### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 57774

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- II Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CRISTOBAL IVAN ARROYO, Appellant.
C HE , J

. ⎯ Cristobal Arroyo appeals the trial court ’s imposition of a $500.00 c rime v ictim

p enalty a ssessment (VPA) and restitution interest. In his s tatement of a dditional g rounds (SAG) , Arroyo argues the trial court should consider his youth at the time of the offense

. In 2013, Arroyo , a juvenile at the time, ple a d ed guilty to first degree murder with a deadly weapon and the trial court sentenced him

. In 202 1 , we remanded Arroyo’s case for resentencing , directing the trial court to consider youthfulness factors at the time of the offense. At resentencing, the trial court took testimony , considered filings by the parties, heard Arroyo’s
allocution , and the parti es’ argument . The trial court waived all discretionary legal fees because Arroyo is indigent , and it imposed restitution plus interest and a $500.00 VPA.
We hold (1) the $500.00 VPA should be stricken because Arroyo is indigent , (2) amended RCW 10.82.090 appl ies to Arroyo because his case is on direct appeal, and (3) Arroyo’s SAG claim fails

. Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two May 7, 2024No. 57774

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Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to strike the VPA and decide whether to impose restitution interest after considering the relevant factors und er RCW 10.82.090(2).
FACTS In 2012, while at home, 14

- year
- old Arroyo and his 16

- year
- old brother repeatedly
stabbed 15

- year
- old HMH. Arroyo also hit HMH in the head with a baseball bat. They then cut
and stabbed HMH further to “ drain him out” in the bathtub before moving HMH to a trash bin. Clerk’s Papers ( CP ) at 383. In 2013, Arroyo pleaded guilty to first degree murder with a deadly
weapon and the trial court sentenced him

. In 2021, we remanded Arroyo’s case 1 for resentencing with direction to consider his youthfulness at the time of the offense under Miller v.
Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 18 3 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)

. In 2022 , a t the resentencing hearing , the trial court considered the factors set forth in
Miller and also discuss ed several post

- Miller cases such as State v. Houston

- Sconiers , 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017)

. The trial court reviewed all materials submitted and heard two days of testimony before issuing an oral ruling finding no “substantial and compelling reasons to depart from a standard range sentence

. ” Rep. of Proc. ( RP ) at 2 74 . In relevant part :

The Court was also provided with transcripts of court hearings, records from [juvenile court] , [ a secure residential facility t hat provides education and vocational training ] , and the Department of Corrections.
This court has read and reviewed all of the materials submitted to it

. During the sentencing hearing, this court heard from

. . . forensic psychologist Dr. Kristin Ca rlson, [and] Dyann Gregg from the Department of

1 In re Pers. Restraint of Arroyo , No. 54540

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- II (Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 2021) (unpublished) , https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2054540

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- II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf

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Corrections

. . . I also heard from Mr. Arroyo ’ s mother and reviewed [Arroyo’s] [supporting] materials.
R P at 258. In Arroyo’s materials , Arroyo detailed his childhood and youth experience s , accomplishments since the crime, and future plans ; he also included mental health evaluations by two psychologists, letters of support , the transcript of the original sentencing, and records from
his juvenile detention facility

. The trial court also hea rd Arroyo’s allocution and the parties’ arguments. In the trial court’s written order, it made detailed, reasoned findings on Arroyo’s immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences , the nature of Arroyo’s surrounding environm ent and family circumstances , Arroyo’s participation in the crimes , how familial and peer pressure may have affected Arroyo , how youth impacted his legal defense , and factors suggesting Arroyo might be successfully rehabilitated. After its extensive analy sis, t he
trial court concluded “there are not substantial and compelling reasons to depart from a standard range sentence.” CP at 393

. T he trial court found Arroyo indigent and waived all discretionary legal fees , but imposed restitution plus interest an d a $500.00 VPA. Arroyo appeals.
ANALYSIS Arroyo argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay a $500.00 VPA and restitution
interest.No. 57774

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4 I. L EGAL F INANCIAL O BLIGATION S
A. Restitution Interest Arroyo argues we should remand for the trial court to consider waiving interest on
restitution under the factors identified in RCW 10.82.090(2) because of a recent amendment to
RCW 10.82.090. 2 The State concedes. 3 We accept the State’s concession

. An amendment to RCW 1 0.82.090 states that the trial court “ may elect not to impose interest on any restitution the court orders ” based on an inquiry into factors such as whether the defendant is indigent. RCW 10.82.090(2); L AWS OF 2022, ch. 260 . Though this amendment did not take effect until after Arroyo’s resentencing, it applies here because Arroyo’s case is on direct appeal. State v. Reed , 28 Wn. App. 2d 779, 781, 538 P.3d 946 (2023) ; State v. Ellis , 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (20 23)

. Thus, we remand for the trial court to decide whether to impose restitution interest after considering the relevant factors under RCW 10.82.090(2).
B

. Victim Penalty Assessment Arroyo argues we should remand for the trial court to strike the VP A because he is indigent under RCW 7.68.035( 5 ) (b)

. The State concedes to a remand to strike the VPA. We accept the State’s concession.

2 In his assignments of error and issue pertaining to assignments of error, Arroyo raises in passing that the trial court erred by ordering restitution, but provides arguments related only to the imposition of interest on the restitution. To the extent tha t Arroyo argues error with respect to ordering restitution (not just restitution interest), we decline to review this argument. State v. Johnson , 119 Wn.2d 167, 171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992) ( We will not review an issue raised in passing or unsupported by aut hority or persuasive argument ); RAP 10.3(a)(6) (Arguments must be supported by citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record).

3 Notice of Concession to Remand, at 1

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Under amended RCW 7.68.035 (4), the trial court cannot impose the VPA if it finds that the defendant is indigent at the time of sentencing. This amendment applies to cases that are on direct appeal. Ellis , 27 Wn. App. 2d at 16 . Because the trial court found Arroyo indigent at

sen tencing and Arroyo’s case is on direct appeal, we remand for the trial court to strike the VPA.
II. S TATEMENT OF A DDITIONAL G ROUNDS Arroyo argues that the trial court should consider his youth at the time of the offense and
reduce his sentence or releas e him

. 4 We disagree that the trial court failed to consider Arroyo’s youthfulness at the time of the offense

. At resentencing , the trial court considered the Miller factors and recognized its duty to consider youthfulness factors in cases post

- Miller

. Arroyo argu es that the trial court “should recognize that youthful chronological age has hallmark features of immaturity, impetuo u s ness and failure to appreciate risks and consequences that may [ a ] ffect an offender’s culpability and
should lessen the sever ity of a sentence

. ” SAG at 2. But Arroyo does not explain how the trial court failed to consider his age and the hallmarks of youthfulness he listed . Indeed, the trial court reviewed Arroyo’s immaturity,

4 Arroyo asserts that the trial court should recognize the “ First Step Act of 2018 ” but provides no authority that suggests that the federal act governs here. SAG at 1. He also mentions the “Youth Sentencing Act” but does not provide any citation to it. SAG at 1. Generally, the Sentencin g Reform Act of 1981 governs Arroyo’s case , since the j uvenile c ourt declined Arroyo and remanded him to the a dult d ivision of the s uperior c ourt

. See State v. Watkins , 86 Wn. App. 852, 855, 939 P.2d 1243 (1997) ; RCW 9.94A.390, .400. Thus , we decline to address this argument. See DeHeer v. Seattle Post

- Intelligencer , 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“ Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that c ounsel, after diligent search, has found none .”). Additionally, Arroyo states that he has been charged costs of incarceration (COI) and those funds should be returned to him. But the judgment and sentence indicate that Arroyo was not ordered to pay his C OI. Thus, we decline to address Arroyo’s claim that his COI should be reimbursed.No. 57774

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impetuosity, failure to appreciate risks and co nsequences , the nature of Arroyo’s surrounding environment and family circumstances , how familial and peer pressures may have affected Arroyo , how Arroyo’s youth impacted his legal defense , and factors suggesting Arroyo might be successfully rehabilitated , and concluded “there are not substantial and compelling reasons to depart from a standard range sentence.” CP at 393

. Thus, Arroyo’s argument that the trial court should consider his youth at the time of the offense is irreconcilable with the record pre sented.
This claim fails.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to strike the VPA and decide whether to impose restitution interest after considering the relevant factors under RCW 10.82.090(2). A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered

.

Che, J. We concur:

Maxa, P.J.

Lee, J.