recovery Act funding.’’ 

Voice. Ms. Bordallo just walked in. 

Ms. BORDALLO. It is okay. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. No, here you are. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Where are you? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Right here. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How far did you get? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry. I was down on 

the floor managing bills. 

First, I would like to thank you all for the work you do to provide 

the best quality of life for all our service members. 

And my first question is for Dr. Robyn. I want to follow up on 

the outcomes from the Economic Adjustment Committee that met 

several weeks ago at the White House to discuss the Guam military buildup. As you know, the Port of Guam did not receive critical Recovery Act funding, and this lack of funding will make it extremely difficult for the military buildup on Guam to move forward 

and be done in a timely and a cost-effective manner. 

So can you elaborate on what progress, if any, was made at the 

EAC [Economic Adjustment Committee] meeting to address 

Guam’s critical civilian infrastructure needs? And will DOD take 

more of a leadership role in addressing these concerns? And what 

is the resolution on providing a comprehensive infrastructure plan 

for Guam? If you could answer those three questions. 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I think it is a work in progress. I think we will 

take more of a leadership role in identifying exactly what the needs 

are outside of the fence and figuring out how the federal government whole of government approach to financing it. 

But it is premature to say that that has done. It was a real honor 

to hear from both you and Governor Camacho several weeks ago, 

and it was a very productive meeting. And because of that meeting 

and because of the President’s visit to Guam, this issue has become 

much more visible, which is very gratifying to Roger and me to 

have the White House send other agencies, becoming very aware 

of this issue. 

So we will keep communicating with you, but I can’t—it is, you 

know, I don’t have a finished product yet. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So no decision was made, then, who would take 

the lead in this? We are finding such a difficult, you know, situation right now, because no one—everyone points fingers at the others, and we were hoping that the Department of Defense would 

take the lead. 

Dr. ROBYN. I think we will take the lead on identifying what the 

needs are and leading a process to figure out how the agencies will 

collectively pay for what is needed and what is appropriate. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, and we are concerned about the grant that 

we lost at the Port. Would there be any update on that? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, no, I can’t. I mean, that was a kind of a onetime thing. As you know, there is another tranche of TIGER 

[Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery] grant 

money, stimulus funding later this year. I have had many con-
28 

versations with Maritime Administration since then, but I can’t report to date any concrete progress. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Well, we hope that, you know, we will 

get word on it soon. 

And I have another quick question for Mr. Natsuhara. 

All right. At this time I would like to yield my time to Mr. 

Bishop, who has been here. 

No, go ahead, go ahead, go ahead. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

I guess the first question I have is why you are still here by the 

time I got back. [Laughter.] 

But let me try and be—at least one question not parochial, but 

I will be parochial at first. 

Ms. Ferguson, if I could start with you, first of all, I want to 

thank you so very much for what you and your office has done on 

EUL [Enhanced Use Lease] Falcon Hill as well. You have done yeoman’s work. We are still not quite over all of the humps, but I am 

sure we will be. And I do want you to know how much I do appreciate what you have done there. 

On the non-parochial basis, though, I did notice in the President’s fiscal year 2011 MILCON budget that when it comes to the 

Air Logistics Centers, there has been a huge slice taken not just 

from mine, but all three of those Air Logistics Centers that is 

there. 

Traditionally, we have seen increases that basically come to 

about $20 million per year for recapitalization, but at our ALCs 

[Air Logistics Centers], which are the largest, the most complex Air 

Force Bases, there must be some kind of commitment to recapitalization to maintain their missions. 

I would hope that this is perhaps just a one-year blip, but when 

I think Warner Robins is at zero percent on MILCON and the others are very, very low, I would like you if you would comment 

about that. I hope this is simply coincidence and not necessarily by 

design. 

Ms. FERGUSON. I think I can answer part of that, and then I will 

take part of it for the record also. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. FERGUSON. Of course, as you know, the Air Force created the 

Air Force depot maintenance strategy back in 2002, and there was 

fairly robust funding from the period of 2004 through 2009 of about 

$150 million a year, and to include depot infrastructure, including 

equipment and military construction and O&M [operation and 

maintenance]. And it was split each year depending on what the 

AFMC [Air Force Material Command] commander needed at that 

time. 

We invested about 325—I am sorry, $328 million in MILCON in 

each one of the three depots over that time, but now that commitment of $150 million commitment a year is—is not there anymore. 

But we did fund two projects in 2010, one at Tinker and one at 

Hill. And as you point out, there are two projects in fiscal year 

2011 budget. 
29 

What I will do is I will take back what is going to happen. I will 

take back for the record the plan for the Air Force from 2012 and 

beyond. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I do appreciate what the Air Force has 

made a good commitment for our Air Logistics Centers. But once 

again, if you see a drop-off in the MILCON commitment that is a 

trend in the recapitalization, then there have other problems. 

So, Mr. Calcara, if I could hit up you parochially for just a 

minute, I am going to contend that you are the receiving end of 

what I was worried about may be happening on the Air Force side 

of those. 

I have two elements of your jurisdiction in my district in the 

state—first of all, Dugway, which once again has had an 800 percent increase in its job functions since 9/11, but has not received 

the MILCON commitments to keep up with it, which means the 

Level Three biolabs still are now being housed in trailers, which 

does have public safety concern from our part at the same time. 

It is also a quality of life decision, specifically the—oh, heaven— 

the commissary, for example. It is 50 years old. It is a 65-mile 

drive before they find any other civilization out there. We have 

some problems with the dining facilities. There are some of those 

issues that are still outstanding, and the Army has not necessarily 

been as proactive as the Air Force has in trying to meet those particular needs. 

If I could refer you to the Tooele Army Depot, for example, it has 

been 17 years since there was a MILCON commitment out there. 

We have some very problematic missions out there, but you don’t 

even have the money to bring the buildings down until they do it 

of their own free will. That is a concern. 

That kind of a commitment to those depot situations, as well as 

to the biolabs out at Dugway, are a concern to me, and it is the 

same kind of issue at hand, except yours perhaps had started before then. Before it was the Air Force’s, I am afraid of looking at, 

if that made sense. 

If you would like to comment—actually, I just gave you a lecture, 

but if you would like to comment on it, I would appreciate that. 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, sir. And I spent some time reading up on 

Tooele and Dugway recently. Let us take Tooele first. I think it is 

important to note that as an AMC [Army Material Command] installation, their economic anatomy is in the working capital fund, 

and a lot of the improvements and investment that they typically 

make are done through the working capital fund’s flexibility. 

As far as their MILCON program goes, the way it works in the 

Army is the local base commander is responsible for identifying 

their highest priorities in terms of projects. And as it would, turns 

out that they do not have a top 20 request for a MILCON project 

coming out of Tooele. Their highest-ranking project on their list is 

ranked 29, and it is in 2016. 

So we would love to sponsor some military construction there and 

look at it for integration in our integrated priorities. We just can’t 

seem to get anyone locally there to prioritize it high enough on the 

list. 
30 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate your answer. Maybe I shouldn’t have 

asked you for a response, because I think one of my staffers right 

now is having a heart attack back in the office, having heard your 

response there. There is, in some of the ways in which we make 

these types of plans, a Catch-22 factor. If you don’t have the commitment to the projects there, it increases the cost, which lowers 

your size of where you can make those commitments. 

Let me just say that I appreciate that response. Seventeen years 

is still a long time. I am not quite buying, to be honest, that in 17 

years there has been nothing that has risen to the level of 

MILCON necessity out there, but we have seen project after project 

that have been pushed to the right year after year, always at least 

five years away. 

So I appreciate that response. I don’t know if I quite buy it, but 

I appreciate it very much. 

Mr. CALCARA. Well, it is an honest response, and one of my lifelines also tells me next week we are meeting with your MLA [military legislative assistant] to go over the prioritization process to try 

to bring some more clarity to how do you get a project in competition, so—but the numbers are what they are. I am told number 29 

in 2016, so—— 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate that again. I will give one plug. I am 

sorry for rambling on here. I am in the red zone already. I will give 

one plug to the colonel who is out there. She does a marvelous job 

with what is available for her. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentleman. 

And now I will come back to my questions. And I would like to 

ask the panel. I have a number of questions here, if you could just 

be very brief with your answers. 

Mr. Natsuhara, this question is for you. As you know, I put forward a set of concerns and counterproposals in my formal comments to the draft environmental impact statement, so I would like 

to get an update from you on where we are in the process of evaluating the comments on the draft EIS. What is the timeline now for 

putting forward the final EIS and for the signing of a record of decision? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes, all of the draft comments—all the comments on the draft EIS, including yours, are currently being evaluated by—we have TIGER team right now in Hawaii that is evaluating all the comments, and we are also working very closely, that 

by CEQ [the Council on Environmental Quality], to help us 

through the process of getting to our final EIS. It is still on track 

for late June, early July with a ROD [record of decision] signature. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Could you give me that date again? Late—— 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Late June, early July. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Late June or July, all right. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. With a final EIS with a ROD in August. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Now, another question with the EIS. 

There was considerable pushback on the idea of housing the Marine aviation unit at Andersen Air Force Base. On Tuesday I had 

the opportunity here in Congress to discuss the Marine bed-down 

plan with members of the National Military Family Association. 

Now, during the hearing I expressed my views regarding reduced 

land use by housing Marines in vertical structures such as con-
31 

dominiums. With regards to housing accommodations, this group 

agreed with me that as long as the Marines are housed in Guam 

standard housing, then they would support vertical structures such 

as condominiums, as opposed to single-family dwelling. Is there serious consideration being given to this issue? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. This is the first I have heard about vertical 

housing. The Marine Corps is committed to building quality housing for the Marines, and the Department of Defense is also. Right 

now, the standard we are trying to achieve is similar to what the 

Navy currently is building in Guam, which are single-family 

homes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I just wanted it to be on the record that the 

family association did agree that they would have no opposition, as 

long as the housing met standards. 

Secretary Ferguson, let me follow up on a question I asked to Mr. 

Natsuhara. Would the Air Force be willing to support an initiative 

to house the Marine aviation unit on existing Air Force land at Andersen Air Force Base in order to reduce the costly need for land 

acquisition and better position our service members in Guam? 

Ms. FERGUSON. The Air Force and the Navy and Marine Corps 

have been working the siting issue since the very beginning, and 

we have already explored the possibility of locating more facilities 

at Andersen, but I think we collectively agree that the best plan 

is the one that is currently in the preferred alternative, which does 

not increase the housing on Andersen. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I see. All right. 

Mr. Natsuhara, the EPA had some very strong comments about 

the draft EIS in regards to the lack of support and commitment for 

civilian infrastructure requirements. The EPA gave the lowest 

score possible, and this may continue unless this matter is resolved. What is the Navy doing to address the civilian infrastructure issue? 

And finally, where are we in the mediation efforts with the Fish 

and Wildlife Service and NOAA [the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] regarding impact and mitigation of coral 

damage associated with the development of a transit CVN [nuclearpowered aircraft] carrier berthing? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. This EIS, as you know, is a very complex EIS. 

It is the most comprehensive and complex EIS the department has 

undertaken. The analysis of all the impacts are currently being 

evaluated by EPA and all the resource agencies and with the assistance of the Department of Justice. 

CEQ is helping us work through to make sure that our analysis, 

our mitigation measures and the plan to mitigate those impacts are 

properly addressed in the EIS. And we are committed to making 

sure that we do not have a significant impact on Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What about the coral? Did you—— 

Mr. NATSUHARA. And we are also working with NOAA and CEQ 

with the Department of Justice to work through those coral issues 

also. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right. And also, Dr. Robyn and Mr. 

Natsuhara, I wanted to find out, to get a better understanding of 

whether mitigation funds from individual military construction 
32 

projects can be used to support civilian infrastructure needs like 

upgrades to the port or wastewater treatment plants. 

And could these funds be used to support the University of Guam 

Center for Island Sustainability that is looking to act as a clearinghouse for solutions to difficult issues regarding the military buildup? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. We are limited in what we have authority to 

use our mitigation funds. Our military MILCON funds essentially 

are for outside of—if it is directly related to the impact, we do have 

some flexibility there, but there is some limitation then. As we 

work through all the mitigations and identifying those, as much as 

we can we are going to try to commit to making those. But at this 

time I don’t have that analysis. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. If you had the authority, would the answer be different? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. If we had the authority and the funds, yes, 

ma’am. We would—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. You would take it on. 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Yes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

The other one is, Mr. Calcara, regarding the environmental impact statement being conducted on the Joint High Speed Vessel, 

the announcement of the notice of intent on the EIS came at a very 

bad time, right after the draft EIS on the military buildup from the 

Navy. 

Now, first, I am concerned about the lack of coordination between the services on this matter, and I am not sure why this action wouldn’t be more closely coordinated with the Joint Guam Program Office. Could you explain the reasoning behind this decision? 

And second, can you provide more detail on why Guam is being 

looked at as a potential location for the stationing of the Army 

Joint High Speed Vessels? 

Mr. CALCARA. Well, I will take the second question first, ma’am. 

We have identified a number of alternatives and, you know, that 

is just part of the process. It is one of the realistic and reasonable 

alternatives to consider. We are not selecting the site as the preferred alternative. It is just the beginning of the process. 

As far as JGPO, the Joint Guam Program Office not being aware 

of it, I guess I will have to get back to you on that. I don’t know 

why. I don’t really have environmental. I am not looking to dodge 

the question, but I would certainly follow up with that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. I think it all amounts to we have got 

to have better coordination here. We have got to have somebody at 

the head of this buildup, rather than to be looking at one another, 

pointing fingers as to who is in charge. And so that was one of the 

reasons we had the meeting at the White House, which I was very 

happy to be able to speak to everyone there. 

We need a schedule of funding, and we are very concerned about 

losing that grant for the port enhancement. That is one of the most 

important aspects. And if we are to meet the 2014 deadline here 

that we are—you know, we have pinned up a wall, I mean, against 

a wall with this deadline date—we are going to have to have better 
33 

coordination on the buildup. So these are some of the things. And, 

of course, the infrastructure outside the fence is very important to 

me as well. 

So I want to thank you all. And if you could get back with more 

specific answers to my questions, I would appreciate it, all right? 

There being no further questions, the Subcommittee on Readiness is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 18, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 18, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2010 

(127) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Lobbyists were not involved in the Quadrennial Defense Review, 

nor the decisions within the Quadrennial Defense Review. [See page 22.] 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn responded to Senator Webb’s 

letter on February 23, 2010. In his letter, he stated the following: ‘‘Neither I nor 

the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense have consulted with ADM Robert 

J. Natter (ret.) during the course of the QDR.’’ He also stated that the Department 

is reviewing the use of retired and general officers as senior mentors to ensure that 

the interests of the taxpayer are fully protected. [See page 22.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army is currently scheduled to receive 5 Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), delivered one vessel per year beginning in 2011. The U.S. Army Environmental Command (USAEC) is supporting the Department of the Army Force 

Management Office (DAMO–FM) in completing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to support the stationing and operation of Army JHSVs and 

their associated detachments. Initial stationing criteria include the need for the vessel to have existing pier and berthing space, maintenance facilities, and the ability 

to meet the strategic needs of combatant commanders. Sites that meet these criteria 

have been carried forward for analysis as potential stationing locations for Army 

JHSVs. Several locations have met the criteria for Army JHSV stationing. Sites 

being carried forward for stationing analysis in the PEIS include sites in Guam, Hawaii, Virginia, California and Washington State. In addition to these sites, several 

overseas host-nation ports are also being considered for JHSV stationing. The JHSV 

PEIS has been coordinated extensively between the services and the Joint Guam 

Program Office (JGPO). This coordination occurred before the release of the Army’s 

Notice of Intent (NOI) for JHSV stationing beginning in the summer of 2009 and 

continues as the Army prepares to release the draft PEIS for JHSV stationing, 

scheduled to be released in the summer of 2010. The Department of the Army remains committed to properly coordinating stationing actions including the proposed 

JHSV action. [See page 32.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Beyond the Special Projects mentioned in my testimony, various 

additional MILCON and Special Projects have been developed to address facility deficiencies identified in the Shipyard long-range infrastructure plan. These projects 

are assessed against all other mission-critical Navy requirements and prioritized for 

funding within our fiscal controls. Regarding your concern with the current conditions of the waterfront support facilities, we have developed a MILCON project to 

construct an annex to the existing steel fabrication facility to align and consolidate 

operations. This project, P–266, Consolidation of Structural Shops, is being considered in our current investment planning. We will continue to assess this project and 

look for opportunities to fund it as we develop future budgets. [See page 14.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Ms. FERGUSON. As part of implementing the Air Force’s Depot Maintenance Strategy the Air Force maintains a Military Construction (MILCON) plan that ensures 

our depots are well maintained, environmentally compliant, efficiently configured, 

and properly equipped to support both existing depot maintenance workloads and 

new weapon system technologies. Title 10 USC 2476, Minimum Capital Investment, 

requires the Air Force to invest at least 6% of the average of the last three years 

of funded depot workload to promote depot maintenance processes/operations and 

facilities. The FY11 President’s budget demonstrates the Air Force’s commitment to 

comply with this law. [See page 28.] 
128 

Ms. FERGUSON. Air Force will oversee the infrastructure investment programs to 

optimize the depot repair enterprise across the Air Logistics Centers with the yearly 

infrastructure investments. We will carefully monitor capabilities over the long term 

and prioritize investments to support current and long-range workload ensuring 

compliance with the minimum capital investment requirement in 10 USC 2476. [See 

page 29.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HOLT 

Dr. ROBYN. No. The Administration will not be revisiting the closure decision on 

Fort Monmouth, or any other BRAC recommendation. 

The Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive review of installation infrastructure pursuant to the statutory authority provided by Congress. The Department’s recommendations, including the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, 

resulted from a thorough analysis of all military installations in the United States 

and Territories on an equal footing, with military value as the primary consideration. 

Fort Monmouth is an acquisition and logistics installation with little capacity for 

other purposes. The Army ranked it 50th of 97 installations in terms of its military 

value. Moving research, development and acquisition capabilities from Fort Monmouth and other locations (Fort Knox and Redstone) and combining them at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) allows the Army to enhance the evolution of its NetCentric warfare capabilities. The strategy is to create a full-spectrum research, development & acquisition, testing & evaluation center through the co-location of testing and evaluation facilities with the program managers and researchers. Even with 

cost growth, implementation of this recommendation will save over $153M annually 

beginning in FY 2012. [See page 17.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2010 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. The BRAC 2005 process requires the Department of Defense to complete associated realignments and closures by September 2011. Does the Department need additional flexibility in schedule to accomplish the BRAC 2005 timeline? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department opposes extending the deadline for any BRAC recommendation. The deadline keeps the Department focused on completing implementation and ensures that bases are closed expeditiously to allow communities to redevelop the property. While many recommendations are complex and will likely complete implementation right up to the deadline, preserving the deadline is key to 

maintaining the discipline that BRAC imposes. In addition, preserving the deadline: 

• Allows the Department to achieve the benefits of each BRAC recommendation 

by a date certain; 

• Forces an end to the turmoil of the BRAC transition process; 

• Avoids additional construction costs; 

• Enforces funding discipline on the Department—allows BRAC recommendations 

to compete effectively in the DoD program and budget processes; 

• Maintains the Department’s commitment to deliver on the ‘‘agreement’’ with 

Congress for an effective and efficient BRAC process; 

• Preserves the ‘‘all or none’’ component of BRAC—the Department cannot pick 

and choose which recommendations to delay; and 

• Provides communities with certainty on when the property will be available for 

redevelopment—an important element of the reuse planning necessary for job 

creation 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Department assess the strategic risk of moving a significant amount of the Department’s command structure concurrently in fiscal year 

2011? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department has six years to implement BRAC recommendations, 

providing ample time for managers to mitigate the impact of personnel moves on 

the command structure. This is why many of the realignments (DISA, NGA, 

FORSCOM) will have concurrent operations in FY2011. 

To the extent there are unmitigated impacts, the Department, no different from 

industry, must be allowed to balance these impacts with the benefits achieved 

through reconfiguring its infrastructure. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Department attribute the doubling of costs associated 

with BRAC 2005 implementation from the fiscal year 2006 submission? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department originally estimated BRAC 2005 investment at 

$21.1B. In the FY 2011 budget submit, the total investment (which includes supplemental requests for Walter Reed) is estimated at $35.1B. 

While the dynamics causing the $14.0B cost increase are not discrete, they can 

be characterized and estimated as follows: 
132 

Adjusting the ‘‘COBRA’’ model output for inflation $1.3B 

Additional inflation resulting from slower implementation of 

this round as compared to the faster implementation profile assumed in COBRA 

$0.5B 

Extraordinary construction industry inflation since 2005. Approximately 70% of the $35.1B BRAC 2005 program or $24.6B 

supports MILCON requirements compared to 33 percent experienced in the previous rounds. 

$1.0B 

Environmental restoration not included in COBRA $0.4B 

Program Management Costs not included in COBRA $0.6B 

Additional O&M to support fact of life cost increases $0.2B 

Construction of additional facilities to enhance capabilities and/ 

or address deficiencies—i.e., BRAC as a recapitalization engine. 

$10.0B 

Total $14.0B 

Mr. ORTIZ. The fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations budget request 

for military construction was finalized before General McChrystal recommended the 

Afghanistan force structure and before the President determined to begin a troop 

withdrawal in June 2011. Considering the military construction will not be available 

until summer 2012, force structure and construction appear to be misaligned. Is the 

fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations military construction request misaligned to support the future force structure? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Overseas Contingency Operations military construction request is 

properly aligned to support future force structure in Afghanistan. The request provides operational capabilities by constructing consolidated command and control facilities and additional airfield capacity to support increased helicopter, airlift, ISR, 

and SOF assets. It also addresses basic infrastructure issues by replacing expedient 

facilities at the end of their useful life, building troop housing and dining facilities, 

and constructing wastewater treatment, utility, and force protection facilities. Lastly, it increases logistics capacity by providing additional fuel, storage, and cargo 

handling and distribution capability at critical locations that support inbound forces 

at locations where the operational footprint is expanding. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What military construction authorities and funding levels are necessary to ensure the force structure and military construction are best aligned? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Overseas Contingency Operations military construction request is 

properly aligned to support future force structure in Afghanistan. The FY 2011 OCO 

request of $1.2 billion is sufficient to expand the logistical backbone and operational 

foundation to enable continued counterinsurgency missions by increasing operational capability, replacing expeditionary facilities at the end of their lifecycle, consolidating functions and facilities, and supporting Special Operations Forces (SOF). 

Regarding construction authorities, we have submitted a proposal to Congress to 

raise the spending limit on the use of operation and maintenance (O&M) funds for 

unspecified minor construction (UMC) from $750,000 to $3,000,000 when applied to 

a project in support of a contingency operation, such as in Afghanistan. The existing 

threshold of $750,000 was established in 2002, without the knowledge we have 

gained after years of operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring 

freedom (OIF/OEF). Since that time, the cost of construction in theater has increased much more severely than the general construction market (up to 20–40% 

per year), pushing many small but essential projects beyond the O&M funding 

threshold for UMC. Under current law, when the cost for a project is between 

$750,000 and $3,000,000, commanders must use limited UMC (military construction) funding, or pursue Contingency Construction Authority that extends the 

project completion time. This is causing work-arounds in theater, often requiring solutions that do not fully meet urgent operational requirements. Increasing the 

O&M-funding threshold would provide an immediate authority at the Combined 

Joint Task Force (CJTF) level to execute critical, urgent projects without affecting 

longer-term project development or violating any mandates applicable to use of Contingency Construction Authority (CCA). 
133 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army initially proposed to reduce BOS services by 20% in fiscal 

year 2010 which would have caused garrison commands to release temporary and 

term employees, reduce contract services, and require the use of soldiers to perform 

grounds maintenance and custodial services. The Army has partially obviated the 

reduction by adding $500 million in fiscal year 2010. If the budget request for 2011 

is enacted at the proposed funding levels for BOS, additional reductions in services 

will be required. Does the Army support reducing services at the installations to 

meet reduced BOS funding levels? 

Mr. CALCARA. There will be no reduction of installation services in support of Life, 

Health and Safety programs, the Army Family Covenant and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements that ensures Soldiers are trained and equipped to 

meet the demands of our nation at war. The Army is conducting a comprehensive 

review of all BOS accounts to ensure adequate funding is maintained to meet Army 

priorities. Senior leadership is committed to looking for efficiencies and best practices in the use of BOS funds, but will not shortchange Soldiers and their Families 

in the process. Army’s goal is to exact greater level of stewardship over its installations’ resources and inculcate a cost culture. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Department propose to restructure the budget request 

to obviate further service reductions that would occur if the fiscal year 2011 budget 

request for BOS is enacted? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Department continues to assess efficiencies gained this fiscal 

year that will mitigate shortfalls in FY11, also taking into account changes such as 

joint basing. The Department is fully prepared to rebalance funding to fully support 

the Army’s most critical missions and leadership’s priorities. The FY11 BOS funding 

request is general commensurate to FY10 funding and includes increases for Army 

senior leader initiatives (Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention 

(SHARP) and Suicide Prevention) and contract security guards in Europe. FY 11 

also reflects a decline for resources transferred to the Air Force and Navy for joint 

base transfers. Army continues to explore every opportunity to be more effective and 

efficient with its current resource levels but believes it will still have some challenges. Army continues to assess BOS funding requirements to determine the appropriate funding level commensurate with mission requirements and the level of service Soldiers and their Families deserve. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army initially indicated its intent to reduce the number of Brigade Combat Teams in Europe from four to two. The Administration decided to hold 

off on the implementation of this decision and is now indicating that a recommendation on the force structure will not be determined until fiscal year 2011. What capabilities would be lost if BCT forces were reduced in Europe? 

Mr. CALCARA. (1) The Department must weigh how the support from our NATO 

allies may be affected by changes to our U.S. defense posture in Europe. NATO 

member nations provide much of our allied support for Afghanistan. The Department has stated in the QDR ‘‘that a strong NATO that provides a credible Article 

5 security commitment, deters threats to Alliance security, has access to U.S. capabilities’’ (QDR, page 58) 

(2) The Department must determine the impact of a reduction on conducting Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) with our 

NATO Allies and friends. A reduction of forces would limit the Army’s ability to conduct training exercises in Task Force East (Hungry and Bulgaria), exercises with 

Poland and the Baltic States unless rotational forces from the United States are utilized. 

(3) The Department must also weigh other factors such as the challenge to generate forces to meet overseas contingency operations; resetting the force after over 

eight years of war; enhancing Soldier and Army Family well-being; and meeting the 

Title 10 responsibilities of recruiting, manning, equipping, and training. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Department balance this capability degradation in Europe with the cost savings associated with stationing forces in the United States? 

Mr. CALCARA. Capability Degradation: To mitigate any capability degradation 

in Europe, the Department may rotate forces to Europe to signal to our allies that 

we still support the goals of NATO. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process would deploy forces to meet the objectives stated in the QDR: ‘‘deter the political 

intimidation of allies and partners; promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, 

Caucasus, and Black Sea regions; demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies; 

build trust and goodwill among host nations; and facilitate multilateral operations 

in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent.’’ (QDR, 

page 64) 

Cost Savings: The analysis the Army has done to date, indicate that in the aggregate, the cost difference is neutral; but, the Army’s cost analysis continues to be 

refined. 
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Mr. ORTIZ. The Navy has proposed to defer investments in facilities restoration 

and modernization. 

Why did the Navy elect to take risk in the facility accounts and delay critical restoration and modernization activities? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. The Navy FY2011 budget request accepts risk in shore infrastructure in order to fund high operational demands, rising manpower costs, and 

critical maintenance for our ships and aircraft to reach their expected service life. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the long-term effect of a delay in funding restoration and modernization activities? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. We fund sustainment to 90% of the Facilities Sustainment Model 

in accordance with DoD direction in order to maintain facilities in their current condition. Deferral of major facility upgrades due to limited restoration and modernization funds results in continued operations from infrastructure that is not optimally 

configured to fully support the user’s mission and relies on older, less efficient energy systems. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Marine Corps has requested $1.2 billion in the FY11 budget to 

support an end-strength increase of 27,000 marines. Will infrastructure be built in 

time to support the arrival of the new 27,000 Marines? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. No, there are challenges in this area. The target date for achieving the end-strength is FY 2011. However, the Marine Corps attained its 202,000 

end-strength goal in 2009. The Marine Corps infrastructure development plan remains on track, and we are supporting the accelerated growth in end strength with 

the continued implementation of our interim solutions including extended use of 

temporary facilities, slowing down of demolition, and more extensive use of Basic 

Allowance for Housing and temporarily adjusting assignment standards for Marines 

in barracks until permanent facilities are in place. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What alternatives is the Marine Corps pursuing to accommodate 

growth? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Due to the long lead time for permanent facilities, units may be 

in temporary facility solutions for 2–4 years after unit standup. Temporary facility 

solutions include: doubling up personnel in existing facilities, slowing planned building demolition for use in the short term, and use of relocatable facilities (trailers, 

sprung shelters and pre-engineered buildings) to support operation requirements. 

For Marine Corps Bachelor Housing, until additional barracks are constructed, 

the Marine Corps has increased authorization of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) 

for senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to allow them to live off-base, and has 

taken steps to temporarily billet Marines in surge/overflow barracks during renovations until new barracks come on-line. Temporary trailers/modular facilities are also 

being used to support initial training/accession pipeline throughput requirements. 

For Marine Corps Family Housing, the Marine Corps plans to rely on the communities near the military installations as the primary source of housing for addressing 

the additional family housing requirement due to Growing the Force. Where, 

through the conduct of housing market analyses, the Marine Corps has determined 

that the local community cannot support the housing needs of our military members, additional housing has been programmed. The Marine Corps plans to construct the housing through use of military housing privatization authorities. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Japanese Prime Minister indicated that he intended to ‘‘start from 

scratch’’ in reviewing options to relocate III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) on 

Okinawa. The Japanese expect to provide a new realignment plan in May 2010. 

How does the apparent Japanese indecision in determining a final basing solution 

influence the Marine Corps’ ability to project forces forward and provide regional 

stability? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. Our current basing posture in Japan enables III MEF to remain 

forward postured to aid in Japan’s defense and available to support regional security and stability. The ongoing review by the Government of Japan does not affect 

the status quo: we will continue to operate from our bases in Okinawa in support 

of bilateral agreements and regional obligations. Any Japanese proposed modification to the Agreed Implementation Plan must preserve this capability. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does the Marine Corps support moving forward with the Guam realignment while the Government of Japan is still reviewing options to move III 

MEF on Okinawa? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. The U.S–Japan Roadmap agreement was a comprehensive set of 

realignment initiatives to meet the strategic needs of both allies. We understand 

that the Government of Japan is reviewing the agreement, and has promised a decision by the end of May. We are confident that they understand the strategic value 

of having Marines on Okinawa for their own defense and for security in the region. 

The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability remain on Okinawa to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force stationed there. We currently 
135 

have that capability at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. If the currently agreed 

upon Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) became untenable, we would continue to 

operate out of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma until an acceptable replacement 

facility is completed. 

Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue, and we have 

a responsibility to provide ready and able forces in support of the Combatant Commander. Per the U.S.-Japan Roadmap agreement and the Guam International 

Agreement, the move of Marine units from Okinawa to Guam will not take place 

until tangible progress is made on the FRF. 

Mr. ORTIZ. When does the Department anticipate completing the overall realignment to Guam, and does the EIS need to be modified to reflect more realistic 

timelines? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. The United States and Japan concluded an international agreement to move 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The Guam Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) uses the 2014 date as a benchmark to complete the 

overall realignment. However, there are indications that completing the move by 

2014 is unachievable, and the Marine Corps MILCON Future Years Defense Plan 

(FYDP) supports completing the move beyond 2015. If the current plan relocates 

Marine Corps forces after 2015, the Guam EIS overstates the environmental impacts locally. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Navy has indicated that alternative CVN berthing is an important 

consideration in managing CVN assets. While the Navy has not programmed any 

construction funds in 2011, it has included $2 million in planning and design funds 

to begin the construction design. What is the risk of a catastrophic event damaging 

Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities, and how might that risk be altered by 

homeporting a CVN at Mayport? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. It is difficult to quantify the precise likelihood of a natural or 

man-made catastrophic event. The risks of a catastrophic event damaging the sole 

aircraft carrier homeport and its facilities, however, must also include an assessment of the consequences. A catastrophic event of any type in the Hampton Roads 

Area, whether to the ships themselves, the shipping channel, Hampton Roads tunnel/bridge, the supporting maintenance and training infrastructure, or the surrounding community has the potential to severely limit East Coast Carrier operations. 

The flexibility of a second CVN capable homeport reduces risk, provides the Navy 

operational readiness and flexibility, and is consistent with homeporting strategies 

in place on the West Coast (i.e., Bremerton, Everett, & San Diego). Strategic dispersal ensures that the carriers, supporting maintenance and training critical infrastructure and the surrounding communities’ skilled labor force are located in more 

than one East Coast facility. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Are the costs associated with homeporting a CVN at Mayport worth 

the benefits in terms of hedging against the risk of a catastrophic event damaging 

Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities? 

Mr. NATSUHARA. The consequences of even one catastrophic event at the only nuclear carrier homeport on the Atlantic seaboard would be a devastating blow to our 

country and national defense. If a catastrophic event were to occur to a carrier 

homeport, it could require many years of rebuilding. Under these circumstances, the 

risk associated with having only one aircraft carrier homeport on the East Coast is 

significant, and given the consequences, unacceptable. 

SECDEF, SECNAV and QDR have all concluded that the risks and consequences 

of a catastrophic event make this a proper and prudent investment. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has proposed to defer investments in facilities 

sustainment and restoration. The Air Force is requesting funds necessary to support 

only 59% of the required facility recapitalization. Why did the Air Force elect to take 

risk in the facility accounts and delay critical restoration and modernization activities? 

Ms. FERGUSON. During the development of the FY11 PB the Air Force had to 

make difficult decisions across all Air Force appropriations and elected to assume 

a certain level of ‘‘risk in infrastructure’’ in order to fund higher mission priorities. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the long-term effect of a delay in funding restoration and modernization activities? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Air Force leadership had to make hard decisions to balance funding across all AF appropriations and assumed ‘‘risk in infrastructure’’ in order to 

fund higher priorities. The Air Force recognizes that delays in restoration and modernization funding can result in increased life-cycle costs for maintaining aging facilities. The Air Force will continue to fund Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization based on priorities that ensure the Air Force meets the mission required 

to support the National Defense. 
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Mr. ORTIZ. The fiscal year 2011 Active Air Force MILCON budget request con- tains $1.3 billion. This limited infrastructure investment is causing significant inefficiencies locally and accelerating degradation of assigned aviation assets. Examples 

include: new F–22s arriving without hangars and other support infrastructure at 

Hickham AFB, Hawaii, and simulation trainers remaining in warehouses until the 

appropriate supporting infrastructure is programmed and built. Why did the Air 

Force not program infrastructure in time to support valuable aviation assets? 

Ms. FERGUSON. With regards to infrastructure, there is no single ‘‘most’’ critical 

area of risk. The risk we have had to take in facilities and infrastructure is broad 

and varies according to the need of each installation. We balance this risk across 

all installations by building our investment program from the bottom up, with wing 

commanders defining the needs of their installation. The need for MILCON investment is across all facilities types, such as operational, training, maintenance hangars, R&D, and quality of life. With a limited and fixed top line, we must determine 

our priorities using investment impact data and take risk where necessary. 

MILCON projects included in the program will be based on individual project merits 

and meeting Air Force priorities. 

However, aviation assets are obviously very important to the Air Force. Projects 

that supported aviation assets and new mission beddowns generally received a higher priority than other infrastructure projects when the Air Force determined which 

projects to fund as it took risk in infrastructure. But as available funding to the Air 

Force could not support all needed requirements, hard choices had, and continue, 

to be made. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has indicated that it intends to determine four JSF 

operational bases and one additional training base to support JSF in the next two 

years. How will encroachment and increased noise associated with the JSF variant 

impact the decision to base aviation assets? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Now that the list of candidate bases has been released, the formal 

environmental impact analysis process and site assessments have begun, allowing 

communities around each candidate base to participate and provide input into the 

environmental impact analysis. No basing decision is final until the environmental 

impact analysis process and site assessments are complete. Based on the results of 

the formal environmental impact studies, which will assess the impact of many factors to include encroachment and noise, the Air Force expects to announce the F– 

35 Preferred Locations in Summer of 2010. A final ROD is expected to be complete 

in mid- CY2011. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How will the recent announcement of a delay in delivery of the Air 

Force JSF aircraft impact the basing decisions and the fiscal year 2011 military construction request? 

Ms. FERGUSON. The announced procurement delays do not affect the initial basing 

decisions, the environmental impact study (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) 

timeline because they are required to support the MILCON projects necessary for 

receipt and beddown of F–35 aircraft at the first operational and next training location. The first operational aircraft will be delivered Summer 2013 and the first 

training aircraft for the potential second training location will be delivered Fall 

2013. FY11 MILCON is required to support beddown at these to-be-determined 

(TBD) locations. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has taken steps to secure real estate interests in areas 

where aviation accidents are most likely to occur. However, there remains significant real estate that could pose a threat to the local community because of aviation 

operations. What steps is the Air Force taking to limit aviation accidents to the local 

community? 

Ms. FERGUSON. One of our main approaches to limiting aviation accident impacts 

to the local community is to encourage compatible development in the areas with 

the greatest history of aircraft accidents occurring around the airfield. The areas 

with the greatest accident potential is the runway, followed by the clear zone, Accident Potential Zones (APZs) I and APZ II at the end of Air Force installation runways. Air Force installations continually work with local communities to limit development to low densities in APZs I and II. The Air Installations Compatible Use 

Zones (AICUZ) program discourages land uses that concentrate large numbers of 

people in a single area, e.g. churches, schools, auditoriums, residential, and manufacturing that involves flammable materials from being located in these two zones. 

Low intensity land uses such as some light industrial, wholesale trade, some business services, recreation, agriculture, and open space, mineral extraction can be 

compatible in APZ I if they don’t create emissions that create visibility problems or 

attract birds. Compatible land uses for APZ II include all the ones compatible in 

APZ I plus a few more types of manufacturing, low intensity retail trade and low 

density single family residential (1–2 dwelling units per acre). 
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The installations and local communities can also pursue encroachment partnering 

projects within APZs under the authority granted to the Services under USC Title 

10, Section 2684a, and they can compete for funding for these types of projects 

through Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative (REPI) program. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does the Air Force have a program for each installation that limits 

aviation incidents to the local community? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Yes. The Air Force conducts its Aviation Mishap Prevention Program under policy, guidance and oversight issued by the Air Force Chief of Safety. 

At the direction of the Air Force Chief of Safety, every installation responsible for 

a flying mission maintains a flight safety program with the over-arching goal of preventing aviation mishaps. An important part of that goal includes preventing mishaps on and around installations where Air Force aircraft operate. 

To accomplish that goal, Air Force installations incorporate mishap prevention 

programs in concert with community involvement, partnering, and information 

sharing. Some examples include Mid-Air Collision Avoidance Programs, Bird Aircraft Strike Hazards Programs, Flight Safety Participation in Airfield Certification 

Processes, Risk Management, and Crew/Cockpit Resource Management. 

In addition to the above listed programs, the Air Force also sponsors an aggressive Foreign Object Damage Prevention Program, and investigates local hazardous 

air traffic reports to identify and mitigate hazards to all aircraft operating in and 

around airfield environments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. As you know, proper and adequate facilities are critical to readiness, recruiting, retention, and even family programs. This is truer today than ever 

before for the National Guard, which has not only transformed into an operational 

reserve, but which also utilizes their facilities for both their homeland and national 

security missions. 

For example, the Iowa National Guard based its flood relief operations in 2008 

out of several Armories throughout Eastern Iowa. Today, they are utilizing them not 

only to train for a deployment to Afghanistan later this year—the largest deployment for the Iowa National Guard since WWII—but also for family readiness programs. 

The average age of the Iowa National Guard’s facilities is 42 years old—about 

twice the age of many of the Soldiers and Airmen that drill out of them! In fact, 

Secretary McHugh recently testified that ‘‘As to the distribution of MILCON, certainly, if I were a Guard or Reserve unit, I’d feel as though I wasn’t getting what 

I needed, and we have to admit that.’’ 

Yet the Iowa Guard has never constructed a new armory through funding provided in the President’s Budget Request—they have had to rely on our congressional 

delegation to secure the funding for them. 

In the FY 2010 Military Construction-VA Appropriations bill, Congress allocated 

$200 million specifically for Guard and Reserve military construction. The FY 2011 

President’s Budget Request reduces the Air National Guard military construction 

account by $188 million from the enacted level in 2010. While the budget proposal 

for the Army National Guard is $324 million over the FY 2010 enacted level, it is 

still far short of the projected need. 

Mr. Calcara—Please share with me the Army’s plans to ensure that the Army National Guard’s facilities adequately support their role as an operational reserve. 

Also, would you please share your thoughts on the degree to which the additional 

funds provided last 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army’s FY 11 President’s Budget request for the National 

Guard is more than double the military construction (MILCON) request for FY 10. 

This may fall short of the Guard’s actual requirement, but goes far in addressing 

critical needs. 

The Army’s MILCON program supports the initiatives of the total force. Properly 

training and transforming the Reserve Components to modular, operational forces 

are very important Army initiatives. The Army National Guard will continue to 

work to align their MILCON priorities with Army Campaign Plan imperatives and 

other guiding documents to ensure they fully compete for limited resources. This is 

especially important as MILCON budgets decrease in size across the Future Years 

Defense Plan, with respect to the additional funds provided to the Reserve Components in FY 10, this initiative is allowing the Army National Guard to address critical requirements. Projects selected include the Owensboro (KY) Readiness Center, 

Bangor (ME) RTI Phase II, Mead (NE) Water Supply and Distribution Center, and 
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Camp Grafton (ND) Shoreline Stabilization. These projects, each from a different region, provide the opportunity for additional training for soldiers, reduces resource 

requirements such as time or funding for existing training, and prevent loaming 

negative effects on readiness. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Ms. Ferguson—Can you please explain to me how a 188% reduction in funding will ensure that the Air National Guard is adequate to support their 

mission? Does that funding level not take on significant risk? 

Ms. FERGUSON. The Air Force made difficult decisions to arrive at the level of 

funding for recapitalization of infrastructure and the current level of risk in infrastructure programs. The Air Force $1.5B Military Construction (MILCON) request 

prioritizes all crucial requirements. The methodology continues taking risk in recapitalizing our aging infrastructure. The risk in MILCON and infrastructure programs is aligned with weapons system deliveries. 

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