GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 10, 2001

The Honorable Lane Evans

House of Representatives

Subject: Status Update of the New 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer

Dear Mr. Evans:

In July 2000, we issued a report to you and several other members of Congress

describing problems with the new 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer program.1

 The new

155 mm Lightweight Howitzer is expected to replace the M-198 towed howitzer. The

Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office is directing this

program’s development, with BAE SYSTEMS (BAE), a British company, as the prime

contractor.

This correspondence responds to your request of December 2000 that we continue to

monitor and report on this program due to your continued concerns about its

schedule, cost, and technical difficulties.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Since our July 2000 report, all key milestones except one have continued to slip. For

example, acceptance of the first developmental howitzer slipped an additional 5

months from June to November 2000, and delivery of the remaining 7 developmental

howitzers was delayed an additional 5 to 10 months. The production decision has

slipped from March 2002 to September 2002 and the initial fielding of the new

howitzer by the Marine Corps has slipped another 8 months to July 2004 or 28 months

from the date set at the original contract award. The initial fielding of the howitzer to

the Army remains unchanged at March 2005.

Since July 2000, total program cost estimates have increased from $1,129.9 million to

$1,250.2 million, an increase of $120.3 million.2

 This increase is principally the result

of restructuring the developmental contract which added $20.2 million and an

approximately $100 million increase for an electronic aiming system.

 1

 See Defense Acquisitions: Howitzer Program Experiencing Cost Increases and Schedule Delays

(GAO/NSIAD-00-182, July 28, 2000).

2

 All fiscal year 2002 cost estimates are predecisional, as the President's fiscal year 2002 budget has not yet

been submitted to the Congress.
Page 2 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

In our July report, we focused on three technical problems—insufficient spade size

(devices that anchor the howitzer in the ground to stabilize the gun during firing),

instability of the saddle (the part of the howitzer in which the cannon barrel rests),

and faulty titanium welds. The Program Office reports that the contractor has

enlarged the spade and tests at Yuma on the first developmental gun have verified it

is now properly sized; the new saddle design was recently successfully field tested in

the United Kingdom; and one weld was repaired on site and a second faulty crack

continues to be monitored. We also focused on four additional technical problems

during our current review. The first is a problem with the cracking of the spades.

The second is a problem with loose spade latches that create difficulties in removing

the spades from the ground. The third is with a device—the spade damper—

intended to help the spade dig into the soil to stabilize the gun, but which does not

work properly in all soil types. The fourth problem involves the durability of the

optical sight being developed for the gun. According to Program Office officials,

design solutions have been identified for each of these new problems. These design

changes have not been fully incorporated and field tested to date.

Program officials provided oral comments that were generally technical in nature to a

draft of this correspondence.

BACKGROUND

The new 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer is intended to be a lighter, more

transportable, and mobile weapon for strategic and tactical movements. Weapon

performance requirements include a maximum weight of 9,000 pounds (7,000 pounds

less than M-198 towed howitzer it is to replace), reduced time to place the weapon in

a firing position, and an increased rate of fire compared with current weapons.

The Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office directs and funds

the Lightweight Howitzer development program. The Army will assume program

management responsibilities for the Lightweight Howitzer program upon completion

of deliveries to the Marine Corps. The Army plans to buy 273 guns and the Marines

plan to buy 413.

BAE is the Lightweight Howitzer prime contractor. Cannon barrels are being

produced at the U.S. Army’s Watervliet Arsenal under a separate contract and are to

be provided as government-furnished equipment. The howitzer will eventually

incorporate the towed artillery digitization upgrade, a precise location and targeting

system being developed by General Dynamics for the Army under a separate contract

as government-furnished equipment.
Page 3 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

BAE is currently planning to subcontract 70 percent of the howitzer’s production to

subcontractors in the United States listed in table 1.

 Table 1: Major United States Subcontractors for the New 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer

Subcontractor/location Subcontracted component/activity

United Defense LP, Pascagoula, Mississippi Final Assembly, Test, and Delivery

HydroMill, Inc., Chatsworth, California Body Assembly

Major Tool and Machining, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana Stabilizers, Spades, Trails

Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois Breach Operating Load Tray System

RTI International Metals, Inc., Niles, Ohio Titanium

 Source: Lightweight 155 mm Howitzer Joint Program Office

PROGRAM SCHEDULE CONTINUES TO SLIP

Since the program inception and since we last reported on this program in July 2000,

the program schedule for all key milestones dates have slipped for the howitzer,

except one. The schedule for the towed artillery digitization upgrade will also slip.

In December 2000, the Joint Program Office restructured the development program

consistent with the new contract with BAE.3

 The restructuring slipped the schedule

even further beyond the already delayed schedule estimates from December 1998, as

reflected in table 2. For example, acceptance of the first developmental howitzer was

delayed by an additional six months, the production decision (Milestone III) and

contract award were delayed by an additional 12 months, and initial fielding of this

system by the Marine Corps was delayed an additional 8 months. Initial fielding of

the howitzer by the Army remained unchanged at March 2005.

 3

 The restructuring was retroactive to June 2000.
Page 4 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

Table 2: Comparison of Key Program Milestones Since the Original Schedule

Key Milestones

Original

February

1996

schedule

December

1998

schedule

December

2000

schedule

Months

delayed

since

original

1996

schedule

Months

delayed

since

December

1998

schedule

First Test Article

Acceptance(first

developmental howitzer)

June 1998 May 2000 November

2000

24 6

Production Decision

(Milestone III)

December

1999

September

20014

September

2002

33 12

Production Contract

Award

December

1999

October 2001 October 2002 34 12

First Production Article

Qualification Testing March 2001 January 2003 December

2003

33 11

Marine Corps Initial

Fielding5

March 2002 November

2003

July 2004 28 8

Army Initial Fielding6March 2005 March 2005 March 2005 No change7No change7

Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office

Delivery of all developmental howitzers has also slipped since our last report in July

2000. Table 3 below shows that all eight developmental howitzers were to be

delivered by February 2001 but only one of the eight developmental howitzers has

been delivered. In addition, delivery of the remaining seven has been delayed from

an additional 5 to 10 months. Program Officials told us that it was a conscious

decision to delay delivery of the last four howitzers for operational testing in order to

implement changes resulting from developmental testing.

 4

 In July 2000, the program office had slipped this date to March 2002.

5

 Marine Corps initial fielding is defined to be about 38 guns for a battalion from both I & II Marine

Expeditionary Force.

6

 Army initial fielding is defined to be about 6 guns to support a troop battery in a light-division.

7

While the overall program has been significantly delayed, program officials believe the original Army initial

fielding date of March 2005 is achievable, in part, due to the likelihood that a small number of guns can be

delivered to support a troop battery.
Page 5 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

Table 3: Comparison of Original and Revised Delivery Dates for Developmental Howitzers

Developmental

Howitzer

(unit number)

Original

delivery

date

Revised

delivery date

(as of May

2000)

Current

delivery date

Months

delayed from

original

delivery date

Months

delayed since

May 2000

1 May 2000 June 2000 Acceptance

November

20008

6 5

2 May 2000 October 2000 April 2001 11 6

3 June 2000 November 2000 June 2001 12 7

4 June 2000 January 2001 June 2001 12 5

5 – 8 October

2000

February 2001 December

2001

14 10

Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office

The schedule delays have been caused by the need for engineering changes and

corrective action to address problems found during manufacturing and initial

contractor and government testing at Yuma Proving Grounds on the first

developmental gun. These problems included difficulties with the design of the

spades, which dig into the ground to stabilize the weapon during firing; the stiffness

of the saddle assembly which holds and supports the cannon barrel; and difficulties

with the titanium welding process.

The initially designed spades were too small to firmly anchor the howitzer into the

ground, causing excessive movement during firing. The original saddle assembly

design created pointing accuracy problems when the howitzer was fired from sloping

ground. As for the titanium welding problems, the first developmental gun

experienced two instances of faulty welds, one of which required repair. Details on

BAE’s efforts to address these problems will be discussed in a later section.

According to Program Office officials, the Army’s towed artillery digitization upgrade,

a precise location and targeting system, is also experiencing significant schedule

delays primarily due to software development. According to these officials, the

winning contractor for the digitization program assumed in its bid that about 90

percent of the software written for another cannon program could be re-used for the

digitization program. The contractor just recently performed a detailed analysis of

the software for the other program and determined that only 70 percent to 80 percent

of this software could be re-used for the digitization program. According to Program

Office officials, more new code will have to be written than originally estimated

resulting in the need to restructure the digitization program. The Program Office is

currently developing alternative courses of action for consideration by the users and

the program executive officer. Because no course of action has yet been adopted,

cost and schedule projections have not been made. However, a Program Office

official stated that since the howitzer is designed to initially operate with an optical

 8

 The first developmental howitzer was delivered in June 2000. However, according to Program Office

officials the gun required additional testing and modifications by the contractor before it was accepted

in November 2000.
Page 6 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

sighting system, rather than a digitized system, any schedule slippage in the towed

artillery digitization upgrade will not affect the howitzer’s schedule.

PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES CONTINUE TO INCREASE

The most recent Program Office cost estimates, as of February 2001, show the total

costs for the development and production of the howitzer and the digitization

program to be $1,250.2 million—an increase of $120.3 million from the Program

Office’s July 2000 estimates. All fiscal year 2002 cost estimates are predecisional--

that is they are not yet final nor approved--because the President has not submitted

his fiscal year 2002 budget request to the Congress. Details of these cost increases are

shown in table 4.

Table 4: Increases in Estimated Development and Production Costs of the New Howitzer and

Towed Artillery Digitization

Then-year dollars in millions

Program July 2000 February

2001

Total program cost increase

from July 2000 to February

2001

US Marine Corps

Lightweight Howitzer

RDT&E

$142.6 $162.8 $20.2

US Marine Corps

Lightweight Howitzer and

Towed Artillery Digitization

Upgrade Production

492.6 543.0 50.4

Army Towed Artillery

Digitization Upgrade RDT&E

43.8 52.3 8.5

Army Lightweight Howitzer

and Towed Artillery

Digitization Upgrade

Production

450.9 492.1 41.2

Total Budget $1,129.9 $1,250.2 $120.3

Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office

The howitzer developmental program funded by the Marine Corps increased by $20.2

million. This increase primarily represents the restructuring of the BAE development

contract for the howitzer. The estimated contract cost increased $22.4 million, from

$43.4 million to $65.8 million, when the contract was restructured from a cost-plusincentive fee contract into a cost-sharing contract.9

 According to Program Office

officials, the increase of $22.4 million includes $5.0 million required for the addition

of two pilot production guns; $8.5 million for risk reduction efforts; integration of the

cannon barrels and towed artillery digitization upgrade (government-furnished

equipment) and long-lead costs; and $8.9 million for extending the program by one

year.

 9

The cost increase of $22.4 million includes $2.2 million contributed by Italy for the development of the

howitzer. Therefore, the total increase in U.S. cost of the howitzer development program is $20.2 million.
Page 7 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

According to Program Office officials, while the Marine Corps has always had the

same requirements for its towed artillery digitization upgrade production program, it

had not included all funding necessary to meet its full requirements in previous cost

estimates. By including all necessary funding for full requirements for the first time

in its February 2001 estimates, an additional $50.4 million for the Marines’ towed

artillery digitization program is reflected in estimated program costs. The $8.5

million increase in the Army’s digitization development program resulted from the

additional costs that will be required to refurbish, after their use for operational

testing, four of the developmental guns needed by the digitization program for testing

purposes.

Program Office officials also reported that the Army increased its cost estimate by

$41.2 million for the production of the howitzer and digitization program. During our

discussions with Program Office officials, they said that they did not know why this

increase occurred. 

According to Program Office officials, the estimated cost of the cannon barrel is

included in the howitzer production costs. These officials said that the cost of

cannon barrels has fluctuated from $106,000 to $334,000, depending on the workload

at Watervliet Arsenal. The most recent estimate for the cannon barrels is between

$200,000 and $224,000.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO BE IDENTIFIED

In our July 2000 report, we focused on three major problems: (1) insufficient spade

size, (2) flexure of the saddle assembly, and (3) faulty titanium welding processes.

BAE has made efforts to address these problems. We have identified four additional

technical problems during our current review that had not been identified in July

2000—spade cracking, spade latch, spade damper, and optical sighting difficulties.

Initial Technical Problems

Based on the results of tests made on the prototypes of the lightweight howitzer prior

to July 2000, BAE determined that the spades were not large enough to securely

anchor the weapon into the ground during firing in all soil conditions. The spades are

critical to the operation of the howitzer because they are designed to dig about six

inches into the ground to stabilize the gun during firing. To solve the spade size

problem, BAE enlarged the spades and installed them on the first developmental

weapon. A Program Office official told us that live-fire testing of the first

developmental weapon at Yuma has confirmed that the spades are now large enough

to anchor the weapon as required.

BAE has stiffened the saddle assembly—now termed “fat boy”—and the cradle to

address problems with the howitzer’s accuracy and stability. The saddle assembly,

along with the cradle, holds and supports the cannon barrel. Program Office officials

told us before the saddle assembly and cradle were stiffened, the fire control system
Page 8 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

(optical sights) would not remain aligned with the barrel of the howitzer (boresight

retention) at high elevation or severe side-leaning conditions because the gun was too

flexible. BAE also reports adding two shims that are intended to reduce offset errors

and a new thermally insulated linkage rod to counter different thermal expansion

effects between adjacent aluminum and titanium components. The stiffened saddle

and cradle have been installed on the second developmental howitzer (scheduled for

delivery in April 2001) and tested in the factory on level and sloping surfaces.

Program Officials report that this redesigned howitzer met accuracy requirements

during the recent preliminary field testing in the United Kingdom.

A February 2000 inspection of the first developmental howitzer being manufactured

by BAE revealed quality problems with the welding process of some titanium parts.

As a result, BAE revised its manufacturing processes related to titanium welding.

Nonetheless, initial field testing of the first developmental howitzer resulted in two

indications of titanium weld cracking. Program Officials report that one of the cracks

was repaired on-site and that they are continuing to monitor the second crack.

BAE is considering casting, the process of building molds for parts and pouring

molten metal into the molds to form the parts, from 30 to 40 of the gun parts that

would have been fabricated by welding pieces of the metal together. The

introduction of castings will cause welding requirements to decline; however, none of

BAE’s current United States subcontractors selected for production of the gun is

capable of producing castings. BAE has identified at least five potential casting

suppliers, who are currently developing quotes, cost estimates and delivery schedules

based on casting concepts approved by BAE, for providing titanium castings. BAE is

currently determining which castings will be incorporated into the production of the

two planned pilot production guns. Program Office officials told us that BAE has

been working with two casting producers under a technology assistance agreement

and expects to finalize casting contracts within the next 30 days. The integrated

program master schedule indicates that the first pilot production gun that is to

include castings is scheduled to be live fire tested in March 2002.

New Technical Problems

While enlarging the spade has reportedly addressed the problem we identified in July

2000, three new problems with the spade have been identified. In August 2000,

testing of the enlarged spade disclosed that the spade cracked in the lower portion of

its blade when the howitzer was fired in very hard soil. To solve the cracking that

was occurring in the spades, BAE made 14 design modifications that essentially

strengthened and reshaped the spades but added no weight. This redesign is to be

incorporated on the seven undelivered developmental guns still in production and the

first developmental testing howitzer. The Program Office is confident that these

changes will address the spade cracking problem, however these changes to the

spade have not been field-tested to date.

Testing of the first developmental gun at Yuma Proving Grounds in December 2000

and January 2001 revealed that the latches used to release tension from the spade so
Page 9 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

it can be removed from the ground were becoming loose during firing of the gun.

This causes difficulty in removing the spades from the ground. This problem

occurred several times and is classified in test incident reports as a major problem

that still requires corrective action. Although Program Office officials told us that a

corrective action has been developed and will be incorporated on howitzers to be

delivered in the future, during our site visit to observe a field test of the howitzer in

March 2001, a Program Office official identified this as a continuing problem. Current

plans are to conduct tests on the spade latch improvements prior to safety testing in

June 2001.

In addition, testing at Yuma identified another problem related to the operation of the

spades involving the spade damper. The spade damper is a device that allows the

trail arm10 to compress against the howitzer body during firing, orienting the spade for

proper digging into the ground to stabilize the gun during subsequent firings. Firing

tests revealed that the damper did not always allow the trail arm to properly

compress against the howitzer body in all soil types. The howitzer is tested in soil

types varying from sand to hardpan/rock. The damper was designed with only a

single setting for all soil types. The Program Office is considering a new design that

would provide two settings for the spade damper that howitzer operators could

choose from depending upon soil type. Program Office officials report that

modifications will be incorporated in the howitzers scheduled to be delivered on and

after June 2001, and then retrofitted on earlier delivered howitzers.

Another new technical problem involves the optical sight that is being developed for

the new howitzer. According to a Program Office official, the lightweight howitzer

program is modifying the M-198 howitzer optical sight and plans to use it on the new

howitzer until the Army’s towed artillery digitization upgrade program reaches full

development. It will be retained as a backup when the digital fire control becomes

available. However, the greater stresses created by the new howitzer, which result

from the lighter weight of the howitzer has proven damaging to the optical sight. A

redesign of the optical sight was recently completed, which Program Office officials

report has operated successfully in factory testing. The new optical sight will not be

tested in live-fire conditions until after the second developmental gun is delivered in

April 2001. A Program Office official told us that the accuracy of the gun could not be

determined until all of the redesigns and the optical sight have been tested under livefire conditions.

AGENCY COMMENTS

Representatives of the Program Office, as well as both the Departments of the Army

and Navy provided oral comments that were generally technical in nature to a draft of

this correspondence. We incorporated these technical changes as appropriate.

 10 The trail arm is an extension that extends outward from the base of the howitzer to give it more

stability.
Page 10 GAO-01-603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To determine progress in meeting program schedule and cost estimates we

interviewed officials of the Program Office, Picatinny Arsenal, Picatinny, New Jersey

and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed data. These data include key acquisition

milestones dates, acquisition schedules for the delivery of the eight developmental

howitzers, and preliminary fiscal year 2002 budget requirements program funding

documents. We compared these data to information previously provided by Program

Office officials. We also met with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, the Departments of the Army

and Navy, Washington, D.C.; and the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico,

Virginia.

In examining technical difficulties affecting the program, in addition to meeting with

and obtaining information, including test reports, from Program Office officials listed

above, we held discussions with representatives performing the testing, and observed

a test firing session of the howitzer at Yuma Proving Grounds, Yuma, Arizona.

We conducted our work from February through March 2001 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards and generally relied upon agencyprovided data.

We plan no further distribution of this letter until 30 days after the date of this letter.

At that time, we will send copies of this letter to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Robert B. Pirie, Acting Secretary of the Navy;

General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Honorable Joseph W.

Westphal, Acting Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Mitchell Daniels, Director,

Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. The

letter will also be available on GAO's home page at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions, or need additional information, please call me at (202) 512-

4841. Major contributors to this letter are James Solomon, Ted Baird, Steve Martinez,

and Lee Carroll.

Sincerely yours,

R. E. Levin

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

(120042)
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