### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y

10, 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CH ARLES T HOMA S LA RD , II and

DOREEN REB ECA GATES LARD
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 5224 Joseph H. Walk er III, Judge

No. W2006-01941-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 5, 2007

T h e Appellants, C harle s Thomas L ard, I I , and Dor een Re beca Gates L ard, e ach ple d g uilty in the Ti pto n Co un ty

Cir c uit Court to p os se ssi on

of on e -h a lf ounc e or mor e of mari jua na wi th int e nt t o de li v e r an d t o t h e m anu f

a c tu r e o f o n e
- h a l f o u n c e o r m o r e o f m ar i j u an a , b o t h C l a s s E fe lon ie s. Pursuant to a plea ag ree ment, the L ards rese rved the following cer tified question for c onsideration by thi s cou

rt on a pp e a l: w he the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingthe ir

re sp e c tiv e mot ion s to su

pp re ss evidenc e and statements obtained by the police a fter a sear ch of their home, base d upon its finding that the L ards knowing ly

and volunt arily consente d to the s ear ch. After thoroug h consideration of the ar g uments of the par

ties and the re cord on a

ppeal, we aff

irm.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

J

. B ar n e y W i t h e r i n g t o nIV , C o v i n g t o n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e A p p e l l an t , C h ar l e s T h o m a s Lar d , II. Fr ank De slaurier s, Covington, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Doree n Rebec a Gates L ard.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Mik e Dunava

nt, Di str ic t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; a

nd Wal t Fr e e land , A ssi sta

nt D istri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n September of

2005, the Tipton County

Sheriff’ s D e p a

r tm e nt r e c e iv e d

a telephone c all from De pa rtme nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s ( “ DC S” ) w or ke r E dn a Ka lmo n. Kalmon

inf or me d D e pu ty Delashmit and Deputy Mike Rose, with the Nar cotics Division, that she had re ceive d a re fer ral a s to p os sib le c hil d a

bu se a t th e ho me of the Ap pe lla nts

. Spe c if

ic a lly , the re fe rr a l a lle g e d th a t th e c hil dG at es i s t he daugh t er of Ap pel l ant D oree n R eb ec a G ates Lar d and t he s t epdaugh t er of Ap pel l ant Char l es 1
T h o m a s L a rd , II.

-2- of the Appe llants’ daug hter, Christine Gate s, had suff ere d a broke n leg . Duringthe cour se of the 1 telephone c onversation, the office rs ad v i sed Ka lmon that the Appellants’ home ha d been unde r surveillance reg ardingpossible drug use. Ka lmon informed th e o ff i ce rs of her intent to visit the home and investig ate, a

nd she aske d that an off

icer acc ompany

her on the visit.
At approximately

3:30 p.m. on September 20, 20 0 5 , Kalmon and Rose a rrived at the Ap pe lla nts ’ hom e and kn oc ke d on the do or . Chr ist ine Gate s o pe ne d th e do or , a nd Ros e imm e diate ly noticed the odor

of burnt mar ijuana. Gates invited them into the house, and Ka lmon informed her of the purpose of the visit. Rose asked Ga t es , “Is ther e mar ijuana in this house? Ican sme ll it.” Gates sa id, “Yes, sir,” and, fur ther, that she ha d “just s m o k ed a joi nt about [t hirty ] m inutes ag o.” Ros e ind ic a te d th a t he ne e de d to take a loo k aro un d and a sk e d G a te s if sh e wo uld

sig n a c on se nt t o
se arc h f or m, t o w hic h G a te s r e sp on de d, “ Ye s, sir , b ut I c an’ t g ive y ou con sent to my ho us e . T his is my pare nts’ house. I can give y ou [consent] wher e I live. I live upstairs in my room.” At 3:40 p.m., Gates sig ned a c onsent form a llowing the office rs to sear ch the “ [l ]i ving [a]rea [u] pstairs . . . t o i n c l u d e a l l c o n t a i n e r s an d [ l ] o c k e d [ b ] o x e s

. ” D u r i n g t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n , an o t h e r s h e r i f f ’ s d e p u t y, Serg eant Da

n J ones, ar

rived at the scene . The off icer s proce eded upsta irs, and Gates direc ted them to a closet a

rea containing two or three jars of a gre en leaf

y substance that Gates identified to the office rs as mar ijuana. Gates informed the office rs that her pa rents had g iven her

the marijuana . At

s o me p o in t s h o rtl y

th e r e a f te r , G a te s ’ s mo th e r , th e A p p e ll an t D o r e e nL ar d , w a s c o n ta c te d by te le ph on e

. Duri ngthi s c a ll, sh e tol d Ro se to “ [g ]o ahe a d a nd se arc h” the re st o f t

he ho us e , b ut R os e inf or me d h e r t hat he wo uld

wa it unti l sh e arr ive d h ome fr om w or k in Me mph is.
Ap pr oximate ly

an h our l a te r, the Ap pe lla nts arr ive d a t th e ho me tog e the r. Ros e imm e diate ly approa ched the m and stated that drug s had bee n found upstairs. Rose informed them that the offic ers require d consent to sea

rch the rest of the house. The A ppellants ea ch sig ned a co n sent form permitting the office rs t o sear ch the house, purpor tedly “[t] o include all outbuildings, ve hicles, and loc ke d c on ta ine rs .” At

the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , Rose te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s r e g ard ingthe of

fi c e rs ’ discoverie s throug hout the course of the sea rch:
Q. What were [t he Appe llants] doing while y ou sear ched the house? A. They

wer e ver y cooper ative. The y

went with me and show ed me eve ry thing that they had in the house. Q. Now, whe n y ou say “eve ry thing,” can you descr ibe what you found in the house? A. It hink there w as [sic] approximately fiftee n fruit jars that we re se aled that they said they had g rown marijuana for their personal use. And a s a matter
o f f ac t , t h ey s h o we d m e a l l o f t h e gu n s , t h e s h o t gu n , ev ery t h i n g. Q. Whe re we re the se fr uit jars ? A. I n th e ir

be dr oo m, u

nd e rn e a th t

he be d w e re so me of

the m. T he re we re so me ba g s, loo se ba g s w ithmari jua na , s c a tte re d d if

fere nt p la c e s in

the be dr oo m.-3- The shotg un was in the closet. There was a pistol l aying on the dresse r, like. There was [sic] t h re e o r four guns in the house. Then the y – afte r we g ot throug h there , they

took me to another r oom where they had som e lig hts and some lines hang ing w ith plants dry ing. T hen they took me outside where

s o m e p l an t s we re s t i l l s t an d i n g.

Th e of fi c e rs a dv ise d th e Ap pe lla nts of the ir ri g hts a g a ins t sel f- inc ri min a tio n, wh ic h th e Ap pe lla nts the n e a c h w a ive d via wr itt e n wa ive r. B oth of the Ap pe lla

nts the n p ro vid e d a

wr itt e n s tate me nt t o the of fi c e rs

.
On November 7, 2005, a Tipton County g rand jury indicted the Appella n t s fo r p ossession with intent to deliver one-ha lf ounce or more of marijuana and for the manufa cture of more than one

half ounc e of ma

rijuana. T h e Ap p ellants ea ch filed a motion to s uppress the e vidence seized and statements g iven to the police. Af ter the tria l court held a hearing on Aug ust 9, 2006, it denied the motions. On August 10, 2006, the Ap p el lants entere d a conditional guilty plea to the indicted offe nses, re servinga ce rtified question for appea l. The trial cour

t entere d judgme nts of conviction on Aug ust 29, 2006, sentencing the Appellants, as multipl e offe nders, to three y ear s of supervise d probation, with a $2000 fine and ser vice of six ty day s in ja il. The Appellants timely filed a notice of appe al.

Ana lys is

Rul e 37 (b )( 2) (i ) o f t

he Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure a llo ws an a pp e a l fr om a

g uil ty plea in ce rtain ca ses under very narr ow circ umstances. An appea l lies from a g uilty plea, pur suant to Rule 37(b)( 2)(i), if the final order of judgme nt c ontains a statement of the disposi t i v e c er t ified question of law r eser

ved by an Appe llant, where in the question is so clearly stated as to identify

the scope and the l imit of t he lega l issues reser ved. State v. Preston , 759 S.W .2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988)

. The orde r must also state that the ce rtified question wa s express ly rese rved a s part of the plea ag ree ment, that the State and the tr ial judge consente d to the rese rvation, and that the State and the trial judg e ar e of the opinion that the question is dis positive of the ca se. Id

.
Th e c e rt if ie d is su e re se rv e d f

or thi s c ourt

on a pp e a l w a s a

rt ic ulate d b y

the tr ia l c ourt

in i ts fi na l or de r a s f

oll ow s:

whether or not the trial cour

t erre d by

finding that the evidenc e seized by law enfor ceme nt in this c ase a nd the statement g iven by defe ndant[s] wer e prope rly not suppressed a

nd that said evidenc e and statement[s] wer e not obtained as a result of

any c oe rc ion on the pa rt of law en fo rc e me nt an d the c on se nt t o s e arc h a nd state me nts
wer e voluntarily

g iven by [t he Appe llants]

. On appe al, t h e Appellants contend that the re cord in this case indicates a “hig hly coer cive atmosphere at the time of the alleg ed consent to se arc h” and that their consent was not give n voluntarily an d intelligently . The Appe llants cite Va ug hn v . S tate , 4 77 S.W. 2d

26 0 ( Te nn . Cr im.W e a c k n o w le d g e the lan g u a g e o f Vaughn , whi ch ob s er ved t hat “ t he f act t hat a def

endan t cons ent s t o a s ear ch 2
k n owi n g t h at c on t r aba n d l i es i n t h e ar ea t h at w i l l be s ea r ch ed ‘ mi l i t at es h ea v i l y a g ai n s t h i s v al i dl y c onsent i ng

. ’ ” 477 S.W

. 2 d at 26 3 (ci t i ng H i gg i ns v. Uni t ed St at es , 20 9 F. 2d 819 , 820 ( D

. C

. Ci r

. 195 4))

. W e woul d al s o not e t hat t he U ni t ed Stat es Co urt of A p p eal s, Sixt h C i rcui t , i n Un ited S ta te s v . E d w a rd K e lly , 9 13 F

. 2d 2 61 , 267 n. 3 (6 Ci r

. 199 0), r ej ect ed th the h o ld ing o f H i g g i n s and ob s er ved t hat “ t hi s r ul e has been over whe l mi ng l y r ej ect ed by ot her cour t s

. ” See, e. g. , Uni t ed S ta te s v . M e n d e n h a ll , 4 4 6 U .S . 5 4 4 , 5 5 9 , 1 0 0 S . C t. 1 8 7 0 , 1 8 7 9 (1 9 8 0 ); Un i t e d S t a t e s v

. Wi l l i a ms , 754 F. 2d 672, 675- 76 (6 C ir. 1 9 8 5 ); Uni t e d S t at e s v

. M anches t er , 7 1 1 F .2 d 4 5 8 , 4 6 2 (1 C ir. 1 9 8 3 ); U ni t ed St at es v

. Robi ns on , 625 F. 2d t h st 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 8 -1 9 n

. 1 2 (5 C ir. 1 9 8 0 ); Uni t ed St at es v. Ci ovacco , 5 1 8 F .2 d 2 9 , 2 9 -3 1 (1 C ir. 1 9 7 5 ); U ni t ed St at es v. P i et , t h st 4 9 8 F .2 d 1 7 8 , 1 8 2 (7 C ir.), cer t

. deni ed , 4 1 9 U .S . 1 0 6 9 , 9 5 S . C t. 6 5 5 (1 9 7 4 ); L ea vit tv. H o w a rd , 462 F. 2d 992, 997 th (1 C i r. 19 7 2 ). st

-4- App. 1971), for

their ar gu m en t t h at “[t] he fa ct that a de fenda nt consents to a sea

rch know ing that contra band lies in the ar ea that will be searc hed ‘mil itates heavily ag ainst his validly consenting .’” 2 Th e Ap pe lla

nts fu rt he r a ssert th at coer cion

is s ho wn

by the fa c t th a t Ro se tol d th e m, p ri or to obtaining c onsent, that he ha d alre ady found marijuana

in the home, there by convincing them that their conse nt was not of their ow n volition.

“ Th e F ourt

h A me ndme nt t o th e Con sti tut ion pr ote c ts ‘ the ri g ht of the pe op le to b e se c ur e in their persons, houses, paper s, and ef fec ts, ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures.’” W

ilson v. Arkansas , 514 U.S. 927, 931, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995). “ I t is ax iomatic that the ‘phy sical entry of the home is the chief evil ag ainst which the wor ding of the Four th Amendment is directe d.’ . . . And a p ri ncipal prote ction ag ainst unnece ssary intrusions int o private dw ellings is the wa rra nt require ment imposed by

the Four th Amendment on ag ents of the g overnme nt who s eek to e nter the home for pur

poses of sear ch o r ar rest.” W e lsh v . W isc on sin , 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S. C t. 2091, 20 97 (1 98 4) . A rt ic le I , s e c tio n 7 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s: [t]hat th e pe op le sh a ll b e se c ur e in t he ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs and po sse ssion s, from unre asonable sear ches a nd seizures; and that gene ral wa rra nts, where by

an office r may

be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout evidence of the fa ct committed, or to seize any person or

persons not named , whose off ence s are not particula rly descr ibed and supporte d by evidenc e, ar e dang erous to li berty and oug ht not to be g rante d.
State v. Stephe nson , 1 95 S.W. 3d 57 4, 59 2 n .1 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) . T his c on sti tut ional pro vis ion is identical in intent and purpose with the Four th Amendment. Id

. ( c i t i n g State v. Y eargan , 958 S.W .2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) ).

A sea rch or seizure conducted wit hout a warra nt is presumed unre asonable , and any evidenc e discovere d as a r esult of such a search is subject to suppression. Coo lid gev . Ne w H

am ps hir e , 403 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5, 91 S. Ct . 2 02 2, 20 31 (1 97 1) ; State v. Bridges , 963 S.W .2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997)

. Howeve r, the e vidence will not be suppressed if the State prove s t h at t h e wa rra ntless searc h or seizure was c onducted pur suant to one of the na rrow l y define d exceptions to the warr ant require ment. Sta te v . B ine tte , 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 5 , 2 1 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Y eargan , 958 S.W .2d at 629). A c onsent to sear ch is an e x ception to the norma l r equire ment of a sear ch war rant. State v.-5-

W atson , 2 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d

6 2 2 , 6 4 4 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Sc hn e c k lot h v . B us tam on te , 4 12 U. S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct . 2041, 2059 (1973)) . To pass constit u t i o n al muster, conse nt to searc h must be

u n e q u iv o c a l, s p e cific, intellig ently g iven, and unc ontaminated by duress or c oerc ion. Sta te v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992)

.
The suff iciency of conse nt depends larg ely upon the facts and circumstance s in a par ticular

case

. S t a t e v. J

ackson , 889 S.W .2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . The de termination of whether consent to sea

rch w as voluntary

can only be made by

examining the t o t al i t y o f t he circ umstances surr ounding the g iving of consent. Sta te v . A sh wor th , 3 S.W. 3d 25 , 2 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1999). The burden is on the pr osecution to prove that consent wa s fre ely and voluntarily

g iven. State v. Mc

Mahan , 650 S.W .2d 383, 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). When a dec ision on a motion to suppress is challeng ed, the trial court’s findings of fac t are presumed corre ct unless the evide nce
c o n ta in e d in th e r e c o r d p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t th e m. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000). Without such a showing , we must aff irm the trial cour

t’s decision.

Th e tr ia l c ourt ann ounc e d its ru lin g a t the c on c lus ion of the he ari ng on th e Appe lla

nts ’ mot ion s to su

pp re ss:

Th e Cou rtf

i n d s t h a tw i t h r e g ar d

t o t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d

b y [t h e A p p e l l an t s ] i n the ir mot ion [s], th a t th e of

fi c e r w a s a c c omp anyingthe c hil dr e n’ s servi c e s a bo ut a
c omp la int that th e y ha d r e c e ive d, that th e y

we re inv ite d in to t

he prem is es, c ou ld smell the odor of a

n illega l narc otic, which gave them rea sonable basis. They wer e lawf ull y the re , f ir st o f a ll. Se c on dly , g a ve the m a re a so na ble ba sis to i nv e sti g a te fu rt he r; that Ms . G a te s g a ve a [c]o ns e nt to [s ]ea rc h f re e ly ; and the n [th e Ap pe lla

nts ]

we re no tif

ie d, or a [n App e lla

nt] w a s n oti fi e d, and

the n later [ th e Ap pe lla nts ] appea red.

Th e Court

fi nd s th a t th e re ’s be e n n o c oe rci on or c oe rc ive be havio r a g a ins t [the Ap pe lla

nts ] sho wn

in the pr oo f tod ay to re qu ir e su pp re ssi on of

the [c]o ns e nt t o [s] ear ch.

. . . .
I n this particular c ase the y cer tainly had proba

ble ca use to secur e a w arr ant if the y ha d w ante d to g o g e t a

wa rr ant in the me anti me

. Th e of fi c e rs c ho se to w a it to see if the [Appellants] would consent to sear ch. All the proof I ’ve hear d was that [t he Appe llants] arr ived, wer e cooper ative, showed the office rs, and maintained that the substance s were for their persona l use.
Finding no rea son to suppress the evide nce or statements re s ulting fr om the sear ch, the tria l court denied the A

ppellants’ motions.-6-

I n s up po rt of the ir argume nt that th e ir

c on se nt t o s e arc h th e ho us e wa s inva lid , th e Ap pe lla nts rely on Vaughn , a

c a se wh ic h invo lve d a

wa rr antl e ss p oli ce se arc h o f t he tr un k o f t he de fe nd ants ’ veh ic le d u r in g a tr a f

f ic s to p

. 4 7 7 S. W. 2 d a t 2 6 2

. I n th a t c a s e , o n e o f th e d e f e n d an ts , w ho was driving the ca

r, wa s place d under a

rre st after th e p o l ice of

fice r discover ed that he ha d no driver’ s license, a nd the other de fenda

nt was arre sted afte r admitting ow nership of a pistol found in the car. Id . The police office r subseque ntly asked f or conse nt to searc h the trunk of the vehicle , wher e he discovere d a quantity of nar cotics. Id

. On appeal, t he defenda nts argued that the evidence from the trunk should have be en suppre ssed, bec ause it wa s obtained as a result of an unc onstitut ional sear ch. Id . In r e ve rs ing the c on vic tio ns fo r po sse ssi on of na rc oti c s, thi s c ourt

dis c us se d th e c on tr oll ingfa c ts
and pr inc ipl e s a s f

oll ow s:

The p i v o t al q uestion, as we vie w this recor d, is whether the sear ch as conducte d was leg al. We are satisfied that the sea rch of the trunk and the discovery of the fo ur te e n ca se s of Rob itu ssi n wa s n ot c onne c te d in any mann e r w iththe of

fe ns e which broug ht about the initial arre st. I n fac t, the o n l y b as i s t h e off icer had for making t h e s ea rc h was his suspicion that was a roused by

the manner isms of [defendant] Vaug hn. This is not sufficient. . . .

Th e t ro oper ha d no prior knowledg e of a ny other off

ense ha ving be en committed by

the def endants, be cause , as he r elated, he was looking for a ny thing he could find. In short, he wa s conducting a conde mned exploratory sear ch.

The trial c ourt fo u n d that the sea rch w as a c onsent sear ch in per mitti ng the

e v id e n c e ( Ro b it

u s s in ) to g o to th e ju

r y an d in o v e r r u li n g th e mo ti o nto s u

p p r e s s

. We

are satis fi e d th a t a def

e nd ant may wa ive his ri g hts re lativ e to s e arc he s and se izur e s.

. . . We d is a g r e e w it

h th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s f

in d in g s f r o m o u r r e v ie w o f

th e r e c o r d

. We note that the troope r took t h e k ey s from the ig nition and unlocked the g love compar tment. His suspicions being arouse d, he then inquire d about looking into the trunk. This permission was denie d by Vaug hn. The troope r then re lated that he ha d to look in the ca

r, that he c ould ge t a war

rant. The defe ndant Vaug hn then re lated he would let him look but he did not have the key , that [defendant] Ba rnes ha d it. They then proc eede d to B arne s when Vaug hn then stated he would let him look and stated that he (the trooper) looked like a leve l-hea ded per son he could do business with.

Under the totality

of the c ircumstance s we do not believe t he State has me t its he a vy burd e n and sh ow n that the de fe nd ant Va ug hn int e lli g e ntl y c on se nte d to thi s
se ar c h

. T h e f

a c t th a t th e c o n tr a

b an d w a s kn o w n b y V a

u g h n to b e in

the trunk milit ates he avily

ag ainst his validly

consenting

. . . . T h e v er y fact that Vaug hn

re fu se d th e tr oo pe r’ s r e qu e st t o s e arc h in the fi rs t ins tanc e is inc on g ru ou s w ithva lid ly

c on se nti ngto t

he se arc h. Hi s hed g ing and de layingin p ro du c ingthe ke y c on ve y s to
u s ac qu i e s ci n g t o au t h o ri t y ra t h er t h an cl ea r p o s i t i v e w o rd s an d ac t i o n s d en o t i n g a valid consent. . . .-7- Under these c ircumstance s, we a re satisfied that Vaug hn’s ac t of consenting was of ne cessity

and not of his volition.

Id . at 262-63 (c itations omi tted).
The Appe llant’s reliance on Vaughn is m isp la c e d. Th e ho ldi ngof that c a se tur

ne d o n th is court’s analy sis of the totality of circ umstances, which indicated that the sear ch of the defe ndant’s

ve hic le wa s unr e late d to the of fe ns e fo r whic h a

rr e st wa s ma de and that the de fe nd ant h a d in iti a lly

re fu se d to c on se nt t o a

se arc h o f t

he ve hic le be fo re e ve ntu a lly c on c e din g to t

he of fi c e r’ s r e qu e sts

. See id

. T h e p r e s e n t c a s e is d is ti n g u is h a b le in nu me r o u s r e s p e c ts

. H e r e , D CS w o r ker K almon reque sted that police off

icer s acc ompany

her to the A

ppellants’ residence afte r she r ece ived a r efe rra l alleg ing c hild abuse at the a ddress. Onc e they arr ived at the home, Gates invited them inside, and Offic er Rose immediate ly noticed the smell of mar ijuana. After obtaining G ates’ c onsent to sear ch her r oom, the validity

of which is not at issue, the law enfor ceme nt of fice rs discover ed contr aband, whi ch Ga t es s t at ed had be en g iven to her by the Appellants. At the suppr ession hear ing, the Ap pe lla nts fa ile d to e sta

bli shany ba sis fo r co nc lud ing that th e ir c on se nt t o s e arc h th e ho us e wa s a
re su lt o f t he ir “ a c qu ie sc ingto a

uth or ity rathe r t ha n c le ar p os iti ve wo rd s a

nd a c tio ns de no tin g a

va lid consent[,] ” as w as held to be the situation in Vaughn . The proof does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’ s finding that Rose waited for the Appellants to return home and aske d them for c onsent to se arc h the re st of the house, whic h we c onclude that they provided, without reluc tance , in written fo r m, v o lu n ta r il y an d w it

h o u t c o e r c io n

. We h o ld th a t in th is c a s e th e St a te c ar r ie d it s burden of establishing that the Appellan t s ’ conse nt to searc h their home wa s fre ely and voluntarily

g iven. Ac c or d i n g l y , t h e A p p e l l an t s ’ a s s i g n m e n t s o f e r r o r t o t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d e n i a l o f t h e m o t i o ns to suppress ar e without merit, and the judg ments are aff irmed.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nts of the Tipton County Circuit Court are a ffirme d.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE