UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2449

MONTE DEXTER PEPPER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PRECISION VALVE CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. 

(6:10-cv-02532-MGL)

Submitted: May 31, 2013 Decided: June 7, 2013

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Melvin Hutson, MELVIN HUTSON, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellant. Reginald W. Belcher, TURNER PADGET GRAHAM & 

LANEY, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Monte Dexter Pepper appeals the district court’s order 

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

granting summary judgment in favor of Precision Valve 

Corporation on Pepper’s discrimination and retaliation claims 

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 

U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 2012). We affirm. 

We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment will 

be granted unless “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Conclusory or 

speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere 

scintilla of evidence in support of [the nonmoving party’s] 

case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 

(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Pepper did not produce direct evidence that 

racial discrimination motivated Precision Valve’s adverse 

actions against him, we analyze his claims under the burden-
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shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). See Hill v. Lockheed Martin 

Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee is 

first required to establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination, showing that (1) he is a member of a protected 

class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he 

suffered this adverse action despite performing his job in 

accordance with the employer’s legitimate expectations; and 

(4) the circumstances gave rise to an inference of unlawful 

discrimination.* Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.– Wilmington, 

640 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2011). If the employee makes this 

showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action.” Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. If the employer provides 

evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the 

presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the employee, who 

bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, must show by a 

 * We decline Pepper’s invitation to adopt the holding of 

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493-94 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). See Stallworth v. Singing River Health Sys., 469 F. 

App’x 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (declining to adopt 

Brady); Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1202 

n.12 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt Brady and “reserv[ing]

the right to undertake each step of the Supreme Court’s 

McDonnell Douglas framework in analyzing discrimination and 

retaliation claims on summary judgment”). 
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preponderance of evidence that the proffered reason was a 

pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 146-49 (2000).

Here, Precision Valve provided ample evidence 

demonstrating that Pepper failed to meet its legitimate 

expectations, including documentation showing that Pepper 

received multiple warnings for producing defective parts, 

unexcused absences, tardiness, improperly clocking in or out, 

and not being at his machine at the beginning of his shift. 

Pepper argues on appeal that Precision Valve cannot logically 

claim that his performance was unsatisfactory prior to his 

termination because Precision Valve continued to employ him for 

a time after recognizing deficiencies in his performance. We 

find this argument unpersuasive. Because Pepper’s self-serving 

statements regarding his job performance are insufficient to

show that he met Precision Valve’s legitimate performance 

expectations, see King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th 

Cir. 2003), we conclude that he cannot make a prima facie 

showing of discrimination. Accordingly, we hold that the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment on 

Pepper’s racial discrimination claims. 

Pepper next argues that the district court erred in 

granting Precision Valve’s motion for summary judgment on his 

retaliation claims. To establish a prima facie case of 
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retaliation, Pepper “must prove that (1) []he engaged in a 

protected activity, (2) the employer acted adversely against 

[him], and (3) there was a causal connection between the 

protected activity and the asserted adverse action.” Hoyle v. 

Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011). Pepper 

argues that the district court erred in determining that the gap 

of ten months between the filing of his lawsuit and his 

termination was too long to establish causation between the two. 

Pepper contends that his protected activity was not his filing 

of the lawsuit but, rather, his continuing pursuit of the 

lawsuit, and, thus, that there was sufficient temporal proximity 

to establish causation. He identifies no authority for this 

contention.

We conclude that Pepper’s protected activity was the 

filing of his lawsuit against Precision Valve. “[A] causal 

connection for purposes of demonstrating a prima facie case 

exists where the employer takes adverse employment action 

against an employee shortly after learning of the protected 

activity.” Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 

2004). Generally, however, the passage of time alone cannot 

provide proof of causation unless the “temporal proximity 

between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an 

adverse employment action” was “very close.” Clark County Sch. 

Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Pepper was 

terminated ten months after he filed his lawsuit against 

Precision Valve, we conclude that Pepper cannot establish a 

causal connection between his filing of the lawsuit and his 

termination. See id. (suggesting that three-to-four-month gap

was insufficient to prove causal connection). Accordingly, we 

hold that the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment on Pepper’s retaliation claims.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED