GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters 

May 1999 COMBATING

TERRORISM

Issues to Be Resolved 

to Improve 

Counterterrorism 

Operations

GAO/NSIAD-99-135

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism

GAO

National Security and

International Affairs Division Letr

B-282474 Letter

May 13, 1999

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and 

abroad highlight the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. As 

requested, we prepared this unclassified summary of our February 1999 

classified report to you on interagency counterterrorist operations. 

Specifically, we examined how agencies worked together in 

counterterrorist operations and special events; strengths and weaknesses 

of international and domestic counterterrorist exercises; and agency and 

interagency processes to capture and share lessons learned.

Results in Brief In the last 3 years, federal agencies have conducted several successful 

interagency operations overseas, including some in which suspected 

terrorists have been returned to the United States to stand trial. In addition, 

federal agencies have deployed personnel and equipment to prepare for 

many special events such as the Atlanta Olympic Games. However, federal 

agencies have not completed interagency guidance and resolved command 

and control issues. Proposed interagency Domestic Guidelines have not 

been completed, nor coordinated with all federal agencies with domestic 

counterterrorism roles. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) has not coordinated the proposed Domestic Guidelines with the 

Department of the Treasury even though it could have a significant role in 

an actual terrorist incident. Furthermore, approval of proposed interagency 

International Guidelines has been delayed because the Department of 

State, the Department of Justice, and the FBI have not reached agreement 

on the level of State participation in highly sensitive missions to arrest 

suspected terrorists overseas. In addition, some interagency and 

intergovernmental command and control issues regarding domestic 

counterterrorist operations have not been fully resolved.
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To improve their preparedness to respond to terrorist incidents, federal 

agencies have conducted over 200 exercises, of which about half included 

three or more federal agencies and about one third included state and local 

participants. However, agencies have not fully achieved the interagency 

counterterrorist exercise program directed in a June 1995 Presidential 

Directive because an interagency Exercise Subgroup has not prepared and 

submitted, and senior agency officials have not approved, an interagency 

program. As a result, some complex transfers of command and control 

between agencies have not been exercised. International counterterrorism 

exercises, sponsored for many years by the Department of Defense (DOD), 

are relatively comprehensive in that they include many federal agencies 

and test tactical units along with State Department’s leadership role and 

DOD’s command and control. In contrast, domestic exercises sponsored by 

the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--the lead 

federal agencies for domestic operations—are not as comprehensive. The 

FBI exercise program focuses on its regional and field offices’ tactical 

capabilities to respond and generally has not included the Bureau’s full 

interagency leadership role that is expected to be critical during a domestic 

terrorist incident. Recently, the FBI has made significant progress and 

taken steps to enhance its program in this regard. The FEMA 

counterterrorism exercise program consists of tabletop exercises and does 

not include field exercises that would deploy personnel and equipment, 

and practice roles and responsibilities in realistic settings.

DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), and FEMA have requirements and 

processes in place to capture lessons learned from counterterrorist 

operations and exercises. These agencies, however, did not capture lessons 

learned for all the exercises they led or all the field exercises they 

participated in. Other federal agencies had less rigorous requirements and 

processes for capturing lessons learned. There is also no requirement or 

process to capture lessons learned at the interagency level. Establishing a 

process to record and share the lessons learned of counterterrorism 

operations and exercises would be beneficial and could improve future 

operations.

In our classified report, we made several recommendations to enhance 

interagency guidance, command and control, exercises, and processes to 

capture and share lessons learned.
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Background The U.S. policy and strategy on combating terrorism have been evolving 

since the 1970s and are articulated in Presidential Directives and 

implementing guidance. These guidance documents divide activities to 

combat terrorism into three elements: preventing and deterring terrorism; 

responding to a terrorist crisis, and managing the consequences after a 

terrorist attack. One of the highest priorities in the federal government is to 

prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks that use weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD).1 Crisis management includes efforts to stop a terrorist 

attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. 

Consequence management includes efforts to provide medical treatment 

and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and 

restore government services. When terrorist attacks occur without 

adequate threat warning, crisis response and consequence management 

will be concurrent activities.

U.S. Policy, Lead Agencies, 

and Guidance

U.S. policy to combat terrorism was formalized in 1986 with the issuance of 

National Security Decision Directive 207, which primarily focused on 

terrorist incidents overseas. After the bombing of a federal building in 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the President issued Presidential Decision 

Directive (PDD) 39 in June 1995, which enumerated responsibilities for 

federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic incidents. In 

May 1998, the President issued PDD 62 that reaffirmed PDD 39 and further 

articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. PDD 62 also established a 

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 

Counterterrorism, within the National Security Council, to coordinate 

agencies’ programs. These directives, and the guidelines and contingency 

plans that implement them, call for robust, tailored and rapidly deployable 

interagency teams to conduct well-coordinated and highly integrated 

operations.

PDDs 39 and 62 assigned or reaffirmed lead and supporting roles to various 

federal agencies and established interagency support teams. The State 

Department is the lead agency for international terrorist incidents. An 

interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) was established to 

provide advice and support to U.S. ambassadors, Washington decisionmakers, and host governments. Similarly, the FBI is the lead federal agency 

1

For the purpose of this report, WMD are defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or 

agents. Within the federal government, there is disagreement as to the precise definition, especially 

whether large conventional explosives should be included.
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for domestic crisis response. An interagency Domestic Emergency Support 

Team (DEST) was established to provide advice and support to FBI onscene commanders. Both the FEST and DEST consist of rapidly deployable 

interagency teams tailored to the specific terrorist incident. For example, 

experts from DOD, DOE, the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might be part of the 

teams if the incident involved WMD. The State Department and the FBI 

determine the composition of the FEST and DEST, respectively. The PDDs 

also affirmed FEMA as the lead agency for coordinating consequence 

management in domestic incidents. Other agencies have important support 

roles in combating terrorism. For example, DOD could provide significant 

support to other agencies, both for international incidents and for domestic 

incidents involving WMD. DOE provides support and technical expertise 

related to nuclear devices and radiological events. EPA provides expertise 

and support in incidents involving certain hazardous chemicals. The U.S. 

Secret Service designs and implements operational security at designated 

special events to provide protection against terrorist attacks.2

Lead federal agencies drafted interagency guidance to provide operational 

details for implementing PDD 39. The State Department, as the lead federal 

agency for international incidents, drafted “Coordinating Subgroup 

Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. 

Government Elements in Response to an Overseas Terrorist Incident” (also 

known as the International Guidelines). The International Guidelines 

outline procedures for deploying the FEST and otherwise coordinating 

federal operations overseas. The FBI, as lead federal agency for domestic 

crisis response, drafted “Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and 

Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic 

Terrorist Threat or Incidence in Accordance With Presidential Decision 

Directive 39” (also known as the Domestic Guidelines) and the “United 

States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations 

Plan” (also known as the CONPLAN). The Domestic Guidelines describe 

specific procedures and responsibilities of deploying the DEST, particularly 

in WMD incidents, while the CONPLAN provides overall guidance to 

federal, state, and local officials on how the federal government is 

structured to respond to a terrorist threat or incident in the United States. 

FEMA, the lead federal agency for domestic consequence management, 

coordinated and completed an interagency annex to the Federal Response 

2

For more detailed information on interagency coordination mechanisms and the roles and 

responsibilities of lead and supporting federal agencies, see our report entitled Combating Terrorism:

Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 

1997).
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Plan that discusses how the federal government would assist state and 

local authorities in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack in the 

United States. Support agencies developed their own guidance to be used 

to support an interagency terrorism response. For example, DOD 

developed a detailed contingency plan to guide its actions in deploying and 

responding to a terrorist incident and HHS developed a plan to deal with 

the health and medical consequences of terrorist attacks.

Issues Identified Through 

Congressional Oversight 

and Legislation

In 1996, a congressional committee held hearings to provide oversight of 

counterterrorism programs, highlighting interagency operational and 

coordination challenges and issues. In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar hearings 

focused on the preparedness of the federal government to conduct 

counterterrorist operations at the agency, interagency, and 

intergovernmental levels (i.e., with state and local governments).3 Some of 

the issues highlighted in the hearings were as follows:

• Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises should be more 

comprehensive and held more often and should go beyond tabletop 

exercises to field exercises where personnel and equipment rapidly 

deploy to a location and practice their activities.

• The FBI and FEMA needed to exercise their operations together when 

crisis response and consequence management was concurrent.

• Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises should include the 

full array of federal, state, and local agencies.

• Individual agencies should capture lessons learned from 

counterterrorism exercises, disseminate such lessons both internally 

and externally, and track corrective actions.

• There should be an interagency process to capture lessons learned and 

track corrective actions.

Following the Nunn-Lugar hearings, Congress passed the Defense Against 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (commonly known as the NunnLugar-Domenici Act).4

 The act designated DOD as the lead agency to 

enhance domestic preparedness for WMD terrorism by providing federal, 

3These hearings were sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar of the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in March 1996. See Senate Hearing 

104-422 part III. 

4

See title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 

1996).
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state, and local emergency response personnel with, among other things, 

training and advice. The legislation led to the creation of the Nunn-LugarDomenici Domestic Preparedness Program, which was intended to be an 

interagency and intergovernmental effort among key agencies with 

responsibilities for crisis and consequence management in the event of a 

terrorist incident. We reported separately on the implementation of this 

program.5

Agencies Operate 

Together But Need to 

Resolve Key Issues

We found that federal agencies worked together and generally coordinated 

their counterterrorist activities. For example, federal agencies carried out 

several overseas operations and prepared for domestic special events. 

However, interagency guidance for coordinating federal operations—both 

overseas and domestically—has not been approved or fully coordinated. In 

addition, several command and control issues related to domestic 

operations have not been resolved.

Agencies Successfully 

Performed Operations and 

Prepared for Special Events

In the 3 years following PDD 39, federal agencies successfully participated 

in many counterterrorist activities. In actual operations and special events, 

agencies generally coordinated their activities. For example, we examined 

several overseas counterterrorist operations and found that agencies 

generally followed the draft interagency International Guidelines. DOD, the 

FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) performed their respective 

roles in military planning, law enforcement, and intelligence gathering 

under the oversight of the State Department (e.g., the ambassador). Minor 

interagency tensions or conflicts during these operations were resolved 

and did not appear to have posed risk to the missions. Examples of these 

overseas operations include several overseas arrests to bring suspected 

terrorists back to the United States for trial outside of normal extradition 

channels. Interagency teams consisting of the FBI, the State Department, 

DOD, and CIA conducted these missions. These arrests included those of 

Ayyad Najim in July 1995, Wahli Khan in December 1995, Tsutomo 

Shirasaki in September 1996, Matwan Al-Safadi in November 1996, Mir 

Aimal Kansi in June 1997, and Mohamed Said Rasheed in June 1998.

6

5See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve 

Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

6

Other successful overseas arrests just outside our scope (June 1995 to June 1998) included those of 

Ramzi Yousef in February 1995 and Mohamed Sadeck Odeh and Mohamed Rasheed Daoud Al Owhali in 

August 1998.
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Key agencies have also prepared for and deployed personnel in advance to 

many special events. Special events are high visibility events in which 

federal agencies initiate contingency measures. For recent major special 

events, such as the 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995, the 

Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, and the Presidential Inauguration in 1997, 

federal agencies prepared contingency plans for a possible terrorist attack 

and provided protection to the President and other dignitaries. For 

example, federal agencies sending advance or contingency teams to the 

Atlanta Olympics included Secret Service, the FBI, FEMA, DOD, DOE, 

HHS, EPA, CIA, the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the 

Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U.S. Customs Service, 

the Internal Revenue Service, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC). Federal agencies also exercised their personnel together in advance 

of these events against various counterterrorism scenarios. For example, 

before the Atlanta Olympics, federal agencies conducted eight exercises 

with scenarios specific to the games. Our review of these special events 

indicated that most agencies involved gained valuable experience in 

coordinating their activities. Agency officials cited special events as 

successful efforts to integrate personnel and assets across federal 

agencies. In preparing for such events, federal agencies also worked 

closely with state and local agencies and nongovernmental organizations. 

These operations and special events enhanced federal agencies’ abilities to 

coordinate and integrate their activities.

Interagency Guidance Not 

Approved or Fully 

Coordinated

With the exception of FEMA, lead federal agencies have not completed 

interagency guidance on counterterrorist operations more than 3 1⁄2 years 

after PDD 39 directed them to do so. The FBI, which drafted the Domestic 

Guidelines and CONPLAN, coordinated drafts of these documents with five 

other federal agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA) that could have 

major operational roles in a domestic terrorist incident. These federal 

agencies have still not given their final approval to either document. 

Further, the FBI has not coordinated the Domestic Guidelines or the 

CONPLAN with other federal agencies that would have counterterrorist 

roles in certain circumstances, such as Treasury Department, the NRC, and 

the Departments of Transportation and Agriculture. Of the agencies 

omitted, the Treasury Department is the most significant, due to its special 

capabilities that have been called upon and could be needed in a variety of 

possible terrorist incidents. For example, the Secret Service protects the 

President and other designated protectees from terrorist attacks and plays 
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a key counterterrorist security role at major special events. The U.S. 

Customs Service provides aircraft at special events to detect and monitor 

aircraft activity and to perform interception if necessary. ATF supports FBI 

investigations of terrorist crimes involving explosives. In addition, the 

Treasury Department has numerous field personnel who could support FBI 

crisis management efforts. The NRC would provide expertise and technical 

support in a terrorist incident involving facilities, materials, and activities 

that it licenses (e.g., nuclear power plants). The Department of 

Transportation includes the Federal Aviation Administration, which has 

jurisdiction over aircraft hijackings in certain circumstances, and the Coast 

Guard, which has jurisdiction over hazardous materials (e.g., WMD) in U.S. 

waterways. The Department of Agriculture is responsible for providing 

emergency food assistance. Department of Agriculture officials said they 

would monitor and ensure the safety of the food supply where a WMD 

agent is released, potentially contaminating crops or livestock or food 

processing facilities.

FBI officials said that they coordinated the Domestic Guidelines and 

CONPLAN with the five other agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS and EPA) 

because those agencies were cited most prominently in PDD 39. However, 

PDD 39 also cited Treasury as having an important role in 

counterterrorism. These officials told us that they plan to coordinate the 

Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with other agencies once the FBI and 

the five other agencies agree on the documents. FBI officials did not have 

an estimate on when the five agencies would approve either document or 

when these documents would be coordinated with other appropriate 

agencies. We believe that the FBI, as lead federal agency for crisis 

management in domestic terrorist incidents, would better serve that role by 

fully coordinating both documents with all federal agencies that have 

counterterrorist roles.

The International Guidelines have also not been approved as final. These 

guidelines, which were drafted by the State Department and provide 

procedures for overseas incidents and operations, had not been approved 

because of differences among agencies about overseas arrests. Specifically, 

the Departments of State and Justice have not reached agreement on 

specific operational issues related to these missions. Since our classified 

report was issued, a State Department official told us the Department 

deleted procedures for these arrests from the International Guidelines to 

expedite their approval, but the different views on operational matters 

continue. He stated that the guidelines are in the final coordination stage.
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Command and Control 

Issues Require Resolution

The FBI and the Secret Service were not always coordinating their 

command and control structures or contingency plans with each other in 

the period we reviewed. FBI and Secret Service officials acknowledged 

that the two agencies had not worked well together, and cited efforts 

underway to improve coordination and cooperation between the two 

agencies for special events. Specifically, the Directors of the FBI and Secret 

Service mutually agreed to a command and control plan and signed the 

agreement in October 1998. This agreement has been submitted to the 

Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury for final approval. The 

two agencies also stated that they recently had conducted a joint tabletop 

exercise to test their command and control relationship.

DOD needs to clarify its internal command and control structure for 

domestic operations. Although not a lead federal agency, DOD could have a 

major supporting role in any federal response to terrorist incidents in the 

United States, particularly those involving WMD. In reviewing DOD’s 

participation in domestic support operations, special events, and exercises, 

we found several command and control issues where guidance was either 

confusing or conflicting. To resolve these issues, DOD is undertaking a 

high-level review of its support to civilian authorities, generally under the 

rubric of “homeland defense.” The National Defense Panel recommended 

that DOD emphasize homeland defense more, and use military assets to 

assist law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism, and incorporate 

its forces into all levels of government to manage the consequences of a 

WMD-type attack.7

 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has chartered 

a study called “UCP 21,” which is reviewing these issues and may 

recommend changes to the Unified Command Plan—the overall command 

structure for military forces.8

There are also unresolved issues of intergovernmental command and 

control (i.e., whether the federal, state, or local government is in charge) in 

certain circumstances. For consequence management, federal guidance—

the Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident Annex—indicates 

7The National Defense Panel was an independent nonpartisan group of private sector experts, 

established by Congress to review the national security strategy. The panel issued a report, 

Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century, in December 1997.

8

By statute (10 U.S.C. 161), the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducts a biennial review of the 

Unified Command Plan and recommends revisions as appropriate. For more information on this 

process, see Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern Command Participation in 1995 Review

(GAO/NSIAD-97-41BR, Dec. 5, 1996).
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that state and local authorities are in overall charge of recovery efforts and 

that the federal government is in a support role. For crisis management, the 

overall leadership of the response at the incident site is not as clear. The 

FBI has recently taken some steps to work with state and local 

governments to better define their respective lead and support roles in 

managing a terrorist crisis.

Strengths and 

Weaknesses in 

Counterterrorist 

Exercises

PDD 39 required key federal agencies to ensure that their counterterrorist 

capabilities were well exercised. We found that federal agencies had 

conducted a number of counterterrorist exercises following PDD 39. 

However, while agencies were exercising together, there was no formal 

interagency program as envisioned in PDD 39. We also found that 

international crisis management exercises were more comprehensive than 

domestic crisis exercises, though neither included scenarios of no-warning 

terrorist attacks. Consequence management exercises sponsored by FEMA 

were not comprehensive, but other federal agencies were making progress 

exercising their capabilities.

Agencies Conducted Many 

Exercises Since PDD 39

Federal agencies conducted 201 exercises to improve their preparedness 

for counterterrorist operations in the past 3 years. In general, exercises test 

and validate policies and procedures, test the effectiveness of response 

capabilities, and increase the confidence and skill level of personnel. In 

addition, exercises identify strengths and weaknesses before they arise in 

an actual incident. Exercises further allow agencies to apply operational 

lessons learned from past exercises and actual deployments. In 

counterterrorism, where federal operations are inherently interagency 

matters, exercises also allow the various departments’ and agencies’ 

personnel to become familiar with each others’ missions and procedures 

and learn to coordinate and operate together. Interagency exercises can 

help identify aspects of cooperation that work well and problems and 

conflicts that require interagency resolution. Table 1 shows the number of 

federal counterterrorism exercises that different agencies participated in 

and led.
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Table 1: Agency Participation and Leadership in Federal Counterterrorism Exercises 

in the 3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998)

Note: When more than one agency sponsored an exercise, all sponsoring agencies were counted as 

the lead agency; thus, the column total exceeds 201 exercises. CIA noted that while it does not lead 

these types of exercises, it practices its support role through participation in other agencies’ exercises. 

Other federal agencies include the Department of Transportation; U.S. Capitol Police; and 13 other 

agencies, offices, or bureaus.

Source: Our analysis of agencies’ data. 

The agencies conducted a mixture of tabletop exercises in which agency 

officials discuss scenarios around a table or other similar setting, and field 

exercises where agency leadership and operational units actually deploy to 

practice their skills and coordination in a realistic field setting. Of the total 

201 exercises, 85 (or 42 percent) were tabletop exercises and 116 

(or 58 percent) were field exercises. Counterterrorism exercises included 

both conventional and WMD scenarios to prepare federal agencies for a 

wide variety of possible situations. In many of the exercises, federal 

agencies gained experience working together. Of the 201 federal 

counterterrorist exercises, 140 (or 70 percent) were interagency 

exercises—involving more than one federal department or independent 

agency.9

 Of these 140 interagency exercises, 96 were major interagency 

Agency

Total exercises

Participated in Led

DOD 143 97

FBI 99 24

FEMA 76 16

HHS 68 3

Secret Service 65 46

EPA 47 1

DOE 36 5

State 24 1

CIA 21 0

Department of Veterans Affairs 12 4

ATF 10 4

Other 36 3

9

For the purpose of this report, we defined “interagency” as involving more than one federal 

department or independent agency. For example, DOD-led exercises that included both Army and Navy 

participation, or Justice-led exercises that included the FBI and Bureau of Prisons participation, were 

not considered interagency exercises.
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exercises and included three or more departments or independent 

agencies. In some of the exercises, federal agencies also gained experience 

working with state and/or local authorities, and nongovernmental 

organizations. Specifically, 69 (or 34 percent) of the 201 exercises were 

intergovernmental, and 18 (or 9 percent) included nongovernmental or 

other private organizations. Four exercises included foreign government 

participation to simulate federal agency integration in international 

incidents.

Interagency Exercise 

Program Has Not Been Fully 

Achieved

We found that there was no formal interagency exercise program as 

envisioned in PDD 39. The National Security Council established an 

interagency Exercise Subgroup co-chaired by the State Department (for 

international exercises) and the FBI (for domestic exercises) that also 

included FEMA, DOD, HHS, DOE, EPA, CIA, NRC, and the Departments of 

Transportation and Agriculture as members. The purpose of the Exercise 

Subgroup is to promote interagency discussions of exercises, but it has not 

implemented PDD 39 requirements to prepare or receive approval for 

interagency exercise objectives and a schedule of exercises. Interagency 

field exercises occur when individual agencies, particularly DOD and DOE, 

invite other agencies to participate. Because individual agencies that 

sponsor or participate in exercises tend to focus on their own roles, some 

complex transfers of command and control between agencies have not 

been exercised, particularly in domestic scenarios. We believe that without 

interagency exercises objectives set by the Exercise Subgroup, agencies 

are not likely to exercise these key scenarios. As a result, the federal 

government will be less prepared to respond in a tailored, synchronized 

manner if an incident occurs. Officials from State, FBI, DOD, DOE, EPA, 

and HHS said that the Exercise Subgroup has fallen short of achieving its 

full objectives. These officials cited a number of obstacles to full 

implementation of the group as envisioned in PDD 39 and in the group’s 

charter.

Despite the incomplete implementation of an interagency exercise program 

as envisioned in PDD 39, in the 3 years since PDD 39, there were 96 

counterterrorist field and tabletop exercises involving 3 or more agencies. 

These interagency exercises occurred because individual sponsoring 

agencies, such as DOD, invited other agencies to participate in their 

exercises. For example, DOD’s Domestic Preparedness Program tabletop 

exercises form the core of interagency exercises with a focus on domestic 

consequence management and intergovernmental participation.
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International Crisis 

Exercises More 

Comprehensive Than 

Domestic Crisis Exercises

International crisis management exercises are more comprehensive than 

domestic exercises. DOD’s and DOE’s well-developed international field 

exercise programs have enhanced the preparedness of the federal 

government to conduct counterterrorist operations overseas. The State 

Department uses DOD-led and DOE-led exercises to practice its leadership 

role in international terrorist incidents. Each year, DOD and DOE sponsor 

several international interagency field exercises. Commanders and 

exercise planners take several steps to challenge participants in these 

exercises. For example, these exercises test rapid and no-notice 

deployment of command elements and tactical units to locations 

worldwide. In addition, these exercises also frequently test the FEST, so 

rapid and no-notice deployments also can be practiced by the full cadre of 

interagency players. While exercises do not guarantee success, they have 

resulted in a high degree of preparedness of federal agencies to operate 

overseas in a terrorist crisis.

Domestic crisis response exercises are led by law enforcement agencies 

and primarily provide tactical training to their crisis response teams. Many 

of these exercises center around the response capabilities of the lead 

agency, rather than coordinating an interagency response and therefore do 

not include many of the federal, state, and local agencies that would be 

needed to effectively respond, or the entire range of activities required to 

respond to a terrorist crisis.

The FBI’s domestic crisis response program is well developed with 

regularly scheduled field exercises that test regional and field office 

capabilities at the tactical level.10 But the program generally does not 

exercise the broader interagency leadership role that the Bureau would 

play in a major terrorist incident. Some aspects of this leadership role have 

been tested in selected exercises, such as FBI-led exercises done in 

preparation for the Atlanta Olympics. The FBI has begun taking steps to 

enhance its program and it played a significant interagency leadership role 

in a June 1998 exercise sponsored by DOD. FBI officials noted that the 

Bureau had increased this program’s budget resources—which they had 

previously cited as an impediment to a more robust program.

10For the purpose of this report, the tactical level refers to the personnel and activities occurring at a 

specific site to eliminate or capture a terrorist or terrorists and to render safe and remove a conventional 

or unconventional weapon or device.
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The Secret Service conducts a variety of counterterrorist exercises for its 

special agents related to its mission to protect the President. The exercises 

generally involve continuity of operations of the White House or protecting 

the President or other officials. Some of the exercises included other 

federal agencies (generally DOD), state and local police, and fire and 

rescue authorities. The Secret Service generally did not conduct exercises 

with the FBI, although the two agencies have overlapping responsibilities 

at special events.11 In the few cases in which both agencies participated in 

the same exercise, they did not exercise how they would interact in a 

terrorist incident. The Secret Service plans to increase the agency’s 

counterterrorism exercise program to reflect its new role in certain special 

events. For example, in preparing for the World Energy Council in Houston 

in September 1998, the Secret Service conducted a tabletop exercise that 

included FBI and state and local authorities. In its comments on our 

classified report, the Secret Service stated that it planned to conduct the 

exercises with the FBI on scenarios where the two agencies need to work 

together.

ATF conducts exercises that test its crisis response and investigation roles 

in terrorist bombings. These exercises do not involve tests of ATF’s 

supporting role in an interagency response led by the FBI. ATF generally 

does not exercise with FBI, although the two agencies have potentially 

overlapping responsibilities, such as in cases where the sources of 

bombings are unknown.12 ATF is developing a crisis management exercise 

program similar to the FBI program. ATF exercises feature its Critical 

Incident Management Response Team and involve its regional Special 

Response Teams. FBI exercises feature its Critical Incident Response 

Group and involve its Hostage Rescue Team and regional Special Weapons 

and Tactics teams. The ATF and FBI scenarios that we reviewed were 

similar, and ATF officials were unable to make any distinction between 

their program and the FBI’s program. Based upon our analysis of the ATF’s 

program, it appears that ATF is exercising its lead in incidents in which the 

11In addition to both agencies providing some type of security function at special events, their statutory 

authorities may result in potential overlap. Secret Service has the statutory mission to protect the 

President and other protectees (18 U.S.C. 3056), and also investigates any threatening criminal activity 

against the President pursuant to that authority. The FBI has the statutory mission to investigate attacks 

upon the President (18 U.S.C. 1751).

12FBI and ATF have a 1973 Memorandum of Understanding on which agency has primary investigative 

jurisdiction in a bombing based upon such factors as the target of the bomb. If the perpetrator of the 

bombing is unclear, both agencies may claim jurisdiction. FBI and ATF officials have been meeting to 

resolve their differences on this issue.
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FBI, not ATF, would lead. The lack of coordination on exercises between 

these two law enforcement agencies could reduce the effectiveness of the 

total federal response to a terrorist incident and lead to duplication of 

effort.

In addition, crisis management exercises, both international and domestic, 

always end in the successful tactical resolution of the incidents and do not 

include more likely scenarios where terrorist attacks are successful, or 

occur without adequate threat warning. Thus, the full gamut of interagency 

crisis management activities is not tested. For example, in the 3 years 

following PDD 39, the FBI did not conduct or participate in a field exercise 

that simulated the concurrence of crisis response and consequence 

management to deal with a major terrorist incident.

Consequence Management 

Exercises Not 

Comprehensive

Domestic consequence management exercises are not well developed. 

PDD 39 designated FEMA as the lead federal agency for consequence 

management in domestic terrorist events. In addition, the fiscal year 1995 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations tasked FEMA to develop 

exercises to focus on the consequences of terrorist incidents as part of its 

exercise program. In response to these taskings, FEMA sponsored a series 

of interagency counterterrorism tabletop exercises that focused on 

interagency and intergovernmental issues. However, FEMA has not 

planned or sponsored an interagency field exercise to test its consequence 

management leadership role. Tabletop exercises are useful to the extent 

they identify important policy and operational issues that need to be 

resolved. However, tabletop exercises are not a substitute for field 

exercises that test the federal government’s ability to use and coordinate 

personnel and assets in a realistic setting. FEMA officials told us that they 

lack the resources to manage an interagency field exercise program. They 

also stated that they are reluctant to commit resources to field exercises 

because the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN are still not approved and 

that they do not want to exercise their staff using procedures that may not 

be correct because of additional changes in these guidance documents. 

Commenting on our classified report, FEMA noted that numerous other 

disaster-related operations (which were outside the scope of our review) 

significantly improved the federal government’s overall response 

capabilities to conduct consequence management in terrorist incidents.

Federal agencies or entities other than FEMA have sponsored some 

consequence management field exercises. The Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA) sponsored four recent domestic field exercises that dealt with 
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the medical aspects of consequence management in a terrorist attack using 

WMD. For example, in March 1997, VA sponsored an exercise, in 

conjunction with the state of Minnesota, that simulated a terrorist attack 

on a federal building with explosives laced with radioactive material, and 

the subsequent decontamination and treatment of hundreds of casualties. 

Commenting on our classified report, VA stated that numerous other 

disaster-related exercises (which were outside the scope of our review) 

also improved VA’s consequence management capabilities. DOD sponsored 

two recent domestic field exercises that also dealt with the medical aspects 

of consequence management in a terrorist attack using WMD. For example, 

in September 1997, DOD sponsored a field exercise (co-sponsored by VA) 

to practice providing medical care to victims of a terrorist WMD attack. 

That exercise, which had over 2,000 participants, also included state and 

local responders, and local community hospitals.

In addition, some states and cities have sponsored field exercises on 

consequence management, some of them in conjunction with the DOD 

Domestic Preparedness Program. For example, in November 1997, New 

York City sponsored a field exercise based on a scenario where terrorists 

released chemical agents. The objectives of this exercise were to test first 

responder’s ability to appropriately evaluate and respond to a chemical 

attack and fully integrate the city’s incident command system. DOD, in 

conjunction with cities, plans to conduct more than 100 Domestic 

Preparedness Program field exercises in the next several years.

Better Processes to 

Capture Lessons 

Learned Could 

Improve Future 

Operations

Lessons learned processes are practices that allow an agency to learn from 

its successes and mistakes to improve its performance. We found that 

DOD, DOE, and FEMA had relatively good processes in place to capture 

and share lessons learned, while other agencies had less rigorous 

processes. There was also no interagency process in place to capture and 

share lessons learned, but agencies were starting to implement a process at 

the end of our review.

DOD, DOE, and FEMA Have 

Requirements and 

Processes to Capture 

Lessons Learned

A key part of any lessons learned process is preparing an After Action 

Report (AAR) or other evaluation that provides an official description of 

the results of an operation, special event, or exercise. An AAR typically 

includes a summary of objectives, operational limitations, major 

participants, a description of strengths and weaknesses, and recommended 

actions. Effective follow-up and validation also are important parts of a 

lessons learned process, as they are the only means to ensure that 
B-282474

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism

problems have been corrected. Another important feature of a lessons 

learned process is the dissemination within an organization and, where 

appropriate, to other organizations, of aspects of operations that worked 

well and those that need further improvement or development. For 

counterterrorism operations, which are inherently interagency matters, the 

lessons learned process should also address the interaction between 

different agencies to highlight problems for resolution in interagency 

forums or by top national leadership.

The DOD and DOE processes for capturing lessons learned had several 

positive characteristics in comparison to the other agencies’ processes we 

reviewed. DOD and DOE had requirements to produce AARs and their 

officials or contractors wrote AARs, made specific recommendations, 

disseminated AARs to different organizational units, and produced AARs 

for some exercises and events led by other agencies. For example, we 

observed DOE contractors as they entered lessons learned data “real time” 

during a June 1998 exercise led by DOD. Some DOD field exercises 

included data evaluation plans in advance to ensure that lessons were 

learned on the specific exercise objectives. In addition, DOD and DOE 

officials included interagency issues in their AARs and sometimes 

disseminated them to other agencies.

DOD and DOE officials cited the value of a sound AAR process to 

improving their performance and said that on the basis of issues identified 

in earlier AARs, they had improved operations. For example, DOD 

exercises helped determine and refine policy and procedures on the final 

disposition of WMD devices. Policy issues on this topic were identified in 

AARs going back to 1993. In the intervening years, DOD continued to 

include this issue in its tabletop exercises. In 1996, a new policy was 

incorporated into a formal contingency plan. The new policy was further 

tested in tabletop exercises in 1997 and finally in field exercises in 1998. 

While there are remaining issues to be resolved on the final disposition of a 

WMD device, DOD officials were able to track their progress on this issue. 

DOE reorganized its Nuclear Emergency Search Team on the basis of 

lessons learned from a series of exercises. We were able to track the 

evolution of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team through past evaluations 

and AARs written by DOE.

Although the DOD and DOE lessons learned processes were good in 

comparison to the other agencies we reviewed, we did note some 

weaknesses in their processes. DOD and DOE did not write AARs for all of 

the counterterrorism operations, special events, or exercises that they 
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participated in. Both DOD and DOE officials stated that emerging crises or 

the tempo of operations did not always allow staff to write AARs. In 

addition, dissemination of lessons learned were sometimes limited because 

of security classifications. Finally, our prior report, which included a 

broader and more detailed review of DOD’s lessons learned programs, 

discussed weaknesses in the collection, analysis, dissemination, and 

ultimate use of lessons learned.13

FEMA also had relatively sound lessons learned requirements and 

processes as part of its Comprehensive Exercise Program for designing, 

conducting, and evaluating exercises. For several years, FEMA had been 

developing computer software to record lessons learned from exercises 

and monitor corrective actions.14 FEMA produced AARs on the tabletop 

exercises it led but not for exercises led by other agencies. Contractors 

usually wrote AARs and FEMA officials reviewed and approved them. 

FEMA disseminated its AARs both internally and externally. FEMA’s AARs 

generally included interagency issues for those exercises that included 

other agencies. For example, the AAR on FEMA’s June 1996 “Cirrus Wind” 

exercise stressed the need for FEMA and FBI to work together to 

understand their responsibilities for consequence and crisis management.

Other Agencies’ Lessons 

Learned Processes Not Well 

Developed

Federal agencies other than DOD, DOE, and FEMA had less rigorous 

processes for capturing lessons learned and producing AARs. The other 

agencies did not have a written policy that required that they produce AARs 

or a formal process to capture lessons learned. The production of AARs by 

some of these other agencies was sporadic, particularly for operations, 

special events, and exercises led by other agencies. In addition, few of 

these other agencies included discussions of interagency issues in their 

AARs. Finally, the dissemination of AARs was limited at many agencies, 

which minimized the benefits of lessons learned. These limitations make it 

more difficult for the agencies to capture the strengths and weaknesses 

shown in operations or exercises so they can continue or expand good 

practices or take corrective actions when necessary to improve future 

performance. Table 2 describes selected agencies’ processes for capturing 

lessons learned and producing AARs.

13See Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped

(GAO/NSIAD-95-152, Aug. 9, 1995). While the review examined DOD lessons learned processes, it did 

not specifically focus on counterterrorist operations or exercises. 

14At the end of our review, FEMA officials told us they were testing software to implement this 

corrective action program throughout the agency.
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Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism

Table 2: Characteristics of Federal Agencies’ Processes to Capture Lessons Learned From Counterterrorist Operations, Special 

Events, and Exercises

Note: We did not include VA or CIA in this table because we did not conduct detailed reviews of their 

processes to capture lessons learned. Both agencies did write AARs for selected exercises.

Source: Our analysis of agencies’ data.

Many agencies did not produce AARs even in cases where they led an 

exercise. Agencies lead exercises because they have specific objectives to 

achieve, and one purpose of exercises is to capture lessons that might 

improve future operations. Nevertheless, we found many cases where 

agencies devoted their resources to develop exercise objectives and 

conduct an exercise, yet did not write AARs. For example, the FBI has 

sponsored the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Support Exercise 

Agency

Agency policy and/or process to 

capture lessons learned

Actual agency production of after 

action reports

AAR discussion of interagency 

issues and dissemination 

DOD Policy requires AARs; formal process 

is Joint Universal Lessons Learned 

System.

Generally produces AARs for 

operations, special events, and 

exercises, including those led by 

other agencies.

AARs generally discuss interagency 

issues; AARs disseminated internally 

and sometimes externally.

DOE Policy requires AARs; formal process 

is After Action Tracking System.

Generally produces AARs for special 

events and exercises, including those 

led by other agencies.

AARs generally discuss interagency 

issues; AARs disseminated internally 

and sometimes externally.

FEMA Policy requires AARs; formal process 

is Corrective Action Program.

Produces no AARs for special events; 

produces AARs for FEMA exercises, 

but not those led by other agencies.

AARs generally discuss interagency 

issues; AARs disseminated internally 

and sometimes externally.

ATF No formal policy or process. Produces AARs for some operations; 

produces no AARs for special events; 

produces AARs for ATF exercises, but 

not those led by other agencies.

AARs do not discuss interagency 

issues; AARs disseminated internally. 

FBI No formal policy or process. Produces no AARs for operations or 

special events; generally produces 

AARs for FBI field exercises but not 

tabletop exercises or those led by 

other agencies.

AARs generally do not discuss 

interagency issues; AARs 

disseminated internally to 

participating FBI offices, but not to 

FBI Headquarters or externally.

EPA No formal policy or process. Sometimes produces AARs for 

special events and exercises, 

including those led by other agencies.

AARs generally discuss interagency 

issues; AARs disseminated internally, 

but not externally.

Secret Service No formal policy or process. Generally produces AARs for special 

events; produces no AARs for 

exercises led by Secret Service or 

other agencies.

AARs generally do not discuss 

interagency issues; AARs not 

disseminated internally or externally.

State No formal policy or process. Rarely produces AARs for operations 

and exercises, even if led by State.

Not applicable.

AARs rarely done.

HHS No formal policy or process. Rarely produces AARs for operations 

or exercises, even if led by HHS.

Not applicable.

AARs rarely done.
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series, which includes numerous federal agencies and has the objective to 

advance interagency coordination for terrorist attacks. However, FBI has 

not produced AARs on any of the four tabletop exercises. Table 3 shows 

whether agencies produced AARs for the exercises they led.

Table 3: Production of After Action Reports by Selected Federal Agencies for the 

Counterterrorism Exercises They Led in the 3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to 

June 1998).

Note: Includes both tabletop and field exercises the agency led. The Secret Service noted that its 

lessons learned are based on special events, not its exercise program. Other government agencies 

include the Department of Transportation, U.S. Capitol Police, and 13 other agencies, offices or 

bureaus.

Source: Our analysis of agencies’ data.

Many agencies also did not produce AARs when they participated in a field 

exercise. Field exercises are very resource intensive because they require a 

great deal of advance planning and because agency personnel and 

equipment actually deploy to another location. Again, we found cases 

where agencies led or otherwise participated in field exercises but did not 

produce AARs. For example, in a recent DOD-sponsored field exercise, 

FEMA developed specific objectives and tasks to be accomplished and sent 

several staff to planning meetings and to the week-long exercise itself, yet 

it did not produce an AAR. Table 4 shows the extent to which agencies 

produced AARs for field exercises that they participated in.

Agency

Total exercises

led by agency

AARs produced by

lead agency

DOD 97 79 (81%)

Secret Service 47 0

FBI 22 13 (59%)

FEMA 16 14 (88%)

DOE 5 5 (100%)

ATF 4 4 (100%)

VA 4 2 (50%)

HHS 3 0

State 1 0

EPA 1 1 (100%)

Other 3 1 (33%)
B-282474

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Table 4: Production of After Action Reports by Selected Federal Agencies for 

Counterterrorist Field Exercises That They Participated in for the 3 Years Following 

PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998).

Note: Includes all field exercises, whether the agency led the exercise or not. Secret Service noted that 

its lessons learned are based on special events, not its exercise program. Other government agencies 

include the Department of Transportation, U.S. Capitol Police, and 13 other agencies, offices, or 

bureaus.

Source: Our analysis of agencies’ data.

Officials from these agencies generally cited a lack of dedicated staff or the 

tempo of ongoing operations or exercises as reasons they did not write 

AARs or otherwise capture lessons learned. In our view, agencies that 

devote the resources to lead exercises or to participate in other agencies’ 

field exercises should also devote the resources to writing AARs to capture 

lessons learned. Some officials noted that they hold a “hotwash” (i.e., an 

oral AAR discussion) after an exercise which, they said, served the purpose 

of capturing lessons learned. Hotwashes are valuable because they are held 

immediately after exercises; however, their value is limited to the 

participants that attend. Written AARs, on the other hand, provide 

accountability because they identify and document problems or issues and 

can be used to track the progress of corrective action. By not producing 

written AARs, agencies are forfeiting many of the benefits of participating 

in exercises. In commenting on our classified report, several agencies cited 

efforts underway to develop or improve processes for capturing lessons 

learned at their individual agencies.

Agency

Total field exercises

agency participated in

AARs produced for field

exercises by agency

DOD 72 38 (53%)

Secret Service 52 0

FBI 32 18 (56%)

FEMA 16 0

State 15 1 (7%)

DOE 13 10 (77%)

HHS 13 2 (15%)

ATF 9 4 (44%)

VA 6 2 (33%)

EPA 4 1 (25%)

Other 14 0
B-282474

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Interagency Lessons 

Learned Process Being 

Developed

The 1996 Nunn-Lugar hearings highlighted that, although some agencies 

wrote AARs and made recommendations, there were recurrent interagency 

problems because there was no central place where officials assembled 

and analyzed AARs together to discuss interagency problems. During our 

review, we also found no AAR or lessons learned process at the interagency 

level. The Exercise Subgroup charter included the discussion of lessons 

learned and AARs. While this interagency forum had been used to discuss 

specific exercises, there was no process to review individual agency AARs 

that raise interagency issues. For more than 2 years, the group has 

discussed developing a formal interagency process and has looked 

specifically at the processes being used by DOD and DOE. The State 

Department has been a repository for various agencies’ AARs for 

international exercises, but Department officials there said they lacked the 

staff and standing to analyze them, separate out the interagency issues, and 

prepare related evaluations or make recommendations. At the time of our 

review, the FBI was in charge of developing an interagency AAR process, 

but no decisions had been made. In commenting on our classified report, 

several agencies noted that the Exercise Subgroup had recently adopted an 

interagency AAR process and was starting to implement it.

Conclusions During the last 3 years, federal agencies have worked together in many 

operations and special events and have generally coordinated their 

activities. However, issues of interagency guidance and command and 

control remain that need to be addressed to enhance the federal 

government’s ability to effectively respond to terrorist incidents. Federal 

agencies have participated in many interagency counterterrorism exercises 

in the last 3 years. However, an interagency exercise program, as directed 

in PDD 39, has not been fully achieved, so exercises have not generally 

practiced key transfers of authority among responding federal agencies. 

International field exercises, generally led by DOD, include the full cadre of 

interagency players in demanding scenarios and some are done with no 

notice. In contrast, domestic counterterrorism exercises are not as 

demanding in testing the interagency ability to respond. The FBI’s crisis 

management field exercises have provided good practice for its tactical 

response units but have generally not exercised the Bureau’s interagency 

leadership role and rapid deployments for no-warning terrorist attacks. 

FEMA’s consequence management exercises have been limited to tabletop 

exercises that do not fully test the federal government’s ability to provide a 

rapid interagency response in a realistic exercise environment. Although 

agencies can benefit most from counterterrorism exercises if they produce 
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AARs and have a process to capture lessons learned, most of the agencies 

that we reviewed did not do so. Although counterterrorism is inherently an 

interagency response, there was also no interagency process to capture 

lessons learned. At the close of our review, agencies said they were 

adopting several measures to address these issues at both the agency and 

interagency level.

Recommendations This report makes no recommendations. However, in our classified report, 

we made several recommendations to enhance interagency guidance, 

command and control, exercises, and processes to capture and share 

lessons learned. DOD classified these recommendations as a result of its 

security review of our classified report.

Agency Comments We received written comments on our classified report from 15 agencies, 

including the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury; DOD, DOE, HHS, VA; 

and FEMA, EPA, CIA, NRC, ATF, the Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, 

and Internal Revenue Service. The National Security Council declined to 

provide official comments on the report. Many of the agencies concurred 

or partially concurred with the report and our recommendations and cited 

recent steps taken to implement them. For example, DOE stated that our 

report was an accurate assessment of both the progress and the lingering 

shortfalls within the interagency counterterrorist community. NRC stated 

that our recommendations will provide a blueprint for resolving many of 

the interagency difficulties outlined in the report. Other agencies did not 

concur with parts of our report and provided additional information about 

their programs or cited improvements underway. For example, the 

Department of Justice cited progress in interagency guidance, command 

and control relationships, exercise programs, and processes to capture 

lessons learned. We did not reproduce agency comments in this report due 

to security classification reasons. However, we incorporated their 

unclassified comments in this report as appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

We focused our examination on counterterrorist activities in the 3-year 

period following the issuance of PDD 39 in June 1995. We obtained 

documents and interviewed officials at the Departments of Justice, State, 

Treasury (including the Secret Service and ATF), DOD, DOE, HHS, VA, CIA, 

EPA, FEMA, NRC, and the U.S. Capitol Police. We also obtained 

information on matters pertaining to intergovernmental counterterrorist 
B-282474

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism

operations (e.g., those involving federal, state, and local entities) from state 

and local officials and selected federal field offices in the course of our 

related work on DOD’s Domestic Preparedness Program.

We compiled a list of 230 counterterrorism activities that included 

operations, special events, and exercises that were conducted from June 

1995 to June 1998. In some cases, we discussed counterterrorist activities 

before and after that period, but we did not include them in the statistics 

we compiled and analyzed. We did not review covert activities or law 

enforcement cases (e.g., criminal investigations and arrests of terrorists) 

except in the cases of overseas arrests, which are interagency operations. 

We also did not include aircraft hijackings or related exercises, where the 

Federal Aviation Administration is generally the lead federal agency. To 

ensure the accuracy of our list of activities, appropriate federal agencies 

reviewed it for completeness and accuracy. We also examined policy 

guidelines, contingency plans, AARs, and other documents from actual 

operations, special events, and exercises. Further, we attended and 

observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and exercises.

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards between November 1997 and September 1998.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 

30 days after its issue date. At that time we will send copies to appropriate 

congressional committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, 

and to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We also will 

make copies available to other interested parties upon request.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact Mark Gebicke, 

Director for National Security Preparedness Issues, at (202) 512-5140. 

Other major contributors to this report were Davi M. D’Agostino, 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Alan M. Byroade, Lee Purdy, and Raymond J. Wyrsch.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General
B-282474

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism

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Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National

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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

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Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE’s

Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).

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Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile

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