UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KIMBERLY J. GUEST-MARCOTTE, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-10738 

v Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

 Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris 

METALDYNE POWERTRAIN 

COMPONENTS, Inc., et al., 

 

Defendants. 

__________________________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

Plaintiff Kimberly J. Guest-Marcotte initiated this case by filing her two-count complaint 

on February 27, 2015, alleging that Defendants violated her rights under the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2), in denying 

her request for short term disability benefits. She further alleges that Defendants violated her 

rights under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”) in 

subsequently terminating her employment. See Compl. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint on April 19, 2016. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 44. 

On December 1, 2016 the magistrate judge issued a report, recommending that Plaintiff’s 

motion for judgment be denied and that Defendant’s motion for judgment be granted. See ECF 

No. 63. The magistrate judge reasoned that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that the Plan 

Administrator’s decision to deny her benefits was in error under the arbitrary and capricious 

standard, particularly given the lack of objective medical evidence. The magistrate judge further 

reasoned that Defendant Metaldyne’s subsequent decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment 

was not inconsistent with the plan administrator’s disability determination. The magistrate judge 
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therefore recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. By an order 

dated January 6, 2017, Plaintiff’s objections were overruled and the magistrate judge’s report 

was adopted. See ECF No. 67. Judgment then entered against Plaintiff on February 2, 2017. See 

ECF No. 73. 

I. 

After the entry of judgment, on March 2, 2017, Defendants filed a joint motion for 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). See ECF No. 74. That section provides that 

in an ERISA action “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of 

action to either party.” Id. This rule serves as a slight abrogation from the presumptive 

“American Rule,” under which “each litigant pays his or her own attorney’s fees, win or lose, 

unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 

560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)). To 

justify an award of fees under § 1132(g)(1), a party must show “some degree of success on the 

merits.” Id. at 255. “A claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving ‘trivial success on 

the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural victor[y].’” Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688). 

In guiding the exercise of its discretion, a district court may consider the traditional 

“King” five-factor fee-shifting test, but consideration of the factors is not required. Id. at 254-55. 

Nevertheless, the King factors are as follows: 

(1) the degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2) the opposing 

party’s ability to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees; (3) the deterrent effect of an 

award on other persons under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party 

requesting fees sought to confer a common benefit on all participants and 

beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve significant legal questions regarding 

ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. 

See First Trust Corp. v. Bryant, 410 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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 Defendants have not demonstrated that discretionary fees are justified in this matter. 

While Defendants indisputably achieved success on the merits, they have not demonstrated that 

Plaintiff acted in bad faith, or that other persons should be deterred from bringing similar claims. 

While Plaintiff’s claim was brought only on her own behalf, the case presented somewhat 

unusual factual and legal issues regarding the interaction between benefits determinations and 

employment actions. Defendants also have not demonstrated any inability to bear their own fees, 

and requiring Plaintiff to bear Defendant’s costs would result in an onerous financial burden. 

Defendants have not identified any other factor weighing in favor of a discretionary award of 

fees. Because the balance of factors weighs against an award of fees, Defendants’ motion will be 

denied. 

II. 

Accordingly it is ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for Attorneys’ fees, ECF No. 74, 

is DENIED. 

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: June 2, 2017 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on June 2, 2017. 

 s/Kelly Winslow 

 KELLY WINSLOW, Case Manager