UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHARLES F. LONGNECKER, II, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11705 

 Honorable John Corbett O’Meara 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TRUE DISCOVERY [45] 

and 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [48, 51] 

Plaintiff Charles F. Longnecker, II (“Longnecker”) brings this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. §405(g), challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the 

Social Security Act (the “Act”). Longnecker has filed at least four separate documents, 

including a motion for summary judgment, setting forth numerous arguments as to why the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) wrongly denied benefits in his case. (Docs. #44, 45, 46, 48). 

With the Court’s permission, the Commissioner filed a consolidated response to all of these 

filings (Doc. #51), and Longnecker then filed a reply brief (Doc. #53). On May 13, 2015, the 

District Court referred this case to the undersigned for determination of all non-dispositive 

motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A) and issuance of a report and recommendation 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C). (Doc. #3). 

 

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I. REPORT 

A. Procedural History 

On April 18, 2012, Longnecker filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability onset 

date of July 17, 2001.1

 (Tr. 125-26). This application was denied initially on September 12, 

2012. (Tr. 43-47). Longnecker filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, which was 

held on September 9, 2013, before ALJ Earl Ashford. (Tr. 19-34). Longnecker, who was not 

represented by an attorney, was the only witness to testify at the hearing. (Id.). On November 

15, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Longnecker was not disabled under the 

Act at any time from July 17, 2001 (the alleged onset date) through December 31, 2004 (his date 

last insured). (Tr. 8-13). On February 27, 2015, the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-3). 

Longnecker filed for judicial review of the final decision on May 12, 2015. (Doc. #1). 

B. Background 

1. Longnecker’s Disability Reports 

Longnecker was born in May of 1962, which made him 51 years old at the time of the 

administrative hearing. (Tr. 135). In a disability function report, he indicated that he lived alone 

“outside.” (Tr. 145). He completed the eighth grade but had no further education. (Tr. 139). 

He indicated that he stopped working in 1999 when he was incarcerated. (Tr. 138). Before that, 

he worked in various construction jobs. (Tr. 139). 

Longnecker alleges disability as a result of multiple physical and mental conditions, 

including back and hip injuries, severe migraine headaches, post-traumatic stress disorder, 

bipolar disorder, and agoraphobia. (Tr. 138). He indicated that pain interferes with walking, 

standing, lifting, and bending, and he has difficulty being around other people. (Tr. 145). He 

 

1

 On April 30, 2012, Longnecker also filed an application for Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”), which was approved in October 2012. (Tr. 48-63). 

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has difficulty with personal care, including shaving and using the toilet. (Tr. 146). He needs 

reminders to take medication, and indicated that “someone else sets out [his] medication 

weekly.” (Tr. 147). He does not do house work or yard work because he is “crippled in 

wheelchair most of the time.” (Tr. 148). Indeed, Longnecker indicates that he uses various aids, 

including crutches, a walker, a wheelchair, a handicapped rail and ramps, and a shower bench. 

(Tr. 148, 151). He cannot drive, does not shop, and does not socialize because he does not like 

to be around people. (Tr. 148-50). He does not get along well with authority figures because 

“torture and abuse of authority [are the] reason for [his] injuries.” (Tr. 151). He suffers from 

panic attacks and agoraphobia and does not handle stress or changes in routine well. (Id.). 

2. Efforts to Obtain Medical Evidence

While the SSA deemed Longnecker disabled as of April 2012, the primary issue before 

the Court is whether the ALJ erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence of a medically 

determinable impairment prior to his date last insured (December 31, 2004). In various filings 

with the Court, Longnecker asserts that the administrative record “is neither full nor complete” 

(Doc. #44 at 2), and that the Commissioner failed to take appropriate steps to obtain his medical 

records from the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) (Doc. #48 at 1-3). Thus, the 

Court will detail the efforts made to obtain these medical records. 

In a disability appeals report dated October 16, 2012, Longnecker indicated as follows: 

The Michigan Dept. of Corrections has medical records currently not in 

possession of Social Security Admin. That the majority of the serious 

spinal, torso, neck and head injurys [sic] in one instant were suffered on or 

around the date July 11, 2001 on state property, by employees of the 

stat[e] of Michigan. 

* * * 

Of note: I did not receive proper or adequate medical attention while 

under the authority of MDOC from date of injuries till 2008[.] I was not 

aware that the date of disabling injury was at issue until I received the 

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denial letter from Social Security. I have not ever reviewed the medical 

records kept by MDOC but I would hope they bare reference adequate for 

Social Security to establish confirmation. I will attempt to supply what 

papers I have in my possession but my personal file is partial at best. 

(Tr. 188). 

In a letter received by the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“ODAR”) on 

June 13, 2013, Longnecker stated that he had reviewed the file CD containing medical records 

and found “no mention of records from the Michigan Department of Corrections ....” (Tr. 208-

11). He again provided his inmate number, along with the names and addresses of the facilities 

at which he had been incarcerated (in chronological order): (1) State Prison Southern Michigan; 

(2) Mound Regional Correctional Facility; (3) St. Louis Correctional Facility; (4) Alger 

Maximum Correctional Facility; and (5) Standish Maximum Correctional Facility. (Tr. 208). 

Additionally, Longnecker provided information for two county jails (Monroe County Jail and 

Washtenaw County Jail) that he believed might have medical records reflecting physical and 

psychiatric treatment he received prior to July 2001. (Tr. 208). 

As a result, the Social Security Administration sent requests for medical records (from 

July 17, 2001 to the present) to each of these state correctional facilities and county jails. (Tr. 

246-47, 249-50, 252-53, 255-56, 258-59, 261-62, 264-65). The request to Standish Maximum 

Correctional Facility was “returned to sender” as “vacant.” (Tr. 239). The request to Mound 

Regional Correctional Facility was “returned to sender,” as the forwarding time had expired (an 

alternate address was provided on the notice). (Tr. 240). The requests to the county jails were 

answered, but there were either no records for Longnecker or the records had been destroyed. 

(Tr. 421-23, 470-74). 

A June 27, 2013 Report of Contact, prepared by ODAR, indicates that a records 

maintenance representative at Alger Maximum Correctional Facility identified a possible 

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discrepancy between the birthdate provided by Longnecker to the Social Security Administration 

and the birthdate the prison had on file for him. (Tr. 213). As a result, ODAR left Longnecker a 

message and asked him to call back. (Id.). On July 8, 2013, ODAR advised Longnecker of the 

returned mail from the correctional facilities, which prompted him to ask that subpoenas be sent 

out to these facilities. (Tr. 215). Longnecker also indicated that he would “send in medical 

documents that show[] that he was in a wheelchair before 2004.” (Id.). An August 2, 2013 

Report of Contact indicates that ODAR advised Longnecker of the status of the records requests, 

as set forth above. (Tr. 216). ODAR did receive some medical records from the MDOC, printed 

on July 2, 2013, which document at least some of Longnecker’s medical treatment from June 21, 

2004 through October 9, 2007. (Tr. 424-68). 

In a letter received by ODAR on August 2, 2013, Longnecker reiterated that he was 

injured by MDOC employees in July 2001, submitted what he claimed were “two of the several 

hundred misconduct reports” he received during his incarceration,2

 and speculated that the 

MDOC was “actively and deliberately trying to block any release of [his] files.” (Tr. 229). In an 

“Affidavit of Truth” received by ODAR on August 8, 2013 (Tr. 219-25), Longnecker again 

indicated that, on or about July 17, 2001, he was “assaulted and grievously injured by corrections 

officers,” resulting in physically disabling injuries. Longnecker asked for issuance of subpoenas 

for his prison medical records and questioned his prison discharge in July 2008, claiming that the 

MDOC should have taken steps to refer him (as a disabled person) to local welfare authorities 

before his release. (Tr. 220-21). 

On August 14, 2013, the ALJ issued subpoenas for medical records to the following 

MDOC facilities: St. Louis Correctional Facility (Tr. 110-12); State Prison Southern Michigan 

 

2

 These records are discussed at Section I(B)(4), infra. 

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(Tr. 114-16); Mound Regional Correctional Facility (Tr. 118-20); and Washtenaw County Jail 

(Tr. 122-24). On August 26, 2013, the St. Louis Correctional Facility sent a letter indicating that 

it had received the request for Longnecker’s medical records. (Tr. 244-45). The letter further 

indicated that because Mr. Longnecker had been discharged from the MDOC more than five 

years earlier, his records had been sent to MDOC Central Record Storage and that the request 

had been “forwarded to Duane Waters Health Center, Release of Information Department for 

paroles and discharges.” (Id.). 

3. Longnecker’s Hearing Testimony 

Longnecker appeared pro se at the September 9, 2013 administrative hearing. (Tr. 19-

34). He continued to maintain that certain “crucial records” were “either being delayed or 

refused by the Department of Corrections.” (Tr. 23). The ALJ then explained efforts taken by 

the Social Security Administration to obtain Longnecker’s MDOC medical records, saying: 

Okay, now, not only did we make an initial attempt to get those records 

and follow up on them, but after my assistant advised me that she had 

been unsuccessful in obtaining those records initially and that she had 

initial discussions with you. I issued subpoenas to the various penal 

institutions that you listed in an attempt to get the records subpoenaed and 

the only thing we’ve gotten back so far other than the few records that are 

already in the file [are] indications that those records no longer existed. 

That they’ve been destroyed by virtue of the amount of time that has 

passed. So, that’s what the status is at this time. 

(Tr. 23-24). The ALJ went on to explain that he needed medical records showing that 

Longnecker was disabled prior to December 31, 2004. (Tr. 24-25). 

Longnecker then indicated that he did not believe he had additional mental health (as 

opposed to physical health) records and said that “it would be a heck of a time for me to find 

them.” (Tr. 25). Longnecker asserted that his MDOC records should not have been destroyed 

because, according to the “Paperwork Reduction Act,” they should have been available for ten 

years following his discharge from prison. (Tr. 25-26). The ALJ then stated: 

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Well, let me say this; in addition to whatever else other information we’ve 

been given there is a letter in the file dated August 26, 2013, to this office 

indicating that this request for records have been forwarded to a particular 

individual within the State of Michigan, so that particular person has not 

responded to that transfer of – 

* * * 

... as I indicated that August 26, 2013 communications to you the last 

thing we heard and that may or may not have been a final 

communication, but there was an indication that the request made by 

Social Security had been forwarded to another individual, and at this 

point and time we haven’t heard from that individual, and so I can’t 

say what’s going to finally happen with regard to that particular 

referral to a central location for the Department of Corrections 

records, but that’s where it stands today.

(Tr. 26-27 (emphasis added)). Longnecker then testified that, on or about July 17, 2001, he was 

“beaten by 13 or more correction officers while shackled and chained during a medical 

examination.” (Tr. 29). He further testified that this beating resulted in spinal, hip, and head 

injuries. (Id.). He reiterated that it was “vital and necessary for the Department of Corrections to 

release [his] medical file,” as it would establish that he was severely injured prior to 2004. (Id.). 

When the ALJ then asked Longnecker if he was “going to submit the additional medical 

evidence” he had, Longnecker said, “I will give you everything that I can get.” (Tr. 30). The 

ALJ then said: 

Okay, I’m going to keep the record open. Today is September 9. I’m 

going to keep the record open for almost two months, so I will not close 

the record and make a decision until November 8, 2013. If you have any 

records to submit, I need them by that date. Otherwise, I’ll be 

deciding your case by the testimony and evidence that I’ve taken 

today and the evidence that’s in the file.

(Tr. 31-32 (emphasis added)). 

4. Relevant Medical Evidence

The administrative record contains very little medical evidence pertaining to 

Longnecker’s condition between July 2001 and December 2004. Correctional records from the 

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MDOC show that Longnecker had a major misconduct hearing due to a charge of failure to 

follow an order of a corrections officer on March 12, 2002. (Tr. 234, 236). In that instance, 

Longnecker was told to “get on the bus,” but he did not, saying that he could not; apparently, he 

was in a wheelchair and the bus did not have wheelchair accessibility. (Tr. 234). Although there 

was apparently some dispute as to whether Longnecker could in fact get on the bus, as he had 

been “medically cleared for transfer,” he eventually was found not guilty of the misconduct 

because “the evidence as a whole [did] not show that Prisoner Longnecker could have physically 

compl[ied] with the order to get on the bus when the order was given .... (Tr. 234). 

In a separate incident, on March 22, 2002, Longnecker refused an order to walk up the 

stairs to his cell, claiming he was unable to do so, which prompted another major misconduct 

hearing. (Tr. 232). He was found guilty this time, with a notation that medical staff thoroughly 

examined him and found that he could “walk without assistance but he refuses to do so in 

addition to refusing testing of areas he claims affect his ability to walk.” (Id.). 

In February 2007, Longnecker was seen at Standish Maximum Correctional Facility for 

an allegedly “long history” of back pain, after he fell out of his wheelchair. (Tr. 437-38). He 

was found to have impaired physical mobility and alteration in comfort secondary to stated lower 

back pain. (Id.). In an April 2007 report, the examiner noted multiple musculoskeletal 

conditions, all with an onset date of October 5, 2006, and he was placed on suicide watch. (Tr. 

439). In September 2007, Longnecker was noted to have the same musculoskeletal diagnoses, 

along with a disorder of muscle/ligaments and leg weakness requiring a wheelchair, with an 

onset date of July 9, 2007. (Tr. 459). 

The record also contains medical records from St. Mary’s of Michigan from a June 2008 

hospitalization, which occurred fairly shortly after Longnecker’s release from prison. At that 

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time, Longnecker complained of having back problems “on and off for the last 6-7 years.” (Tr. 

270). When describing the history of his present illness, Longnecker indicated that he had been 

experiencing “increased pain with walking” and had “been using a wheelchair recently” (Tr. 

275); in another report from the same hospitalization, however, Longnecker reported having 

been “virtually wheelchair bound since an assault in prison since 2001,” having received 

“minimal medical treatment” while in prison, and having experienced “significant problems with 

chronic pain and poor mobility since that time” (Tr. 277). 

Medical records from Family Physician Associates from August 2008 to June 2012 are 

also somewhat inconsistent in terms of Longnecker’s reported in-prison injury. For example, a 

May 2009 treatment note states: “In July 2008 he reports being assaulted by jail guards.” (Tr. 

360). This same “July 2008” incident is repeated in records of other visits. (E.g., Tr. 344, 348, 

356, 374, 378). However, a note from August 2008 indicates: “The patient reports having 

longstanding hypertension and back and other generalized pain symptoms due to an assault while 

in jail in July 2001,” saying that he received “incomplete treatment for pain symptoms while in 

jail, after the incident.” (Tr. 615). There are other references in the medical records to an assault 

that occurred in prison in July 2001, as well as Longnecker’s complaints that he received 

inadequate medical attention while incarcerated. (E.g., Tr. 382, 386, 390). 

C. Framework for Disability Determinations 

Under the Act, DIB are available only for those who have a “disability.” See Colvin v. 

Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines “disability” as the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner’s regulations provide that a disability is to be 

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determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis: 

Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity, benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities,” benefits are denied without 

further analysis. 

Step Three: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, 

has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, 

and the severe impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 

the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled 

regardless of age, education, or work experience. 

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work, 

benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past 

relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform, in view of his or her age, education, and work 

experience, benefits are denied. 

Scheuneman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 6937331, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 

20 C.F.R. §404.1520); see also Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 

2001). “The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four steps .... If the analysis 

reaches the fifth step without a finding that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the 

[defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).

D. The ALJ’s Findings 

At Step One of the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Longnecker has not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 17, 2001 (the alleged onset date). (Tr. 10). At 

Step Two, the ALJ found that, through Longnecker’s date last insured (December 31, 2004), 

there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of a medically 

determinable impairment. (Id.). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Longnecker was not disabled 

under the Act at any time between July 17, 2001 (the alleged onset date) and December 31, 2004 

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(the date last insured). (Tr. 12). 

E. Standard of Review 

The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final administrative 

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the 

court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the 

Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 

591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 

647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f an agency has failed to adhere to its own procedures, we will not 

remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced on the 

merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s procedural lapses.”) (internal 

quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings, the court is limited to an 

examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; 

Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The court “may 

look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals 

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Council,” or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Walker v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ 

or this court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n ALJ can consider all 

evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by 

a party.”) (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter 

differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted);

Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (“if substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial 

evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion’”). 

F. Analysis 

As set forth above, Longnecker argues in his various court filings that the administrative 

record “is neither full nor complete,” and that the Commissioner failed to take appropriate steps 

to obtain his MDOC medical records, which were “important and necessary for a fair 

adjudication of his disability claim ....” (Doc. #44 at 2; Doc. #45-1 at 2; Doc. #48 at 1-3). 

While the Commissioner did take some meaningful steps to attempt to obtain these records, for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court finds it is appropriate to require that certain medical 

records be further pursued before the ALJ makes a final determination in this action. 

1. The ALJ Failed to Adequately Develop the Record 

 a. The Applicable Legal Standards 

While the claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he is entitled to 

disability benefits, courts have recognized that social security proceedings are “inquisitorial 

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rather than adversarial.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000). As a result, an ALJ has an 

affirmative duty to develop the factual record upon which his decision rests, regardless of 

whether the claimant is represented by legal counsel at the administrative hearing. See Lashley 

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (recognizing that the responsibility for ensuring that every 

claimant receives a full and fair hearing lies with the administrative law judge)). 

However, where the claimant is without counsel, incapable of presenting an effective 

case, and unfamiliar with hearing procedures, the ALJ has a “special, heightened duty” to 

develop the administrative record and ensure a fair hearing. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

280 F. App’x 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lashley, 708 F.2d at 1051-52); Nabours v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 50 F. App’x 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1986). To satisfy this duty, the ALJ must 

“scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts,” 

and must be “especially diligent in ensuring that favorable as well as unfavorable facts and 

circumstances are elicited.” Lashley, 708 F.2d at 1052 (internal citations omitted). This is 

especially true in situations where the unrepresented claimant suffers from a mental impairment. 

See Morlando v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4396785, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2011) (“In addition to the 

special solicitude required for pro se claimants, the Second Circuit has also emphasized the extra 

care necessary ‘when adjudicating the claims of a litigant whose mental capacity is in 

question.’”) (internal citations omitted). 

Whether an ALJ has satisfied his “special, heightened duty” to develop the record is 

determined on a case-by-case basis. See Osburn v. Apfel, 1999 WL 503528, at *7 (6th Cir. July 

9, 1999) (internal citation omitted). Although there is no bright line test to be applied, courts 

have recognized that, “Failure by an ALJ to fully develop the factual record in a particular matter 

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is often evidenced by superficial or perfunctory questioning, as well as a failure to obtain all 

available medical records and documentation.” Vaca v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2010 WL 821656, 

at * 6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2010) (emphasis added) (citing cases). Indeed, courts have explicitly 

stated: “An ALJ has the duty to develop the record by obtaining pertinent, available medical 

records which come to his attention during the course of the hearing.” Figard v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 2010 WL 3891211, at *7 (W.D. Mich. July 1, 2010) (quoting Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 

1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1996)). 

This is particularly true in situations where the ALJ’s duty to develop the record 

intersects with the “treating physician rule,” which requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to 

the opinions of a claimant’s treating physicians, so long as those opinions are well-supported by 

clinical evidence and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. See, e.g., 

Williams v. Barnhart, 2007 WL 924207, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527). Because the opinions of a treating physician are of critical importance, “When the 

record before the ALJ is incomplete or inadequate, an ALJ’s failure to request the opinion of a 

pro se claimant’s treating physician is grounds for remand.” Id. at *8; see also Watt v. Astrue, 

2011 WL 3319993, at * 5 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2011). 

 b. The ALJ Did Not Adequately Discharge His 

 Heightened Duty to Develop the Record 

In this case, Longnecker clearly stated in an October 2012 disability appeals report that 

the MDOC had medical records reflecting the injuries he allegedly suffered in prison in July 

2001. (Tr. 188). After he received and reviewed the CD containing his medical records, he sent 

a letter to ODAR indicating that he found “no mention of records from the Michigan Department 

of Corrections ....” (Tr. 208-11). He again provided his inmate number, along with the names 

and addresses of the facilities at which he had been incarcerated, and asked that steps be taken to 

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obtain these records. (Tr. 208). ODAR subsequently sent out requests for records, which did not 

prove particularly fruitful. As a result, Longnecker reiterated in a letter received by ODAR on 

August 2, 2013, that he was injured by MDOC employees in July 2001 and speculated that the 

MDOC was “actively and deliberately trying to block any release of [his] files.” (Tr. 229). 

At Longnecker’s request, on August 14, 2013, the ALJ issued subpoenas for medical 

records to the MDOC facilities at which Longnecker had been incarcerated. (Tr. 110-12, 114-16, 

118-20, 122-24). On August 26, 2013, the St. Louis Correctional Facility sent a letter indicating 

that it had received the subpoena for Longnecker’s medical records. (Tr. 244-45). The letter 

further indicated that because Mr. Longnecker had been discharged from the MDOC more than 

five years earlier, his records had been sent to MDOC Central Record Storage and that the 

request had been “forwarded to Duane Waters Health Center, Release of Information 

Department for paroles and discharges.” (Id.). 

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ acknowledged receipt of this letter from the St. 

Louis Correctional Facility, saying: 

Well, let me say this; in addition to whatever else other information we’ve 

been given there is a letter in the file dated August 26, 2013, to this office 

indicating that this request for records have been forwarded to a particular 

individual3

 within the State of Michigan, so that particular person has not 

responded to that transfer of – 

* * * 

... as I indicated that August 26, 2013 communications to you the last 

thing we heard and that may or may not have been a final communication, 

but there was an indication that the request made by Social Security had 

been forwarded to another individual, and at this point and time we 

haven’t heard from that individual, and so I can’t say what’s going to 

finally happen with regard to that particular referral to a central location 

for the Department of Corrections records, but that’s where it stands 

 

3

 As Longnecker points out (Doc. #53 at 4-5), it appears that the ALJ mistakenly believed 

“Duane Waters” to be a person, rather than what it is – a prison health care facility. 

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today. 

(Tr. 26-27). Longnecker reiterated that it was “vital and necessary for the Department of 

Corrections to release [his] medical file,” as it would establish that he was severely injured prior 

to his date last insured of December 31, 2004. (Tr. 29). 

The Commissioner first argues that Wilson’s “heightened duty” standard does not apply 

here because “there is no evidence that [Longnecker] was in any way ‘incapable of presenting an 

effective case’ or ‘unfamiliar with hearing procedures.’” (Doc. #51 at 18). While the Court 

agrees that Longnecker’s apparently self-prepared filings in this case suggest he has some level 

of understanding of the relevant issues, the Court cannot reach the same conclusion with respect 

to his understanding of (and ability to handle) the relevant hearing procedures. At the time of the 

hearing, Longnecker, who has an eighth grade education, was wheelchair-bound and essentially 

homeless. (Tr. 139, 145). His “testimony” was short, amounting to only 11 transcript pages, 

most of which was actually the ALJ engaging in lengthy soliloquies. Indeed, Longnecker’s 

“testimony” consisted primarily of vague statements that he was “kicked out of school” and 

“spent most of [his] time in prison” because of his “mental situation”; that he was “bi-polar and 

manic depressive”; that he was “severely beaten by 13 or more correction officers while shackled 

and chained during a medical examination”; that the requests for medical records were being 

“delayed or refused” by the MDOC; and that if the MDOC produced his medical records, such 

“would be sufficient to prove that [he] was disabled prior to 2004.” (Tr. 23, 25, 29, 30). Under 

these circumstances, and in light of Longnecker’s alleged mental infirmities, including bipolar 

disorder,4

 the Court concludes that the ALJ did, in fact, have a heightened duty to develop the 

 

4

 Indeed, in a September 1, 2012 report, the consultative examiner, Gayle Oliver-Brannon, Ph.D., 

listed Longnecker’s diagnoses as bipolar disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and posttraumatic stress disorder, and opined that he “appears in need of mental health treatment and 

does not present as a viable candidate for employment at this time.” (Tr. 418). 

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record. 

The Commissioner next argues, in the alternative, that even if “special circumstances” 

did exist such that the ALJ had a heightened duty to develop the record, he properly discharged 

any duty he owed to Longnecker. (Doc. #51 at 18-20). Specifically, the Commissioner asserts 

that the ALJ (1) advised Longnecker that he needed to provide evidence of a medical impairment 

before December 31, 2004 (Tr. 28); and (2) made clear to Longnecker that he had 60 days to 

present additional evidence, saying “[o]therwise, I’ll be deciding your case by the testimony and 

evidence that I’ve taken today and the evidence that’s in the file” (Tr. 31-32). 

The Court disagrees that the ALJ “properly discharged any duties owed” to Longnecker 

in this case. (Doc. #51 at 18). It appears from a review of the administrative record that the 

most important medical evidence that should have been before the ALJ was missing.5

 The Court 

is not persuaded by the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ essentially did enough when he 

“clearly told [Longnecker] that if he received no additional records, then he would make a 

decision based upon the evidence already of record.” (Id. at 20). The Commissioner seeks to 

 

5

 The Commissioner also argues that “it appears that the ALJ secured all available MDOC 

records[,]” noting that he “received copies of medical records covering treatment, including 

records from the Standish and Alger correctional facilities – the last two correctional facilities 

where [Longnecker] was imprisoned ....” (Doc. #51 at 22-23 (citing Tr. 11, 424-68)). The 

Commissioner further contends that, “Even if records of earlier treatment appear sparse, 

[Longnecker] himself has acknowledged, in post-incarceration medical records, that he only 

received minimal medical care while in prison ....” (Id. at 23 (citing Tr. 277)). The Court is not 

persuaded by this argument. The records referenced by the Commissioner primarily appear to be 

various mental health assessments, referrals, and progress notes, and contain virtually no 

reference to treatment provided for any physical impairment. Given Longnecker’s contention 

that he received treatment for injuries incurred in July 2001 – including x-rays after suffering a 

“dislocated hip, compound fractures of two carpal bones in his left hand, and multiple bruises 

and lacerations upon his entire body ...” (Doc. #53 at 8), it seems reasonably likely that 

additional records exist. Moreover, as the Commissioner concedes, Longnecker attached 

additional records to his “Amendment of Claim” – including some prison medical records 

providing for a cane from March 2002 through July 2002, and a wheelchair for periods of time in 

2006 and 2007 – which further undermine the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ had 

“secured all available MDOC records.” (Doc. #46 at 6, 28-31, 33). 

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distinguish this case from Burrows v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL 5411113 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 

28, 2012), in which the court found that the ALJ had not fulfilled his heightened duty to develop 

the record and remanded the case for further proceedings. In Burrows, part of the analysis was 

the fact that the ALJ had specifically informed the unrepresented claimant that “he would 

attempt to obtain relevant treating physician records, but apparently did not do so.” Id. at *11. 

The Commissioner is correct that, here, “the ALJ made no such representation” (Doc. #51 at 19), 

but the Court does not find this fact dispositive. Indeed, if an ALJ could satisfy his duty to 

develop the record by merely telling a claimant “that if he receive[s] no additional records, then 

he [will] make a decision based upon the evidence already of record,” as the Commissioner 

suggests (Id. at 20), then the so-called “heightened duty” requirement would be eviscerated. 

Moreover, as the Commissioner points out, there is a relevant provision of the Hearings, 

Appeals, and Litigation Law Manuel (“HALLEX”), which – although not binding – provides 

“procedural guidance” under the circumstances. (Doc. #51 at 21-22). HALLEX I-2-5-82, 

entitled “Noncompliance With a Subpoena,” provides that if an individual refuses or fails to 

comply with a subpoena: 

... the ALJ must consider any changes in the situation since the 

subpoena was first issued and again determine whether the evidence 

or facts requested are reasonably necessary for the full presentation of 

the case. If so, the ALJ will prepare a memorandum to the OGC Regional 

Chief Counsel requesting enforcement of the subpoena ... and transmit the 

memorandum to the OGC Regional Chief Counsel .... 

HALLEX I-2-5-82, found at https://ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-5-82.html (emphasis 

added) (last accessed May 20, 2016). By issuing subpoenas for Longnecker’s medical records, 

then, the ALJ implicitly determined that these records were reasonably necessary for a full 

presentation of Longnecker’s case. See Bennett v. Colvin, 2016 WL 308777, at *4 (N.D. Ohio 

Jan. 26, 2016). Beyond that, however, it is not entirely clear whether the ALJ complied with the 

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above provision, as the decision makes no mention of whether there were any “changes in the 

situation” since the time the subpoena(s) were issued and contains no explanation as to whether 

the subpoenaed records remained “reasonably necessary for full presentation of the case.” 

HALLEX I-2-5-82. The Commissioner’s conclusory argument that “it is apparent that the ALJ 

determined that the evidence requested by the subpoena was not ‘reasonably necessary for the 

full presentation of the case’” is not persuasive. (Doc. #51 at 21 (emphasis in original)). This is 

not a situation where the subpoena at issue sought redundant or unnecessarily cumulative 

information. Here, given the centrality of the MDOC records to a fair adjudication of 

Longnecker’s claims and the efforts made by Longnecker to obtain these records, the ALJ’s 

failure to follow up on the letter he received in response to the subpoena he issued, indicating 

that these records had been sent to MDOC Central Record Storage, prejudiced Longnecker’s 

right to a full and fair hearing on the merits, and therefore constitutes error warranting remand.6

 

See Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 654. 

2. The ALJ’s Determination that Longnecker is 

Not Disabled is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

For all of the reasons set forth above, the ALJ’s determination that Longnecker is not 

disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. The administrative hearing in this case was 

essentially nothing more than a discussion about medical records that had not been obtained. 

Without these records – which purportedly reflect medical treatment Longnecker received 

between 2001 and 2004 – the ALJ’s conclusion at Step Two that Longnecker did not have a 

 

6

 The Commissioner also argues that remand would “likely be futile” because, pursuant to the 

MDOC Records Retention and Disposal Schedule, Longnecker’s medical records would have 

been destroyed within seven (7) years of his 2008 release from prison. (Doc. #51 at 23). While 

it is certainly possible that, after this much time, Longnecker’s MDOC medical records no longer 

exist, the Commissioner has not established with certainty (for example, via an affidavit of the 

keeper of records) that such records no longer exist. Thus, given the possibility that such records 

remain in existence, the Court believes that remand is appropriate. 

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medically determinable impairment during the relevant period of time is not supported by 

substantial evidence. See, e.g., Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1219 (5th Cir. 1984) (when an 

ALJ fails to develop the record, he does not have sufficient facts to make a decision and, thus, 

his decision is not supported by substantial evidence). On remand, the ALJ should attempt to 

obtain medical records from the MDOC and explain the consideration he gives to such records in 

formulating his decision as to whether Longnecker is disabled under the Act. 

II. RECOMMENDATION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment [51] be DENIED, Longnecker’s Motion for Summary Judgment [48] be 

GRANTED IN PART, the ALJ’s decision be REVERSED, and this case be REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this Recommendation.7

Dated: May 25, 2016 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

NOTICE 

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

 

7

 On February 2, 2016, Longnecker filed a “Motion for True Discovery,” seeking production of 

his MDOC medical records. (Doc. #45). Because the Court is recommending that Longnecker’s 

motion for summary judgment be granted, and that this case be remanded for further proceedings 

– including obtaining these records – his “Motion for True Discovery” [45] is DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

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(1985); Howard v. Sec’y of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues, but fail 

to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. See Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 

401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 

1987). Pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this 

magistrate judge. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 25, 2016. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

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