United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

September 1997 JOINT MANPOWER

PROCESS

Limited Progress Made

in Implementing DOD

Inspector General

Recommendations

GAO/NSIAD-97-229

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277624 

September 19, 1997

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

In November 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General

(IG) reported significant deficiencies in DOD’s joint personnel requirements

and management program and made recommendations for improvement.1

Section 509 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997

directs us to assess and report on the completeness and adequacy of the

corrective actions taken by the Secretary of Defense with respect to the

matters covered in the IG’s report.2

 This report responds to that mandate.

Background In a 1985 study, the Senate Armed Services Committee staff found that the

quality of military personnel assigned to joint duty was inadequate. The

study’s recommendations were grouped into three categories: (1) change

promotion policies to increase interest in joint assignments, (2) improve

the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty

assignments, and (3) provide for improved personnel management of all

military officers serving in joint duty assignments.3

 A 1986 House Armed

Services Committee report contained similar findings. That report

described a weak joint organizational structure and an unsatisfactory

1

Inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process, Department of Defense Inspector

General (96-029, Nov. 29, 1995).

2

Section 509(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-201,

September 23, 1996.

3

Staff of Senate Committee on Armed Services, 99th Cong., Report on Defense Organization: The Need

for Change, S. Rep. No. 99-86, at 179 and 196 (1985).

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B-277624 

personnel management system that failed to fill joint positions with

officers that had the required talent, education, training, and experience.4

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 19865 was passed as a

result of the significant concerns expressed about organizational and

personnel problems affecting joint U.S. military operations.6

 Title IV of the

act established procedures for selection, education, assignment, and

promotion of joint duty officers.

In May 1994, the DOD IG began its inspection of DOD’s joint personnel

requirements and management program. The inspection objectives were to

evaluate the processes and mechanisms used to determine, validate, and

approve requirements and assign and manage personnel at joint

organizations. The DOD IG found that (1) the processes and mechanisms

used to determine personnel requirements for joint organizations are

inefficient, ineffective, and inadequate; (2) the processes and mechanisms

used to validate and approve personnel requirements for joint

organizations are inadequate; (3) the services are unable to satisfy the

personnel requirements for joint organizations; (4) support from the

Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

service secretaries in monitoring the careers of officers who serve or have

served in joint assignments is inadequate; and (5) joint policy, education,

and training of reserve officers assigned to joint organizations are

inadequate. The report included 17 recommendations for improving the

program.

Results in Brief DOD management concurred with 11 of the DOD IG recommendations,

partially concurred with 5, and proposed alternative corrective action to

satisfy the intent of the remaining recommendation. One recommendation

has been fully implemented, and DOD has taken some action on all but two

of the others. However, resolution of most of the concerns raised by the

DOD IG will not be completely accomplished for some time, if at all. For

example, although DOD has drafted or is developing policies and

procedures to address nine of the concerns, approval is not assured

because the policies and procedures are still being coordinated among the

affected organizations. In addition, the corrective actions prescribed or

planned in some cases may not adequately address the DOD IG’s concerns.

4

H.R. Rep. No. 99-700, at 38 (1986).

5

Public Law 99-433, Oct. 1, 1986.

6

S. Rep. No. 99-280, at 4-11 (1986).

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Table 1 summarizes our findings by recommendation. Appendix I contains

a detailed analysis of our position on the completeness and adequacy of

the actions taken on each specific recommendation in the DOD IG’s report.

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Table 1: Status of the Implementation of DOD IG Recommendations

Recommendation

DOD

concurrencea Action taken Effect of action

App. I

page

numbers

1. Issue guidance with criteria for determining

requirements

Partial Guidelines drafted Too early to tell/not

fully resolved

10

2. Issue guidance on military versus civilian

requirements and protect funding of conversions

No No action Too early to tell 12

3. Revalidate personnel requirements Yes Guidelines drafted Too early to tell/not

fully resolved

13

4. Develop analysis capability for reallocating positions Yes Guidelines drafted Too early to tell/not

fully resolved

14

5. Establish plan for service equity Partial No action Too early to tell 15

6. Develop joint manpower validation guidance Partial Guidelines drafted Too early to tell/not

fully resolved

16

7. Bring services on line with automation system Yes Short-term fix is planned Too early to tell 17

8. Designate joint duty positions as stated in law Yes Board is reviewing

positions

Adequate progress

not made

19

9. Streamline process for requirements changes Yes Guidelines drafted Too early to tell/not

fully resolved

20

10. Publish joint assignment guidance Yes Guidelines drafted Too early to tell 21

11. Change joint tour length calculation Partial DOD General

Counsel’s original

opinion was

superseded; no other

action taken

Unable to tellb 21

12. Issue joint officer management guidance Partial Partial guidance drafted Too early to tell/not

fully resolved

23

13. Seek legislative relief on critical joint duty positions

and reporting requirements

Yes Legislative relief

grantedc

Too early to tell how

relief will be

implemented

26

14. Report promotion results as stated in law Yes Yes Fully implemented 28

15. Identify and exempt certain positions from

interruption

Yes Guidelines drafted Too early to tell 29

16. Conduct revalidation boards Yes d Too early to tell 30

17. Develop policy guidance for training of reserve

officers

Yes Working group

developing guidelines

Too early to tell 32

aConcurrence was based on the official comments of the organization responsible for taking

action.

bWe were unable to verify the validity of the substitute DOD General Counsel opinion, as no

written rationale to support this change has been provided.

cPublic Law 104-201, Div. A, Title V, sec. 510, Sept. 23, 1996.

dThe Marine Corps and the Air Force say they have no need for boards. The Navy and the Army

are considering holding boards.

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Agency Comments DOD provided oral comments on a draft of this report and generally

concurred with its findings. DOD stated that our report accurately

portrayed DOD’s actions regarding implementation of the DOD IG’s

recommendations. DOD further commented that, in its view, the report

understates the progress DOD has made toward improving the joint

manpower process. DOD believes that its improvements will correct

problems in all areas of joint manpower, including areas in which it did

not concur with the DOD IG report.

Scope and

Methodology

We examined the November 1995 DOD IG report and supporting DOD IG

workpapers and discussed the report with DOD IG officials. We also

discussed progress and problems in this area with manpower and

personnel officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,

other joint organizations, and the services.

To determine the status of actions to implement the 17 DOD IG

recommendations contained in the DOD IG report, we reviewed DOD’s

April 1997 report to Congress on improvements to the joint personnel

requirements and management program and verified and updated the

status through interviews and analysis of supporting documentation.

To determine whether completed actions appear to have resolved the

concerns raised by the DOD IG, we reviewed documentation of any changes

made and analyzed the effect of those changes.

To determine whether actions planned but not completed appear likely to

resolve the concerns raised by the DOD IG, we reviewed and analyzed plans

and draft directives and instructions and considered the views obtained

from officials of the involved agencies and organizations.

We conducted our review between February and July 1997 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

On September 9, 1997, DOD Directive 1300.19 received final approval and

became effective immediately. At that time, however, this report was

already in the final stages of publication. Consequently, we were not able

to assess the completeness and adequacy of the final directive for

correcting the problems identified in the DOD IG report and still meet the

mandated reporting date.

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We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air

Force; the Commandant, Marine Corps; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will

also be made available to others on request.

Please call me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions on

this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-229 Joint Management Process
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-229 Joint Management Process
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Status of the

Implementation of

Department of

Defense Inspector

General

Recommendations

10

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

34

Table Table 1: Status of the Implementation of DOD IG

Recommendations

4

Abbreviations

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DOD Department of Defense

IG Inspector General

JPME Joint Professional Military Education

JSO Joint Specialty Officer

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-229 Joint Management Process
Appendix I 

Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

Recommendation 1 The November 1995 Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG)

report recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel

and Readiness develop, coordinate, and submit for approval a DOD

Directive on Joint Manpower Management that incorporates a baseline

methodology and criteria for joint organizations to determine military and

civilian manpower requirements against standardized processes.

DOD IG Findings According to the DOD IG report, the personnel requirements determination

process is the basis for an organization to determine the number and skill

level of personnel resources necessary to effectively and efficiently

accomplish its mission. The DOD IG found that a lack of definitive guidance

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Joint Staff resulted

in wide variations in the processes used by joint organizations to

determine requirements.

Most organizations used an ad hoc process to respond to events such as

major mission changes, reorganizations, or staff reductions. The DOD IG

reported two key deficiencies with using an ad hoc process. First, the use

of such a process makes it difficult to ensure consistency across

organizations in their assessments of the personnel required to perform

similar functions. Therefore, the DOD IG concluded that no sound basis

existed for OSD and the Joint Staff to use in comparing competing demands

among joint organizations, setting priorities, or determining whether

guidance was being followed. Second, the lack of documentation of

criteria used and data relied on to determine requirements made it difficult

to respond to future demands for personnel.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially

concurred with the recommendation, agreeing that some standardization

of operational processes was needed for consistency in managing

requirements. However, the Under Secretary noted that the diverse

missions of the joint organizations make a single requirements

determination methodology impractical.

DOD Directive 1100.XX and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

Manual 1600.XX addressing the DOD IG findings have been drafted. They

have not been approved and, because they are still being coordinated

among the affected organizations, may be changed considerably before

approval or not be approved at all. As currently drafted, however, the

January 2, 1997, draft of the DOD directive designates the CJCS as

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Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

responsible for developing guidelines and criteria for determining,

validating, and prioritizing joint requirements and requires the joint

organizations to comply with the CJCS guidelines. In addition, the June 20,

1997, draft of the CJCS manual states that each joint activity will establish

its own internal system to determine joint requirements, lists several

methods for doing so, and requires each joint activity to document its

validation process.

OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that the main problem in approving

these documents concerns DOD’s proposal to make the CJCS responsible for

developing the guidelines and criteria for personnel requirements in all

joint organizations. Currently, many joint organizations report to OSD

rather than through CJCS for approval of personnel requirements. The

officials told us that some of the organizations that do not currently report

through the CJCS do not want to be bound by the CJCS guidance, since the

guidance represents a change in the structure for requesting and obtaining

personnel resources. Joint Staff officials told us that, if the DOD directive

will not be signed or will be delayed for some time because of these

concerns, they will issue a CJCS manual that will apply only to the joint

organizations that already report through the CJCS. The officials also said

that, even if both documents are approved as currently drafted, the Joint

Staff would not be able to implement the manual immediately at all joint

organizations. The officials plan to implement the manual first at the

organizations that report through the CJCS and then start implementation at

the other joint organizations.

Our Assessment We believe that the current draft DOD directive and CJCS manual offer the

opportunity to implement the DOD IG’s recommendation. The documents

allow joint organizations the flexibility to employ requirements

determination methods appropriate for them while requiring that the

process used be documented so that independent assessments of

requirements can be conducted. However, the documents have not been

approved. Moreover, if the CJCS manual is issued and applied only to the

joint organizations reporting through the CJCS, the guidance, procedures,

and processes for implementing the DOD IG’s recommendation will be in

place for only those organizations. As a result, this recommendation has

not yet been implemented, and it is too early to tell whether it eventually

will be implemented.

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Appendix I 

Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

Recommendation 2 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness issue additional, more instructive guidance on

military and civilian requirements determination criteria and procedures

and take action to protect the funding of positions identified for

conversion of military positions to civilian positions.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG found that joint policy governing civilian personnel

requirements was fragmented and that the guidance that was available was

incomplete and ambiguous. In the absence of any DOD-wide guidance for

requirements determination for civilians, the commands followed the

supporting host service regulations for determining civilian personnel

requirements.

As the services downsize, greater emphasis is being placed on converting

military personnel in support positions to civilian personnel. The DOD IG

noted that DOD provides general guidance but does not define any criteria

for determining the appropriate military and civilian mix for a joint

organization.1

 The DOD IG reported that commanders and managers of joint

organizations could not see the advantage of converting military positions

to civilian ones unless they had some assurance that their civilian end

strength would be increased and necessary funding could be guaranteed.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness did not

concur with the recommendation. The Under Secretary noted that it is not

in DOD’s best interest to fence payroll dollars from the effects of general

budget adjustments because this action would encourage a less productive

and efficient mix of labor and capital. In evaluating these comments, the

DOD IG reported that the Under Secretary’s staff said that they were

working with the Joint Staff to develop a systematic process for

determining the requirements of the unified commands and Joint Staff

activities. The Under Secretary’s staff also said that, once the process had

been refined and tested, it could be adopted for use at all activities that

employ joint personnel. The DOD IG concluded that this proposed action

satisfied the intent of the recommendation.

The guidelines for determining whether a joint position should be military

or civilian are the same as they were when the DOD IG conducted its work.

In addition, an OSD official told us that although about 3,000 DOD positions

1

Our recent study, DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian

Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996), found that DOD could save as much as

$95 million annually by converting about 9,500 military positions to civilian status.

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Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

had been converted from military to civilian during fiscal year 1996, none

of these positions were in joint organizations. Furthermore, OSD officials

told us that they do not plan to take any specific action on this

recommendation. The officials believe that this issue will adequately be

addressed by the process being developed in response to 

recommendation 1.

Our Assessment No specific action has been taken to implement this recommendation. It is

too early to tell whether the process being developed in response to

recommendation 1 will adequately address this issue.

Recommendation 3 The DOD IG recommended that the Commanders in Chief of the unified

commands and directors of the defense agencies revalidate manpower

requirements using the methodology established by the Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG found that the various requirements determination processes

used by the DOD activities they visited were fragmented and inefficient.

The processes ranged from a subjective analysis to in-house board of

director reviews, to contracted studies. The DOD IG reported that the

results of those processes were not supported by documented evidence of

any quantitative or objective measurement criteria.

The DOD IG recognized that the development of quantitative approaches to

validate requirements may be costly, labor intensive, and time-consuming

but noted that, in DOD’s current downsizing environment, joint activities

are challenged to accomplish increased missions with less funding and

fewer personnel. The DOD IG concluded that, under these conditions,

relevant and objective analyses were necessary to ensure that the highest

priority needs were met.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The three Commanders in Chief of the unified commands who responded

to this recommendation concurred with it. However, implementation of

this recommendation requires using the methodology and criteria

developed to implement recommendation 1. Although DOD

Directive 1100.XX and CJCS Manual 1600.XX have been drafted, they have

not yet been approved. Because the guidance is still being coordinated

among the affected organizations, they may be changed considerably

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Appendix I 

Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

before approval or not approved at all. In addition, as discussed in

recommendation 1, consideration is being given to applying the manual

only to those joint organizations which report through the CJCS.

Our Assessment Implementation of this recommendation depends on the approval of the

guidance developed to implement recommendation 1. Because that

guidance has not been approved, this recommendation has not yet been

implemented and it is too early to tell whether it will be.

Recommendation 4 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel

Directorate develop a comparative analysis capability of unified command

and defense agency missions, priorities, funding, and manpower levels for

use in aiding the decision-making process for reprioritizing and

reallocating limited joint manpower assets.

DOD IG Findings To help ensure that joint activities are able to accomplish mission

objectives, quantitative or objective measurement criteria are needed to

help identify priority needs within an environment of reduced funding and

reduced personnel strength. The DOD IG, acknowledging that each joint

organization has a unique mission with unique requirements, stated that

the requirements determination process should be measured against

proven criteria that are consistently applied. The DOD IG found that the lack

of comprehensive requirements determination guidance makes it difficult

for the Joint Staff to meet its responsibility of validating the joint

organizations’ requirements in a consistent and comparable manner.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially

concurred with the recommendation, agreeing that it is appropriate for the

Joint Staff to advise the CJCS regarding resource allocations for those

activities under his cognizance. The Joint Staff concurred with the

recommendation.

The June 20, 1997, draft of CJCS Manual 1600.XX describes a methodology

for predicting and validating requirements of the unified commands by

comparing their staffing levels for common functions. Joint Staff officials

told us that, once the manual has been approved, this comparative analysis

will be used to resource new requirements by reallocating resources

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Appendix I 

Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

among the unified commands and requesting additional manpower from

the services only by exception. OSD and Joint Staff officials said that if the

manual is issued applying to all joint organizations, this methodology,

once it has been applied successfully to the unified commands, will be

modified and used for the defense agencies.

Our Assessment We believe that the current draft CJCS manual offers the opportunity to

implement this recommendation. However, it has not been approved.

Therefore, this recommendation has not yet been implemented and it is

too early to tell whether it will be.

Recommendation 5 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness, with the advice of the CJCS, establish a

time-phased plan to realign military service contributions to joint

manpower. The plan should place military service “equity” in the context

of requirements and ability to meet those requirements, rather than a

simplistic “proportionate share analysis.” In that regard, the following

elements should be evaluated:

(a) which positions must be filled with service-unique specialists;

(b) of the remaining positions, what specialty and rank is required;

(c) for each specialty and rank identified, what distribution, among the

four services, of personnel meet those criteria; and

(d) whether proportionate distribution among the services of requirements

by specialty and rank results in critical shortages of personnel to meet

in-service requirements.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG noted that the issue of service equity was not adequately

considered within the joint personnel requirements determination process,

given that the obligation to fill joint positions can have an impact on the

services’ ability to meet their internal demands for personnel. The DOD IG

looked at actual service contributions for fiscal year 1994 and found that

they differed from Joint Staff goals for service contributions. For example,

the Air Force contribution was 37 percent and the goal was 26 percent.

Requirements and personnel officials in each of the services wanted the

matter of service equity addressed and resolved.

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Appendix I 

Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially

concurred with the recommendation, stating that a plan to realign service

contributions was not needed and that changing work force incentives

was a more desirable way to effect realignment. The Director of the Joint

Staff concurred with the recommendation commenting that they would

coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

Readiness to implement the recommendation through the methodology for

revalidating requirements that was being developed to implement

recommendation 1.

OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that no particular action has been taken

to implement this recommendation. However, the officials also said that

actions taken to implement recommendation 1 may result in a change in

the relative contributions of the services.

Our Assessment No specific action has been taken to implement this recommendation. It is

too early to determine whether actions taken by DOD to implement

recommendation 1 will resolve this issue.

Recommendation 6 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness ensure that the DOD Directive on Joint Manpower

Management contains joint manpower validation guidance that would

(a) ensure consistency in approving manpower authorizations to joint

organizations,

(b) establish effective and consistent joint manpower validation criteria

for both military and civilian positions, and

(c) effectively prioritize competing demands for joint manpower by joint

organizations.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG concluded that the processes and mechanisms for validating

and approving joint organizations’ personnel requirements are inadequate.

According to the DOD IG report, the mechanisms used to validate

requirements are intended to be a check and balance for the requirements

decisions made by joint organizations and therefore should be separate

and distinct from the processes used for determining the requirements.

The DOD IG found that joint organizations used ad hoc validation processes

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Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

that did not consist of two separate and distinct functions. Rather, the IG

found that the two functions were generally part of a single process. The

report cited the following problems related to this area:

• The roles and responsibilities of the CJCS and the Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness for validating and approving joint

personnel requirements are not clearly defined.

• The processes and mechanisms in place to review and validate joint

personnel requirements at the local or Joint Staff level were not

adequately defined as separate and distinct from the requirements

determination process.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially

concurred with this recommendation. The Under Secretary agreed that he

and the CJCS should work together to provide some standardization of

processes as discussed in recommendation 1. DOD Directive 1100.XX and

CJCS Manual 1600.XX addressing the DOD IG findings have been drafted. The

January 2, 1997, draft of the DOD directive defines the organizations

responsible for validating and approving joint personnel requirements, and

the June 20, 1997, draft of the CJCS manual includes guidance on the

process and criteria for determining and prioritizing requirements.

Our Assessment We believe that the current draft DOD directive and CJCS manual offer the

opportunity to implement this recommendation. However, as discussed in

recommendation 1, the documents are still being coordinated among the

affected organizations. They may be changed considerably or not be

signed at all. As also discussed in recommendation 1, there is some

question as to whether a CJCS manual applying to all joint organizations

will be approved. If the manual is issued and applied only to the joint

organizations reporting through the CJCS, the guidance, procedures, and

processes for implementing this recommendation will not be in place for

those joint organizations that do not report through the CJCS. Because

guidelines have been drafted but not approved, this recommendation has

not yet been implemented, and it is too early to tell whether it eventually

will be implemented.

Recommendation 7 The DOD IG recommended that the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel

Directorate and military service personnel centers work together and set

milestones for upgrading the capabilities of the Joint Manpower

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Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

Automation System to bring all the military services on line prior to

publication of the next Joint Duty Assignment List. The Joint Staff could

then update the approved Joint Duty Assignment List, providing the

military services access for verification and enhancing assignment

accommodation (fill) for the unified commands and other joint

organizations.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG concluded that the automated data processing system used for

coordinating and validating joint manpower requirements was inefficient

and ineffective and contributed to lengthy delays in making changes to

joint manpower requirements. These delays negatively impacted the

services’ ability to provide the personnel the joint organizations needed

and created some staffing gaps of several months.

The automated information system used to produce requirements

documents for joint organizations that report to or through the Joint Staff

was called the Joint Manpower Automation System. Since the services did

not have on-line access to this system, the validation process for changes

to requirements relied on manual coordination efforts, often resulting in

delays of 1 year or more in processing the requests.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation.

According to Joint Staff officials, the Joint Manpower Automation System

has been enhanced and is now called the Joint Manpower and Personnel

System. The officials told us that this system does not fully satisfy the 

DOD IG recommendation in that the services still do not have on-line access

to the system. However, a recent upgrade to the system is expected to

allow the Joint Staff to periodically provide the services an updated joint

requirements file that they can use with their systems. Joint Staff officials

told us that each service will have to create a program to make the file

compatible with its own programs. They said that, because changes are

made to the database once a month, the services will be sent an updated

file each month.

Joint Staff officials told us that they plan to replace the Joint Manpower

and Personnel System because of major inadequacies. They are currently

planning to identify the requirements for an improved system and plan to

field the new system by mid-fiscal year 1999 if funding is available. They

said they expect that the services will have on-line access to the new

system.

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Status of the Implementation of Department

of Defense Inspector General

Recommendations

Our Assessment We believe the action taken by the Joint Staff is a reasonable short-term

action. However, it is too early to determine if, in the longer term, this

recommendation will be implemented.

Recommendation 8 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness, with the assistance of the CJCS revise the Joint

Duty Assignment List to correspond with congressional intent that joint

duty assignments be designated based on the level of experience in joint

matters required by each position rather than on the organization in which

the billet is located. The use of “100 percent” and “50 percent” organization

quotas for joint duty credit should be eliminated.

DOD IG Findings Officers must complete a joint duty assignment to be eligible for flag rank.

The DOD IG reported that, although the Goldwater-Nichols Act limits the

joint duty assignment designation to those positions in which the officer

gains significant experience in joint matters, in practice the designation is

not based on the duties performed and skills required for a particular

position but on the mission of the organization in which the position is

located. The DOD IG found that certain organizations (OSD, the Joint Staff,

and the unified commands), because of their involvement in planning and

directing the integrated employment of joint forces, were referred to as

100-percent joint organizations and that all positions for major or

lieutenant commander and above in those organizations were designated

joint duty assignments.

All of the defense agencies, however, were referred to as 50-percent joint

organizations, and the number of joint duty assignments they were

allowed was limited to no more than 50 percent of their total positions for

major or lieutenant commander and above. Furthermore, the DOD IG

reported that the 50-percent organizations had not been provided guidance

on how to allocate their share of joint duty assignments. The DOD IG found

some officers were receiving credit for a joint duty assignment, whereas

other officers within the same organization who performed the same basic

functions did not receive credit. In addition, the DOD IG reported the results

of a congressionally directed study. That study indicated that not all joint

duty assignment positions provided significant joint experience, whereas

some non-joint duty assignment positions provided this experience.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the

Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation. Review

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and validation of joint duty assignments is currently underway. The Joint

Duty Assignment List Validation Board, established in June 1996, is tasked

with reviewing all positions in joint organizations at the level of major or

lieutenant commander and above (about 15,000 positions) using specific

criteria, including consideration of duties associated with each position

and the mission of the organization in which each position is located. As of

June 1997, the Board had considered 1,100 (7 percent) of the positions.

Our Assessment Although it appears that the approach being taken by the Board addresses

the problems found by the DOD IG, at the current pace of deliberations, it

will take many years to review and validate all of the current joint duty

assignments. Given the importance of this effort and the fact that progress

in implementing recommendations 12 and 13 relies on the validation

effort, we believe that adequate progress is not being made.

Recommendation 9 The DOD IG recommended that the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel

Directorate in conjunction with each military service headquarters,

establish a process action team to review and streamline the Joint

Manpower Program change process with emphasis on updating service

manpower documents.

DOD IG Findings Having the right personnel available to fill assignment vacancies when

they occur depends partly on sufficient notice of changes to personnel

requirements. The DOD IG found that lengthy procedures for documenting,

approving, and transmitting to the services changes to requirements

contributed to assignment gaps and shortages of officers with the

necessary skills.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation. A

joint working group formed in August 1995 proposed changes to the

process for updating service requirements documents. These changes are

included in the June 20, 1997, draft CJCS Manual 1600.XX that is currently

being coordinated with the affected organizations.

Our Assessment Although guidelines have been drafted, this recommendation has not yet

been implemented and it is too early to tell whether it will be.

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Recommendation 10 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness, with the advice of the CJCS, publish joint

personnel assignments guidance for all joint organizations.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG found that service guidelines and procedures did not cover

some personnel actions and other aspects of the joint assignment process

that applied only to joint duty assignments. The DOD IG concluded that

additional guidance from above the service level was needed to preclude

unnecessary conflict with the assignments process. Examples of topics on

which additional guidance was needed included attendance at joint

professional military education (JPME), early release from joint tours of

duty, and tour length requirements.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred

with the recommendation. The November 22, 1996, draft of DOD

Directive 1300.19 and DOD Instruction 1300.20 addressing these topics have

been coordinated among the affected agencies. On September 9, 1997, the

directive was approved, clearing the way for release of the instruction.

Our Assessment Because various drafts of this directive have been proposed for over 

10 years without approval, there is no assurance this directive will be

approved. Therefore, it is too early to tell whether this recommendation

will be implemented.

Recommendation 11 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness immediately stop including the temporary duty

and return period of Phase II of JPME in calculating joint tour length and

modify the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System data

base to reflect that change. The DOD IG further recommended the following:

(a) The Secretary of Defense inform Congress of the General Counsel, DOD

interpretation and the impact on previously reported tour length averages.

(b) The Secretary of Defense process tour length curtailment waivers for

those officers that completed previous Joint Duty Assignments with

attendance at Phase II of JPME in a temporary duty and return status.

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(c) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, along

with the Joint Staff and the military departments, determine whether the

impact of the General Counsel interpretation on joint officer management

warrants a statutory change. Alternatives that should be considered

include exclusion of Phase II of JPME from the definition of assignments for

training and education, effectively reversing the General Counsel opinion;

a change to the duration and location of Phase II of JPME; or a change in

the statutory minimum tour length.

DOD IG Findings The Goldwater-Nichols Act prescribes specific average tour lengths for

joint duty assignments2

 and specifies that such assignments “shall exclude

. . . assignments for joint training or joint education.”3

 As required by 

10 U.S.C. 667, the Secretary of Defense reports the average tour length to

Congress each year. The DOD IG found that, although the Secretary of

Defense reported to Congress that DOD met the statutory requirements for

tour length averages, the method used to calculate tour lengths was

incorrect. When officers attended the 12-week Phase II JPME program

during their joint duty assignment, that 12-week period was included in the

average tour length. The DOD IG based its finding on an opinion of the DOD

General Counsel.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially

concurred with the recommendations, stating that the DOD General

Counsel had been asked to provide further review of the issue and that

appropriate action would be taken based on the results of that review.

Since the DOD IG report was released, the DOD General Counsel has

withdrawn its earlier opinion and replaced it with one that purports to

support the way DOD has been handling temporary duty for JPME in

calculating joint tour length. However, the General Counsel has not

provided any detailed support for its current position. Without a written

rationale to support this change, we are unable to verify the validity of the

second opinion.

Our Assessment Without a written rationale to support this change, we are unable to verify

the validity of the DOD General Counsel’s second opinion.

2

See 10 U.S.C. 664(a).

3

See 10 U.S.C. 668(b)(1).

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Recommendation 12 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness incorporate comprehensive policy guidance in

DOD Directive 1300.19, “Joint Officer Management Program,” that includes

as a minimum:

(1) criteria for designating the appropriate joint duty billets as critical

positions requiring assignment of officers who hold the joint specialty

designation,

(2) more stringent requirements on movement of established critical joint

billets to provide the military services with a stable target to program the

development of appropriately qualified Joint Specialty Officers (JSO),

(3) career guidelines for military officers that address the timing of joint

duty assignments and the impact of those assignments on service career

advancement,

(4) a limitation on the designation of Lieutenant Colonel and Commander

joint critical positions to the minimum needed to meet operational

requirements so that appropriate time is available for in-service officer

career development assignments at those ranks,

(5) a time-phased plan for reducing the number of waivers granted for

filling critical joint positions with officers who are not JSOs,

(6) more stringent criteria for the CJCS to use in granting waivers for the

assignment of non-JSOs to critical joint positions,

(7) criteria related to future JSO requirements for use in identifying officers

selected to attend Phase II of JPME, and

(8) uniform JSO selection criteria for use by the military service JSO

selection boards.

DOD IG Findings The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary of Defense to establish

policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of active

duty officers who are trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. The

central purpose for the joint officer management provisions was to

develop a pool of qualified JSOs to draw upon for future Joint needs,

especially for assignment to critical joint duty assignments. The DOD IG

found problems in the identification of critical joint duty assignment

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positions that are required to be filled by JSOs and in the management of

these officers. These problems were as follows:

Findings 1 and 2 DOD had not established a standardized approach or adequate guidance for

identifying and designating critical joint duty assignment positions. Joint

organizations were given wide latitude to select which positions to

designate as critical. Joint organizations were moving the critical

designation to accommodate JSO availability rather than basing the

designation on the work performance requirements of the particular

position. Instability in the management of JSOs resulted. The services could

not program for development of officers with specific skills and

backgrounds because the critical joint position designation continually

moved from one position to another.

Findings 3 and 4 Although each service had established career paths for officers, with

expectations regarding the type of assignments, education, and other

duties that officers should successfully complete to be competitive for

promotion, the Goldwater-Nichols Act added joint duty and JPME to those

career paths. The DOD IG found that the career path models can

accommodate the joint requirements but that timing of initial and

subsequent critical joint assignments is crucial for an officer to stay

competitive for promotion to the next higher grade.

Findings 5 and 6 Too many waivers were being granted allowing non-JSOs to serve in critical

joint positions. The waivers were being granted as a direct result of the

services’ inability to develop sufficient numbers of JSOs, combined with

ineffective procedures for designating appropriate critical joint billets and

competing in-service demands for quality officers normally selected for JSO

designation. The DOD IG reported that waivers had been granted for

11.9 percent of filled critical joint positions. OSD officials told the DOD IG

that Senate Committee staff said that the number of waivers granted

should not exceed 5 percent of the filled joint positions.

Findings 7 and 8 The DOD IG found that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

Readiness and the Joint Staff had not developed objective criteria for use

in identifying, nominating, and selecting officers for joint duty assignments

and for JSO designation, which could be used in identifying officers

permitted to attend JPME. Given the limitations on the number of seats

available for JPME, this action negatively impacted the development of JSOs.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially

concurred with the recommendation. The Under Secretary noted that a

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draft DOD directive and instruction, which were being coordinated with the

affected agencies, would be comprehensive and enable the services and

CJCS to comply with legislative mandates and foster sound management

practices to achieve the objectives set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The draft DOD Directive 1300.19 was in process for over 10 years and was

just approved on September 9, 1997. DOD Instruction 1300.20, which

provides more detailed guidance than the directive, has been approved,

and can now be released. The status of action on the particular parts of the

DOD IG recommendation is as follows:

Findings 1 and 2 The DOD instruction provides general guidance to use in designating

critical joint duty assignments. However, OSD and Joint Staff officials told

us that implementation of the guidance as it relates to designating critical

joint assignments is related to the Joint Duty Assignment List Validation

Board’s review of joint assignments. This review (discussed in

recommendation 8) will probably take several years to accomplish. The

officials told us that actions to improve the designation and stabilization of

critical joint positions will not occur until the Board’s effort is completed

and the universe of joint positions has been established. However, officials

of the Joint Staff predicted that it will continue to be necessary for joint

organizations to designate many positions as critical based on the skills of

available JSOs. It is too early to tell whether the management of critical

joint positions will solve the problems identified by the DOD IG.

Finding 3 The DOD instruction assigns the Joint Staff responsibility for establishing

career guidelines that address the timing of joint assignments for military

officers. However, Joint Staff officials told us they have not taken action

on this item and have no plans to do so at this time, choosing instead to let

the services develop their own career guidelines. Air Force, Army, Navy

and Marine Corps officials told us they have no plans to develop new

career guidance. Therefore, this part of the recommendation has not been

implemented.

Finding 4 The DOD guidance does not direct the joint organizations to limit the

number of Lieutenant Colonel and Commander critical joint positions to

the minimum needed to meet operational requirements. OSD and Joint Staff

officials pointed out that, if requirements have been accurately determined

and critical positions have been appropriately identified, the number of

Lieutenant Colonel and Commander joint critical positions will have been

kept to the minimum needed to meet operational requirements. We agree.

However, there is no assurance that requirements have been accurately

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determined, and critical positions have not been appropriately identified.

Therefore, this part of the recommendation has not been implemented,

and it is too early to tell whether improvements to the requirements

determination process will be implemented and whether they will solve

the problem identified by the DOD IG.

Findings 5 and 6 The DOD guidance does not include a time-phased plan for reducing the

number of waivers granted for filling critical joint positions with non-JSOs

or criteria for the CJCS to use in granting such waivers. OSD and Joint Staff

officials told us that they have no plans to create the plan or criteria.

Therefore, this part of the recommendation has not been implemented.

Finding 7 The DOD guidance also does not include criteria for selecting officers to

attend Phase II of JPME. OSD and Joint Staff officials noted that the problem

of JPME course capacity may be resolved by the Joint Duty Assignment List

Validation Board. If the actions of the Board result in a much smaller list

of joint positions, as expected, fewer requirements for officers who have

attended the course will exist, and the capacity problem may be resolved.

Therefore, no action has been taken to specifically implement this

recommendation, and it is too early to determine whether other actions

being taken will solve the problem identified by the DOD IG.

Finding 8 Policy guidance for use by the military service JSO selection boards is

included in DOD’s draft guidance and is addressed in CJCS Instruction

1332.01, dated June 15, 1997. Action on this part of the recommendation is

complete.

Our Assessment Guidance has been issued to implement one of the eight areas specified in

the DOD IG recommendation. DOD has no plans to issue guidance to

implement four of the areas. The November 22, 1996, draft of DOD Directive

1300.19 and the approved DOD Instruction 1300.20 provide guidance that

addresses three of the eight areas but implementation of the guidance may

not occur. Therefore, actions taken to date and planned will not fully

implement this recommendation.

Recommendation 13 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness, along with the CJCS, develop a legislative

proposal to

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(a) seek legislative relief from the requirement that DOD maintain an

arbitrary minimum of 1,000 critical joint duty positions set forth in 

10 U.S.C. 661(d)(2)(A) and

(b) seek legislative relief from the semiannual promotion reporting

requirement set forth in 10 U.S.C. 662(b).

DOD IG Findings The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to maintain a minimum of 1,000

critical joint duty assignments.4

 The DOD IG found that DOD had not

established a standardized approach or adequate guidance for identifying

and designating critical joint duty assignment positions. Joint

organizations were given wide latitude to select which positions to

designate as critical. Joint organizations moved the critical designation to

those positions for which JSOs were available rather than base these

designations on the actual requirements of the positions. That action led to

instability in the management of JSOs, as the critical joint position

designation continually moved from one position to another and the lack

of firm requirements for critical joint positions made it difficult for the

services to identify the skills and backgrounds to provide future JSOs.

The DOD IG reported that the 1,000 minimum critical positions were

regarded as arbitrary and that officials at each joint organization they

visited expressed the opinion that DOD should seek legislative relief from

the requirement to designate a minimum of 1,000 joint duty assignment

positions as critical.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also required the Secretary of Defense to

submit semiannual reports to Congress on promotion results for officers

who are serving in or have served in joint duty assignments.5

 Because

military promotion boards convene only on an annual basis, the DOD IG

concluded that the reporting of promotion data on a semiannual basis

appeared to be excessive.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the

Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation.

(a) Legislation amending 10 U.S.C. 661(d)(2)(A) to reduce the number of

required critical joint positions from 1,000 to 800 was included in section

4

Public Law 99-433, sec. 401, Oct. 1, 1986.

5

Id.

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501 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996.

However, OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that implementing the lower

minimum is tied into the actions of the Joint Duty Assignment List

Validation Board (see recommendation 8) and that once the Board has

completed its review of all joint positions (estimated to take many years),

OSD and the Joint Staff will consider how to implement the lower minimum

for critical positions. Moreover, Joint Staff officials told us they believe it

is unlikely that the services will have sufficient numbers of JSOs with the

right skills to fill even 800 fixed critical positions. Consequently, the

officials predicted that, to meet the legislative numerical requirement, it

will continue to be necessary for joint organizations to designate as many

as 400 positions as critical based on the skills of available JSOs, a process

the DOD IG referred to as arbitrary.

OSD and the Joint Staff sought and have been granted the legislative relief

recommended by the DOD IG. However, it is too early to tell whether they

will implement the requirement for 800 critical joint positions in a manner

that will solve the problems identified by the DOD IG.

(b) The requirement in 10 U.S.C. 662(b) for semiannual reporting on joint

officer promotions was changed to an annual requirement in section 510 of

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.6

 This part of

the recommendation is complete.

Our Assessment Legislative relief has been granted. However, it is too early to tell if its

implementation by DOD will resolve the problems identified by the DOD IG.

Recommendation 14 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness report JSO promotion results consistent with

requirements set forth in 10 U.S.C. 662(b) and 10 U.S.C. 667(5).

DOD IG Findings The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary to report promotion rate

data to Congress.7

 When the data shows a “. . . significant imbalance

between officers serving in Joint Duty Assignments or having the joint

specialty and other officers, a description of what action has been taken

6

Public Law 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996.

7

10 U.S.C. 662(b).

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(or is planned to be taken) by the Secretary to correct the imbalance” must

be included in the report.8

The DOD IG found that, even though each service has had problems in

achieving the statutory promotion objectives, the Secretary’s annual report

to Congress does not highlight these unfavorable promotion results and

provide corrective actions to improve joint officer promotion imbalances.

More specifically, the DOD IG found that, starting with the fiscal year 1993

report, OSD discontinued providing complete promotion statistics for all

categories of officers. DOD did not provide promotion statistics to indicate

whether officers who were serving in or have served in joint duty

assignments were promoted at a pace that was equal to, earlier than, or

later than their peers.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred

with the recommendation. CJCS Instruction 1330.02A, dated May 1, 1997,

contains guidance on reporting JSO promotion results in accordance with

this recommendation. Joint Staff officials told us that the annual report to

Congress for fiscal year 1997 will reflect these changes.

Our Assessment Action on this recommendation is complete.

Recommendation 15 The DOD IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness encourage joint commanders and heads of other

joint organizations to

• identify key positions that are adversely affected by interruption of a joint

duty assignment to attend the Armed Forces Staff College and

• designate those positions as “JPME Exempt,” precluding interruption of a

joint duty assignment to attend the Armed Forces Staff College.

DOD IG Findings The DOD IG found that some joint organizations could make better use of an

available tool to limit the disruption of certain key functions caused when

a joint duty officer’s tour is interrupted to attend Phase II of JPME at the

Armed Forces Staff College. Because of the limited capacity of the school

and the number of officers who attend but are not going to joint duty, only

about one-third of the officers who attended could do so before reporting

8

10 U.S.C. 667(13).

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to their joint organization. Thus, joint organizations frequently released

officers for a 12-week period to attend the school.

The personnel requirements and management officials that the DOD IG

interviewed at all 17 joint organizations expressed concern about the

impact of losing these officers for 12 weeks on the mission of the joint

organization. The DOD IG also found that the Director of the Joint Staff

addressed this problem in a July 1989 memorandum that told managers to

screen their joint duty assignment positions; identify those jobs that were

one-of-a-kind, key, and essential or that had direct mission impact; and

specify that the officers in such positions be exempted from attending JPME

while in that position. The exemptions each organization could establish

was limited to no more than 15 percent of its joint duty assignments. The

DOD IG found that this exemption provision was not being used

consistently, and some commands were not using it at all.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred

with the recommendation. DOD Instruction 1300.20 provides guidance on

designating positions to be exempt from lengthy temporary duty

assignments, such as for JPME. The instruction has been approved but is

awaiting final approval of the directive before it will be formally released.

Various drafts of this directive have been proposed for over 10 years

without approval.

Our Assessment Although the OSD guidance addresses this issue, it is too early to tell

whether it will be approved and, if approved, whether the joint

organizations will effectively follow the guidance.

Recommendation 16 The DOD IG recommended that the secretaries of the military departments

hold JSO Revalidation Boards for the purpose of identifying those

transition-era JSOs who do not qualify for future joint duty assignments and

recommending withdrawal of JSO designation where appropriate.

DOD IG Findings The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion objectives for officers

who are serving in or have served in joint positions. According to the act,

these officers are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next higher

grade at a rate not less than the rate for other officers in their respective

peer groups.

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The DOD IG found that each service has had problems achieving the

statutory promotion objectives. Military service officials told the DOD IG

that the inability to meet the joint officer promotion objectives was

because many officers were designated JSO status under transitional

guidelines in effect from 1987 to 1989. The criteria for designating those

transition-era JSOs were less stringent than current criteria and did not

encompass an assessment of each officer’s competitiveness for future

promotion.

The Air Force and the Army requested and received approval from the

Secretary of Defense to hold JSO revalidation boards to take the JSO

designation away from those officers who would not pass current criteria

for a joint duty assignment. The Navy and the Marine Corps did not

identify a need to conduct such boards. As a result of the boards, the JSO

designation was withdrawn from 315 Air Force officers and 65 Army

officers. On the basis of its analysis of joint officer promotion results and

the actions of the Air Force and the Army revalidation boards, the DOD IG

concluded that the Army did not take sufficiently aggressive steps to

address its JSO promotion problem or improve its subsequent JSO

promotion rates.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Army and the Navy concurred with the recommendation. The Air

Force did not comment on it. Air Force and Marine Corps personnel

officials told us they have no current need to conduct JSO revalidation

boards because most transition-era JSOs have either left or are leaving the

service. Navy officials told us they are considering holding JSO revalidation

boards during fiscal year 1998 but have not made a decision yet because

the natural attrition of transition-era JSOs may resolve the situation.

The Army’s request to hold a JSO revalidation board in 1996 was denied by

OSD. An OSD official told us the request was denied because the Army

wanted to reconsider the JSO status of not only transition-era officers but

other JSOs as well. This action was viewed by OSD as an attempt to revoke

JSO status from non-transition-era officers who were not promotable to

help the Army meet the statutory promotion objectives. The OSD official

said that such an action would not be in keeping with the intent of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act—that the services should (1) provide quality

officers for joint duty who are competitive for promotion at a rate at least

equal to that of officers in their peer group and (2) provide these officers

when not on joint duty status with career opportunities and roles that will

allow them to be competitive for promotion with their non-JSO peers.

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The OSD official stated that to allow the Army to revoke the JSO status from

non-transition-era officers would in effect bail the Army out of a situation

in which it either did not provide the right officers for JSO designations or

failed to provide adequate career opportunities to those officers. The

official said that the Army still has the option of requesting permission to

conduct a revalidation board for transition-era JSOs.

Our Assessment Until the Army and Navy finish assessing the need for withdrawal of JSO

designation from some of their transition era JSOs, it is too early to tell if

the problems identified by the DOD IG have been resolved.

Recommendation 17 The DOD IG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Reserve Affairs, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Force Management Policy and the Joint Staff Director for Operational

Plans and Interoperability, develop policy guidance that provides for the

necessary training and education of reserve component officers assigned

to joint organizations.

DOD IG Findings The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary of Defense to establish

personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters

for reserve officers not on the active duty list.9

 The act also specifies that

such policies for the reserve component should be similar to those

required by the act for the active component, to the extent practical.10 The

DOD IG found that, although some reservists perform duties similar to their

active duty counterparts within joint organizations, there was no

published DOD guidance regarding joint education or training for reservists

and there were no provisions for the education and training necessary to

prepare these officers to meet joint qualification standards.

Status of Action on the

Recommendation

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred

with the recommendation. A reserve joint officer management working

group has been established to develop policy guidance to govern the

education and personnel management of reserve officers who serve in

joint positions. However, officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Reserve Affairs and OSD told us many details need to be

resolved with this issue. For example, they said that, since reservists

9

Public Law 99-433, Title IV, sec.401(a), Oct. 1, 1986, 10 U.S.C. 666.

10Id.

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typically perform military duties on an intermittent or part-time basis, it is

difficult for reservists to find the time to attend the 12 week JPME, Phase II,

course. Reservists also cannot readily be assigned to locations outside

their reserve unit area, thus limiting their availability for joint training.

Also, an OSD official told us that if the education and experience

requirements for reservists are too stringent, the available pool of

reservists who can meet them will be limited, thereby denying joint duty

assignments to many highly qualified reserve personnel.

Because the issues concerning reservists are so complex, Reserve Affairs

officials said that they do not anticipate that any guidance will be issued

during calendar year 1997.

Our Assessment Although a working group is developing guidance on the education and

management of reserve officers in joint positions, it is too early to

determine if this recommendation will be implemented.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-229 Joint Management Process
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon Cekala, Associate Director

William E. Beusse, Assistant Director

Norfolk Field Office Janet Keller, Evaluator-in-Charge

Lynn Johnson, Senior Evaluator

Janine Cantin, Evaluator

(703187) Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-229 Joint Management Process
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