J-A25034-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JAMES COLEY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KEYSTONE TURF CLUB, INC., BENSALEM 

RACING ASSOCIATION, INC., 

GREENWOOD GAMING AND

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., D/B/A PARX 

CASINO, GREENWOOD RACING, INC., 

TURF CLUB SERVICES, INC., KEYSTONE 

PARK SERVICES CO., AND PARX CASINO 

DESIGN, INC.

Appellants No. 3837 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 21, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No: 141201773

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2018

Appellant, Greenwood Racing, Inc. (“Greenwood”),

1 appeals from the 

November 21, 2016 judgment of $150,000 in compensatory and $200,000 in 

punitive damages entered in favor of Appellee, James Coley. We remand. 

The trial court summarized the facts and procedure in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion: 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 The remaining captioned Appellants are no longer participating. 
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On July 31, 2014, at approximately 9:30 p.m., [Appellee] 

was a customer in the Turf Club, a business for off track betting 

located at 1635 Market Street in Philadelphia. [Appellee’s] 

Amended Complaint alleged that each of the corporate defendants 

owned, possessed, maintained, controlled, and operated the Turf 

Club. 

While [Appellee] was at a betting machine, he was verbally 

threatened and physically beaten and robbed by additional 

defendants John Gleason Jr. and John Gleason Sr. [Appellee]

sustained injuries to his head, eye, leg, ankle, and foot. Before 

the altercation, John Gleason Jr. had been drinking and had 

threatened another patron. 

[Appellee] sued the corporate defendants for negligently 

failing to have proper or adequate security in the Turf Club, failing 

to come to his aid when he was attacked by the Gleasons, failing 

to remove John Gleason Jr. from the premises after his earlier 

altercation with a patron, failing to monitor John Gleason Jr.’s later 

activities in the Turf Club, and continuing to serve the Gleasons 

alcohol after they became visibly intoxicated. The corporate 

defendants joined John Gleason Jr. and John Gleason Sr. as 

additional defendants. 

At trial, nonsuits were granted to John Gleason Jr.; John 

Gleason Sr.; Bensalem Racing Association, Inc.; Greenwood 

Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., d/b/a Parx Casino

[“Greenwoord”]; Turf Club Services, Inc.; Keystone Park Services 

Co.; and Parx Casino Design, Inc. Trial proceeded against 

Keystone Turf Club, Inc. and [Greenwood]. 

The jury found in favor of [Appellee] and against Keystone 

Turf Club and [Greenwood] and awarded compensatory damages 

in the total amount of $300,000. Liability was apportioned 50

percent for each defendant. The jury separately awarded 

[Appellee] $200,000 in punitive damages against [Greenwood]

only. 

[Greenwood] filed a timely motion for post-trial relief; 

Keystone Turf Club did not seek post-trial relief. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/17, at 1-2. The trial court concluded that Greenwood

failed to preserve any issues in its post-trial motion and recommended quashal 
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of this appeal. Id. at 4. The trial court therefore did not address Greenwood’s 

substantive issues. 

Greenwood raises four assertions of error, the first of which is as follows: 

Did the trial court err in holding that the post-trial motion of 

[Greenwood] failed to preserve any issues for review, where (1) 

no Pennsylvania court has ever found waiver under these

circumstances, (2) [Greenwood’s] post-trial motion complied with 

Rule 227.1 by setting forth the grounds for appeal and where 

those grounds were preserved, and incorporating its own (and 

only) arguments at trial that the evidence was insufficient for any 

claim against it, and (3) the trial court could clearly address the 

issues raised, there was no prejudice, and justice required 

resolving the case on the merits? 

Greenwood’s Brief at 4 (underscoring in original). We find Greenwood’s first 

argument meritorious, and therefore remand to the trial court for preparation 

of an opinion addressing the issues raised in Greenwood’s post-trial motion. 

We do not address Greenwood’s remaining issues. 

The trial court relied on Rule 227.1(b), which provides as follows: 

(b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa.R.E. 103(a), posttrial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,

(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial 

proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge, 

request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer of 

proof or other appropriate method at trial; and

[...]

(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state 

how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or 

at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless 

leave is granted upon cause shown to specify additional 

grounds.
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Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1(b). The explanatory comment to Rule 227.1 indicates: 

“In requiring the motion to state the specific grounds therefor, motions which 

set forth mere ‘boilerplate’ language are specifically disapproved.” Pa.R.C.P. 

No. 227.1, Explanatory Comment—1983. “The purpose of this rule is ‘to 

provide the trial court the first opportunity to review and reconsider its earlier 

rulings and correct its own error.’” Chalkey v. Roush, 757 A.2d 972, 975 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Soderberg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839, 

845 (Pa. Super. 1997)), aff’d, 805 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2002). 

Greenwood’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

alleged that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that 

Greenwood breached a duty to Appellee, that Greenwood’s conduct was a 

legal cause of harm to Appellee, and that Greenwood was liable for punitive 

damages to Appellee, contending as follows: 

1. The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying 

[Greenwood’s] Motions for Compulsory Non-suit and for Directed 

Verdict, and should now grant JNOV in favor of [Greenwood], 

because the evidence taken as a whole, and viewed in the light 

most favorable to [Appellee] as verdict winner, was insufficient as 

a matter of law to make out a claim that [Greenwood] owed or 

breached any duty to [Appellee]. [Greenwood] incorporates 

herein by reference its Motions for Compulsory Nonsuit and for 

Directed Verdict, and the related briefing and argument. 

2. The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying 

[Greenwood’s] Motions for Compulsory Non-suit and for Directed 

Verdict, and should now grant JNOV in favor of [Greenwood], 

because the evidence taken as a whole, and viewed in the light 

most favorable to [Appellee] as verdict winner, was insufficient as 

a matter of law for the jury to find that any alleged breach on the 

part of [Greenwood] (any such breach being denied) was a legal 

cause of the harm to [Appellee]. [Greenwood] incorporates herein 
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by reference its Motions for Compulsory Nonsuit and for Directed 

Verdict, and the related briefing and argument. 

3. The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying 

[Greenwood’s] Motions for Compulsory Non-suit and for Directed 

Verdict, and should now grant JNOV in favor of [Greenwood], 

because the evidence taken as a whole, and viewed in the light 

most favorable to [Appellee] as verdict winner, was insufficient as 

a matter of law for a jury to hold [Greenwood] liable for punitive 

damages. [Greenwood] incorporates herein by reference its 

Motions for Compulsory Nonsuit and for Directed Verdict, and the 

related briefing and argument. 

Greenwood’s Post-Trial Motion, 10/14/16, at ¶¶ 1-3. As is evident from the 

foregoing, Appellant incorporated by reference the detailed briefing and 

argument of its prior nonsuit and directed verdict motions. The trial court 

believed Greenwood’s JNOV motion was too boilerplate because of its

incorporation by reference of prior arguments. Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/16, 

at 2. We believe Greenwood’s motion was sufficient to apprise the trial court 

of its arguments in support of JNOV. In concluding otherwise, the trial court 

relied on inapposite case law. 

For example, the trial court relied upon Hall v. Jackson, 788 A.2d 390, 

401 (Pa. Super. 2001), in which a defendant doctor incorporated by reference 

the post-trial motion of the co-defendant hospital. On appeal, the doctor 

challenged the trial court’s admission of hearsay testimony from three 

witnesses. The doctor did not raise the hearsay issue in his post-trial motion, 

but the hospital did as to two of the three witnesses. Id. We noted that 

failure to include an issue in a post-trial motion results in waiver under Rule 

227.1, but we also analyzed the merits of the doctor’s argument as to the two 
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witnesses referenced in the hospital’s motion. Id. The trial court’s reliance 

on Hall is misplaced because the Hall Court analyzed the merits of issues that 

the doctor incorporated by reference in his post-sentence motion. 

The trial court also relied on Therres v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of 

Borough of Rose Valley, 947 A.2d 226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), appeal denied, 

963 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2008). There, the appellants challenged a zoning board 

order. By statute, a notice of appeal in a land use case must set forth the 

grounds on which the appellant relies. Id. at 231. The appellants’ notice 

incorporated the zoning board’s findings and conclusions and asserted that 

they were erroneous. Id. at 231. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial 

court’s quashal of the appeal from the zoning board order, reasoning that the 

statute governing such notices would be rendered meaningless if we held the 

appellants’ notice to be sufficient. Id. at 232. Therres is distinguishable for 

two reasons. First, it was governed by a statute that does not apply to the 

instant matter. Second, there is no indication in Therres that the appellants

fully developed the arguments at an earlier stage of the proceedings. 

Likewise, this Court’s opinion in Siculietano v. K & B Amusements 

Corp., 915 A.2d 130, 133 (Pa. Super. 2006), is distinguishable because the 

appellant’s post-trial motion purported to preserve “such other errors as may 

be disclosed by a transcript of the trial.” On appeal, the appellant attempted 

to raise an issue under the Dead Man’s Act, but that issue was not included in 
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the appellant’s post-trial motion. Id. at 132. Boilerplate language such as 

“such other errors . . . ” was not sufficient to preserve the issue. Id.

Instantly, in contrast, Greenwood’s issues were the subject of detailed 

argument and briefing at several times during the trial. Greenwood is 

therefore in a stronger position than the defendant doctor in Hall, whose 

arguments were addressed on the merits even though he incorporated the 

arguments of a co-defendant. Unlike the appellant in Siculietano, 

Greenwood did not leave the trial court guessing with a vague assertion of 

“other errors.” In summary, nothing in the language of Rule 227.1 or any 

case law decided thereunder supports the trial court’s waiver analysis. We 

therefore conclude that the trial court erred in deeming Greenwood’s issues 

waived. In light of the trial court’s finding of waiver, it did not prepare an 

opinion addressing the merits of Greenwood’s issues. Greenwood, in turn,

prepared its brief without the benefit of the trial court’s reasons for denying 

post-trial relief. We remand this matter to the trial court for preparation of 

an opinion, to be filed with this Court within 60 days of the date of this 

memorandum, addressing the merits of Greenwood’s arguments. We direct 

the Prothonotary to issue a new briefing schedule upon receipt of the trial 

court’s opinion. 

Case remanded. Panel jurisdiction relinquished. 
J-A25034-17

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/18