In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐2996

LARRY A. BOSS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JULIAN CASTRO, Secretary of

   Housing and Urban Development,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 6007 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 21, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 18, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and

REAGAN, District Judge*.

REAGAN, District Judge. Larry Boss worked as a general

engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De‐

velopment (“HUD”) from 2002 to 2011. Pursuant to Title VII

                                                  * Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 14‐2996

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐

16), he sued the HUD Secretary1 on theories of workplace

discrimination (Boss is an African‐American), retaliation (for

a prior EEOC discrimination complaint), and hostile work

environment. The district court granted summary judgment

against Boss. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Background

Our review of the case requires some preliminary discus‐

sion regarding two matters.

First, Boss has challenged the district court’s application

of Local Rule 56.1, which controls the presentation of evi‐

dence at the summary judgment stage. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1.;

Petty v. City of Chi., 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). The rule

requires a movant to submit a statement of material facts

consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with

specific references to the record. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a)(3). The

non‐movant counters with correspondingly numbered para‐

graphs summarizing the movant’s position, responses (with

specific cites to the record), and a statement of any addition‐

al facts that support denial of summary judgment. N.D. Ill.

L.R. 56.1(b)(3). The district court’s discretion to require strict

compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been upheld time and

again. See Petty, 754 F.3d at 420; Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City

of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2011); Koszola v. Bd. of

Educ. of City of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004); Metro.

Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2002).

                                                  1 Title VII authorizes suits against the employer as an entity, not

against individual agents of the employer. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888,

896 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2012).
No. 14‐2996 3

In comparing the district court’s thorough recitation of

the facts to Boss’ Rule 56.1 submission, we find no abuse of

discretion. Tellingly, Boss could not dredge up a single spe‐

cific fact that the district court ignored that would have ma‐

terially altered the Court’s Title VII analysis. Notably, liti‐

gants who challenge a district court’s application of the

Northern District’s Local Rule 56.1 must point to a fact or

facts that (1) should have been considered under the local

rule; (2) were not considered; and (3) are material to the

summary judgment analysis. Instead, Boss points to a pro‐

verbial haystack and asks us to find his needle. We decline to

do so. See D.Z. v. Buell, 796 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2015)

(courts not required to “scour the record looking for factual

disputes” or “piece together appropriate arguments”).

Next, we note that a great deal of Boss’ arguments and

evidence is impermissibly intertwined with—and relies up‐

on—the conclusions of an administrative law judge who, in

January 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 Equal Employ‐

ment Opportunity Commission complaint that included tes‐

timony from Boss and several other witnesses. While we can

consider admissible statements from witnesses in that case

as relevant evidence here, the value of the administrative

judge’s legal conclusions (or, indeed, her factual assertions—

she had no personal knowledge of any factual matter) as ap‐

plied to this case is nil.2 Boss cites no precedent—and we

                                                  2 Boss hangs his hat on the administrative judge’s conclusion that

Defendant Ladias subjected him to a hostile work environment in late

2007. While that case is certainly not before us, it bears noting that the

administrative judge reached her conclusion without considering both

the objective and subjective offensiveness of Ladias’ actions. See Orton‐

Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014).
4 No. 14‐2996

find only contrary case law—for the notion that an adminis‐

trative judge’s legal conclusions should have preclusive ef‐

fects on subsequent federal court proceedings. See Welch v.

Johnson, 907 F.2d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Univ. of Tenn.

V. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986) (unreviewed administrative

proceedings have no preclusive effect in federal court Title

VII litigation)).

II. Facts

Boss, an African‐American, worked for HUD from 2002

to 2011. For about seven of his nine years, he was supervised

by Eleny Ladias, who evaluated him at the “highly success‐

ful” level from 2002 through 2006. Then, in 2007, he contact‐

ed an EEOC counselor and initiated a race, sex, and age dis‐

crimination complaint against Ladias. The administrative

law judge found no discrimination based on Boss’ immuta‐

ble characteristics, but did find Ladias discriminated against

him for filing the EEOC complaint.

In May 2009, Boss made another informal complaint (this

time claiming only race discrimination and retaliation). He

alleged several discriminatory and retaliatory acts, including

being put on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) be‐

cause he was behind on “closing out” his assigned grants

(presumably money given by HUD to qualifying organiza‐

tions or individuals). The PIP was initiated in late June or

early July 2008, and ended in November 2008 after Boss

completed his closeouts. Another employee, Alease Thomas

(who helped Boss’ contemporaries process their grants), as‐

sisted Boss with the substantive parts of his closeout as‐

signment.
No. 14‐2996 5

Boss complained about several other matters. He was

marked absent without leave (“AWOL”); he was criticized

for not attending a teleconference; he was assigned cases

from a retired HUD engineer; and he was required to come

to work on what was normally his assigned telework day.

Evidence in the record shows Boss was indeed absent with‐

out having sought leave from his supervisors. He had also

been asked to substantiate his ability to work from home af‐

ter he was unable to complete a task assigned by his super‐

visor.

In October 2009, after HUD received notice of the admin‐

istrative judge’s ruling against Ladias, Boss was transferred

to the supervision of Elmore Richardson, who changed Boss’

midyear evaluation from “highly” to “fully” successful (al‐

legedly in retaliation for Boss’ EEOC activity, but—according

to Richardson—really because it was discovered that Thom‐

as had helped with the late 2008 closeouts).

In July 2012, Boss filed this suit pursuant to Title VII.

Generally, he alleged discrimination (on the basis of his

race), retaliation (on the basis of his EEOC complaints), and

a hostile work environment (which we will generously con‐

strue as stemming from racial motives or from a retaliatory

animus). The district court granted summary judgment,

finding Boss had not adduced evidence to support the asser‐

tion that any of the incidents constituted an adverse em‐

ployment action, that Boss was not subjected to disparate

treatment relative to similarly‐situated employees, and that

Boss had not suffered from a work environment that could

be shown to be objectively hostile. Boss appeals, and we af‐

firm.
6 No. 14‐2996

III. Analysis

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Gerhartz v. Richert, 779 F.3d 682, 685

(7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only

where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972,

978 (7th Cir. 2014). We construe all inferences in the non‐

movant’s favor, but he is not entitled to the benefit of infer‐

ences that are supported only by speculation or conjecture.

Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 599

(7th Cir. 2014). If there is no triable issue of fact on even one

essential element of the nonmovant’s case, summary judg‐

ment is appropriate. Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d

698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). We may affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment for any reason supported by the

record. Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.

2010).

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discrimi‐

nate against any individual “because of such individual’s

race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1); Alexander, 739 F.3d at 979.

The statute also forbids employers from retaliating against

employees for complaining about prohibited discrimination.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a); Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 986 (7th

Cir. 2014). And as pertinent to this case, Title VII prohibits

subjecting an employee to a hostile work environment. Or‐

ton‐Bell, 759 F.3d at 773.

Boss’ failure to show he suffered an adverse employment

action dooms his discrimination and retaliation claims. As to
No. 14‐2996 7

his hostile work environment claim, Boss cannot show he

was subjected to a workplace that was objectively abusive.

A. Discrete Incidents of Discrimination & Retaliation

Though the framework has received criticism, see Cole‐

man v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J.,

concurring), litigants and courts properly discuss Title VII

discrimination and retaliation claims using the language of

the “direct” and “indirect” methods of proof. Simpson v. Bea‐

ver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 789–90 (7th Cir.

2015) (discrimination); Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

799 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2015) (retaliation). Under either

method, the ultimate question at the summary judgment

stage is whether a reasonable jury could find prohibited

conduct. See Simpson, 780 F.3d at 790. But we still must con‐

sider the two methods separately when reviewing a grant of

summary judgment. Id.

1. The Discrimination Claim

In a Title VII discrimination case, avoiding summary

judgment using the direct method requires a plaintiff to

marshal sufficient evidence (either direct or circumstantial)

that an adverse employment action was motivated by dis‐

criminatory animus. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845. Direct evi‐

dence—an overt admission of discriminatory intent—is rare,

and not at issue where, as here, no supervisor admits racial

motivation. See Simpson, 780 F.3d at 790.

Circumstantial evidence typically includes (1) suspicious

timing, ambiguous statements (oral or written) or behavior

toward, or comments directed at, other employees in the

protected group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously sta‐

tistical, that similarly‐situated employees outside the pro‐
8 No. 14‐2996

tected class received systematically better treatment; or (3)

evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an

adverse employment action. Id. Circumstantial evidence

“must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the em‐

ployer’s action.” Id. (quoting Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc., 732

F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2013)). For example, remarks by a de‐

fendant must at least reflect illegal motivation. Id. at 791 (cit‐

ing Sheehan, 173 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999)). Further, a

plaintiff’s subjective beliefs are insufficient to create a genu‐

ine issue of material fact under the direct method. Hanners v.

Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir. 2012); Mlynczak v. Bodman,

442 F.3d 1050, 1058 (7th Cir. 2006). And under the direct

method, a finding of intentional discrimination may not be

established merely with evidence that a person outside the

protected class was treated better than the plaintiff. Simpson,

780 F.3d at 794.

Because “smoking gun” evidence of discriminatory in‐

tent is hard to come by, the “indirect method” (i.e., the

McDonnell Douglas “burden‐shifting” framework) evolved.

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under the indirect method, a

plaintiff must introduce evidence that he (1) is a member of a

protected class; (2) performed his job satisfactorily; (3) suf‐

fered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated less

favorably than a similarly‐situated employee outside of his

protected class. Nichols, 755 F.3d at 604–05. A similarly‐

situated employee is one whose performance, qualifications,

and conduct are comparable in all material respects. Widmar

v. Sun Chemical Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 2014).

If the plaintiff establishes that prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate reason for the
No. 14‐2996 9

adverse employment action. Nichols, 755 F.3d at 605. If the

defendant gives a legitimate reason, then the plaintiff must

provide evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason is a

pretext for discrimination. Id. In other words, when a de‐

fendant proffers legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its employment actions, the defendant wins, unless plaintiff

refutes the underlying facts (which would reveal those rea‐

sons were dishonestly given). Simpson, 780 F.3d at 798.

Under the indirect method, when an employer articulates

a plausible, legal reason for its action, it is not our province

to decide whether that reason was wise, fair, or even correct,

ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for its action.

Silverman v. Bd. of Ed., 637 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2011). The

federal courts are not a super‐personnel department that

second‐guesses facially legitimate employer policies. Wid‐

mar, 772 F.3d at 464. It is not the role of the court to deter‐

mine whether an employer’s expectations were fair, prudent,

or reasonable. Id. So long as its management decision was

not a guise for a discriminatory purpose, we must respect

that decision. Id.

In a discrimination case, a materially adverse employ‐

ment action is one which visits upon a plaintiff “a significant

change in employment status.” Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc.,

743 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 2014). Such changes can involve

the employee’s current wealth, his career prospects, or

changes to work conditions that include humiliating, de‐

grading, unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise significant negative

alteration in the workplace. Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d 645,

653 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, no incident comes close to constituting such a

change in employment status. (Insofar as Boss argues for a
10 No. 14‐2996

“totality of the circumstances” view, the caselaw limits that

approach to his hostile work environment claims, which we

consider below. See Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 334

(7th Cir. 2013); Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 647

(7th Cir. 2011)). The district court’s summary judgment order

explains why eight separate incidents failed to meet the ad‐

verse employment action standard. Boss points to only three

on appeal: his placement on the PIP, being charged AWOL,

and inordinately strict application of HUD’s telework policy.

(Discrimination claims based on the other five incidents are

forfeited. See Russian Media Grp., LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598

F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 2010)).

As to his placement on a PIP, this Court has held that im‐

plementing such a plan is simply not materially adverse in

the discrimination context. Langenbach v. Wal‐Mart Stores,

Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2014); Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d

812, 816 (7th Cir. 2009). Nor does requiring an employee to

substantiate his time off (and noting when he does not) con‐

stitute an adverse employment action. Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t

of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 383–84 (7th Cir. 2002). And asserting

that a “lost” telework day (it wasn’t lost, just rescheduled)

constitutes an adverse employment action borders on the

frivolous. Losing one day of telework hardly constitutes the

“significant change in benefits” needed to trigger Title VII

liability. Lewis, 496 F.3d at 653. See O’Neal v. City of Chicago,

392 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2004).

Establishing a prima facie discrimination case requires suf‐

ficient evidence of a materially adverse employment action.

Boss has failed to adduce that evidence, so his discrimina‐

tion case fails.
No. 14‐2996 11

2. The Retaliation Claim

A Title VII plaintiff proceeding under the direct method

must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he

suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3)

there was a causal link between the protected activity and

the adverse action. Harden, 799 F.3d at 861–62 (citing Cole‐

man, 667 F.3d at 859). A causal link requires more than the

mere fact that an employer’s action happens after an em‐

ployee’s protected activity. Silverman, 637 F.3d at 741.  

To prove retaliation under the indirect method, a plaintiff

must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he

suffered a materially adverse employment action; (3) he was

meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) he

was treated less favorably than similarly‐situated employees

who did not engage in protected activity. Harden, 799 F.3d at

862 (citing Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th

Cir. 2008)). Once a prima facie case is established, a presump‐

tion of retaliation is triggered, and the burden shifts to the

employer to articulate some legitimate, nonretaliatory reason

for its action. Id. (citing Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845). When the

employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff,

who must present evidence that the stated reason is a pre‐

text, which in turn permits an inference of unlawful retalia‐

tion. Id.

In the retaliation context, determining whether an action

is materially adverse means inquiring whether it well might

have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or sup‐

porting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N. & Santa Fe

Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Because Title VII does

not set forth a general civility code for the American work‐

place, its anti‐retaliation provision does not protect against
12 No. 14‐2996

petty slights, minor annoyances, and bad manners. Id. An

employee must suffer something “more disruptive than a

mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.”

Hobbs v. City of Chi., 573 F.3d 454, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2009).

Boss advances five purportedly adverse actions (required

under both methods) that he claims were based on a retalia‐

tory animus. We take them in turn, highlighting their defi‐

ciency in meeting the anti‐retaliation provision’s “materially

adverse action” standard and pointing out several alterna‐

tive grounds for judgment as a matter of law.3

Boss’ telework travails—which in the end constitute a

single reassigned day of flexible worktime—lie far below the

level needed to trigger retaliation liability. Unfair repri‐

mands or negative performance reviews, unaccompanied by

tangible job consequences, do not suffice, so there was no

material adversity when Boss’ boss downgraded him from

“highly successful” to “fully successful,” or when Boss was

disciplined for failing to close out grants. See Jones v. Res‐

Care, Inc., 613 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2010). Nor does Boss ad‐

duce admissible evidence that his evaluation or the PIP were

tied to his bonus or any other tangible job consequence. Fur‐

ther, Boss provides no direct causal link between his EEOC

complaint and either the PIP or his performance review,

which happened four months after Ladias became aware of

the EEOC complaint. And regarding his “close‐outs,” which

were the basis for the PIP, Boss identifies not a single similar‐

                                                  3 We do not mean to suggest these are the only reasons Boss’ claims

fail. His appeal falls far short on numerous grounds that we need not

address, since missing even a single conjunctive element dooms any of

his theories. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d at 702.
No. 14‐2996 13

ly‐placed employee for whom Alease Thomas did substan‐

tive work like she did for him.

Likewise, Boss’ AWOLs do not constitute activity that

would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or

maintaining a discrimination charge. In any event, Boss

identifies no employee who missed work without some sort

of flexible scheduling arrangements, or without being re‐

quired to substantiate their leave, or without being similarly

disciplined. See Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Intern., Inc., 742

F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally—pointing to no admis‐

sible evidence of specific incidents—Boss argues he was sub‐

jected to “a barrage of criticism” and “workplace stresses.”

But conclusory assertions do not constitute evidence, and so

cannot overcome summary judgment. Hart v. Mannia, 798

F.3d 578, 596 (7th Cir. 2015); Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, 626

F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010).

Perhaps most damningly, Boss’ employers adduced evi‐

dence showing that he had failed to meet their legitimate

expectations, thereby rebutting any presumption that their

actions were taken in retaliation for Boss’ EEOC case. In oth‐

er words, he was put on a PIP because his performance

needed improving; he was noted AWOL because he was ab‐

sent without leave. Boss attempts to counter with evidence

of pretext on the part of his supervisors, but those efforts are

futile. He must identify other employees who engaged in

comparable misconduct. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 735. His

attempts to do so depend on speculation about other em‐

ployees’ work histories. As an example, Boss points to other

employees who exercise during the day. This is insufficient:

maybe they put in for time off, or maybe they arrive early to

offset the hours, or maybe they were punished too. The rec‐
14 No. 14‐2996

ord doesn’t tell us, and speculation is not evidence. Sum‐

mary judgment on Boss’retaliation claim was proper.

B. Hostile Work Environment

Title VII, in addition to prohibiting discrimination that

has direct economic consequences, forbids employers from

requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or

abusive environment. Vance v. Ball State Univ.,133 S.Ct. 2434,

2440–41 (2013); Nichols, 755 F.3d at 600. When “the work‐

place is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridi‐

cule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or persuasive to

alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an

abusive working environment,” Title VII is violated. Alexan‐

der, 739 F.3d at 982 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). See also Hobbs, 573 F.3d at 464 (“Retaliato‐

ry harassment can rise to the level of a hostile work envi‐

ronment when it is severe enough to cause a significant

change in the plaintiff’s employment status.”).

Surviving summary judgment on a hostile work envi‐

ronment claim requires sufficient evidence demonstrating

(1) the work environment was both objectively and subjec‐

tively offensive; (2) the harassment was based on member‐

ship in a protected class or in retaliation for protected behav‐

ior; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a

basis for employer liability. Nichols, 755 F.3d at 600 (quoting

Alexander, 739 F.3d at 982). See also Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d

1327, 1334–35 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing retaliatory hostile

work environment theory). Though there is a paucity of

caselaw on the matter, we see no reason retaliation‐based

actions by an employer must somehow be less objectively

offensive than in the context of sex or race. See Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68–69; Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d
No. 14‐2996 15

1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012). We consider the hostile work en‐

vironment claim under a “totality of the circumstances” ap‐

proach. See Ellis, 650 F.3d at 647; Hall, 713 F.3d at 331 (courts

should not carve up incidents of harassment then separately

analyze each one).

Deciding whether a work environment is hostile requires

consideration of factors like the frequency of improper con‐

duct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or hu‐

miliating (as opposed to a mere offensive utterance), and

whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work

performance. Alexander, 739 F.3d at 982.

Here, those factors, in concert with the absence of admis‐

sible evidence suggesting Boss’ bosses were animated by re‐

taliatory animus, tip strongly against Boss. Boss was not

physically threatened or humiliated, and much of the “inter‐

ference” with his job was, as discussed above, reasonable: it

stemmed from his own failure to meet legitimate employ‐

ment expectations. Without the specter of the (legitimate,

non‐pretextual) PIP, the AWOL marks, and “criticism,” Boss’

allegations become a mishmash of complaints about over‐

work rather than about a place permeated with intimidation,

ridicule, and insult. Such frustrations do not support a hos‐

tile work environment claim, especially where the record

fails to link the actions of Ladias or Richardson to retaliatory

animus. See Orton‐Bell, 759 F.3d at 774 (plaintiff required to

show offensive, severe events happened because she was a

woman).

Alternatively, we look to the objective offensiveness of

Boss’ supervisors’ actions. Any notion of a race‐based hostile

environment can be quickly dispatched. The record contains

not a single racially offensive remark, email, or other hint of
16 No. 14‐2996

racial animus. In any event, Boss did not argue the point be‐

low; it is forfeited.

Regarding potential retaliatory hostile work environ‐

ment, analogs to the race and gender contexts show this case

lies far below the objective standard for an abusive environ‐

ment. This Court has affirmed summary judgment where a

plaintiff grieved of non‐threatening, non‐humiliating con‐

duct in the form of a comment that could have been con‐

strued as racial (and some abuse of other protected employ‐

ees for non‐racial reasons), Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d

708, 713 (7th Cir. 2004); where the plaintiff was referred to

(out of his presence) as a “black motherf‐‐‐er,” Smith v. N.E.

Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2004); and where a plain‐

tiff was called a “black n‐‐‐‐r” (albeit once) by a co‐worker,

Nichols, 755 F.3d at 601. On the other hand, we have found

hostile work environments where a plaintiff was referred to

by a racial slur between five and ten times, Rodgers v. West‐

ern‐Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675–76 (7th Cir. 1993);

where a plaintiff was subjected to at least 18 sex‐based com‐

ments over ten months, Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC,

489 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2007); and where an employee was

given a completely duplicative (and mind‐numbing) task,

forbidden from speaking to her co‐workers, prohibited from

meetings, and barred from taking on more work, Hall, 713

F.3d at 328, 331.

The facts in this case are a far cry from the type of offen‐

siveness that supports a hostile work environment claim.

Boss was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but those tasks

were far from the mind‐numbing tasks that had already

been performed in Hall. Nowhere in the record are com‐

ments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which
No. 14‐2996 17

would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work envi‐

ronment. The evidence does not suffice to show a workplace

permeated with discriminatory ridicule, intimidation, and

insult, or one where Boss’ supervisors acted against him for

any prohibited reason. The district court properly granted

summary judgment on Boss’ hostile work environment

claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s entry of

summary judgment against Larry Boss is AFFIRMED.