U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

57–402 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–158] 

ARMY AND AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD 

AND RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT 

POSTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 22, 2010 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 22, 2010, Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve 

Component Equipment Posture .......................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 22, 2010 ........................................................................................ 27 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010 

ARMY AND AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE 

COMPONENT EQUIPMENT POSTURE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 3 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W., USA, Acting Director, Army National 

Guard .................................................................................................................... 4 

Stenner, Lt. Gen. Charles E., Jr., USAF, Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve ........... 8 

Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C., USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve ................................... 7 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard ................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W. ................................................................. 33 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 31 

Stenner, Lt. Gen. Charles E., Jr. .................................................................... 73 

Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C. .................................................................................... 58 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III .......................................................................... 47 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 93 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 92 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 92 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 89 

(1) 

ARMY AND AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE 

COMPONENT EQUIPMENT POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 22, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:31 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. I call the meeting to order. Good afternoon. 

The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive 

testimony on the equipment status and the requirements of the 

Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve components. 

I will apologize as an initial matter. We probably won’t have that 

many members at the committee today, since the House concluded 

its business for the week a little over an hour ago; and many members, I am sure, are heading back to their districts as quickly as 

possible. But Mr. Bartlett and I are, I believe, more than capable 

of holding down the fort; and we will accommodate anybody else 

who does show up. 

But I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and welcome them. We have Major General Raymond Carpenter, who is 

the Acting Deputy Director of the Army National Guard. We have 

Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt, III, Director of the Air National Guard; Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Chief, U.S. Army 

Reserve; and Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr., Chief, 

U.S. Air Force Reserve. Thank you, gentlemen, all for being here. 

Since September, 2001, almost 600,000 selected guardsmen and 

reservists have deployed in support of combat operations, representing 40 percent of the total selected reserve force of 1.4 million troops. All 34 Army National Guard combat brigades have deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan. This is an unprecedented deployment schedule that has placed an enormous strain and burden 

on those in the Guard and Reserve and their families as well. 

But they have also performed with incredible ability. All of us on 

this committee have had the opportunity in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and certainly back here as well to visit with those troops, and they 

have done an incredible job for us while at the same time maintaining their domestic obligations and responding to a variety of 

emergencies as well. And we thank you four gentlemen for your 

outstanding leadership and for the service all those who serve 
2 

under you have provided for our country. We could not be more 

proud of their performance. 

Last year, Secretary Gates adopted 82 recommendations from the 

congressionally mandated Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves. One of those recommendations was to equip and resource 

the Guard and Reserve component as an operational reserve, rather than the Cold War model of a strategic reserve. 

Additionally, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 

4-star general, giving him equal status among the Nation’s senior 

officers. 

The old strategic reserve model assumed very few mobilizations 

and assumed risk with inadequate equipping strategies. The 

change to an operational reserve status coincident with the reorganization of the Army has greatly increased the amount of equipment Guard and Reserve units are required to have. 

While the Department is making improvements in progress and 

providing adequate funding to equip the Guard and Reserve components to enhance its role as an operational reserve, there are a significant number of units that do not have their required equipment; and this is the big issue that we wish to talk about today. 

We understand with the strains that have been put upon the 

force since 9/11 with Iraq and Afghanistan we are doing whatever 

we can to make sure that our warfighters out there in the field 

have what they need, and there are changes that have to be made. 

But, at the same time, we want to make sure that your Guard and 

Reserve components are adequately equipped for the mission that 

we are asking you to do. As difficult as that is, this committee is 

very committed to trying to find the way forward to make sure that 

it happens. 

The witnesses have been asked to clearly lay out what equipment 

levels their organizations are required to have and how those requirements have changed, as well as what equipment levels they 

actually have on hand. While most Guard and Reserve units deployed overseas have all the equipment they require, many of those 

units don’t get all that equipment until just before deployment, in 

some cases after they deploy, which makes training to deploy very 

difficult. 

Aging aircraft continues to be a critical issue for the Air National 

Guard. Air National Guard aircraft are, on average, 28 years old, 

with the KC–135 tankers averaging 48 years old. And, again, I 

should point out it is a major priority for this committee to get you 

a new tanker. There have been a couple of bumps in that road, as 

we all know, but we are proceeding forward, and we will continue 

to press to make sure that happens as soon as it possibly can. We 

very clearly understand the need. 

If the problems of equipment shortages and aging equipment persist, the National Guard and Reserve units that, while very dedicated and willing, may simply not be able to adequately respond 

to domestic emergencies, let alone train for combat. 

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipment 

readiness shortfalls we have noted in many Guard and Reserve 

units. Guard and Reserve component procurement for fiscal year 

2004 to fiscal year 2010 has totaled approximately $42.1 billion, 

averaging almost $6 billion per year. Since 2004, Congress has pro-
3 

vided approximately $7 billion in a separate dedicated equipment 

account entitled the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support both 

on this committee and throughout Congress. 

And, finally, we expect to gain a better understanding of the 

progress that has been made on improving visibility of tracking 

equipment requirements through budgetary preparation and review, appropriations funding allocation and, ultimately, in the distribution of new equipment. 

That concludes my statement. I will submit the full statement for 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. SMITH. With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member 

on the committee, Mr. Bartlett, for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today. Thank 

you very much for your service to your country and for being here 

with us today. 

Mr. Chairman, the reserve component is no longer considered a 

strategic reserve and is now considered an operational reserve. I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to how this transition is going and what, if any, the long-term impacts might be. 

From an equipment perspective, I absolutely agree that if we are 

going to continue to expect so much from our reserve forces then 

not only must we properly equip them in terms of numbers of 

equipment but also equip them with modern equipment. While I 

have some concerns regarding modernized equipment for the Army 

Guard and Reserves, I have major concerns for our Air Guard. The 

Air Force proposed major changes to force structure along with the 

fiscal year 2010 budget request. I, along with most of the other 

members of this committee, was very concerned that these force 

structure changes were solely the result of a budget exercise that 

failed to account for the actual military requirements needed to address the security challenges of today and the future. Seeing the 

short-term perspective, the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] 

and the 30-year aviation plan has only added to my concern. 

In this past week, we have received the final three reports required by last year’s legislation: one on the Combat Air Force restructuring, one on the fighter force structure, and one on the potential to meet fighter shortfalls by procuring new F–15s, F–16s 

and F–18s. Those reports, which are unfortunately classified and 

cannot be fully discussed here, did little to change my belief that 

the budget is driving the force structure requirements, instead of 

the other way around. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget request targeted the fighter force 

structure, and it appears that the 2011 budget targets the tactical 

airlift force structure in a similar manner. The proposed movement 

of C–130s from the Air National Guard to the active component is 

very troubling to me. The C–130s play a key role in the Guard’s 
4 

Title 32 responsibilities and are critical assets for the Nation’s ability to respond to most any type of domestic event such as natural 

disaster or terror attack. 

It is unclear to me how we arrive at a point that the active Air 

Force has to take aircraft in the Air National Guard if what we 

have been told about the budget is true. In my mind, if the military 

requirements were, in fact, being met by the budget request, then 

this attempt at robbing Peter to pay Paul would not be taking 

place. 

I also believe that these shortfalls in tactical aircraft could have 

been mitigated if we had stuck to the plan to procure 78 Joint 

Cargo Aircraft [JCA], but, unfortunately, that program was cut as 

well. 

I find this all very troubling, and I hope our witnesses today can 

help us understand just how much additional risk we have been 

asked to take. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

I will now proceed with the panel’s testimony and then go into 

questions. 

Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. I would ask that you try to keep your 

remarks in the sort of 5-to-8-minute range, and we will have the 

maximum amount of time for questions. 

With that, I will turn it over to General Carpenter for his opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, 

ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

General CARPENTER. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking 

Member Bartlett, distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

It is my honor and privilege to be here today representing over 

360,000 Army National Guardsmen, over 50,000 who are currently 

deployed and on point for our Nation. 

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to share relevant information on the equipment posture of the Army National Guard. We 

thank you for your continued support in sustaining the initiatives. 

Today, we would like to discuss our critical dual-use equipment, 

our critical need for certain configurations of the high-mobility, 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles fondly called the Humvees, the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account, and the improvements in the modernization and making our facilities energy efficient. 

The Army National Guard equipment levels for domestic missions had fallen from 70 percent in 2001 to as low as 40 percent 

in 2006. Several factors contributed to the decline of the Army 

Guard equipment levels: changing requirements, equipment destroyed during combat operations, and equipment left in theater for 

other units. 

Current equipment levels as of April, 2010, are 77 percent equipment on hand; and 83 percent of that equipment is subset critical 

dual-use equipment, is available for domestic response missions. 

During fiscal year 2009, the Army G8 released a new Army 

equipping strategy that establishes a goal of at least 80 percent of 

equipment on hand for critical dual use for Army Guard units, that 
5 

being in the State, available for the governor, regardless of their 

rotation status in the Army force generation cycle. 

The Army National Guard has a fiscal year 2011 authorization 

for 48,712 Humvees, with 96 percent of those Humvees on hand. 

Although we are approaching 100 percent equipment on hand, only 

about 10,000, or around 20 percent, of our authorized fleet is currently modernized. Based on the Army enterprise equipping and 

reuse conference projections, this number will grow to about 

15,000, or approximately 30 percent, by the end of fiscal year 2011, 

assuming scheduled deliveries are executed as planned. 

Congress has been very responsive to the Army National Guard 

requirements. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account [NGREA] has been especially supportive in the pursuit of our 

equipping for the force. The Army Guard via NGREA received $770 

million for fiscal year 2006, $1.1 billion for fiscal year 2007, $1.3 

billion for fiscal year 2008, and $779 million for fiscal year 2009. 

This funding has been used for critical dual-use equipment for command and control, communications, aviation, force protection, including civil support teams, engineering, logistics, maintenance, 

medical, security, and transportation, our essential 10 capabilities 

available for the governors if there is a requirement. 

In your letter, you asked about the status of funds provided for 

2008, 2009, and 2010. Overall, we have used these funds to purchase stocks of radios, trucks, night vision devices, small arms, and 

communications equipment to fill our most critical gaps. Some of 

this funding still remains to be executed, but it is always focused 

on our most urgent priority needs. 

Progress is also being made in the visibility and transparency of 

tracking equipment funds from appropriation through procurement 

to actual fielding. 

The Army National Guard has worked and continues to work 

with the Army to improve transparency, and I am confident we 

have a path to success in the future. The Army National Guard 

will continue to focus on our equipping levels, especially for our 

critical dual-use equipment, enhance our emphasis on energy efficiency and our readiness centers, provide a logistics training that 

supports the Army force generation cycle, and procure vehicles that 

meet our training needs as well as our domestic and contingency 

operation needs. 

The Army National Guard renders a dual federal and state role 

and provides unique support to our Nation in a cost-effective manner. Through adequate funding of resources and leadership engagement in the equipment fielding and transparency driven by ongoing 

support from Congress, the Army National Guard will continue to 

meet operational demands. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in 

the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, General. 

General Wyatt. 
6 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bartlett, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

the opportunity to visit with you today regarding the equipment 

posture of our Nation’s Air National Guard, some 106,700 members 

strong. 

Since 9/11, over 146,000 Air National Guard members have deployed overseas, many of them on second and third rotations to 

combat zones, 75 percent of those in a volunteer status. In the past 

year alone, we have deployed 18,366 service members to 62 countries and every continent, including Antarctica. 

The stewardship of your committee and the level of commitment 

of our Nation’s Department of Defense [DOD] and the U.S. Air 

Force have ensured these airmen go to war well-equipped, welltrained, and well-led. The Air Reserve components are part of a 

seamless, integrated total force team. We are very thankful for 

your support and everything you continue to do to ensure our members are appropriately equipped and trained in the performance of 

their duties. 

The Air Force is in the midst of modernizing and recapitalizing 

its major weapons platforms, and the Air National Guard is a partner in this process. Many of the aircraft and operation today are 

much older than the airmen who fly and maintain them. Our aging 

aircraft fleet of aircraft must be recapitalized concurrently and in 

balance with our total Air Force partners in order to avoid near to 

midterm age-out of the fighter force our Guard airmen operate. To 

that end, we support the Air Force’s recapitalization plan and have 

been working diligently to ensure all force structure road maps are 

inclusive of the Air National Guard. 

Additionally, the Air National Guard as our Nation’s cost-effective, ready and reliable force, accessible and available, continues to 

leverage the vast majority of its equipment as dual use, meaning 

it may be used to support both federal and state missions. This ensures that needed capabilities are available not only to combatant 

commanders but also for the governors and maintaining capabilities for homeland defense. 

However, despite the overall excellent equipment support provided by the Air Force, the Air Guard still has shortfalls in critical 

support areas, including logistics, vehicles, and maintenance. Air 

National Guard equipment readiness presents greater challenges 

as long-term costs in operating and maintaining older aircraft continue to rise due to more frequent repairs, fluctuations in fuel 

prices, and manpower requirements. The cost of aircraft maintenance continues to rise significantly as we struggle to extend the 

life of our aging fleet. 

These rising maintenance costs are not solely confined to aircraft. 

During the past year, we have worked with the adjutants general 

to develop an Air National Guard flight plan, which includes viable 

options for the Air National Guard. In the end, our goal is to ensure that all plans are concurrent and balanced for the entire, total 

Air Force. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf 

of the men and women of our Nation’s Air National Guard. I thank 
7 

you for your continuing outstanding support for the Air National 

Guard as it remains America’s ready and reliable force as we meet 

the challenges of the 21st century. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, General. 

General Stultz. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. 

ARMY RESERVE 

General STULTZ. Chairman Smith, Congressman Bartlett, other 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today on behalf of 207,749 Army Reserve soldiers who are currently deployed in 20 some countries 

around the world, as well as here in the continental United States. 

We continue to transition from what was the strategic reserve 

that I entered way back in 1974—or, actually, 1979, after 5 years 

on active duty in 1974—to what we have today in operational reserve, where we keep 30,000 Army Reserve soldiers on active duty 

in addition to our 16,000 full-time military for this Nation. So out 

of an authorization of 205,000, we are providing roughly 45,000 

full-time soldiers on a regular basis. It is a great return on investment for America, but we need to keep that force trained, ready, 

and equipped. 

The Army Reserve has seen improvements in the amount of 

equipment on hand to meet requirements of an operational force. 

However, several barriers continue to slow the Army Reserve’s 

transition from that strategic to an operational force. 

The Army Reserve relies on internal lateral transfers and theater-provided equipment to meet current missions. Since we are 

currently at 80 percent equipment on hand but only 65 percent 

modernized, we continuously cross-level equipment to meet these 

needs. We are very thankful to Congress for helping us abate our 

equipment challenges through the National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Account. These funds greatly add toward our 

operationalizing the Army Reserve by serving as a supplement to 

the planned Army procurement. 

NGREA enables the Army Reserve to procure modernized equipment that the Army is unable to provide. For example, between 

2009 and 2010, the Army Reserve was allocated $2.7 billion for 

equipment by the Congress and was appropriated $212 million 

through NGREA. We are procuring with that money power generation, field feeding, logistics systems, and tactical wheeled vehicles, 

in addition to what the Army is scheduled to provide for us. Our 

goal is to make the most effective and efficient use of these funds, 

to procure equipment that produces trained units that are ready to 

fight and win on the battlefield or respond to domestic homeland 

missions. 

In order to successfully function as an operational reserve and 

support the Army force generation process, the Army Reserve requires a consistent and transparent stream of modernized equipment. The Army Reserve’s equipping goal is to ensure that our soldiers train with and train on the latest equipment the Army uses 
8 

in the field as they progress through the cycles of the readiness 

model. Filling our unit requirements with current generation 

equipment increases our ability to meet premobilization training 

and readiness objectives in the Army force generation and maximize the boots on the ground time that those soldiers have when 

they are deployed. 

The Army Reserve is working collaboratively with the Army and 

DOD to secure the critical resources required to produce individuals in units that can participate in a full range of missions in a 

cyclical manner. As directed by Army, we have transitioned our 

training programs to prepare our forces to perform full spectrum 

operations, increasing our capability but also requiring the equipment to do full spectrum operations. 

We still have the challenge of modernizing key individual systems. I will give you one example. A family of medium tactical vehicles [FMTV], the FMTV percentage for the Army Reserve may be 

at 80 percent. However, the modernized is only 49 percent. And we 

see this across our force where we have equipment on hand that 

is in lieu of or substitute items for the modernized equipment that 

those soldiers will operate or need to train on to operate in theater. 

One of the greatest challenges facing the Army Reserve today is 

having the right number of modernized equipment sets on hand to 

train prior to deployment. While we have seen improvements in 

equipment levels and upgraded modernized equipment, we continue to experience shortfalls. The NGREA, as I said before, is a 

great asset to us. 

I look forward to your questions, but, on behalf of those 207,000 

plus soldiers, I want to say thank you for the support that they 

have been given by you in the previous years and look forward to 

your support for the future. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, General. 

General Stenner. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHARLES E. STENNER, JR., USAF, 

CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE 

General STENNER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Smith, Congressman Bartlett, distinguished members 

of the subcommittee, thank you as well for allowing us the opportunity to come today and give you a status report on the strength 

that we have here in the Air Force Reserve, the strength that you 

have in an Air Force that is doing the Nation’s business right now 

around the world. 

And I have with me today—I would like to introduce real briefly 

here—our Air Force Reserve Command, Command Chief Master 

Sergeant, Chief Dwight Badgett. He is here helping me in his capacity as the senior ranking enlisted member to keep track of the 

72,000 members of the Air Force Reserve is the number we are 

growing to as we grow in all of the missions that the Air Force is 

doing, all the missions around the world. And as part of that threecomponent Air Force, the Air Force Reserve is pleased to be a full 

partner in that effort. 
9 

I will tell you that the authorizations that you have given us in 

the past have helped tremendously to keep us in a ready status, 

and we have been doing this as an Air Force for 19 years. Since 

the Desert Shield/Desert Storm days, we have had some folks in 

combat operations over the skies, in the Mideast and in other locations around the world continually. 

We have a tempo that was sustainable, we have a predictable rotational base, and we keep our folks trained and ready using those 

authorizations, using the techniques and tools that we have to get 

those folks through the basic training and then through tech 

school, making them combat ready in a much shorter time than 

when they are only available to us on weekends. They are there 

training on the equipment, three components training on the same 

equipment and deploying with the same equipment that we have 

right now. Because we, as an Air Force, do manage and monitor 

the airplanes, the equipment as a three-component Air Force; and 

it is the NGREA dollars that are so precious to us as the Air Force 

Reserve. It helps us accelerate the buys on many of the things in 

the precision engagement kind of equipment in defensive systems 

and in irregular warfare combat gear that allow us to train on the 

same systems and sustain and maintain that combat capability 

that we have as a three-component Air Force. 

You are getting a good deal. For only 5.3 percent of the military’s 

budget, we have got 14 percent of the capability in the Air Force 

Reserve. We are partners in all of those missions, sir; and I think 

that pays the Nation big dividends. 

The way ahead for us in equipment is to continue to sustain that 

increase and that increase in capacity, the production capacity that 

comes with those NGREA dollars in those three major areas. As we 

do that, I think we will grow in all those mission areas; and we 

will, in fact, adjust our active reserve component manpower, our 

authorizations. We will adjust the full time and part time to get 

more efficient in each of those areas, share where we do the equipment, use the equipment at the maximum rate we can use it. And 

in those associate concepts and constructs, we are able to 

seamlessly integrate, train, and ready to the same standards based 

on the readiness dollars we have and using and leveraging that 

equipment as part of that operational force that is, in fact, leveraged from the strategic reserve that we are. 

We are ready for the major conflicts, and we are a full partner 

in a rotational basis on a daily basis. Associations, rebalancing, adjustments, and optimizing the equipment we have, utilizing the 

NGREA that we have got, focusing on precision engagement defensive systems and irregular warfare gear will help us prepare today 

for tomorrow and the future; and we will maintain that in a sustainable and predictable fashion with those 80 percent volunteers 

that are doing the business of the Nation around the world today. 

I thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Stenner can be found in the 

Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 
10 

We will go under the 5-minute rule here, try to keep things moving in an orderly fashion; and I will be under the 5-minute rule as 

well in terms of my questions. 

I start with General Carpenter on the utility in up-armored 

Humvees. As you know, the Army has concluded that they have got 

enough basically and they are not building any more; and now they 

are basically recapping the existing fleet that is here and coming 

back from Iraq. In terms of your needs, will that sufficiently meet 

the requirements as you see them for your needs or do you think 

you will need more vehicles? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, we worked with the Army as they went 

through the process of making this decision; and one of the guiding 

facts with regard to this whole decision process was that up-armored Humvees are no longer being used in Afghanistan and Iraq 

and they have given way to MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles]. So with that knowledge and understanding that 

there was a more modern vehicle on the horizon, the Army made 

the decision that they were going to terminate the procurement of 

a newer Humvee, those being the up-armored ones. 

For us inside the Army National Guard, it is more of a modernization program than a deployment program. As I mentioned in 

my opening statement, 80 percent of our Humvees will be older 

than the 20-year mark by the time we get done using them. So our 

concern is to be able to sustain that fleet. 

Part of the discussions with the Army as we made the decision 

was that they were going to put a certain amount of money against 

the recap program and that, additionally, they were going to cascade a certain number of those Humvees to us so that we could 

maintain something that looked like a modernized fleet. 

To the extent that the Army keeps the promises that they have 

made, I think we are going to be in pretty good shape; And, in all 

honesty, the up-armored Humvees are of marginal use in some of 

our homeland defense responses. General Tonini from Kentucky 

can tell you that an up-armored Humvee doesn’t have the greatest 

utility in an ice storm. So there is good reason for us to sustain the 

Humvee fleet within our organization. 

Mr. SMITH. And you have enough in terms of the domestic needs. 

I understand that completely. But in terms of your training for 

when you are activated, is there a training requirement in terms 

of what you are going to actually be using in the field? 

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. That is important for us as we get 

ready to mobilize and deploy, to ensure that we have the up-armored version of the Humvee so that we have got a training set 

that we can train on in order to qualify our drivers. 

Beyond that, we are also being fielded with MRAPs at selected 

places inside of our training base so that we can qualify those drivers in advance of mobilization and deployment. There is also a plan 

to put MRAP trainers throughout the National Guard. So if all of 

that stays in place, sir, I think we are going to be in pretty good 

shape. 

Mr. SMITH. You have got what you need. 

A question for the Air Force, both General Wyatt and General 

Stenner. I think the biggest concern on this committee when we 

look at the capitalization requirements for Guard and Reserve com-
11 

ponents is the C–130. And the demand for those is great obviously 

in theater. More of those are being moved into the active component, and I think there was a concern on this committee whether 

or not the Guard and Reserve will have what they need in terms 

of 130s to meet their training in domestic mission. Can you walk 

us through that a little bit and what your confidence level is and 

whether or not you are going to have an adequate level of 130s? 

General WYATT. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the Mobility, 

Capability Requirement Study [MCRS] was released and published 

late February, early March identifying a lower requirement and a 

current overcapacity of C–130s. It doesn’t address the component 

necessarily where those aircraft are located, but it does address a 

lower number that are needed. 

I think you see in the President’s 2011 budget an effort to retire 

some of the older E models and H models, which are, again, aging 

airframes, costly to maintain and a direction where we need to go 

so that we can position ourselves for the missions of the future. 

General Stenner and I have met extensively with the Air Force 

subsequent to the release of the President’s budget, and we are addressing the C–130 issue that you have mentioned. In fact, we had 

another meeting on it today. I am confident that we will meet a 

resolution that will address the adjutants general need and the 

governors’ need for domestic airlift and at the same time accomplish the President’s budget initiative to save some money and 

move the force in the direction that it needs to go as far as tactical 

airlift is concerned. 

Mr. SMITH. We will be watching that very closely. 

General Stenner, just quickly. I am out of time, but go ahead for 

just a quick comment. 

General STENNER. Yes, sir. 

I will echo the comments that General Wyatt made. I will tell 

you that some of the things we are looking at is where it is smart 

to leverage the Guard and Reserve, that experience in depth, perhaps in a training role. How do we balance the Active and Reserve 

and Guard at that particular location and mission to get the most 

of it and then how then will that free up some of the other manpower to put into mission sets that the Air Force has been tasked 

with that we have been up until this point unable to finance and 

fund within the cap that we have on manpower? So I think that 

the 130 will be an example of how we might leverage other weapon 

systems as well by rebalancing and, in effect, using the amount of 

iron that we have, the amount of airplanes we have in a more efficient and effective manner, packaging it in associations. 

Mr. SMITH. That makes sense. We will want to keep a careful eye 

to make sure you have enough to do that. But I think certainly I 

want to make the most out of what we have got. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I want to ask a couple of quick questions about the C–27J. It is 

my understanding that the original requirement, which has never 

been formally reduced, was 78 aircraft; is that correct? 

Okay. And I am also assuming that that did not include aircraft 

that might be needed by the Guard for homeland security. That 

was just the combat forces. Am I correct with that? 
12 

General WYATT. I think you are correct, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And in spite of the fact that we originally said we 

needed 78, there has been no study that said we needed fewer and 

those 78 did not include the Guard’s use for homeland security or 

stateside use, we are now buying only 38, and we can only account 

for 24 of those, and we are wondering where the others are going. 

If you could help us where they are going to be bedded down. And 

then the question is, with these reduced assets and the increased 

responsibilities that you have, how are you going to be able to meet 

these demands? 

General WYATT. Congressman Bartlett, you are correct. The program of record is 38, and you are also correct that 24 have announced bed-down locations, four aircraft each at six different locations, leaving 14 aircraft yet to be decided as far as their bed-down 

location. That question is now being vetted through the Air Force’s 

strategic basing executive steering group, which is the entity inside 

the Air Force that addresses locations according to the drafted criteria for that particular platform. And I am advised that a list of 

candidate bases, which will be the first glimpse as to where those 

aircraft may be located, will be coming out shortly. 

As far as the need for additional C–27s, you mentioned the direct 

support mission. The direct support mission can be performed by 

other aircraft. So I guess my best answer to that would be that 

there continue to be discussions and analysis inside the Air Force 

to determine the best way to meet the direct support requirements 

that the Army has indicated and the proper aircraft mix, proper location, proper component to fly those missions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But isn’t it true that our operations in Afghanistan beg for more rather than fewer 27Js because of the size of the 

fields and so forth there? 

General WYATT. We take the request for forces, the request for 

capability from the combatant commanders. And I am aware there 

has been an additional request for direct support aircraft in theater. Again, whether that is filled by the C–27 or the C–130 depends upon the availability of aircraft and the specific type of direct support mission that the combatant commander is addressing. 

So it is difficult to answer your question without knowing specifically what the combatant commanders are requesting at any point 

in time. 

There is a space issue, a ramp space issue in theater. We are 

limited in the numbers of aircraft, regardless of what types they 

are, just because of the limited number of square footage of concrete in theater. But certainly the direct support mission is an important one to the Air Force; and it is extremely important to the 

Air National Guard, since all 38 of those airplanes that you mentioned, the C–27s, are designated for the Air National Guard at 

this time. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General, you mentioned in your unclassified report that the Air National Guard faces a capability gap in the near 

term which increases in the longer term. Additional delays in production rate, a decrease in the F–35 program will have a direct and 

proportionally negative impact on the Air Force and, therefore, the 

Air National Guard fighter gap. How big will this risk be as a re-
13 

sult of your facing the Nunn-McCurdy breach and what can we do 

to mitigate it? 

General WYATT. As you are aware, sir, most of the older block 

F–16 block 30s reside in the Air National Guard. So we face a recapitalization issue. It may be a little more imminent than the Air 

Force as a whole. 

You are also very well aware that the Secretary of Defense has 

recently restructured the F–35 program; and it is essential that the 

program, as restructured, stay on target and be implemented as requested by the Secretary. Any delays create more difficulties for 

the Air National Guard to transition out of the old legacy airplanes 

that will be aging out into the new platforms. So timeliness is critical; and the program, as restructured, is of critical importance to 

the Air National Guard. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Sorry. I should point out—well, Ms. Bordallo is not actually on 

this subcommittee, so we go in that order, though. With permission, I will call on her after Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. I am always happy to defer to Member Bordallo. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Well, go ahead. Okay. Well, one of you has got 

to step forward here, So I will make the executive decision. Mr. 

Wilson go ahead, and then we will go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank all of you for your service 

here. And it is so impressive, your leadership is indeed. 

The Guard and Reserve forces are moving from strategic reserve 

to operational reserve. As a 31-year veteran myself, it is so heartwarming to see the service of our young people. And I know firsthand. I have three sons in the Army National Guard, two sons who 

have served in Iraq, one has served in Egypt. So I know that our 

Guard members really want to be operational, not as I was for 

many years, truly in reserve. So thank you for what you do. 

And, also, I am very grateful—my former National Guard unit, 

I just—I know how much it meant to them, the 218th Brigade, to 

serve in Afghanistan, led by General Bob Livingston. Truly, as I 

travel South Carolina today, people who served in Afghanistan, it 

was a life-changing, positive experience for the members of the National Guard. So thank you for what you do. 

Looking back, I would like for all of you to reference how would 

you rate your ability from the equipment perspective to complete 

your missions in contrast to where we were pre-9/11, 2001? We can 

begin left to right. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, first of all, let me thank you for your 

service and the service of your family and the service of the 218th 

Brigade. They did wonderful work over there at Task Force Phoenix, and they put in place some of the training base for the Afghan 

National Army and Afghan National Police that we are building on 

in theater today. So they can be very proud of what they have done 

over there. 

I think that, in response to your question, there are two pieces, 

those two pieces being the quantity of equipment that we have in 
14 

the Army National Guard and the quality of equipment that we 

have in the National Guard. Pre-9/11, we had 70 percent of the 

equipment that we were authorized, but honestly much of it was 

not modern equipment. So as we saw our responsibility to mobilize 

and deploy our soldiers and what was the kind of equipment that 

was allowed for deployment in the theater and what the combatant 

commanders wanted there versus what the National Guard equipment set looked like, we found that there was a lot of equipment 

inside of our organization that was of the type that would not be 

allowed to even be deployed. 

That was further exacerbated when we saw the results of Hurricane Katrina when we were looking for high-water vehicles in 

order to conduct operations in that particular emergency and disaster. And, again, the old deuce and a half that many of us grew 

up with was not adequate for what we were doing there. And I 

would point out that this year, in fiscal year 2011, we are going to 

retire the deuce and a half, which has been in our formation since 

the 1950s. That is a huge accomplishment, and I think it is a good 

indicator of where we are at in the modernization program. 

As I pointed out, we have got 77 percent of the equipment we are 

supposed to have on hand across the entire Army National Guard. 

Now, it varies by State. Because as States mobilize and deploy that 

equipment, resident inside the State changes, and much of that 

equipment deploys with the organization when they leave. So the 

statistics I quoted at the outset, the critical dual-use equipment, 

which is available for both the homeland and the overseas mission, 

right now is at 83 percent. Sixty-six percent of that is available for 

the governors. So we have seen huge progress here inside the 

equipment counts, and that is due to the $32 billion that you all 

have invested in our organization as an operational reserve. 

General WYATT. Congressman Wilson, from the Air National 

Guard standpoint, we have been an operational force I think probably out of necessity as we have evolved from the very first desert 

war. We have been an operational force for about the past 20 years. 

While we continue to—as far as an equipment standpoint—have 

the numbers of equipment that we need, our problem again is that 

qualitative issue. As the Air Force moves into more modern equipment, our challenge is to modernize our equipment to make sure 

that it remains compatible with that equipment flown by the active 

component. 

We stress the importance of the NGREA account to help us do 

that. We know that recapitalization of the entire fleet is an expensive and time-consuming process, and we know that we can’t get 

to recapitalization at the drop of a hat. So we have got to stress 

modernizing the equipment that we do have. 

We also look at dual use when we expend our NGREA monies. 

Last year, I believe the amount was $135 million, critically important to getting us the communication links that we need to provide 

the type of targeting pods that we need, the type of protective 

equipment for our security forces and those first-responder-state 

mission-type folks that we have embedded inside the Air National 

Guard. So the quantitative is not necessarily the issue, but the 

qualitative and continuous modernization is what is important to 

us. 
15 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General Stultz, you can go ahead quickly. We are out of time if 

you want to get to the next question. But take a quick stab at it, 

and then we will move one. We will probably have time for a second round, but go ahead. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. 

I would just like to echo what General Carpenter said. It is a situation of not just on hand but modernization. And, as I said earlier, we are at about 80 percent of on-hand equipment which is the 

highest we have ever been but only about 65 percent modernized. 

And why that is important and the point I would make—and I 

will keep it short—it is not just about what they are able to do in 

theater. We provide them the best and the most modern equipment 

in theater. But if we don’t have the modernized equipment back 

home, it reduces our strategic flexibility. And we have already experienced that where we have had units that were scheduled to deploy to Iraq and we wanted to remission them to Afghanistan because of the surge going on there but were unable to because they 

were going to fall in on provided equipment in Iraq. There is no 

provided equipment in Afghanistan, and the equipment back home 

was not the modernized equipment, and so it really limited our 

flexibility already there. 

So I would stress that it is not just about having the right equipment for what is currently going on, it is having the right equipment that gives us the flexibility for the future requirements that 

we really don’t have the forecast on. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Sorry. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to ask questions on this important 

hearing even though I am not a member of this particular subcommittee; and I thank my colleague, Mr. Wilson, for offering me 

his slot. 

Distinguished members of our panel, thank you for your testimony today; and I thank you for your dedication to our country. 

My question is for General Carpenter in regards to the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft. The Army Guard fleet of C–12, C–23, and C–26 aircraft continues to age with no replacement in the future year’s defense plan. And, finally, the mobility, capability, and requirement 

study released this year provides little details on the C–27J. The 

items I have listed leave me a little confused. Now, this aircraft is 

needed. However, we have cut the program from 78 to 38 aircraft; 

and the MCRS, a document that describes our mobility capabilities 

in the Air Force, barely addresses the aircraft. Our Army Guard 

planes are getting older; and, therefore, I would like to ask General 

Carpenter, how is the Army and the Army National Guard addressing the critical need to replace fixed-wing aircraft within the 

Army National Guard? 

And I know that I am being a little bit redundant here. Congressman Bartlett touched on this. But I would like to have a clear 

answer on this. 

General CARPENTER. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman Bordallo. 
16 

I think that you know that the Secretary of Defense made a decision this past year to transfer the C–27 program from the Army 

and from the Army National Guard to the Air Force. That left us 

with the C–23 aircraft that we currently have inside of the Army 

National Guard. Those C–23s continue to provide exceptional support in Iraq; and we have, I believe, 11 of those aircraft currently 

deployed. 

The other thing that the C–23 does is it has a huge capability 

in the homeland mission in terms of being able to deliver smaller 

cargo loads in a very responsive manner. Since the C–27 program 

was transferred to the Air Force, our issue is to be able to maintain 

the capability of the C–23 inside the Army for the time that it is 

required, and we have a plan with the Army to do that. The C– 

12 fleet and the C–26 fleet are separate issues, and we are working 

with the Army on a modernization program for both of those aircraft. They have found a place, particularly in ISR [Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] and in transportation of passengers in theater; and the value of that aircraft has been validated. And so we are continuing to work with the Army on the 

modernization piece for that. 

I would defer to General Wyatt to discuss further the C–27 issue 

with regard to that part of your question. 

General WYATT. Congresswoman, I think it has been pretty clear 

that the program of record on the C–27 is 38. We are taking a look 

at the request for forces in regard to the direct support mission 

from theater. It is true that the C–130s can handle some of that 

direct support, but the exact mix in relation to not just the direct 

support mission requirements but also perhaps the larger requirement of tactical airlift as set forth in the mobility capabilities requirement studies requires the Air Force to take a pretty long look 

at how we are going to meet both the MCRS requirements and the 

direct support requirements. 

What that particular mix might be is still being discussed, and 

I wish I could be more specific than that, but I just don’t have the 

exact numbers at this point in time. But it is going to be an issue 

here inside the Air Force as we talk about those requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

I have one question, also. This has to do with the territory of 

Guam, which is important. This is concerning the bed-down of the 

JCA. Tomorrow, our staffs will be briefed on the bed-down plan for 

several airframes, including the JCA. Can we expect to see a beddown plan that addresses the homeland defense requirements of 

the Guard to support the FEMA [Federal Emergency Management 

Agency] regions within U.S. and the territories? 

Also, has there been any discussion about the requirements to 

support the Compact states in the Pacific? This is very important 

to the Guam National Guard and the Navy on Guam since we have 

an obligation to support the requirements of the freely associated 

States in the Pacific. 

General WYATT. It seems to be in my lane. I will try to answer 

that one. 

Your first question as to criteria on JCA C–27 bed-downs, does 

it include concern about the Homeland Security homeland defense 

region, and the answer is, yes, the criteria does consider that. It 
17 

is part of the criteria. It is not necessarily the most important but 

certainly an important one, a lot of different criteria going into the 

bed-down decision of where that airplane should be bedded down. 

As far as the territories are concerned and the airlift support required to cover that part—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Micronesian area. 

General WYATT. Yes, ma’am—is part of the MCRS studies that 

have already been accomplished. 

Now, as to how the Air Force specifically will address that requirement is again being worked out as we study FEMA, as we 

study the airlift support for that part of the world and to 

CENTCOM [Central Command] and the other parts of the world. 

So it is kind of like a Rubik’s Cube, trying to put all the requirements together and best deciding which airframes and what numbers support those particular requirements and which component, 

what type of associations we need as we transition in the future. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you so much for your service. It is great to be 

with you in this committee today. 

I myself served in the regular Army, the Army Reserve, the regular Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve. So I kind of 

wove in and out of active duty in the Reserves. 

My question is, General Wyatt, to the National Guard, Air National Guard. Not every State, obviously, is getting the F–16 replacement, the F–35. The States that currently have them—Colorado is one of those States. We have the F–16, and we are awaiting 

a decision on whether or not we are going to have the F–35. Can 

you tell me where we are in the process right now in terms of making that decision? 

General WYATT. Yes, sir. The Air Force is studying the different 

procurement schedules in the F–35. And, as you are aware, those 

procurement schedules have been recently restructured by the Secretary of Defense. 

Last fall, the Air Force announced through their strategic basing 

executive steering group [SB–ESG] a process, 11 candidate bases, 

that would address the bed-down of the first, I think, 279 aircraft 

F–35s, about half of those roughly going to the training mission 

and about half were operational. The first 279 have been restructured as a part of the Secretary of Defense’s restructuring of the 

program. 

I think it is the intent of the Air Force that as we progress down 

the delivery schedule of that airplane that we will subsequently 

continue with the strategic basing executive steering group basing 

process using the criteria as may be amended through experience 

to consider those bases that might field the next tranche or the 

next portion, and I think what you are going to see is probably 

every two years there will be a release of a number of candidate 

bases. 

Subsequent to the release of the candidate bases, they have to 

go through site evaluations, environmental impact studies, and 
18 

statements to determine—and help inform the Secretary and the 

Chief as they make their final determinations. 

But certainly, Buckley, in Colorado, is one of the bases that is 

being considered. Now, where they will fall out as far as the next 

tranche, we will just have to wait and see as the basing group goes 

through its criteria evaluations. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And how many Guard organizations that currently have the F–16 will not get the F–35 and will have to find 

an alternate mission? 

General WYATT. I think the answer to that question would be determined by how many we ultimately acquire in the Air Force. The 

goal continues to be 1,763. The frequency and the rate that those 

are produced or required will determine to some extent what existing F–16 bases will be I think candidates for that particular airframe. We know that probably not all of our F–16 units will transition to the F–35, but we think all of our F–16 units, whether they 

transfer to the F–35 or some other legacy airplane as the Air Force 

fields F–35s, some of their more modern F–16s, F–15s will then 

float through the Air National Guard. So we see some of our F– 

16 bases being awarded the F–35, some being awarded later block 

F–16s, some transitioning into other missions like remotely piloted 

aircraft, distributed ground stations, intelligence cyber wings, 

emerging missions that will continue to be of vital importance to 

the U.S. Air Force. So to say how many, I cannot at this point in 

time. But that is kind of the process that we will go through. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do any of the members of the panel feel that there 

is equipment that is being decommissioned that should not be decommissioned? I think, General Carpenter, you mentioned the 

deuce and a half truck. Do you still feel that has life in it and that 

it shouldn’t be decommissioned or that there is equipment that is 

being left in Iraq that shouldn’t be left in Iraq? 

General CARPENTER. From my perspective, we are getting the 

most modern equipment. We are getting equipment in quantities 

that we probably haven’t gotten certainly over my career. And we 

can keep a couple of deuce and a halfs around for you, if you would 

like. For the most part, they are not relevant in our operations 

anymore. We retired the last UH–1 aircraft here this past year. 

Again, all of that is certainly a testament to where we are at in 

the modernization piece and what NGREA and the investment that 

Congress has made in the National Guard, how that has increased 

our ability to be an operational reserve. So we are working towards 

the modernization program. We have got a ways to go yet but certainly have come a long way. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to thank each of you for your many years of service 

to our country. I love what I do, and it is an honor to serve in public office, but it pales in comparison to each of you and all our men 

and women in uniform and, specifically, your efforts in leadership 

on behalf of our guards and reservists. 

I am from Pennsylvania, so my Stryker Brigade just spent a good 

part of last year in Iraq. In my own area, the 193rd special ops 

wing out in Middletown I know is one of the most, if not the most, 
19 

deployed Air Guard unit out there; and the issues that my colleagues have raised on the equipment, your advocacy is to meeting 

their needs. 

I know it is so important. I know the 193rd, as they continue to 

meet the mission requirements, are challenged; and equipment is 

part of that challenge. So your efforts in leading the efforts to do 

right by all that serve with you is much appreciated. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I have a couple of questions I want to ask just for the record. I 

know you probably won’t be able to give us a clear answer here up 

front. 

And, also, in following up on Mr. Platts’ remarks, I would be remiss if I didn’t do a little shout-out as well to General Lowenberg, 

who is our adjutant general who does a fabulous job out there and 

also our Reserve wing out at McChord that I know has been very, 

very active. Many of them are my neighbors. So they are doing a 

great job. And the entire Guard in our area, topnotch. So we certainly appreciate their service. 

The two things that I would like for you to get back to me on— 

we have talked about recapitalization requirements for all of your 

components—is a dollar figure. If you could imagine here is what 

we truly need to be where we are at. Now, I understand you get 

your budget and you don’t come up here and then say, this is 

where it is insufficient. You come up here and say, it is sufficient, 

because it is. It is what you have got, and it is what you are going 

to work with? 

But for our planning purposes going forward, to the extent we 

can get an idea of what would be required to recapitalize you at 

the level to get the equipment you need to perform your domestic 

mission and doing the training to be an operational force, that 

would be helpful. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. And then the other big problem that this committee, 

this Congress, and I think the DOD is facing is all of the implications of the F–35 problems. A lot of them come back towards you 

and sort of follows up on Mr. Coffman’s question. There is going to 

be some shortages there as we transition forward. It is quite possible that the F–35 will slip again in terms of when it is going to 

be delivered. It is even more possible that it will wind up costing 

more than we expected; and, as a result, we will not be able to buy 

as many. 

It strikes me as sort of crying out for a Plan B in terms of, let 

us say, we don’t wind up with the current requirement of 2,443 F– 

35s. What are we going to do to make sure that we have the fighter 

attack aircraft fleet that we need Active, as well as Guard and Reserve, and what would we do? 

Obviously, one of the places to look would be to build more F– 

15s and F–16s. We don’t want to do that. And I realize you get into 

a tough sort of call because, if you spend more money on that, then 

you have less money for the top-of-the-line F–35. 

But in terms of making the money work and making sure you 

all have what you need, I think we need to be thinking about those 
20 

things. I would love to see both of those questions, if you could submit something to the committee, what your thoughts are on those 

two. That would be very helpful. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The question I have has to do with recruitment and 

retention and with your force. As I mentioned, I know, as I think 

everyone on this committee and probably everyone in the country 

does, many people who are in the Guard and Reserve and what 

they have been asked to do since 9/11, the number of deployments 

now numbers that I have heard are that you are doing good—well, 

I guess, in terms of getting the numbers out. What are you thinking about in terms of what you need to do for your individual 

Guard and Reserve members and their families? Because, as you 

know, this impacts all of them. And that, in terms of recruitment 

and retention, it is not just the individual, it is the family that is 

impacted as well. What have you thought about in terms of how 

to work on those issues to help with recruitment and retention and 

to make sure you have a satisfied force? 

And, General Stultz, do you want to start off there? 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. 

As was alluded to earlier, our recruiting and retention right now 

is very, very good. We are almost 3,000 over strength. So my problem is rebalancing the force. And we have actually had to tell them 

to slow down on the recruiting because we have got too many of 

the young soldiers and not enough of the mid-grade soldiers. 

But one of the things—and it does get to the equipping side of 

the house, that I have a concern when it comes to retention. We 

have got the best-trained, most-seasoned combat force we have ever 

had. And those soldiers have performed magnificently. What troubles me is when they come back home and they come back home 

to that Reserve center and they go to their weekend drill and there 

is a 30-year-old truck sitting there instead of the piece of equipment they just operated in theater. So it does become a morale 

issue. 

So getting the modernized equipment is a key strategy for me in 

terms of retention. I have got to be efficient about it; and I have 

got to say, if I can get a full set of new trucks, I probably can’t give 

them all to one unit. I have to spread a piece of each of those modernized trucks throughout so they can train on them. But at least 

they get to touch and feel that same piece of equipment that they 

just trained on in theater and just operated in theater. 

With regard to the families, the Yellow Ribbon programs that we 

are doing now, the Strong Bonds programs that we are doing now, 

all of the family support programs that we are doing now are critical. Because it does show to them our commitment that we are 

going to take care of them, that we do realize they are sacrificing 

just as much as those soldiers. So support for our family programs, 

as well as support for modernized equipment. 

Mr. SMITH. General Stenner. 

General STENNER. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. 

I will tell you I will reiterate what my partner here has said, 

that recruiting and retention are good. We have the highest reten-
21 

tion we have had in a long time. We are bringing folks on, and we 

thought we better figure out why. 

So we started looking at it with some data and some analysis 

and some assessment groups; and the questions that we asked 

were, why do you join and why do you stay? 

Patriotism was at the top of the list. They want to be a participant in this Nation’s defense. Folks are doing the job, and they 

don’t want to stop doing the job. But they need to do it in a sustainable and predictable fashion. 

So we protect that civilian job they have got as well. So we protect that career path they have in their civilian job. So we are 

going after the employers as well in asking what is it that is affecting you the most about the tempo that we have? How do we make 

it sustainable and predictable for that employer? And then the families as well. What is it that they need? And the Yellow Ribbon, as 

was already mentioned, is a huge help in getting that done. Folks 

want to participate, sir. And they are doing it in good numbers. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Again over time, so I will move on to 

other members. 

I just wanted to say if there is anything our committee can do 

to help, support for your individual soldiers and airmen and their 

families is incredibly important to us. Let us know what we can do. 

With that, I will turn to Mr. Bartlett, if he has further questions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General Stultz, we hear General Casey talk about the Army’s 

force generation model and the heavy reliance the model has on 

enablers, those combat support and combat service support forces 

which predominantly rest in the Reserve components. This is 

where your force is crucial to the Army’s mission, as a huge portion 

of the Army’s Reserve is essential enablers. As it relates to your 

equipment needs, what are your critical equipment shortages and 

how do these shortages impact your ability to support the Army’s 

missions? 

General STULTZ. Thank you, sir. 

As you just indicated, the structure of the Army has come to the 

point, we have operationalized the Guard and the Reserve not because we wanted to but because we had to. When you have 75 percent of your engineering capability in the Guard and Reserve, when 

you have about 75 percent of your medical capability in the Guard 

and Reserve, when you have about 63 percent of your logistics, you 

have to operationalize that force if you are going to be in an extended conflict. 

The equipping needs I had, as I outlined already, one is, give us 

that flexibility that we need strategically so that we can flex when 

we need to deploy forces in other places as well as that training 

so that we maximize the amount of time we can deploy a force by 

minimizing the amount of time back home required to train because they are training on the right equipment. 

The critical needs I have got, as was already kind of mentioned, 

the FMTVs, family of medium tactical vehicles, I am short about 

5,000 in my formations, which says you are 80 percent equipped 

but you are 49 percent modernizing that family of vehicles. In the 

Humvees, I am 85 percent equipped. I am 13 percent modernized 

in Humvees. My Humvees are the old, soft-skin Humvees. They are 
22 

not the up-armored. They are not equipped for the up-armored. My 

trucks’ average age are 30 years old. The dump trucks we have got 

are 34 years old average age. 

So my needs are getting the modernized equipment on hand to 

the tune of about—by fiscal year 2016, if I was fully modernized, 

it would be about $11.3 billion. 

Because the other challenge I have got, to your point, sir, as the 

Army continues to learn and change based on our lessons learned 

in theater, they are turning to the Reserve and Guard and saying, 

okay, we need you to take down this capability that we are not 

using but we need more engineers, MPs [military police], transportation, whatever. We are transforming 16,000 spaces inside the 

Army Reserves in strength for new capability based on what the 

Army says they need. That comes with an equipment deal, because 

every truck company, every MP unit, every engineer unit has a bill 

of equipment. And that is where that $11.3 billion comes from. It 

is modernized equipment, plus new needs that the Army says we 

need. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

General Wyatt, I have a similar question relative to the essential 

equipment items for the Air Guard to fulfill its homeland defense 

and direct military missions. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request appears to plan further 

drawdowns in Guard aircraft. Can you provide the committee your 

sense of the potential impacts or areas of risk with the level of 

aviation assets planned in the budget? 

General WYATT. Yes, sir. A two-part question, the first having to 

do with essential equipment shortfalls that we see. 

In the dual-use area, things like improved voice data communications, federal mission and the state mission, self-protective equipment anywhere from—chemical, and biological, nuclear, radiological equipment, face masks, shields, helmets, gloves—all the way 

up to large aircraft, infrared countermeasures, protective equipment for aircraft missile warning systems. Anything that upgrades 

our ability to find, fix a target, targeting pods, helmet-mounted 

cueing systems, radar systems that help distinguish, especially in 

the Air Sovereignty Alert mission, to distinguish small targets in 

highly cluttered air environments. And, again, the dual-use equipment, special-use equipment like fire trucks, buses, tactical vehicles, and those sorts of things. 

To your second question on aircraft drawdowns, President’s 

Budget 11 and the fighter world contain no further aircraft 

drawdowns after the fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces Reduction. 

So I think as far as the Air Sovereignty mission goes, at least in 

the near term, we are okay. 

We do have the concern that I mentioned earlier about some of 

our older airplanes in the 2015, 2016 time frame. The block 30s 

face some sustainment issues as we go forward. The larger aircraft, 

again we looked to the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 

as kind of the roadmap. But it has just recently been released, so 

I think the Air Force is going to need some time to work our way 

through that to determine the appropriate mix of different types of 

aircraft before we will be able to answer that question with any 

specificity. 
23 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

At this point, I will just take Mr. Wilson or anyone else that has 

anything further after that. Go ahead. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the earlier response in regard to equipment on hand, 

the modernization, the differential between the two; and my next 

concern is equipping the Guard and Reserve forces who are being 

deployed to Afghanistan. Again, each of you, if you could tell us 

what the status is of their equipping level. 

General CARPENTER. I think, as the chairman pointed out in his 

opening statement, every unit that goes down range has absolutely 

the best equipment that we can provide to him across the Army. 

That results in cross leveling across, in our case, the Army National Guard and, in some cases, across the Army to make sure 

that when a unit like the 81st or the 218th goes down range that 

they have absolutely the best equipment. When they come home, 

it takes a little bit longer for them to get their equipment back, because there are what we call reset requirements. 

So, in some cases, for up to a year maybe, even a little bit longer, 

depending upon the type of equipment, the unit does not have the 

equipment that it is supposed to have. For instance, I think the 

81st right now, the equipment fill for that particular unit is around 

43 percent. They just came back last fall. And so the equipment is 

in process of being recapped, reset, which is absolutely the right 

thing because that equipment needs to be prepared for the next 

time should there be a requirement for that unit to deploy and it 

needs to provide the equipment for that unit to train on. 

So, for the most part, overall the average that I gave you before 

of 77 percent across the board, that accounts for units that are in 

reset—well, other units that are in the available year. 

General WYATT. Congressman, the Air Force keeps us pretty well 

equipped at all times because we are on a lot shorter rotation periods but more frequent rotations than the Army is. We have provided as part of our response in written testimony the requested 

maps that show the equipping levels in the Air National Guard as 

to each of the States. 

We are in pretty good shape. Our issues continue to be primarily 

in the logistics arena, and this goes back to the some of the truck 

special use vehicles. We have some shortages in the weapons, the 

personal weapons for some of our security forces. 

But our primary problem is one of modernization, to make sure 

that, when we deploy, we are up on that operational step with the 

active component in making sure our systems are interoperable. 

And that is where we concentrate, to the degree that we can, the 

expenditures of additional resources like NGREA, trying to mesh 

that with the State mission, too. A lot of those types of equipment 

that we need are dual use, and that is where we focus our efforts. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. Every Army Reserve unit that we deploy down range goes at 100 percent equipped with the mission-essential equipment that they need and it is the modernized equipment that they need. 
24 

The challenge we have, I think, is twofold. One, the unique sets 

of equipment that are in theater—I use the example of the MRAPs 

in Iraq and the M–ATVs [MRAP–All Terrain Vehicles] that are 

now in Afghanistan—we don’t have those back here to train on. We 

are currently trying to acquire 24 MRAPs to put at our training 

centers to give them the experience. We think we will be successful 

in that regard, but now the focus is on M–ATVs, and all the M– 

ATVs being produced are going to theater. So in some cases the 

first time they see that piece of equipment is when they get into 

theater and have to go through a train-up at that time instead of 

prior to deploying. 

The other thing that we are doing to mitigate is on the Rapid 

Fielding Initiative, RFI. That is the personal gear that you get that 

is unique to the theater that is all the best and greatest and 

thanks to Congress protects our soldiers to the best extent possible. 

But they don’t get that RFI equipment until they get to the mobilization center, in most cases. 

We have got a lot of training we want to do prior to that unit 

getting mobilized. So in the Army Reserve we establish what we 

call Regional Training Centers. We have outfitted those with RFI. 

So during the year prior to mobilization, a unit goes through that 

Center to do their warrior leader tasks, and we issue them the RFI 

so they can train with the latest and greatest helmet sights and 

everything. Then they turn that back in. 

So when they get to the mobilization station now, they have already trained on that type of equipment, and they get it reissued 

at that point. 

General STENNER. Mr. Chairman, I will echo and, Congressman 

Wilson, echo General Wyatt’s comments. 

Let me put a finer point on that as far as the bigger dollar 

amounts. We have taken risks as an Air Force over the last several 

years in weapons system sustainment, all three components. We 

have done that to include modernization as a higher priority. The 

weapons system sustainment is now a priority, to catch up on some 

of the backlogs in some of the depots in some of the engines and 

some of the recaps and resets that we have got to do in our major 

weapons systems. So weapons system sustainment overall for all 

three components has got to be increased and the equipping levels 

that we have got for our personal protective gear sustained as well 

and recapitalized as well. But we do send the folks to the area of 

responsibility with the most modern and most recent equipment 

and seamlessly integrated with our active component. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. And as a veteran and a parent, I appreciate so much what you do for our troops with modernization. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Coffman, do you have anything further? 

Mr. COFFMAN. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. I don’t have any further questions myself. 

Anybody else? Do you have something? 

Okay. I think we are good. 

Again, I want to thank all of you gentlemen for your outstanding 

work. It has been a major transition in the Guard and the Reserve 
25 

since 9/11; and, as all of us have testified to, you have done incredibly well and our committee simply wants to help in any way we 

can to provide you the resources and support you need to continue 

to do the fabulous job that you and your soldiers and airmen are 

doing every day. So thank you for testifying. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 22, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 22, 2010 

(31) 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 22, 2010 

(89) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the progress that has been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review, 

appropriations, funding allocation and ultimately in the distribution of new equipment. 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that when Congress provides 

additional funding for National Guard and Reserve equipment that the Army and 

Air Force actually follows through on executing the funding and providing the 

equipment? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the total investment required to adequately resource an ‘‘operational reserve’’? And, are the National Guard and Reserve Components organized 

and capable of maintaining and managing this increase in equipment inventory 

through the out years? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Background: The Department of Defense’s 2010 report on its Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the contributions of the National Guard and reserves in ongoing operations. In addition, the report noted that challenges facing the 

United States today and in the future will require employing the National Guard 

and reserves as an operational reserve while providing sufficient strategic depth. 

However, the Department did not specify actions it would take to support the reserves in their operational role. 

Æ The QDR report noted that an incentive structure must be used to create 

easier access to reserve component capabilities that are routinely in high demand. What kind of incentive structure do you think is needed to accomplish 

both creating easier access to reserve component capabilities for the Army 

and Air Force and implementation of a rotational deployment model that 

meets deployment tempo goals? 

Æ The QDR reported asserted that the reserve component has untapped capability and capacity. Could you comment on the type and quantity of untapped 

capability and capacity you see in the National Guard now? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. As you are aware, the Army has indicated the acquisition objective 

for new production Utility and Up-Armor Humvees is complete and the Army now 

plans to transition from new production Humvees to focusing on ‘‘recapping’’ those 

in current inventory and those returning from Iraq. What is the Army National 

Guard’s position toward the Army’s new acquisition strategy for Humvees? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the status of the payback plans the Army is required to provide the reserve components? If the Army has not provided payback plans, what do 

the units who left the equipment overseas use for training? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Does the Army National Guard have the full time support needed to 

ensure that the increased training and equipment maintenance activities needed to 

increase readiness are completed before mobilization? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the progress that has been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review, 

appropriations, funding allocation and ultimately in the distribution of new equipment. 
90 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that when Congress provides 

additional funding for National Guard and Reserve equipment that the Army and 

Air Force actually follows through on executing the funding and providing the 

equipment? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the total investment required to adequately resource an ‘‘operational reserve’’? And, are the National Guard and Reserve Components organized 

and capable of maintaining and managing this increase in equipment inventory 

through the out years? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Background: The Department of Defense’s 2010 report on its Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the contributions of the National Guard and reserves in ongoing operations. In addition, the report noted that challenges facing the 

United States today and in the future will require employing the National Guard 

and reserves as an operational reserve while providing sufficient strategic depth. 

However, the Department did not specify actions it would take to support the reserves in their operational role. 

Æ The QDR report noted that an incentive structure must be used to create 

easier access to reserve component capabilities that are routinely in high demand. What kind of incentive structure do you think is needed to accomplish 

both creating easier access to reserve component capabilities for the Army 

and Air Force and implementation of a rotational deployment model that 

meets deployment tempo goals? 

Æ The QDR reported asserted that the reserve component has untapped capability and capacity. Could you comment on the type and quantity of untapped 

capability and capacity you see in the National Guard now? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. We understand that the Air National Guard operates 16 of 18 Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) sites, and that by 2013, retirements of F–16 aircraft will affect 

10 of 18 ASA [A–S–A] sites. Are plans in place to replace the retiring force structure 

for all of the Air National Guard’s ASA sites? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The recent Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study identified an 

overmatch in C–130 tactical airlift force structure. How will future reductions affect 

Air National Guard units? Have you, the Adjutants General, and Governors been 

consulted on potential future force reductions? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the progress that has been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review, 

appropriations, funding allocation and ultimately in the distribution of new equipment. 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that when Congress provides 

additional funding for National Guard and Reserve equipment that the Army and 

Air Force actually follows through on executing the funding and providing the 

equipment? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the total investment required to adequately resource an ‘‘operational reserve’’? And, are the National Guard and Reserve Components organized 

and capable of maintaining and managing this increase in equipment inventory 

through the out years? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Background: The Department of Defense’s 2010 report on its Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the contributions of the National Guard and reserves in ongoing operations. In addition, the report noted that challenges facing the 

United States today and in the future will require employing the National Guard 

and reserves as an operational reserve while providing sufficient strategic depth. 
91 

However, the Department did not specify actions it would take to support the reserves in their operational role. 

Æ The QDR report noted that an incentive structure must be used to create 

easier access to reserve component capabilities that are routinely in high demand. What kind of incentive structure do you think is needed to accomplish 

both creating easier access to reserve component capabilities for the Army 

and Air Force and implementation of a rotational deployment model that 

meets deployment tempo goals? 

Æ The QDR reported asserted that the reserve component has untapped capability and capacity. Could you comment on the type and quantity of untapped 

capability and capacity you see in the National Guard now? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The average non deployed unit has about 65 percent of its authorized 

equipment needed to conduct training, participate in future deployments and respond to domestic missions. The Department of the Army has a plan to adequately 

address this equipping shortfall but not until 2019. Is this timeline sufficient and 

what risks are inherited in this plan of resolving this most critical issue so late for 

the Army Reserve? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the status of the payback plans the Army is required to provide the reserve components? If the Army has not provided payback plans, what do 

the units who left the equipment overseas use for training? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the progress that has been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review, 

appropriations, funding allocation and ultimately in the distribution of new equipment. 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that when Congress provides 

additional funding for National Guard and Reserve equipment that the Army and 

Air Force actually follows through on executing the funding and providing the 

equipment? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What is the total investment required to adequately resource an ‘‘operational reserve’’? And, are the National Guard and Reserve Components organized 

and capable of maintaining and managing this increase in equipment inventory 

through the out years? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Background: The Department of Defense’s 2010 report on its Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the contributions of the National Guard and reserves in ongoing operations. In addition, the report noted that challenges facing the 

United States today and in the future will require employing the National Guard 

and reserves as an operational reserve while providing sufficient strategic depth. 

However, the Department did not specify actions it would take to support the reserves in their operational role. 

Æ The QDR report noted that an incentive structure must be used to create 

easier access to reserve component capabilities that are routinely in high demand. What kind of incentive structure do you think is needed to accomplish 

both creating easier access to reserve component capabilities for the Army 

and Air Force and implementation of a rotational deployment model that 

meets deployment tempo goals? 

Æ The QDR reported asserted that the reserve component has untapped capability and capacity. Could you comment on the type and quantity of untapped 

capability and capacity you see in the National Guard now? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The recent Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study identified an 

overmatch in C–130 tactical airlift force structure. How will future reductions affect 

Air Force Reserve units? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 
92 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. As many on this subcommittee know, the Air National Guard is 

very important to me. The 162d Fighter Wing in my home town of Tucson, is the 

largest Air Guard unit in the country and the international training unit for F–16s. 

A year ago we held a very similar hearing on the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. 

Since 9/11, we have scrambled jets 2,350 times to meet potential threats. Sometimes 

the threat proved more real than others but let’s not forget it only takes one aircraft 

getting through the net to make us understand very clearly the consequences of failure. 

A year ago, both Congressman LoBiondo and I spoke of the precipice that our 

fighter fleet was quickly approaching. 

In 7 years, roughly 80% of the Air Guard will have aircraft on that have passed 

their acceptable service life. 

Last month the Secretary of the Air Force announced that Initial Operating Capability for the Joint Strike Fighter would slip further. That can only exacerbate the 

growing fighter gap within the Air Guard. We hear a lot about the Navy’s gap of 

200 or so aircraft but that truly pales in comparison to the 800 fighter shortfall we 

face in the Air Force in coming years. 

1. Last year we thought we had solved some of the problems with getting airframes into the Guard with the ‘‘concurrent and proportional’’ fighter basing language. If the JSF slides further, won’t there still be a number of Guard bases that 

end up getting aircraft late-to-need? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

2. Many of us have seen the chart showing the fighter waterfall that will hit the 

Air Guard over the next 7 years. Can you please address the consequences of an 

80% reduction in capability, and its negative impact on our National Military Strategy? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

3. Over the last year and a half I have been on the record advocating for a small 

interim buy of Generation 4.5 aircraft to offset the fighter gap and also exploring 

a Service Life Extension Program, concurrently. Are you aware of any steps toward 

doing a Service Life Extension Program and do you know of any studies yet completed that indicate it is a safe solution for Guard F–16s? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

4. Are you aware of plans for the Air Force to conduct a full scale review of Operation Noble Eagle—the program that provides for the ASA mission? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

5. Is the current budget request sufficient to fully protect America’s ten major cities and the other high value assets identified as critical under ‘Noble Eagle’? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. How will the shift to Afghanistan affect equipping for domestic missions? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. MILLER. What is the status of the payback plans the Army is required to provide the reserve component? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. MILLER. In regard to the 919th SOW, I understand the wing’s MC–130 Talon 

I will be retiring in the next couple of years, what is the planned follow on mission 

for the 711th SOS? Do you anticipate the size of the wing changing as a result of 

the new mission for the 711th? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. MILLER. Does the Air Force intend to relocate the 2nd SOS from Creech to 

Eglin or Duke? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 
93 

Mr. MILLER. The QDR calls for a plus up in small aircraft for the AFID (Air Foreign Internal Defense), I know the 5th SOS is associated with the AFSOTC (Air 

Force Special Operations Training Center) at Hurlburt, will that unit need to grow 

to accommodate the additional training that will be required? 

General STENNER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Carpenter, how long does the Army National Guard plan 

to fly the C–23 Sherpa? What modifications do you plan for the C–23? Will the C– 

27J replace the C–23 Sherpa? When? 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Æ