United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to the Honorable 

Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senate

March 1998 DEPOT

MAINTENANCE

Lessons Learned From

Transferring Alameda

Naval Aviation Depot

Engine Workloads

GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278920 

March 25, 1998

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison

United States Senate

Dear Senator Hutchison:

This report responds to your request that we review the readiness

implications of moving critical maintenance workloads from closing

military depots to remaining depots. Specifically, the report addresses the

problems, readiness implications, and lessons learned associated with

moving the engine maintenance workloads from the closing Alameda

Naval Aviation Depot to the Jacksonville Naval Aviation Depot and the San

Antonio Air Logistics Center.

We briefed your staff on the results of our work on November 18, 1997.

This report summarizes and updates the information presented at that

briefing.

Background The Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s July 1993

recommendations for base closures and realignments included closing

three of the Navy’ six aviation depots. One of these was the Alameda Naval

Aviation Depot, California. Accordingly, the maintenance workloads

performed at those facilities were redistributed to remaining depots

operated by the Navy and other services. The Alameda depot performed

maintenance on the TF34 turbine engine, used by the Navy on the S-3

aircraft and by the Air Force on the A-10 aircraft, and the Navy’s version of

the T56 turbine engine used on C-130, P-3, and E-2 aircraft.

The Alameda workload for the TF34 engines was transferred to the

Jacksonville Naval Aviation Depot, Florida, and the T56 engine workload

was added to the existing Air Force T56 workload at the San Antonio Air

Logistics Center, Texas. The transition of maintenance capability to these

facilities began in June 1994 and was completed by May 1996.

Results in Brief The transfer of Alameda’s depot maintenance workloads to the

Jacksonville and San Antonio depots was not executed in the most

efficient manner. Both receiving depots experienced production delays

and increased costs, but they could not be quantified. There was an impact

on reported unit readiness; however, it was not widespread. Based on the

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
B-278920 

Navy’s and Air Force’s experience in moving the Alameda workloads,

several lessons learned have been identified to mitigate future workload

transfer problems.

According to Navy and Air Force officials, the delays and increased costs

were attributable to a variety of factors, including competing priorities

between the gaining and losing facilities, unidentified equipment and

retooling requirements, lack of spare parts in the Navy supply system,

limited Air Force access to Navy parts supply system, outdated technical

data, personnel and equipment certification requirements, and shortfall in

skilled Alameda workers accepting transfers to the receiving depots. Air

Force and Navy officials also noted that the Alameda workload transition

was further complicated by the subsequent decision to close the San

Antonio Air Logistics Center.

Our examination of readiness reports submitted before, during, and after

the transition period for 114 Air Force and Navy units using the engines,

shows that the transition problems encountered in moving the

maintenance workloads to Jacksonville and San Antonio had minimal

impact on equipment readiness.

Of the 57 Navy units examined, only two reported lowered equipment

readiness rates based on depot maintenance problems with the transferred

engines. According to Navy officials, extraordinary steps, including the

removal of engines from nonoperational aircraft, were taken to minimize

the impacts of transition problems on reported equipment readiness. None

of the 57 Air Force units we reviewed reported adverse readiness impacts

from the transition of engine maintenance workloads.

Maintenance workloads can be transitioned without impacting equipment

readiness if the transition is properly planned and effectively

implemented. While detailed plans were prepared to move the workloads

from Alameda to Jacksonville and San Antonio, problems arose during the

transitions’ implementation phase. Air Force and Navy officials offered

several lessons learned to mitigate these problems in future workload

transitions. They included hiring key personnel in-place at closing

activities to provide a more orderly transition and ensuring that all

technical data, which are critical to establishing production capability and

meeting production schedules, are updated and provided to the gaining

activity.

Details of our work are presented in briefing sections I, II, and III.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
B-278920 

Conclusions and

Recommendation

Both the Navy and Air Force experienced problems and difficulties in

transitioning the workloads from the closing Alameda Naval Aviation

Depot. Although these problems resulted in some production delays and

increased costs, the impact on readiness was limited. The problems and

difficulties experienced with transferring the Alameda workloads are not

inherent in workload transfers and can be avoided or substantially

reduced through improved planning and management. Accordingly, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense share among the military

services the lessons learned from closing and transferring workloads from

Alameda and other depots.

Agency Comments The Department of Defense agreed with our findings and recommendation

(see app. I). They provided written comments dealing primarily with

technical accuracy and clarification issues. We have revised the report, as

appropriate, to respond to these comments.

Scope and

Methodology

We met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to identify and discuss any problems

associated with the Alameda transfer and the extent they were unique or

reflected systemic weaknesses associated with other prior transitions. We

also interviewed former Alameda Naval Aviation Depot officials to obtain

their views on the maintenance workload transfer.

We visited San Antonio and Jacksonville to document the transition

experience and to solicit opinions as to what could have made the

transition less of a problem to all parties concerned. Further, we obtained

their assessments as to the impact of the identified problems on the

maintenance workload transition.

To determine whether the problems associated with the transition from

Alameda impacted the operational readiness of units in the field, we

selected 114 Air Force and Navy units that used the T56 and TF34 engines

before, during, and after the transition occurred. We analyzed the monthly

readiness reports for 57 Air Force units and 57 Navy units from October

1993 through July 1997 to determine if any degradation in equipment

readiness had been attributed to depot maintenance problems. While we

have previously reported that the Department of Defense readiness

reporting system lacks emphasis on long-term readiness and uses

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
B-278920 

insufficient indicators to ensure a comprehensive assessment, at the

present time, it provides the best readiness data available.1

We conducted our review between June and December 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Army, the Air Force, and the Navy; the Director, Office of Management and

Budget; and interested congressional committees. Copies will be made

available to others upon request. If you have any questions, please contact

me at (202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix I.

Sincerely yours,

David R. Warren

Director, Defense Management Issues

1

Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System

(GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition

Problems

8

Alameda Transition to Jacksonville and San Antonio—Overall

Assessment

8

Command Support 10

Equipment Transfers 12

Parts Procurement—Navy 14

Parts Procurement—Air Force 16

Technical Data Transfers 18

Certification of Personnel and Equipment 20

Personnel Shortfalls 22

1995 BRAC Decisions Complicated Ongoing Workload

Transitions

24

Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition

Readiness

Implications

26

Readiness Implications—Overall Assessment 26

TF34 Transition to Jacksonville 28

T56 Transition to San Antonio 30

Briefing Section III 

Alameda Transition

Lessons Learned

32

Lessons Learned 32

Briefing Section IV 

Recommendation

34

Recommendation 34

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

36

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Contents

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

37

Abbreviations

BRAC Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Alameda Transition to Jacksonville and 

San Antonio--Overall Assessment

The transition of the engine workloads 

from Alameda to Jacksonville and San 

Antonio was not as efficient as it might 

have been.

During the transfer, there were 

significant productivity and quality 

problems at the gaining facilities.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

The transition of the TF34 and T56 engine workloads from the Alameda

Naval Aviation Depot to the Jacksonville Naval Aviation Depot and the San

Antonio Air Logistics Center, respectively, took longer than originally

anticipated and was not executed in the most efficient manner. During the

transfer, significant productivity and quality problems occurred at the

gaining depots and the costs associated with establishing production

capability were higher than expected. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy

could quantify the increased costs to establish maintenance capability or

the delays that the problems caused. They did, however, provide examples

demonstrating the extent to which the identified problems affected cost

and/or the time required to achieve production capability.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Command Support

Competing priorities between closing 

and receiving activities resulted in 

increased time and cost in establishing 

production capability at gaining activities.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

According to Jacksonville and San Antonio officials, a lack of coordination

and cooperation with Alameda officials affected all aspects of establishing

production capability at their facilities. The former Alameda commander

agreed that disagreements over workload transition priorities affected

establishment of production capabilities at the gaining facilities.

Jacksonville and San Antonio officials stated that access to the Alameda

production lines was not provided; local maintenance instructions were

not shared; equipment tooling criteria were not provided; and delays

occurred in shipping needed equipment from Alameda to the gaining

activities. Officials from Jacksonville and San Antonio told us that there

was no single focal point from which to seek assistance in resolving these

differences. Jacksonville officials determined that the problems impacted

both the cost and time required to establish production capability, but had

not quantified these impacts.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Equipment Transfers

Equipment transfer and retooling 

requirements were not fully identified or 

disclosed, resulting in gaining activities 

experiencing higher costs and delays in 

establishing production capability.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

According to the former Alameda commander, representatives from all

gaining activities were invited to visit Alameda, but insufficient Base

Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) funding limited the number

of site survey teams that could visit. Jacksonville and San Antonio officials

told us that limited access to the Alameda production lines resulted in

some equipment needed to establish production capability not being

identified. For example, the Navy had developed customized equipment to

perform specific processes on the Navy T56 engines. However, San

Antonio officials said that they did not become aware of the special

equipment requirements until after the Navy T56 production line was

established at their facility. They had to then obtain the needed equipment

or develop alternate procedures to accomplish the required tasks.

Jacksonville officials also noted that worn production equipment

transferred from Alameda required over 7,000 hours of retooling and

repair to make the production line fully operational. In addition, they

stated that Alameda personnel advised Jacksonville officials that some

equipment already in use at Jacksonville would also satisfy repair

requirements for the TF34 engines. However, Jacksonville officials

discovered that their equipment had to be retooled to meet the new

requirements. Jacksonville officials noted that retooling and developing

work arounds resulted in higher than anticipated costs and delayed

establishment of production capability.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Parts Procurement--Navy

Shortages of repair parts at gaining 

activities. Navy supply system parts 

pipeline was inadequate, in part, 

because Alameda Naval Aviation Depot 

used commercial sources.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

According to Jacksonville officials, parts from the Navy supply system

were unavailable. They noted that, in some cases, the Alameda Naval

Aviation Depot had used commercial sources to obtain parts. The former

Alameda commander told us that when the Navy supply system was

unable to satisfy their requirements, they did obtain parts from

commercial sources. Since the Navy supply system is based on historical

usage to meet anticipated future demands, it was not prepared to respond

to Jacksonville’s requests for parts that Alameda had been purchasing

from commercial sources. According to the former Alameda commander,

Jacksonville production managers chose not to pursue commercial

solutions and, in some instances, it took up to 20 months for the Navy

system to catch up with the demand.

A Jacksonville official told us that if they had been aware of Alameda’s

reliance on commercial sources earlier in the transition, they could have

made similar arrangements to purchase parts commercially.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Parts Procurement--Air Force

The Navy-managed supply system did 

not recognize the Air Force depot as a 

valid user, resulting in delays in 

obtaining needed parts.

According to San Antonio Air Logistics Center officials, the Navy supply

system did not recognize the Air Force depot as a valid user. As a result,

the depot’s requests for Navy-managed T56 parts were rejected. To obtain

needed parts, the Air Force depot had to circumvent the established Navy

process by requisitioning parts manually (or person-to-person) rather than

using the automated procedures. This caused unnecessary delays in

obtaining needed parts.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Technical Data Transfers

Gaining activities experienced lengthy 

repair times due, in part, to out of date 

technical data and lack of local 

instructions from Alameda.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

According to San Antonio Air Logistics Center engine maintenance

officials, depot maintenance technical data provide detailed instructions

on procedures necessary to accomplish each required repair task. The

technical data also identifies the type and number of parts required and

dictate how often each part will be replaced during the repair process.

Jacksonville and San Antonio officials told us that the technical data used

by the Alameda personnel in repairing the TF34 and T56 engines had not

been updated to reflect changes in procedures. For example, the technical

data did not reflect current repair labor hours required to accomplish each

task. San Antonio officials told us that, as a result, they underestimated the

hours needed to meet established production schedules. San Antonio

officials further noted that the technical data issues took an inordinately

long time to solve, cost more than anticipated, and resulted in significant

delays in establishing production capability. Jacksonville officials told us

that the replacement frequencies (how often a part is replaced during an

overhaul process) for TF34 parts were so out of date that they had to be

completely revised. When requisitions were made based on the updated

frequencies, the supply system was unable to meet the demand.

Jacksonville officials told us that, in addition to the technical data,

Alameda employees had developed local instructions for completing some

tasks. These local instructions were not provided to the gaining activities

during the workload transition. As a result, the gaining activities were not

aware of current procedures for performing the repairs.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Certification of Personnel and 

Equipment

Requirements for gaining depots to meet 

other services' repair certification 

requirements added to delays.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

According to Air Force and Navy officials the engine repair certification

requirements increased the time and cost of the workload transition. The

Air Force and Navy each had unique maintenance tasks to be performed

on the TF34 and T56 engines, in addition to the tasks common to both

services. The Air Force required 100-percent certification of all overhaul

tasks, both Air Force unique and common, required on the Air Force TF34

engine and engine components at Jacksonville Naval Aviation Depot.

According to Jacksonville officials, the certification should have been

confined to those tasks unique to the Air Force TF34 engine. Many of the

overhaul tasks required on the TF34 were already performed on other

engines repaired at Jacksonville. According to Jacksonville officials, the

requirement for 100-percent certification was compounded by the lack of

Air Force engineering support. In contrast, the Navy required the San

Antonio Air Logistics Center to certify those T56 processes that were

Navy-unique. However, the Navy processes were substantially different

from the Air Force processes and still caused significant delays in

establishing production capability at the Air Logistics Center.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO Personnel Shortfalls

Jacksonville and San Antonio could not 

recruit the desired number of skilled 

Alameda personnel to transfer with the 

engine workloads; however, the shortfall 

did not have a significant impact on 

establishing production capability.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

Jacksonville and San Antonio officials told us that they offered skilled

personnel at Alameda opportunities to transfer with the TF34 and T56

engine workloads. However, neither facility was able to recruit the full

complement of skilled personnel desired. Thirty-two of the 43 Alameda

employees offered transfers to Jacksonville to work on the TF34 engines

accepted the offer. Jacksonville officials told us that the shortfall of 11

employees had an impact on establishing production capability, but it was

not significant. San Antonio offered transfer opportunities to 50 Alameda

personnel associated with the T56 engine workload, but only 18 employees

transferred. According to the former Alameda commander, more Alameda

employees intended to transfer to San Antonio until they found out that

San Antonio itself was targeted for closure in 1995. San Antonio officials

told us that they were able to retain San Antonio personnel with the

needed skills who would have otherwise been dismissed as a result of

downsizing actions.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

GAO 1995 BRAC Decisions Complicated 

Ongoing Workload Transitions

The 1995 recommendation to close the 

San Antonio Air Logistics Center and the 

Air Force's subsequent decision to 

compete the workload further 

complicated the transition of the T56 

workload from Alameda.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section I 

Alameda Transition Problems

In 1995, prior to completion of the T56 engine workload transition, the

BRAC recommended that the San Antonio Air Logistics Center be closed

and its workload be transferred to remaining depots or private-sector

commercial activities. To mitigate the impact of the closing on the local

community and center employees, the administration, in 1995, announced

its decision to maintain certain employment levels at this location.

Privatization-in-place was one of the initiatives to be used in achieving

these employment goals. Since that decision, there has been a continuing

debate between Congress and the administration over the process for

deciding where, and by whom, the workloads would be performed. Based

on congressional concerns raised in 1996, the Air Force revised its

privatization-in-place plans to provide for competitions between the public

and private sectors as a means to decide where the depot maintenance

workloads will be performed. A San Antonio Air Logistics Center BRAC

official told us that being placed on the 1995 closure list complicated the

transition of the T56 engine workload.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition Readiness Implications

GAO Readiness Implications--Overall 

Assessment

Cost increases and production delays 

were encountered during the transition of 

engine workloads; however, the impact 

on reported unit equipment readiness 

was minimized.

Both Jacksonville and San Antonio experienced higher than anticipated

costs and delays in establishing production capability for the T56 and TF34

engines. However, according to the unit readiness reports we reviewed,

readiness impacts were not widespread.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition Readiness Implications

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition Readiness Implications

GAO TF34 Transition to Jacksonville

Unit readiness reports we examined for 

27 S-3 and A-10 aircraft units showed 

that 2 units had periods of below mission 

capable rates for equipment and 

readiness attributed to "unavailable 

engines."

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition Readiness Implications

We examined 27 units—12 Navy and 15 Air Force—that used the TF34

engine and reported readiness during the 46-month evaluation period. We

found that 2 of the 12 Navy units examined attributed periods of

equipment readiness below mission capable to “unavailable engines.” Both

of these units reported equipment readiness as mission capable during the

transition, but reported readiness levels lower than mission capable after

the transition period. Although the lower readiness rates occurred after

the transition, a Navy official told us that the engines were unavailable due

to the transition. In addition, Navy readiness officials told us that they took

extraordinary steps to maintain mission capable status. The extraordinary

efforts included removing engines from aircraft in depot maintenance to

use on aircraft assigned to active or reserve units.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition Readiness Implications

GAO T56 Transition to San Antonio

Unit readiness reports we examined for 

87 C-130, P-3, and E-2 aircraft units 

showed that one unit reported readiness 

levels lower than mission capable due to 

a "shortage of spare engines." It 

occurred prior to the transition period 

and lasted for 1 month.

We examined 87 C-130, P-3, and E-2 units—45 Navy and 42 Air Force—that

reported readiness during the 46-month evaluation period. One of the 87

units reported engine readiness levels lower than mission capable due to a

shortage of spare engines. However, this occurred prior to the T56

transition period and lasted for only 1 month.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section II 

Alameda Transition Readiness Implications

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section III 

Alameda Transition Lessons Learned

GAO Lessons Learned

Ensure cooperation between gaining and 

losing facilities.

Ensure adequate supply of spare parts.

Ensure that technical data are current.

Eliminate unnecessary certification of 

personnel and equipment.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section III 

Alameda Transition Lessons Learned

Maintenance workloads can be transitioned without impacting equipment

readiness if the transition is properly planned and effectively

implemented. While detailed plans were prepared to move the workloads

from Alameda to Jacksonville and San Antonio, problems arose during the

implementation phase of the transition. Jacksonville and San Antonio

officials offered several lessons learned to mitigate the implementation

problems that occurred. They included the following:

(1) Placing the decision-making authority at a level above both the gaining

and losing facilities would eliminate problems with competing priorities.

(2) Hiring key management and supervisory personnel from the closing

facility to work-in-place until the closure occurs would provide better

information on required equipment and reduce transition problems.

(3) Knowing the extent to which commercial sources are used would

allow the gaining activity to contract with those vendors and obtain

needed supplies until the supply pipeline catches up with the demand.

(4) Modifying the Navy’s system to recognize Air Force users as valid

customers would make it easier to obtain needed parts.

(5) Ensuring that all technical data, including any local instructions, are

current and are provided to the gaining activity would reduce the time and

cost of developing production capability for a new workload.

(6) Avoiding unnecessary requirements for certification of personnel and

equipment would reduce the time and cost of developing production

capability.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Briefing Section IV 

Recommendation

GAO Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense ensure that lessons learned 

from closing military depots and 

transferring workloads to remaining 

depots be shared among the military 

services.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that lessons learned

from closing military depots and transferring workloads to remaining

depots be shared among the military services.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

James F. Wiggins, Associate Director

Dallas Field Office Ronald L. Berteotti, Assistant Director

Jeffrey A. Kans, Evaluator-in-Charge

Penney M. Harwell, Senior Evaluator

David P. Marks, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office James E. Lewis, Senior Evaluator

(709274) Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR Depot Maintenance
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