UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11794 

 Honorable David M. Lawson 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

NORMAN L. WILSON, 

 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT THE GOVERMENT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [9] 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 The United States of America (the “government”) commenced this action against 

defendant Norman Wilson (“Wilson”) after he allegedly defaulted on a federally guaranteed 

student loan. [1]. Before the Court is the government’s motion for summary judgment, to which 

Wilson filed a response [9, 13]. The government did not file a reply. The motion was referred to 

this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and the 

Court held a hearing on May 24, 2016. Counsel for the government appeared at the hearing, but 

Wilson did not. [8]. For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the 

government’s motion [9] be GRANTED. 

II. REPORT

A. Background 

 On March 10, 1988, Wilson executed a promissory note to secure a student loan from 

First American Savings, Inc. (“First American”). [9, Ex A. at Pg IDs 34-35]. The loan was 

disbursed for $2,625 at 8 percent annual interest. [Ex. B. at Pg ID 36]. The loan was guaranteed 

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by the Higher Education Assistance Foundation (“HEAF”), and insured by the Department of 

Education under loan guaranty programs authorized under Title IV-B of the Higher Education 

Act of 1965, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq. (34 C.F.R. § 682.100). [9, Ex A. at Pg IDs 34-

35; Ex. B. at Pg ID 36]. Wilson defaulted on the obligation on June 1, 1989. [9, Ex. B at Pg ID 

36]. HEAF paid the claim, and was unable to collect the amount owed. HEAF then assigned its 

right and title to the loan to the government. [Id.]. As of May 19, 2015, the government 

calculates that Wilson owed $6,751.01 on the outstanding debt. [9 at Pg ID 28]. 

 In its motion for summary judgment, the government argues that Wilson has not made 

any payments towards the outstanding balance. Appended to the motion are copies of the signed 

promissory note, the certificate of indebtedness dated December 17, 1997, and the sworn 

affidavit of a Department of Education loan analyst authenticating the certificate of indebtedness 

as a legitimate business record. [9, Exs. A-C]. 

 B. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court will grant summary judgment 

if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Pittman v. Cuyahoga 

County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). A fact is material 

if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, 

the Court assumes the truth of the non-moving party’s evidence and construes all reasonable 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ciminillo 

v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). 

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The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of 

the basis for its motion, and must identify particular portions of the record that demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

325 (1986); Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). “Once the moving 

party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts 

showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In 

response to a summary judgment motion, the opposing party may not rest on its pleadings, nor 

“‘rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact’ but 

must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” 

Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558 (internal quotations omitted).

C. Analysis 

 To recover on a promissory note, the government must initially make a prima facie 

showing that “(1) the defendant signed it, (2) the government is the present owner or holder, and 

(3) the note is in default.” United States v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(citing United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2001)). The government may 

establish “a prima facie case that it is entitled to collect on a promissory note [by introducing] the 

promissory note and a certificate of indebtedness signed under penalty of perjury by a loan 

analyst.” Guillermety v. Sec’y of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing U.S. 

v. Davis, 28 F. App’x 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d at 290. Once 

the government establishes its prima facie case, “defendant has the burden of proving the 

nonexistence, extinguishment or variance in payment of the obligation.” Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d 

at 290. 

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 Here, the government established its prima facie case by providing copies of: (1) the 

promissory note signed by Wilson; and (2) the certificate of indebtedness, signed under penalty 

of perjury by a loan analyst, showing that Wilson defaulted on the debt. The burden, therefore, 

shifts to Wilson to demonstrate the “nonexistence, extinguishment or variance in payment” of the 

debt. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d at 290. 

 To rebut the government’s prima facie case Wilson had to “produce specific and concrete 

evidence of the nonexistence, payment, discharge, or deferment of the debt.” U.S. v. Johnson, 

No. 02-75044, 2005 WL 1355097, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2005) (citing U.S. v. Durbin, 64 F. 

Supp. 2d 635, 636 (S.D. Tex. 1999)). He failed to meet this burden. 

 In response to the government’s motion, Wilson submitted the following statement: 

1. Defendant admits that he has unpaid student loan debt from 1997. 

2. Defendant contacted plaintiff’s attorney’s office on November 5, 

2015 seeking to settle and make arrangements to repay an agreed upon 

total settlement amount of the unpaid student loan debt. 

3. Upon speaking with plaintiff’s attorney’s office on November 5, 

2015, defendant agreed to the following, as he understands the settlement 

terms to be: 

 

 a. repayment of the settlement of $5,400.00 (which includes 

$400.00 for court costs). $5,4000 [sic] to be repaid at $65.00 per month 

with interest accruing at a rate of .31% per month to being upon receipt of 

the first payment by plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant intends to make the 

first payment by November 9, 2015. 

(Emphasis in original).1

 In view of the foregoing, Wilson not only fails to show the 

 

1

 Contrary to Wilson’s representations, the parties never reached a formal settlement. For weeks 

prior setting the matter for hearing, the Court attempted to convene a teleconference with the 

parties to facilitate the consummation of their settlement discussions, but to no avail. With the 

exception of one brief conversation where Wilson indicated that he would no longer participate 

in any settlement negotiations with the government or communicate with the Court, the Court 

could not reach Wilson. Nevertheless, because Wilson represented that he had reached a 

settlement with the government, the Court scheduled a hearing, and advised Wilson in the Notice 

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nonexistence, payment, or discharge of the debt, but he acknowledges that he executed the 

promissory note and that he has not repaid the outstanding debt. In addition, Wilson fails to 

show that the government miscalculated the outstanding balance on the debt. See United States v. 

Frederick, No. 10-13405, 2011 WL 2606357, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 1, 2011) (holding that 

defendant did “not provide any evidence to support his assertion or otherwise show how the 

interest was improperly calculated.”). As a result, Wilson has not rebutted the government’s 

prima facie case and it is entitled to summary judgment. 

 Accordingly, the Court recommends that the government be awarded $6,751.01 plus prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, $400.00 in court costs, see 34 

C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(2), and post-judgment interest in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).2

 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the government’s motion for 

summary judgment [9] be GRANTED. 

Dated: May 31, 2016 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

of Hearing that he was to “submit evidence, if any, pertaining to the terms of a purported 

settlement between the parties and evidence, if any, that he tendered loan payments pursuant 

thereto.” [14]. As noted above, however, Wilson did not appear at the hearing, and did not 

provide the Court with any of the requested evidence. At the hearing, the government’s counsel 

represented that while Wilson had been offered settlement terms, he had refused to sign the 

paperwork required to memorialize the agreement (and his binding assent thereto). In light of 

this, the Court indicated that it would withhold issuing its recommendation in this matter until 

today’s date to give Wilson one last opportunity to consummate a settlement with the 

government. The Court has heard nothing further from the parties in this regard. 

2

 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) provides that post-judgment interest “shall be calculated from the date of 

the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity 

Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the 

calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” 

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir.1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues, but fail 

to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.1991); 

Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.1987). Pursuant to 

E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge. A 

party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any such response should be concise, and 

should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the objections.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

via email addresses the court has on file. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager

Dated: May 31, 2016 

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