COUNTERFORCE: LOCATING 

AND DESTROYING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION

Robert W. Chandler 

INSS Occasional Paper 21 

Proliferation Series 

September 1998 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

System-of Systems Architecture 7 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 8 

Command, Control, Communications, Computing, and 

 Intelligence (C4I) 12 

Long-Range Precision Strike Forces 13 

Precision Strike Weapons 15 

Theater Enabling Forces 20 

Distributed Ground Combat Cells 21 

Carrier-Based Aircraft 22 

CINC’s Concept of Operations 23 

Find and Characterize the WMD Targets 24 

 Function 25 

 Mobility 26 

 Structure 26 

 Environment 26 

Task Resources 29 

 Vulnerability 30 

 Time Sensitivity 31 

 Military Value 31 

 Political Sensitivity 31 

 Collateral Damage 31 

Attack and Kill (With Limited Collateral Damage) 31 

Assess and Report 33 

Counter-WMD Operations Plan 33 

Long-Range Precision Strike 41 

Endnotes 43 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this twenty-first volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). This paper is particularly timely as it addresses 

a critical situation that United States military forces face in deploying to 

forward locations and in confronting rogue states and asymmetrical 

challenges. Colonel Chandler explores the protection of U.S. forces 

from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats enroute to and during 

deployed operations. He develops a system-of-systems capability 

package using existing or nearly operational systems to provide earlyconflict or pre-conflict dominance, enabling the introduction of 

traditional force packages into theater and their protection from WMD 

threats. He adds a detailed development of how such operations fit into 

the regional combatant commander’s concept of operations, and a 

discussion of planning factors to implement the system for the CINC. 

The threat is real, and these ideas are worthy of full study and 

consideration by military planners at all levels of operations. 

This paper was not written under INSS sponsorship, but was 

brought to our attention by the Air Staff’s Policy Division, Nuclear and 

Counterproliferation Directorate, INSS’ primary sponsor. This is only 

the second Occasional Paper that was not originally an INSS research 

project, and we believe that the timeliness of the topic, the relevance of 

the paper, and the originality and detailed development of its ideas fully 

warrant its publication for wider distribution and review. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 
viii

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 

Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Army Environmental Policy 

Institute, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the Plans Directorate of the 

United States Space Command. The mission of the Institute is “to 

promote national security research for the Department of Defense within 

the military academic community, and to support the Air Force national 

security education program.” Its research focuses on the areas of 

greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control, 

proliferation, national security, regional studies, Air Force policy, the 

revolution in military affairs, information warfare, environmental 

security, and space policy. 

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects 

researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private 

and government organizations. INSS is in its fifth year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We 

appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

Director 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The global technological transformation of warfare has been 

underway since the end of the Cold War. Proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—

and advanced conventional weapons and technology are offering 

potential regional adversaries new operational concepts for countering 

American power projection. The Air Force has been responding to these 

evolving challenges with its own continuous process of renewal and 

global situational awareness that charts a course for the first quarter of 

the twenty-first century. The 1998 Presidential Panel to Review LongRange Air Power added a new element to the process of reshaping Air 

Force strategic concepts and capabilities to meet the exigencies of a 

quickly evolving threat. 

The proliferation of WMD and advanced conventional weapons 

has placed the U.S. power projection strategy under attack in several 

regions of the world. Asymmetric threats pose significant challenges to 

the U.S. military strategy. The United States, on the other hand, 

possesses significant strengths, including the potential to increase the 

tempo of warfare through long-range precision counterstrikes early in a 

conflict. Counterforce operations at the outset of a conflict can be 

effective in preventing the use of WMD and at the same time confuse, 

disorient, and disorganize an adversary's forces. 

In order to defeat a WMD-armed adversary's asymmetric attacks, 

the United States needs to have in place balanced CINC concepts of 

operation and robust counterforce operational concepts for locating and 

destroying WMD early in a conflict. A system-of-systems architecture is 

useful in identifying the military capabilities or building blocks 

necessary to underwrite such a counter-WMD approach: intelligence, 
x

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command, control, 

communications, computing, and intelligence (C4I); long-range precision 

strike forces; precision strike weapons; theater enabling forces; 

distributed ground combat cells; and carrier-based aircraft. The 

synergies among these seven building blocks make possible prompt 

counterforce attacks against an enemy's WMD and other military 

capabilities that could impede U.S. power projection operations. 

When these capabilities are placed in the hands of the combatant 

commanders with global and regional responsibilities, new concepts of 

operation can be fashioned to locate and destroy WMD "before they can 

be used" against U.S. forces and friendly populations. New targeting 

models and planning tools make it possible for a combatant commander 

to chose from an ever-expanding number of military strike options. The 

creative use of intelligence in peacetime can result in workable 

operations plans for conflict and lay the groundwork for providing the 

CINC full-scope battlespace knowledge in the earliest hours of a crisis. 

In regional conflicts involving adversaries armed with WMD and 

advanced conventional weapons, the U.S. should turn to its revolutionary 

advantages based on battlespace knowledge, sensors and rapid 

computing, stealth, precision, and aerial strike. The United States needs 

to create an air dominance in the earliest hours and days of a conflict. 

Non-linear, asymmetric U.S. long-range precision strike operations offer 

the best opportunity to neutralize the new found operational concepts by 

WMD-armed adversaries. 
Counterforce: Locating and Destroying 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Panel to Review Long-Range Air Power...provided several 

far-reaching recommendations for fully exploiting the potential 

of the current B-1, B-2, and B-52 bomber force, and for 

upgrading and sustaining the bomber force for the longer term. 

These longer term recommendations warrant careful review as 

the Department of Defense prepares its Fiscal Year 2000-2006 

Future Years Defense Program. 

 President William J. Clinton 

 March 31, 19981

Anticipating change in regional threats worldwide following the 

enormously successful air attacks in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Air 

Force developed a vision for restructuring and modernization in Global 

Reach—Global Power that would guide it into the 21st century. Building 

 upon this forward-looking Air Force vision, the senior leadership 

recognized early that any new aerospace concept in the mandatory and 

continuous process of renewal must satisfy the demands of America's 

national security and operate more from a reservoir of U.S.-based 

contingency forces. 

Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

presents a strategic vision that charts a course for the Air Force during the 

first quarter of the next century. Centered on the ability to obtain timely 

global situational awareness, orchestrate military operations throughout a 

theater of conflict, and project intense firepower over great distances 

within hours to days, the vision is poised on the capacity to strike an 

adversary's centers of gravity directly and to prevail at the operational 

and tactical levels of warfare. 
2 

These two vision statements tapped into the mainstream of the 

global technological transformation that is creating new instruments for 

shaping international security. The rapid spread of military technology 

and knowledge is strongly influencing the way people think about war, 

its conduct, and its consequences. Gone are the modern versions of 

Napoleonic warfare where clashes of military strength against military 

strength would continue until attrition on one side compelled the other to 

quit the battle out of sheer exhaustion. New operational strategies made 

possible by technology are asymmetric where each side uses its strengths 

against an adversary's weaknesses and, as is the case in the martial arts, 

turns the enemy's strengths against himself. A continuous renewal of Air 

Force strategic concepts and aerospace capabilities will be required in 

this new threat environment to maintain a powerful and superior global 

force. 

One such renewal of Air Force concepts and capabilities was 

initiated in March 1998 by the report of the Panel to Review Long-Range 

Air Power.2

 

The Panel believes that long-range air power is an increasingly 

important element of US military capability.... The potential of 

the bomber force is multiplied by the addition of precisionguided munitions, both direct delivery and stand-off.... The 

Panel believes that more attention is needed to exploit this 

expanded capability of the bomber force.... In addition to their 

own attack capability, stealth aircraft can be employed to 

leverage the success of the rest of the bomber force and fighter 

fleets.3

The Long-Range Air Power Panel's recommendations made it 

crystal clear that the bomber force should not be allowed to wither and 

die. "As these emerging long-range high payload attack systems are 

integrated into the force structure, there will be increasing demand for 

them," the panel chairman, General Larry Welch, former Air Force 

Chief-of-Staff, expressed confidently, "the DoD needs a plan for 

maintaining the bomber force over the years through 2030."4

 
3 

The purpose of Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons 

of Mass Destruction is to integrate the key insights of previous Air Force 

vision statements with the findings of the 1998 Long-Range Air Power 

Panel and address one of the most demanding practical issues that will 

impact America's next first battle. The proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) changes the context and conduct of future warfare. 

For starters, America's military strategy, operations concepts, and 

doctrine for the early 21st century should be based on the very real 

possibility that the armed forces will be pitted against adversaries armed 

with biological and chemical weapons and the ballistic and cruise 

missiles needed to deliver them accurately across great distances.5

 

After the astounding American-led victory over Iraq in the Persian 

Gulf War, several countries have been studying U.S. military operations 

in search of vulnerabilities that might be effectively exploited in future 

conflicts. Their approach is the one recommended by Sun Tzu, the 

Chinese military philosopher in the fourth century B.C.: "To subdue the 

enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme 

importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."6

 

Drawing upon lessons learned from the Gulf War and taking 

advantage of the bustling international arms market, weapons of mass 

destruction offer disaffected non-Western countries new opportunities for 

posing severe asymmetric threats against the U.S. global power 

projection strategy. North Korea, Iraq, and other non-Western countries 

possess the means and the motivation to engage the United States 

militarily with WMD as the twentieth century comes to a close. 

Meanwhile, several other regional powers are growing in wealth, 

technology, and knowledge that will give them more deadly military 

capabilities and greater influence in the years immediately ahead. Some 

may attempt to dominate a region by intimidating U.S. allies and friends, 

pursue interests inimical to the United States, and develop WMD and 
4 

other weapons necessary to challenge American power and influence. 

Regional adversaries unable to confront American power directly may 

attempt to counter the U.S. strategy through asymmetric means by (1) 

confronting the United States in ways that it cannot match, (2) 

circumventing U.S. strengths through inexpensive or unconventional 

approaches, or (3) carefully exploiting military vulnerabilities associated 

with the deployment and operations of American expeditionary forces. 

The proliferation of WMD changes the strategic conditions for U.S. 

forces overseas. First, in a world where a potential enemy is armed with 

biological and chemical weapons, forward-based American forces are 

within range of these mass destruction capabilities, whether delivered by 

strike aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles or terrorists. Overseas-based 

U.S. military forces, therefore, must be recognized as both an inherent 

strength and a potential vulnerability—the June 1996 terrorist attack 

against U.S. forces at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia drove home the 

point in a bloody way. Another weakness is centered on the strategic 

movement of U.S. forces from North America to Northeast Asia, the 

Persian Gulf and Middle East, and Europe—interruption of the orderly 

flow of these forces, whether events occur inside the United States, en 

route, or near their overseas destination, is an important potential 

vulnerability. Third, United States military strategy is dependent upon 

foreign governments making timely decisions to grant access to their 

reception facilities—if a candidate host government is asked to pay a high 

price in terms of the consequences from enemy use of WMD or terrorist 

attacks and the U.S. cannot assure its protection, political access to vital 

ports and airfields may not be readily forthcoming. Fourth, the U.S. 

dependence on a small number of seaports and air bases for reception and 

resupply of land-based air and ground forces opens the door to enemy 

anti-access operations, including biological and chemical warfare attacks. 

 Fifth, deployed American forces are vulnerable to WMD attacks when 
5 

operating from fixed-sites such as airfields and logistics centers, as well 

as carrier-based air operations from the littoral waters within range of the 

adversary's weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Finally, WMDarmed adversaries may try to exploit potential U.S. vulnerabilities by 

threatening or inflicting massive American casualties. 

These observations make it clear that the dimensions of America's 

next first battle are already emerging. One thing is certain: technological 

surprises will challenge U.S. military commanders on the future 

battlefield. They will be confronted by new uses and interactions of 

known weapons, new weapons with expected effects, new weapons with 

unexpected effects because they are used in innovative ways, and "old" 

weapons not anticipated and for which no defenses have been retained. 

The spread of lethal technologies, old and new, to rogue regimes7

 and 

others in the non-Western world is accelerating. This means that the 

United States must prepare for surprises at the outset of the next conflict. 

 

The United States has the opportunity to turn an adversary's 

potential asymmetric attacks against itself through superior knowledge of 

enemy military dispositions and strategically incisive counterattacks with 

precision-guided weapons delivered from aerial platforms early in a 

conflict. Situational awareness provided by an array of sensors, rapid 

fusion through superior computing, and real-time communications can be 

linked directly to strike aircraft and unmanned systems to the point that 

the United States could increase the tempo of warfare to confuse, 

disorient, and disorganize a regional adversary's forces in spite of their 

geographic advantage of proximity to the battle zone. 

In the final analysis, it is quite clear that no less than the 

longstanding U.S. national military strategy—based on strategic agility, 

overseas presence, power projection, and decisive force—is under attack 

by the ever increasing numbers of theater-range strike systems and 
6 

weapons of mass destruction available to regional powers. In the past, 

forward-based and positioned forces, whether stationed there 

permanently or temporarily deployed, were judged to deter adversaries 

while reassuring allies and friends. The future, however, will behold an 

entirely new picture since forward positioned U.S. forces will be held at 

risk of destruction by theater-based systems. Even with air and missile 

defenses, in-theater air bases used by American military forces will be 

highly vulnerable to determined biological and chemical weapons 

attacks, especially during the critical early stages of a conflict. The 

strategic concept of "fighting our way into a denied theater or creating 

and protecting forward operating bases" promises to become more 

onerous over time as adversaries build arsenals of WMD and theater 

ballistic and cruise missiles. 

The single most distinguishing feature of counterforce operations 

against WMD, as compared with existing missions of battlefield area 

interdiction, offensive counterair, and deep interdiction, lies in the targets 

themselves: chemical and biological weapons and ballistic and cruise 

missiles. These targets may already be earmarked for attack under an 

existing mission area but counterforce operations against WMD should 

be considered a specialized subset of these other missions and whose 

neutralization or destruction is of immense importance to the success of 

the overall campaign. Many of the WMD targets should be destroyed 

early in a conflict to prevent their use against friendly populations and 

forces. Locating these targets can be difficult, including, for example, the 

specific site of WMD facilities within the confines of a larger fixed 

target. Some targets may be relocatable; they may be vulnerable to attack 

for a short period of time (hours) at the outset of conflict. Mobile targets, 

such as missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), present an especially 

difficult bombing task due to an enemy's use of ruses, decoys, rapid 

shoot-and-scoot operations, and other tactics. Another consideration is 
7 

the depth of the target from political borders. Generally speaking, the 

deeper the target location, the more onerous is the counterforce strike 

operation. Finally, linking sensors-to-shooters can help significantly in 

striking the WMD target within the enemy's decision-making cycle. 

Such operations will require exquisite intelligence in peacetime to obtain 

the knowledge necessary to characterize WMD and WMD-related 

targets, plan counter-WMD operations ahead of time, and conduct 

informed and effective operations during conflict. 

System-of-Systems Architecture 

A system-of-systems architecture is more than a collection of individual 

system elements. The systems are building blocks used to construct an 

architecture that will support and provide inputs to the CINC's concept of 

operations and counterforce operational concepts. The force structure 

elements in this architecture use existing systems to the extent 

practicable. A concentrated effort is made to avoid redesigning or 

creating new system elements. Rather, emphasis is placed on discovering 

more effective ways to defeat the WMD-armed adversary's asymmetric 

strategy by using those U.S. military forces and technologies that have 

already been developed and that are either in or near being in production. 

 The key is taking advantage of the operational synergies of the systems 

elements resulting from the integrated architecture. 

The system elements necessary to support the counterforce 

architecture are divided into seven building blocks: intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processes; enhanced 

command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (C4I); 

long-range precision strike forces; precision strike weapons; theater 

enabling forces; distributed ground combat cells; and carrier-based 

aircraft. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
8 

The system-of-systems architecture for counterforce operations is based 

on the ability of the United States to apply military forces to impose far 

greater risks against a WMD-armed antagonist than the adversary can 

place against U.S. forces. A key system element of the capacity is 

"battlefield awareness" or the timely knowledge about events before and 

during the battles. For the first time in the history of humankind, the 

commander can "see" the battlefield in depth and breadth. No other 

country is able to bring to the battlefield the integrated array of sensors 

positioned in space, air, ground, and at sea. 

 The Air Force has already taken the initial steps to enhance 

battlefield awareness by development of the Information Superiority/Air 

Expeditionary Force (IS/AEF) concept in which an "electronic triad" is 

built around the long-range sensors such as the Joint STARS—Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (radar tracking of vehicle 

movement), AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System (air 

superiority aircraft control), and Rivet Joint (electronic signals). While 

all three members of the ISR "troika" are important, the Joint STARS 

aircraft provide a key component of the ability to "see" the enemy's 

disposition over a wide area and to choose the time and place to attack 

them before they engage U.S. and friendly forces. The Joint STARS 

combines moving target indicators with synthetic aperture radars, which 

produce images that allow U.S. strike platforms to single out individual 

vehicles. The radar can even distinguish between wheeled and tracked 

vehicles such as trucks and tanks. The potential interdiction of enemy 

armored columns before they engage allied forces is a key synergism of 

the sensor-to-shooter linkage. 

The IS/AEF is an important development in overcoming the 

growing WMD threat to America's power projection strategy. First, it is 

organized as expeditionary force that makes it immediately available for 

worldwide deployment. Second, it has a small footprint in or near the 
9 

theater that minimizes its exposure. And, third, the IS/AEF has both 

flexibility and versatility; it offers a readily adaptable resource for 

countering asymmetric threats. The three aircraft (Joint STARS, 

AWACS, and Rivet Joint), for instance, offer shooters different 

battlefield pictures that can be fused into a single, multispectral image of 

the battlespace. The fusion could be enriched easily by "plugging-in" to 

U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAV), and space surveillance and communications systems. The Navy's 

E-2C Hawkeye air surveillance and P-3 Orion maritime surveillance 

could also tap in. Other potential future components of IS/AEF could be 

the Airborne Laser with its surveillance and battle management systems; 

the Global Hawk and Dark Star high altitude, high endurance UAVs; and 

the highly advanced sensing systems of the F-22 stealth fighter. 

Unattended ground sensors used to monitor an enemy's underground 

weapons storage facilities could also become members. 

New families of in-close sensors are being developed for precision 

attacks against weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Even more 

advanced technologies available over the long-term will allow detection 

of camouflaged targets. Advances in bringing data together from 

multiple sources and assembling the inputs into useable forms for support 

of military operations are making progress. Net-centric operations 

linking sensors with weapons are evolving rapidly through the integration 

of pre-conflict characterization of WMD and WMD-related targets with 

the wartime sensor data that will make it possible to target, deny, 

interdict, or destroy WMD forces and supporting infrastructure. 

Sensors based on satellites and UAVs can be used in mutually 

reinforcing ways. Satellites, for instance, can provide twenty-four hour 

surveillance of a specific target. They can perform this function from a 

predictable location. The potential to have almost constant images from 

satellites of specific trouble spots in the world would give the United 
10 

States a tremendous advantage. UAVs, on the other hand, are mobile and 

can respond to rapidly changing events on the ground. On the flip side, 

UAVs can also offer non-Western states a ready reconnaissance 

capability very cheaply to supplement the more sophisticated one-meter 

square satellite images available from commercial companies. While 

UAVs appear to offer WMD-armed adversaries and other smaller 

countries an equalizing capacity in surveillance and reconnaissance 

capability, it is an enormously complex and challenging task to integrate 

UAVs and the ISR data available from other sources. While the U.S. and 

its allies can be expected to maintain their lead in these capabilities for 

some time in providing real-time targeting information, WMD-armed 

adversaries may achieve systems that are "good enough" to target U.S. 

forces deploying to the theater. 

Another U.S. sensor platform of potential value is the Cobra Ball 

RC-135 aircraft that has been revamped to detect the launch of ballistic 

missiles and analyze their capabilities. Its advanced sensor suite can 

accurately locate a missile launch more than 260 miles away, mark the 

engine's cutoff, and then quickly calculate its trajectory and impact point. 

Valuable information about its stability and accuracy can be gleaned from 

the reentry vehicle's speed of rotation and any signals it receives from 

ground controllers can tell more about the missile's mission. These are 

valuable components of a theater ballistic missile defense system. Cobra 

Ball is expected to provide a sound anti-Scud capability by using proven 

technology. 

The intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets that 

provide a heightened battlefield awareness of the location of weapons, 

troops, and armored columns are important components of a combatant 

commander's concept of operations. The U.S. commander is also offered 

the ability to achieve dominant battlespace knowledge based on (1) an 

awareness of where things are, (2) an understanding of the relationships 
11 

and related significance of the enemy's force elements, (3) how the units 

and weapons fit into the terrain and are constrained by it, (4) what the 

forces are trying to achieve, and (5) how the various military objectives 

relate to each other. The ability to quickly comprehend how the enemy's 

units and weapons relate to each other will provide the United States a 

tremendous leverage in locating and destroying WMD that can be 

exploited by precision munitions. The United States will be able to select 

the highest payoff targets and develop an attack plan that goes after the 

enemy's asymmetric strategy by turning his strengths against himself. 

The ability of the United States to collect and process data rapidly 

from a relatively large area (about 40,000 square miles) will permit the 

identification and location, with minimal processing delay, of virtually all 

friendly, neutral and opposing forces, military facilities, machinery, 

weapons, vehicles, and militarily significant units. Processing the data to 

provide an integrated fusion provides a battlespace picture in great detail. 

This dominant battlespace knowledge is an enormously important 

exploitable advantage. Over time, one should anticipate adversaries will 

adjust by taking actions to deny the United States such knowledge to the 

extent that might be possible. Yet, even a grand "cat-and-mouse" game 

of a competition between "hiders" and "finders" promises to disrupt an 

adversary's invasion forces against neighbors and the flow of asymmetric 

attacks against U.S. deployments. As the adversary becomes better at 

"hiding," the U.S. can be expected to become better at "finding." The 

regional competition will favor the side that is most creative in 

understanding the other. 

Command, Control, Communications, Computing, and Intelligence 

(C4I) 

A second crucial architecture element is the enhanced C4I 

communications and data links that are growing apace with dominant 

battlespace understanding and allow the transmission of the information 
12 

to where it is most needed, whether to the strike operations command 

posts or the top of the chain of command. The Global Command and 

Control System links the various military command centers of the United 

States and provides the warfighter with a fused picture of the battlespace. 

 The commander can also talk to and coordinate a vast number of military 

assets at the same time. Rapid fusion and dissemination of surveillance 

and targeting data can ensure greater battlefield awareness in the cockpit 

or other firing platform. Integrating Global Positioning System data into 

the overall C4I system gives strike platforms even greater visualization of 

the battlefield and opportunities to locate and destroy WMD. 

The C4I system element is important to targeting strike platforms, 

including those attacking on the fly. In the rapidly changing environment 

on the ground anticipated when WMD-adversaries take counter-actions 

against U.S. attacks, military commanders will need to be able to "read" 

the other side quickly and adapt rapidly to the newly emerging 

circumstances. This leads us to the conclusion that the synergy between 

ISR and C4I is a special attribute that must be fully exploited. 

The C4ISR systems elements are fused into one. These capabilities 

are based on more than a collection of hardware and software systems. 

Dominant battlespace understanding can only be achieved by integration 

of concepts, operational methods, people, training, and supporting 

systems and processes. C4ISR provides a usable picture of the 

battlespace to support targeting and strike operations as well as the 

knowledge base for the commanders making informed decisions. 

Integrating C4ISR into the CINC concept of operations is a key to 

enhancing U.S. counter-WMD capabilities and the basis for attacking the 

enemy's asymmetric strategy. 

Long-Range Precision Strike Forces 

The third element of the system-of-systems architecture is use of longrange aircraft armed with precision weapons to execute anti-armor, 
13 

counter-WMD, and other counter-military operations. The C4ISR and 

precision-munitions are essential components in applying airpower's 

inherent characteristics of speed, range, flexibility, and versatility to 

attack enemy targets directly. With a zero delay in sensor-to-shooter 

information, manned aircraft can be re-directed when attacking targets 

not only in the close-in battle between land forces but deep into the 

enemy's rear areas. In many cases, air strikes will be able to reduce the 

enemy's WMD significantly and destroy combat capabilities essential to 

his asymmetrical strategy designed to slow, disrupt, and block U.S. 

deployments to the theater. 

With C4ISR providing a near-real-time global awareness, the U.S. 

will be able to dominate the dimension of time by carefully selecting 

targets and integrating the campaign to strike the enemy throughout his 

territory. This U.S. asymmetric strategy of using long-range precisionstrike aircraft (B-52, B-1B, and B-2) to enable the introduction of tactical 

fighters to a theater earlier and in greater numbers invokes parallel 

warfare in which the enemy is attacked in depth and breadth with 

overwhelming force. The centers of gravity of the enemy's anti-access 

asymmetric strategy are the primary targets, including the critical points 

in the adversary's order of battle and infrastructure that underwrite his 

WMD threats to deny the U.S. access to regional seaports and airfields. 

The U.S. operations would be designed to give the enemy no time to 

adjust, adapt, or mount a counteroffensive. The objective is to attack all 

of the enemy's centers of gravity at once—in parallel or "parallel 

warfare"—rather than serially where the enemy is given a chance to adapt 

to strikes against facilities low on the attack plan. Four operational 

objectives can be expected to guide U.S. strike operations at the outset of 

a conflict: disrupt the enemy command and control, halt the invading 

forces, locate and destroy WMD, and maintain access to the region's 

ports and airfields. 
14 

Long-range bombers have "virtual presence" in overseas regions 

resulting from their capability to strike any target anywhere on earth with 

the assistance of aerial refueling. Saddam Hussein, as we have seen, has 

shown himself to be very sensitive to time and how much he can 

accomplish before the Americans can respond in force. Other foreign 

leaders with political objectives inimical to U.S. interest are also keenly 

aware of America's lengthy response times. A "virtual presence" of 

ready, quick responding long-range bombers armed with precisionguided munitions could alter their strategic calculations and perhaps 

dissuade actions by Saddam and other leaders hostile toward the United 

States. Moreover, stealth enhances the capability for survivable attack 

against defended targets. To hedge against the lack of strategic warning 

and surprise, the initial bomber strikes can occur directly from the United 

States, but this is not the preferred solution. Forward bases just outside 

the reach of a WMD-armed adversary's ballistic and cruise missiles and 

attack aircraft are needed to ensure rapid recycling of the bombers so that 

the highest possible sortie rates can be maintained over extended periods. 

Currently, the United States has a mixed bomber force of cruise 

missile equipped non-stealthy bombers; direct attack, precision equipped 

non-stealthy bombers; and direct attack, precision equipped stealthy 

bombers. A host of operationally-based measures and investments will 

give the bombers greater capability: 

• Non-nuclear operational support for B-52, B-1B, and B-2 

bombers; 

• All bombers capable of carrying the maximum practical 

number of the most effective munitions; 

• Capability to attack multiple high leverage targets per 

sortie by increasing the responsiveness of the mission planning 

system; 

• Assured C4ISR connectivity for battlefield awareness; 
15 

• Better delivery accuracy for the B-1B and B-52 by 

improving the attack radar systems; and 

• Increased sortie rates through upgrading improved B-2 

stealth maintenance and performance, mission planning, and 

additional support resources, especially at forward bases.8

Precision Strike Weapons 

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs), a fourth element of the system-ofsystems architecture, are capable of striking any military-related target 

that can be located precisely and characterized in sufficient detail any 

place in the world. Three main streams of technology assure precision 

guidance. Human-guided weapons include fiber-optic- and laser-guided 

bombs; signature-guided weapons use infrared radar reflection and 

acoustic homing; and location-directed weapons or those that know 

precisely where the target is and where the delivery bomb is located. The 

reason for attacking with precision-munitions is the efficiency obtained in 

strike operations. There are other important logistics benefits as well. 

According to the Defense Science Board, one ton of PGMs is equivalent 

to 12-20 tons of unguided munitions on a tonnage per target basis. With 

fewer misses, it stands to reason that fewer bombs are needed to destroy 

the target. In addition, when taken in the totality of operations during the 

Gulf War, the use of PGMs, on a per target basis, saved as much as 35-40 

tons of fuel.9

 

Since precision weapons make it possible to hit what we aim at, it 

means we can strike biological and chemical weapons and ballistic and 

cruise missiles more effectively. These targets will be vulnerable to 

small-scale as well as large raids. The precision weapons allow a 

significant increase in efficiency of the resources expended for such 

missions with fewer misses or bombs scattered across the landscape. In 

addition, precision accuracy means less collateral damage will be 

experienced which is always an important consideration, especially when 
16 

counterforce operations are conducted in situations with a high political 

context. 

Strikes against biological and chemical weapons manufacturing 

plants, main storage facilities, forward depots, and committed assets in 

transit to launch locations present special considerations in how best to 

destroy the weapons while limiting collateral damage to civilian 

populations and friendly forces. Traditional high-explosive bombs could 

destroy the intended target but also produce the possible release of deadly 

biological and chemical warfare agents into the atmosphere and their 

dispersal over a vast area. Needed are special "agent defeat" weapons 

that will limit such collateral effects while destroying the WMD target. 

Three criteria help to assess the consequences of precision 

munitions: (1) the direct, first-order effects on the destruction of various 

classes of targets; (2) indirect effects such as delays and confusion; and 

(3) the direct and indirect effects after allowing for countermeasures and 

other adaptive responses by enemies, including virtual attrition resulting 

from inducing a diversion of enemy resources to provide active or 

passive defenses against the American weapons. 

The ability to make highly accurate attacks on locatable targets at 

any range has major implications for attacks against fixed facilities. 

These include WMD and WMD-related installations, such as storage and 

garrison locations, command and control facilities, and other critical 

targets. No less important is the target acquisition of wheeled and 

armored vehicles on the move that can be provided by Joint STARS and 

other ISR platforms. 

 Concentrations of vehicles will be subject to accurate fires 

delivered by precision-strike platforms, especially if the enemy's routes of 

advance—restricted by terrain and a scarcity of roads—are known and 

monitored. The enemy can be expected to use counters, including attacks 

against surveillance sensors or control systems, active defenses, decoys, 
17 

camouflage in innovative uses of natural cover, and wider spacing of 

vehicles to reduce the chances of multiple kills by a single precision 

munition. Yet, the aggressor must be on the move to seize the territory of 

others, which means his forces will be more visible and sometimes in 

road-march formation. This will enhance the regional defender's efforts 

to halt the enemy's invasion short of his objectives. It will also lessen the 

chances of an adversary successfully presenting the United States with a 

fait accompli. 

Two kinds of U.S. weapons are of particular interest in developing 

counterforce operations. One set is the right weapons suite for halting the 

aggressor's armored invasion forces, including the enemy's ground 

firepower weapons such as rockets and artillery for delivery of biological 

and chemical warfare agents. The second set of munitions important for 

counterforce attacks are those necessary to destroy an adversary's 

weapons of mass destruction and theater missiles at fixed sites (including 

WMD relocated to new sites).10

• Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD). This is 

an Air Force guidance system designed to get dispensers with 

submunitions close enough to their targets, including moving 

vehicles, so that terminal-guidance sensors will take over to 

produce a high probability of kill. At a 40,000 feet release, for 

example, the WCMD will be able to steer to a target area nine 

miles away and about two or three miles cross-range. Release at 

20,000 feet gives it a down-range distance of four to five miles 

and a cross-range of one to two miles. The WCMD will be able 

to dispense CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, CBU-87 

Combined Effects Munitions (anti-armor/anti-personnel), and 

CBU-89 Gator air-delivered mines.11

• Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW). The CBU-97 munition 

dispenser was specifically designed to attack moving vehicles. 

It dispenses smaller projectiles that fire discriminately at targets 

on the ground—under best-case conditions, a single SFW could 

disable about ten tanks. Each SFW contains ten BLU-108 

submunitions and each submunition houses four Skeet 

projectiles. Each of Skeet projectile forms and fires an 
18 

explosively-formed penetration warhead at a target using 

infrared sensors to locate hot targets such as tanks or armored 

vehicles. 

• Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT). This Armydeveloped submunition is a self-guided, anti-armor, top attack 

system that employs acoustic and infrared sensors. The BAT 

works autonomously to acquire, track, home on to moving 

armored vehicles. An analysis by RAND's Glenn C. Buchan 

and David R. Frelinger shows that BAT, because it has a larger 

footprint or area of coverage than the Skeet submunition, would 

improve the effectiveness of long-range bombers by a factor of 

two or three by reducing the number of aircraft needed to halt an 

invading force. The larger footprint makes BAT far less 

sensitive to enemy dispersal and vehicle interspersal than 

Skeet.12

• Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). 

The AGM-86C delivers a 1,000-pound warhead more than 1,000 

nautical miles with an accuracy of about 40 feet. Each B-52 can 

carry 20 CALCMs. On the opening night of Operation Desert 

Storm 35 CALCMs were launched for defense suppression; 13 

were launched in September 1996 in Operation Desert Strike. 

• Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). This aerodynamically 

efficient, stealthy system is an INS/GPS guided glide weapon 

capable of a 15-40 mile range. It can disperse submunitions to 

attack fixed area and relocatable targets or dive onto the target 

with a 500-pound unitary warhead. The JSOW can be delivered 

by B-52, B-1B, and B-2 bombers as well as F-15E, F-16, and 

F/A-18 fighter aircraft. 

• Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). The 

JASSM is a conventionally armed, low observable cruise missile 

designed to destroy the enemy's high-value targets from aircraft 

that launch from outside the area defenses. The missile has 

automatic target recognition, autonomous guidance, precision 

accuracy, and a J-1000 warhead optimized for penetration and 

carrying a new high-yield explosive. These characteristics give 

JASSM capabilities against heavily defended hard targets such 

as aircraft shelters and underground command posts as well as 

soft targets such as rail yards. 

• Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM is a tail 

kit providing INS/GPS guidance to general purpose and 
19 

penetrator warheads to achieve an accuracy of less than 40 feet. 

This all-weather weapon solves the problem of weatherobscured targets that deny high precision from laser-guided 

weapons. Tactical fighters can carry from two to five of the 

2,000-pound version while the bomber fleet can deliver 16 on 

the B-2, 12 on the B-52, and 24 on the B-1B. The new F-22 

stealth fighter will be able to deliver two of the 1,000-pound 

JDAMs. The JDAM (BLU-109) version will have penetration 

capability. 

Theater Enabling Forces 

Future air defenses, at least for the first decade or two of the 21st century 

are unlikely to be fielded in the numbers and density of the former Soviet 

Union, except in a couple of areas. Even then the adversary's air 

interceptors and ground-based surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft 

guns probably will not be well integrated, making attacks aimed at 

breaking air-ground coordination more successful. The stealth F-22 

Raptor is the next generation air superiority fighter that will soon join the 

Air Force inventory. The aircraft can cruise at supersonic speeds while 

using only slightly more fuel than used by a conventional tactical fighter 

to cruise at subsonic speeds. It has a low radar cross-section—on the 

order of an insect to a small bird—that allows it to penetrate an enemy's 

integrated air defense systems; the aircraft's low drag gives it exceptional 

range and minimal refueling needs. Heat and other emissions from the 

aircraft are carefully managed. Using the latest computer technology, the 

F-22 has an integrated avionics suite that allows the pilot to manage 

information instead of operating complicated sensors. With the onboard 

computers handling more of the sensor tasking, the pilot is freed to fly the 

airplane and fire its eight anti-aircraft missiles or deliver its two 1,000-

pound GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Missiles. 

To the extent that long-range precision strike aircraft are used to 

locate and destroy the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, the F-22 

could be instrumental in establishing the air dominance necessary for 

non-stealth bomber operations and B-2 daylight strikes. Even when 
20 

armed with standoff missiles such as JSOW and JASSM, B-52s and B1Bs may need to push up to area defenses in order to reach deep 

targets—F-22 protection may be needed. If anti-radiation missiles of a 

size to fit the F-22's internal bomb carriage were developed, the aircraft 

could provide a comprehensive suppression of enemy air defenses 

(SEAD). A combination of stealth and speed should compensate for 

what presumably would be shorter-range anti-radiation missiles. 

Distributed Ground Combat Cells 

Situations will arise in the future where air power alone may be unable to 

deal with all aspects of potent military challenges. In these cases, 

compelling roles for U.S. ground forces in the theater may be beneficial 

including (1) integrating with coalition forces, (2) filling in gaps and 

resolving ambiguities associated with remote sensors, (3) identifying 

noncombatants and fixing their locations to the extent possible, (4) 

securing points of debarkation for follow-on forces, (5) controlling 

territory for the time necessary to satisfy the CINC's concept of 

operations, (6) locating and neutralizing WMD or designating them for 

aerial strike, and (7) exploiting the gains achieved by long-range 

precision-strike operations. To satisfy these roles, the rapid insertion of 

ground forces would be required. The new expeditionary force concept 

designed by the U.S. Defense Science Board in 1996 envisions light, 

agile, potent, and rapidly deployable ground forces.13 This is an enabling 

force in that it prepares the groundwork, together with long-range and 

carrier-based airpower, for the deployment of large numbers of U.S. 

tactical fighters and land warfare units. Key elements of this concept 

include a ground force that is distributed and disaggregated into ten to 

twenty man "combat cells." These "cells" would be empowered by battle 

dominant knowledge, supported by precision logistics, connected by 

robust communications, and dependent on remote fires that are effective 

against a variety of targets. By deploying the right suite of weapons, the 
21 

enemy can be attacked when he presents the most lucrative targets and 

when they are most vulnerable. 

The expeditionary force would contribute to halting the enemy's 

armored assaults, destroying his WMD, and securing the in-theater ports 

of debarkation essential to deployment of U.S. forces. When necessary, 

the combat cells would coalesce into larger units. The concept is more 

about "massing fires, not forces" and extensive use of unmanned vehicles 

and robotics. Low profile, responsive logistics provides the essential 

force sustaining consummables. 

C4ISR capabilities that are focused on enabling land warfare can 

provide a comprehensive combat identification of the ground 

environment. This perspective can be created by fusing high resolution, 

multispectral, and geometrically diverse data from multiple sensors on a 

variety of platforms from satellites, aircraft, and UAVs to unattended 

ground sensors and micro air vehicles. 

 Wide-band communication networks will enable the CINC to 

maintain centralized control and stay in the loop of the combat cell 

activities and, at the same time, give the on-the-scene freedom of action 

necessary to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. The command relationships 

that will permit the requisite freedom on the ground while giving the 

CINC enough information to direct long-range, precision-strike air 

operations to halt invading forces and destroy WMD need to be examined 

in great detail to strike just the right balance. 

Carrier-Based Aircraft 

Long-range precision strike bombers and carrier-based aircraft—used in 

tandem against a WMD-armed adversary early in a conflict—could well 

begin to deny the enemy the anticipated benefits of asymmetric WMD 

missile and terrorist attacks against U.S. forces deploying to an overseas 

theater. The cross-service synergies and complementarities could be 

essential in delivering the remote fires upon which distributed combat 
22 

cells would be dependent. Air power debates of the past over the role of 

land-based air versus carrier-based air need to be delivered precisely into 

the trash can of "old think." 

The United States faces adversaries with growing capabilities to 

attack the longstanding U.S. power projection strategy. To adapt 

appropriately and deliver America's own asymmetric blows to defeat the 

enemy's strategy, joint operations are essential. The operational 

synergies between land-based and carrier-based tactical fighters are 

important qualities of the emerging 21st century force posture. These 

aircraft can execute counterforce operations autonomously or in tandem. 

The operational synergies possible range across the conflict spectrum. 

Carrier-based aircraft can also conduct escort missions and SEAD for B52 and B-1B missions pushing up against enemy defenses and support 

land-based surveillance and target acquisition aircraft (AWACS, Joint 

STARS, and Rivet Joint).14 

CINC's Concept of Operations 

The commanders-in-chief or "CINCs"—the combatant commanders 

responsible for the employment of American forces in support of U.S. 

military objectives—deal with new realities like the emergence of the 

WMD and missile threats through the development of concepts of 

operations. Whatever the specifics of the U.S. policy and strategy at the 

time, the CINCs will first look to the adversary's military capabilities and 

infrastructure. If the CINC is asked to use military force, his first steps 

will encompass actions against a set of high-value (to the enemy) and 

high-threat (to the United States) targets. 

Supporting the CINC’s concept of operations is an analytic process 

based on the interaction at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

warfare between intelligence (the target locaters and characterizers) and 

operations (the shooters). Forces, including people and equipment, carry 
23 

out military or operational tasks as specified by a combatant commander 

in a concept of operations that ties together the weapons systems, support 

elements, and organizations assigned to the commander and judged 

necessary to do an assigned mission. When this analytic process is 

completed, a single adaptive plan can be put into place to achieve the 

CINC's concept of operations which also can be seen as a roadmap for 

decisions on what needs to be done first and how best to do it when 

conflict begins or if directed to take military action in response to 

warning. In peacetime, the concept of operations is also a tool for target 

analysis, employment planning, and force requirements validation. There 

are four steps to development of a combatant commander's concept of 

operations: (1) find and characterize the targets, (2) task resources, (2) 

attack and destroy enemy targets, and (4) assess and report the results of 

the attacks. 

Find and Characterize the WMD Targets 

Intense intelligence preparation focused on anti-armor and WMD 

counterforce operations will greatly improve the possibility of identifying 

high priority targets in peacetime and their detection, location, and 

tracking, and, if necessary, destruction during crisis and conflict. 

Peacetime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance offers clues 

about the enemy's intentions, provides vital inputs to planning, helps to 

determine when and where to attack, indicates how best to minimize 

collateral damage, and facilitates long-range precision strike. 

The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) is 

an extremely valuable tool for evaluating options for denying or reversing 

proliferation. Developed by the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, the CAPS modeling system can generate models of a specific 

country's proliferation activities by drawing upon information from many 

sources, both government and private sector. CAPS features include (1) 

models of chemical biological, and metallurgical processes that can be 
24 

used to build WMD; (2) integration of information from diverse sources 

to create country-specific models of proliferation, identifying the specific 

function and location of major production sites and creating details of the 

layout of each site; (3) nodal analyses on each country-specific model to 

identify critical nodes in the country's proliferation production facilities; 

and (4) completed analyses in a logical and easy-to-use format, utilizing 

the latest advancements in commercial computer software development. 

CAPS is presently serving the U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, the Joint Staff, and the Air Staff. In addition it has 

been endorsed by all of the combatant commanders.15

Characterizing the potential adversary's advanced weapons and 

WMD accurately is key to determining how best to deal with them. 

Special attention is focused on WMD from initial and basic research to 

launch and execution. Especially important is the identification of 

proliferation pathway characteristics that will cue reconnaissance, 

surveillance, and target acquisition systems in counterforce attacks. The 

target analysis should also be sufficiently rigorous so that it aids in aim 

point selection and battle damage assessment. 

Each WMD target must be classified according to its function, 

mobility, physical structures, and environmental attributes. These 

elements, taken together, provide important insights for use in tasking the 

right resources and assigning the most effective strike platforms. 

Function 

• Infrastructure: Targets that comprise the WMD research, 

development, manufacture, importation, and support base, as 

well as the recruitment, training, and education processes. 

• Operational: Deployable and non-deployable targets, 

generally associated with military field organizations, that are 

organized and equipped to execute WMD attacks. 

• Support: Deployable and non-deployable targets that are 

organized and equipped for the support of the full range of the 

enemy's WMD operations. 
25 

Mobility

• Fixed: Relocation and replication is not possible without the 

expenditure of considerable time and resources. 

• Relocatable: The target can be moved and easily 

reassembled at another location. Examples include forward 

facilities for warhead mating with missiles, WMD storage 

depots relocated for proximity to potential launch areas, and 

ballistic and cruise missiles for survival. 

• Mobile: The target has inherent ability (i.e., does not require 

added resources) to move at will; may be able to remain fully 

functional while on the move. 

Structure 

• Physics: The nature of a target's design, construction 

function, size, weight and design such that can mitigate the 

effects of one or more weapons effects directed against it. 

• Elements: The principal components of a multiple functions 

target and their interrelationship in contributing to the successful 

operation of the target. Detailed characterization of the key 

components will be required to identify potential weak-links in 

the target's internal processes. 

Environment 

• Defenses: Whether the target is located within a regional or 

local air defense envelope or protected by other forces. 

Defenses increase the risk of attacking the target and, depending 

upon the U.S. attack platform used, may require added effort for 

defense suppression prior to, or in conjunction with, an attack. 

• Accessibility: The degree to which the geographic location 

influences target attack options, e.g., targets located deep within 

a country or region may require extended surface ingress and 

egress or overflight across neutral, hostile or other third party 

territory. 

• Geography: Those aspects of the target's location—climate, 

weather, elevation, soil, vegetation, topography, land use, 

civilian and military populations—that may enhance or mitigate 

the potential for collateral damage and complicate or simplify 

attack options. Potential for collateral damage is defined as the 
26 

probability of damage to "innocent" or friendly and neutral 

facilities and people as a direct result of weapons effects or as a 

result of the secondary effects of damage to the target. 

Corollary effects include such events as secondary explosions 

and release of chemical or biological agents, or other hazardous 

materials. 

Targets associated with biological and chemical weapons and 

missiles include fixed sites such as manufacturing and system assembly 

facilities; relocatable targets such as weapons storage and garrison sites, 

forward storage depots, and final assembly and refueling areas; and 

mobile targets that are in transit to areas for dispersal or concealment as 

well as the recycling of TELs after launch for reload and refiring. In 

addition, operational support mechanisms are priority targets including 

missile launch crews and support personnel, training and exercise 

facilities, weapons support systems (trucks, TELs, etc.), fixed launch 

sites, relocatable command centers, choke points along lines of 

communication, decoys, and other infrastructure, committed (in transit), 

and post-execution targets. 

Counter-WMD operations can be expected to be highly complex 

and very risky since the proliferator will undoubtedly know that America 

viewed his development of WMD and missile delivery systems as highly 

threatening. American counterforce attacks could come after a prolonged 

period of rising political tensions, during which the enemy's suspected 

WMD program will likely have received concentrated U.S. and 

international attention. Fearing military action, the proliferator would 

likely step up defensive preparations, such as concealing and dispersing 

critical WMD assets and placing air defenses in a much higher state of 

readiness. Many of the most critical facilities could very well be located 

in hardened and/or deeply-buried bunkers resistant to all but the most 

advanced penetrating weapons and virtually invulnerable to currentgeneration cruise missiles. Many facilities would probably be guarded by 

an overlapping system of sophisticated local-area and terminal air 
27 

defenses. Moreover, many could be located in, or indeed relocated to, 

heavily populated urban areas. "Hugging" civilians with WMD plays 

against the well-known Western aversion to collateral damage, especially 

when played back by on-the-scene television reports to the court of world 

opinion. 

Fine-grained intelligence is necessary to identify and characterize 

hard and deeply buried targets. Details on these targets are essential for 

weapon penetration and fuzing purposes and to define the appropriate 

physical or functional kill criteria. Some hardened structures will be 

simple surface facilities with a berm of concrete and soil for protection—

these facilities can be easily breached with gravity bombs. Others will be 

below ground at a limited depth and can be breached with penetrator 

weapons. A third category, tunneled or deeply buried targets, can be 

underground at an unlimited depth where only portal areas, adits, vents, 

and supporting functions are visible on the surface. The enemy should be 

expected to house his most critical functions in the deep tunnels, 

including those associated with WMD and their use against U.S. forces. 

Since intelligence may be insufficient to characterize the deep 

tunnels in enough detail to destroy them, functional kill—when the 

facility can no longer perform its mission—may be a viable option. 

Attacks against surface level communications and electrical power, for 

instance, might shut down operations for hours to days to weeks. 

Damaging WMD production equipment or denying access via portals and 

roads could be sufficient to interrupt operations for days to weeks to 

months. Other essential elements above ground might be damaged to 

score a functional kill: commercial power vaults, hardened antennas, air 

intake and exhaust vents, microwave towers, and many other small pieces 

of equipment vital to the underground operations. If the enemy makes 

repairs or uses work-around solutions, additional functional kill attacks 

may be required. 
28 

If one assumes that one military task assigned to U.S. counterforce 

operations would include neutralizing a proliferator's WMD capabilities, 

the Gulf War air campaign sets a rather weak precedent. Iraq's chemical 

and biological programs had fully matured prior to Desert Storm, and 

large quantities of weaponized biological and chemical assets survived 

the allied bombardment. Indeed, the real setbacks to the Iraqi WMD 

program occurred only after the war, when U.N. and IAEA inspectors 

uncovered the extensive Iraqi WMD programs (albeit with many details 

hidden forever by the Iraqis). 

In short, we can expect future WMD target sets to be large, 

extremely difficult to find, hardened, well-protected, and located next to 

things or people we do not want to damage or injure. Counter-WMD 

operations therefore could likely be large in scale, extraordinarily 

challenging from both operational and logistical standpoints, and 

politically controversial. 

Task Resources 

The interface between intelligence and operations is essential for bridging 

the peacetime functions of target identification and characterization with 

the wartime attack and kill functions. The operations-intelligence 

interface is the analytic process that (1) integrates intelligence 

considerations (target characteristics) with operational factors 

(operational tasks), (2) determines the degree of relevance the military 

tasks have to each target, and (3) compares relevant target characteristics 

with their operational attributes in order to provide an operations plan 

that supports the CINC’s concept of operations. Military action against 

WMD targets requires substantially more planning and evaluation 

because of moral and political sensitivities surrounding such an attack 

and the potential consequences of unintended collateral damage. The 

potential lethality of WMD when used against friendly forces and 

populations is a sobering calculation when assessing the impact if we do 
29 

not take timely and effective military action. Besides their operational 

impact, these tasks also hold important force structure implications as 

seen by the combatant commander. These warfighting needs drive the 

force requirements to be satisfied by the military services. 

When making judgments about the attack platforms and precision 

munitions to be used in strikes against WMD and WMD-related facilities, 

five criteria guide decision-making. These criteria are expressed in terms 

of the weapons-target interaction that must be satisfied for successful 

counterforce operations against WMD and WMD-related targets: 

Vulnerability 

Target Damage Assessment. Assess the weapons-target 

interaction by evaluating weapon effectiveness in achieving the 

desired level of damage. Then other important questions are 

asked. Can the target be located and defined well enough to 

conduct military operations? To what degree does lack of target 

detail hamper operations? What is the degree of physical 

security and its threat to attacking systems? 

Time Sensitivity 

Target Kill Window. Assess the weapons-target interaction by 

gauging the ability to achieve desired levels of damage within 

the time lines available. Key questions are: To what extent is 

the target an immediate threat to U.S. interests? What are the 

time factors in locating and attacking the target? Are there 

target perishability windows? 

Military Value 

Relative Target Importance. Assess the weapons-target 

interaction in achieving the desired level of damage within the 

strategic interest of the United States objectives. What is the 

relative value of the target given the CINC's concept of 

operations? What is the target's relationship to non-military 

targets? 

Political Significance 
30 

National Political Imperatives. Assess the weapons-target 

interaction after making adjustments for political guidance and 

instructions form senior civilian authorities that constrain 

military operations. Other questions to be answered include: 

What might be the political significance of U.S. operations 

against the target? What might be the significance of not taking 

military action against this target? 

Collateral Damage

Civil Deaths and Destruction. Damage both from the weapons 

and the agent under attack are important considerations. Assess 

the weapons-target interaction with a view toward minimizing 

damage to civilian populations, structures, and environment—

including the dispersal of hazardous agents/toxins. What is the 

potential for release of hazardous agents due to military 

operations against this target? What are the dispersal patterns 

for this agent and how will they be affected by predicted 

weather at the time of the strike? What may be the effects on 

rural and urban areas? What will be the effects of blowback on 

U.S. and friendly forces? 

Attack and Kill (With Limited Collateral Damage) 

The Gulf War air campaign was one of the most intensive in history. For 

forty-three days between January 17 and February 28, 1991 the United 

States and its coalition partners conducted around-the-clock air strikes 

against Iraq. Approximately 40,000 air-to-ground and 50,000 support 

sorties were flown. By the end of war, approximately 1,600 U.S. combat 

aircraft, mostly Air Force, had been deployed. 

The Persian Gulf War was a wake-up call. A revolutionary change 

in warfare occurred during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict. For the 

first time, the United States and other members of the coalition arrayed 

against Iraq would fight an adversary armed to the teeth with biological 

and chemical weapons and missiles to deliver them—an adversary who 

was also just months away from possessing a limited number of crude 

nuclear devices. Since then, other countries have found it in their interest 

to pursue alternative paths toward obtaining weapons of mass 
31 

destruction, some via indigenous programs and others through direct 

purchase of the requisite components from willing international sellers. 

Thanks to the United Nations inspections of Iraq's weapons-making 

complex following the Gulf War, Americans are offered a rare glimpse 

into an unfolding future filled with deadly new threats and grave risks as 

the up-gunning of the non-Western world continues around the globe. 

For the countries in search of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, 

Iraq's successful development of weapons of mass destruction and 

missiles offers a virtual "how-to" book on alternative proliferation 

pathways. 

While the size of the WMD target base will determine the ultimate 

scale of the operation, the need to suppress enemy air defenses rapidly 

will also drive the attacking force size and composition as well as 

influence its technical difficulty and overall complexity. The use of longrange precision-strike forces—including B-2 stealth bombers and launch 

of CALCMs and JASSMs by B-52s and B-1Bs, respectively—can attack 

ahead of traditional strike packages of fighter-bombers, combat air patrol, 

and airborne suppression of enemy air defenses. 

To prevent dispersal of critical WMD assets and possible WMD 

retaliation, the initial strikes in long-distance counterforce operations 

must be decisive. While many types of military forces may be required, 

land- and sea-based airpower will no doubt comprise the main strike 

force. Planners will want to destroy as many targets as they can as 

quickly as possible. This places a premium on surprise, lethality and 

payload. 

Assess and Report 

Throughout counterforce operations, battle damage assessment (BDA), 

real-time battlefield surveillance, and battle management are equally 

critical. The Gulf War illustrated the difficulty of assessing damage done 

in air attacks. Ironically, precision weapon damage is particularly 
32 

difficult to assess—all that may be visible after a direct hit is a "tiny" hole 

in a structure's roof. In Desert Storm, however, planners had the luxury 

of "the next day" to make sure the desired damage had been done. Even 

then the results were mixed. Some hardened aircraft shelters at Iraqi 

airfields, for instance, were hit several times while others just hundreds of 

yards away were untouched. Another problem was discovered in Desert 

Storm when nearly 1,500 sorties were flown against mobile Scud 

launchers with no confirmed kills. The success of any future theaterbased counterforce operation is likely to hinge on the ability of U.S. 

forces to track and destroy mobile WMD-armed ballistic missiles rapidly. 

Counter-WMD Operations Plan 

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review calls on the armed forces to 

continue to improve capability to locate and destroy biological and 

chemical weapons "preferably before they can be used."16 This is a 

difficult task, one that can never be expected to reach one hundred 

percent effectiveness. Nevertheless, this central counterforce military 

task needs to be built into the CINC’s concepts of operation. After more 

than four decades of building targeting plans for deterrence of nuclear 

warfare and, if necessary, its conduct against the Soviet Union and 

Communist China, the United States has already developed many of the 

requisite targeting and campaign planning tools for effective counterWMD operations. The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning 

System developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory provides 

the basis for building upon the uniformed military's past experience. The 

initial task—combining modern sensors, communications, and target 

acquisition systems—is to reduce the enemy's biological and chemical 

weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles sufficiently to relieve the stress 

on deploying large numbers of U.S. tactical fighters, ground forces, and 

maritime elements to the theater. 
33 

The creation of operations plans to counter-biological and chemical 

weapons and missiles would offer theater commanders another option to 

conduct counterforce strikes against high-priority WMD targets. By 

identifying targets in peacetime, it would become possible to plan for 

attacks against WMD, weaponeer the targets, develop and refine tactics 

necessary to strike them, and train forces for operations against specific 

targets. Strikes can be rehearsed at unit level and in a wide variety of 

military exercises. The importance of theater specifics and actual 

scenarios cannot be underestimated. Yet, peacetime operations plans 

directed against stationary targets, assuming the intelligence is sufficient 

to locate and characterize the WMD facilities, is essentially a question of 

timing, tactics, and weaponeering. The Air Force can perform this task 

quite well. 

Mobile and, to some extent, relocatable targets also present 

significant challenges. Typically, the timelines available to find the 

targets, task the resources, and conduct the attacks will be short. To 

succeed against mobile targets, C4ISR must be exquisite and peacetime 

preparation must be very thorough. The key attribute is to identify the 

knowable variables in peacetime such as area limitation modeling that 

can highlight potential areas that may be used by mobile missile 

launchers. Assessing an adversary's exercises and training as well as the 

location of essential support can all help to cue the search for mobile 

targets in war. These peacetime intelligence efforts can be used to ensure 

appropriate ISR systems, such as Joint STARS, are in the appropriate 

area. Upon detection of activity in the predesignated areas during 

conflict, the data can be passed to attack platforms. 

Counter-WMD operations will not succeed unless intelligence and 

operations functions are fused closely. The CINC’s concept of 

operations will provide the right analytical framework for selection of the 

strike platforms and munitions for counterforce attacks against WMD and 
34 

WMD-related targets. Planning attack operations against these targets 

requires an adaptive process that leans heavily on intelligence preparation 

in peacetime and a workable concept of operations for wartime 

counterforce strikes. The interface between intelligence analysts and 

military operations specialists needs to be close and continuing across the 

pre-war, war, post-war spectrum. 

The peacetime collection and processing of intelligence greatly 

improves the possibility of identification of high-priority WMD targets 

and their detection and acquisition for strike operations during crisis and 

conflict. Intelligence about WMD targets offers clues about the enemy's 

intentions, provides vital input for attack planning, helps determine when 

and where to attack, facilitates precision strike operations, assists in 

minimizing collateral damage, and permits initiation of rapid counterWMD operations. There is much WMD-armed adversaries can do to 

frustrate and complicate peacetime intelligence preparation. Iraq, for 

instance, learned from the Soviets how to deny locational cuing for their 

missile launchers. Some of the Iraqi practices included preparation of 

ready-hide positions near launch points, rapid deployment, false targets, 

decoys, camouflage and deception practices, and good operations 

security, especially radio silence. 

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is vital to the theater 

commander's concept of operations, especially for high-threat systems 

like WMD and their delivery systems. Intense scrutiny of a potential 

enemy’s WMD infrastructure must be undertaken in order to identify 

high-priority targets. Databases on WMD and ballistic and cruise 

missiles are essential to identifying the enemy's vulnerabilities from 

research and development through deployment to the field and launch. 

Attack plans can be created, awaiting essential updating during a crisis or 

conflict as the peacetime unknowns are transformed into known facts. As 
35 

a crisis unfolds, key targets may be reprioritized as dictated by events and 

with special attention given to compressed timelines. 

The better the intelligence preparation is in peacetime, the more 

effective will be control of collateral damage, especially when attacking 

targets in or near enemy urban areas. Intelligence preparation is also 

important because it provides the support needed for rapid attack and, 

under some circumstances, preemptive attacks to prevent the launch of 

WMD-armed missiles against friendly military forces or populations. 

Finally, intelligence preparation can provide crucial clues about an 

enemy’s intentions. The theater commander usually must rely on 

inference from various indicators or reports to judge intentions. 

Intelligence preparation can afford the CINC him clear insight about 

whether and how the enemy is likely to attack. 

The Iraqi WMD facilities in January 1991, as discovered by U.N. 

on-site inspectors after the war, numbered more than 245 targets. When 

dual-use (civilian and military use) facilities are included the number runs 

as high as 335-400 targets.17 It could be a daunting military task to 

demilitarize an adversary of so many WMD targets in a brief period of 

time. On the other hand, stealth and precision strike make it possible to 

conduct disarming attack operations against key functions to destroy or 

disable the backbone of the enemy's WMD target system. WMD 

targeting is a complicated task since destroying or neutralizing the target 

should be done in a way that does not disperse hazardous materials from 

the target. This means an extraordinary degree of intelligence analysis is 

needed to select precision aimpoints. Target characterization and 

selection of aimpoints should be accomplished to the extent possible 

during peacetime. Targeting WMD is a scientific-engineering task to 

achieve an understanding of the target's technological integration and to 

identify critical nodes for precision strike—it is for this reason that the 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's CAPS models are so 
36 

important to counterproliferation planning. On the basis of this 

scientific-engineering target analysis, the combatant commander could 

overlay the enemy's air defense architecture and assess the pros and cons 

of different ordnance choices. One of the most critical choices occurs 

when matching aircraft and munitions, especially when long-range 

precision strike can offer so much to a CINC's campaign plan in the 

earliest hours and days of a conflict. The faster the United States can 

respond against a WMD-armed adversary, the more easily U.S. forces 

can wait until the enemy's attack preparations are unambiguous. 

The combination of stealth, long-range, and precision opens the 

door to potential pre-war operations; not the preventive or preemptive 

attacks contained in traditional military doctrine, but a wholly new 

concept of demilitarization strikes where precision-strike conventional 

weapons, to the extent possible, are used to disarm an adversary of WMD 

and WMD-related equipment. The idea is destruction of equipment to 

save lives by taking away the adversary's capability to strike with WMD. 

 Demilitarization attacks would concentrate on weapons and equipment. 

Extreme efforts would be taken to avoid or minimize human casualties, 

military as well as civilian. The concept is to destroy the opponent's 

WMD or so disorganize and reduce it to such a size that the remnants can 

be easily handled by the active and passive defenses of the United States 

and its regional partners. 

Global counter-military operations in the 21st century will rely on 

long-range aerial strike packages totally different from those experienced 

in the past. Peacetime intelligence preparation and comprehensive 

sensor-to-shooter linkages will be necessary to support a rapid-response, 

global strike orientation. C4ISR and battle damage assessment 

capabilities also will be essential components. The keys to obtaining the 

agility necessary to counter a WMD-armed adversary are range, speed, 

and lethality of the attack platform and the effectiveness of the C4ISR 
37 

that allow U.S. combat crews or teams to "see" the battlefield in depth 

and breadth to assist in selecting the highest priority targets. 

Aerial firepower, including aircraft and cruise missiles, offer a 

great range of action by reason of speed and mobility. Long-range 

bombers could satisfy several important missions during the first two or 

three decades of the 21st century to include posing a rapid initial 

response capability to overseas crises, hedging against enemy attacks 

when forward-based forces are fewer, operating from bases well outside 

the striking range of the enemy's WMD-tipped missiles, delivering large 

numbers of precision munitions against invading armored forces and 

WMD and WMD-related targets, holding targets at risk anywhere in a 

theater of operations, and offering the combatant commander tactical 

responses by holding at forward orbit areas for on-call strikes against 

armored forces on the move and vital fixed targets. With a combination 

of focused battlefield awareness, precision-strike weapons, stealth, speed, 

and range, aerial firepower has emerged as the dominant warfighting 

element against WMD-armed adversaries. Aircraft, missiles, and 

unmanned aerial vehicles offer the capability to intervene on behalf of 

ground forces held under the gun of the enemy's WMD. Combat support 

aircraft such as Joint STARS provide essential ground tracking 

information that make it possible to halt an armored invasion force from 

the air. Ground maneuver leading to force-on-force, tank-on-tank 

attrition warfare has lost its decisive character. Encirclements, 

breakthroughs, and tank concentrations common to Cold War 

conceptions of warfare are slipping into oblivion as the promise of air 

power to intervene directly and effectively in ground battles increases.

Surprise is best achieved in air operations with stealth attack 

platforms that can approach their targets without alerting the enemy. 

Aircraft range will also be critical to achieving surprise. The closer U.S. 

aircraft are based to the adversary, the more likely he would be to detect 
38 

their presence in the region and begin taking evasive and/or military 

countermeasures (such as retaliation against U.S. air bases and aircraft 

carriers). Long-range cruise missiles, though not necessarily "stealthy" in 

terms of radar signature, can also be useful in achieving surprise. Their 

small size and terrain-following mission profile make them virtually 

indistinguishable on current radar screens from other "noise" at their 

altitude; their long range, meanwhile, facilitates delivery from outside 

enemy detection zones. 

Finally, aircraft payload is critical for the simple reason that many 

WMD targets must be destroyed or neutralized in a very short amount of 

time. The more weapons per sortie, the fewer the sorties required to 

destroy a target set. The most valuable airpower assets in counterforce 

operations will therefore be those possessing stealth, long range, large 

payload capacities, and precision delivery capabilities (preferably allweather). The inherent synergy of combined B-52, B-1B, and B-2 

operations can provide a useful capability, 

A carefully constructed process for adaptive planning will bridge 

the intelligence and operational plans functions from peace to crisis to 

war. Potential WMD targets can be identified and characterized in 

peacetime. Planning for theater WMD target sets should at once embrace 

the rigor of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and tactical 

flexibility to respond to a changing array of targets. The highest priority 

fixed targets should be identified in peacetime and strike plans, within the 

scope of the CINC's concept of operations, should be developed. 

Military planners should weaponeer the targets, refine the tactics to be 

used, assign forces against the targets, and train and certify aircrews in 

peacetime for attack operations against these highest value targets. A full 

accounting should be given to the weapons assigned, timelines, rules of 

engagement, expected collateral damage, and risks. The remaining 

targets should be made available for CINC-directed daily task order 
39 

operations involving both long-range precision strike aircraft and tactical 

fighters. A built-in flexibility should give the CINC flexibility for rapid 

reordering of WMD targets in order to integrate attack operations with 

other theater strikes. 

The revolutionary combination of battlespace knowledge, sensors 

and rapid computing, stealth, precision, and aerial strike are coalescing in 

a shift of U.S. strategy toward non-linear or asymmetric operations. 

Future warfare will not be dominated by adversaries threatening or 

actually using missile-borne biological and chemical weapons to shut 

down U.S. deployments to overseas theaters. Rather, the United States 

has the clear and present opportunity to neutralize an adversary's 

asymmetric strategy by developing a robust global response capability 

that emphasizes long-range precision strike in locating and destroying 

WMD. 

Long-Range Precision Strike 

As General John M. Loh, then-Commander of the Air Combat 

Command, said in 1994 testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee: 

Our bomber force is critical to our ability to deal with two major 

regional conflicts, occurring either back-to-back or overlapping 

one another.... Within hours, with appropriate munitions and 

other support, bombers can attack an opponent's most 

threatening means of destruction—his nuclear, chemical and 

biological weapons. They can blind him by destroying his 

command, control and communications facilities. They can 

begin the process of depleting his war-making might and his 

military forces. All of these things could occur before American 

surface forces would be brought into play. As we gain forces 

and capability in the theater, our bombers would continue to 

prosecute the air campaign.18

The 1998 Long-Range Air Power Panel's recommendations on 

bomber modernization emphasize the counterforce potential for locating 
40 

and destroying WMD in the opening hours and days of a regional 

conflict. These enhanced capabilities of the bomber force are in line with 

General Loh's operational vision of their contribution to the nation's 

security. The key consideration is to match the right precision strike 

weapon with the right heavy bomber in the creation of an integrated longrange precision strike force where the synergies of B-52, B-1B, and B-2 

operations are fully exploited. 

A May 1998 House National Security Committee press release 

fully supported modernization of the current U.S. bomber fleet, including 

priority upgrades for the B-2: 

The committee...agrees with the Long-Range Airpower Review 

panel's view that DOD lacks a long-term bomber force structure 

plan. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air 

Force to report to Congress by March 1, 1999, on planned 

upgrades to the current bomber fleet, a funding profile for these 

upgrades, and a timeline for consideration of the acquisition of a 

follow-on bomber.19 

Long-range precision strike operations, combining heavy bombers 

with precision munitions, can be the "first responders" against WMDarmed adversaries. These long distance air strikes can not only disrupt 

and destroy the enemy's WMD and invading forces, but they can make it 

far more difficult to conduct anti-access operations designed to slow or 

block the deployment of ground forces and tactical fighters. This 

enabling function of making it possible for unhindered tactical fighter 

deployments to overseas theaters during crises makes the fielding of an 

appropriate structured long-range precision strike force all the more 

essential. 
41 

ENDNOTES 

 

1. William J. Clinton, President, Letter to the Congress of the United 

States (The White House, March 31, 1998). 

2. The President's Panel to Review Long-Range Air Power was 

established to recommend how funds appropriated in 1997 for the B-2 

might be best spent and to consider the broader issues of long-range air 

power. Retired Air Force General Larry D. Welch served as chairman. 

Other members included Samuel D. Adcock, Senator James J. Exon, John 

S. Foster, Jr., Colonel Frederick L. Frostic, U.S. Air Force (retired), 

General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (retired), Walter E. Morrow, 

Jr., Donald B. Rice, and General Robert L. Rutherford, U.S. Air Force 

(retired). The panel's proceedings took place from late February through 

March 1998. 

3. "Summary of the Principal Findings and Recommendations of the 

Panel to Review Long-Range Air Power" (March 1998) (Washington, 

D.C.: Hearings of the House National Committee, Military Procurement 

Subcommittee, April 1, 1998). 

4. U.S., House National Security Committee, Military Procurement 

Subcommittee, "Hearing on the Report of the Long-Range Airpower 

Review Panel" (April 1, 1998). 

5. These so-called "weapons of mass destruction" or WMD could also 

include nuclear weapons, which would present the United States with an 

entirely different set of circumstances and potential responses. 

6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1977). 

7. The rulers and government of a country that engage in behavior 

contrary to established international norms, such as developing weapons 

of mass destruction and supporting terrorism. 

8. "Summary of the Principal Findings and Recommendations of the 

Panel to Review Long-Range Air Power" (March 1998). 

9. U.S., Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 

Technology), Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Tactical Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

November 1993), p. 17. 
42 

 

10. "USAF Almanac 1998," Air Force Magazine (May 1998), pp. 155-

59. 

11. Combined-Effects Munitions (CEM). The CBU-87 is a cluster 

dispenser weapon that includes both anti-materiel and anti-personnel 

bomblets. Gator Mine. The target kill capability of the CBU-89 includes 

vehicles and light armor as well as soft and relocatable targets. 

12. Glenn C. Buchan and David R. Frelinger, Providing an Effective 

Bomber Force for the Future. RAND Congressional Testimony, prepared 

statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee (May 5, 1994), pp. 

26-27. 

13. U.S., Defense Science Board, Tactics and Technology for 21st 

Century Military Superiority, Vol. 1 - Final Report (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1996). 

14. Charles M. Perry, Laurence E. Rothenberg, and Jacquelyn K. Davis, 

Airpower Synergies in the New Strategic Era: The Complementary Roles 

of Long-Range Bombers & Carrier-Based Aircraft (McLean, Va.: 

Brassey's, 1997). 

15. Details on the Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System 

(CAPS) are available from Tom Ramos, Counterproliferation Group 

Leader in the Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security 

Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, 

California. E-mail: ramos7@llnl.gov 

16. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 1997), 

P. 13. 

17. Robert W. Chandler, Tomorrow's War, Today's Decisions: Iraqi 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Implications of WMD-Adversaries 

for Future U.S. Military Strategy (McLean, Va.: AMCODA Press, 

1996). 

18. General John M. Loh, Commander, Air Combat Command, "Bomber 

Requirements," testimony before the Subcommittee on Nuclear 

Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, Senate Armed 

Services Committee (May 5, 1994). 

19. U.S., House of Representatives, National Security Committee, press 

release (May 6, 1998).