UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE ROSE, #235893,

Petitioner,

 CASE NO. 5:15-CV-11963

v. HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA

JEFFREY WOODS,

Respondent.

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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,

AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. Introduction

Michigan prisoner Willie Rose (“Petitioner”) has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus asserting that he is being held in violation of his constitutional rights. Petitioner pleaded

guilty to assault with intent to commit murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of

a firearm during the commission of a felony in the Wayne County Circuit Court and was sentenced

to 16 to 30 years imprisonment on the assault conviction, a concurrent term of one to five years

imprisonment on the felon in possession conviction, and a consecutive term of two years

imprisonment on the felony firearm conviction in 2012. In his petition, he challenges the validity

of his plea and the effectiveness of defense counsel. For the reasons stated, the Court denies the

habeas petition. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in

forma pauperis on appeal.
II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner’s convictions arise from an incident in which he shot his girlfriend in the head in

an attempt to kill her, but she survived the shooting. On August 10, 2012, he pleaded guilty to

assault with intent to commit murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm in

exchange for the dismissal of additional counts, the dismissal of a fourth habitual offender

sentencing enhancement, and a sentencing agreement of 12 to 30 years imprisonment on the assault

charge, a concurrent term of one to five years imprisonment on the felon in possession charge, and

a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the felony firearm charge. See 8/10/12 Plea Hrg.

Tr., pp. 6, 17. Petitioner also signed a written agreement on that date. See 8/10/12 Settlement Offer

and Notice of Acceptance.

At a hearing on September 26, 2012, the trial court stated that the sentencing agreement fell

below the calculated guideline range such that it would not accept Petitioner’s plea. The court

mistakenly indicated that it had not “accepted” the plea at the prior proceeding. See 9/12/2012 Plea

& Sent. Hrg. Tr., pp. 5, 15-16. The court outlined a revised sentencing agreement of 16 to 30 years

imprisonment on the assault charge. Id. at pp. 3-4. The court also conducted a new, full plea

colloquy during which Petitioner pleaded guilty to the same three offenses in exchange for the

dismissal of additional charges and the dismissal of a fourth habitual offender sentencing

enhancement, but with a revised sentencing agreement of 16 to 30 years imprisonment on the assault

charge (the other sentences remained the same). Id. at pp. 3-15. Defense counsel noted, and the

court agreed, that the prior plea should be officially withdrawn, and it was so withdrawn. Id. at p.

15. Petitioner also signed a new written agreement. See 9/26/12 Settlement Offer and Notice of

Acceptance. Without objection, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 16 to 30 years imprisonment

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on the assault conviction, a concurrent term of one to five years imprisonment on the felon in

possession conviction, and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the felony firearm

conviction. See 9/26/12 Plea & Sent. Hrg. Tr., pp. 17-18.

Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals

asserting that he should be given specific performance of his original plea and sentencing agreement

and that defense counsel was ineffective for advising him to accept the amended plea and sentencing

agreement. The court denied the application for lack of merit in the grounds presented. People v.

Rose, No. 314483 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2013) (unpublished). Petitioner also filed an application

for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People

v. Rose, 495 Mich. 978, 843 N.W.2d 764 (2014).

Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition. He raises the following claims:

I. He is entitled to specific performance of his original plea and sentencing

agreement.

II. He received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his state and

federal constitutional rights.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit. 

Petitioner has filed a reply to that answer.

III. Standard of Review

Federal law imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at

a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per

curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694 (2002).

“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to

‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]

Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. 

However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent

‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The

state court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21

(citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333,

n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit “precludes federal habeas relief so long

as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington

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v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The

Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's

contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). 

Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ...

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding

in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court,

a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility

for fairminded disagreement.” Id; see also White v. Woodall, _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). 

Federal judges “are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only

when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.” Woods v. Donald, _ U.S. _, 135

S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail as long as it is within the “realm of

possibility” that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v.

Etherton, _ U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).

Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of whether the

state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court “has held on numerous

occasions that it is not ‘an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law’ for a state

court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court”)

(quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-

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72. Section 2254(d) “does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed

to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it “does not

require citation of [Supreme Court] cases–indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme

Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16. While the

requirements of “clearly established law” are to be determined by Supreme Court precedent, the

decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court’s

decision. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340

F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with clear and convincing

evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Lastly, habeas review is “limited

to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the

grounds presented and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in a standard order. For

the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the state courts’ decisions are neither contrary to

Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts.1

IV. Analysis

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because he believes that he should be

given specific performance of his original plea and sentencing agreement with a term of 12 to 30

years imprisonment on the assault conviction and because he believes defense counsel was

1

The Court would reach the same result under a de novo standard of review.

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ineffective for advising him to accept the amended plea and sentencing agreement.

When a criminal defendant is convicted pursuant to a plea, habeas review is limited to

whether the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. United States v. Broce, 488

U.S. 563 (1989); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). A plea is intelligent and knowing where

there is nothing to indicate that the defendant is incompetent or otherwise not in control of his or her

mental faculties, is aware of the nature of the charges, and is advised by competent counsel. Id. at

756. The plea must be made “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.” Id. at 748. A plea is voluntary if it is not induced by threats or misrepresentations

and the defendant is made aware of the direct consequences of the plea. Brady v. United States, 397

U.S. 742, 755 (1970). The voluntariness of a plea “can be determined only by considering all of the

relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Id. at 749.

In this case, the state court record reveals that Petitioner’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary. Petitioner was 38 years old at the time of his plea and was familiar with the criminal

justice system as a repeat offender. There is no evidence that he suffered from any physical or

mental problems which would have impaired his ability to understand the criminal proceedings or

the nature of his plea. Petitioner was represented by legal counsel and conferred with counsel during

the plea process. The trial court advised Petitioner of his trial rights and the fact that he would be

giving up those rights by pleading guilty. The parties discussed the charges, the terms of the

amended plea and sentencing agreement, the fact that the original plea would be withdrawn, and the

consequences of the plea. Petitioner indicated he understood the amended plea and sentencing

agreement, that he wanted to plead guilty, that he had not been threatened or promised anything

other than what was included in the agreement, and that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. 

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He also signed a written form which outlined the terms of the amended plea and sentencing

agreement. Petitioner fails to show that his guilty plea was involuntary. The fact that he was

subsequently dissatisfied with his plea or may have hoped for more lenient treatment does not render

his plea unknowing or involuntary. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757.

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to specific performance of his initial plea and

sentencing agreement with the sentence of 12 to 30 years imprisonment (as opposed to 16 to 30

years imprisonment) on the assault conviction because the trial court accepted that initial plea at the

August 10, 2012 hearing before subsequently rejecting it due to the sentencing guidelines calculation

on September 26, 2012. The Court disagrees. First, to the extent that Petitioner asserts that

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), entitles him to specific performance of the initial plea

and sentencing agreement, he is mistaken. Santobello applies to claims involving an alleged breach

of a plea agreement by the prosecution, not to claims involving a trial court’s refusal to accept a plea

agreement. See, e.g., Brown v. McKee, 340 F. App’x 254, 257 (6th Cir. 2009).

Second, the United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that a criminal defendant does

not have a federal constitutional right to have a plea accepted by a judge. See Missouri v. Frye, 566

U.S. 134, 148-49 (2012) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)); see also Lafler

v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). Moreover, even under Michigan law, a criminal defendant

does not have the right to specific performance of a plea and sentencing agreement. See People v.

Killebrew, 416 Mich. 189, 209, 330 N.W.2d 834 (1982). Rather, the judge retains his or her

freedom to choose a different sentence, but must give the defendant the opportunity to affirm or

withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 209-10; Mich. Ct. R. 6.310(B)(2)(a); see also People v. Franklin,

491 Mich. 916, 813 N.W.2d 285 (2012); People v. Bridinger, No. 294 616, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App.

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Jan. 4, 2011) (unpublished).

In this case, after the trial court indicated that it would not accept the 12-year minimum

sentence on the assault charge contained in the initial plea and sentencing agreement, Petitioner

agreed to the 16-year minimum sentence on the assault charge contained in the amended plea and

sentencing agreement and affirmed his guilty plea before the trial court. He had every opportunity

to reject the amended plea offer and proceed to trial, but instead he knowingly and voluntarily chose

to accept it and withdraw his initial plea. Petitioner thus fails to establish a constitutional violation,

see, e.g., United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding no due process

violation where defendant accepted revised plea agreement providing for longer sentence as armed

career criminal), or that he is otherwise entitled to specific performance of the initial plea and

sentencing agreement. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

Petitioner also fails to show that defense counsel was ineffective in advising him during the

plea proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for evaluating the

claim of a habeas petitioner who is challenging a plea on the ground that he or she was denied the

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must establish that

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). To

demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below this standard, a petitioner must overcome the

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Second, if the petitioner satisfies the first prong of this test, the petitioner must then

demonstrate that counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice, i.e., “that there is a reasonable

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probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [he/she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n many

guilty plea cases, the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts

reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial.” Id. The

Supreme Court has also emphasized that “these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where

necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the ‘idiosyncracies of the particular

decisionmaker.’” Id. at 59-60 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

The Supreme Court has confirmed that a federal court’s consideration of ineffective

assistance of counsel claims arising from state criminal proceedings is quite limited on habeas

review due to the deference accorded trial attorneys and state appellate courts reviewing their

performance. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and

when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal and

end citations omitted). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court has emphasized the

extraordinary deference to be afforded trial counsel in the area of plea bargaining. See Premo v.

Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125 (2011) (stating that “strict adherence to the Strickland standard [is] all the

more essential when reviewing the choices an attorney made at the plea bargain stage”); see also

Bray v. Andrews, 640 F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Premo).

Petitioner fails to establish that defense counsel was ineffective. The record indicates that

Petitioner faced additional charges, a habitual offender sentencing enhancement, a very lengthy

minimum sentence under the guidelines, including the potential for a life sentence, without a plea

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bargain. Counsel was able to secure a favorable plea and sentencing agreement on Petitioner’s

behalf with respect to the initial and amended agreements. When the trial court indicated that it

would not accept the 12-year minimum sentence on the assault charge, and was not required to do

so (as discussed supra), counsel reasonably advised Petitioner to accept the 16-year minimum

sentence on that charge. Petitioner fails to establish that defense counsel misadvised him or

otherwise acted unreasonably.

Moreover, even if Petitioner was misinformed by counsel in some way, he is not entitled to

habeas relief. A trial court’s proper plea colloquy cures any misunderstandings that a defendant may

have about the consequences of a plea. Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 1999); Boyd

v. Yukins, 99 F. App’x 699, 703 (6th Cir. 2004). The trial court conducted a sufficient colloquy as

to the terms of the amended plea and sentencing agreement and its consequences during the

September 26, 2012 hearing. Petitioner acknowledged his understanding of such matters and

confirmed that he wanted to plead guilty pursuant to that agreement. He raised no objections or

concerns at the time of that hearing.

Lastly, the Court notes that Petitioner fails to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

conduct, i.e., that but for counsel’s advice, he would have rejected the amended plea and sentencing

agreement and insisted on going to trial. To be sure, the potential evidence against him, which

included the victim’s testimony, was significant and he faced a fourth habitual offender sentencing

enhancement with the potential for a life sentence. Petitioner fails to establish that defense counsel

was ineffective. The Court is satisfied that Petitioner’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

and that he received all the process he was due. Habeas relief is not warranted.

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on his claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITH PREJUDICE the petition for a writ

of habeas corpus.

Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue only if a

petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if

the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A

petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented

are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

327 (2003). Having conducted the requisite review, the Court concludes that Petitioner fails to make

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his claims. The Court, therefore,

DENIES a certificate of appealability.

Lastly, the Court concludes that Petitioner should not be granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal as an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/John Corbett O’Meara 

United States District Judge

Date: December 19, 2017

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of record

on this date, December 19, 2017, using the ECF system and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz 

Case Manager

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