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Home       > Electronic Reading       Room       > Document       Collections       > General       Communications       > Information       Notices       > 2001       > IN 2001-02

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 28, 2001
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-02:  SUMMARY OF FITNESS-FOR-DUTY PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORTS FOR       CALENDAR YEARS 1998 AND 1999- Addressees 
- Purpose 
- Description   of Circumstances 
- Discussion    - (1)     Certified Laboratories 
  - (2)     Random Testing 
  - (3)     Policies and Procedures 
  - (4)     Program and System Management 
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, and licensees authorized to possess or use formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) or to transport formula quantities of SSNM.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to provide lessons learned and summarize the data submitted by licensees to the NRC in their fitness-for-duty (FFD) program performance reports for calendar years 1998 and 1999. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements, therefore no specific actions or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Since the fitness-for-duty rule (10 CFR Part 26) was published, licensees have submitted program performance reports to the NRC, as required by 10 CFR 26.71(d). In the past, the NRC summarized and analyzed the data submitted by the licensees and published an annual volume, NUREG/CR-5758, "Fitness for Duty in the Nuclear Power Industry--Annual Summary of Program Performance Reports." In 1998, the NRC issued IN 98-39 to convey this information for the years 1996 and 1997. This IN provides similar information for 1998 and 1999 FFD statistics are provided in Attachment 1.
Discussion
Lessons learned, management initiatives and problems, and associated corrective actions reported by licensees in 1998 and 1999 are summarized below.
(1)  Certified Laboratories
Some licensees continue to experience problems with laboratory performance or have identified potential weaknesses. Licensees also continue to investigate and review adulterant detection strategies to be used by laboratories.
- A licensee assessor noted that a laboratory's quality control blind   samples were potentially identifiable. The laboratory is certified by the U.S   Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The laboratory gives the   licensee chain-of-custody forms with preprinted numbers and bar codes.   However, because the laboratory's blind samples are not processed with the   licensee's chain-of-custody forms, the blind sample specimen chain-of-custody   forms are out of sequence with the rest of the samples in the tray. The   laboratory generates chain-of-custody forms for the blind samples, using the   laboratory's next sequential numbers. As an interim corrective action, the   laboratory is now mixing samples from different sources in the trays so that   the non-sequential chain-of-custody forms for the blind samples will be less   conspicuous. The laboratory is trying to design a better solution.  
- One licensee reviewed the potential impact of ingestion of hemp seed oil   products on tetrahydrocannabinol test results, disseminated its findings to   the plant personnel, and incorporated them into FFD training.  
- One licensee used Intoxilizer 5000 to verify that over-the-counter   substances such as gum, Nyquil, Listerine, etc., do not cause false positive   test results.  
- One licensee laboratory reported that Klear is an effective adulterant for   the marijuana metabolite but is easily detected if the specimen is tested for   nitrites. Urine Luck made by Spectrum Laboratory is more difficult to detect   but is also a less effective adulterant. Two blind specimens were spiked with   marijuana metabolite. Urine Luck was introduced into one of the specimens.   Onsite immunoassay screening found both specimens positive for marijuana. The   HHS-certified laboratory confirmed both specimens positive, although the   quantitation level for the specimen containing Urine Luck was slightly lower   (189 ng/ml versus 206 ng/ml). The laboratory did not detect the presence of   Urine Luck, not having done the additional adulterant testing it would have   done if the screening and confirmation testing were contradictory. The   specimens were retested a month later and found with quantitation levels of   163 ng/ml and 193 ng/ml, respectively. The laboratory will do more research to   determine if Urine Luck is an effective adulterant for specimens having lower   levels of the marijuana metabolite and to determine whether Multistix 10 SG   effectively detects this adulterant.  
- Other licensees reported they had started testing for the adulterants   nitrate, pyridininium chlorochromate, and glutaraldehyde. One laboratory uses   Test Sure, manufactured by SmithKline, to test for the following conditions   and adulterants: pH, specify gravity, bleach, creatinine, glutaraldehyde,   nitrate, and pyridine.  
- Inaccurate laboratory results for blind specimens continued to point out   human error problems, particularly the use of incorrect cutoff levels and   procedural weaknesses. The different Department of Transportation and NRC   testing requirements contribute to the use of incorrect cutoff levels, and   laboratories should be alert to develop safeguards against this error. The   cause of inaccuracies at one laboratory was that the laboratory had no   procedure to control parameter changes made by technologists on the screening   instrument and to verify parameter settings. The laboratory corrected the   problem by assigning passwords for the screening instrument (so that only   approved personnel could change the instrument parameters) and by requiring   another qualified technologist or supervisor to corroborate any changes before   the instrument is used. In addition, the laboratory implemented a procedure to   require a special quality control test of the instrument after instrument   parameter changes, reagent changes, and calibration. The procedure involves   spiking a sample at a concentration approximately twice as high as the highest   calibrator.  
- Several licensees reported that reviews of adulterant testing showed it to   be useful and cost effective.  
- Two licensees reported that the number of blind specimens they submitted   to the laboratory was below the required 10% for one or more quarters of 1999.   In one case, this was due to misunderstandings between the licensee and site   FFD programs--administrative responsibilities for these programs were   subsequently separated. No explanation was given for the second case.  
- After establishing an onsite testing laboratory, one licensee suspended   unescorted access for personnel who tested positive for cocaine and marijuana,   pending results from the HHS-certified laboratory. 

Several licensees reported working with laboratories to improve testing for specific adulterants. Licensees continued to report problems with laboratory performance.
- At one laboratory, a technician scanned the bar code identification on the   specimen bottle lid rather than on the side of the bottle. Sample lids had   been inadvertently switched, resulting in a sample identification error. The   laboratory has eliminated retest bar codes on bottle lids to ensure that   technicians scan the sides of specimen bottles.  
- Several licensees reported that laboratories used incorrect cutoff levels   or failed to test for the full list of substances.  
- One licensee reported two blind specimens as negative for opiates when   they should have been reported positive. The company that formulated the blind   specimens said the blind specimen batches might not have been adequately mixed   before they were prepared. In addition, the company was not performing gas   chromatography/mass spectrometry on each specimen, only on the batches. The   licensee has contracted with a new company to provide blind specimens. 
(2)  Random Testing
Licensees continued to report incidents in which employees who should have been included in the random testing pool were omitted.
- A licensee reported that it has reinstated a 100% random testing rate.     
- Several licensees reported that workers had been improperly excluded from   the drug testing pool for extended periods. For one licensee, an employee who   returned to the site after a lengthy stint at the Institute of Nuclear Power   Operations (INPO) was not put back into the random FFD testing pool because he   had been "hardcoded" out of the system. This licensee is reviewing the process   of hardcoding individuals out of the pool.   
- One licensee reported that it enhanced its quarterly "repetitive task"   process for verifying the integrity of the random testing pool.  
- Licensees continued to improve their notification process by reducing the   interval between notifying and testing employees and/or by keeping them under   continuous observation during this time.  
- One licensee analyzed the number of random screenings by day of week and   the rate of failures for each weekday during 1998 and 1999. The number of   random screenings was greatest on Monday and generally fell on each subsequent   day of the week. Very few screenings were done on Saturday or Sunday. In 1998   no positive results were identified on Saturdays or Sundays. However, in 1999   the positive rate on these days was very high (Saturday tests had a 12.5%   positive rate and Sunday tests a 15% positive rate). The analysis suggests   potentially useful changes to the testing schedule. 

Licensees continued to report incidents in which employees who should have been included in the random testing pool database were not included.
- A licensee that did weekly quality control checks of the random pool   discovered a software program interface problem as a result of which   contractors were omitted. One weekly check showed 110 contractors to have been   omitted.  
- Another licensee reported that a new contract worker had not been included   in the random test pool for the first draw after being badged and starting   work. 
(3)  Policies and Procedures
Several licensees reported having improved their FFD policies and procedures on the basis of their experience over the years.
- Another licensee reduced its marijuana cutoff value from 100 ng/ml to 50   ng/ml.  
- One licensee introduced a lower cutoff value for alcohol testing for   individuals in the followup program due to a previous positive test result for   alcohol.  
- One licensee reduced its testing list of drugs after finding that there   had only been a single positive for barbiturates and benzodiazepines since its   program was implemented in 1990.  
- One licensee changed its specimen collection procedures to include an   observed collection if the urine sample fell outside the range of 93-98   degrees Fahrenheit and an oral temperature did not match the urine   temperature.  
- Some licensees have instituted a zero tolerance policy, denying an   employee access after a first positive drug test result.  
- More licensees now count the detection of adulterants as a positive test   result and sanction employees accordingly.  
- A licensee prepared the following policy statement on prescription   marijuana and cocaine and communicated the statement to its employees: 
Certain drugs listed in the Controlled Substance Act such as     marijuana and cocaine may be legally prescribed and used in certain states.     However, federal regulations do not allow involvement with or possession or     use of these drugs with or without a prescription by individuals assigned to     [licensee name]. - Several licensees found weaknesses in their FFD records management   procedures. In two cases, the records management process was adequate but not   appropriately documented in procedures. In another case, FFD records being   prepared for shipment to another location for imaging were not stored in   1-hour fire rated cabinets, as required in the site-established procedures. In   a fourth case, a licensee found that the logbook maintained by the FFD program   did not satisfy the definition of a permanent, bound record book.  
- One licensee found that its procedures failed to specify FFD program   training required for personnel assigned to work in the FFD program.  
- To enhance overall FFD at the site, one licensee now requires employees to   report non-job-related injuries to a supervisor or manager before the start of   work or training activities if the injury could impair the employees' ability   to safely perform job assignments. The supervisor evaluates injured employees'   fitness and accommodates them as necessary.  
- At one site, a computer data entry error allowed a contract worker to   enter a protected area before the worker passed a pre-access test. Appropriate   FFD personnel were trained and the access authorization process modified to   prevent this from happening again.  
- One licensee introduced limits on how much time an employee may take to   give a urine specimen and how much water he may drink beforehand.  
- One licensee specified that requests for retesting be made within 72   hours.  
- One licensee reported that an event at another licensee's site helped it   identify and address a potential weakness at its own site. The event involved   an FFD testing technician who recorded drug screen test results as negative   before they were validated by the medical review officer (MRO). As a result,   access was granted to a few individuals whose test results were later reported   to be positive. To prevent this from happening at its own site, the licensee   revised its procedures so that access authorization personnel can only accept   reports that have been prepared by the MRO.  
- One licensee updated its FFD procedures to include a precise formula by   which to calculate blood alcohol concentration when an employee arrives at   work.  
- One licensee discovered that its pre-employment testing protocol implied   breathalyzer testing irrespective of whether the candidate had yet been   offered a job, leaving the licensee vulnerable to being found in violation of   the Americans With Disabilities Act.  
- One licensee initiated a standardized chain-of-custody form throughout its   sites. 
(4)  Program and System Management
Licensees continued to report improvements in overall FFD program management.
- One licensee planed to merge FFD with Access Authorization to improve   coordination and eliminate the potential for errors. This licensee is also   trying to refine FFD performance indicators.  
- A few licensees reported weaknesses in their behavioral observation   programs because of insufficient training. Others reported improvements in   their behavioral observation programs.  
- FFD awareness activities continued to be reported (e.g., sending articles   and newsletters to all employees, giving to all employees refrigerator magnets   with the toll free employee assistance program telephone number).  
- One licensee encouraged supervisors to complete refresher FFD training on   time. The licensee now rigorously monitors overdue supervisor FFD training,   sends an action request, and suspends unescorted access for a delinquent   supervisor and for the workers who report to the supervisor.  
- At one site it was discovered that supervisors who were not badged for   unescorted access but who were required to report to the emergency operations   facility did not have appropriate FFD training. Corrective actions were   implemented to track FFD training requirements for nonbadged   supervisors.  
- Several licensees reported the value of canine searches in enhancing   antidrug awareness at their sites, even the searches that typically did not   discover drugs. 

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the person listed below.
/RA/       
Ledyard B. Marsh, ChiefEvents Assessment, Generic Communications       and Non-Power Reactors BranchDivision of Regulatory Improvement       ProgramsOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:Garmon West, Jr., Ph.D. 301-415-1044 E-mail:       fitnessforduty@nrc.govAttachments:1. Fitness-for-Duty       Statistics2. List of Recently Issued NRC       Information Notices(ADAMS Accession Number ML010250419)