UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

NORMAN JAMES THODE, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-10988 

 Honorable Sean F. Cox 

v. Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

_________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [9, 10] 

 Plaintiff Norman Thode (“Thode”) commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), challenging a final decision of defendant Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the 

Social Security Act (the “Act”). Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which have 

been referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B). 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) conclusion that Thode is not disabled under the Act. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment 

[10] be GRANTED, Thode’s motion for summary judgment [9] be DENIED and, pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

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II. REPORT 

A. Procedural History 

 On February 25, 2010, Thode filed his initial application for DIB, alleging a disability 

onset date of January 1, 2008. (Tr. 86). The claims were initially denied on July 13, 2010. (Id.). 

Thereafter, Thode filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, which was held on April 

6, 2011 before ALJ Mary Ann Poulose. (Tr. 54-82). Thode, who was represented by attorney 

William K. Christie, testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Glee Ann L. Kehr. (Id.). In 

a written decision dated June 13, 2011, the ALJ determined that Thode is not disabled. (Tr. 86-

95). On December 28, 2011, the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 99-104). 

 On February 17, 2012, Thode filed the instant application for DIB, alleging a disability 

onset date of June 14, 2011. (Tr. 10, 105). The claims were initially denied on August 20, 2012. 

(Tr. 118). Thode then filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, which was held on 

September 4, 2013 before ALJ Charles Woode. (Tr. 27-53). Thode, who was then represented 

by attorney Robert Gaecke, testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Zachary A. 

Matthews. (Id.). In a written decision dated October 22, 2013, the ALJ determined that Thode is 

not disabled. (Tr. 10-21). On January 26, 2015, the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-4). 

Thode filed for judicial review of the final decision on March 16, 2015. (Doc. #1). 

B. Framework for Disability Determinations 

 Under the Act, DIB and SSI are available only for those who have a “disability.” See 

Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines “disability” in relevant 

part as the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

 The Commissioner’s regulations provide that a disability is to be determined through the 

application of a five-step sequential analysis: 

Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity, benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities,” benefits are denied without 

further analysis. 

Step Three: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, 

has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, 

and the severe impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 

the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled 

regardless of age, education, or work experience. 

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work, 

benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Five: Even if claimant is unable to perform his or her past relevant 

work, if other work exists in the national economy that plaintiff can 

perform, in view of his or her age, education, and work experience, 

benefits are denied. 

Schueuneman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-10593, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150240, at *21 

(E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920); see also Heston v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). “The burden of proof is on the claimant 

throughout the first four steps . . . [i]f the analysis [then] reaches the fifth step without a finding 

that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the [defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health 

& Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 

C. Background 

 1. Disability and Function Reports 

 In an undated disability report, Thode indicated that he suffers from carpal tunnel 

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syndrome, heart problems, high blood pressure, stomach issues, muscle problems, diabetes, 

herniated discs in his back, and learning disabilities. (Tr. 236). Thode reported that he stopped 

working on January 31, 2009, as a result of these conditions. (Id.). With respect to his education 

level, Thode completed the eleventh grade and did not pursue a trade or any specialized job 

training. (Tr. 237). Prior to stopping work, Thode was employed as a roofing and construction 

worker. (Id.). Thode identified several medical facilities that had treated him for the foregoing 

physical and mental impairments. (Tr. 239-240). At the time of the report, Thode was taking 

multiple medications including Tramadol (for pain), Vicodin (for back pain), Zofran (for 

stomach problems), Robaxin (for muscle pain), Lisinoril (for blood pressure), Citalopram (for 

depression) and Tradonze (for insomnia). (Tr. 239). 

 In a function report dated April 25, 2012, Thode stated that he lives in a house with his 

family. (Tr. 254). When asked to describe how his conditions have limited his ability to work, 

Thode indicated that, “I have pain in my back, legs, arms and hands. Doing anything over and 

over or for a short period of time I get pain. I fall asleep throughout [the] day. I can’t lift or 

bend without pain. I am forgetful, very irritable and anxious. My sleep at night is not good.” 

(Tr. 254). As for daily activities, Thode reported that he “watch[es] television and sleeps 

throughout the day.” (Tr. 255). Thode listed his medications as follows: Vicodin ES, Ultram, 

Celexa, Lisinopril, Neurontin, Trazadone, Robaxin, Aspirin, and Ibuprofen. (Tr. 261). When 

asked to describe what he could perform before the onset of his conditions that he can no longer 

perform, Thode reported that he could no longer “work an eight-hour day and not have pain, I 

could be at work on time, do work safely, dress myself without help, walk, work on cars lift 

transmissions, motors – play with my kids.” (Tr. 255). His conditions also interfere with his 

sleep and he sometimes wakes up with pain. (Id.). 

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 Thode noted that he needs assistance while dressing himself; his wife helps him bathe his 

back, legs, and feet; and he must sit down after a few minutes of shaving (Id.). Thode recounted 

that his wife ensures that he maintains his personal hygiene and reminds him to take his 

medicine. (Tr. 256). When he does cook, Thode generally makes sandwiches, microwave items, 

and snacks. (Id.). He reported that he is able to perform minor repairs around his home, but 

“nothing too heavy or [that] takes [a] long time” as he cannot bend or lift. (Tr. 256-57). Thode 

stated that his son performs most of the household chores. (Tr. 256). 

 Thode is able to drive a car for short distances (approximately one or two miles) and go 

outside alone. (Tr. 257). Thode’s wife usually shops for groceries although he will go on 

monthly trips to the drug store. (Id.). Thode reported that he is unable to handle a savings 

account or use a checkbook because he cannot read or write well. (Id.). He indicated, however, 

that he can count change up to 20 dollars. (Id.). Thode reported that he can no longer work on 

cars as a hobby. (Tr. 258). In regards to social activities, Thode reported that he visits his 

grandchildren two to three times per week. (Id.). His main activities are going to his son’s house 

and doctors’ appointments. (Id.). He indicated that he does not get along with his neighbors and 

that he does not have patience for family members. (Tr. 259). 

When asked to identify functions impacted by his conditions, Thode checked lifting, 

squatting, bending, standing, walking, sitting, kneeling, stair climbing, memory, completing 

tasks, concentration, understanding, following instructions, using her hands, and getting along 

with others. (Id.). He cannot lift more than 10 pounds or repetitively bend or squat. (Id.). Thode 

stated that he is “a special ed. Person so I don’t read, write well at all. I talk with a lisp and I get 

frustrated.” (Id.). He is able to walk 20-30 feet before he needs to stop and rest for five to ten 

minutes. (Id.). Thode noted that he is able to concentrate depending on his daily pain level; he 

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does not complete tasks; he has difficulty following written instructions; he has difficulty 

following spoken instructions; he does not get along with authority figures; he does not handle 

changes in routine well; and he does not handle stress well. (Tr. 260). Thode also expressed 

paranoid fears that his neighbors are always watching him. (Id.). 

2. Thode’s Testimony 

At the time of the September 4, 2013 hearing before the ALJ, Thode was living at home 

with his wife and youngest child. (Tr. 35). He testified that he had been placed in special 

education classes from the sixth grade until he left school after the eleventh grade. (Id.). Thode 

noted that he has significant problems with reading, math, and writing. (Tr. 35-36). He could not 

specifically remember when he stopped working, but he believed it was sometime in 2008. (Tr. 

36). At his last job, Thode was only able to work four days a week because of problems with his 

back and legs. (Id.). Thode stated that he cannot sit or stand for more than a half hour and that he 

cannot bend, stoop, or twist. (Tr. 37). He reported that he suffers from, among other things, 

“spurs and arthritis and stuff in my back and a herniated disc . . . and bad muscle cramps in my 

legs.” (Tr. 37-38). Thode also indicated that, at the time of the hearing, he was suffering from 

pain in his lower left hip. (Id.). 

On direct examination, Thode recounted that he suffered from worsening insomnia, leg 

pain, and back pain since his prior hearing. (Tr. 39). In addition, Thode had recently been 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder, although he testified to exhibiting symptoms of bipolarity in the 

summer of 2011 and at his past work in 2008. (Tr. 40-41). He indicated that he had been 

dismissed from other jobs due to his behavioral issues. (Tr. 41-42). Thode stated that he could 

no longer perform many of the household chores to which he was accustomed. (Tr. 42). His 

depression also worsened after his initial claim for benefits had been denied in June 2011. (Tr. 

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43). As a result, he did not believe that he could work at a job for eight hours a day, five days a 

week due to his mental and physical impairments. (Tr. 47). 

3. Medical Evidence

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the record, and will discuss the relevant medical 

evidence within the analysis portion of this Report and Recommendation. 

 4. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

 Zachary A. Matthews testified as an independent vocational expert (“VE”). (Tr. 49-52). 

The ALJ initially asked the VE to describe Thode’s past relevant work. (Tr. 50). The VE 

responded that Thode performed work as a roofer (skilled with a medium exertional level) and a 

construction worker (unskilled with a heavy exertional level). (Id.). The ALJ posed several 

hypotheticals to the VE, which were progressively more restrictive. (Tr. 50-52). First, the ALJ 

asked the VE to imagine a claimant of Thode’s age, education, and work experience, who was 

limited to medium work; occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, climbing (ramps, 

stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds) and could remember simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. (Tr. 

50). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual would be unable to perform Thode’s past 

relevant work as a roofer or construction worker, but could perform the positions of sorter 

(115,000 jobs nationwide; 5,200 jobs regionally); assembler (272,000 jobs nationwide; 10,000 

jobs regionally); and bagger (256,000 jobs nationwide; 7,500 regionally). (Tr. 51-52). The ALJ 

then inquired as to whether the hypothetical individual would be able to perform any work if 

“due to a combination of impairments, the individual would be unable to work for eight hours a 

day, five days a week or [an] equivalent work schedule.” (Tr. 52). The VE answered that such a 

limitation would be work preclusive and added that his testimony comported with the Dictionary 

of Occupational Titles and his professional experience. (Tr. 52). 

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D. The ALJ’s Findings 

Following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Thode is not disabled 

under the Act. At Step One, the ALJ found that Thode had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity from the alleged onset date of June 14, 2011. (Tr. 12). At Step Two, the ALJ found that 

Thode has the severe impairments of bulging disc in the lumbar spine, dysthymia, phonological 

disorder and cognitive impairment. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Thode’s 

impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a 

listed impairment. (Tr. 14-16). The ALJ then assessed Thode’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”), concluding that he is capable of performing medium work with the following 

limitations: occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and occasional 

climbing of stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 16). The ALJ noted that Thode can 

understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine and repetitive tasks. (Id.). 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Thode is unable to perform any past relevant 

work. (Tr. 19-20). At Step Five, based in part on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that 

Thode is capable of performing a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. 

(Tr. 20-21). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Thode is not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 21). 

E. Standard of Review 

 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final administrative 

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the 

Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the 

Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 

591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 

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647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f an agency has failed to adhere to its own procedures, we will not 

remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced on the 

merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s procedural lapses.”) (internal 

quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the Court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

 When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial evidence, the Court 

is limited to an examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. Bass, 499 

F.3d at 512-13; Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). 

The Court “may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the 

Appeals Council,” or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Thode v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either 

the ALJ or this Court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “an ALJ can consider 

all evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted 

by a party.”) (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter 

differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. 

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Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). 

F. Analysis 

At Step Three of his analysis, the ALJ concluded that “the ‘paragraph C’ criteria of 

listing 12.05 were not met because [Thode] did not have a valid verbal, performance, or full 

scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function.” (Tr. 16). Before this Court, Thode advances 

only one argument: that the ALJ erred in concluding that he does not meet the criteria for Listing 

12.05 (Intellectual Disability). (Doc. #9 at 4-10). Thode’s Step Three argument is potentially 

dispositive because an adult whose impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of a Listing 

is presumed to be under a disability and is granted benefits without further evaluation. See 

Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 649 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc). For the reasons 

discussed below, however, the Court finds that Thode’s argument lacks merit. 

Listing 12.05 describes the elements necessary to establish disability based on intellectual 

disability. The ALJ’s conclusion that Thode does not meet the criteria of Listing 12.05(C) is at 

issue in this case. That provision states, in relevant part: 

Intellectual disability refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual 

functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested 

during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or 

supports onset of the impairment before age 22. 

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the 

requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied. 

* * * 

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.05. Therefore, in order to satisfy Listing 12.05(C), 

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Thode must show: (1) that he experiences significantly subaverage general intellectual 

functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested prior to age 22 (i.e., the 

diagnostic description); (2) that he has a “valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 

through 70”; and (3) that he suffers from “a physical or other mental impairment imposing an 

additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” See West v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 

240 F. App’x 692, 697-98 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Thode specifically contends that “[t]he ALJ’s decision is deficient because it fails to 

address the first requirement of Listing 12.05(C): whether plaintiff met the diagnostic description 

in the introductory paragraph.” (Doc. #9 at 6). This argument is unavailing for two reasons. 

 First, the ALJ did, in fact, discuss whether Thode met the criteria set forth in the 

introductory paragraph to Listing 12.05(C), and her finding that he did not is supported by 

substantial evidence. After acknowledging that Thode “did receive [IQ] scores within the 

identified range (Verbal Intelligence 68, Full Scale 67) and does have other severe physical and 

mental impairments,” the ALJ found that “his ability to engage in substantial gainful activity 

indicates that the claimant does not have deficits that rise to listing-level severity.” (Tr. 16). In 

other words, the ALJ concluded that Thode’s past demonstrated ability to perform substantial 

gainful activity (some of which he performed at the skilled level) precluded a finding that he 

suffered from “deficits in adaptive functioning” as required under the introductory paragraph to 

Listing 12.05(C). See Cooper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 217 F. App’x 450, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that the performance of semiskilled work did not comport with Listing 12.05(C) 

requirements); Carter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-804, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40828, at *18 

(W.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s ability to perform substantial gainful activity is relevant 

to whether she had the deficits in adaptive functioning necessary to meet listing 12.05’s 

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diagnostic description.”). 

Second, Thode ignores the fact that ALJ Mary Ann Poulose, who conducted the prior 

April 6, 2011 hearing, already determined that he did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of Listing 12.05(C). In her June 13, 2011 

written decision, ALJ Poulose concluded that Thode had not met the requirements of Listing 

12.05(C) because: 

[a]lthough the claimant achieved a verbal IQ score of 68 and full-scale IQ 

score of 67, and has other severe physical and mental impairments, a 

review of his earning records reveals the claimant was able to engage in 

substantial gainful activity, within the meaning of the Regulations, despite 

his limitations. The undersigned finds the claimant’s ability to engage in 

substantial gainful activity indicates that the claimant does not experience 

deficits in his adaptive functioning. 

(Tr. 91). Thus, in the absence of “new and material evidence” to the contrary, any 

reconsideration of this same issue would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See SSAR 98-

4(6), 1998 SSR LEXIS 5, at *9 (Jun. 1, 1998) (“When adjudicating a subsequent disability claim 

with an unadjudicated period arising under the same title of the Act as the prior claim, 

adjudicators must adopt such a finding from the final decision by an ALJ or the Appeals Council 

on the prior claim in determining whether the claimant is disabled with respect to the 

unadjudicated period unless there is new and material evidence relating to such a finding . . .”); 

see also Partin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-74, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140526, at *10 (E.D. 

Ky. Sep. 30, 2013) (applying res judicata to a prior Listing 12.05(C) determination even though 

the ALJ did not expressly state “her intent to rely on res judicata in the section devoted to the 

Step Three analysis . . .”). 

 In this regard, Thode fails to highlight any new and material evidence in the record that 

would otherwise alter the original analysis under Listing 12.05(C). Even in response to the ALJ 

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Charles Woode’s inquiry, Thode’s counsel admitted that he could not identify “any particular 

medical record” to support the conclusion that Thode satisfied all of the elements in the 

introductory paragraph to Listing 12.05(C). (Tr. 31). And notably, Leonard C. Balunas, Ph.D., 

the state agency consultant, opined that “[t]here were no material changes” in between the date 

of the prior June 13, 2011 decision and December 31, 2011, the date Thode was last insured. (Tr. 

112). 

 Moreover, to the extent Thode submitted additional medical evidence in the form of 

Hassan Almaat, M.D.’s June 14, 2012 psychiatric evaluation (Tr. 461-62), the report does not 

establish that Thode met the requirements of the introductory paragraph to Listing 12.05(C). 

While Dr. Almaat diagnosed Thode with bipolar affective disorder and indicated that his 

“[j]udgment and insight were poor to fair,” he found that Thode’s “[t]hought process was 

coherent” and that his “[c]ognition was intact.” (Tr. 462). 

In sum, the doctrine of res judiciata bars reconsideration of ALJ Poulose’s finding that 

Thode did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 

the severity of Listing 12.05(C). 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s motion 

for summary judgment [10] be GRANTED, Thode’s motion for summary judgment [9] be 

DENIED, and the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

 

Dated: November 24, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir.1991); United 

States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir.1981). The filing of objections which raise 

some issues, but fail to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 931 

F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 

1373 (6th Cir.1987). Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be 

served upon this magistrate judge. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on November 24, 2015. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager

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