UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

DAFINKA STOJCEVSKI, as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of DAVID 

STOJCEVSKI, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MACOMB, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-11019

Hon. Linda V. Parker

Mag. Judge David R. Grand

IHRIE O’BRIEN

Robert D. Ihrie (P26451)

Harold A. Perakis (P35921)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

24055 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 2000

St. Clair Shores, MI 48080

(586) 778-7778

ihrieobrien@aol.com

hperakis@ihrieobrienlaw.com

MACOMB COUNTY CORPORATION 

COUNSEL

John A. Schapka (P36731)

Robert S. Gazall (P41350)

Attorneys for Macomb County 

Defendants

One S. Main Street, 8th Floor

Mount Clemens, MI 48043

(586) 469-6346

john.schapka@macombgov.org

robert.gazall@macombgov.org

CHAPMAN LAW GROUP

Ronald W. Chapman Sr., M.P.A., 

LL.M. (P37603)

Madeline Young (P82140)

Attorneys for Correct Care Solutions

Defendants

1441 West Long Lake Rd., Suite 310

Troy, MI 48098

(248) 644-6326

rchapman@chapmanlawgroup.com

myoung@chapmanlawgroup.com

WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN

& DICKER, LLP

John T. Eads, III (P43815)

Cara M. Swindlehurst (P79953)

Co-Counsel for Macomb County 

Defendants 

17197 N. Laurel Park Dr., Suite 201

Livonia, MI 48152

(313) 327-3100

John.Eads@wilsonelser.com

Cara.Swindlehurst@wilsonelser.com

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7600 Filed 01/19/21 Page 1 of 31
2

DEFENDANTS CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; MONICA 

CUENY; CHANTALLE BROCK; MICAL BEY-SHELLY; VICKY 

BERTRAM; AND LAWRENCE SHERMAN, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE

TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ELICITING EXPERT TESTIMONY 

FROM PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT ROBERT GREIFINGER, M.D.

NOW COME Defendants CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; 

MONICA CUENY; CHANTALLE BROCK; MICAL BEY-SHELLY; VICKY 

BERTRAM; LAWRENCE SHERMAN, M.D.; (the “CCS Defendants”), by and 

through their counsel, CHAPMAN LAW GROUP, moves to preclude Plaintiff from 

eliciting expert witness testimony from Robert Greifinger, M.D. pursuant to Daubert

v. Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Fed. R. Evid. 702, as follows:

1. Plaintiff retained expert Robert Greifinger, M.D., pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(2)(B), who will present evidence or offer testimony at trial under Fed. R. 

Evid. 702, 703, or 705. 

2. Fed. R. Evid. 702 states expert testimony is only admissible if it satisfies three 

(3) broad requirements: (1) the witness offering the testimony must have 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education that qualifies the witness as 

an expert; (2) the witness’s opinions must be reliable; and (3) the witness’s 

opinions must assist the trier of fact. (emphasis added)

3. District courts are the “gatekeep[ers]” of expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell 

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). 

Fed. R. of Evid. 702 tasks them with determining whether an expert’s “scientific, 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7601 Filed 01/19/21 Page 2 of 31
3

technical, or other specialized knowledge” will assist the trier of fact in doing its 

job, and whether the expert’s testimony “is the product of reliable principles and

methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a), (c).

4. Dr. Greifinger is Plaintiff’s expert retained to provide opinion testimony 

concerning correctional healthcare policy and quality management, as well as 

medical care provided to Plaintiff’s decedent. 

5. While CCS Defendants do not dispute Dr. Greifinger may possess the requisite 

qualifications and experience to opine on healthcare policy and quality 

management, any opinions regarding the medical care must be precluded on the 

basis that:

a. He is not qualified to render expert opinions on matters outside 

correctional healthcare policy and quality management.

b. His opinions are unreliable because he failed to articulate a reliable 

basis for his opinions, or specify the method used in arriving at his 

conclusions as required under Daubert.

c. His opinions are not relevant and would not assist the trier of fact. 

6. Defense counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel on January 13, 2021 via telephone 

and email to attain concurrence. Concurrence could not be obtained. 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7602 Filed 01/19/21 Page 3 of 31
4

WHEREFORE, Defendants CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; 

MONICA CUENY; CHANTALLE BROCK; MICAL BEY-SHELLY; VICKY 

BERTRAM; LAWRENCE SHERMAN, M.D.; by and through their counsel, 

CHAPMAN LAW GROUP, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter an 

order to preclude Plaintiff from eliciting expert testimony from Plaintiff’s expert 

Robert Greifinger, M.D., pursuant to Daubert v. Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Fed. 

R. Evid. 702; and provide any and all such other relief as the Court deems just and 

equitable. 

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 19, 2021 /s/ Madeline Young

Ronald W. Chapman Sr., M.P.A., 

LL.M. (P37603)

Madeline Young (P82140)

Attorneys for the CCS Defendants 

1441 West Long Lake Rd., Suite 310

Troy, MI 48098

(248) 644-6326

rchapman@chapmanlawgroup.com

myoung@chapmanlawgroup.com

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7603 Filed 01/19/21 Page 4 of 31
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

DAFINKA STOJCEVSKI, as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of DAVID 

STOJCEVSKI, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MACOMB, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-11019

Hon. Linda V. Parker

Mag. Judge David R. Grand

IHRIE O’BRIEN

Robert D. Ihrie (P26451)

Harold A. Perakis (P35921)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

24055 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 2000

St. Clair Shores, MI 48080

(586) 778-7778

ihrieobrien@aol.com

hperakis@ihrieobrienlaw.com

MACOMB COUNTY CORPORATION 

COUNSEL

John A. Schapka (P36731)

Robert S. Gazall (P41350)

Attorneys for Macomb County 

Defendants

One S. Main Street, 8th Floor

Mount Clemens, MI 48043

(586) 469-6346

john.schapka@macombgov.org

robert.gazall@macombgov.org

CHAPMAN LAW GROUP

Ronald W. Chapman Sr., M.P.A., 

LL.M. (P37603)

Madeline Young (P82140)

Attorneys for Correct Care Solutions 

Defendants

1441 West Long Lake Rd., Suite 310

Troy, MI 48098

(248) 644-6326

rchapman@chapmanlawgroup.com

myoung@chapmanlawgroup.com

WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN 

& DICKER, LLP

John T. Eads, III (P43815)

Cara M. Swindlehurst (P79953)

Co-Counsel for Macomb County 

Defendants 

17197 N. Laurel Park Dr., Suite 201

Livonia, MI 48152

(313) 327-3100

John.Eads@wilsonelser.com

Cara.Swindlehurst@wilsonelser.com

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7604 Filed 01/19/21 Page 5 of 31
ii

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, 

L.L.C.; MONICA CUENY; CHANTALLE BROCK; MICAL BEY-SHELLY; 

VICKY BERTRAM; LAWRENCE SHERMAN, M.D.’S MOTION IN 

LIMINE TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ELICITING EXPERT 

TESTIMONY FROM PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT ROBERT GREIFINGER, 

M.D.

PROOF OF SERVICE

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7605 Filed 01/19/21 Page 6 of 31
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... iv

INDEX OF EXHIBITS....................................................................................... vi

STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED ....................................................... vii

CONTROLLING/APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF SOUGHT ..... viii

CCS Defendants incorporate by reference their statement of facts in support of 

their Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Dkt. No. 148, PageID.3978-3989). ......1

I. LEGAL STANDARD.....................................................................................1

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT....................................................................................2

A. Dr. Greifinger is Not Qualified to Offer Expert Witness Testimony 

Concerning Matters Outside Correctional Healthcare Policies and Quality 

Management. .....................................................................................................4

B. Dr. Greifinger’s Expert Opinions are Not Reliable nor Relevant Pursuant to 

Daubert and Should be Excluded. ....................................................................10

C. Dr. Greifinger Cannot Render an Opinion on an Ultimate Issue of This Case, 

I.E., Whether the CCS Defendants are “Deliberately Indifferent.”.....................17

III. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................18

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iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Al-Turki v. Robinson, No. 10-CV-02404-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 603109, at *5 (D. 

Colo. Feb. 15, 2013)........................................................................................17

Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994)...................................3

Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir. 2009)......................15

Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 2005) ....16

Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1990).............................4

Daubert ..............................................................................................................18

Daubert v. Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ..........................................................passim

Dukes v. State, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (2006) ........................................... 11, 13, 16

Goforth v. Paris, et al., No. 02-CV-94, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23366 *; 2007 WL 

988733 (M.D. Ga Mar. 30, 2007).....................................................................11

In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529-530 (6th Cir. 2008)........vii, 1

Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 723 (7th Cir. 1999)................................4

Kumho Tire, supra, 526 U.S. at 149-150 ...............................................................3

Morgan-Mapp v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. CV 07-2949, 2008 WL 

11366456, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2008)...........................................................17

Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2012)...15

R.C. Olmstead, Inc., v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 2010).....15

Salgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 73, 742 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1998)...................15

Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1997) .................3

Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 670-672 (6th Cir. 2010)......................2

Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 2005)........................2

U.S. v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir. 1993)..................................................3, 4

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) ...........................16

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7607 Filed 01/19/21 Page 8 of 31
v

United States v. Melcher, 672 F. App'x 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2016) .........................17

Woods v. Lecureax, 110 F.3d 1215 (6th Cir.1997)...............................................17

RULES PAGE

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)....................................................................................2

Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)..............................................................................................3

Fed. R. Evid. 702.........................................................................................passim

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7608 Filed 01/19/21 Page 9 of 31
vi

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A CV of Robert B. Greifinger, M.D.

EXHIBIT B Deposition Transcript of Robert B. Greifinger, M.D. dated 

April 4, 2018

EXHIBIT C Expert Report of Robert B. Greifinger, M.D.

EXHIBIT D Dukes v. State, 428 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Ga Mar. 30, 2006)

EXHIBIT E Goforth v. Paris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23366*; 2007 WL 

988733 (M.D. Ga Mar. 30, 2007)

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7609 Filed 01/19/21 Page 10 of 31
vii

STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED

SHOULD THE COURT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF’S 

EXPERT ROBERT GREIFINGER M.D. FROM 

OFFERING EXPERT OPINIONS CONCERNING 

ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 

AND/OR CAUSATION PURSUANT TO DAUBERT 

AND FED. R. EVID. 702?

DEFENDANTS STATE: YES.

PLAINTIFF STATES: NO.

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7610 Filed 01/19/21 Page 11 of 31
viii

CONTROLLING/APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF SOUGHT

Fed. R. Evid. 702 states expert testimony is only admissible if it satisfies three 

(3) broad requirements: (1) the witness offering the testimony must have knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education that qualifies the witness as an expert; (2) 

the witness’s opinions must be reliable; and (3) the witness’s opinions must assist 

the trier of fact. 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) and 

Fed. R. Evid. 702 require that this Court, “ensure that any and all scientific testimony 

or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”

“The task for the district court in deciding whether an expert's opinion is

reliable is not to determine whether it is correct, but rather to determine whether it 

rests upon a reliable foundation, as opposed to, say, unsupported speculation.” In re 

Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529-530 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Fed. R. 

Evid. 702. 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7611 Filed 01/19/21 Page 12 of 31
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RELEVANT FACTUAL HISTORY

CCS Defendants incorporate by reference their statement of facts in support 

of their Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Dkt. No. 148, PageID.3978-3989).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)

requires that this Court, “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 

admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”

Under the Daubert standard, the factors that may be considered in determining 

whether the methodology is valid are: (1) whether the theory or technique in question 

can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and 

publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance 

of standards controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread 

acceptance within a relevant scientific community.

“The task for the district court in deciding whether an expert's opinion is 

reliable is not to determine whether it is correct, but rather to determine whether it 

rests upon a reliable foundation, as opposed to, say, unsupported speculation.” In re 

Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529-530 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Fed. R. 

Evid. 702.

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7612 Filed 01/19/21 Page 13 of 31
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II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

This Court has the duty to be the gatekeeper as to scientific evidence, which 

requires this Court to assess whether the medical opinions are actually supported by 

science and not just accept the opinions because of the nature of the expert’s 

qualifications: “The trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than 

simply taking the expert's word for it. [A court being] presented with only the 

experts' qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of reliability [is 

not enough under Daubert].” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 432 

(6th Cir. 2005). Further, Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 

form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on 

sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of 

reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has 

reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 

the case.

Thus, an expert’s opinion that is based upon speculation is not admissible, 

because “the courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired 

sort.” Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 670-672 (6th Cir. 2010).

Under Daubert, the "gatekeeping" function, supra, 509 U.S. at 597, consists 

of three (3) steps. First, it must be determined whether the witness is qualified as an 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7613 Filed 01/19/21 Page 14 of 31
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expert. “When making a preliminary finding regarding an expert's qualifications 

under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), the court is to examine ‘not the qualifications of a witness 

in the abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness 

to answer a specific question.’” Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 

303 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 

1994)). Second, it must be determined whether the testimony is reliable. See 

Daubert, supra, 509 U.S. at 590. The Court in Daubert listed several factors for 

consideration in assessing the reliability of scientific testimony, including:

▪ Whether a "theory or technique . . . can be (and has 

been) tested";

▪ Whether it "has been subjected to peer review and 

publication";

▪ Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a 

high "known or potential rate of error" and whether 

there are "standards controlling the technique's 

operation"; and

▪ Whether the theory or technique enjoys "general 

acceptance" within a "relevant scientific community."

Kumho Tire, supra, 526 U.S. at 149-150 (quoting Daubert, supra, 509 U.S. at 592-

594). The focus must be on the principles and methodologies on which the expert's 

opinion is based, and not on the merits of the expert's conclusions. Daubert, supra, 

509 U.S. at 594-595 n. 12; U.S. v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir. 1993) (district 

courts “are not to be concerned with the reliability of the conclusions generated by 

valid methods, principles and reasoning.”). Finally, this Court must determine 

whether the expert's reasoning or methodology properly applies to the facts at issue: 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7614 Filed 01/19/21 Page 15 of 31
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i.e., whether the opinion is relevant. See Daubert, supra, 509 U.S. at 591-593. To be 

relevant, the testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. This relevance requirement ensures 

that there is a “fit” between the testimony and the issue to be resolved at trial. Bonds, 

supra, 12 F.3d at 555.

Here, Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to offer expert witness testimony 

concerning matters outside correctional healthcare policies and quality management

and does not render any reliable opinions regarding standard of care or causation in 

his report, but at most, involve unreliable conclusory statements. 

A. Dr. Greifinger is Not Qualified to Offer Expert Witness Testimony 

Concerning Matters Outside Correctional Healthcare Policies and 

Quality Management.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 requires that an expert have a requisite level of knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, and education in order to offer expert witness testimony. 

A witness’s qualifications must correspond to the subject matter of his or her 

proffered testimony. See Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 723 (7th Cir. 1999)

(citing Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1990)) (“Whether a 

witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in 

which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the 

subject matter of the witness’s testimony.”).

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Dr. Greifinger offers expert testimony against CCS Defendants, three (3) of 

whom are nurses (Monica Cueny, R.N.; Mical Bey-Shelly, R.N.; and Vicky Bertram, 

R.N.), a mental health professional (Chantalle Brock), and doctor (Lawrence 

Sherman, M.D.). However, Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to testify to matters 

outside correctional healthcare policy and quality management. Said another way,

Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to testify to matters which involve actual medical 

treatment of patients as is at issue in this case. Dr. Greifinger has not provided 

medical care since 1985. (Exhibit B p. 6:10-13). Dr. Greifinger’s only relevant 

history related to actual medical treatment of patients is during his time as a pediatric 

physician, which occurred well over thirty (30) years ago. (Id.) He admits that he 

would need reeducation to practice medicine again. (Exhibit B at p. 10). His career 

is summarized as follows:

Dr. Greifinger completed medical school in 1971. (Exhibit B at p. 8). He then 

entered a residency and social medicine, providing medical care for children and 

adolescence from ranging from ages zero (0) to twenty-one (21). The only time he 

was trained on benzodiazepine withdrawals was when he was in pediatric residency 

(Id. at 11); however, he only treated a small number of patients and cannot 

remember actually rendering treatment. (Id. at 21). Dr. Greifinger remains boardcertified in pediatrics simply because he is grandfathered in. (Id. at p. 10). He never 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7616 Filed 01/19/21 Page 17 of 31
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applied or attended neurological residency, psychiatric residency, or internal 

medicine residency. (Id. at 13).

From 1977 through 1980, he held a Medical Director position at Community

Health Plan of Suffolk. (Id.). He maintained an administrative position, requiring 

him to manage recruitment, retention of clinical staff, and general quality 

management. (Id. at 14). This position did not provide the ability to practice 

neurology or psychiatry. (Id.). He did still practice in pediatric care. (Id. at 15).

From 1980 to 1985, Dr. Greifinger was Chief Medical Officer at Westchester 

Community Health Plan White Plains, NY. (Id.). At least half of Dr. Greifinger’s 

duties were administrative at this position. (Id.). The remaining time was spent 

solely in the field of pediatrics. (Id.). This was the last time Dr. Greifinger practiced 

medicine.

From 1985 to 1989, Dr. Greifinger was the Vice President of Montefiore 

Medical Center, and operationally in charge of a variety of non-inpatient programs, 

including the management of the contract that Montefiore had with the City of New 

York to provide medical care for the inmates on Rikers Island. (Id. at 17). This 

position was “100% administrative.” (Id. at 17-18).

From 1989 to 1995, Dr. Greifinger was the Deputy Commissioner Chief 

Medical Officer of the New York State of Correctional Services. (Id. at 17). Again, 

his duties were solely administrative. (Id.).

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7617 Filed 01/19/21 Page 18 of 31
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From 1995 to the present time, Dr. Greifinger devotes his time to consulting 

design management operations, quality improvement, and utilization management 

for correctional healthcare systems. (Id. at 19). He does not allocate any time in the 

active clinical assessment or treatment of adult patients (Id.), patients with 

neurological issues (Id.), patients with psychiatric issues (Id. at 20), or to patients 

suffering from withdrawal. (Id.). 

According to Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York where Dr. Greifinger’s

services are highlighted1, he is a health care policy and quality management 

consultant, and the description of his areas of focus are as follows:

[H]is work focuses on the design, management, and 

quality improvement in correctional health care systems. 

He has extensive experience in the development and 

management of complex community and institutional 

health programs, and strengths in the bridging of clinical 

and public policy interests.

Dr. Greifinger’s curriculum vitae substantiate his testimony that his specialization is 

confined to correctional health care policy and quality management. (Exhibit A).

Dr. Greifinger’s curriculum vitae mentions not one (1) publication related to pain 

management, neurological dysfunction, psychiatry, catatonic state, or drug 

withdrawal, and absolutely no mention of benzodiazepine withdrawal. (Exhibit A, 

pp. 5-8). Dr. Greifinger’s area of expertise and superior education is of correctional 

1 https://www.plsny.org/dr.-robert-b.-greifinger--m.d..html (Last accessed on 

October 24, 2019)

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7618 Filed 01/19/21 Page 19 of 31
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health policy and quality management, which he did opine stating that CCS clinical 

guidelines were more than adequate and were good. (Exhibit B, p. 72:6-9).

CCS Defendants acknowledge Dr. Greifinger possesses a medical degree. 

However, the mere fact that Dr. Greifinger has a medical degree and treated patients 

thirty (30) years ago does not presently qualify him to offer expert witness opinions 

in a situation where the medical treatment provided to Plaintiff’s decedent is at issue. 

Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to testify against the CCS nurse defendants since he 

has never practiced as a nurse, has no nursing education, training, or experience, as 

a nurse. Dr. Greifinger’s only connection to nursing is when he oversaw the 

administration of medical care in the New York prison system over twenty (20) years 

ago. (Exhibit B, pp. 85:12-86:1). Similarly, Dr. Greifinger is not a mental health 

professional, trained in psychiatry, or has ever treated patients as a mental health 

professional. Dr. Greifinger testified that he in fact would rely on opinions related 

to psychiatric conditions to people that are more learned in medicine to make those 

kinds of determinations. (Exhibit B, pp. 36:21-37:2). While general practitioners 

can sometimes be found qualified to testify as to conditions outside their specialty, 

Dr. Greifinger is not a practicing physician or a general practitioner. He is not a 

practicing physician and has no experience in internal medicine, pain and suffering, 

mental anguish, drug withdrawal, catatonic state, malignant catatonia, neurological 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7619 Filed 01/19/21 Page 20 of 31
9

function, and starvation because he has no requisite superior experience or education 

in such areas. 

When evaluating Dr. Greifinger’s experience related to CCS Defendants’

position that Mr. Stojcevski suffered from malignant catatonia, Dr. Greifinger has 

no educational or experiential background in catatonia. Dr. Greifinger testified he 

has never diagnosed or treated a patient who suffered from catatonia (Exhibit B, pp. 

12:25-13:5), has never published anything related to catatonia (Exhibit B, p. 35:21-

23), and has never been involved in any research projects relating to diagnosis or 

treatment of catatonia. (Exhibit B, pp. 35:24-36:2). Even when evaluating 

Plaintiff’s position of benzodiazepine withdrawal, Dr. Greifinger has no educational 

or experiential background qualifications to opine on such condition. Dr. Greifinger 

testified that he cannot specifically recall treating anybody that was going thorough 

benzodiazepine withdrawal during his time as a pediatric resident (Exhibit B, p. 

11:16-20; p. 12:18-21) and had no knowledge of benzodiazepine withdrawal stages 

(Exhibit B, p. 107:6-108:1). He has never prescribed Xanax or Klonopin to a 

patient, cannot identify the difference between Xanax and Klonopin, and does not 

know the different half-life between the two (2) drugs and its effects on withdrawals. 

(Exhibit B at p. 106-107).

Further, the Court must compare the area in which Dr. Greifinger has superior 

experience or education, with the subject matter of the witness’ testimony. Dr. 

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Greifinger’s opinions and conclusions, while mainly resorting to stating the actions 

of various Defendants and claiming they fell below the standard of correctional 

health care and demonstrate deliberate indifference, see infra, includes opinions that 

comment on pain and suffering; nutritional health; mental anguish; and neurological

function. (See Exhibit C, p. 9). Dr. Greifinger is not an expert in internal medicine, 

neurology, mental health, pain management, or drug withdrawal/addiction. (Exhibit 

D, pp. 7-8, Exhibit C). Dr. Greifinger has not provided hands-on treatment to 

patients in over thirty (30) years and, even when he was providing treatment, it was 

to adolescent individuals. Dr. Greifinger testified that he has had no formal training 

in the areas of psychiatry, neurology, forensic pathology, nursing, since either his 

time in medical school or following his pediatric residence. (Exhibit B, pp. 46-48). 

Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to offer expert opinions in areas that do not 

involve correctional healthcare policy and quality management. 

B. Dr. Greifinger’s Expert Opinions are Not Reliable nor Relevant Pursuant 

to Daubert and Should be Excluded.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court of the United States directed district courts 

faced with the proffer of expert testimony to conduct “a preliminary assessment of 

whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 

valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 

facts in issue.” Id. at 592-93, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. Dr. Greifinger’s opinions have 

previously been found to be unreliable by other federal courts due to his failure to 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7621 Filed 01/19/21 Page 22 of 31
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provide any support for his statements and providing no basis for his conclusions,

contrary to the requirements under Daubert and Fed. R. Evid. 702. (See Exhibits D

and E). In the matter of Dukes v. State, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (2006), the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found that Dr. Greifinger’s 

expert report was not sufficiently reliable for various reasons, but namely that:

• Dr. Greifinger offered no argument as to why his 

statements are reliable.

• Dr. Greifinger offered no support for his findings, and 

what he based his conclusions on.

• Dr. Greifinger cited no support for his conclusions 

except his experience. 

• Dr. Greifinger made no reference to any specific 

experience or material upon which he relief in making 

his conclusions. 

428 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (2006). (Exhibit D, p. 9). Similarly, in the matter Goforth v. 

Paris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23366 *; 2007 WL 988733 (M.D. Ga Mar. 30, 2007),

the United States Court for the Middle District of Georgia found that they were 

unable to find the opinions offered as sufficiently reliable because Dr. Greifinger

failed to articulate a reliable basis for his opinions or specify the method used in 

arriving at his conclusions. (Exhibit E). Specifically, the Court stated that rather 

than applying the specific facts of this case, Dr. Greifinger seemed to assume that 

Plaintiff suffered harm because harm is hypothetically possible when treatment is 

delayed. (Exhibit E, p. 6).

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7622 Filed 01/19/21 Page 23 of 31
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Here, Dr. Greifinger’s expert report similarly has not one articulated basis for 

his opinions and makes no mention of the methods he used in arriving at his 

conclusions. Fed. R. Evid. 702 explains that “[t]he expert’s testimony must be 

grounded in an accepted body of learning or experience in the expert’s field, and the 

expert must explain how the conclusion is so grounded.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory 

committee’s notes (2000 amendment). Yet, “[i]f the witness is relying solely or 

primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to 

the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and 

how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Id. (emphasis added). First, Dr. 

Greifinger offers no sufficient data or facts that would prove such opinions were the 

product of reliable principles and methods. Dr. Greifinger offers no studies, 

publications, peer-reviewed articles, in support of his opinions, and provided no such 

documents during his deposition, thus presumably he relies on his experience to 

offer such opinions. When questioned as to the basis of his opinions against CCS 

Defendant Chantelle Brock’s alleged fabrication, Dr. Greifinger resorted to 

conclusory statements: 

Q: Paragraph 65 of your report you accuse Kelly Mann 

and Chantelle Brock of fabricating, that he refused; 

paragraph, 65. 

A: I have it. 

***

Q: He did not talk to her on the 18th, 19th, or 20th, 

correct?

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A: That is correct because he was unresponsive, he was

unable to.

Q: That is your determination, I am asking.

A: That is my opinion.

***

A: [y]ou have no sense of how these neurological 

conditions are. There are people who are 

unresponsive one minute and perhaps responsive 

another minute.

Q: That is your opinion. You are not a psychiatrist, a 

neurologist, you have no training in regard to that 

so let’s not go down that route. 

(Exhibit B, pp. 98-102). When asked for his basis in opining that Dr. Sherman 

ignored Mr. Stojcevski’s altered consciousness, Dr. Greifinger stated:

Q: My question to you is, not that these things happen. 

My question to you is on the 17th he did do an 

examination. What proof do you have that he 

ignored them, he came to a conclusion you might 

not agree with them. What proof do you have that 

he ignored them?

A: That is my opinion.

(Exhibit B, pp. 112-113). Similarly, when asked for his proof or basis for stating 

Dr. Sherman ignored Mr. Stojcevski’s disturbed cognition and tremors, Dr. 

Greifinger testified that, in his opinion, he did not think the exam was adequate 

enough and that was the basis of his opinions that Mr. Stojcevski was being ignored. 

(Exhibit B, pp. 113-114). 

When an expert offers opinions based on experience, Fed. R. Evid. 702

requires Dr. Greifinger to explain how his experience led him to the conclusions 

reached, why such experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that 

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experience is reliably applied to the facts. Dr. Greifinger has failed to tie any specific 

experience with any of the conclusions reached in this matter. Similar to the matter 

in Dukes Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are simply a summary of CCS Defendants’ 

actions with regard to Mr. Stojcesvski and concludes that such actions fall below the 

standards of correctional health care and demonstrate deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

Dr. Greifinger’s opinions and conclusions include seventeen (17) numbered 

paragraphs that can be summarized into eleven (11) broad categories as follows:

1. Mr. Stojcevski’s death was preventable. (⁋57)

2. Mr. Stojcevski suffered pain and suffering as a result 

of a disregard for his withdrawal from benzodiazepine 

medication. (⁋57, 60)

3. Monica Cueny R.N. was aware of the risks of 

withdrawal from benzodiazepines and ignored Mr. 

Stojcevski. (⁋58)

4. CCS nurses failed to verify Mr. Stojcevski’s opiate and 

benzodiazepine medication and take his vital signs. 

(⁋59, 70)

5. CCS Defendants chose to ignore Mr. Stojcevski’s pain 

and suffering and mental anguish. (⁋58, 60, 61, 66, 73)

6. CCS Defendants failed to follow CCS policies, 

guidelines, and protocols. (⁋58, 62, 63, 66)

7. Chantalle Brock fabricated that Mr. Stojcevski

“refused” to cooperate and failed to refer him to a 

psychiatrist for a diagnosis. (⁋ 65)

8. Dr. Sherman chose to ignore Mr. Stojcevski’s altered 

consciousness, his disturbed cognition, and his 

tremors, his recent benzodiazepine medication, chose 

to avoid doing a mental status exam, and a physical 

exam. (⁋66) 

9. CCS Defendants perpetuated a myth that Mr. 

Stojcevski was feigning. (⁋69)

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10.CCS failed to train and supervise its clinical staff on 

policies and guidelines for withdrawal, hunger strike, 

and mental health care. (⁋72) 

11.Mr. Stojcevski suffered from dehydration that caused 

or contributed to his death. (⁋61, 65, 66)

(Exhibit C, pp. 9-11). Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are not supported by any data, facts,

or based on a scientific basis for such opinions. Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are 

conclusory and devoid of any specific experience to support such conclusions. Dr. 

Greifinger opines that Mr. Stojcevski’s death was preventable yet fails to provide 

any evidence that CCS Defendants’ actions or inactions proximately caused his 

death. Dr. Greifinger testified that he relied upon the opinions of pathology experts 

in this case, and that he has no training in pathology or determinations of cause of 

death related to dehydration. (Exhibit B, p. 36:8-14; p. 43:6-9). The Sixth Circuit 

has noted that an expert’s “reliance on anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, 

failure to consider other possible causes, lack of testing, and subjectivity” can render 

his opinion inadmissible. Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 

527 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th

Cir. 2009)). Here, Dr. Greifinger’s opinion fails to consider the facts and rather 

resorts to interpretations of the facts in light of what he believes is an appropriate 

medical assessment, despite not treating a patient in over thirty (30) years. Expert 

reports must include ‘how’ and ‘why’ the expert reached a particular result, not 

merely the expert’s conclusory opinions.” R.C. Olmstead, Inc., v. CU Interface, 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7626 Filed 01/19/21 Page 27 of 31
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LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Salgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 

F.3d 73, 742 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1998)). “[A]n expert opinion must ‘set forth facts’ and, in 

doing so, outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical foundation.” Id. (citing 

Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 2005)). 

Excluding an expert’s ipse dixit opinion testimony maintains the integrity of 

Daubert’s requirements because “[i]f admissibility could be established merely by 

the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability prong would be, for all 

practical purposes, subsumed by the qualification prong.” United States v. Frazier, 

387 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11

th Cir. 2004). Dr. Greifinger’s ipse dixit opinions must be 

excluded because he fails to outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical 

foundation. 

Lastly, Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are not relevant, in that they will not assist 

the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue. Fed. R. Evid. 

702. Dr. Greifinger’s opinion fails to indicate what CCS Defendants should have 

done in relation to Mr. Stojcevski’s medical care, and resorts to summaries of actions 

and conclusions that those actions fell below the standard of care. As was found in 

Dukes, Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are no different from what Plaintiff’s lawyers will 

argue during their closing, and his conclusions do nothing to advance a material 

aspect of Plaintiff’s case. Thus, any opinions or conclusions Dr. Greifinger would 

make would not assist the jury and are therefore not relevant and should be excluded. 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7627 Filed 01/19/21 Page 28 of 31
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C. Dr. Greifinger Cannot Render an Opinion on an Ultimate Issue of This 

Case, I.E., Whether the CCS Defendants are “Deliberately Indifferent.”

Not only is Dr. Greifinger not qualified to testify to matters outside 

correctional healthcare, but he is not permitted to make legal conclusions. Expert 

witnesses are not permitted to make legal conclusions. United States v. Melcher, 672 

F. App'x 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2016). An expert makes a legal conclusion when “he 

defines the governing legal standard or applies the standard to the facts of the case.” 

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Here, Dr. Greifinger’s opinion is littered 

with references that various Defendants actions or inactions demonstrated deliberate 

indifference to Mr. Stojcevski’s serious medical needs. (See Exhibit C).

The Sixth Circuit in Woods v. Lecureax, 110 F.3d 1215 (6th Cir.1997), 

affirmed the trial court's decision to prohibit an expert witness' use of the term 

“deliberate indifference.” The court observed that “whether a prison official acted 

with deliberate indifference depends on that official's state of mind. Thus, by 

expressing the opinion that [the defendant] was deliberately indifferent, [the expert] 

gives the false impression that he knows the answer to this inquiry, which depends 

on [the defendant's] mental state.” 110 F.3d at 1221. This would not be the first time 

that a court has prohibited Dr. Greifinger from using the phrase “deliberately 

indifferent,” or expressing any opinion regarding a defendant’s mental state. AlTurki v. Robinson, No. 10-CV-02404-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 603109, at *5 (D. Colo. 

Feb. 15, 2013); Morgan-Mapp v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. CV 07-2949, 

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2008 WL 11366456, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2008). Dr. Greifinger’s statements 

regarding deliberate indifference were not permitted and were stricken from the 

record.

III. CONCLUSION

Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to offer expert opinions against CCS 

Defendants, and his opinions must be stricken for the following reasons:

• Dr. Greifinger is not qualified to testify as to matters 

outside correctional healthcare policy and quality 

management because he does not have the requisite 

education or experience to testify as to medical 

treatment of patients pursuant to Daubert.

• Dr. Greifinger cannot opine regarding legal 

conclusions and cannot state whether certain actions 

constitute deliberate indifference. 

• Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are unreliable because they

are not based on scientific evidence or peer-reviewed 

evidence; therefore, his testimony must be stricken 

under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert. 

• Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are unreliable because he 

fails to opine how his experience supports the basis of 

his claims and conclusions. 

• Dr. Greifinger’s opinions are not relevant and would 

not assist the trier of fact pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702. 

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7629 Filed 01/19/21 Page 30 of 31
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Respectfully submitted,

CHAPMAN LAW GROUP

Dated: January 19, 2021 /s/ Madeline Young

Ronald W. Chapman Sr., M.P.A., 

LL.M. (P37603)

Madeline Young (P82140)

Attorney for the CCS Defendants 

1441 West Long Lake Rd., Suite 310

Troy, MI 48098

(248) 644-6326

rchapman@chapmanlawgroup.com

myoung@chapmanlawgroup.com

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 19, 2021 I presented the 

foregoing paper to the Clerk of the Court for filing and 

uploading to the ECF system, which will send notification 

of such filing to the attorneys of record listed herein and I 

hereby certify that I have mailed by US Postal Service the 

document to the involved nonparticipants.

/s/ Madeline Young

Madeline Young (P82140)

1441 West Long Lake Rd., Suite 310

Troy, MI 48098

(248) 644-6326

myoung@chapmanlawgroup.com

Case 4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG ECF No. 209, PageID.7630 Filed 01/19/21 Page 31 of 31