UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DENNIS BOLTON

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11838

 Honorable Matthew F. Leitman

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 

Defendant. 

_____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [R. 14, 16] 

Plaintiff Dennis Bolton appeals a final decision of Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application 

for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) under the Social Security 

Act (the “Act”). The Honorable Matthew F. Leitman referred this matter for a 

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). [R. 2]. 

After reviewing each party’s motion for summary judgment and holding a 

hearing on May 31, 2016, the Court finds that the decision by the 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence, and 

thus RECOMMENDS that:

• the Commissioner’s motion [R. 16] be GRANTED; 

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• Bolton’s motion [R. 14] be DENIED; and,

• the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED, pursuant to sentence 

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Bolton’s Background and Claimed Disabilities

Bolton was 40 years old when he submitted his application for 

disability benefits in August 2012, and alleged a disability onset date of 

November 1, 2011. [R. 7-5, Tr. 223, 229]. He has past relevant work as a 

pipefitter. [R. 7-2, Tr. 35]. 

Bolton alleged that he was disabled from heart problems, headaches, 

speech problems, mental problems, high blood pressure, depression, and 

first degree heart valve blockage. [Id.]. After a hearing, the ALJ determined 

that Bolton was not disabled. [Id., Tr. 22]. The Appeals Council denied 

review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 

[Id., Tr. 1-3]. Bolton timely filed for judicial review. [R. 1].

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Disability Framework Analysis

A “disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

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can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Commissioner determines whether an applicant is disabled by 

analyzing five sequential steps. First, if the applicant is “doing substantial 

gainful activity,” he or she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a)(4). Second, if the claimant has not had a severe impairment or 

a combination of such impairments1 for a continuous period of at least 12 

months, no disability will be found. Id. Third, if the claimant’s severe 

impairments meet or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the 

Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, the claimant will be found disabled. 

Id. If the fourth step is reached, the Commissioner considers its 

assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), and will 

find the claimant not disabled if he or she can still do past relevant work. Id. 

At the final step, the Commissioner reviews the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education and work experiences, and determines whether the claimant 

could adjust to other work. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof 

throughout the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner if 

 

1 A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(c).

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the fifth step is reached. Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 

F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 

Applying this framework, the ALJ concluded that Bolton was not 

disabled. At step one, the ALJ determined that Bolton had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since August 2012. [R. 7-2, Tr. 26]. At step two, 

the ALJ identified severe impairments of: “history of cerebrovascular 

accident due to atrioventricular block; hypertension; schizophrenia; polysubstance abuse disorder;” and “antisocial personality disorder.” [Id.]. At 

step three, the ALJ determined that none of Bolton’s impairments, either 

alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. [Id.

Tr. 31-32]. In making this determination, the ALJ found that Bolton had, at 

most, moderate limitations in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in 

social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 

persistence and pace, with no episodes of decompensation that have been 

of extended duration. [Id.].

Next, the ALJ assessed Bolton’s RFC, finding him capable of 

performing light work with the following limitations:

[T]he claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can 

never work at unprotected heights and must avoid hazardous 

machinery such as machinery with moving mechanical parts; 

and can never operate a motor vehicle. In addition, the claimant 

is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive unskilled tasks 

performed at an SVP #1 or #2 level as defined in the Dictionary 

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of Occupational Titles. The claimant is limited to work tasks free 

of fast pace production requirements with few if any work place 

changes and with nothing more than simple work related 

decisions required. Additionally, the claimant is limited to only 

occasional interaction with supervisors and with coworkers, can 

have no tandem tasks with coworkers, and can have no 

interaction with the public.

[Id., Tr. 32]. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Bolton did not have 

the RFC to perform past relevant work. [Id., Tr. 35]. At step five, with the 

assistance of VE testimony, the ALJ determined that a hypothetical 

claimant matching Bolton’s profile could perform a substantial number of 

jobs in the national economy, including hand packager (100,000 jobs 

nationally), small products assembler (100,000 jobs) and visual inspector 

checker (80,000 jobs), and was thus not disabled. [Id., Tr. 36]. 

II. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and was made in conformity with proper legal standards. Gentry v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the 

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evidence in the record below may be considered when determining 

whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bass v. 

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Bolton argues that the ALJ erroneously relied on the opinion of state 

agency consulting psychologist Kathy A. Morrow, Ph.D.; that the ALJ failed 

to accord adequate weight to the opinion of Bolton’s treating physician; that 

the ALJ’s RFC assessment was not supported by the record; and that the 

ALJ failed to properly evaluate Bolton’s mental RFC under Social Security

regulations. The Court disagrees.

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Giving Dr. Morrow’s Opinion Great 

Weight

The ALJ accorded great weight to opinion of Dr. Morrow, the state 

agency consultant, who found in September 2012 that Bolton had only 

moderate limitations and should be able to perform simple, unskilled work. 

[R. 7-2, Tr. 35; R. 7-3, Tr. 130-31]. Citing Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009), Bolton argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. 

Morrow’s opinion was error because Dr. Morrow did not review the 

complete record, including his diagnosis of schizophrenia in May 2013. [R. 

7-7, Tr. 581-85]. He further argues that Dr. Morrow’s opinion is unreliable 

because she wrongly believed that he had worked as a pipefitter from 1988 

to 2011, when he had in fact been in prison from 2006 to 2010. Finally, 

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Bolton argues that Dr. Morrow’s opinion deserves less weight because she 

is a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist. These arguments are 

unpersuasive. 

In Blakely, the court overturned the decision of an ALJ who adopted 

the findings of the state agency consultants when those consultants had 

not reviewed a substantial portion of the record. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409.

But Blakely should not be misconstrued as “providing a blanket prohibition 

on an ALJ's adoption of a non-examining source opinion, where that source 

has not reviewed the entire record.” Kepke v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., ___ F.

App’x ___, 2016 WL 124140, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing Blakely, 

581 F.3d at 409). “There is no categorical requirement that the non-treating 

source’s opinion be based on a ‘complete’ or ‘more detailed and 

comprehensive’ case record.” Helm v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 405 F. 

App’x 997, 1002 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting SSR 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at 

*2 (1996)).

In Blakely, the ALJ failed to give any indication that she had

considered the evidence subsequent to the state agency physicians’ 

opinions before giving them great weight. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409. Here, 

the ALJ considered the overall record, and found that Dr. Morrow’s opinion 

was consistent with it. [R. 7-2, Tr. 26-30, 34-35]. Specifically, the ALJ 

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found that Bolton’s independence in activities of daily living, and his ability 

to write his own music and do some plumbing work during his alleged 

period of disability were consistent with the state agency medical opinions. 

[Id., Tr. 34; R. 7-7, Tr. 570-74]. 

The fact that Bolton was diagnosed with schizophrenia after Dr. 

Morrow rendered her opinion does not change the analysis because a 

diagnosis alone says nothing about its severity or its impact on his ability to 

perform work activities. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir.1988); 

Kennedy v. Astrue, 247 Fed. Appx. 761, 767 (6th Cir. 2007). Both before 

and after Dr. Morrow’s opinion, treating psychiatrist Kehinde Ayeni, M.D., 

assessed Bolton as having a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) 

score of 55, which is within a moderate range.2 [R. 7-7, Tr. 308-12, 331-74, 

394-425, 581-85, 648-55]. Bolton has set forth no evidence that his 

functional limitations increased after he was diagnosed with schizophrenia 

such that Dr. Morrow’s opinion would have changed.

 

2 “The GAF scale is a method of considering psychological, social, and 

occupational function on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. The 

GAF scale ranges from 0 to 100, with serious impairment in functioning at a 

score of 50 or below. Scores between 51 and 60 represent moderate 

symptoms or a moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school 

functioning.” Norris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App’x 433, 436 n. 1 (6th 

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

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Although Bolton disputes Dr. Morrow’s opinion that he demonstrated 

an ability to perform work, pointing out that he was prevented for working 

from 2006 to 2010 due to his incarceration, the record demonstrates that 

he did perform some work during the relevant time period. He earned low 

wages for most years from 1998 to 2005, and he testified to having 

performed some work as a pipefitter from 2000 to 2006, and in 2011 or 

2012. [R. 7-2, Tr. 49-50, 92-93; R. 7-3, Tr. 143]. He further testified that he 

stopped working in about 2011 because of an eye injury, not because of a 

mental disability. [R. 7-2, Tr. 49-50]. For these reasons, Bolton’s 

correction that he did not work from 2006 to 2010 due to his incarceration 

does not undermine Dr. Morrow’s opinion.

Bolton’s argument that Dr. Morrow’s opinion should be rejected 

because she is a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist is without merit. 

[R. 14, PgID 934]. Bolton relies upon Walker v. Eyke, 417 F. App’x 461, 

464 (6th Cir. 2011), but that is a prisoner civil rights case and it does not 

indicate that a psychologist is unqualified to perform an assessment of 

mental impairments. Social Security law specifically allows a psychiatrist or

a psychologist to assess mental impairments, and each is equally capable 

of doing so. Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 421(h). 

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For these reasons, Bolton’s complaint that the ALJ gave undue 

weight to Dr. Morrow’s opinion is without merit.

B. The ALJ Did Not Violate the Treating Physician Rule

Bolton argues that the ALJ violated the treating physician rule by

failing to give controlling weight Dr. Ayeni’s opinion. In July 2013, Dr. Ayeni 

signed a medical source statement in which he assessed Bolton as being 

markedly limited in all categories of understanding and memory, sustained 

concentration and persistence, social interaction and adaptation. [R. 7-7, 

Tr. 592-94]. Dr. Ayeni opined that Bolton had substantial losses in his 

ability to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions; make 

simple work-related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations; and deal with changes in routine work 

settings. [Id., Tr. 594]. Dr. Ayeni’s opinion was identical to that of Thomas 

Haefner, MA, LLP which was rendered in December 2012. [R. 7-8, Tr. 

781-83]. The ALJ gave these opinions little weight. [R. 7-2, Tr. 34]. 

The “treating physician rule” requires an ALJ to give controlling 

weight to a treating physician’s opinions regarding the nature and severity 

of a claimant’s condition when those opinions are well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic evidence, and not inconsistent 

with other substantial evidence. Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723, 727–

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29; Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242–43. An ALJ who decides to give less than 

controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion must give “good

reasons” for doing so, in order to “make clear to any subsequent reviewers 

the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and 

the reasons for that weight.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (quoting SSR 96–2p, 

1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). Those good reasons must be articulated 

with specificity. SSR 96–2p at *5. This procedural safeguard not only 

permits “meaningful appellate review,” but also ensures that claimants 

“understand the disposition of their cases.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242–43 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the ALJ clearly articulated his reasons for according little weight 

to Dr. Ayeni’s opinion, and his conclusion is well supported by the record. 

[R. 7-2, Tr. 34]. Bolton argues that the ALJ improperly rejects the opinions 

of both Dr. Ayeni and Haefner for being identical and in check box form. 

But the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ did not reject the 

opinions because they were identical; he merely noted that the opinions are

identical to explain that his analysis of one opinion may also apply to the 

other. And the ALJ had good grounds to reject Dr. Ayeni and Haefner’s 

opinions because “[b]oth reports consist simply of forms in which spaces 

are filled out and boxes are checked off.” Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

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225 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2000). In other words, the ALJ is not “bound by the 

conclusory statements of physicians, particularly where the statements are 

unsupported by detailed objective criteria and documentation in the medical 

record, and are inconsistent with the rest of the evidence.” Ellars v. Comm'r 

of Soc. Sec., ___ F. App’x ___, 2016 WL 2610234, at *2 (6th Cir. May 6, 

2016).

Bolton contends that the opinions are not conclusory, citing the 

handwritten note on each page of Dr. Ayeni’s form that stated “please see 

attached psych eval.” [R. 7-7, Tr. 592-95]. But the medical record, including 

Dr. Ayeni’s evaluations, do not support her opinion that Bolton suffers from 

such extreme limitations.

The ALJ noted that Bolton had seen Dr. Ayeni approximately once 

per month for “medication review” between July 2011 and April 2013 for

about ten minutes per visit. [Id., Tr. 29]. Although Bolton was described as 

having “noncommand auditory hallucination with paranoid themes,” Dr. 

Ayeni routinely found his mental health to be in stable condition, and 

assessed him with a GAF score of 55 throughout. [R. 7-7, Tr. 308-12, 331-

74, 394-425, 581-85, 648-55]. He was generally found to be “preoccupied,” and on some occasions “delusional” and “paranoid,” but 

otherwise his condition remained unaltered. [Id.]. His initial diagnoses were 

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mood disorder not otherwise specified, polysubstance dependence, and 

antisocial personality disorder. [Id., Tr. 312]. Mood disorder was later 

changed to psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, but the reports 

remained consistent otherwise. [Id., Tr. 472-75]. In May 2013, Dr. Ayeni 

updated Bolton’s diagnosis from psychotic disorder to schizophrenia, 

paranoid type. [R. 7-7, Tr. 581-85]. But otherwise, there is no indication that 

his condition had changed from the start of treatment. [Id.]. The ALJ 

correctly noted that the records during this period “have a mechanical 

quality about them with the brief narrative repeated as if it is copied or 

pasted.” [R. 7-2, Tr. 29].

In June 2013, Bolton met with Mr. Haefner, who opined that he was 

“independent and able to handle his own [activities of daily life].” [R. 7-7, Tr. 

571]. Haefner found that Bolton displayed “an even mood with on target 

speech,” and that his symptoms were managed effectively with 

psychotropic medications. [Id.]. He also opined that Bolton was “severely 

and persistently mentally ill,” but that to “decrease the likelihood of 

decompensation,” Bolton needed only “the Adult Outpatient Program and 

Case Management level of care.” [Id.]. Bolton also stated that he had done 

plumbing repair work at a suspected drug house. [Id.]. At a later meeting 

with Haefner, Bolton displayed an even mood with on target speech, good 

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hygiene and grooming, and a lack of suicidal or homicidal thoughts. [R. 7-8, 

Tr. 657]. 

The ALJ found Dr. Ayeni’s and Haefner’s opinions to be inconsistent 

with Bolton’s treatment record, including the lack of changes in his

medication; his stable condition; and his independence in activities of daily 

living, including writing his own music and doing plumbing work. [R. 7-2, Tr. 

34]. These are relevant considerations, as the ALJ is required to consider 

the type, dosage, and effectiveness of Bolton’s medication, his nonmedication treatment and his daily activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).

The Court also agrees that Bolton’s consistent GAF score of 55 contradicts 

Dr. Ayeni’s opinion that Bolton was markedly limited in all functions. [R. 7-2, 

Tr. 34]. Together, this evidence provides substantial evidence for the ALJ’s 

conclusion.

Bolton argues that the ALJ “failed to offer any credible analysis 

regarding the ‘good reasons’ factors.” [R. 14, PgID 933]. To give good 

reasons, an ALJ need not provide an “exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis.” 

Francis v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 414 F. App’x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011). 

The rule “is not a procrustean bed, requiring an arbitrary conformity at all 

times.” Friend v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 

2010). Here, the ALJ gave legitimate reasons for the weight placed on the 

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various medical opinions of record, permitting a meaningful review of the 

decision. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243.

C. The RFC Assessment Was Within the Province of the ALJ

The ALJ crafted a RFC more restrictive than that suggested by Dr. 

Morrow and state agency physician Michael Parish, M.D.,

3 though based 

on their findings. Bolton argues that by diverging from the exact suggested 

RFC of the state agency consultants, the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by 

the record. He suggests that the ALJ must adopt the RFC of a particular 

medical source in its entirety, or will otherwise be “supplant[ing] his opinion 

regarding limitations or abilities for that of a physician.” [R. 14, PgID 935].

However, “the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of determining the 

RFC based on her evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence.”

Rudd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App'x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Requiring the ALJ to base his RFC on a medical opinion would be an 

abdication of this responsibility. Id. (citing SSR 96–5p, 1996 WL 374183 

(July 2, 1996)). This argument lacks merit.

D. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Bolton’s Mental Impairments

Bolton’s final argument is that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his 

severe mental impairments of schizophrenia, poly-substance abuse 

 

3 Dr. Parish’s opinion can be found at R. 7-3, Tr. 121-133.

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disorder, and anti-social personality disorder under Social Security Rulings

(SSR) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996) and 85-15, 1985 WL 56857

(1985). The Court does not agree.

SSR 96-8p requires the ALJ to individually assess the exertional and 

non-exertional capacities of a claimant in determining the RFC, but it does 

not “require ALJs to produce such a detailed statement in writing.” Delgado 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App’x 542, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). Rather, the ALJ “need only articulate how 

the evidence in the record supports the RFC determination, discuss the 

claimant's ability to perform sustained work-related activities, and explain 

the resolution of any inconsistencies in the record.” Id. at 548 (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). Here, complying with SSR 96-8p, the ALJ 

explicitly weighed the evidence in the record and individually assessed 

Bolton’s extertional and non-exertional capacities. [R. 7-2, Tr. 32-35]. 

Bolton’s reliance on SSR 85-15 is misplaced because that ruling 

applies to claimants with solely non-exertional limitations. Jordan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (“SSR 85–15 

focuses on claimants with mental impairments and explicitly states that it 

applies to claimants with solely nonexertional impairments.”); Doneworth v. 

Shalala, 76 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1996) (agreeing that “SSR 85-15 does not 

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apply to claimant since he has both exertional and nonexertional limitations 

and SSR 85-15 applies to cases where only a nonexertional limitation is 

present.”).

Bolton argues that the ALJ erred in disregarding the hypothetical 

questions posed to the VE by his attorney, but the ALJ was not required to 

consider answers to all hypothetical questions. “Rather, the ALJ properly 

relied on the VE’s response to a hypothetical question that was based on 

the limitations that were credited by the ALJ and supported by substantial 

evidence on the record.” Walton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 60 F. App'x 603, 

611 (6th Cir. 2003).

Finally, although Bolton argues that the ALJ erred by 

mischaracterizing his mental impairments as non-severe, the ALJ did in 

fact find that Bolton’s schizophrenia, poly-substance abuse disorder, and 

antisocial personality disorder were severe impairments and included nonexertional limitations in the RFC assessment. [R. 7-2, Tr. 26, 32]. As to 

Bolton’s alleged attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), the ALJ 

observed that Bolton had never been diagnosed with ADHD; Bolton stated 

that he had such a diagnosis and that was merely repeated by a medical 

provider. [R. 7-2, Tr. 31; R. 7-7, Tr. 513-15]. 

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For these reasons, the Court does not find that the ALJ erred in 

assessing Bolton’s mental impairments.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Bolton’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 14] be DENIED, the 

Commissioner’s Motion [R. 16] be GRANTED and this case be 

AFFIRMED. 

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford 

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: June 3, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

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HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 3, 2016.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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