COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 28, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP885-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF448

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

CHRISTOPHER S. SPAULDING,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Jefferson County: 

BENNETT J. BRANTMEIER, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Christopher Spaulding appeals a judgment of 

conviction entered after he pled guilty to one count of possession of child 
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pornography, as a repeater. See WIS. STAT. §§ 948.12(1m), 939.62(1)(c) (2017-18).1 

Spaulding challenges the circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, arguing that 

the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search of his home. 

We reject Spaulding’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Spaulding with one count of possession of child 

pornography, as a repeater. The charge was based on evidence seized during a 

search of Spaulding’s residence by law enforcement. At the time of the search, 

Spaulding was on probation following a conviction for felony identity theft. Under 

2013 Wis. Act 79, § 9 (“Act 79”), law enforcement may search a probationer, his 

residence, and any property under his control “if the officer reasonably suspects that 

the person is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a crime or a violation 

of a condition of probation.” WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1d). Spaulding moved to 

suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence, arguing that law 

enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to search the premises pursuant to Act 79. 

The circuit court denied the motion after a hearing, concluding that law enforcement 

had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a search of Spaulding’s residence. 

Spaulding appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶3 When we review a suppression issue, we uphold the circuit court’s 

factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Johnson, 2007 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
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WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182. We review de novo whether the 

facts satisfy the standard for reasonable suspicion. See id.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Generally, a full search cannot be conducted absent probable cause. 

State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, ¶2, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285. “However, 

if a person is subject to Act 79, a full search may be conducted on the lesser showing 

of reasonable suspicion.” Id. On appeal, Spaulding does not dispute that he was 

subject to Act 79 as a result of his probation status. However, he challenges certain 

factual findings of the circuit court, and he argues that law enforcement lacked the 

requisite reasonable suspicion to search his residence. For the reasons discussed 

below, we reject Spaulding’s arguments.

¶5 Police detective Chad Garcia testified at the suppression motion 

hearing that he received a “cyber tip” from the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children. The tip came from a bar manager who claimed that Spaulding, 

who was an employee of the bar, possessed child pornography. Garcia met with the 

bar manager, who told him that one of the bar’s patrons had learned from another 

bar employee, Chad Hansen, that Spaulding, who was his roommate, had used 

Hansen’s computer to access child pornography while Hansen was in jail the prior 

year. Garcia attempted to locate Hansen but was unsuccessful. Garcia then spoke 

with Spaulding’s probation agent and confirmed Spaulding’s address. Garcia went 

to Spaulding’s apartment with another officer and knocked on the door. 

¶6 According to Garcia’s testimony at the suppression motion hearing, 

Spaulding answered the door and then quickly exited the apartment and closed the 

door behind him. Garcia testified that, based on his twenty-three years of law 

enforcement experience, he found it very rare for someone to step out and close the 
No. 2019AP885-CR

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door behind him when having contact with law enforcement. Garcia also testified 

that it was “unusual” because, before the door closed, he could see a small child in 

the apartment and it was not clear if there was anyone else inside the apartment with 

the child. When Garcia advised Spaulding of why he and the other officer were 

there, Spaulding responded that he does not look at child pornography and that he 

does not have any electronic communication devices. Garcia testified that he found 

this “very unusual,” both because he does not “know of anyone from teenage years 

up through their 60s that doesn’t have any electronic devices” and because 

Spaulding was so quick to state that he did not have any electronic devices. 

¶7 Garcia then informed Spaulding that the officers would be doing an 

Act 79 search of the apartment to look for electronic devices. Upon searching the 

apartment, the officers found and seized electronic devices including cell phones, 

laptops, and tablets. Forensic searches of the devices revealed images and video 

featuring children engaged in sexual acts. The images and video were connected to 

a user account belonging to Spaulding. 

¶8 At the close of the suppression motion hearing, the circuit court found 

that the behaviors demonstrated by Spaulding when Garcia showed up at his door—

including stepping outside, closing the door quickly while there was a young child 

inside, and blurting out that he did not have any electronic devices—were sufficient 

to establish that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Spaulding had committed 

or was about to commit a crime. 

¶9 Spaulding challenges two of the factual findings made by the circuit 

court in denying his suppression motion. First, he argues that the circuit court 

erroneously found that Spaulding left a small child inside “unsupervised” when he 

closed the door behind him. We reject this argument. Garcia’s testimony supports 
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the court’s finding that Garcia saw a small child inside the apartment before 

Spaulding closed the door. Spaulding does not assert, and the record does not 

establish, that there was anyone else inside the apartment to supervise the child. 

Accordingly, Spaulding fails to persuade us that the circuit court’s finding on this 

point is clearly erroneous. See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13.

¶10 Next, Spaulding argues that the circuit court erred in finding that, 

upon learning that the officers were there to investigate allegations regarding child 

pornography, Spaulding immediately blurted out that he did not have any electronic 

devices. The record contradicts Spaulding’s argument on this issue. Garcia testified 

explicitly that Spaulding “blurted out” that he did not have any electronic devices, 

even though Garcia had not asked him anything. The circuit court’s finding on this 

point is not clearly erroneous. See id.

¶11 Finally, Spaulding argues that, even if the circuit court’s factual 

findings are not clearly erroneous, the cyber tip and Garcia’s observations, taken 

together, do not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a search of his residence. 

We disagree. What constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common-sense, totalityof-the-circumstances test that asks, “[w]hat would a reasonable police officer 

reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. 

Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). A police officer has 

reasonable suspicion when he observes acts that are individually lawful but, when 

taken together, allow that officer to objectively discern “a reasonable inference of 

unlawful conduct.” Id. at 60. 

¶12 Here, we are satisfied based on the totality of the circumstances that 

Garcia had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Spaulding was involved 

in criminal activity. Garcia testified as to several different factors that he found, 
No. 2019AP885-CR

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based on his training and experience, to be unusual. He found it unusual that 

Spaulding stepped out of his apartment quickly, that he closed the door behind him 

when there was a child inside, and that he stated quickly that he did not have any 

electronic devices like laptops, tablets, or phones. We conclude that these factors, 

when considered with the fact that they occurred in quick succession and when 

considered alongside the cyber tip as well as Garcia’s knowledge of Spaulding’s 

probation status, supported a reasonable inference by Garcia that Spaulding was 

involved in criminal activity. 

¶13 In sum, we conclude that there was reasonable suspicion for the search 

such that the circuit court properly denied Spaulding’s motion to suppress evidence 

obtained from the search.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.