Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-10277

Consolidated with

No. 08-10279

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

BILLY WAYNE FARRIS

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:07-CR-313-ALL

USDC No. 3:07-CR-327-ALL

Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Billy Wayne Farris appeals his guilty plea convictions of bank robbery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Farris argues that the district court plainly

erred when it applied the career offender enhancement because his prior

Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 23, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-10277 c/w

No. 08-10279

2

the sentence is unreasonable because the district court relied exclusively upon

Farris’ arrest record when sentencing Farris to 188 months of imprisonment,

which was within the Guidelines range, and the district court plainly erred by

ordering that Farris’ sentence run consecutive to state sentences that were not

yet imposed.

Although the district court relied solely upon the presentence report and

thus did not rely upon the proper documentation when determining that Farris’

prior offense was a crime of violence, see United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d

268, 274 (5th Cir. 2005), the Government has supplemented the record with the

charging document and the judgment of conviction. Farris’ argument that this

court does not have authority to supplement the record is without merit. See,

e.g., United States v. Fernandez-Cusco, 447 F.3d 382, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2006).

Farris’ conviction under the Arkansas aggravated robbery statute, A.C.A. § 5-12-

103, qualifies as a crime of violence because the Arkansas aggravated robbery

statute, like the Arkansas robbery statute, corresponds to the generic,

contemporary meaning of robbery as it involves misappropriation of property

under circumstances involving danger to another person. See United States v.

Santiesteban, 469 F.3d 376, 378-82 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. TellezMartinez, 517 F.3d 813, 814-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 170 (2008).

The district court therefore did not err when it applied the career offender

enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2007).

Also, Farris’ assertion that the district court “exclusively” relied upon his

prior arrest record to determine his sentence mischaracterizes the record.

Regardless whether an arrest record is an irrelevant or improper factor to

consider when determining where within a properly calculated guidelines range

a sentence should fall, in this case the district court provided extensive reasons

explaining its sentencing decision. Our reading of the record indicates that,

although the district court mentioned Farris’ arrest record, the district court did
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3

not exclusively rely upon the arrest record and did not give significant weight to

the arrest record. Farris has not shown that the district court abused its

discretion by imposing a sentence within the advisory guidelines range. See

United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 163

(2007). Finally, as Farris concedes, his argument that the district court plainly

erred by ordering that his sentence run consecutive to state sentences that were

not yet imposed is foreclosed by United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1216-17

(5th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Candia, 454 F.3d

468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2006). 

AFFIRMED.