THE PEACE PROCESS, PHASE ONE:

PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FUTURE CONCERNS

Stephen C. Pelletiere

Editor

January 3, 1997
ii

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iii

FOREWORD

This report grew out of a conference on the Mideast Peace

Process that the Strategic Studies Institute held with North

Georgia College at the latter's Dahlonega, Georgia, campus in

March 1996. At the time of the conference, Israel's Prime

Minister Itzak Rabin had already been assassinated, and his

successor, Shimon Peres, had called for new elections.

Almost all of the participants at the conference felt

confident there would be a peace settlement before October 1996.

This was a confidence built on the widely held conviction that,

with so many powerful players calling for peace, it must come.

Instead, the Israeli referendum on peace--as Peres dubbed the

elections--turned out to be a victory for Israel's Likud Party,

whose leader, Benyamin Netanyahu, had repudiated many of the

provisions of the agreements reached to that time.

It is not known what course the peace process will take or

even if it will continue. There is a danger, despite the best

efforts of the United States and the resumption of

IsraeliPalestinian talks, that we will see a period marked by

political stalemate, likely accompanied by increasing violence.

The three essays which follow, however, take stock of

several key aspects of what can now be considered the first phase

of the Mideast Peace Process (i.e., that period from the 1991

Madrid Conference to the 1996 Israeli election).

In the first essay, Alfred B. Prados examines the JordanianIsraeli peace agreement, which vies with the Israeli-Palestinian

accords as the most positive development of the first phase.

Prados outlines the history and terms of this landmark agreement.

His concluding observations about the risks King Hussein has

taken are even more salient in today's context.

Next, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Gotowicki assesses in

detail the issue of deploying U.S. troops on the Golan Heights.

Recent Israeli and Syrian statements seem to have doomed any near

term Golan arrangement (and hence an Israeli-Syrian settlement).

However, should the peace process with Syria suddenly resume,

expectations of the United States could be even greater, and a

U.S. Army peacekeeping mission would become the topic of intense

debate in Washington.

Finally, Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere's study of Operation

GRAPES OF WRATH looks at possible Israeli and Syrian motives

underlying the violent exchanges in April 1996 in southern

Lebanon. His analysis does not augur well for what lies ahead on

the peace front. U.S. policymakers must move quickly to exploit--

or at least to try to control--developments in the Syria-Lebanon
iv

tangle of relations.

These three essays, then, illuminate different pieces--

Jordan, the Golan, Lebanon--of the large tapestry of a peace

process whose final dimensions are not clear, or, for that

matter, certain of completion. What is clear are the high stakes

for U.S. diplomacy and national security interests attendant on

the outcome.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
1

JORDAN AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Alfred B. Prados

Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948,

Jordan has been the linchpin in long-standing efforts to resolve

the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among Arab states, Jordan has the

longest border with Israel and hosts the largest number of

displaced Palestinians. Until 1967, Jordan governed the principal

portion of pre-1948 Palestine that remained in Arab hands after

the 1948 war, namely the West Bank territory including eastern

Jerusalem. Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel in 1967, and King

Hussein formally severed Jordan's administrative ties to the West

Bank in 1988; however, in practice, the future of Jordan and the

fate of the Palestinian community have remained closely linked.

This linkage between Jordan and the Palestinian community

has seriously circumscribed King Hussein's freedom of maneuver in

negotiating with Israel. The king has always felt a special

responsibility toward his Palestinian subjects and toward the

Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, some of which he continued to

administer even after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

With more than half of his population of Palestinian origin, the

king has had to measure any concession he might offer Israel

against the weight of public opinion in Jordan. To a large

degree, Jordanian steps toward negotiation with Israel have had

to move in tandem with the Palestinian leadership.

The problem for King Hussein has been compounded by the

vulnerabilities of Jordan's geographic position sandwiched

between Israel and the neighboring Arab states of Syria, Iraq,

and Saudi Arabia. Syria and Iraq, governed by left-leaning

socialist regimes sometimes hostile to Jordan, have opposed

negotiations with Israel in the past, at least on terms the

latter would be likely to accept. Both Arab states have mounted

direct military threats to Jordan on previous occasions. Saudi

Arabia, a source of much needed financial support to Jordan in

the past, has not opposed negotiations in principle but does not

countenance separate peace arrangements and is sensitive to any

settlement that might forfeit Muslim interests in Jerusalem.

Hussein, on his part, is well aware that he is surrounded by

militarily stronger neighbors and that his economy heavily

depends on foreign aid. Consequently, he has had to avoid actions

that would unduly provoke Israel on the one hand, and policies

that appeared to stray too far from the Arab consensus on the

other.

With these constraints, it is remarkable that Jordan has

emerged as the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with

Israel. Even more remarkable is King Hussein's determination to

build a "warm peace" with Israel in contrast to the chilly
2

relations that have prevailed between Israel and Egypt since the

conclusion of their peace treaty in 1979. To do this, the king

will have to harness a somewhat reluctant Jordanian public,

withstand likely criticism (and possibly more active opposition)

from Syria and several other regional states, and perhaps deal

with a future Israeli government less inclined to accommodate

Jordanian and other Arab concerns. King Hussein's ability to

achieve this goal may be the ultimate test of his skill in

governing a small but sometimes fractious kingdom and maintaining

its security in an unfamiliar and changing environment.

A brief summary of Jordanian involvement in the Arab-Israeli

peacemaking process may shed some light on the development of

Jordanian-Israeli relations in the years ahead. The story of

Jordan's role encompasses several phases, which will be covered

below: the early--and largely abortive--history of peace efforts

between Israel and Jordan; a 2-year negotiating process under a

U.S.-Russian sponsored process that began in 1991; the rapid

conclusion of bilateral agreements in 1993 and 1994; and the

process of establishing normal relations between Jordan and

Israel, arguably the most intricate and demanding task facing

Jordan's leaders.

Early Peace Efforts.

Direct, open Jordanian negotiations with Israel are of

recent vintage, beginning in 1991 with Jordan's acceptance of the

negotiating framework proposed by then U.S. President George

Bush. Jordanian involvement in peace moves, however, is as old as

the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. Even before the initial ArabIsraeli war in 1948, Jordan's founder, King Abdullah, had

contacts with Israeli emissary (later prime minister) Golda Meir

in an unsuccessful effort to head off the impending conflict.

According to unofficial reports, King Hussein (King Abdullah's

grandson, who acceded to the throne in May 1953) had private

contacts with Israeli leaders long before public negotiations

began in 1991.1

 For the first 38 years of Hussein's reign,

domestic and regional considerations precluded a direct

negotiating forum between Jordan and Israel. Nonetheless, this

period witnessed some significant indirect steps along the road

to formal negotiations between the two countries.

Israel's territorial gains in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,

including its occupation of the West Bank territory which Jordan

had governed since 1948, created a new set of conditions that

have formed the backdrop for subsequent developments in ArabIsraeli affairs. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution

242 of November 22, 1967, which stipulated return of occupied

territories in exchange for peace and mutual recognition,

provided a framework for subsequent Arab-Israeli negotiations.
3

Jordan, like Egypt, accepted the resolution in the context of a

comprehensive peace but dismissed any proposals for a separate

peace with Israel as "neither possible nor sensible."2 Until

1993, a two-fold principle formed the cornerstone of Jordan's

position on Arab-Israeli negotiations--acceptance of a peace

agreement based on the return of Arab territories occupied by

Israel, but only as part of a comprehensive settlement accepted

by all parties including the Palestinians.

Jordan was prepared to press the envelope of these

constraints in an effort to find negotiating opportunities with

Israel, sometimes at the risk of domestic and regional

opposition. Between September 1970 and July 1971, the Jordan

Armed Forces suppressed armed Palestinian guerrillas who for 3

years had launched cross-border raids against Israel and defied

Jordanian governmental authority. In taking this step, King

Hussein reestablished a quiet border with Israel, but his actions

were widely decried in the Arab world and the Palestinian

community. In 1972, he presented a proposal for a "Unified Arab

Kingdom," which would consist of two loosely federated states,

the Jordanian East Bank and the Palestinian West Bank, under the

central authority of the Hashemite monarchy. This proposal, which

largely would have restored the situation that existed before

1967, was not acceptable to Israel and was condemned by Syria,

Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO). In 1982 the king praised U.S. President Ronald Reagan's

plan for Arab-Israeli negotiations as "positive" and

"constructive,"3 and in February 1985 he reached tentative

agreement with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat on a joint negotiating

strategy with Israel. Syria and several radical Palestinian

organizations condemned the Hussein-Arafat agreement as a U.S.-

Israeli inspired plot, and it collapsed a year later.4

With rare exceptions, however, Hussein has not been prepared

to abandon the Arab consensus in pursuing negotiations with

Israel. In November 1994, at an Arab summit conference held in

Rabat, Morocco, the king reluctantly endorsed the decision of the

conferees to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the

Palestinian people, thereby weakening Jordan's ability to

negotiate Palestinian and West Bank issues.5

 Demonstrating once

again his opposition to separate peace arrangements, King Hussein

joined most other Arab leaders in condemning the 1978 Camp David

Accords, which led to a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.

Camp David also envisioned a role for Jordan and Egypt in a

proposal for Palestinian autonomy, which Hussein and other Arabs

viewed as deficient in meeting Palestinian aspirations. In 1988,

acceding to "the PLO's desire and the general Arab orientation"

for Palestinian self-determination, King Hussein announced the

disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank.6 Finally, Jordan's

growing rapprochement with Iraq in the 1980s, though mainly

related to economic considerations and mutual concerns over Iran,
4

had the effect of increasing Jordanian tensions with Israel and

associating King Hussein indirectly with the strident antiIsraeli posture adopted by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the

eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

The Gulf and Its Aftershocks.

Jordan's refusal to join the allied coalition after the

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its sympathetic posture toward Iraq

resulted in one of the most serious crises in the country's

history. Though popular among Jordanians (especially those of

Palestinian origin) and supported by public opinion in many parts

of the Middle East, King Hussein's perceived tilt toward Iraq

alienated important allies in the Arab world and the West. Saudi

Arabia and other Gulf states terminated subsidies to Jordan

(running at approximately $450 to $500 million) and expelled over

300,000 Jordanian expatriate workers, who consequently were no

longer able to send back a portion of their earnings to Jordan,

creating yet another burden on the Jordanian economy. Tourism,

which provided approximately $500 million in 1989, virtually

disappeared. Politically, Jordan was shunned not only by the Gulf

states but by several other Arab members of the allied coalition,

notably Egypt. The United States, angered by Jordan's stand,

suspended a total of $105 million in economic and military

assistance to it during fiscal years 1991 and 1992 although these

funds were gradually released in 1993.

With the defeat of Iraq, Jordan had two principal options in

seeking to restore relationships injured by the Gulf crisis: a

clear-cut reversal of its former support for Iraq or a revival of

previous Arab-Israeli peacemaking endeavors. The two approaches

were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and, in fact, King

Hussein has pursued both of them, albeit at different paces,

since 1991. An immediate Jordanian move to sever relations with

Iraq, however, was economically unfeasible at the time in view of

the many commercial links that remained between the two

countries; among other things, Jordan continued to depend on Iraq

to meet its oil needs of 60,000-75,000 barrels per day since

Saudi Arabia had cut off oil supply to Jordan. The other option,

cooperation in peacemaking with Israel, offered no immediate

prospects of an improvement in Jordanian relations with Gulf

states, but it would be welcomed in the United States, which

recognized that Jordanian participation was essential in seeking

resolution of several core Arab-Israeli issues, notably the

Palestinian problem.

Bilateral Talks and Agreements.

In the summer of 1991, a major Arab-Israeli peacemaking

initiative designed by then U.S. President George Bush and
5

Secretary of State James A. Baker provided Jordan with an avenue

of escape from its diplomatic and economic isolation. Even before

President Bush and then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued

a joint invitation to an international peace conference, King

Hussein informally signalled Jordan's willingness to attend.7

Even more important than this early acceptance was King Hussein's

offer to facilitate the negotiating process by providing an

"umbrella" for a Palestinian delegation in the form of a joint

Jordanian-Palestinian team (the only format acceptable to Israel

at that time for inclusion of Palestinian representatives). This

formula of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was

maintained during two years of bilateral negotiations that

followed the opening conference held in Madrid on October 30,

1991. As time went on, however, the Jordanian and Palestinian

components of the delegation began to conduct their meetings with

Israelis in a separate format. Meanwhile, secret contacts between

Israeli and Palestinian negotiators outside the framework of the

U.S.-Russian sponsored bilateral talks led to the landmark

Declaration of Principles signed by then Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat in Washington on September

13, 1993.

The historic Israeli-Palestinian agreement caught King

Hussein by surprise and confronted him with an altered set of

circumstances. At first, he expressed irritation that Jordan had

not been consulted, particularly in view of Jordan's efforts to

coordinate its peacemaking activities with the Palestinians. He

seems to have realized quickly, however, that this unexpected

development provided him with unprecedented opportunities: first,

his peacemaking strategy need be encumbered no longer with the

burden of supervising a joint Jordanian-Palestinian effort; and

second, the unprecedented recognition of the state of Israel by

Arafat gave Jordan essential political cover to pursue its own

moves with Israel. In addition, the king seems to have realized

that further progress in peacemaking might help unlock doors to

international economic assistance. Although the United States had

released previously suspended aid funds to Jordan by mid-1993,

the country faced a debt of over $7 billion (almost twice

Jordan's gross domestic product) with no outlook for continued

aid at a significant level. These considerations imparted fresh

momentum to Jordanian-Israeli talks which subsequently resulted

in three milestone agreements.

The Common Agenda. The first Jordanian-Israeli agreement was

already in the making by the time Arafat and the late Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met on the White House lawn. In

actuality, by late 1992 Jordanian and Israeli negotiators had

drafted an agenda and formed five working groups to deal with

principal bilateral issues. On September 14, the day after the

Israelis and Palestinians signed their declaration, the heads of

the Jordanian and Israeli delegations with much less fanfare
6

signed their so-called "common agenda," which listed issues to be

addressed by both sides with the goal of achieving a just,

lasting, and comprehensive peace among the Arab states, the

Palestinians, and Israel as per the Madrid invitation. Shortly

afterward, in the the highest level official contact between the

two countries so far, Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan met with then

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in Washington on October 1

and agreed with their U.S. hosts on the formation of a tripartite

commission to discuss economic cooperation.

The Non-Belligerency Declaration. Once again, progress on

the Israeli-Palestinian track coupled with prospects of economic

benefits to Jordan gave added impetus to Israeli-Jordanian

negotiations. On May 4, 1994, Israeli and Palestinian

representatives reached agreement on the terms of a Palestinian

self-rule regime to begin in Gaza and Jericho. During the

following month, U.S. President Clinton promised King Hussein

that he would work to obtain debt relief for Jordan, presumably

in recognition of Jordan's peacemaking role. Concurrently with

these developments, there was an increase in the frequency and

level of Jordanian-Israeli contacts. On July 9, King Hussein

stated in a speech to the Jordanian parliament that he was ready

to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin if such a meeting would

advance the interests of Jordan. Six days later, President

Clinton announced that the Jordanian monarch and the Israeli

prime minister would meet in Washington, stating that this

historic meeting is another step forward toward achievement of a

comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.

On July 25, in the first public contact between the

Jordanian monarch and a top Israeli official, King Hussein and

Prime Minister Rabin signed a declaration at the White House. The

terms of the declaration expanded on those of the 1993 Common

Agenda and included the following highlights: termination of the

state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel; negotiations to

end economic boycotts; establishment of communications, electric,

and air links; establishment of border crossings; Israeli

agreement to respect Jordan's historic role in administering

Islamic holy places in Jerusalem; and further negotiations toward

a full-fledged peace treaty. The two leaders addressed a joint

session of the U.S. Congress the same day. Congress responded by

enacting legislation to forgive a portion of Jordan's debt to the

United States (see below), but accompanying congressional

statements suggested that a final peace treaty (as well as

Jordan's compliance with economic sanctions against Iraq) would

be a factor in further debt forgiveness.

The Peace Treaty. This time the two countries moved more

rapidly to consummate their movement toward peace. On October 17,

Jordanian Prime Minister Abd al-Salam al-Majali and Israeli Prime

Minister Yitzhak Rabin initialed a peace treaty, which the two
7

officials subsequently signed at a ceremony held on the

Jordanian-Israeli border on October 26. President Clinton and

5,000 notables from various countries witnessed the occasion. The

120-member Israeli Knesset (parliament) ratified the treaty by a

vote of 105-3 with six abstentions on October 25. On November 6,

the 80-member Jordanian lower house of parliament endorsed the

treaty by a vote of 56-23 with one absentee. The royally

appointed Senate endorsed it by a vote of 33-0 with one

abstention and six absentees, and ratification became final with

the king's signature on November 10.

The treaty, which consists of 30 articles and five annexes,

stipulates that peace is established between the two countries

"effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification

of this Treaty" (Article 1). The treaty provides for recognition

of each other's sovereignty, borders, and political independence

(Article 2); demarcation of borders within nine months of the

treaty's signature (Article 3); refraining from threats or use of

force against each other (Article 4); exchange of ambassadors

within one month of treaty ratification (Article 5); water

sharing arrangements (Article 6); freedom of access to religious

shrines and respect for Jordan's historic role regarding Muslim

holy places in Jerusalem (Article 9); repeal of discriminatory

legislation (Articles 11 and 26); and a number of provisions

covering cooperation in economic, administrative, scientific, and

cultural fields.

One interesting aspect of the treaty concerned the

demarcation of borders. Aside from the West Bank, which did not

figure prominently in the treaty negotiations, territorial issues

between Jordan and Israel were minor, consisting of several small

border areas that Jordan claimed Israel had occupied through

various encroachments between 1948 and 1967, amounting to

approximately 340 square kilometers. Under Annex I of the treaty,

Israel agreed to return these areas to Jordan; however, the

parties agreed on an arrangement whereby Jordan will allow

Israeli landowners and farmers continued use of two small

enclaves within this territory for a 25-year period. This leaseback arrangement, which is renewable after 25 years, has been

singled out for special criticism by opponents of the peace

treaty as an unnecessary territorial concession to Israel.

Prospects for Durable Peace.

What are the prospects for a viable and durable peace 

between Jordan and Israel? In an effort to answer this question,

it would be useful to examine four more specific ones. First,

what has Jordan gained from the peace treaty with Israel? Second,

how strong is internal support in Jordan for normalization with

Israel and other recent shifts in official Jordanian policy?
8

Third, what degree of support can Jordan expect from its other

neighbors in the Middle East for its role in the peacemaking

process? Fourth, what effect will future arrangements to resolve

the Palestinian question have on Jordan's role in peacemaking

with Israel?

Gains to Jordan. The fruits of peace for Jordan are

difficult to assess. Some limited benefits will accrue to Jordan

through recent agreement with Israel in the form of civil air

access, preferential trade arrangements, and revenues from

tourism. Although Israeli tourists have begun to visit Jordan on

short trips, so far they have not proved to be heavy spenders.

The removal of trade barriers could be a double-edged sword;

Jordanians, like other Arabs, are uneasy over the possibility

that their economy could be dominated by that of their stronger

neighbor. Israeli willingness to accept tariff provisions

weighted in Jordan's favor may reflect Israel's understanding of

Jordanian concerns and its realization that Jordan is a vital

link in Israeli economic access to the farther reaches of the

Middle East.

Beyond the potential economic benefits of open borders,

Jordanian leaders hoped that peace with Israel would lead to an

influx of foreign aid, particularly from the United States. They

have recognized reluctantly, however, that, in an era of

budgetary constraints, there is little likelihood that Jordan

will realize a peace dividend on the scale that accrued to Israel

and Egypt after their peace treaty in 1979. A few comparative

figures illustrate the lowered expectations to which Jordan must

adjust. For the first fiscal year following their peace treaty,

Israel and Egypt received $2.4 billion and $1.7 billion,

respectively, in U.S. economic and military aid, and by 1985

their respective annual aid levels had risen to $3.0 and $2.1

billion, where they have remained ever since. Jordan, on the

other hand, was allocated $59.2 million in economic and military

aid in 1996, the first fiscal year after the Jordanian-Israeli

peace treaty; moreover, there is no outlook for an appreciable

increase in the 1996 level as Congress continues to tighten

foreign aid. But Jordan has received two other significant

benefits in the form of debt relief and a modest military

modernization package.

In mid-1994, on the eve of Jordan's peace treaty with

Israel, the country faced an external debt of approximately $6.4

billion, 109 percent of its gross national product at the time;8

of this amount, an estimated $702.3 million was owed to the

United States.9 In their discussions with U.S. counterparts,

Jordanian leaders emphasized the three-fold importance to Jordan

of debt relief by the United States: to foster popular support

for a peace treaty by creating a climate favorable for foreign

investment with accompanying economic benefits; to help convince
9

other international creditors to follow suit; and to demonstrate

to Syria and the Palestinians the credibility of U.S. commitments

in support of the peace process. On June 22, President Clinton

promised King Hussein to seek forgiveness of Jordan's debt to the

United States and encourage other countries to alleviate Jordan's

debt burden. Congress, increasingly friendly toward Jordan after

it signed the July 25 Non-Belligerency Declaration with Israel,

agreed to forgive approximately $220 million of Jordan's debt to

the United States under a supplemental appropriation; however,

legislative language accompanying the appropriation cautioned

that additional steps by Jordan--a final peace agreement with

Israel, abrogation of the Arab boycott, and compliance with

sanctions against Iraq--would be important factors in further

debt forgiveness.10 After Jordan signed the peace treaty with

Israel on October 26, the administration pressed Congress to

forgive the remainder of the debt. Following further debate over

the amount to be forgiven and the proper legislative vehicle,

Congress ultimately included a provision covering full debt

forgiveness for Jordan in an emergency supplemental appropriation

bill.11

Another high priority on Jordan's list has been

modernization of the armed forces, which over the years have

constituted the mainstay of the Hashemite monarchy. Though well

trained and disciplined, the Jordan armed forces are outgunned

and outnumbered by each of Jordan's neighbors, and military units

face serious equipment shortages. Little or no equipment has been

received since 1983, mainly due to financial constraints; also,

the United States, once Jordan's major supplier, grew

increasingly reluctant to supply Jordan with arms until it

concluded a peace treaty with Israel and distanced itself from

Iraq. As Jordan moved on both fronts, the United States began to

review options for long-term military aid. On January 7, 1996,

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry announced that the United

States was offering Jordan a military equipment package

consisting of 16 F-16 fighter aircraft, M60A3 tanks (50 according

to press reports), night vision equipment, and (according to the

press) a C-130 cargo plane and a helicopter. The package,

estimated at between $300 million and $360 million, does not

include state-of-the-art equipment and will only fill some of the

more glaring gaps in Jordanian inventories. Even this relatively

modest package will require special financing arrangements,

including the authority granted on a one-time basis to draw down

$100 million in military equipment from U.S. stocks.12

Degree of Popular Support. Important as these measures are

to Jordan's financial well-being and national security, they may

have only a limited effect on the perceptions of the average

Jordanian citizen. In this connection, there is considerable

evidence that recent dramatic shifts in King Hussein's regional

policies have outstripped public opinion in Jordan. The process
10

of normalization with Israel has been accompanied by a marked

cooling in Jordan's relations with Iraq and a partial

rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states

angered by Jordan's stand during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. At the

same time, significant segments of the Jordanian population

remain suspicious of or hostile toward Israel; supportive of Iraq

on political or economic grounds, and resentful over the

reprisals they suffered at the hands of the Gulf states because

of Jordan's earlier support for Iraq.

Support in Jordan for the peace treaty with Israel remains

lukewarm. Opposition is strongest within two groups--Islamic

fundamentalists and secular left-wing nationalists. Together

these groups can muster 25 to 30 deputies in the 80-member lower

house of parliament and obstruct government-sponsored legislation

although they have not succeeded in permanently blocking

government initiatives so far. As noted above, opposition to

normalization with Israel is especially strong among professional

and trade organizations, which have become increasingly

aggressive in seeking to block economic and cultural contacts

with the Israelis. Clear support for the treaty seems

concentrated in upper echelons of the government, parts of the

business community, and groups such as the hotel, restaurant, and

transportation sectors that stand to gain from Israeli tourism. A

great many Jordanians appear to be withholding judgment pending

further evidence regarding the impact of the peace treaty and

seem willing to give the king the benefit of the doubt, at least

in the short term. All the same, there is perceptible

disappointment among many mainstream Jordanians that the treaty

with Israel has not brought tangible economic benefits so far.

Though not directly related to the peace treaty, the recent

dramatic shift in Jordanian policy toward Iraq has accentuated

anti-government views in some Jordanian circles and served to

heighten opposition to normalization with Israel. Once Iraq's

leading ally in the Middle East, Jordan began to distance itself

from the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein after 1992; by

1994, U.S. officials noted a marked improvement in Jordanian

enforcement of UN-imposed trade restrictions against Iraq. In

August 1995, King Hussein granted asylum to two high-level

defectors from Iraq, and on December 16, he called for a meeting

of Iraqi factions opposed to the present government to chart a

new direction for the country. On February 6, 1996, U.S.

Secretary of Defense Perry indicated that the United States and

Jordan are cooperating on actions which he refused to identify

designed "to accelerate the demise of the present regime in

Iraq."13 Ties with Baghdad, however, have not been completely

severed. Iraq agreed on December 30, 1995, to continue supplying

oil to Jordan, and in mid-January 1996, the two countries renewed

a trade protocol, albeit providing for a lower level of Jordanian

exports to Iraq.14
11

A combination of political and economic factors have 

contributed to a strong measure of support among Jordanians for

the Iraqi regime. Some Jordanians, especially Islamists,

nationalists, and those of Palestinian origin, applauded Saddam

Hussein's pan-Arab utterances and his defiance of Israel and the

West. Many Jordanian manufacturers and merchants had built close

economic ties with Iraq in the 1980s. They argue that Jordan's

economic future is tied more much closely to Iraq than to the

Arabian Peninsula and are also skeptical over the likelihood of a

profitable commercial relationship with Israel. Jordanians of a

more ideological bent tend to see the government's peacemaking

with Israel and coolness toward the Iraqi regime as twin aspects

of a policy that bears the stamp of Western dictation.

Active opposition to Jordanian regional policies may be

confined to a minority, but it has created a dilemma for the

government. King Hussein seems sincerely committed to the growth

of democratic institutions in Jordan and has said the process of

liberalization in his country is irreversible. On the other hand,

some commentators have expressed concern that the government is

slowing the pace of democratization in an effort to forestall

attempts by the opposition to resist implementation of the peace

treaty with Israel or to curb rear-guard actions by the

opposition against the new policy toward Iraq. A report prepared

by the Committee on Civil Liberties of the Jordanian parliament

in September 1995 expressed the view that government policy since

the October 1994 peace treaty with Israel "has visibly affected

the ceiling of public freedoms."

Regional Support. In its efforts to establish normal

relations with Israel, Jordan does not enjoy the full support of

its neighbors. Predictably, the strongest opposition to the

Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty came from the so-called

rejectionist states of Libya and Iran; the Iranian foreign

minister denounced the treaty as treason against the Palestinian

cause. Lebanon, which closely follows Syrian leads in regional

policy, and Syria criticized Jordan for abandoning the goal of a

comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. President Asad of

Syria called separate treaties a "mistake," but said he would not

fight governments that concluded such agreements. Syria has

objected especially to the arrangements under which Jordan leased

back small plots of territory to Israel, and Syrian leaders

warned that this does not constitute a model that Syria would be

willing to follow. Syria also continues to allow radical

Palestinian groups based in Damascus to inveigh against Jordan

for making peace with Israel. (The mainstream PLO leadership,

which had already concluded agreements with Israel, is

cooperating with Jordan in implementing provisions of their

respective peace pacts with Israel; however, Chairman Arafat has

taken exception to the passage in the Jordanian-Israeli peace
12

treaty dealing with a special Jordanian role regarding the Muslim

holy shrines in Jerusalem.)15

The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--

Saudi Arabia and the five smaller Gulf states--show a certain

ambivalence toward Jordan's role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

Though supportive in principle of the peace process, GCC states

on the whole are cautious over the establishment of formal ties

with Israel. For example, the GCC states have not yet taken

formal steps to terminate their direct boycott of Israel although

on September 30, 1994, they undertook to stop enforcing indirect

boycotts, which penalize other countries and companies that deal

with Israel. Qatar and Oman, which have been laying the

groundwork for future economic ties with Israel, have been more

inclined to support Jordanian-Israeli peace moves, but other GCC

states have been more reticent. In part, this attitude may stem

from residual resentment on the part of Gulf leaders over

Jordan's stand during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis--a resentment that

even King Hussein's growing estrangement from the Iraqi regime

has not totally dispelled.

The Palestinian Dimension. The Palestinian factor will be

particularly important in the success or failure of Jordan's

efforts to normalize relations with Israel. The question is one

of particular complexity, involving Jordan's relations with the

PLO leadership, with its own indigenous Palestinian population,

with other segments of the Palestinian diaspora, and with the

emerging Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza. Before the

effects of the Palestinian question on Jordanian-Israeli

normalization can be assessed, major issues will have to be

addressed--the final status of the West Bank and Gaza

territories, and the fate of Palestinian refugees and displaced

persons.

The 1993 Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles stipulated

that negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories

would begin in May 1996 and should be completed 3 years later.

PLO Chairman Arafat has made clear his view that the negotiations

should lead to an independent Palestinian state, but not many

Israeli leaders are willing to endorse that concept. Despite King

Hussein's 1988 decree disengaging Jordan from the West Bank (Gaza

had never been under Jordanian governance in the first place),

the question of a future Jordanian association with an

independent or autonomous Palestinian entity is likely to arise.

Statements by King Hussein indicate that he would accept some

type of federation with a West Bank-Gaza entity, perhaps along

the lines of his 1972 Unified Arab Kingdom proposal, but only

after the Palestinians have achieved self-determination and can

exercise a free choice in favor of independence or association

with Jordan. Depending on the outcome of Israeli-Palestinian

negotiations, numerous ancillary decisions will have to be made
13

regarding the relationship among Israel, Jordan, and an emerging

Palestinian entity. These decisions could have a profound effect

on later stages of Jordanian-Israeli normalization.

Final disposition of Palestinians dispersed throughout the

Middle East will also heavily influence the course of JordanianIsraeli relationships. The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration

provided for the establishment of a quadripartite commission

representing Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO to discuss the

status of Palestinians displaced during the 1967 Arab-Israeli

war. A meeting of this commission held in Cairo in February 1996

reportedly resulted in some useful proposals to deal with the

problem of Palestinians displaced in 1967. But the declaration

does not deal with the more long-standing and difficult issue of

Palestinians who became refugees after the original Arab-Israeli

war in 1948. It is unlikely that a West Bank-Gaza ministate could

absorb a large number of refugees from other parts of the Arab

World, and Israel (which will either control or have a major

voice in access to a Palestinian entity) would be likely to

resist their return on the grounds that their presence nearby

would heighten threats to Israel's security. Jordan, on its part,

worries that it may become a depository for Palestinian refugees

forced to leave other host countries but unable to be

accommodated in the West Bank or Gaza. A disposition that placed

undue burdens on Jordan could affect the country's stability in

ways that might hinder normalization with Israel and revive

former tensions between the two countries.

Concluding Assessment.

In moving rapidly to consummate and implement a peace treaty

with Israel, King Hussein took a calculated risk. He took this

step with no assurance of a major peace dividend, settling for

relatively small financial gains in the near term and hoping that

regional peace would spawn future economic advantages on a larger

scale. The timing of his peace moves, which took place while

Syrian and Lebanese negotiations with Israel remained deadlocked

and even before Palestinians had fully sorted out the

implementing details of their agreement with Israel, left him

vulnerable to charges of premature peacemaking with Israel. Some

observers, including Middle East governments and individuals

associated with a harder line toward Israel, believe that Hussein

abandoned his long-standing policy of pursuing a comprehensive

rather than a separate peace with Israel.

Jordan's leaders can advance several counter arguments.

Jordan was not the first Arab state to conclude a peace treaty

with Israel; Egypt had done so 15 years earlier. Moreover, Jordan

did not begin signing agreements with Israel until after the

historic Israeli-PLO declaration had been concluded, thus
14

illustrating once again Jordan's policy of moving in tandem with

the Palestinian leadership. Finally, the Jordanian-Israeli peace

treaty did not represent a separate line of endeavor on Jordan's

part; it evolved from negotiations conducted under the umbrella

of the BushGorbachev peace talks, which had been accepted by all

Arab states concerned.

In the final analysis, the question of whether the

Jordanian-Israeli treaty constituted a separate peace or a

component of a comprehensive peace may be academic. Unless and

until Syria and Lebanon follow suit, Jordan is likely to come

under attack at home and in the region from opponents of the

current peace process. The degree to which the average Jordanian

citizen benefits economically could significantly heighten, or

lessen, domestic opposition to normalization. While these

scenarios unfold in the months ahead, Jordanian efforts to pursue

normalization with Israel will require a large measure of

dexterity in dealing with domestic constituencies and neighboring

states. King Hussein, who has proven himself an unusually astute

and nimble figure in Middle East politics, may meet the most

intricate challenges of his career as he strives to make peace a

reality.

ENDNOTES

1. In January 1994, Israeli Army Radio quoted King Hussein

as saying that he had met every Israeli leader except the late

Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Bradley Burston, "Rabin Fuels

Speculation He Met King Hussein," Reuters Newswire, June 6, 1994.

2. Hussein of Jordan, My ‘War' with Israel, as told to and

with additional material by Vick Vance and Pierre Lauer, New

York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969, p. 119.

3. "Chronology," The Middle East Journal, Winter 1983, p.

72.

4. On February 19, 1986, King Hussein announced the

termination of this effort, charging that Arafat had "broken his

word" after the king had secured major concessions from the

United States. "Chronology," The Middle East Journal, Summer

1986, p. 481.

5. King Hussein told reporters that "We have always said we

would be willing to give our support to either option--our way,

or the PLO way. The collective Arab will was to choose the PLO

option." Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, New York: American Academic

Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977, p. 351.

6. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East, August
15

1, 1988, pp. 40-42.

7. On July 21, 1991, two days before the official

invitation, King Hussein announced that "Jordan will be among the

first to attend" such a conference. The Washington Post, July 22,

1991, p. A15. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian

Federation became co-sponsor of the peace talks.

8. Middle East Economic Digest, April 21, 1995, pp. 8-9.

9. Information provided by the U.S. Office of Management and

Budget, July 1994.

10. Congressional Record, August 1, 1994. The appropriation

was contained in Title VI, Public Law (P.L.) 103-306, signed on

August 24, 1994. Because of budgetary scoring procedures, it was

necessary for Congress to appropriate only $99 million to forgive

the $220 million.

11. This was done under P.L. 104-19, signed on July 27,

1995. Again, under scoring procedures, Congress only had to

appropriate $275 million to forgive the remainder, which amounted

to approximately $480 million. Due to the complexities of

fluctuating interest rates and their effect on these

calculations, however, it now appears that an additional subsidy

of $25 million will need to be appropriated to complete the

process of debt forgiveness for Jordan.

12. Granted under Section 572 of the Foreign Operations

Appropriation Act for 1996, P.L. 104-107, signed by the President

on February 12, 1996. See also James Bruce, "Jordan to get F-16s

and Tanks in $300 Million Package," Jane's Defense Weekly,

January 17, 1996, p. 13; and Thomas W. Lippman, "Jordan Plane

Deal Draws GOP Criticism," The Washington Post, February 14,

1996, p. A12.

13. Transcript, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry

discusses national strategy in the Middle East in a speech to the

first Les Aspin Memorial Lecture at the Washington Institute for

Near East Policy, February 6, 1996, Reuters Newswire, February 6,

1996.

14. Under the new protocol, Jordanian exports to Iraq will

drop from about $400 million in 1995 to a projected $200 million

in 1996. Jordanian officials advanced economic rather than

political reasons for the cut, citing a high Iraqi debt owed to

Jordan from previous shipments. Rana Sabbagh, "Jordan Slashes

Trade with Iraq Almost in Half," Reuters Newswire, January 22,

1996.

15. In Article 9, the treaty states that "Israel respects
16

the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in

Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the

permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority

to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines." Arafat asserted

that "sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision of Jerusalem is

for Palestinians."
17

CONSIDERING A U.S. MILITARY FORCE<R>ON THE GOLAN:<R>CONFRONTING

THE HYPERBOLE, PARANOIA, HYSTERIA AND AGENDAS

Stephen H. Gotowicki

First, if there is a peace agreement between Syria and

Israel, and if the two parties request that we send

troops to monitor the Golan Heights, then after

consultation with Congress we would be willing to do

that, or we'd be willing to consider doing it. I'm

quite sure we would find a way to do that, but the

decision is very much contingent on two things. One,

there has to be a peace agreement; and two, both

parties have to request it.

 Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon,

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

 (Public Affairs),

Department of Defense News Briefing

January 16, 1996

President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and

Secretary of Defense Perry have all, at one time or another in

the last several years, offered a U.S. military force to assist

in the implementation of a peace agreement between Israel and

Syria. Indeed, the current administration has placed a high

priority on achieving an Israeli-Syrian accord. At the same time,

neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have requested U.S. military

forces as part of an agreement, but expectations are high that

the Israelis will make such a request as a condition for

withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Moreover, Syria, is likely to

acquiesce to a U.S. force on the Golan as well.

Since the Clinton administration is committed to the success

of the peace process, it is likely that, if U.S. military forces

are required, they will be made available. The question is not

whether the forces will deploy to the Golan; if an accord is

signed, almost certainly they will. The more important questions

for the military planner have to do with the size of the force,

its mission, mission duration, and who will pay.

Administration officials have so far refused to spell out

the specifics of a U.S. presence on the Golan. The standard

administration position is that it is too early for this: first

there must be an accord. To some extent, this is true. The accord

should deal with the security and geographical modalities of the

peace, and these will determine the specific force requirements

in terms of size and equipment but not the force mission. A

peacekeeping force has fairly standard mission requirements,

i.e., compliance monitoring.
18

Pundits, commentators, and armchair strategists, both in

Israel and the United States, have not hesitated to propose the

composition and mission of a possible U.S. military force.

Indeed, many such opinions have sprung from people or groups

opposed to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. These

negative presentations usually adopt a "worst-case" approach and

contend that the dispatch of U.S. troops to the Golan would have

dire existential consequences for Israel and present dangers for

American soldiers. For example, they maintain that an Israeli

withdrawal will lead to a surprise Syrian attack; that a U.S.

force interpositioned between Israel and Syria would restrict

Israeli military options; that a U.S. force could not provide

Israel the security guarantees it requires; and that U.S.

soldiers would be subject to terrorist attack. Speculation on

required force size has ranged from as few as a handful to as

many as two combat-ready divisions. Proposed mission requirements

have included compliance monitoring, early warning, deterrence,

serving as a tripwire and the active defense of Israel.1

A U.S. military deployment to the Golan Heights will most

likely occur under the auspices of a multinational force because

one or both parties is likely to reject a unilateral U.S. force.

This would be in line with U.S. policy. In May 1994, President

Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25) which

was the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral

peacekeeping suited for the post-Cold war era.2 PDD-25 embraced

multilateral peacekeeping operations (specifically UN 

operations) as potentially important and useful tools in American

foreign policy. The directive proposes that collective engagement

is a practical strategy. Collective engagement shares the cost

burdens, shares the commitment of resources, provides community

legitimacy, and shares the blame if problems arise. PDD-25

established a series of factors to consider when contemplating

participation in a given peace operation:3

• Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique

and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are

considered acceptable.

• Personnel, funds, and other resources are available;

• U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's

success;

• The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an

end point for U.S. participation can be identified;

• Domestic and congressional support exists or can be

marshalled;

• Command and control arrangements are acceptable.
19

In the case of a possible U.S. military deployment to the

Golan, it is possible to conclude that participation will advance

expressed U.S. interests; that personnel, funds, and other

resources will be available (within limits); and also that U.S.

participation is necessary for the operation's success. The

issues of unique and general risks, clear objectives and end

point, and domestic and congressional support are as yet

uncertain.4

This chapter will attempt to address all but the last of

these uncertain factors and will survey the prospects for

providing a U.S. military presence on the Golan. It will endeavor

to look beyond the arguments of the special pleaders to focus on

the standard requirements for peacekeeping, the possibilities of

a Syrian surprise attack, the military balance between Israel and

Syria, early warning, deterrence, and the terrorist threat to

U.S. peacekeepers. The goal of the study is to determine what

U.S. military peacekeeping package for the Golan Heights would be

in the best interests of the United States and would most

effectively guarantee the peace between Israel and Syria.

The Golan Heights.

The Golan Heights (see Figure 1) is a mountainous plateau

rising steeply from the Jordan River valley along Israel's

northeast border. The Golan has a north-south length of 40 miles

and an east-west width varying between 7.5 miles and 16 miles. It

covers an area of approximately 780 square miles. The average

altitude of the Heights is approximately 3,200 feet with Mount

Hermon in the north rising to an elevation of 7,296 feet. At its

most rugged, the surface geology is a hard basalt cover strewn

with massive boulders, explosion craters, ropy lava formations,

and, most notably, occasional conical rises shaped like giant ant

hills (known as tels).5

 In other areas, the Golan provides broad

expanses of rich arable land.

During the 1967 Six Day War, Israel captured the Golan

Heights, placed it under military administration, and began to

establish Jewish settlements. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War,

Syria briefly recaptured a portion of the Golan Heights, but

Israel quickly regained the lost terrain and captured additional

Syrian territory. In 1974, the "Israel-Syria Disengagement of

Forces Agreement," brokered by the United States, resulted in

Syria's regaining some of the land lost in 1967, but the majority

remained in Israeli possession. The United Nations Disengagement

Observer Force (UNDOF) was established to monitor compliance for

this disengagement agreement. In December 1981, the Israeli
20

government passed legislation to bring the Golan Heights under

civil law, jurisdiction, and administration. There have been no

major military conflicts on the Golan since 1973.

Prior to the 1967 war, there were reportedly 130,000 or more

Syrians living on the Golan Heights. Today only about 16,500

Syrians (15,000 Druze and 1,500 Alawites) remain on the Heights

in four or five villages. The Jewish population numbers about

14,500 in 32 communities.6

Some commentators have compared the mission requirements for

the Golan with that of the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) in the Sinai, but there are major differences. The Sinai

offers broad expanses of terrain with large buffer zones and a

very sparse population where direct contact between the two

parties is minimized. The Golan, in contrast, is compact,

populated, and offers very little expanse to establish large

buffer zones. Distances on the Sinai are in the hundreds of

miles--on the Golan they are in tens of miles, thus the opposing

military forces can be expected to remain in fairly close

proximity to each other.

The Golan is important to Israel for a variety of reasons.
21

The foremost is security. The Israelis are concerned that Syria

might mount another surprise attack against northern Israel

through the Golan. Many Israelis strongly insist that the Golan

provides an indispensable strategic buffer zone, a favorable line

of defense, and an advantageous position for launching an offense

against Syria.7 As a consequence, the Israelis maintain an

armored division and numerous intelligence facilities on the

Heights. The principal intelligence setup is a large and

sophisticated site on the northern slope of Mount Hermon with a

commanding view of southern Syria and Damascus. From here, the

Israelis gather extensive visual and electronic intelligence on

Syria which provides them detailed tactical and strategic

intelligence as well as early warning data.

Some would argue that there is a certain illogic in Israeli

references to the Golan as a strategic buffer since it has been

occupied and settled. A buffer zone that is settled is no buffer

zone. Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic

Studies, Tel Aviv University, says "The claim that the Golan

provides strategic depth that protects the Galilee has led to an

absurdity: we are simply transferring the Galilee to the Golan,

and the problem of defending the Galilee today will turn into a

problem of how to defend the Jewish population of the Golan in a

few years hence."8 He continues by asking whether it would be

possible to evacuate the 14,500 Israeli settlers on the Golan on

a few hours notice when hostilities are anticipated. These

settlers would compete for use of the same limited and narrow

roads that would be needed for the deployment of the Israel

Defense Forces (IDF) and would likely inhibit Israel's strategic

response to Syrian aggression.

The Israeli settlements on the Golan are also a factor in

the Golan's importance to Israel and constitute a significant

political problem for the Israeli government. In any accord,

Syria will insist upon their removal. A significant percentage of

the settlers are not willing to leave their homes peaceably which

again raises the specter of Yamit for the Israeli government.9

Arguably, water is second only to security in importance to

Israel. Approximately 30 percent of Israel's national water

supply comes from the Golan. Two of the three springs that give

birth to the Jordan River flow from the Golan. Prior to the 1967

war, the Syrians attempted to divert these sources to deny Israel

water, and the Israelis attempted to divert the Jordan River from

Syrian use in the demilitarized zone established by the 1949

armistice agreements. The continued exclusive Israeli control

over Lake Kinneret (also called the Sea of Galilee and Lake

Tiberias) will also be an important factor for Israel in

determining the final Israeli withdrawal lines.

For the Syrians, the present situation is unacceptable
22

because it allows the IDF to occupy positions only about 35 miles

from Damascus. Syria is concerned with the Israeli capability to

use the Golan Heights to launch an attack against it. Moreover,

Syrian citizens continue to live on the Golan under Israeli

occupation, and this is a source of embarrassment for the Syrian

government. An Israeli occupied Golan is also a continuing

reminder of Syria's resounding military defeats of 1967 and 1973.

As the opening quote of this chapter specifies, both Israel

and Syria will have to agree to the deployment of U.S. forces on

the Golan Heights. In meetings with senior U.S. military

officials in 1993 and early 1994, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin

told them he had never asked for, nor accepted, the concept of

U.S. forces on the Golan. Mr. Rabin believed that asking for a

U.S. military presence would violate the Israeli credo of

military self-reliance. On October 3, 1994, during his annual

address to the Knesset, Mr. Rabin changed his position and stated

that he would accept U.S. soldiers on the Golan to provide only

compliance monitoring and early warning.

Today there are 980 U.S. soldiers in the Sinai

supervising the military annex of the Egyptian-Israeli

treaty. We will not demand anything else of the

Americans when we secure a peace treaty with Syria on

the Golan--the same thing, the very same thing. . . .

We will have a multinational force deployed on the

Golan like that which exists in the Sinai today, and it

will include American troops, also similar to those we

now have in the Sinai, as well as early warning

stations, periodic checks, etc.10

It is likely this change of position was an attempt by Mr. Rabin

to gain popular support for a peace accord with Syria. Under

increasing political pressure, Mr. Rabin committed himself to

holding a national referendum to approve peace with Syria.

Israeli polls at the time showed an over-whelming rejection (60-

80 percent) of returning the Golan Heights, in whole or part, to

Syria. Since Mr. Rabin's assassination, polls have shown an

increase in those supporting a withdrawal from the Golan Heights

in return for peace with Syria of 42 to 47 percent. In his

references to American troops "similar to those we have in the

Sinai," Rabin appeared to be asking for a U.S. combat unit as

opposed to U.S. military observers. There is an implication that

these U.S. soldiers would assist in providing Israel security or

assist in its defense which could be intended to mollify public

fears. Dore Gold states, "The Israeli popular perception of an

American presence on the Golan is that it would somehow have

defensive combat value."11

In 1993 and early 1994, Syria's position was that they did

not want an exclusive U.S. military force on the Golan Heights.
23

Their stated preference was for an international force probably

from the United Nations. In late 1994, the Syrians indicated that

they would accept a U.S. military presence on the Golan that was

a part of a larger international force. The Syrians have never

addressed the size of such a force. There are indications that

they see the presence of U.S. military on the Golan as a military

plus for Syria because it would provide them with a measure of

protection against an Israeli attack as well as provide a venue

for improving relations with the United States.

Peacekeeping Requirements.

What should a U.S. military peacekeeping force on the Golan

look like? In the parlance of the United Nations Charter, a

peacekeeping mission on the Golan Heights would normally

constitute a "Chapter VI" mission.12 A Chapter VI mission calls

for the pacific settlement of disputes through negotiation,

mediation, conciliation, arbitration, etc., vice imposition of

peace through military action (Chapter VII). In a Chapter VI

peacekeeping operation, both belligerents have agreed to a

military disengagement (with the accompanying withdrawal,

demilitarization, and military limitations) and the supervision

of an impartial UN peacekeeping force. In these peacekeeping

operations, the primary mission of the peacekeepers is "the

prevention, containment, moderation and termination of

hostilities between states (or forces) through the medium of a

peaceful third party intervention organized and directed

internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police

and civilians to restore and maintain order."13 This is

accomplished through impartial third-party compliance monitoring

of withdrawal, demilitarization, and force limitation

agreements. In a situation such as an Israeli-Syrian accord,

where peace will be established through mutual agreement, a

peacekeeping force to monitor compliance would normally be

comprised of unarmed military observers and would not require

regular combat units.

Such has been the case on the Golan Heights since 1974 where

the peacekeeping mission established by the Israeli-Syrian

Disengagement of Forces Agreement has been successfully conducted

by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF

has a strength of about 1,030, representing four countries

(Austria, Canada, Poland, and Japan).14 Austria and Poland each

provide an infantry battalion, Canada provides a logistics

battalion, and Japan provides transportation assets. Are infantry

soldiers necessary? Probably not, but one must remember that

UNDOF was deployed onto the Golan in 1974 immediately following

major hostilities between Israel and Syria. There was no peace

treaty. Tranquility was by no means assured.
24

Compared to recent U.S. experiences in peacekeeping, the

Golan Heights should offer a relatively straightforward, simple

proposition focusing primarily on compliance monitoring. Unlike

Somalia or Rwanda, there is no ethnic separation required, no

expected conflict with hostile belligerent forces, no requirement

for peace enforcement, no nation building, and no humanitarian

support. Nominally, a U.S. military contingent of between 50-200

military observers as part of a larger multilateral force could

effectively accomplish the required peacekeeping

responsibilities.

However, a new peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights will

have to address Israeli security concerns, be acceptable to

Syria, and have costs consistent with U.S. resources, interests,

and expected benefits. This may not be easy. Israel is expected

to insist that early warning and, implicitly, deterrence be added

as required missions for a new peacekeeping force. Israel's

emphasis on the deployment of a U.S. combat unit is probably

derived from three factors: its concern for the possibility of a

major Syrian surprise attack; the expectation that U.S. soldiers

will be asked to man the Israeli early warning sites that Israel

will be required to vacate, and the symbolic requirement to

appease the concerns of its citizens concerning peace with Syria.

Providing early warning is doable and can be construed as a

reasonable function of compliance monitoring. Moreover, it has

been done by the United States in other circumstances. The

question is, will the commitment of the minimum U.S. resources

necessary to adequately accomplish these missions be acceptable

to realize Israel's largely symbolic requirements?

The United States no longer has the resources to enter into

long-term, open-ended, expensive commitments without compelling

reasons to do so and without possible negative impact on U.S.

global military readiness. Since 1988, the U.S. Army has shrunk

from 16 active divisions to 10. Between 1990 and 1996, U.S.

Defense budgets declined approximately 30 percent (from $349

billion to $245 billion [constant 1996 dollars]).15 The

requirements for global engagement have not shrunk. In committing

itself to maintain force size for a U.S. Golan peacekeeping

contingent, the United States must decide whether to plan for the

"worst case" with the concomitant costs or to seek the economy of

planning for the "most likely." It must balance risks, costs,

likelihood, and benefit. Key to this decision is an assessment of

Syria's commitment to peace and its capability for negative

action. The following will argue that Syria does not have the

motivation or capability to attack Israel.

Asad's Strategic Choice.

Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel
25

as a strategic choice that secures Arab rights, ends

the Israeli occupation, and enables all peoples in the

region to live in peace, security and dignity. In honor

we fought; in honor we negotiate; and in honor we shall

make peace.

Syrian President Hafez Asad

Press Conference with President Clinton

January 16, 1994

After 48 years of conflict with Israel, the Syrian

leadership has apparently made the "strategic choice" to seek

peace. The complete return of the Golan is the sine qua non16 for

peace between Syria and Israel. The changes in the Middle East

over the last decade would seem to indicate that a change in

Syrian attitudes toward peace with Israel is a strategic

requirement. From the strategic, political, and economic points

of view, Syria has found itself in a highly unfavorable situation

that is likely only to deteriorate further.17

For Syria, the regional strategic situation changed

drastically with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Syria depended

on the generous military aid it received from Moscow. Russia is

no longer a willing and generous military sponsor and armorer to

Syria. With a weak economy, Syria has been unable to find other

sources of military aid to replace Soviet largesse. With the

collapse of Soviet influence in the Middle East, Syria also lost

a large measure of perceived deterrence against an Israeli

attack, believing that its close relations with the Soviet Union

would have deterred Israeli aggression.18

Syria's economy is somewhat stagnant. Despite the

significant reforms and ambitious development projects instituted

in the early 1990s, the legacy of long-term, socialist-style

state intervention still hampers Syrian economic growth. Oil

production, while not large when compared to the Arab Gulf

states, accounts for much of Syria's export income; however,

Syrian production levels are expected to shrink in coming years.

Financial aid from the Gulf states is also expected to taper off.

Through heavy military spending in years past, Syria has

accumulated large external debts which it has not adequately

addressed and which diminish its credit worthiness. Syria needs

significant external investment; however, Western and Arab

investors have not rushed to fill Syria's needs.19

Syria's support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war isolated

it from the majority of its Arab neighbors during the 1980s. This

isolation denied Syria significant levels of Arab investment and

regional political support. Egypt's peace accord with Israel

isolated Syria further, making it, along with Iraq, the only

remaining significant confrontation state against Israel. Only
26

since Syria's participation in the allied coalition against the

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has Syria's relations with the moderate

Arab countries and the West improved. Syrian support and shelter

of groups involved in regional and international terrorism

continue to strain its relations with Western nations.

Focusing on this new regional milieu, many believe that Asad

has made a judgment that improved relations with the United

States is a strategic requirement, and this has become one of his

top priorities. It is not hard to imagine that Syria would prefer

to make peace and normalize relations with the United States more

than with Israel--but peace with Israel is the price Asad has to

pay to improve relations with the United States and to recover

the Golan Heights.

Many Israelis question President Asad's dependability.

Logically it would hold that if one accepts that he is committed

to achieving peace with Israel (as does former Prime Minister

Peres, President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and the

late Yitzhak Rabin), one must by default also accept his

dependability. Frequently, senior Israeli leaders refer to Asad

as the most cunning, shrewd, and intelligent leader in the Middle

East. The comments of Major General Uri Sagi, until recently the

Director of Military Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces,

concerning Hafez Asad are enlightening:

I believe that Asad understood that Israel is stronger

than Syria militarily, and he finds it difficult to

reach strategic parity. . . . Asad is a very

experienced person who knows the Middle East inside and

out. . . . He is a man of reason, he is cautious and

suspicious. . . . To a very large degree it is possible

to say that he is reliable as long as his interests are

served. . . . Suffice it to say that if and when he

signs an agreement, he will keep his word. . . . I can

detect enough stability among today's ruling group--I

am referring to four or five people--to continue in

Asad's direction, for a short period of time at least.20

In military terms, Israel doesn't need peace with Syria;

Israel maintains a pronounced military superiority over Syria,

and the border has been (remarkably) quiet since 1974. In some

Israeli circles, the status quo is acceptable. Despite frequent

claims in the Western media, Syria is not a powerful state in the

Middle East. It does not have significant oil resources; it has

no ideological draw for the Arab masses; it does not have a

superpower sponsor; it has a weak economy; and, while it does

have a large military, it cannot project or sustain its military

power far beyond its borders. Its long-range weapons, its SCUD-C

ballistic missiles, are essentially suited only for harassment,

interdiction, and getting it into trouble. For Israel, however,
27

Syria is a key to a broader regional peace. Peace with Syria is

necessary to improve the prospects for peace with the countries

of the Arabian Peninsula (read Saudi Arabia21) and, to a lesser

extent, the Maghreb states. As one of the primary confrontation

states, Syria carried the burdens of the Arabs writ large in the

struggle against Israel. As that struggle comes to an end, Saudi

Arabia will not abandon Syria and is unlikely to openly embrace

peace with Israel until a satisfactory peace accord (from Syria's

perspective) is instituted between Israel and Syria.22

Possibilities of a Syrian Surprise Attack.

The Israeli concern for a major Syrian attack against Israel

after its withdrawal from the Golan is a somewhat legitimate

concern resulting from three wars and almost 50 years of

suspicion, fear, and mistrust. Popular Israeli fear of a Syrian

attack is probably an important factor in Israel's desire for a

symbolic U.S. combat force. Syria's demon-strated capabilities,

however, render this concern somewhat implausible. A number of

facts and considerations support this conclusion.

• President Hafez Asad has long accepted Israeli military

superiority.23 In point of fact, the Syrians are afraid that

Israel will attack Syria.

• While Israel's regional qualitative military edge is

expected to continue to grow in the coming years, Syria's

military capabilities are actually in decline.24 The collapse of

the former Soviet Union left the Syrians without a major military

benefactor and forced President Asad to conclude that his drive

to reach military parity with Israel is unachievable. The flow of

modern military equipment on "bargain basement" credit terms,

which Syria previously enjoyed,25 stopped in the late 1980s. The

Russians now demand cash payment on delivery for weapons systems-

-cash Syria doesn't have. Asad recognizes that Syria does not

have the economic capacity to effectively compete with Israel in

the military sphere.

• Syria's new situation with its former Soviet armorer has

also resulted in major shortages of critical repair parts, which

has precipitated a further decline in Syrian military readiness

and capability. No short-term improvement in this situation is

foreseen.

• An attack upon Israel on the Golan would carry significant

strategic risks for Syria. It would likely precipitate an Israeli

military response either through the Bekaa in Lebanon--flanking

Syria's attacking force and threatening Damascus--or through

Jordan. In either case, Syria would be hard pressed to

effectively respond. It would also probably trigger a massive
28

punitive Israeli air campaign against high-value Syrian targets

and cities. Syria would not be able to achieve air superiority to

prevent such an Israeli air campaign.

• The Syrians take seriously, as do all of the Arab states,

the threat posed by the reputed Israeli nuclear arsenal.

• The Syrians are probably under no illusions that they

could win a war against Israel without significant support from

other surrounding Arab states. Unlike 1973, Syria is now isolated

in its opposition to Israel and would have to attack Israel

without the benefit of its previous allies. The Egyptian,

Jordanian, and Palestinian peace accords with Israel preclude

such support, and support from the Gulf states could not be

expected.

• Syrian military officers were reportedly very impressed by

the U.S. technology and weapons demonstrated in DESERT STORM.

They know that Israel has acquired and produces many of these

weapons which they cannot match.26

• DESERT STORM established a precedent that the United

States would employ combat forces in the region in defense of its

interests. President Asad cannot believe that an attack on Israel

would not precipitate a U.S. military response, given the long

and close relations between the United States and Israel. A U.S.

military response could conceivably consist only of a rapidly

mounted air campaign against Syria, but even such a limited

response would be extremely damaging to and virtually

indefensible by Syria.

• A Syrian attack on Israel would run counter to Syria's

goals of improving its relations with the United States and

seeking Western economic aid.

• With the return of the Golan to Syrian sovereignty, and at

least a partial resolution of the Palestinian plight, Syria's

primary motivations for war against Israel will have been

removed.

A countering argument to most of the preceding could be that

these same concerns did not prevent Syria from attacking Israel

in 1973. While true, in 1973 Syria had a superpower ally.

It is hard to imagine many compelling reasons why Syria

would attack Israel if it withdrew from the Golan Heights.

Unrequited hatred of Israelis or Zionists? Continued unsolicited

support for Palestinian claims? Arab nationalism? One could argue

that such an attack is more likely if Asad is rebuffed by

Israel's refusal to return the Golan to Syria.
29

Israeli-Syrian Military Balance.

The current military balance would also seem to argue

against a Syrian attack on Israel. To evaluate a military

balance, two factors--numbers and potency--need consideration. As

Figures 2 through 4 show, the aggregate differences between the

Israeli and Syrian militaries are not significantly large. Figure

2 shows that, in terms of numbers, Syria possesses more tanks (18

percent) and artillery pieces (46 percent) while Israel possesses

38 percent more armored personnel carriers than Syria. In terms

of potency, 46 percent of Israel's tanks can be rated high

quality (Merkava or M60A3), and the remainder are medium quality

(Centurion, M60A1, M48A5). Only 31 percent of Syria's tanks can

be rated high quality (T-72). Over 48 percent of Syria's tanks

are aging, near-obsolescent, low quality T-54/T-55s. Most of

Israel's artillery pieces are self-propelled systems. Of Syria's

artillery pieces, 84 percent are older, less capable towed

systems. A comparison of long-range targeting and fire control

capabilities would further demonstrate Israeli superiority in

this category.

Figure 3 shows that Israel has a significantly larger fleet

of combat capable aircraft than Syria. As was demonstrated in

1982, the Israeli air force is one of the region's most potent

combat forces. In combat aircraft, Israel commands unquestioned

numerical, technological, and capabilities advantages over Syria.
30

Figure 4 compares personnel strengths and shows a striking

difference in strategic philosophies. Syria maintains a large

standing army of 306,00027 at all times and depends on a smaller

reserve structure of 100,00028 during periods of conflict. Israel,

in contrast, maintains a small standing army of 136,000 and is

dependent on its 363,000 reserve soldiers. This difference in

active versus reserve strengths is the reason why Israel places

such high importance on early warning. Israel nominally requires

24-96 hours to fully mobilize, equip, and deploy its reserves to

the battle zone. It should be noted that once fully mobilized,

the Israeli army is larger than Syria's.
31

The regional proliferation of Surface-to-Surface Missiles

(SSMs) has complicated Israel's mobilization strategy. Syria

possesses sufficient SSMs (SS-21s, SCUD-Cs) with the necessary

range, firepower, and adequate accuracy to disrupt Israel's

mobilization by attacking bases, assembly points, air fields, and

transportation and logistics facilities. However, this threat is

unrelated to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan in that Syria

has this capability in any case. This factor will serve to raise

Israel's perception of threat and may lower its response

threshold.

One last element of comparison is the military expenditures

each country allocates. Figure 5 compares Israeli and Syrian

military expenditures from 1975-1993.29 Despite recent Israeli

concerns for Syrian procurement with its Gulf war profits,30 this

figure shows that Israel's military expenditures are consistently

higher than Syria's-significant when comparing country sizes,

armed forces sizes, and populations.

Potency is factored into military capability evaluations

because it is a force multiplier. Israel's potency is often

characterized by what is referred to as its Qualitative Military

Edge (QME). Israel is the unquestioned military hegemon in the

region because of the quality of its military. Unlike the Arab

states, Israel has embraced the Revolution in Military Affairs.31

In American military thought, QME is the aggregate of all those

factors that enhance a military's capabilities over those of its

adversaries. These include, among other things, the quality and

technology of its weapons as well as the quality of leadership,

personnel, intelligence, training, doctrine, battlefield
32

automation, battle management, research and development,

logistics infrastructure, morale, and alliances. The potency of

QME can best be seen in the dramatic effectiveness of the U.S.

military against Iraq during the Gulf War. Israel possesses and

produces many of the high-technology weapons used by the United

States in DESERT STORM. Like Iraq, the Arab states surrounding

Israel don't.32 Militarily, Israel's is a modern army whose QME is

enhanced further because, without exception, the Arab enemies it

faces are at best eighthth or nineth rate armies.33 Israel's

superior QME is not a new phenomena--it was demonstrated

convincingly in 1967, 1973, and 1982. As was the case for the

United States in the build-up to DESERT STORM, Israel's ultimate

victory over its opponents is not really in question; the only

question is at what cost in casualties?

Assuming some measure of rationality, Syria does not appear

to have the capability or motivation to attack Israel once it

withdraws from the Golan Heights.34 In the context of Israeli

military capability, the Syrian military constitutes not an

existential threat, but merely a nuisance.

Early Warning.

Many Israelis, both opponents and supporters of peace with

Syria, claim that Israel's intelligence facilities on the Golan

are indispensable for ensuring that Syria does not mount a large

scale attack, similar to 1973, against Israel. Senior Israelis

have used this argument in the United States as part of their

demands that Israel be "compensated" for its possible loss of

security guarantees resulting from an Israeli-Syrian accord.35

Were the Israelis to convince Washington to reimburse them for

making peace with Syria, the compensation would provide a major

windfall in modernizing the IDF. However, these claims of an

indispensable Golan are overstated, and the reader should

consider the possibility that there is a political agenda behind

these claims.

Since the early 1980s, the United States has provided Israel

a minimum of $3 billion each year in foreign military financing

(FMF) and economic support fund (ESF) grants.36 This level of aid

is based upon 1981 and 1983 memoranda of understanding on

strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel. These

memoranda called for U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation against a

Soviet threat to the region. With the collapse of the former

Soviet Union, the original assumptions underpinning U.S.-Israeli

strategic cooperation have disappeared. Logically, so has the

rationale for the high aid levels. Coupled with this, recent

milestones in the peace process have led some congressional

leaders to publicly question the need to continue the heavy

subsidy of Israel when the Middle East is moving toward peace.
33

For several years, the Israelis have been seeking out

regional threats, such as Iran, to replace the former Soviet

threat. This would allow the Israelis to maintain their strategic

value to the United States and keep the stream of military

assistance flowing. To date, they have only middling success,

but by portraying a significant Syrian threat, they may hope to

validate their continued need for the aid from a sympathetic

America.

Israel has sufficient intelligence assets to offset the loss

of its intelligence facilities on the Golan Heights and should

suffer no major loss in warning capabilities by withdrawing from

the Golan. Israel has sufficient ground and airborne intelligence

assets available to replace critical data gathered on the Golan

itself.37 These assets include Israel's newly developed Phalcon

Airborne Early Warning aircraft. The Phalcon employs a phasedarray radar with Moving Target Indicator (MTI) mode capabilities

which will allow it to simultaneously track 100 ground or air

targets to a range of 250 miles38--well beyond what would be

needed for Golan surveillance. Israel also has MTI capable radars

mounted on some of its reconnaissance fighter aircraft which can

provide early warning out to 50 miles. In conjunction with these

systems, Israel also has a variety of airbornemounted, longrange, electro-optical, ELINT (electronic intelligence), SIGINT

(signals/communications intelligence), thermal signature, FLIR

(forward-looking infrared radar), SLAR (side-looking airborne

radar), remotely piloted vehicle, and balloon aerostat

intelligence systems. In addition, Israel now has its indigenous

developmental satellite program, the Ofeq-3, reportedly with

sufficient clarity to provide militarily significant

intelligence.39 Taskable, satellite imagery capability with 1-

Meter resolution is now available through commercial sources and

could further offset the Israel's loss of its Golan intelligence

facilities. Under full normalization with Syria, Israel would

probably have liaison officers working with Syrian officers on

the Golan40 and with military attaches in Syria who could provide

early warning information. By withdrawing from the Golan, Israel

may lose a large measure of the convenience that its facilities

provide, but it will not lose the critical early warning

information required.

If forced to withdraw from its intelligence facilities on

the Golan, Israel is likely to ask the United States military to

man and operate these (or other) early warning facilities in its

place. This could present problems for Washington's impartiality41

and credibility as a facilitator of the peace process. Syria

might consider any U.S. reporting to Israel as providing Israel

targeting data against it. As a peacekeeper, the United States

would be required to provide early warning data equally to both

sides. Intelligence provided in this fashion is usually fairly
34

generic42 and is not likely to be sufficient for Israel--they

would want much more.

Opponents of a U.S. military deployment to the Golan focus

on this issue of intelligence supply as a strong negative.43 They

argue that Israel could not rely on critical intelligence

information from a foreign source--even the United States. In

terms of reciprocity between the two parties, Dore Gold

speculates that the United States would have to construct

intelligence facilities directed at Israel to provide Syria

intelligence equal to that given to Israel. Such facilities would

provide a quantum improvement in Syrian intelligence

capabilities44 to Israel's detriment. Gold also argues that

reliability would be an issue. Intelligence collection would be

divorced from intelligence analysis. Both parties would have to

be satisfied with the intelligence provided and could not task

collection based on individual priorities or concerns.45 Both Gold

and Gaffney make the point that Israel would be unlikely to

depend on U.S.-supplied intelligence because of differing

priorities, interpretations, conclusions, perspectives, or

interests. To paraphrase Mr. Gaffney, the intelligence would be

"filtered by foreign interests."46 There is some merit in these

arguments.

This raises the question of how important this issue is to

Israel, and why it was raised. Israel must know that providing

asymmetrical warning to it is out of the question since that

would compromise the impartiality and credibility of the United

States as a peacekeeper. Why would Israel want to risk

compromising the peace accord? Israel and the United States have

robust military-to-military channels for sharing critical

intelligence and military information. U.S. participation in the

Golan peacekeeping force will not preclude continued military

cooperation between Israel and the United States. These channels

will remain open and will allow the United States to pass

critical intelligence to Israel without compromising its

impartiality or Israel's security.47 Possible answers to this

question again might be linked to the Israeli government's need

to provide popular reassurances.

While generic early warning and deterrence are feasible, are

U.S. combat soldiers required to provide this data? Experience

and precedent say no. In previous peacekeeping situations, the

United States has provided early warning data through civilian

organizations and technical means.48 From 1976 to 1982, the Sinai

Field Mission, established by the second disengagement agreement

between Israel and Egypt (September 1, 1975), consisted of 200

U.S. civilians who provided electronic early warning surveillance

in the critical mountain passes in the Sinai desert. Both Egypt

and Israel were pleased with the performance of the Sinai Field

Mission and agreed to extend its service by 2 years.49 Since 1974,
35

the United States has provided airborne surveillance photography

for early warning to both the Israelis and Egyptians in the

Sinai50 and to Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights.

Combat units are not required to perform peacekeeping

duties. U.S. military officers have served as unarmed military

observers in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in

the Middle East since 1948. They have also served in Angola, the

Western Sahara, and Cambodia among others. A Civilian Observer

Unit (COU), consisting of 25-30 State Department and retired U.S.

military personnel,51 currently accomplishes a majority of the

observer duties in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in

the Sinai desert.52 Frank Gaffney makes the point, "There is no

need for the United States to undertake an expensive, risky, and

open-ended commitment of troops to carry out the relatively minor

(and not inherently military) task of serving occasionally as a

third-party referee on compliance issues."53

Deterrence.

A multilateral peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights, by

its very presence, is likely to provide a large measure of

political deterrence. Both Israel and Syria, at one time or

another, have demonstrated a sensitivity to international

opinion. An attack by either party on the other will antagonize,

at a minimum, those countries providing peacekeeping personnel

and could elicit diplomatic condemnation, a possible military

response, or international sanctions of one sort or another.

Peacekeeping forces in a Chapter VI-type mission provide

little, if any, military deterrence--the political deterrence is

more important. Deterrence is also maintained by several factors

outside the context of a peacekeeping force. Israel's military

might provides probably the strongest deterrent to Syria.

Withdrawing from the Golan Heights will not diminish this in Arab

eyes. Another important deterrent is the U.S.-Israeli

relationship. Even without the involvement of U.S. soldiers,

America is likely to respond vigorously to any threat to Israel.

Many pundits have considered the deployment of a U.S. combat

brigade or division to provide a "trip wire" or deterrent force.54

This force would deter violations of the agreement and directly

oppose any party engaging in aggression. Such a deployment would

provide a credible military deterrent, but the downside outweighs

its value. A "trip wire" could not force-posture against any one

party without violating its impartiality. If it did posture only

against Syria, Damascus would most likely oppose its deployment.

A "trip wire" force would not demonstrate confidence in the

strength of the peace or the sincerity of the parties; it "would

send a message that an Israel-Syria peace was more like an armed
36

truce enforced by outside powers rather than a reconciliation

between erstwhile enemies; it would thereby reduce each side's

incentive to work together to enhance mutual security and build

confidence."55 A "trip wire" force would greatly increase the

costs and troop commitment of the United States56 and would

greatly increase its terrorist target value. It would run counter

to Israel's credo of military self-reliance and would constrain

any military action Tel Aviv might consider necessary. Some

analysts also worry that such a force would create conflicts and

tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Threat to U.S. Soldiers.

Opponents of the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan (and

certain members of the U.S. Congress) have postulated a series of

threats to U.S. forces which, according to them, provide a

rationale for not placing them there. The most common threat

proposed is the possibility that U.S. forces deployed to the

Golan would be subjected to terrorist attack. Mark Langfan57 and

Dore Gold58 hold that, upon regaining control of the Golan, Syria

will flood the territory with Syrian population by resettling the

100,000-130,000 citizens that evacuated during the 1967 war in

order to reestablish sovereignty. Mr. Langfan proposes that these

civilians would be potentially hostile and might attack U.S.

forces with "mines, remote controlled [road] side-bombs, snipers,

grenade launchers, or even suicide ‘Beirut'-type car bombs." Mr.

Gold says these citizens would provide the Syrian government the

option to harass an unwanted foreign presence by means of

terrorist action. This latter point is inconsistent with the fact

that U.S. forces will not deploy to the Golan without Syrian

acquiescence (or a Syrian interest in having them there). Neither

Mr. Langfan nor Mr. Gold specify to what purpose these attacks

would be conducted, but Mr. Langfan states that the Syrian

government would have the luxury of denying responsibility for

such attacks by possibly attributing them to radical Muslim

fundamentalist elements. There is no record of terror activity on

the Golan. Such attacks would be inconsistent with Syrian

national interests--improving relations with the United States,

shedding its reputation as a state sponsor of terror, seeking

Western economic investment and having the U.S. forces on the

Golan serving as a deterrent to Israeli aggression. History also

shows that President Asad has effective techniques to counter

such activity.

Other commentators, such as Frank Gaffney,59 cite the threat

of terrorism originating in Lebanon from groups such as Hizbollah

(under nominal Syrian influence) and other rogue states such as

Iran, Iraq, or Libya. Again the purpose of such attacks is not

specified. The threat, I feel, is overstated. With a couple of

exceptions, the Shi'ite and Palestinian elements in Lebanon have
37

not targeted U.S. military personnel, focusing instead on their

goal of ending the Israeli occupation. The 1982 bombing of the

Marine barracks in Beirut occurred in great part because the

United States surrendered its impartiality when it engaged in

combat operations against the Muslims on behalf of the

Christians. Except for the case of Lieutenant Colonel Richard

Higgins, USMC (the U.S. military observer killed in Lebanon),

which may have involved special circumstances, none of the 5-11

U.S. military officers who served as UN military observers in

Lebanon from 1948-1993 had been threatened or harmed by Hizbollah

or any of the other Shi'ite Muslim groups.60 Nor have the U.S.

officers assigned to UNTSO and living in Damascus been

threatened.

U.S. forces on the Golan would not be observable for

targeting or in range of most indirect fire weapons, such as

Katyushas, fired from Lebanon. An attack on U.S. facilities or

troops on the Golan would require terrorist penetration on foot

(since it is unlikely Israel, Syria, or Jordan would allow them

across the border in vehicles) in generally open, unforested

terrain over long distances. Assuming normal and reasonable

security measures, the approach of terrorists on the Golan would

be detected.61

Is there an indigenous terrorist threat that could appear on

the Golan without Asad's blessing or Syrian support? Perhaps.

Could Israeli settlers on the Golan try to sabotage an IsraeliSyrian peace by clandestinely attacking U.S. soldiers? Perhaps.

Is the Golan absolutely devoid of a terrorist threat? Probably

not. Could Asad's perspectives change? Perhaps. The threat of

terrorism is a constant for American forces operating in foreign

countries. American personnel have faced terrorism in countries

as diverse as West Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan,

and Pakistan, to name but a few. Terrorism is part of the

territory in international engagement, but it should not preclude

U.S. participation in activities which advance its national

interests. Assurances from both Syria and Israel to cooperate in

actions to prevent terrorist action against the deployed

peacekeeping force should be included in the peacekeeping mission

mandate.

Another possibility raised is that U.S. troops would be

caught in the middle of a surprise Syrian attack or an Israeli

military preemption against Syria. In the case of the former,

previous arguments have established that such a scenario is

fairly unlikely. The latter case is a possibility, considering

that the loss of Israel's Golan early-warning facilities may

greatly lower Israeli response thresholds. However, American

casualties in such an event would not be automatic or guaranteed.

U.S. military officers assigned to UNTSO served on the Sinai in

1973 and in Lebanon in 1982 without fatalities or major injury.
38

Alternatives.

Unilateral U.S. Peacekeeping Force. Establishment of a

unilateral U.S. military force to serve as peacekeepers on the

Golan should not be considered a credible alternative. It is not

in American interests, i.e., embracing multilateral engagement

(PDD-25), burdensharing, and conserving resources. It would be

unnecessarily expensive for the accomplishment of mission goals

and probably would not be accepted by either Israel or Syria.

Bolster UNDOF. UNDOF is widely held to be one of the United

Nation's most successful peacekeeping missions. Capitalizing on

this success, UNDOF could be bolstered with the addition of

soldiers from the United States and other countries to provide an

enhanced force for guaranteeing an Israeli-Syrian accord. Such an

approach offers several benefits: minimal start-up costs,

extensive institutional mission experience, an established

multilateral basis, and the established confidence of Israel and

Syria. From an American perspective, the UNDOF alternative

provides burdensharing, credibility, and the prospect for

minimizing its personnel contributions. The cost of UNDOF in 1994

was $32.2 million.62

Syria probably would prefer a UN force on the Golan because

it believes, when needed, it could muster a large bloc of 

support within the UN from the Arab and nonaligned states and

because it has two friends on the Security Council--Russia and

China. Israel would prefer that a peacekeeping force on the Golan

not be under the auspices of the UN. Israel views the UN as

indecisive, inefficient, and potentially unfriendly to Israel.

Israeli concerns arise from the precipitous withdrawal of the

first United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai in 1967 which

was prompted only by the unilateral demands of Egypt's President

Nasser. Israel also has a history of unpleasant disagreements

with UNTSO and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). For the

United States, as described by PDD-25, the UN approach might be

the best. If so, Israeli concerns can be addressed by explicit

requirements written into the mission's mandate which would

preclude unilateral termination or alternation of mission

objectives and institute broader mission control responsibilities

for both parties.

MFO II. This alternative would call for the formation of a

new MFO-styled organization on the Golan Heights. Were the

parties to declare success on the Sinai, it might be possible to

migrate the existing MFO structure to the Golan. Such an approach

would not offer the benefits that an enhanced UNDOF could

provide. Mission start-up costs probably would be higher with the

requirement to import mission equipment and support
39

infrastructure. There would be no institutional knowledge on the

mission area, its geography, or effective operational measures.

Command and control arrangements, acceptable to all mission

participants, would need to be established. A new force would

also be required to establish a modus vivendi with the parties to

the accord and earn their confidence. The cost of the MFO in 1994

was $53 million.63 One proposal suggests that such a force could

be established under American civilian control with civilian

technicians but without U.S. troops.64

Sunset Clause.

Both PDD-25 and the United Nations hold that peace

operations should not be open-ended, burdensome commitments. This

recognizes that there should come a point where the peacekeepers

are no longer needed. This principle was not considered in the

formation of the MFO in the Sinai. Many observers believe that

the MFO's mission succeeded (years ago) and that it has outlived

its usefulness. This judgment is supported by the very low

operational tempo and requirements placed upon the MFO's

observers. The MFO's protocols specify that mission termination

requires unanimous agreement to do so. Both the United States and

Egypt have indicated interest in concluding the mission; however,

Israel, emphasizing the symbolic support the MFO provides for the

peace process, wants the MFO to continue to serve.

U.S. concerns over the MFO have to do with the extended

commitment of U.S. soldiers. Egypt's concerns are probably the

costs it pays and an issue of sovereignty--the MFO's military

forces are stationed and operate only on Egyptian soil. Syria is

likely to have the same concerns over sovereignty and may demand

that a "sunset clause" or programmed mission termination date be

included in its accord with Israel. Senior military leaders in

the Pentagon would probably welcome a "sunset clause" for the

Golan Heights.65

Any "sunset clause" should be tied to the successful

accomplishment of specified peace milestones and confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) which encourage and facilitate

increasing the responsibilities of the two parties for the peace

and diminishing the need for third party supervision. These CBMs

should include such measures as liaison officers, joint patrols,

prenotification of military exercises and weapons tests, crisis

management provisions such as a hotline and conflict resolution

committees, and establishing transparency. Transparency is

intended to help each country understand the defense policies and

strategic intentions of the other, and thereby lower tension. The

primary vehicle to institute transparency would be through

military-to-military ties, which could include activities such as

doctrinal exchanges, reciprocal base visits, and personnel
40

exchanges.

Conclusion.

Considering the priority that an Arab-Israeli peace holds in

American foreign policy, providing U.S. military personnel to

perform peacekeeping duties on the Golan Heights is a small price

to pay. A successful peacekeeping mission to guarantee an

Israeli-Syrian peace accord is a doable proposition; however, the

required peacekeeping responsibilities do not warrant committing

a large U.S. force or combat units. As a "Chapter VI"-type

operation, a Golan peacekeeping mission should be reasonably

straightforward and simple. Since both parties will have agreed

to establish peace, a nominal U.S. force of 50-200 military or

civilian observers within a larger multilateral organization of

1,200 to 2,000 personnel could effectively provide the necessary

elements for mission success--compliance monitoring and early

warning.

The United States should not succumb to hyperbole, paranoia,

hysteria, "worst case" pressures, or overemphasize its "special

relations" with Israel in establishing the mission or size of the

U.S. peacekeeping contingent. Israeli claims of the threat posed

by Syria and the indispensability of the Golan must be critically

analyzed. Syria does not have the capability or motivation to

attack Israel. The Israelis are risk averse and prone to the

status quo. Habitually, they analyze threats in a "worst case"

mode which, as opposed to "most likely," is the most resource

intensive and costly mode of planning. The United States must

balance consideration of threat, risks, costs, resources, and

benefit of its peacekeeping contingent comprising the Golan

Heights.

U.S. policy has long held that an Israel confident in its

security would be able to make the compromises necessary to

create peace. The United States can and should continue to 

provide security assurances to Israel through existing bilateral

military-to-military and strategic channels. It should not, and

need not, do so through its participation in a peacekeeping

presence on the Golan. The United States should embrace the

impartiality required and should not unnecessarily compromise its

peacekeeping role with unbalanced bilateral considerations for

one party over the other.

ENDNOTES

1. See, among others, Dore Gold, U.S. Forces on the Golan

Heights and Israeli-Syrian Security Arrangements, Tel Aviv: Tel

Aviv University, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, August 1994.

Dr. Gold is the director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy
41

in the Middle East project at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center

for Strategic Studies; Frank Gaffney, Jr., et al., U.S. Forces on

the Golan Heights: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs,

Washington, DC: The Center for Security Policy, October 25, 1994.

The Center for Security Policy assembled six senior retired

officers and five senior civilians who served in various senior

governmental positions--most as Assistant Secretary of Defense to

address this issue; Mark Langfan, "U.S. Troops on Golan

‘Quicksand'?," Security Affairs, March 1994. Mr. Langfan is a

real estate attorney in New York and an avid activist in this

issue; Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Security in the Context of the

Peace Process," Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1994.

Mr. Steinberg is a Professor at Bar Ilan University in Israel;

and Andrew Bacevich, Michael Eisenstadt, and Carl Ford,

Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Israel-Syria Peace

Agreement, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East

Policy, 1994. A well-reasoned and logical study.

2. PDD-25 is a classified document. An extensive

unclassified extract was provided to the press corps by the White

House. This unclassified extract is available via the Internet

from the Department of the Navy Public Affairs office

(www.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/ peaceops/elements.txt).

3. While PDD-25 was oriented toward U.S. participation in UN

peacekeeping operations, these factors are also meaningful when

considering other, non-UN, peacekeeping operations.

4. The U.S. Congress is likely to debate the issue. As the

deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia demonstrated, Congress has

shown little interest in deploying U.S. soldiers to peacekeeping

missions around the world. Despite traditional generous support

by Congress for the state of Israel, preliminary indications are

that Congress may oppose a U.S. military deployment to the Golan

Heights. Congress has been lobbied (with some apparent success)

by Israeli Likud party supporters who oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and who claim that the risks to

U.S. soldiers would be high.

5. Steven J. Rosen, Military Geography and the Military

Balance in the Arab-Israel Conflict, Jerusalem: The Jerusalem

Post Press, 1977, p. 70.

6. The World Factbook, 1995, Washington, DC: Central

Intelligence Agency, 1995, p. 408.

7. This latter capability also provides a good measure of

deterrence.

8. Ze'ev Maoz, "Strategic Depth and Other Myths," Ha'aretz, June 30, 1995.
42

9. An Israeli settlement evacuated by force by the Israeli

government during Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. The

extensive press coverage of the forced evacuation resulted in

significant government embarrassment.

10. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), "Rabin

Speaks at Opening of Winter Knesset Session", cited in FBIS-NES94-192, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia, October 4, 1994, p.

44.

11. Gold, p. 30.

12. United Nations, "Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of

Disputes," Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco: The

United Nations, 1945.

13. International Peace Academy, Peacekeepers Handbook, New

York: Pergamon, 1984, p. 22.

14. While not directly assigned to UNDOF, American military

officers, assigned to the UNTSO in Damascus, Syria, and Tiberias,

Israel, have supported UNDOF's mission since its inception. UNTSO

officers routinely conduct compliance inspections and liaison

duties for UNDOF; however, U.S. and Soviet officers have been

precluded from physically performing duties on the Golan itself

by restrictions placed on the five permanent members of the UN

Security Council.

15. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to

the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1995, p. B1.

16. See Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready,"

Foreign Policy, Fall 1994, pp. 145-63; and "The Golan: Israel,

Syria, and Strategic Calculations," Middle East Journal, Vol. 47,

No. 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 611-632.

17. Ronald D. McLaurin, "Hidden Agendas Amidst Opposing

Objectives--The Newest Incarnation of the Middle East Peace

Process," Middle East Insight, Vol. 8, No. 2, September/October

1991, p. 17.

18. Ibid, p. 17. Mr. McLaurin points out that the true

degree of Soviet commitment was uncertain, but "the Syrians long

considered the Soviet backing a critical element of their overall

strategic posture, even if it only introduced the requisite

degree of uncertainty into Israeli planning."

19. See Department Of State, Background Notes: Syria, Washington, DC: State Department Bureau of Public Affairs,
43

October 1995; and Patrick Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions:

Syria's Military Build-Up and Economic Crisis, Washington, DC:

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989.

20. Smadar Peri, "IDF Intelligence Chief Interviewed,"

Yedi'ot Aharonot, March 25, 1994. Cited in FBIS-NES-94-061, Daily

Report: Near East & South Asia.

21. In the last year or so, Israel has made improvements in

its relations with some of the smaller Gulf countries such as

Oman and Qatar, but these are peripheral countries whose actions,

in the context of Gulf Cooperation Council bickering, may have

been more intended to annoy Saudi Arabia. The real key to broader

Israeli regional integration lies with Saudi Arabia, the only

Arab economic superpower, which is key to the economic focus of

Israel's (or at least Prime Minister Peres') vision of a "new

Middle East."

22. This writer was told on several occasions by official

Saudi delegates to the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)

working group of the Multilateral Peace Process talks that Saudi

Arabia has a special interest in ensuring that Syria reaches a

satisfactory accord with Israel. Saudi interaction with the

Israeli delegation in successive ACRS meetings appeared to be

conditioned by the prevailing tone of Israeli-Syrian negotiations

at the time. The Saudis are also very interested in the final

status of Jerusalem and the Palestinians. Muhammad Muslih

(Dateline Damascus, p. 159) makes this point as well when he

says, "Saudi policy is almost completely in agreement with

Syria's basic policy with respect to the peace talks with

Israel."

23. Having suffered resounding military defeats to Israel in

1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982.

24. Former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant

General Ehud Barak said, "Today it is also clear that Syria,

without additional Arab allies--and today it has no other Arab

ally--has a far smaller military option than in 1973. If there

has been any change in the Syrian military option, one must

realize that it has weakened due to the developments of the past

few years. It is not getting any stronger." Tzvi Timor, "IDF

Chief of Staff Baraq on Talks With Syria," ‘Al Hamishmar, September 14, 1994, pp. 7-9. Cited in FBIS-NES-94-182, Daily

Report: Near East & South Asia, September 14, 1994.

25. Amassing a debt estimated by some sources as high as $16

billion to the former Soviet Union.

26. See McLaurin, p. 17.
44

27. Both Syrian and Israeli numbers are ground forces only.

28. Shlomo Gazit and Zeev Eytan, The Middle East Military

Balance 1993-1994, Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1994, p. 439,

state that Syria can mobilize another 750,000 reservists not

organized in units and 400,000 members of the worker's militia.

This writer is comfortable ignoring these numbers because these

personnel would not be suitable for offensive operations. Syria

does not have the major weapons systems to arm these personnel,

and they lack the necessary training and leadership to comprise

effective combat units. Their most effective use would likely be

home defense. In most Arab armies, maintenance of low-capability

reserves such as these reduces overall military readiness because

it diverts resources which would be better spent improving the

combat capabilities of the active force.

29. The value of such a comparison is only to demonstrate

broad trends. The data will support little else. The data doesn't

factor the different prices each country pays for equipment from

different suppliers. It doesn't factor equipment received but not

paid for, such as the $700 million in drawdown Israel received

from the United States between 1992-94 or equipment Israel

received from the United States without cost as excess defense

articles. It doesn't necessarily factor the cost of equipment

produced indigenously by defense industries, such as Israel's,

when infrastructure costs are accounted for under other national

categories. It doesn't factor the quality of the technology

transferred. It doesn't factor time differences in delivery and

payment, etc.

30. See Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to

Developing Nations, 1987-1994, CRS Report for Congress 95-862 F,

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 4, 1995,

pp. 50-52. Mr. Grimmett presents data on arms transfer agreements

during the periods 1987-1990 and 1991-1994. In the period 1987-

1990, Syria implemented agreements for $5.3 billion to Israel's

$2.3 billion. During the period 1991-1994, Syrian agreements

totalled only $900 million compared to Israel's $4.3 billion.

Totals for the two periods were Syria $6.5 billion and Israel

$6.6 billion. The significant Syrian decline in the 1991 to 1994

period should have a significant negative impact on future Syrian

military readiness.

31. According to Steven Metz and James Kievit, The

Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, p. 5, the Revolution in Military Affairs is "centered

around the fusion of sophisticated remote sensing systems with

extremely lethal, usually stand-off, precision strike weapons

systems and automation-assisted command, control and

communications (C3) [which] allow smaller militaries to attain
45

rapid, decisive results through synchronized, near-simultaneous

operations throughout the breadth and depth of a theater of war."

32. For strategic reasons, the United States has transferred

high-technology weapons such as M-1 tanks, AH-64 Apache attack

helicopters, Patriot air defense missiles, and F-15 and F-16

fighter aircraft to states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

However the systems usually don't have the same capabilities as

those provided to Israel and the Arab states have significant

problems in absorbing the technologies involved and employing

them in a fashion that in any way approaches their capabilities.

33. With perhaps only one exception--Jordan--the Arab armies

facing Israel emphasize mass over quality; have highly

centralized, inflexible command structures and poor organization

for combat; depend on conscripted, poorly educated, poorly paid

soldiers; lack technical sophistication; rely on outdated

choreographed Soviet military doctrine; eschew effective

training; and lack an emphasis on sustainability. Acquisition

generally focuses on "big-ticket," high-technology equipment

items without the required training and sustainment packages.

These countries seem to believe that the mere possession of these

high-tech, sophisticated weapon systems and not any operational

proficiency with them provides deterrence.

34. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford (p. 11) state that,

"Damascus currently lacks the means to retake the Golan by

force," and cite Michael Eisenstadt, Arming for Peace? Syria's

Elusive Quest for Strategic Parity, Washington, DC: The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992.

35. In various political and military venues, Israel has

been asking the United States to compensate Israel for making

peace with Syria. As part of this compensation, Israel has asked

for several JSTARS and AWACS aircraft, downlink terminals for

U.S. satellite imagery, a variety of other high-technology (and

high cost) weapons systems, and funds to cover redeployment

costs. Reported estimates of Israel's compensation requests run

from $3 billion to $12 billion. See, for example, Avino'am BarYosef, "Baraq Demands Early Warning Alternatives From U.S.,"

Ma'ariv, August 19, 1994, p. 2. Cited in FBIS-NES-94-161, Daily

Report: Near East & South Asia; Alon Pinkas, "Shahaq To Discuss

Golan ‘Compensation Package' in U.S.," The Jerusalem Post, June

11, 1995, pp. 1, 2. Cited in FBIS-NES-94-112, Daily Report: Near

East & South Asia; and Op Ed, "The Price of Middle East Peace,"

The Washington Post, January 17, 1996, p. 16.

36. In fiscal year 1995, Israel's share of the total U.S.

security assistance budget totalled approximately 55 percent.

Assistance to Egypt, linked to Israel through Camp David,

comprised 36 percent. This left only 9 percent for the rest of
46

the world.

37. Major General Uri Sagi, then the Director of Military

Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces, supported this assessment

during a September 14, 1994, interview with the Israeli

newspaper, Yedi'ot Aharonot, when he said, "Nobody better than me

realizes the enormous importance of the Golan Heights from the

intelligence point of view, particularly when we do not yet have

a political arrangement. On the other hand, I also realize that

if and when the political level makes its decision, the Army in

general and the Intelligence Branch in particular will find ways

to supply early warning. . . . If and when the political level

decides that the political arrangement calls for a redeployment,

I believe we will find the answers." Smadar Peri, "Intelligence

Head on Arab Leaders' Health, Syria," Yedi'ot Aharonot, September

14, 1994, pp. 1-3. Cited from FBIS-NES-94-182, Daily Report: Near

East & South Asia, September 14, 1994.

38. Bernard Blake, ed., Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare

Systems, Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1995, pp.

269-270. Note: Israel's Phalcon is apparently experiencing

technical difficulties and is not yet fully operational. Israel

sold a Phalcon to Chile who has had repeated system problems and

complained to Israel of system shortcomings. With Israel's

national technical prowess, these problems should be quickly

overcome.

39. Christian Larder, "Israel Launches Ofeq-3 Satellite,"

Air & Cosmos/Aviation International, April 14, 1995, p. 36. Cited

in FBIS, JPRS-EST-95-014 Reports, April 14, 1995.

40. See Ben Kaspit, "Uzi Dayan's Dilemma: How to Return the

Golan Heights While Presereving Israel's Deterrent Power,"

Ma'ariv, January 19, 1996, p. 14. Cited in FBIS-NES-96-015, Daily

Report: Near East and South Asia, January 23, 1996.

41. The requirement for the impartiality of peacekeeping

forces is universally accepted. There are a plethora of sources

which uphold the criticality of impartiality. The United Nations

states, "It is a key principle that the operation . . . must not

in any way favour one party against another. This requirement of

impartiality is fundamental, not only on the grounds of principle

but also to ensure the operation is effective. A United Nations

operation cannot take sides without becoming a part of the

conflict which it has been set up to control or resolve." United

Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, New York: United Nations Department of Public

Information, 1990, p. 6.

42. In this context, generic is used to refer to early

warning intelligence provided by the peacekeeping authority
47

equally to the two parties on a "take it or leave it" basis. Such

an arrangement would not allow either party to task collection of

special requirements or intelligence priorities without the

acquiescence of the other party.

43. See Gold and Gaffney.

44. Gold, p. 22. Gaffney, p. 18, also addresses this point.

45. Gold, p. 22.

46. Gold, p. 23; and Gaffney, pp. 8, 18-19.

47. While the United States will provide critical

intelligence data in these channels, it would probably be careful

to exclude data which would increase the possibilities of a

preemptive Israeli strike against Syria.

48. Perhaps using these precedents, Bacevich, Eisenstadt and

Ford, pp. 19, 35, 40, 47, call for 200-300 U.S. civilian or

military technicians to perform the early warning duties for a

Golan peacekeeping force.

49. See Mala Tabory, The Multinational Force and Observers

in the Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function, Boulder:

Westview Press, 1986, p. 6; and Gold, pp. 20-21.

 50. See Tabory, p. 7; John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An

Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel

Interface, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 164; and Gold, p. 21.

51. See Tabory, p. 72; Mackinlay, pp. 183-184; and Robert B.

Houghton and Frank G. Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the

Middle East, Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, U.S.

Department of State, 1984, pp. 50-51.

52. The MFO area of operations is broken into four zones, AD. The MFO's military forces operate only in zone C inside the

Egyptian border. Observation duties in the other three zones are

handled exclusively by the COU. The COU operates in zone C as

well.

53. Gaffney, p. 9. It should be noted that Mr. Gaffney, and

the group of retired general officers and former senior leaders

he collaborated with on his work, oppose a U.S. military

deployment on the Golan.

54. See Gold, pp. 30-34; Gaffney, pp. 10-11; and Bacevich,

Eisenstadt, and Ford, p. 36.

55. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford, p. 36.
48

56. In terms of personnel, the commitment of a unit to a

long-term peacekeeping mission requires a force three times the

size of the committed unit to sustain: (1) the unit deployed; (2)

the next unit scheduled to deploy is withdrawn from normal

operations to provide manning, equipment, and specialized

training; and (3) the unit that has returned from serving in the

mission must be blocked to re-train its soldiers in their primary

combat specialties. This re-training is critical to return the

unit to combat proficiency since peacekeeping duties will not

sustain required combat skills.

57. Langfan.

58. Gold, p. 43.

59. Gaffney, p. 15.

60. This fact is not coincidental. In 1985, the Lebanese

Shi'ite Amal military chief Daoud Daoud offered to protect the

American observers assigned in southern Lebanon when their senior

officer received an anonymous death threat and the Americans were

temporarily withdrawn from duty in southern Lebanon. Daoud

believed that the presence of the Americans inhibited the

Israelis and supported Shiite goals. One U.S. Navy Commander

assigned in southern Lebanon noted that a colorful emblem had

been painted onto a building fairly close to his living quarters

which had become a meeting hall. It was a couple of weeks later

when he discovered that the colorful emblem was the crest of

Hizbollah. Despite their proximity and the American flag patch he

wore on his uniform daily, the commander was never bothered or

threatened by Hizbollah.

61. See Michael Eisenstadt, "U.S. Troops on the Golan?",

Middle East Insight, Vol. XI, No. 2, January-February 1995, pp.

51.

62. National Defense University, 1995 Strategic Assessment,

Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995, pp. 166-167.

63. Ibid.

64. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford, p. 35. The authors'

intent in this proposal appears to be related to minimizing the

constraint that U.S. soldiers might place on Israel's freedom of

action.

65. It should be noted that a termination of U.S.

participation would not necessarily lead to mission

discontinuance.
49

HARIRI'S CRITIQUE OF OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS

Stephen C. Pelletiere

Tel Aviv justified its devastating assault on Lebanon in

April 1996 by pointing to the depredations of Hizbollah

guerrillas who were attacking Israel's northern settle-ments.1

Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri brushed that explanation

aside, claiming that, in fact, the Israelis were trying through

Operation GRAPES OF WRATH to wreck Lebanon's economy.2 This

chapter looks at the operation to assess the competing claims. It

finds that Hariri's accusation has merit, but what is more,

Operation GRAPES OF WRATH shows us a new power alignment

developing in the Middle East which will have far-reaching

consequences for the peace of the area.

Background.

The incident that indirectly provoked Israel's Operation

GRAPES OF WRATH occurred in late March 1996 when an Israeli tank

fired on two Lebanese civilians in southern Lebanon, killing

both.3

 Although Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres claimed that

this was an accident and apologized for the occurrence, the

Lebanese guerrilla group, Hizbollah, retaliated by rocketing

Israel's northern settlement of Kiryat Shimona. Peres angrily

attacked Hizbollah's action, saying that this was an escalation.

The matter subsequently died down, but then, not too long

afterward, two more Lebanese civilians died after a roadside bomb

detonated, which the Hizbollahis also blamed on the Israeli

Defense Forces (IDF).4 The IDF disavowed responsibility. However,

Hizbollah fired another barrage at Kiryat Shimona.

This time the IDF retaliated massively. The Lebanese had

been anticipating some such response; however, the scale of the

retaliation and the choice of targets proved a surprise. The

Israelis attacked infrastructure--roads, bridges, water

reservoirs--even bombing the country's electrical grid.5 In

addition, the IDF blockaded the coast so that the Lebanese could

not get food.6

 They interdicted the major highway through Lebanon

and blockaded Beirut International Airport.7 Whenever the

Lebanese tried to rebuild any of the damaged infrastructure, the

IDF warned them off.8 As a consequence, for a period of time

during the attacks, communications between a number of Lebanese

communities were interdicted; commerce came to a standstill.

This is what provoked Hariri's ire. He claimed that because

so many economic targets were hit, Israel was not sincere in 

claiming that the operation was in response to Hizbollah

activity. In fact, said Hariri, this was a plot the Israelis had
50

contrived to wreck Lebanon's economic recovery.9

To understand how Hariri could make this charge, and, also

to assess its significance, one needs to know something about the

recovery to which Hariri was referring.

The Lebanese Miracle.

Lebanon has been torn by civil war since 1975, and, over the

course of that ordeal, the country's infrastructure has been

practically wiped out. The nadir can be said to have come in 1993

when the Israelis mounted a major assault on the country (the

third such carried out by the IDF since 1978).10 The 1993

hostilities, which the Israelis dubbed Operation ACCOUNTABILITY,

resembled Operation GRAPES OF WRATH in a number of aspects. In

both instances, no Israeli ground troops were permitted to enter

Lebanon,11 but enormous damage was inflicted on the country

through aerial bombardments and artillery barrages.

The 1993 assault ended when Secretary of State Warren

Christopher brokered a ceasefire. The terms of that truce were

limited but for this very reason easy to fulfill.12 For the first

time in many years, Lebanon looked forward to peace.

At this point, Hariri announced that he would direct a

monumental rebuilding effort, the so-called $32 billion Horizon

2000 Plan, to replace Lebanon's shattered infrastructure. Through

this activity, Lebanon hoped to become the services entrepot for

a region reshaped by peace and, in particular, a sophisticated

capital market channel-ing funds into the Middle East.

Before the civil war broke out in 1975, Lebanon was

something of a showpiece in the region. One of the loveliest

places on the Mediterranean, it was the favored vacation spot for

the Gulf sheikhs. The monarchs not only came to play in Lebanon,

they banked there as well. This led to the establishment of

Beirut as the financial center of the area.

However, it is not merely that the Lebanese exploited the

largesse of the sheikhs. The Lebanese on their own are master

money managers. Their ability to turn a profit, often on

seemingly little or no basis, is legendary. Middle Easterners

generally regard the Lebanese among the shrewdest traders in the

region.

When the civil war raged, most of this trading ceased.

However, at the first opportunity, the community recovered

itself. Under Hariri's direction, it began to move forward again.

The prime minister's scheme was a simple one--reclaim the bombblasted capital by gutting the city center and rebuilding it from
51

the ground up. Once the building got underway, the economy

generally began to pick up; in the last 3 years, the rate of

growth has averaged over 7 percent, and total assets held by

Lebanese banks increased by 25 percent.13

Hariri is an exceptional individual. A billionaire

contractor who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia, he was able to

enlist the support of the Saudi royal family for the grand

recovery scheme that he envisioned.14 With aid flowing from the

Gulf, other channels of assistance soon opened up.

One unexpected source of funds was Lebanon's Shia community.

The Shias, who traditionally have made their home in southern

Lebanon, were forced out of the area by the first two Israeli

invasions (1978 and 1982). Many of those displaced went abroad as

expatriate businessmen, and many sent money home. Despite the

uncertain conditions in the south, the bulk of the money flowing

into Lebanon went to purchase real estate there as the

expatriates clearly meant to make the area their home. It was

this continuous flow of cash that underpinned Hariri's recovery

program.15

The Shias are an interesting group. For many years they were

outcasts among Lebanese society. Unlike Lebanon's Christian

community and the Sunni Muslims, who rank high in the social

order, the Shias were the lowest of the low. They had little

political consciousness, and this helped to keep them down.16

In the late 1960s, the Palestinians began to set up bases in

the Shias' territory. The Palestine Liberation Organi-zation

(PLO) wanted the area as a launching pad for raids against

Israel's northern settlements.17 The Shias--partially because they

were so politically unaware--allowed the Palestinians to come

among them, and it was not long before they were caught up in the

latter's deadly war against Israel.

In 1982, the Israelis mounted what was probably their most

crushing assault on Lebanon, Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE. The aim

of that operation was to drive the Palestinians not only from the

border area but out of Lebanon entirely. The Shias, who were fed

up with the Palestinians' encroachments, welcomed the Jewish

soldiers as saviors. Had the Israelis exploited this sentiment,

the subsequent history of Israeli-Lebanese relations might have

turned out quite differently.

 Instead, the Israelis ignored the Shias' offer of friendship to concentrate on building up their self-proclaimed security

zone along the border. This was a nine-mile-wide strip,

comprising about 10 percent of Lebanese territory. To create this

enclave, the Israelis took land away from the Shias, and

naturally the latter resented this. The Shias discovered that
52

they had gotten rid of one lot of oppressors, the Palestinians,

only to become saddled with another, the IDF.

Gradually, the Shia community--for so long dormant

politically--began to stir. A leader emerged in the person of

Nabih Berri, heading an already established militia called Amal.

Amal began to fight the Israelis.18

Another group appeared soon after that--Hizbollah. It, too,

was made up of Shias, but Hizbollah was founded by Iran, which

dispatched Revolutionary Guards to instruct the Lebanese Shia

community in the ways of militant Islam.19 Ultimately, the

Hizbollahis became, among the Lebanese, the fiercest opponents

of Israel. But it was not only the Iranians who took an interest

in the Shias; the Syrians did as well.

Syria and the Shias.

Syria was drawn into the Lebanon imbroglio in 1976. It came

in response to an appeal by the Christians, who were losing out

in a fight with a coalition of Muslim groups.20 Ostensibly, the

conflict arose over the desire of the Muslims to involve Lebanon

in the Arab-Israeli War. In fact, the fight was about status. The

Christians had always led the country politically and

commercially; now the Muslims were challenging that suzerainty.21

Syria entered to restore a rough balance of forces in Lebanon. It

checked the Muslims' growing strength, and this prevented the

country from sliding into anarchy.

The Syrians were still in Lebanon in 1982 when Israel

invaded to drive out the Palestinians. Inevitably, the two

countries were fated to clash; this came about as the Israeli

army drove north to Beirut.

The Syrians tried to stay the Israeli advance, and, although

they suffered grievous casualties, they did manage to hold the

Israelis in check.22 Thus, when the United States worked out a

truce--and the Israelis withdrew to their self-proclaimed

security zone in the south--the Syrians settled down in the

Beka'a Valley. Neither side would leave Lebanon as long as the

other was there.

In the meantime, the Syrians made common cause with the

Shias, who by that time were engaged in their guerrilla war

against Israel. Syria's President Hafez al Asad provided the

Shias with a low level of military assistance and undertook to

repair breaches within the community.

The Amal group and Hizbollah were desperate enemies.23 Asad

drew the two together and got them to suppress their animosities
53

so they might better concentrate on fighting the Israelis.

Amal soon turned all of its energies into becoming an

effective political force. The group's secular leader, Nabih

Berri, rose very fast within Lebanon's political system,

eventually becoming speaker of the Lebanese parliament.

Exploiting the power and prestige of this office, Berri was able

to, in effect, draw the Lebanese Shia community up the political

ladder after him.

Hizbollah, on the other hand, became, if anything, more

radical. It carried the burden of fighting the occupation, but

along with that it established a primitive, but nonetheless

effective, network of social services in the south.24 Money for

this, estimated anywhere from between $60 and $100 million a

year, came from Iran.

During all these developments, Asad kept working with the

Shia groups, maintaining excellent relations with both of them.

Asad, who has the reputation of a fox (probably the shrewdest

politician in the Middle East) showed his ability in this

instance.25 Early on, he recognized the potential of the Shias,

and patiently, he brought them along.

In 1991, U.S. President George Bush convened the Madrid 

Conference to try to reach a permanent peace in the Middle East.

Syria went to that conference although its position at the time

was extremely weak. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, meaning

that Damascus had no patron.

The Israelis assumed that Asad would have to make

concessions as he had no other alternative. To be sure, Asad's

position was difficult, but he acquitted himself well. He gave

nothing away, but rather took the stand that Israel, under the

terms of the UN resolutions, was the one obliged to make

concessions.26

Asad and the Israelis were bargaining over the Golan

Heights. Lebanon, which also attended the Madrid conference,

wanted back the security zone Israel had carved out of the Shias'

territory. The Israelis indicated willingness to bargain with the

Lebanese over this but only if they abandoned their common front

with the Syrians. The Lebanese refused.

In fact, Hariri did not have the option of deserting Asad.

With 35,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon, the Syrian President

practically ran the country. Any significant actions Hariri might

make had to be vetted in the Syrian capital. Indeed, Hariri owed

his job to Asad; the latter pressured the Lebanese parliament

into confirming him in his post.
54

This solidarity between Beirut and Damascus somewhat offset

Israel's strong position in the talks. In the meantime, to put

pressure on the Israelis, Asad encouraged Hizbollah to carry on

its guerrilla activities in the south. For a time these

activities were not very effective; the Hizbollahis were not

skilled fighters. But by 1993, things had begun to change.

The Hizbollahis had become more proficient, and they began

to score some remarkable successes. For example, in the spring of

1993, they killed nine IDF soldiers in 4 weeks.27 This stung

Israel's then-Prime Minister Itzak Rabin into ordering Operation

ACCOUNTABILITY, discussed above.

That operation was widely regarded as a debacle. The

announced purpose was to force Lebanon and Syria into curbing the

Hizbollahis, but after 7 days of intense bombardment, in which

500,000 Lebanese were rendered homeless (roughly the number

displaced in Operation GRAPES OF WRATH), nothing changed.28

Neither Asad nor Hariri gave way, and Hizbollah still went on

attacking the IDF.

Christopher's 1993 ceasefire arrangement was widely regarded

as a setback for Rabin. Under it, the Hizbollahis gained

recognition as resistance fighters. Moreover, as the Hizbollahis

construed the agreement, they were free to go after Israel's

northern settlements whenever Israel killed any Lebanese

civilians.29

The Israelis certainly were not happy with the way things

turned out; however, for awhile they were under no compulsion to

react. Starting in late 1993, the pace of the peace talks picked

up, and this motivated Asad to rein in the Hizbollahis by

effectively cutting off their arms supply. The guerrillas

reportedly got their weapons from Iran. They were flown from

Tehran to Damascus and then transported to southern Lebanon

through the Beka'a Valley, which Syria controls. As long as the

peace talks seemed to be making progress, Asad interdicted the

weapons flow to the guerrillas--no weapons, no resistance

activity.

Then, at the end of 1995, Prime Minister Rabin was

assassinated, and his successor, Shimon Peres, had to decide

whether to call for new elections or wait until October when he

was required by law to seek a mandate. The danger in moving up

the elections was that it would cut short negotiations with Syria

and Lebanon (and with the Palestinians), because Peres could not

bargain effectively in the midst of an election campaign.

At the time, negotiations between Syria and Israel had hit a

snag (as discussed below), and apparently for that reason Peres

decided to call elections immediately. Asad, however, was not at
55

all pleased with this, and shortly after the decision was made,

resistance activity in the south flared anew.30

 It was during this renewal of fighting that the Hizbollahis

rocketed Kiryat Shimona, not once but twice.31 This insured

Israeli retaliation, which came in April when Operation GRAPES OF

WRATH was launched.32

With an election coming, Peres probably could not have done

other than he did (in ordering Operation GRAPES OF WRATH).33

Moreover, his reaction was generally expected, and so Operation

GRAPES OF WRATH, when it came, did not generate a lot of concern

in Israel or the non-Muslim world.34 The United States, for

example, reacted in a subdued way, which seemed justified at the

time. The Israelis made a great deal of the fact that, with their

superior technology, they could minimize civilian casualties and

that they were only going after infrastructure.35

Hariri, however, almost immediately began to fulminate

against the operation, claiming that it was not an ad hoc

response to guerrilla depredations but a contrived plot to wreck

Lebanon's recovery. What seems to have set Hariri off was the

open-endedness of the assault. While it was going on, Peres laid

down a number of demands that the Lebanese and Syrians would have

to fulfill before the operation could be stopped. This amounted

to undertaking a campaign to disarm the guerrillas with which

neither Hariri nor Asad was likely to comply.36

As the operation dragged on, more and more infrastructure

was destroyed, and thus the costs to Lebanon escalated. Nor were

these simply random strikes that the Israelis were carrying out;

there appeared to be a pattern to them.

Finding the Pattern.

The obvious point at issue, in trying to make sense of

Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, is the level of destruction. The

Israelis maintained that, by going after infrastructure, they

were sparing the Lebanese. But, the infrastructure damage was

considerable, and along with that, people were killed. To be

sure, the number of deaths increased as the operation progressed

(whereas at the very beginning, casualties were low).37

The most spectacular aspect of the assault was the human

exodus it caused. Anywhere from 300,000 to half-a-million

Lebanese fled their homes (according to one estimate, 90 percent

of southern Lebanon was depopulated). The people decamped after

the IDF warned that the whole of southern Lebanon would be

targeted. Subsequently, the bombardment followed the fleeing

victims north, as the IDF bombed Shia neighborhoods in Beirut and
56

Shia communities in the Beka'a Valley. The United Nations

estimated at one point that the Israelis were firing between

3,000 to 4,000 artillery shells a day into Lebanon and were

flying 200 air sorties across the border.38 Meanwhile, Hizbollah

kept up its barrage of rockets into Israel.

As of April 16, it was reported that 35 Lebanese had died

and 20 were wounded at the hands of the IDF.39 According to the

Israelis, most of these were Hizbollahis. But this does not

appear to be the case; the IDF probably killed no more than four

guerrillas.40 The Hizbollahis have no formal bases; they live

among the villagers they claim to defend. Hence, in going after

the guerrillas, the Israelis were forced to target the villages

and, in the process, innocents died.

Considering the amount of ordnance that the Israelis

expended, it is extraordinary that, in the early days of the

assault, Lebanese casualties were kept so low. This would appear

to constitute a testimonial to the Israelis' precision bombing.

The IDF's success in this department was widely publicized, and

thus, it came as a shock when, on April 18, an Israeli battery

firing into Lebanon hit a UN camp at Qana, into which some 800

refugees had crammed themselves. The barrage killed over 100

persons and wounded a large number more. The IDF immediately

claimed that this was an accident. The United Nations, which

launched its own investigation, reported otherwise.41

A number of points of interest should be mentioned in

connection with this incident. First, the Israeli government

never apologized for the shelling, which, if it were accidental,

would have been a simple thing to do.42 Nor did it ever attempt to

court martial any of the officers involved in the affair. And,

finally, the IDF refused to answer allegations set forth in the

report, although the UN left open the possibility that, if the

Israelis did so, the report could be amended. This apparent

indifference would seem to lend credance to the UN finding that

the attack on Qana was deliberate.

The shelling aroused a significant outcry throughout the

world and is certainly what induced the United States to become

involved. Secretary Christopher travelled to the Middle East and

began to meet with the principals. Ultimately, this produced the

truce which brought Operation GRAPES OF WRATH to a halt.

Selected Targets.

In determining what, in fact, was going on with Operation

GRAPES OF WRATH, we need to pay attention to what precisely was

targeted and the manner in which the raids were carried out.
57

For example, after the huge exodus that was triggered by the

operation got underway and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were

streaming northward, the IDF then went about destroying the

deserted villages; several reports refer to 60 that were

"obliterated."43 The IDF had to inflict a certain amount of

destruction on the villages to keep the exodus moving out of the

area, but the destruction that actually occurred seems excessive.

Reservoirs were blown up, bridges destroyed, and roads were

cratered.44 It was as though the Israelis were trying to degrade

living conditions throughout the entire southern region, not just

temporarily but for some time to come.

This was what went on in the south. Equally disturbing were

the attacks on the capital. Beirut had absorbed the brunt of

damage from Lebanon's 18-year-long civil war, and had assumed as

of 1993 that its long ordeal was over. The return of Israeli

helicopter gunships, blasting neighborhoods in the city's

downtown, horrified the Lebanese.45

Along with that, the Israelis destroyed the capital's

electrical facilities by blowing up the main plant at Jumhour and

another auxiliary installation at B'slam.46 These two

installations had been brought on line in January at a cost of

millions of dollars. With their startup, Lebanon received roundthe-clock electricity for the first time in 16 years.47

Indeed, the plants at Jambour and B'slam were the symbols of

Lebanon's reconstruction.48 With them in operation, the recovery

was free to move forward on several fronts. For example, the

stock market reopened;49 the telephone system came back on line;50

several of the great international hotels began to rebuild their

damaged edifices;51 and a number of international firms, which

formerly had operated out of Lebanon, reopened offices in

Beirut.52

When the electricity shut off again, Lebanon's miracle

recovery slipped under a cloud. It became problematical whether

the great reconstruction would ever be completed. Evidence of

lost confidence was Hariri's decision to cancel a $100 million

bond offering to produce new housing.53 There was another bond

offering set to go (for another $100 million); this, too, appears

to have been cancelled.54 The head of Lebanon's central bank

commented that the Israeli operation set back the recovery at

least 2 years. He put the cost of the damage at $300 million

(other estimates range as high as half-a-billion), and he claimed

that the Israelis should be made to compensate Lebanon for this.55

How serious the damage was and what it will take to recover

from it are questions which will only be answered with time. We

will have to see how the international lending community responds

to further appeals from Hariri, and also whether the Lebanese
58

will be willing to rebuild for yet another time. Indeed, this

would appear to be the key factor--the morale question. Will the

country's morale hold up after all of the destruction to which it

has been subjected?

Targeting the Shias.

Looking closely at the pattern of destruction, it is

apparent that one community was targeted throughout--the Shias.

Their villages were flattened in the south, and when they fled to

Beirut for shelter, their neighborhoods in the capital were

bombed.56 The IDF also went after Shia communities in the Beka'a

Valley.

Who are the Shias; that is, who are they precisely in

relation to the recovery? They are the ones who are bankrolling a

large portion of it.57 Their money--largely coming from expatriate

enclaves in West Africa--is behind much of the reconstruction

effort. The willingness of the Shias to buy up property in the

south is a guarantee of the country's ability to rebuild.58

Thus it would appear that the Israelis, by going after the

Shias, were actually targeting the recovery because if the Shias

were to become demoralized (and stop pouring money in), the

recovery could never succeed.

Looked at from that angle, Hariri's charges appear to have

substance. The aim of the operation was to wreck the recovery or

at least to set it back. The tipoff to this was the targeting.

Destroying Beirut's electrical grid was a disproportionate

response to Hizbollah activity. Nothing the Hizbollahis did

warranted shutting down this system, especially when the country

depended on it for its recovery.59 Further, the shelling of Qana

was unacceptable. Indeed, most of what was done to the Shias

surpassed acceptable limits.

However, if, in fact, the Israelis were trying to harm the

recovery, then targeting both the system and the community makes

sense. With the electricity shut off, the recovery would come

practically to a full stop. Similarly, Hariri could not hope to

continue rebuilding without further infusions of capital from the

Shias.60

Thus, I think that Hariri's accusation is justified. At the

same time, however, I do not agree completely with Hariri. I

think his rationale as to why all this was taking place is not

sufficiently convincing.

In at least one interview, Hariri implied that Israel feared

Lebanon as a commercial rival.61 This does not appear likely to
59

me. Israel's economy is doing very well at present, better

perhaps than Lebanon's.62 Moreover, Israel has the strong support

of the United States. And finally, Israel's economy is largely

high-tech; Lebanon's, commercial banking. The two economies

(Israel's and Lebanon's) do not have to be in competition; they

can exist side by side.

As I see it, Israel was not going after Lebanon's economy

because it regarded that economy as a threat to it.63 Something

else triggered this violent outburst and to discover what that

might have been, look to Damascus.

Lesson of the Master.

In the current peace negotiations, most observers have 

assumed that Asad primarily is interested in getting the Golan

Heights back. This, they feel, is a matter of honor for him. Asad

was Syria's defense minister in 1967 when the Heights were lost,

and before he dies, he wants the Heights returned to expunge the

stain to his reputation.

This at least is the theory, and it appears that the

Israelis based their negotiating position on it. They felt that

Asad was under pressure to get a deal, and thus, all they had to

do was wait him out. The man was ill; he could not last much

longer (the thinking went).64 Eventually, if the Israelis sat

tight, he would be forced to come around.

However, for a man who is presumably driven to make a deal,

Asad has a curious way of behaving. His negotiating style is

exasperating;65 he picks over every detail, causing sessions to go

on for hours. Asad thinks nothing of cancelling sessions and did

this recently when he unilaterally cut off negotiations with

Secretary Christopher, who arrived for a session in Damascus only

to be informed that Asad was indisposed and refused to see him,

thus forcing Christopher to fly back to Tel Aviv.66 This is not

the behavior of a man who feels he has few diplomatic options.

The substance of what the Israelis and Syrians are

negotiating over is fairly straightforward. The Israelis--or at

least the Labor Party--have no objection to giving back the

Golan. However, they will not do it on a silver salver, as it

were. They do not accept Asad's argument that under the UN

resolutions, they are obliged to hand back territory without

preconditions.

The Israelis want what they call full peace. They were

shortchanged (as they see it) by the Israeli-Egyptian peace

agreement, which has really not gone anywhere, at least not

commercially. Militarily, the Israelis achieved a great deal with
60

the peace as they now no longer have to fear an Egyptian threat.

But other aspects of the deal which the Israelis had counted upon

have not materialized. For example, very few Egyptian tourists

visit Israel, and no significant business deals have been struck

between the two countries. As far as the Israselis are concerned,

the Egyptians have fallen down in all the areas that really

count.67

Therefore, in attempting to make peace with the Syrians, the

Israelis are determined to get the best deal that they can. This

means creating a situation whereby Israel would be integrated

into the regional economy. Israel does not want to be the odd man

out as it presently sees itself. And therefore, Asad was given to

understand that, in any final peace, Israel would require an

immediate exchange of ambassadors, full trade relations, and open

borders.68

To date, Asad has been unwilling to go along with this. He

has claimed that the two economies--Israel's and Syria's--are so

different it is impossible to link them up in this way. At least

it cannot be done all at once. The Syrian economy is too fragile;

it could not possibly survive the shock of being confronted with

such a dynamic entity as Israel.69

This idea, that full peace is out of the question--at least

for the present--was communicated to the Israelis by the Syrians

negotiating at Wye, Maryland. Evidently it influenced Peres'

thinking about the elections after Rabin's death. Peres had the

option of deferring the poll until October of this year, yet he

chose instead to go to the people almost immediately, perhaps

because he felt that he had nothing to lose.

Negotiations with Damascus were not going well. The Syrians

would not discuss the one thing Israel was interested in--full

peace. That being the case, it seemed acceptable to call for

elections on the assumption that if Peres emerged a victor, his

position would be that much stronger. And in any event, nothing

would be lost so long as the Syrians were not in a mood to make

any significant concessions.70

This was the setting for Peres' announcement that the date

of the elections would be changed and the negotiations with Syria

would be put on hold. Asad reacted violently, claiming that

precious momentum in the peacemaking was being lost. It was all

that Secretary of State Christopher could do to keep the Syrians

from breaking off the talks entirely. In the meantime, to Peres'

surprise, the guerrilla war on Israel's northern border flared

anew.71

This has been Asad's customary modus operandi. Whenever he

is negotiating in earnest with Israelis, he shuts down the
61

guerrilla war; when he is not, he allows the guerrillas to have

free rein.

This time, however, the Israelis did not expect Asad to

follow his customary pattern. Peres was locked in a close race

with Benyamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party. Asad may distrust

Peres and the rest of the Labor politicians; however, he loaths

Netanyahu who has stated publicly that he will never, as prime

minister, preside over Israel's abandonment of the Golan.

Thus, Peres expected Asad to restrain the guerrillas, if

only to make things easier for the Israeli leader. By not doing

so, the Syrian practically ensured that the Israelis would have

to conduct some operation such as GRAPES OF WRATH; Asad left

Peres no choice. In this respect, his behavior made no sense.

It is easy to see how the Israelis might have reached the

conclusion they did, but I think they misinterpreted what was

going on. They assumed that, before everything else, Asad wants

the Golan Heights back. But does he? After all, what are the

Heights to Asad? They have no great significance strategically.72

In fact, they are nothing but several hundred square kilometers

of rocky ground. Even commercially, they do not have much value.

Supposing Asad were to get them back, what could he do with

them? To be sure, the original settlers, those displaced in 1967

or their descendents would be pleased to recover lost property.

But if that is all the reward that Asad gets, that is not much.

Asad wants Lebanon. That is his primary goal, with the Golan

 Heights coming after that. Interestingly, almost without

anyone's taking notice, Asad has been pursuing this goal of coopting his neighbor from at least 1989.73

Until the United States pulled out of Lebanon in 1983, the

country was in the Western camp, largely because the Christians

ran the government.74 However, after the United States decamped,

the Christians effectively relinquished control. This was a

situation that had been a long time developing, the Christians

had been losing power since the 1960s but had managed to maintain

their position by trading on their ties to the United States.

When the United States abandoned them, the Christians could not

withstand the shock of that occurrence.

The surrender of the Christians to the Muslims left the

field open to Asad to step in and virtually to take over the

country. He did this in a number of ways, one of which was to

strengthen his ties to the Shias, the most dynamic community in

Lebanon and the most numerous.75 Shia leader Nabih Berri's

increasing power in the parliament was, to a certain extent, a

function of his being perceived as Asad's man.
62

But Asad was not content merely to take over Lebanon

politically, he encouraged the amalgamation of the two economies.

During the 1980s, Syrian officers stationed inside Lebanon made

fortunes smuggling drugs out of Lebanon. When Hariri launched his

reconstruction campaign, Asad and the men around him saw to it

that they benefited. For example, many highly placed Syrian

officials sit on the boards of Lebanese firms from which they

take a percentage of the profits.

In addition, trade between the two countries has blossomed,

it is estimated that it is now around $90 million a year. Much of

this is generated by Syrian workers (300,000 to a million of

them) who are employed in rebuilding Beirut and its environs. The

Syrian workers shop in Lebanon, but along with that, many

Lebanese travel to Damascus to purchase items at lower prices

than they can find at home. Wealthy Syrians also come to Lebanon

to do their shopping in Beirut's smart boutiques.76

This growing together of the two economies began slowly, but

in recent years the pace has quickened largely due to the

construction boom that is at the heart of Lebanon's recovery. As

the domestic economy revived, the Lebanese began to speculate in

overseas ventures. In 1994, the country was the first in the Arab

world to tap the Eurobond market with an oversubscribed $400

million issue, followed last year by a $300 million deal. A

Lebanese institution, Bank Audi, became the first Arab issuer of

Global Depository Receipts. It raised over $34 million in a

twice-subscribed issue sold mainly to European and United States

institutional clients.77 As a consequence of such transactions,

Lebanon has achieved a higher than 7 percent growth rate for the

last 3 years, the first 3 years of consecutive growth in the past

30 years.78

To take advantage of these developments, Asad has begun to 

privatize Syria's economy. Areas formerly controlled by the

public sector are being turned over to private enterprise, and as

a result, Syria has been showing greater productivity. The Syrian

economy is looking well and also more like Lebanon's. In other

words, one could say that the Syrian economy is becoming

Lebanized.79

This growing together of the two countries is not a power

grab by Asad, or at least not completely so. No doubt if the

Lebanese had their way, they would prefer to remain independent.

The problem is that they have shown that they cannot live at

peace with themselves. Witness the vicious feuding between the

sects that virtually destroyed the country during the civil war.

Syria has the ability to curb Lebanon's feuding. So, there

is a tradeoff here; Lebanon gets the strong authority that it
63

needs, and Syria gets the revitalized economy that it needs.

If there is any doubt that something like this is happening,

we need only to turn to Hariri. Recently in an interview given

while Operation GRAPES OF WRATH was going on, Hariri said that

the alliance of Lebanon and Syria is a natural one, and he

expects it to persist even after the Israelis withdraw from the

south.80

Playing Catch Up.

It is my belief that the Israelis belatedly came to

appreciate that this, in fact, was what Asad was after. They saw

that they had misjudged him or, more precisely, that they had

underestimated him. He is aiming for nothing less than parity

with Israel. This is ambitious; few would have thought this

possible. Always it was assumed that in any post-conflict

settlement, Israel would emerge as the dominant power. Evidently

Asad does not see it this way.

Assuming that my interpretation is correct, how does this

explain the Israelis' behavior in Operation GRAPES OF WRATH? Once

the Israelis awoke to the fact that Asad was pursuing a separate

agenda (i.e., one not directly related to recovering the Golan

Heights), they then had to reassess their stance in the peace

talks.

They had been assuming that they were in a superior position

and that therefore they would not have to make concessions to

Asad; he would have to come to them. In fact, Asad benefits from

standing pat. The longer the peace process drags on, the more

time the federation of Lebanon and Syria has to work itself out.

It is impossible to say at what point the Israeli leadership

realized the change that had come about, but it must have been a

frustrating revelation. What could they do to restore their

erstwhile advantage? It seems likely that they grasped the

opportunity of renewed Hizbollah attacks to set matters right as

they saw it.

The Israeli leadership never expected Hariri or Asad to

follow through on IDF demands to disarm the guerrillas. Assuming

that the two would balk at this, they counted on being able to

perpetuate Operation GRAPES OF WRATH and target more and more

infrastructure which they knew would hurt the Lebanese recovery

and in the process drive the morale of the Lebanese farther and

farther down.

One could even speculate that, had it not been for Qana, the

Israelis would have devastated Lebanon to ensure that it would
64

never rise again. But when Qana occurred, the international

outcry proved effective in shutting the operation down.81

I doubt this. The Israeli barrage at Qana, according to the

UN report, was deliberately orchestrated to kill a great many

people; and therefore, the Israelies would have anticipated that

once the Qana incident was publicized, further bombardment of

Lebanon would have been impossible. Indeed, U.S. President

Clinton immediately called for a ceasefire, and one was arranged

soon afterward.

Therefore, I would argue that the operation was meant to end

where it did. Qana was a way of driving the point home. And what

was the point? The Israelis were saying to Asad, "You must not

think that you can evade the full peace issue. You must negotiate

with us on this, or we will see to it that your dream is

destroyed. There will be no rejuvenation of Syria's and Lebanon's

economy because the IDF will wreck the recovery before it has a

chance to take hold."

One possible counterargument to this theory is that Israel

has no need to negotiate with anyone. It controls the Golan

Heights and southern Lebanon and thus, had it wished, could

retain its holdings and let the peace talks collapse.

This overlooks two points. One, the United States wants the

talks to succeed, and there were inducements for the Israelis,

not only to keep the talks alive, but to actually make progress

in them.

The Labor Party made deals with a number of Gulf states

which, if they could be consummated, would enrich Israel

considerably. These deals were stalled, however, because Asad had

pressured the Gulf sheikhs to hold back.82 The Labor politicians

also were aware that many foreign firms wishing to do business

with the Jewish state were hesitant so long as peace had yet to

be declared. So Israel had an interest in achieving full peace

and was motivated to galvanize Asad into making concessions.

 Summing up then, Hariri's critique of Operation GRAPES OF

WRATH is sound. The aim of the operation was to threaten

Lebanon's recovery but not, as the Israelis maintained publicly,

to force the Lebanese and Syrians to rein in Hizbollah. The aim

was to force movement in the peace talks, movement that would

benefit the Israelis.

Will Asad do as the Israelis have indicated? Probably not;

the Syrian rarely gives way under pressure. But this may be

academic now with the elections in Israel and the victory of

Netanyahu.
65

Conclusion.

The most illuminating insight to come out of this analysis

is the future of Lebanese-Syrian ties. If Lebanon and Syria are

moving toward an informal federation, Syria has the potential to

be a formidable actor in the Middle East.83 Moreover, a SyriaLebanon federation with ties to Saudi Arabia and to Europe

through France would be in an advantageous position

economically.84

Of course, all of this could be moot if Lebanon does not

recover from Operation GRAPES OF WRATH. Immediately after the

truce, the Shias in the south were quoted as saying that they

would certainly rebuild,85 and Hariri announced that he had

pledges of support from the Europeans to rejuvinate the

construction effort.86 There was even talk that Operation GRAPES

OF WRATH had forged a new consensus in Lebanon; for the first

time, all of the Lebanese--of every sect--were pulling together,

determined to rebuild their country.87

This may be pure rhetoric. But if it is not, and the

rebuilding effort does go foward again, then the spotlight will

shift to Israel's new Prime Minister Netanyahu and to the Likud

Party, the winners in the Israeli elections. If Netanyahu orders

another Operation GRAPES OF WRATH and the economy of Lebanon once

more is targeted, not only Lebanon but all of the Arabs will cry

foul. They will claim with justification that it is not Hizbollah

the Israelis are trying to eliminate, but the chance of Lebanon's

ever recovering.

Effectively, this should provide a pointer to U.S.

policymakers. Washington should take the position that

hostilities between the guerrillas and the IDF must be restricted

to the security zone. The IDF must not perpetuate violent actions

north of the zone; the guerrillas must not fire on Israel's

northern settlements. There is a mechanism in place that is

capable of preventing this.88 We should use it.

Washington must see that after Operation GRAPES OF WRATH,

the expansion of hostilities outside the zone is a very dangerous

proposition as it has the potential to touch off yet another

Arab-Israeli War.

ENDNOTES

1. Israel's Operation GRAPES OF WRATH commenced on April 11,

1996, and was over on April 28, 1996.

2. Hariri made the charges repeatedly while the invasion was

going on. For the thrust of his comments, see FBIS-NES-96-088,
66

May 6, 1996, under the heading "Lebanon."

3. See "Israel and Militants Trade Fire in Lebanon," The New

York Times, April 1, 1996.

4. See "Peres Ponders Response to Attacks," The Philadelphia

Inquirer, April 10, 1996.

5. See "Israeli Bombs are Blocking Aid to Lebanese

Villagers," The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 18, 1996; "After the

Bombardment," The Financial Times, April 27, 1996; "Lebanon

Accuses Israel of Ruining Reconstruction Effort," The Financial

Times, April 18, 1996; "Israeli Shelling of Coast Road Cuts Aid

to Lebanese Villages," The New York Times, April 21, 1996;

"Israeli Gunships Close Lebanese Roads," The Washington Post,"

April 21, 1996; "After Israeli Bombing, Move to Rebuild Lebanon

in Retreat," The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 28, 1996; "Israel

Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy," The Wall Street Journal," April

19, 1996; "Israel Targets Lebanon's Economy," The Washington

Post," April 16, 1996; "Lebanese Cope With Smashed Country," The

New York Times, April 26, 1996, and "Assault Stalls Lebanon's

Postwar Recovery," The Washington Post, April 27, 1996.

6. See "Israeli Shelling of Coast Road Cuts Aid to Lebanese

Villages."

7. See "Syria and Israel Are Still Balking Over a CeaseFire," The New York Times, April 22, 1996.

8. See "Israeli Jets Step up Pressure in Lebanon," The

Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26, 1996.

9. The best succinct statement of Hariri's feelings on this

can be found in an interview he gave on April 29, 1996, over

Beirut Radio (quoted in FBIS-NES-96-084, April 30, 1996). He

said:

[T]here is a clear Israeli plot based, not on striking

at Hizbollah militarily, but on something else. Western

propaganda has given Hizbollah a certain image. Relying

on this image, they started to say the first day that

they wanted to strike Hizbollah. They wanted nothing

from the Lebanese people because the Lebanese are a

peaceful people. They wanted nothing from the Lebanese

state because it is a recognized state. . . . They knew

that Hizbollah could not be uprooted by force. They

started to strike at some places and terrorize the

people. They bombarded the areas around Beirut. . . .

What was their plan? It was to bombard and urge the

people to leave, using the excuse of striking at

Hizbollah and uprooting it by force. Evicting the
67

people forced them to come to Beirut. . . . The idea

was to destroy through the exodus. The Israeli

operation was very clear. The Israeli message was very

clear. Israel sought to undermine the Lebanese

government's plan for the country's revival. . . .

Israel believes that if this plan is implemented, peace

is established and Lebanon is reconstructed, then

Lebanon will be its major economic rival in the Arab

world.

For other accounts of Hariri's position, see "After the

Bombardment"; "Lebanon accuses Israel of ruining reconstruction

effort"; "No More Short Term Solutions, Says Lebanon's PM," The

Financial Times, April 23, 1996; "Lebanese Trapped in the

Middle," The Financial Times, April 20, 1996; and "Trust Is a

Casualty of Israeli Attacks," The New York Times, April 29, 1996.

Also, see "Al-Hariri Speaks to Journalists in Paris, FBIS-NES-96-

073, April 15, 1996; "Prime Minister Views Israeli Offensive,

Occupation," FBIS-NES-96-074, April 16, 1996; "Al Hariri

‘Shocked' by Peres' Comments on Israeli attack," FBIS-NES-96-077,

April 19, 1996; "Al Hariri Interviewed on Situation," FBIS-NES96-078, April 22, 1996, and "Al Hariri-‘Israeli Aggression'

Targeted Construction," FBIS-NES-96-088, May 6, 1996.

10. In 1978, Palestinian guerrillas were raiding northern

Israel from Lebanon, and the Israelis mounted an invasion to

drive them away from the border. The Israelis repeated the

operation in 1982, this time with more success. However, by 1993

when Israeli staged its third assault, Hizbollah had replaced the

Palestinian guerrillas as the principal danger threatening Israel

from Lebanon. The 1993 incursion--Operation ACCOUNTABILITY--was

widely regarded as a failure since it did not end the Hizbollah

attacks. The most recent assault by the IDF in April of this year

was the fourth such attack.

11. In fact, Israeli troops did enter Lebanon in 1993 but

only after the operation had been going on for several days;

tanks went in to blow up the homes of villagers. The Israeli

public is strongly adverse to the introduction of ground troops

into Lebanon, especially after the 1982 invasion. As a

consequence of that affair, Israel experienced an inordinately

large number of casualties, and since then the Israelis have

looked on Lebanon as a potential quagmire.

12. The terms worked out by Christopher appear to have been

left purposely vague. Moreover, the agreement was never committed

to writing. Hence the parties could interpret the agreement

almost any way they wished. The Hizbollahis maintained that

neither party--Hizbollah nor Israel--could target civilians. If

either did, then its enemy was free to target civilians in

return. It is this proviso that Hizbollah used to justify its
68

attacks on Kiryat Shimona, claiming that, since the IDF had

killed Lebanese civilians, it (Hizbollah) was free to go after

Israel's northern settlements. For a discussion of Operation<%0>

ACCOUNTABILITY and Christopher's agreement, see Stephen

Pelletiere, Assad and the Peace Process: The Pivotal Role of

Lebanon, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

February 1, 1995.

13. See "Israel Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy."

14. See "After the Bombardment."

15. Lebanon is home to a number of sects, each with its own

area of residence. The Shias have always lived in the south, just

over the border from Israel. There is also a large complement of

Shias in the north of the Beka'a Valley and in the surburbs south

of Beirut.

16. For information on the Shias generally and Hizbollah

specifically, see Stephen Pelletiere, Hamas and Hizbollah: The

Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 10, 1994.

17. The Palestinians for many years made their headquarters

in Jordan, but clashes with the Jordanian army resulted in their

being driven from the country in the early 1970s, after which

they shifted operations to Lebanon.

18. Amal was started in the early 1970s by Imam Sadr, a Shia

cleric and the spiritual leader of Lebanon's Shia community. When

he died, his place was taken by another cleric, Hussain al

Hussaini, and he in turn was replaced by a secular leader, Nabih

Berri, in the mid-1980s.

19. In the Middle East, the Lebanese represent the largest

community of Shias outside of Iran (which is 90 percent Shia).

Hence, the Iranians have taken an interest in cultivating their

co-religionists in Lebanon. However, the Iranians have not been

able to develop close ties to Nabih Berri's group, probably

because of its secular leadership. Hizbollah is the organization

that Tehran mainly supports.

20. After the Palestinans were driven out of Jordan and took

up residence in Lebanon, the fighting arm of the community, the

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), clashed with the

Christians. At that time Lebanon's Christians were pro-West and

probably pro-Israel. For a time, it appeared that the Christians

would destroy the PLO, but then Muslim groups in Lebanon rallied

to the PLO's cause and effectively turned the tables on the

Christians, threatening to break their powerful position. It was

at this point that Asad intervened to restore the balance in
69

favor of the Christians. His reasons were various, but basically

he feared that if the Christians were seriously harmed, the

Israelis would use this as a casus belli to occupy Lebanon, which

would threaten Syria's security.

21. Power arrangements in Lebanon at this time were set by

the so-called Lebanese National Pact. Under it, the president of

the country was always a Christian; the prime minister, a Sunni

Muslim; the minister of defense, a Druze; and the speaker of the

parliament, a Shia. This pact was based on an understanding that

the Christians were the numerically dominant community. However,

that was a fiction. In fact, the Muslims surpassed the Christians

demographically during World War II; however, to maintain the old

power arrangement, the Lebanese never took a census.

22. For the best account of this conflict, see Robert Fisk,

Pity the Poor Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

23. See Pelletiere, Hamas and Hizbollah, and Assad and the

Peace Process.

24. See "Iran's Party of God Puts Deep Roots in Lebanon,"

The New York Times, April 12, 1996.

25. See Patrick Seale, Assad, Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1988.

26. Under UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 425, Israel is

enjoined to withdraw from the Golan Heights and Lebanon without

conditions.

27. The Hizbollahis probably do not number more than 200

fighters, although in a crisis they can probably call on a few

hundred more. For details on the 1993 attacks, see "Israel

Bombards Targets in Lebanon," The Washington Post, July 27, 1993;

"Israeli Warplanes Pound Guerrillas," The Washington Post, July

26, 1993; "A blow for compromise and conciliation," The Financial

Times, July 31, 1993; and "Rabin faces his greatest challenge,"

The Financial Times, July 31, 1993.

28. Operation ACCOUNTABILITY lasted 7 days, to Operation

GRAPES OF WRATH's 17 days. In the former, Beirut was not hit; it

was in the latter. In neither operation did the Israelis

introduce land troops although at the end of Operation

ACCOUNTABILITY, Israeli tanks went into Lebanon to demolish

homes. After both operations ended, the Hizbollahis went

immediately back into action.

29. According to Secretary Christopher's arrangement, the

Hizbollahis were also free to operate against the IDF in the

security zone. In effect, this is what enhanced their status as
70

resistance fighters.

30. See "The Damascus Dilemma," The Financial Times, January

23, 1996.

31. According to a story in The Washington Post, during the

1990s Hizbollah has launched more attacks inside the security

zone each year. In 1994, the last year for which complete data is

available, the Hizbollahis killed 21 Israelis and 43 Christian

mercenaries fighting with the IDF, compared with 12 and 13 two

years before. Another 23 Israeli soldiers died in 1995, and 7 in

the first quarter of 1996. See "Rationale for Containment Died

Along With the Peace Talks," The Washington Post, April 21, 1996.

As for the Katyusha attacks, the latest round targeted Kiryat

Shimona, and an estimated 36 Israelis were wounded, none

seriously.

32. See "An Attack on Israel Brings Woe to Peres," The New

York Times, April 10, 1996.

33. Prior to the election, Peres had a problem with his

image. He was not perceived to be a decisive leader. One thing

against him was that, unlike most Israeli politicians, he had no

background in the military. Operation GRAPES OF WRATH was seen as

a way to portray the prime minister as a man of action.

34. See "Raids Draw Wide Praise in Israel," The Washington

Post, April 15, 1996.

35. See "Israel's Pinpoint Shelling Creates Barrier for

Refugees," The Financial Times, April 23, 1996.

36. Peres wanted an understanding that Hizbollah would not

launch guerrilla attacks on Israeli soldiers in Lebanon from the

cover of sympathetic Shia villages near the security zone. This

amounted to a demand that the guerrilla force come out and fight

like an army or quit fighting. Second, Peres wanted Syria to

guarantee that Hizbollah would not fire Katyusha rockets or any

other weapons into northern Israel. Both Syria and Lebanon take

the position that as long as Israel is in illegal occupation of

Lebanese territory in the south, the local inhabitants are within

their rights to fight the occupiers. Hence, Hizbollah, which is

carrying on the brunt of that fight, should be considered a

resistance organization, not, as Israel would have it, a

terrorist group. See "Israel Loses Leverage, Support After

Slaughter of Refugees," The Washington Post, April 20, 1996.

 37. The final tally will probably never be known. But it

appears that it surpassed 200 persons killed and a couple hundred

wounded.
71

38. See "Israeli Gunships Close Lebanese Road," The

Washington Post, April 21, 1996.

39. See "Peres Hints He'd Talk as Raids Go On," The

Philadelphia Inquirer, April 16, 1996.

40. See "Israeli Rocket Hits Lebanese Ambulance," The

Washington Post, April 14, 1996.

41. The United Nations investigators found that the pattern

of shelling was inconsistent with the Israelis' claim that it was

an accident. The report notes that the shells fell in two

distinct patterns, one outside and one inside the camp. The

report also notes that proximity-fused rounds fell on the base,

while impact-fused rounds (better for destroying equipment) fell

outside. The Israelis also maintained they did not know the

refugees were in the camp, but the United Nations was able to

show that the Israelis had a reconaissance plane over the camp

and two helicopters nearby. Finally, the camp had been located in

that place for 18 years, and refugees always sought it out for

shelter in a crisis. See "Camp Shelled by Israel, Inquiry Finds,"

The Washington Post, May 4, 1996; "Israel Blames Faulty Map In

Shelling of UN Camp," The Washington Post, May 6, 1996; "91

Bodies Prepared for Rites in Lebanon," The Philadelphia Inquirer,

April 3, 1996; "Israel Blasts ‘Absurd' UN Report on Qana," The

Financial Times, May 9, 1996; "Israeli Says UN Troops Partly to

Blame at Qana," The Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1996; "UN:

Shelling of Base Likely Wasn't Mistake," The Philadelphia

Inquirer," May 9, 1996; "UN Criticism of Refugee Camp Shelling

Attacked by U.S., Israel," The Washington Post, May 8, 1996; "UN

Report Suggests Israeli Attack Was Not a Mistake," The New York

Times, May 8, 1996; "Israel Denies It Targeted the Refugees," The

Philadelphia Inquirer, May 6, 1996; "Israel Says Mapping Error

Led to Shelling of UN Base in Lebanon," The New York Times, May

6, 1996; "Israel Pressed on UN Shelling," The Financial Times,

May 7, 1996; and for Amnesty International's inquiry and

findings, see "Letting Israel Off the Hook," The Washington Post,

April 27, 1996.

42. For comment on Israel's failure to apologize, see Thomas

Friedman, "Lebanon's Aftermath," The New York Times, May 15,

1996. An objection has been raised to the theory that Israel

deliberately bombed the camp; that is, Israel would not have

taken this risk, knowing that the adverse publicity would be

devastating. This line of reasoning assumes, however, that Israel

had to fear exposure. In fact, it was only that the UN released

its report in a timely fashion that hurt Israel. After the

report's release by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, both

the United States and Israel rebuked the head of the world body.

Washington never subsequently condemned Israel's action, so one

could say by way of reply that only in one area important to it--
72

its relations with Washington--did Israel suffer at all. See

"U.N. Criticism of Refugee Camp Shelling Attacked by U.S.,

Israel," The Washington Post, May 8, 1996.

43. See "Hizbollah Portraits Peer from Rubble of Nabatiyeh,"

The Financial Times, April 25, 1996.

44. See "Lebanese Refugees Return Home," The Washington

Post, April 28, 1996.

45. See "In Beirut Suburbs, Attack Brings Back Old

Memories," The New York Times, April 12, 1996.

46. Specifically, the Israelis hit two power stations--one,

a recently refurbished $20 million installation at Jamhour, East

Beirut; and the other, a newer $20 million plant at B'salim,

northeast of the city. See "Israel Targets Economic Sites in

Lebanon," The Washington Post, April 16, 1996.

47. After the plants were knocked out, electricity was

rationed to 6 hours a day.

48. See "Crushing Lebanon's Dream," Time Magazine, May 6,

1996.

49. See "Beirut Exchange Reopens Despite Trading Delay," The

Financial Times, February 13, 1996.

50. See "Beirut Starts to Re-emerge as a Business Centre,"

The Financial Times, January 2, 1996.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. See "After Israeli Bombing, Move to Rebuild Lebanon in

Retreat," The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 28, 1996.

54. Ibid.

55. See "Lebanon Accuses Israel of Ruining Reconstruction

Effort."

56. See "In Beirut Suburbs, Attack Brings Back Old

Memories," The New York Times, April 12, 1996.

57. "After the Bombardment" reports that last year $6.7

billion worth of capital entered Lebanon to finance real estate

purchases and construction. The bulk of the money came from Shia

emigres working in west Africa. In 1994, the same group

contributed $6.5 billion.
73

58. See "Hizbollah Portraits Peer from Rubble of Nabatiyeh."

59. The Israelis claimed that they were justified in

destroying the electrical system because a Hizbollah Katyusha had

knocked out the generator that supplied electricity for Kiryat

Shimona. But Kiryat Shimona is a settlement of only a few

thousand people. Beirut is the capital of Lebanon, and the two

plants supplied electricty for it and its environs.

60. A feature of the operation was the destruction of many

sumptuous villas built by the expatriate Shias. Several stories

reporting on the return of the refugees to their homes in the

south commented on the fact that many of these villas, some worth

millions of dollars, had been destroyed by the Israelis. This, of

course, would be a heavy blow to the expatriates that built them.

See "Lebanese Determined To Rebuild," The Washington Post, April

28, 1996.

61. See interview with Hariri in FBIS-NES-96-088, May 6,

1996, under "Lebanon."

62. See "Israel's Economy has Boomed with the Spread of

Peace in Middle East," The Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27,

1995. Moreover, Israel has $70 billion GNP and is the prime

beneficiary of Washington's shrinking aid program. See "Business

Backs Peres in Bid for Peace Dividends," The Financial Times, May

16, 1996.

63. Not everyone would agree with this. Michael Jansen,

writing on the "Failure of Grapes of Wrath," Middle East

International, April 26, 1996, says that "the long term aim (of

Operation GRAPES OF WRATH) was to delay Lebanon's economic

recovery so that it would not be in a position to challenge

Israel's attempts to penetrate the Middle East on the economic

level and eventually achieve economic hegemony over the region."

64. Asad has had more than one heart attack.

65. See "U.S. Show of Anger Won Asad," The Washington Post, April 28, 1996.

66. See "Christopher Gets Snub From Asad in Middle East

Talks," The New York Times, April 24, 1996.

67. There has been some improvement in trade between Egypt

and Israel, but this is conditioned upon progress in talks

between Israel and the Palestinians. Mubarak has threatened to

break off commercial contacts if Israel's new Prime Minister

Netanyahu reneges on commitments his predecessor made in the

negotiations.
74

68. See "Peres Challenges Syria Leader To Reach Inclusive

Peace Pact," The New York Times, November 23, 1995.

69. See "Israel's Vision of Syria Pact Is Ambitious," The

Washington Post, January 24, 1996; also, "Hussein and Christopher

Make Twin Visits to Israel," The New York Times, January 11,

1996.

70. See "Syrians Critical After Peace Talks with the

Israelis," The Financial Times, January 15, 1996.

71. See "Israel Finds Challenge Impossible to Ignore," The

Washington Post, April 12, 1996; also, "Guerrilla Bombers Heat Up

Israel's War in South Lebanon," The Phildelphia Inquirer, March

20, 1996.

72. See Lieutenant Colonel Gotowicki's article, "Considering

a U.S. Military Force on the Golan," in this document.

73. This is the date of the Taif Agreement, brokered by the

Saudis, which essentially ended the old political system in

Lebanon. In fact, one could argue the Syrians have always wanted

Lebanon to come under their sway ever since the British and

French carved out the separate country of Lebanon after World War

I. That country was deliberately configured to give supremacy to

the Christians so that they would become surrogates of the

Europeans. The Syrians rejected this creation, and,

interestingly, Damascus has never opened an embassy in Beirut,

which would appear to show it did not recognize Lebanon as an

entity separate from it.

74. Under the Reagan administration, the United States left

Lebanon after the destruction of the Marine Corps barracks in

which over 200 marines died.

75. There are 1.2 million Shias in Lebanon, constituting

almost half the population of the country.

76. See "Israel Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy."

77. See "Beirut Starts to Emerge as a Business Centre."

78. The Wall Street Journal sets the figure even higher.

According to it, Lebanon's economy is growing at 8 percent a

year, and total assets in Lebanon's banking system have increased

25 percent in the past 3 years. See "Israel Is Targeting

Lebanon's Economy."

79. For a discussion of the improving Syrian economy, see

Pelletiere, Assad and the Peace Process.
75

80. See "Trust Is a Casualty of Israeli Attacks." Also, see

FBIS-NES-96-088, May 6, 1996, in which Hariri is quoted as

saying, "one of the objectives of Israel's recent war against

Lebanon was to separate Lebanon from Syria. But this only

resulted in strengthening relations between the two countries."

For the viewpoint of a leader of the Christian community on this,

see Amine Gemayel, "A Failed Policy in Lebanon," The Wall Street

Journal, May 2, 1996.

81. There is a possibility (which this report cannot

explore) that the Israeli leadership was split over how to

proceed on this. This would account for a curious incident which

occurred at the outset of the operation. The general in charge of

Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, Giora Inbar, warned Peres publicly not

to try to end the operation prematurely. This suggests that hawks

in the Israeli military may have been following their own agenda.

See "General Tells Peres Not to End War in Lebanon Too Soon," The

Times, April 18, 1996. See also the general's apology in FBISNES-96-075, April 17, 1996. See also "Israel: Army Said Demanding

Different Cease-fire Terms Than Government," FBIS-NES-96-076,

April 18, 1996.

82. There were deals with Qatar and Oman, and other deals

supposedly were in the works.

83. Syria has always suffered from being resource poor,

unlike its chief rival, Iraq, which has enormous supplies of oil.

Syria in a position to exploit a dynamic Lebanese society would

be another matter. It would be a significant economic force in

the Middle East.

84. Asad has been in good standing with the Saudis since he

agreed to take part in Operation DESERT STORM on the side of the

coalition. However, his standing is now, if anything, improved.

Prince Abdullah has taken over as de facto head of the desert

kingdom, and Abdullah is a long-standing supporter of Syria. If,

as everyone feels is inevitable, King Fahd is forced to step down

because of illness, then Abdullah is likely to become king. As

for France, the French inserted themselves into the negotiations

to end Operation GRAPES OF WRATH over the objections of the

Americans and Israelis. However, in the end, the Syrians and

Lebanese maintained that it was France primarily that enabled the

truce to come about. Paris would like to develop strong

commercial ties with both Syria and Lebanon, countries for which

it formerly held mandates after World War I.

85. See "Lebanese Determined to Rebuild," The Washington

Post, April 28, 1996.

86. See "Assault Stalls Lebanon's Postwar Recovery," The
76

Washington Post, April 27, 1996.

87. See "Plight of Qana's Victims Unites Lebanon Factions,"

The Times, April 22, 1996.

88. This is the committee to monitor the ceasefire. For

Hariri's description of how this mechanism will work, see

"Lebanon: Al Hariri Holds News Conference," FBIS-NES-96-084,

April 30, 1996.
77

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ALFRED B. PRADOS was educated at Vanderbilt University and

American University, Beirut, Lebanon. He also is a graduate of

the U.S. National War College. He has completed over 35 years of

federal service, including almost 29 years as an Army officer and

over 8 years as a specialist in Middle East affairs in the

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington,

DC. During his Army career, he served as a military attache in

Lebanon, Yemen, and Jordan; also, he served as the senior

intelligence officer in the Department of Defense charged with

Middle East affairs. In his present job, he responds to queries

from congressional offices and periodically briefs members of

Congress and staff.

STEPHEN H. GOTOWICKI is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army

assigned as the Senior Politico-Military Analyst for the Middle

East in the Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. Colonel Gotowicki is a Field Artillery

Officer, a Middle East Foreign Area Officer, a designated Army

strategist, and a fully qualified Joint Specialty Officer. He has

traveled extensively in the Middle East and served as a United

Nations Military Observer in southern Lebanon. Previous

assignments have included Politico-Military Planner, Strategic

Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), the Joint Staff; Middle East

Desk Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army; and Senior

Intelligence Estimator for Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula,

Directorate for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Lieutenant Colonel Gotowicki received a B.A. in International

Relations from Oklahoma State University; an M.A. in National

Security Affairs and Middle East Studies from the United States

Naval Postgraduate School; and is currently a Ph.D. candidate in

Political Science at The George Washington University in

Washington, DC.

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in International

Politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the

early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign

correspondent during which time he was based in Beirut. Dr.

Pelletiere returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970 for a stay at

Shemlan, the Arabic language school of the British government. In

1975, when the Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was in

Cairo, Egypt, conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. He

interviewed refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many

United Nations professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the

University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College in

Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until

1987 he was an intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the
78

Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1988

and became a full professor in 1992. He has written two books on

the Middle East: The Kurds--An Unstable Element in the Gulf and

The Iran War--Chaos in a Vacuum.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Gotowicki

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Colonel (Retired) Alfred Prados

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Karen K. Gardner

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler