UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN LEE DEJAEGHERE

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 15-10710

Stephanie Dawkins Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

OPINION AND ORDER

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 15, 16)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings in this Court

On February 25, 2015, plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking judicial review

of the Commissioner’s unfavorable decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), District Judge

Victoria A. Roberts referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk

for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff’s

claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (Dkt.

4). On January 5, 2016, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge. See Text-Only Order of reassignment dated 1/5/16. On February 24, 2016,

the parties filed a notice of consent to this Magistrate Judge’s authority, which was

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signed by Judge Roberts. (Dkt. 19, 20). This matter is before the Court on crossmotions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 15, 16). Plaintiff also filed a reply brief in

support of his motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 17). 

B. Factual Background and Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff, John Lee Dejaeghere is a 50 year old man, who worked for

approximately 20 years in heavy construction repairing roads. At 6’2” and 220

pounds, plaintiff was called upon to lift items weighing as much as 100 pounds

and otherwise met the strenuous physical demands of a construction highway

laborer. However, by September of 2009, plaintiff alleges that he was no longer

able to handle the taxing demands on his body. Specifically, he claims that he

experienced such severe pain in his neck, shoulders, hips, lower back and all of his

joints that he simply could not keep up anymore. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 71-73).

Plaintiff filed the instant claims on January 25, 2012 for a period of

disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging that he became disabled on

September 15, 2009. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 50). The claims were initially disapproved

by the Commissioner on July 9, 2012. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing and on

September 12, 2013, plaintiff appeared with counsel before Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) Timothy C. Scallen, who considered the case de novo. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg

ID 68-97). In a decision dated October 25, 2013, the ALJ found that plaintiff was

not disabled. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 47-62). Plaintiff requested a review of that

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decision on November 14, 2013. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 44). The ALJ’s decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council, on

December 29, 2014, denied plaintiff’s request for review. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 39-

43); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004).

C. ALJ Findings

Plaintiff was 43 years old on the alleged disability onset date. (Dkt. 13-2,

Pg ID 61). Plaintiff had past relevant work as a construction worker, which

involves heavy exertion. Id. The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to

plaintiff’s claim and found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Id. at 52. At step two, the ALJ found

that plaintiff’s cervical spondylitis, degenerative disc disease with pain in the neck

and back with exacerbated pain after a motor vehicle accident in April 2012,

carpal tunnel syndrome with neuropathy, and bilateral rotator cuff impingement

syndrome were “severe” within the meaning of the second sequential step. Id. 

However, at step three, the ALJ found no evidence that plaintiff’s combination of

impairments met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. Id. at 53. 

Thereafter, the ALJ determined the following as to plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”):

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find

that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR

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404.1567(a) except lifting and carrying less than 10

pounds and lifting and carrying between 10 pounds and

20 pounds less than occasionally; standing, walking and

sitting up to 4 hours each in an 8 hour workday;

occasional posturals (balancing, stooping, kneeling,

crouching and crawling); occasional climbing of stairs

and ramps but no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

occasional reaching, handling, and fingering; no

unprotected heights or dangerous machinery; no extreme

cold or humidity; and only simple, routine tasks.

Id. at 53. At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform his past

relevant work, given his RFC. Id. at 61. At step five, the ALJ denied plaintiff

benefits because he found that plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs

available in the national economy. Id. at 61-62.

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, the findings

of the Commissioner are REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Standard of Review

This Court has original jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this

statute is limited in that the court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions

absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal

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standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the

record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005);

Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). In deciding

whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, “we do not try the case

de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility.” Bass v.

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383,

387 (6th Cir. 1984).

 If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings of fact

are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Therefore, this Court may not reverse the

Commissioner’s decision merely because it disagrees or because “there exists in

the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.” McClanahan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Mullen v. Bowen, 800

F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Substantial evidence is “more than a

scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers, 486

F.3d at 241; Jones, 336 F.3d at 475. “The substantial evidence standard

presupposes that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Commissioner may

proceed without interference from the courts.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027,

1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (citing, Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545). 

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to an examination of the record

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only. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir.

2001). When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial

evidence, a reviewing court must consider the evidence in the record as a whole,

including that evidence which might subtract from its weight. Wyatt v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). “Both the court of

appeals and the district court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of

whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council.” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). There is no requirement, however, that

either the ALJ or the reviewing court must discuss every piece of evidence in the

administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 508

(6th Cir. 2006) (“[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly

addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.”)

(internal citation marks omitted); see also Van Der Maas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

198 Fed. Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006).

B. Governing Law

The “[c]laimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits.” 

Boyes v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994);

accord, Bartyzel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 74 Fed. Appx. 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2003). 

There are several benefits programs under the Act, including the Disability

Insurance Benefits Program (DIB) of Title II (42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.) and the

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Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) of Title XVI (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et

seq.). While the two programs have different eligibility requirements, “DIB and

SSI are available only for those who have a ‘disability.’” Colvin v. Barnhart, 475

F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). “Disability” means:

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (DIB); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a)

(SSI). The Commissioner’s regulations provide that disability is to be determined

through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:

Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in

substantial gainful activity, benefits are denied without

further analysis.

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, that

“significantly limits ... physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities,” benefits are denied without

further analysis.

Step Three: If plaintiff is not performing substantial

gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected

to last for at least twelve months, and the severe

impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed

in the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed

to be disabled regardless of age, education or work

experience.

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her

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past relevant work, benefits are denied without further

analysis.

Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his

or her past relevant work, if other work exists in the

national economy that plaintiff can perform, in view of

his or her age, education, and work experience, benefits

are denied.

Carpenter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 4793424 (E.D. Mich. 2008), citing,

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Heston, 245 F.3d at 534. “If the Commissioner

makes a dispositive finding at any point in the five-step process, the review

terminates.” Colvin, 475 F.3d at 730. 

“Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence

and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is

precluded from performing her past relevant work.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 474, cited

with approval in Cruse, 502 F.3d at 540. If the analysis reaches the fifth step

without a finding that the claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the

Commissioner. Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). 

At the fifth step, the Commissioner is required to show that “other jobs in

significant numbers exist in the national economy that [claimant] could perform

given [his] RFC and considering relevant vocational factors.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at

241; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g).

If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the

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decision must be affirmed even if the court would have decided the matter

differently and even where substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 

McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545. In other words, where

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, it must be upheld.

C. Weighing of Medical Opinions

1. Legal Standards

The opinion of a treating physician should be given controlling weight if it

is: (1) “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques,” and (2) “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]

case record.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004);

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The Commissioner is required to provide “good

reasons” for discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion. These

reasons must be supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be

sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the

adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that

weight. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Failure to analyze a treating source opinion under the two-prong controlling

weight test amounts to the failure to provide good reasons for giving that opinion

less than controlling weight. See id. at 376-77. 

This requirement is not simply a formality; it is to

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safeguard the claimant’s procedural rights. It is intended

“to let claimants understand the disposition of their

cases, particularly in situations where a claimant knows

that his physician has deemed him disabled and therefore

might be especially bewildered when told by an

administrative bureaucracy that [ ] he is not.

Significantly, the requirement safeguards a reviewing

court’s time, as it “permits meaningful” and efficient

“review of the ALJ’s application of the [treating

physician] rule.” 

Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “This circuit

‘has made clear that [it] do[es] not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has

not provided good reasons for the weight given to a treating physician's opinion.’” 

Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 380 (quoting Cole, 661 F. 3d at 939).

 Even if an ALJ determines that plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinions

should not be given controlling weight despite the medical evidence in support,

“the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a

number of factors, including the length of the treatment relationship,

supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a

whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.” Allen v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 2013 WL 5676254, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013) (citing Blakley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009)). “The more a medical

source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs

and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an

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explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that

opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). “Moreover, when the physician is a

specialist with respect to the medical condition at issue, . . . her opinion is given

more weight than that of a non-specialist.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 652

F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2011).

2. Two-Prong Controlling Weight Assessment

Here, the ALJ determined that the medical opinions of two of plaintiff’s

treating physicians, Dr. Lis-Planells and Dr. George, were not entitled to

controlling weight. Plaintiff disagrees. Plaintiff maintains that the medical

opinions of both doctors are well supported by the objective medical evidence,

treating records, and response to treatment and are therefore, entitled to controlling

weight. 

Dr. Lis-Planells is plaintiff’s treating neurologist. He examined and treated

plaintiff regularly in 2009, 2010, and 2012. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 450, 448, 258, 273,

434, 424, 432, 434). Dr. Lis-Planells diagnosed plaintiff with cervical herniated

nucleus pulposus (HNP) with radiculopathy. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 474). Objective

findings included cervical spasm, cervical MRI, and multiple physical

examinations of plaintiff where his cervical spine had decreased range of motion

with flexion and extension, and muscle spasm. Id. Dr. Lis-Planells made several

attempts to improve plaintiff’s medical condition and to help manage his pain

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without significant success. His medical treatment of plaintiff included

recommending multiple rounds of physical therapy, epidural injections, electrical

modality, and surgical recommendation. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 434, 311, 504).

Likewise, plaintiff contends that Dr. George’s opinions are well-supported

by the objective medical evidence. Dr. George treated plaintiff for several years

predating his disability hearing, primarily handling plaintiff’s pain medication

management. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 556). Dr. George saw plaintiff several times in

2010, 2011, and 2012. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 332-34, 417, 419-20, 322, 430-31). 

Treatment included medication refills, referral for physical therapy, referrals for

additional diagnostic testing, referrals to Dr. Lis-Planells, and injections. Id. Dr.

Lis-Planells also copied Dr. George on plaintiff’s chart notes. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID

504, 508, 511, 515, 520). 

Dr. Lis-Planells opined that plaintiff could lift and carry 10 pounds

occasionally and five pounds frequently; he could not repetitively bend the neck;

he could not sit for more than 30 minutes without interruption on any single

occasion; he could not sit for more than an hour and a half total, and he would

require complete freedom to rest without restriction. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 470-72,

474). Similarly, Dr. George opined that plaintiff could only sit for two hours total

in an eight hour work day because sitting caused his neck to become stiff, crack,

and painful. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 553-555, 556). Further, plaintiff required complete

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freedom to rest without restriction. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 556). According to

plaintiff, the limitations articulated by both doctors are well supported by the

objective medical records and consistent with the overall medical records and

response to treatment, and limit plaintiff to less than sedentary work.

On the other hand, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision to accord limited weight to the two treating doctors’

opinions. The ALJ explained that Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions were inconsistent

with some of his other opinions, as well as the opinions of the consultative

examining and reviewing physicians. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 59-60). Further, the ALJ

determined that Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions were inconsistent with plaintiff’s own

description of his activities and limitations. Id. Since Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions

were inconsistent with other substantial evidence, the Commissioner maintains

that the ALJ accurately concluded that his opinions were not entitled to controlling

weight. 

Additionally, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ accurately explained

the fact that Dr. George’s opinions were also inconsistent with other substantial

evidence of record, including the opinions of Dr. Jurado and Dr. Lis-Planells that

plaintiff could perform sedentary work. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 473, 565). Dr.

Lis-Planells and Dr. George each completed three separate worksheet opinions on

the same day, May 14, 2013. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 552, 553-56). The ALJ noted that

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Dr. George contradicted himself in his opinions, and contradicted Dr. Lis-Planells

in other opinions. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 60-61). Thus, since Dr. George’s opinions

were inconsistent with other substantial evidence, the opinions were not entitled to

controlling weight.

The undersigned is not persuaded that the ALJ provided the requisite good

reasons for assigning the treating source opinions less than controlling weight

because the ALJ’s decision fails to assess the opinions in accordance with the twoprong controlling weight test. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 59). First, the decision does not

discuss whether the treating providers’ opinions are well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and second it does not

properly assess their inconsistency with other substantial evidence. Id. Rather,

the ALJ afforded Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions limited weight only where he reached

conclusions that were inconsistent with the RFC; and where an opinion

purportedly conflicted with plaintiff’s testimony about how long he could sit in his

recliner, the ALJ declined to give the opinions any weight, let alone controlling

1

weight. Id. Furthermore, while the ALJ criticized the “attorney generated” forms

 Notably, plaintiff testified that he could sit for four hours per day in his recliner. Even 1

assuming that sitting in a recliner equates to sitting in a typical workplace, this does not satisfy

the standards for sedentary work under the Social Security Act and accompanying regulations. A

“sedentary” range is generally associated with sitting for about six hours in an eight-hour

workday. Sorrell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., — Fed. Appx. — ; 2016 WL 4245467, 8* (6th Cir.

2016) (citing SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (noting that in a

sedentary range “[s]itting would generally total about 6 hours of an 8-hour workday”); see also

Mager v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 145 F.3d 1332, at *2 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998) (table). 

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completed by Dr. Lis-Planells, he adopted those opinions as consistent with his

RFC and concluded, without any analysis, that Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinion that

plaintiff could perform sedentary work “was supported by the longitudinal record

including the recent consultative exam.” Id. at 59-60. While the ALJ’s decision

purports to support its conclusion on controlling weight, it only provides a

confusing and internally inconsistent rationale, which results in ambiguity. 

This case is similar to Gayheart, supra, in that the ALJ there, also

concluded that the treating physician opinions were not well-supported by any

objective findings. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the ALJ’s

decision in that regard was ambiguous. The Court explained that it could not

“determine whether the purported problem is that the opinions rely on findings

that are not objective (i.e., that are not the result of medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)), or that the

findings are sufficiently objective but do not support the content of the opinions.” 

Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 377. The Gayheart court also rejected the ALJ’s

determination that the opinions of nontreating and nonexamining doctors

constituted “substantial evidence” in support of the decision to deprive the treating

physician opinions of controlling weight. As the Sixth Circuit held, 

Otherwise the treating-physician rule would have no

practical force because the treating source’s opinion

would have controlling weight only when the other

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sources agreed with that opinion. Such a rule would turn

on its head the regulation’s presumption of giving

greater weight to treating sources because the weight of

such sources would hinge on their consistency with

nontreating, nonexamining sources.

Id. at 377. Consequently, the ALJ cannot use conflicting opinions of non-treaters

to create substantial evidence in support of his conclusion that the treating

physician opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. As such, we are left

with the ALJ’s reference to plaintiff’s self-articulated ability to sit in a recliner for

four hours per day (which is inconsistent with the general requirements of

sedentary work) and the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinion that

plaintiff could perform sedentary work was supported by the longitudinal record

including the recent consultative exam by Dr. Jurado - which, like the opinions of

Dr.’s Lis-Planell and George - is memorialized in the form of attorney-generated

forms. 

Like the circumstances in Gayheart, here it is impossible to tease out a

properly analyzed reason for the ALJ’s decision to withhold controlling weight to

the opinions. Part of the ALJ’s stated skepticism about the forms completed by

Dr. Lis-Planell and Dr. George is because they, “[a]re couched in the language of

our rules and regulations and not in the form of medical terminology.” (Dkt. 13-2,

Pg ID 60). The ALJ reasoned that in doing so, a doctor may be answering

questions beyond his expertise, and perhaps even be motivated to provide opinions

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the doctor believes will help his patient’s claim. Id. Notably, however, the ALJ

acknowledges that it is “difficult to confirm such motives,” and does not expressly

state or point to evidence that either doctor’s opinions are not the result of

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Id. Given the

ALJ’s criticism of the attorney-generated forms, it is incongruous for the ALJ to

then circle back and rely on the single checking of a box (by Dr. Jurado) on such a

form to support his controlling weight determination. The decision’s lack of a

clear, cohesive, and substantive analysis under the two-prong controlling weight

test necessarily amounts to a failure to provide good reason for discounting the

opinion’s weight, which compels a remand. See Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376.

3. “Good Reasons” Assessment

Separately, plaintiff also argues the ALJ did not give good reasons for the

actual weight given to the treating medical opinions, under the second part of the

Gayheart analysis. The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinion that

plaintiff could not return to his past work, which was at a heavy extertional level,

but gave little weight to the opinion that plaintiff could not work other jobs. (Dkt.

13-2 Pg ID 59). The ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Lis-Plannells’ opinion that

plaintiff could perform “sedentary work” but gave no weight to the opinion that

plaintiff was required complete freedom to rest as inconsistent with the ability to

perform “sedentary work.” Id. at Pg ID 59-60. As to Dr. Lis-Plannells’ November

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14, 2012 opinion, the ALJ gave it weights that varied from “significant” (as to the

postural and environmental limitations) to “no weight at all” (the one-half hour

sitting limitation). Id. at 59. 

In rejecting the medical opinion of Dr. Lis-Planells that plaintiff could only

sit for an hour and a half total during a work day, the decision pointed to plaintiff’s

testimony that he sits in a recliner most of the day. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 59). 

Plaintiff testified that he sits in his recliner “for a little while, a couple hours. 

Then I go lay down in bed, and I do the circle-lay down a little while on my side,

because I get cramped up. And I go back to bed, move around.” (Dkt. 13-2, Pg

ID 82). Plaintiff points out that a recliner is a chair one uses to lay back, and

posits that it seems unlikely that sitting in a recliner is the same as sitting in a chair

for gainful employment. Rather, plaintiff advances that his testimony about

moving between his recliner and his bed is consistent with Dr. Lis-Planells’

opinion that he needs complete freedom to rest without restriction. However, the

decision also rejected both Dr. Lis-Planells and Dr. George’s medical opinions

that he needed complete freedom to rest without restriction. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 59). 

In dismissing these opinions the decision pointed to physician statement forms on

which Dr. Lis-Planells and Dr. George checked a box indicating plaintiff could

perform sedentary work. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 60). 

The Commissioner maintains, however, that the ALJ here gave several good

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reasons for the weight assigned to Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID

59-60). As the ALJ explained, Dr. Lis-Planells provided several different

opinions. Id. Some of Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions indicated that plaintiff could

perform sedentary work (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 473), while others stated that plaintiff

had restrictions that would preclude any substantial gainful work activity. (Dkt.

13-7, Pg ID 474). The ALJ also reasoned that Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions were

inconsistent with plaintiff’s testimony, and that the opinions seemed to reflect

occupational rather than medical judgments. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 59-60). The

Commissioner points out that consistency with other evidence is one of the key

factors for weighing opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). As described

above, in assigning little weight to Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinions, the ALJ explained

that his opinions were inconsistent with other opinions he authored on the same

date. (Dkt. 13-2, 59-60). 

According to the Commissioner, the ALJ reasonably emphasized the major

inconsistencies between Dr. Lis-Planells’ three November 14, 2012, opinions

regarding plaintiff’s abilities, particularly with regard to sitting. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID

471, 473). Dr. Lis-Planells’ opinion that plaintiff could not sit for more than 30

minutes per day was directly contradicted by his opinion that plaintiff could do a

job that “involve[d] sitting most of the time.” Id. The Commissioner maintains

that the “stark inconsistency” between opinions authored on the same day

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regarding a critical functional ability justifiably led the ALJ to question the

probative value of the opinions. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 60-61. See Combs v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 652 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (ALJ reasonably rejected

treating source opinion that was inconsistent with other opinions provided by the

same source). 

According to the Commissioner, the ALJ also gave several good reasons for

the weight assigned to Dr. George’s opinions. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 59-60). As the

ALJ explained, Dr. George provided several different opinions, some

contradicting others that he authored that same day. Id. at Pg ID 60. Dr. George

opined that plaintiff could stand and walk for a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour

workday, but that he could stand and walk for zero hours on any single occasion. 

(Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 554). The ALJ recognized that Dr. George’s opinions were

inconsistent with opinions from plaintiff’s other treating source, Dr. Lis-Planells,

and also inconsistent with opinions from state agency consultative examining and

reviewing physicians. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 60). The Commissioner points out that

Dr. George’s May 2013 opinion that plaintiff could stand and walk for only 2

hours during an 8-hour workday and could stand and walk for zero hours without

interruption was both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with Dr.

Lis-Planells’ November 2012 opinion that plaintiff had no limitations in standing

and walking. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 470-71). Dr. George and Dr. Lis-Planells also

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differed regarding plaintiff’s sitting limitations, with Dr. George opining that

plaintiff could sit for 2 hours in an 8-hour workday (though, illogically, he could

sit without interruption for zero hours) (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 554), and Dr.

Lis-Planells opining that plaintiff could only sit for one half-hour without

interruption in an 8-hour workday. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 471). Dr. George opined

elsewhere that plaintiff could perform sedentary work, which was defined as

working involving “sitting most of the time...” (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 552). The

examining physician Dr. Jurado opined that plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for

a total of 4 hours per activity in an 8-hour workday (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 565), while

the reviewing physician Dr. Ahmed opined that plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk

for a total of 6 hours per activity. (Dkt. 13-3, Pg ID 106). Given the divergence in

the opinion evidence, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ reasonably rejected

Dr. George’s opinions. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 60). 

The Commissioner also points out that, in certain circumstances, the ALJ is

empowered to give greater weight to the opinions of the state agency medical

consultant than to the treating physician. See SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3. 

The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ appropriately gave great weight to the

opinions of the consultative examining physician Dr. Jurado, while giving little

weight to the opinions of Dr. Lis-Planells and Dr. George. Dr. Jurado performed a

thorough physical examination of plaintiff on June 7, 2013. (Dkt. 13-7, 557-64). 

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Dr. Jurado opined that plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for 4 hours each in an

8-hour workday. Id. at Pg ID 566. Moreover, state agency reviewing physician

Dr. Ahmed reviewed the record in June 2012. (Dkt. 13-3, Pg ID 103-107). The

record included the MRI evidence showing moderate left neuroforaminal

narrowing at C2-C3 and small C4-C5 paracentral disc protrusion. (Dkt. 13-3, Pg

ID 103). Dr. Ahmed opined that plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for 6 hours

each in an 8-hour workday, and that he could occasionally lift 20 pounds and

frequently lift up to 10 pounds. (Dkt. 13-3, Pg ID 106). According to the

Commissioner, the ALJ ultimately adopted an RFC finding that was more limiting

than either Dr. Jurado or Dr. Ahmed opined. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 53). The ALJ’s

RFC finding was largely consistent with the opinions provided by both Dr. LisPlanells and Dr. George that plaintiff could perform sedentary work. (Dkt. 13-7,

Pg ID 473, 552). 

In the Court’s view, even if the decision’s rationale for discounting the

opinions arguably could be read as an assessment under the two-prong controlling

weight standard, the explanation offered by the ALJ does not suffice as good

reasons under Gayheart. Id. As noted in Gayheart, good reasons must be

supported by the evidence in the case record and must be sufficiently specific to

permit meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the treating source rule. Id.

In this case, as noted by plaintiff in the reply brief, both the treating

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physician opinions and the consulting opinion on which the ALJ relied heavily

suffer from internal inconsistencies. Yet, the ALJ did not explain why some

internally inconsistent opinions were supported by substantial evidence and others

were not. Rather, he only adopted the opinions from the treating physician that

were consistent with his RFC - and rejected those that were not, without

determining which opinions from the those treating physicians were actually

supported by the evidence in the record. In doing so, the ALJ ignored

inconsistencies in the very opinion on which he relied so heavily. Dr. Jurado

opined both that plaintiff could “never” lift 11-20 pounds and could

“occasionally” lift 11-20 pounds. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 565). This is precisely the

kind of inconsistency on which the ALJ based his rejection of the treating

physicians’ opinions. 

As in Gayheart, where the ALJ was “quite critical of the alleged

inconsistencies” in the treating physician’s opinions, the ALJ here does not

“acknowledge equivalent inconsistencies in the opinions of the consultative

doctors.” Id. Gayheart specifically held that an ALJ must not apply more

rigorous scrutiny of the treating-source opinion than the nontreating and

nonexamining opinions because that “is precisely the inverse of the analysis that

the regulation requires.” Id. at 379 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); SSR 96-6p,

1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996)). Thus, the ALJ’s

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treatment of the medical opinions in this case does not follow Gayheart’s “good

reasons” analysis for reconciling the weights given to the various medical

opinions and this matter must be remanded so that the correct standards are

applied. 

Additionally, the Court rejects the Commissioner’s view of the “sedentary”

findings by plaintiff’s treating physicians. It is true that those findings were not

consistent with other findings made by the treating physicians. The ALJ,

nevertheless, relied on those opinions to the extent they were consistent with his

RFC, but at the same time, rejected much of those opinions for speaking in terms

of a vocational analysis rather than a medical or functional analysis. Specifically,

the ALJ relied on those very opinions for the conclusion that plaintiff could

perform “sedentary” work. (Dkt. 13-2, Pg ID 60). However, beyond the internal

inconsistency of relying on opinions otherwise rejected, the definition of

“sedentary” used on the form does not comport with the definition of “sedentary”

used by the Commissioner. For instance, there is nothing in the definition on the

forms explaining that a person would need to be able to sit six hours per day in

order to perform sedentary work. (Dkt. 13-7, Pg ID 473, 552); see also, note 1. 

For all of these reasons, this matter must be remanded for further consideration of

the second part of the Gayheart test, should the ALJ conclude that such opinions

are not entitled to controlling weight under the first part of the test.

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D. Recontacting Treating Physicians

The Social Security Administration regulation details how to satisfy the

requirement for resolving medical record ambiguities:

(e) Recontacting medical sources. When the evidence we

receive from your treating physician or psychologist or

other medical source is inadequate for us to determine

whether you are disabled, we will need additional

information to reach a determination or a decision. To

obtain the information, we will take the following

actions.

(1) We will first recontact your treating physician or

psychologist or other medical source to determine

whether the additional information we need is readily

available. We will seek additional evidence or

clarification from your medical source when the report

from your medical source contains a conflict or

ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not

contain all the necessary information, or does not appear

to be based on medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques. We may do this by

requesting copies of your medical source’s records, a

new report, or a more detailed report from your medical

source, including your treating source, or by telephoning

your medical source. In every instance where medical

evidence is obtained over the telephone, the telephone

report will be sent to the source for review, signature and

return.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1); see e.g., Rogers v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4479524 (E.D.

Tenn. 2011) (where treating physician’s notes are illegible, seeking a supplemental

evaluation from the treating physician was deemed to satisfy the “recontacting”

requirement); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,

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110-111 (2000) (The ALJ has a duty to investigate the facts and develop the

arguments both for and against granting benefits.); D’Angelo v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r,

475 F.Supp.2d 716 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (Where an ALJ discounts the opinions of a

treating physician because the record includes virtually no medical records of

plaintiff’s treatment with that physician, the ALJ should perform a further

investigation pursuant to SSR 96-5p.). 

The Sixth Circuit has described a two-part test from Social Security Ruling

96-5p, which parallels the requirements in § 404.1512(e). First, the evidence in

the record must not support the treating physician’s opinion. Ferguson v.

Comm’r, 628 F.3d 269, 273 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Lovelace v. Astrue, 2011 WL

2670450 (E.D. Tenn. 2011). Second, the ALJ must be unable to ascertain the

basis of the opinion from the evidence in the record. Id. In Ferguson, the Sixth

Circuit determined that the second prong of the test was not met because the ALJ

explained that the applicable physician’s opinion was based on self-reported

history and subjective complaints, not on objective medical evidence. Id. The

Sixth Circuit noted that “to the extent the ALJ ‘rejected’ Dr. Erulkar’s ‘opinion of

disability,’ he did so not because the bases for her opinion were unclear to him,

but because those bases, Ferguson’s self-reported history and subjective

complaints, were not supported by objective medical evidence.” Id.

Here, as discussed in detail above, the ALJ did not satisfactorily explain

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how and why the treating physician opinions were not supported by the record. 

Thus, the Court cannot determine at this stage of the proceedings whether the first

prong is satisfied. But it appears that the second prong is essentially satisfied

because while the ALJ might have been “able” to ascertain the basis of the opinion

from the record, he did not do so. This situation is distinguishable from that

presented in Ferguson where the bases of the rejected treating physician opinion

were, in fact, clear to the ALJ and anyone reviewing the record. This situation is

also unlike that presented in Poe v. Comm’r, 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 156-157 (6th

Cir. 2009), where the opinion at issue was contradicted by two other treating

physicians.

Even if the ALJ does not have a duty under Ferguson to re-contact the

treating physicians, given the clear confusion created by those opinions and the

existence of a medical opinion from Dr. Jurado which is itself internally

inconsistent and contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff could perform

sedentary work, seeking more clarity in developing the medical opinions in the

record is prudent. While the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing disability,

the ALJ also has a duty to fully develop the record. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,

110-111 (2000) (The ALJ has a duty to investigate the facts and develop the

arguments both for and against granting benefits). Under these circumstances, in

order to formulate an accurate RFC, the ALJ needs to resolve the internal

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inconsistencies in the medical opinions. Thus, on remand, the ALJ is directed to

supplement and clarify Dr. Lis-Planells’ and Dr. George’s opinions. 

2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 31, 2017 s/Stephanie Dawkins Davis

Stephanie Dawkins Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 31, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing paper

with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send electronic

notification to all counsel of record.

s/Tammy Hallwood

Case Manager

(810) 341-7887

tammy_hallwood@mied.uscourts.gov

 The ALJ will necessarily have to re-evaluate plaintiff’s credibility on remand, which 2

was inextricably tied to the ALJ’s assessment of the treating physician opinions. Thus, the

specific arguments raise by plaintiff regarding the ALJ’s RFC assessment need not be addressed

here. Nothing precludes plaintiff from raising those issues before the ALJ on remand.

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