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i 

53–208 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–47] 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S PERSPECTIVE 

ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN 

MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FULL COMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 29, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 29, 2009, Effective Counterinsurgency: The Administration’s Perspective on the Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Military Partnership .. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 29, 2009 ..................................................................................... 31 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 2009 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY 

PARTNERSHIP 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Boucher, Ambassador Richard A., Assistant Secretary of State for South 

and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................... 7 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 3 

Winnefeld, Vice Adm. James A., Jr., USN, Director of Strategic Plans and 

Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Boucher, Ambassador Richard A. .................................................................... 42 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, joint with Vice Adm. James A. Winnefeld ............ 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF THE 

UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 29, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. Today we have with us the Honorable Miche`le Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense; Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, Junior, Director of the Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

Ambassador Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for the 

South and Central Asian Affairs for the Department of State. We 

thank you for being with us and being willing to address the future 

of American and Pakistan relationship. We are expecting votes in 

the very near future. And I am hopeful we can get most of your 

testimony in before we have to leave to vote. And we ask your indulgence while we are voting. This, however, will be the last series 

of votes today, as I understand it. 

So maybe we can expedite the hearing when we get back. This 

is an extremely important, and, of course, very timely hearing, and 

follows last week’s hearing before this committee on this same topic 

with the outstanding panel of Pakistani experts, including General 

David Barno, who testified that Pakistan presents the U.S. with its 

greatest global strategic challenge. It also follows the release of the 

administration’s latest Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, as well as 

the administration’s supplemental budget request for a new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF). Moreover, this 

hearing comes at a time when there is legislation pending in Congress that seeks to both expand U.S. assistance for Pakistan as 

well as impose limitations and conditions on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. And as we are here today, it appears security 

conditions in Pakistan have become even more worrisome, given 

the Taliban’s recent eastward advance from the Swat Valley to 

Buner, only 60 miles or so from Islamabad. 

I agree with General Barno, Pakistan may well pose the greatest 

strategic challenge facing us today, with serious implications for 

U.S. national security in Afghanistan as well as the entire region. 

I am pleased that Congress and the region have both prioritized 
2 

issues involving Pakistan, and are committed to strengthening the 

U.S.-Pakistan partnership. But these issues are complex. Progress 

is not likely to come easy. I believe the administration’s recent Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is a step in the right direction. However, strategy alone does not guarantee success. The administration continues to request significant resources from Congress and 

the American people for efforts in Pakistan. Following 9/11, Pakistan has received almost $12 billion from our country, including about $6.4 billion in Department of Defense 

(DOD) Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursements. I hope the 

witnesses will elaborate on the fund, that is the Counterinsurgency 

Capabilities Fund, and tell us what military objections it will receive and why it should fall under the authority of the Department 

of Defense rather than under the authority of the State Department. With that, I turn to my friend, the gentleman from New 

York. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try 

do this as quickly as possible. I would ask unanimous consent my 

entire statement be entered in the record. Let me very quickly welcome our very distinguished panelists, particularly Madam Secretary. This is, I think, your third appearance in the first 100 days. 

You must be going for a record. And you are probably well on your 

way to setting that. But we thank all of you for being here to discuss what the chairman rightfully described as a very important 

issue. And certainly this hearing is timely, as the security situation 

in Pakistan sadly continues to be at best volatile. 

And as you look at, as the chairman mentioned, the movement 

of Taliban elements eastward towards Islamabad, some of their activities on the streets of Lahore, we can all understand why in her 

recent testimony, Secretary of State Clinton noted that the 

Taliban, in her judgment, and I couldn’t agree more, pose an existential threat to that Nation. In the meantime, here on Capitol 

Hill, there has been what I will call a House version of the socalled Kerry-Lugar legislation that was recently introduced by the 

chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I think it is fair 

to say that unlike its Senate counterpart, this particular bill calls 

for what can be fairly described as heavy limitations and conditions 

on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. 

Some have expressed concerns that I share, that this proposal as 

currently drafted is disrespectful of Pakistan’s sovereignty, it would 

unnecessarily constrain the Department of Defense amidst what is 

fairly described as an already fluid and dynamic situation in Pakistan. We are also in the process of scrubbing the President’s fiscal 

year 2009 wartime emergency supplemental request, which includes Coalition Support Funds to reimburse partner nations such 

as Pakistan for their efforts in the war on terrorism. This measure 

also provides a new authority and funding stream called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, or PCCF, which is a 

tool, very ably designed in my judgment, to improve the capacity 

and capabilities of Pakistan’s security forces to deny safe haven 
3 

and defeat Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other extremist groups within 

the Pakistan territory. 

Given all these events, as I noted, this committee is rightly focused on Pakistan and the challenges before us. I would just refer 

everyone who has some strange interest in my comments of the 

past week, where we outlined my support of the President’s strategic direction for Pakistan, and some of the questions and challenges that I hope we can explore that lie ahead. With that, Mr. 

Chairman, as I said, let’s get to the testimony, and I will again 

welcome our panelists here today, and I look forward to their comments and yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. The Honorable Miche`le 

Flournoy, would you please lead off? And again, I know we are asking a lot of you in your testimony before us, but it is always so 

helpful. We welcome you back. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MICHE` LE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman McHugh. It is good to be back and see you again. And thank 

you for inviting us here today. I am glad to have the chance to discuss efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership, 

which is a vital component of the Administration’s AfghanistanPakistan strategy. Let me start by laying out the strategic context. 

In our recent strategy review, we went back to the most basic question, what are our national interests in Afghanistan-Pakistan, in 

that region? We concluded that we have a vital interest in defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in the border region. We must 

deny them safe havens from which to launch attacks against the 

United States and our allies. You all know that the situation in 

Pakistan is deteriorating. 

The insurgency along Pakistan’s western border has been steadily expanding, and militants are increasingly in a position to 

threaten the Pakistani heartland. In the Swat Valley, extremists 

have already exercised effective control. And last week militants established bases in Buner, only 60 miles from Islamabad. With instability increasing, many Pakistani civilians and political leaders 

fear violent retaliation if they openly oppose extremist groups. 

Meanwhile, opportunities are growing for Al Qaeda and its associates. From safe havens within Pakistan, they can plan and stage 

attacks against our troops in Afghanistan, and potentially against 

the United States itself. 

Events on the ground are unfolding rapidly. With attacks in the 

Pakistani heartland increasing, Pakistan’s civilian government has 

come under urgent pressure to address this growing crisis. And 

they are taking steps to do so, in part by launching the recent military offensives. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, could you get just a little bit closer 

to the microphone, please? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sorry. In this context, further 

strengthening our partnership with Pakistan, including our military partnership, is absolutely critical. The Pakistani Government 

is undertaking concrete actions to demonstrate their commitment 
4 

to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. We must show our 

Pakistan partners that if they take decisive action against extremists, we will give them the support they need. As you know, Mr. 

Chairman, forging an effective partnership with Pakistan’s military 

has not always been straightforward. Despite our efforts to reduce 

tension between Pakistan and India, the Pakistan security forces 

have historically viewed India, and not the militants, as Pakistan’s 

most existential threat. And they have focused their resources accordingly. There has also been something of a trust deficit in U.S.- 

Pakistan relationships. 

From Pakistan’s perspective, U.S. support has been inconsistent 

over the years. We have oscillated between treating Pakistan as a 

pariah and as a credible ally. There is mistrust on our side too. 

After years of investment in Pakistan’s military, we have seen 

some progress in countering violent extremism, but we have also 

seen many setbacks. Forging an effective military partnership with 

Pakistan has also been hampered by a relative lack of counterinsurgency capabilities on the Pakistan side. Nonetheless, Mr. 

Chairman, we believe that right now it is more important than 

ever to strengthen our military partnership with Pakistan. We 

share common interests. If the militants were to cause the Pakistani Government to falter, this would be as devastating to the 

Pakistani people and security forces as it would be for us. It also 

bears emphasizing that Pakistan’s security forces have made many 

sacrifices in their efforts to combat insurgency. Thousands of military personnel as well as thousands of civilians have lost their 

lives. And we have had some notable successes when we have 

worked closely with them. For instance, our work with the Frontier 

Corps has resulted in improved cross-border coordination, has increased their effectiveness and operations in many agencies. But 

the Pakistan military still has only limited capacity to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Unless we provide them with 

better equipment and training, such operations will continue to 

lead to short-term progress, but not necessarily enduring results. 

Last week, Mr. Chairman, you heard testimony from three experts, all underscoring the urgency of the situation in Pakistan. We 

share that sense of urgency. It is vital that we act now to provide 

Pakistan with the capabilities they so critically need. The proposed 

title 10 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund is absolutely crucial to this effort. The PCCF would give General 

Petraeus, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) combatant commander, the authority and funding required to effectively build the 

Pakistan military’s counterinsurgency capabilities in the kind of 

time frame required. Title 10 PCCF will bring responsibilities, authorities, and funding into alignment. The PCCF is a critical tool 

that will allow our military assistance in Pakistan to be flexible, 

focused, and fast, providing resources when and where they are 

most needed in an urgent and rapidly evolving situation. 

With the PCCF, we can fully fund, plan, train, and equip efforts 

involving Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps, its Special 

Forces, and expand assistance to the Pakistani Army. Establishing 

a dedicated funding stream will also signal our seriousness and our 

commitment to Pakistan, which is vital at this moment when 

again, Pakistan is demonstrating its commitment to taking asser-
5 

tive action against insurgents. I want to make clear that we see 

PCCF as complementing existing authorities and funding streams, 

not replacing them. 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) continues to strengthen U.S.- 

Pakistani bilateral relations over the longer term, but beyond the 

urgent needs the PCCF is designed to meet. Similarly, Coalition 

Support Funds remain vital to sustaining Pakistan’s military 

tempo of operations in the border region. We must also address the 

historic imbalance in funding to Pakistan by increasing nonmilitary 

forms of assistance. We fully support the establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan, and we are hopeful that 

the Kerry-Lugar bill will help boost rule of law and sustainable 

economic development efforts. Nonetheless, the title 10 PCCF is 

crucial to our strategy. As General Petraeus, Ambassador 

Holbrooke, and Ambassador Patterson have all noted, it is through 

the PCCF that we can provide our commanders on the ground the 

flexibility they need to assist the Pakistani military. 

Given the rapidly changing situation on the ground, Mr. Chairman, we do oppose rigid conditionality, such as that which is proposed in H.R. 1886. While we applaud the goal of increasing accountability, we believe that the bill as currently drafted is too inflexible, and would reduce our ability to adapt quickly as circumstances require. We are committed to continuously evaluating 

our own performance as well as that of our Pakistani partners. And 

to that end, we are developing measures of effectiveness that will 

allow us and you to hold us and our Pakistan partners accountable. 

Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members, terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan are growing, increasing the urgent threat to 

our troops in Afghanistan and to Americans here at home. The proposed PCCF is vital to increasing the effectiveness of our partnership with Pakistan’s security forces at this critical moment in time. 

Thank you very much for having me here today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and Admiral 

Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Winnefeld. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS 

OF STAFF 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Congressman McHugh. I would like to also thank you for the opportunity to come testify today on ways to improve Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capability. Under Secretary Flournoy has already covered the goals and the challenges that we face in Pakistan. From 

our point of view, this is really boiling down to a matter of Pakistani will and capability. While we use diplomacy to build trust 

and buoy Pakistan’s will in this very important fight and defeating 

the extremist threats, our ability and our efforts to build Pakistani 

counterinsurgency capability in the middle of an ongoing fight are 

also a key element of our new strategy. The Pakistani military 

knows that it is a largely conventionally-based force fighting in a 

very nonconventional environment. 
6 

And we have been down this road, as you very well know, ourselves. For Pakistan, as it was for us, change has not been easy in 

this type of fight or immediate. And it requires resources. And thus 

Pakistan needs the equipment and the training and the changes in 

doctrine that reflect the difficult lessons that we have learned over 

the last eight years. Thanks to your support, we have made some 

progress in our efforts to enable Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and 

their other forces, including Special Forces and conventional forces, 

but both the pace and the scope of our efforts need to be increased. 

One way of doing this, as Under Secretary Flournoy mentioned, 

is through the PCCF. This is Title 10 authority that General 

Petraeus has requested, that Ambassador Patterson has endorsed, 

and that the President has submitted as part of his supplemental 

as essential to quickly and effectively building Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities, again, in the middle of a fight. It is urgently needed in this fight that is going on right now. We believe 

that it will be responsive and immediate, enabling our combatant 

commander General Petraeus, who has the authority and the responsibility for this fight on both sides of the border, to capitalize 

quickly on opportunities and to plug emergent capability gaps that 

we might discover. 

I would say that it will support U.S. troops who are in an ongoing effort in Afghanistan, because this threat clearly does not respect borders in this fight. And it will complement the other authorities that Under Secretary Flournoy mentioned that are designed to reimburse Pakistan for their operations, that are designed to build its long term defense capability both in the counterinsurgency (COIN) and other environments, and to improves its 

governance and development. It is very complementary. 

As I mentioned a moment ago, the Pakistanis also have to have 

the will, in addition to the capability, to use the COIN capability 

we give them. And in this light, I would like to make two points. 

First, we believe that with increased capability should come increased will. Current events, as we are all watching them unfold 

in Buner, will be a real test for Pakistani capability and will. And 

that only highlights the need for the kind of flexible authorities 

that PCCF would give to General Petraeus. We want to be prepared if there is some emergent, unanticipated requirement that 

would pop up that we need to fulfill, or if a new opportunity arises 

for us to be able to work even more closely with the Pakistani security forces. And PCCF will enable that. 

Second, we believe that publicly attaching conditions to our support will be detrimental to building Pakistani will to fight. And it 

will ultimately erode the trust that we are trying to build between 

our two nations. Rather, we believe that private engagement between our senior leadership is really the key to encouraging our 

partners, the Pakistanis, to use the assistance that we give to them 

wisely. 

So we appreciate the committee’s willingness to consider this sort 

of unusual enactment of authority. We believe we can’t afford to 

wait until next year to obtain the flexibility and agility that it provides to General Petraeus. And accordingly, we ask for your support in accelerating its implementation, and we will ensure that 

the accountability measures are in place so that these funds go ex-
7 

actly where they are intended to go, and that is into the COIN 

fight. Again, I would like to thank you and the members of the 

committee for your ongoing support for our troops and their mission, and I look forward to both your questions and your comments. 

Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld and Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Boucher, why don’t we go ahead and 

ask you for your testimony, and then we will break for the votes. 

I might say that the lack of full attendance here is due to the fact 

that there was a caucus for the House regarding the swine flu challenge that we have. People will be coming in shortly after we vote. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL 

ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McHugh—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Get real close. 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Distinguished members of 

the committee, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Get real close. Way up there. Way up there. 

Come on. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I am about as close as I can without tasting it. Thank you. It is a great pleasure to be here today with you. 

And thank you for holding this hearing. I have a slightly longer 

version of my remarks, but let me make a few comments at the beginning, because my colleagues, I think, have already laid out the 

context and the importance of this program. In the strategy that 

the President laid out last month for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

the approach that is taken was an integrated, comprehensive approach that involves stabilizing Pakistan and building up Afghanistan. 

Overall, our success in building institutions, strengthening governance, and ensuring economic growth is what will produce that 

kind of long-term stability. But we also all recognize that success 

in those areas hinges on helping Pakistan secure itself from the 

dangers of spreading Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgency. Our role in 

this effort is to support a Pakistani effort to defeat Al Qaeda and 

successfully shut down the safe havens in Pakistan. 

We have an active dialogue with Pakistan’s civilian and military 

leaders. We hear from them consistently of their commitment to 

take on this threat, to take on the terrorist threat in Pakistan. But 

it is an ongoing effort, I think, to see how they can carry that out 

and to make sure that we are partners with them in carrying it 

out. And that is where programs like this become very important. 

Cooperation on the counterinsurgency has to proceed on two tracks, 

first by improving the ability of Pakistani security forces to defeat 

and dismantle terrorist groups, and second by extending the reach 

and the legitimacy of the Pakistani Government to all parts of 

their territory. 
8 

So to accomplish these goals, we are looking for this new train 

and equip program, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities 

Fund. And as my colleagues have expressed, this is designed to be 

a program that can deal with the urgent problems, that can deal 

with them quickly and flexibly, and give the combatant commander 

the ability to deal directly with these difficulties on both sides of 

the border. The State Department is fully supportive of this fund, 

fully supportive of the request for this authority to reside with the 

Pentagon and the Department of Defense in the 2009 supplemental. 

We think that this new authority will complement Foreign Military Financing, which remains the foundation of long term security 

assistance with Pakistan. We believe the new authority is necessary because of the unique and extraordinary nature of the situation we face at this moment in Pakistan. The fund would be dual 

key, meaning the Secretary of State would concur in its use. It 

would be time limited in order to address immediate needs. We 

don’t think it sets a longer term precedent for the issues of authorities from one department to the other, which we know we are all 

discussing now. 

We want to do the other things that are necessary to make this 

program succeed in the counterinsurgency effort. We are proposing 

also to step up our assistance to strengthen police and governing 

institutions in the most vulnerable areas around Pakistan so that 

Pakistanis can also work on the hold part of a clear, hold, and 

build strategy. So security assistance, this kind of security assistance is only one component of a much larger strategy. And those 

efforts are designed towards creating the kind of modern, vibrant, 

and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and that the U.S. looks 

forward to working with as a partner in advancing stability in a 

key region of the world. So I will conclude with that and be glad 

to take questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Boucher can be found in 

the Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. Rather 

than begin questions now, I think it is best that we proceed to the 

floor to vote, and then we will return forthwith and carry on. So 

we will be in recess. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will resume and questions will 

begin. Let me ask a couple of opening questions. 

Madam Secretary, there is a growing sense, at least here in the 

House of Representatives, that the Coalition Support Fund construct is not serving the interests of either our country or Pakistan 

very well and the time is right to begin moving away from that 

mechanism as it is. Can you recommend any alternative constructs 

that can achieve the same goals and objectives and be equally or 

more effective? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, the Coalition Support Funds have been 

absolutely critical to providing reimbursement that enables the 

Pakistan military to maintain its operations tempo along the border with Afghanistan. Those operations are critical to helping secure the lines of communication going into Afghanistan, supplies 
9 

supporting our troops, et cetera. They are also critical in other 

ways. 

So I think it is a very important mechanism. We have been sending teams over to work closely with the Pakistanis to make the 

process go better in terms of how the reimbursement gets made, 

while maintaining all of the necessary accountability measures to 

make sure that we in the executive branch and you here in Congress know how the money is being spent. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Boucher, excuse me, Ambassador Boucher, what do 

you want to be called? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. You can call me anything you want to, 

sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that 

the State Department is supportive of the PCCF fund being used 

through Title 10 in the Department of Defense. Am I clear? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. There is some debate here in Congress about 

whether this authority should be granted to the Department of Defense or the Department of State. Could you elaborate a bit on 

what is important by way of this authority to ensure that it can 

be used to make a difference on the ground in Pakistan quickly? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. The issue of which authority to use and 

for which stream of funds is, of course, something that is being discussed on the Hill and in the administration as well. The new administration said they want to sort out some of these authorities 

and funding streams. But when we looked at this immediate program, the decision was made to go for the route that we felt most 

suited the program in the present circumstance and most suited 

the need to get urgent approval for a flexible funding mechanism 

that would accomplish what this program could accomplish, meaning just get it up and running quickly, and so this was the preferred route was to do it under Defense Department authority. We 

thought that was the best way to go about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the administration is in favor of 

it, and the State Department is in favor of this fund being used 

through Title 10 in the Department of Defense; is that correct? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. That is the way we made the request. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not the Department of State; is that correct? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. That is the way we made the request and 

we support that, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are not for it to be in the Department of 

State, right? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We are for it the way we asked for it, I 

guess. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Defense Department, right? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Thank you. Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Given the importance of the issue I am tempted 

to get a clarification of the Ambassador’s statement, but I think it 

was pretty well established. I am going to make a comment about 

it, however. It may seem we are very closely focused on—this is a 

critical issue. And I appreciated the admiral’s comments about the 

fact of the matter is—and I spoke to General Petraeus yesterday— 
10 

our commanders, starting with General Petraeus, view the control 

and flexibilities embodied both in the Coalition Support Funds and 

the PCCF as absolutely essential and absolutely essential they be 

controlled through the Department of Defense, without State Department or any other department’s filters. 

And I think the fact that President Obama, as has again been 

clarified—not clarified, but reaffirmed here today by our witnesses—has to his credit listened to the commanders on the ground 

and, along with the endorsement and support of Ambassador Patterson, has asked for these funds in this fashion is a message that 

cannot be overemphasized. I am deeply concerned about rumblings 

coming from the Appropriations Committee that regardless of what 

Congressman Berman, Chairman Berman’s bill may or may not do, 

there are very significant voices on that committee working, as we 

speak, to put those kinds of State Department filtering conditions 

on our commanders. 

So just to kind of put the cherry on the sundae, if you will, I assume beyond Chairman Berman’s bill, Madam Ambassador, you 

would also oppose any similar constraints imposed to the appropriations process? Simply put. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sorry sir, you said Madam Ambassador, so I am not sure if it should be for me or him. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think we can answer in unison. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We agree with the perspective. 

Mr. MCHUGH. You are an ambassador of goodwill, Madam Secretary, I apologize. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We would—I would agree with your perspective sir. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you. Let me ask another question. There 

has been discussion, media reports, Secretary Lindsey Graham— 

oh, boy—Senator Lindsey Graham and I—I am just kicking people 

from one department to another here today. Senator Lindsey Graham and I have been trading phone calls. There has been discussion about advancing some significant moneys to the Pakistanis 

prior to the development and passage of the supplemental. 

Obviously both President Karzai and Zardari are going to be in 

town in the very near future, and this was looked at both as a confidence-building measure, but also something to free up funds more 

quickly to get supporting dollars into Pakistan and begin the work 

that I think the administration has done a pretty good job in detailing in their proposal. Does the administration have any position 

on that initiative at this time? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think this has been discussed, and I think 

there is a desire for getting this funding as quickly as possible. I 

think within the administration, I think the preference is probably 

to accelerate the entire supplemental, to have an earlier decision 

on that, and to keep these moneys as a coherent sort of package. 

But I think there is definitely a desire to have this as soon as possible. And I think it is open for discussion. 

I don’t know if there is a different view on the State Department 

side. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, the view is essentially the same from 

the State Department. Our hope is the whole package can move expeditiously in the supplemental. The supplemental contained a 
11 

number of elements on Pakistan economic assistance, security assistance and some operational things that we need to get on with 

right away. And I think our view is it is best if the whole package 

can move quickly. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share the concerns of 

Governor McHugh—excuse me—of Representative McHugh. I think 

his term was ‘‘unwelcome signals’’ that we could send if we include 

language in the legislation that is not as helpful to the work that 

you all are trying to do. 

I wanted to ask, it seems like, Madam Secretary, Ambassador, 

that we also need to have some positive signals that we send to the 

Pakistani people. As I look ahead, I don’t know how far off, 15 

years, 20 years, 8 years, I can foresee a time when we will look at 

our relationship with Pakistan as being one of the really strong 

economic cultural relationships. I mean it has that kind of potential. I am always reassured when I pull out those pictures of those 

lawyers in coats and ties demonstrating for the rule of law in the 

streets of Pakistan. It seems to me that we have a lot of common 

shared values. 

And my question is, what other things can we be doing to send 

positive signals that this is more than just our desire to have a 

military ally at a time that we need military help? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, that is a very important point. I 

think part of it is the strategy that is the administration presented 

and that you see in the Kerry-Lugar bill and the House bill as well, 

that we know that we need to beef up, do more on the economic 

and institutional side so that we can help Pakistan modernize its 

institutions of government, modernize its education system, modernize its economy so that people see the benefits of this. 

There is a group I talked to not too long ago. One of the Pakistani colonels in the group said, you need to offer people something 

more than war. And we need to offer them peace. We need to offer 

them prosperity. And indeed if you look at the whole region strategically, the opportunities that a stable Pakistan that is free from 

terrorism opens up economically, in terms of relations with India, 

in terms of access rights to Central Asia, in terms of stability between the Middle East and the Far East, are enormous. And I 

think we do have that long-term interest in Pakistan and in the 

people of Pakistan. We just need to make that part of our rhetoric, 

but also part of our programs. 

Dr. SNYDER. As you look back in the relationship in the last few 

years, I had occasion to talk with some Pakistani friends a few 

weeks ago, and they were going back far enough, I didn’t know 

what the details were, but it was like in the last year, two or three, 

and they expressed concerns that they felt like we had not followed 

through on some things that we had told them we would do as far 

as military equipment or those—something like that. 

Do they have some merit to the fact that we didn’t follow 

through like perhaps we had led them to think we would? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I guess I would say we probably did follow through, but we didn’t necessarily follow through as fast as 

they wanted. I look at the challenges that they face, and especially 
12 

that the new democratic government has faced since last March 

when they came into place. They are dealing with an economic crisis, a political crisis of stabilizing democracy, and a huge security 

crisis all at the same time. Every single one of these needs is urgent. 

And we have tried to come through for them in a lot of ways, but 

some of these things take time to fund and procure and deliver. 

And so I think they are right in saying, hey, we need it now. And 

that is one reason why we are coming to you with this program because this is a way to get now to the people who are out there 

fighting the insurgency. Pakistan’s military just this week is pushing back against these encroachments. 

Dr. SNYDER. I would encourage them if they think that we have 

made some promises—like our constituents, let us know if they 

think there is a problem. 

The last question is, it seems like if I were a Pakistani military 

leader, it would be very difficult for me to figure out how to be as 

involved as perhaps we would like to be in the area along the Afghanistan border, given their great concern with the potential tension with India. Is there a way that the Pakistani-Indian relationships can improve, apart from what is going on in this war against 

terrorism, or do they go hand in hand? I address that to you, either 

one of you. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think there are a lot of ways that the 

Pakistani-India relationship can improve. And, one, we have seen 

a lot of progress over the last few years, Pakistanis and Indians 

both pushing forward new ideas in trying to solve some of the 

issues. The issue of terrorism, though, is central to this. 

The Mumbai bombings carried out by a group that was based in 

Pakistan really disrupted the progress that was going on. And one 

of the best ways to improve Pakistan’s relations with India is to see 

Pakistan carry through on what they have started, and that is to 

prosecute and disband, eliminate the group that was responsible 

for the Mumbai bombings. 

India is going through an election right now. But I hope that 

when the new government comes in, that they will see the progress 

on terrorism and they will be able to work with Pakistan to try and 

reestablish some of that broader progress. Reduction of tensions, 

improvement of economic ties, people-to-people ties, all that I think 

would benefit not only stability in the region but also the fight 

against terrorism in the region. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before I ask Mr. Coffman, let me ask the fact that Taliban forces 

have seized an area. I think some 60 miles from Islamabad, is that 

of great concern to you, Madam Secretary? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is of concern and it is an example of 

some of these militant groups moving out of the northwest territories and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 

into what I refer to as the Pakistani heartland. I think the attacks 

against the cricketers, the attacks on Lahore, we have seen a number of these examples, are part of what is contributing to a shift 

in the level of concern and the determination to do something 
13 

about this on the part of both Pakistan’s leaders and ordinary Pakistani citizens. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is, 

I have seen analyses that show that 80 percent of the Pakistani 

military is focused on its border with India, in the Kashmir area, 

that that is their orientation. 

One question is, has that changed? And the second is, what initiatives does the United States have to defuse the situation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir so that we can get them 

to focus in on the Taliban? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, if you don’t mind, I will defer the military lay-down question to my colleague and just note that I think 

on the India-Pakistan question, I think part of the strategy that we 

laid out is very much of an intensive diplomatic engagement not 

only with Afghanistan-Pakistan, but also all the countries in the 

region, to try to reduce tensions where they exist, to enable some 

shifts in resources to deal with this problem of extremism on the 

border. But I will let my colleagues comment on the details. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. First, to comment on the exact number of 

troops and whether they are shifting or not inside Pakistan, in this 

unclassified forum, would probably be unwise. But I will say that 

the Pakistanis do have around 100,000 troops in the western area. 

And it is my sense from talking with my boss, who does an awful 

lot of military diplomacy with his counterparts in the region, that 

there is a desire on the part of Pakistan to move to the west. And 

it is just about building trust, which is clearly a public diplomacy 

and a military diplomacy task that we are taking on and we have 

been taking on, and we believe we are gradually building that 

trust. 

It is sort of two steps forward, one step back sometimes. And 

there are setbacks when things like Mumbai occur, which sort of 

tend to make people fix in place or even add troops and other 

pieces of military equipment in the areas we would rather not see 

them. 

But our sense is the Pakistani military ‘‘gets it,’’ that they understand where the real threat to their nation’s stability exists, but 

they continue to be worried about their perennial concern, which 

is India. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. We have had testimony before this committee that 

seems to suggest that funding institutions, such as the police and 

the Frontier Corps, are more effective than funding the regular 

Army in counterinsurgency. And in this funding, do we have the 

ability to be specific as to what entities we fund, or are we simply 

giving it to the Pakistani Government? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is one of the great things about this 

authority, is that it really leaves the determination in our hands 

and General Petraeus’ hands, with Ambassador Patterson clearly 

having a very, very important input, along with the Office of the 

Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP) commander, Admiral 

LeFever, as to us funneling this money specifically towards counterinsurgency capability, with specific equipment, that we determine what will be purchased for the Pakistanis and also the training side as well. Yes, sir. 
14 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add, PCCF as a Title 10 authority, is available to support the Frontier Corps, the special operations forces, and we would propose also expanding to the army 

forces that are in that border region. But critical to a broader counterinsurgency strategy is also building police capacity, but that 

would be done under separate authorities and funding streams that 

are in the State Department’s purview through their International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. In the supplemental request that we have presented, there is another $65 million for the police and Frontier 

Corps, about $40 million specifically for the police. And that would 

be added to some other programs that we have this year, and we 

hope next year, to really focus on building a stronger police capability in that area because what we are—part of the counterinsurgency is to allow the government to maintain control in areas that 

the military has been able to clear out, and that is a very important priority for us and, I have to say, for the Pakistanis as well. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith, please. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up a little bit 

on the counterinsurgency piece and our strategy there, first of all, 

tell us a little bit about how we get the Pakistani military and police to the point where we feel confident in their ability to engage 

in counterinsurgency. How far off are we? What do you see as the 

main challenges there? Because it certainly seems critical. It is the 

cornerstone of counterinsurgency, by, through, and with the local 

population and the local law enforcement, as opposed to our hand. 

And that is particularly true in Pakistan, given how the Pakistani 

people feel about us. 

What is the path forward in terms of getting them to the level 

of capability they need to be effective everywhere, including the 

FATA, throughout the whole region? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me start and the admiral may want to 

add. I think there are many dimensions to this. The first is equipment. They have focused most of their equipment acquisitions on 

their deterrent capacity vis-a-vis other neighbors, particularly 

India. They have not focused their equipping efforts on counterinsurgency. And there are some different kinds of capabilities that 

they need there. 

But, as important, is training and you know as we have learned 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, these operations require different mindsets, certainly different doctrine, different skill sets sometimes, different kinds of leadership ability. So I think the training and education piece is just as important as the equipment piece, and giving 

them the ability to do population-focused military operations where 

securing the population is really at the heart of what they do. 

Mr. SMITH. On that point, sorry to interrupt, but how confident 

are we in our intelligence or in Pakistani intelligence on getting to 

know those critical populations, to know who the community leaders are, who the tribal leaders are, who we can work with? Because 

certainly that was the key in Iraq, was finding members of the 

local population who were willing to turn on Al Qaeda and the 

Taliban. 
15 

I am not as confident that we have that same level of knowledge, 

or even necessarily that we are working towards that level of 

knowledge in the critical areas in the lawless regions of Pakistan. 

What is our plan for dealing with that? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think historically—I don’t think that 

there has been a deep understanding of the sort of cultural demographics, if you will, of that area. I think that certainly as with the 

Frontier Corps there with Pakistan, the government moving more, 

starting to focus more on that region, move people and resources 

into that region, that is starting to improve. They are gaining 

knowledge as they go and so forth. But I think that is an area 

where improvement could be made. 

Mr. SMITH. And is that an area where within DOD or within our 

Intel Community we are planning to ramp up our efforts to gather 

information on our side, either supply—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, sir, I can’t really comment on the Intel 

side of it because it is sort of out of my purview. 

Mr. SMITH. We had testimony last week on this subject with 

some outside experts, including Mr. Kilcullen who is very much an 

expert on these issues. And he basically, he made the statement 

that the Predator strikes were counterproductive; that basically 

you are going for counterinsurgency, building support with the population. 

I don’t think I agree with that, but certainly there is a point at 

which if we are doing counterinsurgency correctly, if we are building sufficient support within the local population to confront the 

problem that way, they do become counterproductive. 

Is that something that you have contemplated in terms of our 

strategy there, our unilateral actions, and ramping that down to 

build up population support and to build up the Frontier Corps’s 

strength in that area? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I don’t mean to be unresponsive, but 

I don’t feel—I don’t think it is a good thing for me to comment on 

in an open session. But we would be happy to talk to you in a 

closed session on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Fair enough. Last question has to do something with 

what Mr. Snyder was raising, and that is sort of the trust gap between Pakistan and the United States. And I guess this would be 

for the Ambassador. 

What are the most important things we can do to try to build up 

the Pakistani trust? There has been excessive focus on our side, 

with our lack of trust in them, which of course only exacerbates the 

other problem. But in terms of exchanges, in terms of different 

things our government could do to try and build and strengthen 

our relationship with Pakistan, are there suggestions that you 

would have for us? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I guess I would say that the most important thing is to come through on a broad program that actually 

does improve education and help them economically and help them 

meet their energy needs and help them build institutions of government that they need and help the police provide security for people. 

If we can help the Pakistani Government deliver what its people 

want, then I think that builds the level of public as well as govern-
16 

mental trust between the two countries. And so that is one of the 

thrusts of the program. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of 

you. I know that it is always difficult to speak to kind of theoretical 

questions. But related to any possibility that there being a breakdown in Pakistan’s military hierarchy, whether it is Taliban or 

whoever it might be, that could either gain through a loyalty 

breach or through a force of arms, control of some or all of Pakistan’s military weapons, especially their nuclear weapons. And I 

am not sure what you can say in this venue. 

But, Admiral, what do you think should be our greatest concern 

there, our greatest focus? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. First of all, I would tell you that we believe 

that the Pakistani military is a very stable organization that is 

well led. General Kiyani has a very good relationship with Admiral 

Mullen, and vice versa, and you know that he has been over there 

many times over the last year. I have lost count; I think it is up 

to nine. And he has gotten, he has built a very deep sense for this 

organization and an affinity for it as well. 

And I think he would be the first to say that he is not concerned 

about the Pakistani military breaking down per se in the face of 

a Taliban influx or an assault upon the military organization itself. 

So I think that the thing we need to make sure that we continue 

to do is to build the trust that we do with the Pakistani military. 

And we do that in many ways: through the International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) program, which is absolutely critical—as you know, we had a 12-year gap there and we are trying 

to recover from that—by coming through on what we agreed to deliver to them, by also holding them accountable in private, by continuing our training programs that we do for them. And it is really 

across a broad spectrum of building trust and buttressing their 

military to (a) be a good strong COIN force and (b), be a very responsible actor inside Pakistan. Those are the things we need to 

concentrate the most, I think. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. And thank you for your service to 

this country, to say the least. 

Ms. Flournoy, I guess I will put the question to you in a little 

different way, because obviously you have even the same goal that 

the admiral does, but just a different mechanism. 

Secretary Clinton stated this week, and I am quoting, she said, 

one of our concerns which we have raised with the Pakistani Government and military is that if the worst, the unthinkable were to 

happen and this advancing Taliban encouraged and supported by 

Al Qaeda and other extremists were to essentially topple the government for failure to beat them back, then we would have to— 

they would have the keys to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan, unquote. 

And then she goes on to say, we can’t even contemplate that, we 

cannot let this go on any further, which is why we are pushing so 

hard for the Pakistanis to come together around the strategy to 

take their country back. And unquote here again. 

What is the Department, from your perspective, doing about the, 

quote, unthinkable, and specifically understanding and controlling 
17 

Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile? And what are we doing to contemplate and come up with a strategy to ensure nuclear weapons 

don’t fall into the hands of Al Qaeda? 

It is a little twist on the question I asked the admiral but, of 

course, some of the diplomatic approaches are obviously different 

from the military. What are we doing there to really make sure 

that we are protecting this country, and essentially the world, from 

those weapons falling into the hands of the bad guys? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. First of all, I would say I think we have to 

be concerned anywhere where there is a potential for instability in 

a nuclear armed state, be it Pakistan or anywhere else. I think the 

first thing we are doing is, as Admiral Winnefeld described, is we 

are raising the issue, we are talking about it, we are emphasizing 

the importance of Pakistan’s responsibility for the security of its 

weapons. And as the admiral said, I think they are focused on this 

and they take it very seriously and they have actually invested a 

substantial amount of resources and time and effort in recent years 

to improve the security of their arsenal. 

So I think that it is something that we focus attention on, on our 

side, in our thinking about contingencies and such. But it is also 

something that we consistently raise in dialogue with them, and we 

try to ensure that we are there to work with them to make sure 

that that focus remains. But I think that it is definitely in 

everybody’s mind and there is no lack of attention being paid to it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For some time now, 

we have been underfunding State’s activities generally, worldwide, 

that are important to us as far as maintaining relationships, developing intelligent sources, et cetera, is concerned. 

Frankly, funding to the State Department is an easy target politically. It is easy to cut that stuff and say that we need to be 

spending money here at home as opposed to abroad for any number 

of different reasons. 

I have suggested for some time that perhaps we think about funneling money through DOD to State Department-type activities as 

perhaps a mechanism to have a sustained, politically sustainable 

over the long haul way of addressing long-term security needs that 

can only be met by developing the right kind of partnerships, the 

right kind of relationships worldwide. 

We can’t do this ourselves. We have got to have our partners like 

the Pakistanis furthering our strategic interests and securing 

nukes basically in this instance and pursuing Al Qaeda generally. 

And I kind of see it heading in that direction and, in that sense, 

positive. 

I am a little worried, though, that you seem to be pretty adamantly opposed to H.R. 1886 because of rigid conditionality, I think 

is the term that one of you used in testimony. What are the conditions in H.R. 1886 that have been proposed that would somehow 

constrain your ability to act in a way that you find unacceptable? 

Obviously, everybody would like to just have a free hand, you 

know. Congress, give us the money, we will do the right thing with 

that money, trust us. Congress has the obligation, though, to make 

sure that money is to be spent appropriately, so some conditions 
18 

were apparently proposed that you all don’t find acceptable. And I 

am curious to know what those conditions would be. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that our concern was that the wording of some of the Presidential certification requirements was—to 

our reading, it seemed very absolute and inflexible. So that if we 

are making progress but we weren’t at the end state yet, we are 

still not at the end state, so no assistance. We are worried about 

the way things were worded. 

Mr. MARSHALL. If I could interrupt. Have you already, in writing, 

let the bill’s authors know what your concerns are? Does the committee to which it has been assigned know what your concerns are? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen 

have written a joint letter, actually, to Chairman Skelton and to 

Mr. McHugh, expressing our concerns about the bill; applauding 

the bill for its desired increased assistance to Pakistan, and to do 

so in a comprehensive and integrated way, but voicing concern 

about some of the specifically inflexible language on conditionality 

and so forth. So we are supportive of the spirit but have concerns 

about how it is actually operationalized in the bill. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I see it is in writing, so I don’t need to further 

pursue that line of questioning. I will just read what you have written. I appreciate that. 

We are going about this business, once again, taking the lead. 

And it may be that we are the sole actor that is doing this, and 

as a consequence it will be American tax dollars and American personnel executing this. 

Who are we teaming up with? Obviously, Pakistan’s stability is 

of interest to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 

entire world, really. And Nunn-Lugar proposes 1.5 billion of additional dollars for the next 5 years. It just seems to me we ought 

to have a lot of international partners working with us. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we do. And you may want to elaborate 

on this, Ambassador. But at our urging, our allies, the Japanese actually just hosted a donors conference for Pakistan in Tokyo that 

raised—I think it was $5.6 billion in international pledges. So we 

are not alone in this. 

Coming out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review, we 

really sought to rally others around our desire to strengthen the 

Pakistani Government and to offer various assistance efforts. I 

don’t know if you want to elaborate on that. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, I think there is a lot of international 

concern about Pakistan. And the conference in Tokyo did overpledge the amount that was required. The International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) identified a shortfall of about $4 billion that was going 

to be needed for balance of payments, budgetary and program support for Pakistan, to get them through the economic crisis. And in 

Tokyo we came in for $1 billion, the Japanese came in for $1 billion; the Saudis were in for $700 million; the rest of the Gulf Emirates was 300-plus. So $1 billion from the Gulf. Europeans were 

substantial. 

Some of the other countries that didn’t pledge anything new, like 

China, are already fairly substantial supporters to the Pakistanis. 

So I think there was very broad international support, final number. I think the way the IMF counted it was $51⁄4 billion against 
19 

an original target of $4 billion. So I think there is substantial support as well as international concern, and the two go together. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members 

of the panel, for joining us today. I wanted to follow up a little bit 

on the letter that was sent to Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates 

concerning the whole Pakistani issue. But I want to focus in on the 

international military education and training aspect of that. And I 

also want to include in that a conversation I recently had with 

General Zinni, who was former CENTCOM commander, and looking at the utility of that particular program. And it was pointed out 

by both the Secretary and Admiral Mullen that has been critical 

in the past and they see it as being important into the future. 

I wanted to get your viewpoints about will these programs be increased? Will they be enhanced? How will we apply these to try to 

make sure that we have that sort of training, integration of 

thought process with U.S. forces and Pakistani forces? And what 

we are seeing today are officers at the junior grade that haven’t 

been through those training programs. And we are seeing now a 

difference between the senior officer corps and the junior officer 

corps. And I am wondering what your thoughts are on where this 

is going. Where do we look to enhance that, and what utility will 

that have on our success there in Pakistan? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. Without using up too much of your 

time with specifics, I will tell you that Admiral Mullen is an extremely strong supporter of the IMF program. He came back from 

one of his trips one time, really energizing the staff to pour more 

attention and time into buffing that program up essentially so that 

it would accomplish more of the things that you are describing. 

I think we have 37, if I am not mistaken, Pakistani IMET students in the United States right now. That is sort of a long-term 

program in the sense they come over for an extended period of 

time. And in order to get more leverage and more exposure to the 

exact group of Pakistani officers you are speaking about, we would 

like to get some of them and some of their noncommissioned officers over for shorter periods to expose them. And we believe we are 

going to start seeing some success in doing that. And there are 

other programs that we are trying to ramp up in order to get that 

done. 

So I think the short answer is we understand this. We really 

want to get at that—particularly that tranche of officers that did 

not have the exposure. And it is a very important program for us. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just clarify, the PCCF authority 

proposal does not at all affect IMET. In fact, we are increasing our 

request for IMET. PCCF will allow more operational types of training but it is a complementary effort, not a replacement to IMET. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Secretary Flournoy, a question about 

the integration of different efforts there in Pakistan. We know 

there has been a lot of talk, and we had a panel that testified before us last week suggesting that there has been maybe an overreliance on the military strength through the U.S. intervention 

there in the region, and that maybe we ought to look at some addi-
20 

tional efforts along the development side or the implementation of 

what they call soft power. 

I just wanted to get your thoughts about how do you integrate 

both of those efforts to be successful in those regions, to make sure 

that we not only provide security but we look at security in sustainable ways as it relates to the other aspects of Pakistan and its 

economy? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, when we came up with a budget proposal that is in the 2009 supplemental, and then also what is in 

2010, we very much came at it from a holistic perspective. And so 

you see the bulk of the assistance on the civilian side to do things 

like rule of law assistance, economic development assistance, police, et cetera. The military piece is a portion of that. And it comes 

in several flavors. 

But I think we do have a holistic perspective. We in Washington 

have worked the interagency process very hard to get coherence. 

And then in the person of—combination of Ambassador Holbrooke, 

who will be looking at a regional perspective, and Ambassador Patterson and our folks on the ground, they will be very much looking 

to ensure those things work together. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I can tell you that the military piece is very 

much designed to help create the security environment in which 

the governance and development assistance can be more effective. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield the balance 

of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, please. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for being 

with us, Admiral, Ambassador. I am just curious, I do come from 

a part of the world where $400 million is still a lot of money. What 

is it you think we accomplish with that 400 million? What is your 

level of confidence at the end of the day it has made a difference, 

that anything has changed favorably our way? Or is this just a 

very small down payment on something we are going to be asked 

to provide a heck of a lot of money for in the very near future? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think that as the Pakistan leadership, both civilian and military, become more focused on this threat 

and more willing to deal with it, I think our ability to help them 

develop the capabilities to be effective is going to be that much 

more crucial. And so what we are talking about is, in the PCCF, 

is moneys that can help train and equip the Frontier Corps, the 

Special Operations forces, but now expand also to the Army forces 

in the area. And that can give them very specific capabilities, 

equipment and training that they lack that are essential to effective counterinsurgency. 

So I think this is something that we have been working piecemeal by putting together a patchwork of authorities and trying to 

take little bites out of the apple. What the PCCF will allow us to 

do is take much more concerted and coherent approach to getting 

further down this road much faster. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, if I could just add to that, because I 

have gone out to the border areas a number of times, and I remember a trip I was down south in the area across from Helmand, 

where the U.S. forces are going in, working with some people from 

the Frontier Corps, going out to visit forts that we had actually 
21 

built along various infiltration routes. And talking to the commander of one of these forts, I said do you have night vision goggles? Do you have body armor for your troops? And he said we have 

a very small amount, and we switch it between different places, 

different forts on different nights depending upon where we think 

the smugglers or the infiltration might occur. And I think what 

this program is designed to do is to sort of make sure they can all 

have their body armor, that they can all get out there and do what 

has to be done in a more coherent and concerted way. So it is really 

trying to do this in a systematic way, and not just as the Under 

Secretary said, sort of the hodgepodge that we have done before. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And again, I will presume you have spent years in 

that area and I haven’t stepped foot in Pakistan. But from everything I read, it seems to me that Pakistani Government considers 

India their primary threat, Taliban not to be a threat. So that runs 

counterproductive to what you just said. Night vision goggles to 

protect themselves from what, the people they don’t consider a 

threat? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. These are people that are on the infiltration routes in and out of Afghanistan. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Right, but they don’t consider that infiltration route 

to be a problem. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No, they do. It is just they are not 

equipped to deal with the problem. And I think what this program 

tries to do is equip them to deal with it. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think what you describe is historically accurate. I think there really is a shift taking place as these 

attacks come into the heartland of Pakistan, and as, you know, 

they threaten the Punjabi territory and so forth. I think it is also 

very important to see this in the context of the fact that, you know, 

this is an integrated theater, this border region. And we have tens 

of thousands of troops on the Afghan side. Part of preventing attacks coming from Pakistan across that border is helping the Pakistanis to be more effective in securing the border, denying that 

area as a safe haven, establishing security for the population in 

those areas, and securing the lines of communication. That has a 

direct impact on our forces in Afghanistan. And now that there is 

greater willingness on the Pakistani side to address this, I think 

we have to support them in being more effective because it will affect us in very concrete ways. 

Mr. TAYLOR. In the short time I have remaining, has anyone in 

the Pakistani Government actually asked for this money, and if so, 

whom? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. To our knowledge, they are not asking for 

the money, they are asking for us to help them with their capability. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Who? What is the name, what is the title? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. General Petraeus is asking for—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, no, in the Pakistani Government, who in the 

Pakistani Government, the name and the title, is asking for this? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. General Kiyani. General Kiyani, sir, is asking for us to dramatically enhance his Armed Forces, the Frontier 

Corps, the Special Forces that he has, and in fact, the Eleventh 

Corps, their ability to do counterinsurgency. He has lost 1,400 
22 

killed in action along the border region. He has lost a lot more people out west than he has against India, and he knows it. He realizes, and the entire government is beginning to realize more and 

more that this is the real immediate threat. At the same time, they 

are still worried about India. And we would love for them to worry 

less about India and more about the west, but they are definitely 

raising their awareness of and their concern about what is happening in the west. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today. I agree with Dr. Snyder. I am hopeful for Pakistan. I visited the country a number of times. And the people I 

have met there are very dynamic. There are 30 million, possibly 40 

million middle class people, significant high level of education. I 

have had the opportunity to meet with parliamentarians on my visits there. And also we have a number of members of the parliament 

from Islamabad come and visit here. Every time I am really impressed at the dedication of the people that I have had the opportunity to meet. I have also had the opportunity, with the earthquake relief in 2005, to visit with U.S. Marines who were working 

with the Pakistani military. And the military impressed me as very 

professional, very well organized. 

And so I am just again hopeful, but I have also seen tragedy. I 

had the opportunity, sadly, to have breakfast at the home with 

Benazir Bhutto a month and a day prior to her murder. And so I 

want the best for that country. And Admiral Winnefeld, last week 

when we had a hearing, there was concern expressed that Pakistan 

is actually on a trajectory toward becoming a failed state. In general, we have been discussing this the whole time, but what specifically can we do to develop a strategic partnership with that country 

to succeed? Actually, any of you if you would like to. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think those words are very important, 

strategic partnership. I think one of the things we have got to do 

is move out of a very transactional relationship to investment in 

a strategic partner and a long-term program to invest in strengthening Pakistan’s political and social institutions, strengthening 

their military, and their ability to provide security within their own 

borders, strengthening their economy and so forth. The stability of 

that country is so important to our interests and to the region. I 

think that we have to engage as a priority at all levels, using all 

instruments, from diplomacy to assistance to military engagement 

and so forth. And I think, again, this is one of the primary insights 

that has come out of the strategy. And I think we are trying to 

move out in that direction. But we do need help. We do need the 

tools to be effective in doing that. 

Mr. WILSON. And I have served twice as the co-chair of the India 

caucus. And I have made the points to our friends of India and our 

ally of India that the country that would benefit most from a stable 

Pakistan is India. And Secretary Boucher, you have indicated that 

there have been steps towards a better relationship between the 

two countries. What can we do to promote an improvement in relations between two countries that it would be in their mutual interest that each be successful? 
23 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think U.S. encouragement helps them 

achieve the kind of progress that they have made in the past. 

There are more concrete things that we do. The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) has been involved in the follow-up to the 

Mumbai bombings on both the Indian side and the Pakistani side 

to try to get the facts out, try to get the prosecutions under way, 

try to help them deal with this problem, eliminate the further 

threat of terrorists from these people and move on. And then I 

think, frankly, the more we do to help Pakistan deal with the terrorist problem, the more we open up opportunities for India and 

Pakistan to cooperate. 

Mr. WILSON. What is the status of trade relationship between the 

two countries? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. It is open for a slightly increasing list of 

goods. There is a lot of potential there should we say. There is 

probably a lot of trade that goes in and out of the gulf. But there 

is, I think, very identifiable trade opportunities that both would 

like to take advantage of. 

Mr. WILSON. And what is the status of assisting in any way education? Are we helping in any way the educational—the schools in 

Pakistan? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We are. It has been a priority for previous programs. We have done a lot of it for many years through 

budget support. Last year we moved this into specific projects that 

we were funding. But I think in terms of the new budgets, the new 

amounts that are being requested, that would be a very high priority. 

Mr. WILSON. And in the past, that has been a real problem of 

the lack of education and extremists taking over the system. So 

thank you all for your service. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Exactly. If I could just say the goal is to 

create a good public education sister testimony so it draws kids out 

of madrassas and into the modern sector of life and society and the 

economy. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Mr. Kissell, let me ask is it not 

true that the key to success in Afghanistan is full cooperation with 

Pakistan? Or I should say by Pakistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I do think that cooperation with Pakistan 

is critical to our success in Afghanistan. And I think that enabling 

them to help apply pressure on their side of the border in dealing 

with this extremist threat is absolutely crucial to success over the 

long haul. 

The CHAIRMAN. We don’t want to even speak of Pakistan becoming a failed state, but what if they become as fully ineffective in 

helping us with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the criminal element? What about our conflict in Afghanistan under those circumstances? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think the more that either side of the border becomes a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other extremists, the 

more difficult it is for us—the more difficult it will be for us to 

achieve stability and security in our objectives on either side of the 

border. 
24 

The CHAIRMAN. At what point do we say since you are not helping us as much as you can, we will not allow a safe haven to exist? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I don’t know how to answer that question. I think it is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But it is a real question. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is a real question. And I think our job 

is to try to avoid getting to that point. We have opportunities I 

think to make that a more remote possibility by investing in the 

capacity and capability of Pakistan to avoid the kind of outcome 

that you are describing. And I think that is the primary course of 

action that we should be taking. 

The CHAIRMAN. Bottom line, doesn’t it amount to the will of the 

Pakistani Government to get their house in order? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think there is a will component and a capability component. And I think the more effective we help them 

to be in addressing the insurgency when they choose to address it, 

which they are doing right now, the more that will build political 

will to keep on down that path. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today. Madam Secretary and Mr. Ambassador, recently 

in Afghanistan, I had a chance to visit. And numbers given to us 

for polling numbers independent of the government or military, 

this came from evidently media, listed support for the Taliban in 

Afghanistan being below 10 percent, single digit numbers. How 

strong is the support for the Taliban not in Pakistan in general, 

but in the region where they have recently been so active? How 

strong is the local support for these people? And also I saw a news 

account this weekend that indicated that parts of the Pakistan 

Government said here, you can have this, just leave us alone over 

here. How true was that and how—what does that mean to us? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think probably support for Taliban 

groups in this area, in the border areas of Pakistan is probably 

higher than it might be in Afghanistan. They are rooted in tribes, 

culture, and history, in traditional opposition to governing authority. At the same time, when you talk to people up there, you hear 

they want schools for their kids, they want hospitals, they want 

roads, they want job opportunities. And I think if the government 

can deliver those, people want to side with the government. 

Now, it has been dangerous to do that. There have been hundreds of tribal leaders who have stood up over the last year or two 

in various meetings and supported the government, trying to get 

rid of the Taliban, and they have been killed. The Taliban have 

killed at least 200, I think last year, tribal leaders. So it is very 

dangerous to stand up and side with the government. But there are 

substantial portions of the population that want to do that. The 

idea that maybe, well, you know, if we just left them alone, they 

could stay up there and not cause us any trouble, that kind of goes 

back on and off to British days. And it has never worked. 

It didn’t work for the British, hasn’t worked for this government. 

And particularly right now when you see these groups trying to 

push into other areas and take over other parts of the country, the 

government I think is feeling that they really do have to assert 
25 

governmental authority. And that is what this is all about in many 

ways. 

Mr. KISSELL. Admiral, we had a group last week and I asked this 

question to them, as we are successful in Afghanistan does that 

help or hurt Pakistan in terms of its ability to fight the Taliban? 

Would it mean that the Taliban would concentrate more there? 

Just what would it mean? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is a very difficult—we are looking 

through a glass darkly when we are trying to foresee the answer 

to that. But I think we can safely say that as we are successful in 

Afghanistan, it is possible that some of the Taliban will be driven 

back over the border, which the Pakistanis are very concerned 

about. 

I would add, as a side note, that having authority like PCCF to 

enable us in an agile way, enable General Petraeus to help enable 

the Frontier Corps, for example, and we are going to move that effort into the south eventually where we are going to try to 

strengthen the capability of the Frontier Corps in the south, and 

the Ambassador alluded earlier to how really poor they are in just 

the basic needs, just being able to move from point A to point B 

somehow other than being on foot down there is very difficult for 

them. 

So strengthening them down there will help Pakistan, and it will 

help sort of sandwich the Taliban who might be tempted to leave 

Afghanistan if they are losing in the south, as we are confident 

that they will be this summer and this fall once we get additional 

forces in place. On the other hand, anywhere we can beat the 

Taliban we are going to beat them. And we believe that we 

wouldn’t want to let up at all in southern Afghanistan in order to 

prevent, you know, them from going back across the border. That 

is why we want to work closely with Pakistan, we want to use authorities like PCCF to strengthen them and get this job done. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

panel. The first question kind of ties into what Chairman Skelton 

said in the very beginning. He just mentioned that the Taliban are 

60 miles outside of the Pakistani capital. And I have heard the 

words trust, diplomacy, good will, strategic partnership, but I 

haven’t heard much, maybe the Admiral can answer this, about 

closing with and destroying the enemy through firing and close 

combat as the Marines do, which is what they need right now. The 

$400 million isn’t going to do anything for that, nothing, about 

what is going on now. So what is going on now? What are we doing 

right now to help them? If you can talk about it in this venue. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yeah, I think in the most unclassified manner of speaking, the Pakistanis, as you can read in the press, are 

moving into that area in an attempt to eliminate the Taliban presence, the extremist presence in Buner. That is going to be a difficult job for them, partly because we believe that it is possible the 

insurgents are trying to entrench themselves in that area and they 

are going to be hard to root out like insurgents are anywhere, as 

you well know. And what we are doing is listening to the Pakistanis. If they are going to ask for a request for support we are 
26 

going to listen very carefully. And again, having authority like 

PCCF would help us respond to requests like that very quickly. If 

they were to request—if there were an unanticipated need that 

were to emerge, whether it be training—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Are you saying you can’t do that now, you can’t fulfill those needs without the PCCF right now? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We are less able do it now than we can if 

we have the PCCF, that is correct. 

Mr. HUNTER. Not to belabor the PCCF, but we are talking about 

that a lot, General Petraeus said that the PCCF, in a letter that 

I have here, is integral to the success of Enduring Freedom because 

it enables the commanders on the ground to do what they need to 

do when they need to do it. And this is for all of you. Do you think 

that if the State Department had control of this that it would be 

inserting the State Department into the military chain of command, which is so integral to have quick, efficient operations on the 

ground? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I wouldn’t want to paint it in that negative 

of a light. I think it is appropriate that for an ongoing combat operation, where General Petraeus is responsible, has the authority 

and responsibility on both sides of that border, for whatever we can 

do to make that fight go the way it needs to go. A real no kidding, 

ongoing fight, that it is appropriate for the military from ODRP to 

General Petraeus up through the chain to have the responsibility, 

and therefore the resources in order to do that. I would add that 

Ambassador Patterson is a very important piece of this, and that 

she is the chief of mission, she understands what is going on on 

the ground, and she will have a direct influence on how a PCCF 

would be employed. But we believe that General Petraeus should 

have the authority to use these funds. 

Mr. HUNTER. Unilaterally, through his chain of command. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think ‘‘unilaterally’’ is the wrong word. 

Mr. HUNTER. The Department of Defense down from the President, with that military chain of command. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The way I would say it is that the best way 

to align the authorities, responsibilities, and funding is to make 

PCCF a title 10 authority. And I don’t think there is any disagreement between the Department of Defense and Department of State 

on that at this time, particularly in the urgent period of the 2009 

supplemental. And I think everybody recognizes that alignment is 

what is needed to be operationally responsive on the ground, particularly in a battle zone. The closest analogy is the kind of authorities we have provided to build and support the Afghan National Security Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces. We need 

something comparable here on both sides of the Afghan border to 

be effective. 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think I would agree with the way Under 

Secretary Flournoy put it. The reason we approached this in this 

manner was to provide a more direct route to have an urgent, because of an urgent need. I do have to say that all these programs 

are carried out with a lot of consultation, a lot of effort between the 

departments, and it comes together in the country team that Ambassador Patterson runs in Pakistan. So I don’t think we—— 
27 

Mr. HUNTER. Not when it comes to buying things like Naval 

Beach Groups (NBGs) or getting them Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR). There is no State Department involved 

with buying magazines for AK–47s for them. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No. 

Mr. HUNTER. No, there isn’t. And should there be? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No, I don’t think so. There is one place 

to buy those, and that is the people who make them. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Our job, I think, is just to say, look, as 

we approach counterinsurgency, here is how we need to work it 

with the government, and we all work it together. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the three 

of you for being here today. I appreciate your service, and certainly 

what you are trying to do with respect to Pakistan. I have a very 

simple question at the outset. Can you lay out, and I guess Madam 

Secretary, that might be your job to do this, can you lay out not 

what our goal is in Pakistan, or what our goals are, but what is 

our strategy as it stands today? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think our strategy is to invest in 

strengthening the civilian government of Pakistan and the institutions of Pakistan so that they can meet the basic needs of their 

people and render Pakistan a secure, stable country that is inhospitable to insurgency and terrorism. It is about building the Pakistanis’ capacity to address their own challenges. They cannot do it 

alone. They need our help. And they need our help urgently. And 

when they start to take—when they take steps in the right direction, we should be there supporting them to the fullest extent possible. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And to what extent does the strategy then include components that are beyond Pakistan’s borders, Pakistan’s 

relationship to India and to other countries around Pakistan? How 

does that play into the strategy, if you will? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is very much a regional approach. We, 

as the Ambassador suggested, we have an important role to play 

in trying to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and its neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan. We are about to hold another trilateral session in Washington with the President coming soon, 

Pakistan with India. Hosting things like the donors conference. 

Getting regional stakeholders to realize that they have a stake in 

a stable and prosperous Pakistan. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. There is mention in your testimony, and I was 

not here for your oral remarks, I apologize, you may have mentioned it, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. Can you elaborate on 

what that is? Is this something similar to the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan? And I should mention, too, that Congressman Marshall 

and I agree that in Afghanistan they shouldn’t probably be called 

reconstruction zones, because they start from scratch more often 

than not. Is this what we are talking about PRTs, but in the case 

of Pakistan something different, a little bit different? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No, this is a different, it is a regional 

trade benefits program for border areas of Pakistan and all of Af-
28 

ghanistan so that products that they make in those areas would be 

able to enter the United States duty free. It is to create an opportunity for businesses to set up there, manufacturing to set up 

there, and basically to get kids not to pick up a gun and pick up 

a job or a wrench instead. Legislation has been introduced in both 

the House and the Senate, the bill on the House side sponsored by 

Congressman Van Hollen and I think several others. I am sorry, 

I don’t know the whole list. But we are hoping that the Congress 

will pass this legislation. The Pakistanis have been looking forward 

to this. And feasibility studies say there are actually real manufacturing opportunities in these border areas, opportunities to get kids 

jobs, and get them out of the fighting business. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. So you are talking about the FATA, you are talking about the border areas with Afghanistan? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Exactly. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. And one last question on interagency coordination, that dreaded phrase that no one likes. What is happening with respect to—because we have had a number of questions already. That is one advantage I have of being among the last 

to ask the questions, I get to hear a lot of my colleagues’ questions 

and your responses. But it seems as though that has not been resolved yet perhaps, the whole idea of interagency coordination. Is 

there any one particular individual, or how is that working with respect to Pakistan and our strategy? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, as someone who is in the middle of 

it, I will actually say it is working quite well. At the Washington 

level, you know, the deputies committee, the NSC process is putting a lot of time and attention. I mean, I am very pleased to say 

that when we finished the strategy review we didn’t just put it on 

a shelf. We immediately turned to, okay, how are we going to get 

this implemented? And that is why we are here today. This is part 

of getting the strategy implemented. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. So it is in the NSC principals? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. At the policy, sort of grand policy oversight 

level, yes. But then if you go down a level, Ambassador Holbrooke 

has developed a very close relationship with the ambassadors in 

the region, with General Petraeus as the regional combatant command (COCOM). He is working this interagency coordination piece 

at the regional level. And then when you go down on the ground 

and you look at the embassies, in Afghanistan there is a direct coordination between the ambassador and the military commander 

on the ground. In Pakistan you have an interagency country team 

that is working these issues. So it is happening at multiple levels. 

And for the most part, I have been actually quite impressed with 

how well it is working so far. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. Thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin will be the last questioner unless 

there is someone that has additional questions on a second round. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary 

Flournoy and Admiral Winnefeld and Ambassador Boucher for your 

testimony here today. There have been many news reports about 

the troubling level of support that the Pakistani intelligence serv-
29 

ices, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has given to Taliban 

forces. If part of our strategy is to end violence in the region is to 

help train the Pakistani Army on how to develop and fight counterinsurgency-style warfare, how does the ISI’s close relationship to 

Taliban forces affect the trust and ability of our forces to train and 

support their Pakistani partners? And furthermore, what steps is 

the U.S. taking to reduce the ISI’s support of Taliban forces? And 

what challenges does the U.S. face with ending their relationship? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The ISI is an organization like any organization, and it has a hard time changing. I can speak from personal 

experience in my own Department that we have gone through 

many changes over the years that have been difficult and painful. 

And they are going through a difficult and painful change right 

now. And I believe that they are going to succeed. I think we are 

seeing them succeed. General Kiyani brought in a new ISI chief, 

General Pasha, who has quickly replaced all except two of his two 

star subordinates inside the ISI headquarters. And we are starting 

to see the changes filter down throughout that organization. Now, 

does that mean they have completely changed? No. We do not necessarily believe that. It is going to take time for change to penetrate all of the different corners of that organization. But our sense 

from them is that they understand the need to change, the need 

to make a strategic shift away from some of their past policies. And 

we are confident that they are going to move in the right direction. 

Never as fast as anybody would ever want them to, but we believe 

that through the personal diplomacy that we have experienced between Admiral Mullen and General Kiyani and other interchanges 

between the U.S. Government and the Pakistani Government that 

they are going to get moving in the right direction. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Now, there are reports today, someone discussed this already, that Pakistan is planning major troop 

movements from its borders with India to help fight the militants 

near the border with Pakistan. And while this of course is welcome, 

the Pakistani Army still remains really unprepared to fight counterinsurgency-style war. And throwing people at the problem isn’t 

necessarily going to make it go away. So the question I have is 

does this move reflect a broader shift in the Pakistani military organization towards a more counterinsurgency-focused mission? And 

also what are we planning on doing beyond training to help Pakistan bring a whole government approach to its security efforts? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think this is exactly the kind of moment 

that makes the argument for the PCCF authority, in that it is a 

specific situation where we are getting specific requests for assistance, and we would like to be able to respond urgently, quickly, to 

say, yes, here is the equipment, training, whatever you need to be 

more effective. Part of the PCCF authority is specifically designed 

to help train the Pakistanis in the civil and military aspects of 

counterinsurgency, not just the clear piece, but the hold and build. 

What do you actually need to do with and for the population to actually consolidate security gains once you have cleared an area to 

protect the population, to get them on your side so that the insurgents don’t return to that area. That is very much part of what this 

program would enable us to do. So I think the particular situation 
30 

now is very much an argument for trying to get this kind of program in place. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. That is all the questions I had. I am 

hopeful that we can provide the right support to make these things 

reach fruition as we intended. I think ironically, the Taliban moving into Buner was a real wake-up call to the Pakistani Government, and also the population as a whole. And we may have seen, 

hopefully, the shift that will allow some of our efforts, in coordination with the Pakistani Government, to be successful in turning 

this thing around in undermining the Taliban. So thank you very 

much for your testimony. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Is there any further questions? If not, for the panel we thank you for being with us, for your 

excellent testimony. We look forward to seeing you again. 

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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