No. 05-17-01447-CV

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

FIFTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF

TEXAS

AT DALLAS, TEXAS

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

Appellant,

vs. 

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS,

Appellee.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court 

of Dallas County, Texas 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

 Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D. 

 4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490 

 Houston, Texas 77027 

 (713) 659-7330 

 (713) 599-1659 

 SBOT# 21633500 

 attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION, 

INC.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ACCEPTED

05-17-01447-cv

FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS

3/27/2018 1:56 AM

LISA MATZ

CLERK

 FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 3/27/2018 1:56:00 AM LISA MATZ Clerk
ii

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court's final judgment, as well as 

the names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.

PARTIES COUNSEL

Appellant:

Primestar Construction, Inc. Lori Chambers Gray, Esquire

Lori Gray & Associates

11500 Northwest Freeway, Suite 340

Houston, Texas 77027

Trial Counsel for Appellant

Willie & Associates, P.C.

Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490

Houston, Texas 77027

Appellate Counsel for Appellant

Appellee:

City of Dallas, Texas Office of the City Attorney

Charles Estee, Esquire

7BN Dallas City Hall

1500 Marilla Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

Trial Counsel for Appellee
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

I. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because

the sovereign immunity of the City of Dallas has been waived by

statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because

the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable . . . . . . . . . . 6

III. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because the

Appellant had standing to pursue her cause of action for breach of 

contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

IV. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because a 

Certificate of Merit is not applicable to this litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

V. The trial court erred by not entering properly requested Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CETIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

APPENDIX

Appendix 1 - Order on City of Dallas' Plea to the Jurisdiction; Plea of Res 

 Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; and Motion to Dismiss for Failure 

 to File a Certificate of Merit signed by the trial court on October 

 31, 2017.

Appendix 2 - Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for 

 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial 

 signed by the trial court on December 15, 2017.
v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,

919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Andrade v. Venable,

372 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp.,

837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Bland v. Blue,

34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Citizens Ins. v. Daccach,

217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7

Clear Creek I.S.D. v. Cotton Commercial USA, Inc.,

529 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.--Houston

[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer,

807 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8

Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C.,

178 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth

2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty.,

221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Heckman v. Williamson County,

369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Hernandez v. Texas Department of Insurance,

923 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.--Austin

1996, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12

Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Insurance,

796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12
vi

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)

Page(s)

Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group,

250 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7

In re City of Lancaster,

228 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App.--Dallas

2007, orig. proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

In re Methodist Dallas Medical Center,

No. 05-13-00134-CV, 2013 WL 3423112

(Tex. App.--Dallas Jun. 3, 2013, orig. proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc.,

438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

Macina, Et Al. v. Yanez,

No. 05-17-00180-CV, 2017 WL 4837691

(Tex. App.--Dallas Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

523 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana

1975, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 10

Mussgrave v. Owen,

67 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App.--Texarkana

2002, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fidelity Communications Co.,

376 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.--Dallas

2012, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood,

971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

Samuel v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,

434 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.--Houston

[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

State & County Mutual Fire Ins. v. Miller,

52 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Sysco Food Services v. Trapnell,

890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8
vii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)

Page(s)

Texas Assn. of Business v. Texas Air Control Board,

852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Vernco Construction, Inc. v. Nelson,

460 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

West Orange-Cove I.S.D. v. Alanis,

107 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

West Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Republic Power Partners, L.P.,

428 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.--Amarillo

2014, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

Zachry Construction Corp. v. Port of Houston Authority,

449 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5

RULES AND STATUTES:

TEX. R. APP. P. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 9
viii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is a breach of contract cause of 

action brought by Primestar 

Construction, Inc.

Trial Court: The Honorable Craig Smith.

192nd Judicial District Court,

Dallas County, Texas.

Parties in Trial Court: Primestar Construction, Inc. -

Plaintiff;

City of Dallas, Texas - Defendant.

Trial Court Disposition: Plea to the Jurisdiction rendered in 

favor of the Defendant.

ISSUES PRESENTED

I. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because

the sovereign immunity of the City of Dallas has been waived by

statute.

II. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because

the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable.

III. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because the

Appellant had standing to pursue her cause of action for breach of 

contract.

IV. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because a 

Certificate of Merit is not applicable to this litigation.

V. The trial court erred by not entering properly requested Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 8, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Original Petition asserting a breach of 

contract and wrongful termination of the contract by the Defendant, the City of 

Dallas. (C.R. 11-43.) On June 5, 2017, the Defendant filed its Plea to the 

Jurisdiction, in the Alternative, Special Exceptions; or, in the Alternative, Original 

Answer. (C.R. 44-52.)

On June 21, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendant's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction and Special Exceptions. (C.R. 53-56.) On July 21, 2017, the Defendant 

filed its Plea of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to File a Certificate of Merit and Supplemental Special Exceptions. (C.R. 

57-75.) On August 21, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendant's Plea of 

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File a 

Certificate of Merit; and Supplemental Special Exceptions. (C.R. 76-81.) 

Subsequently, the parties filed their respective briefs and responses to the issues 

that were before the trial court. (C.R. 82-247; 248-267.)

On October 31, 2017, the trial court entered its order granting the 

Defendant's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Plea of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 

and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Certificate of Merit. (C.R. 268.) On 

November 8, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial or, in the 
2

Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration. (C.R. 269-273.) On that same date, the 

Plaintiff filed its Motion to Modify Judgment. (C.R. 274-275.)

On November 9, 2017, the Plaintiff timely filed its Request for Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law. (C.R. 276-277.) On December 11, 2017, the 

Defendant filed its Response to Plaintiff's Request for Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law, Motion to Modify the Judgment, and Motion for New Trial. 

(C.R.278-283.) On December 11, 2107, the Plaintiff filed its Objection and Reply 

to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law, Motion to Modify the Judgment and Motion for New Trial.

(C.R. 284-286.)

On December 11, 2017, the Plaintiff timely filed its Notice of Past Due 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (C.R.287-288.) On December 15, 2017, 

the trial court signed its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Judgment, 

Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial.

(C.R. 296.)

On December 12, 2017, the Plaintiff timely perfected its appeal to the Court 

of Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of Texas. (C.R. 297-298.)
3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In this breach of a bilateral contract cause of action, the sovereign immunity 

of the City of Dallas, Texas has been waived by the statutory provisions of TEX.

LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152. See Zachry Construction Corp. v. Port of Houston 

Authority, 449 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2014); Clear Creek I.S.D. v. Cotton Commercial 

USA, Inc., 529 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed); 

West Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Republic Power Partners, L.P., 428 

S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2014, no pet.).

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable to the 

facts and the law in this breach of a bilateral contract cause of action due to the fact 

that the City of Dallas, Texas was not a defendant in the federal action nor was the 

City of Dallas in privity of contract with the Plaintiff and Travelers Insurance 

concerning their insurance dispute. See Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group, 250 

S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008); Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996); 

Sysco Food Services v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994); Eagle Props., Ltd. 

v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990).

The Plaintiff in this cause had the requisite standing to bring this breach of

bilateral contract cause of action because the Plaintiff's rights had been reserved 

and the City of Dallas, Texas was on actual notice of the reservation of rights. See 
4

Vernco Construction, Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. 2015); Patterson v. 

Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998); Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. v. 

Fidelity Communications Co., 376 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.); 

Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co., 523 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana

1975, no writ).

The Plaintiff is not in the class of litigants where a Certificate of Merit is 

required to pursue this present litigation and the trial court erred by including the 

contrary finding in its judgment. The Plaintiff nor the Defendant is neither an 

licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, registered landscape architect 

and/or registered professional land surveyor and this litigation concerns the breach 

of a bilateral contract for payment and not for professional services. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a); Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc., 438 

S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014); Macina, Et Al. v. Yanez, No. 05-17-00180-CV, 2017 WL 

4837691 (Tex. App.--Dallas Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed).

When a trial court considers evidence and testimony to determine 

jurisdictional facts concerning a Plea to the Jurisdiction, Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law are both necessary and helpful for meaningful appellate 

review. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas Department of Insurance, 923 S.W.2d 192 

(Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ). See also Higginbotham v. General Life & 

Accident Insurance, 796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990).
5

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because

the sovereign immunity of the City of Dallas has been waived by

statute.

This appeal involves the breach of a bilateral contract for construction 

services provided to the Appellee by the Appellant. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 

271.152 states:

A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the 

constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract 

subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the

purposes of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to 

the terms and conditions of this subchapter.

(Emphasis added.)

It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the Appellant's cause of action is for 

the breach of a bilateral contract entered into by the Appellee and the Appellant 

concerning the payment owed for construction services and the wrongful 

termination of the contract by the Appellee. (C.R. 12-24, 27-43.) It is undeniable 

that the Appellee, the City of Dallas, Texas, is a home-rule city and local 

governmental entity that is subject to the provisions of TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 

271.152. The Court in Zachry Construction Co. v. Port of Houston Authority, 449 
6

S.W.3d 98, 109 -114 (Tex. 2014), set out the exact parameters of what constitutes 

waiver of sovereign immunity by a local governmental entity that has entered into 

a bilateral contract and the damages that may be recovered in a suit for breach of 

that contract. The Appellant's cause of action meets all of the statutory and

Supreme Court of Texas' criteria, thus the sovereign immunity of the Appellee has 

been unambiguously waived by statute and applicable case law. See also Clear 

Creek I.S.D. v. Cotton Commercial USA, Inc., 529 S.W.3d 569, 578-580 (Tex. 

App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed); West Texas Municipal Power Agency 

v. Republic Power Partners, L.P., 428 S.W.3d 299, 306-310 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 

2014, no pet.). The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded 

with instructions to order a new trial.

II. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because

the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or 

cause of action that was finally adjudicated in a earlier suit. See Citizens Ins. v. 

Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007); Hallco Tex., Inc., v. McMullen Cty., 

221 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2006). If the claims and/or causes of action arise from the 

same set of operative facts, the doctrine of res judicata applies and the claims 

and/or causes of action will be barred in a subsequent suit. See Samuel v. Federal 

Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 434 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 
7

2014, no pet.); Musgrave v. Owen, 67 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 

2002, no pet.).

Additionally, in order for res judicata to apply, the parties in the second suit 

are the same in the first suit or in privity with them. Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. 

Grp., 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. 2008); Citizens Ins., 217 S.W.3d at 449. It is 

uncontroverted and undisputed that the City of Dallas, Texas, was not a party to 

the lawsuit filed in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, 

Dallas Division. (C.R. 162-177.) Additionally, the federal district court 

unambiguously and expressly held, "[T]he third party claim against the City of 

Dallas appears to be unrelated to Primestar's liability under the indemnity

agreement, and Primestar has not explained why the claim is necessary to the 

disposition of this case." (C.R. 213.) (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that the 

Appellee, the City of Dallas, Texas, was not and is not a party to the final judgment 

rendered by the federal district court. (C.R. 228.) Lastly, there has been no 

evidence presented, either in the trial court below or in the federal district court, 

that the Appellee, the City of Dallas, Texas, was ever in privity of contract 

concerning the indemnity agreement between the Appellant and Travelers 

Insurance that was litigated in the federal district court. See Igal; Citizens Ins., 

supra. Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to this litigation.
8

The Appellee contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel also does not 

apply. Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a particular fact issue 

that the party had already litigated and lost in an earlier suit. State & County 

Mutual Fire Ins. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. 2001); Barr v. Resolution 

Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). To invoke collateral estoppel, a 

party must establish: (1) the same facts sought to be litigated in the second suit 

were fully litigated in the first suit, (2) those facts were essential to the judgment or 

final order in the first suit, and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first 

suit. See Sysco Food Services v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994); Eagle 

Properties. Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990). The litigation in 

the trial court below and the federal district court litigation do not meet all of the 

criteria for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply. (C.R. 213; 218.) The trial 

court most certainly has the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

controversy. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with 

instructions to order a new trial.
9

III. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because the

Appellant had standing to pursue her cause of action for breach of 

contract.

The appellate record in this case clearly shows that the Appellee and the 

Appellant entered into a contract and that the Appellant brought its cause of action 

for breach of the contract by the Appellee, pursuant to the statutory provisions of 

TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152. When standing is conferred by statute, the 

plaintiff does not have to show that it suffered a particularized injury distinct from 

the general public. See Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. 2012); 

Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, no 

pet.). Because standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, the issue 

cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal. West Orange-Cove 

I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583 (Tex. 2003); Texas Assn. of Business v. 

Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993). Standing focuses on 

who is the correct party to bring the suit. See Vernco Construction, Inc. v. Nelson, 

460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015); Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 

439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The Appellant certainly has statutory standing. Additionally, 

the appellate record contains evidence that the Appellant and Travelers Insurance 

had reserved the rights of the Appellant to pursue its cause of action in the trial 

court below. (C.R. 251-252; 272-273.) See Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fidelity 

Communications Co., 376 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.); 
10

Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co., 523 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana

1975, no writ). The Appellee was "actual notice" of the reservation of Appellant's 

rights to pursue its cause of action and breached its affirmative duty to so inform 

the trial court. The Appellee's affirmative duty to the trial court and this tribunal 

never ceases, even on appeal. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 

3.03(a), (b) & cmt. 2, 3, 7; TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.04(a), (b) & 

cmt. 1, 2. See also In re City of Lancaster, 228 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. App.--

Dallas 2007, orig. proceeding); In re Methodist Dallas Medical Center, No. 05-13-

00134-CV, 2013 WL 3423112, at *1 (Tex. App.--Dallas Jun. 3, 2013, orig. 

proceeding). The Appellant most certainly had the standing to pursue its cause of 

action in the trial court. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 

remanded with instructions to order a new trial.

IV. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because a 

Certificate of Merit is not applicable to this litigation.

The trial court held an oral hearing on the Appellee's Plea to the Jurisdiction 

and Motion to Dismiss. At the hearing, the trial court explicitly held that the 

Appellant was not required to file a Certificate of Merit nor was a Certificate of 

Merit relevant to the Appellant's cause of action. (1 C.R.R. 17-18.) Secondly, the 

Appellant is not in the class of litigants where a Certificate of Merit is required to 

pursue this present litigation and the trial court erred by including the contrary 
11

finding in its judgment. The trial court should have granted the Motion to Modify 

Judgment and deleted the Certificate of Merit finding from its judgment. (C.R. 

274-275, 289-294.) The Appellee is neither an licensed architect, licensed 

professional engineer, registered landscape architect and/or registered professional 

land surveyor and this litigation concerns the breach of a bilateral contract for 

payment and not for professional services. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 

150.002(a); Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 571 (Tex. 

2014); Macina, Et Al. v. Yanez, No. 05-17-00180-CV, 2017 WL 4837691 at *2-3

(Tex. App.--Dallas Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed). A Certificate of Merit is not required 

in this litigation. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded 

with instructions to order a new trial.

V. The trial court erred by not entering properly requested Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial court not only received documentary evidence, which has already 

been referenced above, but received live testimony before ruling to grant the Plea 

to the Jurisdiction. (2 C.R.R. 22-28. ) The Appellant timely and properly requested 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning the jurisdictional issue after 

the trial court granted the Plea to the Jurisdiction. (C.R. 276-277.) The trial court 

never entered the requested findings and conclusions and the Appellant timely and 

properly filed its Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
12

(C.R. 287-288.) The trial court denied entering the requested Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law. (C.R. 296.)

A trial court must consider evidence and testimony on a plea to the 

jurisdiction when the evidence and testimony are necessary to determine 

jurisdictional facts. Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 

2012); Bland v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). Since the trial court 

considered evidence and testimony when ruling on the Plea to the Jurisdiction, 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are both necessary and helpful for 

meaningful appellate review. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas Department of 

Insurance, 923 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ). See also 

Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Insurance, 796 S.W.2d 695, 695 (Tex. 

1990). The trial court abused its discretion and reversibly erred by not entering the 

requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The judgment of the trial 

court should be reversed and remanded with instructions to order a new trial.

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, Primestar Construction, Inc., 

requests that judgment of the trial court be reversed and remanded with 

instructions to order a new trial.

PRAYER
13

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

 By:

Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490

Houston, Texas 77027

(713) 659-7330

(713) 599-1659 (FAX)

SBOT# 21633500

attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION, 

INC.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 

served via e-service to Charles Estee, Assistant City Attorney, 1500 Marilla Street, 

7DN Dallas City Hall, Dallas, Texas 75201, on the 26th day of March, 2018.

Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the Brief of Appellant submitted complies with TEX. R. APP. P. 

9 and the word count of this document is 2,733. The word processing software 

used to prepare the document and to calculate the word count is Windows 7.

Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
NO. DC-17-OS460 

PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION, INC § IN THE DISTRlCT COURT 

§ 

Plaintiff, § 

v. 

§ 

§ 192ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

§ 

THE CITY OF DALLAS 

Defendant. 

§ 

§ OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 

ORDER. ON CITY OF DALLAS'S PLEA TO JURISDICTION j PLEA OF RES 

J]JDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; AND MOTIQN TO DISMISS FOR 

FAILURE 'fQFILE A ~ERTIFICATE OF MF-ruT 

ON THIS DATE tbe CoUt1 considered Defehdant City of Dallas's Plea to Jurisdiction; 

Plea Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; and t\,'fotion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Certificate 

of Merit. The Court, after re,liewlng tbe pleas and mMion, finds tha:l gO(Jd cause ha..r,· been shown 

for the granting of the Pleas and Motion. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Court, GRANTS the Def~ndant City of 

Dallas's Plea to Jurisdiction; Plea. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; and Motion to Dismiss 

for Failure to File a Certificate of Iv{erit. 

SlONED thi' 4 day of October 2011. 

Page 268 
Appendix 2 
CAUSE NO. DC-17-05460 I 

PRIMEST AR CONSTRUCCTION, INC, § 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

Plaintiff, 

VS. 

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, 

Defendant. 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

192nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENBT, REQUEST 

FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 

AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 

ON THIS DATE the Court considered Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial. The Court, after reviewing 

the motion and requests and the City of Dallas's response and hearing the argument of counsel, 

fmds that the motions and request should be denied. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial are DENIED. 

SIGNED this I~ day of December 2017. 

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial. 

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