PROSPECTS FOR A 

CONVENTIONAL ARMS 

REDUCTION TREATY AND 

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 

MEASURES IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

Bonnie D. Jenkins 

INSS Occasional Paper 34 

Arms Control Series 

August 2000 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by the Department of Defense; 

distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

 Initial Goals of the Research 1 

 Organization of the Paper 4 

Northeast Asia and a Conventional Forces Treaty 5 

 Why a Multilateral Forum? 5 

 Conventional Arms Control on the Peninsula 

 and Northeast Asia 8 

 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 

 in Northeast Asia 12 

 Other Problems in Moving Forward with 

 North Korea 15 

Current Confidence- and Security-Building Activities 16 

 US/DPRK Discussions 17 

 1994 Agreed Framework (AF) 18 

 The Korean Peninsula Energy Development 

 Organization (KEDO) 19 

 The Four Party Talks 21 

 ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 22 

 The Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration 24 

Building Toward a NEA Security Forum 26 

 Korean Peninsula Agriculture Development 

 Organization (KADO) 28 

 Energy and Environment 29 

 Issues of Transnational Crime 32 

A NEA Security Forum—A Proposal 34 

 Bilateral vs. Multilateral 36 

 Coordination 38 

 Northeast Asia Security Forum 38 

Conclusion 45 

Endnotes 48 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth-fourth volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). In addition to supporting research toward 

immediately applying the results to contemporary policy issues, INSS 

seeks to encourage bright young researchers to think outside of the inbox 

and project new ideas into the future. This is just such an effort. In this 

paper, Bonnie Jenkins looks at creating an infrastructure within which to 

address Northeast Asian security issues and against which to begin the 

process of regional arms control. Of significance, the paper addresses 

some of the barriers to be encountered in attempting to superimpose 

structures and norms developed for Europe upon this very different 

region of the world. This is instructive for similar efforts in other 

regions as well. Also significant is the paper’s emphasis more on the 

process of arms control than on any one particular product, particularly 

while regional mechanisms and trust are still being built. This paper is 

also timely, as the summitry process begins between the Koreas, and as it 

draws in the other regional actors at least at the margins. It is a paper 

that presents both ideas and ideals worth considering. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the 

Air Force's 39th Information Operations Squadron; the Secretary of 

Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); the Army 
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Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the United States 

Space Command; the Air Force long-range plans directorate (XPXP); 

and the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The 

mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to 

support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research 

focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: 

arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, 

information operations, environmental security, and space policy. 

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

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continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Background and Initial Ideas 

The first of two goals undertaken in the research for this paper is to 

explore the possibility of establishing in the Northeast Asian region a 

conventional arms control treaty negotiation leading to an agreement 

similar to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). It is 

presumed a reduction in conventional forces will promote stability in the 

region similar to what has occurred in Europe. The second goal 

undertaken in this research is to determine the prospects for establishing 

a Northeast Asian Security Forum similar to the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This body would promote 

transparency and confidence in Northeast Asia similar to what the OSCE 

has been able to achieve in Europe. 

 The process by which these proposals would take place would 

be two fold. The arms control path would begin between North and 

South Korea. Only after the two Koreas have negotiated such an 

agreement would it be extended to other states in the region. The reason 

for this process is that it is important to first reduce military tensions on 

the Korean Peninsula. The potential for conventional and sudden 

conflict in the region exists predominantly on the Peninsula. The two 

Koreas have already acknowledged the need for a reduction in 

conventional weapons and have established the basis for this type of 

agreement in their 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression 

and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North. A 

second process, a Northeast Asian Security Forum, could be established 

immediately and would include all states of the Northeast Asian region. 

This forum would focus on establishing confidence and securitybuilding measures dedicated to military transparency. 
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Results of Research 

My research has determined that there exists a great deal of trepidation to 

the prospect of establishing a Northeast Asian Security Forum that would 

discuss confidence-building measures. There is also reluctance to the 

prospect of a conventional arms control treaty, either on the Peninsula or 

in the region. The vast majority of individuals I spoke with in 

Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and experts at research centers in Hawaii 

shared this feeling. 

There were a number of reasons given for this reluctance. 

Those who did agree to the necessity of a regional forum highlighted the 

importance of keeping bilateral relations paramount, while the 

multilateral forum (to be established sometime in the “indefinite future”) 

would be complementary to existing bilateral relationships. Some 

wanted to let the Four Party Talks play out before trying to establish new 

forums. Some wanted to see if the Association of South Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) could serve as the site for a new Northeast Asian Forum and 

were reluctant to establish a separate forum (which I prefer). Some 

were not comfortable with the prospect of reducing arms since there was 

not enough trust in the region that other states (particularly North Korea) 

would similarly reduce their arms or be willing to be adequately verified 

through on-site inspections. Others pointed out the differences that exist 

in Europe and Asia, and doubted whether the CFE Treaty and the OSCE 

could serve as an adequate example. If there were to be a conventional 

treaty and a regional forum in Northeast Asia, they would have to reflect 

the particular peculiarities of the region. 

However, underneath the objections to a conventional forces 

treaty and a security forum in the region, I felt there lay the general 

feeling that most would support such a forum if the regional situation 

was conducive to such proposals (for example, if there existed more trust 

and confidence among the states). They did recognize the positive 
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results a security forum, and reduction in arms, could have for the 

Peninsula and the region. Therefore, a certain degree of trust must exist 

prior to these states working to reduce regional tension.1

 

1

 It is important to note that everyone does not share this feeling. South 

Korean, Japan and Russian officials have all in the past expressed 

interest in a Six Party Talk (which would include these three states and 

the U.S., China and North Korea).