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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-30088 

 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

VIOREL PRICOP, 

 Defendant. 

 / 

ORDER OF DETENTION PENDING TRIAL 

 After conducting a detention hearing under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(f), I conclude that these facts require that Defendant be detained pending trial. 

Part I – Findings of Fact 

A. Eligibility. This case is eligible for a Detention Hearing (18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)), 

for the reasons checked below in this Part I A: 

☐(1) Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1), upon the government’s motion in a case that 

involves 

☐(a) a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, or an offense listed in 

2332b(g)(5)(B) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or 

more is prescribed; or 

☐(b) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death; 

or 

☐(c) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or 

more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 801-

904), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 951-

971), or Chapter 705 of Title 46; or 

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☐(d) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more offenses 

described in subparagraphs (a) through (c) of this paragraph, or two or 

more State or local offenses that would have been offenses described in 

subparagraphs (a) through (c) of this paragraph if a circumstance giving rise 

to Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a combination of such offenses; or

☐(e) any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence but involves: 

 ☐(i) a minor victim, or 

☐(ii) the possession or use of a firearm or destructive device (as defined in 

section 921), or

☐(iii) any other dangerous weapon, or

☐(iv) involves a failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250. 

☒(2) Under 18 U.S.C. 3142(f)(2), upon the government’s motion or the court’s own 

motion in a case that involves: 

☒(a) a serious risk that such person will flee; or

☐(b) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or 

threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a 

prospective witness or juror. 

B. Rebuttable Presumption. A rebuttable presumption for detention exists in 

this case if reasons are checked below in this Part I B. 

(1) Defendant on Release Pending Trial (18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)(2)): A rebuttable 

presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 

the safety of another person or the community arises when:

☐(a) Defendant is charged with an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1), 

and has previously been convicted of a crime listed in 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(f)(1), or comparable state or local offense; and 

☐(b) The offense was committed while Defendant was on release pending trial 

for a federal, state, or local offense; and

☐(c) A period of less than five years has elapsed since: 

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☐(i) the date of conviction, or 

☐(ii) Defendant’s release from prison. 

(2) Probable Cause Findings (18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)): A rebuttable presumption 

that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 

appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community arises when 

there is probable cause to believe that Defendant has committed an offense:

☐(a) for which a maximum prison term of ten years or more is prescribed in the 

Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904), the Controlled 

Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 951-971), or Chapter 705 

of Title 46; or 

☐(b) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device 

in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime), 18 U.S.C. § 

956(a) (conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage 

property in a foreign country), or 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (acts of terrorism 

transcending national boundaries); or 

☐(c) listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (federal crimes of terrorism) for which 

the prison term is 10 or more years; or 

☐(d) under Chapter 77 of Title 18, United States Code, for which a maximum 

term of imprisonment of 20 years or more is prescribed (i.e., 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1594)(slavery); or 

☐(e) involving a minor victim as listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). 

Part II – Statement of the Reasons for Detention 

I find that the testimony and information submitted at the detention hearing 

establishes: 

☐ by clear and convincing evidence that, for the reasons set forth below, there is no 

condition or combination of conditions which will reasonably assure the safety of the 

community; or 

☒ by a preponderance of the evidence that, for the reasons set forth below, there is 

no condition or combination of conditions which will reasonably assure Defendant’s 

appearance; or 

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☐ both of the above. 

Statement of reasons for detention pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3142(i): 

 See attached. 

Part III – Directions Regarding Detention 

Defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General or a designated 

representative for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, 

from persons awaiting or serving sentences or held in custody pending appeal. Defendant 

must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult privately with defense counsel. On 

order of a United States Court or on request of an attorney for the Government, the 

person in charge of the corrections facility must deliver Defendant to the United States 

Marshal for a court appearance. 

Review of this Order is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3145 and E.D. Mich. L.R. 57.2. 

Date: April 27, 2016 /s David R. Grand 

 David R. Grand 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

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The defendant, Viorel Pricop, is charged in a criminal complaint with the interstate 

transportation of stolen property in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The government moved 

to detain Pricop as a flight risk, and the Court held a detention hearing on April 26, 2016. 

Relevant Facts

On February 15, 2015, a Michigan State Trooper responded to an address in Oakland 

County to locate a load of Bose stereos that had been stolen in New Mexico. Unbeknownst to 

the thieves, a GPS tracking device had been installed inside the load, which enabled the 

authorities to locate it. The responding officer encountered Pricop standing in front of a storage 

unit containing the stolen stereos. Pricop admitted to transporting stolen products (e.g., stereos, 

televisions, video equipment, etc.) for another individual, and stated he was paid approximately 

$1,000 - $2,000 for each pallet of stolen property he transported. The total value of the property 

recovered was approximately $600,000. 

On February 18, 2015, authorities conducted a search of Pricop’s residence. Two 

handguns were recovered, along with stolen merchandise. Pricop agreed to cooperate with 

authorities at that time, and an additional search of his property was scheduled for the next day. 

Pricop did not keep his word, however. Instead, on February 18, 2015, he, along with his wife 

and children, borrowed a neighbor’s car, and fled to Canada via the Ambassador Bridge. A few 

days later, Pricop’s wife and children returned to Michigan, but he remained in Canada at that 

time. The instant charges were then filed against Pricop. Pricop then traveled to Romania, 

where he resided for over a year. Very recently, without notifying the authorities, Pricop 

returned to the United States from Romania; he was scheduled to fly to Philadelphia, and then 

connect to Detroit. However, upon his arrival in Philadelphia he was apprehended by the 

Marshals, and then brought to the Eastern District of Michigan to answer the instant charges. 

Applicable Standards and Analysis 

In general, “[t]he default position of the law . . . is that a defendant should be 

released pending trial.” United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010). 

Pursuant to “the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 . . . a defendant may be detained 

pending trial only if a judicial officer ‘finds that no condition or combination of 

conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety 

of any other person and the community[.]’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)). The only 

issue here is flight risk, which the government must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence. U.S. v. Hinton, 113 Fed. Appx. 76, 77 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. v. Cisneros, 

328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir.2003)); U.S. v. Ellison, 2007 WL 106572, at *2 (E.D. Mich., 

Jan. 8, 2007). 

The Court first considers the nature and circumstances of the charges against 

Pricop, including whether they involve certain enumerated offenses, such as ones 

involving narcotics, firearms, and minor victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). This factor 

favors release as Pricop is charged with interstate transportation of stolen goods. 

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The second factor the court must consider is the weight of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. 

§3142(g)(2). “This factor goes to the weight of the evidence of [Pricop’s risk of flight], 

not the weight of the evidence of [his] guilt.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 948. This factor 

strongly favors detention. The most salient evidence before the Court on this issue is the 

fact that Pricop, after telling authorities he wished to cooperate, fled the United States 

later that very same day, and remained a fugitive for more than a year, living in both 

Canada and Romania. While the Court considers that Pricop voluntarily returned to the 

United States recently, he did not advise the authorities of his return in advance, and it is 

not clear what his intentions were upon his return here. To that end, the Court notes that 

Pricop’s wife and their children presently live in Romania (though he claims they plan to 

move back to the United States in the next few months, and that he has a son from a prior 

marriage who lives in Las Vegas). Another consideration is that the government 

proffered evidence that when authorities conducted the search of Pricop’s residence last 

year, a K-9 police dog alerted to the presence of cash that had been hidden in large PVC 

piping in one of the property’s outbuildings. Between that, and the fact that hundreds of 

thousands of dollars’ worth of stolen goods was recovered from the property, there is at 

least some evidence that Pricop has sufficient liquid assets to flee the area. While 

Pricop’s assertion that no criminal complaint had been filed when he left the United 

States may be true, it gets him nowhere on the issue of his risk of flight – as this fact is 

simply a reflection of him having beaten the government to the punch; Pricop clearly 

knew, at the time he fled, that he was under investigation, and (given the massive value 

of stolen goods recovered from his property and his admitted participation in the scheme) 

he must have known he would face criminal prosecution. It was thus Pricop’s decision to 

immediately flee which made it impossible for the government to file its complaint while 

he was present in the jurisdiction. Moreover, the circumstances of his crossing into 

Canada strongly suggest that his intent was to flee without being detected for the purpose 

of avoiding prosecution. Also unpersuasive is Pricop’s argument that he had been 

communicating with his counsel about his plan to return to the United States. Again, the 

authorities had never been made aware this plan, and it is unclear what Pricop’s 

intentions were had he not been arrested in Philadelphia. 

The third factor the Court must consider is “the history and characteristics of the 

person” accused, including physical and mental condition, family/community ties, 

employment, past conduct, history of drug/alcohol abuse, criminal history, record of 

appearing for court hearings, and whether the person was on probation at the time of the 

current offense. 18 U.S.C. §3142(g)(3). Although this factor is somewhat mixed, overall 

it tips in favor of detention. As noted, Pricop’s most significant family ties – his wife and 

their three children – presently reside in Romania. No family member, neighbor or friend 

appeared at the detention hearing on Pricop’s behalf. Pricop has a fairly limited prior 

criminal history, though he has had problems with theft-related crimes. NCIC showed a 

1992 charge of Burglary and Assault (though no complaint was filed), and separate 1998 

charges of Larceny (disposition unknown) and conviction for carrying a concealed 

weapon, 2006 (nolle prossed) and 2012 (conviction) charges of theft, and a 2013 charge 

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of Unlawful use of Criminal Instrument (though it is unclear what became of this charge). 

Although Pricop advised Pretrial Services that he owns two Michigan trucking 

companies, he indicated that he has not worked during the past year while he has been in 

Romania, and he represented that he has no income at this time. 

Finally, the Court must consider “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any 

person or the community that would be posed by [Pricop’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. 

§3142(g)(4). This factor favors release as the government does not contest that any 

danger posed by Pricop could be reasonably addressed through bond conditions. 

Weighing all of the above factors, and considering all of the evidence and 

arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds that the government has shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that no condition of release can reasonably assure 

Pricop’s appearance throughout this criminal case. 

Accordingly, detention is ordered. 

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