GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277495 

August 5, 1997

The Honorable Richard K. Armey

Majority Leader

House of Representatives

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman, Committee on Government

 Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Livingston

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Subject: The Results Act: Observations on DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

On June 12, 1997, you asked us to review the draft strategic plans

submitted by cabinet departments and selected major agencies to facilitate

consultations with the Congress as required by the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act). This letter is our

response to that request concerning the Department of Defense (DOD).

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Our overall objective was to review and evaluate DOD’s draft strategic plan.

Specifically, you asked us to review the draft plan and assess (1) whether

it complies with the act’s requirements and its overall quality, (2) whether

it reflects DOD’s key statutory authorities, (3) whether it reflects

interagency coordination of crosscutting functions, (4) whether it

addresses major management problems we have previously identified, and

(5) whether DOD’s data and information systems can provide reliable

information about performance.

The Secretary of Defense states in DOD’s May 1997 Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) report that the report will serve as DOD’s overall strategic

planning document and is intended to fulfill the requirements of the

Results Act. On June 23, 1997, the Secretary submitted to the

congressional authorization committees and the Senate and House

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Appropriations Committees a letter summarizing how DOD believes the QDR

complies with Results Act planning requirements. Congressional staff

asked us to review this summary letter for compliance with the Results

Act. Since the letter describes how DOD believes the QDR meets strategic

planning requirements, we analyzed both the letter and the QDR report

together and refer to them in this letter as DOD’s draft strategic plan. We

sought to determine whether the letter and the QDR report, taken together,

contained the elements that were required by the Results Act and the other

elements you asked us to look for in agencies’ plans. We did not evaluate

the assumptions underlying the QDR report and made no judgment about

them or whether the QDR report met the purposes of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which required the review. We are,

however, evaluating certain aspects of the QDR report in a separate review.

Our overall assessment of DOD’s draft strategic plan (the May 1997 QDR

report and the June 1997 summary letter) was generally based on our

knowledge of DOD’s operations and programs, our numerous reviews of

DOD, and other information available at the time of our assessment.

Specifically, the criteria we used to determine whether the draft plan

complied with the requirements of the Results Act were the act itself,

supplemented by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) guidance

on developing the plans (Circular A-11, Part 2). To make judgments about

the overall quality of the draft plan and its elements, we used our May 1997

guidance for congressional review of the plans as a tool.1

 To determine

whether the draft plan contained information on interagency coordination

and addressed major management challenges, we relied on our general

knowledge of DOD’s operations and programs and the results of our

previous reports. A list of our major related products on DOD operations is

included at the end of this letter.

As you requested, we coordinated our work on DOD’s key statutory

authorities and DOD’s capacity to provide reliable information with the

Congressional Research Service and the DOD Inspector General’s office,

respectively. We did our work between July 7 and July 25, 1997, in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Background DOD has a $250 billion budget, which is 15 percent of the federal budget

and an estimated 3.2 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, to

provide for national security. It currently has 1.45 million active duty

1

Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review

(GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997).

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military personnel, 900,000 military reserve personnel, and 800,000 civilian

personnel. In addition to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine

Corps, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

DOD includes 24 defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency

and the Defense Special Weapons Agency. With 10 active Army divisions, 3

Marine expeditionary forces, 13 active Air Force fighter wings, 202

bombers, 11 active aircraft carriers, 10 active naval air wings, 12

amphibious ready groups, 73 attack submarines, 128 surface combatant

ships, and reserve units and other equipment, and with 200,000 of its

troops overseas, DOD maintains worldwide influence.

DOD has been involved in strategic planning for many years, and the QDR is

the fourth major review of the military since the end of the Cold War.2 DOD

intended the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of

America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015, including potential threats,

strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization

programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense

program. Additional planning efforts are underway or planned, however.

Included in these efforts are

• a separate force structure assessment, which is required by the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 to be undertaken by a

nonpartisan, independent national defense panel and provided to Congress

no later than December 1997;

• a report on defense reforms, which is to be provided by a DOD task force in

November 1997; and

• a report with recommendations on DOD headquarters and cross-service

occupational specialties, which is to be provided in August 1997.

Planning is a dynamic process, and the ongoing and planned activities,

along with any additional input from OMB, congressional staff, and other

stakeholders, could result in changes to DOD’s plan. It is important to

recognize that, under the Results Act, a plan is not due until September 30,

1997. Furthermore, the Results Act anticipated that it may take several

planning cycles to perfect the process and that the plan due September 30

itself would be continually refined as various planning cycles occur. Thus,

our comments reflect a snapshot status of DOD’s plan at this time.

The Results Act requires an agency’s strategic plan to contain six critical

components. They are (1) a comprehensive mission statement;

2

The other three reviews were the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1995

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.

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(2) agencywide long-term goals and objectives for all major functions and

operations; (3) approaches (or strategies) and the various resources

needed to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a relationship between the

long-term goals and objectives and the annual performance goals; (5) an

identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond its control,

that could significantly affect the achievement of the strategic goals; and

(6) a description of the program evaluations used to establish or revise

strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations.

Results in Brief DOD’s draft plan includes discussions of each of the six critical components

required in strategic plans. Overall, while some of the plan’s components

are of higher quality than others, the plan represents an adequate start for

addressing the requirements of the Results Act. Of note, the draft plan

contains a succinct mission statement and general goals and objectives

that cover DOD’s major functions and operations. However, the overall plan

could be improved by clarifying sections, adding information, and

improving the plan’s format. For example, the plan’s overall quality could

be enhanced by

• stating more completely and explicitly its strategies for achieving each

goal and including schedules for initiating and completing significant

actions;

• discussing more clearly how external factors link to and could affect

achieving its goals;

• describing in more detail the program evaluations used in establishing its

strategic goals and identifying the key issues to be addressed in future

evaluations;

• addressing what DOD has done or plans to do to resolve its persistent

management problems, including specific steps it plans to take, the time

frames and resources needed to implement its plans, and identification of

any external factors that could impede resolution;

• beginning now to work closely with Congress and other stakeholders in

developing performance goals and measures;

• identifying programs and activities that crosscut with other agencies’

programs and discussing how those efforts are being coordinated; and

• developing one clear and succinct document primarily based on the QDR

and formatted to correspond with the Results Act’s requirements and the

other expectations for Results Act plans.

Further, to its credit, DOD’s plan included some discussion of formidable

management problems DOD currently faces. These problems are important

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because they could affect DOD’s ability to meet its strategic goals and

objectives. However, DOD’s discussions of management problems could be

more complete. For example, the significant problems DOD faces with

managing its contract operations were not discussed. Additionally, DOD’s

major concern about the reliability of program-related and financial

management information systems does not mention how data limitations

would affect its ability to measure performance and ultimately to

effectively manage its programs.

Addressing these areas would provide decisionmakers and stakeholders

the information necessary to ensure that DOD has strategies that are well

thought-out for resolving ongoing problems, achieving its goals and

objectives, and becoming more results-oriented, as expected by the

Results Act.

DOD’s Draft Plan

Discusses the Act’s

Requirements but

Could Elaborate on

Some Components

DOD’s draft plan includes discussions of each of the six critical components

required in strategic plans. Overall, while some of the plan’s components

are of higher quality than others, the plan represents an adequate start for

addressing the requirements of the Results Act. However, its plan could be

improved if it were to more closely follow the guidance provided in OMB

Circular A-11 and to include more comprehensive discussions for each of

the required components. Two exceptions are the mission statement,

which succinctly states DOD’s mission, and the general goals and

objectives, which cover DOD’s major functions and operations.

Mission Statement A mission statement provides an agency focus by explaining why it exists

and what it does. OMB Circular A-11 states that an agency’s mission

statement should briefly define the basic purpose of the agency, with

particular focus on its core programs and activities. DOD’s draft plan

includes a concise mission statement that meets this criterion. It states,

“The mission of the Department of Defense is to support and defend the

Constitution of the United States, to provide for the common defense of

the United States, its citizens and its allies, and to protect and advance

U.S. interests around the world.”

Goals and Objectives DOD’s draft plan covers its major functions and operations under the

following six goals and objectives:

1. Harness the unmatched capabilities of the U.S. armed forces to

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• shape the international security environment in favorable ways by

promoting regional stability, preventing crises and reducing threats, and

deterring adversaries on a day-to-day basis;

• respond to the full spectrum of crises—from deterrence to smaller-scale

contingency operations to major theater war—when it is in the U.S.

interests to do so and maintain the capability to deter and, if necessary,

defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in

overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies; and

• prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future by transforming

U.S. combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and

respond effectively well into the 21st century.

2. Recruit and retain well-qualified military personnel and provide them

with an equal opportunity and a high quality of life.

3. Support friends and allies by sustaining and adapting security alliances,

enhancing coalition warfighting, and forging military relationships that

protect and advance U.S. security interests.

4. Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative

superiority in key warfighting capabilities, exploits the Revolution in

Military Affairs,3

 and supports the joint operational concepts delineated in

Joint Vision 2010.

4

5. Maintain the U.S. edge in combat readiness while seeking efficiencies

and improved operating procedures. 6. Fundamentally reengineer DOD and

achieve a 21st century infrastructure by reducing costs and eliminating

unnecessary expenditures while maintaining required military capabilities

across all DOD mission areas. Employ modern management tools and

exploit the Revolution in Business Affairs.5

3

The Revolution in Military Affairs refers to efforts to develop the improved capabilities needed to

significantly enhance joint military operations, particularly improved information and command and

control capabilities that can provide DOD an advanced, secure, open command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability.

4

Joint Vision 2010 is the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s conceptual template for how America’s armed forces

plan to channel the vitality and innovation of their people and leverage technological opportunities to

achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. It develops four operational concepts for

fighting in the early 21st century—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional

protection, and focused logistics.

5

The Revolution in Business Affairs refers to DOD’s efforts to reengineer its infrastructure and

business practices, such as outsourcing and privatizing a wide range of support activities and reducing

unneeded standards and specifications.

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The Results Act requires an agency’s plan to include outcome-related goals

and objectives that relate to the agency’s general goals and objectives for

its major functions and operations. Also, our May 1997 guidance for

congressional review of agencies’ strategic plans states that an agency’s

strategic goals should explain what results are expected from the agency’s

major functions. DOD’s goals address its major mission-related

functions—preparing for and defending the United States and its

interests—and generally appear to be oriented to outcomes. However,

DOD’s goals are expressed in terms that may make it difficult for DOD to

translate them into quantitatively measurable performance goals so that

stakeholders and decisionmakers can determine whether the goals are

actually being achieved.

Strategies and the

Resources Needed to

Achieve Goals and

Objectives

DOD’s draft plan includes considerable discussion of the strategies it will

use to achieve its goals and objectives. However, although the discussions

in general could be more complete and explicit, discussions are more

informative for some goals than for others. The draft plan also discusses in

general the resources that will be needed to achieve the goals, such as a

stable budget, the number of military and civilian personnel, the force

structure, and some of the technologies. It does not, however, contain the

schedules for initiating or completing significant strategy actions that OMB

Circular A-11 guidance requires in agencies’ strategic plans. DOD could

improve the plan and provide stakeholders and decisionmakers a more

complete understanding of its strategies by fully and explicitly listing the

strategies for achieving each of its general goals and objectives and

including, where feasible, schedules for initiating and completing

significant strategy actions.

One of the more informative presentations of strategies to achieve a goal

was DOD’s discussion of its sixth goal—fundamentally reengineering DOD.

Our work has shown that it will be key for DOD to continue working to

change its culture to one that is more acceptive of modern business

practices to successfully implement this strategy. Among DOD’s strategies

for this goal are (1) outsourcing certain Defense Logistics Agency

functions; (2) consolidating Defense Information Service Agency

information processing centers; (3) conducting public-private

competitions for certain depot maintenance work; (4) streamlining the

security investigative process at the Defense Investigative Service;

(5) taking maximum advantage of acquisition reform; (6) increasing

cooperative development programs with allies; (7) competing,

outsourcing, or privatizing military department infrastructure functions

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that are closely related to commercial enterprises; (8) reducing unneeded

standards and specifications; (9) integrating process and product

development; and (10) increasing the use of commercial technology,

dual-use technology, and open systems. Further, DOD expects additional

reengineering ideas and recommendations to result from an August 1997

report on the study of headquarters and cross-service occupational

specialties and in a November 1997 report from the Task Force on Defense

Reform. Another of its strategies for reengineering is to seek legislation for

two more base realignment and closure rounds and relief from the

statutory requirement that at least 60 percent of depot maintenance

activities be done in DOD depots. DOD also plans to make additional

legislative proposals to further streamline and increase efficiency in its

operations.

On the other hand, DOD’s discussion for its second goal—recruiting and

retaining well-qualified military personnel and providing them an equal

opportunity and a high quality of life—was less informative. The draft plan

notes that DOD (1) has identified where policy or practice changes that will

improve quality-of-life can be made and will implement them; (2) remains

committed to funding pay raises and other compensation; (3) will make

every effort to continue its commitment to provide adequate funding in

areas such as housing, community and family support, transition

assistance as further reductions are made in military forces, and morale

and recreation activities; and (4) will continue placing a priority on

educational assistance.

Relating Annual

Performance Goals to

General Goals and

Objectives

DOD’s draft plan represents a good start toward trying to link DOD’s general

goals with quantitatively measurable annual performance goals or

descriptions of what would represent progress toward achieving general

goals. Such a linkage is important because it would allow Congress to

judge whether DOD is achieving its goals. The Results Act calls for

quantifiable performance measures, if feasible. If such measures are not

feasible, however, the act allows, with authorization from OMB, for the use

of descriptive statements of both a minimally effective and a successful

program. The draft plan states that its annual performance plan, which the

Results Act first requires for fiscal year 1999 and is not yet completed, will

include the required performance measures or descriptive statements

along with the general goals to which they relate. However, DOD’s goals are

expressed in terms that may make it difficult for DOD to translate them into

quantitatively measurable performance goals that will enable stakeholders

and decisionmakers to determine the extent to which they are actually

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being achieved. That could be the reason some measures DOD is currently

planning to use measure resource inputs or outputs rather than results.

For example, DOD currently plans to compare the force structure it will

need with the force structure included in its future budgets as a measure

of achieving its first goal—shaping the international security environment,

responding to crises, and preparing now to meet uncertain future

challenges. As another example, DOD plans to report the number of major

joint exercises conducted during a fiscal year as one measure of its fifth

goal—maintaining the U.S. edge in combat readiness. DOD’s draft plan

notes that it plans to work with key stakeholders in developing the Results

Act performance plan that is first required for fiscal year 1999. By

beginning now to work closely with Congress and other stakeholders to

develop its performance measures and goals, DOD might improve the

specificity with which it could relate general goals and objectives and

performance goals and measures in its strategic plan and also better

assure that its annual performance plan, when completed, will meet the

purposes of the Results Act.

Key External Factors OMB Circular A-11 points out that agencies’ achievement of their goals and

objectives can be influenced by certain external factors that exist, occur,

or change over the time period covered by their plans. The circular notes

that these factors can be economic, demographic, social, or environmental

in nature. It states that the strategic plan should describe each external

factor, indicate its link with a particular goal(s), and describe how

achieving the goal could be affected by the factor.

DOD’s draft plan identified the following factors it believes are external and

could influence the achievement of its goals and objectives:

• The uncertainty of the international environment, particularly the potential

emergence of a regional great power or near-peer competitor in the

1997-2015 time frame or of “wild card” scenarios, such as the

unanticipated emergence of new technological threats, for which the

United States is unprepared.

• The possibility that Congress may not enact legislative changes DOD

included among its strategies for achieving its sixth goal about

fundamentally reengineering the Department, particularly authority for

two more base realignment and closure-type processes to help reduce DOD

infrastructure and relief from the statutory requirement to perform at least

60 percent of depot maintenance activities in DOD depots.

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• The possibility that annual appropriations could fall below the $250 billion

per year, adjusted for inflation, which DOD says will be needed to achieve

its goals. (We believe this should not be considered an external factor,

because receiving a reasonable budget is the basis of an agency’s strategic

plan under the Results Act.)

DOD could improve the draft plan by clearly discussing the linkage of each

external factor with the goals and the effect of each external factor on the

goals. DOD’s draft plan does not clearly link the international environment

factor with particular goals or discuss the implications on goal

achievement. The draft plan does indicate that if the legislative changes

are not made and savings in infrastructure costs are not realized, DOD may

not have the level of procurement funding it will need to achieve its fourth

goal—modernizing the force. DOD plans to use savings from reducing

infrastructure to increase its procurement funding from the $42.6 billion it

requested for fiscal year 1998 to $60 billion a year by fiscal year 2001.

Program Evaluations The Results Act requires an agency’s plan to include a description of the

program evaluations that were used in establishing its strategic goals and

to lay out a schedule for future program evaluations. OMB’s Circular A-11

guidance calls for a brief description of the program evaluations that were

used in preparing the plan and for the plan to outline (1) the general scope

and methodology for planned future evaluations, (2) key issues to be

addressed, and (3) a schedule for future evaluations.

Although DOD’s draft plan identifies various reviews DOD relied on in

developing the draft, particularly reviews of strategy, force structure,

readiness, modernization, infrastructure, human resources, and

information operations and intelligence, it does not clearly discuss how

program evaluations were used in establishing the strategic goals. A clear

and complete discussion would improve the plan. Additionally, although

the draft plan states that future evaluations will be done annually in the

May to September time frame, it does not clearly outline the key issues to

be addressed. Including a fuller discussion of the key issues to be

addressed is another way the draft plan could be improved.

Observations on the

Overall Quality of the Plan

Although the draft plan discusses each of the six Results Act’s

requirements, the overall quality of the plan could be improved by

incorporating the suggestions discussed in the prior sections. For

example, we noted the plan could be improved if DOD more completely and

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explicitly stated its strategies for achieving each goal and included

schedules for initiating and completing significant strategy actions.

Additionally, we believe that the plan’s overall quality would be

significantly enhanced if the entire plan was presented in one clear and

succinct document formatted in sections to correspond to the six critical

components required in the plans and included the additional factors, such

as major management problems and crosscutting functions, that you

indicated should be discussed in agencies’ plans.

DOD’s was the only draft agency strategic plan we obtained that used a

planning document prepared to meet another requirement for its Results

Act plan. Other agencies’ draft plans were prepared specifically to meet

the requirements of the Results Act. We understand the Secretary of

Defense’s intent to use the results of the QDR in meeting the strategic

planning requirements of the Results Act. However, as DOD’s draft plan is

currently constructed, two documents are required for stakeholders and

decisionmakers to fully understand the degree to which DOD complies with

Results Act strategic planning requirements—the QDR report and the

June 23, 1997 summary letter that describes how the QDR meets the

requirements by linking the requirements to the QDR report. We think that

one document—a stand alone strategic plan prepared specifically to meet

the requirements of the Results Act, regardless of the base from which it

was drawn—could significantly improve stakeholders’ and

decisionmakers’ understanding of how DOD is meeting the strategic

planning requirements of the Results Act.

DOD’s Statutory

Responsibilities Are

Reflected in Its

Mission, Goals, and

Objectives

DOD’s strategic plan does not discuss the major pieces of legislation that

serve as the basis for its mission statement. However, in its statements of

mission, goals, and objectives, DOD’s plan reflects its broad statutory

defense responsibilities. DOD’s statutory responsibilities are primarily

found in title 10 of the United States Code. The organizational structure of

the Department of Defense was established by the National Security Act of

1947. The current structure also reflects the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which modified how

DOD’s mission is implemented. With the Secretary of Defense as its head,

DOD is composed of several entities, including the three military

departments. The Secretary is vested with the authority, direction, and

control of the Department (10 U.S.C. 113), but it is the component military

departments, not the Secretary, that are vested with the specific

authorities reflected in DOD’s mission statement and goals. Generally, these

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authorities pertain to the defense of the United States, supporting national

policies, implementing national objectives, and waging war (10 U.S.C. §§

3062, 5062, and 8062). Additionally, the secretaries of the military

departments, while subject to the authority, direction, and control of the

Secretary of Defense, have broad governance over their respective

departments in such areas as recruiting, organizing, equipping, supplying,

and training (10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, and 8013).

Including

Crosscutting

Activities Would

Improve DOD’s

Strategic Plan

Crosscutting functions are not identified as such in DOD’s draft plan, nor

are the statutes that authorize DOD operations in areas of concern to other

federal agencies specifically mentioned. A key area where coordination

with other agencies is essential to the accomplishment of DOD’s mission is

in the development and implementation of national security strategy and

the shaping of the international environment. In addition to DOD, other

agencies with key roles include the Department of State, the National

Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the

Department of Energy, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. Agency for

International Development. For example, failed or failing states such as

Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Albania create instability, internal

conflict, and humanitarian crises that require a joint and coordinated

response by several U.S. agencies. Moreover, DOD, State, and other

agencies cooperate in a number of programs and activities aimed at

helping to shape the international environment. These include security

assistance programs, the International Military Education and Training

program, and other international arms agreements. While DOD’s draft

strategic plan acknowledges that DOD’s efforts in these areas are clearly

integrated with U.S. diplomatic efforts, the extent and mechanisms for

cooperation and coordination are not described.

The federal government’s adaptive responses over time to new needs and

problems have also contributed to fragmentation and overlap in a host of

other program areas. DOD, for example, has crosscutting programs in such

diverse areas as education, telemedicine, personnel security,

environmental compliance, export promotion, and community

development, among others. Although DOD’s plan touches briefly on

biological and chemical threats, its interaction with other agencies on

these matters, such as assisting the Attorney General in an emergency

situation, is not dealt with in detail. Similarly, DOD’s plan does not discuss

its interaction with various law enforcement agencies in our country’s war

on drugs. For example, the plan does not mention that DOD is the lead

agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of

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illegal drugs in support of the counterdrug activities of federal, state, local,

and foreign law enforcement agencies or that it is authorized to share

information with and make equipment available to law enforcement

agencies. Further, although DOD and other agencies involved with

environmental issues have experimented with a wide range of

partnerships in recent years, the plan does not discuss these efforts.

Consultation and coordination are important for these and other

crosscutting programs because successfully meeting program goals may

depend on actions by both DOD and partner agencies. In the environmental

area, for example, cooperative efforts with other agencies, conservation

organizations, and concerned citizens can be an important tool in ensuring

timely and cost-effective environmental protection. Overlapping and

fragmented programs waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program

customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort.

Additionally, the Results Act’s focus on results implies that federal

programs contributing to the same or similar results should be closely

coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent, and as appropriate,

program efforts are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, we believe DOD’s

strategic plan should include a discussion of crosscutting programs to

provide decisionmakers and other stakeholders the information necessary

to help ensure that DOD has designed well thought-out strategies in

consultation with partner agencies to achieve programmatic and other

goals.

Strategic Plan’s

Coverage of Major

Management

Challenges Is Mixed

Over the years, we, the DOD Inspector General, and the services’ inspectors

general have reported on major management problems that DOD faces in

carrying out its mission. More recently, in our high-risk series report6

 and

related testimony,7

 we noted that DOD has long-standing management

problems in six high-risk areas: financial management, information

technology, weapon systems acquisition, contract management,

infrastructure, and inventory management. DOD also reported material

internal control weaknesses related to all of these areas except weapon

systems acquisition and infrastructure in its fiscal year 1996 Federal

Managers’ Financial Integrity Act report to the President and Congress. It

is important for DOD to correct these management problems because every

dollar it spends inefficiently is one less dollar it has to spend on

modernizing its forces and keeping them ready to perform their missions.

6

High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-97-1, Feb. 1997).

7

DOD High-Risk Areas: Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid Billions of Dollars in Waste

(GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997).

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DOD has taken or plans actions to correct most of these problems and has

made progress in some areas. For example, in response to our

recommendations, DOD implemented certain commercial practices in its

inventory management area, such as direct vendor delivery for medical8

and food9 items, and states in the plan that it will continue to take

advantage of business process improvements being pioneered in the

private sector. DOD, to its credit, also included some discussion in the draft

plan of what it is doing or plans to do to resolve most of these problems.

The extent of DOD’s coverage of these persistent management problems

(high-risk areas) in its draft plan is mixed, however, as noted in table 1. In

determining the extent of coverage given these areas, we considered

several factors, including whether DOD’s draft plan identified (1) the

actions it had taken, was taking, or planned to take to resolve the

problems; (2) the time frames for correcting the problems; (3) the

resources needed to resolve the problems; and (4) any external factors

that might impede DOD’s efforts.

Using these criteria, the high-risk area with the best

coverage—infrastructure—lists several steps DOD has taken or is planning

to take, such as requesting authority for two additional rounds of base

realignments and closures; restructuring laboratories and research,

development, and test facilities; outsourcing and privatizing noncore

activities; and taking advantage of private sector practices, among others.

It includes time frames, needed resources, and external factors for some

but not all elements of its strategy to resolve this problem. In the area with

the least coverage—contract management—the plan merely states that

DOD will streamline vendor pay but does not discuss how past control

problems over contract expenditures are being or will be addressed.

Most of the other management problems lack specificity in terms of steps

DOD will take to resolve them, time frames for resolution, needed

resources, or external factors that could affect successful resolution. At a

minimum, in problem areas where DOD has taken successful corrective

actions, it would be useful for DOD to discuss how it addressed the

problems and intends to prevent them from resurfacing. The plan could

identify other problems where DOD may have had less success and discuss

how it plans to resolve them. Such details could be useful in determining

8

DOD Medical Inventory: Reductions Can Be Made Through the Use of Commercial Practices

(GAO/NSIAD-92-58, Dec. 5, 1991).

9

DOD Food Inventory: Using Private Sector Practices Can Reduce Costs and Eliminate Problems

(GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 6, 1993).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

the extent to which these persistent management problems could impede

DOD’s efforts to achieve its goals and objectives or its efforts at measuring

performance. DOD could significantly improve its strategic plan by

including this degree of specificity, since its ability to successfully

implement the Results Act could be hampered by these persistent

management problems.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

Table 1: Extent to Which Persistent

Management Problems Are Covered in

DOD’s Strategic Plan

High-risk area The problem Coverage in the plan

Financial

management

DOD does not have adequate

financial management

processes in place to produce

the information it needs for

making decisions affecting its

operations and accountability.

Partial. The plan states that DOD

plans to consolidate and

outsource much of this function.

Information

management and

technology

DOD spends billions annually on

information technology but

makes system selections without

appropriately analyzing costs,

benefits, and technical risks;

establishing realistic project

schedules; or considering how

business process improvements

could affect technology

investments.

Partial. The plan states that DOD

plans to consolidate 16 large

information processing centers

into 6 but lacks specific

discussion of how it will ensure

the systems are compatible and

the data produced are reliable.

Weapon systems

acquisition

Wasteful practices, including

establishing questionable

requirements for weapon

systems; projecting unrealistic

cost, schedule, and

performance estimates; and

beginning production before

adequate testing has been

completed, add billions of

dollars to defense weapon

systems acquisition costs.

Partial. The plan states DOD will

take maximum advantage of

acquisition reform but lacks

specificity on how the reforms

are expected to address the

problems.

Contract

management

Inadequate controls over

contract expenditures risk

millions of dollars in

overpayments to contractors.

None. The plan does not

discuss how controls will be

strengthened, only that DOD will

streamline vendor pay.

Infrastructure In recent years, DOD has

undergone substantial

downsizing in force structure but

commensurate reductions in

operations and support costs

have not been achieved.

Partial. The plan discusses

specific steps DOD is taking or

plans to take to reduce

infrastructure and quantifies the

expected reductions.

Inventory

management

Fundamental control

deficiencies in inventory

management systems and

procedures make DOD

vulnerable to billions of dollars in

unneeded inventory.

Partial. The plan discusses DOD

initiatives such as Joint Total

Asset Visibility and the Global

Combat Support System but

lacks specifics and time frames.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

DOD Does Not Have

Reliable Information

for Helping Achieve

Its Goals or Measuring

Its Results

A lack of reliable management information is a serious problem

throughout DOD. Until the DOD can reliably obtain such information, its

ability to effectively oversee and manage its vast operations, including

developing and implementing a viable strategic plan for achieving the

performance measurement objectives of the Results Act, will continue to

be impaired. If DOD is to obtain reliable management information, it must

overcome a number of challenging problems, particularly those in the

critical areas of financial management and information systems

technology.

DOD has acknowledged a departmentwide problem in accumulating

accurate and complete cost accounting information. Without reliable cost

and other management information, DOD will be limited in its ability to

establish reasonable performance measures and to reliably assess

progress against these measures across the spectrum of its operations. As

DOD faces difficult decisions associated with balancing scarce resources

with critical needs, accurate, reliable, and timely information on financial

aspects of performance will be particularly important to consider in

judging program results. In addition, DOD has had only limited success in

implementing departmentwide information technology initiatives. Yet,

many of the goals and objectives included in the DOD’s draft plan rely

heavily on the effective use of information technology.

DOD Faces Considerable

Challenge If It Is to

Develop Reliable Financial

Information

Financial statements, prepared and audited in accordance with the Chief

Financial Officers’ (CFO) Act, provide an annual scorecard to measure

DOD’s progress in resolving its financial management reporting

deficiencies. Since 1991, several of the military services and major DOD

components have attempted to prepare financial statements in accordance

with the CFO Act’s requirements. None of the financial statements prepared

by the military services or major DOD components have been sufficiently

reliable to withstand the scrutiny of a financial statement audit. In

addition, auditors found that DOD’s first attempt to prepare

departmentwide financial statements for fiscal year 1996 were unauditable

due to problems within DOD’s accounting systems and internal control

structure.

Deficiencies identified in auditors’ reports have prevented DOD managers

from obtaining reliable financial information needed for sound

decisionmaking across the spectrum of the Department’s financial

operations. In addition, auditors have consistently found that DOD financial

data available for decisionmaking have been adversely affected because

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

many basic control procedures either were not in place or were not

followed. Auditors have also reported that DOD lacks reliable information

on billions of dollars of disbursements as well as on other critical areas of

the Department’s operations.

Our and DOD auditors’ reports have confirmed that DOD does not have

accurate cost data for almost all of its assets, such as inventories of

equipment, aircraft, and missiles, nor can DOD accumulate reliable

information on the cost of its business activities and critical operations.

For example, auditors have reported that DOD managers did not have

accurate information on actual operating and capital costs to consider

when making decisions to replace or upgrade weapon systems or on the

actual costs associated with base closure and realignment decisions. Our

reports have also disclosed that pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s general

computer controls placed DOD at risk of improper modification or loss of

sensitive financial data. In addition, as discussed in the following section,

DOD’s information system efforts, including systems relied on to provide

financial data, will be critical to reliably measuring performance. DOD

relies on an estimated 10,000 automated systems to carry out its mission,

including accounting, finance, logistics, personnel, budgetary, and other

management information. Few of these systems are effectively tied

together. DOD has acknowledged that its financial operations are plagued

with duplicative processes and are slow and error prone.

DOD has recognized the importance of tackling these financial management

deficiencies and has many initiatives planned or underway that are

intended to address them. One of the major initiatives directed at

improving its cost accounting capabilities was the establishment of a set of

working capital funds intended to focus attention on the total costs of

carrying out certain critical DOD business operations, including helping to

better manage the costs associated with maintaining DOD’s weapon

systems. However, DOD’s efforts in this area have been plagued with

implementation problems. For example, past financial reports on the

funds’ operations were not sufficiently reliable to determine whether they

met their financial goal of operating on a break-even basis. DOD has also

begun an initiative directed at better ensuring that senior DOD managers

play a more active role in correcting poor controls.

To its credit, DOD has also recognized business process reengineering as a

key element in its financial management reform initiatives. However, we

have expressed concern over whether reengineering efforts have focused

largely on greater use of technology within existing processes and

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

organizations. Using this approach may not result in the radical

improvements in processes and practices—and associated financial

management information—DOD envisioned.

We believe that DOD’s draft plan could be significantly enhanced by

addressing how it will ensure that financial data used to measure and

manage program performance are complete, reliable, and timely. At a

minimum, DOD’s strategic plan could include a discussion of what DOD has

done, is doing, and plans to do to address financial data problems,

particularly those highlighted through the annual public scorecard

provided by the CFO Act financial statement audits, and the ease or

difficulty it anticipates in obtaining financial data needed to assist in

measuring results. Because of the widespread nature of acknowledged

financial management deficiencies and the large number of DOD

components relied on to carry out the DOD’s financial operations, it is also

critical for DOD’s plan to address the development of actions to unite the

organizational support and commitment of DOD’s logistics, personnel,

accounting, and budget components.

DOD Faces Considerable

Challenge in Managing

Information Technology If

It Is to Achieve Its Goals

Many of DOD’s general goals and objectives rely on the effective use of

information technology to obtain the stated goal, as well as to measure

progress toward its achievement. For example, DOD’s sixth goal—to

fundamentally reengineer the Department to reduce infrastructure costs

by using modern management tools and exploiting the Revolution in

Business Affairs—will require fundamental changes in the underlying

support systems. Further, DOD’s first strategic goal for harnessing the

capabilities of the U.S. armed forces also relies on the effective use of

information technology. For example, in discussing in its draft plan the

critical enablers necessary to sustain military capabilities, DOD states that

“our global communications must allow for the timely exchange of

information, data, decisions, and orders. . . The ability to gather, process,

and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of reliable and precise information

anywhere in the world and under any conditions is a tremendous strategic

and military advantage.” To achieve this capability, DOD must develop

computer systems and communications channels that interoperate

seamlessly, develop and enforce data standards, and greatly reduce system

redundancy.

We have consistently reported that DOD has not succeeded in its efforts to

modernize its information infrastructure. In fact, we placed DOD’s

Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative on our list of

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

government information management and technology programs at high

risk. CIM was intended, in large part, to reengineer key business processes

and reduce the number of redundant DOD systems. With CIM, DOD intended

that business services such as logistics and health care would be improved

and that costs would be greatly reduced. This effort has not succeeded, in

part, because of DOD’s difficulty in managing large-scale technology

initiatives across the Department. The prevailing culture too frequently

demands unique solutions at each organizational level.

The Clinger-Cohen Act was enacted in 1996 to foster better management

of technology resources at all levels by encouraging strong leadership in

technology management oversight, calling for effective controls over

technology investments, and requiring agencies to consider alternatives

before making substantial investments in technology upgrades or systems

modernization. Because DOD’s strategic goals are so fundamentally linked

to technology and because DOD has experienced significant difficulties in

managing technology initiatives, we believe its strategic plan would be

significantly enhanced by more explicitly linking these goals to a strategy

for improving management and oversight through implementation of the

Clinger-Cohen Act.

Additionally, DOD should recognize the dramatic impact the year 2000

problem10 will likely have on computer operations throughout the

agency—including the mission critical applications identified in its draft

strategic plan. Our initial review of DOD components’ response to the year

2000 problem has been mixed. While some small segments within DOD are

responding well to the issue, other organizational units face a potential

disaster unless planning and implementation activities are dramatically

improved.

Finally, DOD needs to recognize in its plan that many of its individual

systems are extremely vulnerable to data loss, unwanted browsing, and

loss of access due to computer hacking. Our 1996 report showed that DOD

suffered over 250,000 hacker attacks in 1995, with over 60 percent of the

attacks successfully gaining access.11 In discussing the global security

environment, DOD’s draft plan recognizes that information warfare

capability is one of a number of areas of “particular concern,” especially as

10On January 1, 2000, many computer systems, including DOD and defense contractor systems, if not

adequately modified, will either fail to run or malfunction simply because the equipment and software

were not designed to accommodate the change of the date to the new millennium.

11Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks

(GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996).

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

it involves vulnerabilities that could be exploited by potential opponents.

Again, this problem is so pervasive throughout DOD and so critical to

successful implementation of its goals that we believe its plan should

specifically address this issue.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

On July 30, 1997, we provided a draft of this letter to DOD for comment. On

July 31, 1997, we met with Department officials, who agreed that DOD’s

strategic plan could be improved in some respects. They indicated that as

DOD’s planning processes move forward, DOD will consider the suggestions

made in our letter.

Regarding our discussion on crosscutting federal agencies’ programs, DOD

officials stated that DOD coordinates and cooperates with other federal

agencies extensively as part of its ongoing strategic planning process.

They believed such coordination and cooperation were consistent with

DOD’s effort to make the most efficient use of government resources.

Regarding our discussion on persistent management problems, the

officials said that addressing persistent management problems in an

agency’s strategic plan is not required by the Results Act. They noted,

however, that each management problem identified in our letter is being

actively addressed in DOD. Much of the detail, they said, can be found in

underlying DOD strategic plans, such as the DOD Logistics Strategic Plan,

which provides DOD managers and stakeholders with comprehensive

planning information. They added that DOD managers, oversight bodies,

and stakeholders can get a better understanding of how the Department is

addressing these areas by referring to these lower-level plans. DOD officials

said that the persistent management problems mentioned in our letter are

addressed in the following lower level-plans.

• Financial Management: DOD Chief Financial Officer’s Financial

Management Report and 5 Year Plan 1996-2000 and the Defense Finance

and Accounting Service, Accounting Systems Strategic Plan (Apr. 1997).

• Information Management and Technology: DOD Information Technology

Management Plan (Mar. 1997).

• Weapons Systems Acquisition: Acquisition Reform - Mandate for Change 

(Feb. 1994); Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs Annual Report (1996);

Acquisition Reform Benchmarking Group Final Report (June 1997); and

DOD’s Three Year Acquisition Goals as a designated National Performance

Review Reinvention Impact Center (RIC) (July 1997).

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
B-277495 

• Contract Management: Defense Logistics Agency Performance Report

(May 1997).

• Infrastructure: the Secretary of Defense commissioned a report from the

Task Force on Defense Reform, which is due in November 1997.

• Inventory Management: DOD Logistics Strategic Plan (June 1996); update

expected in October 1997.

We did not evaluate or comment in this letter on DOD’s efforts to address

persistent management problems or its coordination and cooperation with

other agencies on crosscutting programs. Our point is that DOD could

improve its draft strategic plan by including more of a discussion of these

topics. With respect to major management problems, we recognize that

this type of information is not specifically required to be included in DOD’s

plan. However, as we state in our letter, DOD’s persistent management

problems could impede its efforts to achieve its goals and objectives and

to measure performance. Therefore, we continue to believe that DOD’s

strategic plan should include a more extensive discussion of the steps it

has taken or plans to take to resolve its management problems.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this letter until 30 days from its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this letter to the Minority

Leader of the House of Representatives; Ranking Minority Members of

your Committees; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of other

Committees that have jurisdiction over DOD activities; the Secretary of

Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will

be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 or Ken Knouse at (202) 512-9280 if you

or your staff have any questions concerning this letter. Major contributors

to this report are listed in enclosure I.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Enclosure I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division Washington,

D.C.

Charles I. (Bud) Patton, Jr.

Kenneth R. Knouse, Jr.

F. Earl Morrison

Yolanda C. ElSerwy

Harold J. Johnson, Jr.

Barbara L. Wooten

Accounting and

Information

Management Division

Washington, D.C.

Jack L. Brock, Jr.

Geoffrey B. Frank

Office of General

Counsel, Washington,

D.C.

William T. Woods

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Related GAO Products

High-Risk Areas DOD High-Risk Areas: Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid Billions of

Dollars in Waste (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997).

Defense Financial Management (GAO/HR 97-3, Feb. 1997).

Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4, Feb. 1997).

Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR 97-5, Feb. 1997).

Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR 97-6, Feb. 1997).

Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR 97-7, Feb. 1997).

Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR 97-9, Feb. 1997).

Defense Financial

Management

Financial Management: DOD Inventory of Financial Management Systems Is

Incomplete (GAO/AIMD-97-29, Jan. 31, 1997).

DOD Accounting Systems: Efforts to Improve System for Navy Need Overall

Structure (GAO/AIMD-96-99, Sept. 30, 1996).

Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating

Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94,

Aug. 16, 1996).

CFO Act Financial Audits: Navy Plant Property Accounting and Reporting Is

Unreliable (GAO/AIMD-96-65, July 8, 1996).

Financial Management: DOD Needs to Lower the Disbursement

Prevalidation Threshold (GAO/AIMD-96-82, June 11, 1996).

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose

Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996).

Navy Anti-Deficiency Act Training (GAO/AIMD-96-53R, Apr. 12, 1996).

Defense Business Operations Fund: DOD Is Experiencing Difficulty in

Managing the Fund’s Cash (GAO/AIMD-96-54, Apr. 10, 1996).

CFO Act Financial Audits: Increased Attention Must Be Given to Preparing

Navy’s Financial Reports (GAO/AIMD-96-7, Mar. 27, 1996).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Related GAO Products

Financial Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Meeting the Goals of the

Chief Financial Officers Act (GAO/T-AIMD-96-1, Nov. 14, 1995).

Financial Management: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Reform Initiatives

(GAO/T-AIMD-95-146, May 23, 1995).

Financial Management: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Reform Initiatives

(GAO/T-AIMD-95-143, May 16, 1995).

Financial Management: Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of Improper

Navy Civilian Payroll Payments (GAO/AIMD-95-73, May 8, 1995).

Travel Process Reengineering: DOD Faces Challenges in Using Industry

Practices to Reduce Costs (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-95-90, Mar. 2, 1995).

Defense Business Operations Fund: Management Issues Challenge Fund

Implementation (GAO/AIMD-95-79, Mar. 1, 1995).

Defense Contract

Management

Contract Management: Fixing DOD’s Payment Problems Is Imperative

(GAO/NSIAD-97-37, Apr. 10, 1997).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the

Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996).

DOD Procurement: Use and Administration of DOD’s Voluntary Disclosure

Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-21, Feb. 6, 1996).

DOD Procurement: Millions in Contract Payment Errors Not Detected and

Resolved Promptly (GAO/NSIAD-96-8, Oct. 6, 1995).

High-Risk Series: Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-95-3, Feb. 1995).

DOD Procurement: Overpayments and Underpayments at Selected

Contractors Show Major Problem (GAO/NSIAD-94-245, Aug. 5, 1994).

DOD Procurement: Millions in Overpayments Returned by DOD Contractors

(GAO/NSIAD-94-106, Mar. 14, 1994).

Defense Inventory

Management

Inventory Management: The Army Could Reduce Logistics Costs for

Aviation Parts by Adopting Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-97-82, Apr. 15, 1997).

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Related GAO Products

Defense Inventory Management: Problems, Progress, and Additional

Actions Needed (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109, Mar. 20, 1997).

1997 DOD Budget: Potential Reductions to Operation and Maintenance

Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-220, Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense IRM: Critical Risks Facing New Materiel Management Strategy

(GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept. 6, 1996).

Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating

Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94,

Aug. 16, 1996).

Inventory Management: Adopting Best Practices Could Enhance Navy

Efforts to Achieve Efficiencies and Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-156, July 12, 1996).

Defense Logistics: Requirement Determinations for Aviation Spare Parts

Need to Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-96-70, Mar. 19, 1996).

Best Management Practices: Reengineering the Air Force’s Logistics

System Can Yield Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-5, Feb. 21, 1996).

Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress in Using Best Practices

to Achieve Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-95-142, Aug. 4, 1995).

Best Practices Methodology: A New Approach for Improving Government

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-95-154, May 1995).

Defense Business Operations Fund: Management Issues Challenge Fund

Implementation (GAO/NSIAD 95-79, Mar. 1, 1995).

High-Risk Series: Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-95-5, Feb. 1995).

Defense Supply: Inventories Contain Nonessential and Excessive

Insurance Stocks (GAO/NSIAD-95-1, Jan. 20, 1995).

Defense Supply: Acquisition Leadtime Requirements Can Be Significantly

Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-2, Dec. 20, 1994).

Defense Weapon

Systems Acquisition

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on

Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/NSIAD-T-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Related GAO Products

Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition Funding

Would Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb. 13, 1997).

Acquisition Reform: Implementation of Title V of the Federal Acquisition

Streamlining Act of 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-97-22BR, Oct. 31, 1996).

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making

Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer

Improvements for DOD (GAO/NSIAD-96-162, Aug. 26, 1996).

Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement

at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).

Comanche Helicopter: Testing Needs to Be Completed Prior to Production

Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-95-112, May 18, 1995).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

High-Risk Series: Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-95-4,

Feb. 1995).

Electronic Warfare: Most Air Force ALQ-135 Jammers Procured Without

Operational Testing (GAO/NSIAD-95-47, Nov. 22, 1994).

Defense

Infrastructure

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly

While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing

Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996).

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to

Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,

Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense Acquisition Infrastructure: Changes in RDT&E Laboratories and

Centers (GAO/NSIAD-96-221BR, Sept. 13, 1996).

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Related GAO Products

Defense Infrastructure: Cost Projected to Increase Between 1997 and 2001

(GAO/NSIAD-96-174, May 31, 1996).

Military Bases: Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs Are

Being Missed (GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr. 23, 1996).

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little

Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

Defense Transportation: Streamlining of the U.S. Transportation

Command Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-60, Feb. 22, 1996).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Information

Management and

Technology

Defense IRM: Strategy Needed for Logistics Information Technology

Improvement Efforts (GAO/AIMD-97-6, Nov. 14, 1996).

DOD Accounting Systems: Efforts to Improve Systems for Navy Need

Overall Structure (GAO/AIMD-96-99, Sept. 30, 1996).

Defense IRM: Critical Risks Facing New Materiel Management Strategy

(GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept. 6, 1996).

Defense Transportation: Migration Systems Selected Without Adequate

Analysis (GAO/AIMD-96-81, Aug. 29, 1996).

Defense Management: Selection of Depot Maintenance Standard System

Not Based on Sufficient Analyses (GAO/AIMD-95-110, July 13, 1995).

Defense Management: Impediments Jeopardize Logistics Corporate

Information Management (GAO/NSIAD-95-28, Oct. 21, 1994).

Defense Management: Stronger Support Needed for Corporate

Information Management Initiative to Succeed (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-94-101,

Apr. 12, 1994).

(709284) Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
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