For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:30 p.m.

Thursday,

October 12, 2000

GAO-01-76T

DRUG CONTROL

Challenges in

Implementing

Plan Colombia

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government

Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO
Page 1 GAO-01-76T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work you requested on the

counternarcotics efforts of the United States and Colombia. Today we will

highlight the preliminary findings from our ongoing review of the U.S.

assistance to Colombia. Our draft report is with the responsible agencies

for comment; we expect to issue a final report at the end of October. I will

discuss three broad issues: (1) how the drug threat has changed in recent

years, (2) problems the United States has had in providing its assistance to

Colombia in the past, and (3) challenges the United States and Colombian

face in reducing the illegal drug activities.

In October 1999, the Colombian government announced a $7.5 billion plan,

known as Plan Colombia, which among other things, proposes reducing

the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent

over 6 years. Colombia has pledged to provide $4 billion to support the

plan and called on the international community, including the United

States, to provide the remaining $3.5 billion. To assist in this effort, in July

2000, the United States agreed to provide about $860 million to Colombia

for fiscal years 2000-01,

1

 in addition to previously approved U.S. assistance

of over $330 million for fiscal years 2000-01. U.S. counternarcotics

assistance to Colombia has almost doubled compared to 1999 levels.

U.S. estimates indicate that the drug threat from Colombia has both

expanded and become more complex over the past several years. During

fiscal years 1996-2000, the United States provided Colombia more than

$765 million in assistance to help reduce illegal drug activities.

Nonetheless, Colombia remains the world’s leading producer of cocaine,

doubling its production during 1995-99. Over this period, Colombia also

became the major source of heroin consumed in the United States.

Furthermore, the number and types of organizations, including insurgent

groups, involved in illegal drug activities has increased and these groups

control more than 40 percent of Colombia’s territory. Both these factors

make eradication and interdiction operations to reduce illegal drug

activities more difficult.

The United States has had long-standing problems in providing

counternarcotics assistance to Colombian law enforcement and military

 1The act (Division B of P.L. 106-246) provides $1.3 billion, but about $440 million was for other Andean

countries and for U.S. agencies involved in drug interdiction and law enforcement.

Summary
Page 2 GAO-01-76T

agencies involved in counternarcotics activities. Although U.S.-provided

assistance such as aircraft, boats, and training has enhanced Colombian

counternarcotics capabilities, it has sometimes been of limited utility

because the United States did not provide spare parts or the funding

necessary to operate and maintain them to the extent possible for

conducting counternarcotics operations. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy has

made little progress implementing a plan to have the Colombian National

Police assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication program,

which requires the assistance of costly U.S. contractors. U.S. Embassy

officials also expressed concern that the National Police has not always

provided documentation about its use of some counternarcotics

assistance.

The U.S. and Colombian governments face a number of management and

financial challenges in implementing Colombia’s strategy to reduce the

cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent in

6 years. Although both governments are taking certain actions to address

the challenges, at this point however, the total cost and activities required

to meet the plan’s goals remain unknown, and significantly reducing drug

activities will likely take years.

• U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense (DOD) and

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), are still

developing comprehensive implementation plans for eradication and

interdiction operations and alternative development projects.

2

However,

negotiating for the manufacture and delivery of major equipment, such as

helicopters, is ongoing and staffing new programs in Colombia will take

time. As a result, agencies do not expect to have many of the programs to

support Plan Colombia in place until late 2001.

• Officials from State and DOD are now determining how the Blackhawk

and Huey II helicopters mandated by the Congress for Colombia will be

equipped and configured. They do not yet know if the funding planned for

fiscal years 2000-01 to support Plan Colombia will be sufficient. In

addition, State officials have begun planning for funding in fiscal years

2002 and beyond to continue the Plan Colombia programs initiated in

fiscal years 2000-01. While estimates have not been completed, these

officials stated that substantial funding would be needed.

 

2State and DOD manage most of the U.S.-provided counternarcotics assistance;

USAID oversees related development assistance programs.
Page 3 GAO-01-76T

• Colombia is relying on international donors in addition to the United

States to help fund Plan Colombia, but much of that support has yet to

materialize. To date, the Colombian government has not shown that it has

the detailed plans and funding necessary to achieve stated goals.

• Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its political and

economic instability fostered by its long-standing insurgency and the need

to ensure that the National Police and military comply with human rights

standards in order for U.S. assistance to continue.

As evidenced by past U.S. counternarcotics assistance programs, the

United States has not always provided the necessary support to operate

and maintain the U.S.-provided equipment to the extent possible to help

counter the illegal drug activities in Colombia. If these past problems

continue, the dramatic increase in

U.S. support for Plan Colombia will not be used in the most effective way.

At a minimum, if the United States or Colombia does not follow through

on its portion of Plan Colombia, or other international donors do not

support Colombia’s appeals for additional assistance, Plan Colombia

cannot succeed as envisioned.

For more than two decades, the United States has supported Colombia’s

efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities and to stem the flow of illegal

drugs entering the United States. Table 1 shows the U.S. assistance

provided to Colombia during fiscal years 1996-2000.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-76T

Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia (Fiscal years 1996–

2000)

(Dollars in millions)

Agency 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000aTotal

Stateb$22.6 $44.4 $83.1 $237.7 $76.3 $464.1

DODc14.5 53.2 61.4 80.9 72.5 282.5

USAID 0 0 3.3 6.3 9.0 18.6

Total $37.1 $97.6 $147.8 $324.9 $157.8 $765.2

aWe did not include the $860 million appropriated through the Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P.L. 106-246) in fiscal

year 2000 figures because the agencies have not yet allocated the funding between

fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

b

Includes $173.2 million in Colombia-specific counternarcotics assistance

provided to State in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1999 (Division B of P.L. 105-277).

c

Includes amounts delivered through September 1, 2000, from emergency

drawdowns of DOD inventories authorized in fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, and

1999. For fiscal year 1996, DOD could not provide funding data on its other

assistance programs.

The Colombian government’s $7.5 billion, 6-year Plan Colombia represents

a significant change from prior efforts. The government recognizes that

the program must address the conditions that foster the growth in illegal

drug activities. Central to the program is the Colombian government’s

effort to regain control of the drug-producing regions of the country from

insurgent and paramilitary groups, increase drug interdiction efforts,

provide coca farmers alternative ways to earn a living, and enhance the

protection of human rights. All key Colombian ministries, including the

Justice and Defense ministries, are assigned roles and specific tasks in the

plan.

In July 2000, Congress appropriated over $860 million in additional funding

for fiscal years 2000-01 to directly support activities in Plan Colombia.

3

The

activities include providing equipment, such as helicopters and fixed-wing

aircraft, and training to support counternarcotics operations of the

Colombian military and National Police; alternative development projects

in drug producing areas; judicial reform and rule of law initiatives;

 3

$330 million in counternarcotics assistance for Colombia had already been approved for fiscal years

2000-01.
Page 5 GAO-01-76T

strengthening Colombian human rights organizations; assisting displaced

persons; and supporting the peace process.

Historically, Colombia has been the world’s largest producer of cocaine.

However, starting in 1997, Colombia surpassed Bolivia and Peru as the

world’s largest cultivator of coca. Since 1995, the area under coca

cultivation in Colombia expanded by over 140 percent to over 300,000

acres in 1999. Most of this increased cultivation took place in the areas of

southern Colombia that are controlled by insurgents and paramilitary

groups. Moreover, the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia has

increased by 126 percent since 1995, from 230 metric tons to 520 metric

tons in 1999. Finally, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA), Colombia has become a major source of the heroin consumed in

the United States, producing about 6 metric tons annually.

Despite U.S. and Colombian efforts to disrupt drug-trafficking activities,

the U.S. Embassy in Colombia has not reported any net reduction in the

processing or export of refined cocaine to the United States. Moreover,

according to DEA, while two major groups (the Medellin and Cali cartels)

dominated drug-trafficking activities during the late 1980s and early 1990s,

hundreds of smaller and more decentralized organizations are now

involved in all aspects of the drug trade. According to DEA, several billion

dollars flow into Colombia each year from the cocaine trade alone. This

vast amount of drug money has made it possible for these organizations to

gain unprecedented economic, political, and social power and influence.

To further complicate matters, the two largest insurgent groups–the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation

Army–and paramilitary groups have expanded their involvement in drugtrafficking. The insurgents exercise some degree of control over

40 percent of Colombia’s territory east and south of the Andes, an area

equal in size to Texas.

According to DOD, two-thirds of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia’s units and one-third of the National Liberation Army units are

involved in some form of drug-trafficking activity. U.S. Embassy officials

stated that information over the past 2 years indicates that units of the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia have become more heavily

involved in growing coca, establishing coca prices, and transporting

cocaine in Colombia.

Moreover, in 1998, DEA reported that certain leaders of some paramilitary

groups that emerged as self-defense forces in response to the insurgents’

violence had become major drug traffickers.

The Changing Nature

of the Drug Threat in

Colombia
Page 6 GAO-01-76T

The United States has had long-standing problems in providing

counternarcotics assistance to Colombian law enforcement and military

agencies involved in counternarcotics activities. In 1998, we reported that

planning and management problems hampered U.S. counternarcotics

efforts in Colombia.

4

 For example, we reported that limited planning and

coordination between U.S. agencies hampered the delivery of some

counternarcotics equipment, such as fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and

boats, to the National Police and the Colombian military. We reported that

this equipment required substantial funding to make it operational.

Between October 1998 and August 1999, State provided the National

Police with six additional Bell 212 helicopters and six UH-II helicopters.

Neither set of helicopters was provided with adequate spare parts or the

funds to ensure adequate logistics support because of budget constraints.

Recognizing that the National Police could not operate and maintain the

helicopters, the Narcotics Affairs Section budgeted $1.25 million in fiscal

year 2000 to replenish the low supply of spare parts. However, according

to a U.S. Embassy official, the funding was not available until March 2000

because of delays in submitting State’s plan for the funds to the Congress.

Further aggravating the situation, the Embassy requested spare parts for

some of these helicopters from DOD stocks. While DOD agreed to provide

$3.1 million worth of helicopter spare parts, only $378,000 worth had been

delivered as of September 1, 2000. Although DOD intends to deliver the

remaining parts, a DOD official did not know when.

Furthermore, in September 1999, State and DOD initiated a plan to provide

the Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters State had purchased from

Canada to support Colombia’s three counternarcotics battalions. Between

November 1999 and February 2000, 18 of the helicopters were delivered to

Colombia,

5

 and a U.S. contractor trained 24 pilots and 28 Colombian Army

copilots to operate them. The original plan called for using these

helicopters beginning in May 2000 to support the first U.S.-trained

counternarcotics battalion, which was ready to begin operations on

January 1, 2000. The helicopters were to move troops into insurgent-

 4Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (GAO/NSIAD98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

5According to U.S. embassy officials, the remaining 15 helicopters and the training of 25 additional

pilots and 22 additional copilots would be provided once State received congressional approval to

allocate the funds recently provided as part of the U.S. support for Plan Colombia.

Problems in Managing

U.S. Assistance to

Colombia

Spare Parts Unavailable

for Helicopters

Inadequate Funding for

Helicopter Support
Page 7 GAO-01-76T

controlled areas so they could secure the areas and enable the National

Police to conduct eradication or interdiction missions.

At the time State agreed to purchase the helicopters, it had not included

the funds necessary to procure, refurbish, and support them in its fiscal

year 1999 and 2000 budgets. As a result, the helicopters could not be used

for conducting counternarcotics operations and 17 of the 24 contractor

pilots trained to fly the 18 UH-1Ns were laid off beginning in May 2000.

In August 2000, after the U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was approved,

State reprogrammed $2.2 million from the U.S. counternarcotics program

for Mexico to rehire and retrain additional personnel. According to State

and U.S. Embassy officials, it will take about 3 months for the

counternarcotics battalion to commence operations with the helicopters—

nearly a year after the original date to begin operations.

During fiscal years 1996 through 1999, the United States agreed to provide

Colombia almost $148 million worth of equipment and services from DOD

inventories to support counternarcotics efforts. As of September 1, 2000, it

had provided only about $58.5 million. According to DOD officials, the

difference between the amount of assistance requested and the amount

delivered is the result of a combination of factors—from overvaluing the

items when the request was initially developed to the unavailability of

some items in DOD inventories and the length of time to obtain and the

ship articles. For example, in 1996, DOD agreed to provide the Colombian

military and National Police with 90 secure radios and supporting

communications equipment from its inventories. However, according to

DOD records, this equipment was not available.

Beginning in 1998, U.S. Embassy officials became concerned over the

increased U.S. presence in Colombia and associated costs with an aerial

eradication program.

6

 At the time, the Embassy began developing a plan to

phase out U.S. contractor support of aerial eradication by having the

National Police assume increased operational control over this program.

This would be accomplished by providing the National Police with

training, aircraft, and other support needed to develop an infrastructure to

enhance their overall abilities to eradicate coca leaf and opium poppy.

According to Embassy personnel, the National Police have not formally

 6State estimates show that the direct costs of supporting the contractor increased from about $6.6

million in fiscal year 1996 to $36.8 million in fiscal year 1999.

DOD Has Not Provided

Some Equipment

Requested by the U.S.

Embassy

Colombian National Police

Have Not Assumed Control

Over Aerial Eradication

Operations
Page 8 GAO-01-76T

approved the plan, and State has not approved the funding needed to begin

the phaseout. Now, according to State officials, implementing Plan

Colombia is a higher priority, and they do not know when the phaseout

program will be approved.

According to U.S. Embassy officials, despite extensive training and other

efforts to have the National Police develop a management program that

would ensure a more effective aerial eradication program, little progress

has been made. For example, the National Police continue to emphasize

training high-ranking officers, even though the Narcotics Affairs Section

has informed the National Police that training should be given to junior

officers in areas such as logistics, operations, flight instructors,

maintenance, and administration. Moreover, the July 2000 State Inspector

General report stated that the National Police rotate more experienced

mechanics into other areas for developmental purposes.

7

 The Police are

therefore constantly training new personnel, making it difficult to maintain

a skilled workforce that is needed to repair the aerial eradication aircraft.

According to the Inspector General report, it will take 3 to 4 years before

entry-level mechanics will become productive journeymen.

Department of State policy requires that Narcotics Affairs Sections

adequately oversee U.S. counternarcotics assistance to ensure that it is

being used as intended and that it can be adequately accounted for.

However, U.S. Embassy officials stated that the National Police have not

always provided necessary documents, such as budgetary and planning

documents, to determine if the National Police are using the resources in

accordance with eradication and interdiction plans. In two instances, U.S.

Embassy officials said they observed the National Police using U.S.-

provided helicopters for purposes other than counternarcotics, but the

Police did not cooperate in their attempts to clarify how the helicopters

were being used.

Also, until recently, neither the U.S. Embassy nor the Colombian National

Police had conducted program reviews, as required in annual bilateral

agreements. Recognizing it may have a problem, the Narcotics Affairs

Section requested in early 2000 that the State Inspector General audit the

major National Police accounts for the first time in 15 years. In May 2000,

the State auditors reported to the Narcotics Affairs Section that the

National Police could not account for 469,000 of the 2.76 million gallons of

 7Report of Audit: Review of INL-Administered Programs in Colombia, 00-CI-021 (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of State, July 2000).

U.S. Embassy Concerns

About Program Oversight

Over Some U.S.-Provided

Assistance
Page 9 GAO-01-76T

fuel provided for counternarcotics missions in 1999. The auditors

concluded that the fuel may have been misused.

The governments of the United States and Colombia face a number of

challenges in implementing Colombia’s strategy to reduce the cultivation,

processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years. Although

both governments are taking steps to identify funding and complete

implementation plans, at this point, the total cost of U.S.-supported

activities required to meet the plan’s goals remains unknown. In addition,

Colombia must deal with the political and economic instability fostered by

Colombia’s long-standing insurgency and human rights problems.

As in the past, State and DOD will have to request additional funding to

support U.S.-provided equipment. Officials from State and DOD recently

testified that they do not know if sufficient funding is available to procure

the number of helicopters mandated by the Congress because they have

not determined how the helicopters will be equipped and configured.

8

According to State, the funding proposed by the administration and

approved by the Congress was not intended to support the equipment

scheduled to be provided through the 6-year life of Plan Colombia. State

officials noted that they are still developing cost estimates for fiscal year

2002 and beyond but that funding just to sustain the equipment included in

the current assistance for Colombia would be substantial.

During our recent visit to Colombia, government defense and budgeting

officials said that with their already tight defense budget they cannot

afford to operate and sustain the new U.S. helicopters by themselves.

Colombian and U.S. Embassy officials agreed that Colombia will need to

establish a new logistical and support system, including maintenance and

repair, for the Huey IIs that are not currently in the Colombian’s inventory

and that this will likely require continuing U.S. support.

Most of the assistance provided under Plan Colombia is targeted for the

Colombian military, but U.S. Southern Command officials said their

original input on Colombia’s needs was based on the information they had

and intuitive assessments of the Colombian military’s basic requirements.

At the time the administration was developing its assistance package,

 8Before the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,

House of Representatives, September 21, 2000.

Financial,

Management, And

Social Challenges Will

Complicate Efforts To

Meet Goals Of Plan

Colombia

Additional U.S. Funding

Will Be Needed to Support

Equipment Provided Under

Plan Colombia

U.S. Plans to Implement

the Counternarcotics

Program Have Not Been

Finalized
Page 10 GAO-01-76T

Colombia did not have a military plan on which to base its needs.

Moreover, the Southern Command had not expected large increases in the

levels of assistance for the military, and the daily management of the

current assistance program precluded military officials in the U.S.

Embassy from assessing Colombian overall needs.

To better define the Colombian military’s requirements, DOD recently

undertook two studies. The first specifically targeted the deployment of

the helicopters included in the assistance package and addressed issues

such as support for mission requirements and the organization, personnel,

and logistical support needed. The second addressed how the Colombian

military should structure and modernize itself to address the internal

threats of narcotics and insurgents. DOD officials said that these two

studies provide sufficient information to develop the operational doctrine,

structure, and systems necessary to use U.S. assistance and meet

counternarcotics goals effectively.

State is also drafting an implementation plan for U.S. assistance that is

necessary to better synchronize all U.S. programs and activities involved in

supporting Plan Colombia. State officials presented their draft to the

Colombian government to help them develop their strategy for the use of

U.S. funds. State officials stated that they expect the U.S. implementation

plan to be approved by U.S. agencies in October 2000.

State anticipates that it can obligate some funds for Plan Colombia

activities by the end of September 2000. However, DOD and the

Colombian Army have not finalized specifications for the Blackhawk

helicopters and State officials testified in September 2000 that the first

Blackhawk may not arrive in Colombia until October 2002. Similarly, State

testified that the first Huey IIs may not be delivered until mid-2001. In

addition, although State expects to initiate pilot projects such as

alternative and economic development and judicial reform in September

or October 2000, State and the U.S. Embassy cautioned that it will take

years to show measurable results.

U.S. Embassy officials said that the ability to begin implementing and

overseeing programs will hinge on obtaining additional staff to manage

programs. The Narcotics Affairs Section estimated it might need up to 24

additional staff, and USAID estimated it might need 40 more staff to

implement programs envisioned under Plan Colombia. As of September

2000, State and other agencies involved were still determining the number

of additional personnel needed and ways to address security and other

issues, such as the lack of secure office space in the U.S. Embassy.

It Will Take Time to See

Results of U.S. Assistance
Page 11 GAO-01-76T

Although the Colombian government has pledged $4 billion for Plan

Colombia, State and Colombian government officials were pessimistic

about Colombia’s ability to obtain much new money without cutting other

government programs. They expect that Colombia will try to raise

$1 billion from bonds and loans. As of August 2000, it had collected

$325 million from domestic bonds and planned to collect an additional

$325 million from bonds by the end of 2001. Colombian government

officials indicated that, at best, most of the funds that will be available are

already included in the national budget. However, according to an official

with the Planning Ministry, it is difficult to document the purposes of

funding in Colombian budgets because Colombian ministries’ budget

preparation and coordination among ministries vary.

The Colombian government is also seeking donations of more than

$2 billion from donors other than the United States to fund the social,

economic, and good governance development portions of Plan Colombia.

As of July 2000, other donors had pledged about $621 million, and State

officials were optimistic that the remainder could be obtained. They said

that many donors responded favorably to Plan Colombia and made plans

for meetings in the fall 2000 to revisit the issue.

The Colombian government has not yet developed the detailed

implementation plans necessary for funding, sequencing, and managing

activities included in Plan Colombia. In early 2000, State officials began

asking the Colombian government for plans showing, step-by-step, how

Colombian agencies would combat illicit crop cultivation in southern

Colombia, institute alternative means of making a livelihood, and

strengthen the Colombian government’s presence in the area. In May 2000,

State officials provided Colombia extracts from the U.S. draft

implementation plan with the expectation that the Colombian government

would develop a similarly detailed plan. However, Colombia’s product,

provided in June 2000, essentially restated Plan Colombia’s broad goals

without detailing how Colombia would achieve them. A U.S. interagency

task force went to Colombia in July 2000 to help the Colombians prepare

the required plan. The Government of Colombia provided their action plan

in September 2000 which addressed some of the earlier concerns.

The Colombian government agrees that ending the civil conflict is central

to solving Colombia’s problems. State reports have noted that a peace

agreement would stabilize the nation, speed economic recovery, help

ensure the protection of human rights, and restore the authority and

control of the Colombian government in the coca-growing regions.

Colombia Has Not

Determined How It Will

Fund Its Share of Plan

Colombia

Colombia Still Developing

Plans to Address Plan

Colombia Goals

Insurgency and Human

Rights Conditions Further

Complicate

Counternarcotics Efforts
Page 12 GAO-01-76T

However, unless such an agreement is reached, the continuing violence

would limit the government’s ability to institute its planned economic,

social, and political improvements.

The U.S. Embassy has already reported that initial Plan Colombia activities

have been affected because of security concerns. Specifically, the lack of

security on the roads in southern Colombia prevented the Justice Ministry

from establishing a justice center there. Moreover, indications are that the

insurgents have warned farmers in one area not to participate in

alternative crop development projects unless they are part of an overall

peace plan. The Embassy has reported that these security impediments are

probably a small indication of future security problems if peace is not

achieved.

Regarding human rights, the Colombian government has stated that it is

committed to protecting the human rights of its citizens. State and DOD

officials said they will apply the strictest human rights standards before

approving assistance under Plan Colombia. For example, State did not

approve training for the second counternarcotics battalion until an

individual officer suspected of a violation was removed from the unit, even

though the Colombian government had cleared the person of wrongdoing.

Nevertheless, human rights organizations continue to allege that

individuals in the Colombian armed forces have been involved with or

condoned human rights violations and that they do so with impunity. As

such, Colombia’s failure to adhere to U.S. to human rights policies could

delay or derail planned counternarcotics activities.

Although the Congress required the President to certify that Colombia had

met certain human rights standards prior to disbursing assistance for Plan

Colombia,

9

 the President waived the certification as permitted by the act.

10

According to State officials, the waiver was issued because it was too soon

to determine the extent to which Colombia was complying with the

legislation’s requirements.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my

prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may

have.

 9Section 3201(a)(1) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P.L. 106-246).

10Section 3201(a)(4) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P.L. 106-246).
Page 13 GAO-01-76T

For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford

at (202) 512-4268. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony

included Al Fleener, Ron Hughes, Al Huntington, and Joan Slowitsky.

(711570)

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