12424 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0629; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–214–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker 

Services B.V. Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA withdraws a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that 

proposed a new airworthiness directive 

(AD), which applies to certain Fokker 

Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 

and 0100 airplanes. The NPRM would 

have required installing fuses in the 

maximum level (Max Level) sensor 

wiring, and revising the airplane 

maintenance program by incorporating 

critical design configuration control 

limitations. Since the NPRM was issued, 

we have received new data indicating 

that the modification proposed in the 

NPRM interfered with the normal 

operation of the Max Level shutoff 

system. Accordingly, the NPRM is 

withdrawn. 

DATES: As of March 5, 2014, the 

proposed rule, which was published in 

the Federal Register on July 31, 2013 

(78 FR 46298), is withdrawn. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2013– 

0629; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD action, the NPRM (78 

FR 46298, July 31, 2013), the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1137; 

fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We proposed to amend part 39 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

part 39) with a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) for a new AD for 

certain Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 

Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on July 31, 2013 (78 FR 46298). 

The NPRM resulted from a design 

review, which revealed that, under 

certain failure conditions of the Max 

Level sensor wiring, a short circuit may 

develop that causes a hot spot on the 

wiring conduit, or puncturing of the 

wiring conduit wall in the center wing 

fuel tank. The NPRM would have 

required installing fuses in the Max 

Level sensor wiring, and revising the 

airplane maintenance program by 

incorporating critical design 

configuration control limitations. The 

proposed actions were intended to 

prevent an ignition source in the center 

wing fuel tank vapor space, which could 

result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

Actions Since NPRM (78 FR 46298, July 

31, 2013) Was Issued 

Since we issued the NPRM (78 FR 

46298, July 31, 2013), we received a 

report that after an operator installed the 

fuses in the wiring of the Max Level 

sensors of the center fuel tank, as 

specified in Fokker Service Bulletin 

SBF100–28–073, dated August 10, 2012, 

the Max Level shut-off system did not 

operate correctly. After initial refueling 

shut-off, refueling restarted, leading to 

fuel spilling onto the platform. The 

manufacturer is developing a 

modification to address the unsafe 

condition that does not interfere with 

the normal operation of the Max Level 

shutoff system. We might issue AD 

rulemaking once the manufacturer has 

issued service information that includes 

the modification. 

FAA’s Conclusions 

Upon further consideration, we have 

determined that the NPRM (78 FR 

46298, July 31, 2013) does not 

adequately address the identified unsafe 

condition. Accordingly, the NPRM is 

withdrawn. 

Withdrawal of the NPRM (78 FR 

46298, July 31, 2013) does not preclude 

the FAA from issuing another related 

action or commit the FAA to any course 

of action in the future. 

Regulatory Impact 

Since this action only withdraws an 

NPRM (78 FR 46298, July 31, 2013), it 

is neither a proposed nor a final rule 

and therefore is not covered under 

Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory 

Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, 

February 26, 1979). 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Withdrawal 

Accordingly, we withdraw the NPRM, 

Docket No. FAA–2013–0629, Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–214–AD, which 

was published in the Federal Register 

on July 31, 2013 (78 FR 46298, July 31, 

2013). 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

19, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–04890 Filed 3–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0636; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM); 

reopening of comment period. 

SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier 

proposed airworthiness directive (AD) 

for certain Airbus Model A300 B4–601, 

B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes; Model A300 

C4–605R Variant F airplanes; and Model 

A310–204 and –304 airplanes; powered 

by General Electric (GE) CF6–80C2 

series engines. The NPRM proposed to 

require installing a shunt of the rotary 

selector (introducing an auto-relight 

function). The NPRM was prompted by 

reports of two single-engine flameout 

events during inclement weather. This 

action revises the NPRM by adding an 

additional wiring modification to a 

certain circuit breaker panel. We are 

proposing this AD to prevent a long 

engine restart sequence after a nonselection of continuous relight by the 

crew and a flameout event of both 

engines, which could result in reduced 

controllability of the airplane, especially 

at low altitude. Since these actions 

impose an additional burden over that 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 12425 

proposed in the NPRM, we are 

reopening the comment period to allow 

the public the chance to comment on 

these proposed changes. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by April 21, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Airbus SAS, 

Airworthiness Office—EAW, 1 Rond 

Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac 

Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 

96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email 

account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0636; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2125; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket 

No. FAA–2012–0636; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this proposed AD. We will consider all 

comments received by the closing date 

and may amend this proposed AD based 

on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

We proposed to amend 14 CFR part 

39 with an earlier NPRM for the 

specified products, which was 

published in the Federal Register on 

June 18, 2012 (77 FR 36211). The NPRM 

proposed to require actions intended to 

address the unsafe condition for the 

products listed above. 

Since the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 

18, 2012) was issued, we have 

determined it is necessary to require an 

additional wiring modification of the 

circuit breaker panel, 105VU, to make it 

possible to complete the modification of 

the shunt of the rotary selector 

(introducing an auto-relight function). 

Relevant Service Information 

Airbus has issued Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 05, 

dated May 23, 2013; and Mandatory 

Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, 

Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013. The 

actions described in this service 

information are intended to correct the 

unsafe condition identified in the 

Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness 

Information (MCAI) European Aviation 

Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 

2011–0113, dated June 17, 2011. 

Comments 

We have considered the following 

comments received on the NPRM (77 FR 

36211, June 18, 2012). The Air Line 

Pilots Association, International, 

supported the NPRM and its compliance 

time. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 

36211, June 18, 2012) Based on Safety 

Record 

Based on its safety record, FedEx 

requested withdrawal of the NPRM (77 

FR 36211, June 18, 2012). FedEx stated 

that the impact of the NPRM solely falls 

on its company; therefore, its exemplary 

safety record, superior pilot training, 

and performance standards should be 

significant factors in the FAA’s decision 

regarding the need for the proposed AD. 

FedEx stated that a review of 

operational events on past and present 

airplanes operated by FedEx revealed 

that there are no known occurrences of 

the inclement weather flameouts that 

are the primary driver of the NPRM (77 

FR 36211, June 18, 2012). In addition, 

FedEx stated that it has fully 

implemented the full authority digital 

engine control (FADEC) software 

upgrades required by AD 2007–21–06, 

Amendment 39–15224 (72 FR 57848, 

October 11, 2007), on certain engines in 

its fleet. FedEx stated that the latest GE 

guidance indicates that the worldwide 

rate of engine flameouts has decreased 

significantly in the last several years 

and that the rate associated with full 

authority digital engine control (FADEC) 

engine models in particular has shown 

a significant decline and is now well 

below that of the power management 

control fleet. 

We disagree with FedEx’s request. We 

have received reports of two singleengine flameout events during 

inclement weather. We consider this to 

be an unsafe condition that could result 

in reduced controllability of the 

airplane, especially at low altitude. 

Also, not all affected airplanes have 

FADEC-controlled engines installed. 

We consider a design solution that 

does not require pilot action to be a 

more robust mitigating action to address 

an unsafe condition. We have 

determined that it is necessary to 

proceed with issuing this SNPRM to 

adequately address the identified unsafe 

condition. Affected operators may 

request approval of an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) under 

the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this 

SNPRM by submitting data 

substantiating that the change would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 

36211, June 18, 2012) Based on 

Operational Impact 

FedEx also requested withdrawal of 

the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012) 

based on operational impact. FedEx 

stated that the modifications required by 

the proposed AD would affect the 

interface between the flight crew and 

the airplane, and would alter the pilot’s 

degree of control in the event of an 

engine event. FedEx stated that the 

modification is intended to ensure rapid 

relight of the engine following a 

flameout in the event that the crew does 

not correctly follow procedures and 

manually select the continuous relight 

function when entering an inclement 


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weather environment. FedEx stated that 

it is consistently following proper 

procedures and has trained crews 

accordingly. 

In addition, FedEx stated that there 

does not appear to be any concurrent 

requirement for the CF6–80C2-powered 

Model MD–11 airplane in the FedEx 

fleet. The current MD–11 flight manual 

provides for an optional ice detection 

system that automatically switches 

continuous relight on in the case of 

icing conditions. FedEx stated that this 

system is not required and not desired 

by the FedEx pilots. 

FedEx stated that in the view of the 

air operation division (AOD) flight 

technical operations and fleet technical 

pilots, a controlled (as opposed to 

automated) relight of an engine after 

flameout has a greater chance of 

success. FedEx stated that under the 

current configuration, the flightcrews 

have the capability—with guidance on 

recommended in-flight restart airspeeds 

and altitudes from the quick reference 

handbook (QRH)—to ensure that 

accessory loads have been reduced and 

the fuel flow has been managed through 

throttle movements prior to a relight 

attempt. FedEx stated that an automated 

system could potentially force a relight 

attempt under non-nominal conditions, 

which could actually delay a successful 

engine restart. FedEx noted an example 

would be a restart attempt when 

windmilling N2 is below the 

recommended restart value in the GE 

operating instructions. 

FedEx stated, therefore, its position is 

that the steps that have already been 

taken, and the controls that are 

currently in place to ameliorate the 

extremely small risk of an engine 

flameout, which could result in a lossof-control event, are adequate to ensure 

safety under all flight regimes. FedEx 

stated that, furthermore, the proposed 

modification does not increase the level 

of safety in real-world terms to 

sufficiently justify the relatively high 

financial and operational impact to its 

company. 

We disagree with FedEx’s request to 

withdraw this SNPRM. As stated 

previously, because we have received 

reports of two single-engine flameout 

events during inclement weather, this 

condition is unsafe and could result in 

reduced controllability of the airplane, 

especially at low altitude. 

In regard to the Model MD–11 

airplanes, those airplanes are not 

included in the applicability of this 

SNPRM; each engine installation is 

evaluated separately from other airplane 

models due to their installation 

differences. The actions specified in this 

SNPRM are not the same as the actions 

tied to the ice protection system 

described in FedEx’s comment. Also, 

not all affected airplanes have FADECcontrolled engines installed. In 

addition, as noted previously, we 

consider a design solution that does not 

require pilot action to be a more robust 

mitigating action to address an unsafe 

condition. 

Affected operators may request 

approval of an AMOC under the 

provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this 

SNPRM by submitting data 

substantiating that the change would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed this SNPRM in 

this regard. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 

36211, June 18, 2012) Based on 

Financial Impact 

FedEx requested that the NPRM (77 

FR 36211, June 18, 2012) be withdrawn 

based on the financial impact it will 

have on its company. FedEx stated that 

it agrees with the FAA’s estimates that 

the financial impact would be nearly $1 

million to its company in material and 

labor, and it has concerns that the cost 

may in fact continue to increase. FedEx 

stated that to date, Airbus has revised 

the service information three times, and 

each of these revisions has increased the 

material costs of the modification. 

FedEx stated that the manpower 

requirements and lead time for the 

required parts have also increased 

significantly over the initial release of 

the service information. FedEx stated 

that it has elected to begin performing 

the modifications immediately upon 

release of the initial service information; 

therefore, it would have to return 

multiple times to perform additional 

work in order to meet the requirements 

of the subsequent revisions. FedEx 

stated that it does not have a high 

degree of confidence that the scope of 

this modification will not continue to 

increase and result in further cost and 

operational disruption. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter. We disagree to withdraw 

this SNPRM based on the financial 

impact as we have received reports of 

two single-engine flameout events 

during inclement weather, as stated 

previously. This condition is unsafe and 

could result in reduced controllability 

of the airplane, especially at low 

altitude. 

We agree, however, with FedEx that 

the estimated costs of compliance have 

increased with each service information 

revision. We have revised the Costs of 

Compliance paragraph of this SNPRM to 

reflect the updated costs in the latest 

service information. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This Proposed AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are proposing this 

AD because we evaluated all pertinent 

information and determined an unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

Certain changes described above 

expand the scope of the NPRM (77 FR 

36211, June 18, 2012). As a result, we 

have determined that it is necessary to 

reopen the comment period to provide 

additional opportunity for the public to 

comment on this proposed AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this proposed AD 

affects 47 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this proposed AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Modification ..................................... Up to 98 work-hours × $85 per 

hour = $8,330.

Up to $18,417 ................................ $26,747 $1,257,109 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 12427 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in 

Alaska; and 

4. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Amend § 39.13 by adding the 

following new AD: 

Airbus: Docket No. FAA–2012–0636; 

Directorate Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

We must receive comments by April 21, 

2014. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 B4– 

601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes, Model A300 C4– 

605R Variant F airplanes, and Model A310– 

204 and –304 airplanes; certificated in any 

category; all serial numbers; powered by 

General Electric (GE) CF6–80C2 series 

engines. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 74, Ignition. 

(e) Reason 

This AD was prompted by reports of two 

single-engine flameout events during 

inclement weather. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent a long engine restart sequence after 

a non-selection of continuous relight by the 

crew and a flameout event of both engines, 

which could result in reduced controllability 

of the airplane, especially at low altitude. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Modification 

Within 6,000 flight hours or 30 months 

after the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later: Modify the airplane by installing 

a shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an 

auto-relight function), in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus 

Mandatory Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, 

Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013 (for Model 

A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–605R 

airplanes, Model A300 F4–605R airplanes, 

and Model A300 C4–605R Variant F 

airplanes); or Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 05, dated 

May 23, 2013 (for Model A310–204 and –304 

airplanes). 

(h) Credit for Previous Actions 

This paragraph provides credit for the 

actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, 

if those actions were performed before the 

effective date of this AD using the applicable 

service information specified in paragraphs 

(h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD, and provided that 

the additional work in Airbus Mandatory 

Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 05, 

dated May 23, 2013; or Airbus Mandatory 

Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 05, 

including Appendix 1, dated May 23, 2013; 

is done, as required by paragraph (g) of this 

AD. 

(1) For Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and 

B4–605R airplanes, Model A300 F4–605R 

airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R Variant 

F airplanes: Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 04, dated 

January 9, 2013, which is not incorporated by 

reference. 

(2) For Model A310–204 and –304 

airplanes: Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 04, dated January 9, 

2013, which is not incorporated by reference. 

(i) Other FAA AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the International Branch send it to ATTN: 

Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

telephone (425) 227–2125; fax (425) 227– 

1149. Information may be emailed to: 9- 

ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. 

Before using any approved AMOC, notify 

your appropriate principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. The AMOC 

approval letter must specifically reference 

this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer, use these actions if they are 

FAA-approved. Corrective actions are 

considered FAA-approved if they are 

approved by the State of Design Authority (or 

their delegated agent, or the Design Approval 

Holder with a State of Design Authority’s 

design organization approval, as applicable). 

For a repair method to be approved, the 

repair approval must specifically refer to this 

AD. You are required to assure the product 

is airworthy before it is returned to service. 

(j) Related Information 

(1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information (MCAI) European 

Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness 

Directive 2011–0113, dated June 17, 2011, for 

related information. This MCAI may be 

found in the AD docket on the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012–0636. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness 

Office—EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; 

telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 

93 44 51; email account.airworth-eas@

airbus.com; Internet http://www.airbus.com. 

You may view this service information at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

19, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–04853 Filed 3–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS