UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

VICTOR WILSON, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-10693 

 Honorable David M. Lawson 

v. Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

 

COUNTY OF WAYNE, CITY 

OF DETROIT, and 

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO SUA SPONTE DISMISS, WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT [1] UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

This case has been referred to the undersigned for management, hearing and 

determination of all pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A), and for any reports and 

recommendations on dispositive matters that may be necessary pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. #6). 

Plaintiff Victor Wilson (“Wilson”) has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

in this matter. (Doc. #5). The Court now having assessed the sufficiency of the complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), IT IS RECOMMENDED that Wilson’s complaint be 

dismissed sua sponte, without prejudice. 

II. REPORT 

A. Background 

This is a pro se civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. In his complaint, 

Wilson, a State of Michigan prisoner, challenges the state criminal proceedings in which he was 

charged in the 36th District Court with two counts of Criminal Sexual Conduct – First Degree 

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and two counts of Criminal Sexual Conduct – Second Degree, though he was convicted only of 

the latter two offenses. (Doc. #1 at Ex. A, 1/2/09 criminal complaint).1

 Wilson alleges that he 

was arrested, subjected “to an unconstitutional criminal proceeding,” and convicted through 

Defendants’ use of an unconstitutional “form complaint,” which deprived him of his “rights, 

privileges or immunities without due process,” and denied him “equal protection of the laws, 

within the meaning of State and federal constitutions.” (Doc. #1). More specifically, Wilson 

alleges that Defendants – Wayne County, the City of Detroit, and the Detroit Police Department 

– used a “bare bones ‘form complaint[]’” to procure the warrant that ultimately led to his 

criminal conviction. (Doc. #1). According to Wilson, Defendants “failed to include facts or 

circumstances on the face of the criminal complaint in order for a magistrate to make an 

independent determination of probable cause” and failed to “attach to [the] form complaint an 

affidavit of probable cause, or swear [] on oath [] [to facts] that support probable cause for 

issuance of [the complaint]...” (Id. at 2).2 In short, Wilson claims he was charged based on 

nothing more than an assertion in the criminal complaint that he violated the statutes specified 

therein. He seeks a declaration that the Defendants’ practices with respect to using the alleged 

“form complaint” violate the United States Constitution and other laws, an injunction against 

Defendants’ future use of the alleged “form complaint,” an order requiring the Defendants to 

follow the “warrant requirements” of the Constitution, and “such other appropriate relief as the 

 

1

 A jury convicted Wilson on the two CSC-Second Degree charges, and on January 8, 2010, he 

was sentenced to 30 to 50 years imprisonment. See Offender Profile, Michigan Offender 

Tracking System, http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=194476. 

2

 Wilson provides the Court with a copy of the underlying criminal complaint, but no other 

documentation related to his criminal case. (Doc. #1 at Ex. A). He seems to infer, and implies in 

his complaint, that no additional procedure – not the swearing to an affidavit, nor the 

presentation of sworn testimony regarding the facts supporting the criminal complaint against 

him – took place prior to the criminal complaint’s execution. (Doc. #1; cf. id. Ex. B (other 

unrelated criminal cases where those procedures apparently did take place)). 

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interests of justice may require.” (Doc. #1 at 9-10). 

B. Legal Standards 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court shall sua sponte 

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint “at any time” if it determines that the action is frivolous 

or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the Court must dismiss a complaint seeking redress against 

government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A. 

The Court must liberally construe complaints filed by pro se litigants. See Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Such litigants must nevertheless satisfy the basic pleading 

requirements in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), including the requirement of a complaint that sets forth “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a 

demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The rule’s purpose is to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). While this notice 

pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require more than the bare 

assertion of legal principles or conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To state a civil 

rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he or she was deprived of a 

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States; and 

(2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Flagg Bros. v. 

Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). 

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C. Analysis 

As discussed above, the crux of Wilson’s Section 1983 complaint is that he was charged 

(and ultimately convicted) based solely on an assertion in the state court criminal complaint that 

he violated the statutes specified therein. Wilson is thus attempting to use this Section 1983 civil 

action to challenge the validity of his state court criminal proceedings and resulting conviction 

based on an alleged lack of probable cause. However, because Wilson does not allege that his 

criminal conviction has been overturned, the law makes clear that the relief he requests is not 

available under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 

In general, §1983 provides a vehicle for a state prisoner to challenge a condition of his 

imprisonment, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), but not its validity. See Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that for a state prisoner to be eligible for 

relief due to an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused 

by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” he must first 

“prove that [his] conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”). 

Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state 

prisoner’s §1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought 

(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to 

conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would necessarily 

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 

81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original). Again, the underlying basis for this principle is that “civil 

tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal 

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judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.3

 

Here, the crux of Wilson’s complaint is that the state court criminal proceedings which 

were instituted against him, and which resulted in his conviction and incarceration, were based 

on a criminal complaint that was allegedly constitutionally deficient because it was not supported 

by probable cause. However, his conviction on the underlying charges has not been terminated 

in his favor, and, to find that the Defendants utilized a procedure which could not have provided 

probable cause for his arrest and prosecution would clearly call into question the validity of his 

conviction. See e.g., Austin v. Howell, 2012 WL 553127, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2012) 

(applying Heck to plaintiff’s claim that his arrest and prosecution were not supported by probable 

cause because “any such claim, if successful, ‘would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction.’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). See also Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142 

(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the “finding of guilt and imposition of fines” in the state court 

criminal proceedings brought against the plaintiffs “estop[ped] plaintiffs from now asserting in 

federal court that the defendant police officers acted without probable cause”). Accordingly, 

Wilson’s Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck, and thus fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, necessitating their dismissal. See Geeter v. Cooper, 2012 WL 6214419 (E.D. 

Mich. Dec. 13, 2012) (dismissing, under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) and Heck, pro se plaintiff’s 

Section 1983 claims that his arrest and conviction were not supported by probable cause). 

 This is so even though the only specific4

 relief Wilson seeks is prospective 

 

3

 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a 

§ 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’ He must seek federal habeas 

corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78 (internal citations 

omitted). See also Heck, 512 U.S. at 482 (“‘habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state 

prisoners attacking [in federal court] the validity of the fact or length of their confinement...’”) 

(quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490). 

4

 In addition to his request for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against the 

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injunctive/declaratory relief. Supra at 2-3. The case of Koger v. Florida, 130 F. App’x 327, 333 

(11th Cir. 2005), is instructive on this point. Koger received a traffic ticket in Florida for making 

an illegal u-turn. A Florida statute specifically provided that persons charged with traffic 

offenses were to be brought to trial within 180 days of the traffic citation’s issuance, and that 

“[i]f trial is not commenced within [that period], the defendant shall be entitled to dismissal of 

the infraction charge.” Florida Rules of Traffic Court 6.325(a). Koger’s trial was adjourned 

multiple times, and was eventually scheduled to take place on a date beyond the 180-day period. 

A week before trial, Koger moved, pursuant to Rule 6.325(a) to dismiss the traffic citation. The 

motion was apparently not heard, and Koger, who did not appear at the trial, was convicted of 

the charge. 

Koger then filed a §1983 action in the Southern District of Florida arguing that 

commencing his trial beyond the 180-day statutory period violated, inter alia, his civil rights 

under the Fourth (malicious prosecution) and Sixth (speedy trial) Amendments to the United 

States Constitution. Koger, 130 F. App’x at 332. In addition to seeking monetary damages and 

a declaration that his civil rights were violated, Koger sought injunctive relief in the form of an 

order “commanding defendants to stop and cease their activity,” which the district court 

interpreted as a request for an order prohibiting “the defendants from trying cases after the 180–

day speedy-trial deadline imposed by Rule 6.325.” Id. at 330 n. 5. The district court dismissed 

Koger’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the 11th Circuit affirmed. The 11th 

Circuit noted that to the extent Koger sought damages and a declaration that his rights had been 

violated, he “essentially was challenging either the legality of his conviction or his sentence. A 

 

Defendants’ future use of the purported “form complaint,” Wilson seeks “such other appropriate 

relief as the interests of justice may require.” (Doc. #1 at 9-10). This vague request clearly 

could encompass a demand that his underlying conviction be invalidated. 

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judgment in Koger’s favor in his speedy-trial claim would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87). Thus, the 11th Circuit affirmed the 

dismissal of those claims. 

The court then turned to Koger’s claim for prospective injunctive relief to prohibit the 

defendants from any future violations of Rule 6.325(a): 

To the extent Koger also was seeking injunctive relief in requesting an 

injunction “commanding defendants to stop and cease their activity,” the 

Supreme Court has determined that, despite the limitations of Heck, a 

plaintiff may still seek prospective injunctive relief. To obtain such relief, 

however, a plaintiff must show that the relief will not “necessarily imply” 

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Because Koger’s requested 

prospective relief would have “necessarily implied” that the defendants 

violated his speedy trial rights and/or maliciously prosecuted him and, 

thus, that his convictions were invalid, the court also did not err in 

dismissing Koger’s claims to the extent he was seeking injunctive relief. 

Accordingly, the court did not err in dismissing for failure to state a claim 

Koger’s § 1983 claims. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186, 189-91 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Here, as in Koger, if Wilson were to obtain a declaration from this Court that the 

Defendants’ continued use of the “form complaint” that was allegedly used in his underlying 

criminal case was unconstitutional, it would necessarily imply that his conviction was invalid.5

 

 

5

 This case is distinguishable from others in which courts have declined to find that Heck bars a 

claim for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief because in those cases the relief sought 

would impact the plaintiffs’ future rights, but would not necessarily bear on the validity of their 

underlying prior convictions. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (“[the 

prisoners’] claims are cognizable under § 1983, i.e., they do not fall within the implicit habeas 

exception. [Prisoners] Dotson and Johnson seek relief that will render invalid the state 

procedures used to deny parole eligibility... a favorable judgment will not ‘necessarily imply the 

invalidity of [their] conviction[s] or sentence[s].’ [] Success for Dotson does not mean immediate 

release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new eligibility 

review...Success for Johnson means at most a new parole hearing at which Ohio parole 

authorities may, in their discretion, decline to shorten his prison term. [] see also Tr. of Oral 

Arg. 18 (petitioners' counsel conceding that success on respondents' claims would not inevitably 

lead to release). Because neither prisoner's claim would necessarily spell speedier release, 

neither lies at “the core of habeas corpus.” [] Finally, the prisoners' claims for future relief 

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Thus, his prospective claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are barred by Heck. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Wilson’s complaint be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE6 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Dated: April 17, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation and 

Order, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and 

recommendations and the order set forth above. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1). Failure to timely file objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, (1985); United States v. Sullivan, 431 

F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005). Only specific objections to this Report and Recommendation will 

be preserved for the Court’s appellate review; raising some objections but not others will not 

preserve all objections a party may have. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 

F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th 

Cir. 2006). Copies of any objections must be served upon the Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Mich. 

 

(which, if successful, will not necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its 

duration) are yet more distant from that core.”) (internal citations omitted). Here, in contrast, the 

prospective relief Wilson seeks would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his prior conviction, 

and indeed only impacts him as it relates to that prior conviction. The relief that Wilson is after 

therefore lies at “the core of habeas corpus,” and is barred by Heck. 

6

 Dismissal without prejudice is recommended so Wilson could pursue a future §1983 claim 

regarding the subject matter of his instant action in the event he first obtains a favorable 

disposition of his underlying criminal conviction. See Clarke, 154 F.3d at 191. The Court 

expresses no opinion on the merits of such a claim. 

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LR 72.1(d)(2). 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be 

concise, and should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the 

objections.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on April 17, 2015. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

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