WATER: THE HYDRAULIC 

PARAMETER OF CONFLICT IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 

AFRICA 

Stephen D. Kiser 

INSS Occasional Paper 35 

Environmental Security Series 

September 2000 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

The Jordan River Basin 3 

 Recent History 3 

Water and Conflict—The Variables 6 

 Water Scarcity 6 

 River Waters of the Region 7 

 Ground Waters of the Region 8 

 Rainfall in the Region 11 

 Rapid Population Growth 11 

 Rapid Economic Development 14 

 Technology Enables Greater Water Exploitation 16 

 Unequal Distribution of Water 17 

 Poor and Difficult Water Management 19 

 International Law 20 

 Previously Existing Tensions 23 

The Current Peace Process and Water 24 

 Return of the Golan Heights 25 

 Increased Palestinian Autonomy in the West Bank 26 

 Israeli Withdrawal from the Security Zone 28 

 Peace, the 1967 War and Conquered Water 28 

Future Water Conflicts 29 

 Theoretical Framework to Analyze Potential 

 for Conflict 30 

 Specific Indicators of Potential Conflict over Water 32 

 High Level of Palestinian Autonomy/ 

 Sovereign State in West Bank 32 

 Massive Immigration from the Palestinian 

 Diaspora to a New Palestinian State 33 

 Government Elected in Israel that is 

 not Pro-Peace 34 

Summary of Middle East Water Conflict 35 

Northeastern Africa 36 
vi

Internal Conflict over Nile Waters 36 

 Civil War and Conflict in Sudan 37 

External (State Against State) Violence 41 

Summary of Northeast Africa Water Conflict 50 

Policy Implications 50 

Endnotes 54 

Works Referenced 59 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth-fifth volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). Steve Kiser has produced a significant study 

behind today’s headlines, explaining in detail how environmental factors 

underlie many real and potential conflicts. Environmental security is one 

of several “new” dimensions of the contemporary international scene, 

and it is one that requires much greater examination. This paper deepens 

our understanding of its dynamic interplay with more traditional security 

factors in two important cases. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the 

Air Force's 39th Information Operations Squadron; the Secretary of 

Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); the Army 

Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the United States 

Space Command; the Air Force long-range plans directorate (XPXP); 

and the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The 

mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to 

support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research 

focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: 

arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, 

information operations, environmental security, and space policy. 
viii

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects 

researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private 

and government organizations. INSS provides valuable, cost-effective 

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continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 Water is a primary concern of most governments in the Middle 

East and North Africa. A myriad of synergistic variables are 

exponentially increasing demands for water, while simultaneously 

decreasing the region’s ability to supply it. These variables include a 

rapidly increasing population, a large per capita increase in water 

demand, increasing water pollution, rapid economic growth, persistent 

regional drought, and irrecoverable water overexploitation. 

Compounding the issue are regional tensions (such as those between 

Israel and the Palestinian Authority and Egypt and Sudan), vague 

international water laws, and a history of regional conflict. 

 A gloomy prediction emerges if one extrapolates the trends in 

each of these variables. Especially in the Middle East, water supplies are 

so tight that even the most optimistic forecast suggests the water issue 

will be “super-critical” within a decade. Indeed, water issues surround 

the current peace process, and may actually be worsened should a 

successful treaty be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinian 

Authority. 

 This paper examines these variables in depth, and then forecasts 

a series of possible events that could be the catalyst for a water-based 

conflict in the Middle East. These events include mass Palestinian 

migration to a newly declared Palestinian state, transferring control of 

the West Bank aquifer to the Palestinian Authority, loss of Israeli control 

of the Jordan River headwaters (which would necessarily result from 

returning the Golan Heights to Syria), continued or exacerbated drought, 

and an Israeli return to a more hawkish government. 

 While currently water should only be considered a proximately 

source of conflict in the region, in the future, water could very well 

become the primary reason governments decide to go to war. 
Water: The Hydraulic Parameter of 

Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa 

INTRODUCTION 

“Unless properly managed, water scarcity can be a major source of strife, as 

well as a roadblock to economic and social progress.”1

 These words, spoken 

by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, illustrate the expanding notion 

of security. Instead of viewing it through the narrow lens of traditional 

national security, the less discriminating notion of human security is gaining a 

broader acceptance in the international community. In a world full of conflict, 

identification of the causes of fighting is as important as the identification of 

who is fighting, and the conventional premises of national security are no 

longer sufficient. Environmental security is one key component of human 

security, and access to water is one of the components of environmental 

security—one that is increasingly acting as a catalyst for different groups to 

initiate hostilities, or at least as a hindrance to achieving peace and stability. 

The Middle East and North Africa highlight this trend well. In the 

Middle East, despite the present chaos that seemingly makes peace a remote 

prospect, most major parties involved at least appear to want peace. In a 

region of the world where ten years ago simply admitting your enemy even 

had the right to exist was a major concession, this desire for peace represents a 

sea change in attitude. Therefore, the prospects for the peace process to move 

forward are incontestable, albeit at a frustratingly inconsistent gait. The 

formal parties to the peace process must deal with the same familiar points—

the status of the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and West 

Bank settlements. All are thorny issues that will test even the most patient and 

skilled negotiator. However, the less visible and often unmentioned hurdle is 

water; this issue historically is the most difficult to solve, and there is little 

hope the current peace negotiations will be any different. Water and other 

natural resources are constant underlying sources of conflict in North Africa 
2

as well. The possibility of conflict occurring between Egypt and the Sudan 

over water exists, and will only be exacerbated by Egypt’s ambitious plans for 

increased use of the Nile. Moreover, Sudan’s civil war has clear roots in 

water issues. These examples fortify many analysts’ suggestions that water 

has eclipsed oil, the source of many previous conflicts, in importance. 

Ironically, the most oil-rich region of the world is a most likely candidate to 

host a war, not over the once all-important crude, but over water. 

This paper will specifically address these two case studies where 

water will either catalyze conflict or at least complicate peace. The first study 

details the significant water interests which Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, 

and Syria must address before a permanent, structured peace can be negotiated 

in the Jordan river basin. It also models how the current peace proposals 

would affect water rights, and how those new water allocations and 

parameters could create the potential for future water conflict. The second 

study examines potential conflict over the waters of the Nile River, 

specifically Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia’s water security plans/issues, and how 

they could precipitate conflict. The water issue in both regions is a 

complicated tapestry of interconnected interests and needs; while Israel, 

Jordan and the Palestinians obviously are all competing for the same water 

resources, Israel’s water concerns with Syria are complicated by the fact that 

Syria’s water shortages are being exacerbated by Turkey’s decision to dam the 

Euphrates River. Egypt could potentially alleviate some of the water 

shortages in Israel, Jordan and the Gaza strip by diverting water from the Nile, 

but that would significantly increase tensions with the Sudan and Ethiopia. 

Indeed, creating a properly managed water program in the Middle East that is 

agreeable to all parties involved will be a very complicated and delicate 

exercise in negotiations and statesmanship. 

THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN 

This section of the paper examines water issues in the in the Jordan River 

basin. This region includes several states and non-state entities: Lebanon, 
3

Syria, Israel, Jordan and the West Bank, as the Jordan (or its tributaries) flows 

through each of these countries/territories. Water shortages are a common 

theme in the history of this particular region of the world, often acting as a 

source of conflict. Today access to fresh water in the Middle East, and in the 

Jordan River basin particularly, is critical for survival—water is a lifesustaining resource that is being exploited well beyond the rate it can be 

replenished. Current meteorological, demographic, economic, and political 

trends all suggest the water situation in the Jordan drainage area will worsen, 

at least in the near term. This increasingly tense situation tempers any 

euphoria born from the reinvigorated peace process; indeed, water will be one 

of the most difficult negotiating points in the peace process and very well may 

prove too difficult to completely solve. Hence, it is critically important to 

explore the dynamic between water and the Middle East peace process. 

 To fully address this question, I will provide a brief summary of the 

recent political, economic and military events related to the water issue. Next, 

I will list the numerous variables affecting the water shortage: hydrology, 

geology, population growth, economics and a host of other factors that make 

water an especially contentious issue. I will then present a brief review of the 

principal elements of the current peace process, illustrating how water and 

conflict in the area are inextricably linked. Finally, I will forecast potential 

events that will highlight how water could derail even the best efforts of wellintended peacemakers and become a proximate cause of conflict in the future. 

Recent History 

To better understand how water can be a source of conflict in the Jordan basin, 

a summary of recent “water history” is necessary. Such a brief historical 

review will illustrate how contested the water issue has been in the region. 

 Development of water sources in the Jordan basin has been 

contentious since Biblical times, but became especially acrimonious since the 

Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British document in which Jews were 

promised a “National Home” in Palestine. The water issue was sparked then 
4

because the British declared that if the water resources of the area could be 

fully developed, at least 4-5 million Jewish immigrants could move to the area 

without displacing any of its current Arab occupants. Hence, studies on water 

distribution began to either corroborate or disprove the Balfour numbers. 

 Several water studies were conducted resulting in multiple 

comprehensive water plans and recommendations for the entire region. In 

1922, the British published the Mavromatis Plan, which was followed by the 

Henriques Report in 1928; the World Zionist Organization advocated the 

Palestine Land Development Company Plan, authored by American J.B. 

Hayes, in 1935; M.G. Ionides, an engineer and advisor to the Transjordanian 

government, published an irrigation plan in 1939. This was followed by the 

U.S.-sponsored Lowdermilk Plan of 1944 and the Anglo-American 

Committee of Inquiry’s Survey of Palestine Plan in 1946. This was the last 

major plan before the state of Israel formally came into existence in 1947, 

followed immediately by the outbreak of war.2

 While these plans did have 

scientific methodologies, their results and recommendations, unfortunately, 

were more affected by political ideology than by the data collected. If the 

author or sponsor of the study was pro-Arab, the study illustrated why the land 

could not absorb Jewish immigrants. If the sponsor was Zionist, the study 

invariably constructed a more optimistic scenario. 

After Israel won its war of independence, it unilaterally began 

developing water resources. This included draining the swamps of Lake 

Huleh in northern Israel and construction of the National Water Carrier, both 

of which enabled Israel to begin exploitation of the Jordan River headwaters. 

Arabs, outraged at the diversion of water out of the Jordan basin and into the 

Negev Desert, attempted to divert water from the Jordan River to Lebanon, 

Syria and Jordan, before it reached Israeli territory (their projects failed for a 

variety of technical and political reasons).3

 Several minor clashes, specifically 

over water diversion attempts, occurred between Jordanian, Lebanese, Syrian 

and Israeli forces. Indeed, destruction of the other camp’s water projects was 
5

the main goal in many of these small raids: Syrians ambushed soldiers 

protecting workers digging trenches to drain the Huleh Swamp in April, 1951; 

Israelis unilaterally began exploiting water sources in demilitarized zones, 

under heavy (and often used) military escort. Other minor skirmishes with 

Jordan and Lebanon occurred frequently as well. Several years later, the 

skirmishes over water escalated to include the use of artillery, mortars, and 

aircraft. In February 1964, Israel shelled a joint Syrian-Jordanian water works 

project designed to exploit water from Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea 

of Galilee). Israel launched armed raids into southern Lebanon and destroyed 

three water reservoirs in a border town on October 26, 1965.4

 

Partly because of the increase in tensions over water in the early 

1950s, the United States sent a special ambassador to the region. Eric 

Johnston was the head of the International Council of the Authority for 

Technical Assistance. He was tasked with creating a comprehensive water 

scheme for the entire region. He did so, with mixed results. All countries 

involved generally agreed upon what came to be known as the Johnston Plan. 

The plan was not signed, however, as Jordan feared such an agreement would 

necessarily entail a peace treaty with Israel. When tensions between Israel and 

Egypt increased, leading to the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Johnston plan was 

set aside. However, it became the de facto agreement that Arab powers in the 

region generally attempted to follow.5

 In the meantime, during the period 

1948-1964, no fewer than 13 water development schemes in the region were 

proposed by various organizations. Since none were fully agreed to, Israel 

finished construction of its National Water Carrier, a large water carrier which 

takes water from Lake Tiberias and the headwaters of the Jordan River, and 

pumps it to the Mediterranean littoral and the northern Negev Desert. 

Hence, although the Johnston Plan remained the de facto blueprint 

for the region for a number of years, as of 1984 Israel exploited approximately 

55 percent of the available water in the Jordan basin (the Johnston Plan 
6

allocated far less to the Israelis). This left only 45 percent for Jordan, 

Lebanon and Syria.6

Today, no comprehensive water plan currently exists, although Arab 

nations generally still refer to the Johnston Plan when discussing water rights. 

Only two ratified bilateral water arrangements exist, one between Israel and 

Jordan, and one between Syria and Jordan. I will discuss these later in the 

paper. In the absence of an agreed-upon framework, the current water 

situation is only marginally more structured today than it was in the previous 

decades. 

WATER AND CONFLICT—THE VARIABLES 

The water struggle in the Middle East arises from a confluence of variables, 

including water scarcity, rapid population growth, economic expansion, 

technological advances, poor water management, ill-defined water laws, and 

previously existing tensions. None of these variables exists in a vacuum—

each affects the others in some way, adding to the complexity of any 

comprehensive water solution in the Middle East. 

Water Scarcity—An Examination of the Water Sources in the Region 

 It is obvious that the very root of the water problem in the Middle 

East is a shortage of water. It is one of the most arid areas in the world. There 

are three natural sources of water for the subject countries to exploit: river 

waters, ground waters, and rainfall. None of these sources is abundant in the 

Jordan River basin, and what few sources do exist are all currently either fully 

(or over) exploited, or their use is prevented due to conflict. Other sources of 

water, which include recycled and desalinated water and the import of water 

from outside the Jordan basin, are too expensive, too technically challenging, 

or politically unfeasible, and therefore will not notably affect the peace 

process, at least in the near term. An examination of each of the three primary 

water sources follows. 

River Waters of the Region: There are two major river systems 

involved in the Arab-Israeli water conflict: the Jordan watershed, comprising 
7

the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, and the Litani watershed. (Although the Litani 

is not part of the Jordan basin, it is included in this discussion due to its close 

proximity to the Jordan and the political considerations surrounding it.) Both 

Jews and Arabs have claims to these river systems, many of which are 

irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. The Jordan watershed is especially 

problematic, as the majority of its headwaters originate in Lebanon, Syria and 

Jordan but are largely exploited by Israel. The Litani poses its own problems, 

despite the fact it completely originates in and flows only through Lebanon. 

Its close proximity to Israel has created ambition south of the border and 

paranoia to the north. 

 The Jordan headwaters are comprised of the Hasbani and the Banias 

rivers, which originate in Lebanon and Syria respectively. These two rivers 

converge north of Lake Hula in the northern Galilee region of Israel. The Dan 

River, which rises in Israel, joins the Jordan at Lake Hula. From that point of 

confluence, the Jordan River flows south through Israeli territory and Lake 

Tiberias. Just south of Tiberias, the Jordan is fed by the Yarmuk River, which 

originates in southern Syria, and then forms the international boundary 

between Jordan and Syria before emptying into the Jordan. The southern half 

of the Jordan, between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea, forms the 

international boundary between Israel and Jordan. Hence, water for the 

Jordan originates in all four nations, and partially forms an international 

boundary for three of them. This hydrology complicates political and 

economic considerations among these riparians. According to a study 

conducted by the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1953 under the auspices of 

the United Nations, the total estimated annual flow of the Jordan amounts to 

1880 million cubic meters of water per year (mcm/y), 77 percent of which 

originates in the three Arab countries, 23 percent of which originates in 

Israel.7

 This mixture of water origins, river flows and international 

boundaries creates a witch’s brew of problems. Over 90 percent of Syria’s 
8

water is shared with Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Jordan. Approximately 

36 percent of Jordan’s water sources are shared with Syria, the West Bank and 

Israel. More than half of Israel’s water is shared with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan 

and the West Bank. With such a complicated hydrological river system, the 

situation can be volatile. Indeed, the Jordan basin has been described as 

“having witnessed more severe international conflicts over water than any 

other river system in the Middle East...and...remains by far the most likely 

flashpoint for the future.”8

 The Litani river watershed is, geographically speaking, much 

simpler. It rises in central Lebanon, flows in a southwestern route completely 

through Lebanon, and empties into the Mediterranean Sea several miles north 

of Tyre. Hence, the boundaries of this watershed are completely contained 

within the political boundaries of Lebanon. However, this has not prevented 

its waters from being a source of contention in the region. Part of this 

problem is that the Litani has never been fully exploited by Lebanon; the extra 

water flowing unused into the Mediterranean is desperately needed by Syria, 

Jordan and Israel. Many speculate part of the reason Israel invaded Lebanon 

in the early 1980s was to secure, and then partially divert, the Litani. The 

estimated annual flow from the Litani totals 410 mcm/y.9 

Ground Waters of the Region: Syria, Lebanon and Israel all have 

indigenous underground aquifers within their political boundaries—hence, 

these particular aquifers are not directly contributing to the Arab-Israeli 

struggle for water at the sovereign state level. However, a large aquifer 

located under the West Bank symbolizes the struggle between Palestinian and 

Jew for access to water. 

Diagram 1. Jordan River Basin 
9

International Basin 

Modified from: A.H. Miller, “The Jordan River—Too 

Little for Too Many”10
10

Table 1. Jordan Flows and Originations 

Source: Thomas Naff and R.S. Matson, Water in the Middle East. 

Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1984.11 

 Ground water makes an enormous contribution to Israel’s total water 

supply—indeed, Israel uses approximately 850 mcm of ground water each 

year, accounting for just under 45 percent of its total water use.12 However, 

about 400 mcm/y of this water comes from the Mountain Aquifer (see diagram 

2, which divides this into three sections: the Western, Eastern, and 

 Source 

Country 

 Gain 

(mcm/y) 

Loss Total 

Dan River Israel 245 

Hasbani R. Lebanon 138 

Banias River Syria 121 

Jordan (in 

Hula Valley) 

 Israel 504 

Hula Valley Israel 100 

Local runoff 

In Hula 

 Israel & 

 Syria 

140 

Flow into 

Lake Tiberias 

 Israel 544 

Runoff/rainfall 

Into Tiberias 

Israel/ 

Syria 

200 

Evaporation 

From Tiberias 

 Israel 270 

Outflow to 

Lower Jordan 

 Israel/ 

 Jordan 

 474 

Yarmuk Syria/ 

Jordan 

492 966 

Wadis/Springs 

In Ghor Valley 

Jordan/ 

Israel 

505 1471 
11

Northeastern Aquifers), which lies under the West Bank and was captured 

from Jordan in the 1967 War. It flows to the Israeli littoral or into the Jordan. 

The primary way to access this water from the West Bank is to sink wells, as 

there are few natural springs directly above the aquifer. Tensions between the 

Palestinians and Jews arise primarily because Israel refuses to allow 

Palestinians to sink their own wells in the West Bank, instead insisting the 

Palestinian villages hook into the Israeli National Water Carrier (NWC). 

However, Jewish settlers in the West Bank can sink their own wells if they are 

not yet supplied by the NWC. Hence, Jews can exploit this water, but Arabs 

are not allowed to do so, creating tensions between the various occupants of 

the West Bank. This situation will be discussed further later in the paper. 

Rainfall in the Region: Rainfall is especially scarce in the Jordan 

basin, particularly in the exceptionally arid southern Negev desert in Israel. 

While northern Israel and the extreme northwest corner of Jordan receive 

approximately 110 cm of rainfall annually, for both nations rainfall accounts 

for very little of the region’s water, and therefore, does not supply any 

meaningful amount of water that can be reliably exploited. Unfortunately, the 

rain for an entire year in Israel and Jordan usually comes in one or two major 

showers. Syria and Lebanon, on the other hand, receive rainfall in enough 

amounts to aid in agriculture and some recharging of underground aquifers. 

 To better put the scarcity issue in perspective, Jordan and Israel are 

the fifth and seventh driest nations on the planet respectively, both in total 

water availability and in a per capita measurement. Only Kuwait, Libya, 

Oman and Singapore are drier.13 

Rapid Population Growth—Higher Demand for an Increasingly Scarce 

Resource 

The second greatest factor underlying water tensions in the Middle East is the 

explosive population growth in the area over the last 50 years. According to 

the Population Reference Bureau, a Washington, D.C.-based organization that 

tracks global population trends, the population of the Middle East quintupled 
12

from 60 million in 1950 to 286 million in 1996. If the current rate of 

population growth continues, the population of the region will double yet 

again in the next 30 years.15

Diagram 2. Aquifers/Ground water in the Jordan 

12

 

1

 Adapted from Assaf & al Khatib 

2

 Adapted from Assaf and al Khatib 

Table 2. Total Usable Water Availability in the Region, by Source 

 River (Surface) 

Flow (mcm/y) 

 Groundwater 

 (mcm/y) 

 Rainfall 

 (mcm/y) 

Israel 600 850.0

Jordan 1.0

Lebanon 33.0 38.0 120.0 

Syria 55.0 70.0 70.0 

West Bank 3.0 3.0

Source: World Resources Institute14
13

 Specifically within the Jordan basin, population grew at a faster rate 

than in the Middle East overall, mostly due to large influxes of immigrants. 

Syria and Jordan’s natural population growth rate is estimated at 3.7 and 3.4 

percent, respectively. While Israel’s natural population growth is only 

estimated at 1.5 percent, the continuing influx of Jewish immigrants, 

especially those from Russia, caused the real annual population growth to be 

closer to 10 percent since 1987.16 Additionally, hundreds of thousands of 

Palestinians moved to Jordan from Kuwait after the Gulf War, further 

increasing the population of one of the most water-scarce nations in the world. 

 As populations increase, the per capita water availability decreases. 

Population growth in the Middle East is on a trajectory to reduce per capita 

water availability approximately 50 percent by the year 2025.17 Indeed, a 

World Bank Report in 1993 stated, “within one’s lifetime, annual average per 

capita renewable [water] supplies—excluding so-called ‘fossil’ aquifers in the 

Arab region—will have fallen by about 80 percent.”18 The outcomes of this 

increasing gap between supply and demand lead to land and water 

degradation, disruptions in the hydrological cycle, an increase in water-born 

illnesses, and other maladies—all of which will increase insecurity and the 

likelihood of conflict. 

Table 3. Population/per capita water availability

(population in thousands, water in cm/year) 

 Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria 

1955 1,748/ 

1,230 

1,447/ 

905 

1,613/ 

3,087 

3,967/ 

6,501 

1990 4,821/ 

461 

4,259/ 

308 

2,555/ 

1,949 

12,348/ 

2,089 

2025 8366/ 

247-303 

9369/ 

104-114 

5621/ 

1,021-1,248 

27,165/ 

713-835 

2050 12,549/ 

192-300 

11,500/ 

68-90 

8431/ 

768-1,218 

40747/ 

454-667 

Sources: Falkinmark, World Resource Institute19

Swedish hydrologist and Population Reference Bureau scientist 

Malin Falkinmark developed an index to measure the adequacy of water 
14

supplies. Her guidelines, which can be compared to the chart above, are: 

Stress: 1,000-1,700 cm/y, Scarcity: 500-1000 cm/y, and Absolute Scarcity: 

below 500 cm/y. By these standards, the table suggests Israel and Jordan were 

in the lowest “absolute scarcity” category as early as 1990 in per capita water 

availability, with projections suggesting that even that meager supply could be 

almost halved in the next 25 years. To put this in better perspective, as of 

1995, the annual per capita water availability in the United States was 9,413 

cubic meters—30 times that of Jordan and 25 times that of Israel.20 

Rapid Economic Development—Increasing Pressures of Water Usage 

Despite recurring war and perpetual tension, Middle East economies have 

enjoyed significant development in the last 25 years. While the benefits of 

such development are unquestionable, the new pressures placed on scarce 

water resources are significant. 

It is important to note the majority of this growth occurred in the 

industrial sector of these economies; such industrial growth creates increasing 

competition for water, which is already being used for domestic or agricultural 

purposes. Although increasing populations require more food, little growth in 

the agricultural sectors of these economies (with the exception of Syria) 

occurred, especially in the last decade. In fact, agriculture constituted 18 

percent of Jordan’s GNP in 1965, but only 6 percent by 1993.21 This is mostly 

because all the water sources available in the region were already fully 

exploited, preventing any further irrigation of arid lands. Moreover, all lands 

that do not need irrigation are already fully planted. Hence, growth in these 

economies is naturally in the non-agricultural sectors: in Israel, high-tech 

industries are springing up in the Haifa region. Indeed, industrial use of water 

is projected to continually increase in the Middle East; while it constituted 

eight percent of total water use from 1986 to 1993, it is projected to be as high 

as 14 percent by 2000 and 37 percent by 2025.22 

This increasing industrial use of water creates problems. While 

industrial uses of water contribute much more to a nation’s gross domestic 
15

product than do agricultural uses of water, industrial run-off is much more 

difficult to treat and often ends up polluting other sources of water, such as 

aquifers and streams. This is especially true of areas where water 

infrastructure is not well developed, as in the Middle East. Hence, pollution 

of water sources will be increasingly problematic. 

Increases in economic growth also typically lead to greater 

urbanization; over half the Middle East now lives in urban areas where people 

consume 10-12 times as much water per capita as village dwellers.23 For 

example, in 1960, approximately 35 percent of Jordan’s population lived in or 

around the capital of Amman; in 1991, that figure reached 55 percent, and it is 

projected to be nearly 60 percent by 2000.24 In 1996, the entire Jordan basin’s 

population was 63.4 percent urban, with that number likely to increase 

significantly in the coming decade. Thus, economic development created and 

will continue to drive greater per capita demands for water. Hence, these last 

two variables (increasing population and a growing economy) create a 

synergistic spike in water demand. 

Table 4. Water Use as a Percentage of Total Use 

Sources: World Resources Institute, 1992; Central Bureau of Statistics, 199825 

Technology Enables Greater Water Exploitation 

Modern technology gives humans the ability to alter their natural environment, 

which is now happening at an unprecedented level and in unprecedented ways. 

Specifically with water exploitation, technology allows the construction of 

irrigation canals, dams and deeper wells. As with economic development, this 

 Domestic Industrial Agricultural 

Israel 29 7 64 

Jordan 29 6 65 

Lebanon 11 4 85 

Syria 7 10 83 

West Bank 22 0 78 

Gaza Strip 15 0 85 
16

has both good and bad outcomes. Certainly, the increasing capability to 

develop previously unusable water with dams and aquifer construction 

allowed the population of the Middle East to expand, increased regional crop 

yields, improved sanitation, and enhanced other quality of life factors. 

However, this technology is a two-edged sword. Dams create large 

reservoirs, creating higher water loss due to increased evaporation. Large 

irrigation projects waste water through inefficient watering. Deeper wells 

extract larger amounts of groundwater, lowering water tables. Lowered water 

tables allow saltwater seepage, in turn causing increased salinization of the 

water table, permanently rendering it unusable. 

 All these scenarios exist in the Jordan basin. Indeed, water 

exploitation in the Gaza Strip has caused the salinity of the water table there to 

reach almost unusable levels. Each year 140 mcm are pumped out, while the 

natural annual return is approximately 60 mcm.26 Water projects, to include 

Israel’s National Water Carrier and Jordan’s East Ghor Canal, are typical of 

large water projects which increase evaporation rates. Water usage has so 

altered the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers that the Dead Sea (the final basin where 

the Jordan flows) has dropped by approximately 50 feet in the last 80 years, 

and its total surface area has shrunk by nearly 40 percent.27 The Jordan is 

little more than a rivulet by the time it drains into this ever-shrinking body of 

water. Hence, technology has enabled the population of the region to exploit 

water beyond the point of sustainability. 

Unequal Distribution of Water 

Water rights and allocation is, and always has been, a great source of 

contention. From the very beginning of Israeli statehood, securing as much 

water as possible for one’s own state or territory was synonymous with 

survival and denying the enemy water was a way of undermining his strength. 

Under present water distribution schemes, a very visible disparity in water 

consumption exists that favors Israel. This is a source of tension both at the 

international level and between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank. 
17

The construction of the National Water Carrier allows Israel to pump 

approximately 500 million cubic meters per year of high-quality sweet water 

out of the headwaters of the Jordan and Lake Tiberias.28 Indeed, this 

represents the lion’s share of the irrigation-quality water in the Jordan. This 

water, which represents roughly one quarter of Israeli total consumption each 

year, is completely removed from the Jordan watershed, and pumped to 

consumers in the Mediterranean littoral and the northern Negev. 

This water diversion represents a double blow against Arab water 

interests in the area. First, by removing water from the headwaters of the 

Jordan, the flow of high-quality water into Lake Tiberias is lowered. This 

reduces the quality of water in the lake, from which both Jordan and Israel 

pump additional water. There are salt water belts under and around Lake 

Tiberias, which, when the level of the lake got below a critical level in the 

1980s, began discharging into the lake itself, further reducing the quality of 

the lake’s water. Israel responded to this by tapping the salt springs and then 

pumping the saline drainage water downstream to dump it back into the 

Jordan, where it enters Jordanian territory. Again, since the flow out of Lake 

Tiberias is reduced, already increasing the salinity of the Jordan below it, the 

addition of this saline drainage into the Jordan significantly reduces the quality 

of water Jordan can exploit out of that section of the river. Thus the injury is 

two-fold: Jordan receives much less water from the Jordan River than does 

Israel, and the water it does receive is so high in salt content it is only 

marginally useful, even for irrigation.29 

Ironically, Israel makes water claims on the Yarmuk (Jordan’s 

primary river water source) as well, since the Yarmuk is the primary tributary 

to the Jordan. This further reduces Jordan’s water claim. Indeed, with the 

severe drought in the region over the past two years, Israel is attempting to 

reduce the amount of water Jordan can claim from the Yarmuk from 55 mcm/y 

to 27 mcm/y.30
18

Within Israel and the occupied territories, the uneven distribution of 

water is obvious as well. In the 1980s, water consumption among Israeli 

settlers in the West Bank was seven times that of the Arab inhabitants.31 

Recently, Mustafa Natsheh, the mayor of Hebron, indicated the disparity was 

eight times as much.32 Western sources suggest a smaller, but still enormous, 

four-fold difference: Israeli settlers consume between 90-120 cubic meters 

per capita per year, while Palestinians consume 25-35 cubic meters per year.33 

Furthermore, Israel forbids Arabs living in the West Bank from drilling their 

own wells or developing any other water resources in an attempt to rectify the 

consumption imbalance.34 Indeed, while this ban is in place, Israeli settlers, 

using the latest technology to drill deep into the aquifer, are exploiting the 

West Bank aquifer at a rapid rate. Should a political settlement giving the 

Palestinians control of the West Bank ever be agreed upon, the Mountain 

Aquifer in the West Bank will be already over exploited, which will make it 

difficult for the Palestinian Authority (which currently does not have access to 

the same drilling technology Israel has) to supply adequate water for the 

remaining residents of the Territories. 

Additionally, Palestinians pay up to twice as much for water as Israeli 

settlers—when water is made available to the Palestinians. Some camps in the 

West Bank have not had water for months. One 7000-member refugee camp 

depends on a water supply provided by the United Nations, which has run for 

just two hours a day since April. Hebron has to truck in water for its 100,000 

residents.35 This creates bitterness and tension between Jews and Arabs, 

especially when water supply is tight, as it has been in the last two years. 

Poor and Difficult Water Management 

Water management in the Jordan basin is problematic for two main reasons. 

The first is the difficulty in exploiting the only outside water that enters the 

region naturally—rain. Although rains in the area are seasonal, they are very 

unpredictable. The majority of the rain typically comes in the winter months, 

leaving the hot summer months with little to no precipitation. Moreover, the 
19

rains are often irregular and localized, making their capture and exploitation 

nearly impossible. Thus, while Jordan and the West Bank receives on average 

20 mcm/y of rainfall a year, only 3 mcm/y of that amount can be captured and 

utilized, because it comes in only one or two rainfalls. Furthermore, due to the 

extreme arid nature of the region, high evaporation and transpiration rates 

diminish the amount of rain that can be used. 

 On a strategic level, none of the countries under discussion use their 

water efficiently. Israel, Syria and Jordan all insist, as a matter of national 

policy, that they need to be self-sufficient in food production. Thus, to 

paraphrase the first Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, they try to make the 

desert bloom, despite the extraordinarily heavy water burden this creates. 

 Israel uses 1180 mcm (62 percent of total supply) and Jordan uses 67 

mcm (74 percent of total supply) for agriculture. Because the agricultural 

lobby is so strong in both governments, each heavily subsidizes water. While 

both nations have done much to increase the efficiency of their irrigation 

methods (indeed, Israel was a pioneer in the development of drip irrigation 

technology, and boasts only a 12 percent loss during irrigation36), the 

contribution of each nation’s agricultural sector to GNP have steadily declined 

over the years. In 1993, only 2.6 percent of Israel’s and only 6 percent of 

Jordan’s GNP was generated by agriculture.37 These figures suggests that 

while both Israel and Jordan are improving their water efficiently within their 

agricultural economic sectors, a more appropriate overall water strategy would 

be to import more food and transfer the newly available water to efficient 

industrial and domestic uses. This would not only boost GNP (a ton of water 

used in industry typically generates $14,000, while a ton of water in 

agriculture typically generates $1,00038), but would also leave additional water 

for inevitable future population growth in the region. Interestingly, due to the 

perceived vulnerabilities both nations argue would exist due to the resulting 

food dependence, such a change in strategic water management is highly 
20

unlikely. The political clout of the agricultural sector in each nation also 

prevents any significant reduction in subsidies. 

International Law—Muddling the Issue 

Existing international law regarding water sources shared among multiple 

sovereign states is vague and does not apply well to developing areas. The 

majority of international water law was developed in Europe and is concerned 

mostly with navigation rights and water purity, rather than water availability.39 

Hence, international law provides little concrete guidance to the Jordan basin 

riparians. 

 Two conflicting legal principles exist concerning international fresh 

water laws: sovereignty and integrity. Absolute sovereignty is advantageous 

to the upstream riparians as it regards water as an integral part of a state’s 

national territory. This doctrine states “Territorial sovereignty is the 

sovereignty applied to a specific country or basin, the right to make decisions 

with regard to his country or basin without having to consult other countries 

and their citizens.”40 Downstream riparians who may object to the way the 

upstream riparians are developing common water sources are considered to be 

meddling in the internal affairs of the sovereign nation where the water 

originates. This is the principle Turkey used to create the massive reservoir 

behind the Attaturk Dam in 1989. Despite earlier guarantees of a constant 

flow of water, Turkish President Turgut Ozal rattled Syria and Iraq by 

deciding to hold back the flow of the Euphrates for a month. Indeed, in 

November 1998, Syria threatened to bomb several of the smaller dams that 

make up Turkey’s Grand Anatolia Project (GAP), a massive hydrology project 

that reduced the Euphrates’ flow by approximately 60 percent. The Turks 

responded that the water originating within their national borders was as much 

theirs as oil within the boundaries of Arabic nations belongs to the Arabs. If 

Arabs, despite having used the waters of the Euphrates for centuries, wanted 

to make a water claim against Turkey for the GAP, then Turkey would have 

the right to make oil claims against downstream Arab riparians. 
21

 The second legal principle is that of absolute integrity, which focuses 

on the integrity of the body of water rather than the sovereignty of the state 

where the body of water originates. This legal doctrine states “A river which 

flows through the territory of several states or nations is their common 

property.... Neither nation can do any act which will deprive the other of the 

benefits of those rights and advantages. The inherent right of a nation to 

protect itself and its territory would justify the one lower down the stream in 

preventing by force the one further up from turning the river out of its course, 

or in consuming so much water for purposes of its own as to deprive the 

former of its benefits” (italics added).41 This principle obviously favors the 

downstream riparians. 

 When these two principles come into conflict, they do not permit a 

reconciliation of interests—indeed, they are mutually exclusive. Historically, 

the outcome of such a conflict of legal principles is dependant on a single 

factor—which state advocating a particular doctrine is stronger. 

 The Jordan basin is very complex legally speaking and would be so 

even if well-developed water laws existed. As mentioned earlier, the lion’s 

share of the Jordan River’s water rises outside of Israel, in Lebanon or Syria. 

Israel, through military action, subversion, and negotiation, has been very 

successful in preventing any attempted diversion of these waters before they 

enter Israeli territory. This allows Israel’s National Water Carrier to extract 

almost 70 percent of the Jordan River after it enters Israel, but before it 

reaches a point where the Palestinians in the West Bank can exploit it. Indeed, 

in 1967, Israel shelled a joint Syrian/Jordanian dam on the Yarmuk River, as it 

viewed the dam as a threat to its water supply. Both situations illustrate Israeli 

reliance on the absolute integrity principle—despite the water originating 

outside its political borders, Israel makes a claim to the water. However, when 

addressing Palestinian complaints of not leaving enough water in the West 

Bank aquifer or Jordanian complaints of needing more water flowing out of 

Lake Tiberias, Israel follows the principle of absolute sovereignty. Hence, 
22

Israel is implementing both (albeit contradictory) legal principles to maintain 

its share of water. 

 The matter is even more complicated than this. Of the approximately 

1,950 mcm/y of water Israel uses annually,42 roughly 950 mcm/y, or 48 

percent, comes from territory Israel captured during the 1967 war: 400 mcm/y 

from ground water in the West Bank and 450 mcm/y from the upper Jordan. 

Depending on the legal status of the Occupied Territories and the Golan 

Heights, the legal status of water ownership becomes even murkier. As later 

discussion will point out, the current possibilities of returning the Golan to 

Syria and granting greater autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank will 

greatly increase the contention of which population can legally exploit those 

950 mcm/y of water. 

 As noted, only two international water agreements exist in the region: 

the Jordanian-Syrian Agreement on the Utilization of the Waters of the 

Yarmuk River (signed in September 1987) and the water provisions in the 

Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan (signed in October 1994). Lebanon 

has no water treaties with any of its neighbors, and the two most bitter 

enemies in the region, Syria and Israel, have no bilateral water agreements. 

Because of the complicated nature of the water system in the Jordan basin, 

creating more than bilateral agreements is difficult. Also due to the 

complicated nature of the water system, a comprehensive water agreement 

among all four nations is necessary to achieve a lasting solution to the water 

crisis in the area. 

Previously Existing Tensions 

Water use is simply one of many tensions between the peoples of the Jordan 

River basin. It has been the primary source of conflict in the past, as both 

Arab and Jew have attacked the other’s water infrastructures based on 

perceived threats. It has also been the proximate source of conflict, as many 

Arab analysts claim one of the overriding reasons for Israel to go to war in 

1967 was to capture additional water sources.43 But even if there were 
23

adequate water sources in the Middle East, there would still be plenty of 

reasons for conflict to exist. As Israeli hydrology professor Uri Shamir stated 

for National Geographic, “If there is political will for peace, water will not be 

a hindrance. If you want reasons to fight, water will give you ample 

opportunities.”44

 The loss of water sources to Israel seems to be a national shame to 

Palestinians, Jordanians and Syrians. Priit Vesilind, a reporter for National 

Geographic, conducted a series of interviews in 1993 throughout the Middle 

East to gauge sentiment on the water issue. A Syrian border official in the 

Golan Heights stated in 1993, as he pointed to an Israeli flag flying across the 

demilitarized zone, “See that flag? Those blue stripes represent the Nile and 

Euphrates. The Israelis think this is where their land should extend, all the 

way from Egypt to Turkey. And they are working to get this area.” Abdullah 

Toukan, the science advisor to the late King Hussein of Jordan suggested, “In 

this arid region water is life. Money may bring desalination plants, but the 

real solution remains the restoration of Jordan’s rightful share of water.” 

Palestinian elder Shaher Khufash, living in the village of Marda in the West 

Bank, once stated, “Israel has stolen our water, and we are thirsty.” Despite 

the fact Israel built National Water Carrier infrastructure to the village, the 

village elders refused to hook up to Mekorot, Israel’s national water supplier. 

“Doing so means accepting them and their confiscations. Also, they say we 

have to pay for the water then. The people refuse.”45 It seems from these 

limited statements that at least some believe the solution to current water 

shortages isn’t to make sure everyone has enough water; rather, it’s to make 

sure your enemy doesn’t have any water. 

 Until recently, Israel maintained a security zone in southern Lebanon. 

Katyusha rockets, fired by Hizbollah extremists, slammed into northern Israel 

regularly until the Israeli pullout in June 2000. Israeli tanks still practice 

maneuvers in the Golan Heights, anticipating a Syrian attack. Syria will not 

even discuss peace with Israel unless Israel comes to the negotiating table 
24

willing to return the Golan Heights. A peace treaty between Israel and Jordan 

was signed only 5 years ago; water rights were the last issue to be agreed 

upon, and are among the main issues threatening to undermine the otherwise 

workable pact. And although the Camp David Accords sealed a peace treaty 

between Israel and Egypt decades ago, the peace is an uneasy one. In this 

environment of mutual distrust, terrorist organizations, occupation zones, 

demilitarized zones, occupied territories and a history of a major war every 

decade since 1947, there is little wonder progress on such things as 

cooperation in water use hasn’t received more attention. 

THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS AND WATER 

While the Knesset frequently debates the necessity of a regional water 

solution, Israeli policy makers have generally chosen to “go it alone” in terms 

of water management. Without a formal regional peace agreement, a formal 

regional water solution would be exceptionally difficult, despite the numerous 

and varied attempts. With Israeli economic and military might unchallenged 

in the area, the unilateral water policy Israel pursued could not be challenged 

by the Arabs. However, the current peace process, if successful, will change 

that—Israel’s “imposed” water solution to the region cannot survive. 

While the details of the current peace plans between Israel, the 

Palestinians and Syria are not fully available, the most important issues are. 

Israel is willing to return land for peace. Prime Minister Barak of Israel 

appears willing to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights to Syria, and to 

give greater autonomy (and possibly allow the Palestinians to declare 

statehood) in the West Bank. These actions will have significant ramifications 

for the balance of water in the region. A discussion of each follows. 

Return of the Golan Heights 

By returning the Golan Heights to Syria, Israel will relinquish its nearly 

exclusive control over the headwaters of the Jordan River. This is a major 

sacrifice, one that Israel, after reviewing its implications on the water 

situation, may not be willing to make. According to Thomas Stauffer, a 
25

former professor at both Harvard and Georgetown Universities, Israel’s 

control of the Golan is significant to its water supply for three reasons:46

 First, control of the Golan prevents Syria, Lebanon and Jordan from 

developing the headwaters of the Dan, Banias, and Hasbani Rivers. In the 

1960s, these three nations developed their own unified water plan that 

essentially would divert water from these rivers before it ever entered Israeli 

territory. As mentioned earlier, Israel bombed these areas to prevent such a 

plan from ever reaching fruition. Relinquishing the Golan Heights now would 

at least strategically allow these three nations to pursue development of those 

headwaters. Should the Levant Arabs choose to do so, a significant reduction 

in water to the upper Jordan, and consequently to Israel, would result. 

 Secondly, Israel has expressed an interest in including the Litani 

River in southern Lebanon in any regional water plan. Indeed, some articles 

suggest Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s was to secure the Litani for 

itself; the 15-year maintenance of the security zone only fed those fears. 

Control of the Golan protects Israel’s flank should she ever decide to divert 

Litani waters to the Hasbani River, thus increasing the flow of water into the 

headwaters of the Jordan. While this is highly unlikely under Prime Minister 

Barak (it would require re-occupation of southern Lebanon in order to regain 

access to the Litani), a more hawkish Israeli government might, in the future, 

seriously consider such a plan. By giving up the Golan now, any such action 

by the Israelis becomes much more difficult. 

 A third factor in giving up the Golan is the protection of the inlets of 

the National Water Carrier and the pumping stations from possible 

bombardment of Syrian artillery. Again, this scenario is unlikely in the 

current political climate, but there is no guarantee this climate will continue. 

Should Syria place military forces on the Golan; the entire Hula Valley and 

Lake Tiberias would be in range of Syrian artillery. 

 In short, giving up the Golan will make Israel vulnerable to Arab 

designs on Jordan River water, complicate any future Israeli water designs on 
26

the Litani, and expose Israel’s northern tip once again to Syrian military 

forces. No doubt, this will be a major point in the negotiations between Israel 

and Syria. Indeed, the most contentious (and last) issue to be agreed upon in 

the peace talks between Israel and Jordan in 1994 was the creation of a Joint 

Water Committee to develop additional water resources on the Yarmuk River. 

The Yarmuk is much less significant to Israel than are the feeder rivers to the 

headwaters of the Jordan, which will likely make this aspect of any peace 

agreement especially difficult. 

Increased Palestinian Autonomy in the West Bank 

Israeli hegemony in the West Bank is crucial to Israel’s water supply. As 

previously mentioned, approximately 400 mcm/y of water from the West 

Bank aquifers feed into Israel’s National Water Carrier. Additionally, Israelis 

have, and must continue to preempt local use of the Mountain Aquifer so that 

the water continues to flow to Israeli surface water sources along the coast, 

rather than be siphoned off by residents of the West Bank drilling wells. 

Should Palestinian wells be sunk in the West Bank, the aquifer could quickly 

be exploited to the point Israeli springs in the Mediterranean littoral would go 

dry, or at least experience significantly decreased flows. 

 Additionally, there is the concern of water pollution. Palestinian 

water projects are primitive compared to Israeli standards. What little 

agriculture they do have uses inefficient irrigation techniques, and the black 

market wells that do exist add to the pollution of the aquifer. Indeed, some 

sewers in the West Bank simply empty straight into the aquifer. Should the 

Palestinian Authority (in whatever form, be it an autonomous controlling 

authority or the national government of the state of Palestine) take more 

control of the water sources in the West Bank, the Israeli springs and wells fed 

by the West Bank aquifers will almost certainly become more polluted. 

 Immigration would also pose a significant impact on the water 

situation if Palestinians assume control in the West Bank and their people are 

allowed to return home. Approximately 2 million Palestinians live around the 
27

world—a de facto Palestinian diaspora. Should a Palestinian State become 

reality, these 2 million people would have a politically recognized homeland 

based on their ethnicity. Just as Israel encouraged millions of Jews to 

immigrate after declaration of statehood (in not too dissimilar circumstances) 

in the last five decades, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, both in the 

refugee camps in Jordan and in the Palestinian diaspora, may decide to move 

to the West Bank. Such an influx of new residents would create an incredible 

strain on an already marginal water supply. Assuming Kliot’s assessment 

(previously quoted) that each Palestinian consumes approximately 25-35 cubic 

meters of water per year, 1 million Palestinian immigrants to the West Bank 

would create an immediate additional need of 25-35 million cubic meters of 

water per year—a demand for which there is currently no supply. 

Israeli Withdrawal from the Security Zone 

Israel’s withdrawal from the Security Zone in Lebanon now makes it 

extraordinarily difficult for Israel to make any claims on the Litani River in 

the future. Indeed, increasing populations in both Israel and the West Bank 

may make this an eventual necessity; however, without Israeli hegemony (if it 

ever really existed) in southern Lebanon, such exploitation of the Litani would 

most likely need to come about through negotiations rather than force. 

Peace, the 1967 War and Conquered Water 

The 1967 War vastly increased Israel’s supply of water. The possible loss of 

this water due to territorial concessions would create a crisis in Israel—a crisis 

that would be exceptionally difficult to solve. There is no new water in the 

Jordan basin area that is waiting to be developed. As early as 1981, Israel was 

exploiting 99 percent of its available water. Drought, like in the early 1980s 

and since 1997, has forced Israel to critically examine the value of the water it 

does use. War in 1967 made up the water deficit Israel needed in order to 

continue to expand economically and agriculturally, as well as to continue 

absorbing Jewish immigrants. The peace process strongly suggests Israel will 
28

now have to share that water it once conquered. Israel has no means to 

acquire new water to replace what it gives up in the peace process. 

This factor alone will be one of the most contentious issues on the 

negotiating table. Any peace with the Palestinians must address increased 

water rights for West Bank Palestinians. A sovereign West Bank would 

complicate further exploitation of the Jordan. The waters of the Golan 

Heights, while not important to Syria prior to the 1967 War, are now 

increasingly significant due to Turkish exploitation of the Euphrates River. 

Hence, Syria will be very reluctant to share any water originating from the 

Golan with Israel should a peace treaty be signed. Negotiating these water 

issues will be extraordinarily problematic. 

In sum, Israel’s imposed water solution to the Jordan basin cannot 

survive the peace process unless Israel is ready to abandon its agricultural 

sector. Only by thinking in terms of a regional water solution will Israel be 

able to meet current water demands and effect peace in the region.

Table 5. Significance of Water Captured by Israel in 1967 War 

Source: Stauffer, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 199647
29

 Table 6 dramatically depicts the water challenge Israel would face by 

returning territories occupied in the 1967 War. It is important to note that this 

is available water, currently used and exploited. The following chart shows 

how much total water Israel would lose control of, should the Golan and the 

West Bank be returned. 

FUTURE WATER CONFLICTS 

Conflict over water in the Jordan basin remains possible, despite the current 

prospects for regional stability. As demand shows no sign of slowing and 

new supply is not available, in the near-term, the water situation can only 

become more critical. Indeed, the return of the Golan and loss of the West 

Bank aquifer would have profound effects on the geohydro-political structure 

of the Jordan basin. 

Theoretical Framework to Analyze Potential for Conflict 

The Middle East Research Institute has directed an on-going international 

study of water in the Middle East since 1984. The 13-volume set includes a 

theoretical framework from which one can roughly predict the potential for 

conflict. To simplify the data, the authors constructed a matrix that predicted 

the relative power and conflict potential in the Jordan basin. This matrix was 

constructed on three factors: perceived water need, power, and riparian 

position. These factors were then added to get a total that tentatively reflects 

the relative strength of the individual riparian (see Table 7). 

According to the model, the greatest potential for conflict exists when 

a lower riparian is a more powerful actor than the upper water controlling 

riparian and perceives its water needs to be deliberately frustrated. 

Additionally, the model suggests that a significant geohydro-political inhibitor 

to conflict is when the uppermost riparian is the most powerful actor in an 

international river basin. 

The peace process will create the first condition and remove the 

second condition, setting up the most likely scenario for conflict in an 

international river basin. Israel, having withdrawn from the security zone in 
30

Lebanon, and if it gives up much of the headwaters to the Jordan by returning 

the Golan to Syria, would essentially become a lower riparian state on the 

Jordan River. The power differential between these three nations is enormous, 

thus satisfying the requirements for the most unstable river basin arrangement: 

that of a lower riparian being more powerful than the upper riparians who 

control the water source. Hence, the peace process, at least according to this 

theoretical construct, will structure the Jordan River basin in such a way as to 

maximize the likelihood of conflict in the future. 
31

Table 6. Jordan Flows/Originations, Post Peace Process 

Source: Naff and Matson, 1984. Modified by author, 200048

Notes: * Although the Hasbani and Banias originate in Lebanon and Syria 

respectively, Israel’s control of the Golan allows Israel to exploit them. Both 

these rivers run almost exclusively through the Golan before they flow into the 

Jordan. Hence, the loss of the Golan would prevent Israeli exploitation and 

(geographically, at least) enable Lebanon and Syria to begin exploitation of 

these headwaters prior to their flow into Israel. 

** From the loss of the West Bank. 

 Source Country 

Pre/Post Peace 

Gain 

(mcm/y) 

Loss Total Israeli 

Loss 

Dan River Israel to Syria 245 245 

Hasbani R. Lebanon 138 138* 

Banias River Syria 121 121* 

Jordan River 

(in Hula Valley) 

 Israel 504 

Evaporation in 

Hula Valley 

Israel 100 

Local runoff 

In Hula 

 Israel/Syria to 

 primarily Syria 

140 Approx. 

100 

Flow into 

Lake Tiberias 

 Israel/ 

 Syria 

 544 

Runoff/rainfall 

Into Tiberias 

Israel/ 

Syria 

200 

Evaporation 

From Tiberias 

Israel 270 

Outflow to 

Lower Jordan 

 West Bank/ 

 Jordan 

 474 

Yarmuk Israel/Syria/ Jordan 492 966 

Wadis/Springs 

In Ghor Valley 

Jordan/Israel to 

Jordan only 

505 1471 505** 

TOTAL ISRAELI LOSS OF WATER CONTROL 1109 1109 
32

Table 7. Relative Power as a Measure of Conflict Potential 

 Perceived 

Need 

Military 

Power 

Riparian 

Position 

Total 

Israel 5 9 5 19 

Jordan 5 2 2 9 

Syria 3 3 2 8 

Lebanon 1 0.5 2 3.5 

Source: Frey, 199249 

Specific Indicators of Potential Conflict Over Water 

While a theoretical framework is certainly helpful in assessing the potential 

for conflict in a given region, it does little to actually help predict when that 

conflict will occur. Given the hydro-political situation in the Jordan basin, 

and knowing what specific factors contribute to the current water crisis, it is 

possible to forecast some specific indicators of impending water conflict. At 

least three specific developments could occur which would, once again, create 

conditions ripe for interstate conflict over water. 

High level of Palestinian Autonomy/Sovereign State in West Bank 

Any increase in Palestinian authority in the West Bank will proportionally 

increase tensions with Israeli settlers. The greater the authority and autonomy, 

the more likely clashes will occur between Palestinians and Jews. While the 

rise in Palestinian authority will be the prime reason tensions and the 

possibility of conflict will increase, water would be a very convenient and 

likely proximate cause of any outbreak of violence. Indeed, as many Israeli 

settlers in some way depend on local water infrastructure instead of 

exclusively on the National Water Carrier, any attempt by Palestinian 

authorities to directly curtail the West Bank Israelis consumption of water—or 

increase their own consumption to the detriment of the settlers—is likely to 

synergize a conflict. 

This is a very likely outcome of the peace process. Skirmishes 

between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the West Bank are likely to be local 

and contained should the Palestinians simply increase their authority over 

water. Again, water would not be the primary source of conflict—rather, any 
33

perceived control or superiority by Palestinians over Israelis would be the 

primary source. Water is simply a likely catalyst that would ignite nationalistic 

passions. 

However, full-blown Palestinian statehood may cause much more 

widespread violence. Declaration of a Palestinian state will, without a doubt, 

cause a great deal of consternation among many Israelis, especially those who 

may have to move out of the West Bank, either by choice or coercion. Any 

remaining Israeli settlers would be subject to a sovereign Palestinian 

government, which at the very best would treat the Israelis and Palestinian 

citizens equally. There is no reason to believe this equality would not include 

water allocations. Hence, Israeli consumption of water would be cut by at 

least 75 percent (assuming Western sources are the most accurate concerning 

the distribution of water in the West Bank), possibly by as much as 88 percent 

(assuming Arab sources are the most accurate). However, if Israelis are not 

treated equally with Palestinians, their water supply may very well be cut 

completely. In either case, conflict throughout the West Bank between Israeli 

settlers and Palestinians should be assumed. 
34

Massive Immigration from the Palestinian Diaspora to a New 

Palestinian State: As previously mentioned, the creation of a sovereign 

Palestinian state may result in massive immigration to the West Bank. If only 

half of the Palestinian diaspora moves to the West Bank, an immediate 

additional need of 25-35 mcm of water would exist. This would quickly 

deplete the already damaged West Bank aquifer and the Jordan River, in turn 

creating a need for new water resources outside the region within a few years. 

Additionally, the underground flow of the West Bank aquifer to springs in the 

Israeli littoral would be significantly reduced, further curtailing Israeli water 

supplies. The remaining flow of the Jordan would also need to be shared 

between the Palestinians and Jordan. In essence, the artificially introduced 

and very sudden increase in population would put a tremendous strain on 

already faltering water resources. 

 Such a strain on these resources probably would not result in largescale conflict between Israel and the newly created Palestinian state. 

However, general tensions in the region would rise. An independent 

Palestinian State would be dependent on Syria, Jordan and Israel to ensure 

adequate flows from the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers to get their necessary water 

supplies from the Jordan River. Jordan and Palestine would need to come up 

with a water sharing agreement for the Jordan River, an agreement that would 

almost by definition reduce Amman’s already meager supply of water. A 

nascent Palestinian state would have no military power, only traces of 

economic influence, and very little economic clout. Syria and Jordan, not just 

Israel, may not see it in their best interest to be generous with such a scarce 

resource. Hence, the tension would not be just between Arab and Jew, but 

between Arabs as well. Immigration would thus only add to the difficulties of 

the region and despite the added manpower, leave the Palestinians less able to 

fight for their share of water. 

Government Elected in Israel that is not Pro-Peace. Prime Minister 

Barak, should he return the Golan to Syria and in some way reduce Israel’s 
35

access to West Bank water, will be making Israel vulnerable in a variety of 

ways, to include creating a significant need to find new sources of water. 

Should the variety of options for bringing additional water to the Jordan basin 

prove unfruitful (such as massive desalination projects, bringing water from 

Turkey and/or Egypt, building a canal from the Sinai to the Negev, etc.), water 

will likely come to the forefront of Israeli politics. The Israeli agricultural 

community, long very powerful in Israeli politics, will withdraw support from 

the Barak government, as agricultural subsidies would most likely be one of 

the first casualties of water shortages. A candidate and political party who 

vows to recapture the water that a pro-peace Labor coalition “gave away” to 

the Arabs could very well replace the Barak government. Such developments 

would strongly suggest state-level conflict is much more likely. 

 This scenario is largely conjecture and requires a series of specific 

events to occur, but is still certainly within the realm of possibility, especially 

considering the Knesset’s (Israeli Parliament’s) several attempts to pass a vote 

of no-confidence against Barak following his participation in the unsuccessful 

Camp David II Accords. While this is the most unlikely of the possible roads 

to conflict, it is also the most dangerous, as it would include the conscious 

decision of the Israeli government to enter into conflict with other sovereign 

Arab states to regain water lost to the peace process. 

SUMMARY OF MIDDLE EAST WATER CONFLICT 

Water has always been a source of contention in the Middle East, and the 

current peace process will not change that. Indeed, all of the contributing 

factors that caused the water situation in the region to reach critical 

proportions are becoming worse, not better. While the Barak government 

certainly has good intentions in creating a lasting peace in the region, 

overcoming the water question may be the most contentious issue faced by 

both Arab and Jewish negotiators. Even if a peace agreement is reached in the 

next year, continuing (and worsening) water shortages may cause the 
36

negotiated peace to fail; indeed, demographic changes directly resulting from 

the peace process may serve to increase water tensions in the region. 

 Israeli courage in considering the return of occupied territories is 

remarkable. By giving back these territories, Israel will create a tremendous 

water burden, as well as make itself more vulnerable to Arab water 

exploitation at Israel’s expense. All these factors highlight the urgent need to 

develop a regional water strategy that is accepted by all parties in the Middle 

East. Whether these strategies include the introduction of outside water to the 

Jordan basin, technological advances (such as extensive desalination, large 

increases of water reuse from domestic and industrial waste, etc.) or a 

decrease in agricultural use in water, cooperation among all the actors in the 

Jordan basin is absolutely critical. The peace process, as difficult as it may be, 

is the first step towards that cooperation. 

NORTHEASTERN AFRICA 

The Nile River shares some of the same conflict-inducing characteristics as 

the Jordan. It, too, is an international river basin, as it runs through 10 

different sovereign nations. Just like the Jordan Basin, a large and growing 

population depends on its waters—40 percent of Africa’s population lives in 

the Nile Basin. The Nile River is the only significant source of water in one of 

the driest regions in the world. Furthermore, the population and water 

distribution in the Nile basin is such that Egypt consumes the vast majority of 

the flow, but contributes no water to the river. Indeed, according to the 

Strategic Studies Institute, 86 percent of the Nile waters originate in Ethiopia, 

while Egypt uses a remarkable 99 percent of the water supply.50 These 

factors, along with others, create a variety of possibilities that could lead to 

conflict. 

Two different types of conflict could erupt over Nile waters—

internal, civil conflict, and state against state conflict. Internally, water 

continues to fuel the civil war in Sudan, and indeed appears to be bringing 

other parties into the civil war. Water could precipitate traditional state-
37

versus-state conflict in the region as well. The governments of Ethiopia, 

Sudan, and Egypt all could be brought to the point of conflict over Nile 

redistribution issues. 

INTERNAL CONFLICT OVER NILE WATERS 

Few wars are ever fought in the name of their real causes: instead they are 

fought under old banners and old slogans, based on memories of past conflict. 

Because these memories fade so slowly, they obscure from the valiant 

warriors the possibility that they might be fighting for reasons no longer 

relevant or valid and even, on occasion, against their own interests. Recent 

strife in the Nile Basin is a case study of such misdirection.

 There are a variety of internal issues among the various Nile Basin 

states that can and have caused war: ethnic strife, hunger, religious 

differences, and the effects of post-colonial political structures have all 

contributed to violence in the region. However, upon closer examination of 

many of these internal conflicts, environmental degradation is not far below 

the surface. While access to resources (which are becoming increasingly 

scarce due to environmental damage caused largely by a perennial state of 

conflict in Africa) is not yet the obvious or stated source of many of these 

conflicts, it certainly is a contributing cause. Indeed, many of the conflicts 

occurring now may be fought in the name of identity (race, religion, etc.), but 

the underlying issue is resource scarcity. 

 Internal conflicts in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, and other Nile basin 

riparians can in some way be traced to resource shortages. However, the 

ongoing civil war in Sudan best illustrates how water is a definite source of 

conflict in the basin. 

Civil War and Conflict in Sudan 

 Such stated versus real cause misdirection is at least partly 

responsible for Sudan's current civil war. Most fighters on both sides remain 

convinced that the war is all about ethnicity, cultural identity and religion; 

however, access to key resources, primarily water, is a primary source of the 
38

war. Sudan is such a vast country that for long periods most Sudanese tribes 

were able to live in their homelands in relative isolation from each other, free 

to develop their own cultural values and norms. Only when forced to move 

from their traditional habitats by reason of ecological degradation or political 

coercion did they have to confront alien cultures and peoples. These points of 

contact between strong ethnic identities, whether Arab or African, created 

friction and raised the potential for low or high intensity conflict. 

 The ecological division in Sudan is between North and South. The 

North, densely populated with Arab Muslims, is arid. While the Nile River 

Diagram 3: Map of Sudan 

 Source: CIA World Factbook, 2000 

flows through the North, it is largely beyond the drainage basins of the feeder 

streams and rivers that consolidate themselves into the White and Blue Niles 

further to the south, and which converge in Khartoum, the capital. The South, 
39

lightly populated, is much wetter, receiving adequate rainfall as well as 

enjoying many feeder streams and springs scattered throughout the area. 

Hence, the Arabs are “water have-nots,” while their fellow “citizens” to the 

south are African “water haves.” 

While the civil war is a continuing if sporadic feature in Sudan, the 

current conflict is being exacerbated by water and land. Due to a significantly 

changed environment (persistent drought and desertification) and the need to 

increase food output (to feed a burgeoning population and increase grain 

exports as part of an International Monetary Fund package), the northern 

Arabs began looking south. Indeed, mechanized farming, which is still very 

foreign to southern villagers, began replacing huge swaths of savannah and 

forest in areas where Southerners once subsisted. Furthermore, Egypt is 

continually pressing Sudan for more water from the Nile to feed its own 

exploding population. Hence, the current civil war in Sudan is fueled by the 

need to take land and water from the Southern Sudanese—a political decision 

that transcends any cultural, ethnic or religious difference. 

Many of the fighters in the South, primarily organized under the 

Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), have attacked a variety of Northernintroduced projects in the last 30 years, most notably the canal digging 

equipment at the Jonglei Canal project and the large mechanized farming 

schemes. Both the canal and the farming projects must be examined, as they 

go to the heart of the current conflict—the need for more water. 

The Jonglei Canal project was started primarily for two reasons—

drain the Sudd Swamps to create more farmland, and conserve the 

approximately 4000 mcm/y that is assessed to be lost through evaporation in 

the swamps. The project, first envisioned at the turn of the century, was 

actually started in 1978 as a joint Sudanese-Egyptian project, working with a 

French company. For northern Sudan, since the adoption of mechanized 

farming and heavy irrigation in the mid-1970s, water has become the limiting 

factor for agricultural expansion. Additionally, draining the swamps would 
40

theoretically create a “breadbasket” of fertile land for farming. Finally, Egypt 

desperately wanted the additional water represented by its half share in 

Jonglei. 

The Jonglei was one of the most researched and debated 

hydroprojects in Africa. Averaging 210 feet in width and 16 feet in depth, it is 

large enough to be seen from space. Conspicuous through its absence, 

however, was any serious discussion of how draining the Sudd wetlands 

would affect the local residents—the approximately 1.7 million tribespeople 

that depend on the swamps for their existence. The fear of loss of water 

during the dry seasons, loss of fish in the swamps, introduction of foreign 

peoples to the area, and rumors that Egyptian farmers would settle in the canal 

area sparked riots in the southern city of Juba in November 1974. They 

voiced their opinions loudly through violence, as many southerners flocked to 

the SPLA. Despite the protests, the Sudanese government decided to go 

through with the project, sparking many violent attacks on the construction 

sites by the SPLA’s swollen ranks. The Canal project was forcibly suspended 

in 1984 due to continual SPLA attacks, having completed 250 km of the 360 

km length of the canal.52

Water became an issue in the violence aimed at the spread of 

mechanized farming in the South as well. The fertile savannah plains of 

acacia trees and tall grass were also where the Arab-dominated Sudanese 

government envisioned Sudan’s new “bread-basket.” More predictable rains 

make these plains suitable for a variety of crops; however, the traditional 

Sudanese crops, such as sorghum, millet, maize, sesame, groundnuts and 

cotton, require vast swaths of land. The huge expansion of large-scale 

mechanized farming, which constantly devoured new land, spread into 

southern Kordofan and the northern parts of the Upper Nile provinces. The 

owners of the mechanized farms, having exhausted vast tracts of the north, 

pushed inexorably southwards into the area inhabited by the Nilotic tribes, 

who ran the major cattle economies of the South. Having seen how the locals 
41

were squeezed off their land when mechanized farming arrived, Southerners 

were hostile to this incursion, and their response was violent.53

 Another conflict between the Sudanese government and its people 

rises from the decision by the Sudanese government to build the Kajbar 

Dam on the Nile. The resulting reservoir would require the relocation of the 

last core concentration of Nubian tribes in the Sudan. This decision has 

created a flurry of protests, threats, and low-intensity conflict, as the 

Nubians see the necessary relocation resulting in a diffusion and eventual 

extinguishing of their unique culture and language. Members of the Nubian 

Alliance (representing communities in Sudan's Northern State) are 

threatening mass suicide to protest the taking of their lands. These peoples 

were adversely affected four times this century by dams, most notably 

Egypt’s construction of the Aswan. This project flooded much of the 

Nubian homeland along the Egyptian and Sudanese border, causing many of 

the indigenous peoples to relocate to other areas. Despite the current 

protests, threats and petitions, Sudan's government seems determined to 

proceed with the project and it has announced that it would compensate and 

resettle those affected by the dam; however, the Nubian people have refused 

the offer.54 A mass suicide would undoubtedly be marked by violent 

protests, by both the Nubian “diaspora” in Khartoum and by those Nubians 

who would wish to strike a blow against what they see as an oppressive 

government. 

EXTERNAL (STATE AGAINST STATE) VIOLENCE 

As mentioned earlier, Egypt is the mega-consumer of all Nile River water, 

despite contributing no measurable water to the river. Historically, culturally, 

and politically the Nile is synonymous with Egypt. However, upstream 

riparians are now beginning to compete with Egypt for the precious waters. 

Egypt and Sudan have long had contentious relations over water. 

The low point this century between these two nations is arguably in the 1950s, 

when Egypt began building the Aswan High dam. This project flooded areas 
42

near Wadi Halfa, displacing some Sudanese residents, to include the Nubian 

population previously mentioned. 

The resulting consternation over which nation got a greater share of 

the Nile, who would pay for reparations for the displaced Sudanese citizens, 

who would pay for hydroprojects, and a variety of other concerns helped 

midwife the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959. 

Diagram 4. Egypt 

Source: CIA, Atlas of the Middle East, 1993 

This agreement is the benchmark for division of the river between 

Egypt and the Sudan. In it, Egypt’s annual allotment is 1.9 trillion cubic feet 

of water annually, while Sudan is allocated 648 million cubic feet. The 
43

remaining 8 riparians did not get any allocations, as they refused to recognize 

the agreement.55

However, the Nile Waters Agreement is quickly becoming overcome 

by events, with both Egypt and Sudan indicating they need greater amounts of 

water to continue economic development and to feed their ever-increasing 

populations. As will be discussed later, Ethiopia will also become a 

significant country in Nile water use in the coming decade. 

 Egypt in particular has begun a massive project just south of the 

Aswan. Currently, the Nile covers just 4 percent of Egypt’s landmass, but 

hosts 95 percent of Egypt’s population of some 65 million people. With that 

population growing at 1 million residents every eight months,56 overcrowding 

is one of President Mubarak’s major domestic challenges. To solve this 

problem, he has looked to the desert and ordered construction of the New 

Delta Project in southern Egypt and a “peace pipeline,” named the Salaam 

Canal, in the Sinai Peninsula. Smaller projects include digging a series of 

wells and irrigation ditches along an old caravan route, and developing oases 

in western Egypt. The Associated Press graphic (see diagram 6) illustrates 

these ambitious plans.57 

 While these hydro-projects will enable Egypt to disperse its 

population and increase its ability to grow greater amounts of food, it does so 

by increasing its allotment of water from the Nile River. Indeed, Egypt’s 

ambitious plans are running headlong into future projects Sudan and Ethiopia 

have for the Nile River. 

As previously mentioned, Sudan plans to build the Kajbar Dam on 

the Nile north of the capital, Karthoum, where the Blue Nile and the White 

Nile converge before flowing into Egypt.58 This promises to reduce the flow 

of the Nile into Egypt by a still undetermined amount. Additionally, 

Khartoum plans to build a second dam, the Merowe dam, on the Nile south of 

the Kajbar dam, in addition to adding 10-foot embankment on the Roseires 

Dam, located 300 miles southeast of Khartoum on the Blue Nile. According 
44

to Sudan’s Irrigation and Water Minister, Sharif al-Tahami, the two new dams 

and modified Roseires Dam would only give Sudan “complete storage of its 

share of the Nile,”59 and not exceed its allotment. Despite Tahami’s 

assessment, Sudan’s and Egypt’s projects will result in both states likely 

exceeding their water allocations from the 1959 agreement. It is still unclear 

how this issue will be resolved. 

Diagram 5. Irrigation Plans for Egypt 

Source: CIA, Atlas of the Middle East, 1993. Modified by author. 

However, the more important, longer-term concern is Ethiopia’s 

plans for the Nile. Ethiopia recently emerged from a long period of civil war 

and famine and entered into a period of accelerated growth and economic 

development. While the wasteful war with Eritrea stunted that development 

temporarily, Ethiopia’s need for additional water to fuel her population and 
45

economy will continue to grow. The government has overseen the 

construction of more than 200 small dams that will use nearly 500 million 

cubic meters of the Nile's flow annually.60 Additional dams are being planned 

to increase the country's irrigation and hydropower capacity. Though 

Ethiopia's current development plans will require only a small portion of the 

Nile's water, its potential demands could significantly reduce the river's flow 

into Egypt. Ethiopia has an estimated 3.7 million hectares of land, an area 

larger than Belgium, which could be irrigated.61 With a population nearly the 

size of Egypt's and a faster annual rate of population growth—3.2 percent 

annually for Ethiopia versus 2 percent for Egypt—Ethiopia will need to 

develop a large portion of this land for agricultural use.62 Irrigating only half 

this land area with water from the Nile could reduce the river's flow to Sudan 

and Egypt by 15 percent. Hydrologists doubt the basin produces enough 

renewable fresh water to satisfy the irrigation plans of both Ethiopia and 

Egypt. 

The Egyptian government has long recognized upstream 

development of the Nile's waters as a potential national security threat and has 

stated its willingness to go to war to preserve its access to fresh water. Indeed, 

former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, then acting 

as the Egyptian Foreign Minister, stated “The next war in our region will be 

over the waters of the Nile, not politics.”63 Indeed, the Egyptian High Military 

Command has prepared contingency plans for armed intervention in each of 

the countries around the Nile basin in case of a direct threat to the flow of the 

river.64

Applying the Middle East Research Institute’s (MERI) theoretical 

framework for measuring the potential for state-on-state violence in an 

international river basin, the Nile basin provides yet another example of the 

future likelihood of war. While the feeder streams and rivers originate in a 

total of 10 countries, for the purposes of this study, only 3 countries are 
46

currently projected to exercise enough influence over the Nile Basin in the 

next 20 years to be significant: Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. 

Table 8. Relative Power as a Measure of Conflict Potential, Current 

 Perceived 

Need 

Military 

Power 

Riparian 

Position 

Total 

Egypt 9 7 9 25 

Sudan 3 4 5 11 

Ethiopia 2 2 1 5 

Table 8 is the author’s assessment of how these states fit the MERI 

framework. Currently, Sudan’s military spends approximately $550 million 

annually on their military, compared to Ethiopia’s $138 million; nearly a fourfold difference. However, Sudan’s military is largely equipped with outdated 

Soviet weaponry, lacks professionalism, and is continuously beaten down by a 

better-equipped, better-trained, and more motivated SPLA. Sudan’s 

population of 59 million is growing at a 2.7% annual rate, compared to 

Ethiopia’s 61 million growing at a 3.2% rate. Finally, Sudan’s gross domestic 

product, as measured in purchasing power parity, is $31.2 billion, compared to 

Ethiopia’s $32.9 billion.65 Hence, Sudan can roughly be considered twice as 

powerful, based mostly on the much larger military outlays; economic and 

population figures are currently close enough to not significantly affect the 

military power comparisons. Egypt, with both Soviet and US weapons, a 

$3.28 billion annual military budget, regular training with US military forces, 

and a population of 67.2 million, is clearly stronger than either Sudan or 

Ethiopia.66

If Egypt were to execute offensive measures to ensure its current 

flow of what most would consider its more than “fair share” of Nile water, 

neither Sudan (embroiled in a civil war) nor Ethiopia (just exiting from a civil 

war, a prolonged drought, a war with Eritrea, and geographically distant from 

Egypt) would have the military capability or the political will to defend 

themselves from Egypt. Both countries are much more likely to appeal to the 
47

international community for aid in food, power, and other sources of aid, as 

any military action against Egypt with the current power dyads would be 

futile. Hence, the likelihood of armed state versus state conflict in the short 

term between any of these riparians is low. 

Table 9. Relative Power as a Measure of Conflict Potential, 2010 

 Perceived 

Need 

Military 

Power 

Riparian 

Position 

Total 

Egypt 9 7 9 25 

Sudan 6 2 5 13 

Ethiopia 6 4 1 11 

However, once all three countries finish their ambitious water 

projects along the Nile, a different hydro-political situation emerges (see Table 

9, above for the author’s projection of relative power by 2010). Egypt will 

continue to be significantly stronger, both militarily and economically, than 

either Sudan or Ethiopia. However, the situation between Sudan and Ethiopia 

becomes problematic. Should peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea hold, 

Ethiopia will likely surpass Sudan in military power for a variety of reasons. 

The civil war in Sudan shows absolutely no sign of resolution, which will 

continually sap Khartoum of military resources. Indeed, some analysts are 

suggesting the SPLA is gaining the upper hand, which will ensure a steady 

erosion of military readiness of the Sudanese military.67 Additionally, Sudan 

will continue to be on the U.S. State Department’s list of nations who support 

terrorism in the near future, thus earning it economic sanctions and weapons 

purchasing difficulties. Juxtaposed is Ethiopia with hard cash to pay for 

modern weapons. Indeed, from January to July of 2000, Ethiopia spent over 

$300 million on weapons—over twice it’s normal annual amount in half the 

time. Addis Ababa reportedly bought up to 210 T-55 tanks from Bulgaria, 

field guns and multiple rocket launchers from China, Mi-8 transport 

helicopters, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and Su-27 fighter-bombers from Russia. 

Additionally, an ammunition factory apparently was built in the capital to fuel 
48

the improvident war against Eritrea.68 Sudan has no such military luxuries, 

has no patron states to provide them free of charge, and has little chance of 

reversing its economic fortunes in the next decade. Hence, Sudan’s military 

power will continue to erode, while Ethiopia’s will improve. Despite the 

changes in the power dyads of these three riparians, Egypt will remain 

dominant—threatened neither by a weakened Sudan nor a strengthened 

Ethiopia. 

The potential for conflict in the Nile River thus becomes one between 

Ethiopia and Sudan. A variety of scenarios could develop. Recalling that 86 

percent of the Nile originates in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa could significantly 

affect the flow of water into Sudan. A reconstituted Ethiopia, recovered from 

the war with Eritrea and with a continually growing economy, could feel safe 

enough from Egypt simply through geographic distance, and strong enough to 

rebuff Sudanese efforts, politically, economically, or militarily, to stem the 

flow of the Blue Nile. It is important to note Ethiopia is not a party to the 

1959 Water Agreement, and is therefore not obligated by treaties to allow 

certain amounts of water to flow out of her borders. Should Ethiopia adopt 

the absolute sovereignty paradigm of international water law, as has Turkey, 

Addis Ababa would be justified (at least according to the government’s 

internal analysis) to retain as much water as technically possible. Hence, 

feeling relatively safe and immune from external pressures and without legal 

bindings from treaty or law, and with a burgeoning population and growing 

economy both in acute need of more water, Ethiopia could consider herself 

free to act as she thought appropriate. 

Ethiopia would probably be correct in feeling safe through her 

geographic separation from Egypt. While Egypt is unquestionably the most 

powerful state of the three, Cairo cannot project her military might beyond 

states along her borders, especially to deter a drought-prone Ethiopia from 

exploiting more of the abundant river water running off its western mountains. 

Egypt is much more likely to resort to political and economic pressure than 
49

military might. However, in an area of Africa that is rife with guerilla and 

proxy conflict, the border between Sudan and Ethiopia is highly suitable for 

surrogate warfare. Sudan could easily train and equip a rebel-like group, 

whose ranks are filled from a spectrum of possible fighters, from disaffected 

Ethiopian tribes to Sudanese regular soldiers. These groups could, with little 

difficulty, infiltrate the unguardable border, and conduct missions ranging 

from destroying the small dams along the Blue Nile (thus freeing additional 

water for Khartoum) to destabilizing the Ethiopian government, or at least act 

as leverage against Addis Ababa in water negotiations. Given Khartoum’s 

history of supporting guerilla groups in other countries to push its political 

causes, historical support of terrorism, and a weakened military, it is unlikely 

for Sudan to use conventional forces to initiate an openly state-versus-state 

conflict. 

However the scenario unfolds, the wildcard in future conflict in the 

Nile Basin is, at least according to this theoretical framework, Ethiopia. She is 

the unquestionable upstream riparian, is projected to have an unspecified but 

significantly expanding need for water, and will increase and probably surpass 

Sudan in economic and military strength in the coming decade. If the 

immediate downstream riparian, the Sudan, perceives its water needs being 

frustrated by an emboldened Ethiopia, conflict could result. 

However, with populations rapidly growing in the area, another 

specter looms—internal dissent in all three nations, as citizens increasingly 

question the ability of their governments to meet a basic need—providing 

enough water. 

Unfortunately, while numerous studies exist regarding the Nile in 

Egypt and Sudan, the level of study and amount of data outside these two 

countries is insufficient to make sound policy suggestions. Unlike the Jordan 

River basin, which has been the subject of numerous comprehensive 

hydrological studies since the beginning of the 20th Century, studies 

concerning the Nile Basin headwaters remain relatively scarce. It is in the 
50

headwater regions that data is most needed. Regrettably, data is unlikely to be 

available in the near future; persistent violence in those areas prevents any 

long-term, in-depth studies to determine the sources and amounts of flow that 

originate in each of the headwater states. 

SUMMARY OF NORTHEAST AFRICA WATER CONFLICT 

Various groups have already fought one another over access to water in the 

Nile River basin. Thus far, the violence has been confined to internal strife 

between various ethnic groups or an ethnic group against the government. No 

significant state-versus-state fighting has occurred between the 10 riparian 

states of the Nile basin over water rights. However, that is largely because the 

resources of the Nile have never been stretched to the point of breaking, but 

this point is now quickly approaching. 

 The likelihood for continued civil conflict over water, especially in 

Sudan, is high. However, it is quite unlikely that the United States or the 

United Nations would become involved in Sudanese internal matters. 

Moreover, the states with the greatest potential for conflict, Sudan and 

Ethiopia, do not have the means or will to do so at present. Still, that could 

change in the coming decade. Hence, the United States and the United Nations 

are not likely to be called upon to resolve a Nile conflict in the near term, but 

may be called upon to enter the Nile basin, perhaps in a peacekeeping or 

enforcing role, in latter part of the decade. 

POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

 The international community is taking human security, and thus 

environmental security, more seriously each year. Most notably Canada, 

Australia, New Zealand, and Norway are leading the way in arguing for these 

new notions of security, focusing on the security of the individual that ignores 

international boundaries, rather than the traditional state-centric focus on 

security issues. It is no coincidence that the latter three states mentioned 

suffer from environmental problems: ozone depletion in Australia and New 
51

Zealand, and radioactive fallout from Chernobyl in Norway. It is only a 

matter of time until more states, to include the United States and Canada, are 

more significantly affected by global environmental matters. While the U.S. is 

slowly moving away from a state-centric notion of national security (as 

evidenced by the 1999 White House National Security Strategy document, 

which indicated disease and a degraded environment are US security 

concerns69), it needs to do so more quickly and become more fully engaged in 

human security efforts around the world. 

 The theoretical framework used in this paper, developed by the 

Middle East Research Institute, is a valuable (although simplistic) first step in 

developing predictive tools where the environment could contribute to 

conflict. By measuring riparian position, perceived need, and military 

strength, a security analyst can quickly approximate how a government may 

assess its abilities to use force against another state over water issues. A stable 

situation exists where the most powerful state is also the state that controls the 

headwaters of an international river basin. The most unstable situation exists 

where the strongest state controls none of the headwaters, but feels its water 

needs are being aggravated by a weaker (and thus easily defeated) upstream 

riparian. 

Whether or not this model is completely accurate is secondary to the 

fact that the theory it represents highlights the importance of water issues in an 

international river basin. Water is an international issue and thus, water 

programs should not be developed unilaterally. With water demand on the 

rise and water supply waning, water programs need to be developed on a 

basin-by-basin level at a minimum. 

In the Jordan river basin, water is a traditional source of conflict, and 

promises to be even more contentious in the future. Currently, Israel is the 

undisputed power in the region and controls most of the headwaters of the 

Jordan. However, Israel has already withdrawn from its security zone in 

Lebanon. If it also returns the Golan Heights to Syria, Jerusalem will no 
52

longer control the majority of the Jordan headwaters. To exacerbate the 

situation, any Palestinian state in the West Bank would challenge Israel’s 

exploitation of the aquifer below. The peace process would thus take the 

Jordan Basin from the most stable to the least stable situation according to the 

theory. 

The Nile Basin is similar in many ways, with each likeness adding to 

the central problem: a rapidly increasing water demand coupled with a 

decreasing water supply. Egypt is the undeniable power in the basin—so 

powerful, currently no nation can or will challenge Egypt’s claim to Nile 

waters. However, with Ethiopia’s increasing population, expanding economy, 

and growing military capability, Addis Ababa may feel it necessary and 

possible to start keeping more of the Blue Nile for herself, which would likely 

trigger a conflict with her western and immediate-downstream neighbor, 

Sudan. 

While the water issues described above are certainly not global in 

nature, they are international. Decisions made by the Turkish government 

concerning the flow of the Euphrates will affect Egypt’s decisions on water 

uses for the Nile. As such, a truly comprehensive water plan, including the 

waters of the Tigris, Euphrates, Litani, Jordan and Nile Rivers must be 

negotiated by all 15 states involved. Until an international agreement and 

cooperation on these disputed waters is in place, the potential for conflict and 

violence will remain high. As such, it is imperative that international 

organizations such as the United Nations have a role in such agreements. 

Since the U.S. is already playing a key mediation role in the Middle East 

peace processes in addition to having Israel, Egypt and Turkey as strategic 

allies, Washington should necessarily be involved in any international water 

agreement in the region. 

Such a cosmopolitan approach to water management is appropriate. 

Like air, water is truly a global, common resource—actions of one nation 

concerning a river (be they benevolent or harmful) will necessarily influence 
53

the actions of neighboring states. Currently, the United Nations, various aid 

organizations and environmental interest groups follow water issues. 

Applicable UN issue areas include Sustainable Development, Human 

Settlements, Social Development , Humanitarian Affairs and Environmental 

Programs, although there is no single international body for water governance. 

The creation of such a body would aid development of international water 

law, mediation of international water disputes, and provide a forum for 

educating underdeveloped regions on ways to conserve water as well as tackle 

the other issues presented in this paper. It might also moderate the dozens of 

other potential water conflicts around the world. 

 It is important for any organization involved in promoting peace and 

stability in this region of the world to understand the growing significance of 

water. With a fixed supply and a skyrocketing demand, access to this 

fundamental resource will become increasingly important to governments and 

populations. Developing expertise in water management is the first step in 

cultivating the skills to negotiate conflicts where water is an issue, and it will 

be the cornerstone of any attempt to create a comprehensive water plan. The 

scientific, economic, geographic, sociologic and political communities need to 

focus increasing attention on developing data, models, theories and histories 

of water use and needs. The United States and United Nations ought to 

encourage such efforts. 

 The United States should also take a leading role in promoting the 

spread of water-saving technology. For example, because Egypt continues to 

rely on traditional ditch irrigation, it uses far more water than is necessary to 

grow its food. Should Egypt adopt Israeli-developed drip irrigation, the 

agricultural demand for water would decrease by orders of magnitude. This 

would free up tremendous amounts of Nile water for other uses and for other 

states, thus reducing tensions. Furthermore, the U.S. should encourage both 

U.S. and foreign firms to develop desalinization technology and promote its 

use around the world. While Saudi Arabia leads the world in desalinized 
54

water use, it is still economically unviable for most regions. Israel is 

developing new techniques to desalinate water that is less costly, but it is still 

not cheap enough for widespread use. Finally, the U.S. should encourage the 

sharing of energy-saving technology in order to reduce the need to build dams 

for hydroelectric power. By allowing lesser-developed states to “leapfrog” to 

more efficient energy infrastructures, the need to alter rivers and water usage 

for energy-related purposes could be avoided. 

Peace depends on satisfied states and populations, generally free of 

external coercion or threat. Adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care and 

education are key components to keeping populations healthy and satisfied. 

These are the basic components of human security. At the very core of each is 

the need for water. The more contentious this basic component for life 

becomes, the more likely populations will fight over it. And it is becoming 

very contentious indeed. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Albright, Madeleine. Remarks at Event Sponsored by the World 

Resources Institute and National Defense University in Recognition of Earth 

Day, Fort Lesley J. McNair. April 10, 2000, Washington, D.C. 

http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000410.html (as of 10 August 

2000) 

2. Kally, Elisha. Water and Peace: Water Resources and the ArabIsraeli Peace Process (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 5-13. 

3. Drake, Christine. “Water Resource Conflicts in the Middle East.” 

Journal of Geography. (Jan/Feb 1997), 4-11. 

4. Paul, David. “Water Issues in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” 

http://www.salam.org/palestine/water.html. (as of 10 August 2000) 

5. Kally, 16-19. 

6. Hassan Bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan. Address to International 

Arab/Israeli Water Symposium, Amman, Jordan, 25-26 February, 1994. 

7. Main, Charles T. “The Unified Development of the Water Resources 

of the Jordan Valley Region.” Prepared at the request of the United Nations 

under the direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Boston, 1953. 

8. Anderson, E. “Water: The Next Strategic Resource.” The Politics of 

Scarcity: Water in The Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1988), 3. 
55

9. Halawani, Salah. “Lebanese Development Projects and Israel’s 

Pursuit of the Litani and Hasbani Waters.” Israel and Arab Waters: An 

International Symposium. (London: The Arab Research Center, 1984), 53. 

10. Miller, A.H. “The Jordan River—Too Little for Too Many.” Global 

Seminar, on-line. http://www.seagrant.wisc.edu/Advisory/Water_Seminar/ 

Jordan_River/jordan_r.htm#Watershed. (as of June 1999) 

11. Naff, Thomas and R.S. Matson. Water in the Middle East (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1984). 

12. Stauffer, Thomas. “Water and War in the Middle East: The 

Hydraulic parameters of Conflict.” (Washington, D.C: The Center for Policy 

Analysis on Palestine, 1996), 9 

13. World Resource Institute, Annual Global Environmental Data on 

CD, 1992. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Population Reference Bureau, 1996 World Population data sheet, 

Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, Inc, 1996 

16. Hoch, Gary. “The Politics of Water in the Middle East,” Middle 

East Insight, Volume IX, No. 3, (March-April 1993), 20. 

17. Sadik, Abdul-Karim, and Shawki Barghouti. “The Water Problems 

of the Arab World: Management of Scarce Resources,” Water in the Arab 

World—Perspectives and Prognosis (Boston: Harvard University Press, 

1994), 2. 

18. World Bank, Water Resources Management: A Policy Paper, 

Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 1993. World Bank. World 

Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment. (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1992). 

19. Falkenmark, M. and C. Widstrand, Population and Water 

Resources: A Delicate Balance (Washington, D.C. Population Reference 

Bureau, 1992). 

20. World Resource Institute, World Resources 1996-97 Database. 

Washington, D.C. 

21. Dombrowsky, Ines. “The Jordan River Basin: Prospects for 

Cooperation Within the Middle East Peace Process?” Water in the Middle 

East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation (Berlin: 

Springer,1998), 96. 

22. Sadik and Barghouti, 5. 

23. Drake, 5. 
56

24. Rogers, Peter. “The Agenda for the Next 30 Years.” Water in the 

Arab World—Perspectives and Prognosis (Boston: Harvard University Press, 

1994), 293. 

25. Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of Israel. Statistical 

Abstract of Israel. http://geography.miningco.com/gi/dynamic/ 

offsite.htm?site=http://www.cbs.gov.il/engindex.htm. 1998. 

26. Kally, 52. 

27. Andersson, Hilary. “Dead Sea in Danger.” BBC Online Network, 

Aug 29, 1999. http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle%5Feast/ 

newsid%5F392000/39242.stm 

28. Stauffer, 4. 

29. Stauffer, 7. 

30. Harman, Danna. “Jordan: Israeli Decision to Cut Water Supply Casts 

Suspicion on Peace Process.” Jerusalem Post. March 18, 1999. 

31. Hassan Bin Talal, 1984. 

32. Adams, Paul. “West Bank Water Row.” BBC Online Network, Aug 

26, 1999. http://news2thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle%5Feast/ 

newsid%5F158000/158955.stm (as of Oct 1999) 

33. Kliot, Nurit. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East

(London: Routledge, 1994). 

34. Drake, 11. 

35. Adams, Ibid. 

36. Hoch, 21. 

37. Dombrowksy, 96. 

38. Brown, Lester R. and Brian Halweil. “China’s Water Shortage Could 

Shake World Food Security.” The Worldwatch Institute, Vol. 11, No. 4 

(1998), 10-11. 

39. Barandat, Jorg, and Aytul Kaplan. “International Water Law: 

Regulations for Cooperation and Discussion of the International Water 

Convention.” Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects 

for Cooperation, (Berlin: Springer,1998), 14. 

40. Berber, F.J. Die Rechtsquellen des Internationalen 

Wassernutzungsrechts, Muenchen, 1955, 13. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Stauffer, 9 
57

43. Schimda, Leslie. “Israeli Water Projects and their Repercussions on 

the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Israel and Arab Water (New York: Ithica, 1984), 

28. 

44. Vesilind, Priit J. “Middle East Water—Critical Resource.” National 

Geographic, Volume 138, No. 5. (May 1993), 48. 

45. Ibid, p. 60-62. 

46. Stauffer, 8. 

47. Ibid, 12. Used with permission. 

48. Naff, Thomas and Frederick Frey. “Water: An emerging Issue in the 

Middle East?” Annals. American Association of Political Science. Vol. 431. 

Special issue, November 1985. 

49. Frey, Frederick. “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation 

Over International River Basins.” Conference on Middle East Water Crisis. 

May 7-9, 1992. Waterloo, Ontario. 

50. Strategic Studies Institute. Conference Brief: “Natural Resources and 

National Security Policy: Sources of Conflict and U.S. Interest.” 8 May 

2000. Washington, D.C., 2. 

51. NASA Space Shuttle Earth Observatory Database, as illustrated in 

the Southwestern Bell WorldRoom webpage. http://worldroom.tamu.edu/ 

mideast/photos/51g-46-001.html(as of 10 August 2000) 

52. Abi-Aad, Naji and Grenon, Michel. Instability and Conflict in the 

Middle East (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1997). 

53. Ibid. 

54. Environmental Defense Fund. Online. http://www.edf.org/programs/ 

international/dams/africa/c%5Fkajbar.html. 7 Oct 99 

55. Markus, Amy Docker. “Water Fight.” Wall Street Journal, 22 

August 1997. 

56. World Population Prospects Database. Washington, D.C. 1996. 

57. CNN. Online http://cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9910/30/sudan.peace/(as 

of 10 August 2000) 

58. Markus, Amy Docker. “Water Fight.” Wall Street Journal, 22 

August 1997. 

59. “Power Short Sudan Seeks Finance for New Dams.” Rueter News 

Service, June 4, 1998. 

60. Ibid. 
58

61. Postel, Sandra. Dividing the Waters: Food Security, Ecosystem 

Health and the New Politics of Scarcity. Washington, DC: Worldwatch 

Institute, 1996. 

62. World Population Prospects Database. Washington, D.C. 1996. 

63. Sunday Nation, 10 Jan 1988. 

64. Abi-Aad and Grennon, 144. 

65. CIA’s World Factbook, on-line. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 

factbook/country.html#e(as of 10 August 2000) 

66. Ibid. 

67. “Confluence of Crisis Hits Sudan.” Stratfor online, July 12, 2000. 

http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/0007122202.htm(as of 10 

August 2000) 

68. “The Ethiopian Offensive: Where does it End” Stratfor online, 

February 9, 2000. http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/020999.asp (as of 10 

August 2000) 

69. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House. 

3. December, 1999. 

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