United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 21-1522

DANILO DE PAULA VIEIRA,

Appellee, Petitioner,

v.

DJAIANE AQUINO DE SOUZA,

Appellant, Respondent.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge,

Lipez and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

Shamis N. Beckley, with whom Annabel Rodríguez was on brief, 

for appellant.

Wendy O. Hickey, with whom Valerie E. Cooney was on brief,

for appellee.

January 7, 2022
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GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. In this Hague Convention case, 

Danilo De Paula Vieira ("Vieira") seeks the return of his sevenyear-old child from Massachusetts to Brazil, pursuant to the Hague 

Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 

Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 ("Hague 

Convention") and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act 

("ICARA"), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–11, which implements the Hague 

Convention. We hereinafter will refer to the child as "Minor 

S.V.". 

On April 27, 2021, Vieira filed a petition pursuant to 

the Hague Convention seeking the return of Minor S.V. to Brazil 

and alleging that Djaiane Aquino De Souza ("De Souza") removed 

Minor S.V. from Brazil to Massachusetts without his authorization. 

The district court determined that De Souza wrongfully removed 

Minor S.V. and that she failed to establish that Minor S.V. would 

be subject to a grave risk of harm in Brazil. Consequently, the 

district court granted Vieira's petition and ordered that Minor 

S.V. be returned to Brazil within thirty days of July 1, 2021. 

Minor S.V.'s mother, De Souza, appeals the district court's 

decision, which has been stayed during the pendency of review by 

this Court. 

Appellant—Respondent De Souza contends the district 

court erred (1) in concluding that ICARA's grave risk exception 
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did not apply; and (2) in failing to consider whether the mature 

child exception of the Act applied. We affirm.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Vieira and De Souza's relationship

Vieira is a Brazilian national who began a romantic 

relationship with De Souza around 2008–2009 in Minas Gerais, 

Brazil. De Souza is a citizen of the United States. The parties

lived together in Brazil until December 2018, when De Souza 

relocated to Massachusetts. 

In January 2014, Vieira and De Souza had their only child

together, Minor S.V., in Contagem, Brazil. Minor S.V. is a dual 

citizen of Brazil and the United States. Throughout the years, 

Vieira and De Souza had an off-and-on consensual relationship, in 

which they would periodically end and resume the relationship in 

short succession. During one of the breakups, Vieira had another 

child. Minor S.V. and the half-sibling were raised together. 

Vieira and De Souza's relationship lasted eleven years and was 

characterized by multiple incidents of domestic verbal abuse. 

Vieira verbally threatened De Souza several times and once broke 

De Souza's telephone during an argument. 

During an argument between the parties in 2017, Vieira

grabbed and placed Minor S.V. in his car, proceeding to drive 

recklessly while threating De Souza. As a result, De Souza sought 

and received a restraining order against Vieira. De Souza
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separately sought psychiatric treatment to deal with the ongoing

abuse. The district court found that De Souza revoked the 

restraining order upon reconciling with Vieira, although De Souza 

disputed this fact at trial. De Souza left Brazil and moved to 

Massachusetts in December 2018, leaving Minor S.V. with Vieira in 

Brazil. Vieira and De Souza's relationship ended in April 2020.

Minor S.V.'s removal from Brazil

Minor S.V. remained with Vieira in Brazil for almost two 

years until Minor S.V. was taken to Massachusetts without Vieira's 

consent. No formal custody order was issued during this time. On 

November 22, 2020, Minor S.V.'s maternal aunt offered to take the 

child to a follow-up appointment for Minor S.V.'s recent 

adenoidectomy and tonsillectomy. Vieira had no qualms with the 

proposal. The maternal aunt, however, instead took Minor S.V. to 

the airport and put the child on a flight to Massachusetts.1 

Vieira reached out to Minor S.V.'s maternal aunt that night but 

received no response. On November 23, 2020, De Souza called Vieira

to let him know that Minor S.V. was with her in Massachusetts and 

would not be returning to Brazil. On May 21, 2021, De Souza sought 

and obtained a restraining order against Vieira from the Chelsea 

1 Minor S.V.'s passport had an authorization signed by Vieira 

for Minor S.V. to travel. It is unclear if the authorization 

covered domestic or international travel. 
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District Court in Massachusetts. To this day, Minor S.V. remains 

with De Souza in Massachusetts. 

Vieira’s Petition and the district court's decision

On April 27, 2021, Vieira filed a petition in the United 

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for the 

return of Minor S.V. to Brazil pursuant to the Hague Convention

and ICARA. Vieira also filed an emergency ex parte motion, seeking 

an order directing De Souza not to remove Minor S.V. from 

Massachusetts. The district court scheduled a hearing for June 

17, 2021. Present at the hearing were Vieira's counsel and 

interpreter as well as De Souza, appearing pro se without an 

interpreter. In lieu of a preliminary injunction hearing, the 

district court consolidated the hearing with the trial scheduled 

for July 1, 2021, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

65(a). 

During the one-day bench trial, Vieira was present by 

way of video teleconference and was represented by counsel assigned 

pro bono. De Souza appeared pro se.2 Both parties testified 

through an interpreter. 

Vieira stated that Minor S.V. has never lived outside of 

Brazil and only speaks, reads, and writes Brazilian Portuguese. 

2 De Souza was not represented by counsel in the district 

court proceedings. This court appointed pro bono counsel for her 

appeal.
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Additionally, Vieira testified that although he tries to stay in 

frequent contact with Minor S.V., there are times when he has been 

unable to speak with the child for weeks. Vieira was not crossexamined by De Souza. For her part, De Souza raised the 

affirmative defense of grave risk, alleging that Minor S.V. would 

be exposed to physical or psychological harm if returned to Brazil. 

De Souza testified that Minor S.V. has witnessed Vieira 

engage in violent acts directed against De Souza and Vieira's own

mother. When cross-examined by Vieira's counsel, De Souza stated 

that she lived with Vieira in Brazil because he threatened to take

Minor S.V away from her if she left. During closing arguments, De 

Souza added that she fears for Minor S.V.'s safety if the child

was sent back to Brazil. De Souza also affirmed that Minor S.V. 

is currently attending school in Massachusetts and stated that "if 

you ask [Minor S.V.], [the child] will tell you [of wanting] to 

stay here."

The district court issued its ruling from the bench and

granted Vieira's petition for the return of Minor S.V. to Brazil.

We subsequently ordered the district court to issue findings of 

fact and conclusions of law. In its written findings, the district 

court concluded that "De Souza failed to demonstrate that there 

existed 'a grave risk that [the child's] return would expose [Minor

S.V.] to physical or psychological harm' because she proffered no 

evidence that Vieira ever threatened or abused the Minor." The 
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district court did not identify the mature child defense as a 

distinct issue that had been raised at the bench trial but

nevertheless observed that there was no evidence that Minor S.V. 

had attained an age and degree of maturity sufficient to take the 

child's preference into account.

On July 22, 2021, we granted a stay of the district 

court's ruling pending appeal. On July 28, 2021, we appointed pro 

bono counsel to represent De Souza and set an expedited briefing 

schedule. 

II. Discussion

The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty designed to 

address "the problem of international child abductions during 

domestic disputes. It . . . provid[es] for the prompt return of 

children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting 

State." Neergaard-Colón v. Neergaard, 752 F.3d 526, 529–30 (1st 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010))

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Notably, 

an order of return pursuant to the Hague Convention is not a final 

determination of custody rights. It simply ensures that custodial 

decisions will be made by the courts of the children's country of 

habitual residence." Id. (citing Abbott, 560 U.S. at 9). Under 

ICARA, De Souza, as the party opposing return of the child, bears 

the burden of establishing the grave risk exception by clear and 

convincing evidence and the mature child exception by a 
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preponderance of the evidence. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2). We 

review legal issues, including the interpretation of the Hague 

Convention, de novo. Da Silva v. de Aredes, 953 F.3d 67, 73 (1st 

Cir. 2020). We review for clear error the district court's 

determination concerning any defenses. Id. at 72.

a. The Grave Risk Exception

The District Court Did Not Err in Finding that Returning Minor 

S.V. to Brazil Would Not Expose the Child to a Grave Risk of Harm. 

The district court found that Brazil was Minor S.V.'s 

country of habitual residence, that Vieira was exercising custody 

over Minor S.V. at the time of the child's removal, and that De 

Souza's removal and retention of Minor S.V. in the United States 

was therefore wrongful. See Hague Convention art. 3. Neither 

party disputes that portion of the district court's findings. The 

district court then found that De Souza failed to show that there 

was a grave risk that Minor S.V.'s return would expose the child

to physical or psychological harm. See Hague Convention art. 

13(b). 

At the outset, we acknowledge that De Souza's burden of 

proof for the grave risk defense is quite high: ICARA provides 

that the respondent opposing the child's return has the burden of 

establishing the grave risk defense by clear and convincing 

evidence. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A); Danaipour v. McLarey, 

286 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2002). Additionally, exceptions to the 
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Hague Convention should be construed narrowly by courts. 

Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 14. This serves the Hague Convention's 

strong presumption in favor of the child's return. Id. at 13; 22 

U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4) (requiring a child's prompt return unless one 

of the "narrow exceptions" applies). The grave risk defense may 

not be used "as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child's 

best interests." Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 14 (quoting Hague 

International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 

51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986)). 

The district court found that De Souza failed to meet 

her required evidentiary burden. The court heard De Souza's 

testimony that Vieira verbally abused and threatened her, broke 

her phone, and forced her to have an abortion. It also considered

the incident where, following a verbal altercation, Vieira put 

Minor S.V. in the car and drove in a dangerous manner while 

continuing to threaten De Souza, leading to the issuance of a 

restraining order against Vieira. However, the district court 

found that none of the abuse was directed at Minor S.V. 

De Souza argues on appeal that domestic abuse of a parent 

alone is sufficient to establish grave risk to the child, and that 

the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that 

Vieira's abuse needed to be directed at Minor S.V. De Souza relies 

on authority from this Circuit, namely Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 

204 (1st Cir. 2000), and the Sixth circuit in Simcox v. Simcox, 
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511 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that abuse does 

not need to be directed at the child for it to implicate the grave 

risk exception. The district court's reasoning, however, is not 

in tension with these precedents. To the contrary, the district 

court recognized the "credible social science literature" which 

establishes that spousal abusers are also likely to be child 

abusers. But the district court nonetheless found that De Souza 

failed in this case to meet her burden of proof that the abuse was 

of a nature sufficient to trigger the grave risk exception.

The district court further considered the precedent 

cited by De Souza and distinguished it from the case at bar. It 

determined that the abuse did not rise to the level of the abuse 

in Walsh, where the petitioner exhibited a "more generalized 

pattern of violence, including violence directed at his own 

children." Walsh, 331 F.3d at 219. Moreover, the district court 

determined that De Souza had not established a grave risk to Minor 

S.V., and, under our precedent, "'grave' means more than a serious 

risk." Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 14 (citing Hague International Child 

Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 

10,510).

De Souza further argues that the district court failed 

to make the necessary factual findings regarding the impact that 

Vieira's abuse of her may have had on Minor S.V., and specifically 

failed to make any factual findings about the risk of future 
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psychological harm to Minor S.V. De Souza posits that the district 

court was required to make factual findings regarding the 

likelihood that Vieira's abusive conduct put Minor S.V. at a grave 

risk of psychological harm. 

In its findings of fact, the district court accepted De 

Souza's testimony regarding the incident where Vieira drove 

dangerously with Minor S.V. in the car while threatening De Souza. 

The district court also noted that both state and federal law have 

recognized an increased risk of psychological injury to children 

when they are in contact with a spousal abuser. Nevertheless, the 

district court found that "De Souza failed to demonstrate that 

there existed 'a grave risk that [Minor S.V.'s] return would expose 

[Minor S.V.] to physical or psychological harm.'" The district 

court found that the evidence De Souza presented did not rise to 

the level needed for an article 13(b) defense. See, e.g., Whallon

v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that verbal 

and physical abuse of a mother, when not directed at the child, 

did not give rise to the type of psychological harm contemplated 

by the Hague Convention).

The role of the district court in Hague Convention cases 

is one of factfinder. See Díaz-Alarcón v. Flández-Marcel, 944 

F.3d 303, 311 (1st Cir. 2019); Taglieri v. Monasky, 907 F.3d 404, 

408 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[W]e must let district courts do what 

district courts do best -- make factual findings . . . ."), aff'd, 
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140 S. Ct. 719 (2020). The grave risk finding requires that the 

court identify the legal standard and then answer the fact-based 

question of whether the respondent has shown that the child would 

be exposed to a grave risk if returned. Da Silva, 953 F.3d at 72. 

The district court determined that the return of Minor 

S.V. will not expose the child to physical or psychological harm.

The record reflects that De Souza did not allege that any harm 

befell Minor S.V. during the two-year period between 2018 and 2020 

following De Souza's relocation from Brazil to the United States,

in which Minor S.V. resided in Vieira's care. Nor was De Souza so 

concerned for Minor S.V.'s safety under Vieira's care that she 

refused to leave Minor S.V. in Vieira's custody. On the record 

before us, the district court committed no clear error in its

finding.

b. Mature child Defense

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO CONSIDER MINOR 

S.V.'s VIEWS

Article 13 of the Hague Convention includes an 

unnumbered provision that carves out a defense for the party 

opposing return. This defense, grounded in a mature child's 

objection to repatriation, permits a court to "refuse to order the 

return of the child if it finds that [the minor] objects to being 

returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which 

it is appropriate to take account of [the child's] views." Blondin
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v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 166 (2d. Cir. 2001) (quoting Hague 

Convention art. 13).

De Souza contends that the district court erred in 

failing to conduct any analysis of Minor S.V.'s maturity after she

alluded to the child's preferences at trial. Namely, she posits 

that the district court failed to speak to Minor S.V., appoint a 

guardian ad litem or child psychologist to represent the child's 

interests, or assess any of the other factors relevant to 

determining the child's maturity and thus whether Minor S.V.'s

views should be heard. Further, De Souza argues that "while there 

is no one way for a district court to assess a child's maturity, 

here there are no factual findings as to [Minor S.V.'s] maturity 

at all." De Souza finally asserts that, because she appeared pro 

se and through a translator at the bench trial, the district court 

had a duty to be solicitous of any arguments she established, even 

if she raised the latter only incompletely or obliquely. In light 

of the important interests at stake, De Souza petitions that we 

remand to the district court to allow for further factual 

development on the mature child exception. 

As a threshold matter, it is not clear the district court 

recognized that De Souza had invoked the mature child defense at 

all. De Souza posits that the defense was raised at the bench 

trial and that the district court, in its factual findings and 

rulings of law, acknowledged that. To wit, De Souza contends that 
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"[t]here is no indication that the [d]istrict [c]ourt considered 

the exception waived. Nor did the [d]istrict [c]ourt indicate 

that it was unable or unwilling to consider De Souza's statement 

that [the child] wanted to stay with [the child's] mother and would 

tell the [d]istrict [c]ourt that if asked." De Souza thus argues 

that the district court erred when it "simply decided that it did 

not have to consider the issue because the child was only seven 

and no other evidence of [the child's] maturity was elicited during 

[the] mother's pro se testimony."

Despite De Souza's contentions, however, the district 

court in its written findings declined to isolate the mature child 

exception from the other questions at issue, simply observing that 

there was no evidence that Minor S.V. was sufficiently mature to 

be consulted. Insofar as the district court's written findings 

reflect a view that the mature child issue had never been raised, 

such a determination is eminently supportable from the record. 

Indeed, De Souza only mentioned in passing that Minor S.V. had 

acclimated to Massachusetts and did not want to return to Brazil, 

and she did so only one time in her closing argument. Further, De 

Souza did not mention the child's maturity at all in her testimony.

While De Souza is surely correct that courts must be mindful of 

the challenges faced by pro se litigants and construe their 

arguments liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007), "[o]ur duty to be 'less stringent' with pro se complaints 
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does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations." McDonald

v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1979) (quoting Hurney v. Carver, 

602 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1979)). As such, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to raise the mature child

issue sua sponte or assist De Souza in developing the defense. 

See also Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) 

("[A] district court should not 'assume the role of advocate for 

the pro se litigant,' and may 'not rewrite a petition to include 

claims that were never presented.'") (first quoting Hall v. 

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); and then quoting 

Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. 

denied, 525 U.S. 1151 (1999)).

As to the merits of the defense, we review the district 

court's determination whether a child is of sufficient age and 

maturity to have their views considered for clear error. Avendano

v. Balza, 985 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2021). "The Hague Convention 

applies only to children under the age of sixteen. However, it 

does not set an age at which a child is considered to be 

sufficiently mature; rather, the determination is to be made on a 

case-by-case basis." Id. (citation omitted). To the extent that 

the district court recognized the mature child defense as having 

been raised, it found that De Souza failed to meet her burden of 

proof that Minor S.V. was of a sufficient age and maturity to have 

her views considered.
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De Souza bore the burden of proof yet provided no 

evidence as to Minor S.V.'s maturity. Despite De Souza's claims 

to the contrary, nothing in the district court's decision suggests 

that a seven-year-old may never be mature enough to express an 

opinion. Rather, the district court determined that the mother 

had not proffered sufficient evidence to support a finding that 

the child in this case was mature enough to have his or her views 

considered. Given that De Souza presented no evidence as to the 

child's maturity, this determination was not clearly erroneous. 

Finally, the district court's factual findings were sufficiently 

detailed given the lack of evidence presented on the mature child 

defense.

III. Conclusion

We stress that this case does not involve a determination 

of custody. Indeed, the Hague Convention is explicit that "[a] 

decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child 

shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any 

custody issue." Hague Convention art. 19; see also Yaman, 730 

F.3d at 22–23; Mauvais v. Herisse, 772 F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Instead, implementation of the return remedy here means that the 

courts of Brazil -- Minor S.V.'s country of habitual residence --

will make the appropriate custodial and family law determinations. 

See Neergaard–Colón, 752 F.3d at 530 (citing Abbott, 560 U.S. at 

9); Charalambous v. Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 469–70 (1st Cir. 
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2010) (per curiam) ("We point out that [the mother] is free, in 

the courts of [the children's country of habitual residence], to 

seek custody of the children and such other orders as may become 

necessary as to the children.").

For all the foregoing reasons, we find no clear error in 

the district court's findings of fact that, as regards the narrow 

grave risk exception, returning Minor S.V. to Brazil would not 

expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise 

place Minor S.V. in an intolerable situation. We further find (1) 

that the district court did not err by not sua sponte developing

the mature child defense for De Souza, and (2) the court did not 

err in rejecting application of the defense on the merits.

Therefore, the decision of the district court is

Affirmed.