NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURIE A. RICCIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-35265 

D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05461-DWC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

David W. Christel, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted August 20, 2024***

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Laurie Riccio appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner 

of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, the 

parties consented to have this matter decided by a Magistrate Judge.

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 22 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the agency’s denial of 

Social Security disability benefits, Miskey v. Kijakazi, 33 F.4th 565, 570 (9th Cir. 

2022), and must affirm if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and free of legal error, Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).

1. Riccio first contends that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinions of 

Dr. Thompson and Dr. Gaffield. Because Riccio applied for benefits after March 

27, 2017, the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence was governed by 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), under which the critical factors for consideration are 

“supportability” and “consistency.” See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th 

Cir. 2022). 

Applying this standard, the ALJ determined that Dr. Thompson’s opinion was 

not persuasive because it was inconsistent with (1) some of Dr. Thompson’s own 

examination notes, as also recognized by two state agency reviewing physicians; (2) 

other treatment records demonstrating normal mental status examinations and 

improvement with conservative treatment; and (3) Riccio’s reported activities, 

which included, among other things, travel, shopping, raising her grandchildren, and 

helping others in the community. The ALJ found that Dr. Gaffield’s opinion was 

partially persuasive and similarly discounted those portions of the opinion that the 

ALJ found inconsistent with (1) Dr. Gaffield’s examination notes; (2) other 
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treatment records reporting unremarkable findings and conservative treatment; and 

(3) Riccio’s daily activities.

Although Riccio argues that the medical evidence could be interpreted to 

support the opinions of Dr. Thompson and Dr. Gaffield, we must uphold the ALJ’s 

determination so long as it is a rational interpretation of the evidence. See Terry v. 

Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2021). The ALJ’s analysis, here, is just that, 

and substantial evidence supports it. See Woods, 32 F.3d at 792–93.

2. Riccio next contends that the ALJ erred by discounting her testimony 

regarding the severity of her physical and mental symptoms. The ALJ clearly and 

convincingly explained that Riccio’s symptom testimony was not fully credible 

because it was inconsistent with other evidence. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 

489, 497 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that an ALJ must provide “clear and convincing 

reasons” to discount claimant’s testimony (citation omitted)). Contrary to Riccio’s 

contention, the ALJ did not penalize her for failing to support her testimony with 

objective medical evidence. Rather, the ALJ permissibly found her testimony not 

fully credible because it was inconsistent with other objective medical evidence. See 

id. at 498 (“When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the 

claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such 

testimony.”). 
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The ALJ gave several other valid reasons for discounting Riccio’s testimony. 

For example, Riccio testified that she left her last employment as a residential 

caregiver because her “back just couldn’t handle it.” However, she told Dr. Gaffield 

that her employment ended because her client had improved and no longer needed 

her services. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 497 (relying on “direct contradiction” in 

testimony to uphold adverse credibility finding). Riccio’s testimony that she spent 

the majority of her time in her bedroom was undermined by treatment records 

reporting that Riccio traveled; went hiking, camping with her grandchildren, and 

grocery shopping; and got out of the house to help others in the community. See 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ may consider 

“whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged 

symptoms”). Medical records also reflected that Riccio’s conditions were often 

managed with conservative treatment. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“[E]vidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a 

claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s clear and 

convincing explanations, and Riccio has shown no error.

3. Riccio similarly fails to show any error in the ALJ’s assessment of a 

functional report prepared by Riccio’s husband. The ALJ thoroughly considered the 

statement from Riccio’s husband and permissibly concluded that it did not warrant 
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any change to the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding. See, e.g., Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (no error in ALJ’s consideration of 

lay witness statements that were inconsistent with other medical evidence).

4. Riccio’s remaining contentions—regarding the ALJ’s classification of 

certain impairments as non-severe, RFC determination, and ultimate disability

finding—are derivative of her arguments relating to the ALJ’s assessment of the 

opinions of Drs. Thompson and Gaffield, her own testimony, and her husband’s 

functional report. Accordingly, her remaining contentions also fail. See, e.g.,

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting 

argument that the ALJ’s hypothetical did not include all limitations as derivative of 

already rejected arguments that the ALJ improperly discounted claimant’s testimony 

and opinions of medical experts).

AFFIRMED.