UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MONICA MELISSA MILLER, 

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11345

v. District Judge DAVID M. LAWSON

Magistrate Judge R. STEVEN WHALEN

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Monica Melissa Miller (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§405(g) challenging a final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying her application for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the

Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Both

motions have been referred for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be GRANTED to the extent that the case be remanded for further

administrative proceedings, and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

DENIED. 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 11, 2012, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging disability as of March

14, 2012 (Tr. 153, 159). Following the initial denial of benefits, Plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing, held on September 25, 2013 in Oak Park, Michigan (Tr. 29). J.

William Callahan, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) presided. Plaintiff, represented by

attorney Beth Versical, testified (Tr. 32-59), as did Vocational Expert (“VE”) Pat Silver (Tr.

60-70). On November 18, 2013, ALJ Callahan found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 20-25). On

February 10, 2015, the Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff filed suit in this

Court on April 13, 2015. 

 BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff, born July 31, 1980, was 33 when ALJ Callahan issued his decision (Tr. 25,

153). She completed high school and received training as a medical assistant (Tr. 183). She

worked previously as a fast food worker and store manager (Tr. 184). Her application for

benefits alleges disability as a result of arteriovenous malformation (“AVM”)1, weakness,

fatigue, status post cerebrovascular accident (“CVA”)2

(1995), foot drop, bladder problems,

1

AVMs are defined as “defects in the blood vessels of the circulatory system.” 

http://www.healthline.com/health/arteriovenous-malformations#Symptoms4. (Last visited

April 18, 2016). AVMs in the brain can cause bleeding in the skull, seizures, headaches,

confusion, memory lapses, and hallucinations. Id. 

2

A CVA is more commonly referred to as a stroke. http://www.healthline.com

/health/cerebrovascular-accident #Overview1. (Last visited April 18, 2016). 

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and hand and foot cramping (Tr. 182).

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

 Plaintiff offered the following testimony.

She lived in a condominium in Shelby Township, Michigan with her boyfriend (Tr.

32). She was single and did not have children (Tr. 33). Her boyfriend supported her (Tr. 33). 

She worked until March, 2012 as a store manager at Subway at which time she was fired for

stealing over $25,000 from her employer to pay for her addiction to prescription pain killers

(Tr. 33-34, 37). Her earlier work at Burger King required her to prepare food (Tr. 35). She

had attended “a few years of college” but did not have a focus area (Tr. 34). She completed

nine months of training for a medical assistant certificate but had not worked in that field (Tr.

34).

Plaintiff stood 5'1" and weighed around 180 pounds (Tr. 36). She had gained

approximately 20 pounds in the past year (Tr. 36). She experienced pain in her lower back,

hip joints, knees, and ankles (Tr. 38). She treated with a podiatrist for the ankle pain and a

physician for the back pain (Tr. 39). Her condition had slightly worsened in the past year

(Tr. 41). 

Plaintiff’s work as a Subwaymanager required her to stand most of the day, use a cash

register, go to the bank, and hire and fire subordinate employees (Tr. 42). The manager job

did not require her to perform any lifting or carrying (Tr. 42). She would be unable to return

to the position due to the need to stand for long periods (Tr. 43). She had not seen a

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physician since March, 2012 and could not remember the last time she received a physical

checkup (Tr. 45). Following her March, 2012 termination, she received substance abuse

treatment counseling and attended AA meetings (Tr. 45). She was sentenced to one year of

probation for embezzlement (Tr. 46). She denied the current use of any medication, but

noted that before her termination she was taking bladder control medication (Tr. 47). Due

to bladder problems, she required the use of a bathroom every 90 minutes (Tr. 48). Her work

abilities were also compromised by left arm problems and concentrational deficiencies (Tr.

50). She had not received physical therapy since her 1995 CVA and had never received

treatment for concentrational problems (Tr. 50). She continued to perform upper extremity

physical therapy exercises (Tr. 51). Her podiatrist had addressed the ankle problems by

giving her a shoe insert and an ankle brace (Tr. 52). She had not worn the brace since

working at Subway (Tr. 53). She experienced problems typing due to hand cramping (Tr.

53). 

In response to questioning by her attorney, Plaintiff testified that her body pain had

become gradually worse since her March, 2012 termination due to refraining from

prescription pain medication and the worsening of her condition (Tr. 56). Her pain also

caused concentrational problems (Tr. 56). She required breaks between household chores

(Tr. 56). She stated that was unable to obtain treatment due to lack of money and health

insurance (Tr. 56). She experienced fatigue and irritability due to sleep disturbances (Tr.

57). She reported that she was unable to lift significant weights with her left hand and

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needed to use the bathroom every hour (Tr. 57). She testified that she would be unable to

perform a sit-down job due to lower back pain and leg cramping and swelling (Tr. 58). She

reported that she required position changes every 30 minutes (Tr. 59). In response to

additional questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff stated that her mother paid for the Tylenol and

counseling services (Tr. 59). 

B. Medical Evidence

1. Treating Sources

 In March, 2004, Lucia Zamorano, M.D. referred Plaintiff for a physical therapy

evaluation related to the condition of cervical arteriovenous malformation (“AVM”) (Tr.

233). The same month, an MRI of the cervical spine showed that the condition of AVM was

stable (Tr. 242). In October, 2004, Dr. Zamorano noted that Plaintiff had “progressively

improved her balance” since 2001 treatment for AVM (Tr. 238). Dr. Zamorano noted that

Plaintiff was currently taking Detrol for bladder control problems (Tr. 238). In January,

2005, an MRI of the brain showed an abnormal cord signal resulting from AVM (Tr. 227). 

The same month, Plaintiff underwent surgery for treatment of “a very high flow” AVM (Tr.

225). April, 2005 neurological records note an ataxic gait (Tr. 237). A May, 2005 MRI of

the head and cervical spine showed that the condition of AVM was stable (Tr. 236). 

May, 2010 treating records by podiatrist John Arsen, D.P.M., note a left drop foot and

that Plaintiff was able to walk more easily with an Ankle Foot Orthosis (“AFO”) device (Tr.

244). A July, 2011 ultrasound of the kidneys showed the presence of renal cysts (tr. 247). 

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2. Non-Treating Sources 

A July, 2012 work assessment by Michigan Rehabilitation Services noted vocational

impairments related to impulsivity, physical limitations, and “below average concentration

and memory” (Tr. 257). Plaintiff’s “severe difficulty concentrating,” walking limitations,

and left upper and lower extremity weakness were deemed “impediment[s] to employment” 

(Tr. 258). 

In October, 2012, Lasmi Manyam, M.D. performed a consultative physical

examination on behalf of the SSA, noting Plaintiff’s report of a 1995 CVA resulting in

severe headaches, and extremity weakness (Tr. 248). Plaintiff reported good results on the

right side from physical therapy but noted continued extremity weakness and a left foot drop

(Tr. 248). Plaintiff reported level “seven” pain on a scale of one to ten but denied memory

problems (Tr. 248). She reported “overactive bladder” requiring bathroom breaks six times

a day (Tr. 249). Plaintiff admitted to a former, long-term addiction to Vicodin (Tr. 249). 

Dr. Manyam observed an ataxic gait, left hand weakness, lumber spine limitations

due to lower extremity weakness, an inability to squat, and left foot drop requiring the use

of an AFO device (Tr. 250). Dr. Manyam found that Plaintiff’s ability to stand, walk, carry,

lift, or climb was “markedly” limited (Tr. 250). She noted Plaintiff’s report of lower back,

knee, and hip pain resulting from mild degenerative arthritis (Tr. 250). Dr. Manyam found

that Plaintiff required the use of a cane to reduce pain and to avoid falls (Tr. 255). 

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The same month, Tariq Mahmoud, M.D. performed a non-examining assessment of

Plaintiff’s residual abilities, finding that she was limited to lifting 10 pounds and standing

or walking for two hours and sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday (Tr. 98). Dr.

Mahmoud also found that Plaintiff was limited to occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, 

kneeling, crouching, and crawling (Tr. 98-99). 

In February, 2013, Employment Development Manager Elaine Palmeri noted that

Plaintiff was candid about her past substance abuse and its repercussions (Tr. 260-261, 271). 

Ms. Palmeri recommended “volunteering as a positive to add to her work experience” (Tr.

261). Plaintiff expressed an interest in working in the medical field (Tr. 273). 

3. Evidence Submitted After the November, 2013 Administrative Opinion3

June, 2010 treating records by Jennifer Prohow, D.O. state that Plaintiff was

prescribed Ibuprofen, Flexeril, and Darvocet for lower back pain (Tr. 279). Dr. Prohow’s

October, 2012 records state that Plaintiff reported ongoing symptoms of left drop foot, leftside weakness, and walking and balance problems but had not been able to obtain

neurological treatment since 2005 (Tr. 277). 

3

These records were not among those considered by the ALJ (Tr. 5, 274-281). Under

42 U.S.C. § 406(g), records submitted after the administrative decision are subject to a

narrow review by the reviewing court. Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir.1993). To

establish grounds for a Sentence Six remand, the claimant must show that the “new evidence

is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the

record in a prior proceeding ...” § 405(g). Plaintiff does not cite the newer material, much

less argue that it provides a basis for remand. 

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C. Vocational Expert Testimony

VE Pat Silver classified Plaintiff’s past jobs as a fast food worker as unskilled and

exertionally light and fast food manager, skilled/sedentary4(Tr.61). The VE stated that her

testimony would be consistent with the information found in the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles (“DOT”) and that she would advise the ALJ of any conflicts with DOT “and the basis

of [her] opinion” (Tr.60-61). ALJ Callahan then posed the following question to the VE,

describing a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience (Tr.

62) with the following limitations:

[Exertionally] light, no climbing, and only incidental walking or standing

totaling a maximum of two hours a day. No limitations on sitting. Only

incidental climbing of ramps or stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching

or crawling. And I’ll define incidental as one to two times every 15 minutes. 

No climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds (Tr. 61). 

 

The VE testified that the above restrictions would allow for the exertionally light,

unskilled work of a parking lot attendant (2,100 jobs in the local economy); office helper

(1,000); and various assembly positions (Tr. 2,500) (Tr. 63-64). The VE testified that if the

4

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a-d) defines sedentary work as “lifting no more than 10 pounds

at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small

tools; light work as “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying

of objects weighing up to 10 pounds;” medium work as “lifting no more than 50 pounds at

a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds;” and that

exertionally heavy work “involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds. Very Heavy work requires “lifting

objects weighing more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing 50 pounds or more. § 404.1567(e). 

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same individual were limited to sedentary work, she could perform the unskilled work of a

surveillance monitor (1,000); bench assembler (1,700); and telephone information clerk

(1,300) (Tr. 64). The VE stated that if the ability to reach, handle, finger, or twist with the

hands were limited to an occasional basis, all of the above jobs would be impacted except

for the surveillance system monitor position (Tr. 66). 

In response to questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney, the VE testified that the first three

jobs cited would require lifting up to 20 pounds (Tr. 67). The VE stated that her job

testimony assumed two 15-minute breaks and one 30-minute break each eight-hour workday

(Tr. 68). Aside from the scheduled breaks, the VE testified that being off-task for up to 10

percent of the workday was not work preclusive (Tr. 68). The VE noted that the need to be

off-task for five minutes every hour would preclude the parking lot attendant job, but would

not affect the “self-paced” assembly jobs (Tr. 69). The VE testified that the need to elevate

both legs for two hours each workday would be work preclusive (Tr. 70). 

D. The ALJ’s Decision

Citing Plaintiff’s medical records, ALJ Callahan found the severe impairment of

“status post cerebrovascular accident with an arteriovenous (‘AV’) malformation” but that 

the condition did not meet or medically equal any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 22-23). The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) for sedentary work with the following additional limitations: 

[I]ncidental standing or walking for not more than 5-10 minutes at a time for

up to 2 hours; incidentally using ramps or stairs just once or twice for not more

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than 15 minutes; occasional reaching, twisting, handling, or fingering with the

hands; and no ladders, ropes, scaffolds, or foot controls; where she could be

off task up to 15% of the time with normal breaks (Tr. 23). 

Citing the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that while Plaintiff was unable to return to any of

her past relevant work, she could perform the job of surveillance system monitor (Tr. 25). 

The ALJ discounted the allegations of disability, noting that Plaintiff had been

employed “since 1995 when she had her stroke” and stopped working in March, 2012 when

she was discharged for embezzling from her employer (Tr. 24). He noted that Plaintiff’s

alleged need for frequent bathroom breaks was undermined by her ability to sit through the

75-minute administrative hearing (Tr. 24, 31, 71). The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s claimthat she

could not afford needed medical treatment, noting that she was able to obtain “$45 a week

for substance abuse counseling. . . .” (Tr. 24). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court reviews the final decision of the Commissioner to determine

whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Sherrill v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 757 F.2d 803, 804 (6thCir. 1985). Substantial evidence is more

than a scintilla but less that a preponderance. It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229, S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.126 (1938)). The standard of review is deferential and 

“presupposes that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which decision makers can go either way,

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without interference from the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 

1986)(en banc). In determining whether the evidence is substantial, the court must “take into

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Wages v. Secretary of Health

& Human Services, 755 F.2d 495, 497 (6th Cir. 1985). The court must examine the

administrative record as a whole, and may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of

whether it has been cited by the ALJ. Walker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,

884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989).

 FRAMEWORK FOR DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS

 Disability is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). In

evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner is to consider, in sequence,

whether the claimant: 1) worked during the alleged period of disability; 2) has a severe

impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment

listed in the regulations; 4) can return to past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether he or she

can perform other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a). The Plaintiff has

the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at

step five to demonstrate that, “notwithstanding the claimant's impairment, he retains the

residual functional capacity to perform specific jobs existing in the national economy.” 

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Richardson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir.1984

ANALYSIS

The ALJ’s Step Three Findings 

Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s Step Three determination that she did not meet or

medically equal a listed impairment. Plaintiff’s Brief, 8-12 (citing Tr. 23), Docket #16. She

argues that the ALJ’s one-sentence finding that “[t]he record does not contain the requisite

clinical and objective findings that would meet or equal any Listings” fails to mention the

Listing considered, much less the criteria for the Listing or a rationale for the finding that she

was not disabled at Step Three. Id. (citing Tr. 23). In response, Defendant argues that the

ALJ’s error was harmless, given that Plaintiff “has not presented evidence that her

impairment met or equaled any listed impairment.” Defendant’s Brief, 7-11 (citing Forrest

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 591 F. App’x 359, 366 (6th Cir. November 17, 2014)), Docket #17. 

At Step Three of the administrative sequence, a claimant meeting or medically

equaling “the requirements of a Listed Impairment will be deemed conclusivelydisabled, and

entitled to benefits.” Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security, 424 Fed.Appx. 411, 414,

2011 WL 1228165, *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2011); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii). “Listing of Impairments, located at Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the

regulations, describes impairments the SSA considers to be ‘severe enough to prevent an

individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work

experience.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a)). While “[t]he Sixth Circuit ‘does not

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require a heightened articulation standard from the ALJ at Step Three of the sequential

evaluation process’ Grohoske v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL2931400, *3 (N.D.Ohio, July

18, 2012),” it “has made clear the step-three ‘reasons requirement is both a procedural and

substantive requirement, necessary in order to facilitate effective and meaningful judicial

review.’” Brock v. Colvin, 125 F.Supp.3d 671, 672 (N.D.Ohio, 2015)(citing Reynolds, 424

Fed.Appx. at 414). Nonetheless, the Court may “overlook the ALJ's failure to articulate his

Step Three findings” if the error is found to be “harmless in nature.” M.G. v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 861 F.Supp.2d 846, 859 (E.D.Mich.2012). 

Both parties agree that Listing11.04B (Central nervous system vascular accident) is

applicable. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 11.04. To meet subpart B, a

claimant must show that the condition creates “[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization

of motor function in two extremities, resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and

dexterous movements, or gait and station” as described in Listing 11.00C. Listing 11.00C

states that “persistent disorganization of motor function” may take the form of “paresis or

paralysis, tremor or other involuntary movements, ataxia and sensory disturbances . . .” Id.

Listing 11.00C states further that the motor function limitations “frequently provides the sole

or partial basis for decision in cases of neurological impairment,” noting that the “assessment

of impairment depends on the degree of interference with locomotion and/or interference

with the use of fingers, hands, and arms.” 

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In certain cases, an insufficiently articulated Step Three finding can be cured by a

discussion of the evidence supporting non-disability at earlier or subsequent steps in the

sequential analysis. See Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 Fed.Appx. 408, 411, (6th Cir. January 31,

2006). In contrast here, the Court is unable to discern a rationale for the Step Three finding

anywhere in ALJ’s determination. An ALJ “must articulate, at some minimum level, his

analysis of the evidence to allow the appellate court to trace the path of his reasoning.”

Lowery v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Administration, 55 Fed.Appx. 333, 339, 2003 WL

236419, *5 (6th Cir. January 30, 2003); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir.1995). 

The Step Three finding is not only truncated, but inconsistent with the ALJ’s

subsequent discussion. It is possible (but not certain) that the ALJ’s one-sentence Step

Three finding was drawn from Dr. Mahmoud’s non-examining conclusion that Plaintiff did

not meet Listing 11.04B (Tr. 23, 87). Dr. Mahmoud’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet the

Listing might arguably constitutes evidence in support of the Step Three finding. Dr.

Mahmoud’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 11.04B appears to be based on his

finding that while she had significant lower extremity problems, she did not experience any

manipulative limitations (Tr. 89, 98-100). Without more, it could be argued that the ALJ’s

failure to state a Listing or provide a rationale at Step Three was harmless error. 

However, the ALJ’s RFC differs significantly from Dr. Mahmoud’s findings. In

contrast to Dr. Mahmoud’s findings, the ALJ acknowledged ongoing “neurological deficits”

of both the upper and lower extremities resulting from the CVA (Tr. 24). He found the

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presence of significant upper extremity impairment limting Plaintiff to occasional reaching,

twisting, handling, and fingering in both hands (Tr. 23). The ALJ’s finding of upper

extremity limitations is also supported by Dr. Manyam’s consultative observation that

Plaintiff experienced marked limitations in carrying which limited her to carrying only five

pounds (Tr. 250, 254). The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff experienced hand cramping and other

upper extremity limitations resulting from the 1995 CVA, is not inconsistent with a finding

of “[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization of motorfunction in two extremities, resulting

in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station” as required

to meet the Listing 11.04B.5 As such, an assessment of Plaintiff’s “degree of interference

with locomotion and/or interference with the use of fingers, hands, and arms” in determining

whether she meets Listing 11.04B is particularly critical. § 11.00C. Given that the ALJ 

acknowledged both upper and lower extremity limitations, a remand for consideration and

articulation of whether Plaintiff meets Listing 11.04B is required. Plaintiff’s history of

substance abuse and its consequences, while relevant to the credibility determination, does

not obviate the need for a proper Step Three analysis and a rationale for why her

longstanding condition resulting from the 1995 CVA does not meet a a listing. 

5Plaintiff’s lower extremity limitations, such as an ataxic gait, are undisputed by

the treating, consultative, and non-examining sources. 

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For this reason, a remand is appropriate. However, Plaintiff has not presented an

“overwhelming” case for disability benefits. Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1994). Further, because it cannot be said that “all

essential factual issues have been resolved,” a remand for further fact-finding, rather than an

award of benefits, is appropriate. Id. 

 CONCLUSION

For these reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED to the extent that the case be remanded for further administrative proceedings

consistent with this Report, and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

DENIED. 

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within 14 days of

service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR

72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of

appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Howard v.

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th

Cir. 1981). Filing of objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with

specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and

Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th

 Cir. 1991); Smith v.

Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to E.D.

Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

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 Within 14 days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than twenty (20)

pages in length unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the court. The

response shall address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained

within the objections. 

s/R. Steven Whalen 

R. STEVEN WHALEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Date: April 21, 2016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record on

April 21, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. mail.

s/Carolyn M. Ciesla 

Case Manager to the 

Honorable R. Steven Whalen

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