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i 

57–403 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–162] 

AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 28, 2010 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 28, 2010, Air Mobility Programs ............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 28, 2010 ..................................................................................... 21 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2010 

AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 3 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Johnson, Brig. Gen. Michelle D., USAF, Director for Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics, United States Transportation Command ...................... 4 

Van Buren, David M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, joint with Lt. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, 

USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, 

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and Brig. Gen. Richard C. Johnston, USAF, 

Director of Strategic Planning, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force ......................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Johnson, Brig. Gen. Michelle D. ...................................................................... 27 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 25 

Van Buren, David M., joint with Lt. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove and Brig. 

Gen. Richard C. Johnston ............................................................................ 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 49 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 49 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 55 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 53 

(1) 

AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 28, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon. We will call the subcommittee meeting to order. The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today 

to receive testimony on air mobility programs. 

And we welcome our witnesses: Brigadier General Michelle Johnson, who is the Director for Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics for the U.S. Transportation Command [TRANSCOM]. 

Welcome. Good to see you again. 

Mr. David M. Van Buren, who is Acting Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force for Acquisition. 

Good to see you, sir. 

Lieutenant General Philip Breedlove, Air Force Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements. 

Welcome, General. 

And Brigadier General Richard Johnston, who is the Director of 

Strategic Planning at Air Force Headquarters. 

Welcome, General. 

Today’s hearing follows the early March release of the Mobility 

Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 2016. MCRS 

2016 was a significant study by the Department of Defense to identify mobility capabilities and requirements needed to support the 

U.S. strategic objectives in the 2016 time frame. The study assessed the major components of the mobility system, including aircraft, aerial refueling, sealift, surface transportation ashore and 

afloat, pre-positioning, forward-stationing, and infrastructure. 

And that is, I think, the biggest questions that our committee is 

going to have, is how the plans that are put in place and that are 

reflected in the DOD budget that was submitted to us reflect those 

requirements, and also what has changed that has altered some of 

the numbers in those various requirements so that we can best understand why the Air Force and the Mobility Command think they 

need what they need, what has changed, and how we are going to 

meet those needs as we go forward, making decisions on the various airframes that we need to build and some, of course, which 

will be being removed from service at the same time; that, as we 

are doing all that, we are meeting those requirements. 
2 

MCRS developed three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of 

military operations linked to notional strategic environments, 

which is a fancy way of saying trying to figure out what might happen and to make sure we are prepared for it. Those airframes will 

be necessary to support possible decisions regarding future mobility 

force structure. Those cases included two nearly simultaneous 

large-scale land campaigns, demanding homeland defense consequence management events, and a long-term irregular warfare 

campaign. 

With few exceptions, MCRS–16 found the Department’s planned 

mobility capabilities sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. Regarding strategic airlift, the study determined that the capacity of the Department’s strategic airlift fleet 

exceeds the peak demand in each of the three MCRS–16 cases. 

Peak demand for one of those cases required 304 strategic airlift 

aircraft. 

Of note, the previous mobility study, the Mobility Capabilities 

Study in 2005, or MCS–05, identified strategic airlift force structure of 292 to 383 aircraft as a moderate-risk force. We hope our 

witnesses will be able to talk to us today about the differences between the 2016 and the 2005, as to how they came up with the 

slightly different numbers. 

Additionally, the current commander of the U.S. Transportation 

Command and his predecessor, who is now the Air Force Chief of 

Staff, have testified that a force of 316 strategic airlift aircraft is 

considered the sweet spot for strategic airlift inventory. Congress 

passed legislation adopting 316 as the minimum number of strategic airlift aircraft last year. 

The current Air Force programmed strategic airlift and inventory 

includes 223 C–17s and 111 C–5s, for a total of 334 aircraft. In this 

year’s budget, the Air Force proposes to retire 17 C–5s in 2011, 

which would bring the inventory to 317 aircraft. We also understand the Air Force plans to retire five additional C–5s in 2012, 

which would bring the total strategic airlift inventory below 316. 

For fiscal year 2012, we expect the Department of Defense will 

submit a legislative proposal seeking to change the Title X statute 

which mandates 316 strategic airlift aircraft be maintained in the 

Air Force inventory if the Department still plans to proceed with 

C–5 retirements beyond those now planned for fiscal year 2011. 

So, obviously, we want to know how to balance that out. Do we 

need to maintain that 316 number, or is it possible to move below 

it—is it possible and responsible to move below it? We would want 

to know the explanations for that. 

Regarding tactical or intra-theater airlift, MCRS–16 found that 

the programmed fleet of 401 C–130s exceeds the peak demand in 

each of the three MCRS–16 cases. The highest C–130 demand in 

these cases would have required 335 aircraft. However, the 2016 

study notes that the direct support mission to meet the Army’s 

time-sensitive airlift requirements was not assessed and that C– 

130s may be required to supplement C–27s to support this mission. 

Of note, MCS–05 identified a moderate-risk intra-theater airlift 

force structure of between 395 and 674 aircraft. We hope our witnesses can address the Air Force analysis of the Army’s direct sup-
3 

port requirements today, as well as how tactical airlift inventory 

requirements have changed since the previous mobility study. The budget request also includes $65.7 million for 15 aircraft in 

a new start program called the Light Mobility Aircraft. This program proposes to acquire commercial off-the-shelf aircraft to satisfy 

a new Air Force light mobility mission requirement designed to 

build partner capacity, especially in lesser-developed partner nations. 

This program would support irregular warfare efforts to help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating an airlift capability that is consistent with their needs 

for infrastructure, methods of employment, acquisition and 

sustainment costs, and mission capability. We hope our witnesses 

can further expand on this new requirement in today’s hearing. 

Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Maryland, the ranking member on the committee, Mr. 

Bartlett, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This committee has been actively working to try to understand 

the risk the Department is taking in its aviation programs. I hope 

this hearing will clarify some things for us because I have some 

real concerns about the force structure decisions that have been 

made. 

After reviewing the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the President’s fiscal 

year 2011 budget request, it is still not clear to me if force structure recommendations were made based on a real requirement or 

simply constrained by the budget. 

As a case in point, I would like to highlight the tactical airlift 

programs and requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council [JROC] validated a requirement for 78 Joint Cargo Aircraft 

[JCA], yet the current program of record reflects only 38. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study recently concluded that 

we have excess tactical aircraft capacity; yet the study failed to account for the aircraft needed for the direct support mission to meet 

the Army’s time-sensitive intra-theater requirements. 

To complicate matters further, the President’s budget proposes to 

retire several of the older C–130s in fiscal year 2011. However, we 

subsequently are informed that you will have to take assets from 

the Air National Guard to backfill the gap created by the retirements. 

If the MCRS is at all accurate with respect to the tactical aircraft 

requirements, then why do we have to take C–130s from the Air 

National Guard to fulfill mission requirements in the active duty? 

I find this all very confusing and very concerning. I hope that our 

witnesses will shed some light on these decisions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward to the discussion. 
4 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

We will proceed with the panel’s testimony and then get into 

questions. 

Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. 

And, with that, we will begin with General Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHELLE D. JOHNSON, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY, POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND LOGISTICS, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General JOHNSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is truly an 

honor to testify before you today on behalf of General Duncan J. 

McNabb and the 140,000 men and women of the United States 

Transportation Command. 

Whether delivering equipment to give our warfighters decisive 

advantage over the enemy or flying wounded warriors home to receive the world’s best life-saving care, these men and women give 

everything to provide hope and to earn the trust of the greatest 

fighting force on Earth. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the MCRS results indicated that 

we have sufficient airlift, strategic and tactical, surge sealift, prepositioned material, and Continental United States transportation 

assets to satisfy the most demanding scenarios used to determine 

the requirements in this study. 

However, the study did report a few exceptions where current 

programmed capacities were not sufficient to accomplish the mission: air refueling aircraft; offshore petroleum discharge system, or 

OPDS; and infrastructure at foreign locations. The advent of the 

new KC–X tanker will help address the air refueling shortfall, and 

the Navy is researching options for providing additional OPDS capability to ensure two systems are available. 

With respect to infrastructure, TRANSCOM remains ever vigilant in exploring strategies to ensure we can accomplish our mission. We are working infrastructure in two fronts. First, we are developing and improving concepts and technologies to overcome the 

constraints in delivering warfighter requirements to austere destination theaters. Some of this work includes joint high-speed vessels, airships, cargo-carrying UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], and 

precision airdrop. 

Second, we are maturing our strategy for global access with the 

completion of a global access study this summer. This work goes 

hand-in-glove with the development of our en route infrastructure 

master plan to identify and obtain funding for investments for the 

most critical en route locations, particularly multimodal locations 

like Rota, Spain, and Diego Garcia, where their ports are connected 

by roadways to airfields and, thus, provide critical support for our 

global force projection. 

Meanwhile, the men and women of TRANSCOM continue to 

transport supplies to our forces around the world. We rally to support humanitarian missions, such as Haitian earthquake relief, 

while remaining on track to meet the President’s requirement for 

additional troops in Afghanistan by the end of this summer. 
5 

Though sometimes challenging, these missions are the lifeblood of 

TRANSCOM. 

And though I sit before you in the Air Force blue today and am 

proud to do so, I do represent soldiers, sailors, airmen, and basically our fourth component in the commercial fleets of sealift and 

airlift in performing our mission. We appreciate the congressional 

support that allows us to accomplish our mission and ensure that 

transportation and logistics remain an asymmetric advantage for 

the United States. 

Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bartlett, again, thank 

you for inviting me to discuss the remarkable work our 

TRANSCOM team accomplishes around the clock every day. Thank 

you for submitting my written testimony for the record, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Johnson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Van Buren. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE; LT. GEN. PHILIP M. 

BREEDLOVE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. 

AIR FORCE; AND BRIG. GEN. RICHARD C. JOHNSTON, USAF, 

DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. 

AIR FORCE 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking 

Member Bartlett, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Lieutenant General Breedlove, Brigadier General Johnston, and I 

thank you for the opportunity to address the committee regarding 

the Air Force’s current and future mobility requirements and programs. 

Within acquisition, we are focused on our warfighting customers 

and our strategic planning, represented by General Breedlove and 

General Johnston. We are focused on what we buy and how we buy 

it. We are working very hard on the critically important KC–X program, with a planned award date this fall. We have much effort, 

as well, on modernizing our aging force, such as the C–5 reliability 

enhancement re-engining program, and we plan to acquire 15 light 

mobility aircraft in fiscal year 2011 to foster building partnership 

capacity. 

With a key emphasis on assuring affordability and reducing cycle 

time of deliveries to our warfighter customer, our overall efforts for 

C–17, C–5 modernization, C–27J, C–130J, and C–130 modernization are currently proceeding relatively well. 

The Air Force and its outstanding airmen remain focused on a 

mission, the continued security of our great Nation. And we thank 

the subcommittee for your shared commitment. We have submitted 

a combined statement for the record, and we look forward to answering your questions today. 

Thank you. 
6 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren, General 

Breedlove, and General Johnston can be found in the Appendix on 

page 37.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, no opening remarks. I join in Mr. Van 

Buren’s remarks. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General Johnston. 

General JOHNSTON. Thank you, sir. No opening remarks, and I 

also join Mr. Van Buren. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Well, I think it is obvious from the statement I gave the questions that we have. I will start out in one general area, and that 

is focusing on the C–5s and the C–17s and the balance between the 

two and how you see that meeting the needs. And the degree to 

which money is constraining your choices here is something that 

we would like to know, as well, just in terms of planning. 

But in terms of getting to the right number combination of those 

two aircraft, number one, if you could—and I guess I will start 

with General Breedlove—if you could explain to us better, you 

know, 316, 304, the differences in the outcomes between the 2005 

and the 2016 studies. What has changed, and what makes you confident that 304 is enough to meet your needs and demands? 

General BREEDLOVE. If you will let me just frame it, I might 

ask—— 

Mr. SMITH. Please. 

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. General Johnson to speak to 

that, since they did the study. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General BREEDLOVE. But, sir, as I think you are aware, what we 

are really concerned about is total ton-mileage required, which the 

study came up of. And, as these aircraft are balanced, the numbers 

will breathe one way or the other. 

The C–17 brings unique capability, its outsize cargo and lift capacity somewhat less than the C–5. So the balance is really about 

not the type of the airplane but the ton-mileage that they bring to 

the equation. As we lower C–5s, C–17s would come up, and may 

come up in a nonlinear fashion since they don’t cover or carry the 

load that the C–5 does. 

As far as the numbers 304 and 316, if you don’t mind, I will 

allow General Johnson to speak to it. 

Mr. SMITH. Please. 

General JOHNSON. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity. 

And as you noted in your opening comments, the MCRS did take 

us forward in the way we have analyzed the fleet and the mobility 

capacity. The fleet mixes that you describe can vary, as General 

Breedlove described, to achieve the same outcome and the same 

output capacity. 

What the MCRS did that really improved over the fidelity of the 

MCS–05 was to take the three cases that you described in your 

opening comments and to stress air mobility in different ways so 

to bracket the, sort of, capacity requirements. 
7 

One scenario had two major land campaigns that stressed this 

air mobility, the strategic airlift requirement. One really stressed 

the air refueling requirement, with a naval and air campaign combined with an asymmetric land campaign. 

And the third scenario took us to a new place to include irregular 

warfare scenario over a long term that required the rotation of 

forces and lacked infrastructure in a foreign environment that 

could accommodate the strat airlift, and so it put the strain on our 

system in a different way. And that was combined with another 

land campaign. 

And so those three scenarios were meant to bracket the capacity 

which we would need with more fidelity, frankly, than we had in 

the MCS–05. So, in itself, there is a range within MCRS such that 

the least demanding requirement for strat airlift demanded 274. 

Three-hundred-and-four was the greatest requirement. 

As General McNabb has said before—and you cited him and 

General Schwartz as using the 316 figure. At the time, that was 

their best judgment based on MCS, standing by for the results of 

MCRS. And that is what General McNabb would express to you, 

that there is that other clause that he would want to add that was 

pending MCRS results. 

And so the 304 provides the capacity that TRANSCOM is looking 

for, and then we count on the Air Force to manage that fleet internally to maintain that capacity. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, if I could add just one thing—— 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. And I am sure General Johnson would agree with me, that, in each of the three cases, too, one 

of the biggest delimiters on how we could move men, material, and 

equipment was the throughput capacity of the APODs [aerial ports 

of debarkation] at the destinations. In most cases, more aircraft 

made no difference in how fast we could move the material 

through. 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. The ‘‘throughput capacity of the APODs’’ 

exceeded my level of understanding. Could you—— 

General BREEDLOVE. I am sorry. The aerial ports of the debarkation, the places where we unload. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General BREEDLOVE. The capacity of the airport to receive the 

material and then transload it and move it on was, in most cases, 

the biggest delimiter in the study. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. So basically what you are saying, then, is that 

the mobility issues—and this would go back to General Johnson— 

you know, have as much to do with what we are able to accommodate on the ground as it is in the air. 

General Johnson, do you want to comment on that? 

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. That is great insight. 

And, as you know, for the business of Transportation Command, 

we have become more sophisticated in our mode selection and 

found that, even though it might be counterintuitive, most of our 

throughput comes from the surface. We do 90 percent of our support from sea and land and only 10 percent by the air in mature 

theaters. 
8 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I get it. 

General JOHNSON. So seaports and airports are the mainstays for 

what we do. 

In places where there are severe environments and lack of infrastructure, throwing in more resources that require that infrastructure don’t actually help. It is counterproductive. So this infrastructure and this intermodal selection is really important, as we close 

the force. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. One more quick question, and then I want to 

get Mr. Bartlett in before we have to go vote. 

As you are looking to retire C–5As going forward, I think, as I 

mentioned in my opening statement, you know, 17 this year, five 

next year, have you estimated how long you expect the life of all 

of the C–5s to be? Do you have projections in 2013, 2014, 2015, 

going forward, for how many more C–5s you are going to retire? 

And how does that impact the possible need for replacements, new 

C–17s basically? 

General JOHNSTON. Sir, I can tackle that one. 

You are correct, we have plans to retire 17 in fiscal year 2011 

and then five in fiscal year 2012. And then we are also—you know, 

we have to get relief from the 316 number, and we have plans to, 

as the number of C–17s go up, to reduce the number of C–5s accordingly, in order to maintain that 316 number so far until we 

have relief down to a lower number, 304 or what have you. 

Mr. SMITH. How many more C–17s above the 223 are you expecting, at this point? 

General JOHNSTON. Right now, 223 is what we are planning on, 

sir. We have no expectations to go any higher than that. And if we 

have a higher number than 223, then you get into the issue of how 

many C–5s are you going to retire. And then you get to a fleet size 

of C–5s to a point where—— 

Mr. SMITH. I got that. 

General JOHNSTON. Okay. 

Mr. SMITH. You actually have all 223 right now? 

General JOHNSTON. No, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. That is what I am asking. How many more—— 

General JOHNSTON. Oh, I am sorry. We are at 197 right now. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. So as they come up—— 

General JOHNSTON. Yes, sir. We are at 197. Probably be about 

205, should be at 205 by the end of this year, fiscal year 2010; 215 

for C–17s in 2011; and then 223 in 2012. 

And then, you know, depending on that mix, to stay at 316 or 

go below, we are planning on lowering the number of C–5s if we 

do get relief to a number around 94 in fiscal year 2011 and probably about 89 in fiscal year 2012 on the C–5s. Again, we still have 

to ask for relief from that. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

I have C–27 questions, but something tells me Mr. Bartlett will 

take care of those, so I will yield to him. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

In my opening statement, I mentioned that the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study recently concluded, ‘‘failed to ac-
9 

count for the aircraft needed for the direct support mission to meet 

the Army’s time-sensitive intra-theater requirement.’’ 

Can you tell me what kind of analysis the Air Force is doing to 

determine the number of aircraft required to perform the intra-theater aircraft mission and the direct support mission? 

General JOHNSON. Mr. Bartlett, if I may, from the TRANSCOM 

perspective, frame this a bit and then have the Air Force fill in. 

The direct support mission is still being analyzed. This 78 requirement that you mentioned was from the Army and JROC approved, and it is being analyzed in terms of the mix, the mixture 

that still matches up in terms of numbers. 

But in the meantime, the Air Force and TRANSCOM are very 

intent on providing direct support to the Army. And so we have already, in the last year, provided a concept of employment test with 

two C–130s, because C–27s aren’t available yet, with which the 

Army was very pleased. 

In addition to that, General Odierno and General McChrystal 

have both expressed great appreciation to General McNabb for the 

additional direct support that AMC [Air Mobility Command] and 

TRANSCOM are providing in the form of 30 to 40 of C–130s in theater right now at the beck and call of the Army to provide the support they need, in addition to the airdrop support each and every 

day. 

And so, numerically, what we are looking at is, in addition to the 

38 JCAs that you described, General McNabb and previously General White, in previous testimony in another committee, have cited 

that about 40 C–130 equivalents will be probably required to fill 

that bill. And so that is earmarked and set aside to make sure we 

can support the Army, and further supported by the notion that 

only about three airfields in Afghanistan are accessible by C–27s 

and not C–130s. 

So we think we can continue to provide that support with C–130s 

until continued analysis can narrow down the exact number of C– 

27s. But it is tremendously important for us to earn that trust from 

the field commanders on the ground, and we seem to be doing so 

now. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, if I could add just a short note, you are 

correct. And in the 78 number, I think our JROC used the number 

of 75, but they are close enough. The way we are addressing that 

is the 38 C–27s, which is the program of record, plus the 40 that 

General Johnson has mentioned, to bring the 78, a number that we 

will hold dedicated to that Army mission. 

We are currently flying under a construct called ‘‘direct support 

apportioned.’’ It is the construct that was worked out specifically by 

the Army. They are, as General Johnson mentioned, very, very 

happy with the way that is working out. And, again, General 

McChrystal and General Odierno have both personally approved 

and look forward to the way ahead on direct support apportion via 

the 78 aircraft. 

Mr. BARTLETT. It is interesting that 38 plus 40 is 78, but we really don’t have 40 C–130s or we wouldn’t be taking them from the 

Guard, would we? 

General Breedlove, you know, over many months in many committees, I have asked the question, has there ever been any study 
10 

that came to a different conclusion than that we needed 78 Joint 

Cargo Aircraft? And the answer has always been, ‘‘No. That is still 

a validated requirement.’’ And if that is true, sir, why are we disregarding this validated requirement in our procurements? 

General BREEDLOVE. Well, sir, I think I would agree with you, 

there have been no other studies that indicate any other number 

other than 78. And it is our intention to fill that requirement with 

the 38 C–27s and 40 apportioned C–130s, not necessarily from the 

Guard but from the general pool of the C–130s in our TRANSCOM 

fleet. 

And, currently, the absolute requirement on the ground 

downrange now is being fulfilled by those C–130s, which are earmarked every day on the Air Tasking Order as ‘‘direct support apportioned.’’ So we are going to meet that requirement via those 38 

C–27s and 40 aircraft dedicated against the requirement of 78. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But we are taking those aircraft from our Guard 

and making them shorthanded. And the C–130 is not the 27, because it requires a longer field. 

Where we are now, you may be able to meet the need; where we 

may be next month, you may not be able to meet the need. I remain very concerned that this validated requirement for 78 is just 

being ignored and filled by an aircraft that we are kind of stealing 

from the Guard that doesn’t really meet the requirements because 

it is not the same aircraft. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time. 

Mr. SMITH. I actually have a few more questions. Actually, I 

wanted to ask about the Civil Reserve Air Fleet [CRAF], something 

I don’t understand as well as I would like to, and how that figures 

into all of your plans, how you would assess the utility of it at this 

point. 

General Johnson, do you want to take a quick stab at talking 

about that a little bit? 

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. What has been helpful to us in this 

study is to be able to measure a steady state over a long period of 

time to see how we really do business with the Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet so we can understand better how we can surge with the organic fleet. So the study was able to measure that. 

And you and I have had a chance to talk about—we tend to look 

at CRAF in terms of wide-body equivalents, in terms of the aircraft. But what is the bottom line is the amount we relied on 

CRAF, whether MCS or MCRS, is roughly equivalent, but what we 

have been able to look at is more of this steady-state rotational role 

the CRAF serves. 

And they primarily carry passengers and bulk cargo. The overand outsized cargo and the weapons and the specialized sensitive 

equipment we carry on our ‘‘gray tails,’’ as we say it, or our organic 

fleet. So we look to CRAF to do bulk cargo, palletized cargo, and 

passengers. And so they manage that steady-state requirement 

day-in and day-out. 

And, in a long conflict, as we are in now and as we measured 

in MCRS, we had a better way to see what the role is for the 
11 

CRAF. And our fleet seems manageable. We have requirements in 

each stage of CRAF to handle an activation surge, and we have 

participation from our fleet. And even right now, as we speak, 

there is a meeting with our civil carriers to help upgrade the CRAF 

program, to make it more responsive in this environment, and to 

upgrade the rules that really came into play in the Cold War. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 

We do have a series of votes, including a motion to recommit, 

which always adds a hour-hour, in the middle of it. So it is going 

to be a good 45 minutes to an hour, I suspect, before we are able 

to come back. 

And I can’t even guarantee we are going to have that many more 

questions. I have a few more. But there may be Members who went 

to the vote who would like to have the opportunity to ask questions. I hate to make you hang around for an hour, but I am going 

to have to, just to make sure the committee has an adequate 

chance to ask questions. 

So we will be in recess until we can get back from the votes. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The votes always take longer than they actually 

should. 

We should also explain, Mr. Bartlett will not be able to come 

back. He had a 3:30 meeting with Ashton Carter from the Pentagon, as a matter of fact. And he informed me he will have to attend that. 

And, General Johnson, we were talking a little bit during the 

break there. You have had some further clarification on some of the 

C–130 answers. And, please, elaborate. 

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. I think if I could frame 

and then will look to my left for the Air Force to fill in some details. 

But the reference, the 130 force and the excess tails that are 

available that we found in a study—and I say ‘‘excess’’ in quotation 

marks—there were sufficient airframes to handle all the scenarios. 

One of the scenarios actually tested our intra-theater forces 

harder, in a sense that there are rotational forces and it goes over 

a long period of time, 7 years. And what we found that, even 

though the airframes were available, it is the crew force that is not 

able to sustain the rotations over time because of the way our policies work between the active duty and the Guard and the Reserve. 

Without being too arcane, the crew ratios differ, and the access 

to the crews on the active-duty side can work, but the limited number cannot support the conflict on its own; we need the help from 

the Guard and Reserve forces. The crew ratios in the Guard and 

Reserve forces are different, and therefore it is difficult to access 

the crews to sustain a long rotational-type conflict. And that is the 

shortfall that the study found, was in the crew forces, not so much 

in the airframes. 

And, with that, I think if I could yield to the Air Force to perhaps talk about the allocation of the crews and airframes within 

the force structure, that might bring some clarity. I hope that 

helps. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah, that would be great. Thank you. 
12 

General JOHNSTON. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to 

just further elaborate on Mr. Bartlett’s question. 

The most stressing scenario from the study led us to a 335 number for C–130s. Of course, our current program of record is 401 aircraft. And in addressing the direct support mission to the Army, as 

I was explaining to Mr. Bartlett, there is a requirement, validated 

by our JROC, for 75 aircraft. 

I think there may be a little confusion in that that 75 is very 

close to the 78 number that the Army was originally going to buy 

of C–27s. Currently, our program of record for C–27s is 38, and 

that is what we will proceed with. 

Mr. SMITH. And if I could clarify, building off Mr. Bartlett’s questions, it is true that since the original study came out and said we 

need this many C–27s, no new study has been done that says we 

need that many C–27s. 

But I think what you are saying is, things have happened that 

have called into doubt, in your mind, whether or not you need the 

78, I guess it was. We haven’t done a full, formal, 100 percent 

study that says, ‘‘Here is the new idea,’’ but there, as was discussed, the number of airfields that actually the C–130 can access. 

Do you plan to do—not to shift subjects on you in mid-sentence 

here—but do you plan to do a more formal requirements study for 

the C–27? 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I would like to get back to you, take 

that for the record. I think it is prudent that we would look at that, 

but I don’t want to commit until I have gone back and taken a look 

at our requirements guys and asked them that. 

Because we do agree that 78 was a number that was developed 

by the Army, not by us, and we need to take a look at what that 

is, especially now that we have the experience, that we gained in 

October through December of last year when we actually did this 

mission for the Army and did it well. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 49.] 

Mr. SMITH. Well, it would be helpful to the committee. Obviously, 

this is an issue of some concern to a number of Members. If we 

could have a more firmed-up requirements look at why you think 

this different ratio would work and play out for you. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, we got that, and we will get back to 

you. 

And just to clear one point from our conversation with Mr. Bartlett, we do not intend to move any aircraft out of the Guard into 

the active duty to cover that 40. That 40 aircraft comes out of the 

general pool. That mission will be shared by active duty and Guard 

alike. So there is no movement across the active or the ANG [Air 

National Guard] to accommodate that 40 aircraft. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

I wanted to have you talk a little bit about the tanker. We are 

all very much aware of the fact that there is a huge need and that 

it has taken too long to fill that need. There is certainly a tortured 

history and many to blame for the fact that it has taken that long. 

But be that as it may, we need the new tanker. And we are optimistic that we are now on a path to get it. 
13 

But if you could quantify a little bit for us, either General Johnson or General Breedlove, you know, how bad is it right now in 

terms of our needs for tanker capacity. And in many of these studies, I did not see in front of me estimates of how many tankers we 

would need, how many we have, how we are going to handle the 

fact that they are getting old and, you know, will be out of service. 

And where are we going to have shortfalls as we wait to build the 

new tanker? 

General JOHNSON. Sir, if I may lead off, the study found that in 

two of the three scenarios we did not have sufficient air refueling 

support in the fleet. And in one case, we would need 103 percent 

of what we have, and obviously did not have sufficient use; and 

then 120 percent in the more air and naval campaign kind of scenario. And this tanker fleet, the existing fleet consists of the 59 

KC–10s and the 415 KC–135s and the 79 Marine Corps KC–130s. 

And the thing that is telling, probably, about this fleet is that 

this study used KC–135 equivalents. And anything that a modern 

aircraft would bring would help, because up to 19 percent of the 

KC–135s are in depot at any one time. So a new aircraft would immediately provide more availability and better mission-capable rate 

right just to start with, let alone with the other capabilities it 

would bring in the requirements in the contract. 

So, as far as TRANSCOM is concerned, not only do we need 

more, the better quality would facilitate this. And the better capability might reduce the top-end numbers because of what it can 

bring, but we had to model what we have in KC–135 equivalents. 

So, again, I think the depot rate really spoke to the age of the 

aircraft in this. 

Mr. SMITH. So when you come to those figures of the shortfall in 

your scenarios, you are assuming that at any given time roughly 

20 percent of that fleet will not be available. 

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. That is factored into your scenario. 

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Well, I just want to reiterate this committee’s commitment to do 

whatever we can to move that process forward as quickly as possible. We understand we now will likely—or will have a competitive 

bid with two companies. Certainly, I think that is good, to have 

competition. But we hope we will make a decision on that as quickly and as timely as possible. And it is my commitment on this committee to try and not muck with that, if you will. We want to get 

this decision done as quickly as possible. And just, you know, anything we can do to help or not hinder, please let us know. 

I don’t have any further questions. I know Mr. Coffman—I am 

sorry—Mr. Coffman had been here, and he told me after the meeting that he did have a question, so I will give him a shot. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, when we look at the logistical support for Iraq and 

we are facing down in Iraq, we have port facilities that are available to offload key vehicles and various support equipment as well 

as weapons systems. But when we look at Afghanistan, it is incredibly logistically difficult to support. And we have really relied on 

airlift capacity to bring in things that we would not normally bring 
14 

into an airstrip. I think pretty much all of our weapons—I think 

that things like, I think, chow and fuel maybe go on rail and then 

are trucked in, but pretty much everything else, I think, comes in 

through airlift. 

And so, are you able to meet the demands for Afghanistan now, 

number one? And, number two, when we phase down from Afghanistan, will we then have surplus capacity in terms of our airlift capability, or will the numbers and type of aircraft be reasonable to 

meet future challenges? 

General JOHNSON. Sir, thank you for that question. 

Afghanistan is about the most difficult location we could imagine 

to supply logistically, and yet a lot of the ratios remain. We provide 

about 80 percent of the supplies for Afghanistan by surface. And 

because it is an immature theater and, as you said, the infrastructure is not as robust, we provide about 20 percent by air. It is a 

sensitive, lethal type of cargo. 

However, still 80 percent by surface, because that is the way we 

work. Normally, in a mature theater, we would provide 90 percent 

by sea and land and only 10 percent by air. 

The other thing that helps us not build in too much of an excess 

when we are in a, you know, great push, as we are now, is that 

we really tap into our commercial capacity. And that is one of the 

asymmetric advantages that Transportation Command has. We 

work with our civil reserve air fleet. We work with commercial 

partners on the sea and on the land. And so we not only bring in 

supplies by the ground via Pakistan but also from the Northern 

Distribution Network, with which I am sure you are familiar, 

whether from northern Europe, through Russia, or through the 

Caucasus, through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 

And we tap into existing rail lines. And the advantage of this is 

these are commercial lines with commercial products. And so, when 

they arrive in theater, they are supplying the forces, but when we 

step back down at the end of this, the commercial infrastructure 

remains, hopefully, for the benefit of the region and their development, but not at the expense of the DOD [Department of Defense] 

to maintain it because it is a commercial network. 

In fact, I was able to travel with General McNabb to Manila last 

fall to be with him when he thanked the president of the Asian Development Bank for their investment in a railway link between 

Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan to link the railway to 

the Ring Road. It helps us because it helps us gets supplies in, but 

it helps the region be more viable. And a peaceful and stable Afghanistan is something that all of the neighbors seek. Even though 

the neighbors are interesting there, they see the advantage there, 

too. 

So that is one of the great leverages that TRANSCOM brings. I 

hope that that comes to the nature of your question. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could—but I understand that 

all the vehicles—is it true that all the vehicles are coming by air, 

all the MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] are 

coming by air? 

General JOHNSON. Over 2,000 of them have come now, sir, and 

we have probably about 6,000 to go. I mean, there is a large family 

of those vehicles. 
15 

But what we have started to do is an intermodal solution that 

will close it quicker to send 300 to 400 by sea and then to an intermediate staging base near Afghanistan but not necessarily within 

the country, then offload and shuttle and use C–17s to the advantage for which they were made, to be able to fly these long legs, 

and cycle in faster than if we do, you know, four at a time or eight 

at a time in a wide-body aircraft. 

So, initially, yes, indeed, we have gone by air. We are looking at 

ways to do this intermodal system to get them faster. And we are 

able to, actually, now, keep up with the production rate and the integration rate so that we are getting them into theater over 500 a 

month, and we will be able to match the absorption rate that 

CENTCOM [Central Command] can take. 

So it is something we are watching very closely, and there is not 

much room to spare, but we are on track. 

Mr. COFFMAN. What is the dividing line between what is flown 

into the country and what is brought in by surface transportation? 

General JOHNSON. Normally, it is this idea of sensitive and lethal. It is something that you need to have and we can’t afford to 

have out of our eyesight. But we have actually done experiments 

up the Pakistan line of communication with trucks with close RFID 

[Radio Frequency Identification] tracking, so that we have an eye 

on where they are, to see how that would work on the surface and 

see what is possible. We do it very carefully to make sure that we 

don’t lose, again, control of what we have. 

It also provides us flexibility to be able to adjust to convoys with 

this RFID technology to be able to say, let’s move this convoy 

ahead or adjust its order as we go through. So we try to use good 

supply-chain methods to have accountability for them. 

But on the ground—and you cited it initially, very astutely—food, 

construction materials, lumber, fuel, sort of fungible commercial 

products that can come in. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, if I could just add one little piece to 

that to get to your specific question about how the mission is being 

accomplished inside Afghanistan. 

The tactical airlift piece of that, we are meeting the requirement 

and exceeding it, in some cases. If you were to talk to General 

McChrystal’s staff right now and ask them what their needs are inside Afghanistan, it would be rotary-wing lift, especially high-altitude-capable rotary-wing lift. 

And, as was mentioned earlier, all the airfields that we use in 

Afghanistan, only three require an airfield that is smaller than a 

C–130 can service. A C–27 would be good for that, and that would 

be part of that mission set. 

But almost all of the requirements that we struggle to meet are 

rotary-wing lift to distribute after we move it in via tactical air or 

via ground commercial. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on the 

shortage on rotary-wing lift? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General, just as a follow-up, could you address the 

shortfall on rotary-wing lift and where we are in terms of meeting 

that capability? 
16 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I would really like to get you a good answer for that, if I could take that for the record and get back to 

you. That is not exactly the detail I brought today. 

In general, it is heavy rotary-wing lift that can essentially operate at higher altitudes above 6,000 feet. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 49.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I am going to recognize Mr. Kissell in just a second. I do have 

a 4 o’clock meeting back up in my office that I have to get to. So, 

at some point during the course of his questions, I will slip out and 

turn the committee over to Mr. Kissell to wrap up. 

And I just want to, before I go, thank all of our witnesses for 

their testimony and their work on behalf of our country. Difficult 

decisions. I appreciate your work. We look forward to working with 

you on all those issues. 

And, with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for not being here for the opening comments. I was 

doing some work on the floor. So I am not sure if this would have 

been discussed earlier. I know parts of it have been discussed since 

I have been here. 

But, a few weeks ago, right after the situation in Haiti first developed, there was a hearing that we had, and one of the questions 

that I was able to ask—and it concerned transport, and I am not 

sure if some of you might have been there or not—but I asked the 

question: Do we have lift capacity to be able to handle the situation 

in what is going on in Afghanistan and all of the challenges there, 

plus other places that we have to be, plus having a situation like 

Haiti come along, and to be able to accomplish all of this? And I 

was told that, yes, we did; we were able to rearrange some training 

exercises and move some equipment around; that we are fine. 

About 3 weeks after that, I got a call from the head of our National Guard in North Carolina, General Ingram, saying that the 

Air Force had stated that they wanted to take two of the Air National Guard–North Carolina C–130s. And I think it was 10 all together from different States, two from North Carolina. And they 

were very concerned about this. We expressed that concern. We 

were advised last week that this was being worked out and that 

we should not worry about it anymore. 

Mr. KISSELL. In another hearing maybe a couple of weeks ago, 

somebody had said to me, to the same reference, to tell General 

Ingram it is going to be fine. 

In what you said a couple minutes ago—and I am not even sure 

who said it. I apologize for that. Someone said that we have no intentions of taking Air National Guard equipment, C–130s, to regular Air Force for a certain mission. Now, can we still assume that 

you don’t need those C–130s for any other mission also, at this 

point in time? 

General JOHNSTON. Sir, let me address the one that you asked 

first, which was directed more at the schoolhouse, providing C– 

130s to the Little Rock school house in order to continue that training. 
17 

The E models at Little Rock are, you know, they are retiring. 

They are coming out of inventory. We are going to retire all the C– 

130Es. And the airplanes that you are referencing, it was 12 Air 

National Guard C–130s we were looking at and six Air Force Reserve C–130s, for a total of 18. And that was part of the fiscal year 

2011 presidential budget. 

We heard you, and we are looking at a more efficient and effective way to manage the three components and come up with a solution that not only meets the State mission but as well as the 

schoolhouse mission at Little Rock Air Force Base. And we have 

been discussing with the Air National Guard as well as the Air 

Force Reserve and, of course, the active component, we have come 

up with a smart solution to address those concerns. 

And it hasn’t been formally presented to the Secretary. And once 

it is—Secretary Donnelly—he will work that through to you all, to 

Congress, with the solution. And my sense is that he will come 

up—or, you should see a response on that in the next few weeks. 

Mr. KISSELL. If you would keep us in the loop on that, it would 

be much appreciated. 

And I missed some conversation here, and, once again, I do 

apologize. The C–27, the number we were looking, at one time, 78? 

Did I hear that we are down to 37? 

And Mr. Bartlett’s question I missed. But, at one time, there 

seemed to be some talk up on the committee that the development 

of this joint cargo plane for the Air Force and the Army, it seemed 

to be going to the Air Force, who didn’t seem to want it; that the 

Army wanted it. You know, where do we stand now? Are we down 

to 37? 

You mentioned earlier about the ability of this plane to be useful 

in a lot of situations in Afghanistan. What is the status of this 

plane right now and its needs and where we are going with it? 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I would be happy to take that question. 

The Army created the original requirement for a Joint Cargo Aircraft. And, in their study, they developed a requirement for 78 C– 

27-type aircraft, and that was the program that they embarked on. 

Then the Department of Defense entered the discussion and decided that that mission was more appropriately provided by the Air 

Force. And the Air Force was given the mission of doing direct support mission for the Army. 

At that time, the decision was also taken by the Department that 

38 aircraft would be purchased of the C–27 variety. And since we 

have excess C–130 capacity in our Air Force—the current study 

says we need about 335, and since we have 401 in the total inventory, we would augment the 38 Sherpa buy with 40 aircraft from 

the general C–130 population to accomplish the Army direct support mission. And so that would bring us back to a level of 78 aircraft available for that mission. 

And, as the chairman has aptly asked, we have as an Air Force 

now gone back and studied to see if the actual requirement is for 

78. That was the number that the Army came to in their judgment. 

Since that time, we have had a lot of experience. We conducted 

a direct support experiment in Iraq, from October to December of 

last year, and we gained a lot of insight into what the Army requires to do that mission. The Army commanders on the ground 
18 

were ecstatic with the performance of the Air Force in that mission. 

And so we were able to gain enough knowledge to know that 

what we will be able to do, as we further look at this, is use the 

38 C–27s, plus 40 aircraft from the general population, to do the 

direct support mission. And then, as I spoke to the chairman, we 

will go back and bring back to the committee an answer about 

when and how we will study to see if that is the right number. 

In the meantime, we are accomplishing this mission currently in 

both Afghanistan and Iraq at the direction of General McChrystal 

and General Odierno. We are doing this via general support apportioned, which means we have aircraft that are set aside every day 

for direct support of the Army on the ground. And they, the aviation brigade commanders, can lay out the work for those aircraft 

on that day. And the Army is very happy with our performance in 

this general support apportioned role that we are doing now. 

And so, that is sort of the status of the problem. Does that answer your question, sir? 

Mr. KISSELL. Yes, sir. Thank you so much. 

And the chair recognizes Mr. McIntyre from North Carolina. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you gentlemen for your service to our country. 

As you know, we have been interrupted by votes, and so hopefully what we ask right now has not already been asked. We would 

ask for your indulgence. 

But the average age of the C–5 is more than 27 years old. It has 

a very low mission-capable rate, I think about 30 percent below the 

C–17. 

Since the C–5A is much less available than the C–17 and is 20 

years older and will have to be replaced at some point, has there 

not been some consideration given to keeping the C–17 line open, 

in light of that situation? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Right now, the stated requirement for C–17 is 

223 aircraft. It comes under the total force structure for strategic 

aircraft, which is 111 C–5s. So, right now, we have no acquisition 

plans for anything beyond the 223. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I mean, would you be willing to consider that, 

given the age situation with the C–5? 

General JOHNSTON. Sir, as we compare the number of C–17s and 

number of C–5s that we have and we compare it against the MCRS 

number of 32.7, which is the highest case number of million-tonmiles per day, we feel that the number of 223 C–17s, based on the 

number of C–5s we feel will be in the force for the next 20 years 

or so, is about right. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. 

No further questions right now, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. KISSELL. Being we have no other Members here, Congressman McIntyre, any other questions you want to ask? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. No, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

We would like to thank the panel for being here. And we do 

apologize for the interruption. I know there are questions that you 

will be getting back to us on, and as individuals in the committee, 
19 

we appreciate that. And thank you for coming. Thank you for your 

service. 

And this is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 28, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 28, 2010 

(25) 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 28, 2010 

(49) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, the AF is presently engaged in an Air Mobility Command led analysis to determine the Direct Support Mission requirement. We anticipate preliminary results mid to late summer 2010. [See page 12.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

General BREEDLOVE. From an Air Force perspective, we are satisfied with the size 

and make-up of our rotary-wing lift fleet. The Air Force is currently recapitalizing 

the existing HH–60 fleet and pursuing the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform 

for Global Strike Command and Air Force District Washington. These programs will 

allow the Air Force to meet our anticipated commitments. Furthermore, as our rotary-wing missions evolve or additional missions added, the Air Force will continue 

to conduct the appropriate analysis to meet national security objectives. [See page 

16.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 28, 2010 

(53) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. The previous mobility study, Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 (MCS 

05), identified a ‘‘moderate risk’’ range of strategic airlift aircraft as 292–383. Why 

does the current study identify only 304 aircraft as meeting the most demanding 

scenario? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Last year, General McNabb testified that 316 strategic airlift aircraft 

is a ‘‘sweet spot’’ considering both wartime needs and the contributions of the civil 

reserve air fleet, or CRAF. His predecessor, General Schwartz, also identified 316 

strategic airlift aircraft as the ‘‘sweet spot.’’ Has this belief changed in TRANSCOM? 

If so, why? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. In your remarks provided to the subcommittee, you noted that 

TRANSCOM supports the Air Force acquisition of light mobility aircraft and that 

it will ‘‘pay dividends in our global logistics mission,’’ but that TRANSCOM has no 

current plans to use these aircraft. Can you expand on how the light mobility aircraft will fit into the mobility mission from your perspective? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. MCS 05 identified a ‘‘moderate risk’’ range of 395–674 intra-theater 

airlift aircraft necessary to meet requirements. MCRS 2016 concluded that only 335 

intra-theater aircraft are needed to meet the most demanding scenario examined. 

Why has the requirement for intra-theater airlift aircraft dropped so significantly? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The MCRS 2016 makes use of the CRAF fleet but it does not detail 

this usage in million-ton-miles. In previous testimonies for a number of years, DOD 

officials have depended upon CRAF to provide 20 million-ton-miles (MTMs) of capacity per day. Does the MCRS 2016 raise this number or in any way increase the dependence on CRAF? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What was the greatest gap or shortfall that the MCRS 2016 identified? Are there gaps that currently exist that are projected to be mitigated before 

2016? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. To what extent is the MCRS 2016 a budget constrained forecast? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. MCRS is the anxiously awaited bedrock for many of the mobility-related budget decisions we will make in Congress this year, and for years to come. 

In order to provide some additional context, please share with us the major MCRS 

learning points for TRANSCOM, and how you intend to apply that information in 

your future decision-making. 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Current operations are a fact of life and the backdrop for many decisions involving DOD. Were current operations taken into account for this mobility 

study? Tell us about that? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. How is the MCRS–16 study tied to the priorities of USTRANSCOM? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 
54 

Mr. SMITH. How has recent experience with the Afghanistan forces increase, the 

Haiti earthquake, and the Chilean earthquake either validated or questioned the results of the study? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Last year, DOD agreed to establish objectives and measure of effectiveness to monitor CRAF modernization; what concrete steps have been taken to 

accomplish these improvements and what progress has been made? 

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. A recent newspaper report noted that the Air Force plans to issue 

‘‘technical corrections’’ to its solicitation for bids to build a fleet of aerial refueling 

tankers, and that these corrections would be revisions in the rules for foreign-owned 

prime contractors so that it would be easier for EADS to bid without a U.S.-based 

industry partner. What corrections will be made to the KC–X request for proposal? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the acquisition and sustainment strategy for the light 

mobility aircraft. How did you arrive at a quantity of 15? What validated requirement are these aircraft filling? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The average age of the C–5 is more than 27 years old, and has a very 

low mission capable rate (30% below the C–17). Since the C–5A is much less available than the C–17, and is 20 years older, and will have to be replaced at some 

point, why shouldn’t consideration be given to keeping the C–17 line open? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The KC–135 fleet averages 49.8 years old and the KC–10 fleet averages 26.3 years. MCRS 2016 noted that some scenarios require more aerial refueling 

aircraft than the 415 KC–135s and 59 KC–10s in the Air Force inventory. Is the 

Air Force funding modifications to these aircraft that will allow them to better meet 

requirements for availability until KC–X enters the inventory? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. MCRS 2016 determined that 335 intra-theater airlift aircraft were required to meet the most demanding scenario, but MCRS 2016 did not evaluate the 

Air Force’s direct support mission to meet the Army’s time-sensitive cargo requirement. How many intra-theater aircraft need to be added to that 335 number to meet 

total inventory requirements for intra-theater aircraft? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. We understand that the active Air Force was planning to move 18 C– 

130s from the reserve component to the active to meet training and operational requirements? If the force structure is, in fact, adequate, why is that move necessary? 

General Wyatt testified before the committee last week and indicated that there 

may be changes to that request. Can you please update the committee on the issue? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. On February 27, 2008, the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff sent 

a letter to the committee on the C–27 program noting a requirement to ‘‘build international partnerships around a common airframe.’’ Since we have a program to procure 38 C–27s, why does the Air Force need the Light Mobility Aircraft to also do 

this mission? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Recent legislation passed by the Congress last year requires the Air 

Force to maintain a strategic airlift fleet of 316 aircraft. With 111 C–5s, we will 

reach 316 aircraft when the 205th C–17 is delivered in the first quarter of 2011. 

Does the Air Force plan to retire any of planned 17 C–5s before the first quarter 

of 2011? 

General JOHNSTON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. We understand that the Air Force plans to retire an additional 5 C– 

5s in 2012. Does the Air Force plan to submit a legislative proposal to change the 

requirement for strategic airlift aircraft from 316 to a lower number? 

General JOHNSTON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 
55 

Mr. SMITH. What are long-term Air Force plans for inventories of C–130 and C– 

27 aircraft? 

General JOHNSTON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The MCRS only considered the program of record until 2016. Although 

the C–5 could fly until 2025 and beyond, realistically when do you expect to completely remove the C–5As from the fleet? 

General JOHNSTON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. EADS, the parent company of France-based Airbus, recently announced that they intend to bid without a U.S. partner for the KC–X tanker program. It concerns me that any foreign-owned and foreign government financed company could possibly control the development, production and support of such a key 

piece of our national military capability. I am also concerned about the delays in 

this program’s status. As an Air Force veteran I fully appreciate the tactical need 

for an upgraded fleet. I would have serious reservations about an award to EADS 

and any further delays. How would you resolve these concerns? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

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