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i 

57–258 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–75] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 4, 2009 
(II) 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, June 4, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for the U.S. Special Operations Command ................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, June 4, 2009 ........................................................................................... 19 

THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 2 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Olson, Adm. Eric T., Commander, United States Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Miller, Hon. Jeff ................................................................................................ 24 

Olson, Adm. Eric T. .......................................................................................... 25 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 4, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m., in room 2212, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the 

subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon. I think we will go ahead and get 

started. It is right at one o’clock. We certainly expect other members to come drifting in as we proceed, but I want to be respectful 

of the Admiral’s time and get started on time. 

Welcome, as always, before our subcommittee, Admiral Olson. It 

is always pleasure to see you up here, and certainly we appreciate 

the work you do for our country in leading the Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM). 

I have an opening statement that I have written that I will submit for the record. 

Just briefly, I want to say how important the Special Operations 

Command is to our Nation’s national security and how much we 

really appreciate and respect the job that you and all of the people 

under you have done in protecting our national security all over 

the world in many, many places, some of which are well-known, 

like Iraq and Afghanistan, others of which many people are not 

aware of, but in many ways are just as important, certainly, for the 

future of the broader conflict against violent extremists. And I 

think that the holistic approach that the Special Operations Command has brought to winning that fight is invaluable. 

Without question, you are the best in the world at finding and 

disrupting terrorist networks, at targeting individual terrorists and 

either capturing or killing them; and that skill, regrettably, will 

continue to have an important role in our national security. 

But you also understand how important it is to win the broader 

ideological war, to work with our partners out there in other countries in the world to get them to take the lead in countering 

insurgencies, to give them the training and help they need. Of 

course, nowhere is that truer or more in need right now than in 

Pakistan, and that training will be an important part of the suc-
2 

cess there as well. And also just the broader message issues: How 

do we communicate; how do we do counter radicalization? 

Both your command, and I think as impressively, the individual 

soldiers, marines, airmen, Navy SEALs out there, have developed 

skills in those areas that are invaluable not just to the Special Operations Command, but have proven to be valuable to the broader 

Department of Defense and Intel Communities, in truly understanding what we are up against, how to confront it, and also how 

to build on alliances that are out there. 

What has been learned out there on the battlefield has really 

been very helpful in terms of preparing on all of those issues. We 

know Special Operations Command takes a strong leadership role. 

Our subcommittee is very interested in being supportive and 

being helpful. We know there are inevitable battles over funds, but 

you always seem to do a very, very good job with what we provide. 

And I do believe the Congress has also recognized the importance 

of this role and has done our best to provide what you need to fight 

that fight. 

So we appreciate what you are doing and look forward to hearing 

your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. SMITH. With that, I will turn it over to the Ranking Member, 

Mr. Miller, for any opening statement he might have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM FLORIDA, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also have 

a statement I would like submitted for the record. 

I would like to say welcome, Admiral, I hope your travels up 

were good. Thank you for the hospitality. I had a wonderful chance 

to visit with you and Marilyn, Monday evening, and we thank you 

so much for hosting us and look forward to your testimony today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 24.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

With that, Admiral Olson. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, COMMANDER, UNITED 

STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Well, thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman 

Smith, Congressman Miller. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee to highlight the current posture of the United States Special Operations Command. I will say 

that thanks to the foresight, advocacy and strong support of this 

body—and we recognize that we were a product of the Congress— 

we do remain well positioned to meet the Nation’s expectations of 

its Joint Special Operations Forces. 

Primarily, as you well know, U.S. Special Operations Command 

is responsible through its service component commands, the U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and Naval Special Warfare Com-
3 

mand (NAVSPECWAR), for organizing, equipping, training and 

providing fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to serve 

under the operational control of geographic combatant commanders 

around the world. 

In this role, the United States Special Operations Command 

headquarters shares many of the responsibilities, authorities and 

characteristics of a military department or a defense agency, including a separate major force program budget established by the 

Congress for the purpose of funding equipment, materiel, supplies, 

services, training and operational activities that are peculiar to 

Special Operations Forces. 

The United States Special Operations Command has also been 

designated as the combatant command responsible for synchronizing Department of Defense planning against terrorists and terror networks globally, a function that requires robust daily activity, 

punctuated semiannually by a conference that now attracts over 

1,000 people from about 40 different agencies and organizations. 

Additionally, we have been assigned proponency by the Department of Defense for security force assistance. In this role, we expect to foster the long-term partnerships that will shape a more secure global environment in the face of global challenges such as 

transnational crime, extremism, and migration. 

The Joint Special Operations Force itself, those assigned to the 

United States Special Operations Command by the military services for most of their military careers, comprises Army Special 

Forces, Rangers, Navy SEALs, combatant craft crewmen and mini 

submarine operators, Marine special operators, fixed- and rotarywing aviators from the Army and the Air Force, combat controllers, 

pararescue jumpers, practitioners of civil-military affairs and military information support; all of these, and more, augmented, supported, and enabled by a wide variety of assigned logisticians, administrative specialists, sensor operators, intelligence analysts, acquisition professionals, operations planners, strategists, communications experts, budget managers, doctrine writers, trainers, instructors, scientists, technologists and many more, who are great 

men and women, Active Duty and Reservists, military and civilian, 

who generally work within the Special Operations community for 

an assignment or two. 

This is truly a team of teams. It is a force that is well suited to 

the irregular operating environments in which we are now engaged, as you mentioned in your opening statement, sir, and its 

proven abilities have created an unprecedented demand for its effect in remote, uncertain and challenging operating areas. Whether 

the assigned mission is to train, advise, fight or provide humanitarian assistance, the broad capabilities of Special Operations 

Forces make them the force of choice. 

And while the high long-term demand for Special Operations 

Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to 86 percent of the overseas force currently being deployed to the United States Central 

Command area of responsibility, Special Operations Forces do 

maintain a global presence. 

In fiscal year 2009, Special Operations Forces have already conducted operations and training in 106 countries around the globe. 

Throughout these operations, Special Operations Forces have taken 
4 

a long-term approach to engagement designed to forge enduring 

partnerships contributing to regional stability. This balance of effective direct and indirect actions, the combination of high-end tactical skills and an understanding of the operational context of their 

application is the core of Special Operations. From support to 

major combat operations to the conduct of irregular warfare, Special Operations Forces are normally the first in and last out, accomplishing their missions with a very small, highly capable, and 

agile force. 

Given our current environment, it is important to note that the 

traditional activities of irregular warfare are not new to Special 

Operations Forces. Unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, civil 

affairs operations, information operations, psychological operations, 

foreign internal defense, are longstanding Special Operations 

Forces core activities. As a result, significant resources are required to ensure that Special Operations Forces are properly 

manned, trained and equipped to operate globally and with unmatched speed, precision, and discipline. 

The United States Special Operations Command fiscal year 2010 

budget request includes the resources necessary to continue providing full spectrum, multi-mission global Special Operations 

Forces that will equip the United States with a comprehensive set 

of unique capabilities. 

While the United States Special Operations Command’s major 

force program (MPF) 11 budget has historically been robust enough 

to meet the peculiar Special Operations mission requirements, the 

success of Special Operations Forces depends not only on SOCOM’s 

dedicated budget and acquisition authorities, but also on Special 

Operations Command’s service, parents and partners. Special Operations Forces rely on the services for a broad range of support. 

Some of the enabling capabilities that must be provided by the 

services include mobility, aerial sensors, field medical capabilities, 

remote logistics, engineering, planning, construction, intelligence, 

communications, security and more. And with the combination of 

the United States Special Operations Command budget and the 

support from the services, Special Operations Command seeks a 

balance, first, to have a sufficient organic Special Operations peculiar force for speed of response to operational crises; and, second, 

to have enabling capabilities assigned in direct support of Special 

Operations Forces for sustainment and expansion of operations. 

The United States Special Operations Command headquarters 

will continue to lead, develop and sustain the world’s most precise 

and lethal counterterrorism force. We will provide the world’s most 

effective Special Operations trainers, advisers and combat partners, with the skills, leadership and mind-set necessary to meet today’s and tomorrow’s unconventional challenges. 

This Nation’s Joint Special Operations Forces will continue to 

find, kill or capture our irreconcilable enemies; to train, mentor 

and partner with our global friends and allies; and to pursue the 

tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies that will keep us 

ahead of dynamic emerging threats. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I will conclude my opening remarks with a simple statement of 

pride in the Special Operations Force that I am honored to com-
5 

mand. Special Operations Forces are contributing globally well beyond what its percentage of the total force would indicate. Every 

day, they are fighting our enemies, training our partners, and, 

through personal contact and assistance, bringing real value to 

tens of thousands of villagers who are still deciding their allegiances. 

I stand ready for your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I have several questions. We 

will adhere to the five-minute rule, just to keep structure to the 

questioning. 

The first question I have is about 1208 authority, which I know 

has been a critical tool for what you have been able to do in a number of different places. You are asking for an expansion of a little 

bit of the money. I think it is $35 million now. You are asking for 

$50 million. 

Can you tell us how those funds are used and why they are so 

important to what you are doing? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. The 1208 authority is peculiar to Special Operations. It requires that the funds be used to support ongoing Special Operations. This is really enabling the Special Operations Forces to extend their operations through the use of surrogates and counterparts to conduct activities in partnership or in 

support of the Special Operations Forces who are on that operation. 

It is an authority, not an appropriation. It authorizes the United 

States Special Operations Command to recommend to the Secretary of Defense, after coordinating with the geographic combatant commander and the chief of mission in the country, to utilize 

up to currently $35 million of Operation and Management (O&M) 

funds from within the Special Operations budget. So it is an issue 

of prioritization within our budget. 

It is enormously important because it is an agile fund. It is a focused fund. It is used for purposes that are well-coordinated. And 

in a closed session I could provide a fair bit of detail about how it 

has had effect around the world. 

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. I think it is a program that we strongly 

support. And I think it essentially contributes to sort of the second 

area of questioning, and that is the importance of interagency cooperation in what you are doing, which is increasingly important. 

When we look at this broadly, globally, as a counterinsurgency 

fight, there are a lot of different pieces that are going to have to 

be pulled together in order to make this work. I think from what 

I have seen of Special Operations Command under your leadership, 

and also out in the field under the leadership at one point of General McChrystal, I think pulled those pieces together about as effectively as anywhere I have seen in government. 

As we go forward and you look outside of areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, where I think we are specifically familiar with the 

struggles there, but you look at some of these emerging threat environments around the Horn of Africa and Yemen and Al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Maghreb, what do you think 

is most important towards pushing forward that level of coopera-
6 

tion between SOCOM, other elements of DOD, State and the Intel 

Community? 

Admiral OLSON. The most important thing to push forward are 

structures that provide a forum so that the interagency community 

can provide the content to the discussions. These are relationships 

that are building over time. We are way better than we have ever 

been. We are not as good as we will be next year or the year after. 

But so much of it has to do with just understanding each others’ 

organizations and cultures. And we are even seeing now what I call 

second or third generation, or second or third order effects of people 

who have worked together in one place, coming together in another 

place, and already having a relationship so that they can move 

much more quickly together. 

General McChrystal, I think, set the standard aggressively at the 

operational level. I think the United States Special Operations 

Command is serving as a model of sorts at the higher headquarters 

level. We wake up every day with about 85 uniformed members of 

the Special Operations Command going to work in other agencies 

of government inside the National Capital Region; most of the 

agencies that you would expect, and perhaps some you wouldn’t 

normally expect us to be in, in small teams, typically two to four 

people with an 06 colonel or Navy captain as the team leader. 

We also wake up every day at our headquarters at McDill Air 

Force Base in Tampa with about 140 members of other agencies 

coming to work in our headquarters. Full members of the team, sitting in on all the discussions, sitting in on all the global collaboration kinds of briefings, and this has provided a transparency in the 

interagency environment that is very helpful. 

It is hard now, having seen it in action for a few years, to imagine, to remember back what it was like before we—back when we 

used to look around the room and see only uniformed members. It 

really is a good, solid team effort at this point. 

Mr. SMITH. That is something we really want to encourage. I 

think you hit upon the absolute key to it, is getting people from the 

different agencies to actually work together side by side, day in and 

day out with each other, in different forums. You have done an excellent job, as you mentioned, in sprinkling some SOCOM people 

out in other places. Other agencies need to do that as well. I think 

the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a good forum for 

that. But we want to see that happen more and more and look for 

ways to encourage it. 

I think in particular some of the Title 10, Title 50 conflicts between Intel and DOD can be resolved better if we start having 

more sharing back and forth. Now, obviously, we understand all of 

those different pieces have personnel to manage. That is the great 

challenge, I know, for you. And if your personnel is sent all over 

a bunch of different other places, you have a core mission to accomplish. 

So if along the way, if there are ways we can help you free up 

more personnel, please let us know. I know you have got an ongoing issue in terms of just the management just within your own entity of different service members, and we are communicating that 

concern to DOD and trying to give you the authority you need to 

better manage your own personnel within SOCOM. 
7 

Certainly we look for those opportunities also to build those relationships and really just sort of continue on with the GoldwaterNichols principle and now apply it across agency lines as well as 

within the DOD. We look forward to that. 

With that, I will yield to Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I serve on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and I have had an 

opportunity to visit with some of our NATO allies, and they are indeed proud of the contributions they are making, certainly within 

the SOF community and certainly in Afghanistan. 

What I would like to ask you for the record, if you would, explain 

the impact of the SOF capabilities of those partners in the current 

fight as it exists in Afghanistan, and, if you could, an update as 

well on Iraq as we transition out. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. From your visits to the NATO SOF Coordinations Center, you understand how this team is coming together and the bonding that is occurring across the Special Operations Forces of NATO at the headquarters environment. I think 

it is inspired. It certainly stimulated the activities of some Special 

Operations Forces being provided to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort in Afghanistan. 

So I am not the expert on how individual nations’ Special Operations Forces are performing, what their activities are in Afghanistan. That is outside my realm of responsibility, and I am not sure 

my monitorship is strong enough to give a coherent and an accurate answer on that at this point. 

I will say in my discussions with NATO’s SOF leaders, there is 

a sense of community that is forming across the Nation’s Special 

Operations communities. I would term it, loosely perhaps, special 

operations forces, the special operations flag is something around 

which NATO forces can rally. It is a relatively inexpensive, relatively low-level investment in a much broader military capability 

that NATO can provide. 

The NATO–SOF Coordination Center now, as you know, is less 

than three years old, but it has got its legs up under it pretty well. 

Mr. MILLER. What do you think we can do to assist our allies as 

they develop their SOF units? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, there is already robust activity in NATO, 

and we are seeing some NATO countries step forward in terms of 

presenting their Special Operation Forces as subject matter experts 

in particular disciplines and then using that to attract others to exercise and train with them. So there is a synergy that is occurring 

bilaterally in areas where the United States isn’t involved, and 

multilaterally and bilaterally where we are. 

I think that my shortest answer to that would be to explore ways 

to operationalize the NATO SOF Coordination Center, and I am 

not knowledgeable enough about how NATO works organizationally to understand the details and nuances of that. 

The NATO SOF Coordination Center director is now a dualhatted American two-star general who serves in his primary role 

as the commander of Special Operations Command/European Command, so I would suggest exploring ways by which we might form 

a separate director for the NATO SOF Coordination Center. 
8 

Mr. MILLER. One question, moving away from NATO, involves 

where we are with our gunships. Certainly with AFSOC in my district, it appears that there is a shortfall. But the budget doesn’t request any additional funding for gunships this year. 

Can you talk about our plans, or your plans, to address that particular shortfall, along with your plans to maintain, modernize and 

upgrade the existing aircraft that are out there? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. We have a recapitalization program for 

most of the rest of our C–130 fleet, 37 MC–130Js will come into 

our program. That was a higher priority initially than the AC–130 

gunship for recapitalization because of the ages of the airframes involved. 

The recent level of activity in Afghanistan is causing us to understand again how important precision firepower is in that tactical 

environment, and we are understanding clearly that our capacity 

is insufficient and that other platforms, substitute platforms, simply don’t bring the same response to troops in contact that an AC– 

130 does. 

The AC–130 is not a precision-fire platform. It is actually an 

area-fire weapon that is extremely accurate with its sensors and 

guns. So what we are doing to augment the AC–130 fleet, what we 

are seeking to do immediately is modify our MC–130W fleet to 

serve as a platform for a standoff precision-guided munition as a 

primary weapon and a 30-millimeter gun as a secondary weapon. 

All proven systems. It is simply a matter of integrating them in a 

platform that hasn’t been used for that purpose before. 

We are seeking funds to do this, and we think that because the 

technology risk is so low, that we can deliver it very quickly. 

Mr. MILLER. That is all for now, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. McIntyre is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you for being with us, Admiral, and thank 

you again for your hospitality last year when I was able to join you 

down in Tampa. And thank you for the service you give to us here 

at home and around the world. 

The concern about wear and tear on equipment I know is one we 

have had, especially since the situation occurred in Iraq. Tell me, 

with regard specifically to the Special Operations Forces equipment 

and resources, what resources are you finding under your command 

that are experiencing the greatest wear and tear, and to what exactly do you attribute this extraordinary aging process, and do you 

have some thoughts you can share with us about how we might can 

best help you address that situation? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. I don’t think it will surprise 

anybody; the answer is that it is our mobility systems that are suffering the most wear and tear because of the ways they are used 

and the pace that they are used. So I asked my staff just recently 

to give me the top five items in terms of what we are seeing in 

wear and tear, and it is exactly what you would think. It is our 

fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation, it is our ground mobility fleet, 

and in one case it is a maritime platform. 

We are simply flying more hours, we are driving more miles, we 

are spending more time on the water, and this is just at a pace beyond what we had predicted when those systems were procured. So 
9 

we are refurbishing them more often, and we have been resourced 

adequately to do that. 

My concern, looking ahead, is simply that we sustain the level 

of resources that will permit us to keep this equipment going. As 

we look forward to some forces perhaps drawing down, in Iraq especially, we don’t see that happening for Special Operations Forces 

at all. So as we have come to depend on some special funding 

means to keep this equipment going in the operational environment, we are going to have to find a way to work that into our 

baseline budget in order to sustain this equipment over time. 

Mr. SMITH. Sorry to interrupt you. Just on that point, as we are 

drawing down our conventional forces, I know there are some challenges in terms of your staying there in the same numbers, in 

terms of making sure you continue to get the support equipment 

that you need. A lot of that you get from the conventional forces 

in the field. 

How is that playing out? Are you satisfied that those concerns 

are being met, or is there more that needs to be done? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think it is playing out well. Recently we 

have had service chief-level talks with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the Army. We are in complete 

accord about what the challenges are and seeking ways together to 

resolve those. 

I think there is a broad understanding that whether it is a small 

force in an area or a large force in an area, you still need somebody 

to control the airspace, operate the airfields, provide the quick reaction force, provide the medical support to do all the rest of it that 

it takes to look after the force that is forward. 

So we are helping them help us by doing the detailed analysis 

of exactly what it is we think will have to be left behind, if you 

will, by the forces that draw down in order to sustain the activity 

that stays behind. So I think we are on a good track with that in 

our conversations with the services. 

Mr. SMITH. Thanks. I apologize, Mike. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Can you tell us what the typical rotational cycles 

are of SOF personnel, particularly in the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM), and how that may be affecting what you best feel 

like you can do with regard to keeping up with such a pace in 

terms of the rotation to personnel? I know that is an issue that has 

come up in the broader context with our military, but I specifically 

want to be concerned about how that is affecting you with Special 

Operations Forces. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. The service components have sort of 

evolved into different rotational paces, depending on the nature of 

the force, the type of equipment they use, the nature of the operations they are conducting. So it ranges from about 90 days on the 

short end for some of our aviators who fly an awful lot of hours at 

night, on night vision goggles, and who burn up their allotted flying hours more quickly and therefore need to come back and sort 

of reset, through about seven months for our Special Forces operational detachment A teams, the Green Berets, who are at battalion-level rotations at that pace. And then it extends beyond that 

to one-year rotations for many of the people assigned to the higher 
10 

headquarters in order to provide a campaign planning continuity to 

the effort at the more senior levels. 

The rate now is sustainable. Our predictions about how long we 

could sustain it were wrong. We didn’t think that we could sustain 

it at this pace this long, but the force is proving resilient beyond 

our estimates. 

I think personally that we are at about the maximum rate that 

we can sustain, but I think that we can sustain this rate for some 

time longer. It has now become the new normal. It is the way we 

operate. People who are doing this have been doing it long enough 

to know that this is what it is they can expect to do, and our retention rate remains high and our recruiting remains healthy. 

So if the demand didn’t increase, we are probably pretty okay. 

But what we see is an increasing demand for Special Operations 

forces, so we have got a growth plan in place to accommodate that. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. It is good to have you here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ellsworth is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral. I apologize for being late. I had some Hoosiers in the office that didn’t want to let me go. 

If this question has been discussed, let me know and I will move 

on to something else. Can you talk, Admiral, about some of the 

interoperability between the agencies? If things are being done in 

the most efficient manner between the interagency cooperation, 

some of the challenges you might have faced, what is the best practice and what are our successes and what challenges are you facing 

in the meld there? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, we did address that to some level, and 

what I said, very quickly, is it is better than it has ever been. It 

will get better. We are now at the point where the structures have 

evolved to provide the venues for these kinds of interactions to 

occur. Now it is a matter of the people getting the knowledge of 

each others’ organizations and traditions and, frankly, languages in 

order to optimize the efficiency of it. The trend is certainly one in 

the right direction. We are way ahead of where we thought we 

might be just a couple of years ago. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. If you would—this is totally unrelated but an 

area of particular interest to me—discuss what you can about our 

attempts and our movement in the non-lethal field, where we are 

at on that, whether vehicle stops or personnel stops. I know that 

is not what normally would be discussed in Special Ops, but certainly it would be a valuable part in winning hearts and minds, if 

you wouldn’t mind telling me where we are at and what we need. 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, we are all in favor of every applicable nonlethal technology. We understand as well as anybody, I think, that 

killing people is not the way to success in either Iraq, Afghanistan 

or anywhere else that we work, and that a non-lethal effect that 

can then give you time to sort out the situation, sort the people, 

would be a great advantage on the battlefield. 

Special Operations is in favor of any feasible appropriate technology. Our position, though, is that those technologies have a 

much broader application than Special Operations Forces. So we 

are advocates of it, we are champions for it, we are supporters and 
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cheerleaders for it, but we have very few of those programs initiated within the Special Operations budget itself. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I have seen some of the things. I am embarrassed to say, being in Congress and on Armed Services, that I am 

watching the Discovery Channel and seeing some of the new technology about the heat-projecting apparatus. I don’t even know what 

you call it, but it is very interesting. Is that on the edge of being 

used? 

Mr. SMITH. My staff is telling me it is called the active denial 

system. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is a great name for that. I couldn’t have 

named it better myself. Is that in the prototype stage? Is it being 

used? 

Admiral OLSON. I saw that demonstrated, but it has been a couple years ago, and I don’t know what has happened since then. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. A couple areas I want to ask about, and we will go 

back through the members as well. 

Piracy has been emerging as a threat and a challenge. I guess— 

congratulations, I guess, is the word on running a very, very good 

operation in rescuing the Maersk crew here about a month or so 

ago. 

We had an opportunity to get briefed by Captain Moore and a 

couple others who had participated in that operation—a very impressive accomplishment—but all those years ago you were trained 

to do that. Basically you were set up so that if there was a hostage 

situation anywhere in the world, you would respond very, very 

quickly. 

You have been doing a lot of other things in between. But it is 

impressive to see that training paid off and we knew what to do. 

Going forward in terms of how we confront piracy, certainly it is 

a challenge in that part of the world, off the coast of Somalia, and 

has huge implications that we need to try and confront. As at the 

same time, as we have mentioned in this hearing, you have a 

wealth of other opportunities that are also important in Afghanistan and Pakistan and a variety of other places. And one of my 

concerns is with the media attention on piracy coming up, if we 

shift too much of our focus in that direction we distract from these 

other very important missions as well. 

I just wonder if you could comment on how you see SOCOM’s 

role in combating piracy in that part of the world and how it may 

distract from some of the other missions? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Obviously, across the military there is 

robust capability to take on piracy in different ways, and Special 

Operations contributes some of the capability to that, as was evidenced here a couple of months ago. 

How that force is used is a matter of policy. It is my responsibility to train the force to do what it is asked to do. We do keep 

some elements of our force on standby, on alert, to respond to that 

kind of situation. So that if they are infrequent, then I think we 

would consider it not to be much of a burden on the force. 

Mr. SMITH. That has always been the case. Even with everything 

that has gone in the last eight years, it has always been the case 

you have had that standby force. 
12 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry, I didn’t mean to interrupt. 

Admiral OLSON. Again, it is more of a policy issue. But the question is really are we going to prevent piracy or are we going to respond to piracy with a military force? Today, we have been more 

in the business, with my force, of providing those who respond to 

it, and we are able to continue with that mission without impacting 

on our others. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. I will pass. 

Mr. SMITH. I have got more questions. Mr. McIntyre, do you have 

anything you want to add? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I just want to ask you if you feel like the partnership with NATO and their Special Operations capability is working 

well? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, we did address that briefly earlier, but the 

NATO Special Operations Coordination Center, the NSCC, 

headquartered in Mons, is an up-and-running organization. It is 

not fully manned, it is not fully capable yet, but the relationships 

that have occurred within that organization have developed quite 

strong bonds among the NATO Special Operations Forces. 

I was able to attend their first annual conference last year. 

Twenty-eight countries, I believe, came to that conference; and it 

was remarkable how similar the conversation was, the vision is 

across the Special Operations Forces of NATO, some of which say 

they feel that they have more in common with the Special Operations Forces of other nations than they do with other forces of 

their own nation because of the way that they train and exercise 

together. 

I think that there is an opportunity to take that to the next step. 

I am just not certain what the next step is. What I mentioned before is we might explore a way to operationalize the NATO SOF 

Coordination Center in some way and provide it an independent director, who is now a dual-hatted officer. 

Mr. SMITH. Following up on that, a trip I took in January with 

some Members, on the way back from Iraq we stopped in Mons and 

had the opportunity to visit Special Operations Forces in NATO 

Command, and I just can’t tell you how impressed we were by the 

degree of coordination. And without getting into too many detailed 

aspersions here, we did not find similar coordination in other parts 

of NATO that we met with. 

Certainly that is a major, major challenge in Afghanistan, is figuring out how to get all of our partner nations—it would be far too 

ambitious to stay on the same page, but at least in the same book, 

when it comes to how we are going to confront Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

NATO is set up the way it is set up. It is an important alliance. 

It is very difficult to manage that many different countries coming 

from that many different perspectives, so I certainly have a fair 

amount of respect for the difficulty the organization faces. 

But we went through all of these meetings on that with increasing frustration. Actually at the last meeting, which regrettably we 

didn’t have as much time as I would have liked for, was to visit 

the SOF force, and it was inspirational, because we saw that it can 
13 

work. You can in fact bring that many different nations together 

to coordinate in a way that is effective. 

I guess my plea would be that the SOF forces over there try to 

spread that message out more broadly among the other aspects of 

NATO. I think it would be very, very critical. 

A couple of things I wanted to ask you about—— 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, if I could make one additional point, I didn’t 

mean to attribute more countries to NATO or more to this conference. What we are seeing, actually, is an extension of Special 

Operations cooperation beyond NATO, and those who participate in 

other operations where they may work with a NATO–SOF country 

are now becoming part of this team. 

So this first annual conference we came to last year was actually 

attended by some non-NATO countries because they choose to develop those relationships. It is really encouraging to see this play 

out. 

Mr. SMITH. It is invaluable, the mantra of counterinsurgency— 

by, through, and with—you want to work with the host nations, 

and many of them are now participating in this and learning the 

necessary skills and how to implement that policy. 

I want to ask a little bit about some of the contracting issues. 

It is something we have dealt with. What we have always tried to 

do on this committee is find ways to enable SOCOM to have a 

slightly more nimble approach to acquisition. The normal processes 

are difficult when you are operating at such speed and with so 

much technology that is rapidly changing. If you go through a normal 18-month acquisition process, by the time you acquire the 

product it is out of date. So we have tried to speed it up in a couple 

of different areas. I am curious how you think that is going in general. I also wanted to give you an opportunity to respond. 

I know The Washington Post had written an article recently, critical of some of that contracting, that it hadn’t followed the process 

in some instances. I have a very strong bias that drowning the 

DOD in process is one of the things that is inhibiting our ability 

to move forward. But that is not to say we don’t need to have some 

transparent process so that we make sure it is all on the up-andup and done in the best interests of the taxpayers. 

I just want to give you an opportunity to comment on a couple 

of those issues and where you see it headed. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. I certainly agree with you and I am encouraged by all that Secretary of Defense Gates has said about relooking at how acquisition is done Department-wide, with an eye 

towards cost reduction and streamlining the acquisition processes. 

Within the Special Operations Command, as you said, we are intended by Congress, I believe, to be more agile than the services 

can be with their large acquisition programs using our MFP–11 

budget for the Special Operations’ peculiar acquisition procurement 

actions that we take. 

I focused on this a couple of years ago in investigating our own 

house. I realized that many of the barnacles that have grown on 

our process were barnacles that we let grow. As I termed it within 

our own headquarters, I thought we were operating comfortably, 

sort of in the middle of our authorizations, and certainly not pushing the edge of it. 
14 

So we have several initiatives within our own headquarters to 

provide more agility internally along the way. We have sought and 

been granted relief from participation in some of the servicewide 

joint acquisition processes which had been applied, probably improperly, to the Special Operations programs. The Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs, who runs some of this process, he has relieved 

us of those where the acquisition program is a Special Operations’ 

peculiar program. 

We do operate under all the same laws and policies and reporting requirements. We have got a ways to go in terms of continuing 

to scrape the barnacles off, but I think we are making progress in 

that regard, and we will certainly continue to report to you how 

that is going. But I am encouraged by what we have seen here just 

in the last few months. 

With respect to the DOD Inspector General (IG) report, that was 

not an acquisition contracting issue; that was a contract that we 

let with a single provider of many services to the Special Operations community. They modify equipment, they maintain equipment, they repair equipment and refurbish it, they store equipment 

for us. They do build sort of small ‘‘one of’’ items for us, they design 

and build those. It is a comprehensive set of activities that they 

perform for us, and the DOD IG look into that—which we appreciate—highlighted three findings, two of which we concurred mostly with and have taken several internal actions to resolve working 

with IG and I think to their satisfaction. 

The third one actually had to do with a potential Antideficiency 

Act (ADA) violation, which it was our responsibility to conduct a 

preliminary review of. We did that. Our preliminary review identified that the finding had some merit. There is the potential of an 

ADA violation, and so this week my comptroller has initiated a formal investigation into that finding, which is our responsibility to 

do. 

We have nine months to report the results of that investigation. 

We have 90 days to respond formally to the release of the final IG 

report. 

Mr. SMITH. I have one more question. I want to see if any of my 

colleagues have anything else. 

Just focusing for a moment, as long as we have you here, it 

would be interesting, your take on Afghanistan and Pakistan and 

the various situations there. In particular, two areas. In both—and 

this is something General McChrystal highlighted in his comments 

yesterday and the day before yesterday in front of the Senate, talking about the balance between confronting the enemy and being 

able to track down the terrorists that threaten us, and, at the same 

time, protecting against civilian casualties and taking a more classic counterinsurgency approach. 

And I agree with General McChrystal that we need the Afghan 

people on our side, and right now the two greatest threats to them 

being on our side are, number one, the civilian casualty issue, both 

real and, in some cases, I think generated by Taliban propaganda. 

But we need to get better at countering that propaganda, getting 

our own message out. But also it is a very, very real concern. 

Then, of course, the other issue is the efficacy of the Afghan government, which the people of Afghanistan do not believe in. And 
15 

I think certainly the best approach there is to try to go local as 

much as possible. The Afghan people are far more likely to trust 

their local tribes and work with their provisional governments than 

they are to buy off on whatever the national government winds up 

looking like, not to say we shouldn’t try to make the national government a little bit better as well. But in balancing that with an 

Afghanistan going forward, how do you see the best approach to 

striking that balance? 

The second question, with regard to Pakistan, this issue affects 

Pakistan as well. In fact, David Kilcullen testified before our committee a while back and had a pretty good summary of that, saying 

the drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

(FATA) are actually fairly well thought of in the FATA because the 

people who live there have been dealing with these violent psychopaths who have been running their communities. 

It is in Pakistan itself and in Afghanistan where the civilian population sees this as a threat to their sovereignty and therefore is 

less likely to be supportive of us. 

But also, specifically, Pakistan needs to learn counterinsurgency. 

And I won’t go through the litany of challenges there, you know 

them well. But we need to be able to help them, while at the same 

time we have a limited role to play. Their sovereignty is very important. It is incredibly important in getting support for their government that we not have too heavy a hand there. 

So I guess my two questions at the end of all that are: What can 

we do to better help Pakistan get to the counterinsurgency level 

that they need to get at, because as successful as they have been 

in Swat and other regions recently, it has been a pretty heavyhanded conventional approach that has created 2 to 3 million refugees even as it has driven back the Taliban, number one. 

And, number two, how do you see us striking the balance in Afghanistan between fighting the people we need to fight and stopping the number of civilian casualties? 

Admiral OLSON. Well, sir, I think you just said it better than I 

could, and I certainly support everything that General McChrystal 

said in his confirmation hearing a couple of days ago. 

If I could go to Pakistan first, I think that we can’t help Pakistan 

more than they want to be helped. And one of the filters on sort 

of their willingness to be helped is how the Pakistan military is 

perceived within Pakistan. It is the strongest element of Pakistan 

historically. It is the element of government upon which the people 

depend. And I think that we have to be very careful in recognizing 

that we cannot take actions that would cause the Pakistan military 

to appear to the Pakistani people to be an extension of ours. We 

can only help them in a way that truly helps them, and they are 

much more expert in that than we are. 

So I think the best thing that we can do is develop the relationships that will erode whatever atmosphere of distrust exists, help 

the Pakistani people understand that our interests there are theirs, 

and that our commitment is a long-term commitment for the good 

of Pakistan and the stability of the region. But it will require us 

to work very carefully and very wisely with the Pakistan Government and with the Pakistan military and the Frontier Corps. 
16 

Regarding Afghanistan, I would highlight that Afghanistan is a 

uniquely complex environment. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 

is very different than it has been anywhere else where we have operated. It is really a village-by-village, valley-by-valley counterinsurgency. 

One of the things I have found myself saying more often is, presence without value is perceived as occupation; and in Afghanistan, 

in particular, occupation is resisted. It is simply their culture to resist outsiders, and they pride themselves on a long history of resisting outside influence. 

Much of Afghanistan has not felt the presence, the impact of a 

central government in Kabul ever. And, as you said, I think a large 

part of our goal there is to encourage the people who are now deciding where their allegiance will be. It is causing them to decide 

to place their bet with a legitimate government, at whatever level 

that is. Whether it is a legitimate tribal, local, regional or Federal 

Government, it will come down to ultimately where they place their 

bet. And I think in absence of solid metrics, it will be our sense 

of where the people are beginning to place their bets that will lead 

us to understand whether or not our efforts are successful in the 

hinterlands of Afghanistan. 

That will require a careful approach. It will require as small a 

footprint as we can get away with in the places we go, with the capability and the security considerations as part of that. It will require, I believe, more of a shift towards true local regional knowledge, however that is obtained. 

We have to get beyond generalizations in Afghanistan, into true 

deep knowledge of tribal relationships, family histories, the nuances of the terrain and the weather, and how that affects how 

business is done, how money is made, how their world operates. 

If we are to be predictable in our effects, I think an awfully large 

part of what we have got to develop is an ability to be—I said that 

wrong. I don’t mean ‘‘predictable’’ in our effects, I mean ‘‘accurate’’ 

in our predictions of our effects. We have got to have a better sense 

of the impact of our behavior as we put our plans together to work 

in the remote regions of Afghanistan. 

I think this is a long-term commitment for us in order to build 

that depth of knowledge, and then allow it to have the impact in 

the places where that needs to occur. This will not be people deciding overnight where their allegiance is. It is going to have to be 

convincing them over a long period of time that they are better off 

placing their bet with the local regional government than with the 

illegitimate power players in the region. 

Mr. SMITH. As so frequently happens, in asking you that question, I thought of one more. 

Shifting to Africa for the moment, I recently did a Congressional 

Delegation (CODEL) throughout many portions of Africa, but we 

went to Burkina Faso and we got a little bit of a brief on AQIM 

and sort of the surrounding area there—Mauritania, Mali, Algeria—and we know there is activity of violent extremist groups 

there. Al Qaeda has set up a franchise most present in Algeria, but 

also in vast areas of Mali and Mauritania that are largely unpopulated. We know that there is some activity from Al Qaeda-sympa-
17 

thetic groups. We have some presence in different places, not a 

great deal. 

How concerned are you about that area, and is that an area 

where we need greater coverage, at least in terms of Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)? Because there are these 

huge, vast, open spaces out there. There is stuff going on but we 

don’t have a lot of coverage of it, so we don’t know exactly. Is that 

something we should be really concerned about or not? 

Admiral OLSON. I think we should understand that as pressure 

is applied, as it was in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, and as the 

Pakistanis are applying pressure in Pakistan, that this will not 

necessarily end the activity. It will shift some of the sanctuaries to 

other places. And I think that in these large expanses of what are 

often called undergoverned regions, simply because the governments don’t have the capacity to govern in some of the places 

where they have the will, then we have got to find ways of having 

a better understanding of what is happening there. ISR would be 

one of those possibilities. 

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. Thank you very much. I don’t think my 

colleagues have any more questions. 

I just want to conclude by saying our subcommittee has many 

roles, but one them we consider to be the most important is being 

as supportive as possible to what the Special Operations Command 

is doing. We could not ask for a better partner than we have in you 

as the commander there. I look forward to continuing that relationship. 

Thank you for coming out and testifying. We look forward to 

working with you. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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