ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, 

REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING 

These are consolidated appeals from a default judgment in a 

contract action and a post-judgment order denying a motion to set aside 

that judgment. Third Judicial District Court, Lyon County; Department 

One. 

This matter arises from an action respondents filed against 

various parties, including appellants.' In conjunction with the second 

withdrawal of their counsel, the district court warned appellants of the 

possibility that it would strike their answer and counterclaims and enter 

default against them if they did not comply with certain requirements 

imposed by the court, and the court later directed them to show cause why 

their answer should not be struck. When appellants failed to respond to 

these orders, the district court struck the answer and counterclaims and 

entered their default. Appellants later moved to set aside the default, but 

that motion was denied. The district court then held a prove-up hearing, 

determined that appellants did not have standing to participate in that 

hearing, and entered a default judgment in respondents' favor. 

Appellants' motions to recuse the district court judge and set aside that 

judgment were later denied. Appellants now challenge these 

determinations on appeal. 

Appellants initially challenge the district court's refusal to set 

aside the default, arguing that they did not act in bad faith, that any delay 

was excusable, and that there were no discovery violations. NRCP 55 

authorizes the entry of judgment by default as a sanction when a party 

"The appeal filed by Rotate Black, LLC and Rotate Black, Inc., was 

dismissed without prejudice, following their bankruptcy filing. 

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fails to defend a lawsuit against them. See Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 

251 P.3d 163, 171-72 (2011). This court reviews a district court's 

refusal to set aside a default under NRCP 55 for an abuse of discretion. 

Id. at , 251 P.3d at 171. Here, appellants repeatedly failed to appear at 

hearings, to timely respond to pleadings or motions, or to heed the district 

court's directives. We therefore affirm the refusal to set aside this default 

as a proper exercise of the district court's discretion. Id. 

Appellants next challenge the district court's entry of the 

default judgment, arguing that the court improperly refused to allow them 

to participate in the prove-up hearing. As noted in Foster v. Dingwall, 126 

Nev. 227 P.3d 1042, 1049 (2010), generally, when a default 

judgment is sought "for an uncertain or incalculable sum, the plaintiff 

must prove up damages, supported by substantial evidence." When a 

prove-up hearing is required, the district court has wide discretion to 

determine how the hearing will be conducted and the extent to which the 

defaulted party may participate. Id. at , 227 P.3d at 1050. But even in 

the context of a discovery-sanction-based default, where the nondefaulted 

party need only set forth a prima facie case to obtain a default judgment, 

the district court must permit the defaulting party to identify fundamental 

defects in the nonoffending party's case and to present evidence if 

fundamental defects are identified. Id. at , 227 P.3d at 1049-50. 

Here, far from providing even this opportunity to identify 

defects in respondents' case, the district court simply determined that 

appellants did not have standing to participate in that hearing, at which 

time their attorneys left the courtroom and the district court conducted 

the hearing with only respondents' counsel present. While respondents 

argue that appellants' attorneys voluntarily left and that the absence of a 

hearing transcript must be construed against them, the minutes from the 

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Douglas 

Las 

Cherry 

J. 

prove-up hearing plainly reflect the district court's conclusion that 

appellants lacked standing to participate in this hearing. 2And because 

we conclude that the decision to completely bar appellants from 

participating in the prove-up hearing was an abuse of discretion, id., we 

reverse the default judgment and remand this matter for further 

proceedings. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the 

district court for proceedings consistent with this order. 3 

tAr risAin J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Third Judicial District Court Dept. 1 

David Wasick, Settlement Judge 

Steven Donald Talbot 

Belanger & Plimpton 

Moore Law Group, PC 

Law Offices of Michael B. Springer 

Third District Court Clerk 

2The district court's default judgment itself is silent on this point. 

3In light of our decision here, we need not address appellants' 

challenge to the denial of their NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the default 

judgment. Further, we have considered appellants' other arguments on 

appeal, including those regarding the denial of their motion for the district 

court judge's recusal, and conclude that they are without merit. 

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