U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

57–260 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–121] 

REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE 

ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE 

MILITARY SERVICES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 
(II) 

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California, Chairwoman 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

DAVID KILDEE, Professional Staff Member 

JEANETTE JAMES, Professional Staff Member 

JAMES WEISS, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 3, 2010, Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual 

Assault in the Military Services ......................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 3, 2010 ................................................................................ 23 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN 

THE MILITARY SERVICES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Chairwoman, Military Personnel Subcommittee ............................................................................. 1 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Ranking Member, 

Military Personnel Subcommittee ...................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Dunbar, Brig. Gen. Sharon K.G., USAF, Member, Defense Task Force on 

Sexual Assault in the Military Services ............................................................. 5 

Iasiello, Dr. Louis V., Co-Chair, Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in 

the Military Services ............................................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Davis, Hon. Susan A. ....................................................................................... 27 

Iasiello, Dr. Louis V., joint with Brig. Gen. Sharon K.G. Dunbar ................ 30 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL 

ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 3, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:04 p.m., in room 

210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Susan A. Davis (chairwoman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, MILITARY 

PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mrs. DAVIS. Good afternoon. Today the Military Personnel Subcommittee meets to receive the report of the Defense Task Force 

on Sexual Assault in the Military Services. The task force was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 

as an extension of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment 

and Violence at the military service academies. 

We are very pleased that you are here. We are very pleased that 

you have completed your report. We know that you got started a 

little after that initial 2005 authorization, certainly not the task 

force’s fault, but we are glad that it commenced and that you really 

did the tremendous work that you did. Thank you so much for that. 

Sexual assault is a complex problem that does not lend itself to 

a single hearing. Last year we set out to continue our examination 

of sexual assault in the military by starting a series of hearings on 

individual subjects so that members and witnesses could have indepth discussions about various issues to build towards a comprehensive understanding of the problem. This in turn will guide 

our deliberations on what can and should be done next. 

The first two hearings of this series looked at victim advocacy 

and support as well as the prevention programs put in place by the 

Department of Defense. Our next hearing was to focus solely on 

prosecution of sexual assault in the military. But since the Defense 

Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services released 

their report in December, we have decided instead to have this 

hearing to fully examine their findings and recommendations. 

I want to thank the task force co-chairs for the depth, the 

breadth, the thoughtfulness and quality of this report. This is exactly the type of well-researched report we hope for when we create 

these task forces in law, complete with comprehensive and practical recommendations. I certainly cannot promise that all of your 

recommendations for Congress will be implemented, nor that those 

that are implemented will be done exactly as you have put forth, 
2 

but I can assure you that each and every one will be carefully reviewed and considered by this subcommittee. 

I certainly don’t want to steal any of the thunder from our witnesses but there is a recurring theme that needs to be mentioned 

from the outset. While the Department has done much in recent 

years to address sexual assault in the military, much more remains 

to be done. Thankfully, due to the work of this task force and others, we have a much clearer understanding of the problem. It is important that we make some significant improvements to how the 

Department deals with sexual assault and that we all do what we 

can to avoid inadvertently making things worse in the process. 

Sexual assault within the ranks is antithetical to the trust and 

camaraderie that defines military culture. Any sexual assault undermines the moral foundation of our Armed Forces and does irreparable harm to unit cohesion. Hopefully, today’s hearing will help 

us chart a legislative course to make progress in our goal to eliminate sexual assaults in the military. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Davis can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. We have with us two distinguished members of the 

task force. Rear Admiral Iasiello is a former Chief of Navy Chaplains and served as one of the task force co-chairs. Brigadier General Dunbar is a director of force management policy for the Air 

Force and served as a senior military member of the task force. We 

certainly welcome you to be here. 

I wanted to mention that I would ask unanimous consent that 

Mr. Turner be allowed to participate in today’s hearing and be able 

to ask questions after the subcommittee members have had an opportunity to do that. 

I now turn to Mr. Wilson for any of his comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

SOUTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. I join you in welcoming 

our witnesses and thank them and the other task force members 

and staff for the excellent work and report concerning a very difficult, important, and challenging set of issues. This report is comprehensive, detailed, and highly insightful as to how much yet 

needs to be done to ensure that the military culture adequately, appropriately, and effectively addresses the issues related to sexual 

assault. 

Certainly the report cites many instances of best practices by the 

military services to illustrate that progress has been made and is 

being made. Among those best practices are the efforts at Fort 

Jackson, which is in the Second District of South Carolina that I 

represent, the Army’s largest gender-integrated, initial-entry training center where sexual assault is addressed within the first two 

days of training. Overall, however, the report cites serious shortcomings in the strategic direction, prevention, and training, response to victims, and accountability efforts of the Department of 

Defense [DOD] and the military services. Furthermore, the report 

is critical of the well-intentioned effort by Congress to create a new 

comprehensive article 120 of the Uniformed Code of Military Jus-
3 

tice, UCMJ. Practitioners see it as cumbersome, confusing, and a 

barrier in some cases to convictions. Also, significant issues have 

evolved related to the article’s constitutionality. 

Finally, the report touches on implementation challenges of DOD 

policies and practices during deployed joint operations overseas and 

in joint-basing situations in the United States. 

It is sad that nearly 65 years after World War II demonstrated 

the military necessity to expand the roles for women in the military and continuous efforts by Congress to facilitate the integration 

and assimilation of women into the military, we are here today to 

receive yet another report that clearly indicates so much still needs 

to be done. I believe the authors of this report provide most of the 

answers to my question. I quote: ‘‘The task force believes that culture change is essential for military services to improve how they 

prevent and address sexual assault.’’ 

The lesson we should take away from this report is that culture 

change is hard, difficult, and neither smooth nor quick. It is a process requiring enduring commitment to change over the long term. 

In that vein, I am sure this subcommittee will energetically pursue 

and support the task force recommendations. 

But I would also caution that as the subcommittee begins to address other issues that will require significant military cultural 

changes that I have seen in my 31 years of Army National Guard 

service, such change will not be easy or quick and, like the efforts 

to change military culture with regard to assimilation and integration of women, likely to be disruptive and difficult for many years, 

not withstanding the assurances to the contrary of some advocates 

for change. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. Dr. Iasiello, would you like to proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LOUIS V. IASIELLO, CO-CHAIR, DEFENSE 

TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY SERVICES 

Dr. IASIELLO. Chairwoman Davis, Ranking Member Wilson, and 

other distinguished members, thank you for this opportunity to 

present the work of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in 

the Military Services. As co-chairs we are honored to be here to discuss the recommendations and findings of the task force membership and staff. Given the fact that our formal statements have been 

forwarded to you, we will keep our opening comments very, very 

brief. 

As regards to the task force authority, as the Chairwoman has 

already mentioned, the Congress directed the task force to be established in 2005 by the Defense Authorization Act and it was established by the Secretary of Defense in August of 2008. The task 

force employed an extensive methodology, employing both quantitative and qualitative measures. 

Over a period of 15 months, we have visited more than 60 military installations, CONUS [continental United States], OCONUS 
4 

[outside the continental United States], and in the AOR [area of responsibility]. We have interviewed more than 3,500 individuals, 61 

victims of sexual assault, senior military and civilian DOD leadership, sexual assault response coordinators [SARCs], victim advocates and, of course, their supervisors. 

We have interviewed the first responders to sexual assault, the 

doctors, the lawyers, the chaplains, the military police, the DOD 

Criminal Investigative Services. We have reviewed hundreds of 

their criminal investigative reports as well as all prior reports on 

sexual assault leading up to our work. And at the completion of our 

work, we submitted our report to the Secretary of Defense December 1 of 2009. 

The task force focused its work in three distinct yet interrelated 

areas: victim response, prevention and training, accountability and 

strategic oversight. 

First off, the report recognizes the progress made by the Department of Defense in the area of victim response since the inauguration of the SAPR [sexual assault prevention and response] program 

in 2005. We believe that the recommendations contained in our report will significantly improve these programs in this critical area 

of victim response. 

Next, in the area of strategic direction, the task force recommends that the Deputy Secretary of Defense take responsibility 

for the SAPRO [sexual assault prevention and response office] for 

a period of at least one year and until the Secretary of Defense apprises Congress that the SAPR program is meeting its established 

goals. We further recommend that the SAPR program be given a 

more permanent complexion. The Department of Defense needs to 

communicate the message that the SAPR program is here to stay 

and illustrate that resolve through designated funding for SAPR 

funding in its DOD POM [program objective memorandum] or 

budgeting process. 

The task force recommends that the organizational design, personnel, and mission of the DOD SAPRO Office be revised to strategically lead in this critical area. 

We recommend the establishment of a uniform SAPR terminology and core structure to be implemented across service lines. 

The task force recommends the professionalization of victim advocates to ensure qualified personnel with national certification, and 

we recommend that SARCs, the sexual assault response coordinators, be either DOD personnel or uniform personnel. 

The task force recommends the development of program standards and subsequent metrics which will enable the DOD to more 

accurately measure the health of the SAPR programs. 

And finally, in the area of strategic direction, the task force is 

strongly recommending funding for SAPR research in collaboration 

with civilian experts throughout our country such as those found 

in the world of academia, advocacy groups, and other Federal agencies. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Iasiello and General Dunbar 

can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Dr. IASIELLO. And now I would like to turn the microphone over 

to my esteemed colleague, General Sharon Dunbar. 
5 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. SHARON K.G. DUNBAR, USAF, 

MEMBER, DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN 

THE MILITARY SERVICES 

General DUNBAR. Chairwoman Davis, Congressman Wilson, 

other distinguished members, as a senior uniformed member of the 

task force, I appreciate the opportunity to come before you to talk 

about the findings and recommendations of our report. 

Based upon the 15-month review that we had, several themes 

clearly emerged. First, prevention in sexual assault should be the 

number one goal to prevent the devastating impact sexual assault 

has on member, his or her unit, the readiness of his or her unit, 

as well as the undermining effects sexual assault has had on the 

reputation of our Armed Forces. 

Second, there needs to be greater consistency among each of the 

services because of the jointness which we see in our operations 

today, joint basing as well as the deployed operations taking place. 

There are also distinct differences between our components, Active and Reserve. We do not have time to fully address these differences, which is why we recommend DOD undertake a separate 

review of this. The availability and the consistency of data also remains a concern for us. 

Finally, in the area of response, a notable improvement in that 

area, but additional improvements as we have discussed are clearly 

needed. 

In the realm of prevention and training, prevention if we accept 

it as a top priority in addition to providing support for victim advocates and being key to combating sexual assault, we would say that 

the SAPRO Office needs to establish a very clear overarching prevention strategy. That was not clear during our review. We understand that they have since developed an overarching prevention 

strategy, and so its implementation will be key to the success of the 

Sexual Assault Prevention Response program. 

In addition, that overarching prevention strategy will allow 

greater consistency among the services and drive them into having 

uniform terms and conditions, positions, and approaches for addressing this particular issue. Under that prevention strategy, bystander intervention is a very clear area where the Department of 

Defense and military services have made tremendous strides. 

But we would argue that the overarching prevention strategy entails much more. It encompasses assessment of a community’s 

physical environment from the terms of safety, facility location, 

issues that we saw in the AOR. It is also encompassing of community awareness, leadership emphasis and involvement. To a certain 

extent we have seen that where the leadership is involved, the success of the program is much more effective, stemming from looking 

at the senior leadership of the military services, holding annual 

summits addressing sexual assault prevention and response to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s video, which we saw when 

we traveled over into the AOR, to even at the lowest unit level 

commanders who are very actively engaged in addressing the issue 

of sexual assault prevention and response. The leadership sets the 

tone. 

We also would say that sexual assault from the standpoint of 

prevention, the strategy that we would like to see will guide initia-
6 

tives, process, the training and the public outreach that is required 

to address the issue, which would also enable the military services 

and the Department of Defense to better leverage and partner with 

outside experts in addressing the issue. That affects not just those 

who are serving in the military services but all of our society as 

well. 

In the training arena, we would argue that in order to be effective, the training that is currently conducted must be more tailored 

and developmental in nature. Tailored to both military and civilian 

personnel over the course of their service, tailored to maturity levels, leadership levels, and skill levels. 

Improving awareness should be one of the key aspects of training, addressing the frequency of incidents, addressing victim and 

perpetrator risk factors from age, alcohol, location, acquaintance 

versus stranger, garrison versus deployed, and risky behavior in 

general. 

The training should address myths, the very myths that are out 

there that are prevalent and accepted by members of society as 

well as members of our military services. And we would also argue 

that the training needs to be less nearly focused on women because 

that makes it all the more difficult for male victims to come forward. We all know that the ability of male victims to report is 

much less. It is very difficult for any victim of sexual assault to 

come forward. But currently the training tends to be more geared 

towards females than encompassing any individual who might become a victim of sexual assault. 

We would also argue that the training needs to be more specialized and recurring: first responders and SARCs; victim advocates 

specific to the gender of the victim; as well as investigators and 

prosecutors in order for us to be able to be improve successful prosecution of sexual assault; as well as specialized training for leadership, as I mentioned, at all levels of service. 

In the victim response area, as we have said, much has been 

done in order to improve what we are doing there, but some of the 

areas where we see additional improvement is in providing the immediate victim support from the first responders, the communitybased support and victim advocacy, as well as just from general 

safer access, the contact numbers and accessibility. All of those are 

very key for a victim to know in a standardized way if they are 

anywhere serving, whether it is CONUS, OCONUS, or in a deployed environment, exactly who they go to, where they can go in 

order to receive the care and treatment that they need. 

We have heard consistently that the victims are dissatisfied with 

the treatment that they received during the investigative process, 

and we make a number of recommendations in order to improve 

how these victims are treated in order to ensure that they are able 

to receive support from a certified, very well-trained victim advocate, to being able to get advice from a qualified military attorney, 

to also providing them with privileged communication which we see 

as necessary in order to encourage more victims to come forward. 

And longer-term support is something, obviously, that we need to 

be looking at beyond an individual’s service in the military. We did 

not fully address this particular area, but we would offer that as 

an area to further explore. 
7 

In accountability, we took a look at the system accountability as 

well as offender accountability and found that we need improvements in terms of the database, in terms of the reliability and the 

validity of the data as submitted to Congress in the annual report. 

We have concern over the sufficiency of the funding in order to ensure timely delivery of the much-needed database and the service’s 

ability, in order to provide the data to be integrated into a database 

which allows the opportunity for Members of Congress as well as 

the Department of Defense to do trend analysis in sexual assault. 

In the accountability area we would also address leadership accountability, the need for commanders to address more openly the 

issue of sexual assault at the unit level. As I mentioned, we have 

seen it addressed at the senior levels of the services to include the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we have seen it very 

successfully addressed at some unit locations, but we would argue 

that much more needs to be done in this area. 

Routine discussion of sexual assault by unit commanders helps 

to continue to increase awareness, reinforce a commander’s stance 

on no tolerance of sexual assault in the unit, and it instills confidence in the system in the attention that it is given to it. 

We outlined a number of best practices. Fifteen are listed. No 

doubt there are many more best practices that are out there beyond the locations we were able to visit. There is much that is 

going on that is very positive within the DOD and the military 

services, and I think that the SAPRO Office needs to take a look 

at what all those best practices are and integrate those into the 

prevention strategy it is currently addressing. 

In closing, I would say that on behalf of the task force members, 

some of whom have been addressing the issue of sexual assault for 

decades now, we thank you for your leadership on this issue, your 

concern, and the invitation to speak before you today. 

Dr. Iasiello and I stand by to take any questions you may have. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Dunbar and Dr. Iasiello 

can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate your thoughtfulness throughout this. 

One of the recommendations you have had, especially as we 

move forward, is to place a sexual assault prevention and response 

office under the Deputy Secretary of Defense for at least a year. 

And you thought that that would give them a chance to kind of apprise what is happening. Our experience has been that they just 

aren’t really in a position to be able to do that, that it is not the 

staff—they are not designed for that kind of oversight. 

I am wondering if you have had any additional thoughts about 

that, if you feel that you looked at that and felt that that was the 

only way to give this the kind of stature, perhaps, that we are looking for. How can we look at that? There is a concern that they are 

just not ready to do that. 

We had an experience as well with oversight of the process at 

Walter Reed, and, you know, there is just a lot of question whether 

that is really the best place to put this additional responsibility for 

oversight. 

Dr. IASIELLO. It was our thought as we put forward that recommendation, that after 2005 each of the services took off in their 
8 

own direction trying to answer this issue and trying to confront 

this issue in the best way possible, and we applaud that initiative 

that each of the services took in sort of taking this forward. But 

I think I speak for the task force membership when I say that we 

really would like to see a strategic leadership role taken by the 

SAPRO Office at the DOD that would help to bring together these 

incredible efforts that we see now from the leadership of the different services, the I Am Strong Program in the Army being just 

one of the many examples that are out there; and especially, as the 

General mentioned, as far as the comprehensive prevention strategy that we are talking about, someone really needs to take the 

lead on that. Someone needs to be able to be liaison and to partner 

with the intellects that are out there in the civilian society and to 

capitalize on the great ideas that are part of our American culture. 

And so we felt that by placing the office, at least temporarily, 

under the Deputy Secretary of Defense, that we expect, of course, 

a lot to be done in a very short period of time. We felt that that 

added support, added attention, would, in fact, help them to realize 

their goals. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think you would stand by that statement. 

I think what we are just wondering is if a decision was made 

that perhaps they don’t have the ability now, the capacity to actually provide the kind of oversight that we are really seeking here. 

Were there some other thoughts about how this might be done? 

I think what I hear you saying very strongly is that you want 

to have more authority, more oversight, and certainly raise the 

level of—I am not sure that the word is ‘‘competency,’’ I think it 

is the capacity to deal better and to be seen as an office that really 

means exactly what it says here. And we are struggling a little bit 

to sort of define that better. 

General DUNBAR. Yes, ma’am. I think the intent behind the recommendation is to provide higher oversight, and I think that there 

are a number of ways to do that. The recommendation was geared 

to highlight the fact that that oversight is necessary, and so that 

is one recommendation. But there are clearly other ways of doing 

that. And we indicated in the report, one of the areas that we 

found a shortcoming was just in the staffing alone of the SAPRO 

Office in order for it to be able to do what is required. And I think 

when you look at some of the issues that drove that recommendation, it stemmed from the under resourced nature in terms of staffing of the office that, frankly, you go back to the inception of the 

office, it was geared more towards response and it now needs to expand into prevention and training and other areas. And in order 

to do that higher oversight at a level, whether it is the level recommended in the report or elsewhere, we believe is prudent. 

Dr. IASIELLO. And if I may, we see it as critically important that 

there be uniformed members as part of that staff, people in uniform and people that have had the experience of leading and understand. 

We also are asking for a seasoned JAG [Judge Advocate General] 

officer from one of the military services to be part of that staff and 

to have a designated victim advocate on staff with the expertise to 

handle the issues at that strategic level. 
9 

Mrs. DAVIS. I was going to ask if there are professionals, and you 

mentioned the JAG officer, experience level or educational level 

that you feel would contribute greatly to that kind of stature and 

authority that it would have. Is there anything in addition to that? 

General DUNBAR. Principally the leadership of the office and the 

recommendation that we make is that it be led by a general flag 

officer or a civilian-level equivalent. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

General and Doctor, thank you very much for being here. I notice 

behind you, you have a very distinguished JAG officer with you. I 

am a former JAG myself, so I appreciate your service. 

However you want to answer in whichever order, you cite there 

are implementation difficulties with JAG, with article 120 of the 

UCMJ, in your report and recommend a review by military justice 

experts as to its effectiveness. Are these difficulties related to the 

fact that the law only went into effect for offenses committed on or 

after October 1, 2007, and lawyers are simply not familiar with 

how to use the new provision; or are there serious issues with article 120 and on what particular issues should the review focus? 

General DUNBAR. Congressman Wilson, I believe that from practitioners what we have heard is that article 120, as it is currently 

outlined is, as you used the word, ‘‘cumbersome.’’ It is complicated 

and confusing. It is confusing for those who are trying to prosecute, 

but it is confusing for individuals who are hearing the cases in 

order to look into the types of charges. It encompasses far more, 

and I think as a result of that, it is very difficult for individuals 

sitting on a jury in order to be able to come to a conclusion. The 

concern is because of the broad nature of it, that there may be individuals that, as a result, may be acquitted. And that is why we 

would just ask for a review of it. Those who are implementing it, 

the JAG officers, know better than we do, and I think that that 

dialogue is important. 

Mr. WILSON. And in line with your concern about acquittals, I 

have the same concern. Your report suggests the view that the 

military is aggressive in prosecuting sexual assault. However, you 

note that the pursuit of prosecution in court-martial cases, where 

evidence is not as strong as it might be, leads to pure convictions. 

This is also an obstacle for obtaining court-martial convictions. 

What recommendations would you give to the military prosecutor 

for increasing court-martial convictions? What role can nonjudicial 

measures, such as article 15s and administrative actions, have in 

the effort to prevent and to punish sexual offenders? 

General DUNBAR. As a former commander, I think that this is an 

area that everybody struggles with from the standpoint of wanting 

to prosecute cases to looking at what is prosecutable, and I think 

in the end you want to provide justice for the victim. 

What we would recommend and we do, in fact, recommend for 

prosecutors as well as investigators, is additional training, because 

sexual assault, the incidence level of it spread across all the installations, across all the JAGs who have to try the cases, their ability 

to have familiarity with trying sexual assault cases is not as extensive as one would think. So if you establish a cadre of individuals 
10 

who are well-trained in order to be able to prosecute those cases— 

the Army is doing that—or you bring on additional investigators, 

as the Air Force and other services are doing, and you provide specific training to sexual assault, we are hoping that that leads to increased success in prosecution. 

To your reference as far as nonjudicial punishment, we would 

argue that certainly when we are looking at cases and the ability 

to prosecute successfully those cases, that the JAG and the commander need to have that discussion and need to look at the tools 

that are there in order to be able to provide justice for the victim. 

At the same time, it probably merits including the victim in some 

of the consultative process there, and we have addressed that issue 

as well. 

Mr. WILSON. Another concern I have that your report hits on, indicates victims often jeopardize their option for restricted reporting 

because they share information with the assault about a friend, 

family member, or superior. But you note it is natural for a victim 

to want to tell someone they trust about the assault. You recommend for a victim to have the right to make a restricted report 

despite disclosing to a third party. However, you exclude the direct 

chain of command or law enforcement from the third parties. 

Why shouldn’t a victim have the right to choose restricted or unrestricted reporting regardless of who may be aware of the assault? 

General DUNBAR. That recommendation was essentially one step 

in the direction of trying to afford the victims with a little more 

latitude as to who they can turn to in order to discuss their situation. Right now, as you know, they could confide in a peer, and it 

may not guarantee them confidentiality. 

Again, kind of harkening back to having been a commander and 

having the opportunity to speak to the commanders, for the victim 

to talk to a commander about being sexually assaulted, it puts the 

commander in a very difficult position because the commander is 

going to want to seek justice, and having that information and not 

being able to act upon that information is, I think, problematic. 

Hence, the restrictive reporting as we have currently set up we believe works very well. But expanding the opportunity for a victim 

to be able to confide to peers, friends, as research indicates they 

are more inclined to do, as opposed to go to authorities that they 

know, even offer them confidence—chaplains as being one of 

them—we believe provides a support network for the victims 

which, in the end, one of the objectives is for us to ensure that military victims of sexual assault come forward to receive the care and 

treatment that they need; and that is an option that allows that, 

while at the same time enabling the commanders to kind of have 

that law in order for them to be able to seek the prosecution of the 

offenders. 

Mr. WILSON. I again thank both of you for your efforts. This is 

such an important issue for the young people serving in our military and the great opportunity that they have to serve that they 

should serve without fear of sexual assault. 

Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
11 

General Dunbar, would you give me your 15-second summary— 

I know it wasn’t your all’s fault, but why there was such a delay 

between the time of passage until you all went to work? 

General DUNBAR. Sir, I honestly can’t comment on that because 

I was busy doing my job, just waiting for us to convene; so the 

machinations behind it, I couldn’t comment on it. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do you —— 

Dr. IASIELLO. I can’t speak to the decision, but what I can speak 

to is the fact that when members were asked, it was an immediate 

yes. They saw the opportunity to help men and women in uniform, 

and they aggressively pursued this task, not in a ceremonial fashion, but actually giving up a year of their lives to the work of the 

task force. So we really can’t speak to the question of why, but we 

can speak to the fact that, when asked, everyone responded in a 

magnificent way. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Dunbar, when you look at the differences 

between how you view the challenges at a military base domestically versus overseas in a war zone, do you see those as being 

qualitatively different, or can they be basically the same approach 

in all three places? 

General DUNBAR. I believe that there are qualitative differences. 

We are looking at OCONUS versus CONUS. One of the issues that 

we saw OCONUS overseas was the need to ensure that we are providing our civilian members, the DOD, civilian personnel, with the 

support that they require because they are overseas in a different 

environment. From a military member standpoint, OCONUS to 

CONUS, probably not that much different. In the AOR compared 

to CONUS or OCONUS, certainly differences. You have individuals 

who are moving in and out of theater very quickly, out of bases 

very quickly. You have individuals that are dispersed over the 

area, and that need for accountability, the importance of having individuals know exactly who it is that they can go to, is paramount 

given the circumstances of just operations in the deployed theater 

in general. So there are differences. 

Dr. SNYDER. One of your recommendations deals with the issue 

of letting victims of sexual assault know what the results of formal 

military disciplinary reaction is. That is not a problem just for sexual assault, though, is it? I mean you could have victims of other 

crimes, breaking into their home, destroying—vandalize their favorite trophy, who knows what it is—all kinds of things can happen—beat up their kid. That is a problem not just with regard to 

sexual assault; is that correct. 

Dr. IASIELLO. If I may, obviously the investment that a victim 

makes in the whole legal process is a very emotional one, a very 

draining one. And also the way that things are handled and keeping the rumor mill under control and so on within a command is 

extremely important, obviously, for the morale and welfare of the 

members of a unit. And I guess the point we were getting at or trying to get at was the fact that too often we interviewed victims or 

we met with focus groups, and people were absolutely unaware of 

what happened, why someone was acquitted, why charges were 

dropped or whatever. So the information chain is critically important not only for the victim, but also for the members of the unit 
12 

in order to have a more transparent look at what is going on. That 

is why the recommendation was made. 

Dr. SNYDER. My question is that is not just a problem—I understand you—that is not just a problem with sexual assault, that the 

disciplinary process may not inform, you know, whether—I mean 

certainly it is qualitatively different, but people who go down and 

file charges and testify or make complaints may not hear what the 

results are in other areas too, not just sexual assault; is that accurate. 

General DUNBAR. Yes, that would be the case. 

Dr. SNYDER. Your recommendation that the SARCs need to specifically be either DOD civilian or DOD military. Would you amplify that about why—I don’t know—a military spouse who is not 

DOD, may not be a civilian, maybe a volunteer or somebody from 

the community, a community organization—why that breaks down 

so strongly that you feel that it—you make that strong recommendation? 

Dr. IASIELLO. It is one of the recommendations we all felt very 

strongly about. And the reason why, Congressman, was the fact 

that it is really access to the commander, a person’s ability to be 

able to access their commander. And what we found with contractors is sometimes they are placed under other organizations, like 

family advocacy groups or community services and so on, and there 

may be a two- or three-tiered chain of command between them and 

the commander. 

We feel for a SARC to be effective, there needs to be this immediacy of presence with their commanders not only to keep them informed but to have that access when necessary. 

So the membership, as we were talking about ways to make 

things better, we felt that making the SARC a member of the DOD 

team as far as a DOD employee or, as the Air Force has done in 

some locations, making them uniformed members and giving them 

that SARC responsibility, we saw a great improvement in the areas 

where that was happening. So that is why we made the recommendation. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you again 

for having this hearing. As you know, I have been working on this 

issue for a while and I am very interested to hear—and I have read 

the report with respect in particular to the article 120 comments, 

and I would like to say some of the comments in there were red 

herrings, and I have a different view of it. But also some of them 

were due to, I think, just the nature of law-making. I mean the initial change to article 120 that I proposed was different, and when 

I look at cumbersome pieces of it, those pieces actually came from 

the Secretary’s Office. So I would love a chance to go back, Madam 

Chair, and be able to redo, if we have to, article 120, because I 

think it is that important for us to bring it into today’s world. 

In the military report, you had a case-by-case synopsis of all sexual assault cases reported, and when I looked over the number of 

cases where an individual would be convicted of rape or aggravated 

sexual assault, but then they would merely receive an administra-
13 

tive action or be demoted, or in many cases no action was taken 

at all, there were quite a few of those. 

And since one of the reasons we made the effort to change article 

120 was so that we could get prosecutions—and now we have prosecutions, we have convictions—and so I am wondering why is it 

that individuals who were clearly convicted of sexual assault are 

getting away with mere demotions or administrative action? And I 

have to tell you that that, when I read that, unless you can clarify 

that for me, pretty much really angered me. So it is my understanding that most of the investigation and adjudication of the allegations of sexual assault fall under the commander’s jurisdiction. 

And so that is why I added language to the fiscal year 2010 NDAA, 

requiring the Comptroller General to provide the congressional defense committees with a report on the capacity of each service’s infrastructure for the investigation and the adjudication of allegations of sexual assault. 

So what are the barriers that exist in the sense that—to facilitate a fair and effective investigation, to adjudicate the sexual assault cases to the full extent of the UCMJ, and why are so many 

individuals committing these crimes, getting convicted, and getting 

minor sentences or demotions? 

Dr. IASIELLO. I am not sure how appropriate it would be, but we 

have some great legal minds with us who have studied this for the 

last 15 months and have pored over a lot of cases. And if it would 

be appropriate to allow Colonel Grant, who is a member, who is 

also one of our legal experts, to maybe address that question for 

Congresswoman Sanchez? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Any objection? 

Hearing none, please go ahead. 

Colonel GRANT. Ma’am, as far as your initial statement, I believe 

you were referring to the reports at the end of the SAPR report? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. 

Colonel GRANT. The way that those are written is, the allegation 

is rape or aggravated assault, and one of the problems that we 

know in the report itself is there is frequently not a discussion of 

what the actual —— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Conviction to —— 

Colonel GRANT. So it is the allegation. I am sure in reading our 

report, we are very critical of the way that that information is related because it really doesn’t provide you good information at all. 

And that is why a lot of our recommendations deal with improving 

the report, so you get a clear picture as to what really happened 

in each individual case. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So, in other words, what you are saying is someone alleged rape and then it went to be prosecuted and we received 

a conviction; we don’t know what that person was really convicted 

of under the report. 

Colonel GRANT. I do not believe that the reports actually have 

that information in there, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But we do have that information, and if we figured 

out a way to get that information, we would have better information to tell us what they are being convicted of and why. Because, 

again, I saw mere dismissals and changing to other units, et cetera, 
14 

et cetera, which if that is the case, that is not the intent of what 

we had in mind. 

Colonel GRANT. Absolutely. But what happens is they go and 

they report to the investigators and they say, I was raped. And 

then the investigation occurs and there is any number of different 

conclusions that can be reached after the course of that investigation. There is a gap in the report as to that particular process. 

Maybe there is an unknown perpetrator. She was raped but we 

don’t know who did it. She was raped by a civilian, not a military 

person. She recanted, it really didn’t happen. She thought she was 

raped but after we figured out what the facts were, it wasn’t technically, legally, rape. There are any number of reasons but—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But again there were convictions, so we didn’t find 

the perpetrator, we don’t know who he is. I mean, you wouldn’t 

convict somebody. 

Colonel GRANT. Yes, there are convictions in certain cases, I 

would agree with that. But some of the information where you are 

saying is—I can’t remember exactly what the punishment was, but 

it was not consistent with a conviction. There are situations where, 

if there are convictions and they are just like demoted in rank, it 

is possible that the thing they were found guilty of, it was not actually rape or aggravated assault. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I understand. I guess it goes back to the whole 

issue of we need to have the right information so we can find out 

whether we are really getting convictions or whether the culture is 

still one where the commandant or whoever, the commanding person, is still leery of, you know, ruining somebody’s, you know, 

whatever. 

I mean, we have had so many stories of people being sent off to 

other places, et cetera. We need to get to the bottom of what is a 

conviction and why are there dismissals going on. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. I am going to move on so 

we can get at least a question in before we have to break for votes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think the discussion has been having the results 

of disciplinary actions, having more transparency around those, 

and trying to figure out what is the best way to get to that place 

so that we are even able to see that in the context of the discussion 

today. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And thank you for your testimony and your report. I found it 

very interesting, a very serious effort to address the great challenge of sexual assault in the military. We know there is much 

more to be done, just from anecdotal stories from people who have 

experienced sexual assault, who tell us how that they feel they are 

not particularly taken care of. And one of the issues I think we 

keep coming back to is the role of the commander in making the 

decision over whether or not a case goes to court martial. 

The 1999 decision of U.S. versus Gammons in the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces stated, quote: ‘‘One of the 

hallmarks of the military justice system is a broad discussion vested in commanders to choose the appropriate disposition of alleged 
15 

offenses.’’ And we know that the military is a unique place with 

unique requirements. 

The Department of Defense general counsel also analogized the 

role of a commander to be similar—and we had a meeting with the 

gentleman to sort of walk us through some of the issues there— 

to be similar to that of a prosecuting attorney in the event of a reported assault. He or she has full discretion over whether or not 

to take a case to court. The commander may get advice from a 

judge advocate general on the merits of the case, but ultimately it 

is the commander who makes the final decision. 

My question is: What existing mechanisms does DOD have in 

place for third-party oversight of review of these decisions or a 

commander’s decisions regarding how to proceed on a sexual assault case appealable? If so, what are the steps needed to be taken 

to appeal such a decision, and does the lack of such a process, do 

you think, pose a problem? 

And the other question I would have is really the oversight 

around the JAG officer. If the commander is depending very much 

on the JAG officer’s recommendations, how can we engage in sort 

of questioning the JAG officer’s role in advising the commander? 

General DUNBAR. Those are all very good questions. From the 

JAG officer, taking the last first, the JAG officer has reachback authority back to the commands—higher level commands, if the individual is feeling as if they do not have all the data points, all the 

advice, all the support that they need in order to provide the commander with the advice, considering the circumstances. 

I believe that most commanders when they are talking with 

JAGs, they know that the JAGs are providing advice. The commanders ultimately make the decision as to what they want to do, 

where they want to go in terms of judicial, nonjudicial measures. 

And if the commander is dissatisfied with the advice the JAG has 

made, the commander likewise has higher-level command authorities supporting major command in order to be able to elevate the 

issue in order to seek to get some additional guidance. 

From an oversight perspective, I will tell you that our task force 

did not feel that additional oversight was necessary. I mean the review through the investigative files indicated that where information was available, where you were actually able to make a determination of having sufficient evidence to prosecute a case, that the 

commanders as well as their JAGs sought to prosecute the case. 

The concern, as Congresswoman Sanchez raised, is that it is very 

difficult to ascertain that information just based upon the report, 

and that level of data collection and offender accountability needs 

to be built into the system accountability so you can see exactly 

what is taking place. 

But from the standpoint of oversight, I personally do not see that 

as being necessary, and I would defer to Dr. Iasiello if he has a difference of opinion. 

Dr. IASIELLO. Not at all. I would like to add they were great 

questions, Congresswoman, very important questions. 

One of the things we did see as we went around these many locations was we met with the courts martial convening authority everyplace we went, and we saw a desire there to aggressively pursue 

and to step forward wherever they thought it was possible. And I 
16 

say that, knowing that as we went in and conducted our interest 

interviews with these commanders and with these courts martial 

convening authorities at even flag levels, they knew why we were 

there; but I really sensed from them the intent was to aggressively 

pursue, wherever and whenever possible, any sort of a perpetrator 

of sexual assault. And, of course, they know that they set the tone; 

the commanders set the tone. And they send messages within the 

command as to whether or not they do pursue and aggressively 

pursue these perpetrators or alleged perpetrators. So I think the 

intent is there. 

You know, we have added recommendations such as to recognize 

the special nature of prosecuting these cases and the need for more 

training for our JAGs and those involved in the judicial process. 

And I think with that added training, with these specialized prosecutors, and with the intent of commanders to eradicate this crime 

from their midst, knowing its impact on morale and welfare of 

their troops, I think we are stepping in the right direction. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I have just about run out of time. But did you see 

many instances in which a commander’s decision not to prosecute 

as it went up a chain of command was overturned, that a higherup in the chain, somebody said no, that case we really have to pursue it? 

Dr. IASIELLO. Ma’am, I have been informed we didn’t see anything like that. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

We have the first of five votes and then this will be the last votes 

for the day. So I beg your patience and we will return in—it is 

probably going to be close to a half hour. 

[Recess.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much for your patience and waiting 

for us to return. We may be joined by one or two members, but I 

think I am going to start off again and then we will see if others 

arrive. 

Mr. Wilson and I are very happy to have you here and to continue with our conversation. I wanted to try and get in a little more 

depth about the privileged communication and how you see the 

changes that you are recommending. You wanted to enact a comprehensive military justice privilege for communication between a 

victim advocate and a victim of sexual assault. It is interesting, because I think some of the more emotional testimony that I have 

heard, just more privately as people have talked to us about that, 

is how frustrating that has been. And perhaps you can share with 

us if this is one of the areas where you really did feel quite a bit 

of passion on the part of the people you spoke to about trying to 

define that better, what can we do to make sure that that works. 

Are you aware of any time that a victim advocate has actually 

testified in a court martial? 

General DUNBAR. I am personally not aware of any specific incident, but I know that in the review that we did of the cases, that 

there have been instances where they were called to testify, which 

goes back to why we believe that this is very important. And I 

think that when we first established victim advocates, the intent 

was to allow victims to have somebody to talk to, somebody who 
17 

was trained; and it is pretty extensive training, 40 hours of training. But I don’t think folks thought about the unintended consequence of an individual confiding in somebody who ultimately 

would be called to testify against them. 

And it goes back to what is the intent of why it is that we address sexual assault response, prevention. We want individuals to 

be able to come forward so that we can help them. And if they 

know that the individual that is designated, who is very well 

trained, who can help them, ultimately can also testify against 

them, many of the victims are loath to come forward and, as a result of that, do not receive the care and the treatment that they 

need. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there other effects that you see as well in terms 

of that relationship if, in fact, that person did have to testify? I 

think in some cases perhaps it would be a positive thing that they 

would testify as well. Does it go both ways? 

Dr. IASIELLO. Madam Chairwoman, as far as what the General 

has already said, I can think of no instance of that being reported. 

But even just the threat that something could be used against 

someone—and as someone who enjoyed that privilege as a chaplain 

in my former life and having that sort of sacred trust of having 

someone walk in my office and know that whatever was discussed 

would never be discussed outside of those four walls, that sort of 

comfort that you give to someone at a moment of extreme pain, 

personal pain in their lives, is so critical. And we don’t make this 

recommendation lightly. We know that extending this military justice privilege is really stretching things. But we feel that for the 

sake of the victim, it is so important to know that. And not all victims feel comfortable going to their chaplain. And to have that outlet of having someone else not within the command structure, but 

somebody in the proximity of them that they can go to and share 

this incredible pain with, begin the catharsis, begin the healing, we 

feel is so critical. But even the threat they could be called in some 

way to testify and to break that seal that others enjoy, that is why 

we felt strongly about making that recommendation. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Does that belief also go to—that it be a uniformed 

advocate and a uniformed victim? 

Dr. IASIELLO. Ma’am, we were looking at whoever fulfills that 

role of victim advocate. And that is why we see the 

professionalization of that role and the national certification as extremely important. Because along with the privilege comes a great 

responsibility that needs to be understood and needs to be put in 

context. So the extension of the privilege is really contingent upon 

the training and the certification of those individuals. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Did you have any concerns about the capacity of the 

system to bring forth individuals who are willing to go to that extent to become a victim advocate? Did you sense a lot of willingness 

for people to be far better trained? And what kinds of benefits 

might they have to be in that highly professional position? 

General DUNBAR. Madam Chair, we actually have a number of 

victim advocates who are volunteers across the services. And that 

is actually one of the things that we focus on. We have probably 

far too many victim advocates, and, as a result, their ability to actually provide support doesn’t occur very often, because you may 
18 

have 80 victim advocates on any one installation and the frequency 

of sexual assaults is that maybe one or two might actually have 

some experience. So there is extensive training, the investment of 

training to keep people refreshed on the skill, to keep them aware 

of what is going on. And then folks are doing this as a second collateral duty, additional duty. 

So what we are recommending is actually narrowing down and 

professionalizing the victim advocates so that you may have a fulltime victim advocate that could be a civilian social worker type. 

But then you also need to have military victim advocates because 

those victim advocates need to deploy. While civilians do deploy in 

our services, typically that is a military member. It is a combination of both. It is a smaller group of people, some of whom will be 

volunteers at a more senior level as opposed to some of the junior 

levels that we have seen. And through the training, the 

professionalization, we would be able to ensure that they are able 

to provide the level of support that we would want for the victims, 

to include being able to have that level of maturity for the confidentiality. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson, do you want to go on? And maybe we will come back. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, actually in conclusion, I just want to thank 

both of you. And, General Dunbar, your background here, serving 

as a congressional fellow, Senate fellow, is well appreciated. And 

just thank you for your service in this regard. 

And, Admiral, I was so happy to find out your background as a 

chaplain. And I am very grateful that the Joint Chaplain School is 

located at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. So we look forward to a 

long history of working with the chaplains and your service as 

chaplain in the Marine Corps. I represent Parris Island too, the 

Marine Corps Air Station, so your service with the Navy. So thank 

both of you. It is certainly encouraging to me and it certainly maintains my high regard, with four sons serving in the military, for the 

persons who are serving in the military it is a great opportunity 

of service where people want the best for the young people who are 

serving our country. So thank you for what you have done to look 

out for the young people of our country so that they have the best 

opportunities to serve in a most fulfilling way. Thank you very 

much. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. One of the other recommendations in the report is for Congress to enact a law that 

would exempt federal medical personnel from state provisions requiring them to report sexual assaults to civilian law enforcement 

and to ensure that all service members have the restricted reporting option. So how do you see that working exactly? What sort of 

concerns would you have about that? 

General DUNBAR. Currently we only have a few states that fall 

in that category. And it is problematic if we are trying to ensure 

that military members at installations in those states are afforded 

the same opportunity to be able to make a restricted report. There 

are agreements that can be made with the local officials, but for 

the most part one would think that you should not have to do that. 

So that is the purpose of the recommendation that we make for 

congressional action. 
19 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there other federal agencies that would be in 

that same position? 

General DUNBAR. Ma’am, I am not familiar with that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. California and Illinois, are they problematic in this 

regard? 

General DUNBAR. Yes, those would be the two states. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And what about sexual assaults that 

don’t take place on federal installations? Does that provide any different obligation in terms of reporting? 

General DUNBAR. Our recommendation, I believe, was largely focused on those assaults that take place with military jurisdiction. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Only in military jurisdiction. Thank you. 

One of the other concerns that we talked about in hearings prior 

to this is the accountability of commanders. And the issue was 

raised whether or not we are certain that the case dispositions 

under that commander are well-known when it comes to career advancement. 

Did you have a chance to look at where this might really resonate in terms of how people are evaluated for their advancement? 

Do you think that it exists? Is it part of the evaluation today? Is 

there a way that it could be more transparent in terms of incidents 

that happen under an individual’s command? 

General DUNBAR. Currently, commanders are assessed on their 

performance, obviously, in command and the technical specialty, as 

well as how well it is that they take care of the men and women 

in their charge. So I think that it is indirectly assessed, as are so 

many other issues that run into areas of domestic violence, suicide, 

workplace violence, et cetera. 

And I think that to specifically categorize the response to sexual 

assault, again given the infrequency that it occurs during the 

course of command—and when I say infrequency, I don’t mean to 

dismiss the fact that sexual assault does occur in the military. For 

instance, when I was in wing command, it occurred one time, the 

allegation of sexual assault. And we did what we needed in order 

to provide the support to the individual. In two other commands, 

it did not occur at all. So if you are to separate in a performance 

report a specific area that addresses sexual assault, given the fact 

that it does not occur that often, I think that that would be problematic. And I do think that there is such a focus on taking care 

of people that it is sufficiently addressed as it is. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Doctor, any comment? 

Dr. IASIELLO. I think the General has stated it very well; that 

first and foremost, of course, is the completion of mission and making sure that the troops are ready to do what they need to do for 

their country, but being so involved with the morale and welfare 

of their troops in every aspect, including family life, interrelationships and so on. I would say that specifying this in a way that 

would identify it as something special from all the other responsibilities would certainly, as the General said, would be problematic. 

Mrs. DAVIS. One of the concerns throughout the report is that 

the strategies in place have been to some extent, with the exception 

of best practices that you witnessed and wrote about in the report, 
20 

that we just haven’t had the kind of strategies that really have an 

evaluation process in place to be able to go back and understand. 

Now as we move forward, trying to incorporate many of your considerations in this report, what should that look like? What would 

you really like to see? And I guess the other counter to that would 

be you would feel like all this effort was for naught if you didn’t 

see something in place that really stood out in terms of these strategies. 

General DUNBAR. One of the recommendations that we make is 

worded as a metric. But it really gets to coming up with a way to 

measure the effectiveness, the efficacy of the strategies. And in this 

area, we believe it would be very beneficial for us to work with others who are dealing with these issues. There are colleges and universities that are addressing the same youth population; federal, 

state and local areas that are support providers who have some 

strategies that they believe might work. 

We did a lot of research and we could not find any particular 

way to measure the effectiveness of existing strategies. And that is 

one area where we believe that Congress could assist, because I 

think that there needs to be some research that would benefit everybody who is addressing a major social issue. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And this authority would lie in a more expanded, 

more—tighter authority in the SAPRO Office? Is that what you 

think over time? 

General DUNBAR. I believe that part of this is actually funding 

the research that would enable us to better understand what strategies are effective. But certainly the SAPRO Office, as it is setting 

up its overarching strategy, needs to do assessments in working 

with the services so that they can determine how it is that you are 

having an effect on training, how it is that you are having an effect 

on prevention. 

Part of it is attitudinal. Certainly part of it is behavior. It is understanding. We do a number of surveys, the gender relation surveys every four years. We advocate doing it every two years in 

order to see maybe the impact of some of the strategies. But I 

think as we ask some of the questions in the surveys, they need 

to be specifically drawn back to some of the strategies we have in 

place to have a better understanding. That is just one example of 

being able to do it. 

But, again, there are colleges and universities that have strategies in place and they don’t have any kind of measures of effectiveness. And we were hoping that we might be able to learn from 

them. It is an area that requires some further study, we believe. 

Dr. IASIELLO. Ma’am, you have identified an area that for us we 

all feel passionate about. We would love to see the metrics there, 

but you can’t develop the metrics until you have developed the 

standards on which to measure. We see that as an incredible void 

in not only helping us to identify the health of our programs, but 

also the way ahead, to be able to identify and give granularity to 

the numbers so that we can begin to identify trends, so that we can 

begin to address issues proactively. So we all feel rather passionate 

about its membership. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Just as we are finishing up, is there any interview 

or discussion that you had that just really stands out that, I think, 
21 

inspires you or inspired the task force in their work that you would 

like us to know about? 

General DUNBAR. I think there are a lot of compelling instances 

where we have seen the remarkable difference of how involvement 

and how leadership, how awareness has improved the situation in 

terms of prevention and response. 

At the same time, we have seen a lot of compelling cases where 

it has for us unearthed the fact that this has been a longstanding 

issue that needs to be addressed, that affects not just females who 

are serving in the military, but males as well. 

And I think as we have done the research and we have realized 

that others are in communities—and I keep hearkening back to colleges and universities because that is primarily the age group of 

those who are most at risk—that there is tremendous opportunity 

for collaboration in terms of coming up with some solutions to address a societal issue. 

Dr. IASIELLO. I have to be very careful this doesn’t turn into a 

sermon. But dealing with such a heinous crime could be something 

that could take the wind out of your sail pretty easily. But for us, 

going to all of these installations and seeing the caliber of our 

young men and women in uniform, for us it is always an incredibly 

uplifting experience. I wouldn’t go to one area and one command 

and say this was a very special event, but I would look at all of 

them and say that our interaction with our young men and women 

have energized us again, and they have left us with a very positive 

and optimistic attitude, no matter how big the issue or how big the 

crime or how big the obstacle to overcome, that it will be overcome 

because of the caliber of our young men and women. So that for 

us has been extremely important in this process. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Our young 

men and women serving our country inspire us every day as well. 

I appreciate that. I certainly hope that you will feel and believe 

that your efforts have been well taken and that we will continue 

to move forward, and hope that many of those recommendations 

are put in place and that we can even have a reporting mechanism 

in place in the near future. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

(27) 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 

Æ