J-S69005-17

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMALL JACKSON

Appellant No. 1599 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 27, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007067-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, RANSOM, JJ. and STEVENS P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2017

Jamall Jackson appeals from the judgment of sentence of four to eight 

years imprisonment followed by two years probation. Judgment of sentence 

was imposed after a jury convicted him of possession of a firearm by a 

prohibited person. We affirm. 

The jury’s conviction rests upon the following evidence adduced by the 

Commonwealth. At approximately 1:30 p.m. on May 8, 2015, Pittsburgh 

Police received several 911 calls indicating that a firearm had been 

discharged multiple times near the intersection of Sacramento Avenue and 

Minton Street. The shooter was described as a bearded African-American 

man, who had fired shots at the feet of a woman just before they entered a 

red car, which the assailant was driving. 
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Police Officer Jeffrey Brock arrived at the scene. Officer Brock found 

no one and did not see blood, but he did retrieve eight shell casings from the 

sidewalk and a grassy area near the described intersection, as well as a cell 

phone owed by Jenna Cox, Appellant’s girlfriend. While Officer Brock was 

investigating the area, a bearded African-American male drove a red Impala 

along Minton Street. Police unsuccessfully attempted to stop the vehicle in 

question, which was found parked about .2 miles from the scene of the 

shooting. The Impala was registered to Ms. Cox. 

Several days later, Officer Brock called Ms. Cox, who was evasive and 

appeared frightened. On May 13, 2015, Detective Dawn Mercurio called 

Appelant, who agreed to come to the police station for an interview. After 

being given his Miranda warnings, Appellant made a statement, which the 

trial court described:

[Appellant] told Detective Mercurio that he had been in a 

romantic relationship with Jenna Cox and that he had acted as a 

surrogate father for her five-year-old son. The natural father 

was incarcerated so he was acting in that individual’s place. 

[Appellant] told Detective Mercurio that on the 8th of May, he 

was angry at Cox because he had learned that Cox and the 

natural father of her five-year-old had been talking behind his 

back and that the natural father had recently been released from 

incarceration. [Appellant] found out that Cox had taken her son’s 

natural father to his son's school so that he could meet with the 

teachers and become more involved in his son's life. [Appellant] 

called Cox's cell phone and confirmed the fact that Cox was at 

her son's school with the child's natural father and he demanded 

that she leave him there and that she come pick him up at the 

300 block of Minton Street.
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When Cox arrived, [Appellant] got in the passenger seat 

and he was very angry and pulled out a gun from his right 

pocket and set it on his lap while he was talking with her. The 

[g]un was a nine-millimeter Ruger handgun. He was yelling at 

her[,] telling her that he did not appreciate how deceitful she 

was and he demanded to know where the natural father was 

living because he needed to die. [Cox] then got out of the car 

and was walking down the street when [Appellant] followed her, 

telling her to get back in the car. When she refused to listen to 

him, he fired several rounds at her feet and she took off running. 

[Appellant] then got into the driver’s side of the vehicle and was 

pursuing her down Minton Street. He told her to get back into 

the car and if she did not, he was going to harm her. She got 

back into the car and then they drove away. [Appellant] then 

drove to his father’s house in McKees Rocks so that he could 

dispose of the firearm. After giving the firearm to his father, 

they drove back to Minton Street to look for the cell phone that 

Cox had dropped. [Appellant] told Detective Mercurio that his 

father still had the gun and then agreed to call his father to tell 

him that they at least wanted to obtain the weapon. His father 

agreed and then they rode to his father’s house and his father 

came out to the police car with the gun and magazine in a bag 

and gave it to Detective Mercurio. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/17, at 4-5. The Commonwealth also presented 

evidence that Appellant was previously convicted of three counts of robbery. 

In response to this Commonwealth evidence, Appellant’s father denied 

receiving the gun from Appellant and claimed that he found it in some 

bushes. Appellant also denied the entirety of the statement that he gave to 

Detective Mercurio. 

The jury rejected Appellant’s proof and convicted him of the firearm’s 

offense. After imposition of the above-described sentence, Appellant filed a 

post-trial motion, which included a challenge to the weight of the evidence. 
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This appeal followed denial of that motion. Appellant presents these issues 

for our review: 

I. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to

establish Appellant as possessing a firearm beyond a

reasonable doubt, since no witness testified that Appellant

was ever in actual possession of a firearm, no scientific or

circumstantial evidence indicated Appellant possessed the

firearm, and the only evidence regarding Appellant's

possession of a firearm were the hearsay statements of Jena

Cox introduced by Detective Mercurio as if these statements

were made by Appellant during his alleged confession that

was neither written or recorded.

II. Whether Appellant's conviction of person not to possess a

firearm was against the weight of the evidence; where no

witness testified that Appellant was in possession of the

firearm; where no scientific or circumstantial evidence

indicated Appellant possessed the firearm; where the only

evidence regarding the element of possession of the firearm

was hearsay testimony of an alleged confession made by

Appellant; where Appellant's confession was not recorded,

reduced to writing, or adopted by Appellant in any part.

III. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare or 

demonstrate a sufficient understanding of the evidence and 

ultimately failing to object to the hearsay statements of Jena 

Cox introduced by Detective Mercurio as the Appellant's 

alleged confession.

IV. Whether the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for

mistrial was an abuse of discretion where Appellant sought

to terminate trial counsel's representation for the

aforementioned ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellant’s brief at 5. 

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction. Since a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a 
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question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary. Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d 635, 638 (Pa.Super. 2017). 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted). 

Appellant was convicted of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), persons not to 

possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms, which states: 

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated 

in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, 

regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the 

criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, 

transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, 

control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this 

Commonwealth.
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18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). One of the enumerated offenses is robbery. 18 

Pa.C.S. § 6105(b). Thus, § 6105(a)(1) essentially contains two elements, 

that the defendant (1) possessed a firearm and (2) was convicted of an 

enumerated offense. See Commonwealth v. Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254 (Pa. 

2014); Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736 (Pa.Super. 2014). 

Herein, Appellant does not contest that he was convicted of an 

enumerated offense, and the Commonwealth established that he had been 

convicted of three counts of robbery prior to the incident at issue herein. On 

appeal, Appellant challenges that the Commonwealth proved, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that he was in possession of a firearm. Although 

Appellant confessed to Detective Mercurio that he had a gun in possession 

on the day in question, Appellant suggests that his confession must be 

discounted since it was not written or recorded, even though it could have 

been. As clearly articulated above, the jury assesses the credibility of the 

trial witnesses. Detective Mercurio outlined the contents of Appellant’s 

statement, and the jury was free to credit her testimony, regardless of 

whether Appellant’s statement was written or recorded. Hence, we reject 

Appellant’s first position. 

Appellant next raises a challenge to the weight of the evidence, which 

is identical to his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

verdict. He suggests that the jury should not have credited Detective 

Mercurio’s report of the contents of his confession since he did not sign a
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written confession and since it was not recorded. Our standard of review in 

this context is settled:

In assessing a claim that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence, this Court will not substitute its 

judgment for that of the factfinder, which is free to assess the 

credibility of witnesses and to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 

860 A.2d 102 (2004); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 

384, 668 A.2d 97, 101 (1995) (“An appellate court is barred 

from substituting its judgment for that of the finder of fact.” 

(citing Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 498 Pa. 245, 445 A.2d 

1203, 1206 (1982)).

“When the challenge to the weight of the 

evidence is predicated on the credibility of trial 

testimony, our review of the trial court's decision is 

extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is 

so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any 

verdict based thereon pure conjecture, these types 

of claims are not cognizable on appellate review.” 

Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “Moreover, 

where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim 

below, an appellate court's role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003). “Rather, appellate review is limited to 

whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion 

in ruling on the weight claim.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 198 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Commonwealth v. Fortson, 165 A.3d 10, 16 (Pa.Super. 2017). 

Additionally, resolution of a weight-of-the-evidence challenge is 

assigned to the discretion of the trial court so that this Court does not review 

such an allegation in the first instance. Commonwealth v. Storey, 167 
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A.3d 750, 761 (Pa.Super. 2017). Instead, we consider whether the trial 

court abused the discretion in rejecting a contention that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. Id. The trial court should credit an 

averment that the verdict is against the weight of evidence only if the 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Id. 

In this case, the jury was permitted to accept Detective Mercurio’s 

testimony about the statement that Appellant gave to her. We conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s 

conviction was not so against the weight of the evidence as to shock the trial 

court’s sense of justice. We therefore reject Appellant’s second position. 

Appellant’s third issue concerns trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. A claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be addressed on direct appeal, 

but must be deferred to collateral review. Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 

A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). Hence, we decline to examine Appellant’s third issue, 

which he can raise in a PCRA proceeding. 

Appellant’s final claimed error is that the trial court should have

granted counsel’s request for a mistrial, which counsel sought on the basis 

that his relationship with Appellant had deteriorated to the point that counsel 

could no longer effectively represent Appellant. In the criminal context, a 

mistrial is declared in order to “to eliminate the negative effect wrought 

upon a defendant when prejudicial elements are injected into the case or 

otherwise discovered at trial.” Commonwealth v. Cole, 167 A.3d 49, 73 
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(Pa.Super. 2017). A mistrial is warranted when the trial process is tainted, 

depriving the defendant of a fair trial. Id. The trial court “is vested with 

discretion to grant a mistrial whenever the alleged prejudicial event may 

reasonably be said to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.” Id. 

Mistrial can be granted only when “misconduct or prejudicial error actually 

occurred,” and, if it did, a new trial is needed to avoid the resulting 

prejudice. Id. 

In this case, there was no prejudicial element introduced at trial. 

There was no improper evidence or remarks presented to the jury. 

Appellant’s mistrial request was predicated solely upon the manner in which 

counsel was conducting trial. Simply put, there was no ground upon which 

a mistrial could have been granted because there was no trial error.

However, as noted, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be 

deferred to collateral review. Appellant is free to present any issue involving 

how he was represented at trial in a timely collateral proceeding. Hence, we 

reject this final claim. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary
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Date: 11/16/2017