Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PO-1226 | November 14, 2018 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Darlene R. Seymour

Bryan L. Ciyou

Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jane H. Ruemmele

Hayes Ruemmele, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

V.E.,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

A.S.,

Appellee-Respondent.

November 14, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PO-1226

Appeal from the Hamilton

Superior Court

The Honorable William J. Hughes,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D03-1803-PO-1910

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PO-1226 | November 14, 2018 Page 2 of 5

Case Summary

[1] In May of 2017, then-twenty-eight-year-old V.E. and then-twenty-year-old A.S.

were engaging in sexual intercourse when they were interrupted by V.E.’s 

mother. V.E. subsequently sought a protective order against A.S., claiming that 

A.S. had committed a sex offense against her and had stalked her. The trial 

court issued an Ex Parte Order for Protection (“Ex Parte Order”) and set the 

matter for a hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated the Ex 

Parte Order and denied V.E.’s request for an order of protection, determining 

that V.E. had failed to establish that either a sex offense or stalking had 

occurred. V.E. challenges the trial court’s determination regarding the sex 

offense on appeal. Because we conclude that the trial court’s determination is 

supported by the record, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Prior to the night in question, V.E. and A.S. performed in a jazz band and 

attended some social events together. Although V.E. denied being involved in 

a romantic relationship with A.S., she expressed interest in such a relationship 

on various occasions. 

[3] On the evening of May 3, 2017, the jazz band rehearsed and had dinner 

together at the home V.E. shared with her mother. After rehearsal, A.S. stayed 

and socialized with V.E. At some point, V.E. and A.S. began engaging in 

sexual intercourse. They continued to do so until they were interrupted by 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PO-1226 | November 14, 2018 Page 3 of 5

V.E.’s mother. After V.E.’s mother made her presence known, V.E. expressed 

her embarrassment before running up the stairs to her bedroom. 

[4] The next day, V.E. sent A.S. a series of text messages. At first, V.E. admitted 

to initiating sexual contact. V.E.’s texts later became accusatory and suggested 

that A.S. had taken advantage of her when she was drunk. Two days after the 

incident, V.E. sought medical treatment for an alleged rape. 

[5] On March 1, 2018, V.E. filed a petition for a protective order against A.S., 

alleging that she had been the victim of a sex offense committed by A.S. Based 

on the statements alleged in V.E.’s petition, the trial court granted an Ex Parte 

Order and set the matter for a hearing. V.E.’s testimony during the two-day 

hearing differed significantly from that of both her mother and A.S. 

Specifically, her testimony regarding her alleged state of drunkenness and hers

and A.S.’s actions leading up to, during, and after intercourse contradicted the 

largely consistent testimony presented by her mother and A.S. V.E.’s testimony 

also contained contradictions to earlier statements she had given in connection 

to the case. On April 30, 2018, the trial court terminated the Ex Parte Order 

and denied V.E.’s request for an order of protection, finding that V.E. “has not 

shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ... a sex offense has occurred 

sufficient to justify the issuance of an Order for Protection.” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 8.

Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PO-1226 | November 14, 2018 Page 4 of 5

[6] V.E. contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for a protective 

order against A.S.

Protective orders are similar to injunctions.... We apply a twotiered standard of review: we first determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether 

the findings support the order. In deference to the trial court’s 

proximity to the issues, we disturb the order only where there is 

no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support 

the order. We do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness 

credibility, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the 

trial court’s order. The party appealing the order must establish 

that the findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly 

erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced 

that a mistake has been made. 

Fox v. Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citations and quotation 

omitted).

[7] In challenging the trial court’s denial of her request for a protective order, V.E. 

asserts that the trial court erroneously determined that she failed to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a sex offense occurred. While V.E. admits 

that she and A.S. engaged in sexual intercourse, she argues that “the 

undisputed evidence in this case is that the parties engaged in sexual intercourse 

at a time when [V.E.] was very drunk” and “was not legally capable of 

consenting to sexual conduct.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. 

[8] It is not undisputed, however, that V.E. was “very drunk.” While the record 

indicates that V.E. drank at least some alcohol on the night in question, it 

contains contradictory evidence relating to the amount of alcohol consumed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PO-1226 | November 14, 2018 Page 5 of 5

and V.E.’s resulting level of drunkenness. The trial court, acting as the trier-offact, found that V.E. failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she 

was so intoxicated that she could not give consent. V.E.’s claims on appeal 

effectively amount to an invitation for this court to reassess her credibility and 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Fox, 45 N.E.3d at 798. The 

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s order supports its determination that 

V.E. failed to prove that a sex offense occurred. We therefore affirm the trial 

court’s termination of the Ex Parte Order and denial of V.E.’s request for an 

order of protection against A.S.

[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.