89–010 

Calendar No. 461 

111TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 111–279 

APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 

CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003 

AUGUST 5, 2010.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. BAUCUS, from the Committee on Finance, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S.J. Res. 29] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 29) approving the renewal of import restrictions 

contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without 

amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee ................................................. 2 

A. Report of the Committee on Finance ............................................... 2 

B. Background ........................................................................................ 2 

1. The Government of Burma ........................................................ 2 

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 ................ 2 

3. S.J. Res. 29 Is a ‘‘Renewal Resolution’’ for Purposes of Extending Import Restrictions .................................................... 4 

4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 29 ................................. 4 

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions Against Burma ............................................................... 4 

6. Additional International Sanctions Against Burma ................ 8 

II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution ..................................................... 9 

III. Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters .................... 9 

IV. Changes in Existing Law ................................................................................. 10 


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I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE 

A. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 29) approving the renewal of import restrictions 

contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without 

amendment and recommends that the resolution do pass. 

B. BACKGROUND

1. The Government of Burma 

Burma is governed by the State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC), a military junta that took power in September 1988. Since 

taking power, the junta has violently suppressed pro-democracy 

movements. International human rights organizations and the U.S. 

Department of State have reported a pattern of SPDC policies that 

include the suppression of political and civil liberties, jailing of political prisoners, widespread physical abuses, forced relocation of civilians, conscription of civilians—including children—into military 

services, and conscription of thousands of civilians for work on economic projects. Recent examples of these human rights abuses are 

provided below. 

In May 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred people 

assaulted the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) 

leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near Mandalay, 

Burma’s second-largest city. The attackers were members of the 

United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), an organization affiliated with the SPDC. Some NLD supporters were killed, 

and others were taken into custody. 

In September 2007, the Burmese government engaged in a violent crackdown against Buddhist monks and other Burmese citizens who were demonstrating peacefully against the poor economic 

conditions in Burma and the repressive policies of the SPDC. The 

Burmese government also failed to provide adequate humanitarian 

assistance or allow speedy entry of international aid in response to 

Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. 

In August 2009, the regime convicted Burmese human rights 

leader and Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi of spurious 

charges of violating the terms of her house arrest, and sentenced 

her to three years in prison with hard labor, commuting that sentence to 29 months of house arrest. United Nations investigators 

allege that the Burmese Government has violated Suu Kyi’s substantive and procedural rights during the course of her trial. All 

told, the SPDC continues to hold an estimated 2,100 political prisoners. And, in March 2010, the SPDC announced that it intended 

to hold national elections this year, but promulgated a series of 

electoral laws that seem intended to ensure that the elections will 

not be fair and transparent. 

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 

On June 4, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 

2003 (the BFDA) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) in response to the 

attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30, 2003. A revised 


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version of the legislation was introduced in the Senate (S. 1215) on 

June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215, passed the Senate with 

an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a recorded vote of 97–1. In the 

House, H.R. 2330 passed with an amendment on July 15, 2003, by 

a recorded vote of 418–2, 1 Present. The Senate then passed the 

House-passed version of H.R. 2330 without amendment on July 16, 

2003, by a recorded vote of 94–1. The legislation was presented to 

the President on July 22, 2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28, 2003 (Pub. L. 108–61). 

The BFDA bans the importation of any article that is a product 

of Burma. The BFDA allows the President to lift these import restrictions if he certifies to Congress that (1) the SPDC has made 

substantial progress to end human rights violations, including 

rapes, and no longer systematically violates workers’ rights, including forced and child labor, and conscription of child soldiers; (2) the 

SPDC has made substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government, including by releasing political prisoners, by allowing freedom of speech, press, association, and religion, and by 

reaching agreement with the NLD for a democratically elected civilian government; and (3) Burma has not been designated as a 

country that has failed to abide by its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take other effective 

counternarcotics measures. In addition to the import ban, the 

BFDA also freezes the assets of the Burmese regime and its officials held by U.S. financial institutions, directs the Secretary of the 

Treasury to instruct the U.S. representatives to international financial institutions to oppose loans or other assistance to Burma, 

and authorizes the President to deny visas to the leaders of the 

Burmese regime. 

In July 2008, Congress amended the BFDA when it passed the 

Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act). The JADE Act was introduced in the 

House on October 18, 2007, and passed by voice vote on December 

11, 2007. The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on December 19, 2007. After resolving the differences between the two 

bills, the revised legislation was passed by the House on July 15, 

2008 by voice vote and by the Senate on July 22, 2008 by Unanimous Consent. The President signed the legislation into law on 

July 29, 2008. The JADE Act amends the import restrictions of the 

BFDA by prohibiting the importation into the United States of jewelry from any country that contains jadeite or rubies mined in 

Burma. The JADE Act also imposes additional financial and visa 

sanctions on members of the SPDC or USDA and their immediate 

family members. 

Pursuant to section 9(b) of the BFDA, the import ban expires 

after 1 year unless a new joint resolution approving a 1-year renewal of the import ban is enacted into law prior to the anniversary of the date of enactment of the BFDA. The current import ban 

remains in effect through July 28, 2010. 

As originally enacted, section 9(b)(3) also limited the imposition 

of import restrictions to a maximum of 3 years from the date of enactment, or until 2006. In 2006, a joint resolution was introduced 

to extend this period to a maximum of 6 years from the date of enactment, or until 2009. Specifically, H.J. Res. 86 was introduced in 

the House on May 19, 2006, and S.J. Res. 38 was introduced in the 


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Senate on May 26, 2006. The House passed H.J. Res. 86 on July 

11, 2006 by voice vote. H.J. Res. 86 was placed on the Senate calendar on July 26, 2006 and passed without amendment by voice 

vote. The President signed the joint resolution on August 1, 2006 

(Pub. L. 109–251). 

In 2009, S.J. Res. 17 was introduced to extend the limitation on 

the import restrictions for an additional three years, to a maximum 

of 9 years from the date of enactment, or until 2012. A similar resolution (H.J. Res. 56), which included budgetary offsets, was passed 

by the House on July 21, 2009, by voice vote. H.J. Res. 56 was received by the Senate on July 22, 2009, and passed by Unanimous 

Consent on July 23, 2009. The resolution was signed by the President on July 28, 2009 (Pub. L. 111–42). 

On May 5, 2010, S.J. Res. 29 was introduced to renew the import 

ban for another year, in accordance with section 9(b) of the BFDA. 

On May 11, 2010, a companion resolution, H.J. Res. 83, was introduced in the House of Representatives. 

3. S.J. Res. 29 Is a ‘‘Renewal Resolution’’ for Purposes of Extending 

Import Restrictions 

As described above, the import restrictions in the BFDA may be 

renewed for a 1-year period if Congress approves a ‘‘renewal resolution,’’ which section 9(c)(1) defines as a joint resolution whose sole 

matter after the resolving clause is language to renew the import 

restrictions for 1 year. Section 9(c)(2)(B) applies the expedited procedures set forth in section 152(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Trade 

Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)), to Finance 

Committee and floor consideration of a renewal resolution. S.J. 

Res. 29 meets the definition of ‘‘renewal resolution’’ under section 

9(c)(1) of the BFDA. 

S.J. Res. 29 was introduced and approved by the Finance Committee before receipt of H.J. Res. 83 from the House. After the 

Committee reported the Senate measure, the vote on passage in 

the Senate was on the House-passed measure. The Senate approved H.J. Res. 83 by a vote of 99 to one on July 22, 2010. 

4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 29 

The Committee considered S.J. Res. 29 in open executive session 

on June 30, 2010. With a quorum present, the Committee approved 

S.J. Res. 29, without amendment, by a roll call vote, 22 ayes, one 

nay. 

Ayes: Baucus, Rockefeller, Conrad, Bingaman, Kerry, Lincoln, 

Wyden, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, Carper, 

Grassley, Hatch Snowe, Kyl, Bunning, Crapo, Roberts, Ensign, 

Cornyn (proxy). 

Nays: Enzi. 

The Chairman reported the resolution to the Senate on July 14, 

2010. 

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions 

Against Burma 

On April 21, 2010, the U.S. Department of State submitted to 

Congress a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, as 

required by section 8(b)(3) of the BFDA. At the request of the 

Chairman, that report was made a part of the record of the ComVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:54 Aug 10, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR279.XXX SR279

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mittee’s consideration of S.J. Res. 29. The State Department report 

is reprinted below: 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, DC, April 21, 2010. 

Hon. MAX BAUCUS, 

Chairman, Committee on Finance, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The enclosed report reviews measures to 

promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the 

effectiveness of the trade provisions in the Burmese Freedom and 

Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108–61) to improve conditions in 

Burma and advance U.S. policy objectives. This report also discusses the importance of maintaining the import ban contained in 

the Act. 

We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate 

to contact us if we may be of further assistance in this matter. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD R. VERMA, 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs. 

Enclosure: As stated. 

REPORT ON U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, (Pub. L. 108–61) (the BFDA), and in view of the 

impending expiration of the import ban contained in the BFDA, as 

amended by the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s AntiDemocratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110–286) (the JADE Act) 

this report reviews bilateral and multilateral measures to promote 

human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the BFDA’s trade provisions relative to the improvement of 

conditions in Burma and the furtherance of U.S. policy objectives. 

During this reporting period (July 2009 to March 2010), the Administration completed its Burma policy review. The review was 

undertaken to find the best ideas to influence the regime because, 

as Secretary Clinton noted, neither sanctions nor efforts to engage 

the regime alone have proven successful in influencing the authorities in Burma. The review reaffirmed the Administration’s fundamental goals in Burma: we support a unified, peaceful, prosperous, 

and democratic nation. To achieve these goals, the Administration 

has pursued senior-level dialogue with the Burmese government 

and has announced plans to expand humanitarian assistance directly to Burma’s people. Sanctions remain an important element 

of our strategy and there will be no change to the sanctions regime 

until Burmese authorities take concrete steps to address core concerns. Given the absence of concrete progress by the Burmese government on respect for human rights, release of political prisoners, 

transition to democracy via inclusive dialogue, and an end to conflict with ethnic minorities, the State Department supports a renewal resolution to maintain the import ban. 


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BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

During the reporting period, the United States intensified its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Burma through 

diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in Southeast Asia 

and beyond by supporting U.N. action on Burma and by delivering 

a direct message on these issues to the Burmese regime through 

senior-level engagement. The United States continued to lead efforts in the international community to ensure that others echo the 

call for Burmese authorities to begin a dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority representatives on a transition to democracy. The U.S. embassy in Rangoon maintained regular contact with representatives of democratic parties including 

the National League for Democracy and its allies, civil society, and 

ethnic minority groups, and used every interaction with Burmese 

officials to advocate respect for human rights and encourage political reform. 

Senior U.S. officials encouraged their counterparts in the region 

and other like-minded states to press the regime to take concrete 

and credible actions toward national reconciliation and democratic 

transition. The European Union, Australia, and Canada maintain 

financial and trade sanctions against the Burmese regime, including targeted financial sanctions against senior junta members and 

their inner circle of supporters. 

The United States has consistently pushed for the United Nations, including the U.N. Security Council, Human Rights Council, 

and the U.N. Secretary General’s Good Offices Mission to keep 

pressure on the regime. On September 28, 2009, Secretary of State 

Clinton briefed the Secretary General’s Group of Friends on the 

conclusions of the policy review and advocated a unified position on 

the need for dialogue and support for those working for democracy 

in Burma. The United States co-sponsored resolutions on the 

human rights situation in Burma in the General Assembly’s Third 

Committee and in the Human Rights Council. On March 15, following a February trip to Burma, U.N. Special Rapporteur Tomas 

Ojea Quintana presented his report to the Human Rights Council 

and recommended that U.N. institutions consider establishment of 

a Commission of Inquiry for Burma to investigate whether human 

rights abuses there amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. The United States is considering his recommendations 

carefully, including the Commission of Inquiry. 

The United States continues active efforts to identify regime officials and cronies who should be subject to sanctions. To date, the 

United States has sanctioned 17 persons providing financial and 

other support to the regime and certain family members, and 41 

companies. The United States also maintains a broad travel ban on 

key regime officials, their family members, and their supporters. 

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SITUATION IN BURMA

U.S. economic sanctions have made it more difficult and more 

costly for the Burmese regime and its financial supporters to continue profiting from its repressive policies. Senior Burmese officials, such as the Foreign Minister, have publicly complained about 

sanctions and called for them to be lifted. Influential businessmen 

in Rangoon with connections to the regime have increasingly comVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:54 Aug 10, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR279.XXX SR279

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plained about the detrimental effects sanctions have had on their 

business operations and personal lives. Between July 1, 2009 and 

March 26, 2010, 58 transactions totaling approximately $1,770,000 

and involving Burmese individuals or entities were reported to the 

Treasury Department as blocked. 

During the reporting period, the Treasury Department issued 14 

licenses authorizing the release of blocked funds or otherwise prohibited transactions to allow, for example, NGOs to conduct assistance-related transactions, including agricultural development, 

microfinance, and education projects. In the aftermath of Cyclone 

Nargis, which devastated Burma in May 2008, the Department of 

the Treasury issued General License 14, which, as subsequently 

amended, continues to provide a broad authorization for funds 

transfers in support of humanitarian and religious activities in 

Burma. 

Although the United States and others continue to look at ways 

to target sanctions against the Burmese authorities, growing trade 

with countries in the region and increased income from the exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits enable the regime to retain 

power. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Burma’s GDP 

grew roughly 1.8 percent in 2009, due primarily to rising prices for 

petroleum and agricultural exports. According to Burma’s Central 

Statistical Organization (CSO), total trade in 2009 (up to November) reached $9.4 billion, with exports of $5.6 billion and imports 

of $3.8 billion. Nevertheless, foreign investment falls well below potential investment levels, as the Burmese business climate continues to worsen. Notably, during the reporting period the regime 

began a wide-scale sell-off of state assets including some stateowned enterprises and valuable real estate, via a process that 

lacked transparency. It is too soon to gauge the effects of this privatization on Burma’s economy or long-term development. 

The regime continued to commit grave human rights abuses during this reporting period. The military regime severely restricted 

and frequently violated freedoms of assembly, expression, association, movement, and religion. Human rights abuses have included 

custodial abuses and deaths, disappearances, rape, torture, recruitment of child soldiers, and forced labor. The government continued 

to infiltrate and covertly and overtly monitor meetings and activities of vitally all non-governmental organizations, including religious organizations. Although the regime released more than 100 

political prisoners during the reporting period, it continued to arrest, detain, and convict activists on politically-motivated charges. 

The regime continues to hold an estimated 2,100 political prisoners, including democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, 

who was convicted in August 2009 on spurious charges of violating 

the terms of her house arrest. She was sentence to three years in 

prison with hard labor, which was commuted to 18 months of house 

arrest. The United States condemned these actions against her and 

urged many other countries to join us in doing so. 

In March 2010 the regime established an Election Commission 

under the control of the SPDC and promulgated a series of electoral laws and by-laws that appear to ensure the elections planned 

for 2010 will not be transparent, inclusive or credible. The United 

States has expressed deep concern over these laws, and urged the 

regime to engage in genuine political dialogue with all stakeholders 


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and to release all political prisoners unconditionally. Furthermore, 

we have called on countries around the world to deliver a similar 

message to the Burmese government. 

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON BROADER U.S. INTERESTS

Sanctions targeting regime leaders and their financial supporters 

send a clear signal to the regime and to the Burmese people of our 

support for a transition to democracy. Many individuals in the Burmese democracy movement support U.S. sanctions. However, some 

academics, exiled Burmese, and independent Burmese business 

people argue that U.S. sanctions will continue to have only limited 

economic impact so long as Burma continues to enjoy the benefits 

of trade and investment from China, India, ASEAN members, and 

other countries. 

The trade-related and financial sanctions implemented pursuant 

to the BFDA and Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 13448, and 13464 

have had a limited impact on U.S. relations with other nations. Although some foreign businesses and their representative embassies 

have complained about the impact of sanctions, those investing in 

Burma since 2003 have done so recognizing the difficult operating 

environment and overall poor economic climate created by the regime. 

The regulations and restrictions contained in the JADE Act, 

amending the BFDA to (i) prohibit the important of jadeite and rubies mined or extracted from Bruma, and articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from Burma, and (ii) 

regulate the importation of jadeite and rubies mined or extracted 

from a country other than Burma, and articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from a country other 

than Burma have an impact on other countries that process jadeite 

and rubies. Thailand, specifically, has expressed strong concern 

over the negative impact the JADE Act provisions have had on its 

ruby-processing and jewelry manufacturing industry. It is in such 

processing and manufacture that the majority of the value is added 

to the final imported product. 

CONCLUSION

The Administration’s support for Burma’s democracy movement 

remains firm. The United States continues to work within the U.N. 

and with countries in Southeast Asia and beyond to promote a 

peaceful transition to democracy. Economic sanctions are one important tool for exerting pressure on the regime to respect the will 

of the Burmese people and to cooperate with the international community’s efforts to facilitate a genuine dialogue with democratic 

and ethnic minority representatives on a transition to democracy. 

The Administration believes we must send a consistent message to 

Burma’s generals that in the absence of concrete progress in key 

areas of democracy and human rights, sanctions will remain in 

place. The Department of State supports renewal of the import ban 

in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, as amended by the 

JADE Act. 

6. Additional International Sanctions Against Burma 

The international community has joined with the United States 

in protesting human rights conditions in Burma. The European 


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Union, Australia, and Canada each maintain financial and trade 

sanctions against the Burmese regime. All three continue to impose 

restrictions on Burmese imports, focusing on gems and timber, as 

well as targeted financial sanctions against senior Burmese government members and their inner circle of supporters. In May 2008, 

the United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential Statement that called on the Burmese Government to hold a free and 

fair constitutional referendum, and to allow greater humanitarian 

aid to enter the country. 

II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION 

CBO ESTIMATE FOR H.J. RES. 83 

[Estimate is in millions of dollars] 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2010– 

2015 

2010– 

2020 

Changes in Revenues 

Section 1: Renewal of import ban ....... * ¥2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¥2 ¥2 

Section 3: Corporate timing 

shift .............. 0 0 0 0 0 153 ¥153 0 0 0 0 153 0 

Total Revenues ..... * ¥2 0 0 0 153 ¥153 0 0 0 0 151 ¥2 

Changes in Outlays 

Section 2: Customs user 

fees ............... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¥3 ¥7 0 0 10 

Net Increase or Decrease (¥) In the Deficit 

Total 

Budgetary effect a .... * 2 0 0 0 ¥153 153 0 ¥3 ¥7 0 ¥151 ¥8 

a Negative numbers indicate a reduction in the deficit; positive numbers indicate the opposite. 

Source: Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation. 

Note:* denotes a revenue loss of less than $500,000. 

III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION 

AND OTHER MATTERS 

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the 

resolution will not significantly regulate any individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy of individuals, and will 

result in no significant additional paperwork. 

The following information is provided in accordance with section 

423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Pub. 

L. 104–04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of S.J. Res. 

29 as approved by the Committee on June 30, 2010. In accordance 

with the requirement of Pub. L. 104–04, the Committee has determined that the bill contains no intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not affect the budgets of state, local, 

or tribal governments. 


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IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW 

Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 

the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law made 

by S.J. Res. 29, as ordered reported. 

Æ 


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III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION 

AND OTHER MATTERS 

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the 

resolution will not significantly regulate any individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy of individuals, and will 

result in no significant additional paperwork. 

The following information is provided in accordance with section 

423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Pub. 

L. 104–04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of S.J. Res. 

29 as approved by the Committee on June 30, 2010. In accordance 

with the requirement of Pub. L. 104–04, the Committee has determined that the bill contains no intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not affect the budgets of state, local, 

or tribal governments. 

IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW 

Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 

the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law made 

by S.J. Res. 29, as ordered reported. 

Æ 


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