UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

STACI TAJUAN PINKETT, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-cv-12226 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

______________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [13] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [16] 

 Plaintiff Staci Tajuan Pinkett seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security’s determination that she is not entitled to social security benefits for her physical and 

mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 13) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 16). Plaintiff also submitted a reply brief in support of her Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (Docket no. 17.) With consent of the parties, this case has been referred to the 

undersigned for final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73. (Docket no. 14.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing 

pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and is now ready to rule. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits on June 16, 2008; Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Drew A. Swank issued an 

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unfavorable decision with regard to that application on December 14, 2010. (TR 185-94.) 

Plaintiff then protectively filed an application for supplemental security income on June 8, 2011, 

and an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on April 16, 2012. 

(TR 232-33, 280-92.) In both applications, Plaintiff alleges disability beginning December 15, 

2010, due to hypertension, a herniated disc, depression, coronary disease, diabetes, obesity, and 

sleep apnea. (TR 106, 309.) The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims on 

February 27, 2013. (TR 204-33.) Subsequently, at Plaintiff’s request, ALJ Jerome B. Blum held 

a hearing on January 27, 2014. (TR 155-81, 256.) In a May 2, 2014 decision, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because she was capable of performing her past relevant 

work as an administrative assistant and an office manager. (TR 106-14.) Plaintiff then requested 

a review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council, which was denied on April 20, 2015. 

(TR 1-6, 87-88.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, 

and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed the instant 

Motions for Summary Judgment. 

II. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE 

Plaintiff (docket no. 13 at 9-14), Defendant (docket no. 16 at 6-13), and the ALJ (TR 

110-13) each set out a detailed, factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record and 

hearing testimony. Having conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s medical record and 

the hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that there are no material inconsistencies among 

these recitations of the record. Therefore, the undersigned will incorporate these factual 

recitations by reference. Additionally, the undersigned will include comments and citations to 

the record as necessary throughout this Opinion and Order. 

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security 

Act through December 31, 2012; that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date of December 15, 2010; and that she suffered from the following severe 

impairments: obesity, diabetes mellitus, obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension, and history of 

coronary artery disease/non-ST elevation myocardial infarction status post cardiac 

catheterization and stenting. (TR 107.) The ALJ stated that this combination of impairments 

caused significant limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. (TR 109.) The 

ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered from non-severe degenerative disc disease and that 

Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairment of depression did not cause more than 

minimal limitation in her ability to perform basic mental work activities and was therefore nonsevere. (TR 109.) 

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (TR 110.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff had 

the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined in 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). (TR 110-13.) Subsequently, in reliance on the 

vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing her 

past relevant work as an administrative assistant and an office manager. (TR 113.) Therefore, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act from December 15, 

2010, through the date of the decision. (TR 108, 114.) 

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IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richarson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “’such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d ay 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Eckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting 

that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”). 

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B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in response 

to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] 

individual physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis 

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

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remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).) Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter 

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 

WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D.Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174.) 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed or remanded because (1) the record 

evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary 

work; and (2) the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician 

and erred in assigning no weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating therapist. (Docket no. 13 at 

15-23.) Defendant argues, among other things, that “the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff, 

already limited to sedentary work based on the RFC finding in the prior decision, had not met her 

burden to provide new and material evidence of any worsening in her impairments to justify a 

more limited RFC.” (Docket no. 16 at 19.) 

1. The ALJ’s Application of the Res Judicata Doctrine 

 In Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the Sixth Circuit held that social-security 

claimants and the Commissioner are barred by principles of res judicata from relitigating issues 

that have previously been determined. 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner is 

bound by the principles of res judicata unless there is new and material evidence of changed 

circumstances. Id. at 842; Acquiescence Ruling 98-3(6), 63 FR 29770-01, 1998 WL 274051 

(Soc. Sec. Admin. June 1, 1998); Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6), 63 FR 29771-01, 1998 WL 

274052 (Soc. Sec. Admin. June 1, 1998). Where a claimant who has previously been 

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adjudicated “not disabled” seeks to avoid application of res judicata, he must provide proof that 

his condition has worsened since the date of the prior decision to such a degree that he is no 

longer capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity. Vesey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-

10967, 2012 WL 4475657, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2012) (citations omitted). 

 On December 14, 2010, Plaintiff was found “not disabled” by ALJ Drew A. Swank, who 

determined that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, diabetes mellitus, 

obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension, and history of coronary artery disease/non-ST elevation 

myocardial infarction status post cardiac catheterization and stenting. (TR 185-94.) He further 

found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). (TR 189-93.) 

 Thus, ALJ Blum was bound by this determination unless he found new and material 

evidence of changed circumstances. Noting his responsibility under Acquiescence Rulings 98-

3(6) and 98-4(6), ALJ Blum found that the record did not demonstrate deterioration in Plaintiff’s 

condition since ALJ Swank’s decision, and he therefore found the prior decision to be binding 

and adopted it in full. (TR 106, 110.) The ALJ supported this finding by pointing out that the 

new medical evidence from the period since the prior decision did not establish any change in 

Plaintiff’s obesity, diabetes mellitus, obstructive sleep apnea, or hypertension. (TR 111.) The 

ALJ also noted that the prior decision accounted for Plaintiff’s chest pain given her history of 

coronary artery disease. (TR 111.) Next, the ALJ discussed the treatment that Plaintiff had 

received for her back pain since the prior decision, and he concluded that Plaintiff’s back 

condition “has not been shown to cause more than a mild interference in [her] ability to work and 

does not cause limitations inconsistent with sedentary work;,” the ALJ further noted that this 

finding was consistent with the prior decision. (TR 111.) The ALJ also discussed the mental 

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health treatment that Plaintiff had undergone since the prior decision and found that there was no 

evidence to support any change in Plaintiff’s mental health condition since the prior decision. 

(TR 112.) In reaching this determination, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s mental health records 

indicated that she had experienced her symptoms for many years dating back to the time when 

she was performing skilled work; that there had been no aggravating circumstance related to 

treatment since the prior decision; and that Plaintiff seemingly began treating for her mental 

health in an effort to obtain disability benefits, where her treatment records noted “work on 

getting SSI and Medicaid” as a treatment goal. (TR 112.) 

 Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence or set forth any argument with regard to 

whether or how her condition has worsened since the prior decision or why res judicata should 

not apply in this matter. In fact, Plaintiff does not address res judicata, Drummond, or the 

Acquiescence Rulings at any point in her Motion for Summary Judgment or the brief in support. 

Plaintiff does acknowledge the ALJ’s assertion that there is no evidence to support any change in 

her mental health since the prior decision (docket no. 13 at 19), but Plaintiff presents no evidence 

or argument to the contrary. 

 The closest that Plaintiff comes to addressing this issue is in her Reply to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket no. 17.) Plaintiff structured her reply brief to mirror 

the argument section of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment by using headings virtually 

identical to those of Defendant. For example, one heading in the argument section of 

Defendant’s brief states, “Plaintiff has not demonstrated that her physical RFC has worsened in 

comparison to her condition in December 2010.” (Docket no. 16 at 17.) Plaintiff uses the same 

heading in her reply brief but removes the word “not” so that it states, “Plaintiff has 

demonstrated that her physical RFC has worsened in comparison to her condition in December 

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2010.” (Docket no. 17 at 1.) Beneath this heading, Plaintiff states that she stands by the 

evidence proffered in her brief in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.) Plaintiff, 

however, does not further develop this conclusory statement. The Court is not obligated to 

address perfunctory arguments or develop them on Plaintiff’s behalf, and it declines to do so 

here. See Bush v. Astrue, No. 12-11790, 2013 WL 1747807, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2013) 

(Grand, M.J.) (citation omitted). 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her condition has worsened since the 

date of the prior decision to such a degree that she is no longer capable of engaging in substantial 

gainful activity. The denial of Plaintiff’s Motion is warranted on this basis alone. Nevertheless, 

the Court will address the arguments set forth by Plaintiff in her Motion, as some of them 

challenge the ALJ’s reasoning cited above. 

2. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC 

Plaintiff generally challenges the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

perform the full range of sedentary work. (Docket no. 13 at 15.) In doing so, Plaintiff 

specifically challenges the ALJ’s findings, or lack thereof, on four distinct issues. (Id. at 15-21.) 

 a. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Activities of Daily Living 

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff has only a mild limitation 

in performing her activities of daily living (ADLs). (Docket no. 13 at 15-16.) To support this 

argument, Plaintiff cites the opinion of her treating therapist, Krystal LePoudre-Johnston, 

Limited License Master Social Worker (LLMSW), that Plaintiff had extreme restrictions of her 

activities of daily living and extreme difficulty in maintaining social functioning; that Plaintiff 

suffered from a complete inability to function independently outside the area of her home due to 

panic attacks; and that Plaintiff had deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace resulting 

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in frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. (Id. (citing TR 1058).) Additionally, 

Plaintiff points out that in her function report, dated January 6, 2013, she reported being in 

constant pain and on medications that make her sleep and forget things, that she needed help 

getting dressed, got dizzy in the shower, needed help preparing food, and did not do house or 

yard work because it tired her out and caused severe pain. (Id. at 16 (citing TR 328-31).) 

Plaintiff claims that the evidence cited above shows that her activities of daily living are greatly 

limited. (Id.) 

The ALJ made the finding that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in performing activities of 

daily living as part of his determination that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe at 

step two of the sequential evaluation process. (TR 109.) In making this finding, the ALJ 

reasoned that Plaintiff is able to handle all of her self-care requirements, citing Plaintiff’s 

medical record of her December 12, 2011 appointment at the Mary Washington Heart Failure 

Clinic, in which physician’s assistant Elisa Carter assessed that Plaintiff could “perform all of 

her ADLs without difficulty, but ha[d] to do so slowly and with care due to her lower back pain. 

(TR 109 (citing TR 437).) The ALJ continued to rely on this objective medical evidence in 

formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, particularly in evaluating Plaintiff’s back condition and in assigning 

little weight to Plaintiff’s credibility. (TR 111, 113.) The ALJ’s reliance on this evidence was 

not improper. 

In making this argument, Plaintiff essentially points to evidence in the record that could 

support a contrary determination with regard to the severity of her limitation in performing 

ADLs and seemingly invites the Court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment 

for that of the ALJ; but it is not the Court’s role to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See 

Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681 (citation omitted). While the evidence cited by Plaintiff tends to 

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support Plaintiff’s assertions, there is also substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. 

Therefore, this issue falls within the ALJ’s zone of choice, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied with 

regard to this issue. 

 b. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Back Condition 

Plaintiff’s subsequent argument suffers from the same fatal flaw. Plaintiff argues that the 

ALJ erred in finding that her back condition had not been shown to cause more than a mild 

interference in her ability to work. (Docket no. 13 at 16-17.) Plaintiff then sets forth record 

evidence that supports her position. (Id.) For example, Plaintiff points out that on December 29, 

2011, Timothy Cannon, M.D. noted that Plaintiff had a history of severe disc disease (Id. at 16 

(citing TR 999).) She also points out that a September 12, 2011 MRI of her lumbar spine 

showed disc herniation impinging on the nerve root.1

 (Id. (citing TR 580).) Plaintiff adds that 

she was hospitalized for her back pain a few months later. (Id. at 17.) Additionally, Plaintiff 

cites to her hearing testimony that her back pain registered at an eight to nine on a scale of one to 

ten and that it required her to lie down and elevate her feet for seven to eight hours a day. (Id. 

(citing TR 166-67).) Plaintiff further cites the opinion of her primary care physician, Shadiqul 

Hoque, M.D., who opined that Plaintiff suffered from severe cervical and lumbar pain, could 

stand for less than fifteen minutes and sit for thirty minutes, needed to change position more than 

once every two hours, and could work for fifteen minutes per day, among other things. (Id. 

(citing TR 1064).) 

A review of the ALJ’s decision reveals that the ALJ considered the record evidence cited 

by Plaintiff and even cited to some of it in reaching his conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s back 

                                                            

1

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “diminished” the results of the MRI, presumably by stating in his decision that the 

results “revealed [a] L5-S1 small right paracentral disc herniation impinging upon the right S1 nerve root. The MRI 

also revealed mild degenerative change of the facets.” (Docket no. 13 at 16 (citing TR 111, 580).) But a review of 

the MRI report reveals that the ALJ recited the MRI results in his decision almost word for word. Plaintiff’s 

argument lacks merit. 

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condition. (TR 110-11.) But in reaching his determination that Plaintiff’s back condition had 

not been known to cause more than a mild interference in her ability to work, the ALJ relied 

upon substantial evidence contrary to Plaintiff’s position, and he supported his determination 

with several citations to the record. (TR 111.) For example, the ALJ noted that despite 

Plaintiff’s ongoing back pain, she was able to perform all of her activities of daily living without 

difficulty. (TR 111 (citing TR 437).) He reasoned that the results of an August 18, 2011 x-ray of 

Plaintiff’s spine noted that Plaintiff’s back pain was unexplained. (TR 111 (citing TR 429).) 

The ALJ also cited the results of Plaintiff’s September 12, 2011 MRI: “[a] L5-S1 small right 

paracentral disc herniation impinging upon the right S1 nerve root” and a “mild degenerative 

change of the facets.” (TR 111 (citing TR 580).) The ALJ further pointed out that on June 25, 

2012, Plaintiff rated her pain level at a three to five out of ten and that a July 14, 2012 x-ray of 

Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed no acute osseous abnormality. (TR 111 (citing TR 392, 425).) 

In this instance, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s “back 

condition has not been shown to cause more than a mild interference in [her] ability to work and 

does not cause limitations inconsistent with sedentary work.” (See TR 111.) Again, where there 

is substantial evidence to support both Plaintiff’s and the ALJ’s positions, the issue falls within 

the ALJ’s zone of choice. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument fails with regard to the ALJ’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s back condition. 

 c. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Mental Health 

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ inaccurately addressed Plaintiff’s mental condition. 

(Docket no. 13 at 17-20.) In doing so, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s statement that [o]n 

October 16, 2013, the claimant indicated that she had less panic attacks since her medications 

were increased and she was feeling happy.” (Id. at 17-18 (citing TR 112 (citing TR 1092-1101) 

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(emphasis added)).) Plaintiff argues that there is no indication in the medical records cited by 

the ALJ that she was “feeling happy,” and that the records indicate quite the opposite – that 

Plaintiff was experiencing hopelessness, helplessness, crying spells and suicidal ideations. (Id. at 

18.) In fact, “feeling happy” is listed as one of the goals of Plaintiff’s mental health treatment. 

(TR 1101.) Defendant concedes the ALJ’s error in this instance (docket no. 16 at 23-24), and the 

Court agrees that the ALJ’s interpretation of this portion of Plaintiff’s medical records is 

erroneous. The Court finds, however, that this error, standing alone, does not warrant remand. 

Plaintiff also argues that “the ALJ diminishes the fact that the plaintiff states that she has 

been having less panic attacks since her medication was increased.” (Docket no. 13 at 18.) 

Plaintiff’s argument is counterintuitive as written but becomes understandable upon considering 

Plaintiff’s subsequent argument that even though her panic attacks may be less frequent, she is 

still experiencing them every day. (Id.) Apparently, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ diminished the 

fact that Plaintiff experiences panic attacks by considering Plaintiff’s statement to her mental 

health provider that her panic attacks decreased with increased medication (see TR 1092) and 

relying upon that statement in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit; the 

ALJ’s consideration of and reliance upon this objective medical evidence was appropriate. 

Additionally, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff seemingly began 

receiving mental health treatment in an effort to obtain social security benefits because her 

treating records indicated that one of the goals of treatment was for Plaintiff to work on getting 

SSI and Medicaid. (Docket no. 13 at 19, 20 (citing TR 112 (citing TR 1082)).) Plaintiff argues 

that the underlying reason for that goal is because she is disabled and unable to work and that the 

goal was set as part of her standard mental health treatment. (Id. at 20.) As Defendant points 

out, however, the ALJ’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s treatment goals and his reliance upon that 

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interpretation in discounting the severity of Plaintiff’s mental health condition is not erroneous 

under Sixth Circuit precedent. (Docket no. 16 at 24-25 (citing Covucci v. Apfel, 31 F. App’x 

909, 912-13 (6th Cir. 2002)).) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument fails with regard to this issue.2 

After a careful review of the record, including the treatment notes cited by Plaintiff, the Court 

finds that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental health conditions are non-severe and 

that they had not changed since the prior decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

 d. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Leg Pain, Swelling, 

 Numbness, and Need to Elevate her Feet 

Finally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to address Plaintiff’s leg pain, swelling, 

numbness, and need to frequently elevate her feet for extended periods of time. (Docket no. 13 

at 21.) Plaintiff is partially incorrect. The ALJ specifically acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony 

that her back pain requires her to lie down and elevate her feet for seven to eight hours a day and 

that she also experiences swelling of the feet. (TR 111.) The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s 

testimony to be incredible because the treatment records and examination reports did not 

mention such a need to lie down and elevate her feet. (TR 113.) Additionally, the ALJ 

acknowledged Dr. Hoque’s indication that Plaintiff suffered from Type II diabetes with 

neuropathy. (TR 111.) Plaintiff is correct, however, that the ALJ did not mention her leg pain. 

But his failure to do so does not constitute reversible error, as an ALJ need not discuss every 

piece of evidence in the record. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th 

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s argument fails with regard to this issue.

 

                                                            

2

 Plaintiff also argues that the prior ALJ erred in considering Plaintiff’s testimony that she could not afford mental 

health treatment. (Docket no. 13 at 19.) The prior ALJ’s decision is not under review in the instant appeal; thus, the 

Court will not consider Plaintiff’s argument in this regard. 

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3. The ALJ’s Assessment of the Medical Opinion Evidence

 a. Plaintiff’s Treating Physician 

 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 by failing to 

accord adequate weight to the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician. (Docket no. 13 at 21-22.) 

Plaintiff does not name the treating physician to whom she refers or discuss his or her opinion or 

the weight assigned to the opinion by the ALJ; rather, the focal point of Plaintiff’s argument is 

the weight that the ALJ assigned to the doctors employed by the State Disability Determination 

Services, Daniel Blake, Ph.D. and Muhammad Khalid, M.D. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 

the ALJ erred in according more weight to their opinions than those of her treating physician 

where neither of them spoke with her or examined her, and they did not review her entire 

medical record. Plaintiff expounds that at the time they reviewed her medical record, there were 

only five exhibits in the record as compared to the fifteen exhibits, which included four hundred 

additional pages of medical records, at the time of the ALJ’s decision. 

 “An administrative law judge may give more weight to the opinions of examining or 

consultative sources where the treating physician's opinion is not well-supported by the objective 

medical records.” Dyer v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 568 F. App'x 422, 428 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2013)). As discussed above, 

Plaintiff does not name her treating physician or address his opinion in relation to this argument; 

nevertheless, seeing as the only physician’s opinion in the record is that of Dr. Hoque, and 

Plaintiff refers to Dr. Hoque as one of her treating physicians in her brief (see docket no. 13 at 

14), the Court will address his opinion here. 

 The nature and extent of Dr. Hoque’s treatment of Plaintiff is unclear; however, on 

January 14, 2014, Dr. Hoque completed three medical statements regarding Plaintiff’s diabetes, 

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coronary artery disease, and cervical and lumbar pain. (TR 1062-64.) In each of the statements, 

Dr. Hoque opined that Plaintiff could work fifteen minutes per day, stand for less than fifteen 

minutes at a time, sit for thirty minutes at a time, lift five pounds on an occasional basis but not 

at all frequently, and occasionally balance. The ALJ discussed Dr. Hoque’s opinion in his 

decision and assigned it little weight because it was inconsistent with the evidence as a whole, 

reasoning further that there was no evidence suggesting Plaintiff’s inability to perform the 

exertional requirements of sedentary work, let alone the ability to work no more than fifteen 

minutes daily. (TR 111-12.) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Hoque’s 

opinion until her reply brief, in response to Defendant’s argument that the ALJ”s assessment was 

proper. (Docket no. 17 at 2.) Plaintiff argues that Dr. Hoque’s opinions are consistent with her 

testimony and the medical records, except for Dr. Khalid’s opinion, which was only based on 

one third of the medical exhibits. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, does not develop this conclusory 

argument or support it with citations to the record evidence. Plaintiff does not sufficiently assert 

error with regard to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Hoque’s opinion, and the Court finds none. The 

ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion on the basis that it is 

inconsistent with the record evidence is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, under 

Dyer, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by crediting the non-examining physician’s opinion 

over that of her treating physician, fails. 

 b. Plaintiff’s Treating Therapist 

 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in giving no weight to the opinion of her 

treating therapist, Krystal LePoudre-Johnston. (Docket no. 13 at 22-23.) According to 

Plaintiff’s medical records, Ms. LePoudre-Johnston, a Limited License Master Social Worker 

with Development Centers, Inc., met with Plaintiff twice in late 2013. (TR 1080-86, 1092-

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1101.) On January 9, 2014, Ms. LePoudre-Johnston completed a Medical Statement Concerning 

Depression with Anxiety, OCT, PTSD or Panic Disorder with regard to Plaintiff’s impairments, 

in which she opined that Plaintiff had an extreme restriction in activities of daily living, extreme 

difficulty in maintaining social functioning, deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace, 

repeated episodes of deterioration or decomposition in work or work-like settings, and a 

complete inability to function independently outside the area of her home due to panic attacks. 

(TR 1058.) Ms. LePoudre-Johnston also opined, among other things, that Plaintiff’s abilities to 

carry out very short and simple instructions; to perform activities within a schedule, maintain 

regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; and to complete a normal 

workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, were 

extremely impaired. (TR 1059.) Plaintiff argues that, “Krystal LePoudre-Johnston’s medical 

statement should be given great weight because she has had regular appointments with the 

plaintiff to have personal knowledge of the plaintiff’s consistent complaints of her symptoms, 

had been seeing the plaintiff on a regular basis for over a year, is a Limited License Master 

Social Worker, and her opinion was not only based on her interactions with the plaintiff, but 

evaluations and diagnoses from ‘acceptable medical sources’ that were apart [sic] of the 

treatment team members.” (Docket no. 13 at 23.) 

 Limited License Master Social Workers are not “acceptable medical sources” under the 

Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). Opinions from sources that are not 

considered “acceptable medical sources” are important and should be evaluated when assessing 

the severity of an individual’s impairments and the impact those impairments have on the 

individual’s ability to function. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d); SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 

2329939, at *2, *3 (Aug. 9, 2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ is not required to accord those 

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opinions any special weight or consideration as is required with the opinions of doctors. Taylor 

v. Comm’r, No. 11-46, 2012 WL 1029299, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R § 

404.1513(d)(1)). Social Security Ruling 06-03p states that there are certain factors an ALJ may 

weigh when reviewing opinions from non-acceptable medical sources, such as the nature and 

extent of the relationship between the source and the individual, how well the source explains the 

opinion, the source’s specialty or area of expertise, the degree to which the source presents 

relevant evidence to support his or her opinion, whether the opinion is consistent with other 

evidence, and any other factors that tend to support or refute the opinion. 2006 WL 2329939, at 

*4-5. 

 Here, the ALJ assigned no weight to the opinions of Ms. LePoudre-Johnston because she 

was not an acceptable medical source and because her findings were inconsistent with the 

evidence of record. (TR 112.) Additionally, the ALJ reasoned that Ms. LePoudre-Johnston had 

extremely limited treatment history with Plaintiff and that she relied exclusively upon Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints. (TR 112.) The ALJ considered the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s 

relationship with Ms. LePoudre-Johnston and the consistency of Ms. LePoudre-Johnston’s 

opinion with the other record evidence. Since the ALJ was not required to accord Ms. LePoudreJohnston’s opinion any special weight, and because he considered certain factors, Plaintiff’s 

argument with regard to the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. LePoudre-Johnston’s opinion fails. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [13] is 

DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [16] is GRANTED. 

Dated: September 26, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub__ 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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 PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Order was served upon counsel of record on this date. 

 

Dated: September 26, 2016 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager 

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