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CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY 

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 2, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 2, 2010 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, A U.S. Senator From California ................. 1 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 3 

WITNESSES 

Blair, Dennis, USN (RET.), Director of National Intelligence ............................. 7 

Panetta, Leon, Director, Central Intelligence Agency .......................................... 11 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ..................... 12 

Burgess, Ronald, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ............................ 13 

Dinger, John, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research .................................................................................................................... 15 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Prepared statement of Dennis Blair, USN (RET.), Director of National Intelligence ................................................................................................................... 44 

Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department 

of Justice ............................................................................................................... 90 

Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, 2009 Update and Recent 

Developments ....................................................................................................... 126 

Examples of Leaks in Federal Terrorism Cases ................................................... 131 

Prepared statement of Hon. Russ Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ..... 134 

(1) 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL 

SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller, 

Wyden, Mikulski, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Hatch, Snowe and 

Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. The committee meets today in open session to receive the coordinated analytic assessment of the intelligence community of the threats facing 

the United States. 

We welcome our witnesses, Admiral Dennis Blair, the Director of 

National Intelligence, who will provide a summary of the written 

statement he has submitted on behalf of the intelligence community; the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta; 

the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bob Mueller; 

the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Ron Burgess; and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 

Intelligence and Research, Ambassador John Dinger. 

This hearing presents an annual opportunity to focus on the 

threats our nation faces, and it provides a rare forum for the public 

to receive strategic intelligence analysis. I think that right now the 

top threat on everyone’s mind is the heightened terrorism threat, 

especially against our own homeland. The committee has held 

hearings in the past two weeks to review the Christmas Day attempted attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and the Fort Hood 

shootings by United States Army Major Nidal Hassan. We have 

also reviewed the attack on CIA’s Khowst base in eastern Afghanistan on December 30th, the most deadly attack against CIA personnel in decades. 

These three events are reminders of the ongoing threat the nation faces from within and without and the challenges and dangers 

with which the intelligence community must deal on a daily basis. 

We’ve been briefed on the continuing terrorist threat, and I want 

to thank Director Mueller for our discussion yesterday. I received 

a lengthy follow-up briefing on the status of ongoing terrorism inVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
2 

vestigations and intelligence we’ve received as part of those investigations. 

I know this is a very sensitive matter and will ask if members 

who have questions relating to counterterrorism operations will 

hold them until we can go to a classified session at the end. The 

written testimony submitted to us today provides an important reminder stating that—and I quote—‘‘the recent successful and attempted attacks represent an evolving threat in which it is even 

more difficult to identify and track small numbers of terrorists, recently recruited and trained, and short-term plots than to find and 

follow terrorist cells engaged in plots that have been going on for 

years.’’ 

Our committee stands ready and willing to provide the tools, gentlemen, you need to make sure our counterterrorism efforts are the 

very best they can be. Despite the Christmas Day and Fort Hood 

intelligence shortcomings, the intelligence community has thwarted 

numerous terrorist plots and apprehended several suspects in 

2009. And I’d like to tick a few off: al-Qa’ida operative Najibullah 

Zazi, living outside Denver, was identified through good intelligence work as having trained in Pakistan and conspiring with 

others to detonate a bomb in the United States. Two of Zazi’s associates were arraigned in January, and his father also has been 

charged. 

Secondly, Chicago-based David Headley was identified for his involvement in the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks on Mumbai in 2008 and 

for his connection to a plot to bomb a Danish newspaper. Three, 

14 people were charged in Minnesota this year for recruiting Somali-American youth to travel to Somalia, train and fight alongside 

terrorist groups. In October, Tarek Mehanna was arrested in Boston and charged with plotting to attack shopping malls and seeking 

out terrorist training. 

In September, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi was arrested for 

plotting to bomb a Dallas skyscraper. And earlier in the year, Daniel Boyd was identified as having traveled to terrorist training 

camps and plotting an attack on U.S. military personnel at the 

Quantico Marine Base. He was charged, along with six others, on 

charges that include conspiring to provide material support to terrorists. So clearly, there have been both counterterrorism successes 

and a few failures. Also clear is that the threat to the homeland 

is high and that terrorist groups have identified ways of getting operators and facilitators into the country without raising suspicion. 

Let me shift from terrorism to the topic that DNI Blair highlights in his written testimony, the threat to our government, public and private sector from cyber espionage, crime and attack. Director, your description of the problem is very blunt, and I believe 

it to be accurate. The need to develop an overall cyber security 

strategy is very clear. This committee has carefully examined cyber 

security through five hearings in the past year, carefully reviewed 

various cyber attacks and penetrations from foreign actors and appointed a cyber task force of three members—Senators Whitehouse, 

Mikulski and Snowe—to conduct a six-month analysis of our government’s current plans. The task force will be reporting to the full 

committee shortly. 

3 

It is my belief—and I think the belief of others—that certain nations represent serious cyber attack potential to our country. And 

I believe that robust diplomatic efforts should be made, with the 

goal of effecting international agreements among key actors regarding cyber security. The time has come to look at the value of a 

cyber treaty with built-in mutual assurances of behavior. It is noteworthy and commendable that the State Department has, for the 

first time, demarched another country for its cyber activity. 

It is also worth noting that this country has stated its willingness to cooperate internationally on these matters. There are far 

more developments around the world that threaten the national security interests of the United States. The past year saw a Taliban 

surge in Afghanistan that led to the President’s decision to shift 

strategy and increase troop levels. Pakistan continues to be an uneven partner in our counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Somalia and Yemen are failed and failing states that require 

enormous attention. 

These and many other threats are outlined in the DNI’s testimony. So now, let me turn to the Vice Chairman, with whom I 

have had the pleasure of working this year. And I thank him very 

much for his cooperation on all matters. Mr. Vice Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, let me welcome our witnesses and thank you for the very open and generous way that you 

and your staff have worked with the minority. We believe that this 

is the way we can achieve what we’re supposed to achieve—bipartisan, nonpartisan oversight of the critically important intelligence 

community. 

This hearing today comes at a time where the importance of the 

national security threats are currently highlighted by recent 

events. 

From the terror plots disrupted this fall by the FBI to the deadly 

attacks at Fort Hood and the Little Rock recruiting station to the 

failed attack on Christmas Day, we have seen an alarming number 

of terrorist threats, in particular within and against the homeland, 

and they’re being carried out. 

As members and witnesses are aware, this will be my last annual worldwide threat hearing, as I intend to depart from the Senate upon the completion of the 111th Congress. No applause please. 

Ironically, I believe we find ourselves, today, in the same place we 

were in when I first joined the committee years ago—analyzing deficiencies within the intelligence community to make recommendations for changes that will help us better prevent plots and connect 

the dots. 

So as we embark on our final year together, I offer these 

thoughts for the path forward over the next year and into the future. First, our priority as congressional oversight committee members and your constant challenge as the leaders of the IC is to focus 

on threats to the homeland and to our interests overseas. AlQa’ida, its affiliates and other terrorist organizations today have a 

global reach. In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen, the Horn 

4 

of Africa and elsewhere, terrorist operators train and prepare for 

attacks against us and our allies. 

Our focus must be on these entities wherever they operate. This 

is a global conflict, and yes, it is a war—a war of terror these radicals have declared on America and the West. The intelligence community must lean forward in this war, and we on congressional 

oversight committees must back you up. When we ask you, behind 

closed doors, to be aggressive, and we do that quite freely, it is our 

responsibility to stand behind you when the doors are open and to 

support your actions when they are under the spotlight. And I 

pledge we will try to continue to do so. 

At the same time, our committee will hold the IC accountable, 

and the IC must hold itself accountable, because the threats we are 

dealing with are far too dangerous to tolerate any kind of sloppy 

work or careless mistakes. As the saying goes, the terrorists only 

have to get it right once to be successful; you and we have to get 

it right all of the time. We must use all avenues available for obtaining the crucial information we need to protect our people, and 

that includes a full and humane interrogation of captured suspects 

prior to or without Miranda rights. And I emphasize enemy combatants must be questioned to the fullest by the intelligence community before—if they are Mirandized, before they are Mirandized 

and given an attorney. 

Treating terrorists like common criminals can cost us lifesaving 

intelligence. While I have no doubt that the FBI obtained useful information from the Christmas bomber, we just don’t know how 

many timely leads have been lost as a result of his refusal to cooperate after he was Mirandized. This approach gave his terrorist 

colleagues time to cover their tracks while Americans remained at 

risk. Any FBI interrogator or other interrogator will tell you that 

50 minutes is not long enough to build rapport and get all needed 

intelligence. 

And any interrogator will tell you that you study up on your subject and read everything in the file first before you’re ready to go 

in for a full and productive interrogation. That takes time and that 

time must be devoted to the preparation prior to effective questioning. We must plan ahead for how we can bring intelligence to 

bear in interrogation, whether at home or abroad. Timely action demands timely intelligence, and we must ensure that all intelligence 

tools are used when we find ourselves in a similar circumstance 

again. 

I am frankly appalled—I am appalled—that one year after the 

President ended the previous administration’s interrogation program, that there was nothing in place, nothing in place to handle 

the sort of situation presented by the Christmas Day bomber. I 

submit to our witnesses today that we cannot afford to make that 

same mistake again. I presume that the high-value interrogation 

group that is still coming online will solve a number of these problems. And rest assured that this committee will be following this 

closely to ensure that it does. 

Similarly, we cannot let campaign promises blindly guide decisions, no matter what the consequences to our society. The ideal of 

closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility cannot become more 

important than protecting our American citizens from the terrorists 

5 

imprisoned there. And we cannot put Americans at risk by letting 

detainee after detainee rejoin the fight. That was a mistake made 

in a prior administration. That mistake must not continue to be repeated today. 

The top two al-Qa’ida operatives in Yemen today, just as one example, are both Gitmo graduates that have returned to the fight, 

despite the fact they were supposedly in a rehab program. We also 

must not let our desire to showcase American justice outweigh the 

requirement to protect our citizens. Terror show trials in New York 

or anywhere else are clearly not the most expedient way to try the 

9/11 suspects. It has taken a while for some to wake up to this reality, but I believe Mayor Bloomberg’s evolution on this topic and 

his comments from this past week are telling. 

Some in the administration have said they want to try them, 

now, in a rural area. Well, I’m from a rural area, and speaking 

from a rural state, I can tell you that we want nothing to do with 

those trials in our state. Aside from the security concerns and 

costs, domestic terror trials have exposed sensitive classified information in the past and have given intelligence to al-Qa’ida. The examples are well known; I need not recount them there. 

Former judge, former Attorney General Mike Mukasey has spoken eloquently about that. There are some who’ve tried to contradict him, but they have proven no contradiction. It is an unacceptable risk, essentially, since this Congress has passed and the 

court has upheld the military commission process, which ensures 

that even a foreign terrorist/enemy combatant can get a fair trial. 

Now, turning to Afghanistan, we must win there; we cannot afford to fail. The addition of 30,000 troops to implement General 

McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy was a positive step. Employing smart power as a whole-of-government approach is the best 

way to eliminate al-Qa’ida and the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan. 

But the intelligence community must rally around General 

McChrystal’s COIN strategy and continue to shift from a CT-only 

focus to both a CT—or counterterrorist—and counterinsurgency approach. 

There are other threats that are serious, and terrorism and the 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are by no means the only threats facing our community. For more than a decade, the intelligence community has debated Iran’s nuclear intent and all the while Iran 

has progressed closer and closer to a nuclear weapons capability. 

Today, Iran seems to be capable of producing highly enriched uranium. And that, gentlemen, is the long pole in the tent of a nuclear 

weapons program. 

And we are left waiting for a nation that provides support, training and weapons to our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan, along 

with their allies like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, to come to the bargaining table. While Iran’s intent may 

change over time and I’m hopeful that the people of Iran will be 

successful in pressuring their government for change, I, for one, do 

not believe it is in any nation’s interest—United States or other nations in the world—for Iran to possess a nuclear weapons capability. I trust that our witnesses will address the threat from Iran 

and other nation states today. 

6 

Turning now to how we spend the money in the IC to combat the 

threats we face, I believe we must be good stewards of taxpayer resources. Unless we start moving in the right direction with our bigdollar overhead purchases, we’ll continue to waste billions of dollars on one-trick ponies, some of which never, ever come to fruition. 

Those of you in the community know the examples of large and ultimately unsustainable programs that have followed this path. 

Now, the NRO Director told Madam Chair and me last week that 

he agreed with our committee’s approach to a cheaper, more 

versatile acquisition that this committee has recommended for 

years, and he was moving forward to execute the program. That 

means we were very surprised, yesterday, in the President’s budget 

that this option is not even funded. I believe that’s a mistake our 

committee will be closely following and hope we will be able to correct that through the legislative process. 

Finally, Director Blair, I was encouraged, as was the Chair, to 

see that in your written opening statement, you spent the first two 

and a half pages discussing cyber threats. Recent cyber attacks 

against Google underscore the importance of sound cyber policies 

and initiatives. And we know that the intelligence community recognizes this threat as real and of highest importance and goes well 

beyond what we are discussing publicly. 

Yet, to my chagrin, the administration’s solution has been to create another position, I am afraid, as a figurehead—a cyber czar— 

with less than a half-dozen staff. In a few years, I believe we could 

lament the fact that more was not done now to confront this challenge when we had the chance. As Senator Feinstein, the Chair 

said, Senators Whitehouse, Snowe and Mikulski comprise a cyber 

working group on our committee and should have much to say on 

this cyber topic. I believe all on the committee agree that it’s very 

real, very serious and the administration needs to treat it as such. 

In conclusion, the greatest danger comes from the unknown—the 

threat not yet on the radar. Further threats are unlikely to be repeat performances, so we must create new methods and tradecraft 

to recognize terror threats we haven’t seen before. 

Unfortunately, the process of intelligence community reform, legislatively, is not complete. Congress gave the DNI a load of responsibility without the requisite authority. The squabble between the 

DNI and the CIA Director, which unfortunately surfaced earlier 

this year, over who will serve as the DNI representatives over this 

past year, is just another disappointing example to me that we 

don’t have the right balance and clear rules of the road for the IC. 

We must get the balance right if you are expected, Mr. Director, 

to meet the challenges ahead. 

Congress still has work to do in reforming itself in this regard. 

I pushed a proposal for 7 years—one that 14 members of this committee signed on to a few years ago—that would provide better coordination between the authorization and appropriations process 

for intelligence in the Senate by creating an intelligence subcommittee on the Appropriations Committee. The 9/11 Commission 

and others have said we have to bring the authorization and appropriations together. Unfortunately, there are some who still strongly 

oppose making these necessary changes within the Congress to 

serve our intelligence community better. I would hope to see 

7 

progress on that. I’m not holding my breath, but it still needs to 

be done. 

Additionally, I would mention that the Project on National Security Reform, led by Jim Locher, has made excellent and prescient 

recommendations concerning long-needed national security reform 

within the U.S. government. Leaders in the current administration, 

like National Security Advisor Jim Jones, Deputy Secretary of 

State James Steinberg, Ambassador to the United Nations Susan 

Rice, among others, all sat on the guiding coalition of that project 

before assuming positions in this administration. And yet, the administration subsequently moved to strip all funding for the project 

and has not shown any interest, yet, in making the necessary 

changes the project rightly recommended. I hope they’re listening 

today, because we need some leadership to make sure that we are 

better equipped to face the challenges of tomorrow. 

As we remember the sacrifices made by the men and women 

fighting these threats on the front lines every day, including those 

who so tragically paid the ultimate price recently in Khowst, our 

primary concern must be to prevent attacks on the United States 

and to ensure the safety of the American people, as well as our 

friends and interests abroad. Today’s hearing will give us a good 

idea how we can measure up. And I thank you, Madam Chair, and 

look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Here’s how we will proceed, gentlemen: Director Blair, if you will 

begin, representing the entire intelligence community, we will then 

go to Mr. Panetta, Mr. Mueller, General Burgess and Mr. Dinger 

for five minutes or so each. And then each one of us will proceed 

with questions. So Director Blair, we’d be delighted to hear from 

you. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS BLAIR, USN (RET.), 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Director BLAIR. I thank you, Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman 

Bond, members of the committee. In providing you with this intelligence community annual threat assessment, I’m proud to represent the thousands of patriotic, highly skilled, brave professionals 

of the world’s finest intelligence team, and we’re especially conscious of this as we mourn the recent loss of seven of our officers 

and care for a dozen others who’ve been wounded in recent months. 

All intelligence agencies participated in preparing my statement 

for the record, and I’m pleased to be accompanied by my colleagues 

here this afternoon. 

Every day, as we know, information technology brings gadgets 

and services that make our lives better and more efficient. However, malicious cyber activity is growing at an unprecedented rate, 

assuming extraordinary scale and sophistication. In the dynamic of 

cyberspace, the technology balance right now favors malicious actors rather than legal actors, and it’s likely to continue that way 

for quite some time. In addition, the growing role of international 

companies supplying software and hardware for private networks— 

even for sensitive U.S. government networks—increases the potential for subversion and mischief. 

8 

The recent intrusions reported by Google are yet another wakeup call to those who have not taken this problem seriously. Cyber 

crime is on the rise. Global cyber bank and credit card fraud has 

serious implications for economic and financial systems. Attacks 

against networks controlling critical infrastructure, transportation, 

financial networks, and energy could create havoc. Just the facts 

of the matter are that cyber defenders have to spend more, have 

to work harder than cyber attackers, and American efforts are not 

strong enough in this regard right now. The United States government and the private sector, who are interlinked inextricably in 

this space, have to ensure that adequate cyber defenses are in 

place. 

Let me turn to the global economy, where the trends are more 

positive. It was a year ago that I sat here and warned of the dangers of a global depression. But an unprecedented policy response 

by governments and central banks around the world laid a foundation for global recovery that most forecasters expect will continue 

through 2010, although high unemployment and pockets of difficulty will still persist. Not all countries have emerged from the 

slump, and several of them are important to the United States. 

Pakistan and the Ukraine are still struggling to put their economic houses in order. Our allies are trying to insulate spending 

on Afghanistan, where many of them are helping us, from budget 

cuts. 

China is emerging with enhanced clout. Its economy will grow 

from being a third of the size of that of the U.S. to roughly half 

by 2015, an earlier date than we had previously projected. This is 

assuming it maintains the rapid growth, which it appears to have 

the ingredients to do. 

Last year, Beijing contributed to the G–20’s pledge to increase 

IMF resources. It deployed naval forces to international anti-piracy 

operations in the Gulf of Aden. It supported a new U.N. Security 

Council sanction resolution against North Korea. However, Beijing 

still believes that the United States seeks to contain it, seeks to 

transform it, and it reinforces Chinese concerns about internal stability and about perceived challenges to their sovereignty claims. 

China continues to increase its defense spending. Preparation for 

a Taiwan conflict involving a U.S. intervention continues to dominate their modernization and contingency plans. And China also 

increasingly worries about how to protect its global interests. 

Turning to violent extremism, as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, we’ve been warning in the past several years about al-Qa’ida 

itself, al-Qa’ida-associated groups and al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorists 

striking the United States. And we’ve seen the reality of all three 

of those characteristics of al-Qa’ida in the examples that you cited 

in your opening statement—Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab and Major Nidal Hasan. 

But the violent extremist threat, al-Qa’ida at center, is evolving. 

We have made the complex, multiple-team attacks very difficult for 

al-Qa’ida to pull off. As we saw with the recent successful and attempted terrorist attacks however, identifying individual terrorists, 

small groups with short histories using simple attack methods, is 

a new degree of difficulty. We did not identify Mr. Abdulmutallab 

9 

before he boarded Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day. We 

should have and we are working to improve so that we can. 

On a positive note, however, only a decreasing minority of Muslims support violent extremism, according to numerous polls within 

the Muslim community. But even with a decreasing and smaller 

amount, al-Qa’ida’s radical ideology still seems to appeal strongly 

to some disaffected young Muslims, a pool of potential suicide 

bombers and other fighters. And this pool unfortunately includes 

Americans. Although we don’t have the high-level, home-grown 

threat that faces European countries right now, we have to worry 

about the appeal that figures like Anwar al-Aulaqi exert on young 

American Muslims. 

However much we improve our intelligence—and we intend to 

improve it even more than it is, however—we cannot count on it 

to catch every threat. So intensified counterterrorism efforts in the 

Afghan- Pakistan theater as well as around the world in places like 

Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere will be critical to further diminishing the threat. 

We have to continue to work with allies and partners in this 

campaign, enhance law enforcement, security measures, immigration and visa controls, aviation and border security; all of these are 

important for a multi-layered, dynamic defense that can disrupt 

terrorist plans. 

Let me turn to the outlook in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 

January of 2007, the Taliban has increased its influence and expanded the insurgency while holding onto its Pashtun belt thresholds. The challenges that we face are clear. 

Number one: reversing the Taliban’s momentum while we reinforce security elsewhere. Second: improving Afghan security forces, 

governance and economic capability so that security gains will endure and that responsibility can be transferred to the Afghanis 

themselves. 

Early successes in places like Helmand, where Marines have 

been deployed for several months, where aggressive counter-drug 

and economic programs are in place, and where local governance 

is competent, show that we can make solid progress even when the 

threat is high. 

The safe haven that Afghanistan insurgents have in Pakistan is 

the group’s most important outside support. Disrupting that safe 

haven won’t be sufficient by itself to defeat the insurgency but disrupting insurgent presence in Afghanistan is a necessary condition 

for making substantial progress. 

The increase in terrorist attacks in that country has made the 

Pakistani public more concerned about the threat from Islamic extremists, including al-Qa’ida. Pakistanis continue to support military action against insurgents. Islamabad has demonstrated determination and persistence in combating militants that it perceives 

are dangerous to Pakistan’s interests. But it also has continued to 

provide some support to other Pakistan-based groups that operate 

in Afghanistan. 

U.S. and coalition success against the insurgency in Afghanistan 

could provide new, long-term incentives for Pakistan to take steps 

against Afghan-focused militants. Increased Pakistani cooperation 

is more likely if Pakistan is persuaded that the United States is 

10 

committed to stabilizing Afghanistan and will ultimately have success. 

Finally, turning to Iran, the available intelligence continues to 

indicate that Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear 

weapons. This is being done in part by developing various nuclear 

capabilities that bring it closer to the ability to produce weapons. 

One of the key capabilities Iran continues to develop is its uranium enrichment program. Published information from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, indicates that Iran has 

significantly expanded the number of centrifuges installed in its facility in Natanz. But it has had problems operating its centrifuges, 

which constrain its production of low-enriched uranium. 

The United States and other countries announced last September 

that Iran for years has been building in secret a second enrichment 

facility near Qom. Overall, we continue to assess that Iran has the 

scientific, the technical and the industrial capacity to produce 

enough highly-enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few 

years, if it chooses to do so, and ultimately, to produce nuclear 

weapons. The central issue is a political decision to do so. Iran also 

continues to improve its ballistic missile force, which enhances its 

power projection and provides Tehran a means of delivering a possible nuclear payload. 

We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear 

weapons. And we continue to judge that Iran takes a cost-benefit 

approach in its nuclear decisionmaking. We judge that this offers 

the international community opportunities to influence Tehran’s 

decisionmaking. 

The Iranian regime meanwhile has found itself in a weaker internal position—internal political situation—following last June’s 

disputed Presidential election and the crackdown on protestors. Reacting to stronger-than-expected opposition and the regime’s narrowing base of support, supreme leader Khamenei, President 

Ahmadinejad and their hard-line allies appear determined to retain 

the upper hand by force. They are moving Iran in a more authoritarian direction to consolidate their power. However, they have not 

been successful so far in suppressing the opposition. 

Madam Chairman, this is the top layer of threats and opportunities. Other areas demand our continued attention and focus. They 

include security in Iraq, on the Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass 

destruction-proliferation, and challenges right here in the Western 

hemisphere, especially working with Mexico in its efforts against 

the drug cartels. But I’m also prepared with my colleagues to discuss important transnational issues like global health. 

Really, it’s the very complexity of the issues and multiplicity of 

actors—state, nonstate—that increasingly constitute one of our biggest challenges. The intelligence community is meeting these challenges every day both to policymakers and to units in the field, 

both civil and military. 

In my year on the job, I’ve been enormously impressed by the 

abilities, dedication and the results of the 100,000 military and civilian intelligence professionals I have the honor to lead. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. We’ll be glad to answer questions 

after my colleagues have a chance to make statements. 

11 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Director Blair. Mr. 

Panetta. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR, 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Director PANETTA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Mr. Vice 

Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to be able to share our thoughts with regards to the 

threats, both current and future, that face this country. 

I think the Director has presented a summary of some of the key 

threats that we confront. Of those, I would share with you that my 

greatest concern and what keeps me awake at night is that alQa’ida and its terrorist allies and affiliates could very well attack 

the United States in our homeland. That’s the primary reason the 

President provided the mission that we follow, which is the mission 

to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida and its allies. 

Having said that, the biggest threat I see is not so much that we 

face another attack similar to 9/11. I think the greater threat is 

that al- Qa’ida is adapting their methods in ways that oftentimes 

make it difficult to detect. We have done a very effective job at disrupting their operations in the FATA. And I think intelligence confirms that they are finding it difficult to be able to engage in the 

planning and the command-and-control operations to put together 

a large attack. 

What’s happening instead is that they are moving to other safe 

havens and to other regional nodes in places like Yemen and Somalia, the Maghreb and others. And what’s happening is that they are 

pursuing an effort to try to strike at the United States in three 

ways. 

One is that they deploy—they have deployed—individuals to this 

country. We’ve had a series of arrests. I think the Nazi arrest, the 

Headley arrest, are indicative of those that have been deployed 

here and continue to stay in touch with al-Qa’ida. Secondly, it’s the 

concern about the terrorist who has ‘‘clean credentials,’’ that 

doesn’t have a history of terrorism that has come to our attention. 

Abdulmutallab obviously was someone that was out there. He had 

a visa and, as a result, they decided to make use of somebody like 

that within a very short period of time that he arrived. I think 

they’re going to be looking for other opportunities like that. And 

thirdly, there is the loner—the individual like Hasan who, out of 

self-radicalization, decides that the moment has come to engage in 

an attack by himself. 

So it’s the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to as a threat to this country. We are being aggressive at going 

after this threat. We’ve expanded our human intelligence. We are 

engaging with our liaison partners in other countries to try to track 

these kinds of threats. We obviously are checking and reviewing 

watch-lists and other lists to determine who among them could be 

that potential lone wolf. And we are taking the fight to the enemy, 

and we will continue to do that. 

But in addition to the fight against al-Qa’ida, we are also facing 

threats from other terrorist groups—terrorists like al-Shabaab, 

Hezbollah, Hamas, other jihadist militant groups. And a particular 

concern is LeT—Lashkar-e-Taiba—which, if they should conduct an 

12 

attack against India, could very well undermine our efforts in Pakistan. 

In addition, the Director has mentioned the threat from North 

Korea and Iran, and while obviously we’re concerned about the nuclear side, they also continue to export terrorism—providing weapons, providing support to a whole series of other terrorist groups. 

So the bottom line here is that the war on terrorism is not just 

al-Qa’ida. It is a series of terrorist groups that are basically confronting us. And it is the kind of changes that we see in their 

method of approaching the United States that I think represents 

a very important threat that we have to pay attention to. 

We are being aggressive, we are taking the fight to the enemy, 

and at the same time, we have to be agile, we have to be vigilant 

and we’ve got to be creative in the way we approach these new 

threats. The fundamental mission we have is, obviously, to protect 

this country. It’s the mission that the people at Khowst gave their 

lives for. And it’s the mission that the CIA will follow because we 

believe our greatest mission is to keep this country safe. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Panetta. Mr. 

Mueller. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Director MUELLER. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman 

Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond and members of the committee. 

Director Blair and Director Panetta rightly pointed to the global 

nature of many of the threats we face, from international terrorism 

in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere to cyber attacks to computer 

crime committed by international criminal enterprises. 

And what is striking is how many of these overseas threats reach 

directly into the United States. Today, events outside the United 

States often have immediate impact on our security here at home. 

And as I discuss our mission and the overall threat assessment, I 

do want to highlight how quickly these threats are evolving and 

how globalization has often led to the integration of these foreign 

and domestic threats. 

Over the past decade, the focus of strategic terrorism threats has 

been South Asia, the heartland of al-Qa’ida. But now, as Director 

Panetta pointed out, al-Qa’ida trainers see the tribal areas of Pakistan as less secure and this had led al-Qa’ida to franchise into regional components in places such as North Africa and the Arabian 

Peninsula. This evolution has been most rapid with al-Qa’ida in the 

Arabian Peninsula, which has changed from a regional group with 

links to al-Qa’ida to a global threat with reach into American cities 

such as Detroit. 

These changes affect the way we at the FBI think about the targets we pursue and what tools we need to pursue them. They also 

require us to keep changing continuously to meet the evolving 

threats of tomorrow. The expansion of violent ideology has proven 

to be persistent and global, as demonstrated by the plots we have 

seen in the past year—those plots listed by the Chairman in her 

opening statement. Those cases demonstrate the global diversity of 

the new terrorism threats. 

13 

Some extremists were radicalized over the Internet or in prison. 

Others received training from known terrorist organizations 

abroad. They were of different ages and nationalities. A number 

were U.S.-born. The targets of these attacks range from civilians 

to government facilities to transportation infrastructure to our military, both in the United States and overseas. 

The threat from cyber attacks, as has been pointed out by Director Blair, reflects the same globalization and pace of change. In the 

past, we focused primarily on state actors seeking national security 

information from our military or intelligence services or seeking to 

acquire technology related to defense systems. But as the global 

economy integrates, many cyber threats now focus on economic or 

nongovernment targets, as we have seen with the recent cyber attack on Google. Targets in the private sector are at least as vulnerable as traditional targets and the damage can be just as great. 

Our focus on the cyber threat does not mean that we have seen 

a decline in classic intelligence and counterintelligence activities in 

the United States. The presence of foreign intelligence officers in 

the United States is not declining and they are increasingly using 

non-traditional collection methods to gather information. These 

services continue to pose a significant threat and our counterintelligence mission remains a high priority for the FBI. 

Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond, let me conclude 

by thanking you and the committee for your support of the bureau 

and on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, we look forward 

to continue to work with you to improve the FBI and to keep America safe. And thank you, and I’d be happy to answer any questions 

you might have. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. General Burgess. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD BURGESS, 

USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General BURGESS. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, 

members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to be 

here today to present the Defense Intelligence Agency assessment 

of current and projected threats to the security of the United 

States. 

The global strategic environment today remains marked by a 

broad array of dissimilar threats and challenges. As the United 

States continues to conduct combat operations in several theaters, 

the nation also faces the threat of terrorist attacks at home. Simultaneously, we continue to face risk posed by other nations’ growing 

abilities to challenge our qualitative military superiority in other 

regions. It is a time that significantly challenges the international 

system and the Department of Defense. Therefore, our armed 

forces and DIA must remain cognizant of dynamic global forces and 

trends. 

As the 2010 QDR states, the United States faces a complex and 

uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues 

to accelerate. Al-Qa’ida remains the most significant terrorist 

threat to the United States. Al-Qa’ida’s propaganda, attack planning and support of the Taliban and Haqqani networks continues. 

The group still pursues chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 

materials for attacks. Al-Qa’ida’s affiliates continue to extend the 

14 

terrorist group reach and brand. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula is growing in size and is broadening its repertoire of attacks. 

Once focused mainly inside Algeria, al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the 

Islamic Maghreb is conducting operations in neighboring countries. 

Violence levels in Afghanistan increased last year while security 

declined because of an increasingly capable insurgency, the government’s inability to extend security throughout the country and insurgent access to sanctuaries in Pakistan. Originally concentrated 

in the Pashtun-dominated south and east, the insurgency retains 

momentum and has spread west and north. Afghanistan’s security 

forces are growing but not keeping pace with the Taliban’s ability 

to exploit the security vacuum. 

Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Area continues to provide the insurgency, al-Qa’ida and terrorist groups with valuable 

sanctuary for training, recruitment, planning and logistics. Successful strikes against al-Qa’ida and other militant leaders in the 

FATA have disrupted terrorist activities but the groups are resilient. Pakistan’s military has demonstrated increased counterinsurgency training and doctrinal adjustments but its priority remains 

India. We have confidence in Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons, though vulnerabilities exist. 

Notwithstanding recent high profile bombings claimed by alQa’ida in Iraq, the country is still on a generally secure path. The 

group remains the most capable Sunni terrorist group, though constrained by a lack of safe havens. It has regained some freedom of 

movement following U.S. forces’ withdrawal from Iraqi cities. Iraq’s 

security forces conduct the majority of security operations independently but still require improvements in logistics, tactical communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. 

In Iraq, Iran continues to rely heavily upon the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force, its special operations command, 

to undermine U.S. efforts by providing weapons, money and training to Iraqi Shia militants for attacks against U.S. personnel. 

Turning briefly to nations, region and trends of interest, Iran 

supports terrorist groups and insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere as a means to expand its own influence, 

frustrate regional rivals and impede U.S. strategy across the region. It invests heavily in developing ballistic missiles with greater 

accuracy and new payloads. With more than 8000 installed centrifuges at Natanz, Iran now has enough low-enriched uranium for 

a nuclear weapon if it further enriched and processed. 

China’s military modernization continues with the acquisition of 

growing numbers of very sophisticated aircraft, warships, missiles 

and personnel required to employ these capabilities. China seeks 

military superiority along its periphery, with a focus against traditional U.S. military advantages in air and naval power projection 

and in space. 

North Korea remains unlikely to eliminate its nuclear weapon 

capability for the foreseeable future, believing the weapons serve as 

a strategic deterrent and leverage while also counterbalancing the 

logistic shortages, aging equipment and insufficient training that 

plague its conventional forces. 

Russia is proceeding with ambitious military reform. The effects 

of the global recession, an aging industrial base, corruption, misVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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management and demographic trends will limit Moscow’s ability to 

realize the full benefits of the reform plan, but the sweeping reorganization likely will increase the military advantages over adjacent nations. 

In Latin America, Mexico remains locked in a violent struggle 

against drug trafficking organizations which pose a grave threat to 

the state. 

Venezuelan arms purchases, primarily from Russia, continue. Colombian operations have reduced the Marxist-oriented Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerillas’ end strength by nearly 

50 percent to approximately 8500 personnel. Sustained pressure 

could splinter the FARC until it poses less of a threat to democratic 

institutions, though it would remain involved in criminal activities. 

The threat posed by ballistic missiles is likely to increase and 

grow more complex over the coming decade as they become more 

mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate at greater ranges. Prelaunch survivability also grows as potential adversaries strengthen 

their denial and deception methods. 

Let me conclude by saying that while DIA’s top war time priority 

is to provide the intelligence required by our military commanders 

and policymakers in support of our ongoing combat operations, this 

agency concurrently retains a core responsibility to prevent strategic surprise and be positioned to respond to a wide range of contingencies. 

That requires the most prudent and judicious use of our resources, especially our most important resource, our people—both 

civilians and those in uniform. In visits with DIA’s forward-deployed military and civilian personnel, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, I remain impressed by and thankful for their willingness to serve the nation in wartime. Many are on their second or 

third deployment alongside our troops in harm’s way. Some have 

been wounded by roadside bombs and mortar attacks. 

Notwithstanding their sacrifices, they continue to serve knowing 

that the intelligence they provide saves lives and speeds operations. On their behalf, I want to thank this committee for your 

strong support and continuing confidence in the Defense Intelligence Agency and our mission. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General Burgess. 

Ambassador Dinger, if you’d be the wrap-up speaker, please. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN DINGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 

Ambassador DINGER. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman, 

members of the committee. It’s my pleasure to be here today to represent the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. 

Although one of the smallest intelligence community elements, 

we consider ourselves to be mighty contributors to the Secretary of 

State as she fulfills her responsibility as the President’s chief foreign policy advisor and we’re proud of our contribution to the intelligence community as it ensures the security of the United States. 

One of INR’s principal missions is to provide timely and accurate 

intelligence analysis that enables U.S. diplomacy to anticipate and 

16 

address threats and opportunities and to do so early enough so that 

policymakers can take action. The average analyst in INR has 11 

years of experience on his account, allowing him to offer what we 

believe is an uncommon depth of understanding of the characters 

and issues at play in the world. 

INR is proud to put its analytical depth at the service of the Secretary and the intelligence community. Through our intelligence 

policy and coordination staff, INR also ensures that intelligence activities are consistent with and advance U.S. foreign policy interests and that other components of the intelligence community understand the information and analytical needs of the foreign policy 

decisionmakers. 

INR has other important missions. One is to act as the IC’s executive agent for analytical outreach, bringing outside expertise to 

bear on the most challenging intelligence and foreign policy issues 

of the day. INR’s Office of Opinion Research aims to be the U.S. 

government’s foremost authority on worldwide public opinion. 

DNI Blair’s written statement comprehensively addresses the 

global challenges before us. I will take just a few moments to highlight two areas that DNI and others have already spoken to in 

which INR is supporting the priorities of Secretary Clinton and the 

intelligence community and the United States government. 

First, countering terrorism. Terrorism remains a key focus for 

INR’s analysts. We have a small but dedicated team of analysts in 

our Office of Terrorism, Narcotics and Crime. They work closely 

with our regional analysts and with those throughout the IC to 

produce all-source strategic counterterrorism analysis with 

nuanced context and perspective. 

The second area I also want to highlight is cyber. In 2008, the 

State Department established a new office, INR’s Office of Cyber 

Affairs, INR Cyber, to analyze cyber issues and help coordinate the 

department’s cyber activities. Currently housed in INR, INR Cyber 

collaborates across corridors in the State Department and throughout the IC to strengthen cyber security. It is also engaging with 

other nations to help establish norms that will help maintain the 

stability of and confidence in the Internet. 

INR believes the intelligence community has an obligation to provide global intelligence coverage. I want to very briefly mention two 

regions, only one of which has been covered today in today’s oral 

statements. 

First, economic and political progress in Africa remains uneven, 

varies greatly from nation to nation and is still subject to sudden 

reversal or gradual erosion. The daunting array of challenges facing African nations makes it highly likely in the coming year that 

a number of African countries will face new outbreaks of political 

instability and economic distress that will join ongoing and seemingly intractable conflicts in places such as Sudan and Somalia. 

Nigeria, for example, faces serious social, economic and security 

challenges over the next year. Guinea provides an example of how 

quickly African crises can emerge. Many African nations also risk 

humanitarian crises. 

In some Latin American countries, democracy and market policies remain at risk because of crime, corruption and poor governance. Powerful drug cartels and violent crime undermine basic seVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
17 

curity elsewhere. Elected populist leaders in some countries are 

moving toward a more authoritarian and statist political and economic model and oppose U.S. influence and policies in the region. 

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, INR will continue 

to think, analyze and write strategically to identify for Secretary 

Clinton the threats, challenges and opportunities arising from a 

complex and dynamic global environment. We will work hand-inglove with the rest of the intelligence community to ensure the security of the United States. INR will strive to put intelligence at 

the service of foreign policy and make certain that intelligence activities advance America toward our foreign policy goals and protect us from threats. 

Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before you 

and I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

To begin the questions, I’d like to ask a very specific question of 

each one of you if you would answer it. The question is, what is 

the likelihood of another terrorist attempted attack on the U.S. 

homeland in the next three to six months—high or low? Director 

Blair? 

Director BLAIR. An attempted attack, the priority is certain, I 

would say. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Panetta. 

Director PANETTA. I would agree with that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. Agree. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. General Burgess. 

General BURGESS. Yes, ma’am. Agree. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Dinger. 

Ambassador DINGER. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. I think that tells us something 

very clearly. There has been a response to the Abdulmutallab case 

that all suspected terrorists should be labeled enemy combatants 

and prosecuted through the military commissions system, if at all. 

Candidly, my view is that the President should have the flexibility to make a determination based on the individual circumstances of the case—the location of the terrorist activity, the location of the arrest, the nationality of the suspect, whether federal 

crimes or law of armed conflict have been violated, et cetera. 

I’d like to ask this question, Mr. Mueller. What is the FBI’s track 

record in gaining intelligence and collecting evidence to convict terrorists since 9/11? 

Director MUELLER. Well, Madam Chairman, in your opening 

statement, you mentioned many of the cases that we addressed last 

year: a number of disruptions from Dallas to Springfield, Illinois; 

Charlotte, North Carolina; the Zazi case in Denver and New York. 

In almost all of the cases, we have gathered intelligence. Some of 

that intelligence has become evidence so that we could arrest, indict and continue to prosecute those individuals. 

Since September 11th we’ve had numerous disruptions. In just 

about every one of these cases where there are two or more involved, one or more of the individuals have ultimately cooperated, 

given the leverage of the criminal justice system to cooperate not 

18 

just against the conspirators but also to provide intelligence as to 

other potential threats. 

And to the extent that we have had success since September 

11th, it has been because we have been able to convince persons 

to provide intelligence, to provide evidence on others who may be 

involved in the plot and persuade individuals both here in the 

United States as well as elsewhere in the world to contribute intelligence as well as evidence to disrupt plots and to assure that those 

who were engaged in the plots are successfully prosecuted and incarcerated. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

I’d like to just quickly ask one question on the status of 

Hezbollah which has not been mentioned. Director, you assess that 

Hezbollah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training 

and weaponry. And Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hezbollah as 

a model for other militant groups. How has Hezbollah rebuilt its 

military arsenal since its 2006 war with Israel? 

Director BLAIR. Let me get some help from General Burgess here 

too, but overall, Hezbollah is stronger now than in 2006, when the 

last war took place. And it’s also developed politically. 

General BURGESS. Madam Chairman, I would agree with his assessment. They in fact reinforced and replaced very quickly what 

they had lost in the 2006 war with Israel. And today I think they 

are actually stronger and have improved themselves. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Can you comment on the sophistication of 

these replacements? 

General BURGESS. In some cases, from a missile standpoint, I 

think there are indications that they have improved. Hezbollah has 

increased the quantity of their missiles and may have acquired additional systems with improved accuracy. But at a minimum, their 

overall missile effectiveness remains the same. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I think that’s going 

to be it for me, for now. 

Mr. Vice Chairman, why don’t you go ahead? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. Director 

Mueller, we appreciate and congratulate you on the excellent work 

that the FBI has done in capturing and bringing to justice Zazi and 

other people whose capture was announced last fall. 

Do you believe that questioning of an enemy combatant, someone 

with potential knowledge of battlefield intelligence for the future, 

can be done briefly or within a short timeframe needed to give the 

customary Miranda rights of a normal criminal suspect, a bank 

robber, in the United States? 

Do you agree with those in the intelligence community who say 

that the only effective way of interrogating somebody like 

Abdulmutallab would be to spend the time to collect the information otherwise available in the intelligence community, background 

and what other intelligence may be available, in order to question 

him effectively, to be able to ask him questions about issues where 

we know the answers to see if he’s telling the truth and to confront 

him with other intelligence? Do you believe that that is necessary 

in some cases to get information on an enemy combatant? 

Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, let me talk generally but then 

also somewhat specifically about the events of Christmas Day. Let 

19 

me start off with a belief that we in the FBI—as everybody in this 

room understands—know the importance of intelligence. Since September 11th, it has been the mission of the FBI to prevent terrorist 

attacks—not just indict and arrest and convict persons for those 

terrorist attacks but to prevent the terrorist attack and intelligence 

is key. 

If you look at the circumstances of Christmas Day, the plane 

came in at approximately 12:00. Shortly there afterwards, we started pushing out information relating to the events that had occurred 

on the plane as it went into Detroit. We then, as I think everybody 

in this room knows and understands, Mutallab was arrested on the 

plane and taken to a hospital. 

We had agents from the Joint Terrorism Task Force go to the 

hospital. They were given an opportunity to talk to Abdulmutallab 

before he went through surgical procedures. He had burned himself 

in trying to light the explosives. They had a window of opportunity; 

they exploited that window of opportunity to try to find out information as to whether there were other bombs on the plane, were 

there other bombs in other planes, who was responsible—and took 

that opportunity because it was given and there was an immediate 

need to have that information, that intelligence, to determine what 

the threat was at that time. 

The doctors then took him in for surgical procedures. Going into 

that afternoon, there were discussions here amongst most of the 

agencies here as to what should occur down the road, although no 

specific instructions or consultations with persons at this table as 

to whether the individual should be Mirandized. 

We were then given an opportunity later that night to again 

interview him. And after consultation, or in consultation with Justice Department attorneys, we determined to follow our protocols— 

protocols established by the Supreme Court—in terms of how you 

interrogate and question individuals in custody in the United 

States. A team went in to talk with him. He talked for a few moments and then afterwards, after he was given his Miranda warnings, asked for an attorney and we discontinued the questioning. 

We felt we had to take that opportunity at the outset to gather 

the intelligence. It was not ideal; we did not have much information at 3:30 in the afternoon when the plane came in at 1:00. We 

gathered information throughout the afternoon to do a better interrogation that evening. We have found over a period of time that the 

Miranda warnings can, but often are not, an impediment to obtaining additional intelligence. 

And the story continues. We have been successful, very successful in gathering intelligence over a period of time with teams, persons from various agencies, the most recent example being the intelligence we’ve gotten from David Headley, who was arrested in 

Chicago for his participation in the Copenhagen plot but also subsequently indicated his involvement in the Mumbai shootings. 

As I say, this case as in all cases, we will continue to try to provide or obtain, I should say, information and intelligence from 

Abdulmutallab and to the extent that you wish further information 

on that—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. We will ask that. I’m asking a general procedural question. You’re not saying that an enemy combatant that 

20 

comes into the United States has been ruled by the Supreme Court 

to be entitled to Miranda rights before questioning proceeds, are 

you? 

Director MUELLER [continuing]. No, what I’m saying is that if a 

person is accepted by DOD for prosecution before a military commission, he is not entitled under the procedures that are extant to 

Miranda warnings. However, that has not yet gone up to the Supreme Court. And so there is a difference between having a person 

in the federal district court and the civilian courts and under military commissions. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And that’s the point. That’s the point. 

Many commentators and I have agreed that treating this person as 

a common United States criminal when he was clearly an enemy 

combatant—I don’t know how much more clearly you can be an 

enemy combatant, like the German saboteurs who arrived in the 

United States in the early 1940s. Nobody thought that they were 

bank robbers coming from Germany to rob some banks. They didn’t 

treat them as such. 

And from the press reports of what we’ve seen, this was not your 

average bank robber. He was not a car hijacker. This person was 

an enemy combatant. Who ultimately made the decision to 

Mirandize him? Who was the individual—where did that decision 

rest in the chain? 

Director MUELLER. It rested with the head of our Counterterrorism Division along with attorneys from the Department of Justice. 

Vice Chairman BOND. So it was a Department of Justice decision 

to Mirandize. 

Director MUELLER. No, it was a combination of our providing the 

facts to the Department of Justice and in consultation with the Department of Justice making a decision that he should be 

Mirandized. 

Vice Chairman BOND. While other agencies took part in it, we 

have heard that they felt that they needed to have more opportunity to question him. 

Director BLAIR. Mr. Vice Chairman, on that score, I’m as strong 

for getting as much intelligence as we can from anybody remotely 

connected with terrorism, much less somebody who’s carried a 

bomb into the country. But I think that we need to have a flexibility in the tools that we have available to use. And I’m not convinced that you can make a—in fact, I’m convinced that you cannot 

make a hard decision that everything should be taken through a 

military tribunal or everything should be taken through a federal 

court. 

There are decisions that have to be made in which you balance 

the requirement for intelligence with the requirement for a prosecution and the sorts of pressure that you bring onto the people 

that you arrest in either form. It’s got to be a decision made at the 

time. And I think the balance struck in the Abdulmutallab case 

was an understandable balance. We got good intelligence, we’re 

getting more. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I disagree very strongly with that conclusion, but I agree with you that there should be a decision made 

after consultation with the relevant agencies and the intelligence 

21 

community when an enemy combatant comes in before the Department of Justice gives the order to Mirandize him. 

He’s an enemy combatant and the decision ought to be made 

with the participation of the intelligence community, whether he 

thinks the future safety of the United States would make it imperative to question that enemy combatant before giving him a lawyer 

and Mirandizing him. 

I see my time is up, Madam Chair. 

Director BLAIR. Let me just say that we consider Director 

Mueller a full member of the intelligence community. He’s one of 

the brothers. 

Vice Chairman BOND. But he reports to the Attorney General 

and you, Mr. Director, in my view, should be the head of the intelligence community. If we haven’t made it clear in IRTPA, we need 

to make that clear. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I don’t relish pursuing this, but in that 

it’s become kind of a cause du jour, I think it’s important to. I 

agree totally, Director Blair, with what you said, that it should be 

done on a case-by-case basis. Nothing should be ruled in; nothing 

should be ruled out. There’s an instinct on the part of some that 

the only way that you can correctly get intelligence and then prosecute the enemy combatant or whatever you want to call him is 

through the military commissions. 

And I think their record is they’ve condemned three and two of 

them are gone, on the streets. You, through the criminal justice 

system, Director Mueller, have prosecuted hundreds and they’re 

around or in jail. Let me just ask, Director Mueller, in your experience as FBI Director in the 8 years since 9/11—and you’ve been 

there every single one of those days—have terrorist suspects provided valuable intelligence after they have been Mirandized? 

Director MUELLER. On a number of occasions, yes, sir. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Case by case? 

Director MUELLER. Case by case. There are two cases—one that 

was already mentioned, David Headley out of Chicago, which is one 

of the more recent ones. Back in 2004, there was an individual by 

the name of Mohammed Junaid Zabar. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you. 

Director MUELLER. Another individual who provided substantial 

intelligence. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. On the flipside, do terrorist suspects always automatically come forth with intelligence unless and until 

they are Mirandized? 

Director MUELLER. No, it differs from case to case. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Case by case. 

Director MUELLER. Circumstance to circumstance. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you. Is it true that, depending on 

the circumstances, in some cases the best method for gaining intelligence is by charging the terrorist with a crime, Mirandizing him 

and conducting a thorough criminal investigation? 

Director MUELLER. We have found that the system of justice in 

the United States, which allows for consideration for a contributing 

intelligence and information and credit for that is a powerful incenVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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tive to persons to provide truthful, actionable information, evidence 

and intelligence. 

You have other countries that don’t have the same system of justice, where there is no incentive to cooperate or provide intelligence 

and the person stays in jail without any incentive to provide intelligence and without providing, ultimately, any intelligence. So in 

case after case here, we have been successful in entering into some 

sort of agreement with the defendant and having that defendant 

provide actionable intelligence. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I don’t want, particularly, an answer from 

any of you on this, but it is my impression, having studied this 

some, that the military commissions process for prosecuting is relatively unformed and in a state of play. It is not an experienced, 

professional process such as you have at your disposal. It may work 

very well. It may not work very well. 

I’m not talking about the getting of intelligence, but I’m talking 

about the prosecuting. I don’t expect you to answer on that, I’m 

simply giving you my opinion. Recognizing the classification issues 

at stake here, can you tell me if—and you’ve answered this already, but I want it on record—if Abdulmutallab had provided the 

valuable intelligence in his FBI interrogations? 

Director MUELLER. On Christmas Day itself, he provided responses to questions, information and to the extent that we go into 

more detail, I’d ask that we do it in closed session. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I understand that. I understand that. In 

your professional judgment, I would say to Director Blair—and you 

sort of answered this, but I’d like it again on the record because 

I think this is a debate which is spilling most unhelpfully across 

the talk shows and beyond—in your professional judgment, are 

there compelling national security reasons to prosecute some terrorism cases in a federal criminal court rather than in a military 

commission? And on the other side, would there be some cases 

where you might prefer to do it in a military commission, or are 

you familiar enough with their processes to make such a recommendation? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, it’s not my responsibility nor do I have 

a great deal of expertise in the venue that’s chosen for prosecution. 

What I’m interested in is getting the intelligence out so that we 

can do a better job against the groups that send these people. And 

I’ve seen intelligence come from a variety of interrogations, primarily based on the skill of the interrogators—and there are good 

ones in many different places—and by the degree to which we back 

them up and back them up quickly with an intelligence team which 

can help them with their requirements. I think that’s the key thing 

from my point of view. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Then I would ask both of you, and actually of all five, it seems to me that what we’ve come down to in 

this brief interchange is that this should be done on a case-by-case 

basis based upon what seems to be best according to professionals 

who carry the responsibility and the judgment for making those decisions, should it be criminal justice, should it be military commission. Would you agree with that? 

Director BLAIR. I think that decision is bound up in the interrogation, which is what I care about. So I think yes, it should be a 

23 

rapid, flexible, case-by-case, balancing the requirement for intelligence with the requirement to put these people behind bars and 

not let them go free that is what we need. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. I think our history has been that the decision 

whether or not to proceed in a federal district court or in a civilian 

court versus a military commission is a weighty decision. We’ve 

had two occasions where it’s happened in the past where somebody’s been taken out of civilian courts and put into the military 

courts and then ended up back in civilian courts—al-Mari and an 

individual by the name of Padilla. 

And so yes, the differences in procedures for interrogation is one 

factor, but there probably are a number of other factors that need 

to be weighed by the Justice Department and the executive before 

that decision is made. And I’m not certain that it is a decision that 

can be made very quickly because there are a number of competing 

factors and one would want to take some time, I would think, in 

order to sort those factors out. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But in the end, this is a decision that 

should be made by professionals according to their responsibilities 

and according to the facts of the case? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, but ultimately, it is the Attorney General and the President that make the decision. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But what I’m saying is that we should 

not limit the President by saying it has to go here or it has to go 

there. 

Director MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. He should not be limited. 

Director MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I thank you both. Thank you Madam 

Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and, first of all, 

I’d like to thank all of you for the hard work that you do for our 

country and for our people. You’re all great people in my eyes. 

Director Blair, let me just start with you. A few minutes ago, we 

received from your office a copy of a letter signed by John Brennan, 

who’s Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism to Speaker Pelosi on the subject of the closure of 

Guantanamo and the transfer of detainees abroad. 

Now, the second paragraph of the letter states the following, 

‘‘The professional assessment of our military commanders and civilian leaders of the Department of Defense is that closing the detention facilities at Guantanamo is a national security imperative in 

the war against al-Qa’ida. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and 

General Petraeus have all stated that closing Guantanamo will 

help our troops by eliminating a potent recruiting tool.’’ 

Now, in my mind, the word ‘‘imperative’’ implies something that 

has to be addressed for an immediate reaction. Now, Director Blair, 

I concur that terrorist propaganda does use Guantanamo as a 

theme. It also uses our close relationship with Israel, but I don’t 

think we’re going to change our policies toward Israel as a result. 

24 

And by his assertion—or this assertion by Mr. Brennan, let me just 

ask you these specific questions. 

Is there any intelligence or analysis that you can share here or 

provide in closed hearing that proves, indicates or even suggests 

that al-Qa’ida would change its plans and intents towards us if we 

closed Guantanamo? 

Director BLAIR. I don’t think it would change its plans or intent, 

but it would deprive al-Qa’ida of a powerful symbol and recruiting 

tool, which it has actively exploited over the years. 

Senator HATCH. Well, just because they would have one less recruiting theme, is there an intelligence or analysis that the threat 

from al-Qa’ida would be diminished? 

Director BLAIR. Well, the extent to which they weren’t able to recruit people who the Guantanamo symbol helped to recruit, they 

would be weaker without it. 

Senator HATCH. Well, is there any intelligence or analysis that 

you’re aware of that specifically indicates that U.S. forces abroad 

would be under any less threat from al-Qa’ida were Guantanamo 

to be closed? 

Director BLAIR. You’re a much better lawyer than I am, Senator 

Hatch. I’ve learned that in these exchanges, but what I’m trying to 

say is that it’s a factor that helps the enemy, that if we can deprive 

them of that factor, it’s good. 

Senator HATCH. Yeah, I’m not trying to give you a rough time, 

nor am I trying to cross examine you. But I am trying to establish 

that, my gosh, nothing’s going to change their attitude towards us. 

There are a lot of things that we do that they don’t like, including 

our friendship with Israel and some other countries in the Middle 

East, the Arab countries. Let me ask you this, have you ever provided intelligence to our policymakers that supports the notion that 

the homeland or our troops would be safer after Guantanamo’s 

closed? 

Director BLAIR. We provided intelligence and I assess, Senator 

Hatch, that among the things that we can do that would weaken 

al-Qa’ida would be to close Guantanamo and diminish the emotional and symbolic support that that gives them in the pool of people they try to recruit in order to come against us. 

Senator HATCH. Well, isn’t it true that al-Qa’ida used the prosecution and imprisonment of the blind sheikh as a recruiting tool 

and that al-Qa’ida members have said they were inspired to attack 

us because of that incarceration? You know that’s true. Is there 

any intelligence that suggests al-Qa’ida would not use a prison located in the United States as a recruiting tool? 

I’ve been to Guantanamo. It’s pretty nice compared to the place 

in Illinois where they want to put them. It’d be nice and cold in 

the winter time and all I can say is that I imagine there’ll be a hue 

and a cry that we’re not fair by bringing them here. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, I’m sure there will be stories about wherever they’re incarcerated, but I’m thinking of books that have been 

written by former detainees that are passed out, testimonies on the 

Internet that Guantanamo has achieved a sort of mythic quality 

which helps al-Qa’ida. 

Senator HATCH. Well, I think the point I’m trying to make—and, 

of course, I think it’s easy to see—is that no matter what we do, 

25 

they’re going to criticize us. We’ve got a very significant courthouse 

down there at Guantanamo that could try these in a military commission. We treat them very, very well down there. Some of them 

probably are treated better than they’ve ever been treated in their 

lifetimes. 

But no matter what you do, the terrorists and al-Qa’ida and 

Taliban and others are going to complain and say that we’re not 

doing it right. Seems to me crazy to, you know, to take the position 

that because Guantanamo has been a recruiting tool, then we 

ought to close it, when in fact it meets basically every need I think 

that we need in handling these matters. I have a lot of other questions, but I think I’ll submit them in writing, but I’m really concerned. 

We’ve seen what’s happened just this past week with regard to 

the desire to hold the trial in midtown Manhattan. And now there’s 

a great desire not to. As a trial lawyer, I can tell you right now 

that there are all kinds of approaches that could be taken that 

would be better than trying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed in this 

country. 

And I think that the Zacarias Moussaoui case—4 years to try it 

or to go through the whole process—he ultimately gets off because 

one juror didn’t believe in the death penalty. And during that trial, 

he was taunting families of those who had been killed and using 

it as a propaganda device to act like he was a hero when in fact 

he was nothing but a murderer as the twentieth hijacker. And I 

can’t even begin to imagine what Khalid Shaykh Mohammed would 

do if that trial was within the confines of the United States and 

it’s not a military tribunal. 

Well, I know that you have to be a loyal member of the administration—all of you. And I accept that. But I think it’s a dumb, 

dumb, stupid approach to take when we have the facilities that are 

perfectly capable of taking care of these people and doing it an a 

way with a military commission that makes sense, is legal, after 

we corrected the military commission statute and totally acceptable, it seems to me. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Would the Senator yield? 

Senator HATCH. Sure. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. That was quite a potent statement you 

made there. 

Senator HATCH. Yeah, it was. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. To recognize that these five men before 

us are members of an administration and therefore the implication 

that they can only talk based upon what they have been instructed 

to say as opposed to being profound professionals in their field, as 

opposed to what they might actually feel. So are you saying that 

they’re just saying what they’ve been told to say? 

Senator HATCH. Well, I’ve only been here 34 years, but I can say 

that I’ve seen administration after administration executives that 

support their administration. I don’t blame them for that. Their 

budgets depend on it. There are lot of other things—their jobs depend on it half the time. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you. 

Senator HATCH. I don’t have any problem with that. All I do have 

a problem with is I think it’s stupid to put the whole country 

26 

through this mess because the Attorney General feels that might 

be a better way of doing things, when in fact it’s the worst way of 

doing things. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I may—— 

Senator HATCH. Sure. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. Now, you know, you’re a good 

friend of mine, Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. I am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And I love and respect that friendship. But 

I’ve really got to correct the message. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. First of all, the policy was really established during the regime of Ronald Reagan. And let me quote Jerry 

Bremer, who was this President’s—Ronald Reagan’s—first coordinator for counterterrorism in 1986. This is what he said in a 

speech in November of 1987 to the Council of Foreign Relations in 

Tampa. 

He said, ‘‘Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal actions 

like murder, kidnapping and arson. And countries have laws to 

punish criminals. So a major element of our strategy’’—and remember, he’s saying that on behalf of President Reagan—‘‘has been to 

delegitimatize terrorists and get society to see them for what they 

are.’’ 

That was the policy then; it was the policy of every President 

since that time. George Bush—and I can go chapter and verse on 

each individual when they were transferred from one custody to 

another—he had flexibility, he made changes, and now all of a sudden, it’s a huge political issue. And I think it’s absolutely wrong to 

do that. So now I’ve had my say. 

Senator HATCH. Now, let me just take a point of personal privilege. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You may respond, Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Yeah, I think that it’s a question of law. It’s a 

question of how you approach the law. And whether Reagan did 

that or not, I don’t know. All I know is that we didn’t have 3,000 

people killed in one day in New York City, in the three various incidents that occurred. These are vicious people. As I understand it, 

Khalid Shaykh Mohammed said he would plead guilty and that he 

wanted to be executed so he could be a martyr for his people. And 

I think even having said that he deserves at least an opportunity 

for a trial. 

But I think when you have the capacity of doing it in a place as 

good as Guantanamo, it ought to be done there. And it shouldn’t 

be brought to this country on our shores. And I think you’re seeing 

more and more people getting upset about this. And it’s not so 

much a political thing as it is just a domestic security thing that 

people are concerned about. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, I just have to add. I don’t 

think Ronald Reagan deserves to be in this discussion. You talk 

about 1986. That was before the activities of the 1990s and when 

9/11 brought a whole new threat to our views. Now, when 9/11 happened, President Bush took a number of actions. There’s some that 

27 

I think—where he’s been proven wrong and I would hope we would 

learn from releasing detainees. That was wrong. He made the right 

decision when he did treat Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant in 

questioning. 

But if we can’t learn from our mistakes, no matter whether it’s 

Republican or Democrat, then we’re doomed to commit them again. 

And I just suggest that we are learning a lot. And I would hope 

that we would have a different approach next time an enemy combatant lands on this soil. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you. Just for the record, I’m 

going to submit to the record a list of individuals convicted under 

the Bush administration in criminal court, in Article III court—beginning with Richard Reid, going to Omar Abu Ali, Zacarias 

Moussaoui, as well as Padilla, Lindh, the Lackawanna Six and so 

on and so forth—and put these in the record. 

The point is that a President should have flexibility to cite the 

venue for trial. And it may be different for different cases. And all 

I can say is those of us on this side of the aisle did not criticize 

President Bush for doing this at this time. And we view with some 

suspicion the fact that President Obama is being criticized for following policy that had been established since 9/11. I’ll now recognize—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair—I will add —— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. I’ll now recognize Senator 

Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Vice Chairman BOND [continuing]. I will add the names of the 

people who—the information released as a result of these trials, 

where we held the trials and I will discuss further—I disagree with 

your characterization. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Madam Chair, I have not been here 34 

years. I have been here only three years, but I find it extremely 

discouraging that with these gentlemen before us—the head of the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, the head of the FBI, the Director of 

National Intelligence, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency 

and the acting head of the State Department’s intelligence service—who I would add is the acting head because there is a Republican blockade of the person who is slated for that position here 

more than a year into the Obama administration—that all this 

committee can talk about is where Mr. Abdulmutallab was 

Mirandized and where trials should be. 

There are so many issues that are so important to our national 

security that these gentlemen have real expertise in. I think it’s 

clear that the tradition has been strongly towards civilian trials. 

There is one person in the world incarcerated as a terrorist as a 

result of a military tribunal right now, hundreds because of the 

other and yet this question persists and persists and persists and 

persists and persists. 

It seems to be the only talking point on the other side of the 

aisle. And because so much of it is fallacious, we then have to respond in order to try to clear up the record and then this whole 

hearing turns into a focus on a point for which none of these gentlemen would need to be here and that really does not bear as sigVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
28 

nificantly as other issues, I think, on the responsibilities that they 

have to discharge. 

So I say that and I will move to another issue, which is your report, Director Blair, leads off with a discussion of the risk of cyber 

attack to the country. And I want to read a couple of statements 

from a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine by Josh Rogin. He 

reported that senior U.S. military officials believe, ‘‘the Chinese 

government is supporting hackers that attack anything and everything in the national security infrastructure on a constant basis.’’ 

He continues, ‘‘the Defense Department has said that the Chinese government, in addition to employing thousands of its own 

hackers, manages massive teams of experts from academia and industry in cyber militias that act in Chinese national interest with 

unclear amounts of support and direction from Chinese Peoples 

Liberation Army.’’ 

It seems that the analogy in cyber warfare goes back to the ancient days of naval combat when nations not only sent out ships 

under their own flag to engage in warfare but also offered to private ship owners, to pirates, indeed, letters of mark to go out and 

act in that nation’s interest. 

What do you believe are the most important structural deficits 

that we have and need to fix in dealing with state-sponsored cyber 

attacks on our country that either come through false legs or are 

hidden behind work stations that are located all around the world 

in order to be able to deter these attacks? 

And, if it makes a difference, could you distinguish between what 

Mr. Rogin referred to as hackers that attack anything and everything in the national security infrastructure on a constant basis 

and the brain drain that we face from wholesale industrial espionage—stealing our manufacturing and technological secrets so that 

competitors abroad can take advantage of them without paying for 

the intellectual property they have stolen. 

Director BLAIR. Senator Whitehouse, the individual skills of a 

single hacker, whether he is doing it for fun or paid off by a criminal or employed by an intelligence service of another country, you 

can have really ace hackers under all three of those scenarios. The 

advantage of a government or the characteristics of governmentsponsored attacks are more the focus on what they do and the ability to put it together with other forms of intelligence—spies and 

humans that they can use, not just sitting there at the keyboard. 

Criminals can do some of that, individual hackers generally don’t. 

So the nature of this threat is pretty much the same no matter 

who is doing it. It’s just the resources they have to put against it. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Those resources can matter a lot when it 

ends up to thousands or even tens of thousands of attacks daily 

and weekly. 

Director BLAIR. Absolutely. And that brings me to the second 

point which is that, as I said in my statement, the general level 

of our defenses is just not good enough for either the monetary 

value or the intrinsic value of what we keep on the Net—intellectual property and so on. Now, our big international central banks 

that send billions of dollars across wires in networked systems 

have developed tough defenses. And they spent a lot of money on 

them and they put a lot of people on them. They continually check 

29 

them and they can have high confidence that they can be secure 

against outsiders—an insider is still a threat. 

There are many transactions that involve extremely powerful information and which people seem to think that a relatively simple 

password is enough to protect. And even a moderate hacker can get 

into files in major companies in lots of commercial areas that are 

not protected at all. 

So I think we simply have to raise the game, spend more money 

which is proportionate to what we’re protecting rather than just 

making it an add-on thing. Do more training of people so that they 

are more skilled and take advantage of the techniques that are 

available there if we just put them in and apply them. 

I’d say if we do that, we would be up at the 90, 95 percent level 

of protection and after that, it would take a very skilled, determined, resourced, timely attack in order to get in. But a lot of extremely valuable things are available through very, very unsophisticated hackers who just do brute force methods. And they can be 

criminals or hackers or they can be government agents. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Director. My time has expired. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to all 

of you for your service to our country. 

We’ve had a number of closed sessions on the Christmas Day attack but I’d like to talk about a couple of issues in public to get 

actually on the record what I think the country is especially concerned about. My sense is that the intelligence community does a 

good job collecting intelligence but has a harder time integrating it 

and analyzing it. 

And you all have talked about a number of steps through the 

course of the afternoon. Director Panetta, you talked about how 

people like Mr. Abdulmutallab are going to be looking for other opportunities. And here’s my question, and I want to ask this of you, 

Director Blair. If the events leading up to Mr. Abdulmutallab’s attempted attack were repeated over the next several months, how 

confident are you now that a new Mr. Abdulmutallab would be 

identified as a threat before he boarded an airplane bound for the 

United States? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Wyden, I’m confident that someone who 

left the trail that Mr. Abdulmutallab did would now be found. Even 

in the month since the 25th of December, we have added human 

resources—we put more people on the problem, we’ve assigned 

them more specifically, and we’ve made some more tools available 

that would catch an Abdulmutallab. 

What I can’t tell you is that even with these improvements we 

would be able to catch someone who took more care in—I’d rather 

not talk about it in open session—but someone who is more careful, 

more skilled, could still leave an intelligence trail that we would 

have a hard time—— 

Senator WYDEN. But you could provide the assurance to the 

American people—because this is why I wanted to ask it in public—that with the additional resources, with your effort to unpack 

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fident that another Mr. Abdulmutallab would be apprehended before he got on the plane. 

Director BLAIR [continuing]. Yes, sir. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. Director Mueller, if I could, I wanted to 

ask you about this homegrown al-Qa’ida and terrorist threat, and 

certainly, when you look at some of the high-profile arrests that the 

FBI has made over the past year of people like Headley and Mr. 

Zazi, this is something also very much on people’s mind. You 

touched on it in your statement: How serious do you believe the 

threat of a homegrown al-Qa’ida threat is today? 

Director MUELLER. I think it’s a very serious threat and increasing, principally because of the enhanced use of the Internet to 

radicalize and to be utilized to coordinate actions. And so with the 

growth of the Internet, so too has grown the threat domestically. 

If you look at individuals like Samadi in Dallas, he was radicalized 

by the Internet; the individual up in Springfield; individuals in 

Charlotte. The homegrown radicalization by those who were 

radicalized in the United States who do not and have not traveled 

overseas for training has grown over the last several years. 

Senator WYDEN. Are you more concerned about al-Qa’ida terrorists coming from inside the United States now or from outside? 

Director MUELLER. I’m equally concerned about—probably both 

are about the same level of concern. I do think that the attacks undertaken by individuals who have some association or training 

overseas tend to be more of a threat in terms of the capabilities 

than some of the threats that we’ve seen domestically. And so it 

is the training, the enhanced capabilities that come for persons 

traveling overseas and then coming back that would make any terrorist attack a more substantial terrorist attack in most cases than 

undertaken by a lone individual in the United States. 

Senator WYDEN. Let me just close the loop on this. So you think 

it’s a serious threat and would you say it’s as significant threat as 

you see, say, in Great Britain? 

Director MUELLER. I think to a certain extent, in some areas, we 

share the same concerns as Great Britain. And by that, I mean 

places like Somalia and Yemen and the ability of terrorists in those 

countries to identify individuals who can be trained in either Somalia, Yemen or Pakistan and then travel back to the U.K. or the 

United States, we have somewhat the same problems—particularly 

with Somali youth, individuals, we found last year who were traveling to Somalia and coming back to the United States. 

On the other hand, the U.K. has, I believe, a stronger network 

of individuals who have been radicalized with close ties to South 

Asia—stronger ties to South Asia than you’ll find here in the 

United States—which presents a different threat to the U.K. than 

it does to us. 

Senator WYDEN. Let me turn to one other subject for you, Director Panetta. Do you or any of your associates have an estimate 

about what it would take to drive al-Qa’ida out of the Pakistani 

tribal areas? I think I want to touch briefly on the question of Pakistan, and what is your assessment of what it would take to drive 

al-Qa’ida out of that area. 

Director PANETTA. Senator Wyden, I’ve asked that question a 

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sive and very directed and, as I said, are very effective with regards to disrupting their operations. Having said that, the reality 

is that they continue to operate; they continue to move within the 

FATA and the tribal areas. I would just share with you that I 

think to effectively be able to disrupt al-Qa’ida and to end their 

threat we need to have boots on the ground in addition to our operations. 

Senator WYDEN. One last question if I might, Madam Chair. 

What else, Director Panetta, could the Pakistani government do if 

Pakistani leaders wanted to provide more assistance on counterterrorism issues? 

Director PANETTA. Just what I said, which is boots on the 

ground. They, in fact, went into South Waziristan. That was very 

effective on bringing pressure on these groups. They had to move; 

they had to scramble. That helped us in terms of our operations. 

We need them to continue that effort. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for 

being here today. 

I just want to be clear because this is obviously a profound concern and I share the sentiments expressed by my colleague, Senator Bond, about the whole issue and issuing of Miranda rights to 

a terrorist on Christmas Day. And I think the American people 

need to have reassurances as well in terms of what is going to 

change as a result, you know, of what happened, and what is going 

to be the process going forward? 

Because it seems to me, in this instance, it clearly should have 

commanded the attention at the highest levels in the intelligence 

community about whether further questions should be posed to this 

individual to be certain that the questions being posed were based 

on all of the information regarding al-Qa’ida in Yemen, for example, about this individual, and putting it all together before issuing 

his Miranda rights. 

And I think that’s what’s so disturbing here because that did not 

occur, so it didn’t seem to me, and I don’t think it seemed to the 

American people, that there was a cohesive, concerted effort and 

determination based on all of the information that had been gathered in highly-classified settings regarding al-Qa’ida in Yemen and, 

of course, this individual and any associates, and whether or not 

there was vital information that needed to be gleaned. And we 

won’t know that now. 

And furthermore, the administration had said they were setting 

up in a group called the high-value detainee interrogation group 

precisely for this type of circumstance. Has that been done? And 

why wasn’t that done? And how are we going forward? 

How is the intelligence community going to move forward based 

on this particular situation that really does cast a shadow? Because 

we won’t ever know about what could have been elicited from this 

individual because of who posed the questions, frankly. You weren’t 

consulted, Director Blair, at the highest level, for any questions 

that should have been posed to this individual. And it seems to me 

32 

it should have warranted consultation with you and others to be 

sure under this circumstance. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, Senator Snowe, if we’d known all we needed 

to know about Mr. Abdulmutallab, he wouldn’t have been on the 

airplane. It was a pop-up. There were extraordinary time pressures 

on Christmas Day. I said to another committee that the process of 

bringing together intelligence and skilled interrogators, in the light 

of how we want to prosecute somebody, is the absolute key thing. 

A form of that was done on Christmas Day. The Joint Task Force 

FBI agents asked good questions. I’ve read the intelligence reports 

that they put out and they were good. 

We have taken advantage of the time we now have in order to 

bring the full intelligence expertise into the support of the FBI, in 

this case, which will—we hope—bring even more intelligence which 

we can use. We have this high-value interrogation team building 

the file so that when we get somebody that we know about, probably overseas, we can have done a lot of that homework that Senator Bond referred to first. 

So the principle of using intelligence, using good interrogators, 

making sure that we are taking the steps we need to get them behind bars in the most effective way are what we need to bring together. And we just need to do that fast and the right way. 

Director MUELLER. I understand the concern in terms of the 

public’s understanding of what happened on Christmas Day. I also 

share your concern that in doing a thorough interrogation you have 

the input from a number of sources, the background, the preparation and the like. But it also is important to obtain the facts as 

soon as you can and the time frame as such that you do not have 

the opportunity to do that background such as you would like. 

There were very fast-moving events on Christmas Day. We took 

advantage—and I say ‘‘we’’—the FBI took advantage, in my mind, 

of the opportunities to gather that intelligence as quickly as we 

could under the constraints that we operate in and with a person 

who is arrested in the United States. 

I, along with Director Blair and Director Panetta, believe that 

teams of individuals with the appropriate background should be deployed to do interrogations. And the protocol has been established, 

has been set up, but we have not waited for that protocol. We have 

utilized those teams already. With Headley, for instance, in Chicago, we had a team of individuals who were doing the follow-up 

questioning of him with expertise from a variety of areas, and 

there we had the luxury of time in order to do it. 

We have teams established that will be ready to go, in terms of— 

or in the instance where we will pick up somebody in a particular 

area of the world—where we will have teams, and do have teams, 

ready to go to undertake those interrogations. So we have done a 

lot in terms of putting together these teams to interrogate. But you 

also have to look at what happened on Christmas Day in the confines of trying to get intelligence on that day as to what was the 

immediate threat that the American public faced. 

Senator SNOWE. So what was the fast-moving event of that day 

that necessitated issuing his Miranda rights? I’m not clear on that. 

What was the rush and the extraordinary pressures that were 

being faced? 

33 

Director MUELLER. Well, first of all, we had to determine whether there were any—in the initial interview, we had to determine 

whether there were other bombs on the plane, whether there were 

other planes that had similar attacks contemplated, wanted to understand who the bomb maker was, who had directed him. All of 

that came in the first series of questions. 

Later that night, we had another opportunity to interview him, 

and I believe that at that time, not only would we be able to interview him, but we would interview him in the way that we could 

utilize his statements to assure his successful prosecution, understanding that we have the obligation to take the individual before 

a magistrate without undue delay, which would mean he’d go before a magistrate within the next 24 hours. So we sought to take 

advantage of that time to undertake the interrogations we could 

with the evidence we gathered at hand. 

Senator SNOWE. But why wouldn’t it have been—I guess I’m still 

not clear, because I don’t understand why we’d want to issue the 

Miranda rights when we’re worried about whatever other subsequent events that might be occurring. 

Director MUELLER. Because we also want to utilize his statements to effectively prosecute him. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, you know, I just profoundly disagree with 

that. I think most people do, given those circumstances. It just 

doesn’t seem to me to make sense. And frankly, not having the collective weight on the intelligence community to really zero in on 

this particular individual at this moment in time is really disconcerting and troubling, and I think that’s the point. 

Director MUELLER. Now, let me just add one other point, and 

that is, it is a continuum. In other words, you can look at it in that 

day, but I encourage you to look at what has happened since then. 

And it is a continuum in which, over a period of time, we have been 

successful in obtaining intelligence not just on day one, but day 

two, day three, day four, day five and down the road. And so I encourage you to look at it as a continuum as opposed to looking at 

it as a snapshot of what happened on one day. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. First of all, Senator Snowe is right, 

and I’m going to come back to that in just a minute. But I want 

to engage in the political sparring that we’ve had here, briefly, to 

start with. 

First of all, I think the questions by my colleague from Oregon 

were very on point, wanting to know if the American people can 

be assured that somebody like Mr. Abdulmutallab will not be allowed on a plane again. And I have every confidence that you guys 

are right, that you’ve got it figured out, that this isn’t going to happen. Unfortunately, most people that, if they’re going to do this 

again, they won’t have a guy with the credentials that this guy’s 

got. There’s a million people out there that have no record, and you 

won’t see it again. But it’s important. 

As far as the Article III trial, I don’t understand it and I don’t— 

you know, whether Bush did it or Reagan did it or this President 

did it, when it comes to a combatant, they’re all wrong on this. ArVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
34 

ticle III courts were put together for the protection of the United 

States citizen. It is expensive to try someone in an Article III court. 

It is a great protection that most of the world doesn’t have. Certainly, people that come here that are foreigners that attacked us 

are not entitled to an Article III trial. So I don’t care who made 

the decision, what party they’re in; they’re dead wrong on that. 

Guantanamo—yeah, it’s a political issue only because it became 

a political issue during the last campaign. Every one of us here has 

met with people from the Arab world and what-have-you. The 

flashpoint for them is not Guantanamo; it’s Israel, as was pointed 

out. And I’d like to associate myself with remarks from Senator 

Hatch. 

Let’s talk about Miranda for a minute. Let me try to put this in 

perspective for you. I used to be a prosecutor—in fact, I was a prosecutor when Miranda was decided. We all thought it was the end 

of the world. It turned out it wasn’t. But we learned a lot of things 

from it. Miranda simply—the court said look, in America, we are 

not an inquisitorial criminal process, we are an accusatorial criminal process. That means the government’s got to accuse you, 

they’ve got to prove it and you don’t have to come up with any information to help them do it. That’s what Miranda was all about. 

Again, it was done for the protection of United States citizens living under the United States Constitution, and not for foreigners. 

Miranda is simply an exclusionary rule. Now, I think most people 

in this room know what an exclusionary rule is. You don’t go to jail 

if you’re a police officer because you don’t Mirandize someone. The 

case doesn’t get thrown out because you don’t Mirandize someone. 

The only thing that Miranda does is it excludes any evidence that 

the police got because they didn’t give the guy his Miranda warning. 

All right, let’s take the Christmas Day bomber. Somebody tell me 

why he had to be given his Miranda warnings. With all due respect, Mr. Mueller—and by the way, thank you for what you do. 

You guys have tough jobs and I appreciate it—but with all due respect, you didn’t need to give this guy Miranda in order to have a 

legitimate criminal prosecution. You had 200 witnesses that saw 

what he did. You didn’t need a confession from the guy. 

And anything you got out of him, if you didn’t Mirandize him, 

couldn’t be used in a court of law, but who cares? You’ve got all 

kinds of eyewitnesses; you were going to convict him. I would hope 

you’d go back and look at this again and understand that the Miranda rule is simply an exclusionary rule. 

Number one, if you’re not going to try him in an Article III court 

you don’t need to Miranda him. And number two, if you’ve got all 

the evidence you need, you don’t need to Miranda him. Go ahead 

and interrogate this guy until the cows come home because it 

doesn’t matter. 

What you want that for is you want it for intelligence, and if 

whatever he says never sees the light of day in a courtroom, who 

cares? This guy is going to get convicted. But with all due respect, 

I think you lost some information that could have been very, very 

valuable to the American people. 

35 

And with that, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And 

there’s a couple minutes left, so maybe, Mr. Blair, you’re in the 

middle seat; do you want to comment on that. 

Director BLAIR. I find the intelligence committee has an awful lot 

of former prosecutors on it but I think that the balance that we’re 

trying to strike—it’s interesting, I hear these same conversations 

inside the executive branch when we have our meetings on the 

same subjects. I mean, these are not easy matters and somebody 

would have found the absolute perfect way to balance the prosecution and intelligence value before now if it had been right there. 

So I’d just say these are balance cases and we can talk about individual ones, but we need to keep all the tools out there, we need 

a process to think them through, we need to take advantage of 

whatever time we have and the circumstances of the case, and try 

to do the best thing. 

Senator RISCH. Well, Mr. Blair, let me disagree with you, as far 

as this being a balancing matter. This is not a balancing matter. 

The question is, whatever I get out of this guy, do I need it in a 

court of law? If you don’t need it in a court of law, there’s no balance that’s necessary or anything else. I mean, there’s no reason— 

I mean, just think about this guy. He came from a foreign country 

and he wasn’t able to accomplish what he wants, so he gets drug 

into the room by American authorities and he’s sitting there thinking, geez, I wonder what’s coming next. You know, I don’t know 

what these guys do, but I bet it isn’t pretty. 

And somebody comes in and says, by the way, we’re going to give 

you a lawyer if you’d like one. This guy says, have I died and gone 

to heaven? You know, I mean, of course he’s going to shut up. 

When you tell him don’t say anything until you talk to a lawyer 

and we’re going to give you a free one, of course, he’s going to do 

that. With all due respect, this is not difficult. It’s really simple. 

Do you need the statement in court or do you not need the statement in court? And if you don’t, wring everything you can out of 

that guy. 

Madam Chairman, I’m done. 

Director MUELLER. May I just add one thing? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, you may, Mr. Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. I don’t disagree with what you said, Senator, 

but I will say that you are looking at it in the rear mirror. And 

the decisions that are made—you are assuming that, at the point 

in time decisions are made, we have a full understanding of the 

case that we have against him. And this is but five, six hours afterwards—four or five hours after he’s gotten off the plane. 

And so I don’t disagree with a lot you say, but by the same 

token, you’re looking at it in the rear-view mirror. And if you put 

yourself at the time and the decisions that you have to make at 

that time, you may come down on the other side. 

Senator RISCH. And Mr. Mueller, I don’t disagree with that. But 

in this case, I’ll bet you guys had talked to about a half a dozen 

people that saw exactly what he did and knew you had an airtight 

case against this guy. 

Director MUELLER. Sir, we were out interviewing that afternoon 

the passengers from the plane. But the results of those interviews, 

we don’t get until late that night or the following day. The first inVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
36 

formation we have off the plane, when our agents are out there, is 

saying an individual has set off some firecrackers on the plane. 

And that’s the first information we have. And so, as you well know 

as a prosecutor, as the day goes forward and the events, that you 

get pieces of information at a particular point in time. 

The other point I would make is that, again, as I made it with 

Senator Snowe, is this is a continuum over a period of time. And 

what happens on that day happens on that day. But do not discount what has happened or what does happen after that in terms 

of gaining that intelligence. 

Senator RISCH. And that’s fair. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Feingold, you’re up. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I have a statement that 

I ask be included in the record. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Without objection. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In light of the discussion this afternoon, I 

want to note my strong support for the decision to try Khalid 

Shaykh Mohammed and Abdulmutallab in federal court. It’s a decision that I think actually demonstrates our national strength. 

Director Blair, on January 7th, White House Counterterrorism 

Advisor John Brennan acknowledged, ‘‘we didn’t know that AQAP 

had progressed to the point of actually launching individuals here.’’ 

Do you agree with that statement? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, we had some information that they had 

ambitions to attack the United States before that point. 

Senator FEINGOLD. You know, this strikes me as an area of strategic intelligence and perhaps a failure of strategic intelligence. 

And it’s important, I think, that we acknowledge and address 

that as part of this even as we simultaneously work on how to improve the so-called connect-the-dots tactical capabilities. I just 

think it’s important to see that as part of what happened. 

CT Advisor Brennan also said that al-Qa’ida is looking in Africa 

for recruits and that the government is very concerned about this 

and is following up. I’d ask both Directors Blair and Panetta, 

where in Africa do you see this occurring? And are you concerned? 

Do we have a good enough handle on this threat continent-wide? 

Director PANETTA. The areas of principal concern are Somalia 

and we have intelligence that obviously there are individuals that 

are going to Somalia—in some cases, U.S. citizens that are going 

to Somalia and that are involved in training camps there. And 

that’s one area of concern. Yemen is another area of concern, as is 

obvious. And, again, there al-Qa’ida has a presence and we have 

strong intelligence that is trying to target those individuals. More 

importantly, we have intelligence that indicates that there is a continuing effort to try to recruit somebody to institute some kind of 

attack on the United States. 

Director BLAIR. Senator Feingold, I think you’re familiar with the 

organization al-Qa’ida in the Maghreb, which is based in Western 

Africa. And I think what we’re learning is that this really is a syndicate al-Qa’ida in South Asia, Yemen, other places, and that 

they—in ways that we don’t entirely understand—pass people from 

one to the other. Abdulmutallab was a Nigerian; 70 million MusVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 055045 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\56434.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
37 

lims, generally moderate, in Nigeria. But obviously, there is a number who can be radicalized to the point that he was. 

So what I’m finding is to put them into geographic pigeonholes 

is kind of limiting our vision. And maybe that was part of the limited vision that we had before. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think that’s exactly right, Mr. Director. And I appreciate your adding that to the items that Director 

Panetta mentioned. I tried to talk today to the Secretary of State 

about the countries in Western Africa where drug trade, perhaps 

from Latin America, is perhaps being connected up with these 

things. And of course, your reference to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic 

Maghreb is absolutely right in terms of Northern Africa. 

So I guess I go back just to comment, do we have the resources? 

Do we have the capacity to follow this? These are incredibly vast 

areas. And the conditions that allow al-Qa’ida to recruit in Africa 

are exactly the kind of problems that I think demand broader reform of the sort that I have proposed and this committee and the 

Senate have already approved. And I’m hoping that that can be 

completed and undertaken in terms of a commission in the near future. Until we integrate the intelligence community with the ways 

we openly gather information, radicalization, I think, we’ll keep 

being one step behind al-Qa’ida. 

We also need counterterrorism policies that are informed by 

what is actually happening in these countries. Last year, the State 

Department concluded that the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen was 

distracting the government from counterterrorism. Do the witnesses have any concerns that Sana’a’s recent interest in CT will 

not be sustained or that fighting the rebellion they’re dealing with, 

the southern secessionists, will be competing priorities? 

Director Panetta. 

Director PANETTA. Senator, the situation in Yemen remains a 

volatile situation. And although we have gotten strong support 

from President Salih to go after targets and to share opportunities 

to ensure that we are working together, he is besieged by the 

Houthi situation on the border. He’s besieged by what’s happening 

in the south and the potential that they might divide from his 

country. So there are a series of problems there that could very 

well consume him. This is not a clear-cut situation in terms of having his support. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Director Blair, your prepared testimony is refreshingly candid about Pakistan’s continued support 

for militant proxies and about the assistance provided by some of 

those groups to al-Qa’ida. You also indicated that Pakistan’s actions are motivated by a desire, of course, to counter India, which 

makes Pakistan’s strategic view of India central to our national security. 

I’m not convinced that the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan are going to actually change Islamabad’s calculations in this 

regard. Isn’t something else going to have to happen to alter how 

Pakistan has looked at the region for the past 60 years? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, in conversations with Pakistani officials 

and through assessing them with intelligence experts, we think 

that that historical foundation that you cite certainly provides the 

foundation and the heritage of what they go into these decisions 

38 

with. But they are constantly reevaluating what is happening on 

their western border. 

What I think General Kayani, for example, one of the key leaders, said yesterday that what he sees as important in Afghanistan 

is that it be a friendly state and stable state. And he has offered, 

for example, training to Afghanistan armed forces in order to 

achieve that. So while the Pakistani threat coming from India is 

historically well-grounded and lies at the core of Pakistan’s concern, I think they are realistic in terms of looking around and seeing how do they best carry out their interests in that framework. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you all. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think we should probably begin to wrap 

it up. There may be some additional questions. All right, Mr. Vice 

Chairman, why don’t you go ahead and then I’ll wrap it up. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Okay, just a couple quick things. I admit 

to having been on the government and the defense side in a few 

criminal cases, limited manner, but I do associate myself with the 

country lawyer from Idaho. Not only are there problems with the 

trial, but I also recall Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, when arrested, 

said something like, my lawyer and I will see you in New York. So 

if he were to be tried in New York, which apparently not, it would 

be granting his greatest wish. 

Now, turning to Gitmo, it was always my understanding that the 

many detainees in Gitmo were never intended to come to the 

United States for trial. That’s why we worked, in 2007 and 2009, 

to get the military tribunals properly established. 

Now, moving along, Mr. Director, I was very disappointed—I 

wrote you a month and a half ago asking the recidivism numbers 

for the past year detainees returning to terrorism to be made public. I first got my answer via the media last night, when the letter 

from White House Advisor Brennan was sent to the House Speaker, which stated openly what we’ve known, that the recidivism rate 

was 20 percent. 

He went on to note that all those were from the previous administration. But putting aside all that, and the fact that it took us 

a long time to get that answer, number one, I hope that the information will be forthcoming on a regular basis in the future. When 

I ask a question, I’d like to hear from you in a more timely manner. 

But I do know that the detainees released prior to 2009 were 

judged to be the very most rehabable or most subject to rehabilitation detainees they had. 

So I don’t believe it takes a rocket scientist to realize that letting 

any more go would heighten the risk. Do you have any reason to 

believe that additional detainees will not go through the so-called 

rehab programs, or come back with additional information they can 

use to plan and execute terrorist attacks against the United 

States? 

Director BLAIR. I think you’re absolutely correct on this, Vice 

Chairman, that the 500-odd detainees who had been released before last year, and then the 120-some-odd that have been designated for release since then are probably easier cases. And I’ve 

been personally going through some of these harder cases, and 

there’s a fairly large number of them that we shouldn’t—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. I would hope they would not be released. 

39 

Director BLAIR [continuing]. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Now, moving to the high-value detainee 

interrogation group that everybody’s calling HIG for short, when 

will the document be finalized and the committee get a copy of it, 

and have this operation in place? 

Director BLAIR. Sir, the charter—I’ve signed off on the charter, 

so it should—it requires a number of sign-offs around the government. I’ll look at when it would be available, but it’s moving along, 

and, as Director Mueller said, we are using the components that 

we expect will coalesce into a HIG right now. 

Vice Chairman BOND. But as I understand it from the executive 

order, that the HIG is actually under control of the White House 

through the National Security Council. Is that correct? 

Director BLAIR. The body that makes the decision on deploying 

it is in the White House with representatives from everybody at 

this table. 

Vice Chairman BOND. But it’s the National Security Council. If 

Usama bin Ladin were captured tomorrow, would the HIG interrogate him? Would he be read his Miranda rights? 

Director BLAIR. If Usama bin Ladin were captured, I would very 

much hope that the HIG would interrogate him and squeeze all the 

information out of him—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. Prior to Mirandizing him. 

Director BLAIR [continuing]. I’m not going to talk about the—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. Director Panetta, to what extent is the 

CIA in the interrogation business at all? I’ve talked to colleagues 

who’ve gone overseas and met with commanding officers who, when 

asked about who can interrogate them, bring their lawyer in to 

give an answer because they don’t seem to know. Does the CIA 

have any role in interrogation? If so, what is it? 

Director PANETTA. Yes, Senator, we are engaged with these 

teams, and what we bring is obviously the intelligence value associated with whoever is being interrogated. But we do participate in 

those kinds of interrogations. 

Vice Chairman BOND. So you’ve been participating in the HIG? 

Director PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Vice Chairman BOND. How long’s that HIG been going? 

Director PANETTA. Well, obviously, we have gone ahead and dispatched some of these teams with the CIA, with the FBI, in order 

to—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. How long have they—I didn’t know that 

the CIA or anybody else was interrogating people; how long has 

that been going on? 

Director PANETTA [continuing]. Well, we’re participating with the 

FBI. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Since when? 

Director MUELLER. Last fall. 

Vice Chairman BOND. So you have been doing this—— 

Director MUELLER. I mean, we have been doing it in teams in anticipation of the formal signing of the document, but the concept 

has been in place since last fall and we have used it on a number 

of occasions. 

Director BLAIR. Senator, the CIA personnel are not the interrogators; they’re the backup, aren’t they, Director Panetta? 

40 

Director PANETTA. They’re backup, but they are doing some of 

the interviewing. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I may, the HIG is operational and has 

been deployed, correct? 

Director BLAIR. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Senator Rockefeller, you had a 

comment and Senator Whitehouse, will you make a comment? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I don’t have a question, but just a comment because time is running out. The two things that I’d hoped 

to discuss here today, but which we won’t have time to do—but 

we’ll have plenty of time in the near future—is, number one, to 

meet the two greatest growing threats within our terrorist community. One has already been discussed, and that is the youth—I believe by you, Director Panetta—and that is that Abdulmutallab is— 

you know, he had no record; he was clean, had a 2-year visa. 

He started in when he was 22 years old. He was arrested when 

he was 23 years old. I see this as growing all across the world, including in our own country, obviously, because they are clean, because they cannot be traced. And for that reason, as Director Blair 

knows, it’s a concern of mine that when these folks choose to travel 

and they pay in cash, and because they pay in cash, there’s simply 

an interchange with somebody at an airport or a travel agent, 

nothing is known about them—just that they paid in cash and, you 

know, maybe checked luggage or maybe didn’t. 

So there has to be a way, which we can work out, that when 

somebody pays in cash, that the person at the counter or the person at the travel agency asks questions, gets certain information 

from that person—Social Security number, telephone number, address, address where the person will be overseas. People won’t like 

it. Airlines won’t like asking those questions. They’ll think it’s a 

harassment upon them. But there is no other protection that I 

know of for people who have a paperless trail. So that’s one thing 

that concerns me greatly. 

And the second one we’ve also talked about in other situations, 

and that is the fact that—I think I’ve read it in several books and 

plenty of articles—that, let’s say that the entire operation of bringing down the twin towers cost al-Qa’ida about $500,000 and that 

with all of the poppy activity, the corruption activity, the criminal 

gang activity which interrelates in with the Taliban in Pakistan, 

with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and with others. And they crossfertilize at some point, because money is money. Also, so much 

money is contributed to this from foreign countries, and we all 

know who those foreign countries are. 

The question of chasing down the financing of terrorism is, to 

this Senator, a primary concern. I don’t know how much is being 

done about it. I do know that—I think that they can sort of do a 

twin tower every three weeks, according to the amount of money 

they raise. And that may be just from the drug trade—the narcotics—much less the other types of financial resources that are 

coming to them, just in overwhelming hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars. 

That has to be faced up to. And it’s serious; it’s hard; it’s a hard 

thing to shut down because it’s worldwide. You’re dealing with different people; you’re not necessarily dealing with the terrorists 

41 

themselves. You’re dealing with the people who facilitate. But now, 

they become equally dangerous. They enable. And that’s scary. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Whitehouse, you had a question? 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I believe that the Chairman in her opening remarks referenced the report that the committee is working 

on on cyber security. I believe that the extent to which the country 

is under cyber attack is under-appreciated by the public. And I 

would like to ask each of you for your cooperation with that report 

in making timely decisions about declassification so that we can, 

without compromising any national security information, present 

information in the report about the scale of the attack that we face 

in a meaningful way and in our time frame. 

I believe that will require some cooperation from you as 

declassifiers since nobody in the legislative branch of government 

is a declassifier and our procedures for declassifying information 

are so complex that I frankly believe that they have never actually 

been used. 

So it will require your cooperation and I’d just like to take this 

public opportunity to ask you for your cooperation in accomplishing 

that. 

Director BLAIR. Senator, we’ll do that. 

And, Madam Chairman, if I can just clarify one thing in my exchange with Senator Feingold, I just had a chance to review the 

statement by Mr. Brennan that he mentioned. And we’re not at 

odds. It’s a distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence 

and we’re both saying the same thing. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I’d like just to clarify my understanding. My understanding is that the high value detainee interrogation team is in fact operative, that it has been deployed and that it will participate in any future interrogation. Is 

that correct? 

Director PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Panetta. 

It is also my understanding that Mr. Abdulmutallab has provided valuable information. Is that correct? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And that the interrogation continues despite the fact that he has been Mirandized. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It is also my information that the no-fly 

list has been substantially augmented. Is that correct? 

Director PANETTA. That’s correct. We have added a number of 

names to the no-fly list. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And can you discuss the definition for 

placement on the no-fly list? We discussed this and you read the 

definition, which took a Philadelphia lawyer to—— 

Director BLAIR. Closed session. And we showed you the stack of 

paper which is required. And I think it’s a case of practice and interpretation of those rules. And, as Director Panetta said, we are 

interpreting those more aggressively right now until we get a better handle on this situation with al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. 

42 

So it’s within the same words written on the paper, but it’s more 

aggressive and flexible in terms of actually getting more names on 

the list when we’re in the gray area. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. And it’s my understanding 

that the views of a chief of station will be taken into consideration 

in terms of determining whether an individual should be placed on 

a no-fly list or a watch list. Is that correct, Mr. Panetta? 

Director PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think that’s very important. And I’m delighted to hear that. All right. 

I’d like to thank everybody. I’d like to thank you for your service 

to the country. I’d like to thank your staff that have worked on 

this. I know it’s a very hard time and that the next six months are 

a difficult period. So the committee stands available to be of whatever help it can be. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I was going to say, before you closed, first, 

I join with the Chair in thanking you for your discussions. I believe, having been around here a little while, that when we have 

these open hearings, one of the most important things we can do 

is talk about issues that are important to the public. And while 

we’ve had very spirited debate on both sides, there is strong disagreement. 

I think the public wants to hear from you, from both sides of the 

aisle on our views on this. So I find this is a very, very helpful discussion. It’s difficult because good friends are disagreeing. But I 

thank the Chair for having this in open hearing, and letting us 

pursue those. 

Number two, I’ve said that I believe that we have very strong interest on both sides of the aisle in making sure that cyber security 

is pursued as an intelligence matter, but that the American people 

understand just how dangerous these cyber attacks are for our personal bank accounts, credit cards, for the security of our infrastructure—power supply, water companies and all that—and for our national security. 

So when we find things that can be discussed openly, we will 

look forward to doing so. 

And finally, Madam Chair, I believe the record normally will stay 

open for a couple of days. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It will stay open. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Surprisingly enough, I didn’t even get 

through the questions. I would like to give our distinguished witnesses an opportunity to respond to some of the comments that 

have been made by former Attorney General, Mike Mukasey, who 

was the trial judge in the Blind Sheik and other cases. And I would 

like to get your reaction to those. 

But I thank you, Madam Chair, for putting up with this and having a very spirited, interesting debate. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

The Christmas Day attack on our country, by a regional al Qaeda affiliate in 

Yemen using an operative from Nigeria, underscored the global nature of the terrorist threat we face. If we are to stay ahead of al Qaeda, we must respond by improving our intelligence capabilities and developing better informed and more comprehensive counterterrorism strategies. 

First, we must maximize our ability to anticipate radicalization and the emergence of new terrorist safe havens by fully integrating our Intelligence Community 

with the ways in which our government gathers information openly around the 

world. I have proposed an independent commission to do just that, and the Senate 

Intelligence Committee and full Senate have approved this proposal. 

Second, we need counterterrorism strategies that take into account the local conflicts and conditions that allow al Qaeda to operate and that distract our partners 

from counterterrorism. That is why, last week, I joined with the chairmen of this 

committee and the Foreign Relations Committee to introduce a resolution requiring 

a comprehensive strategy for Yemen. In Somalia, the Sahel and elsewhere, our government needs to identify and tackle head-on the conditions that serve as an invitation to al Qaeda. 

Finally, we simply cannot afford our current military escalation in Afghanistan. 

It is not necessary to counter the fewer than one hundred al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, and it risks further destabilizing an already dangerous Pakistan. Instead, we must develop and support sustainable, global and effective counterterrorism strategies. 

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