[Cite as State v. LaRosa , 2020-Ohio-160.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 2018-T-0097 - vs - : JACOB R. LaROSA, : Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. Case No. 2015 CR 00942.

Jud g ment: Affirmed.

Dennis Watkins , Trumbull County Prosecutor; Christopher Becker and Ashleigh Musick , Assistant Prosecutors, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 1 60 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481-1092 ( For Plaintiff-Appellee )

. Lynn Maro , Maro & Schoenike, Co., 7081 West Boulevard, Suite 4, Youngsto wn, OH 44512 ( For Defendant-Appellant )

.

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Jacob R. LaRosa (“LaRosa”), appeals a judgment in th e Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, sentencing him to a prison term of life without parole, to be served consecutively with three other pri son terms. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. {¶2} The following facts and procedure are supported by the record i n this

matter:2 {¶3} On the morning of March 31, 2015, 15-year-old LaRosa was releas ed from the Juvenile Justice Center (“JJC”) after serving time in deten tion for a probation violation. According to his own account, he met with friends and began dri nking excessively. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., LaRosa entered the house of the victim , 94-year-old Marie Belcastro, at 509 Cherry Street in Niles, Ohio. Mrs. Belcastro ’s house was directly across from LaRosa’s house and was separated by an alleyway. LaRosa w as later identified by video surveillance, which was pro vided by a neighbor, walking f rom the direction of the victim’s house with a bottle of alcohol and proceeding down the alleyway around the time of the alleged crimes. The neighbor who provided video surveil lance to investigators also found an empty whiskey bottle in his yard that he believed was removed from Mrs.

Belcastro’s home. {¶4} Thereafter, LaRosa arrived home in a nearly incoherent state wi th blood on his shirt, shoes, and glasses. He made claims to multiple fami ly members that he was attacked by other juveniles who forced him to consume alcohol a nd other substances at gunpoint. LaRosa’s mother call ed for help. Niles Police Offic er Mobley and EMT personnel arrived at the residence to attend to LaRosa’s injuri es resulting from the alleged

assault. {¶5} As LaRosa was being loaded into the ambulance, Officer Mobley w as alerted to a commotion at 509 Cherry Street, adjacent to LaRosa ’s home. One of Mrs. Belcastro’s daughters waved down the paramedics at the LaRosa r esidence in a panic after discovering that the Belcastro residence had been broken into through the side door. Inside the home, a blood trail was found throughout the house f rom the living room through the hallway. A large secretary desk was also toppled o ver and blocking the front3 door from the inside. Mrs. Belcastro’s deceased body was disco vered by Officer Mobley and her daughter on the floor in the first bedroom of her home, naked from the waist down and twisted awkwardly into a fetal position. She was severely beaten, and her undergarments were found in the living room. Outside the house , police discovered liquor bottles, including one liquor bottle that had blood on it. {¶6} LaRosa was taken to St. Joseph Hospital, where his blood alcoho l level was determined to be nearly three times the legal limit for an adul t. He had no discernable injuries to explain the blood on his body. Blood was also foun d by the attending nurse on LaRosa’s underwear and his penis. LaRosa’s underwear was seize d by investigators. LaRosa was interviewed by a detective. His statements were err atic and, at times,

incoherent due to his intoxication. LaRosa was not read his Miranda rights prior to this

interview. {¶7} LaRosa was charged in a complaint of delinquency on April 9, 20 15, with four counts alleging crimes involving LaRosa breaking into the home of Mrs. Belcastro, beating her to death, and attempting to rape her. The case was filed in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, as Case No. 20 15-JD-177. Juvenile Division Proceedings {¶8} On the same day the complaint of delinquency was filed, the sta te of Ohio filed a motion to transfer the case from the juvenile division to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas General Division, seeking to charge LaRosa as a n adult. Thereafter, he waived a probable cause hearing, and the matter was set for an amenability hearing to determine whether LaRosa, who was 15 years old at the time o f the alleged crimes,4 should be transferred to the general division and tried as an a dult. The amenability hearing was conducted over the course of four days, beginning o n November 16, 2015. {¶9} At the hearing, the juvenile division heard testimony from, int er alia, the coroner that conducted the autopsy of Mrs. Belcastro, various d octors who had evaluated LaRosa and his medical history, detectives and law enforcement officers who investigated the homicide of Mrs. Belcastro, juveniles who had interactions with LaRosa at JJC before and after the homicide, and members of LaRosa’s family. {¶10} LaRosa’s psychological and behavioral history were presented in great detail at the amenability hearing. Three experts presented tes timony and reports on his history of treatment, which had been mostly unsuccessful. LaRo sa had been in treatment—either out-patient or within a structured facility—st arting at approximately 8 years of age. He had been prescribed various medications for i ssues such as bipolar disorder, ADHD, defiance disorders, and mood disorders. {¶11} After closing arguments, the juvenile division issued an order granting the state’s motion to transfer the case to the general division for criminal prosecution as an adult. In the order, the court individually addressed each of the statutory factors—R.C. 2152.12(D) in favor of transfer, and R.C. 2152.12(E) weighing a gainst transfer—before concluding as follows: Based on the totality of the facts, relevant testimony, evidenc e, and after due consideration to both sets of factors contained in OR C Section 2152 and given [sic] appropriate weight to all evidence presented and appropriate, as well as serious concerns for the safety of the community given the history of fear his family lived und er which extended to the neighbors and community and the brutality and violence of the alleged offense, THE COURT FINDS that the facto rs for transfer greatly outweigh the factors against transfer. Th ere are reasonable grounds to believe that the Juvenile is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in a facility designed for the care[,] s upervision,5 and rehabilitation of delinquent children, and that the safety of the community requires that Jacob LaRosa be subject to adult sancti ons. General Division Proceedings {¶12} Following the transfer, LaRosa was indicted by the Trumbull Cou nty Grand Jury on December 16, 2015, and charged with four counts: Aggrav ated Murder (F1) in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B); Aggravated Burglary (F1) in viola tion of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) and/or (2); Aggravated Robbery (F1) in violation of R.C. 2911.0 1(A)(1) and/or (3); and Attempted Rape (F2) in violation R.C. 2923.02(A)&(E)(1) and 290 7.02(A)(2)&(B). {¶13} On December 14, 2016, LaRosa filed a motion for determination o f competency to stand trial, which was voluntarily withdrawn on A ugust 4, 2017. On June 23, 2017, LaRosa filed a motion for a bifurcated trial, which w as denied on July 31, 2017, and again before trial on February 12, 2018. Neither of these issues are subject to the present appeal. Suppression Motion {¶14} On March 8, 2017, LaRosa filed a motion to suppress various evi dence obtained during the investigation of the homicide. The evidenc e sought to be suppressed that is at issue in the present appeal is as follows: A. Fingernail scrapings from LaRosa taken at the hospital. B. LaRosa’s socks, underwear, and a washcloth used to wipe his groin at the hospital. The motion also sought to suppress statements obtained from LaR osa, as well as the fruits of any unlawful arrest, search, seizure, and interrogati on. {¶15} A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on December 28, 20 17, and on February 1, 2018, the trial court issued its judgment with f indings of fact and6 conclusions of law overruling the motion. The court found that there was no expectation of privacy in LaRosa’s hospital room or in the items removed fr om LaRosa by hospital staff after he voluntarily presented there purporting to be the victim of an assault. Further, the court found that the warrant authorizing a “hand swab” of L aRosa was sufficient in its description to authorize fingernail scrapings, because “[t]he d escription of a hand swab is such that an officer can without reasonable effort identify the place intended to be swabbed- i.e. the hand. Fingernails are located on the hand.” {¶16} Further, the trial court denied suppression of the statements m ade by LaRosa in the hospital room because he was not subject to custo dial interrogation and, therefore, did not need to be advised of his Miranda rights. The court held that any “volunteered unforeseeable incriminating statement unforeseen t o police” made by LaRosa to police and hospital staff alike was not subject to su ppression. Trial and Sentencing {¶17} Voir dire commenced for trial in the matter on February 12, 201 8. After one day of voir dire, LaRosa entered a no contest plea to all charg es on February 13, 2018. The trial court advised LaRosa of the potential penalties for e ach charge, including the Tier III sex offender registration requirement, and found him g uilty of all charges. LaRosa was also referred by the court to the Adult Supervision Departm ent for a presentence evaluation, and the court set the matter for a mitigation heari ng on April 5and April 6,

2018. {¶18} At the mitigation hearing, many of the same witnesses called in the juvenile amenability proceeding testified: the coroner for Trumbull Coun ty, doctors familiar with both LaRosa and institutional resources, one of the detectives who investigated the7 homicide, juveniles who discussed the homicide with LaRosa at J JC, and members of LaRosa’s family. {¶19} Dr. Humphrey Germaniuk, the coroner and medical examiner for Tr umbull County, performed Mrs. Belcastro’s autopsy. Dr. Germaniuk test ified that Mrs. Belcastro was approximately four feet, seven to eight inches tall and wei ghed approximately 80-85 pounds at the time of her death. He stated that she was beaten so severely, he could not even opine as to how many times she was struck in the head by h er assailant. He further testified that her eyes had been ruptured inside of her head du e to the beating, and the bones in her face and the top of her skull had been crushed rat her than merely broken. A fragmented hearing aid was still compacted into one of her ea r canals, and portions of brain matter were visible through the crushed skull portions in the autopsy photographs.

Dr. Germaniuk determined the manner of Mrs. Belcastro’s death w as homicide, and the

cause of death was blunt craniocerebral trauma. {¶20} A detective with the Niles Police Department testified as to th e scene of the homicide at the Belcastro residence. On the outside, a side do or to Mrs. Belcastro’s home was broken into, which was photographed and submitted as eviden ce. Inside the home, the detective described three different places where the crimes listed in the complaint had been committed. In the living room, there was a massive amount of blood on the couch, floor, and sprayed on the walls and lamp. A flashlight—believe d to be used in the attack— was visible in photographs of the living room, as well as Mrs. Belcastro’s sweatpant s and undergarments on the living room floor. In the hallway between the living room and bedroom, a second location contained a massive amount of blood, as well as blood splatter on the floorboard and wall. In addition, the detectiv e confirmed the coroner’s8 testimony that brain matter was visible on the floor and spraye d across the wall, as well as a broken hearing aid and a piece of Mrs. Belcastro’s skull. In the first bedroom outside the hallway, a third location contained a massive amount of blo od on a bed, as well as

the victim deceased on the floor. She was naked from the waist down, twisted into a fetal position on the floor, and the entire front of her head and fac e was crushed, as the coroner’s testimony and photographs confirmed. {¶21} At the conclusion of the mitigation hearing, LaRosa was permitt ed to address the trial court. Also, each of the victim’s two daught ers were given the chance to address the court. Each indicated how the particularly brut al circumstances of their mother’s murder has impacted them, their families, and the comm unity. One of the daughters specifically asked the trial court to impose the maxi mum sentence. The state recommended the maximum sentence of life without the possibilit y of parole, as well as for all sentences to be served consecutively. {¶22} The trial court reviewed, among other things, a presentence rep ort from the Department of Adult Probation, the extensive psychological asse ssments and medical information provided for LaRosa, victim impact statements, LaRo sa’s allocution statement, the transcript of the juvenile amenability hearing, and the Miller factors for sentencing juveniles. The presentence report ordered by the co urt contained an Ohio Risk Assessment System rating of “very high” with regard to LaR osa’s risk of recidivism. The report also stated that LaRosa had not only struggled with expressing true remorse, but had repeatedly bragged about his crimes to other inmates wh ile in JJC, despite having been advised by his counsel to show remorse.9 {¶23} In considering all of the aforementioned, the trial court order ed the following sentence for each charge: Aggravated Murder (F1)- Life in prison without parole; Aggravated Burglary (F1)- 11 years; Aggravated Robbery (F1)- 11 years; Attempted Rape (F2)- 8 years. {¶24} The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutivel y, stating— among other things—LaRosa showed a lack of remorse, the harm wa s so great and unusual that a single prison term does not adequately reflect t he seriousness of the conduct, and consecutive terms are necessary to protect the pub lic and punish him.

LaRosa was also classified as a Tier III sex offender with the most stringent, lifetime reporting requirements. {¶25} LaRosa filed a timely notice of appeal and raises seven assignm ents of error for our review. For clarity and convenience, we combine and consider the assignments out of order. {¶26} LaRosa’s first two assignments of error challenge the juvenile division’s decision to transfer the matter to the general division. LaRos a’s first assignment of error

states: Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 1: The juvenile court abused its discretion and violated Jacob LaRosa’s due process rights w hen it determined Jacob was not amenable to treatment in the juveni le system, in violation of R.C. §2152.12(b), the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Arti cle I, Section 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶27} During an amenability determination, the juvenile division may transfer jurisdiction if it finds, inter alia, that the child is not ame nable to rehabilitation within the10 juvenile justice system and that, to ensure the safety of the c ommunity, the child should be subject to adult sanctions. R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). R.C. 2152. 12(D) lists the factors in favor of transferring jurisdiction: (1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psycholo gical harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act. (2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim d ue to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the phy sical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim. (3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the ac t charged. (4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or a s a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity. (5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or u nder the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act cha rged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated tha t the child possessed a firearm. (6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adju dication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community con trol sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudic ation or conviction. (7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system. (8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically ma ture enough for the transfer. (9) There is not sufficient tim e to rehabilitate the child with in the juvenile system. To the contrary, R.C. 2152.12(E) lists the factors in favor of retaining jurisdiction: (1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged. (2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing t he act charged.11 (3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, o r, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influ ence or coercion of another person. (4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or prop erty, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature wo uld occur, in allegedly committing the act charged. (5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child. (6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologicall y mature enough for the transfer. (7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability. (8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within t he juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile syst em provides a reasonable assurance of public safety. In addition to the factors specifically listed in the statute, the juvenile court is instructed to consider “any other factor bearing on whether the child is amen able to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental examination of the child by a public or private agency or a person qualified to make the examination.” R.C. 2152.12(C). “The record shall indicate the specific factors that were applicable and that the court we ighed.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). {¶28} “[T]he juvenile court enjoys wide latitude to retain or relinqu ish jurisdiction,

and the ultimate decision lies within its sound discretion.” State v. Watson , 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95 (1989), citing State v. Carmichael , 35 Ohio St.2d 1 (1973), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. A juvenile court’s amenability determinat ion under R.C. 2152.12 will

not be reversed unless the court has abused its discretion. See State v. Douglas , 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 37 (1985); see also Carmichael , supra. {¶29} In the matter sub judice, the juvenile court stated each factor contained in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) individually and engaged in an analysis regarding each factor.12 Specifically, the court found that seven of the nine factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) weighed in favor of transfer, whereas none of the eight factors in R.C. 21 52.12(E) weighed against transfer, and the court indicated greater weight was given to c ertain factors. {¶30} LaRosa argues on appeal that multiple factors were determined i ncorrectly by the juvenile court and without support in the record. Speci fically, LaRosa contends that factor 8 under R.C. 2152.12(D)—also contained in factor 6 under R.C. 2152.12(E)— relating to whether the juvenile is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for transfer, was decided incorrectly and unsupported by the record. Also, LaRosa argues that factor 7, reg arding whether rehabilitation o f the child can occur in the juvenile system, and factor 9, regarding whether there is suffi cient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system, were erroneously determined b y the court. LaRosa does not assert in his briefing how his due process rights were viol ated by the juvenile court in conducting the amenability hearing. {¶31} Multiple psychologists testified and opined that (1) they did n ot believe LaRosa was mature enough for transfer; (2) untried treatment op tions existed in the juvenile system; and (3) there was adequate time for rehabilita tion in the juvenile system. This testimony alone, however, is not persuasive enough to rend er the trial court’s

decision an abuse of discretion. Each of the doctors acknowled ged that their determinations were only with regard to individual factors for the court to consider and that the juvenile court had the ultimate responsibility to cons ider all of the statutory factors balanced together in making an amenability determination. The undisputed factors still overwhelmingly support transfer to the general division, and th e juvenile court was within its discretion to assign more or less weight to those factors a s applicable. Further, the13 extensive history of unsuccessful or uncompleted treatments ove r nearly a decade of LaRosa’s life, beginning in early childhood, support a finding that he will not be amenable to treatment in the juvenile system before he reaches the age o f 21. {¶32} The court conducting the amen ability hearing is in the best pos ition to assess the statutory factors after hearing the testimony and ev idence. Because the record reflects that the court fulfilled its obligation under R .C. 2152.12(B)(3) in weighing the statutory factors, and because its determination is support ed by competent and credible evidence in the record, we hold that the decision to t ransfer LaRosa to the general division was not an abuse of discretion, nor was it a v iolation of his right to due

process. {¶33} LaRosa’s first assignment of error is without merit. {¶34} LaRosa’s second assignment of error states: Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 2: The decision to transfer the case to the general division was invalid because the amenab ility hearing was conducted in violation of due process when the tria l court permitted introduction and consideration of improper evid ence and improper arguments in violation of the rights and liberties secured by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, 16. {¶35} LaRosa points to five instances of allegedly improper evidence or improper argument during the amenability hearing, which are addressed in dividually and in

combination as follows: [A.] Improper arguments by the state throughout the amenability hearing regarding “lack of remorse” violated the presumption of innocence and interjected improper facts into the hearings. {¶36} “A bindover proceeding has two components: a probable-cause determination and an amenability determination.” State v. Whitterson , 1st Dist. Hamilton14 No. C-110207, 2012-Ohio-2940, ¶19. Here, the hearing on probab le cause was waived by LaRosa. Hence, the juvenile court found there was probable cause that LaRosa committed the charged offenses. Therefore, a presumption of in nocence is not relevant during an amenability determination because the purpose of the amenability determination is establishing whi ch forum will ultimately hear the case—the juvenile division or the general division. Once the proper forum is det ermined, the presumption of innocence applies. {¶37} Further, the remorse of a juvenile offender is regularly discus sed and presented to the court in aid of determining whether the offend er is amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system. See , e.g. , State v. Morgan , 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶8; State v. Moorer, 11th Dist. Geauga Nos. 2001-G-2353 & 2001-G2354, 2003-Ohio-5698, ¶45; State v. D.H. , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26383, 2015-Ohio3259, ¶3; State v. McDonald , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 11228, 1990 WL 78593, *5-6 (June 5, 1990) (expert testified that the offender “never expre ssed any feeling of remorse” over the victim’s death, and the court stated that “[g]enerally , the greater the culpability of the offense, the less amenable will the juvenile be to rehabili tation”); State v. Ferguson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27032, 2017-Ohio-7930, ¶45, ¶94; State v. Anderson , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 14 CAA 05 0034, 2015-Ohio-888, ¶18; In re D.M. , 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L16-1237, L-16-1238, & L-16-1270, 2017-Ohio-8768, ¶23; State v. J.L.S. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-125, 2019-Ohio-4173, ¶72. Therefore, evidenc e pertaining to remorse of an offender is not improper for presentation to a juvenile c ourt during an amenability

determination.15 [B.] Admission of Jacob LaRosa’s statements made at the hospita l for consideration of the statutory factors at the amenability h earing was improper as there was no valid waiver of rights. [C.] The state improperly impeached its own witness during the amenability hearing under the guise of refreshing recollections

. [D.] The state offered facts not in evidence to discredit DYS a nd Dr. Stinson’s testimony. {¶38} “[B]ecause the bindover proceeding is not adjudicative (the juv enile’s guilt or innocence is not at issue), statutory and constitutional que stions concerning the admissibility of evidence are pr emature and need not be address ed.” State v. Whisenant , 127 Ohio App.3d 75, 85 (11th Dist.1998). “Fundamental fairness and due process are not violated by the juvenile court’s failure to rule on or to s uppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of Miranda in this type of proceeding.” Id. {¶39} Further, we agree with our sister districts that a juvenile cou rt conducting a dispositional hearing, including a bindover hearing following a probable cause determination, “may admit evidence that is material and relevan t, including, but not limited to, hearsay, opinion, and documentary evidence.” Juv.R. 34(B)( 2). See in re: B.W. , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0071, 2017-Ohio-9220, ¶46; State v. Williams , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 91CA005054, 1991 WL 231496, *2 (Nov. 6, 1991). {¶40} It was not improper to allow the state to present the recorded audio made by police of LaRosa at the hospital in the context of the amena bility hearing. The juvenile court was permitted to admit evidence that is material and rele vant to LaRosa’s amenability to transfer, including hearsay. Further, none of t he evidence or statements referenced by LaRosa on appeal were cited in the trial court’s analysis in support of or in opposition to transfer, and it does not appear from the juvenil e court’s entry that they were16 weighed by the court in making its determination. Therefore, t he court’s admission of the statements and evidence in the above instances was not improper , and LaRosa was not prejudiced by the admissions. [E.] The juvenile court improperly admitted the testimony and r eport of Dr. Neuhaus and considered his testimony as an expert witnes s. {¶41} As discussed, the juvenile court has broad discretion to admit evidence that is material and relevant during an amenability hearing. It is undisputed that the parties stipulated to Dr. Neuhaus as an expert. He was one of three me dical experts presented to the court. To the extent his testimony offered an opinion n ot contained in his written report—in this case, agreeing with the assessment of another ex pert who offered testimony and a written report to the court—the juvenile court was permitted to receive and consider it, determining the appropriate weight to give it in making an amenability

determination. {¶42} For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not viola te LaRosa’s due process rights when conducting t he amenability hearing. His se cond assignment of error

is without merit. {¶43} LaRosa’s fourth and fifth assignments of error challenge the de cision to deny his motion to suppress evidence. LaRosa’s fourth assignme nt of error states: Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 4: The trial court erred in failing to [sic] items seized by the police on March 31, 2015 f rom appellant, the hospital room of appellant as the seizures were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Oh io Const., art. I, §14. {¶44} LaRosa argues the trial court erred by not prohibiting the stat e from using the items seized by police from the hospital room on March 31, 2015, following the filing and hearing on the motion to suppress the items and evidence.17 {¶45} “An appellate court’s review of the grant or denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003- Ohio-5372, ¶8. “During a hearing on a motion to suppress evide nce, the trial judge acts as the trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to r esolve factual questions and assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Lett , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2008-T-0116, 2009-Ohio-2796, ¶13, citing Burnside , supra , at ¶8. “An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress is bound to accept the trial court’s finding s of fact where they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id. “Once the trial court’s factual determinations are accepted, the appellate court then conducts a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to those facts.” Wickliffe v. Dust , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-129, 2006-Ohio-2017, ¶8, citing State v. Dohner , 11th Dist. No. 2003-P-0059, 2004-Ohio-7242, ¶10. {¶46} “‘While the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly state that the violation of its provisions against unlawful sea rch and seizure will result in suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the violati on, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusion of evidence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment.’” State v. Eggleston , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0068, 2015-Ohio-958, ¶17, quot ing State v. Casey , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-10-090, 2014-Ohio-2586, ¶29, cit ing Weeks v.

United States , 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (overruled) and Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961). “‘The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to violate the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. , quoting Casey , supra , at ¶29. {¶47} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarante es that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, house s, papers, and effects,18 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violat ed, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmatio n, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” “The language of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution is n early identical, and it has been interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court as affording the sam e protection as the

Fourth Amendment.” State v. Mullen , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0018, 2018-Ohio5188, ¶17, citing State v. Hoffman , 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶11, citing State

v. Robinette , 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238-239 (1997). {¶48} Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures conducted wit hout a warrant based on probable cause are unreasonable unless the sea rch falls within an exception to this requirement. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warra ntless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey , 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶18, citing Athens v. Wolf , 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 (1974). A. Improper seizure of Jacob’s socks, washcloth, and underwear. {¶49} The state argues that LaRosa’s socks, underwear, and the washcl oth used by hospital staff to clean blood from his groin were not unlawf ully seized because the seizure was done by a private person—a nurse at the hospital—ra ther than police officers. We agree. {¶50} The trial court’s finding of facts, to which we defer in a revi ew of the suppression hearing, state in pertinent part: Officer Biddlestone who at that time was employed by the Niles Police Department was sent to St. Joseph’s Hospital to secure19 Defendant, who was the suspect in the homicide of Marie Belcast ro. Officer Biddlestone was instructed to secure Defendant and he w as handcuffed as a suspect. Defendant’s underwear and socks were already taken off so that hospital staff could treat Defendant. * * * Furthermore, when Defendant went to use the bathroom, the nurse who was there to administer aid to Defendant, advised Biddlesto ne that there was blood on his groin. The nurse wiped Defendant’s groin clean with hospital property and there was blood on the rag. O fficer Biddlestone retrieved this wash rag, his underwear, and socks f rom hospital staff. {¶51} “[I]f a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched, then the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply. Burneson v. Ohio State Racing Comm. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-925, 2004-Ohio-3313, ¶30, citing State v.

Lane , 4th Dist. Athens No. 97CA47, 1998 WL 159929, *3 (Mar. 11, 199 8), citing Katz , supra . “Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment only provides protection against government action.” Id. at ¶31, citing State v. Henry , 1 Ohio App.3d 126, 127 (1981). “Thus, a seizure by a private person is not prohibited by the F ourth Amendment.” Id. , citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Irvine v. California , 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Burdeau v. McDowell , 256 U.S. 465 (1921); and State v. McDaniel , 44 Ohio App.2d 163 (1975). {¶52} In State v. Drain , the Tenth Appellate District analyzed the issue of seizures of clothing from a suspect repor ting to a hospital as a victim, and stated as follows: It remains a question of first impression in Ohio whether an expectation of privacy persists in clothing or personal effects cut away from a purported robbery victim in a hospital emergency ro om to which he has voluntarily presented himself. Four other state s, however, have addressed the issue, and have concluded that Four th Amendment protection does not apply thereto. In People v. Sutherland (1980), 92 Ill.App.3d 338, the court found that “there is nothing in the record showing that defendant asked or even indi cated that when his clothing was removed at the hospital it was not t o be given to anyone else, or that he otherwise demonstrated an actu al intent to preserve the privacy of his apparel.” Id. at 342.20 In Floyd v. State (1975), 24 Md.App. 363, the court concluded on similar facts that “the bloody clothing was evidence of the sho oting. Inasmuch as it was evidence of a crime, the police had a right to seize it lest it be removed from the hospital emergency room an d destroyed.” Id. at 365. The Floyd court, rather than reaching its conclusion based on expectations of privacy, simply based its decision on exigent circumstances due to the imminent danger th at the clothing would be destroyed or otherwise placed beyond the reach of police.

In State v. Rogers (Mo.App.1979), 585 S.W.2d 498, the court concluded without supplementary reasoning that the police seizu re of clothing from a purported crime victim in an emergency room is reasonable under the circumstances, citing United States v. Chadwick (1977), 433 U.S. 1. The case involving the most detailed reasoning, however, is tha t of Craft v. Commonwealth (Va.1980) 269 S.E.2d 797. The Virginia Supreme Court in Craft followed a rationale based upon the contention that when a purported victim is admitted to a hospit al emergency room, and consents to the removal of his clothing incident to medical treatment, there can remain little expectat ion of privacy against seizure of the removed clothing. The court went even further, and concluded that a bullet removed from a defendant’s body during treatment by the attending surgeon could properly be tur ned over to the police by the doctor without any expectation of pri vacy on the part of the patient. “The defendant had no property right i n the bullet. No search by the officers was required or effected. It was not necessary because the clothing and bullet were not hidden or concealed. The articles lawfully came into the possession of [t he doctor] and, under the circumstances of this case, there was no reason why they should not have been delivered to and received by the officers.” Id. at 800.

State v. Drain , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APA03-351, 1995 WL 765169, *4-5 (De c.29, 1995). {¶53} Applying the law to the trial court’s findings of fact, the sei zure of LaRosa’s clothing was done by a nurse attempting to treat him for allege d injuries. Because there was no government action, the protections of the Fourth Amendme nt are not invoked.21 Likewise, the washcloth with the blood wiped from LaRosa’s groi n was not LaRosa’s property. Therefore, he had no reasonable expectation of priva cy in hospital property. B. Fingernail scrapings outside the warrant authorization. {¶54} LaRosa argues that the scrapings taken from his fingernails whi le at the hospital exceeded the authorization of the search warrant. We disagree. {¶55} The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, bu t upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized .” (Emphasis sic.) “‘The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent genera l searches. * * * [T]he requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searc hes the Framers intended to prohibit.’” State v. Bangera , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2015-G-0021, 2016-Ohio-4596, ¶31, quoting Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79 (1987). “By requiring a particular description of the items to be seized, the Fourth Amendment ‘pr events the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.’” Id. , quoting Marron v. United States , 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). {¶56} “The standard for determining the sufficiency of the descriptio n” for a search warrant “is that ‘“the description is such that the officer wit h a search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.”’” State v. Dalpiaz , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2001-P-0044, 2002-Ohio-7346, ¶17, quoting State v. Pruitt , 97 Ohio App.3d 258, 261 (11th Dist.1994), quoting Steele v. United States , 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).22 {¶57} The dispute in the present matter is whether “hand swabs” encom passes “fingernail scrapings.” We agree with the trial court’s determ ination that it does. The warrant authorized police to search and retrieve evidence from LaRosa’s hands. A reasonable interpretation of that language would include the fi ngernails, as they are attached to and a part of the hand. There is no danger here, a s the Fourth Amendment contemplated, of a seizure of one thing under a warrant describ ing another, or an exercise of discretion by the officer executing the warrant to search wi thout authorization. We agree with the trial court that an analogy can be drawn from th e “description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort a scertain and identify the place intended” standard used to obtain a search warrant for a premise, and the fingernail scrapings in the matter sub judice. {¶58} Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to deny the mot ion to suppress. LaRosa’s fourth assignment of error is without merit. {¶59} LaRosa’s fifth assignment of error states: Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 5: Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a m otion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to warrant when the warran t was based upon improperly obtained statements from Jacob in violation of Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Uni ted States Constitution and Ohio C onst., art. I, §§1, 10 and 16. {¶60} On appeal, LaRosa asserts that trial counsel was ineffective be cause they failed to challenge the search warrant used to obtain the bucca l swab, hand swab, and swab of LaRosa’s penis. LaRosa claims that the statements he m ade at the hospital, which the state agreed not to use at trial, were the basis for the warrant. {¶61} In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel cla im, an appellant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell “below a n objective standard of23 reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises fr om counsel’s performance.” State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus (adop ting the

test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach th e inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defend ant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 143. There is a general presumption that trial counsel’s c onduct is within the broad range of professional assistance. Id. at 142. Debatable trial tactics generally do not constitute deficient performance. State v. Phillips , 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85 (1995). {¶62} In order to show prejudice, the appellant must demonstrate a re asonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the pr oceeding would have been

different. Bradley , supra , at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶63} LaRosa’s challenge to the search warrant is an attack on the af fidavit used to secure the warrant, which contained the statements he made a t the hospital. LaRosa cannot show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to cha llenge the search warrant. {¶64} “The Supreme Court of the United States, in Franks v. Delaware , set forth a two-part test to be applied in addressing such challenge to a ffidavits offered in support

of a search warrant.” Bangera , supra , at ¶55. “First, the defendant must make a preliminary showing that the affiant included in his affidavit false statements that were made deliberately or with reckless disregard for their truth.” Id. ; see also State v. Kidd , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2006-L-193, 2007-Ohio-4113, ¶42. {¶65} “Second, the court must determine if the allegedly false statem ents were necessary to the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause.” Id. , citing Franks , supra ; see24 also State v. Gross , 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, ¶17, quoting United States v.

Karo , 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984) (“after excising tainted information from a supporting affidavit, ‘if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in t he warrant affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid’”) and State v. Jackson , 11th Dist. Lake No. 9-130, 1983 WL 6126, *2 (“The Franks decision also stands for the proposition that if the questioned material is found to be false and is set aside and there remains sufficient content in the affidavit to support a finding of pro bable cause, then the search warrant is valid.”). {¶66} Setting aside the statements made at the hospital, there was st ill overwhelming evidence in the affidavit supporting the judge’s f inding of probable cause

to issue a search warrant. LaRosa had blood on his hands and c lothing, as well as his groin. He presented to the hospital with no injuries justifyin g the blood. A neighbor had video evidence of LaRosa near the victim’s property around the suspected time of the crimes. Following the issuance of a valid warrant and consent from the owner of the residence, police recovered clothing, shoes, and glasses belong ing to LaRosa which had a substance on them believed to be blood. All of these facts, which were stated in the affidavit submitted for the search warrant, support a finding o f probable cause, even without the statements LaRosa made at the hospital. {¶67} Because LaRosa has not established that the result of the proce edings would have been different had counsel challenged the affidavit, he cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. His fifth assignme nt of error is without merit. {¶68} LaRosa’s seventh assignment of error challenges the voluntary n ature of his no contest plea. It states:25 Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 7: Jacob’s plea was not knowingly intelligently and volunt arily entered because the tri al court failed to advise Jacob of sex offender registration, requiremen ts at the time of the plea rending [sic] the plea involuntary in viol ation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. {¶69} “‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea m ust be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of th ose points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and

the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Gensert , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0084, 2016- Ohio-1163, ¶8, quoting State v. Engle , 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “In order for a plea to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, a defe ndant must be ‘informed in a reasonable manner at the time of entering his guilty plea of hi s rights to a trial by jury and to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrim ination, and his right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf.’” Id., quoting State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 478 (1981), interpreting Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). {¶70} Criminal Rule 11(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of gu ilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following: (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the impositi on of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.26 (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. {¶71} The Ohio Supreme Court has instructed that a trial court must s trictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C) as it relates to the waiver of consti tutional rights. State v. Veney , 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶18, citing State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479 (1981). Failure to literally comply with the language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) does not, however, invalidate a plea agreement so long as the record demonstrates that the trial court explained or referred to the constitutional rights “‘“ in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant .”’” State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶14, quoting Veney , supra , at ¶27 (emphasis sic), quoting Ballard , supra , at paragraph two of the syllabus. “[W]ith respect to the nonconstitutional notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and 11 (C)(2)(b), substantial compliance is sufficient.” Veney , supra , at ¶14, citing State v. Stewart , 51 Ohio St.2d 86 (1977). {¶72} The Ohio Supreme Court has held “an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to other po rtions of the record, including the written plea, in determining whether the defendan t was fully informed of the right in question.” State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶25. {¶73} Contrary to LaRosa’s contention, the record reflects he was adv ised by the trial court about the sex offender registration requirements pr ior to pleading no contes t. The plea agreement LaRosa signed at the plea hearing specifical ly stated the27 requirements for Tier III sex offender status. Further, the co urt made the following statement before the plea was accepted: The Court: Do you understand the serious—and you also have to be classified as a Tier III sex offender. Do you understand th e penalties involved for each one of these crimes? LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: And the seriousness of the offenses? LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor.

* * * The Court: How do you ple ad to the amended indictment?

LaRosa: No contest. The Court: I’m showing you this document called Finding on No Contest Plea to Amended Indictment, is that your signature? LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor. The Court: Did you sign that freely and voluntarily? LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor. The Court: Any promises or threats made to you to sign this document? LaRosa: No, Your Honor. The Court: Do you understand what’s contained in this document ? LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor. The Court: And what I’ve explained to you? LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor. The Court: Do you have any questions whatsoever? LaRosa: No, Your Honor. The Court: Do you still wish to plead no contest?28 LaRosa: Yes, Your Honor. {¶74} The Finding on No Contest Plea to Amended Indictment signed by LaRosa

states: I understand that I am pleading no contest to, and will be foun d guilty to, a sexually oriented offense in Count 4. I also understand t hat upon conviction I will be classified as a Tier III Sex Offender . I understand that upon conviction (or release from prison, if applicable), I will be required to register, in person, with th e sheriff of the county(ies) where I establish residence, employment, and education. I will be required to verify my place of residence, employment and education, in person, with the sheriff every 90 days for life. I understand that as a Tier III Sex Offender, I am su bject to community notification. [Emphasis sic.] {¶75} Any suggestion that LaRosa was unaware that he was required to register as a Tier III sex offender is unsupported by the record. The t rial court duly advised LaRosa of the sex offender registration requirement at the time of his no contest plea, which is also contained in the record in the written plea he si gned. {¶76} LaRosa has not established that his no contest plea was entered involuntarily. His seventh assignment of error is without meri t. {¶77} LaRosa’s third and sixth assignments of error challenge the sen tence LaRosa received following the no contest plea and mitigation he aring. {¶78} LaRosa’s third assignment of error states: Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 3: The trial court erred when it imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole based upon factual findings which are inconsistent with the requireme nts [sic] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const., art. I, §9. {¶79} LaRosa argues his sentence of life in prison without parole vio lated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to th e Eighth and Fourteenth29 Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec tion 9 of the Ohio Constitution. He relies on the “evolving standards” regarding juvenile offenders following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 (2005), syllabus (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid impositi on of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes wer e committed.”); Graham

v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (“The Constitution prohibits the impos ition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not comm it homicide.”); and Miller

v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“ Graham , Roper , and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).

LaRosa also cites Justice Frankfurter’s 1950 dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz , 339 U.S. 56 (1950), a case which was overruled 50 years ago and dea lt with the reasonableness of a search warrant in an adult forgery proceedi ng. We find Rabinowitz wholly inapposite to the present proceeding. {¶80} “The court hearing an appeal [of a felony sentence] shall revie w the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may va cate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing * * * if it clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or * * * [t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b).30 {¶81} “‘A punishment does not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, if it be not so greatly disproportiona te to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.’” State v. Dioneff , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0063, 2007-Ohio-3387, ¶79, quoting State v. Chaffin , 30 Ohio St.2d 13 (1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. “‘Eighth Amendment violations are rare and instances of cruel and unusual punishment are limited to those punishment s, which, under the circumstances, would be considered shocking to any reasonable p erson.’” Id. , quoting

State v. Rhodes , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-089, 2001-Ohio-8693. “Sentences t hat fall within the statutory range cannot amount to cruel and unusual p unishment.” State v.

Lane , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3144, 2014-Ohio-2010, ¶71 (citat ions omitted). {¶82} Here, a sentence of life without parole is within the statutory range for aggravated murder in Ohio. Therefore, the sentence cannot amou nt to cruel and unusual punishment. Also, it is clear the trial court carefully and th oroughly considered the Miller factors for juvenile sentencing in detail, along with all the o ther evidence and circumstances, before issuing a sentence. {¶83} The trial court made the following statements in its sentencing entry: The Court has considered the record, including all evidence presented at the April sentencing hearing, oral statements, the allocution of the Defendant, the pre-sentence investigation rep ort, and any victim impact statements, the briefs of all parties, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under O.R.C. Section 2929.11, and has balanced the seriousness and recidivism factor s of O.R.C. Section 2929.12. In imposing this sentence, the Court fully incorporates, by ref erence, the Judgment Entry memorializing its findings, filed on October 12, 2018. The Court incorporates all findings previously made in t hat entry with regard to any and all factual and legal issues conce rning the sentence imposed [sic] this case.31 As detailed within the October 12, 2018 Judgment Entry, the Cou rt has considered all relevant factors pursuant to Miller v. Alabama , 132 S.Ct. at 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 and State v. Long , 138 Ohio St. 3d 478, 8 N.E. 890 (2014). {¶84} Further, as this court has previously held, the Roper , Graham , and Miller decisions are inapplicable here because “none holds that the se ntence of a juvenile homicide offender to a discretionary sentence of life without p arole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Lane , supra , at ¶75. “To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Miller , supra , stated that a sentencing court is not precluded from imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.” Id. at ¶80 (emphasis sic) (citations omitted). {¶85} Therefore, the trial court did not impose a sentence inconsiste nt with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. LaRosa’s third assignment of error is without merit. {¶86} LaRosa’s sixth assignment of error states: Appellant’s Assignment of Error No. 6: The record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s findings in sup port of consecutive sentences. {¶87} R.C. 2929.41, which governs multiple sentences, provides, in pe rtinent part: “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, * * * a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with a ny other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this st ate[.]” R.C. 2929.41(A). Therefore, a presumption exists in favor of concurrent sentenci ng absent the applicable statutory exception. {¶88} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court may order separat e prison terms for multiple offenses to be served consecutively only if the court finds it “necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offend er and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the of fender’s conduct and to32 the danger the offender poses to the public[.]” The trial cour t must also find that one of the following statutory factors applies: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiples offense s while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to s ection 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929. 18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a pr ior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as par t of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unus ual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriou sness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates tha t consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶89} Regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences, the trial co urt stated the following during the sentencing hearing: Said periods of incarceration on Counts 2, 3, and 4 are to be s erved consecutively to each other and to Count 1. The Court finds th at because the harm was so great and unusual that a single term do es not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s condu ct, consecutive terms are necessary to protect the public and to adequately punish the defendant. Further, the Court finds that consecutive terms are not disproportionate to defendant’s condu ct and to the public danger posed by this defendant. The judgment entry entered for sentencing also indicates the sa me. Therefore, the trial court did state appropriate statutory grounds for imposing cons ecutive prison sentences. {¶90} When the trial c ourt properly sets forth the statutory requirem ents that allow for imposition of consecutive sentences, our review is limited to whether any of the findings made by the court are clearly and convincingly not sup ported by the record. State v. Wilson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-028, 2017-Ohio-7127 , ¶20; State v. Marcum , 14633 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶23. In doing so, we keep in m ind that the “trial court is not required to give any particular weight or emphasis to a given set of circumstances” when considering the statutory factors. State v. DelManzo , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L218, 2008-Ohio-5856, ¶23. {¶91} LaRosa’s argument on appeal is straightforward: he cannot pose a danger to the public because he has already received a sentence of lif e without the possibility of parole on Count 1. Therefore, consecutive sentences are not wa rranted. However, this court and other courts have upheld an imposition of consecutive sentences even where a life without the possibility of parole sentence is imposed on a defendant when the record supports such a finding. See Lane , supra , at ¶120-132; State v. Roark , 3d. Dist. Mercer No. 10-14-11, 2015-Ohio-3811, ¶24. LaRosa has offered no argum ent that convinces us to abandon precedent on this issue. {¶92} We do not clearly and convincingly find that the record does no t support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C). The trial court did not err in ordering

consecutive service of LaRosa’s sentences. {¶93} LaRosa’s sixth assignment of error is without merit. {¶94} The judgment of the Trumbull Coun ty Court of Common Pleas is af firmed.

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

concur.