UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

RICKY BILLS, #136523, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-11415 

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

DANIEL HEYNS, et al., 

 Defendants. 

_______________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Ricky Bills is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Muskegon Correctional Facility 

in Muskegon, Michigan. He asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that he was 

denied due process during a prison misconduct proceeding that arose out of an incident at the 

Adrian Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan. Plaintiff names four defendants, all employees 

of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and monetary relief. For 

the reasons that follow, the complaint will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

I. 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the 

relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, 

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions or 

“an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a 

complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this 

action due to his indigence. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the court is 

required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it 

determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the court is required to dismiss a 

complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees that it finds to be 

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint 

is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 

(1989). 

 To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a 

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and 

(2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. 

Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 

II. 

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 Plaintiff challenges a prison misconduct proceeding that resulted in a conviction. A 

prisoner’s ability to challenge a prison misconduct conviction depends on whether the conviction 

implicated a liberty interest of the prisoner. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the 

Supreme Court prescribed certain minimal procedural safeguards that must be followed before 

depriving a prisoner of good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. This decision did 

not create a right to due process that attaches to all prison disciplinary proceedings. Rather, the 

Supreme Court recognized that due process is implicated only when a prisoner loses good-time 

credits and where the good time credits create a right to a shorter sentence. When a prisoner does 

not lose good-time credits or when good-time credits are simply one factor considered by the 

parole board, a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in the credits. Plaintiff does not allege the 

loss of good-time credits. Therefore, the procedural protections established in Wolff are not 

implicated. 

 Even absent a due process interest in the procedures by which good-time credits are lost, 

a prisoner may be able to raise a due-process challenge to prison misconduct convictions that 

result in a significant, atypical deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). From the 

information contained in the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff’s misconduct proceeding resulted 

in the loss of some of his property because he was found to have property in excess of that 

allowed under prison policy. Property interests “do not derive from the Constitution,” but are 

created and defined by state law. Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244–245 (6th Cir. 1996). 

State regulations do not create protected property interests unless the loss of the relevant property 

imposes “an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Dobbins v. Craycraft, 423 F. App’x 550, 552 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

The property restriction does not implicate Plaintiff’s right to due process because Plaintiff does 

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not have a protected liberty or property interest in having an unlimited amount of property in his 

cell, and such a restriction is not a significant and atypical hardship. See Morrison v. Garraghty, 

239 F.3d 648, 658 (4th Cir. 2001) (having “little doubt” that a state prison regulation that “limits 

the possession of personal property by prison inmates is designed to serve legitimate safety and 

security concerns”); Friend v. Chapleau, No. 95–5628, 1995 WL 607835, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 

1995) (holding that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to possess unlimited 

amounts of property); Blanton v. Caruso, No. 1:10-cv-1187, 2011 WL 202094 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 

19, 2011) (same). 

 Moreover, the negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner’s property does not 

violate due process if adequate state remedies are available to redress the wrong. Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-36 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part 

on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (ruling that negligence does 

not amount to a “deprivation” implicating due process). To maintain a § 1983 action “claiming 

the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must 

plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 

721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that Michigan’s judicial 

remedies are inadequate or that it would be futile to present his claim in the Michigan state 

courts. Plaintiff has an adequate remedy in the state courts. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 

476 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

III.

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED

with prejudice. 

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 It is further ORDERED that permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is 

DENIED. An appeal would be frivolous and could not be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). 

Dated: November 5, 2015 s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on November 5, 2015. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

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