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51–667 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–15] 

COMBATING PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FULL COMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 5, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 5, 2009, Combating Piracy on the High Seas .......................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 5, 2009 ........................................................................................ 33 

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2009 

COMBATING PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Gortney, Vice Adm. William E., USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central 

Command .............................................................................................................. 6 

Mull, Ambassador Stephen, Acting Under Secretary for International Security 

and Arms Control, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 9 

Pike, Daniel W., Acting Principal Director, Office of African Affairs, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 4 

Wycoff, Karl, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Coulter, Michael, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................... 37 

Gortney, Vice Adm. William E. ....................................................................... 39 

Mull, Ambassador Stephen .............................................................................. 60 

Wycoff, Karl ...................................................................................................... 66 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

COMBATING PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 5, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today, the committee meets to 

hear testimony on the challenge of piracy on the high seas and the 

United States government efforts to deal with this challenge. 

Joining us today, Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander, 

United States Naval Forces, Central Command; Mr. Daniel Pike, 

Acting Principal Director of the Office of African Affairs within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense; Ambassador Stephen Mull, Acting Under Secretary for International Security and Arms Control 

from the State Department; and, Mr. Karl Wycoff, Acting Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. 

We certainly thank you for being with us today. 

If we had called such a hearing two years ago, many might have 

wondered why. Until recently, piracy seemed a thing in the past, 

part of the stories we tell our children or part of the history lessons 

about the Barbary pirates or Blackbeard. 

Recent events in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, 

however, make this very much a current and important issue for 

American national security. 

Piracy fits in the spectrum of low intensity conflict, with threats 

like terrorism and cyber warfare. These threats are all fed, in part, 

by globalization, which radicalizes significant numbers of people 

who feel alienated and disenfranchised and who seek to undermine 

the security and prosperity of those they hold responsible. 

At the same time, globalization can spread the reach and impact 

of these kinds of attacks across the world, including the homeland, 

certainly more than just a cost of doing business. 

The United States has always been a seafaring nation. Our ability to project power globally is critically linked to our presence on 

the seas, the strength of our Navy and our commitment to keeping 

the lanes of trade and communication open. 

The maintenance of free trade and free passage of vessels are 

crucial components of our national security. At a time when we remain dependent on foreign energy supplies, the free movement of 

international shipping is very much a national lifeline. 
2 

So it is disturbing to see the trends of the last several years. 

While piracy incidents have come down in other critical checkpoints, like the Straits of Malacca, due to the concerted efforts of 

neighboring states, incidents in the Gulf of Aden have exploded. 

In 2008, there were 293 attacks worldwide, with 111 of them occurring in the Gulf of Aden or the east coast of Somalia. 

The international community, led by the United States, has 

taken some key steps, and I commend you for it. First, combined 

Joint Task Force 151 has brought together Naval forces and our allies and has sparked support for the mission from friends as diverse as Russia and China. 

It has helped focus the attention of many nations in pursuit of 

our joint interest in maintaining free movement of vessels in the 

Gulf of Aden. 

Second, the efforts of the Kenyan government, through the agreements with the United States and United Kingdom, should be applauded as a promising way to ensure greater prosecution and to 

raise the cost of doing business for these pirates. 

Third, the international shipping community, working with the 

combined joint task force, has made some progress in improving 

and disseminating their best practices. 

More must be done and must be done quickly. My own view is 

that the international arrangements coordinated by Central Command should be made more formal, more institutionalized. We 

need an international counter-piracy league under the auspices of 

the United Nations. 

What is clear to me is that the United States must remain a 

leader in these efforts, but at the same time, we know that neighboring nations must get involved and the collective weight of the 

international community must be felt in this regard. 

We know, too, that there will be no lasting solution to the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden until Somalia’s failed state is addressed. I fear that the situation on the ground in Somalia will be 

repeated in other failed states and states with vast areas of 

ungoverned territory within their borders. 

Piracy cannot exist on this scale and with this level of 

brazenness if there was effective government control of that nation. 

I look forward to the witnesses’ thoughts on what can be done 

to influence Somalia’s stability and, in the absence of such stability, what additional steps can be taken to curb piracy in that region. 

The issue of piracy is a complex one. Like issues of economic instability and global climate change, it is a nontraditional national 

security issue, while, at the same time, reminding us of the historic 

persistence of this problem. 

Piracy goes to the hard core of American national security and 

economic interests. It also demonstrates that any solution must be 

both multifaceted and multinational, coordinating the world’s naval 

powers, the United Nations, the international shipping community 

and the nations that neighbor Somalia. 

I am confident that today’s hearing will lay some of the options 

for addressing this issue on the table. 
3 

Before I turn to the witnesses, let me turn to the ranking member, my good friend from New York, John McHugh, for any remarks he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. I thank my good friend and my leader, the chairman, for his gracious comments. 

Also, let me add my words of welcome to our distinguished panelists. 

As the chairman very ably outlined, it may seem something of 

a disconnect today for us to be talking about something as ancient 

really as piracy, particularly when this committee concerns itself 

on a routine basis with ballistic missile defense, nuclear warfare, 

those other more modern-sounding problems that beset us. 

But that notwithstanding, as the chairman maintains, and I fully 

agree, the challenge of maintaining the sanctity and security of our 

shipping lanes and semblance of the sanctity and security on the 

high seas falls heavily upon the agenda of our national security interests. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that I just have unanimous consent 

to enter my full comments into the record and, in lieu of that—excuse me—at that same time, just make a few points, if I may. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, of course. 

Mr. MCHUGH. First, at the risk of stating the obvious, piracy is 

not new, as the chairman, again, discussed. Throughout history, we 

have been dealing with the events of pirates attacking ships and, 

certainly, most notably in our nation’s history, that of the Barbary 

pirates who operated from the northern coast of Africa from the 

late 1500s into the early 1800s. 

In recent testimony to the Transportation and Infrastructure 

Subcommittee, a senior policy analyst from RAND stated, ‘‘Piracy 

is, above all, an economically driven phenomenon,’’ and I think that 

is an important point, one that the chairman alluded to, as well, 

and it is important that we remind ourselves that piracy, at its 

root, is often not driven by ideology. 

But I certainly hope you gentlemen may have the chance to talk 

a bit today about your thoughts regarding the possibility that piracy may well be linked in these days with terrorist agendas, by 

certain Islamist factions seeking to expand particularly control in 

Somalia. 

Second, I think it is important to remember piracy is a criminal 

activity. International law defines piracy as such a criminal act and 

requires all nations to work effectively together to suppress that activity, and, therefore, counter-piracy efforts must include coordinated maritime enforcement provisions. 

The chairman talked about the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF– 

151) and it is an important coalition. We have 20 countries operating, as you gentleman all know so very well, in combating piracy 

in the region, including Russia, China, India, Germany, Denmark 

and Iran. 

But not all of those nations, again, as you know, are part of 

CTF–151 and, as we have seen, often operate under very different 
4 

rules of engagement, and I would very much appreciate comments 

on how the Navy is working with members of CTF–151 and other 

members of the international community, as well as the U.S. Coast 

Guard, in the Gulf of Aden and what challenges may be out there 

with respect to those differing rules of engagement. 

Thirdly, I think we have to put this in a broader context. There 

is a significant increase in the number of attacks in the Gulf of 

Aden, particularly, and the chairman cited the data that shows 

how the larger percentage of worldwide attacks has begun to focus 

very heavily, statistically, in that region and in the Somali coastal 

areas. 

But just last month at a press conference, Vice Admiral Gortney, 

you may recall, had commented that, ‘‘Your chance of being successfully pirated is 0.13 percent.’’ 

In other words, as significant a problem as this is, the chances 

of being a target of piracy remains low. That is important, not to 

diminish the challenge before us, but rather to try to put it, as I 

said, in a larger context. 

The U.S. Navy and America, of course, has committed two of its 

largest surface combatants and the only deployable San Antonio 

class amphibious transport ship to counter-piracy efforts in this region. 

In short, we are throwing thousands of soldiers and—excuse 

me—sailors and Marines at this fight and almost a dozen vessels. 

And I think we have to ask ourselves, given the demands on U.S. 

forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Naval Forces Central Command’s 

(NAVCENT’s) priority mission of partnership strength and presence, how do we use this challenge to better integrate ourselves 

with our allies and our international partners to make sure that 

we are not carrying, as perhaps one might argue in other parts of 

the world, too great a burden. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, let me just say again how happy I am 

that you had the foresight and concern to call this hearing and look 

forward to our witnesses’ comments and the remainder of this 

event. 

And I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from New York. 

Four witnesses in this order: Mr. Pike, Vice Admiral Gortney, 

Ambassador Mull, and Mr. Wycoff. 

Mr. Pike, you are on. You will have to get very, very close to the 

microphone and turn it on. 

Mr. PIKE. Good morning, Chairman Skelton. 

The CHAIRMAN. A little closer. 

Mr. PIKE. We will try this. 

The CHAIRMAN. There you go, okay, very well. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL W. PIKE, ACTING PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE, FOR MICHAEL COULTER 

Mr. PIKE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McHugh, members of the House Armed Services Committee. 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. 
5 

My name is Daniel Pike, the acting principal director of the Office of African Affairs, and I am speaking on behalf of Mr. Michael 

Coulter, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for 

international security affairs, who is ill and could not attend today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Just a little closer, because I am having a problem—— 

Mr. PIKE. Just a little closer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Push it down right in front of you. 

Mr. PIKE. Is this better? 

The CHAIRMAN. Almost eat it, yes. 

Mr. PIKE. Okay. Mr. Mike Coulter could not be here today. His 

office provides defense policy guidance for Europe, Africa and the 

Middle East. 

In a moment, I will introduce Vice Admiral Gortney, the naval 

commander of our military operations in the Gulf of Aden. He will 

go into details of our efforts to combat piracy, but before he does, 

I would like to take a brief minute to outline how we see piracy 

in the broader policy context. 

Throughout history, we have depended on maritime highways for 

a global transportation system that deliver goods and materials 

around the world. The concept of unimpeded sea lanes underpins 

the very meaning of an effective national security strategy, a strategy primarily based on global engagement, and to protect and sustain the global interconnected economy system through which we 

maintain our way of life. 

Today, freedom of access means the awareness and control of the 

entire spectrum of the maritime domain to ensure its access to 

good actors and deny its access to bad actors. 

From experience, we have come to learn that no one nation can 

singlehandedly secure every ocean and every waterway around the 

world and because the oceans play an indispensible role in the 

safety, security and economic stability of the international community, all nations have a vital interest in ensuring that the maritime 

domain remains secure and open for the free and legitimate use of 

all. 

For these reasons, the recent uptick in piracy in the Gulf of Aden 

has caused likeminded leaders and industry and government to 

unite to discuss what can be done collectively to unhinge and defeat the scourge of piracy. 

We, along with a number of other countries and international organizations, have now committed additional resources to this task. 

As you will hear from Vice Admiral Gortney, we are partnering together with traditional allies and with new partners to achieve 

international interests. 

We will, in our collective effort, use the seas to unite and not divide. 

The shaping function of this mission must be interagency, as well 

as international. Only some of the tools required to shape the security environment and to reach into the ungoverned sea spaces reside in the U.S. or international navies. 

The root causes of piracy reside on land. The absence of a strong 

government in Somalia remains the single greatest challenge to regional security and provides freedom of action for those engaged in 

piracy along the Somali coast. 
6 

We are, therefore, reaching out to interagency participants, with 

their tools, and even further into the private sector. The net beneficiaries of these efforts in the international community must also 

be proud and robust contributors. 

The Department of Defense co-chairs with the Department of 

State an interagency counter-piracy steering group that addresses 

the full spectrum of anti- and counter-piracy efforts, from piracy 

prevention to interruption and termination of acts of piracy, to ensure the accountability of pirates. 

The Defense Department is also supporting the State Department through the recently established contact group on counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia, an international forum that is encouraging countries with a direct interest in countering piracy, including flag and crew states, to provide counter-piracy forces, track piracy financing, and accept custody of and prosecute suspected pirates when apprehended. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again 

for this opportunity to appear before you today. 

Now, let me introduce and turn things over to Vice Admiral 

Gortney. Following Vice Admiral Gortney’s comments, I will be 

happy to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coulter can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Mr. Pike. 

Admiral Gortney, please. Get real close. We can’t hear it. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND 

Admiral GORTNEY. There we go. 

The CHAIRMAN. A little closer. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Good morning, Chairman Skelton. 

The CHAIRMAN. A little closer. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Good morning, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. There you go. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Ranking Member McHugh and members of 

the House Armed Services Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on our 

coalition counter-piracy operations in the Central Command area of 

operation. 

I have a full opening statement and request that my full testimony be submitted for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the accomplishments that have been made over the past several months 

and to identify some of the challenges that lie ahead. 

My name is Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, and I am the commander 

of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, headquartered in the 

Kingdom of Bahrain. I took command of NAVCENT at the beginning of July, but have been operationally deployed to the region 

throughout my Navy career. 

As the NAVCENT commander, I am the Naval component commander for General Petraeus at U.S. Central Command. 

I also command two additional organizations. I serve as the commander of the United States Fifth Fleet, the Navy’s numbered fleet 
7 

commander, and, most importantly, in terms of this hearing, I 

serve as the commander of the combined maritime forces, an international coalition of more than 20 nations of the willing who provide people, ships and aircraft in the region. 

There are national mandates that limit the participation of some 

of our coalition partners, but this remains a cooperative and multinational effort. 

As most of you know, acts of piracy spiked in late August, but 

the recent history of piracy does not start there. Several years ago, 

we started to see an increase in piracy off the east coast of Somalia. At that time, it was routine for the merchant vessels to transit 

within about 30 miles along the coast. 

In response to those attacks, Fifth Fleet and the shipping industry moved the transit lane further off the coast, and it has worked 

and the rate of attacks decreased, returning to just a few per year. 

That situation changed in the middle of August, when a new clan 

of Somali pirates began to attack ships in the Gulf of Aden to the 

north of Somalia. The number of ships pirated went from three to 

12 in just a few days and, ultimately, we knew the solution to the 

problem of piracy is ashore in Somalia itself. 

Therefore, I focused the coalition maritime efforts on the security 

and stability prevention operations at sea that would give the 

international community time to address the long-term solution. 

In late August, as commander of the combined maritime forces, 

I directed the establishment of the maritime security patrol area 

in the Gulf of Aden and we did that in concert with the international maritime organization. We have had coalition ships and 

aircraft patrolling the area ever since. 

Now, the maritime security patrol area is just one part of a 

counter-piracy campaign plan developed by the coalition staff. The 

plan was designed to complement and further the efforts of the political, diplomatic and industrial maritime communities. 

The operational design of the plan was developed with the purpose of outlining our efforts to engage the international community 

to help fix this international problem along three primary lanes— 

a political/legal, an informational and industrial, and a military. 

We focused our counter-piracy efforts on these three main 

areas—to increase international naval presence, to improve the defensive measures from the shipping industry themselves, and to 

internationalize or create an international legal framework for the 

resolving of the piracy cases. 

Since late August, there have been significant strides made. To 

date, we have seen forces from the U.S., the U.K., Canada, China, 

Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and Yemen. 

Some of these forces operate within alliances, such as the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU), 

some as part of the combined maritime forces coalition, and some 

independently representing their own nation’s interests. Additional 

forces from Bahrain, Jordan, Japan, Singapore, Republic of Korea, 

Sweden, Belgium and Poland, are expected to participate in the 

coming months. 

The shipping industry has also been at the forefront. We have 

seen countless examples of shipping companies and individual mer-
8 

chant mariners taking proactive measures to serve as the last line 

of defense against pirates, and these are really armed criminals at 

sea. 

On the operational side, I initially gave the mission to the commodore of one of our existing combined task forces, and that was 

the Combined Task Force–150 (CTF–150). However, I did so knowing that it was an additional mission for an already busy operational commander. 

More importantly, I did so very carefully, because at that time, 

I knew that some navies in our coalition did not have the authority 

to conduct counter-piracy operations from their government and if 

we have one red line in our coalition, it is that we will never ask 

a member of the coalition to be involved in operations that they do 

not have the authority from their national authority to do so. 

As a result of the complexity of the operation in that portion of 

our area of responsibility, I determined that it was necessary and 

prudent to establish a separate task force with a specific mission 

and mandate to conduct counter-piracy operations. 

In early January, we established CTF–151, based on the United 

Nations Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851. 

The task force was operational by the middle of that month. Since 

that time, we have had several nations join the task force and have 

had formal indications from others who have stated they will be 

sending ships and/or aircraft in the coming months. 

The efforts of CTF–151 are critical to the tactical coordination 

and deconfliction efforts with all of the international naval forces’ 

operation in the Gulf of Aden. The operational coordination is handled in my headquarters at the combined maritime forces in Bahrain. We have incredible examples of international cooperation, 

ranging from personnel exchanges to operational mission coordination to maximize the efficiency of our efforts. 

CTF–151 and other cooperating naval forces have encountered 

approximately 250 pirates. A 121 were disarmed and released, 117 

disarmed and turned over for prosecution, and nine are pending 

final disposition. Seven suspected pirates taken by CTF–151 twoand-a-half weeks ago were turned over this morning to Kenyan authorities in the Port of Mombasa with full evidentiary packages. 

Higher capacity has been further impacted by the seizure or destruction of 28 pirate ships and the confiscation of the pirates’ tools 

of the trade, including 133 small arms, 28 rocket-propelled grenades, 51 rocket-propelled grenade projectiles, and 21 ladders and 

grappling hooks. 

Ultimately, piracy is a problem that starts ashore and requires 

an international solution ashore. We made this clear at the offset 

of our efforts. We cannot guarantee safety in this vast region. Our 

role in preventing some of these attacks is only one part of the solution to preventing further attacks. 

Historical precedent can be found in our nation’s encounters with 

the Barbary pirates. We have been successful not only in our coalition efforts, but in communicating and coordinating with other 

naval forces deployed to the region, as well as working with the 

merchant shipping industry to share best practices and lessons 

learned. 
9 

Lastly, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the tremendous efforts of the sailors, Marines, Coast Guard personnel and 

civilian navy mariners under the command of Rear Admiral Terry 

McKnight, the CTF–151 commander. They have truly made a difference. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank 

you for inviting me to appear here today and I will be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Gortney can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you. We especially thank you for coming all the way back to testify. We are most appreciative. 

Ambassador Mull. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEPHEN MULL, ACTING 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 

ARMS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador MULL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member McHugh. Thanks very much for the opportunity 

to appear again before the committee today, especially with such 

distinguished colleagues here on the panel. 

As you said, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McHugh and 

Admiral Gortney mentioned, freedom of the seas has been a bedrock interest for the United States foreign policy from the very beginning of our republic. It is the key to our prosperity and key to 

our security. That was true at the beginning of the republic, as it 

is today, when pirates pose a growing threat to a key economic 

chokepoint off the Horn of Africa. 

As piracy attacks in this region almost tripled from 2007 until 

2008, with the numbers of innocent crew members held hostage 

growing into the hundreds and ransoms running as high in 2008 

as $30 million, which, in turn, fuels the growth of organized crime 

and the breakdown of authority in Somalia, the United States government decided to act by adopting a strategy on four distinct 

tracks. 

First, the diplomatic track to strength international authority 

and to coalesce multilateral support to counter piracy. Second, 

work with industry to press for better efforts for their own self-defense. Third, to improve judicial capacity among states in the region to prosecute and penalize pirates. And fourth, to strengthen 

our own military involvement, as well as the involvement of other 

militaries, to counter the force of piracy. 

On these four tracks, working together, I think we have made 

good progress just in the past few months. In the United Nations, 

the United States played the leading role in passing a series of 

U.N. Security Council resolutions, most recently, Security Council 

Resolution 1851, which Secretary Rice was in the chair to organize 

support for up there at the Security Council, and that extended 

Chapter Seven authority to enable our militaries, in conjunction 

with our foreign partners, to take military action against pirates. 

Acting on that resolution, in January, the United States formed 

an international contact group, which today has grown to encompass 28 states and six international organizations, who agreed to 

pool their efforts to coordinate the fight against piracy, and that 
10 

contact group has formed four separate subgroups to look at the 

military coordination, military and intelligence coordination piece 

of counter-piracy, to improve judicial cooperation among regional 

states, to liaise better with industry, and, fourth, to coordinate better diplomatic activity. 

As Admiral Gortney mentioned, we put meat on the bones of this 

framework very quickly with the standup of Coalition Task Force 

151, which now features 23 ships from a broad range of militaries, 

including group operations, such as the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, successive NATO operations, and other contributions from countries like China, India and Russia, and the others 

that the admiral mentioned. 

We also in January concluded a memorandum of understanding 

with the Kenyan government that we, in fact, put into force today, 

as the admiral mentioned, with the delivery of seven suspected pirates that U.S. forces captured a couple of weeks ago. 

Separately, we have worked with the international maritime organization to produce a booklet of guidelines that advises international shippers on how they can best protect themselves against 

pirate attacks. 

We have worked with our military partners to create a transit 

lane through the Gulf of Aden that has an enhanced military presence to further protect international shipping from the threat of piracy. 

The results of all of these efforts combined have been encouraging. The rate of successful piracy attacks, which was 64 percent 

in October, plummeted to only 17 percent in February and as of 

today, there are only six ships held hostage compared to 14 ships 

that were held hostage towards the end of last year. 

While weather, bad weather at this time of year and payout of 

ransoms certainly had an impact in lowering this, I think it is undeniable that important factors have been this sustained and coordinated diplomatic and military effort. 

The benefits from this effort, I think, will go far beyond just stopping pirates. This issue has showcased American leadership in 

multilateral diplomacy. It has opened constructive new channels of 

communication with the Chinese and Indians and other militaries. 

It has improved our overall maritime awareness in a very strategically important region and it has improved the prospects for diplomatic, military and further judicial coordination in the region. 

Longer term, I think this cooperation could form the foundation 

for a new regional security, maritime security framework, with regional states and outside contributors, like our European allies and 

ourselves, and this new framework could include a whole range of 

features that I think would improve the security of the region, as 

well as our own security. 

It could offer a framework for more confidence-building measures 

among the military. It could offer a framework for exercises to 

build interoperability among these militaries and to help them improve their capabilities in patrolling the seas, in conducting interdiction operations, and responding to humanitarian emergencies. 

This is a model that we have followed very successfully with our 

partners in southeast Asia in the Malacca Straits, which has seen 

a dramatic decline in incidents of piracy, and which has now fea-
11 

tured much better and much more integrated military and security 

cooperation among our partners there in southeast Asia. 

Finally, no discussion about piracy in the region would be complete without a mention of Somalia. There is no doubt that piracy 

is a symptom of Somalia’s failure as a state. While our efforts to 

counter piracy described here are strictly focused on piracy, in recognition of the broader problem, the U.S. separately supports the 

U.N.-led Djibouti peace process, which provides a mechanism for 

political reconciliation, and we also cooperate with a broad international group of donors to support the recovery and reconstruction 

of Somalia. 

Those efforts face a difficult role and my colleague, Mr. Wycoff, 

will address them in greater detail. When those efforts succeed in 

Somalia and the piracy threat goes away, I am confident, based on 

the great work that Admiral Gortney and our other forces have 

done in the region, will provide that foundation for a much more 

improved security climate in the critically important Horn of Africa 

region. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Mull can be found in the 

Appendix on page 60.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Wycoff. 

STATEMENT OF KARL WYCOFF, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. WYCOFF. Thank you, Chairman. 

I have a short statement that addresses some of the questions 

and observations that the committee raised in its opening statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Get real close. We are having difficulty hearing 

up here. That is why I want you all to get close. The acoustics in 

this room are not very good. 

Mr. WYCOFF. All right. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for affording me the privilege of discussing the 

relationship between the conditions in Somalia and the blight of piracy in the waters off its shores. 

Somalia piracy, offshore, is borne out of instability and insecurity 

onshore. Consequently, a complete, long-term and permanent solution to the piracy problem off the coast of Somalia will require a 

multifaceted strategy that leads to political and economic stability 

on the ground in Somalia and the establishment of basic security. 

To protect U.S. national interests, our immediate policy objectives in Somalia are to help Somalia regain political and economic 

stability, respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, 

and eliminate the threat of terrorism. 

Sustainable change in Somalia requires a comprehensive regional strategy and a political solution to conflict that is authored 

and implemented largely by Somalis themselves and not by outsiders. 

In this regard, we continue to support the United Nations-led 

Djibouti peace process, which has provided the mechanism for So-
12 

malis to make important political and security decisions in recent 

months. 

We also continue to work with a broad international group of donors to support the U.N.-led process, including the African Union 

and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 

The Djibouti process has led to the establishment of a new unity 

government with a respected leader as president, Sheikh Sharif 

Sheikh Ahmed, and a well-experienced prime minister, Omar 

Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. The prime minister has now appointed 

a cabinet. The new team represents a broad cross-section of Somali 

clans and political opinions. 

The next step is for this unity government to foster deeper credibility with Somalis by establishing itself in Mogadishu, a process 

that has already begun, and to facilitate the delivery of services 

there and in surrounding regions of Somalia. 

The United States worked with the other members of the U.N. 

Security Council Somalia Sanctions Committee to adopt Resolution 

1844 in November of 2008, which empowers the committee to designate spoilers of Somalia’s reconciliation process for targeted sanctions. 

While the recent political progress is encouraging, no political solution can be sustainable, even if widely supported, unless it is anchored by a robust security force capable of protecting the unity 

government and its activities. We encourage efforts by the international community to support the unity government as it stands 

up such a security force. 

A good way to address African conflicts or security issues is with 

African forces and expertise. Africans know and understand their 

terrain well and have a paramount vested interest and stake in 

any outcome. In this regard, we continue to support the African 

Union Mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM, and are especially 

appreciative for the governments of Uganda and Burundi for sending soldiers to do the difficult work associated with peacekeeping 

in Somalia. 

We are currently funding the deployment of additional AMISOM 

battalions, which we hope will bring the total number of African 

Union forces on the ground in Somalia to over 5,000 within the 

next few months. Nontraditional donors to Somalia, such as Gulf 

Arab states, have indicated a possible willingness to support 

AMISOM and the unity government security force. 

Mr. Chairman, it almost goes without saying that security must 

improve in order for displaced people to return home. Without political stability, the humanitarian situation will remain dire. 

The U.S. remains the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia. We hope the relocation of the unity government to Somalia and the standup of the joint security forces in 

Mogadishu will help improve security conditions at the community 

level and produce arrangements to facilitate humanitarian access 

so emergency assistance reaches those most in need. 

I welcome your comments and your questions. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wycoff can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wycoff, thank you very much. 
13 

Admiral, tell us a typical example of piracy takeover of a ship 

and what happens from beginning to end. 

And my first question is why in the world don’t they just pull up 

the ladder. Why don’t you give us a typical example of what happens from the very beginning to the end? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. As you mentioned, as you implied, to 

have a piracy event, you need two things—you need a pirate and 

you need a ship willing to get pirated. 

And if the coalition is out there with ships, airplanes and helicopters, there aren’t any pirates. If they see us, they are fishermen. 

If they don’t see us, they are potentially pirates and, therefore, if 

we are not around, they will attempt to attack a type of vessel that 

is susceptible to attack, which is based on the speed of the vessel 

and the freeboard or the height above the first deck to the water. 

If it is a low freeboard and the ship is doing about 13 knots or 

less, it has got a high probability of being attacked, to be picked 

out for attack. If it has a high freeboard and going over about 15 

knots, high freeboard or doing about 15 knots, it is too hard for the 

pirates to get on board and they will bypass those vessels. 

So if they see one of these vessels that we call low and slow and 

they are able to get near it, they will pull up alongside with their 

very small boat that was probably towed out to the area where the 

merchant ships are by a mother ship, and that mother ship, in 

most cases, almost all cases, is a pirated vessel itself, a dow of 

some sort, and it looks just like all of the fishing dows out there 

that tow their skiffs to tend their nets that are out there. 

They will get in their skiffs. They will pull up alongside and intimidate either with the AK–47s or Rocket-Propelled Grenades 

(RPGs), in some cases, actually shooting both to get the captain to 

stop. 

Early on, we saw instances where the shipping industry did— 

there are occasions when the ladder was even down and they were 

able to just come up the Jacob’s ladder. 

Since then, you are seeing they put up grappling hooks, ladders 

to get up on board, and intimidate the crew to stop the vessel. The 

time from the initial attack until on the vessel is about a 15-minute 

window of opportunity and if we aren’t there to prevent them from 

getting on board in that 15-minute window of opportunity, then if 

we have—if they are successfully on board and they stay on board, 

then we are in a hostage situation and the pirates take it to the 

east coast of Somalia and work the negotiation process with the 

shipping company that is responsible for that vessel. 

We see the attacks occur in the morning and with a sea state 

less than three feet. We did have an attack last week before the 

sunrise. We saw that as a change of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), but the sea states and seas, they are very small vessels. We watch very carefully. If it is less than three feet in the 

morning, we anticipate these fishermen become suspected pirates. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a quick question first, and I guess I would direct it to the 

admiral, but anybody who may have an answer. 
14 

I am sure we are categorizing these acts of piracy against a nation ship or the flag that has been seized. Anybody seem immune? 

Anybody just kind of never had a ship snatched? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I would say no one is immune out of the pirates’ intent to get on a vessel, not by a nation state. It really becomes a look for targets of opportunity more than anything else. 

We have seen no instances of not targeting a particular nation’s 

flag or targeting one. It is just an opportunity that they can get on 

board. 

Mr. MCHUGH. So we have a lot of misery in our company, a lot 

of folks affected. 

I mentioned in my opening comments the traditional historic root 

cause of piracy as being financially, economically driven. There are 

social factors, of course, on the ground that, Mr. Ambassador, you 

and others have commented upon and, obviously, we need to deal 

with that. 

But having just returned from Afghanistan, of course, the poppy, 

depending on whose data you use, it is $100 million to $500 million 

a year in Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban’s pocket. 

Do we see any connection between the activities on the seas, the 

piracy and the giving up of the booty, if you will, as to Islamic or 

radical factions operating in the war in Somalia or elsewhere? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir, we do not. We look very, very carefully for a linkage between piracy and terrorism or any kind of ideology and we do not see it. It would be a significant game changer 

should that linkage occur. 

But we have not seen it. We watch very carefully for it. This is 

financially motivated criminal activity at sea because they have no 

alternatives to make a living other than that. 

Mr. MCHUGH. As I mentioned, as well, last question and then I 

will be happy to yield back, Mr. Chairman, CTF–151 is a unique 

undertaking and I commend you and everyone, all our nation’s 

partners for being involved, that there are nations beyond that and 

some bring both an interesting and a first presence. 

This is really, for the Chinese, this is a historic deployment for 

them, way beyond their traditional bounds of influence and their 

sea lanes. 

How would you describe the cooperation and the differing rules 

of engagement, particularly from your perspective, with the Chinese who are operating in that same theater? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Piracy is defined as a universal crime, and all 

navies are authorized and obligated to conduct counter-piracy operations. 

The founding rules of engagement that we are using are all 

based on United Nations Security Council resolutions, but it comes 

down to the individual nation’s interpretation of some of those authorities and the aggressiveness that they might pursue. 

In some instances, nation’s may only be able to respond to a piracy attack. Other nations that have aligned themselves have sent 

them down there for a pure counter-piracy mission, either inside 

151, associated with 151 or underneath their national mandate. 

They have authorities to conduct and, I would say, offensively 

conduct counter-piracy operations. 
15 

The coordination effort with that number of nations that are not 

aligned in a clean chain of command is not insignificant, but naval 

offices know how to get the job done. 

At the operational level, the coordination is done in my headquarters. We have NATO and E.U. liaison officers in my headquarters in the combined maritime forces embedded in my combined maritime forces staff as part of the team that is putting it 

together. 

Through United States Pacific Command (PACOM), we have offered for the Chinese if they would like to put a liaison officer into 

headquarters, as well. 

At the tactical level, though, we leave it to CTF–151, previously, 

it was 150, to do the tactical deconfliction on the waterfront, that 

has to occur on the waterfront. We communicate, we share all of 

our information that is unclassified. We keep nothing from anybody 

that is down there assisting with it. 

And then how we communicate with those nations, with those 

navies that are down there on the waterfront is a function of the 

technology that they have. If they are part of NATO, E.U., the combined maritime forces, they have our CENTRICS, which is our coalition Internet communication method, the chat rooms. 

In the case of the Russians, we have to do it over bridge-to-bridge 

radio. That is the only mechanism. 

With the Chinese, we communicate via unclassified e-mail with 

their Yahoo account and they are actually giving us their intentions via that process, where they are going to go the next day. 

That better helps us put the ships where they are not going to be 

at that tactical deconfliction. 

We have had visits by the Russian commander onboard our flag 

ship, meeting with Admiral McKnight, and we have made that 

offer to the Chinese, who have said they would accept it, but we 

just haven’t been able to make the meeting occur in person. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Mr. Ortiz, let me ask. The pirates get the ship. They control the ship. Then what normally happens? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The pirates, usually, they will take the vessel 

or have the master drive the vessel to the northeast coast or the 

tip of the Horn of Africa. Another crew gets on board and then they 

sail it down to one of the anchorages on the east coast of Somalia, 

roughly within a mile of—inside of a mile of the shoreline, and another crew, another group of pirates gets on board to maintain that 

ship while the negotiation process goes on. 

The CHAIRMAN. How do they do the negotiations? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That is worked out through a pirate clan. 

Sometimes the senior pirate leader on the vessel itself, with whatever mechanism, the shipping line, the owners of that vessel want 

to perform that negotiation. 

We do not get the coalition or any of the nations get involved 

with the negotiation process. That is not in our lane. It is not our 

job to do that. We do not want to do that. 

But we do monitor, through any technical means that we have 

available, to monitor the health and well being of the hostages, the 
16 

mariners that are on board, how much fuel they have, how much 

water they have, are they their food. 

So we have an understanding of where we are in the negotiation 

process. Average time from the attack to release of the vessel averages around 45 days, $1.5 million to $2 million ransom. That was 

skewed a little bit with Faina, which was a vessel that was carrying T72 tanks and large percentages of RPGs. 

We did monitor that and kept a cruiser or destroyer on it so that 

those weapons didn’t get offloaded and further destabilizing a destabilized place. That was a fairly long negotiation process for that 

one to occur. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In December, I guess, 2008, and I think Mr. McHugh mentioned 

that, the United Nations passed Resolution 1851 that allows states 

to use land-based operations in Somalia for counter-piracy. 

Does the Department of Defense have any intention to combat piracy within Somalia? 

Ambassador MULL. I will be happy to take the lead in answering 

that. On a policy level, while we sought in the negotiations for the 

Security Council resolution to give that authority to any nation 

willing to take it, we do not plan, at this time, to conduct any 

counter-piracy operations on land. 

Mr. ORTIZ. So we don’t have anybody willing to take it. 

Ambassador MULL. None of our other coalition partners as of yet 

have expressed an intention to do that. But in the negotiations up 

at the United Nations to put that language in the resolution, it was 

to plan for what would happen if a member of the international coalition were pursuing a pirate and the pirates managed to escape 

and get up on land, would we need authority to go after them and 

pursue them. 

And so just to be safe, we sought that authority within the resolution. But there are no plans to conduct counter-piracy operations 

on land. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Now, I know that we have a new command, the Africa 

Command. What is their role now with these piracy activities? 

Mr. PIKE. The U.S. Africa Command does have the geographic 

responsibility for it if there would be operations in the Somalia territory, if you will. 

While we understand that there is a maritime component which 

is clearly in the Central Command’s area of responsibility, the 

land-based operation would be under the U.S. Africa Command. 

At present, as has already been stated, we do not have any intentions to forward any active operations on land. That does not preclude that and, in fact, the Defense Department is looking at that, 

but there is no such intention at this point to advance that. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you think that the pirates know what is in the 

pipeline? Do they know what these ships are carrying? Do you 

think that somebody might be giving them information as to what 

is moving along the pipeline so that they know what ships to attack? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, I will take that. We do not see them targeting any particular vessel, have any foreknowledge or any intelligence of the vessel that they might want to take. 
17 

They really just look for the soft target that they might be able 

to get on board. Early on, we saw, when the maritime security patrol area as a little further to the north, it was in cell phone range. 

We did get indications that one piracy, one skiff missed an opportunity, he would call a buddy up the shipping lane and say, ‘‘This 

vessel is coming, you might be able to get on board.’’ 

It is one of the reasons why we moved the maritime security patrol area farther to the center of the Gulf of Aden. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Can I just have one last question? 

You mentioned that once they are apprehended and you have got 

those pirates in custody, that they are turned over for prosecution. 

They are turned over to whom to prosecute? 

Ambassador MULL. As we mentioned earlier, we have concluded 

this memorandum of understanding with the government of Kenya 

and just today they did accept seven pirates with packets of evidence that our Navy managed to collect in a particular incident 

and the Kenyan foreign minister has said that he would welcome— 

this is in their economic interest, because Mombasa is a key—the 

Port of Mombasa is a key source of wealth for them. 

And so because of that, the Kenyan government says that they 

would be welcoming any pirates that the international community 

can provide them for prosecution. 

There are other states in the region. Tanzania has expressed 

some possible interest and we are exploring that with them. Of 

course, it is a little farther away. 

The challenge we run into, sir, is very often you can’t catch pirates in the act of committing. You can suspect that they are pirates, but without any evidence. And without any evidence, in 

cases like that, we really have very little option under international 

law except to certainly take their weapons away from them, but 

then release them. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fleming, please. 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When we prosecute these criminals, what law or laws do we 

prosecute them under or what? Is it international law? Is there 

state law? How do we approach that? 

Ambassador MULL. Well, our authority to capture pirates is 

based very much on international law and U.N. Security Council 

resolutions. But the actual prosecution is based on national law. 

So when the Kenyan government prosecutes these seven pirates 

that we have just turned over to them, it will be based on Kenyan 

laws against piracy. 

Similarly, if there were ever a U.S. victim of one of these attacks 

or a U.S. shipping line that were a victim, our Justice Department 

has said that it would favorably consider prosecuting such apprehended pirates and, again, it would be on the basis of American national law. 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you. With any kind of crime, it is always 

an issue of risk and reward and, obviously, you want to do what 

you can to increase the risk for the criminal and lower the reward. 

Has there been an effort or plan to have decoy ships or something that would kind of pull them in and a little bit of honey, if 
18 

you will, that will attract them and then create a high enough risk 

that that is going to make them want to go another direction? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We contemplated that a few years back and 

rejected it as being not as effective. We think a combination of military presence and working with the shipping industry has a higher 

probability of success. 

We have put a slide, I hope you have it in front of you, of campaign results. If you look at the lower left-hand corner of that slide, 

it has two columns per month. The first column is in red, which 

is the number of successful attacks. It is not cumulative. It is for 

that month. 

The next bar is either green or blue, green if that bar is unsuccessful attacks and if it is in green, it is because the shipping industry, the merchant ship itself took defensive action and it was 

successful in breaking it up. If it is blue, it was because of the military. 

You see the combination of that is why it has been—the combination of it is having a deterrent effect, but not as successful an effect 

that we are looking for until last month. 

If you look at it even through the month of January, the number 

of attempts continued to be on the rise, which was telling us our 

campaign plan wasn’t working. It isn’t the total number of successful attacks that we are using for our metrics, it is we want to drive 

the total number of attempts down. 

So in order to do that, you need to disincentivize piracy, which 

is part of your question. Two ways to do that. One is don’t pay 

them. But the shipping industry has said they are going to pay 

them. 

The second thing is we have to disincentivize another mechanism 

and that is where, in the middle of the month, working to the 

memorandum of understanding with the Kenyan government that 

when we capture these pirates, we have a mechanism to take them 

to a court of law, that are suspected pirates, suspected criminals 

at that point, try them; if found guilty, hold them accountable for 

their actions. 

And so we think between the combination of all of that is what 

is having our success right now. The question is where will we be 

a year from now. Will we continue to be effective? 

Sir, as you said, there is a lot of resources being invested into 

this. Will the E.U., will NATO, will the other nations continue to 

be there? 

Fifth Fleet, United States Navy, will be there, combined maritime forces will be there. And so keeping this international support 

down there to help while we work the other avenues is very, very 

important. 

Mr. FLEMING. And finally, is there any effort by the shipping industry to harden their ships, make them faster, make them sit 

higher in the water or do any of the other things that make them 

less of a target? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. We share with them best practices, 

lessons learned, how to harden the target, the speed and maneuver. Some vessels, though, just can’t go any faster or they are 

laden, so they are going to be low to the water or they are designed 

to be low to the water. 
19 

And then you use mechanisms such as put barbed wire around 

the low areas so that it is hard to get on board. Embark security 

guards, we see instances of that, using non-kinetic and kinetic 

measures with security guards is a last line of defense. Non-kinetic 

measures, Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs), fire hoses, posting lookouts. 

The shipping industry have really leaned their crews out. So they 

don’t have the manpower to post the lookout. So they have to put 

additional people on board and, once again, that is the line of defense and that statistically has proven to be the most effective reason for unsuccessful attacks. 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you gentlemen for being with us today. 

Ambassador Mull, I am curious. Is the State Department empowered to say that an attack upon an American vessel will be considered an attack upon America and no matter who apprehends the 

pirates, we will try them and, if convicted, detain them in an 

American prison? 

Do you have the legal authority to do that at this time? 

Ambassador MULL. Our basis for pronouncing on any kind of piracy is really based on recognized international law of the high 

seas in that a piracy attack is a crime. 

We wouldn’t really consider it an attack on the United 

States—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Just for clarification, it has always been my understanding that an American flagged vessel is considered a piece of 

America. 

So would that not be a crime on America? 

Ambassador MULL. Yes, it very much would be. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. So let’s follow up, then. To what extent is our 

State Department putting out the word that an attack on an American flagged vessel would be treated as an attack on America, and 

that no matter which country apprehends the criminals, that we 

would expect them to be turned over to a United States court of 

justice, tried in American court, and, if convicted, detained in an 

American facility? 

Ambassador MULL. The decision—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think that would be a very strong message, and 

if you don’t have the legal authority to do that, I would like to give 

you that legal authority. So let’s get that clarified right now, if we 

can. 

Ambassador MULL. The decision to prosecute really rests with 

the American law enforcement community, but the Justice Department or the respective U.S. attorney, it would be his or her decision to decide whether or not to prosecute a case. 

And so as part of our international engagement, we have been 

very much seeking Justice Department authority to say that to our 

international partners, that we are eager to prosecute people. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ambassador, you know where I am going. I would 

like, in writing, from you, an answer to that question. 
20 

Do you have the legal authority to say what I just asked you to 

say and then to back that up in the American courts, and if not, 

why not? So that if that is not the case, we can correct that as a 

legislative body. 

Ambassador MULL. Well, we can say it is a violation of U.S. law. 

The decision and the authority to say that is unquestioned. It is a 

matter of fact. 

But the decision—the second part of your question, sir, about 

that we will prosecute the case, that would depend on—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I very much appreciate that, 

but I had the pleasure of a briefing by the admiral in December 

over in Bahrain. He let it be known to the delegation that part of 

his problem was if someone is caught, there was no one to take the 

criminal. 

Now, I am old enough to remember when the world had a selective outrage when it came to hijackings. If our plane was hijacked, 

we were outraged. If a plane coming from a perceived enemy of the 

United States was hijacked, we thought it was okay. 

And only after several tragedies did the world community say hijacking is wrong no matter where it occurs. I am talking about of 

aircraft. 

I think it is time for the world community to do that. Now, until 

we can get the world community to do that, at least as far as this 

nation is concerned, I think a strong message coming from our 

White House, from our State Department, along the lines of what 

I just said, would be very beneficial. 

If you don’t have the legal authority to do that, I need to know 

that so that we can address that. 

Ambassador MULL. Well, we do. I am happy to say that and any 

State Department official would say that a crime against America, 

that we have the right to pursue and certainly the intention to pursue it. 

It is just when it gets to individual cases, it would be up to the 

Justice Department to make the call on individual cases. But as a 

general principle, when a crime is committed against Americans or 

American property or our assets overseas, absolutely, we have total 

authority to see a prosecution of the perpetrators. 

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent are you pursuing some sort of an 

international agreement, keeping in mind that a great many of 

these vessels are flagged in Panama, for example? 

I would think the thought of spending time in a Panamanian 

prison might be a deterrent to that crime. 

On the flipside, I have never been to Kenya. So I really know 

nothing about the country, but I have got to say there is within me 

a certain concern that there is a lot of money involved here. Let’s 

make sure that that person stays in prison once he gets there. And 

who is going to track that? 

Secondly, what the admiral didn’t touch on, Mr. Chairman, it is 

my understanding that many of these pirates are represented by 

some of the most prestigious law firms in London and, it has become a business. 

It has become that sophisticated and I think we, as an—first, as 

our country, ought to do it independently and then as part of the 
21 

international community take the steps to address this before it 

gets any further out of hand. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think a clarification from the Justice Department, Ambassador Mull, might be of some help on that issue. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Are these pirates rich people getting richer or poor people trying 

to feed their family? 

Admiral GORTNEY. They are poor people trying to pay their—the 

pirates themselves that are doing—that are in the pure execution 

mode are just trying to make a living. We do not see there is—the 

clan is fairly organized. There is a hierarchical process. There are 

different skill sets. But at the end of the day, the ones that are actually doing—taking the—making the piracy attempts are just trying to make a living. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand one of the big problems is—well, 

first of all, these people have learned that crime really does pay in 

that part of the world, doesn’t it? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Because generally, getting ransomed and if they 

are caught, I understand that there is a problem in finding a legitimate courts to try them. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. That was why we felt that we developed our campaign plan was to increase international support, 

more navies to work with the shipping industry and the most important tool that we needed was a method to, when we capture 

them, we have the authorities to capture them and rules of engagement to capture them all along, but when we capture them, we had 

no place to take them to try them and, if they were found guilty, 

hold them accountable for their actions. 

That is why the most significant, decisive event that occurred occurred when the State Department worked that agreement with 

Kenya to take the pirates that we think—that we are pretty confident we have the evidence that they are asking for to try them 

and hold them accountable. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is there no world court that could try them? 

Ambassador MULL. No, sir, there are not now. There have been 

some proposals of creating a new international tribunal, perhaps 

under the aegis of the United Nations. The U.S. view of that is that 

the number of pirates involved would not justify the many, many 

millions of dollars that would be required to stand up that court. 

So we think a quicker, a cheaper and a more efficient way is to 

use the national legal authorities with Kenya, with other countries 

in the region, or, when necessary, using our own courts. 

And if I could just follow up, actually, to Congressman Taylor’s 

question by commenting that today, for example, we are meeting 

legal authorities of the 28 countries that participate in this contact 

group. The legal authorities are meeting in Copenhagen today, in 

fact, to get a broader consensus about how to best use those national authorities in prosecuting pirates. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Would it be simpler simply to modify the charter 

of an existing world court so that they could do this? 
22 

Ambassador MULL. That is one possibility. We could look at the 

international criminal court, for example. But part of the challenge 

in that is that these courts do not have the expertise on their staff. 

So it would require, again, an expenditure to get them smart 

enough to try these cases. 

But then there is the broader problem of what you do if they 

were convicted in an international court. What would you do with 

them then? There is no such thing as a world prison. So there 

would have to be some mechanism through which pirates could 

then be incarcerated and held, which would, again, be a significant 

expense. 

In looking at all of these options, we believe the national route 

is the more efficient way to go. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I have a problem with renditions that turn criminals over to countries and courts that do not adhere to the same 

civil liberties protections that we should adhere to. 

I would be much more comfortable and I think that the world 

generally would be much more comfortable if these criminals were 

turned over to an international criminal court, where I think most 

everybody feels that defensible civil liberties are practiced. 

Shouldn’t it be fairly simple simply to modify the charter of an 

existing world court? They have to learn that crime doesn’t pay. As 

long as it pays, they are going to keep doing this. 

So we have to do something so that crime doesn’t pay. There has 

to be a certain punishment. It has to be swift and sure and it has 

to be adequate to deter future potential crimes. 

Ambassador MULL. Yes, sir. It is an option that remains under 

consideration and just because we are using national authorities 

now doesn’t mean that we would rule that out. 

That is one of the purposes of this meeting in Copenhagen today 

is to explore whether or not that might be a way of moving forward. Our own judgment is that it would take a while to do that. 

We would have to work through the United Nations to alter the authorities of the existing courts. 

As you may know, sir, U.S. policy on these courts has been somewhat skeptical of these courts out of fear that what happens if an 

American citizen ends up getting caught up in one of these international courts. 

So we would have to work that whole process through the United 

Nations. In the meantime, we don’t want to let that get in the way 

of putting pirates in jail now. But it is an option that we continue 

to consider with our international partners. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is everybody’s problem. It is not just our problem. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WYCOFF. If I may just add one comment, please, and that is 

that the State Department and our interagency partners are very 

clearly focused on the legal and due process aspects, the humanitarian law and so forth, of how piracy suspects are treated. 

We take your concerns about local courts and administrations 

and due process of law very seriously and that is part of this process. The legal affairs bureau or legal attaches in the field and so 

forth are all part of a combined effort to make sure that those 

rights are respected. 
23 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Not too long ago, I think it was a Chinese vessel that was detained and then ransomed and the ransom was paid and apparently the weather was bad and the upshot was that a number of 

the pirates drowned and there was some publicity about that, and 

I was really struck by the statement of the uncle of one of the pirates who had drowned. 

He expressed outrage with the delay had resulted in this bad 

weather and the uncle felt that really those folks who had—that 

others were actually responsible for the death of his nephew rather 

than the nephew being responsible for his own death because he 

is a pirate. 

It is as if the view of the family is that this is a legitimate business and somehow the system has wronged the family by making 

it a little tougher to get the ransom money home. It is really just 

kind of stunning. 

And to pick up on Mr. Bartlett’s inquiry, how do we increase the 

costs so that we discourage the behavior here? I find myself wondering if, say, insurance companies that are probably losing a lot 

of money covering claims haven’t hired mercenaries, essentially, to 

ride around in slow, low boats, as you described them, Admiral, 

and, when attacked, kill the attackers and with the idea that if you 

do that often enough, maybe that will discourage some of this behavior. 

Is there a problem with the law of the seas that would somehow 

prohibit or the law of England probably is where an awful lot of 

these maritime insurers are located, would prohibit these insurers 

from doing that, from hiring boats to go out there and lessen the 

likelihood, lessen the enthusiasm for doing this? 

Ambassador MULL. Yes. In fact, sir, a number of private security 

firms around the world have expressed an interest and have, in 

fact, marketed themselves to shipping lines to provide exactly the 

service that you describe. 

Many of the shippers, in our contact with them, are very reluctant to take on more aggressive means of self-defense, because they 

believe that it will have a pendulum effect in that the more violent 

or aggressive they become in their self-defense measures, the more 

violent and more armed the pirates will become. 

So that the prevailing view within the international shipping 

community has been to adopt some of the more passive self-defense 

measures that Admiral Gortney mentioned, which are, in fact, 

quite effective in repelling the vast majority of pirate attacks. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So has there been some—apparently, you are 

saying that there has been some conscious decision not to do this, 

not to engage in that kind of behavior, not to hire people to float 

around in small vessels waiting to be attacked. 

Ambassador MULL. That is right. Most shipping companies do 

not want those sorts of services. 

Mr. MARSHALL. And Somalia is such a failed state that it is just 

impractical to think that somehow we can entice Somalia into dealing with the pirates itself. 
24 

Mr. WYCOFF. As I mentioned in my statement, there is a comprehensive set of policies and efforts to try to help Somalia regain 

its place in the—its stability, its internal security. 

We are certainly in touch with Puntland authorities, a lot of this 

is based in Puntland, and are advocating that additional measures 

be taken. But I cannot say that that is a short-term solution to 

this. It is very much a mid-term and longer-term approach, one 

that we are very focused on. 

It is an interagency process, State Department, AID, Department 

of Defense, a number of partners working on it. 

But the short-term—the measures that we have discussed this 

morning are really kind of the best short-term approach to dealing 

with the problem. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Has anybody considered, I guess, this may be impossible or somehow illegal, employing—I don’t know who you 

would call on. You have got the pirates out there making money 

attacking ships and taking them and holding them for ransom. 

How about paying somebody to make money attacking the pirates? And to the extent that you see significant reduction in the 

pirating, then pretty generous payments are made. Just let sort of 

a lawless area work it out. 

Mr. WYCOFF. Our approach on that, as I say, has been to work 

with the authorities that we are able to have contact with in Somalia and to try to build respect for the rule of law and a political 

process there, an inclusive political process that deals with the 

basic security problems in Somalia, and it has been limited to that. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Mr. Coffman, let me ask—and 

I don’t know, Mr. Pike, you or the admiral might answer the question. The incidents of piracy in the Malacca Straits have gone 

down. 

Why is that? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Working with my counterparts in Seventh 

Fleet, it is because the governments that their waters, territorial 

waters share those straits took activity to stop the—to prevent the 

actions from occurring. 

So it was the states themselves, the nation states that share 

those waters that took it upon themselves to take action. 

The CHAIRMAN. So the safe havens in that part of the world have 

disappeared. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I wouldn’t say they have disappeared. They 

are significantly reduced. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the first question, I think, in part, was already asked, but 

let me restate it and get some clarification. 

And that is, in Iraq, obviously, we were successful in bringing 

former insurgent elements, Sunni Arab folks on our side through 

the awakening councils. 
25 

Has there been any discussion for doing the same with some of 

these clans in Somalia to get them to assist by providing some type 

of patrols in their area to counter the pirate element? 

Mr. WYCOFF. Yes. What I would say is that there is this Djibouti 

peace process, the formation of this unity government. President 

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is engaged in a process of outreach 

to all of the communities in Somalia with the intention of establishing a functional government in all the areas of Somalia that 

would be in a position then to enforce the rule of law. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, my question is in terms of our involvement 

or outside of Somalia, is there any discussion in the international 

community of engaging some of these clan elements in terms of enlisting their support and helping to patrol these waters? 

Mr. WYCOFF. Specifically in terms of helping to patrol these 

waters, two things I could say, Congressman. 

One is that the Puntland government has, as I understand it, a 

contract with a private Somali company that has several boats— 

the admiral may know more about this than I do—and there is 

some nascent effort there that might be built on. 

The other is that there are representations with Puntland authorities to be more serious in terms of rule of law in their own 

area. As you know, Somalia is a very difficult operating environment. 

So at this stage, I could not assure you that that would bear fruit 

and would be a way forward, but there is a larger process that we 

hope will bear fruit in the longer term. 

Admiral GORTNEY. We have turned over, on a couple of occasions, 

suspected pirates that we lack the evidence to the Puntland coast 

guard. We see them patrolling in a small effort, but they are just 

so small, the problem is so large, that they are not very effective. 

Mr. COFFMAN. We obviously have a profile of what these folks 

look like. If they are engaged in fishing, aren’t they a little closer 

to the coast than if they are not engaged in fishing? 

I mean, is there a way that we can establish a pattern of behavior whereby we can board these vessels and search these vessels? 

Admiral GORTNEY. One of the reasons we moved, if you look on 

the slide, the maritime security patrol area down in the center of 

the Gulf of Aden, when it was up to the north, it was actually 

intermixed with some of the prime fishing grounds just to the 

south of Yemen. 

And so it was very difficult to differentiate between the types of 

vessels. So we moved it further out and that did help a little bit. 

That said, mother ships are pirated fishing dows and the skiffs 

that the pirates are working from are the same skiffs, same color. 

So it is really when we get on top either with maritime patrol or 

with helicopters or with a ship and we look inside these skiffs and 

we determine that they don’t have nets or baskets and they have 

AK–47s, RPGs and ladders, we know that they are not involved in 

fishing and that is when we take those—we take them, we disarm 

them, we take their pictures, we fingerprint them, biometric them, 

and then we release them if we did not catch them in the act. 

Mr. COFFMAN. But we obviously take those weapons. 
26 

Admiral GORTNEY. Absolutely. Actually, if we are going to take 

them and try them, we keep some for evidence. Otherwise, we 

throw them all overboard. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Very well. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

It has always been said that money is the root of all evil, and 

so since money is the root of this problem, I want to talk about the 

money. 

It would seem to me that it would not be feasible for these pirates to be able to accumulate the money, hold it and hold onto 

cash money. 

Is that the way the ransoms are paid out, in cash, and if so, is 

it American dollars? And if so, what is the current state of the Somali banking system? I would think that it would be darn insistent 

or, at the very least, just not sophisticated enough to fill in dollars. 

Also, I understand that these exchanges of the moneys made by 

air drop, I want to know if that is the way it goes all the time. I 

also want to know how do the pirates communicate with the victims, in other words, they get a ship and want two million bucks? 

Where does this money end up? 

It would seem that we should be able to track the money. It 

would seem to me that we would have a theory as to how that 

money is used. Is it deposited somewhere and if so, where? And ultimately, I would like to know who is behind this whole piracy 

issue, because I just have a hard time thinking that a small band 

of uneducated—I am making assumptions—uneducated Somalis 

would have the capability for pulling off something like this repeatedly. 

Admiral GORTNEY. The exact transfer is pretty low tech. The negotiation is completed. The negotiations occur over primarily 

Inmarsat, satellite radio, between the pirate negotiator and whoever is handling the negotiations for that shipping line, the owner 

of the vessel. 

Mr. JOHNSON. By telephone or cable? 

Admiral GORTNEY. It is a satellite phone, satellite mechanism. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do we have the capability of tracking the phone 

call from the pirate to the victim? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We use all mechanisms available to monitor 

the negotiation process. Once the negotiation has been completed, 

the cash, it is just pure cash, usually American dollars, and we are 

seeing now being parachuted in to where the pirated—near to the 

pirate vessel. 

The cash is distributed among the pirates and where it goes once 

it is ashore, I am not certain. But I do know that we are looking 

into that process. 

It is organized crime. In their sense, it is organized crime. It is 

clear about that. There are hierarchies. There is leadership and we 

do see that and we are getting a better understanding of that network as we proceed with our interviews and our collection efforts. 

Ambassador MULL. I would just add to the admiral’s statements 

that early in our diplomatic efforts on this, earlier this winter, we 
27 

did pursue with our partners the idea of adopting some kind of 

code of conduct that would regulate the payment of ransom, with 

a view of trying to diminish it, to stop the flow of funds to them. 

But the answer from all of our European allies was that they 

would not be willing to support it at this time because they fear— 

they don’t want to risk the lives of their citizens who might be at 

risk of being killed in the event a ransom isn’t paid. 

We also explored the prospect of looking at what sort of international financial controls are in place, but the problem we run 

into, as the admiral mentioned, is most of these transactions are 

cash. And so it is very difficult to use the international banking 

system to stop it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is that dollars, American dollars? That is how the 

ransoms are paid. 

And what is the national currency—— 

Ambassador MULL. Also, pounds, as well. British pounds, also, 

are commonly used. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But what is the currency being used in Somalia 

currently? 

Mr. WYCOFF. There is a Somali currency in circulation. It remains in circulation. But I believe there are also money changers 

and that dollars are accepted and can be used to gain value to 

make purchases and so forth in Somalia. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for having such extraordinary people here today to discuss piracy in the 21st century. 

Who would ever imagine? 

And in particular, Admiral Gortney, I want to congratulate you 

on your command, the Fifth Fleet. It is extraordinary the success 

of the Fifth Fleet which has been in the Persian Gulf for over 50 

years. 

I had the opportunity to visit in Bahrain. I was so impressed by 

the people of Bahrain. I appreciate so much the hosting by the 

Kingdom of Bahrain of the Fifth Fleet, and it has been so mutually 

beneficial, providing security for the region, leading to development 

beyond imagination. 

When I visited Bahrain, it just was really heartwarming to see 

the success of the people in that country and the region. 

Another part of encouragement to me is combined Task Force 

151, working with nearly 20 nations to try to address the problem 

of piracy. 

And if you could explain how this command, which was established in January, is working. I am particularly interested in our 

new partner, India, a great ally of America today, but also working 

with the navies of China and Russia. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Well, thank you for those kind words, sir, and 

I will pass them on to the sailors, Marines and Coast Guard personnel that are there, and to the Kingdom—151, currently commanded by an American one-star, Admiral Terry McKnight. Eventually, we are seeking another coalition nation to command it, and 

we see opportunities there. 
28 

We work coordination efforts. Really, the level of coordination is 

different with different nations that are not in the combined task 

force. In the case of the Indian navy, we are in very close communication with them, sharing information, exchanging where we 

would like them, where they are able to go. 

Additionally, we provide them logistics support. As a matter of 

fact, for all of the nations that are down there, we provide refueling 

at sea and logistics support, the U.S. Navy does and the combined 

task force does, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Russia and China. 

Russia and China brought their own ships. Malaysia takes care 

of themselves and we are working on the capability to expand 

Saudi Arabia’s capability to do that. 

But that level of exchange, once again, occurs differently based 

on the technical needs that we have with those different nations. 

With India, they do have CENTRICS and we use CENTRICS 

with them. 

Mr. WILSON. And, again, we do appreciate your personnel and 

the success they have made. 

A pleasant surprise to me, Secretary Wycoff, was to find out that 

there is a developing government, functioning government in Somalia. I have always been concerned about the failed state as to 

a haven for terrorism and, obviously, piracy. 

And you have already addressed on it about the unity government, but it is just great to see efforts being made to establish a 

government in Mogadishu, the security forces from neighboring 

countries, and then the economic assistance from regional countries. 

Can you go further into that? 

Mr. WYCOFF. I am happy to, sir. I do not want to leave you with 

the impression—thank you for your comments—do not want to 

leave the committee with the impression that we are on the certain 

road to success in Somalia. 

Mr. WILSON. Hey, any success is a surprise to me. 

Mr. WYCOFF. Thank you, sir. And there is some optimism in the 

international community on Somalia, but I caveat that, some optimism. There was, for instance, an international contact group 

meeting on Somalia attended by over 30 countries last week and 

a half a dozen international organizations, regional organizations. 

So there is a tremendous amount of goodwill toward Somalia to 

try to help them as they work through this process. But, also, there 

is a very strong extremist element, al Shabaab comes to mind, for 

instance, but there is a very strong extremist element in Somalia 

that are acting as spoilers that continue to attack civilians, that 

continue to attack expatriates, foreigners who are humanitarian 

workers who are trying to help deal with the humanitarian tragedy 

in Somalia. 

So there is a complex mix underway in Somalia and, as I say, 

the unity government is taking steps to try to move in the right 

direction to bring more Somali elements into this political dialogue 

and that is getting widespread support. 

I would just note, for instance, that the Arab League has pledged 

$1 million to support this process. The African Union is deeply involved, as is the U.S. And it is multifaceted. It is not just this polit-
29 

ical effort, but there are also a number of partners that are trying 

to work with the unity government to establish a better security 

force, a joint security force that would take root, I think, in 

Mogadishu and then would hope to go farther into Somalia. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

We have three members that still haven’t asked questions. We 

would like to squeeze them in, if at all possible, so that the witnesses won’t have to come back. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A very quick question. The pirates, is that a growing industry? 

We talked about these are people trying to feed their families. Is 

it basically the same clan? 

The attacks are up. Is it a growing industry or is it the same people attacking more? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We saw a growth industry specifically in the 

middle of August, when, in 2 days, we went from three pirated vessels to 12 pirated vessels, and it was the result of the clan on the 

north coast of Somalia, and, clearly, we saw more and more suspected pirates attempting to pirate vessels. 

And so our goal has always been to curb that growth, actually 

drive the demand signal down. 

Mr. KISSELL. The ship that had the tanks on it, would that have 

fit the definition of a low, slow ship? 

Admiral GORTNEY. It was, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Do the pirates have any sense, when they are going 

out, of what may be on a ship or are they just going after what 

is there? 

Admiral GORTNEY. They are going after any target of opportunity 

that they think that they can get on board, soft targets. 

Mr. KISSELL. Is there any sense, in their minds, from what you 

all could see, they overreached in all the attention they got when 

they got the ship with the tanks on it, that maybe, ‘‘Hey, we need 

to go lower profile?’’ 

Admiral GORTNEY. We did have efforts that, when they got on 

board, they saw what they had, they were very surprised what they 

had and, initially, they were concerned about that. Then they saw 

an opportunity that they might get higher ransoms from it, which 

was exactly what drug on why motor vessel Faina was held for the 

length of time that it was. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Gortney, just a question. In looking at the counter-piracy mission, as it expands and as it emerges, can you talk a little 

bit about the unique training and equipment requirements that 

you are facing there, and what capabilities might be able to improve the Navy’s abilities to counteract these particular threats? 

Admiral GORTNEY. We see no shortfalls in either equipment or 

training of the sailors, Marines or Coast Guardsmen that are involved in this. Through the fleet response training plan that all of 

the U.S. naval vessels go through, they are taught the skill sets 
30 

necessary to execute the mission and the command and control of 

the mission. 

Mr. WITTMAN. In looking at this threat, in total, and, of course, 

obviously, having small crafts around the ocean and coming up on 

these different vessels, do you see, is there a benefit for the Navy 

to maybe be looking at a different class of ships in order to be able 

to counteract that, especially across the variety of different conditions and shallow water that we are facing these particular threats. 

And I am just looking at that into the future, and if you believe 

that the current mission set might generate requests for new needs 

within the shipbuilding realm. 

Admiral GORTNEY. We see the forces that we have and we are 

currently procuring adequate to do this mission. It is a fairly lowtech war—I am sorry, excuse me—it is fairly a low-tech capability 

that we need in order to do it. 

We need good sea keeping capability. We need the sustainment. 

And everything that we currently have and we are projecting to 

build, we think, will be adequate. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you think the demand generated now currently 

by the number of piracy events going on out there, do you believe 

that that has, in any way, challenged NAVCENT in its ability to 

meet its mission set across the board? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir. We are able to meet all of the tasking 

that Central Command has given us. The location and the inherent 

flexibility of the naval forces when there is a need, we are able to 

position those ships where they are needed in greater detail. 

That is the real strength of the coalition with the numbers of 

ships that are involved is that I can pull the Navy, U.S. Navy ships 

out to go do the mission that the other nations don’t have the authorities to execute and they are still able to do the counter-piracy 

mission and we continue to command that mission through the 

combined maritime forces. 

So it is a good model. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you see this particular threat continuing to 

emerge? Do you see it as topping out? What do you see sort of the 

future of the challenges that we face in these areas with piracy? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Piracy has been around for centuries. It will 

be around for centuries more. It is just criminal activity at sea. 

My concern now is where we will be a year from now. Will we 

have the level of international effort to assist with the counter-piracy? Will our efforts to try and hold suspected pirates accountable 

for their actions? Will it be effective? Will it have the enduring effect that we are looking for? 

We don’t know. So I see that it will be episodic in the future as 

tactics, techniques and procedures change on both sides to keep the 

piracy at a level that the international community is willing to sustain. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Heinrich, grab it up. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I will keep this short. 

I am curious about the relationship with declining fishing stock 

resources in the Gulf of Aden and what, if anything, can be done 

regarding that that would reduce the tendency of piracy in the 

area. 
31 

Admiral GORTNEY. The best fishing in the world, I would say, 

down there. It is really phenomenal fishing opportunities, which, if 

you study it, is one of the root causes that people are coming down 

there and fishing out illegally out of Somali waters. 

So whether or not it is depleting the stocks or not, we are going 

to have to get back to you on that. I just don’t know on the rest 

of it. 

Ambassador MULL. I would add to what the admiral said that we 

share your concern that a motivating factor in all of this, Congressman, is it is a very emotive issue, really, in Somalia that these 

international fishing firms are coming in and depleting the fishing 

stocks there in the region. 

And so one of the goals that we had in standing up this international contact group of these 28 countries and six organizations 

that we launched in New York back in January was to get all these 

countries to commit, not only are they going to fight the pirates, 

but they are also going to commit to not fish illegally or dump toxic 

substance into Somalia’s territorial waters, and to also support the 

government of Somalia’s efforts to assert its rights for exclusive economics zone, the 200-mile zone under the law of the sea treaty. 

So all of our European partners have pledged to do that. Some 

countries have actually passed laws against it. The enforcement is 

still a little spotty and we will keep working on that with them. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I think that is an important point and I am glad 

to hear that, because if we are not going to be dealing with this 

10 years from now, we need to address some of the underlying factors. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

And the hearing has ended. Special thanks to each one of you. 

We appreciate it. We do have a letter that we will be sending regarding the question Mr. Taylor raised, and hopefully we will get 

that back. 

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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