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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Desislava Vladimirov,

Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs) No. 18-0689 (Kanawha County 13-D-1714)

Nedeltcho Vladimirov,

Respondent Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Desislava Vladimirov, by counsel Christopher T. Pritt, appeals the Circuit Court 

of Kanawha County’s June 28, 2018, order affirming the Family Court of Kanawha County’s May 

30, 2018, equitable distribution order in the divorce proceeding. Respondent Nedeltcho 

Vladimirov, by counsel Henry R. Glass III, submitted a summary response in support of the circuit 

court’s order.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

According to the May 30, 2018, “Order for Equitable Distribution” entered by the Family 

Court of Kanawha County, the parties owned both real estate and personal property, and one or 

both parties had bank accounts, PayPal accounts, medical bill refunds, workers’ compensation 

claim benefits, and retirement accounts.1 According to that order, subsequent to the final hearing 

the parties entered an agreed order regarding the marital home, granting exclusive ownership and 

possession of that home to respondent. In addressing gold coins the couple owned, the family court 

stated that petitioner contended they were subject to equitable distribution and had a value of 

$5,000; however, she “provided no basis for such value.” Respondent presented an exhibit 

showing that the sale of gold coins in January and February of 2012 was for $1,308 and $8,697.80, 

with the funds deposited into the couple’s joint account. He testified that the remaining gold coins 

have a value of approximately $500 and proposed that they be divided equally. The family court 

 

1 We note at the outset that petitioner’s brief ignores the mandates of Rule 10(c)(4) of the 

West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires the following: “Supported by 

appropriate and specific references to the appendix or designated record, the statement of the case 

must contain a concise account of the procedural history of the case and a statement of the facts of 

the case that are relevant to the assignments of error.” The two-paragraph statement of the case in 

petitioner’s brief does not contain a single citation to the record and omits a number of important 

facts, including the length of the marriage, when the action for divorce was filed, or whether there 

were any children involved. 

FILED

January 13, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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found that the best evidence regarding the gold coins was that provided by respondent.

The family court stated that “[r]espondent owns guns which he described and valued 

totaling $1,100, and which remain in the residence occupied by [p]etitioner. Respondent valued 

the guns at $2,000 but provided no basis for such value.” Based on the assignments of error, it 

appears that petitioner was the one who valued the guns at $2,000. The family court found that 

respondent provided the best evidence regarding the value of the guns, and he was awarded 

possession of those guns. 

The family court order provides that petitioner asserted a claim for “Conrad” credits.2

However, that court found as a matter of law that the pronouncements in Conrad are inapplicable 

to this case since petitioner continued to reside in and benefit from mortgage payments made by 

her from the joint account during the relevant time period. It further found that “during the period 

of time aforementioned [p]etitioner continued to have her paychecks deposited into the joint bank 

account of the parties from which the expenses were paid, which creates a presumption of gift 

which she failed to rebut.”

In that order, the family court determined that, because it was unlikely that respondent 

could qualify for a loan sufficient to purchase a suitable residence for him and the parties’ minor 

child in the immediate future, he should be awarded ownership of the former marital home, subject 

to him fully assuming and indemnifying petitioner for the existing mortgage indebtedness, 

refinancing the home in his name within two years, and immediately placing the home on the 

market for sale and promptly selling the home for an amount that results in full payment of the 

mortgage balance in the event he defaults on any monthly mortgage payment for a period 

exceeding thirty days. 

Petitioner appealed that distribution order to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on June 

27, 2018. By order entered June 28, 2018, the circuit court denied and dismissed petitioner’s 

appeal. Petitioner appeals from that order.

As this Court has found,

“[i]n reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review 

of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the 

findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous 

standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion 

standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216

W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).

Syl. Pt. 2, In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015). Further, as this Court has set forth, 

“‘[i]n general, an abuse of discretion occurs when a material factor deserving 

significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all 

proper and no improper factors are assessed but the circuit court makes a serious 

 

2 Conrad v. Conrad, 216 W. Va. 696, 702, 612 S.E.2d 772, 778 (2005).
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mistake in weighing them.’” [State v. Hedrick, 204 W. Va. 527, 553, 514 S.E.2d

397, 403 (1999)] (quoting Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 520 n. 6, 466 S.E.2d

171, 179 n. 6 (1995)).

Shafer v. Kings Tire Service, Inc., 215 W. Va. 169, 177, 597 S.E.2d 302, 310 (2004).

On appeal, petitioner asserts five assignments of error. However, we will not address the 

merits of the assignments of error that do not comply with Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.3

Petitioner first argues that the family court gave preference to respondent’s valuation of 

marital property despite the fact that respondent is not qualified as an expert. Petitioner asserts that 

this was erroneous due to respondent’s self-interest. Without citing any authority, petitioner 

contends that “[v]alue cannot be added to [respondent’s] testimony based on his specialized 

knowledge unless he is an expert.” Respondent contends that he did not provide expert testimony 

under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence so he was not required to be qualified as 

an expert. In the context of destroyed or damaged property, this Court has held that “the owner . . 

. is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her 

personal knowledge. When the value of the personal property is disputed, the ultimate 

determination of the value of personal property must be resolved by the trier of fact.” Syl. Pt. 2, in 

part, Evans v. Mutual Min., 199 W. Va. 526, 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997). Because petitioner fails to 

point to any particular valuation the family court improperly determined in this assignment of 

 

3 Rule 10(c)(7) provides as follows: 

[t]he brief must contain an argument exhibiting clearly the points of fact and law 

presented, the standard of review applicable, and citing the authorities relied on, 

under headings that correspond with the assignments of error. The argument must 

contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on appeal, including 

citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error were 

presented to the lower tribunal. The Court may disregard errors that are not 

adequately supported by specific references to the record on appeal.

Additionally, in an Administrative Order entered December 10, 2012, Re: Filings That Do Not

Comply With the Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court specifically noted that “[b]riefs that lack 

citation of authority [or] fail to structure an argument applying applicable law” are not in 

compliance with this Court's rules. Further, “[b]riefs with arguments that do not contain a citation 

to legal authority to support the argument presented and do not ‘contain appropriate and specific 

citations to the record on appeal . . .’ as required by rule 10(c)(7)” are not in compliance with this 

Court’s rules. Id. “A skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve 

a claim . . . . Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” State v. Kaufman, 227

W. Va. 537, 555 n.39, 711 S.E.2d 607, 625 n.39 (2011) (quoting U.S. v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,

956 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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error, this Court is unable to specifically address any such valuation determination.4

Petitioner next argues that the family court improperly valued certain gold coins at $500 

despite her contention that the correct value was $5,000. She asserts that the family court failed to 

provide a rationale as to why the $5,000 was not proper. Without citing to the order or the 

demonstrative exhibit, petitioner argues that “[b]ased on the order, the only difference between the 

evidence presented between [petitioner] and [respondent] was that [respondent] used a 

demonstrative exhibit.” In her two-paragraph argument, petitioner does not cite to a transcript of 

the disputed testimony and does not set forth any basis for her assertion that the coins are worth 

$5,000. Instead, she refers this Court to the family court order, which provides that petitioner 

“provided no basis for such value. Respondent presented an exhibit showing the sale of gold coins 

. . . and the deposit of the sale proceeds into the joint bank account . . . He testified that the 

remaining gold coins have a value of approximately $500 . . . .” Thereafter, the family court found 

that the best evidence regarding the valuation of the coins was provided by respondent. Due to the 

fact that petitioner’s vague argument is not supported by factual or legal authority, we find that 

she is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Similarly, petitioner argues that the family court provided no basis to support its valuation 

of the guns. She argues that the family court failed to make a finding as to why petitioner’s 

testimony regarding the gun valuation is less credible than respondent’s testimony on that issue. 

Again, she fails to provide any information to support her valuation of the guns.5 Therefore, we 

cannot find that petitioner’s third assignment of error is meritorious.

Without citing to the record, petitioner next contends that the family court improperly 

failed to give petitioner “Conrad credits” for payments made. Pursuant to Conrad v. Conrad, 216 

W. Va. 696, 702, 612 S.E.2d 772, 778 (2005), “[r]ecoupment of payment of marital debt by one 

party prior to the ultimate division of marital property has often been permitted upon a final 

equitable distribution order. See Jordan v. Jordan, 192 W.Va. 377, 452 S.E.2d 468 (1994).”

Petitioner argues that payments were made using petitioner’s income, regardless of whether those 

payments were from a joint account. She further contends that the order lacks a legal basis on 

which the family court made its conclusions. However, petitioner fails to cite to the family court 

order for that assertion. The family court found that Conrad was inapplicable to the instant matter 

because petitioner continued to reside in and benefit from the mortgage payments made from the 

joint account during the relevant time period. 

West Virginia Code § 48-5-508(c) provides that 

 

4 Petitioner’s only citation to the record in this assignment of error is to the final page of 

the family court’s order, which does not address the valuation of any personal property.

5 The portion of the family court’s order addressing the valuation of the guns is unclear and 

appears to contain typographical errors that make it difficult for this Court to ascertain what the 

family court concluded regarding their value. Specifically, the family court found that 

“[r]espondent valued the guns at $2,000 but provided no basis for such value. The [c]ourt finds 

that the best evidence regarding the value of the guns is that provided by [r]espondent . . . .” 
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[t]he court may order either or both of the parties to pay the costs and expenses of 

maintaining and preserving the property of the parties during the pendency of the 

action. At the time the court determines the interests of the parties in marital 

property and equitably divides the same, the court may consider the extent to which 

payments made for the maintenance and preservation of property under the 

provisions of this section have affected the rights of the parties in marital property 

and may treat such payments as a partial distribution of marital property. The court 

may release all or any part of such protected property for sale and substitute all or 

a portion of the proceeds of the sale for such property.

Petitioner fails to articulate why she is entitled to Conrad credits, simply stating that “[p]ayments 

were clearly made.” Therefore, we again find that this argument is insufficient to show that the 

family court abused its discretion as to this issue.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the family court erred by awarding respondent the marital 

home with refinancing to be done within two years. Petitioner points to West Virginia Code § 48-

7-101 to support her very brief argument that all property must be divided equally unless a specific 

finding is otherwise made.6 Petitioner argues that the parties did not come out as economic equals 

because her credit is encumbered for two years. However, she fails to cite a basis for her assertion 

that such purported encumbrance makes the parties economically unequal. In its order, the family 

court determined that petitioner was gainfully employed due, in part, to respondent financially 

supporting the family while petitioner furthered her formal education during the marriage. The 

court also noted the difficulty respondent may have obtaining financing to refinance the marital 

home due to an injury that diminished his earnings. The family court took efforts to protect 

petitioner, requiring that respondent fully assume and indemnify petitioner for the existing 

mortgage indebtedness, refinancing the home within two years, and promptly listing the home for 

sale if respondent defaults on any monthly mortgage payment for a period of more than thirty days.

Therefore, we find that the family court did not abuse its discretion by awarding respondent 

possession of the marital residence under the conditions set forth in its order.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 13, 2020 

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison

 

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“Except as otherwise provided in this section, upon every judgment of annulment, divorce 

or separation, the court shall divide the marital property of the parties equally between the parties.” 

W. Va. Code § 48-7-101.