UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

DARYL LAMONT SAMPSON, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-10704 

v Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

VILLAGE OF MACKINAW CITY, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Plaintiff Daryl Lamont Sampson initiated this case on February 25, 2015 against 

Defendant Mackinaw City and Defendant Robert Klave, a 12-year veteran with the Mackinaw 

City Police Department. The complaint contains five counts. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Sampson 

alleges that Defendant Klave falsely arrested him in the early morning hours of March 14, 2013 

and then initiated a malicious prosecution against him in violation of federal and state law. Id. 

Sampson also alleges that his injuries were the result of Defendant Mackinaw City’s reckless 

execution of its policies, customs, and practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. 

Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. 

 After the close of discovery, Plaintiff and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment. See ECF Nos. 23, 26. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion will be 

denied and Defendants’ motion will be granted. 

I. 

 In February of 2012, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began investigating a group 

suspected of trafficking narcotics from Detroit to northern Michigan. See Supernault Dep. 29-30, 

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ECF No. 26 Ex. 4. The investigation was pursued by the Straits Area Narcotics Team 

(“SANE”), a multi-jurisdictional drug task-force in northern Michigan. Id. Instrumental to 

SANE’s investigation was a drug user who served as a confidential informant after becoming 

concerned about the amount of drugs being used and distributed at a motel owned by his mother 

in Mackinaw City (the “CI”). Id. at 48. One of the primary suspects in the investigation was a 

man named Darryl Decosta Duncan (“Mr. Duncan”). 

A. 

 The events giving rise to Plaintiff Sampson’s arrest took place in the late evening of 

March 13, 2013 and early morning of March 14, 2013. According to Defendants, at 

approximately 9:30 PM on Defendant Klave was contacted by Detective Supernault, a member 

of SANE, and advised that Mr. Duncan “would possibly be traveling to Mackinaw City in the 

evening hours to receive some money owed to him by CI.” Supp. Case Rep., ECF No. 26 Ex. 2. 

Klave was advised that Mr. Duncan would likely be in possession of narcotics, and that the 

vehicle he would be traveling in was unknown. Id. 

 Just after 3:00 am on the morning of March 14, 2013, the CI called 911 to inform 

Defendant Klave that a drug dealer had arrived at his location. 911 Recording, ECF No. 33 Ex. 2. 

The 911 dispatcher informed the CI that she would have Defendant Klave return his call. Id. 

Defendant Klave returned the CI’s call in a manner of minutes. See Supp. Case Rep. The CI, 

who seemed “very nervous,” informed Defendant Klave that Mr. Duncan was currently parked 

behind the hotel in a white Dodge Intrepid. The CI stated that Mr. Duncan had heroin on his 

person that he wanted to sell, and that he had told Mr. Duncan that, because he did not want to 

purchase drugs at his mother’s motel, they would need to go to a different location for the deal. 

Id. The CI further told Klave that there was an unknown black male in the vehicle with Mr. 

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Duncan. Id. The CI intended to ask the two men to follow him in their vehicle, hoping that Klave 

would be able to make a traffic stop on the vehicle. Id. 

 Klave advised the CI to disregard a stop sign on the route in the hopes that the driver of 

the white Dodge Intrepid would also disregard the stop sign. Id. At approximately 3:14 AM, 

after watching the CI’s vehicle pass through an intersection without stopping, Klave pulled over 

a white Intrepid that was following the CI’s vehicle after it allegedly rolled through the stop sign 

without stopping. Id. 

 After stopping the vehicle, Klave arrested the passenger, Mr. Duncan, who he was 

familiar with, on an outstanding arrest warrant. See Arrest Video, ECF No. 26 Ex. 5. Sampson 

stated to Klave that he was driving Mr. Duncan up to Mackinaw to see a friend because the 

friend owed him money. See Supp. Case. Rep. Klave could smell the odor of burnt marijuana in 

the vehicle. Id. Klave then sought consent to search the vehicle from Sampson, who 

acknowledged that he owned the vehicle and agreed to the search. Id. Upon searching the 

vehicle, Klave discovered two “baggies” of heroin behind the passenger’s seat. Id. Klave also 

discovered a burnt marijuana joint inside a packet of cigarettes. Klave then arrested Sampson for 

(1) possession with intent to deliver 4 grams of heroin and (2) maintaining a drug vehicle in 

violation of M.C.L. § 333.7405(d) because the drugs were found located in his vehicle. At some 

point that night, Detective Supernault informed Klave that Plaintiff Sampson was somehow 

directly connected with the SANE investigation. See Klave Dep. 66-67; Supernault Dep. 65-66. 

B. 

Plaintiff’s version of the relevant events differs in some ways from Defendants’ version. 

According to Plaintiff, at some point on March 13, 2013, Mr. Duncan arrived at his home in 

Detroit and offered Sampson $150 to drive him to Mackinaw City. See Sampson Dep. 53-54. 

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Sampson accepted the offer, and the two left right away for Mackinaw City. Id. at 55. Sampson 

did not remember the exact time that they left, but believed that it was just getting dark. Id. at 56. 

Sampson testified that Mr. Duncan told him that the purpose of the trip was to collect some 

belongings he had left in Mackinaw City after going to jail, which were currently in the 

possession of a friend at a hotel. Id. He testified that he did not know that Mr. Duncan was in 

possession of narcotics, and that he would not have driven him if he had known he was in 

possession of narcotics. Id. 

After arriving at the hotel in Mackinaw City, Mr. Duncan got out of the car and entered a 

hotel room. Id at 58-59. Sampson testified that he remained in the vehicle. Id. After around 10 

minutes Mr. Duncan returned to the vehicle and directed Sampson to follow a man in a different 

vehicle. Id. at 61-62. Sampson began following the man, and was quickly pulled over for 

allegedly running a stop sign. Id. Sampson testified that he did not run a stop sign. Id. at 84. 

The police officer, Defendant Klave, arrested Mr. Duncan on an outstanding arrest 

warrant. Klave then requested permission to search the vehicle, and Sampson consented. Id. at 

62-63. Sampson testified that he consented to the search because he was confident that there 

were no narcotics in the vehicle. Id. at 83. Upon searching the vehicle, however Defendant 

Klave discovered two small bags of heroin on the floor behind the passenger’s seat. Samspon 

informed Klave that the heroin was not his and that he had not been aware that there was heroin 

in the vehicle. Id. Mr. Duncan informed Klave that the heroin was his. Klave arrested Sampson 

on two counts: (1) possession with intent to deliver 4 grams of heroin; and (2) maintaining a dug 

vehicle in violation of M.C.L. § 333.7405(d). See Arrest Warrant Request, ECF No. 23 Ex. K. 

C. 

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Both Sampson and Mr. Duncan were taken into custody, and Defendant Klave prepared 

the following affidavit of probable cause: 

On 03-14-2013 at approximately 0314 hours I Officer Klave was contacted by CI 

who informed me that a White Dodge Intrepid would be following him near the 

Dixie Saloon in Mackinaw City. I was advised by CI that within the vehicle was 

a Darryl Duncan. I was advised by CI that they would be going to a different 

location so that DUNCAN could sell CI heroin. CI stated to me that there was 

heroin within the suspect vehicle. 

On the above date at approximately 0323 hours I observed the suspect vehicle 

following CI West on Central Ave. I noticed that the suspect vehicle bearing 

Michigan Registration CLB2718 did not come to a complete stop at the 

intersection of Huron and Central Ave. I conducted a traffic stop on the above 

vehicle on Central ave near Henry Street. Upon contract with the driver who was 

identified as a DARYL LAMONT SAMPSON b/m 12/16/1974 I advised the 

reason for the traffic stop as running the stop sign. I immediately recognized the 

passenger in the vehicle as a DARRYL DECOSTA DUNCAN b/m 11/20/1978. I 

advised DUNCAN to step out of the vehicle and he was placed under arrest for an 

active warrant out of our department. DUNCAN was placed in the back seat of 

patrol car 114 and was advised his Miranda warning. 

I then returned to the vehicle and asked DARYL LAMONT SAMPSON to step 

out of the vehicle. I asked SAMPSON if the vehicle was his and he stated that it 

was. I asked SAMPSON if there was any drugs or weapons inside the vehicle. 

He stated that there was not. I asked SAMPSON if I could search the vehicle and 

he stated that I could. Upon searching the vehicle I noticed Two small baggy type 

containers in the back seat of the vehicle believed to be heroin. Since the items 

were located within the vehicle the driver and owner of the vehicle DARYL 

LAMONT SAMPSON was also placed under arrest. I then returned to my patrol 

car and asked DUNCAN about the two baggy’s. DUNCAN stated to me that the 

two baggy’s located within the vehicle were his. DUNCAN stated that there was 

about 4 grams of heroin and it was his for personal use. Both subjects were 

placed under arrested for maintaining a drug vehicle, possession with intent 

delivery of 4 grams of heroin. Both subjects were cuffed from behind and 

transported to the Cheboygan County Jail without incident. The vehicle was 

transported to the Mackinaw City Police Department for inventory purposes. 

Note: Suspects were never advised about CI information given, for CI’s own 

protection. 

Id. (sics in original). The prosecutor for the county of Cheboygan, Daryl P. Vizna, authorized 

the arrest warrant for Plaintiff Sampson on March 15, 2013. See Vizna Aff., ECF No. 33. Ex. 4. 

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His authorization was based on Defendant Klave’s affidavit and independent information he had 

regarding the CI. Id. The arrest warrant was signed by a magistrate judge that same day. See ECF 

No. 26 Ex. 5. Sampson was also arraigned on March 15, 2013, and bond was set by the Court for 

$100,000.00. 

D. 

Sampson’s preliminary examination was originally scheduled for March 27, 2013. 

However, Mr. Duncan’s attorney was on vacation that date and the lab tests of the heroin were 

not yet available. Finding that the preliminary examinations for Sampson and Mr. Duncan should 

be run together for the convenience of the witnesses, and finding good cause to adjourn, 

Sampson’s preliminary examination was adjourned until April 15, 2013 – over a month after his 

arrest. See Prelim. Exam Tr. 3, ECF No. 23 Ex. 8. Sampson thus moved for dismissal of the 

charges against him on the grounds that the adjournment violated the 14-day rule. The court 

denied Sampson’s motion, and proceeded with the hearing. Id. at 4.1

In support of his argument that probable cause existed to arrest Sampson, the prosecuting 

attorney presented testimony from the CI and from Defendant Klave. After hearing the 

testimony, Judge Barton found the vehicle stop to have been permissible and therefore bound 

Mr. Duncan over trial on “possession with intent to deliver heroin” but not on the second count 

of maintaining a drug vehicle because Sampson, not Mr. Duncan, owned the vehicle. Without 

addressing the consent search or the heroin discovered in the vehicle by Klave, Judge Barton 

 

1

 Michigan has a fourteen-day rule, as codified at M.C.L. § 766.4 (“the magistrate before whom any person is 

arraigned on a charge of having committed a felony shall set a date for a probable cause conference to be held not 

less than 7 days or more than 14 days after the date of the arraignment....”). Such a preliminary examination may 

only be adjourned or delayed without the consent of a defendant upon a finding of good cause. See M.C.L. § 766.7. 

While the absence of an essential witness or the need to ensure that the defendant has counsel constitutes good cause 

for adjournment, inconvenience does not. Compare People v. Williams, 216 N.W.2d 499 (Mich.1974) and People v. 

Bersine, 210 N.W. 2d 501 (Mich. App. 1073) with People v. Twomey, 433 N.W.2d 418 (Mich. App. 1988). There is 

nothing in the record to suggest that any essential witnesses would have been unavailable at on March 27, 2013; 

only that it was more convenient for the witnesses to conduct the preliminary hearing for both defendants together. 

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dismissed both counts against Sampson because the CI did not testify that he had any prior 

contact with Sampson. Sampson was not bound over on any charges, and was released from 

custody. Id. 

On February 25, 2015 Sampson filed the instant suit, alleging four counts against 

Defendant Klave: (1) False arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(2) Malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) 

Common law false arrest and false imprisonment; and (4) Malicious prosecution in violation of 

M.C.L. § 600.2907. Sampson also stated a claim against Defendant Mackinaw City, alleging the 

city had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through the reckless execution of its policies, customs, and 

practices pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 

and its progeny. 

II. 

Now before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. A motion for 

summary judgment should be granted if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of identifying where to look in the record for 

evidence “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party 

who must set out specific facts showing “a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted). The Court must view the evidence and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant and determine “whether the evidence 

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided 

that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. 

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A. 

The parties first cross-move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that he 

was falsely arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment. “A plaintiff proceeding under § 1983 

must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the 

Constitution or by federal law.” In the specific context of § 1983 actions, the non-moving party 

“must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the following two elements: 1) the 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) that the 

deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 

F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citations omitted). Because there is no dispute that 

Defendant Klave was acting under the color of state law, only the first prong is at issue in this 

case. 

i.

Plaintiff first argues that Defendant Klave did not properly initiate the stop of Plaintiff 

Sampson’s vehicle, thus depriving him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. A stop of a vehicle “constitutes a seizure within the meaning 

of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir. 2012). A traffic 

stop is justified “when a police officer has reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime or a 

completed felony or when he has probable cause to believe that a civil traffic violation has been 

committed.” Hoover v. Walsh, 682 F.3d 481, 493 (6th Cir. 2012). 

a. 

Defendants first argue that Klave had probable cause to believe that Sampson committed 

a civil traffic violation by running a stop sign. Sampson contests the accusation, and testified 

that he did not run a stop sign. See Sampson Dep. 84. Taking the facts in a light most favorable 

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to Plaintiff Sampson, there is a material factual dispute as to whether a civil traffic infraction 

could give rise to justification for the traffic stop. 

b. 

Defendants next argue that the traffic stop was justified by Klave’s reasonable suspicion 

that Plaintiff Sampson was involved in an ongoing crime under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

Under the first prong of Terry, “an officer may seize an individual without offending the Fourth 

Amendment if the ‘officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.’” 

Hoover, 682 F.3d at 494 (citing United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2008). As 

explained by the Sixth Circuit: 

a Terry stop requires a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

particular person ... of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts. We 

determine whether an officer has the requisite quantum of proof by looking at the 

totality of the circumstances. This analysis requires us to consider all 

circumstances surrounding the actions of a suspected wrongdoer. Pertinent 

circumstances include the officer’s own direct observations, dispatch information, 

directions from other officers, and the nature of the area and time of day during 

which the suspicious activity occurred. We must consider these circumstances as 

a unified whole rather than as a series of disconnected facts; the lawfulness of an 

investigatory stop is judged by the totality of the circumstances to determine 

whether the individual factors, taken as a whole, give rise to reasonable suspicion, 

even if each individual factor is entirely consistent with innocent behavior when 

examined separately. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a “mere hunch,” 

but less than probable cause, and falls considerably short of satisfying a 

preponderance of the evidence standard. 

Hoover, 682 F.3d at 494 (quotations and citations omitted). 

 Here, it is uncontested the SANE taskforce was investigating Sampson’s passenger, Mr. 

Duncan, as part of a narcotics investigation, and that SANE had received information that Mr. 

Duncan might be traveling to Mackinaw City on the night of March 13, 2013 to receive money 

owed to him by a CI. It is uncontested that Plaintiff Sampson proceeded to drive Mr. Duncan to 

a hotel in Mackinaw City that same night. See Sampson Dep. 59. It is also uncontested that the 

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CI called 911 at around 3:00 AM on March 14, 2013 to inform Defendant Klave that a heroin 

dealer was at his location at the Stay Inn Motel in Mackinaw City. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 

Ex. 4. It is further uncontested that the CI informed Klave that Mr. Duncan had narcotics that he 

wanted to sell to the CI, and that Mr. Duncan was seated in a white Dodge Intrepid behind the 

motel – or the vehicle driven by Plaintiff Sampson. Finally, it is uncontested that after Mr. 

Duncan returned to Sampson’s vehicle from the hotel, Defendant Klave observed Sampson begin 

to follow the CI’s vehicle down the road. Klave then stopped Sampson’s vehicle. 

 Even considering the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff Sampson, all of these 

factors together create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop of 

Sampson’s vehicle. The case cited by Plaintiff in support of his claim that the stop was 

unreasonable, Penrice v. Szokola, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13339 at 8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2016), 

does not suggest otherwise. Here, the information provided by a known CI on multiple 

occasions, Klave’s corroborating observations, the location of the events, and the fact that all 

events occurred in the middle of the night together gave rise to at least reasonable suspicion that 

the vehicle’s occupants were involved in a drug transaction. 

 Because Defendant Klave had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the second prong 

of Terry requires an inquiry into whether the stop was “reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. “[A]n 

investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 

purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Plaintiff makes no allegation 

that the stop was unreasonable in scope under Terry based on the reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. Instead, Plaintiff again argues that he did not run a stop sign. Because Plaintiff 

has not met his burden of showing a material dispute regarding whether the stop was reasonable 

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under Terry, Defendant Klave’s initial stop of Plaintiff Sampson’s vehicle was proper as a matter 

of law. 

ii. 

 Because the initial stop was proper, the question becomes whether Klave’s search of the 

vehicle was proper. Plaintiff concedes that he gave Klave voluntary consent to search to search 

his car. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[O]ne of the specifically 

established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that 

is conducted pursuant to consent.”). Accordingly, Klave’s search of the vehicle was proper as a 

matter of law. 

iii. 

Having determined that both the initial stop and the vehicle search were lawful, the next 

question is whether Defendant Klave had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Sampson. “An 

investigative detention that is constitutionally permissible when initiated may “ripen into a ... 

seizure that must be based on probable cause.” United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 530 (6th 

Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A false arrest claim under federal law requires a 

plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Voyticky 

v. Vill. of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). 

“Probable cause requires only the probability of criminal activity not some type of ‘prima 

facie’ showing.” Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir.1988). The probability of 

criminal activity, in turn, is assessed under a reasonableness standard based on “an examination 

of all facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.” Crockett v. 

Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003). It is viewed “from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight[.]” Klein v. Long, 

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275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citation omitted). Probable cause to arrest 

therefore requires “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to 

warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, 

that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. 

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Furthermore, “[t]he validity of the arrest does not depend on 

whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted 

of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest.” Id. at 36. 

Here, at the preliminary hearing a state judge determined that there was insufficient 

evidence to bind Sampson over for trial on either the drug offense or the offense of maintaining a 

drug vehicle. Plaintiff Sampson argues that summary judgment should be granted in his favor 

based on this fact alone. This Court need not address the question of whether the state court 

judge’s finding of no probable cause controls in this action because even if Plaintiff establishes 

that he was arrested without probable cause he cannot overcome Defendants’ entitlement to 

qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (6th Cir. 2009) (overruling a rigid 

two-step approach in determining government officials’ qualified immunity claims, and holding 

that Courts may consider qualified immunity before determining whether a plaintiff has 

established the violation of a constitutional right). 

iv.

 Even if Plaintiff Sampson was arrested without probable cause, Defendants may still be 

entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, (1985). The doctrine protects 

government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

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known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982). “Qualified immunity balances two 

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when 

they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 

 The existence of qualified immunity turns on the question of whether a defendant’s 

action violated clearly established law. Id. at 243-44. “This inquiry turns on the ‘objective legal 

reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at 

the time it was taken.’” Id. at 244 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, (1999). “The 

Fourth Amendment conditions warrants on probable cause and prohibits unreasonable seizures. 

A police officer violates those restrictions only when his deliberate or reckless falsehoods result 

in arrest and prosecution without probable cause.” Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 

771-72 (6th Cir. 2014). 

“Once the qualified immunity defense is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to 

demonstrate that the officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.” Silberstein v. City of 

Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006). The relevant inquiry is whether “it would be clear to 

a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 

U.S. at 202. 

 There is no dispute that Defendant Klave had probable cause to arrest Sampson’s 

passenger, Mr. Duncan: Mr. Duncan was the subject of an ongoing narcotics investigation, he 

had been implicated in a drug deal that night by a CI, and the drug deal was subsequently 

corroborated by Defendant Klave through the traffic stop and discovery of heroin in the vehicle. 

 There was also reason to believe that Sampson and Mr. Duncan were working together. 

In the context of a drug case, the Supreme Court has specifically held that an officer may 

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reasonably infer a common enterprise between the driver of a vehicle and a passenger under 

certain circumstances. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); see also U.S. v. 

Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 590-92 (6th Cir. 2004). Defendant Klave’s assumption that Mr. 

Duncan and Sampson were engaged in a common enterprise was reasonable under the 

circumstances, especially considering that Klave knew that Sampson had driven Mr. Duncan for 

around five hours from Detroit in Sampson’s car, knew the suspects did not arrive until around 

3:00 AM, knew Sampson had waited at the hotel for around ten minutes before following the CI 

in his vehicle, and ultimately discovered heroin in Sampson’s vehicle. 

Furthermore, upon discovering heroin inside Sampson’s vehicle in a location accessible 

to Sampson, Defendant Klave could have reasonably believed that he had probable cause to 

arrest Sampson. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985). This was bolstered by 

Detective Supernault’s statement to Klave that Sampson was also somehow a subject of the 

SANE investigation. Whether that claim was ultimately proved true is irrelevant to the question 

of what Klave reasonably believed at the time of the arrest. Similarly, Defendant Klave was not 

required to believe Sampson’s statement that the drugs did not belong to him. Finally, the fact 

that the judge ultimately determined that the arrest lacked probable cause does not change the 

fact that Klave’s actions were not unreasonable in light of clearly established legal rules. 

Because Klave acted reasonably in believing that there was probable cause to arrest Sampson, he 

is entitled to qualified immunity on Sampson’s § 1983 false arrest claim. 

B. 

 The parties also cross-move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Sampson’s malicious 

prosecution claim. A claim of malicious prosecution is distinct from a claim of false arrest in that 

the malicious prosecution claim “remedies detention accompanied not by absence of legal 

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process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 

(2007). A plaintiff raising a malicious prosecution claim must satisfy the following four 

elements: (1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and the defendant made, 

influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) probable cause for the prosecution 

was lacking; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty under the Fourth Amendment as a 

consequence of the legal proceeding; and (4) the criminal proceeding resolved in the plaintiff’s 

favor. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010). Under the first prong, a defendant 

need not have actually made the decision to prosecute to be held liable for malicious prosecution. 

Instead, the Sixth Circuit has determined that law enforcement officers may be held liable for 

malicious prosecution if they influence or play a role in the criminal process. Id. at 311-12. 

 Even assuming Plaintiff Sampson has satisfied the elements of a malicious prosecution 

claim, Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendant Klave’s assertion of qualified immunity. As set forth 

above, “[t]he Fourth Amendment conditions warrants on probable cause and prohibits 

unreasonable seizures. A police officer violates those restrictions only when his deliberate or 

reckless falsehoods result in arrest and prosecution without probable cause.” Newman, 773 F.3d 

at 771-72. 

 Plaintiff argues that Klave is not entitled to qualified immunity because he made 

materially false statements in the affidavit that were either knowingly false or in reckless 

disregard for the truth. In support of this argument, Plaintiff emphasizes that the affidavit did not 

disclose the identity of the CI, the CI’s criminal history or reliability, and Klave’s lack of 

relationship with the CI. See Supp. Rep. The lack of information about the CI and his connection 

to the SANE investigation is not a materially false statement, but an omission. While the 

omission is arguably negligent, negligence alone does not give rise to a claim of malicious 

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prosecution. Newman, 773 F.3d at 772. The omission was not misleading, since both the 

prosecutor and the judge authorizing the warrant had the opportunity to independently make a 

probable cause determination. 

 Plaintiff also emphasizes the fact that Defendant Klave does not state in his affidavit that 

the bags of heroin were found in the backseat of the passenger side of the vehicle or that Plaintiff 

denied the bags of heroin belonged to him. Again, these are omissions and not false statements. 

The affidavit states that the bags of heroin were discovered “in the back seat of the vehicle.” See

Aff. ECF No. 30 Ex. J. This representation is not materially false, and does not change Klave’s 

subsequent statement that Sampson was arrested because heroin was discovered in his vehicle. 

Omission of the specific location of the heroin does not alter the material fact that heroin was 

discovered in Sampson’s vehicle. Furthermore, the affidavit states that “DUNCAN stated to me 

that the two baggy[]s located within the vehicle were his. DUNCAN stated that there was about 

4 grams of heroin and it was his for personal use.” The omission of Sampson’s disclaimer of 

ownership was neither deliberate nor in reckless disregard of the truth. 

 Plaintiff also emphasizes that Klave’s affidavit does not mention that the CI did not refer 

to Plaintiff Sampson at all. Klave did not falsely claim that the CI had implicated Sampson in 

any way. Indeed, all of the information attributed to the CI in the affidavit refers to Mr. Duncan 

alone. Klave was not required to affirmatively state that the CI had not mentioned Sampson. The 

omission of such an affirmative statement was neither deliberate nor in reckless disregard of the 

truth. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Klave misrepresented that the CI had stated there was heroin 

in the vehicle, when in fact the CI had stated that Mr. Duncan had heroin on his person. Klave’s 

affidavit states as follows: “I was advised by CI that within the vehicle was a Darryl Duncan. I 

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was advised by CI that they would be going to a different location so that DUNCAN could sell 

CI heroin. CI stated to me that there was heroin within the suspect vehicle.” See Aff. ECF No. 

30 Ex. J. Plaintiff does not identify any representation by the CI inconsistent with this statement. 

Moreover, if Mr. Duncan had heroin on his person and if Mr. Duncan was in the vehicle, then 

Klave’s representation that there was heroin in the vehicle is not materially false. Klave’s 

affidavit was “not so far off the mark” from the CI’s so as to permit an inference of deliberate or 

reckless disregard for the truth. Newman, 773 F.3d at 772 (citing Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996 

(6th Cir. 1993). 

While these allegations might arguably furnish a foundation for a motion to suppress 

based on the inadequacy of the information contained in the affidavit, even considering the facts 

in a light most favorable to Plaintiff they cannot support an inference that Klave submitted 

deliberate or reckless falsehoods in the affidavit. The allegations are therefore insufficient to 

overcome Klave’s claim of qualified immunity. Because Defendant Klave was reasonable in 

believing that probable cause existed for Sampson’s arrest and subsequent detention, and 

because he did not make any false representations in his affidavit that were in deliberate or in 

reckless disregard of the truth, summary judgment will be granted in Defendant’s favor. 

C. 

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Monell claim. In Monell, the 

Supreme Court held that municipalities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 

Monnell, 436 U.S. at 700-01. Such a claim may only be brought when “execution of a 

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity 

is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. The Sixth Circuit has instructed that, to satisfy the 

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requirements of Monell, a plaintiff “must identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself 

and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner 

v. Memphis Police Dept., 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). 

Accordingly, to succeed on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must first allege that the 

municipality itself caused a constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. 658 at 691. A municipality 

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality 

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. Second, a Plaintiff 

must show that the alleged conduct qualifies as a policy. Monnell municipal liability may attach 

where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s 

officers.” Id. at 690. Monell liability may also attach where a plaintiff alleges “constitutional 

deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not 

received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id. at 690-91. 

Municipal liability may also attach for policies promulgated by the official vested with final 

policymaking authority for the municipality. See Miller, 408 F.3d at 813 (citing Pembaur v. City 

of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482–83, 106 (1986). This second element requires a plaintiff to 

show “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives 

by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject 

matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). Third, a plaintiff 

must show causation. In other words, a plaintiff must connect the municipality’s policy to the 

particular injury alleged. 

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 Plaintiff argues that it has established a Monell claim under a theory that Defendant 

Mackinaw City failed to supervise its police officers. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant Mackinaw City had a policy of not providing Defendant Klave with any performance 

evaluations. In order to state a claim under a Monnell “failure to train or supervise” theory a 

plaintiff must show that the need for additional supervision or training “is so obvious, and the 

inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the 

city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, 

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, (1989). 

 Plaintiff Sampson has not met this burden. Plaintiff points to no evidence in support of 

his claim other than Defendant Klave’s deposition, in which Klave stated only that he did not 

receive performance evaluations. Klave Dep. 12. Performance evaluations are by no means the 

only way in which employees may be supervised by or receive feedback from employers. 

Indeed, immediately after stating that he did not receive performance evaluations Defendant 

Klave explained that he received yearly training on “arrests, procedure regarding arrests, [and] 

determination of probable cause.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the lack of 

performance evaluations was a deliberately chosen custom, much less an official departmental 

policy. Plaintiff has also presented insufficient evidence to raise an inference that Defendant 

Mackinaw City was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights. Finally, Plaintiff has 

presented no evidence whatsoever that a lack of performance evaluations led to Sampson’s 

alleged constitutional injury. Because Plaintiff has provided no evidence in support of his 

Monnell claim, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Mackinaw City. 

III.

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Because Plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed on the merits, Plaintiff’s related state 

law claims will be dismissed without prejudice. A federal court may exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state law claims if they form part of the same controversy as the 

federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A federal court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a claim if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 

district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or 

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 

jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). When a plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed on the merits, the 

question of whether to retain jurisdiction over any state law claims rests within the court’s 

discretion. Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). However, the dismissal 

of the claims over which the federal court had original jurisdiction creates a presumption in favor 

of dismissing without prejudice any state-law claims that accompanied it to federal court. Id. at 

863. In addition, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity 

and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of 

applicable law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The issues 

presented are more appropriate for resolution by a state court and therefore the Court declines to 

exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ supplemental state law claims will therefore be 

dismissed without prejudice. 

IV. 

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 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Sampson’s motion for summary judgment, 

ECF No. 23, is DENIED. 

It is further ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, is 

GRANTED. 

It is further ORDERED that Count 1, Count 2, and Count 5 of Plaintiff Sampson’s 

complaint, ECF No. 1, are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 It is further ORDERED that Count 3 and Count 4 of Plaintiff Sampson’s Complaint, 

ECF No. 1, are DISMISSED without prejudice. 

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: June 3, 2016 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on June 3, 2016. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

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