Report to the Ranking Member,

Subcommittee on International

Security, Proliferation, and Federal

Services, Committee on Government

Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

April 2001 HUMAN CAPITAL

The Role of

Ombudsmen in

Dispute Resolution

GAO-01-466
Page i GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 12

Some Agencies Use Ombudsmen to Deal With Workplace Issues 14

The Case Illustrations: Varied Approaches to a Shared Goal 15

Forums Exist for Sharing Best Practices and Lessons Learned 24

Conclusions 27

Recommendation to the Attorney General 28

Comments of Experts 28

Comments from the Attorney General 29

Appendix I Ombudsman-Related Internet Resources 31

Appendix II Federal Workplace Ombudsman Offices as of

January 16, 2001 33

Appendix III The General Accounting Office’s Panel of Federal

Experts Recognized for Their Knowledge of the

Ombudsman Field 34

Appendix IV Case Illustration: Ombudman’s Office, International

Broadcasting Bureau 35

Origins and Operating Characteristics 35

Approach to Independence, Neutrality, and Confidentiality 37

Evaluation and Outcomes 37

Appendix V Case Illustration: The Office of The Ombudsman,

Center For Cooperative Resolution, National

Institutes of Health 40

Origins and Operating Characteristics 40

Approach to Independence, Neutrality, and Confidentiality 41

Evaluation and Outcomes 42

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Appendix VI Case Illustration: The Ombudsman Program, U.S.

Secret Service 45

Origins and Operating Characteristics 45

Approach to Independence, Neutrality, and Confidentiality 47

Evaluation and Outcomes 47

ABBREVIATIONS

ABA American Bar Association

ADR alternative dispute resolution

ARCS Advisory Referral and Counseling Service

EAP employee assistance program

EEO equal employment opportunity

EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FDA Food and Drug Administration

GAO General Accounting Office

GS General Schedule

HR human resource

IBB International Broadcasting Bureau

NIH National Institutes of Health

OCR Office of Civil Rights

OPM Office of Personnel Management
Page iii GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution
Page 1 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

April 13, 2001

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on International Security,

Proliferation, and Federal Services

Committee on Government Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Akaka:

During the 1990s federal agencies have had to deal with an increasing

number of complaints from their employees, particularly complaints of

alleged employment discrimination. However, the formal administrative

processes to deal with complaints have long been criticized as adversarial,

inefficient, time consuming, and costly. Such flaws in the processes can

destroy relationships and be corrosive to an agency’s productivity and its

work environment. As a result, federal agencies have been expanding their

human capital policies to include alternative dispute resolution (ADR)

processes to resolve disputes in a more efficient, timely, and less

adversarial manner. In doing so, some agencies have established

ombudsman offices. In the workplace, an ombudsman (also referred to as

an “ombuds”) provides an informal alternative to existing and more formal

processes, employing a variety of techniques and often “working outside

the box” to deal with conflicts and other organizational climate issues.1

 An

ombuds not only works to resolve disputes but is also in the position to

alert management to systemic problems and thereby help correct

organizationwide situations and develop strategies for preventing and

managing conflict. In this regard, an ombudsman office can be an integral

part of an organization’s human capital management strategy to create a

fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory workplace.

Because of the role that ombudsmen can play in an agency’s management

of its human capital, you asked that we provide the Subcommittee with an

up-to-date perspective on the role of ombudsmen in resolving workplace

issues. Specifically, in your letter of July 10, 2000, and in subsequent

 1

There are two kinds of ombudsmen. In addition to ombuds who deal with workplace

issues, which are the subject of this report, there are other ombudsmen who handle

concerns and inquiries from the public.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

conversations with your office, you asked that we develop information to

answer the following questions:

1. What is the number of ombudsman offices at federal agencies

addressing workplace issues, and what kinds of issues do they

address?

2. At selected ombudsmen offices,

• What are the operating characteristics in terms of their structure, financial

and staff resources, authority, and how they interact with other offices

responsible for handling employee complaints and providing employees

assistance?

• How do ombuds offices conform to professional standards of practice,

particularly with regard to the core principles of independence, neutrality,

and confidentiality?

• What is known from formal and informal evaluations about the results of

the programs?

3. How are federal ombudsmen provided with guidance and what means

exist for sharing “best practices” and “lessons learned” among

ombudsmen offices?

The number of ombudsman offices dealing with workplace issues in

federal agencies is small but, according to federal ADR experts, is

expected to grow. Based on our research, and in consultation with a panel

of federal ADR experts, we identified 22 workplace ombuds offices in 10

agencies. We cannot be sure, however, that this is a complete list because

there was no complete and verified source of federal ombuds offices.

Federal ombuds offices deal with a wide range of workplace issues, from

helping employees get answers to questions about agency policies and

cutting through “red tape” to more serious situations, such as allegations

about employment discrimination, other prohibited personnel practices,

and workplace safety issues. Ombuds work to resolve disputes between

individuals as well as within work groups. We were not able to identify any

governmentwide data regarding the various issues ombudsmen deal with

and the frequency with which these issues are raised.

In studying the ombudsman offices at the National Institutes of Health

(NIH), the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), and the U.S. Secret

Service, we found some common approaches in how they operated as well

as some differences. Common among the three ombudsman offices was

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

their broad responsibility and authority to deal with almost any workplace

issue, their ability to bring systemic issues to management’s attention, and

the way in which they worked with other agency offices in providing

assistance to employees. But how they were structured to carry out this

authority varied. Ombuds offices at NIH and IBB were independent

entities of the agency director’s office while the Secret Service

ombudsman was a component of the agency’s Office of Human Resources

and Training. Of the three offices, only the NIH ombudsman office had its

own budget. Each of the ombudsmen was a high-level manager—General

Schedule (GS) grade 15 or senior executive—and the ombudsmen at NIH

and the Secret Service had defined or limited terms. Assistant ombudsmen

were full-time permanent positions at two offices (NIH and IBB) while

being a part-time, collateral duty position at the Secret Service. Two of the

offices (IBB and Secret Service) drew ombudsman candidates from within

their ranks while NIH recruited dispute resolution practitioners from

within and outside the agency.

There are no federal standards specific to the operation of ombudsman

offices, but program literature and the ombudsmen at the three offices we

studied described how they adhered to the standards of practice for

ombudsmen established by professional organizations. These professional

standards revolve around the core principles of independence, neutrality,

and confidentiality. One way in which the ombudsman offices said that

they maintained independence is by having a reporting relationship with

the agency head. The NIH and IBB ombudsmen reported to their agency

director’s office. Although the Secret Service ombudsman did not directly

report to the agency director, he had “unfettered” access to the director’s

office, according to agency officials. The three ombudsman offices also

asserted their neutrality in their dealings by not taking sides in a dispute

but advocating for resolution, achieving results, as one ombudsman put it,

“through persuasion.” The ombudsman offices were explicit about

providing for confidentiality in their dealings by not keeping a log of

visitors’ or callers’ names or formal case records and by destroying any

informal notes.

Although the recommended standards of professional organizations

generally state that ombudsmen should be accountable for their activities

and results, the three agencies gave only limited attention to evaluating

their ombuds programs. However, officials at the three agencies generally

viewed the ombudsman programs as beneficial. They said that the ombuds

offices, through their early intervention, were particularly helpful in

resolving workplace conflicts quickly and in lightening the caseloads of

other offices dealing with complaints and grievances. The ombudsmen
Page 4 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

estimated that they resolved between 60 and 70 percent of their cases. In

addition, the ombudsmen and other officials identified lessons they

learned in establishing and operating an ombuds office. Chief among these

is the need for top-level support. Another important lesson officials at NIH

and IBB noted was the importance of collaborating with stakeholders on

ombuds program design and operation. Officials at the three agencies also

said they learned that, in addition to being trained and skilled, the

ombudsman must be respected and have credibility with management and

staff alike. Officials said it was also important to publicize the services of

the ombuds office. Having a diverse ombuds staff was something that

officials said was important at each of the three agencies that we studied.

Although there is no formal federal guidance on the standards of practice

for the federal ombuds community, there are several forums for

ombudsmen to share information informally about best practices and

lessons learned. Outside the federal government, professional groups that

have developed and published professional standards of practice also

provide forums for information sharing and training. Within the federal

community, the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen (an informal group of

federal ombuds) and the Interagency ADR Working Group (authorized

under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act to encourage and

facilitate agencies’ use of ADR) are venues for information sharing and

training. Some federal ADR experts are concerned that among the growing

number of federal ombudsman offices there are some individuals or

activities described as “ombuds” or “ombuds offices” that do not generally

conform to the standards of practice for ombudsmen. As a result, the

Coalition is considering developing guidance that would follow the

standards of practice put out by the outside professional groups. In

addition, the Interagency ADR Working Group, which has the authority to

issue policy guidance on dispute resolution issues that have a

governmentwide impact, has begun a study of federal ombudsman that

may lead to guidance on standards.

We are recommending that the Attorney General, as chairman of the

Interagency ADR Working Group, see that any guidance resulting from the

Working Group’s study of federal ombudsmen (1) be clearly defined and

transparent and, in addition to including the core principles of

independence, neutrality, and confidentiality, include standards for

accountability and (2) contains information about how this new guidance

can be consistently applied within the federal ombuds community. In his

comments on a draft of this report, the Attorney General said that he will

ensure that the Working Group’s study includes guidance as we are

recommending.
Page 5 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Federal employees have long had substantial workplace protections

through a redress system that safeguards them from arbitrary agency

actions and prohibited personnel practices, such as discrimination or

retaliation for whistleblowing.2

 But the redress system—especially insofar

as it affects workplace disputes involving claims of discrimination—has

long been criticized by federal managers and employee representatives

alike as adversarial, inefficient, time consuming, and costly. As a result,

federal agencies have examined their human capital policies and have

moved toward alternative means of resolving workplace disputes,

collectively called ADR processes. These processes give employees a place

to resolve their complaints and concerns, whether or not these issues are

covered under a formal redress system.

Executive branch civil servants are afforded opportunities for redress of

workplace disputes at three levels: first, within their employing agencies;

next, at one or more of the central adjudicatory agencies; and, finally, in

the federal courts. No fewer than four independent agencies hear

employee complaints and appeals not resolved at the agency level. The

Merit Systems Protection Board hears employees’ appeals of firings or

suspensions of more than 14 days, as well as other significant personnel

actions. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) hears

employee discrimination complaints and reviews agencies’ decisions on

complaints. The Office of Special Counsel investigates employee

complaints of prohibited personnel actions—in particular, retaliation for

whistleblowing. For employees who belong to collective bargaining units

represented by unions, the Federal Labor Relations Authority investigates

complaints of unfair labor practices and reviews arbitrators’ decisions on

grievances. The complexity of the redress process is compounded by the

fact that a given case may be brought before more than one of the

agencies—a circumstance that adds time-consuming steps to the redress

process and may result in adjudicatory agencies reviewing each other’s

decisions. Moreover, the law provides for further review of these agencies’

decisions in the federal courts.

In the past, the government has relied heavily upon traditional, adversarial

processes to resolve disputes, according to the former Attorney General in

 2

The current redress system grew out of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and related

legal and regulatory decisions that have occurred since the act’s enactment.

Background

Overview of the

Administrative Redress

System for Federal

Employees
Page 6 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

her January 2001 letter to the President. She said that this approach can

destroy the underlying relationships between the parties, which can be far

more harmful in the long run. In the workplace, she said, formal

complaints often force employees working in the same office to take sides

against one another. During the months or years required to process a

complaint, and even long after it is over, the dispute can be extremely

corrosive to the productivity of the office and the morale of its employees.

Processes for complaints of discrimination have drawn particular

attention because of the increased volume of such complaints and the

extended time taken to process them. In oversight hearings before the

House Civil Service Subcommittee, we testified that the number of new

discrimination complaints by federal employees grew by more than 50

percent—from 17,696 in fiscal year 1991 to 26,655 in fiscal year 1999,

overwhelming the ability of agencies and EEOC to process them.3

 At the

same time, backlogs of unresolved complaints grew, as did the time taken

to process them. It is significant to note that a case traveling the entire

administrative complaint process—from filing at the agency through

hearing and appeal at EEOC—could be expected to take an average of

1,275 days (3 years and 6 months) based on fiscal year 1999 data. In fiscal

year 1995, this figure stood at 801 days (2 years and 2 months).

In past reports and testimonies, we noted, among other things, that the

discrimination complaint process was burdened by a number of cases that

were not legitimate discrimination complaints; some were frivolous

complaints or attempts by employees to get a third party’s assistance in

resolving workplace disputes unrelated to discrimination.4

 Similarly,

EEOC reported in its 1996 study that a “sizable” number of complaints

might not involve discrimination issues at all but instead reflect basic

communications problems in the workplace.5

 EEOC said that such issues

 3

Equal Employment Opportunity: Discrimination Complaint Caseloads and Underlying

Causes Require EEOC’s Sustained Attention (GAO/T-GGD-00-104, Mar. 29, 2000).

4

Equal Employment Opportunity: Complaint Caseloads Rising, With Effects of New

Regulations on Future Trends Unclear (GAO/GGD-99-128, Aug. 16, 1999); Federal

Employee Redress: An Opportunity for Reform (GAO/T-GGD-96-42, Nov. 29, 1995); Federal

Employee Redress: A System in Need of Reform (GAO/T-GGD-96-110, Apr. 23, 1996); and

Civil Service Reform: Redress System Implications of the Omnibus Civil Service Reform

Act of 1996 (GAO/T-GGD-96-160, July 16, 1996).

5

Only a small proportion of agency and EEOC decisions contains findings of

discrimination. In fiscal year 1999, for example, discrimination was found in 1.4 percent of

the cases agencies decided on the merits without a hearing, and 9 percent of EEOC

administrative judges’ hearings decisions contained findings of discrimination.
Page 7 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

may be brought into the EEO process because of a perception that there is

no other forum to air general workplace concerns. EEOC said “there is

little question that these types of issues would be especially conducive to

resolution through an interest-based approach.”

Federal agencies have been spurred towards greater use of ADR to deal

with workplace disputes by legislation, policies of the adjudicatory

agencies, and by the desire to avoid the time, cost, and frustration of the

more formal dispute resolution processes.6

 ADR is a term that covers a

variety of techniques designed to resolve conflicts consensually, usually

with the assistance of a neutral third party. ADR techniques generally

focus on determining the disputants’ underlying interests and working to

resolve their conflicts on a more basic level, perhaps to bring about a

change in the work environment in which the conflicts developed. It is

generally agreed that early intervention is important in bringing about

resolution before positions harden, working relationships deteriorate, and

matters wind up in a formal process.

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, reenacted with

amendments in 1996, authorizes agencies to use ADR and requires that

they adopt a policy that addresses the use of ADR. According to the act,

ADR techniques are voluntary procedures that supplement rather than

limit other available agency dispute resolution techniques. In addition to

mediation, the act defines alternative means of dispute resolution to

include conciliation, facilitation, and fact finding. The act also authorized

“use of an ombuds.”

Impetus for agencies to adopt alternative means of dispute resolution as

an integral component of their human capital policies has also come from

the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), which requires

agencies to pursue performance-based management. Under GPRA,

agencies are encouraged to assess their human capital policies to

determine how well their “people policies” focus on valuing employees

and are aligned to support organizational performance goals. As part of a

framework for human capital self-assessment that we developed, agencies

are encouraged to evaluate their performance culture to determine the

health of the workplace—for example, whether there is honest two-way

 6

Alternative Dispute Resolution: Employers’ Experiences With ADR in the Workplace

(GAO/GGD-97-157, Aug. 12, 1997) discusses in detail why organizations turned to ADR.

Movement Toward ADR
Page 8 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

communication and whether perceptions of unfairness are minimized—

and whether workplace disputes are resolved by fair and efficient means.7

ADR processes can help in achieving such goals.

An ombudsman, or ombuds, is a dispute resolution practitioner who (1)

receives complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals; (2) works

to resolve these issues, making recommendations on individual matters

where appropriate; and (3) brings to an entity’s attention chronic or

systemic problems and makes recommendations for improvement.8

Although the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act authorized use of an

ombuds, an ombuds is not itself an alternative means of dispute

resolution; rather, the ombudsman is a neutral who uses a variety of

procedures, including ADR techniques, to deal with complaints, concerns,

and questions. A key feature distinguishing ombuds from other dispute

resolution practitioners is the ombuds’ focus on systemic issues and on

developing conflict prevention strategies.

There are two kinds of ombudsmen. Traditionally, ombudsman has

described an individual who handles concerns and inquiries from the

public—often referred to as an “external” ombudsman. For example, the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has ombudsmen who serve

as points of contact for members of the public who have concerns about

Superfund activities.9

 Over time, organizations—government and

nongovernment alike—have also established ombudsmen to deal with

workplace issues. Workplace ombudsmen provide an informal alternative

to existing and more formal processes to deal with conflicts that arise in

the workplace and other organizational climate issues. Because an

 7

Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders (GAO/OGC-00-14G, Sept.

2000). The checklist provides a framework for human capital self-assessment divided into

five parts: strategic planning, organizational alignment, leadership, talent, and performance

culture.

8

The Ombudsman Association, a professional association for practicing ombudsmen,

published sample generic ombuds position descriptions. Among the critical skills and

characteristics for an ombudsman contained in these position descriptions are

communication and problem-solving skills, conflict resolution skills, sensitivity to diversity

issues, and integrity. The sample position descriptions also suggest that an ombuds have a

bachelors degree or equivalent, managerial experience, demonstrated leadership skills, and

demonstrated ability in implementing and managing broad-based programs.

9

The Superfund Program provides support to locate, investigate, and clean up hazardous

waste sites nationwide.

What Is an Ombudsman?
Page 9 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

ombuds does not have to follow formal processes, he or she can exercise

flexibility and “work outside the box” to resolve issues.

Professional organizations expect ombudsmen to conform to professional

standards of practice that revolve around the core principles of

independence, neutrality (or impartiality), and confidentiality. Although

authorizing the use of an ombuds, the Administrative Dispute Resolution

Act does not further define an ombudsman or establish standards specific

to an ombudsman.10 However, members of the Interagency ADR Working

Group, authorized under the act to facilitate and encourage federal

agencies’ use of ADR, and other experts said that although there are no

specific federal standards for ombudsmen, they identified other

professional organizations that have published or drafted standards of

practice for ombudsmen. Among those groups are The Ombudsman

Association, the Ombudsman Committee of the American Bar Association

(ABA), and the University and College Ombuds Association.11 In addition, a

model ombudsman act for state governments drafted by the United States

Ombudsman Association12 and recommendations of the Administrative

Conference of the United States contain standards for ombudsmen. These

 10The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act charged the Administrative Conference of the

U.S. with establishing standards for neutrals. However, the Administrative Conference, an

independent federal agency and advisory committee, was abolished in October 1995. The

1996 amendments to the act authorized a successor to the Administrative Conference to

facilitate and encourage ADR. However, the 1996 amendments do not require the

successor, the Interagency ADR Working Group, to set such standards.

11The Ombudsman Committee of the ABA drafted recommended Standards for the

Establishment and Operation of Ombudsman Offices. These recommended standards, put

forward in July 2000, are intended to expand on a 1969 ABA resolution that identified

independence, impartiality, and confidentiality as essential characteristics of ombudsmen.

The committee that drafted the recommended standards was made up of experts, including

representatives from ombudsman organizations—the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen,

The Ombudsman Association, The U.S. Ombudsman Association, and the University and

College Ombuds Association.

12The U.S. Ombudsman Association and The Ombudsman Association are different

organizations.

Core Principles for

Ombudsmen—

Independence, Neutrality,

and Confidentiality
Page 10 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

standards revolve around the core principles of independence, neutrality,

and confidentiality.13

The Ombudsman Association Standards of Practice define independence

as functioning independent of line management, with the ombudsman

having a reporting relationship with the highest authority in an

organization. According to the ABA Ombudsman Committee’s

recommended Standards for the Establishment and Operation of

Ombudsmen Offices, the office of the ombudsman must be independent in

its structure, function, and appearance and free from interference in the

legitimate performance of duties to be credible and effective. According to

the recommended standards, “In assessing whether an ombudsman is

independent, the following factors are important: whether anyone subject

to the ombudsman’s jurisdiction or anyone directly responsible for a

person under the ombudsman’s jurisdiction can (1) control or limit the

ombudsman’s performance of duties, (2) eliminate the office, (3) remove

the ombudsman other than for cause, or (4) reduce the office’s budget or

resources.” The recommended standards also state, among other things,

that the ombudsman position should be explicitly defined and established

as a matter of organization policy and that the ombudsman should also

have access to all information within the organization, except as restricted

by law. The University and College Ombuds Association standards of

practice parallel The Ombudsman Association and ABA standards, while

adding that the ombuds should be placed at the highest possible level.

The Ombudsman Association Standards of Practice define neutrality as

not advocating for any one person in a dispute within an organization but

advocating for fair processes and the fair administration of those

processes. The recommended standards of the ABA Ombudsman

Committee state that the ombudsman does not represent complainants

nor does the ombudsman defend the entity complained against. The

ombudsman conducts inquiries and investigations in an impartial manner,

seeking resolution for a fair outcome and making recommendations where

appropriate. In addition, according to the recommended standards, the

ombudsman should be an advocate for change when an investigation or

 13The U.S. Ombudsman Association drafted a model ombudsman act for state governments

for dealing with complaints from the public. Similarly, the Administrative Conference put

forth a recommendation that the President and Congress support federal agency initiatives

to create and fund an external ombudsman in agencies with significant interaction with the

public. Both the model ombudsman act and the Administrative Conference

recommendation embody the principles of independence, neutrality, and confidentiality.

Independence

Neutrality
Page 11 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

inquiry identifies a systemic problem. The University and College Ombuds

Association standards add that an ombuds should have no interest or

personal stake in the issues handled.

The Ombudsman Association standards define confidentiality as

communications that are intended to be held in secret. The Ombudsman

Association standards assert that there is a privilege, regarding

communications, that allows individuals to come forward in a confidential

setting without the risk of reprisal.14 The recommended standards of the

ABA Ombudsman Committee state that confidentiality must extend to all

communications with the ombudsman, including all notes and records

maintained in the performance of the ombudsman’s duties. The

Ombudsman Association standards also state that the ombudsman must

not keep case records for the organization and that any written notes the

ombudsman records in handling a case should be destroyed. The

University and College Ombuds Association standards require that when

seeking systemic change, an ombuds should not reveal the identity of a

singular situation that could be associated with a particular individual.

In addition to the core principles of independence, neutrality, and

confidentiality, the recommended standards of various organizations

generally state that ombudsmen should be accountable for their activities

and results. The ABA Ombudsman Committee’s recommended standards

state that an ombudsman, to ensure the office’s accountability, should

issue and publish periodic reports summarizing the ombudsman office’s

findings and activities. Such reports may include statistical information

about the number of contacts with the ombudsman and subjects that the

ombudsman addressed. Likewise, the University and College Ombuds

Association standards and the U.S. Ombudsman Association model

ombudsman act state that ombudsmen should issue periodic reports on

their activities. Furthermore, the Administrative Conference

recommendations regarding the establishment of external ombudsman

offices in federal agencies state that ombudsman should be required to

 14Privilege is a legal term that describes a relationship that the law protects from forced

disclosure.

Confidentiality

Accountability for

Activities and Results
Page 12 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

submit periodic reports summarizing their activities and outcomes.15

Moreover, the ADR Working Group has identified evaluation as a key

component of successful ADR program management and consistent with

GPRA, which requires agencies to set goals and track outcomes, and has

drafted guidance to that effect.16

Information on Internet locations for the various standards of practice and

recommended legislation can be found in appendix I.

Our overall objective was to develop information about the role of the

ombudsman in dealing with workplace issues at federal agencies.

To determine the number of ombudsmen offices that address workplace

issues, we reviewed (1) the membership directory of the Coalition of

Federal Ombudsmen, (2) a listing of workplace ombuds developed by an

expert in the field, (3) Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Resource Guide

published by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and (4) the

results of an ADR Working Group survey of federal agencies. From these

sources, we developed a listing of ombuds offices. In consultation with

members of an expert panel knowledgeable of ombudsman activities in

the federal government, we identified ombuds offices dealing with

workplace issues that the experts believed met the standards of practice

and the core principles of independence, neutrality, and confidentiality for

ombudsman offices (see app. II). To answer the question on the kinds of

issues ombudsmen address, we used information from experts, literature

on ombudsman in organizations, and three ombuds offices selected for

case illustrations.

To identify the operating characteristics of ombudsman offices, the

approaches they took to conform to professional standards of practice,

and the extent to which ombudsman offices have been evaluated and the

 15According to the Administrative Conference recommendation, which was made in 1990,

reports from external ombudsmen should summarize (1) the grievances considered; (2)

investigations completed; (3) recommendations for actions, improvement in agency

operations, or statutory changes; (4) agency response; and (5) any other matters the

ombudsman believes should be brought to the attention of the agency head, Congress, or

the public.

16The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act had charged the Administrative Conference

with compiling and maintaining data on agencies’ use of ADR. The section of the act

dealing with compilation of information was repealed.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology
Page 13 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

results they have achieved, we primarily used information obtained from

ombudsman offices selected for case illustration. In selecting ombudsman

offices as case illustrations, we considered offices that experts identified

as “good examples” in terms of (1) following the standards of practice

advocated by The Ombudsman Association and the Ombudsman

Committee of the ABA, (2) the reputation of the office within the federal

ombudsman and ADR communities, and (3) the availability of information

relating to case activity and outcomes. Based on our consultation with

federal experts in the field, information we gleaned from the literature,

and our subject matter knowledge, we selected the ombudsman offices at

the International Broadcasting Bureau,17 the National Institutes of Health,18

and the Secret Service. We also considered other factors of the three

agencies and their ombudsman offices in selecting them as case

illustrations. For example, IBB had a large unionized and foreign-born

workforce; NIH had to deal with disputes involving scientific research; and

the Secret Service used collateral-duty ombudsmen to serve its global

workforce. In addition to obtaining relevant documentation for each of the

case illustrations, we interviewed or obtained responses to our questions

from the ombudsmen, the agency officials to whom the ombudsmen

report, and other officials with whom the ombudsmen have dealings, such

as equal employment opportunity (EEO), employee assistance program

(EAP), and human resource (HR) officials. Because of the confidential

nature of ombuds offices, we did not speak directly with employees who

had used the offices. However, to gain an employee perspective, we spoke

with union officials at IBB.

To identify the ways in which ombudsman offices are provided with

guidance and the means for sharing “best practices” and “lessons learned,”

we looked to the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, professional and

federal groups, and ombudsmen we interviewed.

To assist us in this engagement, we assembled a panel of federal experts

recognized within the ADR community for their knowledge of the

ombudsman field (see app. III). These experts were drawn from the

Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen and the Steering Committee of the

Interagency ADR Working Group. We consulted with panel members in

 17The IBB broadcasts nonmilitary international programming and includes the Voice of

America, Worldnet Television and Film Service, and Radio and TV Marti.

18The NIH program received the OPM Director’s Award for Outstanding Alternative Dispute

Resolution Programs in 2000.
Page 14 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

designing this engagement and in selecting case illustrations. In addition,

because there is no single agency responsible for ADR policy development

and oversight, we obtained comments on the draft of our report from the

panel. Their comments are summarized at the end of this letter. In

addition, we requested comments on a draft of our report from the

Attorney General in his capacity as chairman of the Interagency ADR

Working Group. His comments are summarized at the end of this letter.

We also obtained comments on the case illustrations from the ombudsmen

at IBB, NIH, and the Secret Service about their respective agency’s

ombudsman program. Each of the ombudsmen provided comments of a

technical or clarifying nature, which we considered in finalizing this

report.

We conducted our work from August 2000 to February 2001 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Based on our research, and in consultation with a panel of federal ADR

experts, we identified 22 ombuds offices in 10 federal agencies dealing

with workplace issues (see app. II).19 We cannot be sure, however, that this

is a complete list because there may be other workplace ombuds offices in

federal agencies that did not come to our attention. For example, two of

the sources we used to identify the universe of federal ombudsman

offices—OPM’s Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Resource Guide and the

ADR Working Group survey—relied on voluntary reporting by agencies

and therefore did not provide a complete and verified census of federal

agency ADR practices. At the time of our study, the ADR Working Group

had begun a governmentwide survey to determine, among other things, the

number of offices that call themselves ombuds, whether they deal with

external or workplace issues, to whom they report, and their

organizational location.

Federal ombuds offices deal with a wide range of workplace issues.

Ombuds can help employees get answers to questions about agency

policies and to cut through “red tape.” They also can listen to employee

concerns, counsel them on alternatives at hand, and coach them in

managing situations. This assistance may be provided in an in-person visit

or through a telephone inquiry. Ombudsmen also handle more serious

 19In addition, there are two external ombudsmen offices (FDA and EPA) that deal with

workplace disputes on an ad-hoc basis.

Some Agencies Use

Ombudsmen to Deal

With Workplace

Issues
Page 15 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

situations, including allegations about employment discrimination, other

prohibited personnel practices, and workplace safety issues. With a

client’s permission, they often act as a go-between, employing shuttle

diplomacy to help employees deal with their managers and supervisors as

well as to help managers and supervisors handle situations with

employees. If the parties agree, ombuds may also mediate the dispute. The

goal of the ombudsman is to intervene early in the dispute before positions

harden, working relationships deteriorate, and matters end up in a formal

process.

We were not able to identify any governmentwide data discussing the

various issues ombudsmen deal with and the frequency of these issues. Of

the three ombudsman offices we studied as case illustrations, only NIH

tracked statistics on the issues raised and the frequency with which they

were raised. According to the NIH ombudsman’s annual report for 1999,

the office categorized most of the issues it dealt with as “work

environment” (e.g., relationship with coworkers, safety), “management”

(e.g., leadership behavior and judgment), and “personnel” (e.g., promotion,

job classification). The ombudsmen at IBB and Secret Service did not

track the issues their offices handled. However, the IBB ombudsman said

that in addition to cultural misunderstandings involving foreign-born staff,

his cases included issues relating to promotions, work hours, disputes

with supervisors, and allegations of discrimination. The Secret Service

ombudsman said that he most often deals with complaints over managerial

style and assignments.

In their shared goal of handling workplace issues in an efficient and

nonadversarial way, the three agencies took varied approaches in

establishing, structuring, funding, and staffing their ombuds offices (see

apps. IV, V, and VI). Nonetheless, the three offices shared broad

responsibility and authority to deal with almost any workplace issue as

well as to bring systemic issues to management’s attention. Ombudsmen at

all three agencies were an integral part of their agency’s dispute resolution

system and all three worked with other agency offices that dealt with

employee complaints and provided employee assistance. The three offices

described the approaches they took to adhere to the standards of practice

for ombudsmen and the core principles of independence, neutrality, and

confidentiality. However, the three agencies gave only limited attention to

evaluating their ombuds programs and accounting for their activities. Still,

officials at the three agencies generally viewed the ombudsman programs

as beneficial, particularly in resolving conflict and lightening the

The Case Illustrations:

Varied Approaches to

a Shared Goal
Page 16 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

workloads of other offices dealing with employee complaints and

concerns.

The varied approaches the three agencies took in structuring, funding, and

staffing their ombuds offices were influenced by conditions related to

their mission as well as perceived inadequacies in agency grievance

processes. After starting as pilot programs, the ombuds offices each took

different shapes as they matured and were made permanent.

• At NIH, officials were dealing with disputes arising out of the agency’s

scientific research mission, such as credit for authorship and intellectual

property rights, for which there was no grievance process. In addition,

NIH’s post-doctoral students involved in research were not covered under

redress processes available to regular federal employees. NIH officials also

recognized the ineffectiveness of the traditional administrative dispute

resolution processes, and they found that many cases not involving

discrimination were burdening the EEO complaint system. The NIH

ombudsman office, which was established in 1997, had grown to four fulltime ombuds (the ombudsman and three assistants) and one support staff

member by 2000. The office serves the NIH workforce of 17,000 plus about

3,000 post-doctoral students, most of whom work at NIH’s main campus in

Bethesda, MD. Organizationally, the NIH ombudman’s office is a

component of the NIH director’s office. The office has its own budget for

which it must submit a business plan that lays out the ombudsman’s

objectives, goals, and resource requirements. In fiscal year 2000, the

ombudsman’s budget was $800,000 for the office’s dispute resolution,

conflict prevention, and other activities.

• At IBB, management established its ombuds office because of employee

discontent over grievance processes. In addition, about one-third of IBB’s

workforce was made up of foreign-born employees involved in the

agency’s foreign-language broadcasts. Cultural differences led to

workplace conflict and some of the foreign-born staff were not afforded

the same range of redress options as permanent federal workers. The IBB

ombudsman’s office grew from a part-time position in 1988 to two full-time

ombudsmen (the ombudsman and an assistant ombuds) serving the

agency’s approximately 1,900 employees, almost all of whom are in

Washington, D.C. The ombudsman is a component of the IBB director’s

office and depends on that office for its budgetary needs.

• At the Secret Service, management was faced with a rising number of EEO

complaints among the agency’s Uniformed Division officers. Management

Varied Approaches in

Structuring, Funding, and

Staffing the Ombuds

Offices
Page 17 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

found that many of the complaints were not EEO problems per se, but that

they reflected distrust of management. These disputes ended up in the

EEO process for a lack of an alternative forum. At the Secret Service, the

ombudsman program, which started in 1987, is staffed by one full-time

ombudsman and a corps of nine collateral-duty ombuds to serve 5,600

employees at the agency’s Washington, D.C., headquarters and field

locations across the United States and abroad. The ombudsman’s office is

a component of the Secret Service’s Office of Human Resources and

Training, and depends on that office for its budgetary needs.

Each of the ombudsmen at the three agencies was a high-level manager,

and the ombudsmen at NIH and the Secret Service had defined or limited

terms. Assistant ombudsmen were full-time permanent positions at two

offices (NIH and IBB) while being a part-time collateral duty position at

the Secret Service. Two of the offices (IBB and Secret Service) identified

ombudsman candidates from within their ranks while the NIH ombudsman

recruited dispute resolution practitioners from within and outside NIH.

• At NIH, the agency conducted a nationwide search to recruit a nationally

respected ombudsman acknowledged for his skill and talent. The NIH

ombudsman, who had been an ombudsman in academia and past

president of both The Ombudsman Association and the University and

College Ombuds Association, is a senior-level executive working under a

renewable 5-year contact. The ombudsman recruited dispute resolution

practitioners from within and outside the agency, which helped to achieve

some measure of racial, gender, and ethnic diversity. The assistant

ombuds are GS-14s.

• At IBB, the ombudsmen have been recruited from within the agency. The

first ombudsman, a GS-15 who took office in 1988 and remained until his

retirement in December 2000, was the former director of administration.

He was selected because of his reputation as a knowledgeable and

impartial manager. His successor was also selected from within the agency

because of the value the agency placed on the need for the ombudsman to

know the IBB’s operations and culture. The agency’s assistant ombuds, a

GS-13, was recruited from IBB’s broadcaster ranks to enhance the office’s

ability to meet the needs of the broadcaster staff and to add gender

diversity.

• The Secret Service has recruited full-time ombudsmen from the ranks of

the agency’s special agents. The Service’s director has appointed GS-15

special agents who understand the agency’s structure, processes, and

culture to fill the ombudsman position under the agency’s rotation
Page 18 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

process. The appointment is renewable on a yearly basis. The nine

collateral duty ombuds were selected from the ranks of special agents,

Uniformed Division officers, and mission support staff. The collateral

ombuds corps, in addition to making ombuds services more available

outside of headquarters, has helped to provide for gender, racial, and

ethnic, as well as occupational diversity.

Although the ombudsmen at IBB and the Secret Service were not trained

dispute resolution practitioners when selected for their assignments,

officials told us that all had since received training in conflict

management, including training offered by The Ombudsman Association.

The three ombudsman offices we studied had broad responsibility and

authority to deal with almost any workplace issue as well as to bring

systemic issues to management’s attention. Of the three offices studied,

the program at NIH—called The Office of the Ombudsman, Center for

Cooperative Resolution—was the broadest in scope. In addition to

addressing individual and multiparty and group conflict, the NIH

ombudsman’s office was also involved in training, conflict prevention, and

dispute systems design initiatives. Among the initiatives was a seminar

series for executives on a variety of conflict resolution topics, training a

pool of collateral duty mediators for EEO disputes, and training

facilitators and panelists for a peer resolution pilot.20 In addition, the office

has been developing dispute resolution protocols for teams that would be

in place from the beginning of scientific collaborations.

The ombudsmen at the three offices studied, along with officials at their

respective agencies, said that the ombudsman office is an integral

component of the agency dispute resolution system. The ombudsman

offices we studied provided an additional resource to employees and did

not replace other agency offices that deal with employee complaints and

other human capital issues, including the EEO, EAP, and HR offices.

Ombudsmen and other officials with whom we spoke described regular

information sharing and cross referrals of cases as appropriate. For

example, the NIH ombudsman office reported that about 12 percent of the

cases it handled in fiscal year 1999 were referred to a formal process, such

 20In the peer pilot program, grievances will be heard and decided by a panel of employee

peers.

Broad Authority to Deal

With Workplace Issues

Working With Other

Offices to Resolve Issues
Page 19 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

as the EEO complaint process. Also, the ombuds and EEO offices at NIH

and the Secret Service were closely allied because the ombuds offices

provided ADR services in EEO cases, thereby helping the EEO offices at

these agencies meet the requirements of regulations that ADR be available

to employees alleging employment discrimination. At IBB, the

ombudsman, in addition to the routine dealings with other offices, was a

member of the agency’s EEO Advisory Committee, comprised of the

agency’s human capital-related offices and employee representatives, that

meets monthly to address organizationwide issues.

Additionally, the ombudsman at IBB faced a different situation, compared

with NIH and the Secret Service, because about 80 percent of the IBB

workforce belonged to collective bargaining units represented by three

unions.21 According to both the ombudsman and union officials, the IBB

ombudsman’s office, in dealing with employees belonging to bargaining

units, respected the representational rights of the unions (provided for in

the Federal Service Labor-Management Statute) and the provisions of their

labor agreements with the agency and did not intervene without consent

from the client and the union. 22

 21There were no bargaining units at the Secret Service. Only a small number of the NIH

workforce belong to a bargaining unit and the NIH ombudsman will not intervene without

the union’s consent.

22When there is union representation at an agency, like there is at IBB and NIH,

management and the ombudsman need to be mindful of the Federal Service LaborManagement Relations Statute when establishing and operating an ombuds program. The

General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority has issued guidance in this

regard. The guidance points out, for example, that the establishment of ADR programs

designed to resolve EEO complaints and EEO procedures constitute a condition of

employment that cannot lawfully be implemented or changed without fulfilling the

statutory bargaining obligation with an exclusive representative (the union). Additional

guidance discusses types of situations where a bargaining unit employee has a right to

representation by the exclusive representative at a meeting, and where the union, as the

exclusive representative of all bargaining unit employees, has a right to be represented at a

meeting. This applies to “formal” discussions involving EEO complaints and may also

include “informal” discussions about informal EEO complaints that concern a personnel

policy or practice or general condition of employment. The General Counsel advises that

the most effective means to avoid disputes over representation at discussions involving

EEO complaints is for the union and the agency to work together in establishing their ADR

program and EEO processes that satisfy the institutional interests of the agency and the

union, as well as respecting an individual’s right to file, and have processed, an EEO

complaint.
Page 20 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

We selected the three ombuds offices for case illustration in part because

our expert panel told us that these offices conformed to the standards of

practice for ombudsmen. Accordingly, the program literature, agency

policy, and the ombudsmen with whom we spoke said that they met the

standards of practice for ombudsmen, including the core principles of

independence, neutrality, and confidentiality. Information from the three

ombudsman offices specifically stated that they follow The Ombudsman

Association code of ethics and standards of practice.

One way in which the ombudsman offices said that they meet the

independence standard is by having a reporting relationship with the

agency head. The ombudsmen at NIH and IBB report directly to the office

of their agency head. The NIH principal deputy director said that the

independence of the ombudsman’s office is enhanced by the fact that the

ombudsman is not part of the management team, does not participate in

setting policy or making managerial decisions, except in the case of ADR,

and has no other assigned duties. The IBB ombudsman said that his

office’s independence is enhanced because he has no managerial or

operational line authority. The situation at Secret Service changed in 2000

as a result of a reorganization following an efficiency review. Previously,

the ombudsman had been a special assistant to the director. Under the

reorganization, the ombudsman’s office was consolidated into the human

resources and training office along with other human capital-related

offices, including the EEO and EAP offices. Secret Service officials said

that although the ombuds office had become a component of the human

resources and training office, the ombudsman would still have

“unfettered” access to the director’s office.

All three of the ombudsman offices and their program literature also said

they assert their neutrality by not taking sides in disputes but by being

advocates for resolution. In addition, although the ombudsmen will make

recommendations when appropriate, they cannot require that the

recommendations be adopted. As the former IBB ombudsman said, he

worked “through persuasion.”

Literature of each of the ombudsman offices and the three ombudsmen

were explicit about providing for confidentiality in their dealings. The

offices maintain confidentiality in all but rare situations, such as when a

person may be a danger to themselves or others. The ombudsmen said that

they do not act on behalf of an individual without that person’s

permission. The offices also help to promote confidentiality by being

located in remote areas and by meeting or speaking to clients off site, if

necessary. In addition, none of the offices kept formal case records.

Ombudsman Offices Took

Similar Approaches to

Provide for Independence,

Neutrality, and

Confidentiality
Page 21 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

However, the three ombudsmen said that they keep informal notes as

memory joggers but that these notes are eventually destroyed. None of the

offices kept a log of visitors’ or callers’ names, although the NIH

ombudsman tracked the number of complaints handled, kinds of issues

involved, and the types of resolutions achieved for statistical purposes.

As previously discussed, the ombudsman offices we studied did not keep

formal records, and their agencies gave only limited attention to evaluating

the programs, including determining user satisfaction. However, agency

officials generally viewed the ombudsman programs as beneficial,

particularly in helping to resolve conflicts and lighten the workloads of

other offices that handle complaints and grievances or provide other

assistance to employees. In addition, agency officials said that the work

environment had improved as a result of the ombudsman offices, allowing

employees to be more focused on accomplishing the agency’s mission. The

ombudsmen and other officials also identified lessons they learned in

establishing and operating an ombuds office.

The ability to evaluate ombudsman offices is limited because of the

constraints of confidentiality. As discussed earlier in this report, several

organizations’ standards for ombudsmen stipulate the need for

confidentiality while also recommending that ombudsmen ensure their

office’s accountability by issuing periodic reports on their activities and

outcomes. These reports, however, can only contain data of a statistical

nature and not report any kind of case-related information that could

divulge the identity of complainants. Of the three ombuds offices studied,

only one—NIH—tracked statistical information on the number of

complaints handled and types of resolutions achieved and prepared an

annual report.23 According to the NIH ombudsman’s first annual report,

which covered 1999, the office handled 328 cases, achieving full or partial

resolution in 65 percent of them.24 The ombudsman also reported that the

office closed about 40 percent of the cases within 2 weeks and 60 percent

within 6 weeks. Although NIH has not evaluated the Office of the

Ombudsman, officials were unanimous in their views that the office had

 23In addition, the NIH ombudsman office prepares an annual business plan that includes

objectives, goals, and performance measures.

24The three ombuds offices used the term “resolution” to describe cases in which the

ombudsmen believed that part or all of the concerns of individuals were successfully

addressed.

Evaluation Limited but

Officials Perceived

Ombuds Offices as

Beneficial
Page 22 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

helped to both resolve and prevent disputes. For example, NIH’s acting

director said that the ombudsman’s intervention in scientific disputes

saved important scientific projects from near-certain dissolution. Two

offices that handle workplace disputes—the Office of Intramural Research

and the Office of Equal Opportunity—saw a drop in their caseloads after

the ombudsman office was established. Officials in those offices said that

they believed that at least some of the decrease was a result of the

ombudsman office.

Of the three offices that we studied, NIH was the only ombudsman office

that had attempted to measure user satisfaction and the effect of the

processes used on consumers. However, this initiative was abandoned

because of low response rates to questionnaires. The office is working

with an expert to develop measures of ombudsman effectiveness. To help

determine perceptions of the ombudsman function and its effectiveness,

the plan for future evaluation calls for assessing complaints processed

using ombudsman services compared with those processed by standard

EEO complaint counseling, with feedback to be obtained from

complainants and respondents.

Data about case activity and outcomes at IBB were less precise compared

with NIH. Except for a report he sent annually to the director of IBB’s

Office of Civil Rights about EEO-related cases, the ombudsman did not

prepare reports of his office’s activities.25 However, he kept a rough tally of

cases that he and his assistant handled. He estimated that their combined

workload was between 150 and 175 cases in 1999, not including

“numerous” routine telephone calls and policy questions. The ombudsman

estimated that his office resolved between 60 and 70 percent of the cases

handled. In fiscal year 2000, resolutions included 25 cases that the

ombudsman believed were EEO related, according to his report to the

Civil Rights Office director. Other IBB officials perceived that the

ombudsman office added value by preventing some issues from growing to

formal complaints and grievances or having a greater adverse effect on the

workplace. The personnel director said that the ombudsman helped in

preventing some cases from rising to a formal grievance. The former

senior advisor to the IBB director said that the ombudsman alerted the

director’s office to emerging workplace problems. Union officials said that

 25The IBB ombudsman periodically prepared Ombudsman Advisory Papers for IBB

management to report perceived systemic problems or recurring conflicts.
Page 23 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

the ombudsman had helped to resolve “many cases” before they grew into

EEO complaints or formal grievances.

Data about the operations of the Secret Service ombudsman were scant.

The ombudsman kept only a tally sheet of the number of cases he handled.

During his first 2 months as ombudsman (August and September 2000), he

said that he handled 48 cases, of which 3 or 4 had “EEO overtones.”

26 He

had no data on the number of cases the collateral duty ombuds handled;

however, one collateral duty ombuds with whom we spoke estimated that

she handled about 30 cases a year. The ombudsman said that he expects

that his office will resolve about 70 percent of the cases, an estimate

consistent with that of a former Secret Service ombudsman. Although the

Secret Service has not evaluated the ombudsman office, perceptions of the

directorate that the office is “very effective” and helps to improve morale

were reinforced during the efficiency review conducted in 2000. In

addition, the EAP coordinator said he believed that the ombuds office

might have lightened his office’s workload.

The ombudsmen and other officials commented on lessons learned in

establishing and operating an ombuds office. Chief among these lessons is

the need for top-level support in not only establishing an office but also in

establishing the office’s credibility among senior managers and employees

alike. The NIH principal deputy director said that the fact that NIH

leadership promotes a program that is independent, neutral, and

confidential imparts a crucial message to the entire NIH community.

In order to build support, officials at NIH and IBB learned the importance

of collaborating with stakeholders on an ombuds program design. At NIH,

a working group of practitioners knowledgeable about dispute resolution

collaborated in developing and later piloting the ombudsman concept. In

contrast, IBB management unilaterally established that agency’s ombuds

program without consulting the unions. According to the ombudsman, the

unions consequently viewed the ombuds office as a “management tool”

and resisted cooperating with him. The ombudsman said that it took

several years of “fence mending” to develop credibility with the unions.

Officials at NIH and IBB said that it is important that the ombudsman and

EEO offices work closely to protect the redress rights of potential EEO

 26This total is in line with an estimate provided to us in 1996 by a former Secret Service

ombudsman. He said that he handled about 300 cases per year (i.e., 25 cases per month).

Some Lessons Learned
Page 24 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

complainants. According to EEO complaint process regulations, an

employee must contact the EEO office within 45 days of the alleged

discrimination. Therefore it is important that an ombudsman inform

employees of this requirement and make clear that contacting the

ombudsman’s office does not satisfy this requirement.

Another lesson that officials at the three agencies reported they learned is

that it takes time to develop respect and credibility. One Secret Service

official said that the frequent turnover of ombudsmen (there have been six

ombudsmen since the agency’s program was established in 1987) detracts

from the ombudsman’s ability to establish his credibility. However, other

officials said that the short tenure of ombudsmen at the Secret Service

helps to provide fresh perspectives and guard against “burnout.”

Officials said it was also important to publicize the services of the ombuds

office. Each of the offices we studied had brochures and took other steps

to bring their services to the attention of their agency’s workforce. For

example, the NIH ombudsman office made numerous briefings to groups

within NIH and later developed a Web site. The IBB ombudsman wrote a

column in the agency’s bimonthly newsletter. At the Secret Service, the

ombudsman made presentations at training sessions and management

meetings and distributed a poster featuring the names, pictures, and

contact numbers for the entire ombuds corps.

A final lesson that officials at each of the three agencies reported was the

importance of the diversity of the ombuds staff. Ombudsmen said that it is

important for some employees that there be an ombuds with whom they

can identify. For example, the IBB ombudsman said that some employees

tended to seek the assistance of his female assistant ombuds.

The federal ombuds community has several forums it can turn to for

sharing information about best practices and lessons learned. Outside the

federal government, there are professional groups, such as The

Ombudsman Association, which have developed and published standards

of practice for ombudsmen and also provide forums for information

sharing. Within the federal community, the Coalition of Federal

Ombudsmen and the Interagency ADR Working Group provide venues for

Forums Exist for

Sharing Best

Practices and Lessons

Learned
Page 25 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

information sharing and training. 27 The ombudsmen from the three offices

selected for case illustration are actively involved in these informationsharing networks. Some federal ADR experts expect the number of federal

ombudsman offices to grow and, at the same time, they are concerned that

there are dispute resolution practitioners or activities describing

themselves as ombuds or ombuds offices but that do not generally

conform to the standards of practice for ombudsmen, particularly with

regard to independence and neutrality. Consequently, the Coalition and

the ADR Working Group can play an important role in disseminating

information on guidelines for ombudsmen.

A frequently mentioned resource for information sharing outside the

federal government is The Ombudsman Association. The three

ombudsmen in our study said that they are members of The Ombudsman

Association, a professional association for practicing ombudsmen that

provides a forum for sharing professional experiences and knowledge. The

Ombudsman Association, as noted earlier, established a Code of Ethics

and Standards of Practice for ombudsmen. The association is also a source

of continuing professional education. Other professional organizations

similar to The Ombudsman Association include the U.S. Ombudsman

Association and the University and College Ombuds Association.28

For federal ombuds, the primary vehicle for sharing information is the

Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen. The Coalition is an informal working

group that was formed by federal ombuds to provide a means for

information sharing and coordination. The Coalition’s membership, which

included the three offices we studied, is made up of workplace and

external ombuds as well as other dispute resolution practitioners

 27OPM’s Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Resource Guide is another source of information

for the federal dispute resolution community. The guide, available on OPM’s Web site,

provides descriptions of various ADR techniques, summaries of workplace ADR programs

and program contacts, sources of ADR training, and an annotated bibliography.

Information in the guide is limited, however, to those agencies that responded to OPM’s

invitation to submit information about their ADR programs for the guide.

28The chairman of the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen is past president of The

Ombudsman Association and the University and College Ombuds Association. Another

member of the Coalition, who also serves on the Interagency ADR Working Group Steering

Committee, is past president of the University and College Ombuds Association and is a

member of The Ombudsman Association Board of Directors. She also served on the ABA’s

Ombudsman Steering Committee. Another coalition member, besides serving on the

Interagency ADR Working Group Steering Committee, was a member of the ABA’s

Ombudsman Steering Committee.
Page 26 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

interested in ombuds operations and practices. The members, most of

whom are located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, meet

bimonthly. Meeting topics have included discussions on steps agencies

take in establishing an ombuds office; the relationship between ombuds

and unions under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations

Statute; how to handle sensitive situations, such as harassment; and

training opportunities for ombudsmen. During our study, the Coalition was

developing a charter, which, the chairman said, would help ensure that

ombuds offices conform to standards of practice for ombudsmen. He also

said that the Coalition was considering developing guidance that would

follow the standards of practice put out by outside professional

organizations. He said that such guidance is needed because he believes

that the term ombudsman is being used loosely among the Coalition’s

membership. Other experts also told us that there are dispute resolution

practitioners or activities that call themselves ombuds but who, in their

opinion, do not generally conform to the standards of practice for

ombudsmen. They said that some ombuds may lack independence

because they do not have a reporting relationship to the agency head. They

also pointed to an ombudsman position at one agency that is called

“employee advocate” that, in their view, was in conflict with the core

principle of neutrality.

Another vehicle for sharing information is the Interagency ADR Working

Group. The Working Group’s Steering Committee, whose membership

includes the chairman and other members of the Coalition of Federal

Ombudsmen, serves as the central forum for the advancement of ADR in

the federal government by coordinating multiagency ADR initiatives,

promoting best practices for federal ADR, conducting discourse and

disseminating information regarding federal policy on ADR, and providing

recommendations for policy guidance. The ADR Working Group, which is

chaired by the U.S. Attorney General, has no regulatory power, and its role

is to issue policy guidance on issues in dispute resolution that have a

governmentwide impact. At the time of our study, the Steering Committee

had undertaken a governmentwide survey to determine, among other

things, the number of offices that call themselves ombuds, whether they

deal with external or workplace issues, to whom they report, and their

organizational location. Members of the Steering Committee said that this

survey may lead to guidance on standards of practice, suggesting

opportunities for expanding the number of ombuds offices, and

disseminating information about best practices for establishing an ombuds

office.
Page 27 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Federal ADR experts said that providing guidance and information

resources within the federal government is important because they believe

that more ombudsman offices will be established in the future. This will

occur for several reasons, they said. One reason agencies may consider

establishing an ombuds office is to meet the requirements of laws and

regulations calling for the availability of ADR. Another reason is that

agencies may recognize that many complaints brought into the EEO

complaint system do not really stem from unlawful discrimination issues.

Still another reason is that there are gaps in coverage by grievance and

redress processes at agencies, which become more evident when agencies

adopt “zero tolerance” policies about behaviors and situations not covered

under existing processes. Similarly, the experts believe that agencies will

see an ombudsman as an essential component of an integrated conflict

management system, providing an informal and confidential resource to

employees and management alike.29

Modern human capital policies and practices offer the federal government

a means to improve its economy, efficiency, and effectiveness to better

serve the American people. Ombudsman offices can offer a useful option

for agencies to consider in developing their overall human capital

management policies and practices. In line with this tenet, federal agencies

are using ADR processes in response to legal and regulatory requirements

as well as to deal pragmatically with workplace conflict, particularly

allegations of discrimination. The three federal agencies we studied

established ombuds offices because other agency processes were not

effectively dealing with conflict and because agency personnel had no

place to turn to for assistance in some situations. Informality and

flexibility characterized the approach of the ombudsmen to dispute

resolution, and they worked with other offices to bring coherency to the

agency’s dispute resolution strategy. Ombudsmen were also in the position

of being able to alert management to systemic problems and thereby help

correct organizationwide situations or develop strategies for preventing

conflict.

We believe that it is important that ombudsmen, like those in other

professions, conform to professional standards of practice. In the absence

 29As a resource, experts pointed to Guidelines For The Design Of Integrated Conflict

Management Systems Within Organizations prepared by the ADR in the Workplace

Committee of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR).

Conclusions
Page 28 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

of clearly defined and transparent federal standards specific to

ombudsmen, the three ombuds offices we studied followed procedures

that they said allowed them to conform to standards of practice that are

advocated by professional organizations and built around the core

principles of independence, neutrality, and confidentiality. However,

experts are concerned that the standards of practice for ombudsmen are

not consistently followed among those within the federal dispute

resolution community who call themselves ombuds; specifically, they say

that some practitioners may lack the independence and neutrality

expected of an ombudsman. Accountability, in addition to being a

cornerstone of performance management principles embodied in GPRA, is

another recommended standard that we believe is important for

ombudsman offices to follow. Although the three offices we studied as

case illustrations are not representative of the entire federal ombuds

community, we found it noteworthy that only one of the studied offices

kept statistics on the number of cases handled, issues presented, and

outcomes or prepared an annual report summarizing activities and

accomplishments. Moreover, each of the three offices fell short in

evaluating results. In this regard, we believe that the Interagency ADR

Working Group’s draft guidance on evaluating ADR programs is necessary

and timely. In addition, with experts expecting more ombuds offices to be

established in the future, the Working Group’s study of federal

ombudsmen it is undertaking is all the more important because it may lead

to guidance on standards of practice and dissemination of information on

best practices. It is our experience that the value of such guidance that the

Working Group may develop would be enhanced if it is clearly defined and

transparent and includes information on how the guidance can be

consistently applied.

As the Interagency ADR Working Group moves forward with its study of

federal ombudsmen, we recommend that the Attorney General, as

chairman of the Working Group, see that any resulting guidance on

professional standards of practice that the Working Group develops be

clearly defined and transparent and, in addition to including the core

principles of independence, neutrality, and confidentiality, include

standards for accountability and contains information about how this new

guidance can be consistently applied within the federal ombuds

community.

Because there is no single agency responsible for ADR policy development

and oversight, we obtained comments on a draft of our report from a panel

Recommendation to

the Attorney General

Comments of Experts
Page 29 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

of federal experts recognized within the ADR community for their

knowledge of the ombudsman field. Overall, they were in agreement with

our presentation. We considered comments they offered of a technical or

clarifying nature and made changes as appropriate in finalizing this report.

In addition, one of the experts pointed out the importance unions play in

agency efforts to establish an ombuds program. She said that in some

cases there have been union concerns about an ombuds office

encroaching on the institutional rights of unions under the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute, while in other cases unions and

ombuds offices have worked collaboratively to resolve these kinds of

concerns. We agree that agencies and ombuds need to be mindful of

statutory requirements, especially in light of the fact that 60 percent of

federal workers belong to bargaining units represented by unions. In this

regard, we added a discussion about guidance issued by the General

Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Also, two members of

the panel provided comments with regard to evaluating ombuds programs.

They said that this task is made difficult because some ombuds results are

intangible and therefore difficult to assess. One of the experts said that the

ombuds community needs to address how outcomes could be assessed.

This is a matter that we believe the Interagency ADR Working Group could

take up in its study of federal ombuds.

We received comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General

in his capacity as chairman of the Interagency ADR Working Group. In his

letter, the Attorney General said that the Department of Justice had no

substantive comments on our report, and that, as chairman of the Working

Group, he will ensure that the group’s ongoing study of federal

ombudsmen will include guidance as we have recommended.

As agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report

until 30 days after its issuance, unless you publicly release its contents

earlier. We will then send copies of this report to Senators Thad Cochran,

Joseph I. Lieberman, and Fred Thompson; and Representatives Dan

Burton, Danny K. Davis, Joe Scarborough, and Henry A. Waxman in their

capacities as Chair or Ranking Members of Senate and House Committees

and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies to The Honorable John

Ashcroft, Attorney General; The Honorable Ida L. Castro, Chairwoman,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; The Honorable Steven R.

Cohen, Acting Director, Office of Personnel Management; The Honorable

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget; and

Comments from the

Attorney General
Page 30 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

other interested parties. We will make copies of this report available to

others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me or Assistant Director Stephen Altman on (202) 512-6806. Other

major contributors to this report were Anthony P. Lofaro and Katherine

Brentzel.

Sincerely yours,

Carlotta C. Joyner

Director, Strategic Issues
Appendix I: Ombudsman-Related Internet

Resources

Page 31 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

The following is a list of selected ombudsman-related resources that can

be found on the Internet.1

 These sites also have links to other sites

providing information on ombuds and alternative dispute resolution.

The Ombudsman Association

http://www.ombuds-toa.org/index.html

The Ombudsman Association Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice

http://www.ombuds-toa.org/toa_code&std.html

The United States Ombudsman Association

http://www.usombudsman.org/

The United States Ombudsman Association Model Ombudsman Act for

State Governments

http://www.usombudsman.org/References/modelombudact.htm

The University and College Ombuds Association

http://www.colorado.edu/Ombuds/UCOA/

The University and College Ombuds Association Standards of Practice

http://www.colorado.edu/Ombuds/UCOA/SOP.html

Administrative Conference of the U.S. Recommendation for Ombudsmen

in the Federal Government

http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305902.html

American Bar Association, Ombudsman Committee Homepage

http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/home.html

The Interagency ADR Working Group, Workplace Section

http://www.financenet.gov/financenet/fed/iadrwg/workplace.htm

Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Guidelines for the Design of

Integrated Conflict Management Systems Within Organizations

http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html

 1

The Web addresses were valid at the time of our study.

Appendix I: Ombudsman-Related Internet

Resources
Appendix I: Ombudsman-Related Internet

Resources

Page 32 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Office of Personnel Management’s Alternative Dispute Resolution: A

Resource Guide

http://www.opm.gov/er/adrguide/toc.htm

NIH Office of the Ombudsman, Center for Cooperative Resolution

http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr/

Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen (e-mail contact)

gadlinh@od.nih.gov
Appendix II: Federal Workplace Ombudsman

Offices as of January 16, 2001

Page 33 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Federal Workplace Ombudsman Offices

1. Department of Agriculture/Food and Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)a

2. Department of Energy (DOE)

3. DOE/Bonneville Power Authority

4. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)/Public Health Service (PHS) –

National Institutes of Health (NIH)

5. HHS/PHS/NIH/National Library of Medicine/Agency for Healthcare Quality and

Research

6. HHS/PHS/Centers for Disease Control/National Center for Health Statistics

7. Department of Justice (DOJ)

8. DOJ/Bureau of Prisons

9. DOJ/Federal Bureau of Investigation

10. Department of Labor

11. Department of the Navy/Bethesda Naval Hospital

12. Department of State

13. International Broadcasting Bureau

14. Department of Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

15. Department of Treasury/Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

16. Department of Treasury/Secret Service

17. Department of Veterans Affairs/Office of Resolution Management

18. Department of Veterans Affairs/Inspector General

19. Central Intelligence Agency

20. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

21. Smithsonian Institute

22. U.S. Capitol Police

a

FSIS is setting up its office; the ombudsman position has yet to be filled.

Appendix II: Federal Workplace Ombudsman

Offices as of January 16, 2001
Appendix III: GAO’s Panel of Federal Experts

Recognized for Their Knowledge of the

Ombudsman Field

Page 34 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Howard Gadlin, Ombudsman and Director of the Center for Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health; member, Steering Committee,

Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group; Chairman,

Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen; past president of The Ombudsman

Association and the University and College Ombuds Association.

Carole Houk, ADR Counsel, Department of the Navy; member, Coalition of

Federal Ombudsmen; member, Steering Committee, Interagency

Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group; member, ADR in the

Workplace Committee, Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.

D. Leah Meltzer, Deputy Dispute Resolution Specialist, U.S. Securities and

Exchange Commission; member, Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen;

member, Steering Committee, Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution

Working Group; member, Ombudsman Steering Committee, American Bar

Association.

Jeffrey M. Senger, Deputy Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute

Resolution, U.S. Department of Justice.

Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute Resolution,

U.S. Department of Justice.

Ella Phillips Wheaton, Ombudsperson, U.S. Department of Justice;

member, Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen; past president of the

University and College Ombuds Association; member, Board of Directors,

The Ombudsman Association; member, Ombudsman Steering Committee,

American Bar Association.

Appendix III: GAO’s Panel of Federal Experts

Recognized for Their Knowledge of the

Ombudsman Field
Appendix IV: Case Illustration: Ombudman’s

Office, International Broadcasting Bureau

Page 35 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

The International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), headquartered in

Washington, D.C., broadcasts nonmilitary international programming to

various countries around the world. IBB is composed of the Voice of

America, Worldnet Television and Film Service, Radio and TV Marti, and

other elements that support IBB’s broadcasting entities.1

 The Bureau

employs a multinational workforce to produce its foreign language

programming; approximately one-third of the Bureau’s 1,880 employees

were not born in the United States.2

 The IBB’s Ombudsman Office was

created in May 1988 to provide a neutral, informal, and confidential

alternative dispute resolution resource to all employees, about 80 percent

of whom belong to collective bargaining units represented by unions.

The impetus for creating the IBB ombudsman’s office came from the Voice

of America director, at the time, in response to employee discontent over

formal grievance and redress processes at the agency. The office, which

has grown from one part-time ombuds to two full-time staff—the

ombudsman and an assistant ombuds—does not replace or circumvent

formal grievance complaint or appeal processes at the agency. The

ombudsmen receive a variety of cases, ranging from employee questions

about promotions and work hours to disputes between peers and

perceived discrimination cases. A particular focus of the ombudsman’s

office is to respond to the issues and concerns of IBB’s large foreign-born

population, such as cultural misunderstandings and questions about visa

procedures. In addition to conflict resolution, the ombudsman acts as a

“troubleshooter” or “trend alerter.” He publishes Ombudsman Advisory

Papers for IBB management on an ad-hoc basis to report what he sees as

systemic problems or recurring conflicts. He also writes a column called

“Advice from the Ombudsman” in the bimonthly employee newsletter,

“Tune In.” The office publicizes its services through these columns, a

program brochure, and through word-of-mouth referrals.

The ombudsman’s office, which is organizationally placed within the IBB’s

director’s office, has no formal budget of its own. A management budget is

tapped for the ombudsmen’s travel or office administrative costs. The

ombudsman is a General Schedule (GS) grade 15. The former VOA

 1

IBB reports to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, an independent federal agency.

2

The IBB Personnel Office reported that as of December 2000, IBB had 1,880 employees,

including 607 who were not born in the United States. Of the foreign-born staff, 452 were

naturalized U.S. citizens, 155 were not.

Appendix IV: Case Illustration: Ombudman’s

Office, International Broadcasting Bureau

Origins and Operating

Characteristics
Appendix IV: Case Illustration: Ombudman’s

Office, International Broadcasting Bureau

Page 36 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

director selected the first IBB ombudsman from within the agency for his

past experience as Director of Administration and for his reputation as a

knowledgeable and impartial manager. There is no term limit for the

position; the first ombudsman remained in the job from the start of the

office in May 1988 until December 2000. His successor was also selected

from within IBB, with the belief that knowledge of the organization is

important to perform the ombudsman duties. When the ombudsman’s

office was first established, the position of ombudsman was part time

because the workload was initially small. After about a year, the position

became full time. An assistant ombuds (a GS-13) was added in 1997. A

female former broadcaster was chosen for the post because she brought

both gender and occupational diversity. The ombudsman said that some

employees feel more comfortable talking to a female ombuds. Both

ombudsmen’s performance is rated on their ability to assist employees

informally and confidentially and to communicate systemic problems to

management.

The ombudsman’s office works in tandem with other offices at IBB that

handle employee matters, such as the Advisory Referral and Counseling

Service (ARCS), the Office of Personnel, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR),

as well as employee unions. The ombudsman reported that he interacts on

a regular basis with the ARCS and Personnel offices to share information

and to make and receive client referrals. The Director of Civil Rights said

that in addition to arranging meetings as case needs dictate, she and the

ombudsman are members of an EEO Advisory Committee that meets

monthly to address organizationwide issues.

Because 80 percent of IBB’s workforce belong to collective bargaining

units,3

 the ombudsman interacts frequently with union officials. In dealing

with the unions, the ombudsman’s office brochure states that the office

respects the representational rights of the unions and the provisions of

their labor agreements. The ombudsman said that he does not encroach on

issues within their domain without consent from the client and union. The

ombuds told us that he believes in keeping union officials informed at all

times when an employee approaches the ombuds with a case in which the

union should be involved, he will notify the union, with employee consent.

 3

The three unions at IBB are the American Federation of Government Employees Local

1812, the American Foreign Service Association, and the American Federation of State,

County and Municipal Employees Local 1418.
Appendix IV: Case Illustration: Ombudman’s

Office, International Broadcasting Bureau

Page 37 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Although IBB has three unions, the ombudsman said that he interacts

primarily with the largest of them—the American Federation of

Government Employees, which covers approximately 60 percent of IBB’s

workforce, including most of the foreign-born employees. That union’s

vice-president reported that she and the ombuds meet about once a week

to discuss employee disputes, with union officials usually initiating the

contact. In fact, union officials stated that they themselves have utilized

the ombudsman to act as a facilitator for union-management disputes.

The IBB ombudsman said that his office adheres to the fundamental

ombudsman principles of independence, neutrality, and confidentiality.

The Ombudsman’s Office program brochure states that the office is a

member of the U.S. Ombudsman Association and the Coalition of Federal

Ombudsmen and that it “subscribes to the code of ethics and rules of

professional conduct for membership in those organizations.” The

ombudsman said that his office maintains its independence because he has

no managerial or operational line authority. He reports directly and only to

the IBB director’s office. Moreover, as an example of how he avoids any

conflicts of interest, the ombudsman told us that he does not accept

invitations to socialize with IBB management. According to the program

brochure, the ombudsman’s neutrality is supported by the fact that he

does not function as an advocate or representative of either management

or employees; rather, the ombudsman facilitates communication between

all parties. The brochure states that all interactions between the

ombudsman and employees are confidential except in the case of physical

threat to the IBB, its employees, or to U.S. national security. To help

ensure this confidentiality, the ombudsman’s office is located on a

different floor from the IBB director’s office so it will not be obvious who

is meeting with the ombudsman. Employees can also reach the

ombudsmen through two private telephone lines that are either answered

personally by one of the ombuds or by a confidential and private

answering machine, according to the program brochure. The ombudsman

said that he and the assistant ombudsman keep informal, confidential case

notes. The ombudsman said that he retains his notes until he is certain that

the case is closed and that the employee will not be a repeat client; then

the notes are destroyed.

In 1999, the ombuds estimated that he and the assistant ombuds had

together handled approximately 150 to 175 cases. The ombudsman did not

include in this count the numerous telephone calls and policy questions

they routinely answer. Of the 150 to 175 cases, he said that they

Approach to

Independence,

Neutrality, and

Confidentiality

Evaluation and

Outcomes
Appendix IV: Case Illustration: Ombudman’s

Office, International Broadcasting Bureau

Page 38 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

successfully resolved 60 to 70 percent. He considered a case successful if

“all parties in the case achieved at least some degree of satisfaction or

partial accommodation regarding the outcome.” He reported that the cases

varied widely in the length of resolution time—from 1 day to several

months. The ombudsman’s office does not prepare formal reports of its

activities.

IBB has not formally evaluated the ombudsman program. However,

officials perceive that cases that are resolved successfully by the

ombudsmen lessen the burden of other dispute resolution bodies at IBB.

The ombudsman reported to the director of OCR that in the fiscal year

ending September 30, 2000, there were 25 potential EEO-related cases that

were handled and resolved by the ombudsmen. The OCR Director told us

that she believes that 25 cases is an understatement. She thinks the

number could be as high as 75. The Director of Personnel said that he

could not say whether the ombudsman had lessened Personnel’s caseload.

However, he said that the ombudsman has “definitely helped some cases

from becoming administrative grievances.” The ombudsman also helped

the Director’s Office save time. The former Senior Advisor to the IBB

Director, with whom the ombudsman interacted every couple of weeks,

reported that the ombuds was able to give her background information on

disputes and provide her with early warnings about upcoming problems.

Union officials said that they and the ombudsman had resolved “many

cases” together before they became formal EEO cases or administrative

grievances. Although the officials expressed concern that the

ombudsman’s neutrality might be compromised by his reporting

relationship to the IBB director, they both stated that the ombudsman had

done an excellent job.

The only oversight mechanism over the ombudsman’s office is the IBB

director’s office. IBB had not formally evaluated the ombudsman’s office,

other than the performance evaluations of the two ombuds, which are

conducted by the director’s office. No IBB officials had estimated cost

savings as a result of the ombudsmen, although with a staff of two

handling a high volume of cases, the former Senior Advisor to the Director

contended that the ombudsman’s office “must be cost-effective.”

In citing lessons that they had learned about establishing and operating an

ombudsman’s office, IBB officials were unanimous in stating that the

ombudsman must be someone who is credible to both management and

employees. The Director of Personnel and union officials said that the

Lessons Learned
Appendix IV: Case Illustration: Ombudman’s

Office, International Broadcasting Bureau

Page 39 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

personal skills and abilities of the ombudsman are crucial to the success of

the office. “It’s not the office, it’s the person in the office that makes it

what it is,” said union officials. The ombudsman himself concurred, stating

that a respected senior employee should fill the position. The Director of

OCR stressed the importance of communication between offices

responsible for conflict management.

The ombudsman said that management should never establish an

ombudsman program without the support of unions and employee groups.

Initially, the relationship between the ombudsman and the three unions at

IBB was volatile because management had established the position

without seeking union buy-in. According to the ombudsman, the unions

feared that management had created a tool to take power away from them.

The ombudsman said he worked very hard to establish his credibility and

demonstrate that he would work with the unions to solve disputes and not

work against them.
Appendix V: Case Illustration: The Office of

The Ombudsman, Center For Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health

Page 40 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

The National Institutes of Health (NIH), one of the eight health agencies of

the U.S. Public Health Service, within the U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services, is the federal focal point for medical research in the

United States. NIH is comprised of 26 Institutes and Offices, and is

primarily located in Bethesda, MD. In addition to 17,000 federal

employees, the NIH workforce includes more than 3,000 post-doctoral

students engaged in medical research. NIH’s Office of the Ombudsman,

Center for Cooperative Resolution, which began as a pilot program in 1997

to serve five institutes, became permanent in 1999 and now serves the

entire NIH community.1

 According to its mission statement, the Office of

the Ombudsman, Center for Cooperative Resolution, is committed to

providing expert, neutral, confidential, and independent assistance in

resolving workplace disputes and improving conflict management at NIH.

The directors of the Offices of Human Resource Management and Equal

Opportunity provided the initial impetus for an ombudsman when they

recognized the ineffectiveness of the traditional administrative dispute

resolution processes, including that many nondiscrimination cases were

burdening the equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint system.

The Office of Intramural Research later became a partner in this initiative,

believing that an ombudsman might offer a better way to deal with

disputes arising from NIH’s scientific research, such as disputes over

credit for authorship and intellectual property rights.

By fiscal year 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman had become the focal

point for conflict management at NIH, with a budget of $800,000. As of

December 2000, the office had five full time staff.2

 The office is authorized

to work with all members of the NIH community to resolve problems and

its responsibilities include developing and coordinating conflict

management initiatives. As part of NIH’s integrated conflict management

system, the ombudsman office is to complement, but not replace, the

agency’s formal dispute resolution processes. The office has publicized its

services through a Web site; brochures; presentations before special

 1

Employees belonging to a bargaining unit represented by a union are not eligible to

participate in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program until the union has been

informed of the ADR program and provided an opportunity to negotiate any negotiable

issues. Contractors working at NIH are excluded and referred to their employers, except

when a dispute involves NIH staff.

2

The Office of the Ombudsman is considering establishing a collateral duty ombudsman at

one NIH institute site with about 800 employees in Raleigh, NC.

Appendix V: Case Illustration: The Office of

The Ombudsman, Center For Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health

Origins and Operating

Characteristics
Appendix V: Case Illustration: The Office of

The Ombudsman, Center For Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health

Page 41 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

interest, professional, and other groups; as well as through articles

appearing in the NIH Record.

The five-person ombudsman office staff consists of the ombudsman, three

associate ombudsmen, and a support person. The ombudsman said that he

considers the staff to be “reasonably” diverse in its makeup. The

ombudsman, who was recruited following a nationwide search, is a senior

level employee operating under a 5-year renewable contract. The associate

ombudsmen are mid-level—General Schedule (GS) grade 14—permanent

federal employees hired from within and outside NIH. The ombudsman’s

office has developed performance elements and standards for the

associate ombudsmen. The elements and standards include

responsibilities to act as a neutral in resolving disputes and to develop

appropriate conflict resolution programs or initiatives.

Staff of the ombudsman office work in conflict intervention, conflict

prevention, and internal education on ways to manage individual and

group conflict. Most of their time—about 65 percent—is spent addressing

individual and multiparty and group conflicts and concerns using a wide

variety of dispute resolution techniques. Staff routinely coordinate with

other offices dealing with workplace disputes and in making and receiving

referrals. In particular, the Office of the Ombudsman serves as the on-site

provider of alternative dispute resolution services to the Office of Equal

Employment Opportunity in EEO matters. The ombudsman’s office is also

involved with training, conflict prevention, and dispute systems design

initiatives. Among these initiatives was the Executive Seminar Series for

institute and scientific directors and other senior executives on a variety

of conflict resolution topics. In addition, the office will administer and

conduct training to develop a pool of collateral duty mediators to mediate

EEO cases. The ombudsman’s office will be administering and training

facilitators and panelists for a peer resolution panel pilot to have

grievances heard and decided by a panel of employee peers. Further, the

office is developing a model for “partnering agreements” to establish

dispute resolution protocols at the beginning of scientific collaborations.

The brochure for the Office of the Ombudsman states that the office

operates under the code of ethics and standards of practice of The

Ombudsman Association and, accordingly, adheres to the core values of

independence, neutrality, and confidentiality. The ombudsman’s office

said that it conforms to the independence standard because (1) it is an

organizational unit within the NIH director’s office, with the ombudsman

reporting directly to NIH’s acting director; (2) the ombudsman is not part

Approach to

Independence,

Neutrality, and

Confidentiality
Appendix V: Case Illustration: The Office of

The Ombudsman, Center For Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health

Page 42 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

of the management team, does not participate in setting policy or making

managerial decisions, except in the case of ADR, and has no other

assigned duties other than ombudsman; and (3) the ombudsman’s office

has its own budget financed through the NIH Management Fund. The

office said that it practices neutrality by serving as a facilitator to

resolution and not as the person who will make the final judgment. The

office said that it supports its commitment to confidentiality by not

maintaining official records of visitors’ names, affiliations, or grievances.

The ombudsman staff will not identify or pass on a client’s confidences

without permission. The ombudsman said that any informal notes are

destroyed. To track its activities and outcomes, the office maintains

statistical information on the number of complaints handled, processes

used, and types of resolutions achieved.

For accountability purposes, the Office of the Ombudsman prepares

annual reports of its activities and accomplishments, including the number

of cases, issues involved, outcomes, and processing time. According to the

first annual report covering 1999, the office handled 328 cases, many with

multiple issues. The office categorized 32 percent of the issues as work

environment (e.g., relationship with coworkers, safety), 27 percent as

management (e.g., leadership behavior and judgment), and 15 percent as

personnel (e.g., promotion, job classification). Other issues were

categorized as discrimination/harassment (7 percent), research-related

disputes (6 percent), ethics (4 percent), discipline (4 percent), benefits (3

percent), and policy (2 percent). The annual report showed that the Office

of the Ombudsman achieved full or partial resolution in 65 percent of the

328 cases handled in 1999. In addition, 12 percent of the cases were

referred to formal processes (e.g., the Equal Opportunity Office). The

ombudsman also reported that despite the office’s intervention, 4.5

percent of the cases were not resolved. Further, the ombudsman found

that not all those who sought assistance wanted the office to intervene on

their behalf, as was true in 14 percent of the cases. In providing assistance,

the annual report states that ombudsman staff used coaching (54 percent

of the cases) and facilitation (23 percent of the cases) as the primary

modes of intervention.3

 However, the ombudsman said that most cases

involved multiple forms of intervention. The ombudsman reported that the

office closed about 40 percent of the cases within 2 weeks and 60 percent

 3

Coaching involves working with individuals to develop options and devise strategies to

address their issues directly. Facilitation is a less formal intervention than mediation.

Evaluation and

Outcomes
Appendix V: Case Illustration: The Office of

The Ombudsman, Center For Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health

Page 43 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

within 6 weeks. Cases that took longer than 6 weeks to close involved

multiple parties or numerous complex or contentious interpersonal

relationship issues, according to the annual report.

NIH has not evaluated the Office of the Ombudsman. An earlier attempt to

measure user satisfaction and effect of the processes used on consumers

during the pilot was abandoned because of low response rates to

questionnaires. The office is working with an expert to develop measures

of ombudsman effectiveness. To help determine perceptions of the

ombudsman function and its effectiveness, the plan for future evaluation

calls for assessing complaints processed using ombudsman services

compared with those processed by standard EEO complaint counseling,

with feedback to be obtained from complainants and respondents.

Although there has been no evaluation of the ombudsman office, NIH

officials were unanimous in their views that the office had helped to both

resolve and prevent disputes. For example, NIH’s principal deputy director

said that “In many instances the ombudsman’s intervention in a scientific

dispute saved an important scientific project from near-certain

dissolution...Many of these projects represent an investment of hundreds

of thousand or even millions of dollars.” Two offices that handle

workplace disputes—the Office of Intramural Research and the Office of

Equal Opportunity—saw a drop in their caseloads since the ombudsman

office was established. Officials in those offices said that they believed

that at least some of the decrease was a result of the ombudsman office.

For example, the Office of Intramural Research reported that during a 43-

month period before the ombudsman office was established, it received an

average of 2.8 cases a month. During an 18-month period after the

ombudsman office became permanent, the average declined to 1.9 cases

per month, with fewer mentoring, authorship, or property issue disputes.

Data from the Office of Equal Opportunity showed that the number of

counseling contacts declined from 178 in fiscal year 1997 to 104 in fiscal

year 1999, when the ombudsman office began to serve all of NIH.

Similarly, the number of formal EEO complaints declined from 94 to 72

during the same period.

NIH officials identified several lessons they learned. Chief among these is

that there must be top-level support for the program, with NIH leadership

promoting the program while respecting its autonomy. Also important was

the planning process that involved collaboration of different

constituencies and piloting the idea, which convinced people that the

ombudsman’s office could be effective and created buy-in for its

Lessons Learned
Appendix V: Case Illustration: The Office of

The Ombudsman, Center For Cooperative

Resolution, National Institutes of Health

Page 44 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

expansion. The officials also learned that it is important that the staff of

the ombudsman’s office be trained, experienced professionals in order to

command respect from top administrators and scientists. Similarly, the

ombudsman office staff needs to be diverse in order to respond to the

needs of a diverse workforce. Officials also learned the importance of

early, informal intervention to address potentially difficult conflicts in

early stages before they become intractable and working relationships

irreparably harmed. Officials also learned that while the program needs to

be marketed to the workforce, they found that the “build it and they will

come” principle held true; that is, build a credible process and employees

will take advantage of it in more than expected numbers. One final lesson

that the officials learned is the importance of top administrators

understanding that it does not reflect adversely on them if they ask the

ombudsman for assistance.

For further information, visit the Office of the Ombudsman, Center for

Cooperative Resolution, Web site at http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr.
Appendix VI: Case Illustration: The

Ombudsman Program, U.S. Secret Service

Page 45 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

The U.S. Secret Service, a Department of Treasury bureau, is a federal law

enforcement agency responsible for (1) protecting the President, Vice

President, and other U.S. and foreign dignitaries and (2) conducting

criminal investigations into counterfeiting, financial institution fraud, and

other fraud. The agency’s 5,600 employees, including 2,800 special agents

and more than 1,000 uniformed division officers, are located in its

Washington, D.C. headquarters and in over 125 offices throughout the U.S.

and abroad. The Secret Service piloted its ombudsman program in 1987 for

uniformed division officers. In 1989, the Director opened the program to

all Secret Service employees—special agents, uniformed officers, and

support staff.

Secret Service top management established the ombudsman’s office

because of the large number of equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaints and grievances in the uniformed division. On study, the agency

determined that many of the complaints were not EEO problems but

instances of distrust between management and the officers. The Secret

Service found that the EEO complaint process was sometimes used for

non-EEO issues because employees did not have a place to take these

issues.

The ombudsman’s office serves all Secret Service employees. The program

is publicized through a program brochure, a poster with photographs and

contact information for all the ombudsmen, and information sessions the

ombudsman holds during new employee and supervisor training and

management meetings. The program’s brochure states that the

ombudsman assists employees with work-related questions and disputes

and that he provides “unfiltered feedback to management by reporting

issues and trends—without discussing names.” The ombudsman’s services

are not intended to replace or circumvent formal grievance procedures.

The ombudsman’s office is organizationally within the Secret Service’s

Office of Human Resources and Training and draws its budgetary

resources from that office. Until 2000, however, the ombudsman position

had been a special assistant to the director of the Secret Service.

Following an efficiency review, the ombudsman’s office, along with the

employee assistance program (EAP) and EEO offices, was placed within

the human resources and training office in an effort to bring human

capital-related activities under one roof.

The ombudsman’s office has one full-time ombudsman in Washington,

D.C. and nine collateral-duty ombuds who work at headquarters or in field

Appendix VI: Case Illustration: The

Ombudsman Program, U.S. Secret Service

Origins and Operating

Characteristics
Appendix VI: Case Illustration: The

Ombudsman Program, U.S. Secret Service

Page 46 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

offices. The current ombudsman—a General Schedule (GS) grade 15—is

the sixth to hold that position since the program began in 1987. All have

been male special agents, typically serving in the position as a final

assignment. Applicants for the position bid on the job as part of their

rotational process, and the appointment is renewable yearly. According to

the Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Government Liaison and Public

Affairs, who represented the Secret Service director’s office, the director

selects a respected senior agent who has had a variety of assignments and

who understands the agency’s structure, processes, and culture.1

 This

official said that special agents are selected as ombudsmen because most

of the issues the ombudsman handles come from law-enforcement staff.

The nine collateral-duty ombudsmen bring gender, racial, and

occupational diversity to the program staff. Currently, there are special

agent, uniformed division, and support staff performing collateral-duty

ombuds work. Clients can choose which ombuds they would like to

contact. The ombudsman said that candidates for the collateral-duty

positions bid on the job and are selected for their seniority, the respect

they receive from their coworkers, and their work experience. Once

selected, there is no term limit. In addition, the ombudsman said that he is

a member of The Ombudsman Association and the Coalition of Federal

Ombudsman and that all ombuds staff have attended training provided by

The Ombudsman Association.

The ombudsman said that collateral-duty staff spends approximately 10 to

30 percent of their workweek on ombuds duties. One collateral ombuds

with whom we spoke concurred, stating that she spends, on average, 4

hours a week on ombuds tasks. She said that she has weekly telephone

contact with the ombudsman to report basic case statistics and to inform

him of any cases with which she is having difficulty. Furthermore, she said

that, in the past, the ombudsman and the collateral staff have met annually

to discuss cases they handled, as well as to receive notice of upcoming

training and seminars. The ombudsman often brings a representative from

The Ombudsman Association with him.

The ombudsman program is part of the total conflict management strategy

at Secret Service, and the ombudsman works together with the EAP and

EEO offices to share information and cross-refer cases. Similarly, a

collateral-duty ombuds said that collateral-duty staff make and receive

 1

A position description for the ombudsman was not available; the ombudsman told us that

the agency is currently developing a “functional statement of responsibility.”
Appendix VI: Case Illustration: The

Ombudsman Program, U.S. Secret Service

Page 47 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

referrals to the EAP and EEO offices. The EEO specialist said that his

office refers cases to the ombudsman’s office, which satisfies

requirements under the EEO complaint process regulations to make ADR

services available. He said that approximately half of all initial EEO

contacts are referred to the ombudsman.

The Secret Service ombudsman said that his office operates under the

Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice of The Ombudsman Association,

thus adhering to the basic ombudsman tenets of independence, neutrality,

and confidentiality. Although the ombudsman’s program is now housed in

the Office of Human Resources and Training, the ombudsman said that his

independence would not be compromised. The ombudsman said that

while he nominally reports to the assistant director for human resources

and training, he would continue to meet with the Secret Service Director

and Deputy Director on an as-needed basis. The Deputy Assistant Director

of Public Affairs said that the ombudsman continues to have complete and

unfettered access to the Director’s office. Similarly, the ombudsman said

his neutrality is still intact. The ombudsman said that he is not an advocate

for either management or employees—he said that he remains neutral and

promotes improved communication between parties and shared solutions.

A former ombudsman told us that “confidentiality is the crux of the

ombudsman program” and that employees need to be 100 percent certain

that their interaction with the ombuds is confidential. The program

brochure states that “Confidentiality is the rule. No formal written records

are kept. Ombudsmen take no action without permission unless criminal

behavior is involved, or a life has been threatened.” In an effort to provide

confidentiality, the ombudsman’s office is windowless and located on a

different floor from the Director’s office. A former ombudsman reported

that he also accepted client calls at his home telephone number after work

hours.

The collateral-duty ombudsmen maintain the same standards of practice

as the ombudsman. One collateral ombuds said that she did not have a

problem maintaining her independence, neutrality, or confidentiality and

that no one had ever challenged her ability to do so.

The ombudsman said that his office keeps no formal records, which is

consistent with the program’s brochure and with the Secret Service’s

Administrative Procedures Manual. He informally tracks his cases for

statistical purposes, and in the future, he plans to create a computer

Approach to

Independence,

Neutrality, and

Confidentiality

Evaluation and

Outcomes
Appendix VI: Case Illustration: The

Ombudsman Program, U.S. Secret Service

Page 48 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

database to record the number and nature of cases. The ombudsman, who

took office in August 2000, said that during his first 2 months as

ombudsman, he worked on 48 cases, 3 or 4 of which had “EEO

overtones.”

2

 Other cases typically involved disagreements over

management styles and questions about promotions and job rotations. The

collateral-duty ombuds said that she usually handles 2 to 3 cases a month

for a total of about 30 cases a year. Both the ombudsman and the

collateral-duty ombuds reported that the program works well and that

they have been able to detect systemic problems at the agency and

encourage management to make comprehensive changes. The ombudsman

considers himself to be the frontline of dispute resolution and hopes to

resolve 70 to 80 percent of his cases so that they do not reach the EAP,

EEO, or Inspections3

 offices. The current ombudsman’s predecessor said

that he believed the program saved the Secret Service money, especially

because of the ombudsman’s ability to deflect or diffuse conflicts before

they escalated.

The Secret Service has not formally evaluated its ombudsman program,

but the Deputy Assistant Director for Public Affairs stated that the

perception in the Director’s Office is that the program is “very effective”

and that it helps improve employee morale. He said that this perception

was reinforced during a recent efficiency review. Although he could not

make an estimate of cost savings, he thinks the program saves the agency

money by resolving issues early, before they become formal EEO cases or

administrative grievances.

The EAP Coordinator said that he recognized some positive results

stemming from the ombudsman program but that these results are difficult

to measure. He said that the ombudsmen’s services might have lightened

EAP’s caseload.

In citing lessons that the Secret Service has learned about the

establishment and operation of an ombudsman program, officials voiced

different opinions. A former ombudsman and the Deputy Assistant

 2

This total is in line with an estimate provided to us in 1996 by a former Secret Service

ombudsman. He said that he handled about 300 cases per year (i.e., 25 cases per month),

resolving about 70 percent of them.

3

The Inspections Office handles any internal complaints or criminal violations by any

Secret Service employee.

Lessons Learned
Appendix VI: Case Illustration: The

Ombudsman Program, U.S. Secret Service

Page 49 GAO-01-466 The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution

Director for Public Affairs agreed that the ombudsman must be a credible,

trusted, and respected senior employee who knows the agency and its

policies. The Deputy Assistant Director stressed the value of the gender,

racial, and occupational diversity that the collateral-duty ombuds bring to

the program, as well as the additional insight they offer from being

stationed in the field.

There were differing views on the value of continuity in the ombudsman

position. The EAP Coordinator said that the frequent turnover of

ombudsmen detracts from the ombudsman’s ability to establish personal

credibility and a reputation for effective dispute resolution. He said that

“As soon as he [the ombudsman] knows the job, he leaves.” The Deputy

Assistant Director for Public Affairs and the ombudsman did not concur.

They said that the length of terms served helps provide fresh perspectives

for the program and helps avoid ombudsman burnout.

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