alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MARY W. COTTRELL, PLAINTIFF, v. IRA BARTON CHAMPION, DEFENDANT.

Argued. October 3, 1928

Decided March 20, 1929.

*315Before Justices Trestci-iard, EAliscii and Lloyd.

For the rule, *James Mercer Davis.*

*Contra, George R. Greis.*

Per Curiam.

This is defendant’s rule to show cause why plaintiff’s verdict should not be set aside. The case was tried at the Cape May Circuit and the verdict was for $7,000.

The plaintiff, Mary W. Cottrell, was a passenger in a Ford sedan owned by her son and was being driven by her daughter Mary in a westerly direction on Ninth street in Ocean City. As the sedan was crossing Central avenue it was struck and overturned by a Pierce Arrow automobile owned and operated by the defendant, which was proceeding in a southerly direction on Central avenue, and at the time of the collision was attempting to make a left turn into Ninth street.

We think that there was evidence from which the jury could properly infer that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident, and might also lawfully conclude that the plaintiff’s driver was not negligent. We also think that the jury’s verdict, involving such findings, is not against the weight of the evidence.

Mary Cottrell, the driver of the Ford car, testified that upon reaching the intersection of Ninth street and Central avenue, she practically came to a stop, blew her horn and started across Central avenue, and when she started across the car of the defendant was on Central avenue “aside of the school house” and was approaching Ninth street at a speed of from forty to forty-five miles an hour, but she thought she could cross the intersection safely because the other car was “quite a distance up the block.” The school house is on Central avenue and is one hundred and sixty-two feet northerly from the curb line of Ninth street. She further testified that *316defendant made no effort to stop. While there was some testimony in contradiction of the foregoing testimony, it was open to the jury to find it to be true. Whether in the circumstances such conduct of the defendant was negligence, and whether it was contributory negligence upon the part of the driver of the Eord car to proceed in such circumstances, the Pierce Arrow car being upwards of one hundred and sixty-tw.o feet away, we think was at least a fair jury question, and we are not disposed to disturb the verdict.

Also, we think, upon a careful examination of the evidence relating to damages, that the verdict for $7,000 in favor of the plaintiff cannot be said to be excessive.

The rule to show cause will be discharged.
§ 28.76 Similarly qualified organizations. An organization desiring to be designated by the Commandant as a similarly qualified organization must request such designation in writing. As a minimum the organization must verify that it— ( a ) Publishes standards for vessel design and construction which are as widely available as and which are of similar content to the standards published by the ABS;
( b ) Performs periodic surveys in a wide range of localities during and after construction to ensure compliance with published standards, including drydock examinations, in a manner similar to the ABS;
( c ) Issues certificates testifying to compliance with the published standards;
( d ) Has as its primary concern the survey and classification of vessels;
( e ) Has no interest in owning or operating fishing, fish processing, or fish tender vessels; and
( f ) Maintains records of surveys and makes such records available to the Coast Guard upon request in a manner similar to the ABS.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Charles Martin,

Plaintiff,

v.

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

Case No: 14-14343

Honorable Victoria A. Roberts

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On January 19, 2016, Magistrate Judge Whalen issued a Report and

Recommendation [Doc.15], recommending that Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 14] be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.

13] be DENIED. Neither party filed objections within the fourteen day period pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report

and Recommendation. 

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

Judgment will enter in favor of Defendant.

IT IS ORDERED.

 S/Victoria A. Roberts 

Victoria A. Roberts

United States District Judge

Dated: February 11, 2016

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this

document was served on the attorneys of

record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on

February 11, 2016.

S/Linda Vertriest 

Deputy Clerk

2:14-cv-14343-VAR-RSW Doc # 16 Filed 02/11/16 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 726
§ 190.01-10 Structural standards. ( a ) In general, compliance with the standards established by the American Bureau of Shipping, see subpart 188.35 of this subchapter, will be considered as satisfactory evidence of the structural efficiency of the vessel. However, in special cases, a detailed analysis of the entire structure or some integral part may be made by the Coast Guard to determine the structural requirements.
# Quality ratings

# References in Quality Table
§ 183.310 Power sources. ( a ) ( 1 ) Each vessel that relies on electricity to power the following loads must be arranged so that the loads can be energized from two sources of electricity: ( i ) The vital systems listed in § 182.710 of this chapter;
( ii ) Interior lighting except for decorative lights;
( iii ) Communication systems including a public address system required under § 184.610 of this chapter; and
( iv ) Navigation equipment and lights.
( 2 ) A vessel with batteries of adequate capacity to supply the loads specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section for three hours, and a generator or alternator driven by a propulsion engine, complies with the requirement in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
( b ) Where a ship service generator driven by a propulsion engine is used as a source of electrical power, a vessel speed change, throttle movement or change in direction of the propeller shaft rotation must not interrupt power to any of the loads specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)  Board Actions | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports received:Boston | New York | Philadelphia   | Cleveland | Richmond   | AtlantaChicago | St. Louis | Minneapolis   | Kansas City | Dallas   | San Francisco

#   Board Actions 

## Actions taken during the week ending October 15, 2005

----

EnforcementDeutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, New York, New York  -- written agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York State Banking Department.					-Announced, October 14, 2005 					Surety Capital Corporation, Fort Worth, Texas  -- written agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.					-Announced, October 14, 2005 					

Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)  Board Actions | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports received:Boston | New York | Philadelphia   | Cleveland | Richmond   | AtlantaChicago | St. Louis | Minneapolis   | Kansas City | Dallas   | San Francisco
Home | Banking information and regulationAccessibility | Contact   usLast update: October 20, 2005
EPA SANITIZED Page 1 of 9
 EPA SANITIZED Page 2 of 9
 

EPA SANITIZED Page 3 of 9
EPA SANITIZED Page 4 of 9
EPA SANITIZED Page 5 of 9
EPA SANITIZED Page 6 of 9
 

EPA SANITIZED Page 7 of 9
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EPA SANITIZED Page 9 of 9
#### MARY SCHOR AND JOHN SCHOR, HER HUSBAND, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. ALVIN J. WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT.

Decided October 16, 1929.

Before Gumheee, Chief Justice, and Justices Paekee and Bodine.

Eor the defendant, *Wayne Dumont*and *William V. Rosenkrans.*

Eor the plaintiffs, *Aaron L. Simon.*

Pee Cueiam.

Our examination of the testimony in this case leads us to the conclusion that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the driver of the plaintiff’s car, and was not contributed to in any way by any negligence of the defendant.

The rule should be made absolute.
§ 28.385 Structural fire protection for vessels that operate with more than 49 individuals on board. ( a ) *Applicability.* Each vessel that operates with more than 49 individuals on board must comply with the requirements of this section in addition to the requirements of § 28.380.
( b ) *Construction.* The hull, structural bulkheads, columns and stanchions must be composed of steel. Superstructures and deckhouses must be constructed of noncombustible material.
( c ) *Protection of accommodation spaces.* A bulkhead or deck separating an accommodation space from a control station, machinery space, cargo space, or service space must be constructed of noncombustible material.
[CGD 88-079, 56 FR 40393, Aug. 14, 1991; 56 FR 49822, Oct. 1, 1991]
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:
Boston
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New York
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Philadelphia
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Cleveland
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Richmond
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Atlanta
Chicago
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Minneapolis
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# District: 1
Federal Reserve Bank of: Boston

## Filings received during the week ending April 15, 2006

|Filer                          | Filing Type   | Filing Proposal                                                                                                                                                                                                            | End of Comment Period                             
|------------------------------ | ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------
|FIRST SUFFIELD FINANCIAL, INC. | * 3A1         | Section 3 application by First Suffield Financial Inc., Suffield, Connecticut, to become a bank holding company by acquiring 100% of the outstanding shares of The First National Bank of Suffield, Suffield, Connecticut. | Newspaper:Not availableFederal Register:05/11/2006
|Newspaper:                     | Not available
|Federal Register:              | 05/11/2006   

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location | RSSDID | Exam Date | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|---------------------- | ------ | --------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|NONE                  

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:
Boston
 |
New York
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Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
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Kansas City
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Dallas
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San Francisco

---

Home Banking information and regulation  Accessibility Contact 
  us
SUPREME COURT.

#### John H. Platt, assignee in bankruptcy of the Stuyvesant Bank, agt. Asahel Chapin and others.

*Tried at New York Circuit,*

*May,*1875, *without a jury ;*

*decided July,*1875.

*Bona fide holder for value.*

The Stuyvesant Bank, just before its failure, received on deposit an accommodation check drawn by the defendants upon the Sixth National Bank. The Stuyvesant Bank gave credit therefor on its books to the payees thereof, who deposited it. The Sixth National Bank declined to honor the check, which afterward passed into the plaintiff’s hands, as assignee in bankruptcy of the Stuyvesant Bank.

*Held,*that the Stuyvesant Bank did not become *Iona fide*holders of the check for value, and that its assignee had no right of action upon it against the accommodation drawers.

Trial by court without a jury upon a written stipulation admitting the facts.

*Waldo Hutchins,*for plaintiff.

*Geo. W. McAdam,*for defendant.

Westbrook, *J*.

The stipulation between the attorneys admits that the defendants, on the 12th day of October, 1871, made their check for the sum of $1,690, on the Sixth National Bank, payable to the order of Weston *■&*Schlichting.

The check was made for the accommodation of the payees, who paid nothing therefor, and who having received it deposited it in the Stuyvesant Bank, duly indorsed by them, the *319bank crediting them upon its books with the amount thereof. The payees, however, did not draw against the check, and on the day of its deposit the bank stopped payment and was afterward adjudged a bankrupt and the plaintiff appointed its receiver, whpj now brings a suit upon the check. The statement of the case would seem to be conclusive argument against the right to recover. The bankrupt institution which the plaintiff represents has never parted with a cent, and if a recovery is to be had it is upon the technical ground that the valueless credit it gave upon the books to the payees of the check made it a *bona fide*holder of the instrument.

It is conceded that the deposit and credit gave the depositors a right of action against the bank, but that question is not the one to be determined. The point is, did the credit to the depositors — from which they derived no benefit — make the bank the holder for value so as to recover against the makers ? The payees clearly could not recover, and is the assignee of the bank in any better position ?

If the institution which the plaintiff represents could be called a holder for value, it would be by the substitution of names for things. It has in fact parted with nothing, and the credit it gave the payees represents really nothing.

Without the citation of any authority, and as an original question, I should hold that the bank having parted with no value for the cheek is in no better position to maintain the action than the payees thereof. The exact question is, however, decided in the *Fulton Bank*agt. *Phenix Bank*(1 *Hall,*562). The defendants are entitled to judgment.

Judgment accordingly.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:Boston
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New York
 |
Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
 |
Kansas City
 |
Dallas
 |
San Francisco

# District: 3
Federal Reserve Bank of: Philadelphia

## Filings received during the week ending September 30, 2006

|Filer | Filing Type | Filing Proposal | End of Comment Period
|----- | ----------- | --------------- | ---------------------
|NONE 

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location | RSSDID | Exam Date | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|---------------------- | ------ | --------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|NONE                  

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:Boston
 |
New York
 |
Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
 |
Kansas City
 |
Dallas
 |
San Francisco

---

Home Banking information and regulation  Accessibility Contact 
  us
Exhibit 4.1

                                       FORM OF CERTIFICATE

                                        HUMBOLDT BANCORP

                    Incorporated under the laws of the State of California


     This certifies that _________________________________________ is the 
owner of __________________ Shares of the Common Stock of Humboldt Bancorp 
transferable only on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in 
person or by Attorney upon surrender of this Certificate properly endorsed.  

     In Witness Whereof, the said Corporation has caused this Certificate to be
signed by its duly authorized officers and its Corporate Seal to be hereunto 
affixed.

Dated:


_________________________       (CORPORATE SEAL)     _____________________
Secretary                                            President


<PAGE>  Reverse side

     The following abbreviations, when used in the inscription on the face of
this certificate, shall be construed as though they were written out in full
accordingly to applicable laws or regulations:

     TEN COM - as tenants in common
     TEN ENT - as tenants by the entireties
     JT TEN - as joints tenants with right of survivorship and not as
              tenants in common
     UNIF GIFT MIN ACT - ___________ Custodian __________
                           (Cust)                (Minor)
                         under Uniform Gifts to Minors
                         Act _____________________________
                                     (State)

Additional abbreviations may also be used though not in the above list.

    For Value received, _____________________________ hereby sell, assign and

Please insert Social Security or other 
identifying number of assignee
 _________________________
/                        /
-------------------------
 
transfer unto _____________________________________________________________
                   (please print or typewrite name and address, including
                    zip code of assignee)

____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Shares of the capital stock represented by the within 
Certificate, and do hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint _______________
Attorney to transfer the said stock on the books of the within named Corporation
with full power of substitution in the premises.

Dated: ______________________

NOTICE:  The signature to this assignment must correspond with the name as
         written upon the face of the certificate in every particular, without
         alteration or enlargement or any change whatever.

Signature(s) guaranteed: ________________________________________________
                         The signature(s) should be guaranteed by an
                         eligible guarantor institution (banks, stockbrokers,
                         savings and loan associations and credit unions)
                         with membership in an approved signature guarantee
                         medallion program, pursuant to S.E.C. Rule 17Ad-15.
# C_2012174EN.01002102.xml

| 16.6.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 174/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 174/21

---

Judgment of the General Court of 2 May 2012 — Universal Display Corp. v OHIM

(Case T-435/11) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - International registration designating the European Community - Application for Community word mark UniversalPHOLED - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

2012/C 174/33

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Universal Display Corp. (Ewing, New Jersey, United States) (represented by: A. Poulter and C. Lehr, Solicitors)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: P. Geroulakos, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 18 May 2011 (Case R 215/2011-2) concerning an application for registration of the word sign UniversalPHOLED as a Community trade mark

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Universal Display Corp. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Universal Display Corp. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 298, 8.10.2011.

1

---
# C_2012133EN.01002602.xml

| 5.5.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 133/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.5.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 133/26

---

Order of the General Court of 21 March 2012 — Modelo Continente Hipermercados v Commission

(Case T-174/11) (1)

1

(Action for annulment - State aid - Aid schemes allowing for the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions - Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the common market and not ordering the recovery of aid - Lack of individual concern - Inadmissibility)

2012/C 133/51

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Modelo Continente Hipermercados, SA, sucursal en España (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, M. Muñoz de Juan and R. Calvo Salinero, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal and C. Urraca Caviedes, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of Article 1(1) of Commission Decision 2011/5/EC of 28 October 2009 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (OJ 2011 L 7, p. 48).

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed; |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed;

| 2. | Modelo Continente Hipermercados, SA, sucursal en España, is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Modelo Continente Hipermercados, SA, sucursal en España, is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 139, 7.5.2011.

1

---
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<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,377
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### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JU NE 29, 2016

NO. 03

- 16

- 001 37

- CR

Ex parte Daniel Lee Miller

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GO ODWIN, AND FIELD

DISMISSED AS MO OT

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus signed by the trial

court. Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the appeal is moot and should be

dismissed. Therefore, the Court dismisses the appeal as moot. Because appellant is indigent for

purposes of this proceeding, no adjudication of costs is made.