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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MAHMOUD ELZEIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 15-11457 

FEDERAL NATIONAL 

MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, HON. AVERN COHN 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________________/

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 13)

I. INTRODUCTION 

This is a wrongful foreclosure and consumer protection case under the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 12 U.S.C. §1692, et seq. Plaintiff Mahmoud Elzein 

(Elzein) is suing Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) relating to 

the foreclosure by advertisement of real estate owned by Elzein located in Dearborn 

Heights, Michigan. The Court granted FNMA’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the case 

(Doc. 11). Now before the Court is Elzein’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 13). For 

the reasons that follow, Elzein’s motion is DENIED. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Local Rules of the Eastern District of Michigan provide that “[a] motion for 

rehearing or reconsideration must be filed within 14 days after entry of the judgment or 

order.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(1). 

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The Court “will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely 

present the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable 

implication.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). To obtain reconsideration of a court order, “the 

movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties 

and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show 

that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” Id. A palpable 

defect “is a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.” Ososki v. 

St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. 

The Court notes that this Motion for Reconsideration was filed 26 days after the 

initial judgment on the matter. As such, the motion is untimely under E.D. Mich. LR 

7.1(h)(1). 

B. 

Regardless of whether the Motion for Reconsideration is timely, Elzein does not 

point to a palpable defect within the dismissal order. Elzein proposes two substantive 

bases for granting reconsideration. Neither argument has merit. The Court will address 

each in turn. 

1. 

First, Elzein argues that the Court’s dismissal order contradicted the holdings in 

Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., __ F. Supp 3d __, No. 14-CV-11073, 2014 WL 

7157172 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2014), and El-Sablani v. Indymac Mortgage Services, 510 

F. App’x 425 (6th Cir. 2013). Elzein waited to file this lawsuit until March 17, 2015, one 

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day prior to the expiration of the statutory redemption period; he did not obtain an 

extension of the redemption period. 

Elzein argues that, based on Jackson and El-Sablani, because there was fraud 

and/or irregularities in the foreclosure by advertisement process, the Court should 

disregard the expiration of the statutory redemption period and the foreclosure sale 

should be set aside. This argument is without merit. As explained in the dismissal order, 

there were no procedural irregularities in regards to the notice of foreclosure by 

advertisement or any unnecessary delays preventing Elzein from redeeming the 

property (See Doc. 11 at 7). Further, Elzein failed to assert fraud beyond mere 

allegations; he has described no specific details as to how or when a fraud relating to 

the foreclosure process was perpetrated (See Doc. 11 at 7-8). As noted in the dismissal 

order, “[a] plaintiff asserting fraud must meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading 

standard by ‘stat[ing] with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.’” 

Woodland Harvesting, Inc. v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 2d 732, 739 (E.D. Mich. 

2010)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 9(b)). Here, Elzein failed to do so. 

Jackson and El-Sablani do not apply. 

2. 

Elzein’s second argument is the Court failed to recognize the assertions of 

prejudice contained in his First Amended Complaint. 

This argument is without merit. This argument fails to add any new details 

beyond those provided in the First Amended Complaint and merely asks the Court to 

review a document which it has already taken notice of and determined to be lacking. 

“[T]o set aside the foreclosure sale, plaintiffs must show that they were prejudiced by 

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defendant's failure to comply with [Michigan's foreclosure by advertisement statute]." 

Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 493 Mich. 98, 115 (2012). As noted in the 

dismissal order, the foreclosure sale was valid and was not defective. The allegations of 

prejudice in the First Amended Complaint were mere speculation. As such, there is no 

prejudice to Elzein. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED. 

 

s/Avern Cohn 

 

 AVERN COHN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: September 16, 2015 

Detroit, Michigan 

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