IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

DIANNAH DINSMOOR,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PHOENIX, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; DEER VALLEY UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 97 OF MARICOPA COUNTY, A POLITICAL 

SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA; LYNN MILLER AND JANE DOE 

MILLER, HUSBAND AND WIFE; KIMBERLY HEINZ AND JOHN DOE HEINZ,

HUSBAND AND WIFE; KENNETH PALMER AND JANE DOE PALMER, HUSBAND 

AND WIFE,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-20-0214-PR

August 6, 2021

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable David B. Gass, Judge (Ret.)

No. CV2015-001448

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

249 Ariz. 192 (App. 2020)

Filed June 30, 2020

VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL:

Bradley R. Jardine (argued), Michael Warzysnki, Jardine, Baker, Hickman 

& Houston, P.L.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Deer Valley Unified School 

District No. 97, Lynn Miller, and Kimberly Heinz

David L. Abney (argued), Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix; Ryan 

Skiver, The Skiver Law Firm, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Diannah Dinsmoor
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

2

Lynne C. Adams, Eric M. Fraser, Hayleigh S. Crawford, Osborn Maledon, 

P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Charter Schools 

Association, Arizona School Boards Association, and Arizona School Risk 

Retention Trust

VICE CHIEF JUSTICETIMMERauthored the opinion of the Court, in which 

JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, and PELANDER 

(RETIRED)* joined.**

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Matthew and Ana were sophomores at Sandra Day O’Connor 

High School in the Deer Valley Unified School District when they began 

dating. After the two became entangled in a dispute at school involving 

Matthew’s ex-girlfriend, Ana agreed to meet Matthew after school at a

friend’s home to talk matters over. While there, Matthew shot and killed 

Ana and then killed himself. School personnel knew that Ana planned to 

meet Matthew that day. They also knew that Matthew had been violent 

with his ex-girlfriend and had possibly threatened her the previous day.

Regardless, they did not take any action to protect Ana. The issue before 

us is whether the school owed Ana a duty of care. We hold it did not owe 

her a duty under the circumstances here.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Matthew and Ana were in a dating relationship before 

breaking up during the fall of 2013. Matthew then began dating Raven. 

During their relationship, Matthew told Raven that Ana had been making 

* Chief Justice Brutinel is recused from this matter. Pursuant to article 

6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Justice John Pelander (Ret.), of the 

Arizona Supreme Court, was designated to sit in this matter.

** Justice Andrew W. Gould (Ret.) announced his retirement from the 

Court before the oral argument in this case. He did not participate in 

deciding the case or in drafting this opinion.
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

3

derogatory remarks about her. Raven broke up with Matthew in January 

2014.

¶3 Soon after their break-up, Matthew taunted Raven at school, 

and she responded by slapping his face. Matthew retaliated by shoving 

her to the ground and shaking her. Consequently, the school suspended 

Raven for five days and suspended Matthew for three days. Matthew did 

not have any other disciplinary incidents while attending the school.

¶4 Matthew and Ana started dating again, and Matthew told her 

that Raven had been making derogatory comments about her. On 

March 5, Ana heard that Raven wanted to hire someone to beat up the 

couple. Ana approached Raven during lunch at school, and in the ensuing 

conversation Raven denied harboring ill feelings toward Ana or intending

to hurt her. The girls compared notes and concluded that Matthew had 

been attempting to play them against each other so they would fight over 

him. According to Raven, Ana was livid and immediately walked over to 

Matthew, who had been watching, and yelled at him.

¶5 The next day, March 6, Matthew texted Ana, “We’ll take care 

[sic] it when she’s walking home from the bus,” and “I’ll see to it that this 

stops.” Alarmed, Ana warned Raven in a school bathroom that Matthew 

planned to hurt her. According to Raven, Ana also said Matthew had 

texted, “I’ve got a gun. I know where she lives.” (Raven never saw the 

texts, and they did not, in fact, refer to a gun or Raven’s home.)

¶6 Raven was understandably distressed and reported Ana’s 

warning to school authorities. Vice principal Kimberly Heinz investigated 

by speaking separately with Raven and Ana and then reviewing the text 

messages. Because Matthew was not at school that day, Heinz did not 

speak with him but planned to do so the next morning. Heinz thought the 

texts were “very vague,” but both Ana and Raven stated Matthew might be 

planning to hit or hurt Raven because he had done so previously. Heinz 

also learned that Raven had dated Matthew, Ana was currently dating him,

and the girls had just discovered he was pitting them against each other. 

Ana expressed worry only for Raven, not herself.

¶7 Considering Ana and Raven’s concern, Heinz asked for input 

from school safety officer Kenneth Palmer, an off-duty City of Phoenix 

Police Officer. Ana told Palmer she thought Matthew was “crazy,” but 

she did not feel personally threatened by him. Raven repeated her belief 
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

4

that Matthew would harm her. Palmer concluded the texts were not 

threatening.

¶8 Heinz implemented a safety plan for Raven, which included 

informing Raven’s mother of the situation, switching Raven from her 

classes with Matthew, having a security monitor walk her to the bus, and 

verifying that someone would pick up Raven from her bus stop. Heinz 

also informed principal Lynn Miller about the possible threat towards 

Raven and the plan to protect her. Believing the only potential threat was 

aimed at Raven, Heinz did not implement a safety plan for Ana.

¶9 March 7 was an early-release day. Heinz checked 

attendance and discovered Matthew was not on campus, so she could not 

speak with him as planned. Nonetheless, several students reported 

rumors to Palmer that Matthew was on campus with a gun. Palmer 

investigated but concluded the rumors were false. Matthew was absent 

from all his classes, and Palmer could not locate anyone who had seen 

Matthew that day. A security monitor searched the hallways and 

restrooms but could not find Matthew. And immediately before school 

recessed, Matthew’s mother informed Palmer that Matthew had stayed 

home that day.

¶10 That same morning, Ana told Heinz that Matthew wanted to 

meet with her after school. Ana said Matthew did not pose any threat to 

her, and Heinz urged her to “make good choices.” Ana also told Palmer 

she was going to a friend’s house after school to see Matthew. Palmer 

warned her it “was not a good idea” but took no action. Ana went to her 

friend’s house, where Matthew shot and killed her and then himself.

¶11 Ana’s mother, Diannah Dinsmoor, sued Heinz, Palmer, 

Miller, the Deer Valley Unified School District, and the City of Phoenix, 

alleging negligence-based claims. The trial court entered summary 

judgment for all defendants, reasoning they did not owe a duty to protect 

Ana under the circumstances. The court of appeals affirmed summary 

judgment for the City but reversed as to the remaining defendants. 

Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix, 249 Ariz. 192, 201 ¶ 40 (App. 2020). The court 

concluded that the District and its agents “owed Ana a duty based on the 

special relationship between a school and its students.” Id. at 197 ¶ 23. 

Because an issue of material fact existed whether Palmer was acting as an 

agent of the District, the court determined he was also not entitled to 

summary judgment. Id. at 201 ¶ 39.
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

5

¶12 The District, Heinz, and Miller (collectively, “the District”)

petitioned for review. Palmer did not. We granted review to clarify the 

duty owed by schools to their students, a recurring issue of statewide 

importance.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

¶13 We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing 

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glazer v. 

State, 237 Ariz. 160, 167 ¶¶ 28–29 (2015). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

56(a).

II. The school-student duty

A. General principles

¶14 To prevail on her claims, Dinsmoor must establish that the 

District owed a duty to Ana to conform to a particular standard of conduct 

to protect her against unreasonable risks of harm. See Gipson v. Kasey, 214 

Ariz. 141, 143 ¶¶ 9–10 (2007). Duties are based on “special relationships” 

or on relationships formed by public policy. See Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 243 

Ariz. 560, 565 ¶ 14 (2018). Special relationships include those recognized 

at common law and those formed by contracts, joint undertakings, and

family relationships. See id.; Stanley v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, 221 ¶ 7 

(2004). “The special relationship imposes a duty to avoid harm from ‘risks 

created by the individual at risk as well as those created by a third party’s 

conduct.’” Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt. of Tucson, Inc., 229 Ariz. 117, 121 

¶ 17 (2012) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical 

Harm § 40 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2007)). 

Whether a duty exists is a legal issue we determine de novo. See Quiroz, 

243 Ariz. at 564 ¶ 7.

¶15 The parties here agree that any duty owed by the District to 

Ana is grounded on the common law special relationship between a
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

6

primary or secondary school and its students.1 See Jesik v. Maricopa Cnty. 

Cmty. Coll. Dist., 125 Ariz. 543, 546 (1980) (recognizing this duty). People 

do not generally have a duty to protect others from harm. See Quiroz, 243 

Ariz. at 573–74 ¶¶ 62–63; Lips v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., 224 Ariz. 266, 

269 ¶ 14 (2010). Nevertheless, the school-student relationship imposes an 

affirmative duty on schools to protect students from unreasonable risks of 

harm. See Hill v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 191 Ariz. 110, 112 (App. 1997) 

(acknowledging that schools have a statutory and common law duty “not 

to subject students within their charge” to “unreasonable risk[s] of harm 

through acts, omissions, or school policy”); see also Jesik, 125 Ariz. at 546

(noting that a college has duties to make its premises reasonably safe and 

to protect students from torts). The duty imposed recognizes that the 

school “is a custodian of students, it is a land possessor who opens the 

premises to a significant public population, and it acts partially in the place 

of parents.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 40 

cmt. l (Am. Law Inst. 2012).

¶16 The parties disagree whether the school-student duty is 

limited by time and place considerations. The District argues the duty 

exists only when a student is endangered while attending school during

school hours or participating in off-campus, school-sponsored activities. 

Dinsmoor counters the duty exists regardless of where and when the 

student suffers injury if the school learned of an unreasonable risk of harm 

to the student while the school exercised custody and control over her.

¶17 Our view of the school-student duty falls between the parties’ 

positions. A school’s duty to its students is not limitless. See Monroe v. 

Basis Sch., Inc., 234 Ariz. 155, 157 ¶ 6 (App. 2014). A duty based on special 

relationships, including the school-student relationship, applies only to

“risks that arise within the scope of the relationship.” See Boisson v. Ariz. 

Bd. of Regents, 236 Ariz. 619, 623 ¶ 10 (App. 2015) (quoting Restatement

§ 40(a) (2012)). Generally, the scope of such relationships is “bounded by 

1 Schools may also owe duties grounded on statutes or bases other than

the school-student relationship. See Alhambra Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 

165 Ariz. 38, 41–43 (1990) (holding that a school owed statutory and 

common law duties to all persons using marked crosswalk that it 

voluntarily established). Here, we address only the duty arising from the 

special relationship between primary and secondary schools and their 

students.
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

7

geography and time.” See Restatement § 40 cmt. f (2012) (“The duty 

imposed in this Section applies to dangers that arise within the confines of 

the relationship and does not extend to other risks.”). Thus, in the schoolstudent relationship, the duty “encompass[es] risks such as those that occur 

while the student is at school or otherwise under the school’s control.” 

Monroe, 234 Ariz. at 157–58 ¶ 6 & n.2 (citing Restatement § 40(b)(5) and 

cmts. f, l (2012)).

¶18 Monroe illustrates the confines of the school-student 

relationship. There, the court of appeals held that a charter school did not 

owe a duty of care to Jennifer, an eleven-year-old student who was struck 

by a truck as she rode her bicycle home from school. Monroe, 234 Ariz. at 

156 ¶¶ 1–2. The court reasoned that “[w]here a duty arises from a special 

relationship, the duty is tied to expected activities within the relationship” 

and in the school-student relationship, “the duty of care is bounded by 

geography and time, encompassing risks such as those that occur while the 

student is at school or otherwise under the school’s control.” Id. at 157–58 

¶ 6 (citing Restatement § 40(b)(5) and cmts. f, l (2012)). Because Jennifer 

had left the school’s custody when riding home, the school “did not have a 

protective obligation and lacked the special, school-student relationship” 

when the accident occurred. See id. at 158 ¶ 9. The court therefore 

concluded that even though the school was near a busy intersection, it did 

not owe Jennifer a duty of care to protect her traveling to and from school. 

See id. at 158–59 ¶¶ 9–10; see also Pratt v. Robinson, 349 N.E.2d 849, 854 (N.Y. 

1976) (“We see no basis, either in statutes or common law, for the creation 

of a school’s duty to protect its students from hazards which may [beset] 

them once they are on their way home and outside the control of the 

school.”).

¶19 The court of appeals’ opinion in Hill conflicts with Monroe by 

suggesting that the school-student duty is more expansive. The Hill court 

held that a high school and a teacher were not liable as a matter of law for 

student Clint’s death, which occurred when another student, Scott, shot 

Clint after school and off-campus. 191 Ariz. at 111, 117. Clint and Scott

had argued earlier that day at school before an associate principal 

intervened and sent the boys to class. See id. at 111–12. Clint’s mother 

sued, citing circumstances from which the school and the teacher “knew or 

should have known that [Scott] had dangerous propensities [and] it was 

foreseeable that [Scott] would harm or cause injury to [Clint]” after the 

argument that day. See id. at 111. Without analysis, the court agreed that 

the school-student relationship imposed a duty on the school “to take 
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

8

reasonable precautions for [Clint’s] safety.” See id. at 112. But it 

ultimately concluded the school had not breached that duty “[b]ecause

[Clint’s] death was not reasonably foreseeable and did not result from an 

unreasonable risk created by the school or [the teacher].” Id. at 117.

¶20 We are persuaded by Monroe’s more limited view of the

school-student duty and reject Hill on that point. Because the school’s 

roles forming the basis for the duty—custodian, land possessor, and quasiparental figure—apply when the school supervises and controls students

and their environment, enabling it to identify and eliminate risks, we are

convinced the duty to protect students exists only while the school is 

fulfilling these roles. But once students safely leave the school’s control,

the special relationship ends, and students are simultaneously released to 

their parents’ or guardians’ full custodial care. At that point, the school is 

relieved of any duty to affirmatively protect students from any hazards 

they encounter. Thus, in Hill, neither the school nor the teacher owed any 

duty to protect Clint from Scott once the boys safely left the school’s control, 

and to the extent Hill suggests otherwise, we disapprove it.

¶21 Other courts concur with our view. See, e.g., Pratt, 349 

N.E.2d at 852 (reasoning that a school’s duty is “coextensive with and 

concomitant to its physical custody of and control over the child,” and 

when that child passes from “the orbit of its authority,” the school’s 

custodial duty ceases); Norton v. Canandaigua City Sch. Dist., 624 N.Y.S.2d 

695, 697, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (concluding that “a school district’s duty 

to a student, unlike a parent’s duty to a child, is strictly limited by time and 

space” and whether a child should cross a street to await a school bus “is a 

decision for a student or parent to make, not a school”); Davis v. Lutheran S.

High Sch. Ass’n of St. Louis, 200 S.W.3d 163, 168–69 (Mo. App. 2006) 

(deciding school did not owe a duty to high school students killed while 

driving to school softball game held during school hours because it lacked 

authority and control over the students’ mode of travel); Young v. Salt Lake 

City Sch. Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Utah 2002) (“[W]hen a school district 

lacks custody, it has no protective obligation and no special relationship 

exists.”).

¶22 We decline, however, to draw a bright-line rule barring 

recognition of the school-student duty whenever the student suffers harm 

while outside the school’s supervision and control, although that may 

usually be the case. See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, 

The Law of Torts § 418 (2d ed. 2011) (“Injury generated outside the school 
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

9

property, outside of curricular or extra-curricular activities, and from 

sources unconnected to the school, is not likely to be the school’s 

responsibility.”). Our courts have refused to draw such lines in cases 

involving duties grounded in other special relationships, and no reason 

appears why we should do so in the school-student context. See Stephens 

v. Bashas’ Inc., 186 Ariz. 427, 430–31 (App. 1996) (concluding that a grocer 

owed a duty to an invitee-driver injured while opening delivery truck doors 

on adjacent public street because businesses have a duty to provide a 

reasonably safe means of ingress and egress for invitees and the grocer 

knew drivers used that area for parking and opening doors before backing 

onto its property to deliver goods); Udy v. Calvary Corp., 162 Ariz. 7, 11 

(App. 1989) (stating that a landlord owed a tenant-child a duty and the fact 

the child was injured when he ran into a busy road next to the unfenced 

premises was relevant only to whether the landlord breached the standard 

of care).

¶23 Unique circumstances may exist where a school has a duty to

protect students from risks that arise while under school supervision and 

control even though such risks result in harm when students are outside 

school supervision and control. For example, in Warrington v. Tempe 

Elementary School District No. 3, the court of appeals stated that a district 

owed a duty of care to a seven-year-old student injured while walking 

home from a bus stop located on a heavily travelled street. 187 Ariz. 249, 

253 (App. 1996). The court reasoned that in deciding where to place bus 

stops, the district had a duty not to subject students to an unreasonable risk 

of harm. See id.; see also Garrett v. Grant Sch. Dist. No. 124, 487 N.E.2d 699, 

703 (Ill. App. 1985) (to same effect). Similarly, a school’s duty to provide 

a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress does not evaporate if a 

student is injured off campus while trying to enter school property to attend 

classes. See Stephens, 186 Ariz. at 430–31. And if a threat of harm exists 

for students leaving school for the day—an active shooter in the 

neighborhood or a tornado, for example—that risk arises within the schoolstudent relationship, thereby imposing a duty on the school to protect 

students. See Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 192 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11–

12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding duty of on-premises supervision implicated 

where teacher kept student after school until after a crossing guard had left 

assigned intersection for the day and the student was injured there after 

leaving school); Jerkins ex rel. Jerkins v. Anderson, 922 A.2d 1279, 1288 (N.J. 

2007) (recognizing existence of duty to supervise elementary students 

during dismissal in case involving nine-year-old student injured after he 

left school without an adult on an early dismissal day).
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

10

¶24 In sum, the school-student relationship creates a duty to 

protect students from unreasonable risks of harm arising within the 

confines of the relationship. See Boisson, 236 Ariz. at 623 ¶ 10; Restatement 

§ 40(a) (2012). The key consideration is whether a known and tangible risk 

of harm arose that endangered the student while under the school’s custody 

and control. See Restatement § 40, cmt. l (2012). In such scenarios, 

students are “deprived of the protection of their parents [or guardians],” 

and the school has an affirmative duty to protect them from such risks until 

they are safely released from the school’s custody and control. See id. § 40, 

Reporters’ Note, cmt. l.

B. Application

¶25 Dinsmoor argues the District owed a duty to protect Ana 

because she was under its custody and control when she told Heinz and 

Palmer of her plans to meet with Matthew on the day of her death. The 

court of appeals agreed, concluding “the District’s obligation to Ana arose 

within the school-student relationship and required it to take appropriate 

actions—here, actions it could have taken while Ana was on campus during 

school hours—to protect her from the harm that ultimately occurred off 

campus, after school.” Dinsmoor, 249 Ariz. at 198 ¶ 25.

¶26 Dinsmoor’s position is flawed by failing to consider whether 

the known and tangible risk of harm to Ana—that Matthew would 

physically hurt her—arose within the scope of the school-student 

relationship, which would impose a duty on the District to protect Ana. 

See Monroe, 234 Ariz. at 157–58 ¶ 6; Boisson, 236 Ariz. at 623 ¶ 10; 

Restatement § 40, cmts. f, l (2012). A possible explanation for this omission 

stems from Gipson’s admonition that the existence of duty “is a legal matter 

to be determined before the case-specific facts are considered.” 214 Ariz. at 

145 ¶ 21. But this language cautioned against considering the specific facts 

of the parties’ relationship where a special relationship was absent. See id.

¶¶ 19, 21 (noting the absence of a special relationship and reasoning that 

the parties’ relationship as co-workers, friends, etc. was “a problematic 

basis for determining if a duty of care exists”). The Court similarly 

warned against “equat[ing] the concept of ‘duty’ with . . . specific details of 

conduct” as doing so would “conflate[] the issue with the concepts of 

breach and causation.” Id. (quoting Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 

52 (1984)).

¶27 We do not understand Gipson as meaning a court cannot 

consider facts to determine whether a duty exists based on the presence of
DINSMOOR V. CITY OF PHOENIX, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

11

an unreasonable risk of harm that arose within the scope of a special 

relationship. Logically, a court cannot determine whether a duty arises 

from such relationships unless it considers whether an unreasonable risk of 

harm arose while, for example, persons were patronizing an inn, riding a 

bus, or, here, attending school. See Restatement § 40(b) (2012) (listing 

special relationships). Identifying the risk within the scope of the special 

relationship does not touch on concepts of breach or causation, so there is 

no danger of conflating duty with those elements. See Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 

145 ¶ 21; see also Dabush v. Seacret Direct LLC, 250 Ariz. 264, 272 ¶¶ 33–35 

(2021) (rejecting argument that court could not consider case-specific facts 

to determine as a matter of law that a defendant had not assumed a duty to 

plaintiff).

¶28 Nothing in the record suggests that Matthew posed a risk to 

Ana before she safely left the District’s supervision and control on March 7. 

Assuming Matthew’s text messages to Ana threatened harm, that threat 

was aimed only at Raven. Ana herself told Heinz and Palmer that 

Matthew did not pose a threat to her. Dinsmoor acknowledges that Ana 

was not directly threatened but nevertheless argues a threat existed because 

Matthew had previously been violent with Raven, and Ana and Matthew 

had recently argued. We reject this argument because it effectively injects 

foreseeability into the duty calculus, which this Court has repeatedly 

cautioned against. See Quiroz, 243 Ariz. at 563 ¶ 2 (“[F]oreseeability is not 

a factor in determining duty.”); Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 15 

(“[F]oreseeability is not a factor to be considered by courts when making 

determinations of duty.”). Because no evidence suggests Matthew posed 

a threat to Ana before she left school to meet him on March 7, a known and 

tangible risk of harm did not arise within the scope of the school-student 

relationship. The school consequently did not owe a duty to protect Ana

from Matthew, and the trial court therefore correctly entered summary 

judgment for the District. Considering our holding, we do not address the 

parties’ arguments concerning breach and causation.

CONCLUSION

¶29 This is a tragic case, and we empathize with Dinsmoor for her

great loss. Nevertheless, because the District did not owe a duty to Ana 

based on the school-student relationship, we affirm summary judgment for 

the District. We also vacate paragraphs 23–39 and the relevant portions of 

paragraphs 40–41 of the court of appeals’ opinion.