FI LED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEV ENT H CI RCUI T MAY 3 , 201 0 J OHN LEY CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 0 9- 13 47 2

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 8- 00 81 0- CV-J OF-1 RONALD J. CAMPB ELL, JR., KRISTIE CAM PBELL,
Pl ai nt iff s- App el la nt s, GEORGIA POW ER COMPANY,
In te rv en or -Pl ai nt iffApp el la nt , ve rs us ALTEC INDUSTRIES, INC., TEXAS HYDRAUL ICS, INC ., JOHN DOE CORPORATION # 1, JOHN DOE CORPORATION # 2,
Defen da nt s- App el le es .

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt fo r th e North ern Dis tri ctof Ge or gi a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ (Ma y 3, 2 01 0)Befo re TJ OFLAT, W ILSON an d EBEL, Cir cu itJu dg es . *
PER CURI AM: CERTIFI CATION FROM THE UNITED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A . § 1 5- 2- 9. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTIC ES: Thi s ca se in vo lv es a qu es ti on of Ge or gi a la w th atis de te rm in at iv e o f th is ap pe al bu t n otcle arl y

set tl edby con tro ll in g p rece de ntof t he Supr em e Co urt o f Geo rg ia . W e th eref

or e certi fy

th e que st io n fo r res ol ut io n b y th e Supr em e Co urt. Ro na ldJ. Cam

pb el l, J r., a Geo rg iaPo wer Co m pa ny em pl oyee, was i nju red whi le op erat in g an A7 7- T bu ck ettru ckwhenth e lo wer b oo m li ft c y li nd er fa il ed
on Ju ne 30 , 20 06 . Alte c In du strie s, In c. (“ Alt ec”) m an uf actur edan d s ol d t he bu ck ettru ckto Geor gi a Po wer Co m pa ny; Texa s Hydrau li cs , Inc . (“ THI”)
m an uf actur edth e d efec ti ve li ft c y li nd er, wh ic h was de ve lo pe d jo in tl y by A lt ec an d THI forus e in th e b uc ke t t ru ck . On Feb ru ary 4, 2 00 8, Ro na ldJ. Ca m pb el l, J r. an d hi s wi fe, Kri st ie Cam

pb el l (c ol le ct iv el y , “ Cam pb el l” ) br ou gh t t hi s ac ti onag ai ns t

Honora ble David M. Ebe l, United States Circuit J udg e for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by * designation. 2Alt ec an d THI o n t he or ie s o f de fect iv e d es ig n, m an uf actur in g, an d a ss em

bl y of t he bu ck ettru ckun de r pr in ci pl es of s tri ctli ab il it y an d n eg li ge nc e. 1 O.C.G.A. § 51 -1 -1 1 p ro vi de s a c au se of a ct io n i n t ort fo r a p ers on in jure d b y
Campbell also sued Altec and THI for f ailure to wa

rn of the da

ng erous pr opensity

of 1 the bucke t truck. F ollowing the district c ourt’s grant of summar y judgme nt on Campbell’s product liability

claims, Campbell moved the district cour t pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P
. 15(a) (2)—whic h permits a par ty to “amend its plea ding only with the opposing pa

rty ’s written consent or the court’s le ave”—to withdraw the only rema ining c laim, the failureto warn c laim. Campbell asserte d that the grant of this motion would make the district cour t’s judgme nt final and appe alable. Campbell also stated on the re cord tha t he would not rene w the fa ilure to war n claim af ter it was withdra

wn from the c ase. The jurisdictional issue of whe ther the district c ourt’s judg ment was fina l and appe alable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 was ca rried w ith this appea l. A preliminary issue was ra ised as to whether amendment pur suant to Rule 15(a) w as the c orre ct way to handle the dismissal of the failure to warn c laim, or the dismissal should have bee n pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 41, which pr ovides for the dismiss al of a ctions. Pursuant to subsection 41(a) (2), if the require ments of subsection 41(a )(1) are not satisfied (as w ould be the ca se her e), “ an ac tion may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s r equest only by court orde r, on terms that the c ourt consider s proper .” Our

circ uit prece dent dictates that Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims ag ainst a par ticular defe ndant; its tex t does not permit plaintiffs to pick and c hoose, dismissing only particula r cla ims withi n an ac tion. “A plaintiff wishingto eliminate particula r claims or issues fr om the action should amend the complaint under Rule 15( a) rathe r than dismiss under Rule 41(a ).” Klay v. United Hea lthgr oup, Inc., 376 F .3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting8 Moore’ s Fe dera l Practice § 41.21[2] , at 41–32). Rule 15, theref

ore, w as the c orre ct way

to dismi ss this claim. That does not addre ss, howeve r, the fina lity

of the dismissal. “Unless the plaintiff’ s motion or the district court’s orde r stipulates otherwise, a

claim droppe d through a Rule 15 ame ndment—or, for that matter, a

n action droppe d pursuant to Rule 41(a) —is dismi ssed without prejudice .” I d. at 1107. While the district court’s orde r does not state that the dismiss al was w ith prejudice, the g rant of the Rule 15(a) motion, coupled with the announce ment on the re cord that Campbell would not renew his failure to warn c laim, operated as the f unctional equivale nt of a dismissal with prejudice of this claim—turningthe district court’s summar y judgme nt order into a f

inal judgme nt. We therefor e have jur isdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides that “ courts of a ppeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appea ls from all final dec isions of the district courts of the United States.” 3pe rs on al pro pe rty agai ns t t he pro pe rty’ s m anuf actur er i f th e co nd it io n i n wh ic h t he pr op erty was s ol d i s the pro xi m at e cau se of t he in jury sus ta in ed . O.C.G.A. § 5 1- 1- 11 (b )(1 ). The s ta tu te , ho wev er, i m po se s a t im e li m iton bri ng in g a n a ct io n u nd er
subs ect io n (b )(1 ); t he act io n m us t co m m en ce wi th in “ te n years f ro m th e d at e o f th e fir stsal e fo r us e o r co ns um pt io n o f th e p ers on al pro pe rty caus in g o r ot he rwis e br in gi ng ab ou t t he in

jury.” Id. § 5 1- 1- 11 (b )(2 ). Alt ec an d THI m ov edth e co urt fo r su m m ary jud gm en t o n a ll of C am pb el l’s p ro du ctli ab il it y

cla im s b as edon th is pr ov is io n, kno wn as th e st atut e o f rep os e. The di stric t co urt g ran te d C am pb el l’s m ot io n, fi nd in g t ha t t he st atut e o f rep os e b eg anto run on Jan uary 14 , 19 98 , m or e th anten y ears be fo re Ca m pb el l’s Feb ru ary 4, 2 00 8 l aws ui t. OnJan ua ry 14 , 19 98 , Alt ec p la cedth e as se m bl edli ft cy li nd er, wh ic h c au se d C am pb el l’s i nju ry , on a te stch as si s an d o pe rat edit . The fin al ass em

bl y of t he li ft c y li nd er an d p la cem en t o nt o t he bu ck ettru ck , ho wev er, di d n otoc cu r un ti l s om et im e in Marc h 1 99 8. Th e in it ia l d el iv ery to th e u lt im at e pu rch as er, Geo rg iaPo wer Co m pa ny, the n o ccu rredin Apri l 1 99 8. Ina cas e whe re i nju ry

aro se fro m

a m et al pl at e p utin a pa ti en t’s b ack , th e Geo rg iaSupr em e Co urt h el d t ha t t he st atut e o f rep os e d idno t b eg in to runwhen th e h os pi ta l p ur ch as edth e p la te , bu t ra th er wh enth e p la te was re m ov edfro m in ve nt ory an d s ol d t o t he pl ai nt iff

“ fo r it s ac tu al in te nd edpu rp os e o f pl acement i n
4hi s b ack .” Paffo rdv. Bi om et , 44 8 S .E. 2d34 7, 3 49 (Ga. 19 94 ). On the othe r 2 ha nd , th e Geo rg iaCo urt o f App eal s l at er h el d, i n t he cas e o f anall eg edpro bl em wit h acar s wit ch , th atth e st atut e o f rep os e b eg anto run when th e carco m pany in st al le d t he swi tc h i n the car an d t he car b ecame op erab le , no t wh enth e carwas
so ld . Jo hn so n v . For d M ot or Co ., 63 7 S .E.2d20 2, 2 06 (Ga. Ct . App . 20 06 ). 3 Neit he r de ci si on see m s t o d efi ni ti ve ly reso lv e th e is su e o f whi ch of the fol lo win g
co ns ti tu te s t he “ fir stsal e fo r us e o r co ns um pt io n o f th e p ers on al pro pe rty caus in g
orot he rwis e b rin gi ng ab ou t the in jury”: th e co m

pl et io n o r te stof t he li ft c y li nd er, th e co m pl et edass em

bl y of t he bu ck ettru ck , or t he de li ve ry of the fin is he d b uc ke t tru ckto th e in it ia l p ur ch as er. Bec au se res ol ut io n o f th is qu es ti on wou ldde te rm in e whe th er Ca m

pb el l ca n p ur su e h is cau se of a ct io n a nd , th us , det erm in es th is ap pe al , an d “ no cle ar co nt ro ll in g p rece de nt ” ex is ts , see § O.C.G.A. 15 -2 -9 , we

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In so holding, the c ourt “re cognize[ d] a disti nction betwee n the individual who initially 2 purcha sed a ma

nufac tured produc t for mer e static re tention in his i nventory and that individual whose a ctual employ

ment of the produc t was ultimately intended.” Paf

ford, 448 S.E.2d at 348. It found that the re levant “f irst ‘use or c onsumption’” would be by the individual who ultimately intended to use the pr oduct. This distinction does not apply here
. I f a c onflict exist s betwee n these de cisions, Pafford w ould control bec ause it is a ruling 3 by the Georg ia Supreme Court. The Geor g ia Supreme Court ha s not addresse d whether the intermediate court’s r

uling in Johnson conflicted with Pafford. As noted, if the time whe n the lift cy linder wa s tested commenc ed the statute of repose 4 period, a s the district court held, Campbe ll’s suit would be untim ely . I f the statute wa s not trig g ere d until either the bucke t truck’s a ssembly , or the buc ket truck’ s delivery to the initial purcha ser, Campbe ll broug ht suit wit hin ten year s of those eve nts, so the suit would be tim ely
. 5cert ify the fol lo win g que st io n t o t he Supr em e Co urt o f Geo rg ia :

IN A STRICT LIABILITY OR NEGLIGENCE ACTION, D OES THE STA TUTE OF REPOSE IN O.C.G.A. § 51 -1 -1 1 B EGIN RUNNING WHEN (1) A COMP ONENT PART CAUSING AN INJURY IS ASSEMB LED OR TE STED, (2 ) A FINISHED PRODUCT, W HICH INCLUDES AN INJURI NG COMP ONENT PART, IS ASSEM BLED, OR (3) A FI NISHED PRODUCT, W HICH INCLUDES AN INJURI NG COMPONENT PART, IS DELIVERED T O ITS INITIAL PURCHASER ? W e d o n otin te ndth e p art ic ul ar p hr as in g o f th is qu es ti onto li m itth e co urt i n it s co ns id erat io n o f th e p ro bl em s p os edby thi s ca se , or e ve n t o c on st rai n i ts ch oi ce of th e tr ig ge rin g e ve ntto th es e th ree o pt io ns . In o rd er t o a ss is t the co urt’s
co ns id erat io n o f th e que st io n, we ar e p ro vi di ng th e co urt wi th th e en ti re re co rdan d th e p art ie s’ bri efs on ap pe al
. IT IS SO ORDERED.

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