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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

DEONTA MATTHEWS, 

Defendant. 

2:15-CR-20201-TGB 

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE 

Defendant Deonta Matthews has filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 seeking to vacate his 20-year sentence for a racketeering conspiracy. 

This case was transferred in October 2020 from Judge Battani to this 

Court. Because the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to 

relief, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, and the motion is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On January 17, 2017, Deonta Matthews pled guilty to two counts of 

a four-count indictment: racketeering conspiracy and receipt of a firearm 

by a person under indictment. There was no Rule 11 plea agreement, but 

the government agreed to dismiss the other two counts upon his plea of 

guilty. ECF No. 362, PageID.2549. On May 8, 2017, his attorney Michael 

Rataj filed an objection to Mr. Matthews’ presentence report (“PSR”). 

This objection specifically addressed Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the report, 

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which dealt with the murder of an individual named Marcus Cole. ECF 

No. 296. This murder was included in the PSR as an overt act under 

Count 1: Racketeering Conspiracy. PSR, pg. 12. The objection was 

stricken because objections to PSRs must be filed directly with the 

Probation Department. Id. The substance of the objection, however, was 

repeated in a footnote in the sentencing memorandum filed by Rataj on 

July 23, 2017: “Mr. Matthews has admitted to being a member of RTM, 

conspiring with others to commit the jewelry store “smash and grabs” 

and to possessing guns when he was not allowed. However, Mr. Matthews 

denies having anything to do with the murder of Marcus Cole.” ECF No. 

306, PageID.2146. 

At the time of his sentencing on September 21, 2017, Mr. Matthews 

had a new attorney, Barton Morris. It is unclear whether Rataj ever 

properly communicated his objection to the Probation Officer who 

prepared the PSR, but the record indicates that the Court was eventually 

made aware of it. Tr. 9/21/17 Hearing 4:9-11, ECF No.325, PageID.2276 

(“THE COURT: Okay. And I did receive an objection. Mr. Morris, the 

objection was regarding paragraphs 18 and 19. Do you want to address 

those?”). Morris withdrew the objection to Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the 

PSR at the beginning of the hearing. Id. at 4:12-18. 

Based on the information contained in those paragraphs, Mr. 

Matthews was assigned a total offense level of 41 and a criminal history 

category of III, resulting in a guideline range of 360 months to 420 

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months, or thirty to thirty-five years. PSR, pg. 20. The murder, Count 1c, 

had an offense level of 43. If the murder had not been included in the 

PSR, Mr. Matthews’ total offense level would have been 30. The guideline 

range for a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of III 

is 121 to 151 months, or roughly ten to twelve and a half years. U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1(a); ECF No. 358, PageID.2516-17. Mr. Matthews was eventually 

sentenced to 300 months, or twenty-five years. ECF No. 358, 

PageID.2480. 

Mr. Matthews filed this § 2255 motion on March 26, 2020, 

proceeding with the assistance of counsel. ECF No. 358. He alleges 

Morris provided ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing 

when he (1) failed to preserve the objections to Paragraphs 18 and 19 of 

the PSR, (2) failed to object to the scoring of the sentence guidelines, and 

(3) failed to argue that Mr. Matthews was not guilty of the murder of 

Marcus Cole. ECF No. 358, PageID.2510. Mr. Matthews asks the Court 

to hold an evidentiary hearing to address his counsel’s performance, and 

to vacate his sentence if it is found to have been deficient. Prior to resentencing, he would then ask the Court to hold a second evidentiary 

hearing on specific factual allegations bearing on the eventual sentence. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence 

of a court . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, 

set aside or correct the sentence.” Specifically, a prisoner may allege that 

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the court's sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose 

such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 

authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Id. To 

prevail upon a § 2555(a) motion, a petitioner must allege: “(1) an error of 

constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory 

limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render 

the entire proceeding invalid.” Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 

496-97 (6th Cir. 2003). 

As a general rule, claims not raised on direct appeal are 

procedurally defaulted and may not be raised on collateral review unless 

the petitioner shows either (1) “cause” and “actual prejudice” or (2) 

“actual innocence.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); 

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1998); United States v. 

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). An ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, however, is not subject to the procedural default rule. Massaro, 

538 U.S. at 504. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be raised 

in a collateral proceeding under § 2255(a), whether or not the petitioner 

could have raised the claim on direct appeal. Id. 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under a 

two-prong test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A 

defendant must prove that (1) counsel's performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel's deficient 

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performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or 

fundamentally unfair outcome. Id. A court considering a claim of 

ineffective assistance must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct falls within a wide range of professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 

Mr. Matthews requests a “Rule 8” evidentiary hearing on his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. When a § 2255 motion is not 

dismissed procedurally, Rule 8 requires a judge to review the record “to 

determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted” to address the 

claims in the motion. R. Gov. § 2255 Cases 8(a). A court is not required 

to hold such a hearing. Spearman v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1234, 

1237 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Specifically, a hearing is not required if a court 

determines “the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled 

to no relief.” Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 235 (6th Cir. 1996). 

III. ANALYSIS 

i. Attorney Morris’ performance 

Under the first prong of the Strickland analysis, the Court must 

determine whether Morris’ performance “fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” A defendant can prevail in challenging specific 

choices made by their attorney during a proceeding if they can show the 

“action (or inaction) could not have constituted sound strategy.” Thelen 

v. United States, 131 F. App'x 61, 65 (6th Cir. 2005). However, Courts are 

instructed to give a “healthy amount of deference to counsel's tactical and 

litigation decisions; they are “virtually unchallengeable” in the ordinary 

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case.” Vasquez v. Bradshaw, 345 F. App'x 104, 115 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

Mr. Matthews’ specific claim of ineffective assistance is that Morris 

decided not to object to the inclusion of several paragraphs in his PSR. 

But the record indicates that Morris had tactical reasons for not objecting 

to the two PSR paragraphs at issue. In an affidavit filed with the 

government’s Response, he states that the decision to withdraw the 

objections “was a strategic decision made in an effort to minimize Mr. 

Matthews’ sentence.” ECF No. 362-1, PageID.2566. He determined that 

such a challenge “would not have convinced the Court to not score the 

murder of Cole.” Id. He also states his belief that challenging the scoring 

would have counteracted “the stronger argument” that he made at 

sentencing regarding Mr. Matthews’ changed character. Id. at 

PageID.2567-68. 

This is a sound strategy, certainly within a “wide range of 

professional assistance.” See, e.g, United States v. Ballard, No. 1:13-CR021-1, 2019 WL 5307348, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2019) (noting that “a 

reasonable attorney might choose a strategy that abandoned far-fromsure objections for the opportunity . . . to argue for a downward 

departure”). Moreover, Morris’ stratagem appears to have succeeded: Mr. 

Matthews was eventually sentenced to twenty-five years, as advocated 

by Morris, rather than to thirty-five years, as the government requested. 

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The Sixth Circuit has found that “an attorney's failure to object to 

an error in the PSR's calculation of the guidelines . . . can be grounds for 

finding deficient performance.” Howard v. United States, 743 F.3d 459, 

464 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 

787 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when 

attorney “failed to object to a flawed sentencing calculation that was 

based on the government's view of the evidence and the probation officer's 

intuition”). 

For example, in Arredondo, the defendant was charged in a 

conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine. The PSR stated that “it is 

felt” he was responsible for “between 1 and 3 kilograms of heroin,” but 

did not provide any specific facts or evidence for the amount cited. 

Arredondo, 178 F.3d at 784-85. The calculations advanced in the 

government’s brief also did not justify the amount. Id. at 785-87. 

Compounding this flaw in the basis for determining the proper guideline 

range, the defendant’s attorney conducted virtually no preparation for 

the sentencing hearing. He did not go over the PSR with his client and 

did not catch the lack of an adequate factual basis for sentencing in the 

PSR. Id. at 787-88. This “failure to investigate, participate in, and 

prepare for the sentencing proceedings fails to satisfy an objective 

standard of reasonable representation” and was therefore grounds for 

finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

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By contrast, Mr. Matthews provides no evidence of egregious 

deficiencies in the PSR and supporting materials; rather, he argues that 

the government’s evidence regarding the murder of Marcus Cole was not 

sufficient to justify assigning a higher guideline to his role. ECF No. 358, 

PageID.2517-18. This is not comparable to Arredondo, where the charged 

amount was based on demonstrably incorrect calculations. 178 F.3d at 

784-85. Neither does he provide evidence that Morris was unprepared for 

sentencing. In his affidavit, Morris specifically cited the evidence he 

reviewed regarding the murder of Marcus Cole in preparation for the 

sentencing: (1) grand jury testimony of Darrell Webb and Jerome 

Quinney, (2) grand jury testimony of a lay witness working nearby, (3) 

an audio recording of the driver of the vehicle Mr. Matthews was in just 

prior to the shooting, and (4) grand jury testimony of Jerome Welch. ECF 

No. 362-1, PageID.2567. At sentencing, Morris was aware Mr. Matthews’ 

previous attorney had raised the objections, indicating his familiarity 

with prior proceedings and his subsequent preparation. Tr. 9/21/17 

Hearing 4:12-18, ECF No.325, PageID.2276. 

Mr. Matthews simply challenges Morris’ strategic decision not to 

maintain the objection raised by previous counsel. He does not allege that 

Morris was unprepared for the sentencing, or that he was unaware of the 

nature of the government’s evidence connecting Mr. Matthews to the 

murder of Marcus Cole. Rather, he claims that Morris’ affidavit does not 

show he “gave careful consideration to all of the weaknesses in the 

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government’s case for murder.” ECF No. 363, PageID.2578. Courts 

should not blindly accept any conduct as reasonable merely because an 

attorney labels it “strategic.” But on this record, there is sufficient 

evidence to indicate that Morris’ decision was both strategic and 

informed. Indeed, Morris specifically states that he did consider the 

weaknesses in the government’s case, including the fact that witnesses 

“received reduced sentences, received funds from the government, or 

were not prosecuted” and that there was a “lack of physical evidence.” 

ECF No. 362-1, PageID.2567. Despite these problems with the 

government’s evidence, he made what appears to be a deliberate strategic 

choice to drop the objection in favor of an argument that focused on Mr. 

Matthews’ changed persona. Id. Given the clearly tactical nature of this 

choice, Mr. Matthews is unable to make out a claim of deficient 

performance under Strickland. 

Again, if the Court can conclusively answer the question of 

performance based on the record, there is no need for an evidentiary 

hearing. See Arredondo, 178 F.3d at 782. Courts should not make this 

decision lightly, because “[w]here there is a factual dispute, the habeas 

court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the 

petitioner's claims.” Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 

1999) (emphasis in original). Mr. Matthews attempts to allege such a 

factual dispute regarding his counsel’s performance by saying he is 

prepared to testify Morris “suggest[ed] that he would argue against the 

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murder” at sentencing. ECF No. 358, PageID.2504. But even if Morris 

made such an assertion, it was within his strategic purview to later 

change his mind. And the record clearly indicates that is what happened. 

This allegation from Mr. Matthews does not create a factual dispute as 

to whether Morris’ eventual choice not to object was strategic in nature. 

Given that it was, the Court can conclusively determine based on the 

record that Morris’ conduct was within the “wide range of professional 

assistance” that is acceptable. 

ii. Prejudice to the defendant 

But even if Morris’ conduct were found to be deficient, Mr. 

Matthews would still have to show prejudice to succeed on his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. Deficient performance is prejudicial if “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Howard, 43 F.3d 

at 464 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). An error in 

sentencing calculations can be the basis of a finding of prejudice. Glover 

v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 204 (2001). 

Mr. Matthews claims that if Morris had objected to the relevant 

PSR paragraphs, his guideline range would have been lower, and it is 

virtually certain he would have received a lower sentence. The failure to 

object, he argues, was therefore prejudicial. But this assumes that the 

Court would have sustained the objection by concluding that “Matthews 

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did not commit the Cole murder” and excluding the murder from the 

guidelines calculation. ECF No. 358, PageID.2516-17. 

The problem with this contention is that Mr. Matthews has not 

shown that there is a “reasonable probability” the Court would have 

excluded the murder from the PSR if Morris had raised an objection. The 

government put forward extensive evidence in its sentencing 

memorandum regarding the murder and Mr. Matthews’ alleged 

connection to it: testimony from multiple associates of Mr. Matthews, 

testimony from an individual who had been working nearby, and 

testimony from the admitted driver of the homicide. ECF No. 301, 

PageID.1899-1905. 

Mr. Matthews has pointed out what he believes to be deficiencies in 

all the offered evidence. ECF No. 358, PageID.2487-96. But all of that 

information was available to the sentencing court in the first instance. 

The court indicated in its sentencing colloquy after a review of all the 

provided materials that it was considering “the young man who was 

killed” as one of the victims of Mr. Matthews’ conduct. Tr. 9/21/17 

Hearing 30:16, ECF No.325, PageID.2302. The sentencing court thus 

indicated that it would not have sustained the objection even if it had 

been made. There is no reasonable probability the relevant paragraphs 

would have been excluded, and therefore Mr. Matthews cannot show 

prejudice. 

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CONCLUSION 

The Court finds sufficient evidence on the record to address Mr. 

Matthews’ claims, and a Rule 8 evidentiary hearing is not needed. 

Specifically, the record shows his attorney’s performance was within the 

range of professionally reasonable conduct: he made a sound tactical 

choice not to object to the paragraphs in the PSR referencing the murder 

of Marcus Cole. Additionally, there is no showing of prejudice because 

Mr. Matthews cannot show a reasonable probability the court would have 

sustained such an objection even if it had been made. Therefore, he has 

failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and his sentence 

cannot be vacated on those grounds. 

WHEREFORE, it is HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion be 

DENIED. 

SO ORDERED, this 15th day of December, 2020. 

BY THE COURT:

s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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