1 16-3267-cv
Grievance Committee v. Grimm

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA TABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 1 st day of June, two thousand seventeen.

PRESENT: B ARRINGTON D. P ARKER

, C HRISTOPHER F. D RONEY

,  Circuit Judges

.

---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- G RIEVANCE C OMMITTEE OF THE S OUTHERN D ISTRICT OF N EW Y ORK

, Petitioner-Appellee

,

v. No. 16-3267-cv

M ICHAEL G. G RIMM
, Respondent-Appellant

.

---------------------------- ---------------------------- --------------

FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT: Annette G. Hasapidis, Law Offices of Annette G. Hasapidis, Ridgefield, CT.

FOR PETITIONER-APPELLEE: Devin W. Ness, Counsel to the Grievance Committee, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

 Judge Wesley, a member of the original panel, sub sequently recused himself. Therefore, this case is decided by the two remaining member s of the panel pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure E(b) of the Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 Appeal from an August 22, 2016, order of the Committee on Grievances of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, Chair, Committee on Grievances S.D.N.Y. ).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that Appellant’s motion for judicial notice is GRANTED , the order of
the Committee on Grievances of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York is AFFIRMED , and Appellee’s motion for judicial notice is DENIED AS
MOOT

.

Respondent-Appellant Michael G. Grimm, an attorney, appeals from an order of
the Committee on Grievances of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (“the Committee”) striking his na me from the roll of a ttorneys admitted to practice before that court. In support of the Committee’s order, Petitioner-Appellee moves the Court to take judicial notice of the stipulated facts in support of Grimm’s guilty plea in the district court and of ce rtain previous discip linary orders of the Committee. We assume the par ties’ familiarity with the un derlying facts, record of prior proceedings, and issues on appeal.

On July 21, 2015, Grimm was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New Yo rk, following a guilty plea, of one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudul ent tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). On the basis of this conviction, the Committee issued an order pursuant to
S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1. 5(d)(1) directing that Grimm be stricken from the roll of practicing attorneys of that court unless he filed a written response showing why he
should not be stricken. Grimm filed a re sponse through counsel requesting that the Committee impose reciprocal discipline in the form of a suspension rather than striking his name from the roll, based on the New York Appellate Division’s suspension of Grimm pending further order of that court and the disposition of that disciplinary proceeding against Grimm. 1 Grimm’s response to th e Committee also argued that suspension was a more appropriate sanction th an disbarment in the circumstances. On August 22, 2016, the Committee ordered that Grimm be stricken from the roll of practicing attorneys, noting th at the Committee had consid ered Grimm’s submission and declined his request to impose a suspen sion instead of disbarment.

1 As reflected in Grimm’s motion for judicial noti ce filed after this appeal had been submitted for decision, the Appellate Division has since issued a decision in the disciplinary proceeding imposing a four-year nunc pro tunc suspension as a sanction for Grimm’s misconduct. We grant Grimm’s motion to take notice of the Appellate Division’s order, t hough for the reasons explained herein, the disposition of the state proceeding does not bear on the Committee’ s authority to sanction Grimm on the basis of his
federal conviction.3 We review an original disciplinary order entered by a district court for abuse of
discretion. In re Peters , 642 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 2011). “A district court has
abused its discretion if its im position of sanctions was based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of th e evidence, or cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although our
review under this standard is “deferential,” we must “be careful to ensure that any decision to impose sanctions is made with restraint and discretion.” Id. (internal alterations and quot ation marks omitted).

On appeal, Grimm primarily argues that the Committee’s order striking his name from the roll should be vacated because: (1) he was entitled to a hearing prior to being disbarred, and (2) the Committe e erred in disbarring him rath er than imposing reciprocal discipline in the form of a temporary susp ension. Both of these arguments fail.

Grimm’s assertion that he was entitled to a hearing under S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1.5(d) misreads the text of that rule. According to subsectio n (1), “[i]f good cause is shown to hold an evidentiary he aring, the Committee on Grievances may direct such a hearing.” S.D.N.Y. Local Ci vil Rule 1.5(d)(1) (emphasis added). The rule further provides that, “[i]f good cause is not sh own to hold an evid entiary hearing, the Committee on Grievances may pr oceed to impose discipline or to take such other action as justice and this rule may require.” Id. Thus, under the text of this rule, the Committee has the authority to hold a hearing if good cause is shown; otherwise, the Committee is permitted to impose di scipline without such a hearing.

Grimm’s argument that he showed good cau se for the Committee to hold a hearing overlaps with his second cha llenge to the order, namely, that the Committee erred in declining to impose reciprocal discipline based on the Appellate Division’s order of suspension. This argument conflates the Committee’s authority to impose discipline on
its own accord with its author ity to impose reciprocal disc ipline on the basis of another court’s already-issued disciplinary decision.

Local Rule 1.5(b)(1) explicitly states that “[d]iscipline or other relief . . . may be imposed” if it is “found by clear and convincing evidence” that “[a]ny member of the bar of this Court has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor in any federal court . . . .” S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(1); see also In re Kandekore , 460 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that S.D.N.Y. rules “state that it is a ground for discipline if an attorney has been co nvicted of a felony or misdem eanor”). Under this rule, the Committee may impose discipline on the basis of a federal conviction, without regard for the discipline other courts ma y decide to impose in connec tion with that conviction. See Matter of Jacobs , 44 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A distri ct court’s authority to discipline attorneys admitted to appear befo re it is a well-recognized inhe rent power of the court.”).4 This disciplinary authority of the Committee is separate and apart from its authority to impose “reciprocal discipline,” which we have defined as “disbarment or suspension summarily imposed after some other court has taken such action based on a plenary inquiry.” In re Edelstein , 214 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2000). Grimm’s reliance on the Committee’s practices with respect to recipr ocal discipline is therefore misplaced.

Grimm does not dispute that he has been co nvicted of a federal felony offense, nor does he dispute that he was provided notice a nd an opportunity to respond in writing as required by Local Rule 1.5(d). In light of these facts, we conclude that the Committee
did not abuse its discretion in striking Grimm’s name from th e roll of practicing attorneys
on the basis of Grimm’s 2015 conviction. We also conclude that Grimm received all the process he was due because th ere is “no evidence suggesti ng any appreciable risk that without an evidentiary hearing [Grimm] might be erroneously deprived of his interest in practicing law.” Jacobs , 44 F.3d at 91. Because we reach these conclusions without consulting the documents that are the subject of the Committee’s motion for judicial notice, that motion is denied as moot.

We have considered Grimm’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we GRANT Grimm’s motion for judicial notice, AFFIRM the order of the Committee, and DENY AS MOOT the Committee’s moti on for judicial
notice.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court