### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 13, 200 5 S es sio n LA R R Y A N D BR EN D A M OR R IS , d /b /a E A ST TE N N ES SE E M OT OR S v.

INSURANCE AND INVES TMENT S OLUT IO NS, INC. Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Bradley County No. V-98- 1011 Law renceHow ard P uckett, Judge

No. E2004-02950-COA- R3-CV - F ILED S EPTEMBER 28, 2005
The plaintiffs suff

ere d damag e to per sonal property at a location other than as described in a policy of insuranc e. They failed in the ir attempt to rec over on the policy , and filed suit ag ainst the issuing ag ency , claiming that the ag ency knew or should have known that they desired c overa g e not only at their business ad d re s s b u t als o at their re sidence . The sig ned application lis ted only their ser vice a dd re ss, a ndthe los s o c c ur re d at th e ir

re sid e nc e . Sum mary jud g me nt w a s e nte re d f or the de fe nd a nt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed W I L L I AM H. INMAN , S R
. J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined.
M. Dr e w R ob ins on , Cl e ve la nd , T e nn e ssee , f or app e llants , L arry

a ndB re nd a

Mo rris d /b/ a / E a st Te nn e sse e Mo tor s. Cy nthia D. Hall, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for a ppellee, Insuranc e and Investment Soluti ons, I nc. OP IN ION The de fend an t is a g ener al insuranc e ag ency eng ag ed in the business of unde rwriting insurance

. The plaintiffs a lleg e that “they h ad been pay ing pr emiums to the defendant with the understanding that they had ins uranc e covera g e in effec t when in fa ct they have be en notified that their insuranc e cove rag e wa s canc elled Aug ust 27, 1998," a nd that “the de fendant eng ag ed in ac tions which constituted fr aud in the cour se of their dealing s with the plaintiffs.” Th e y a lle g e that it wa s th e ir

un de rs ta nd ing that th e y

ha d s e c ur e d in su ranc e “ wh ic h w ou ld cover the phy sical p re m i s es l ocate d in Ocoee , Tenne ssee,” and that on May 7, 1998 they

suffe redA separat e act i o n was f i l ed agai nst H aul ers Ins urance C o m p any t o reco ver d am ages caused b y t he hai l st o rm 1 t o ce r t ai n au t omobi l es . T h i s a ct i on w as di s mi s s ed on mot i on for s u mmar y j u dg men t
. T h e di s mi s s al w as n ot a ppea l ed.

T hes e we r e mi s r epre s ent at i ons wh i ch wer e t he bas i s for t he s ummary j udgment i n favor of H aul er s I ns ur anc e 2 C om pany . T he i nv al i di t y of t he H aul er s pol i cy i s not an i s s ue i n t hi s ca s e.

-2- a loss to their property

throug h hail damag e, and a s “a r esul t o f t he misrepr esentations of the defe ndant said loss has not been c overe d by Hauler s I nsuranc e Company , I nc.” 1
T h e d e f e n d a n td e n i e d a l l a l l e g a t i o n s o f f r au d , a n d f

i l e d a m o t i o n f o r s u m m ar y j u d g me nt, alleg ing that it was entitled to a dismiss al of the action as a matter of law. By rd

v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208 (T en n . 1993). The motion was g rante d and the plaintiffs a ppeal, pr esenting for r eview the propr ie ty of the dis mis sa l of

the ir c omp la int . O ur

re vie w i s de novo on the re cord w ith no presumption of t he correc tness of t he judgment. Anderson v. Standard R egister Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555 (Tenn. 1993)

. The re levant and material fa cts are not disputed. The plainti ffs we re e ng ag ed in the used c ar business at a business location on Highway 411 , in Ocoee . I n their application the plaintiffs denied that they used butane or propa ne g as on the p re m i s es , denied the use of we lding mate rials or conducte d a salva ge operation. The a pplication listed the place of business as be ing loc ated on 2 Hig hway 411 in Ocoee

. But the automobiles which wer e dama g ed by hail wer e located at t he plaintiffs ’ residenc e, and admittedly

wer e not cove red by the Hauler s’ policy

. Given this proble m the plaintiffs say that an employ ee of

the def endant, Rhonda B eck, a ssured them of cover ag e whe n they purcha sed the policy . T he y

a dmi t th a t th e y

didno t r e a d th e app lic a tio n, a nddidno t di sc ov e r the fa lsi ty of the ir response s to the questions involvi ng flammable substanc es until after the loss occur

red two months later. The a lleg ation of fr aud cente rs upon the arg ument that Ms. Be ck wa s not a licensed insurance ag ent contra

ry to the belief of

the plaintiffs. Whether she was or not, howe ver, is irre levant. She wa s a n e mpl oy e e of

the de fe nd a nt w hic h w ou ld b e bo un d b y he r a c tio ns if take n intheor din ary c ou rs e of business of the e mploy er. B ut our inqui ry i s n o t t h u s limi ted; the application signed by the plaintiffs, and the policy

issued pursuant to the application, clea rly provide for

cover ag e at the named business addre ss of the plaintiffs, Hig hway 411. The re sidence of the plaintiffs is not shown, and the policy provided no c overa g e for the vehicle s located in the g ara g e on their r esidenc e. I t is ax iomatic that the plaintiffs are bound by the re prese ntations in the application and the provisions of the policy

. Montgom ery v . Reserve Life Ins. Co., 585 S.W .2d 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 79 ). I f w e a ssu me that the plaint if fs tol d Ms. B e c k that the y wante d c ov e ra g e a t both locations , and that Ms. B eck ne verthe less listed onlythe 411 location, the plaintiffs are bound by their sig ned application and the subsequent issuance of the policy

. Giles v. A llstat e In s. Co. , 871 S.W .2d 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).-3-

Th e jud g me nt i s a ff

ir me d at th e c os ts o f the app e llants
.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM H. INMAN, SENI OR J UDGE