UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 14-20814 

 Honorable Victoria A. Roberts 

STEVEN SMITH, 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE [ECF No. 33] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This matter is before the Court on Steven Smith’s motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He asks the 

Court to grant him a compassionate release because his medical 

conditions make him particularly vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The Court held a video hearing on the motion on August 26, 2020. 

Smith was present and consented to proceed via videoconference. 

The Court DENIES Smith’s motion [ECF No. 33]. 

II. BACKGROUND 

In August 2015, Smith pled guilty to distribution of child pornography 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). A forensic review of Smith’s family 

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computer revealed 1,158 images and 404 videos of child pornography, the 

bulk of which belonged to Smith. Smith’s collection mainly depicted 

prepubescent children engaged in sex acts with adult males and 

sadomasochism. Smith admitted that he had been downloading child 

pornography for over 15 years. During that time, Smith influenced his nowadult son, who admitted to first viewing child pornography on Smith’s 

computer about ten years earlier when he was a teenager. Smith’s son 

pled guilty to receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 110 

months in prison. 

 Smith was held accountable for possessing over 600 images of child 

pornography. His guidelines range was 151 to 188 months. In January 

2016, the Court sentenced Smith to 130 months in prison and five years of 

supervised release. The Court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) place Smith in a residential sex offender treatment program. Smith 

has served 54 months of his sentence. His projected release date is May 

10, 2025. 

Smith is 58 years old with underlying medical conditions including 

obesity and Type 2 diabetes. He is serving his sentence at FCI Elkton in 

Ohio. Smith has no history of disciplinary incidents. He has not participated 

in a sex offender treatment program, but he is on the wait list. Under 

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“PATTERN” – a prisoner risk assessment tool used by the BOP – Smith 

was found to present a “minimum” risk of recidivism. Also, a psychological 

evaluation conducted before Smith pled guilty indicated that Smith “is likely 

a below average risk to re-offend.” While on bond awaiting trial, Smith 

complied with all conditions of release. 

Smith filed a pro se motion for compassionate release on May 14, 

2020. The Court subsequently appointed Smith counsel, and his counsel 

filed a supplemental brief in support of compassionate release. Smith 

proposes returning home to live with his wife and 16-year-old son. The 

government opposes Smith’s release. 

III. DISCUSSION

 The compassionate release statute allows the Court to modify a 

defendant’s term of imprisonment if: (1) he fully exhausts all administrative 

remedies; (2) he shows both “extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warrant such a reduction [or release]” and that the reduction or release is 

consistent with” the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements; (3) he is 

not a danger to any other person or the community; and (4) the factors in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support the reduction or release to the extent they are 

applicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States Sentencing 

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Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1; United States v. Austin, 

No. 15-20609, 2020 WL 2507622, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2020). 

A. Smith Exhausted Administrative Remedies 

The Sixth Circuit recently held that exhaustion of administrative 

remedies is a “mandatory condition” before a defendant can file a motion 

for compassionate release. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th 

Cir. 2020). The Sixth Circuit found “[t]he seriousness of COVID-19 and its 

spread in many prisons make it all the more imperative that the prisons 

have authority to process these applications fairly and with due regard for 

the seriousness of each inmate’s risk.” Id. at 835-36. 

Smith did not properly exhaust administrative remedies before filing 

his pro se motion in May 2020. Since then, however, Smith’s counsel has 

requested his compassionate release from the BOP, and the BOP denied 

the request. Although Smith filed his motion before he properly exhausted 

administrative remedies, the Court will not require Smith to refile his 

motion. In email correspondence with defense counsel, counsel for the 

government also stated that the government will not insist that Smith refile 

his motion. 

Smith satisfies the exhaustion requirement. 

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B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Exist

 Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines is the “applicable policy 

statement” with which the Court must comply when considering a request 

for compassionate release. Section 1B1.13 explains that a defendant must 

“not [be] a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) and must fit within at least one of the following 

four categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons”: (1) the 

defendant’s medical condition; (2) the defendant’s age; (3) the defendant’s 

family circumstances; and (4) other reasons as determined by the BOP. 

USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1; Austin, 2020 WL 2507622, at *1. 

Smith says extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for his release 

based on COVID-19, his age and medical conditions, and the heightened 

risk the pandemic poses to prisoners. He also says Elkton has one of the 

worst Coronavirus outbreaks in the BOP. 

The government acknowledges that Smith has medical conditions – 

including diabetes and obesity – that place him at a heightened risk should 

he contract COVID-19. Based on this, it concedes that Smith establishes 

extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. 

Moreover, the Court is aware that COVID-19 was particularly rampant 

and uncontrolled at FCI Elkton at one point. In April and May 2020, nine 

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inmates died of COVID-19, and in total, over 900 of the nearly 2000 

inmates housed at Elkton have tested positive for the virus. See BOP 

COVID-19 Cases, at https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ & BOP Press Release,

at https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/20200509_pres_rel_elk.pdf. However, it 

appears the BOP has put measures in place to successfully control the 

spread of the virus at Elkton. There have been no deaths at the facility 

since May 8, 2020. As of August 26, 2020, only three inmates have 

COVID-19. 

Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges the heightened risk this 

pandemic places on prisoners. 

Smith demonstrates extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

compassionate release exist under USSG § 1B1.13(1)(A) & cmt. n.1(A). 

C. Smith is a Danger to the Community 

 Although Smith establishes extraordinary and compelling reasons 

exist, he is ineligible for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because 

he is a danger to the community, and because § 1B1.13(2) of the 

Sentencing Guidelines only permits compassionate release if “the 

defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 

community.” USSG § 1B1.13(2); Austin, 2020 WL 2507622, at *1. An 

evaluation of dangerousness in this context requires a comprehensive view 

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of community safety – “a broader construction than the mere danger of 

physical violence.” United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 

1989). 

 “[F]ederal courts have been disinclined to grant compassionate 

release to petitioners convicted of crimes involving child pornography, even 

for vulnerable petitioners during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing potential 

dangerousness.” Coleman v. United States, 2020 WL 3039123, at *4 (E.D. 

Va. June 4, 2020) (denying motion for compassionate release because 

defendant’s release plan did not adequately protect the public from the 

potential of a subsequent offense involving child pornography and because 

defendant had not participated in rehabilitative programming specific to his 

offense). Nevertheless, “while offense conduct may inform the Court’s 

discretion in deciding a motion for compassionate release and determining 

the appropriate conditions of release, such a motion may not be denied 

simply because of the underlying offenses.” Id.

 Smith proposes returning to the same environment in which he 

committed his offense. Smith would live with his wife and teenage son. In 

their home, they currently have two desktop computers, a laptop, and two 

iPhones. In letters to the Court, Smith’s wife and son say they will protect 

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each device and their internet connection with a password so Smith cannot 

gain access to the internet. 

 Smith says he does not present a danger to the community because 

he was assessed to present a minimum risk of recidivism and because his 

compliance with pretrial release conditions demonstrates he is able to 

comply with Court orders. The Court disagrees. 

The Court finds that Smith’s release plan does not adequately protect 

the community from a subsequent child pornography offense. When Smith 

was on pretrial release, the Probation Department was able to monitor him. 

But today – since Probation is not conducting home visits during COVID-19 

– Probation would not be able to implement or monitor the internet and 

device restrictions contemplated by Smith’s wife and son. Moreover, Smith 

downloaded child pornography for over 15 years before his arrest. His wife 

never prevented him from doing so. The minimum risk recidivism 

assessment under PATTERN did not account for Smith’s release into the 

same environment in which he committed the offense. 

Releasing Smith under these circumstances would present a danger 

to the community, especially considering that Smith has not completed a 

rehabilitative sex offender program and because the ease of access to 

electronic devices and his ability to hide his conduct from his wife for over 

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15 years would make it easy for him to reoffend. See Coleman, 2020 WL 

3039123, at *4; United States v. Mitchell, 2020 WL 2770070, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. May 28, 2020) (denying compassionate release because defendant 

failed to participate in any rehabilitative program and failed to provide a 

detailed plan to prevent reoffending); United States v. Miezin, 2020 WL 

1985042, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2020) (denying motion for 

compassionate release of defendant convicted of receipt and distribution of 

child pornography because, “[i]n today’s society with smartphones, tablets, 

laptops, smart TVs, and countless other devices, it would not be possible to 

place [defendant] in home confinement and eliminate his ability to engage 

in his prior criminal conduct”); United States v. Hylander, 2020 WL 

1915950, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020) (denying motion for 

compassionate release where defendant proposed being released to the 

same location he committed his child pornography offense). 

Finally, Smith influenced his now-adult son to view child pornography 

when he was a teenager. A release to his home where his 16-year-old son 

resides opens the door to the same corrupting danger to his teenager. 

D. The § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors Weigh Against Release 

The Court also denies Smith’s motion because the applicable § 

3553(a) factors weigh against his release. See Austin, 2020 WL 2507622, 

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at *1 (the Court must find that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in 

favor of release before granting such relief). 

Smith has only served 54 months of his 130-month, below-guidelines 

sentence. Given the nature of his crime, to release Smith with more than 

half of his sentence remaining and before he completed a sex offender 

treatment program would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, 

promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate 

deterrence, or protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Because of Smith’s influence, his older son was convicted on a child 

pornography charge as well. The Court sentenced Smith’s son to 110 

months imprisonment in December 2015. Since Smith’s son was detained 

pending trial, he has already served 70 months of his sentence, and even 

with good time credit, he still has over two more years that he will be in 

prison. Section 3553(a)(6) warns courts “to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 

guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This factor weighs 

against Smith’s release, considering that Smith’s conduct was more 

egregious than his son’s, and his sentence was 20 months longer than his 

son’s. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 Smith directs the Court to several cases, including United States v. 

Grubbs, No. 16-228, 2020 WL 3839619, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2020); 

United States v. Delateur, No. 18-5364, 2020 WL 3989175, at *2 (W.D. 

Wash. July 1, 2020); and United States v. Dillard, No. 15-CR-00170, 2020 

WL 2564638 (D. Idaho Apr. 27, 2020). 

While those cases involve the compassionate release of defendants 

convicted on child pornography charges, none of them involved the unique 

circumstance that this case presents: the corrupting influence the 

defendant had on his older son, and the opportunity for him to do the same 

to his youngest son if the Court releases him. 

For this reason and those set forth above, the Court DENIES Smith’s 

motion for compassionate release [ECF No. 33]. 

IT IS ORDERED. 

 s/ Victoria A. Roberts 

 Victoria A. Roberts 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: August 26, 2020 

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