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i 

57–259 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–118] 

STATUS OF THE AIR FORCE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ROADMAP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JANUARY 21, 2010 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, January 21, 2010, Status of the Air Force Nuclear Security Roadmap ........................................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, January 21, 2010 ................................................................................... 29 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010 

STATUS OF THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY ROADMAP 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Chairman, 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee ........................................................................... 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrent and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force .................................................... 4 

Klotz, Lt. Gen. Frank G., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, U.S. Air Force ........................................................................................... 6 

Thomas, Brig. Gen. Everett H., USAF, Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, U.S. Air Force .................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald ............................................................................ 33 

Klotz, Lt. Gen. Frank G. .................................................................................. 48 

Thomas, Brig. Gen. Everett H. ........................................................................ 40 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 57 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 66 

(1) 

STATUS OF THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ROADMAP 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, January 21, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. James R. Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee will come to order. 

Today’s hearing will review the Air Force’s progress in revitalizing its nuclear enterprise following the serious incidents involving 

nuclear weapons and weapons-related components that occurred or 

came to light between August 2007 and March 2008. 

Those incidents spawned numerous investigations into, and assessments of, Air Force and Department of Defense [DOD] nuclear 

security procedures. 

In Congress and in the Pentagon, these incidents were recognized as indicators of deterioration in the structure, procedures, 

culture and leadership of the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise that 

had evolved over more than a decade. So at a more basic level, the 

purpose of this hearing is to examine how well the Air Force is 

doing addressing these fundamental concerns. 

Given the significance of these issues, I think it is fitting that 

this is our first hearing of the year and, indeed, the first hearing 

I have chaired since becoming chairman of the subcommittee. 

In that context, I am very pleased to welcome our three very distinguished witnesses: 

Lieutenant General Frank G. Klotz, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command; Major General C. Donald Alston, Assistant 

Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrent and Nuclear Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force; and Brigadier General Everett H. Thomas, Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Kirtland Air 

Force Base. 

In his report into the Minot-Barksdale transfer more than a year 

ago, Major General Doug Raaberg stressed maintaining custody 

and control over our nuclear weapons is about people executing 

their responsibilities properly, which is in turn based on training, 

supervision, and leadership. 
2 

The several reviews that followed both the Minot-Barksdale 

transfer and the mistaken shipment of sensitive missile components to Taiwan also stressed training, supervision, and leadership. 

These reviews, including the report ordered by Secretary Gates, 

focused on the need for better organizational structure and accountability. Indeed, the Air Force’s recovery roadmap created the 

positions occupied by our witnesses—General Klotz as Commander 

of Global Strike Command, General Alston as the integrator of all 

things nuclear on the Air Staff, and General Thomas’ responsibility 

with Air Force Materiel Command for all nuclear weapons 

sustainment. 

Each of these changes was designed to demonstrate the Air 

Force’s increased focus on the nuclear mission. 

As significant as these changes are, however, nuclear inspection 

results over the course of 2009, and changes in command late last 

year at some of our ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] bases 

underscore the degree to which training, supervision, and leadership remain fundamental challenges for the Air Force. 

At the end of the day, it is our airmen that keep our Air Force 

strategic weapons safe and secure. So I look forward to hearing 

what the Air Force is doing to improve the training, supervision, 

and leadership of our airmen. 

With that, let me now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Turner, 

for any opening comments that he may have. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I first want to recognize you in your first hearing as chairman 

of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I have had the pleasure of 

working with our chairman for several months now, and I look forward to our continued joint efforts of oversight on the subcommittee. I also look forward to learning more of the chairman’s 

priorities, one of which I know is the concern of our vulnerability 

for cyber-attacks. I look forward to your leadership on the committee. 

Today’s hearing on the Air Force nuclear enterprise is a topic of 

strong bipartisan concern. Nuclear weapons safety and security are 

of paramount importance. There is no margin for error. Yet, 2 

years ago, there were serious errors. In August 2007, nuclear weapons were mistakenly transferred aboard a B–52 from Minot to 

Barksdale Air Force Base. Roughly 7 months later, the committee 

learned about the misshipment of ICBM nose cones to Taiwan. 

Several high-level internal and independent reviews followed. 

The Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons 

Management, led by Dr. James Schlesinger, concluded, ‘‘There has 

been an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the 

Air Force’s commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until 

very recently, little has been done to reverse it.’’ 

The severity of these incidents led to Secretary Gates’ direct 

intervention in his commitment to ‘‘correcting the systemic and in-
3 

stitutional nuclear weapons stewardship problems that have been 

identified.’’ 

Significant leadership and organizational changes were made 

within the Air Force. Three new organizations were established— 

Global Strike Command, A–10, and the Nuclear Weapons Center— 

each of which are represented by our witnesses today. A Nuclear 

Security Roadmap containing a comprehensive set of corrective actions was developed. 

However, mishaps continue to plague the Air Force nuclear enterprise. In October, two wing commanders at Minot were relieved 

of duty in response to continued lapses in procedure and security. 

Headlines continue to be made with nuclear units that receive unsatisfactory ratings on their nuclear surety inspections. 

We understand that changes take time, and the progress being 

made by the Air Force is certainly commendable. However, we also 

need to understand why, 16 months after the release of the roadmap, that these incidents continue. What challenges and impediments to roadmap implementation remain? 

Leadership and organizational changes cannot be effective without cultural change. As the Schlesinger report noted, ‘‘An essential 

element of leadership involves inspiring people to feel they are 

doing important work and are valued for it.’’ 

I would appreciate our witnesses’ thoughts on how to change that 

culture and how to sustain those changes. I know that has been a 

substantial focus of your efforts. We certainly appreciate your work 

and look forward to your success. 

I am also interested in how the Air Force cultivates its next generation of nuclear leaders and experts. Is the nuclear mission an 

attractive career field for airmen, particularly as policymakers seek 

to shrink it? 

The various reviews highlighted a particular concern with positive inventory control of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related components. I share this concern. I believe this is an area where technology can play a greater role, rather than just brute force methods. The challenge, however, is moving from ideas and basic research to fielding solutions that can have an immediate effect on 

improving nuclear inventory control. 

Lastly, I think it is noteworthy that this renewed focus has led 

to greater advocacy and involvement by the Air Force in the Nation’s nuclear policy and posture. Several Air Force-related nuclear 

forces issues require decisions and/or investments in the next few 

years, such as the B–61 Life Extension Program, the Next-Generation Bomber and a potential ICBM follow-on. 

I hope that the Nuclear Posture Review that the Administration 

will soon release will lay the groundwork for addressing these key 

Air Force nuclear issues and investments. I would be interested in 

our witnesses’ thoughts on how improvements made to the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise will assist in these decisions. 

There is no doubt in my mind that our witnesses here today— 

General Klotz, General Alston, and General Thomas—have an incredibly tough job. I want to thank each of you for your service to 

our Nation. You are in these leadership positions because the Department and we are confident in your abilities to reinvigorate the 

enterprise. 
4 

I look forward to your testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. Mike and I worked 

together for quite a few years on the Armed Services Committee, 

and I am looking forward to our continued working relationship. 

Thank you. 

With that, in consultation with our witnesses, we are going to go 

not in rank order, but in more of chronological order, in the terms 

of Air Force’s efforts to revitalize the nuclear mission. We will start 

with General Alston, then move to General Thomas, and conclude 

with General Klotz. 

General Alston, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENT AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General ALSTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Air 

Force strategic deterrence programs and the progress the Air Force 

has made reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise. 

Nuclear systems require uncompromising mission focus, and I 

am proud to represent the Air Force with two leaders who have 

brought that level of focus to their duties throughout their distinguished careers: Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, the Commander 

of Air Force Global Strike Command, our newest major command, 

executing arguably our longest-standing mission; and Brigadier 

General Everett Thomas, who has been driving major changes 

throughout his tenure as the Commander of the Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Center. 

Reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise has been the Air 

Force’s top priority for the past 18 months. The foundation of our 

effort was a comprehensive roadmap titled ‘‘Reinvigorating the Air 

Force Nuclear Enterprise.’’ This roadmap was a product of an Air 

Force Task Force that analyzed and integrated the findings and 

recommendations of a series of reviews of our processes and performance by expert distinguished national leaders. 

Under the direct leadership of the Secretary of the Air Force and 

the Chief of Staff, we have been on an urgent but deliberate path 

to not only correct deficiencies but to set the conditions for renewed 

proactive stewardship of this vital mission area. We have made significant structural changes, both in the field and at headquarters. 

We have made extensive process changes from resourcing the mission to inspections. And as the changes take root, we expect to see 

long-term cultural impact across the enterprise. 

The credibility of our strategic deterrent depends on capable systems and competent people. Consistent, precise, and reliable performances by our forces to our uncompromising standards, together 

with safe, secure, and reliable deterrent systems, are the daily objectives of our fielded forces. 

My role is to support those forces as they require and to integrate air staff efforts to ensure success across the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise. Daily success deters adversaries and assures our allies. 

Despite comparable success over the past 18 months, there is still 

work to be done. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 
5 

[The prepared statement of General Alston can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General Alston. 

General Thomas, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. EVERETT H. THOMAS, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CENTER, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

General THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank 

you for this opportunity to discuss the current state of the Air 

Force’s nuclear sustainment efforts. 

On behalf of a dedicated team of military, civilian, and industry 

professionals, I am pleased to report our sustainment and stewardship of nuclear weapons and support equipment is much improved 

since 2007. Our progress to date is a direct result of the continuing 

evolution of the Air Force’s vision to address gaps in the nuclear 

enterprise as far back as 2003, when a series of reports highlighted 

the need for a single manager for nuclear weapons sustainment. 

Thanks to the strong, unwavering leadership of Secretary Donley, 

General Schwartz, General Hoffman, and many others, including 

my fellow general officers here today, we have made considerable 

progress toward creating a center of excellence with a singular responsibility that is nuclear sustainment. 

This realignment is reminiscent of the Air Force plans dating 

back to 1949. This is profound in that since 1992, following the deactivation of Strategic Air Command, there was no single four-star 

officer charged with understanding and articulating the needs of 

the Air Force with regard to nuclear sustainment below our Chief 

of Staff. 

Today, the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command, General 

Donald Hoffman, is vested with this authority. In addition, I am 

accountable for day-to-day nuclear sustainment issues and partnerships with all of the Air Force Materiel Command centers and with 

oversight of an entire MAJCOM, major command staff. Together, 

we keep our Secretary, Chief of Staff, and our Air Force 

warfighting customer, General Klotz, informed and engaged in the 

sustainment of nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles, and associated 

support equipment. 

In addition, we have gained approval to establish a flag-level Air 

Force Program Executive Officer, or PEO, for Strategic Systems in 

direct acknowledgment of the Schlesinger report’s recommendations. This PEO for Strategic Systems will ensure future acquisition efforts are properly aligned with near-term sustainment challenges. To ensure these efforts remain integrated and synchronized 

with day-to-day operations and sustainment, the new PEO will be 

co-located with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland 

Air Force Base, New Mexico. 

Let me assure you that all we have done over the past few years 

and all we will do over the coming years is driven by renewed commitment to the oldest, highest, most fundamental and most demanding tenet of nuclear capability—surety—that we deliver safe, 

secure, reliable nuclear capability to Air Force Global Strike Command. 
6 

I look forward to discussing with you our gains in direct support 

to the warfighter, our growing partnerships, efforts we have made 

in gaining positive inventory control of nuclear weapons-related 

material, and our work to prepare for the future. 

I have a written statement that goes into more detail. With your 

permission, we would like to enter it into the record. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity and for all this committee 

is doing to support our strategic forces. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Thomas can be found in the 

Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General Thomas. 

General Klotz, I look forward to your testimony. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

General KLOTZ. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Turner, and distinguished members of the committee. 

It is an honor to appear before you for the first time as the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. In fact, this is the 

first hearing that any member of Air Force Global Strike Command 

has ever testified before. I thank you for the opportunity to discuss 

the current status of the Air Force’s newest major command. 

Now, as you know, Air Force Global Strike Command was established as part of a broader roadmap developed by Secretary of the 

Air Force Michael Donley and our Chief of Staff General Norton 

Schwartz to refocus our attentions and our efforts on the nuclear 

enterprise and to ensure that as long as nuclear weapons are part 

of our national strategy that they will remain safe, secure, and reliable. 

Now, the command itself is being established and stood up in a 

very systematic step-by-step approach. The first step was to stand 

up a provisional command just over a year ago at Bolling Air Force 

Base here in Washington, D.C., under the leadership of then-Brigadier General, now Major General Jim Kowalski, who now serves as 

the Vice Commander of Global Strike Command. Its principal tasks 

were to develop the initial planning documents, to define manpower requirements, and to begin assigning people to Global Strike 

Command. 

The next step took place on August 7, when General Schwartz 

formally activated Global Strike Command in a ceremony at 

Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, the permanent site of our 

new headquarters. 

Since then, the Command has followed a detailed plan to bring 

all of the Air Force’s long-range nuclear-capable forces under a single major command. 

In executing this comprehensive plan, Global Strike Command 

develops and provides combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence 

and global strike operations in support of the President and the 

combatant commanders. 

Now, the first actual transfer of forces occurred on the 1st of December when Global Strike Command assumed responsibility for 

the intercontinental ballistic missile mission. Under the new com-
7 

mand arrangements, 20th Air Force, which is headquartered at 

F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, and its three ICBM 

wings—the 90th at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, the 341st at 

Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, and the 91st at Minot Air 

Force Base in North Dakota—now all fall under Global Strike 

Command. 

On the same day, Air Force Global Strike Command also took 

charge of the ICBM test mission of the 576th Flight Test Squadron 

near Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and the targeting 

analysis mission of the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron at 

Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. 

In just 10 days, on the 1st of February, the transfer of forces to 

Global Strike Command will be complete as our new command assumes responsibility for 8th Air Force and the long-range, nuclearcapable bomber mission from Air Combat Command. Eighth Air 

Force headquarters is also located at Barksdale Air Force Base, 

Louisiana, and exercises command over two B–52 wings, the wing 

there at Barksdale itself as well as the wing at Minot Air Force 

Base in North Dakota, and it also exercises command over the B– 

2 wing at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. 

Global Strike Command will achieve full operational capability 

later this summer, 2010, with about 900 people on board at our 

headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base and nearly 23,000 people in the entire Command. 

As the other two—my two colleagues have said, nuclear deterrence and global strike forces of the Air Force remain vitally important to the Nation as well as to our friends and allies around the 

world. For the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command, that means we have an extraordinarily important mission, 

noble and worthy work to perform and work that demands the utmost in professionalism, discipline, excellence, pride, and esprit. 

The new Command also reflects the Air Force’s firm and 

unshakeable conviction that strategic nuclear deterrence and global 

strike operations are a special trust and responsibility, one that we 

take very seriously. This Command will serve as the single voice 

to maintain the high standards necessary in stewardship of our 

Nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence forces. 

Like General Thomas, I have a longer written statement that I 

would like to enter into the record. 

I would like to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity, and other members of the committee, for the opportunity to 

present today the status of Air Force Global Strike Command. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. General, thank you for your testimony. 

I am going to thank the panel for their testimony. 

Before I begin with my questions, I also want to welcome our colleague, Representative Fleming, to the hearing. Welcome. While 

not a member of the subcommittee, Mr. Fleming has a strong interest in these issues, I know. No wonder, since his district is home 

to Barksdale Air Force Base, home of Global Strike Command. 

So, Representative Fleming, welcome to this hearing this morning. Once each of the subcommittee members have had a chance 
8 

to ask questions in turn, we will turn to you to also be able to ask 

some questions, without objection. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, I would like to begin with a question 

for General Alston. 

General Alston, you have described Air Force organizational 

changes associated with the Nuclear Security Roadmap as consisting of ‘‘three big muscle movements’’ in your testimony: the creation of your position within the Air Force headquarters, the consolidation of all nuclear weapons sustainment activities at the Nuclear Weapons Center in Albuquerque, and the standup of Global 

Strike Command. My question is, how do you assess the impact of 

these changes at this stage? 

General ALSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that we have, despite there just being 18 months since 

we began this effort with the Secretary of the Air Force, with Mr. 

Donley taking responsibility as the Secretary of the Air Force and 

with Major General Schwartz stepping up to become Chief of Staff, 

we established the A–10 function, my Office of Strategic Deterrence 

and Nuclear Integration on the first of November, 2008, and we 

had essentially the opportunity to go through a budget cycle with 

my office being able to contribute to that part of the cycle and leverage the changes that we have made to the resourcing process 

that the Air Force has. 

There has been a change to that where we have established a nuclear operations panel that enables or ensures that we are thoroughly working through all of the nuclear-related requirements. I 

have a seat at the table throughout that process from one end all 

the way to the culminating piece of that, which is the Air Force 

Council which makes recommendations to the Chief and Secretary. 

So my office has been able to wade into that, as the Chief and Secretary have intended that we would be able to do. 

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center has a legacy that is a few 

years old, but they have been growing in numbers, virtually tenfold 

over the course of these 18 months, to fulfill all of the responsibilities that we have levied upon them to take full responsibility for 

all of sustainment of our nuclear systems. 

General Thomas can speak to that more thoroughly than I can, 

but the integration of his efforts and the long-range planning that 

he has already been able to contribute to our processes has enabled 

us to start to get a footing on examining the issues related to the— 

what it is going to take to sustain the Minuteman III to 2030 and 

beyond. And that is already—he has already produced a roadmap 

that we continue to refine but is already contributing to the Air 

Force corporate process and are stepping up to the stewardship responsibilities that we have. 

In my organization, we also created a requirements division. And 

because at this point in time General Klotz will grow the capacity 

to be the requirements driver for the nuclear enterprise, at this 

time filling that void, I have the capacity to contribute to that. And 

because my office was stood up, we have been able to complete a 

capabilities-based assessment of our follow-on airlines cruise missile capability, and it is going through the requirements develop-
9 

ment process this spring, and then analysis of alternatives will 

begin in the fall. 

So I think that—and now Global Strike Command, on time and 

on target, taking responsibility for the ICBM mission on the 1st of 

December and now within a couple of weeks fulfilling the organizational alignment on the 1st of February with 8th Air Force nuclearcapable bombers coming over, we can already see the tangible 

changes that the Secretary and the Chief had intended being manifested in the actual consequential work that we are all getting the 

chance to do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In each of these changes, can you give me your 

assessment? Are each of them at your highest confidence level, the 

changes that were made, still some work in progress, or are they 

at your highest confidence level? 

General ALSTON. Sir, my organization was probably at about 40 

people in April, and I am at about 120 right now. I am just finishing the hiring of civilians. So all of my uniformed forces have 

arrived. But they, too, need to be cultivated, and they need to be 

oriented on the challenges that are in front of us. So it is a work 

in progress in terms of me really finding my full stride. I have got 

the responsibility, and I have got critical mass to get my job done. 

I will leave my two colleagues to describe their assessment of the 

maturity of their parts of this enterprise. 

But as I have heard the Chief say, airmen didn’t fail the Air 

Force when they had these breakdowns; the Air Force failed our 

airmen. And we had not given the enterprise the attention that nuclear missions demand, and this has gone on for an extended period of time. 

So these organizational changes that we are making are very important. But without the leadership and the prioritization by the 

Chief and the Secretary, and without that prioritization being carried out at every level of our Air Force, I don’t think that the organizational changes in and of themselves will carry the day. 

So I think it is that continued focus by our leadership at all levels, and the absolutely unambiguous clarity that the Chief and Secretary have given the nuclear mission, that is really the principal 

driver to the advancements that we have made so far. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

Well, for any of the generals at the table, I would like to ask a 

question about what I will call inventory control. Can you tell me 

what the current state of the Air Force inventory control over our 

nuclear weapons within its control is right now? For instance, is 

the Air Force able to identify where each of the nuclear weapons 

within its control is at any given moment? 

General THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer that 

one for you. 

The short answer is, yes, sir. Upon standing up the Air Force 

Nuclear Weapons Center and robusting it up under Secretary 

Donley and General Schwartz, our peer view, the charge I had immediately was to understand on a day-by-day basis where every 

nuclear weapon was in the Air Force, to include if it was going to 

move, where it was going to move, time, location, how it was going 

to move. 
10 

So I have that responsibility, and I take it very seriously. Every 

week, I get an update; and if there is an out-of-schedule movement, 

we review the update. We funnel that update to our counterparts 

in Global Strike Command and General Alston. My boss, General 

Hoffman, immediately gets an update; and so, ultimately, the 

Chief, General Schwartz, and the Secretary of the Air Force are updated on weapons movement. 

It is a pleasure of mine to be involved in that, and it goes back 

to a statement by Ranking Member Turner is how are we communicating down to the youngest airman that this is an important 

mission? That is one of them, by my daily involvement in it, by me 

being able to communicate to a unit that is moving a weapon, the 

importance of ensuring that we have accountability, not just visual 

accountability but the documentation that is done through our information, technology systems, and personal visits. 

I personally would like to thank the ranking member for visiting 

Kirtland Air Force Base and taking the time. And even though 

Congressman Heinrich lives there, he also takes an opportunity to 

come out and visit us. So those are the kinds of things that we are, 

as my colleagues say, inculcating from weapons storage, weapons 

movement, weapons maintenance, weapons locations, kind, and 

tracking. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you talk about how we maintain operational 

security so that when nuclear weapons are moving only those who 

need to know do know? 

General THOMAS. Well, security safety resource protection is kind 

of several layers. I am involved in just the security requirement, 

required security in the event that we do move a weapon. That is 

the only time I really get involved. I am involved in security systems inside the weapons storage areas from a perspective that the 

right amount of security guarantee that weapon. 

But normally I don’t get involved in day-to-day security that surrounds the external part of a weapons storage area or a launch facility or a flight line. I would be happy to take that question and 

get some help from our colleagues and security professionals on 

who watches the day-to-day security. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would appreciate that, for the committee. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Recognizing, then, that we are in open session, 

can you talk about how much progress was made in leveraging 

technology to assist personnel in executing inventory control, for 

example, bar codes or something analogous? 

General THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer 

that. 

Prior to standing up the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center robust and along with our partners in Air Force Global Logistics Support Center, we were failing in what I call automatic tracking systems and applied to what we have now defined as nuclear weapons-related material. 

Every component now that comes to the Air Force either is coming from industry or we are bringing it back, for instance, taking 

it off, for example, an assembled Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

or off an aircraft now is bar coded with what we call a unique iden-
11 

tifier. That unique identifier is then loaded into our supply system, 

either in the Defense Logistics Agency supply IT or into a separate 

entity for the United States Air Force as we begin what we call our 

positive inventory control, fusion that will eventually lead into our 

expeditionary combat supply system. 

From that, we can track through that IT fusion at the Air Force 

Global Logistics Support Center or at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center exactly the kind, condition, location of every nuclear 

weapon-related material component that moves through the system. Prior to that, we didn’t have this, and this is still coming to 

us. We are improving on it on a daily basis. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

With that, I will now turn to the ranking member for questions. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Once again, I want to thank each of you, because you have taken 

on a task where there were a number of problems. You had to do 

an assessment, you have to try to respond to the criticism, and you 

have to bring your own ingenuity and insight to what needs to be 

done. 

One of the things that, whenever we look at an issue where there 

has been a gap in performance, recognizing that is always an important first step—and I appreciate that each of you have said that 

it is the Air Force’s responsibility and your interest in fixing it— 

but we know that the Air Force is part of overall DOD. And the 

things that were occurring in the Air Force could not have occurred 

in the Air Force without also a lack of focus also from the Department of Defense. 

In order for you to fix it, you need that overall support from 

DOD. And I know you have a number of accomplishments that you 

put on the board of changes that you have made and you have 

given us the answer that the Air Force is committed. But what I 

want to ask you, the question is, are you getting the support from 

DOD that you need? Is it recognized that this is an important task 

within the Air Force and needs to be honored as such, just as you 

then try to honor those who are working within the Air Force in 

this area. It needs to have that level of recognition in DOD. Do you 

feel you are getting that support? 

We will start with you, General. 

General ALSTON. Congressman Turner, I have a good component 

of my day or my week engaged in the interagency process, principally inside the Department of Defense, interfacing with the Nuclear Weapons Council and the subordinate organizations that feed 

the Nuclear Weapons Council. I have a continual relationship with 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA], which is a very important partner in supporting our efforts, as well as the department wide. 

We also have a regular communication with the Department of 

Energy [DOE] and the National Nuclear Security Administration 

[NNSA] principally. 

The Air Force, about 2 years ago, it was the spring of 2008, we 

had left a job vacant at the National Nuclear Security Administration. We had not competed a flag officer to fulfill the job there. 
12 

The Air Force recognized that this, too, could contribute to our 

improved performance, and we decisively put a general officer into 

that job, and we have continuously manned that position since. 

So I am in a pretty good position to give you a feel for how those 

relationships are going. The Department of Defense provided a 

great deal of oversight, as the Air Force was beginning to be informed by what is now totaling about 13 different internal and external reviews, and so AT&L [Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] was the principal interface with the Air Force. They also are 

the architecture to support the Nuclear Weapons Council, so it 

makes sense that that is where the interface would be. 

But we had good recognition of the work that we were doing. We 

were given the kind of breathing room that I think we needed in 

order to march out decisively as we did. So, as much as I was doing 

my best to keep them informed, they did not interfere and, in fact, 

were supportive of the efforts that we had brought under way. 

They helped craft definitions for something new called nuclear 

weapons-related material. In the aftermath of the challenge that 

we had with the misshipment of those sensitive missile parts, there 

was a whole category of materiel that really needed to be defined 

with some degree of precision for us to do, to get our arms around 

it and to put into place the tracking mechanisms that are required 

to do that job. So it has been a partnership when it came to those 

things as well. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, we have been very transparent. We have demanded transparency, and we depend on objectivity. DTRA has been very supportive of our inspection process. 

They have equities in our performance as well. The Combatant 

Commander, STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], 

General Chilton, has equities. He has been having his folks monitor and accompany inspection teams. 

And I think that all of these things in aggregate do show a partnership that is helping us understand. There has been discovery 

that has gone on for us to fully understand the weaknesses that 

we had and the strengths so that we can propagate those as broadly as we need to across the enterprise in an accelerated fashion to 

adopt new and good ideas. 

So I would say in every dimension that this is certainly not a 

uniquely Air Force issue, the atrophy in focus on the nuclear enterprise. Dr. Schlesinger made that clear in both his first volume, and 

particularly in his second volume. But for the Air Force interfaces 

with those agencies that we need to partner on, I think that we 

have developed very robust relationships. 

And I would also include the United States Navy. I have benefited a great deal from my counterparts in the Navy. The Chief of 

Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations have, over the last—as 

General Schwartz and Admiral Roughead have worked together. 

This partnership is also bearing fruit that benefits both of our services. 

So I think there has been more outreach than an internal effort. 

We opened our arms, and we are very transparent in our efforts, 

and folks pitched in to help us every step along the way. 

Mr. TURNER. General Klotz, would you like to add something? 
13 

General KLOTZ. If I could add to that very comprehensive and 

thorough answer from General Alston, just let me just say in my 

mind there is no doubt that there is very strong, committed support from the level of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Defense Gates, both in his public statements, in his testimony before 

this and other committees, in his visit to Minot Air Force Base 

about a year ago where he addressed both the members of the 

bomb wing and the missile wing to stress the importance of their 

duties and responsibilities with respect to nuclear weapons, that 

we have very strong leadership from the top down through the Department of Defense to the Air Force. 

Like General Alston, I regularly interact with various offices 

within the Office of Secretary of Defense and with the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency. They have been out to visit us at 

Barksdale Air Force Base, and I think the lines of communication 

are open and the support is both strong and palpable. 

The Air Force, too, senior leadership, has shown extraordinary 

interest and leadership in this particular field. The Secretary of the 

Air Force, Mike Donley, and our Chief of Staff, General Schwartz, 

have made this one of our top priorities within the Air Force. 

To give you an example of how they have walked the talk is, over 

the Christmas holidays, when they could have been just about anyplace else, our Chief of Staff, General Schwartz, was in Francis E. 

Warren Air Force Base, one of our missile bases. And the Chief 

Master Sergeant of the Air Force, Chief Roy, was at Minot Air 

Force Base visiting the bomb wing and the missile wing there. I 

will add that both of them almost got snowed in by blizzards when 

they were up there, but it made a tremendous signal of support 

from the leadership to those airmen who serve in both the bomb 

wings and the missile wings. 

It is important for people—if your boss takes your work seriously, then the individuals will take their work seriously. And our 

leadership in the Department of Defense and in the Air Force have 

made that known and sent a very strong signal of how important 

they think this particular mission is. 

Mr. TURNER. General Thomas, our chairman asked the question 

of, do you know where all the nuclear weapons are? And you answered, ‘‘The short answer is, yes.’’ I am not going to challenge you 

on that answer, other than to perhaps add to it to say that the answer needs to include also, ‘‘but we could do better.’’ 

When we were talking yesterday, the three different categories 

that you were looking at, of the improvement of core structure, 

chain of command, personnel, how do you enhance the personnel, 

their capabilities, and then the other side is infrastructure and, as 

the chairman referenced, the issue of technology. 

As you know, having no record that a weapon has been moved 

doesn’t necessarily mean that it is where it is supposed to be. And 

I know you make an effort to make certain that things are where 

they are supposed to be. But, nonetheless, technology is an issue 

that both provides you a problem with the security that you have 

to be putting forward and also provides an opportunity to help lessen the risk. 

So I do hope that as you look to your to-do list it continues to 

include the need for ‘‘we can do better.’’ For although I know the 
14 

answer is yes, I know that there is still an opportunity to know 

more, and more accurately, where all of our items and nuclear 

weapons might be. 

Shifting then to—having said that, shifting then to the issue of 

culture: one of the criticisms had been that the people who were 

performing these duties may not have valued it, or received the 

support illustrating its value. I would like you to speak about that 

for a moment. 

The importance, obviously, of you have no margin of error. The 

security to our country, the weapons, represent a risk to us. Also, 

the importance of our nuclear deterrent and what it means for the 

overall national security. 

But culture remains an issue. Especially, you have the administration talking about the issue of wanting to eliminate nuclear 

weapons from the face of the Earth. 

We have to still be able to instill in the people that are doing it 

the importance that they are actually keeping our country very 

safe. 

Could you speak to that for a moment? 

General THOMAS. Yes, sir, Congressman Turner. 

First, thank you, we can do better. I will make sure that I start 

to say that more often. We can do better with the ability to track 

all of our nuclear weapons-related material. 

Regarding the culture, I am the product of about 30 years of 

being in the Air Force and being in the nuclear enterprise business. 

And during those 30 years I have seen that we have withdrawn 

weapons from active duty. And in that steadfast time what I have 

always had, as General Klotz so brilliantly stated, is the senior 

level of leadership awareness. 

While we have documented that there has been almost a decade 

and a half of us not communicating the importance, the culture 

started to wane and the question of the youngest airmen was, if 

there is no leadership involved, then why am I doing that? 

We have started to turn the corner on that by not only getting 

the resources—resources meaning funding and personnel; our Secretary and our Chief have been very support active in giving us the 

things that we need—but, also, starting to take care of the issues 

that we have neglected over that decade and a half. For instance, 

nuclear support equipment. It is critical to have it operational in 

order for us to give our warfighter an operational weapon. 

We bought nuclear support equipment in 1965. We made some 

attempts in the early 1990s to upgrade that, but we failed because 

of the nuclear certification requirement. Today, the youngest airman out there knows, as a point of fact, because our senior leadership has been there to tell them, our senior leadership has added 

more personnel to their unit, and our senior leadership has provided the money to get newer support equipment, or at least in the 

interim, while we do the acquisition process correctly, to fund the 

broken items on those assets. 

So the culture starts with the senior leadership on the ground, 

where the youngest airman is, explaining the importance of the 

mission, applying the resources necessary, so we can overcome 

what I determined last year was potentially a culture of resignation at the youngest person’s level, because they didn’t see the sen-
15 

ior leadership out talking about it. They didn’t see more personnel 

coming for the mission. They didn’t see funding to upgrade this 

warhead equipment by bringing in the newest technology, as you 

both acknowledged. So that is where we begin the foundation of restoring a culture of excellence, a culture of preciseness, a culture 

of ‘‘we are going to be in this mission for a long time.’’ So, Congressman Turner, that is the beginning of it. 

But from the information technology and other technologies, as 

part of our nuclear roadmap, those are the things that we are integrating. As General Alston said, we started the first nuclear roadmap with the ICBM delivery system that we have undergone since 

about 2001. As a part of that, you have to do the entire systems 

assistance. 

Do we have the people to operate it? Do we have the training 

that goes along with that before that person intends to operate it? 

Do we have the tech data that goes along before the person goes 

through the training? 

So all of those are part and parcel to us changing the culture. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. 

With that, Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having 

this hearing and thank you all for your service and for your being 

here today. 

I find your testimony reassuring that we are taking this vital 

mission and making it even better, making it even more excellent. 

So thank you for all that. 

My question is closely related to your testimony and has to do 

with the warheads themselves. I am concerned about two things. 

One is the warheads are made of an inherently unstable material— 

radioactive materials—and they are going to degenerate over time. 

Now, we all know that. 

Secondly, I know that today we have more capability of building 

in security features that would make—should, God forbid, anyone 

unauthorized or a terrorist or whoever get their hands on one of 

our weapons, they would be—it would be impossible for them to 

detonate it with the kind of security features that we are capable 

of implementing today. 

Are we doing enough to make sure that these—monitoring of the 

radioactive portion of the warheads and the security features are 

being either retrofitted or added into, as we go? I mean, I know it 

is a little different than your testimony today, but that is a concern 

that I have. And I just want to make sure that we are doing everything that we can to make progress in these important areas. 

General ALSTON. I would like to probably turn this over to General Thomas in a minute, because he is the nuclear weapons wizard at the table. 

But I would first comment, though, that General Chilton and 

other senior national leaders are on record on how important it is 

for us to provide attention to the national stockpile. The Air Force, 

the credibility of our deterrent systems depends on all of the parts 

of those systems and the weapons being a principal part of that 

system. 
16 

We do have challenges. Our partnership with the Department of 

Energy, this is not exclusively a resourcing issue for the NNSA and 

the Department of Energy. The Air Force has significant amounts 

of investments that are also required in partnership with DOE, depending on whose responsibility it is for the weapon. But we do 

have challenges in the Department of Energy infrastructure. The 

stockpile is aging, and I think that is pretty well documented that 

attention needs to go into that. 

But, at the end of the day, it is the credibility of these systems 

that would be at stake, despite the great Stockpile Stewardship 

Program that has done such a magnificent job to date to help us 

calibrate just how safe, secure, and reliable that stockpile is. 

General Klotz. 

General KLOTZ. Congressman Lamborn, thank you for letting 

General Thomas give the expert answer. 

From the operator’s point of view, I accept the premise of your 

question, which is that these weapons are inanimate objects, yet 

made up of many different components that age with the passage 

of time. 

I think we have, through the Department of Energy, working 

with General Thomas and the Nuclear Weapons Center, good, solid 

plans and programs for making sure that the systems are sustained over time through a series of life extension programs, but 

there are challenges. 

As General Alston pointed out, there are challenges to the Department of Energy in terms of an aging infrastructure. Many of 

the facilities which they operate out of were built during the Manhattan Project in the Second World War, and those are the same 

facilities that they have now in various states of repair. They find 

it difficult, under those kinds of circumstances, to recruit the best 

and brightest graduating from engineering and science schools 

across the country. 

So there is much attention, I think, that needs to be paid to our 

principal provider, the Department of Energy, in terms of being 

able to continue to sustain these weapons for as long as they are 

part of the operational inventory or part of the reserve inventory. 

The other point, though, is, as we conduct these life extension 

programs, there is the opportunity to, without changing the military capability—in other words, not creating a new military capability—to design in and to put in additional safety and security features into the existing weapons. And as an operational commander 

that has responsibility for those as they are deployed out in the 

field, I would hope as a Nation, as a Department of Defense, as a 

Department of Energy, would be given the permission and have the 

opportunity to trade space, as it were, to take advantage of those 

opportunities as we go through life extension programs to design 

in those types of features. 

General THOMAS. It is my privilege to answer that question for 

you. 

In my oral, I talked about my partnerships. I am pleased to report to the committee that I am in partnership with George Miller 

up at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Tom Hunter up at 

Sandia National Laboratory, and Michael Anastasio at the Los Alamos National Lab. We are in frequent contact on the subject of the 
17 

state of health of all nuclear weapons. Through DOE’s continued 

surveillance, I am repeatedly and frequently updated on the status 

of every weapon in the Air Force inventory. 

You are right. We can do better. We can upgrade from the early 

1950s, 1960s, 1970s technologies, security systems and surety that 

we put into every weapon. In working with these three labs and 

working with now a Chief and a Secretary, a warfighter, and the 

headquarters of Air Force, understanding that we can do better, I 

think you will start to see us articulate more of rendering safety 

features where a weapon that can render itself useless as a weapon 

as we move down to protect us from the threat of terrorism, someone actually captures one of our weapons. So I am pleased to report 

that we are involved in those on a frequent basis. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Lamborn, thank you. Mr. Fleming is now recognized. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. It is always great to see you again. Barksdale Air Force Base 

being in my district, it is of vital importance to hear your testimony 

today. 

Just one comment before I get to my first question. General Alston, paraphrasing you, you said that the airmen didn’t fail the 

system; the system failed the airmen, and I entirely agree with 

that. 

I come from a medical background, obviously, and dealing with 

hospital issues and mistakes, the unthinkable things such as amputating the wrong leg, we have to deal with these issues. 

We use things like total quality management concepts that involve redundancy, accountability, the use of technology and certain 

leadership, and reading about this failure, the unauthorized transmission or the unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons to 

Barksdale from Minot, and reading that summary, it is very interesting that, even though it was a very redundant system, it appeared that over time people had begun to ignore the checking of 

various statuses, that finally it wasn’t until it reached Barksdale 

that somebody actually performed on their job and discovered the 

weapon. So the system worked in a way, but, obviously, we would 

much rather catch problems much earlier. But I think a refocus on 

that is certainly the right thing to do, and I appreciate the fact that 

we are doing that. 

I would like to focus on the weapons storage area [WSA] at 

Barksdale. You know, we have worked on this in the past months. 

We even have appropriated $77 million for the project. 

I want to pull a quote out regarding this discussion in the Schlesinger report and others, and it is the following: The closure of the 

weapons storage area at Barksdale was a—because we did have 

one in the past, you know, back from the SAC [Strategic Air Command] days. The closure of the weapons storage area at Barksdale 

was a significant mistake with a negative operational impact. It 

created a requirement for bombers to train and exercise far from 

their home station, resulting in operational complications. Nuclear 

munitions training and proficiency were severely impacted, owing 

to the inability of training weapons to simulate the real thing. Only 

from a global nuclear deterrence perspective do the ramifications of 

this become clear. 
18 

The Task Force strongly encourages the Air Force to revisit the 

WSA closure decision. That is to say that should we reopen the nuclear weapons storage area at Barksdale—and I think the decision 

was made to do so. We have appropriated the money, but I would 

like to hear kind of what the status is on that and are we going 

to follow through with that? 

General ALSTON. Yes, sir. You recount where we are very well. 

We recognize and fully understand Dr. Schlesinger’s position on the 

closure of the Barksdale weapons storage area and, therefore, Air 

Force leadership made the decision to begin taking action to recertify the weapons storage area at Barksdale. And throughout the 

course of last spring and last summer and through the fall, we 

went through all of the appropriate steps that are required for us 

to begin that process, to include a site activation task force that 

went to Barksdale to survey the weapons storage area. We brought 

Sandia in because Sandia Labs has responsibility to validate what 

the security requirements would be in order to do that. 

Initially, I think we had a rough order of magnitude early figure of about $150 million that would be required to reopen the 

Barksdale weapons storage area. But we continued that process, 

and that has culminated at this point—just I think within the last 

few weeks, at Air Combat Command—that phase has culminated 

with their producing an end-to-end programming plan which is another part of the process. 

The proximity of the conclusion of this phase in our assessment 

of the weapons storage area and the next steps that have to be 

taken is now in proximity to the Nuclear Posture Review being 

published, and we are going to, now that we have got the plan in 

hand, we are going to be informed by the Nuclear Posture Review 

before we begin taking any additional actions with regard to the 

Barksdale weapons storage area. So that is the current state of 

play with that project. 

Dr. FLEMING. All right, thank you. 

I have another question, and this is really a little unrelated to 

this, but I think I couldn’t have a better panel in front of me to 

ask this question. And this relates to a discussion that we had in 

a hearing last week with Admiral Willard where we are seeing 

some vulnerability by our—and don’t get nervous about this; I realize you are not Navy, okay? But it does impact the Air Force. 

But the aircraft carriers, there is some vulnerability from medium-range missiles from China, and our ability to project force 

around the world is impacted by that, and that opens the discussion again about the Next-Generation Bomber. That had been sort 

of set aside in a budgetary way over the last year or so, and I know 

that there are discussions to open that back up. It seems to me, 

since we don’t have an immediate antidote for this problem, this 

vulnerability we have to our aircraft carriers, that we need to 

refocus on the Next-Generation Bombers. So I would like to ask the 

panel’s view and perspective on that. 

General ALSTON. Sir, I can tell you, as you know, the Secretary 

of Defense back in April of last year directed the Air Force to take 

another look at that program to revalidate the requirements, to understand the technology better, and to relook at that and get back 

to him. That process has been part of the Quadrennial Defense Re-
19 

view. There has been a lot of work done on that in the Air Force 

and in partnership with the Department in order to validate those 

requirements and fulfill the requirements set out by the Secretary 

of Defense last April. 

So we have current penetrating platform capability in the B–2 

and we have standoff capability with the B–52. At some point, the 

B–2 will not be as effective in emerging threat environments in the 

future. We do think that it is important to have that kind of capability and, therefore, as we make our risk calculus, that has to be 

all part of the equation. Now, I don’t know how debatable it is 

when the B–2 falls into that category of less capable as a penetrating platform, but I believe it is into the next decade that we 

would have that capacity. 

So I think we recognize the threat as you articulate the threat 

and the challenges ahead of us, and I think that that will be spoken to in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the upcoming budget cycle. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Anyone else? 

General KLOTZ. I would like to add to that. I think General Alston has it right. There will be a lot of discussion on this after 1 

February when the Quadrennial Defense Review gets delivered and 

key senior leaders from the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force come over here for the posture hearings. I 

think this will be an item that will be directly addressed by that. 

Let me just say something about our current bomber force, 

though. Our sense at Air Force Global Strike Command is that 

these weapons systems continue to make a major contribution to 

both the strategic nuclear deterrence as well as conventional operations. 

B–52 provides that standoff capability with the Air-Launched 

Cruise Missile that General Alston mentioned and, of course, the 

B–2 has the ability to penetrate more heavily defended targets. So 

synergistically, they contribute capabilities, both of which we think 

are important. 

They also play a major conventional role which should never be 

overlooked. They played a key role during Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Operations Iraqi Freedom in the early stages of the 

war; the B–2 with that ability to penetrate through heavily defended airspace, and the B–52 with its ability to carry large 

amounts of armaments, and with the developments in munitions to 

drop those armaments from 35,000 feet to within meters of their 

targets, which was an awesome, and, I think in particular engagements, a decisive capability. 

So I am fairly optimistic about the contribution that both of those 

platforms will continue to play for many, many years to come as 

an integral part of any air campaign planning that is done by a 

combatant commander. 

We need to continue to sustain and upgrade both the B–52 and 

B–2 to make sure that, for instance, we can take advantage of new 

communication technologies. Later this year, the Air Force will 

launch the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite and we 

will need to make sure that both the B–2 and the B–52 can make 

full use of that new communications mode. There are advances in 

radar technology which have been introduced into other aircraft, 
20 

which I would submit would make a major contribution to the capabilities of both of those platforms. 

But without getting into any operational planning details, which 

we are enjoined from doing, they continue to have and continue to 

make, can make, an important contribution to combatant commanders as they do air campaign planning. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Owens is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. OWENS. Thank you. I am sorry I was a bit late getting here. 

Having visited a few WSAs in my time in the Air Force, I do 

have a visual in my head. It appears to me from the reading that 

I did, that this was a human error scenario in both of these cases. 

I think the conclusions that were reached by the investigating officers were that the procedures were in place and that it was, again, 

human error that caused these problems. 

The question that I really have is what have the steps been, or 

what steps have been taken to ensure that this doesn’t occur 

again? I do recall reading about the story in North Dakota, and obviously you took some rapid steps relative to the commander out 

there. But what is the process that you went through to ensure 

that we have the safety of the weapons in hand? 

General ALSTON. Well, sir, of course, immediately in the aftermath, there was a comprehensive assessment of the quality of the 

training, the inspection process and the quality of the inspection 

processes that we had. There was a very thorough treatment of the 

current procedures that were in place and there were revisions to 

those procedures. 

The nuclear business is a system of checks and rechecks and balances, but over all of that needs to be a culture that is self-critical 

and that the safeguards that are in place are, in fact, effective. 

So on the ground at Minot on how a maintenance team and a 

munitions team would go and open and enter a weapons storage 

area and identify the weapon that needs to move, pull it out, bring 

it to the flight line and load it up on a B–52, there is fantastic scrutiny on how to perform that procedure. Early on, I am sure there 

were wing commanders that were validating whether or not every 

step was being performed. But there has been great leadership 

intervention in order to ensure that. 

We have to depend on our processes, but our people at the end 

of the day are what are going to sustain us, and our culture is 

going to be the kind of—the atmospherics and the environment 

under which these folks are going to perform. 

The people are the long pole in our tent right now in terms of 

having that self-sustaining culture and the proficiency levels we 

need. Our bench strength isn’t what we used to be. Our depth isn’t 

what it used to be. We made personnel decisions in the early nineties that have created an enlisted bathtub in the 15- to 17-year 

range for all of our AFSCs [Air Force Specialty Codes], and we 

have done close scrutiny of all of our nuclear-related Air Force Specialty Codes. So, consequently, in the field today, if you do not have 

the tech sergeant at the 15-year point of experience that you otherwise would depend on, you are going to cover that with a junior 

person or a senior person, and neither one of those is optimized. 
21 

So we have begun work at the direction of the Secretary, and you 

can trace this into Admiral Child’s Defense Science Board report on 

the erosion of nuclear deterrent skills, that we have a comprehensive human capital strategy that is in its early stages to make sure 

that we are going to deliver the right people in the right place at 

the right time. 

But, really, leadership focus was a missing ingredient under the 

conditions that we were operating before. The leadership focus 

from the Chief and the Secretary has been consistently—I mean, 

it is echoed from the top to the bottom on a daily basis. But we 

do need to strengthen that, and that is going to take us more time 

in order to make sure. Our force structure is not so large anymore. 

We need to make sure that we deliberately deliver that kind of capability and that proficiency, every man and woman just making 

sure they are absolutely prepared to succeed. 

Mr. OWENS. Just a follow-up question. In reading the materials 

that were provided, you have a series of, in some cases, multiple 

checks that were missed in these particular instances. Do you have 

an audit process that allows you to see up the chain of command 

if, for instance, one or more checks were missed, so that you can 

evaluate whether or not what you are doing now is taking hold? 

General ALSTON. The inspection process that is underway in the 

field today audits—when did you open the door, when did you close 

the door, how long should that procedure take? If you have to go 

in and you have to check every configuration in there, should that 

be a 5-minute procedure or should that be a 45-minute procedure? 

So you get to audit that. 

We used to do samples. We still do sampling, but we do much 

larger sampling, and in some cases we do 100 percent audits of the 

paper trail that supports the procedures that we have put in place. 

So we have gone through a centralized training program for 

every one of our inspectors. They are certified by their major commands. This is new. We had not done this with our nuclear surety 

inspections prior to this time. So, common training, MAJCOM certification, a 100 percent oversight of all of our inspections. 

We provide additional oversight. So a major command goes out 

to inspect his operation and the Air Force inspection agency is part 

of that process for a full nuclear surety inspection. DTRA accompanies us on many inspections. STRATCOM accompanies us. So 

there is an awful lot of oversight and inspection prowess that is 

currently in evidence in the field today. 

But I think that we are depending on daily performance and the 

audits associated with inspection to ensure that we are, in fact, following through with the procedures and the processes that we have 

put in place. 

Mr. OWENS. Thank you. 

General KLOTZ. Mr. Chairman, may I add to that? There are a 

lot of changes from when I first started walking around WSAs as 

well, sir, quite apart from the security which is very, very different 

from the technology which we use in the WSAs. 

But there is another significant change that we should point 

out—and General Thomas would be the actual one to talk to the 

details of that. One of the changes we made post-Minot incident 

was to take all of our WSAs and place them not under the local 
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wing commander’s authority, but under the authority of the Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base. 

We talked earlier about how we draw good ideas from the Navy 

and vice versa. I think that is one of the good ideas we took from 

the Navy in the sense that they had had centralized managed control of their equivalents of weapon storage areas through a single 

contractor. So to a certain extent, we bought into that same notion, 

only that the contractor here in this case is actually the Air Force 

Nuclear Weapons Center that does that. 

What that was intended to do was to ensure that we had standardization of procedures and processes and checklists within the 

weapons storage area, so that whether it was a bomb wing weapons storage area or a missile wing storage area or one of the weapon storage areas that belongs to General Thomas at the Nuclear 

Weapons Center, that you would see the same procedures, the 

same checklists, the same inventories and so on. 

Now, we are relatively new into this and we will be very closely 

looking at how well they do. There was just a nuclear surety inspection at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in which 

the Inspector General from the Air Force Materiel Command was 

in looking at the WSA, and they passed that inspection. So that is 

another change, in addition to those that General Alston has mentioned, to deal with issues inside the weapons storage area. 

Mr. OWENS. Thank you. 

General THOMAS. Thank you, sir, for the question, and I would 

like to follow up a little bit. General Klotz and General Alston have 

done a great job explaining. But one of the things, with the Secretary and the Chief and General Hoffman’s approval, the first 

thing we did was, as General Klotz said, you looked at the standardization at every weapons storage area to make sure it was correct. I am fairly certain in a day-to-day oversight that we are not 

there yet, but we are getting there rapidly. 

The second thing we did was upgrade the leadership at each one. 

Previously, we had a young captain that was a flight commander 

that was responsible for the inner workings inside of the weapons 

storage areas as it had to do with weapons. So we moved that to 

a lieutenant colonel’s position, who brings in a little bit more experience. 

The second thing we did was go back and look at the training 

that each person working inside the WSA had, local training. We 

have standardized the lesson plans and standardized everything. 

But we also went back to Sheppard Air Force Base to see what 

they were being taught. We found there was a deficiency there. 

Over the years we stopped the training that was there when we 

were young lieutenants that were going to go into the maintenance 

business. So we reinstituted that, robusted that up. At the Nuclear 

Weapons Center, we now look into that training because those 

trained personnel will go to those weapon storage areas. 

We partnered with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and increased computer-based training at Sheppard Air Force Base and 

the ability to deploy that computer-based training out to our weapons storage areas. 

Additionally to that, we did an assessment. We will be moving, 

as others have alluded, to get better technology for portal moni-
23 

toring at the gate. Something passes with a radiation signature, we 

will know; and we will then be able to compare whether it should 

be moving. 

On a daily basis, we have experts at the Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Center that go into the defense integration and automated management of nuclear data services to see exactly what 

maintenance was done on each weapon and whether that was the 

right type of maintenance and whether we fulfilled all of the 

squares of the paperwork that was required. 

The other thing that our Chief of Staff, after visiting Barksdale, 

encouraged us to do was get an automated process for the 504 procedure, which is actually where you transfer weapons, where we 

can go back in and do that robust auditing of exactly where did it 

transfer, at what point, who transferred it, to include the maintenance of it. 

So we made leaps and bounds on that. But it started with getting 

the right senior people in with the right training. So our Chief and 

our Secretary has just helped us tremendously in making sure that 

we do this correctly. 

Mr. OWENS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Just a final question, switching gears for a second if I could. General Klotz, how will you coordinate with Air Combat Command to 

sustain the readiness of the B–52 and B–2 fleet? With all nuclearcapable bombers now under Global Strike Command, how are you 

managing the competing demands placed on the bomber fleet to 

support conventional missions and training requirements? 

General KLOTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is an excellent 

question and, in fact, one of the principal issues that we have been 

working very closely on with Air Combat Command. In fact, as we 

work through this mission transfer process, we have been holding 

weekly meetings at the working group level and then every other 

week at the two-star level, video-teleconference. And just last week 

General Fraser, who is the commander of Air Combat Command, 

came to Barksdale Air Force Base and we did a final readiness review to make sure we were ready to make this transfer. 

I hasten to add that after the transfer is made, that does not 

mean that we never talk to Air Combat Command or Air Combat 

Command never talks to Air Force Global Strike Command. We are 

still going to be working very closely together as Global Strike 

Command achieves its full operational capability later this summer. 

But even beyond that, Air Combat Command plays a unique role 

within the Air Force. It is the lead for what we call the Combat 

Air Forces, the CAF. As such, they are the lead major command 

not just for developing tactics and exercises and deploying forces 

for Air Combat Command, but for the other commands that operate 

strike aircraft, such as the Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Air Forces 

in Europe, and now Global Strike Command. Air Force Space Command is also an important part of that process. 

So they will continue under memoranda of agreement and memoranda of understanding and under a program plan that the Chief 

of Staff signed to be the lead on scheduling exercises, such as at 

Red Flag, and integrating forces, including Global Strike Command 
24 

bombers, into those types of exercises; and in serving as the principal interface between the Air Force and Joint Forces Command, 

which has responsibility for presenting all forces based in the Continental United States to overseas regional commanders. 

We also have people at Air Combat Command headquarters, will 

have and continue to have people there, Combat Command headquarters, under a detachment there, who wear an Air Force Global 

Strike Command patch on their uniform but actually sit at desks 

alongside their counterparts at Air Combat Command to make sure 

in the key areas that we are lashed up together. 

We will participate, as I said, in exercises like Red Flag and the 

other flag series of exercises. There is a process known as weapons 

and tactical conferences, WEPTAC, which we hold. In fact, I was 

just out at Nellis Air Force Base last week with General Fraser of 

Air Combat Command and General Kehler of Air Force Space Command, where members of our three respective commands were 

working down to the level of actual operational tactics and integrating forces across the entire range of capabilities that the Air 

Force can bring to bear. 

So we will be working very, very, closely with them in terms of 

organizing, training and equipping the bomber force for, as I said 

before, its awesome and in some cases potentially decisive capabilities that it brings to the fight and one that is valued highly by regional combatant commanders across the globe. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How well do all the airmen in both Global Strike 

and Air Combat Command understand the rationale for the division of bomber platforms within each major command? Are there 

any conflicting command and control issues that you discovered or 

other issues that have created any adverse effects in successful 

mission execution? 

General KLOTZ. Again, an excellent question. And to put this in 

context, the Air Force made a conscious decision to leave the B– 

1B bomber out of Global Strike Command. I think the simplest reason for that is the B–1B has been re-roled as a conventional-only 

bomber. That is a position that we have taken within the Air Force 

in terms of sustainment modernization. It is also a position we 

have taken internationally, particularly in our discussions with the 

Russians as part of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] 

and Moscow Treaty consultations that have continued since those 

treaties went into effect. 

Now, having said that, you know, the B–1 and the B–2 and the 

B–52 are bombers, multi-engine, large aircraft, and there are skill 

sets that are applicable to all three bombers. In fact on my staff, 

both at the senior level and at the action officer level, there are pilots and navigators and electronic warfare officers who have flown 

in two or more of those weapon platforms. 

So I would see, and in my discussions with General Fraser, we 

agree on this point, that there will continue to be a cross-flow between platforms. In other words, you might fly the B–52 for a tour 

and then transition into the B–1, or vice-versa. 

Additionally, another thing General Fraser and I agreed on: we 

are going to bring back competition, annual or biannual competition, as a means of promoting excellence and esprit and pride in 

what we do. And as part of that combination, we intend to invite 
25 

the B–1s, even though they are not part of Air Force Global Strike 

Command, to participate and compete in those competitions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. I will have some further questions for 

the record. 

With that, let me turn to the Ranking Member for any other 

questions. 

Mr. Owens. 

Mr. OWENS. I have no questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. I would like to ask one. 

General Alston, just a follow-up to my question about the weapons storage area in Barksdale and the Quadrennial Review, and I 

understand all that. What would be the scenario where we 

wouldn’t move forward with reestablishing the nuclear weapons 

storage area at Barksdale? 

General ALSTON. Sir, our way forward is, as we are informed by 

the Nuclear Posture Review—and we have a new major command 

commander taking responsibility for the bomber mission, and we 

have reached this point in the process where we have to reengage 

senior Air Force leadership—I think that we are going to benefit 

from that collaboration to make sure that we are doing the right 

thing for the nuclear mission. So, I think the Secretary and the 

Chief would expect nothing less than for us to bring together all 

of the required players to ensure that they are able to make the 

very best decision and pace the project and otherwise make sure 

we are doing the right thing for the nuclear mission. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Just under the wire, Mr. Heinrich is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I was on 

the floor. I have got a couple questions, actually. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I don’t think your microphone is pushed on. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I apologize. First, just let me congratulate you on 

the initial operations capability of the Air Force’s Nuclear Weapons 

Center Sustainment and Integration Center back in November. 

Thinking long term, I wanted to ask, if fully funded, when would 

you foresee the final operations capability being achieved and how 

will that benefit the overall Air Force nuclear weapons enterprise? 

General THOMAS. Thank you, Congressman Heinrich. Fully funding is certainly a part of the equation to become full operational capability. But another part is sufficient manning, which we have 

gotten the resources now and we are hiring. By 1 February we 

think we should have hired all shifts to go there. The second portion would be facility, as you have traveled to see. 

Our MAJCOM commander, General Hoffman, has made a facility 

for the Sustainment and Integration Center his number one 

MILCON to the tune of about $49 million. But the other part goes, 

I think, to what the other members of the committee have asked 

about. It is the information technology and our ability to wed that 

into that facility that gives us instant visibility, 24/7, 365. Once we 

move forward continually in what we call our phasing of information technology with regard to positive inventory control, we will be 

able to say 100 percent or fully operational capability. That will be 

the only piece that will hold us. 
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But, you know, in the Air Force, we don’t wait for 100 percent. 

Once we get to about 75 or 80 percent, where we have visibility 

through tracking and the other mechanisms being able to have a 

partnership with Air Force Global Logistics Support Center, we 

will declare full operational capability. We are going to declare that 

before we get the new facility, because at Kirtland Air Force Base, 

among the 100 or so mission partners, we have had mission partners move out of space to give us space. So we will declare that, 

but will still start working toward a facility through MILCON. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, General. 

In September of 2008, I think it was, the Secretary of Defense’s 

Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management outlined the 

need to establish the Nuclear Weapons Management Fundamentals 

Course at the Nuclear Weapons Center. According to your written 

testimony, or your submitted testimony, one of the most significant 

challenges that lies ahead—and you have raised this directly with 

me—is your most important asset, your people, and rebuilding that 

asset. 

What is the status of the aforementioned course and how has it 

better prepared your airmen for certification and command? 

General THOMAS. Thank you again, Congressman Heinrich. The 

status, it is full operational capability. We have run about 13 

courses, to the tune of about 300 people that were going through. 

Upon initially establishing that, our biggest customer at the time 

was General Kehler out of Air Force Space Command who thought 

he needed rapidly to get some of his commanders, newly in command, through the course so we could talk about it. 

When we did that, we recognized that we couldn’t send everybody through basic training again, nor could we wait until they 

went through professional military education. So we established 

this week-long course where we hit upon everything from why we 

have the weapons, why we exist as the United States Air Force, to 

the challenges, the priorities, to better inculcate the culture of nuclear fundamentals for strategic deterrence. But I think we have 

kind of hit that really hard and the 299 or so that have gone 

through have critiqued us very hard, and with each course it gets 

better. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Great. The last question. You mentioned mission 

partners a few minutes ago, and I want to broaden that a little bit 

and just ask you about the level of collaboration with Sandia and 

the other national labs, our universities, et cetera, even Guard and 

Reserve components, to support the mission that you do. 

General THOMAS. Thank you again, Congressman. Our partnerships, as you well articulated there, include Lawrence Livermore 

National Lab, Sandia National Lab and Los Alamos National Lab. 

In our frequent conversations with each lab, they recognize that 

they could contribute more if they assigned personnel to the Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center. I am proud to report that each lab 

has, on their own, provided a weapons expert inside our facility 

and my commander’s headquarters, a weapons expert for each of 

the labs. 

Second, the University of New Mexico, which we are pleased to 

be aligned with, has come on very hard in helping us with stayin-school students, particularly those in graduate school, that we 
27 

kind of get to take their transcripts and their resumes to see what 

talent they could bring to us. So the University of New Mexico, 

New Mexico State University, New Mexico Tech, all have come to 

us and are providing us students so we can continue to grow the 

talent that we are going to need. And that talent, as you know, 

may not stay with the Air Force but it may go to any of the national labs or to industry that is into this business. 

The third thing we have done is we have gone out to industry 

right there in Albuquerque. As you know, we have some very technologically-inclined industry there, and they are starting to support 

us too; some through existing contracts, but most know that the 

contracts now are going into insourcing and to hire them as government. But they have come to us with some of their employees that 

they may potentially lay off and say, ‘Hey, this is a good candidate.’ 

So that effort is working with us very well. 

Mentioning our partners there at Kirtland Air Force Base, the 

Air Force Research Laboratory is integrated into everything we are 

doing in trying to get us the newest technology—so much so that 

their chief executive officer for technology has been on loan to us. 

The Air Force Operational Test Evaluation Center, led by Major 

General Sargeant, is involved with helping us with our center test 

authority, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency is involved with 

helping us with our nuclear fundamentals course. The Air Force Inspection Agency lends people to us when we talk about inspecting 

to a higher standard, consistency of standards. So it has just been 

a total partnership at Kirtland Air Force Base and throughout the 

Air Force. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

With that, let me conclude by thanking our witnesses for their 

testimony today. We take very seriously on this committee the 

issue of securing our nuclear enterprise. I know that you share that 

commitment. I appreciate your testimony and the progress that has 

been made. We will continue to exercise robust oversight over this 

issue and look forward to working with you in your various roles. 

With that, I want to thank you all for your service to our country 

and all you do to keep America strong and keep us safe. 

I want to thank the members for their attendance today. Members will have a week to submit additional questions for the record, 

and I would ask our witnesses to respond expeditiously in writing. 

With that, given this was our first hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee under my chairmanship, I would be remiss if 

I didn’t publicly acknowledge and thank the great work of my predecessor, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher, now Under Secretary for 

Arms Control and International Security, and appreciate the great 

work she did in leading this subcommittee and her continued service to our Nation. 

With that, this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

General THOMAS. We maintain very strict Operational Security (or OPSEC) to ensure only those with a need to know are involved in weapons movements. This is 

spelled out to us in DOD Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (DODM S–5210–41– 

M) and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (AFM 31–108): ‘‘At a minimum, all information that would reveal a movement is planned or scheduled shall 

be classified Confidential.’’ ‘‘Information concerning times, routes, and destinations 

shall be handled on a strict need-to-know basis and controlled as appropriate. Dissemination, display, and access to information concerning impending or actual 

movements shall be limited to the minimum essential personnel to support the mission.’’ 

As the Air Force Service Logistics Agent for all nuclear weapons related movements, the 708th Nuclear Sustainment Squadron (a unit under the 498 Nuclear 

Systems Wing and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB), coordinates all movements with the National Nuclear Security Administration and/or Air 

Mobility Command. Mission planners accomplish all exchanges and mission requirements regarding weapons movements via secure (classified) communications, such 

as the Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear Data Services (DIAMONDS). Local mission planning meetings are also held in secure locations where 

information is handled and verified on a strict need-to-know basis and any compromise results in mission rescheduling. 

Movements on a local level, for example within the ICBM missile field or the 

Weapons Storage Area, are also planned, scheduled, and executed under a similar 

OPSEC umbrella. For instance, movements within the weapons storage area are coordinated face-to-face between munitions control and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) security forces. They are limited to only those personnel who have 

a need to know. Movements outside the weapons storage area are coordinated in 

a classified meeting in advance with the host wing. Configuration, location, routes, 

travel time and security requirements are discussed. The meeting includes munitions, missile maintenance, security forces, operations, wing leadership, explosive 

ordnance disposal technicians, wing safety and Office of Special Investigations (OSI) 

agents. Access to this meeting is limited only to those who are listed on an entry 

authority list and have a need to know. The host AFGSC wing signs for custody 

prior to departure and oversees all aspects of off-base movements. [See page 10.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How is the Air Force measuring progress in its implementation 

of the Roadmap-identified corrective actions (i.e., when do you know you’re successful)? How have Air Force changes and adjustments to the nuclear enterprise impacted mission performance? 

General ALSTON. We are using a composite set of indicators to measure our performance. In additon to tracking the progress of the initiatives laid out in the Roadmap entitled, ‘‘Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,’’ we are using a 

broad range of tools to enhance our understanding of the state of the nuclear enterprise—inspections, staff assistance visits, exercises, mentors, resourcing levels, safety reports, surveys, to name a few. The standards for performance are clear, so as 

a snapshot in time, we have good insight—making progress, more to be done. We 

believe we are setting the conditions for positive, long-term stewardship, and we are 

building on our current tools to improve the quality of that longer-term assessment 

process. The changes we are making need to continue to ensure that the Air Force 

consistently meets USSTRATCOM requirements and delivers effective strategic deterrence by performing safe, secure, precise, reliable operations at all our nuclear 

units, as we are doing today. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there any outstanding challenges or impediments to your ability to implement the corrective actions identified in the Roadmap? 

General ALSTON. No. With only 17 months since the publication of our comprehensive Roadmap, and with the magnitude of some of the key changes that have been 

implemented, we are early in a multi-year effort. Our priorities have been clearly 

established by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff: #1 – Continue 

to Strengthen the Nuclear Enterprise. Our challenges were created over a period of 

years and we will not get to where we want to be for a period of time. But we understand our challenges, have a plan to meet them head on, all the while performing 

safe, secure, reliable operations and contributing substantial deterrence value every 

day. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Who has responsibility for the programming, planning, budgeting 

and execution (PPBE) process for nuclear forces and capabilities within the Air 

Force? Should Congress expect to see additional resource requests to implement the 

Roadmap? 

General ALSTON. A8 (Strategic Plans and Programs) manages the programming, 

planning, budgeting and execution (PPBE) process for the USAF which includes AF 

nuclear forces and capabilities. Within A8, a Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO) 

panel was established before the FY11 POM that has specific responsibility for nuclear programming. 

The FY10 and FY11 budgets have increased investments in the AF nuclear enterprise which addressed Roadmap implementation issues. The AF will continue to 

strengthen excellence in the nuclear enterprise. All nuclear resource requirements 

will be thoroughly examined through the AF Corporate Structure to determine the 

correct balance of funding in relation to other AF missions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The recent relief of two commanders at Minot with nuclear forces 

responsibilities was an indication that improvements to the Air Force nuclear enterprise still need to be made. What are the most pressing challenges that still must 

be addressed? 

General ALSTON. Though the relief of the commanders at Minot was extraordinary, holding leadership accountable is not. Commanders at all levels of leadership in the AF are focused on daily mission performance and have made it clear 

that performance matters. Having said that, we recognize that our prior shift in 

focus to other vital mission areas had a cost in the nuclear mission area and that 

this shift occurred over a period of years. The course we are on will require a considerable amount of time to achieve the persistent level of performance we are seeking. 

The key to our success in the future is the deliberate development of our people to 

ensure they are functionally proficient and grow into seasoned leaders. We have 

made significant changes in the areas of training, education, tracking nuclear experience, modifications to Professional Military Education curricula, expanding fellowship opportunities as means to address improving the deliberate development of our 
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outstanding airmen. We are focused on ensuring our airmen are functional experts 

and seasoned leaders. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With the reorganization of nuclear focus and expertise in the Air 

Force, what organization(s) now have lead responsibility for Air Force nuclear requirements, nuclear-related acquisitions, nuclear force structure, and advocating for 

nuclear capabilities? 

General ALSTON. The newly created AFGSC is responsible for the organize, train 

and equip function of AF strategic forces (ICBM, B–2, B–52) while USAFE and ACC 

are responsible for organizing, training and equipping all dual-capable fighter aircraft. Nuclear capabilities advocates on the headquarters staff include but are not 

limited to AF/A10, SAF/AQ, AF/A8PN, and AF/A5XC. Nuclear capabilities advocates 

from the MAJCOMs include but are not limited to AFGSC, USAFE, AFMC, AMC, 

ACC, and PACOM. And AF/A10 provides the key integration piece and collaborates 

with established Air Force acquisition and requirements process owners and has 

oversight to ensure uniformity of nuclear policy, guidance, requirements and advocacy across the HAF staff and throughout the broader nuclear enterprise. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. There appear to be several Air Force-related nuclear forces issues 

requiring decisions and/or investments in the next few years, such as: the B–61 life 

extension program, a nuclear-capable Next Generation Bomber, dual-capable Joint 

Strike Fighter, and a potential ICBM follow-on. How will the improvements made 

to the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise assist in these decisions? 

General ALSTON. The re-organized Air Staff and MAJCOM structures are providing for institutional focus and coherent, consistent advocacy for nuclear capabilities. AF Global Strike Command, along with the other commands with nuclear responsibilities, establish nuclear requirements. The Air Staff, through the Assistant 

Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration stewards the requirements into the AF requirements and resourcing structures and provides 

propency for these capabilities. The integrated result ensures these capabilities compete effectively for AF resources. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As the Air Force looks ahead, what are the key challenges to sustaining the nuclear-capable ICBM and bomber force? Are there any key decisions 

regarding these forces that will have to be made in the near- to mid-term? 

General ALSTON. Key challenges to sustaining the nuclear-capable ICBM and 

bomber force include: ensuring current capabilities are viable and credible, maintaining the ICBM industrial base and intellectual/engineering capability supporting 

fleet modernization, and continuing legacy bomber sustainment/modernization activities. 

Key decisions being reviewed/evaluated by the Air Force in the near- to mid-term 

timeframe include making investments in the current ICBM system to maintain its 

viability/capability to 2030. Additionally, the Air Force is continuing to refine the 

requirements for developing a new long-range strike platform and developing requirements for a new nuclear-capable stand-off weapon system. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Please discuss Air Force efforts to sustain a nuclear career field, 

including identifying clear career paths, cultivating expertise, and identifying leadership opportunities for airmen to ascend in nuclear-related careers. 

General ALSTON. As part of a comprehensive strategy to ensure we have the right 

person in the right job at the right time and to improve our nuclear experience levels, we have a variety of initiatives underway. 

We identify and track nuclear experienced individuals by applying Special Experience Identifiers to their record. We have established key nuclear billets where we 

have well-defined requirements for specific nuclear expertise. We baselined all nuclear-related training and education and revised course content for all levels of AF 

Professional Military Education. We increased the number of fellowships aligned 

with the nuclear mission. Additionally, we are in the process of creating a Human 

Capital Development Strategy that leverages all these initiatives while ensuring our 

policies, processes and authorities properly align to ensure each airman associated 

with the AF nuclear enterprise is fully prepared to perform both technical duties 

and to carry out leadership responsibilities in this vital mission area. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Please discuss Air Force nuclear enterprise personnel requirements and how the Air Force is addressing those requirements. 

General ALSTON. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services 

(AF/A1) and Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration 

(AF/A10) are partnering to develop a nuclear-focused Human Capital Strategy 

(HCS) to ensure nuclear mission success. 

A key element of the HCS is the systematic review of force development requirements across components of the Nuclear Enterprise. Over 2,500 nuclear billets were 

added as part of the stand-up of Air Force Global Strike Command, expansion of 

the AF Nuclear Weapons Center, the stand-up of HQ/USAF A10 and fortifying other 
63 

organizations within the Air Force nuclear enterprise. We have already made 

changes to training, education, tracking nuclear experience, identifying key nuclear 

billets, and modified curricula at all levels of AF Professional Military Education. 

We are focused on ensuring our airmen are functional experts and seasoned leaders. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Navy has a 30-year shipbuilding plan and a long-term SSBN 

plan. Does the Air Force have a long-term plan for the sustainment of its nuclear 

deterrence capabilities? 

General ALSTON. The Air Force has sustainment plans for all of its nuclear missions: dual-capable aircraft, land-based ICBMs, stand-off missiles and the platforms 

to deliver gravity and stand-off weapons. 

In the near-term the Air Force plans to sustain extended deterrence capabilities 

by recapitalizing the dual-capable aircraft fleet. In the mid-term the Air Force has 

developed a plan to field a new airborne Long Range Strike capability, stand-off capability, and a Roadmap to sustain the Minuteman III fleet through 2030 per congressional direction. For the long-term the Air Force has developed plans to sustain 

the legacy bomber fleet through 2040. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you expect the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap to affect 

the working relationship between the Air Force and other institutions involved in 

the nuclear enterprise—namely, STRATCOM, the Nuclear Weapons Council and the 

NNSA? If so, please explain. 

General ALSTON. Yes. The Roadmap has increased focus throughout the nuclear 

enterprise and has strengthened and broadened our relationships with other stewards of our nuclear deterrence force. Establishing AFGSC clarifies and strengthens 

the relationship and forces presented to the USSTRATCOM Commander. 

USSTRATCOM nuclear requirements are well understood because of the working 

relationship established between USSTRATCOM/J8 and A10. Additionally, interactions between the Navy, NNSA and the Air Force on everything from a B–61 Life 

Extension Program planning, joint fuze program and stockpile stewardship are more 

frequent and of higher quality than in the past. We would also include OSD Policy 

and AT&L, with whom we have highly functioning relationships. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What sort of interaction does the NWC have with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)? 

General THOMAS. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) has formed 

a partnership with the Air Force Global Logistics Support Center (AFGLSC) which 

capitalizes on and enhances the Air Force’s Supply Chain Management expert’s core 

competencies to ensure effective, dedicated nuclear supply chain management support. The AFGLSC has played a key role in defining and instituting a Nuclear 

Weapons Related Materiel Positive Inventory Control concept of operation to deliver 

the ability to identify, protect and account for the location and condition of NWRM 

anywhere in the supply chain at any point in time. 

Specifically, the AFNWC, AFGLSC and DLA have worked closely together in establishing the Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel (NWRM) Positive Inventory Control (PIC) Storage Facilities at Hill AFB, UT and Tinker AFB, OK. The AFGLSC 

is the principal supply chain interface with DLA and has worked closely over the 

last year to identify and transfer over 12,000 NWRM assets from various DLA storage locations to these facilities. DLA is providing the current information technology 

system for these facilities and is providing needed training and support for operations. Additionally, the AFNWC also participates in a weekly telecon with DLA 

and the Air Staff addressing joint nuclear-related actions/issues. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Could the consolidation of nuclear weapons sustainment activities 

at the Nuclear Weapons Center have mitigated against or prevented the mistaken 

shipment of missile components to Taiwan that occurred in 2006? How so? 

General THOMAS. It could have mitigated the incident; however, human error 

played a role in the mistaken shipment and prevention requires a continuous concerted effort by all involved across the nuclear enterprise and our mission partners. 

— The AFNWC was stood up to reestablish a centralized nuclear sustainment 

focus and expertise that had grown fragmented over the years. The increased nuclear oversight of, and collaboration with, other AFMC centers and Air Force Major 

Commands is already paying dividends in terms of asset control, improved policies, 

procedures, training and tools. 

— New Air Force policy on Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel Management, in 

parallel with updated maintenance, supply, transportation and acquisition policies, 

are providing clearer guidance and closing the gaps for Air Force personnel. 

— The AFNWC has formed a partnership with the Air Force Global Logistics 

Support Center (AFGLSC) which capitalizes on and enhances the Air Force’s Supply 

Chain Management expert’s core competencies to ensure effective, dedicated nuclear 

supply chain management support. The AFGLSC has played a key role in defining 

and instituting a Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel Positive Inventory Control con-
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cept of operation to deliver the ability to identify, protect and account for the location and condition of NWRM anywhere in the supply chain at any point in time. 

— The web-based Positive Inventory Control (PIC) Fusion capability is providing 

the AFGLSC, AFNWC and other AF stakeholders with unprecedented visibility and 

control of NWRM assets. It has enabled the control of each NWRM transaction and 

tracking asset movements across the AF enterprise. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What area(s) do you believe are most challenging for your organization? 

General THOMAS. While we’ve made tremendous progress to date, we’re not ready 

to declare victory yet. Our biggest challenge is time. It will take years to overcome 

decades of atrophy and inattention in nuclear sustainment. As such, we will remain 

focused on executing our plan and bringing resources to bear. To reach Full Operational Capability, we must create enduring staff processes and instructions to capture and codify our best practices and standards, successfully advocate for adequate 

resources, mature and fully man our staff, and finally, validate our actions through 

independent assessments with measurable, repeatable and auditable successes in 

our support to the warfighter. 

In this regard, perhaps the most significant challenge that lies ahead is with our 

most important asset – our people. Today we are behind the power curve as a result 

of two gaps. One challenge is that the existing talent pool is finite and everyone 

in the Nation’s nuclear enterprise is competing for this scarce resource. This naturally leads to the second challenge, where we must hire, train, and retain a generation of motivated, talented, but inexperienced personnel. As such, the future looks 

bright when this new generation grows to take on the middle and senior level positions of leadership and responsibility of tomorrow. Today, however, we are 

leveraging a small and aging technical workforce of nuclear professionals. Today’s 

force is heavy with experience at the top, and full of fresh faces at entry level, leaving a gap in between. To manage this challenge, we have taken deliberate steps to 

identify key nuclear billets requiring nuclear expertise; to create and deliver relevant nuclear training; to partner with learning institutions to ensure a steady pipeline of expertise; to utilize the Total Force by reaching out to the Guard and Reserve 

partners as a bridge to future permanent manning and, finally, to lay out career 

paths that develop today’s sustainers, logisticians, scientists, engineers, acquirers 

and program managers to become tomorrow’s leaders of the force. We have fielded 

an Air Force Nuclear Fundamentals Course that encompasses nuclear weapon fundamentals, force structure, nuclear stockpile guidance and planning, nuclear surety, 

the nuclear enterprise, etc. We plan to partner with the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency University to share best practices and resources. Finally, we are working 

with the Air Staff and Air Force Personnel Center to build a robust and well-managed nuclear workforce. We are playing a central role by bringing together key players throughout DOD to solve our nuclear workforce issues together. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Air Force nuclear units continue to receive ‘unsatisfactory’ ratings 

in their nuclear surety inspections (e.g., 498th Nuclear Systems Wing at Kirtland 

AFB, NM in November 2009; 69th Bomb Squadron at Minot AFB, ND in September 

2009; and 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, MO in November 2008). Please 

discuss why you believe these ‘unsatisfactory’ ratings continue to occur and any key 

patterns that have emerged from these inspections. How has the Air Force changed, 

or made improvements to, its nuclear inspections and procedures? If changed, what 

shortcomings were improved? In what measurable or quantitative ways have operations improved as a result of these changes? 

General THOMAS. The Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff have made continuing to strengthen the nuclear enterprise the Air Force’s top priority. Across the 

Air Force, and especially within the nuclear enterprise, their focus is on renewing 

the Air Force’s commitment to long-established standards of excellence. The rigor 

of our nuclear surety inspections demonstrates a new commitment to the highest 

levels of performance. We can expect that it will take time to fully bring performance in line with our standards. The inspection results you cite represent our absolute commitment to thorough, independent and rigorous validation of this mission’s 

most exacting, no-defect standards. There is no discernable pattern to these specific 

inspection results except one: they re-confirm the atrophy of focus on existing standards over the years that has been well documented and is well known to the committee. And so, these results were largely anticipated when a renewed emphasis on 

higher inspection standards met with years of declining focus. With every inspection, pass or fail, we hone our craft and conduct rigorous root cause analyses to continuously improve. But remember, these results represent a snapshot based on a 

limited sample size. The real progress is demonstrated by today’s team of military, 

civilian and industry professionals who are delivering safe, secure and reliable nuclear capability to the warfighter. Together, we all will do even more to ensure 100 
65 

percent precision and reliability in our nuclear logistics – every task, every day, 100 

percent of the time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Has the establishment of Global Strike Command affected operations within the 8th and 20th Air Forces? How so? 

General KLOTZ. AFGSC was established to consolidate the Air Force’s nuclear-capable bomber and ICBM forces under a single command, one that provides sharp 

focus to the organize, train, and equip functions necessary in the stewardship of our 

Nation’s deterrent forces. This new Command reflects the Air Force’s firm and 

unshakable conviction that nuclear deterrence and global strike operations are a 

special trust and unique responsibility. 

The immediate changes may be transparent to many. Eighth and Twentieth Air 

Forces, as well as their subordinate units, have the same commanders and perform 

the same mission as they did before their transfer to AFGSC. Likewise, their personnel perform their duties in accordance with the same technical orders, Air Force 

instructions, directives and checklists as before. 

What is different is they now have an advocate and champion focused solely on 

the common interests and requirements unique to their missions. The Command 

headquarters is populated by personnel who have unique and extensive knowledge 

of and experience with the nuclear deterrence and global strike missions. A high 

level of headquarters expertise and interest is essential to establish and maintain 

a culture of excellence and a climate of discipline in order to provide the Nation 

with a safe, secure and effective deterrent. More focused and detailed AFGSC headquarters oversight of unit operations, along with highly responsive staff, has already 

made a positive impact. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The increased utilization of bomber platforms in the conventional 

role over the last five years and the simultaneous re-emphasis the Air Force is placing on the nuclear enterprise may combine to place real ops tempo stress on airmen 

and their families. With the Air Force having designated fiscal year 2010 as ‘‘Year 

of the Air Force Family’’, what reporting methods, metrics and goals are you implementing to monitor the ops tempo and quality of life for personnel within the bomber enterprise to hopefully avoid over-stressing the force? 

General KLOTZ. AFGSC is establishing programs that recognize exceptional innovation and performance and executing a strategic communication strategy to foster 

personal readiness, morale, and professional development. AFGSC will be conducting periodic self-assessments to define, program, and allocate resources for 

Family Care programs. The Command tracks several key indicators—including retention rates and Aviator Continuation Pay acceptance rates—to help ascertain the 

‘‘health’’ of the force. In addition to health of the force, the AF conducts periodic 

studies and surveys measuring quality-of-life. The data from these studies guide AF 

spending prioritization on quality-of-life programs and initiatives. AFGSC will continue to actively evaluate quality-of-life programs to improve the support we provide 

to airmen and their families. 

Finally, a major priority of AFGSC will be more effective synchronization of exercises and inspections with deployments to ensure adequate readjustment time between events in order to reduce stress on airmen. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Please discuss the rationale for why Air Force nuclear forces in 

the U.S. Air Forces-Europe (USAFE) region are not included in Global Strike Command or the Nuclear Weapons Center? How does the Air Force ensure consistent 

implementation of policy, operational procedures, and standards across these different nuclear organizations? What area(s) do you believe are most challenging for 

your organization? 

General KLOTZ. Air Force nuclear forces in Europe remain under the control of 

USAFE is due to the unique political and operational requirements these weapons 

have within NATO. In addition, the Schlesinger Phase II: Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission report stated in regard to USAFE’s policy, operational procedures, and 

standards: 

USAFE has worked these issues for years, and has demonstrated strong leadership 

in the surety of the nuclear weapons in Europe, always remaining cognizant of host 

nation perspectives. For these reasons, the Task Force recommends that USAFE retain control of the WS3s rather than placing them under the NWC. 

The operational control of the USAFE nuclear forces was discussed in a meeting 

between General Brady (COMUSAFE) and Brigadier General Thomas NWC/CC and 

it was agreed that the nuclear forces in USAFE would remain under the control of 

USAFE. 

The scope of the NWC is further documented within the ‘‘Headquarters United 

States Air Force, Program Action Directive 08–05, Implementation of the Secretary 

of the United States Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff Direction to Execute 
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Phase III of the Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center’s Mission Alignment,’’ which 

states: 

AFNWC assuming responsibility for all CONUS-based, nuclear weapons under the 

custody of the Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO), nuclear cruise missiles and reentry vehicle/system maintenance, storage, accountability, specific handling and control, and select Force Development Evaluation (FDE) functions. 

The Air Force will continue to provide consistent implementation of policy, operational procedures, and standards across these different nuclear organizations 

through the direction and nuclear integration efforts being conducted by A10 and 

the oversight and inspection responsibilities of SAF/IG. The efforts of USAFE and 

those of NWC are providing safe, secure and effective weapons and are adhering to 

all Air Force nuclear policy, operational procedures, and standards. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Most of the reviews conducted subsequent to the mistaken shipment of nuclear weapons from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB in August 2007 identified failures in leadership, training and culture as among the contributing factors 

to the incident. This past October, more than a year after the incident, both the 91st 

Missile Wing Commander and 5th Bomb Wing Commander at Minot were relieved 

of their commands for lack of senior leadership confidence in their ability to lead. 

What are the key challenges to changing the culture at Minot AFB? What can be 

done to assist the new wing commanders there as they seek such changes? 

General KLOTZ. Air Force Global Strike Command is dedicated to assisting subordinate units in successfully accomplishing their missions. AFGSC sees it as a major 

command’s responsibility to provide resources and unambiguous guidance in a way 

that helps them maximize mission effectiveness. 

A key challenge for AFGSC is to restore a force with experience in the nuclear 

mission. Expertise requires time to develop, and the Command has established a 

foundation to support this growth in the years ahead. Within the personnel system, 

the Command has already begun to identify, track, and carefully manage airmen 

with skills in the nuclear enterprise. 

To help restore a culture of excellence in the nuclear enterprise, the AFGSC Commander personally visited each AFGSC base immediately upon assumption of the 

missile and bomber missions. He used these opportunities to provide senior military 

leaders and airmen alike with his philosophy and expectations. The Commander’s 

message emphasized the vitally important role of nuclear deterrence and global 

strike operations, not only to the Nation, but to its friends and allies around the 

world. The credibility of our Nation’s strategic deterrence depends not only on capable systems, but also on elite, highly disciplined airmen who consistently adhere to 

the highest standards. Finally, the Commander reinforced personal responsibility 

and accountability for individual and team performance. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Is the attention on Minot obscuring challenges at other bases? If 

so, please discuss. 

General KLOTZ. No, Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command is intensely 

focused on all six wings assigned to the Command. It proactively monitors operations, maintenance, security and support through daily status briefings, the tracking of key metrics, a reinvigorated inspection process, and an aggressive program 

of base visits by the Commander, Vice Commander, and senior functional staff directors. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. What offices or processes are in place to proactively assess the applications of new technologies to the nuclear enterprise? 

General THOMAS. Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center (AFNWC) is working with Air 

Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) to identify and formalize our Science and 

Technology (S&T) process. AFNWC and AFGSC are working to create an operating 

instruction that includes processes for interfacing with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Department of Energy and other nuclear stakeholders to ensure all 

S&T organizational perspectives are incorporated. 

In addition, many nuclear agencies participate in the ICBM Long-Range Planning 

(ILRP) working groups and conferences. Members of the ILRP include the Headquarters Air Force (HAF), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), AFMC, 

AFNWC, AFGSC, AFRL, Nuclear Wings. There are plans to extend invitations to 

Department of Energy, National Laboratories, industry and academia. The ILRP focuses on looking at near-term, mid-term and long-term sustainment and technology 

capability gaps to determine what’s needed to mitigate these gaps. The ILRP is developing a technology Roadmap that communicates prioritized needs to the S&T 

community. The nuclear community is leveraging existing S&T processes used by 
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Air Force Space Command as a starting point. The nuclear community will take 

best practices to refine the nuclear S&T process. 

The Nuclear S&T Roadmap will prioritize S&T needs based technical risk, Nuclear Master Plan needs, and available funding. AFGSC’s Master Plan will communicate capability needs based on information contained in several sources to include: 

ICBM Master Plan, Weapon System Effectiveness Report, input from the technology 

working group, etc. 

The AFNWC is utilizing the Technology Development and Transition Strategy 

(TDTS) process. This process continuously assesses emerging technology as it matures. It is designed to increase confidence levels for transitioning technology. This 

includes establishing stage gates at certain intervals of the technology maturation 

process. This process includes sustainment, logistical, testing, and business strategy 

considerations from inception to transition. This process ensures the technology 

meets all warfighter considerations prior to fielding. 

Mr. TURNER. What technologies have been considered for process improvements 

since 2008? 

General THOMAS. Technologies are being continually assessed for their utility in 

improving the operation of the Nuclear Enterprise. 

Examples include: 

ICBM Demonstration and Validation: Program goal centers on the preservation 

of ICBM critical skills, technologies, and unique capabilities. The technologies developed during this process will lead to the reduction of technical risks to current and 

future ICBM Systems. This process will also lead to the maturation of technology 

to a point that allows for the transition from lab environment and tech insertion 

into weapon system sustainment and acquisition efforts. Application Areas include: 

Guidance, Propulsion, Reentry Vehicle, Command and Control, and Long-range 

Planning. 

The Air Force has implemented data fusion technology to provide enterprise visibility of NWRM assets in maintenance, supply, contract repair and transportation. 

Key logistics domain systems are being reviewed and mapped to make data from 

each of these systems available for consolidation into a ‘‘fused’’ view enabling visibility of accountable assets by serial number. This data fusion also supports the 

tracking and control of all asset transactions and movements. The PIC Fusion Center is implementing alerts and notifications if assets visibility is lost, serial number 

or inventory balance discrepancies appear, or an asset is late to arrive at its destination when being transported. 

The Air Force is leveraging state-of-art identification technologies and information 

technologies to deploy Positive Inventory Control. All NWRM assets are required to 

implement Unique Item Identification (UII) tagging. The UII machine readable 

markings are being implemented to eliminate human errors in asset identification 

while being handled in maintenance or supply operations. All NWRM packaging requires the application of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. The RFID 

technology enables the verification of inventory and tracking of movements of assets 

across the AF through the use of hand scanners and static portals. (A4) 

Currently the DOD uses the Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear 

Data Services (DIAMONDS) application to track nuclear munitions. Another area 

being examined for process improvement via technology insertion is nuclear weapon 

and Nuclear Weapon Related Materiel (NWRM) inventory tracking. This involves 

combining a suite of technologies and applications on a biometrically secure 

handheld computing device to enable the real-time tracking of nuclear warheads 

and nuclear bombs across all USAF installations. This is expected to significantly 

support the Air Force’s efforts to reinvigorate the Nuclear Surety Mission. 

We are also implementing under the PIC program a commercial off-the-shelf product lifecycle management (PLM) information technology to improve ICBM problem 

reporting and engineering change management processes. This capability will be implemented through spiral releases ultimately providing a modern and secure management capability for critical ICBM configuration management and nuclear data. 

Mr. TURNER. Though there appears to be robust reporting processes in place to 

minimize risk during the movement of nuclear weapons, what technologies are currently being considered, developed, or prototyped in increase ‘positive accountability’ 

of warheads? What steps are being taken to minimize the time required to positively 

account for each and every warhead and report status up the chain-of-command? 

General THOMAS. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) established 

its Sustainment and Integration Center (STIC) to track the kind, condition, count 

and location of all Air Force nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons related material 

(NWRM). The STIC is a 24/7/365 center to track and monitor Positive Inventory 

Control of nuclear weapons and NWRM. The STIC also facilitates communication 
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with key DOD and DOE command centers and provides capabilities to support effective crisis management corrective action responses. 

There are several technologies being considered for positive accountability. This 

includes efforts ranging from ‘‘Commander’s Dashboards’’ to biometrically handheld 

scanners. The AFNWC works with Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Energy, and Air Force Safety Center 

to determine feasibility of new technologies based on current Concept of Operations 

to ensure all operational conditions are considered prior to pursuing new technologies. 

The Center is continually assessing technology in the area of nuclear surety and 

asset tracking. When technology has demonstrated a mature enough Technology 

Readiness Level or becomes commercially available, it will be evaluated in terms of 

its ability to meet the validated needs of AFGSC and the needs of the other members of the Nuclear Enterprise. 

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