### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary 22, 200 9 S es sio n VINTAG E HEAL TH RES OURCES, I NC.

v . JAME S J OSE R. GUIANGAN
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelb y County No. CT-000950-06 D’Ar my Bailey, Judge

No. W2008-01288-COA- R3-CV - Filed August 25, 2009

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s a bre a c h of an e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt. Th e plaintif f c omp a ny re c ru its he a lth
car e wor kers f rom the Philippi nes to come to the United States to work for its clients. The company
rec ruited the de fendant nurse by using written re cruitm ent materials. The nurse signed an employment agre ement that differ ed from the rec ruitment materia ls in that one of the bene fits list ed as “f ree ” in the re cruitment materials was not fre e. Approximately one yea r into the nurse’ s threeyear term of e mploym ent, t he nurse resigned. When notifie d of the nurse ’s intent to resign, the
c omp a ny ’s ma na ge me nt thr e a te ne d to re po rt the nu rs e to imm igr a tio n of fi c ia ls. De sp ite thethr e a ts, the nurse le ft the employ of the c ompany. The c ompany t h en fi l ed the instant lawsuit against the nurse, asserting brea ch of contra ct. In his answer, the nur se asse rted, int e r a lia , that the employment agre ement violated public policy and was une nforc eable beca use the c ompany’s thre ats constituted involuntary servitude. A lthough unconscionability was not pled, the nurse wa s permitted to assert the def ense at trial. The trial wa s bifurcated, with the i ssue of damages re serve d. After the trial, the trial co u r t h e ld th at t h ec ompany’s thre ats constituted involuntary servitude, and that the employment agre ement wa s unenfor cea ble bec ause it wa s unconscionable and contr ary to public policy. The trial court a lso, su a s

po nte , enjoined the c om p an y i n the future from using rec ruitment materials that differ ed fr om the employment agre ements and from threatening t o report employees to immigration of fi c ia ls. Th e compa ny app e a ls. W e re ve rs e theho ldi ng that th e e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt i s unenfor cea

ble bec ause unc onscionability was neve r pled, the e mployment ag reement is not unconsciona

ble, and the agre ement is not contra ry to public policy. We vacate the injunctive re lief
a s to th e re c ru itm e nt m a te ri a ls anda ff irm a s to there ma ini ng inj un c tiv e re lie f. Th e c aus e is
remanded for

consi deration of the plaintiff company’s damageclaim and the de fendant nurse’s counter claims.-2-

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affir med in Part, Re ve r se d in P ar t, Va c at e d in P ar t, and R e ma nde d

H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., deliver ed t h e opini on of the Court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J. , joined.

Elizabe th E. Chance, Me mphis, Tennessee , and E. Patrick Lanc aster, Olive Branc h, Mississ ippi, for the Plaintiff/Appellant Vintage He ath Resourc es, Inc

. Maure en T. Holland, Me mphis, Tennessee , for the D efe ndant/Appellee James Jose R. Guiangan
OP IN ION

F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY Plaintiff/Appel l ant Vintage H ealth Resourc es, Inc . (“V intage”) , located in Ge rmantown, Tenne ssee, pr ovides contra ct hea lth careworke rs, primarily nurses, to c lients such as hospitals and nursing homes. In ord er t o p rovi de these service s, Vintage re cruits hea lth care worke rs from the Phili ppines to come to the United States to wor k. In a typica l situation, a Fi lipino who is i ntere sted in working for V intage sign s an employment agr eeme nt in which he agr ees to immigrate to the United States, undergo the require d testing for licensur e in the U.S., and thereaf ter work for Vintage fo r thr e e ye ars, in a lo cat ion a ndfo r a c lie nt d e sig nate d b y V int a ge . I n r e turn, Vi nta ge a gr e e s to handle the immigration proc edure s and obtain an employment vis a for the employee , transport the employee to the U nited States, provide room and board, classes and pay to the employee w hile he is s tud yin g f

or thelic e ns ur e e xam, andpay th e e mpl oy e e a c omp e tit ive wa ge a ndbe ne fi ts d uring his three -yea r term of employment. When Vintage contra cts with a medical f acility for the e mployee’s
se rv ic e s, Vi nta ge is p a id b y th e me dic a l f a c ili ty at a

hig he r r a te than th e rate paid by Vi nta ge to i ts employee; Vintageretains the differ enceto rec oup its expenses an d as its profit. After the initial thr e e -y e ar t e rm

of emp lo ymen t, t

he e mpl oy e e c a n e ith e r r e ne w h is e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt w ith Vintage or

work e lsewher e. To re cruit Filipi nos to work for it, Vintage cir culates recr uitment materia ls in the Phi lippines that outli ne the be nefits of wor king for Vintage

. One of the nurses r ecr

ui t ed by Vintage was De fendant/Appellee James Jose R. Guiangan (“Mr . G u ian g a n ” )

. M r

. G u ian g a n is a Fi li p in o c itiz e n , e d u c a te dinth e Ph il ip p in e s

. I n the Phili ppines, Mr. Guiangan’s cour se work w as taught in English, and he is fluent i n E n g l i s h . He
wo rk e d a s a

nu rs e in the Phi lip pin e s f or so me 12 to 1 3 y e ars

. In20 04 , M r. Gu ia ng a n w a s e mpl oy e d a s a nu rs e in the Phi lip pin e s ma kin g a pp ro xim a te ly 5, 00 0 p e so s p e r m on th; thi s w as th e e qu ivale nt o f a pp ro xim a te ly $ 50 to $ 10 0 p e r m on th i n U . S. do ll ars . H e wa s in te re ste d inimm igr a tin g to theUn ite d St a te s inor de r t o b e tte r p ro vid e fo r h isM r. G u ia n g a n in d ic a te d th a t a n u m b e r o f F ili p in o s d e sire to im m ig ra te to p la c e s l ik e th e U n ited S ta te s to 1 i m p ro v e th eir ea rn i n g s.

B e fo re o n e o f V in ta g e ’s n u rs e re c ru its ca n e n te r th e U n ited S ta te s, V in ta g e m u st p e tit io n fo r th e re c ru it to 2

r ec ei ve an em pl oym ent ba s ed vi s a. For t he vi s a t o be i s s ued, t he r ec r ui t m us t pas s an Engl i s h com pet enc y exa m a nd
a n u rs in g sk ill s e x a m . T h e im m ig ra tio n p ro c e ss u su a lly tak e s fr o m fo u rte e n to e ig h te e n m o n th s.

O nce a r ecr ui t ent er s t he U ni t ed St at es , he m ust pas s t he N C L E X exam , w hi ch i s t he nat i on al l i cens i ng exam 3 fo r n u rs e s, b e fo re h e c a n b e g in w o rk in g a s a n u rs e

. -3- family. Mr. Guiangan rec eived a flier f rom Vintage a

bout opportunities t o wo rk in the United 1 States; when he inquire d, Vintage se nt him a rec ruitment “pac ket” outlining t he bene fits of working for Vintage

. The rec ruitment materials Mr. G uiangan r ece ived listed the following benef its: “Free Recruitment, FreeVisa Proce ssing, Free TSE Review , Free Language E xams, Free A irfar e, 2 NCLEX Tutoring, Driver ’s Training, Paid Vacation & Holidays, F re e Housing until working, 3 He a lthInsur ance Pr ov ide d, Li feIn su ranc e Pr ov ide d, Pr of e ssi on a l L ia

bil ity Pr ov ide d, W or

ke rs ’ Compe ns a tio n, Up to $ 1, 50 0 H ou sin g L oan, Up to $ 1, 50 0 Aut o L oan. ” Th e re c ru itm e nt m a te ri a ls didno t in dic a te that r e c ru its wo uldbe c omp e ns a te d f or tim e sp e nt p re pa

ri ng fo r the NC LE X e xa m.
On Marc h 30, 2004, Mr. Guiangan signed Vintage’ s “Master Employment Agree ment” and

“ As sig nme nt P oli c y” (c oll e c tiv e ly, the“ Ag re e me nt” ) at is su e in this c a se . U nd e r the Ag re e me nt, Mr. Guiangan agre ed to re locate to the U nited States, with Vintage paying the c ost of transportation and, with minor exc eptions, the cost of immigrating to the United States and obtaining a visa. Once in th e Un i t ed S tates, the Agr eeme nt stated that, for up to e ight weeks, housing, transportation, NCLEX tutoring, and drive r’s training would be provided to Mr. Guiangan “a t a re asonable cost and deducte d from [his] Pre -NCLEX compensation.” The “ Pre-NCLEX ” pay, at the rate of $9 per hour, was de signed to pay for Mr. Guiangan’s ex p enses while he studied for the NCLEX exam at Vi nta ge ’s tr a ini ng c e nte r i n Cl e ve la nd , M iss iss ipp i.

Th e Ag re e me nt also se t ou t th e ho urly b a se a ndov e rtime pay th a t Mr . G uiang an wou ld
rec eive onc e he pa ssed the NCLEX lice nsure exam and began working as a nurse. He would r ece ive sick leave , vacation, holidays, and medical and life insurance. M r. Gu i an gan agr eed to wor k for Vi nta ge a t a

U. S. f a c ili ty o f V int a ge ’s c ho os ing fo r a pe ri od of thr e e ye ars ; upon c omp le tio n o f this term of e mployment, he wo u ld rec eive a $4,000 bonus. The Agr eeme nt provided that, if Mr. Guiangan le ft employment with Vintage prior to the co m p l eti on of his term of e mployment, he would be subjec t to a non-comp et e co v en an t and would be liable to Vintagefor its ac tual and conseque ntial damages. TheAgre ement also stated that, if it appear ed to Vintage that Mr. Guiangan had ac cepte d employment with V intage for the sole purpose of obtaining a visa, Vintagemay re port this to U.S . immigration officials. During the pe riod of time in which Mr. Guiangan ’s i m m igration pape rwork w as being proce ssed, he c ommu n i ca t ed regularly with Vintage per sonnel, by email and othe rwise. He informed the V intage employee s that his wif e is a nurse, that his w ife ha s a sister in California, and that hea ndhis wi fewe rein the pr oc e ss o f le ga lly a do pti ng his wi fe ’s nie c e a ndho pe d to e ve ntu a lly bring thenie c e to the Un ite d St a te s to liv e wi th the m.T h e L i v i n g S t i p en d p ro v i d es a s fo l l o w s: 4

I unde r s t and t hat m y “P r e Em pl oym ent A gr ee m ent ” w i t h V i nt age H ea l t h Res our ce s , I nc. ( Com pany) pr ovi des m e w i t h a gr os s s t i pend of $9. 00 pe r hour dur i ng t he t i m e I s pend a t C om pany’ s Tr ai ni ng C ent er i n C l evel and, M S. I f urt her un ders t and t hat duri ng t he t i m e I am at t he T r ai ni ng C ent er I am t o us e m y t i m e l ea r ni ng how t o dr i ve an aut om obi l e. I t i s a nt i ci pat ed that I w i l l be a t t he Tra i ni ng C en t er fo r a fe w w ee k s.

I ackn o w l ed g e t h at the C o m p an y w i l l i n cu r exp en ses for m y ho u si n g , l o cal t ransp o rt at i o n , D ri v er’s Tra i n i n g , e t c. duri ng t he t i m e I a m a t t he Tra i ni ng Cent er

. I a gr ee t o a de duct i on i n t he am ount of $ 7 0 0 pe r m o n t h fr o m m y gro ss s t i p en d t o pa y for t h e C o m p an y ’s ex p en ses on m y be h al f.

M y ne t s t i pend w i l l be $300. 00 pe r 30 da y pe r i od a nd w i l l be pai d by Com pany che ck. Thi s $300. 00
w i l l cover m y ou t of po cket li v i ng expenses t o i ncl ud e, but not l i m i t ed t o: f oo d, l on g di s t ant [ s i c] p h o n e e x p en ses, an d v ario u s an d su n d ry p erso n al i t em s.

M r. G u i an g an ’s res i g n at i o n l et t er di d n o t includ e h i s an t i ci p at ed d at e o f resi g n at i o n

. In M r. Z i m m erm an ’s 5 O ct o b er 19 , 20 0 5 le tter to M r. G u i an g an , ho w ev er, M r. Z i m m erm an s t at ed t h at V i n t ag e reco rds i n d i cat ed t h at M r. G u ia n g a n ’s las t d a y o f w o rk w o u ld b e o n o r a b o u t O c to b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 . T h e re is n o e v id e n c e in th e a p p e llate re c o rd to i ndi ca t e t hat M r

. G ui anga n pl anne d t o l ea ve on a ny da y ot her t han O ct ober 31, 2005.
-4- Mr. Guiangan reloc ated to the United States on June 7, 2004. The ne xt day, he attended a one-day orientation at Vintage’ s headqua rters in Ge rmantown, Te nnessee . During the orie ntation, Mr. Guiangan signed an a cknowledgme nt that the Agre ement he ha d signed in the Philippi nes on Mar ch 30, 2004 governed his employment in the United States with Vintage. H e also signed a do c ume nt e nti tle d “ Li vin g Stip e nd ,” wh ic h pr ov ide d th a t du ri ng his NC LE X p re pa ratio n, he wo uld be paid a n et stipend of $300 per month. The Living Stipend contemplated a gross stipend of 4 $1,000 per month with a $700 monthly deduction to pay for expense s such as ho using, transportat i on, and drive r’s training. The remaining $300 was designed to cove r Mr. Guiangan’s
ou t- of -p oc ke t e xp e ns e s.
Mr. Gu ian g a n p a s s e d th e N CL E X e x a m. H e w a s a s s ig n e d to w o rk f o r V in ta g e a t the Tuomey Regional Medic al Center in Sumter, South Carolina. Mr. Guiangan’s start date under the Ag re ement

wa s Se pte mbe r 7 , 2 00 4. Du ri ng thec ou rs e of Mr . G uiang a n’ s e mpl oy me nt i n So uth Caro lin a , V int a ge wa s p le a se d w ithhis job pe rf orma nc e a ndMr . Gui ang an wa s satis fi e d w ithhis employment with Vintage. On September 29, 2005, approximate ly a year into his t hree -yea

r term of employment, Mr. Guiangan e mailed a letter to Robert Zimmerman (“ Mr. Zimmerman” ), Vint ag e’ s Senior Vice President, s tating that he would resign his employment with Vint age. Mr. Guiangan stated in the 5 letter that he was lea ving because his w ife was pregnant and she wanted to move to California to be wi th h e r s ist e r andto e nr oll in C a lif ornia ’s Me dic arepr og ram. After Vintage r ece ived Mr. Guiangan’ s email, Jerry Turner (“Mr . Turner ”), V intage’s Vic e President for O perations in S outh Carolina, sche duled a mee ting w i t h M r. Guiangan. During the meeting, Mr. Guiangan reiter ated his re asons for le aving. In re sponse, Mr. Turne r wa rned Mr

. Guiangan that, if he lef

t Vintage bef

ore the end of his term of employment, Vintage w ould report him to im migration officia ls for bre aching his employment contra ct.T h e “ US C I S ” i s t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s C i t i z e ns hi p a nd I mm i g r a t i o n S e r v i c e s , wh i c h wa s f o r me r l y t h e I NS 6 (I m m i g rat i o n an d N at u ral i zat i o n Serv i ce).

T h ro u g h o u t th e re c o rd , th e te rm s “ in v o lu n ta ry se rv itu d e ” a n d “ in d e n tu re d se rv itu d e ” a re u se d s e e m in g ly 7 in te rc h a n g e a b ly . F o r th e sa k e o f c o n siste n c y , w e w ill u se th e ter m “ in v o lu n ta ry se rv itu d e .”
-5- The mee ting with Mr. Turner did n o t change Mr. Guiangan’s mind about resigning. Con se qu e ntl y, on Oc tob e r 1 9, 20 05 , Mr. Zi mme rm a n sen t a lett e r to Mr. Gu ia ng a n outl ini ng to h im the ramifications of his decision to br eac h the employment contra ct. If Mr . Guiangan le ft on Octobe r 31, 2005, as planne d, Mr. Zimmerman said, he would owe Vintage $20,000. The letter included a pr omi sso ry no te in the a mou nt of $2 0, 00 0 plu s 7% int e re st, a nd wa rn e d Mr

. Gu ia ng a n th a t if he did not sign the promissory note, Vintage would be forc ed to f ile a civil la wsuit a gainst him. Fi nally, thele tte r w arn e d M r. Gu ia ng a n th a t V int a ge wo uldre po rt Mr . G uiang a n to theUSC IS a ndse e k h is 6 de po rt a tio n, a ndif

that w a s n ot s uc c e ssful, Vi nta ge wo uldse e k d e nial of his app lic a tio n f

or U. S. citizenship.

De sp ite thethreat s by Mr . T urne r andMr . Z imm e rm a n, Mr . G uiang a n le ft Vi nta ge in October 200 5 as planne d, and moved with his wife to California. Vintage ne ver r eporte d Mr. Gu ia ng a n to imm igr a tio n o ff ic ia ls.

On Februa

ry 23, 2006, Vintage filed the instant la wsuit, a lleging that Mr

. Guiangan br eac hed his employm en t contract by leaving be fore the end of his term. Vintage sought dama ges for the brea ch. On June 1, 2006, Mr. Guiangan filed his answer and counter complaint. In his answe r, Mr. Guiangan denied liability and asserted: (1) failure to state a c laim upon which re lief can be granted, (2) e stoppel because Vintage sought a judgment f or “unsubstantiated monies,” (3) a setoff f or Mr. Guiangan’ s unpaid Octobe r 2005 salary, and (4) the Agreement was contra ry t o public policy. Mr. Gu ia ng a n’ s c ou nte rc la im all e ge d that Vint a ge br e a c he d the Ag re e me nt by faili ng to p a y h im h is f ull pr e -N CLE X p a y, a ndthat V int a ge faile d to pay h im h is O c tob e r 2 00 5 s ala ry, th ere by un jus tly enric hing Vintage.

Meanw hile, during disco v er y, Vintage submitted interrogatories to Mr. Guiangan. One interrogatory asked Mr . Guiangan to list the eleme nts allegedly lac king from the Agr eeme nt, thereby making it an invalid contrac t. Mr. Guiangan obje cted to the interrogatory, but without waiving the objection, stated that ther e wa s no meeting of the minds and that the A gree ment v i o l at ed a prohibition against involuntary servitude. Vintage a lso submit ted to Mr. Guiangan an interr ogatory 7 asking him to list the public policies he c laimed wer e violated. W ithout waiving his obj ection, Mr. Guiangan r esponded that the Agre ement wa s against the public policy against debt bondage. The trial took plac e over

a four day period in October 2007. At the out set of t he trial, the trial court discussed w ith the attorneys the issues prese nted, and in particular sought to asce rtain the lega l theories on which Mr. Guiangan relied in de fending a gainst the employment contra ct. Afte r Mr. Gu ia ng a n’ s atto rn e y r e fe rr e d to the pa rtie s’ un e qu a l bar gaini ng po we r, thetria l c ou rt inq uir e d a s to whether Mr. Guiangan was asserting an unconsciona bility def ense. Mr . Guiangan’ s counsel re plied that sh e wa s ar gu ing tha

t the c on tr a c t is inv a lid be c aus e it is agains t publ ic po lic y a s e xp re sse d in the fe dera l and state c onstitut ions and as “a mat t er of inequities of the cir cumstance s.” The trial court inquired f

urther a bout unconscionability, and th en n o t ed that public policy and-6-

unconsciona

bility are sepa

rate defe nses. Mr. Guiangan’s counse l responde d b y stating that she sought to argue both de fense s. Asked to pr ovide the trial court with the standards f or dete rmining unconsciona

bility, M r. Guiangan’s counse l asked for a short rece ss to resea rch unc onscionability, commenting that the issue had not bee n briefe d.

Af te r s omea dd iti on a l di scu ssion , th e tria l c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t Mr . G uiang a n e sse nti a lly
conce ded that, abse nt the affirmative defense s, the employm ent agr eeme nt was enf orce able. I n light of this, the trial court told the attorne ys that it would bifurcate the proc eedings, fir st hearing pr oof on Mr. Guiangan’s af

firmative de fense s and then he aring pro o f o nd amages if that bec ame ne cessa ry. At this point , Vintage objec ted to proof on unc onscionability a s a defe nse beca use it was neve r pled and conse quently the r ew a s n o d is c o v e r y on unconsciona

bility. Despite Vintage’s objec tion, the trial court a llowed Mr. Guiangan to present pr oof on unconsc ionability as well as public policy. In his testimony, Mr. Guiangan described his ba ckground as a nurse in the Phili ppines, and his desire to better

provide for

his family by immi grating to the United States. He s aid that numerous employment age ncies re cruited nur ses in t h e P h ilippines. The Vintage r ecr uitment materia ls were made an exhibit and Mr. Guiangan noted that they spec ified that he would re ceive fre e housing. OnceMr. Guiangan enter ed into the employment agr eeme nt with Vintage, howeve r, he under stood from the provisions of the e mployment agree ment that the cost of housing and transportation would be deducte d from his pre- NCLEX pay. The proc ess o f Vi n t ag e obtaining M r. Guiangan’s visa to come to the U nited States took many months. After Mr . Guiangan obtained his visa and wa s transported to the United States, he attended the Vintage orientation. At the orientation, Mr. Guiangan wa s given the “Living Stipend” document informing him that, instead of re ceiving hourly pay, he would be paid an over all stipend, with deductions for expenses such as t raining and housing; afte r such expenses we re de ducted f rom the over al l s t i p end, he w ould rec eive a net $300 per

month “living st ipend” to pay f or per sonal expense s and food. This arr angeme nt applied during the six-we ek period in which Mr. Guiangan was studying for the N CLEX exa m. Had he be en given the i n fo rm at i on on the “living stipend”
arr angeme nt befor e leaving the P hilippines, Mr. Guiangan asserted, he would have ha d “a se cond though t” ab o u t h is d e c is io n

. T h e o n ly b r e a c h o f th e e mp lo y me n t a g r e e me n t a ll e g ed by Mr. Guiangan is Vintage ’s change in the pre -NCLEX c ompensation.

After M r. Gu i an g an passed the N CLEX exam and was pla ced in South Carolina, he understood that, under the terms of his a gree ment, he was obligated to w ork for Vintage for a thre eyear employment term. Afte r working f or Vintage for a

pproximately a ye ar, Mr. Guiangan notified Vi nta ge that heint e nd e d to re sig n b e c aus e his wi fewa s pr e gn a nt a nd wante d to mov e to C a lif ornia to be with her sister. T hat was the only rea son Mr. Guiangan gave f or his decision.

Mr . G uiang a n te sti fi e d a

bo ut the thr e a t by Je rry T urne r that V int a ge wo uldre po rt him to U .S. imm igr a tio n o ff

ic ia ls, a s w e ll a s th e thr e a te nin g le tte r fr om Rob e rt Zi mme rm a n. Mr . Gui a ng a n s a id he fe lt threatene d by the l etter. Despite the threats, he and his family moved to California and Mr. Guiangan se cure d employment at a hospital there

.In M r. G u i an g an ’s case, in ad d i t i o n to t h e co n t ract u al b en efi t s, V i n t ag e g av e h i m int erest -f ree loan s t o s ecu re 8 h o u si n g i n S o u t h C aro l i n a a n d t o b ring h i s fam i l y t o t h e U n i t ed S t ates.
-7- Vintage submitted testimony from a repr esentative of a Vintage competitor, a company that also rec ruited nurse s from outside of the U. S. to come to the United States to w ork at c lient medical fac iliti es. He said that the seve re shortage of nurses in the U.S. cr eate s a high demand f or nurse s from over seas. Thewitness verifie d th at t h e ra t es charged by Vintageto client fac iliti es, and the
rate s p a id b y V int a ge to n ur se s su c h a s Mr . G uiang a n, we rein l inewi th i nd us try s ta nd ard s. Vintage se nior vice pr esident Robert Zimmerman testified as we ll, outl i n i n g t h e Vintage pr oc e du re s f

or re c ru iti ng he a lthc arewo rk e rs fr om the Phi lip pin e s, se c uring vi sas f or the m, transporting them to the United States, providing housing and tra ining for them, and f inding
e mpl oy me nt f

or the m. He te sti fi e d abo ut the te rm s of thee mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt andthebe ne fi ts provided to Mr. Guiangan. Mr. Zimmerman a cknowledge d that Mr. Guiangan was told that he 8 would be paid $9 pe r hour during his pre-NCLEX tr ai n ing, but in fact he w as paid a $1,000 per month sti pend w i t h d ed u ct i ons for e xpenses suc h as housing and training, leaving a net $300 pe r mon th “ liv ing sti pe nd ” fo r p e rs on a l e xp e ns e s. Mr . Z imm e rm a n claime d that the ne t $300 pe r m on th living st ipend amounted to more than Mr. Guiangan would have r ece ived at the $9 pe r hour r ate.
Mr. Zimmerman a cknowledge d sending the threatening let t er to Mr. Guiangan. Mr

. Zi mm e r man main tain e d th a t th e s tate me n t a b o u t c o n ta c ti n g im mi g r a ti o n o f f ic ials about Mr. Guiangan’ s brea ch of his agr eeme nt stemmed from advic e fr om an immigration attorney. He
conce ded that the de port ation threat was not pursuant to advic e of c ounsel and a dmitted that the threat was a “ bad choic e of w ords” and was “ wrong” and “a mistake on my part.” Mr . Zimmerman acknow ledged that, at the tim e t h e l et t er was sent to Mr. Guiangan, Vintage was a war e of Mr

. Gu ia ng a n’ s c on tin uin g e ff orts t o b ri ng his a do pti ve daug hte r t o th e Un ite d St a te s. He sa id that, i n thewa ke of Mr . G uiang a n’ s d e pa

rtur e , V int a ge didno t c on ta c t im mig ratio n o ff ic ia ls.

At th e e n d o f th e trial, th e trial c o u rt r e n d e r e d a n o r a l ru li n g th a t th e A g r e e ment was unenfor cea

ble, and a lso su a s

po nte issued injunctive relief against Vint age. The trial court’s r uling
wa s me moria liz e d ina n o rd e r e nte re d o n M arc h 6 , 2 00 8, in w hic h th e tria l c ou rt he ld a s f oll ow s:The t r i al c our t l at er e nt er ed an or der c l ar i fyi ng t hat i t s u se o f t h e p h ra s e “ba i t a nd s w i t ch” w as onl y f or 9

a n a ly tica l p u rp o se s a n d w a s n o t a se p a ra te d e fe n se to th e A g re e m e n t.
-8- FINDING S AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. Based upon the e n t i re re co rd , the testimony of the witnesses and the argume nts of counsel, including the law argue d by counsel for the parties, the Court finds and conc ludes that the enf orce ment of the [A gree ment], which w as signed by [Mr. Guiangan] should be and here by is ref used on t he grounds of

unconsciona

bility. The Court spec ifically found and conclude d and here by rea ffirms and c oncludes that the circ umstances show that 1 ) t h er e wa s substantially unequal bargaining power be tw e e n th e pa

rtie s; 2 ) that th e [A gr e e me nt] wa s ba se d o n in iti a l mi sr e pr e se ntatio ns ; 3) that th e re c ru itm e nt p a c ke t w a s so a t va ri a nc e wi th t he [Ag reemen t] that it amounts to a bait and switch; 4) that the terms of compens ation set out in the 9 [Agre ement] are unrea sonably vague and unfair; and 5) that all these fac t o rs t aken together c onstitut ed high hande d and oppre ssive conduct of [Vintage ]. * * * C. Based upon the testimony and evidenc e submitt ed and the entire r ecor d, the C ourt d e te r mi n e dth a t th e f u n d a me n tal f

a irn e s s w o u ldr e q u ir e [ V in ta g e ] inthe [A gr e e me nt] to t e ll the e mpl oy e e ho w l on g th e y a reor din ari ly andre a so na bly expec ted to be at the Pre -NCLEX training center , and the minimum number of hours per w eek that they areordinarily and rea sonably expec ted t o acc rue f or payme nt of the pre -NCLEX pay. D. Based upon the testimony and evidenc e submitted and the e ntire re cord the Court determined that the circ umstances unde r which the [Agr eeme nt] deve loped and wa s implemented was ba sed upon an une qual bar gaini n g p ower betwee n the pa rtie s. E. Based upon the testimony and e vidence submitt ed and the entire r ecor d theCou rt de te rm ine d th a t [ Vi nta ge ’s ] a tte mpt to fo rc e [M r. Gu ia ng a n] to re ma in i n thee mpl oy of

[V int a ge ] u nd e r the thr e a t of e xtr e me ly p un itive me a su re s, a s in deportation and denial of citi zenship, based upon t he ca se of Hump hrie s v . Va rio us Federal UNINS Employees , 164 F.3d 936 (5th Cir. 1999), constit utes involuntary servitude through the threat of legal c oerc ion. F. Even if the attempt to forc e [Mr. Guiangan] to remain in the e mploy of [Vintage ] under

the threa t o f extre mely punitive measure s as in deportation and denial of c itizenship did not amount to involuntary servitude, it would be violative of the public policy of the State of Tenne s s ee

. An d t h at a c ontrac t sought to be
e nf or c e d b y s uc h a

bu sin e ss –

that c on du c ts the mse lve s inthi s man ner w iththe se kinds of threats – would be unenfor cea ble.
Thus, the trial court determined, int e r a lia , that the Agreement was unconsciona ble, t hat there was unequal ba

rgaining powe r betwe en the pa rties, that Vi n t ag e’ s threats constituted involunt ary servitude, and that the threats violated publi c policy, all of which r ender ed the Agr eeme nt unenfor cea

ble. Consequently, the trial court dismiss ed both V intage’s claim for br eac h of contra ct-9-

a ndMr . G uiang a n’ s c ou nterc la ims

. T h eor de r e njo ine d V int a ge fr om u sin g r e c ru itm e nt p a c ke ts w ith terms “c ontradictory to the act u al t er m s used in any contr acts pre sented to the e mployees of [Vintage ]” and threatening to report e mployees to immigration officia ls, or threatening deportation
or to d e ny c iti z e ns hip so le ly b a se d o n an e mpl oy e e ’s de c isi on to s e e k o the r e mpl oy me nt. Vintage then f

iled a motion for a ne w trial or to alter or ame n d t h e j u d g m en t , and Mr. Guiangan f

iled a motion to amend his answer to conform to the evidence, seeking to assert defe nses no t origi na lly ple d, inc lud ing un c on sc ion abil ity . Bo th m oti on s w e rede nie d. Vi nta ge the n f ile d th is
app e a l.

I S S UE S ON A P P E AL AND S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, Vintage r aises the f ollowing issues for our re view:

1. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed by allowing and r elying u p o n d efenses that Mr . G uiang a n d id n ot r a iseprior to t ri a l. 2. Whethe r Mr. Guiangan’s e vi d en ce at trial ca rried his burde n of proof

on theun ple d d e fe ns e s. 3. Whethe r the proof

at trial on Mr. Guiangan’s a sserted de fense of violation of public po l i cy and involuntary servitude was suff icient to void the employment contra ct at issue. 4. Whethe r the trial court e rre d in finding that the employment contrac t was wholly unenf

o rceable, notwithstanding the princ iples of contra ct construction, waiver, and the existenc e of a sever ability clause. 5. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed by entering injunctions against Vintage, sua sp on te

. Be cause this case wa s tried by the t rial court sitti ng without a jury , we review the trial court’ s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo upon the re cord w ith a presumpti o n o f corr ectne ss, unless the evidenc e pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; see also Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W

. 3 d 7 2 1 , 727 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted). Questions of laware revie wed de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. S. Con structors, I nc. v. Loudon Cou nty Bd. of Edu c. , 5 8 S. W. 3 d 7 0 6 , 7 1 0 ( T e n n. 2001) (c itations omi tted).

A N A L Y SIS
From our examination of the t rial court’s order , it appea rs t hat t he trial court held that Mr. Guiangan’ s employment agre ement with Vintage w as unenf orce able be cause(1) it was unconsciona

ble and ( 2) it violated public policy. The holdi ng of unconscionability appear s based on the diffe renc e betwe en the pr ovision in t h e rec ruitment materials indicating that housing was “fr ee” and the pr ovisi o n i n M r. Guiangan’s employment agr eeme nt stating that housing was deducte d from his pre- NCLEX compensation, a s well as va gue and unf air terms in the contrac t andU n eq u al ba rgaini n g po w er betw een t h e p art i es i s a fact o r t o co n si d er w h en a co u rt ex am i n es w h et h er a 10

c o n tra c t i s u n c o n sc io n a b le , b u t i s n o t a n in d e p e n d e n t b a sis o n w h ic h to in v a lid a te a c o n tra c t. See R E S T AT E M E NT (S E C OND ) O F C O N TRA CTS § 2 0 8 c m t. d (1 9 8 1 ).
-10- the parties’ unequa l bargaining powe r. The finding of violation of public policy appea rs base d on 10 the threats of deportation or denial of citizenship, held by the trial court to c on s t i t u t e i n v o luntary servitude unde r fe dera l law.

Wa ive rof Unc ons c ion abi lity a s D e fe nse Vintage a rgues that unc onscionability was neve r pled by Mr. G uiangan. I t co n t en d s that unconsciona

bility i s an af

firmative de fense that, under Rules 8.03 and 12.08 of t he Tennessee Rules of Civ il Pr oc e du re , mu st b e ple d by the pa rty ass e rting it; if

no t, i t w ill be de e me d w a ive d. Be c aus e Mr . G uiang a n n e ve r a sse rt e d an u nc on sc ion abil ity de fe ns e prior to t ri a l, V int age main ta ins that it
wa s w a ive d andthetria l c ou rt sh ou ld n ot h a ve c on sid e re d it

. Inre sp on se , M r. Gu ia ng a n a rg ue s th a t the de fe ns e of un c on sc ion abil ity is b a se d o n p ub lic policy, see R ES TATEMENT (S EC OND ) O F C O N TR A CT S § 208 cmt. a (1981), and therefor e it should not be dee med waive d beca

use he specific ally pled public policy as an aff irmative def

ense. A lthough he ne ve r u se d th e wo rd “ un c on sc ion able ,” Mr

. Gu iang a n a sse rt s, his motionin l imi ne fi le d p ri or to tria l ma de it a

pp are nt that hewa s a sse rting a n u nc on sc ion abil it y defe ns e. Hea lso arg ue s th a t, beca use the trial c ourt has the authority to consider a defense of public policy eve n if not pled, see Cum mins v. McCoy , 1 25 S.W .2 d 50 9, 51 3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 38 ), a ndun c on sc ion abil ity is a pu bli c policy-base d defe nse, er go the trial court has t he authority to consider unconsc ionability even if the defe ns e is not specifically pled. Alternatively, Mr. G uiangan a sserts that Vintage ne ver ma de an
a c tual ob je c tio n to his a sse rtio n of thede fe ns e of un c on sc ion abil ity , anddidno t r e qu e st a
c on tin uanc e , andis the re fo repr e c lud e d f ro m r a isi ng theiss ue on app e a l.

W e be ginby dis c us sin g th e ple a din g r e qu ir e me nts fo r a ff irmativ e de fe ns e s. Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civil P roce dure 8.03 r equire s that aff irmative def

enses be asserted i n appropriate plea dings. The
ve rs ionof

Rul e 8. 03 in e ff

e c t at th e tim e Mr . G uiang a n f ile d h is ans we r p ro vid e d a s f oll ow s: In plea ding to a prec eding pleading, a party shall set forth aff irmatively fac ts in short and plain t er m s relied upon to c onstitut e ac cord and satisfac tion, arbitration and
awa rd, expr ess assumption of risk, compar ative fault (including the identity or de sc ri pti on of

a ny oth e r alle ge d to rt fe a so rs ), dis c ha rg e in b a nk

ru ptc y, du re ss, estoppel, failure of consideration, f raud, illegality, lac hes, license , payment, re lease , res judicata, statute of f

rauds, sta t u t e o f l imitations , waiver , and any othe r matter
c on sti tuting a n a vo idanc e or a ff irmativ e def

e ns e . W he n a

pa rty h a s mi sta

ke nly de sig nate d a de fe ns e a s a c ou nte rc la im o r a c ou nte rc la im a s a

de fe ns e , th e c ou rt , if justice so require s, shall treat the ple ading as if there had bee n a prope r designation.E ff ect i v e Jul y 1, 20 0 6 , R u l e 8

. 0 3 w as am en d ed t o i n cl u d e t h e d efen ses of st at u e o f r ep o se and w o rker’s 11

c o m p e n sa tio n im m u n ity

. See Tenn. R. Ci v. P. 8. 03 A dvi s or y Com m i ss i o n Com m ent t o 2006 A m endm ent

. The
am endm ent al s o re m ov ed t he t er m “a vo i dance” f r om t he R ul e.

R u le 1 2 .0 8 p ro v id e s in p e rtin e n t p a rt a s fo llo w s: “ A p a rty w a iv e s a ll d e fe n se s a n d o b je c tio n s w h ic h th e p a rty 12 does not pr es ent e i t her by m ot i on .

. . , or , . . . i n t he par t y’ s ans w er or r epl y, or a ny a m endm ent s t her et o. ” Tenn. R. Ci v. P. 12. 08.

M r

. G ui angan al s o ar gu es t hat , i n hi s m ot i on i n l i m i ne, he m ade i t appare nt t h at h e w as as s er t i ng an

13

u n co n scio n ab i l i t y d efe n se e v en t h o u g h h e d i d n o t u se th e w o rd “u n co n scio n ab l e.” T h i s C o u rt m ay co n si d er o n l y “th o se f act s es t abl i s hed b y t he evi dence i n t he t r i al court and s et f ort h i n t he r ecor d. ” Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( c)

. A l t hough t he
m o tio n is atta c h e d to M r. G u ia n g a n ’s a p p e llate b rie f, a n a ttac h m e n t t o a n a p p e llate b rie f is n o t a p a rt o f th e re c o rd

. See U T M ed. G r oup, I nc . v . Vogt , 2 3 5 S .W .3 d 1 1 0 , 1 2 2 (T e n n . 2 0 0 7 ) (c itatio n s o m itt e d ). W e h a v e b e e n u n a b le to lo c a te t he m ot i on i n l i m i ne i n t he r ec or d, a nd M r

. G ui anga n doe s not c i t e us t o a p l ace i n t he r ec or d w her e i t c an be f ound. T h e re fo re , w e d o n o t co n sid e r th is a rg u m e n t.
-11- Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 (2006). An af firmative de fense is a defe nse “that wholly or partly avoids the 11
causeof ac tion asserted b y t h e prec eding pleading by ne w allegations that admit part or all of the
causeof ac tion, but avoids li ability becauseof a le gally sufficie nt excuse , justification, or other matter ne gating the allege d brea ch or w rong.” Thompson , Breeding, Dunn , Creswell & S parks v. Bow lin , 765 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting L AW RE NCE A. P I V N I CK , T ENNES S EE C IRCU IT C OURT P R AC T I CE § 12-4 (2d e d.)). Unc onscionability, although not included in the defe nses listed in Rul e 8.03, is nonethele ss an af firmative de fense

. See 61A A M

. J UR

. 2 D P le ading § 327 (1 99 9) . T he re fo re , und e r Rule 8. 03 , it mus t be ple d. Othe rw ise , u nd e r R ule12 .0 8, it i s d e e me d to be waived. Se e In r

e Est ate of Bake r v . King , 207 S

. W. 3 d 2 5 4, 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) 12 (citations omitted).

In this case , Mr. Guiangan argue s that he effec tively pled unconscionability by asserting the defe nse of public policy in his answe r. Wedisagree . As pointed out by the trial judge at the outset of the trial, “ [p]ublic policy an d unconsciona bility concerns, a lbeit based on similar fa cts, aredistinct issues.” Bla nd, e

x r e l. C ok e r v . He alt

h Car e and Re t. C or p. of Am. , 92 7 So . 2 d 2 52 , 2 57 (F la . D ist

. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). The purpose of the plea ding require ments in the Tennesse e Rules of Civil Proce dure is to “pr ovide the parties and the trial c ourt with notice of the c laims and defe nses involved in the case .” Rawli ngs v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 78 S.W.3d 291, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citations om itted). To rea d a pleading that asserts only violation of public policy as implicitly i ncluding unconsciona bility would be contrary t o both the language and purpose of Rul e 8. 03 . Cl e arl y, e ve n M r. Gu ia ng a n’ s c ou ns e l di d n ot i nte rp re t th e pu bli c po li cy defe ns e to include an unconsciona

bility def ense; on two separ ate occa sions, Mr. Guiangan’ s attorney a sked the trial court f

or a short rec ess in order to rese arc h the elements of unconscionability, noting, “I ha ve no t brie fe d th e iss ue of

un c on sc ion abil ity .” W e mus t c on c lud e that Mr . G uiang a n d id n ot p ro pe rl y assert the aff

irmative def

ense of unconsciona

bility i n his answer

. 13 Mr. Guiangan asserts that Vintage neve r madean ac tual objection at trial to the defe nse of unconsciona

bility, and did not request a continuanc e. Weinterpre t this as arguing that Vintage’ s failure to object at trial pre cludes it from a rguing on appeal that Mr. Guiangan waived the unconsciona

bility defense by f

ailing to plead it.-12-

This argument is without merit. Although Vintage d i d n o t u s e the wor ds “objec t” or “objec tion,” when it bec ame c lear that the trial court intended to allow Mr. Guiangan to rely on the de fe ns e of

un c on sc ion abil ity , V int a ge ’s c ou ns e l ma de thefo llo wi ng state me nt: [F]irst of all, u n co n s cionability of the contra ct is not pled. It’s not an af firmative defe nse that had been c ited by [Mr. Guiangan]. So we ’re coming in here today dealing with the issue of unconsciona bility, and it’s ne ver been set up as a de fense

. Therehad bee n virtually to my knowledge, no discovery concer n i ng unconsciona

bility because it’s not bee n raised a s an issue. Although the word “ object” is not use d, Vintage c learly opposes allowing Mr. Guiangan to assert unconsciona

bility because it wa s not affirmatively pled. See E llison v. Ellison , No. E2007-01744- COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4415768 ( Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2008) (langu ag e n o t u sing the word “objec t” is nonetheless tre ated a s an objec tion).

Under all of these c ircumstance s, we c onclude t h at M r. Guiangan w aived the de fense of
un c on sc ion abil ity by faili ng to p le a d it

. Unconscionab ility of Contrac t
In th e a lt e r n a ti v e , e v e n if th e d e f e n s e o f u n c o n s c io n ab il ity is n o t d e e me dw a iv e d , V intage
asserts that Mr. Guiangan’ s employment agre ement is not unconscionable . The de termi n ati on of
w h e th e r a c o n tr a c t o r a c o n tr a c tu a l p r o v is io n is u n c o n s c io n ab le is a q u e s ti o n o f law. Taylor v. Butler , 142 S.W.3d 277, 284–85 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Le wis Re fr ige ra tio n Co. v. S awy e r Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Stor

age Co. , 709 F.2d 427, 435 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983)).

Whethe r a c ontrac t is unconscionable i s d et er mined based on the circ umstances a s they existed at the time the pa

rties exe cuted the c ontrac t. See id. at 285 (citing R ES TATEMENT (S EC OND ) O F C O N TR A CT S § 2 08 (1 98 1) ). As pr e vio us ly s tate d b y th is C ou rt :
Unconsc ionability can be pr ocedur al or substantive or both. Procedura l unconsciona

bility i s usually “some improp ri et y during the proc ess of forming the
c on tr a c t th a t de prive s a

pa rt y o f a m e an i n g fu l c ho ic e .” Sub stanti veun c on sc ion abil ity involves whether

the terms of the contra ct ar e overly harsh or one -sided. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Argo Cons tr. Corp. , No. W2008- 00822-COA-R3-CV, 2009 W L 2245667, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. July 29, 2009) (citations and footnotes omitted). An ea rly ca se ca

psulized a contra ct that involves both proce dural and substantive unconsciona bility: “Unc onscionability has gener ally been r ecogniz ed t o include an a bsenceof meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties togethe r with contra ct terms which a re unr easona

bly favora

ble to the other pa

rty.” Wil lia ms v. Walker-Thomas Furn itur e Co. , 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cited in Trinit y Indus., In c. v. McKinnon Bridge Co. , 7 7 S. W .3 d 1 59 , 1 70 –7 1 (T e nn . Ct. A pp . 2 00 1) . T he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s d e sc ri be d su bs ta nti ve un c on sc ion abil ity a s e xis tin g w he n th e “ ine qu a lity o f the ba rg a in is s o manif

e st a s to sh oc k th e jud gme nt o f a pe rs on of

c omm on se ns e, andwh e rethete rm s a reso op pr e ssi ve th at no re a so na blepe rs on wo uldmake the m ontheon e hand , andno ho ne st andfairT he t hrea t s of depo r t at i on and ef f ort s t o hav e M r

. G ui angan ’ s U

. S. ci t i zens hi p den i ed occurr ed l on g aft er 14

t he cont r act w as execut ed, af t er M r

. G ui angan n ot i fi ed V i nt age t hat he i nt ended t o re s i gn pri or t o t he end o f hi s t hree

y e a r te rm o f e m p lo y m e n t. T h e re fo re , t h e se th re a ts a re n o t re le v a n t t o th e a n a ly sis o f w h e th e r th e c o n tra c t i s
un consci on abl e.

Th e t r i a l c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t Vi n t a g e s h o u l d h a v e e s t i m a t e d f o r M r

. Gu i a n g a n t h e n u m b e r o f p r e
- NCLEX 15 hour s he w oul d be pa i d. H ow eve r , a t t he t i m e of t r i al , M r

. G ui anga n w as ful l y c apa bl e of t es t i fyi ng a s t o how m any ho urs he a c tu a lly s pent i n pr epa r at i on f or t he exa m , but he f ai l ed t o do s o.

The V i nt age re pr es ent at i ve, M r

. Z i m m er m an, t es t i fi ed t hat t he ne t t o M r

. G ui anga n fr om t he Li vi ng St i pend 16

w a s n o les s th a n h e w o u ld h a v e re c e iv e d a t $ 9 p e r h o u r. H o w e v e r, th e trial c o u rt in it s o ra l ru lin g se e m e d to d isc re d it t hi s as s er t i on. W e defer t o t he t r i al cour t ’ s a s s es s m ent of M r

. Zi m m er m an’ s c r edi bi l i t y on t hi s poi nt

. N eve r t hel es s , t he bur den r em ai ned on M r

. G ui anga n t o pr ove t hat he r ec ei ved l es s m oney under t he Li vi ng St i pend t han he w oul d ha ve
r ec ei ved under t he pr e- N CL EX pa y out l i ned i n hi s e m pl oym ent a gr ee m ent

. M r

. G ui anga n f ai l ed t o do s o. -13- person would acc ept them on the other.” Taylor , 142 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Hau n v . King , 690 S

. W. 2 d 8 6 9 , 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)) . “An unc onscionable c ontrac t is one in which the pr ov isi on s a

reso on e -s ide d, in v ie w o f all the fa c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s, that th e c on tr a c tin g p arty is denied any opportunity for meaningful choice .” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial c ourt’s conc lusion that the Agreement was unc onscionable a ppear s to have be en based on the following findings: (1) the pre -NCLEX housing wa s listed as fre e in the re cruitment packe t but lis ted among the de ductions from pre -NCLEX pay in the Agreement; (2) the description of the pre -NCLEX compensation in the Agre ement was vague and unfair in that it did not include
a n e sti mate of

thenu mbe r o f h ou rs Mr . G uiang a n c ou ld e xp e c t to be paid; (3 ) the re wa s su bs ta nti a lly unequal ba

rgaining powe r betwe en the pa rties; and (4) Vintage’ s overa ll conduct was “high hande d and oppre ssive.” 14

Her e, the pr oof does not support a f inding of either pr ocedu ral or substantive unconsciona

bility. The trial court wa s obviously tr oubled by the variance betwee n Vintage’ s re c ru itm e nt m a te ri a ls andits e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt w ithre sp e c t to wh e the r M r. Gu ia ng a n w ou ld have to pay for his housing cost s d u ri n g t h e six-we ek period in which he studied for his NCLEX lic e ns ur e e xam. H ow e ve r, there c ru itm e nt m a te ri a ls d id n ot say that Mr

. Gu ia ng a n w ou ld b e pa id at a ll for his t i m e s p ent pre paring for the NCLEX e xam. Mr. Guiangan put on no proof that he
rec eived less c ompens at i o n d u ring the pre -NCLEX pe riod than he w ould have r ece ived with the benef its outl ined in the re cruitment materials. Even with the trial proce edings bifurc ated, showing 15 detriment wa s an ele ment of Mr. Guia ngan’s substantive pr oof of his af firmative de fense

. Mr. Guiangan also put on no proof that the differ ence betwee n the pre -N C L E X pay
arr a nge me nt i n th e e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt and in the Li vin g St ipe nddo c ume nt w or ke d to his detriment. Indee d, Mr. Guiangan did not even say that, had he known the information in the Living

16 Stipend document about his pre- NCLEX compe nsation, he w o u l d h ave ma de a dif fer ent dec ision about coming to work for Vintage. Mr. Guiangan was asked on direc t examination: “If you had bee n given this livi ng stipend information when you w er e i n the Philippi nes, would that havechange d wh e the r o r n ot y ou sig ne d th e ma ste r e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt? ” Inre sp on se , M r. Gu ia ng a n c ou ld only reply that he w ould have given it “a second thought.” The overa ll recor d shows that the methodW h e n M r. G u ia n g a n d e c id e d to re sig n fro m h is e m p lo y m e n t w ith V in ta g e , t h e o n ly re a so n g iv e n fo r h is 17 deci s i on w as hi s pre gn ant w i f e’ s des i r e t o l i ve near her s i s t er i n C al i f orni a. N ot hi ng i n t he r ecor d i nd i cat es t hat , w hen Mr

. G u i a n g a n e n t e r e d i n t o t h e e mp l o y me n t a g r e e me n t o r d u r i n g h i s e mp l o y me n t wi t h Vi n t a g e , h e p e r c e i v e d t h e t e r ms
a s o v e r a l l u n f a i r o r o p p r e s s i v e t o h i m. -14- of c a lc ulatin g M r. Gu ia ng a n’ s c omp e ns a tio n du ri ng thesix we e ks in w hic h h e wa s p re pa ri ng fo r h is NCLEX exam was a minor component of the overa ll c ontrac tual arr angeme nt betwee n Vintage and Mr. Guiangan. Mr. Guiangan simply di d not show that any variance in the calculation of t he pre

NC LE X c omp e ns a tio n ma de a ny re a l di ff e re nc e to h im.

The trial c ourt also base d its determination of unconsciona bility on a finding that the pa rties ha d s ub stanti a lly un e qu a l ba rg a ini ng po we r. Un e qu a l ba rg a ini ng po we r alon e is an in s u f f i c i e nt b a sis upon which to conc lude that a c ontr ac t i s u n consciona ble. See R ES TATEMENT (S EC OND ) OF C O N TR A CT S § 208 cmt. d (1981). I t is, however, a fac tor. The fac t that Vintage is a c orporation and Mr. Guiangan is an individual is a consideration, but is not e nough in and of itself to find that the parties ha d substantially unequal bar gaining power . In this case, the te stimony at trial established that Mr. Guiangan’s s k i l l s as a nur se we re in high demand in the United States, and ther e we re sever al age ncies in the Philippines competing with Vintage to rec ruit nurses to work in the U nited States. Moreove r, although t h e ev i d en ce indicated that Mr. G uiangan’ s pay as a nurse in the Phili ppines was a

small perce ntage of aver age nurse pay in the U nited States, there w as no evide nce rega rding the standar d of living in the Phi lippines to put i t into context. There was no e vidence of spe c ial c ir c u ms tan c e s th a t c o mp e ll e dM r

. G u ian g a n to le a v e th e Ph il ip p in e s a n dim mi g r a teto the U.S. Overa ll, the evidencedoes not indicate that, at the time the parties exec uted the employment agre ement, Mr. Guiangan wa s left without a meaningf ul choice. Most importantly, t he undisputed proof shows that the terms of Mr . Guiangan’ s employment agre em en twi t h Vi n t ag e w er e f arfr o m“o n e- s i d ed ” o r “ u n re as o n ab l y h ar s h ” o r “ o p p re ssive.” Inde ed, the terms over all wer e fair and favor able to Mr. Guiangan. Under the Agreement, Mr. Guiangan 17 paid e s s e n ti a ll y n o th in g in a d v a n c e , a n d V in ta g e “ f r o n te d ” a ll o f th e e x p e n s e s

. T h e Agre ement provided that Vintage would pay for, among ot her things, Mr. Guiangan’s visa, attorne y’s fe es for pr oc e ssi ng theimm igr a tio n p ape rw or k, tr a ns po rt a tio n to theUn ite d St a te s, c om pen sation wh ile studying for the licensur e exam, and his state licens u re fe es. Once Mr. Guiangan passe d the licensure exam, the A gree ment provided that Mr. Guiangan would have a waiting job in the U.S., at which he would earn $17 per hour , and that he w ou ld rec eive r aises af ter six months, after

one ye ar, a nda ft e r t wo ye ars . V int a ge wa s a lso re qu ir e d to pr ov ideMr . G uiang an withva c a tio ns , holidays, health insuranc e, and lifeinsuranc e at no cost t o Mr. Guiangan, and if Mr. G uiangan completed the three year term, Vintage agre ed to pay him a $4,000 completio n b o n u s

. Vintage would rec oup its expenses and make its profit by re taining a portion of the c o m p en s at i o n paid by Vintage’ s U.S. c lient f

or Mr. Guiangan’ s service s, over a three -yea r period of time. After

that, Mr. Gu ia ng a n w a s fr e e to re ma in wo rking in the U. S. with no furthe r obl igatio n to Vint a ge . O ve ra ll, this is hardly a contra ct in which the “ i n eq u al i t y of the ba rgain is so manifest a s to shock the jud gme nt o f a

pe rs on of c omm on se ns e , a nd wh e re thete rm s a reso op pr e ssi ve that no re a so na ble person would makethem on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would acc ept them on the other.” Taylor , 142 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Hau n , 690 S.W.2d at 872).M r

. G ui anga n’ s a r gum ent a s t o i nvol unt ar y s er vi t ude, a nd t he t r i al c our t ’ s fi ndi ng i n t hi s r ega r d, does not 18

a p p e a r to b e th e b a sis fo r a sep a ra te re q u e st fo r re lief , a s w ith a to rt c la im . T h e trial c o u rt fo u n d n o se p a ra te li a b ili ty of V i nt age ari s i ng o ut o f t he t hrea t s

. Rat her, t he fi nd i ng of i nv ol un t ar y s er vi t ud e w as ar gu ed on l y as a bas i s f or t he t r i al court ’s fi n di ng t hat t he em pl oym ent a gr ee m ent s houl d be de em ed unenf or ce abl e as vi ol at i ve of publ i c pol i cy. M o reov er, de spi t e M r. G u i an g an ’s vigo rou s ass erti o n s to th e c o n t rary, t h e reco rd i n d i cat es t h at t h e t h reat s w ere
u n succe ss ful, an d M r. G u i an g an l eft V i n t ag e’s em p l o y m en t as h e o ri g i n al l y p l an n ed

. Sp eci fi cal l y , M r. Z i m m erm an ’s t hr ea t eni ng l et t er t o M r. G u i an gan r efer s t o M r

. G ui anga n pl anni ng t o l ea ve by O ct ober 31, 2005, a nd t her e i s no evi dence i n t he r ecor d of any ot her pl anned depart ure dat e. T he r ecor d i nd i cat es t hat M r

. G ui angan l eft du r i ng O ct ob er 2005.
-15- In sum, the rec ord does not support a finding that Mr. Guiangan’s employment agr eeme nt with Vintage wa s unconscionable . There fore , this finding by the trial court must be reve rsed.

Publ ic Policy Vintage a

rgues on a

ppeal that the trial court e rre d in holding tha t M r. Guiangan’s employment agre ement wa s unenfor cea ble as violative of public policy. The trial cour t’s holding was ba s ed o n Vintage’ s threats to re port Mr. Guiangan’s bre ach of his three- year

employment contra ct to U.S. immi gration off icials, and Vintage ’s threats to seek depor tation and denial of

Mr. Gu ia ng a n’ s b id f

or U. S. c iti z e ns hip . T he tria l c ou rt fo un d th a t V int a ge ’s c ondu c t a mou nte d to involuntary servitude through the threat of legal c oerc ion, in violation of fede ral criminal laws, and
was a violation of the public policy of the State of Tenne ssee. 18 Mr. Guiangan’s employment agr eeme nt with Vintage contains the f ollowing provision:

If it appea rs t hat the Employee has ac cepte d employment with the Company for the
so le pu rp os e of o bt ain in g an imm igr a nt v isa , th e Company may n oti fy theU. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service that, in their opi nion, the visa was obtaine d wi th f ra ud ule nt int ention s. Th e Company may a lso no tif y th e U. S. E mba ssy in Ma nil a , Ph ili pp ine s.
Of c ourse, Mr. Zimmerman’s letter to Mr. Guiangan w ent well beyond any provisions in Mr. Guiangan’ s contrac t, stating: “[W]ewill r ep o rt y ou to [U.S. immi gration off icials] and se ek your deportation and if not succe ssful with that we wil l seek denial of your citizenship.” At trial, Vintage repr esen t atives expla ined that their attorneys re commended that they inform U.S. immigration officia ls when an e mployee bre ache d his contrac t, but they had no explanation or excuse for the threats to seek deportation or denial of citizenship, conce ding that suc h statements wer e “a mistake” and we re “ wrong.”

The de termination of whe ther a contra ct is against public policy is a question of law

. Mattox
v . L or e tto Fin. Se rv s. , No. 01A01-9307-CV-00308, 1994 WL 698046, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (citing 5 S AM UEL W I LLI S TO N , A T RE ATI S E ON THE L A W O F C O N TR A CT S § 12:1 (5th ed. 19 93 )) . G e ne rally , p artie s a refr e e to c on tr a c t a s th e y w ish ; c ou rt s sh ou ld c arry o ut the te rm s bargained for in the c ontrac t unless those terms violate public policy. Guilian o v. Cleo, Inc. , 995 S.W .2 d 88 , 10 0 (T e nn

. 19 99 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . Ac on tr a c t w ill no t bede e me d to vio late pu bli c-16-

policy unless it tends to harm th e p u b l i c g ood or conf lict with Tennessee ’s constitution, laws or judicial decisions. Spi e

ge l v . T hom as , M ann & Smit

h, P .C. , 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991)

. To determine whether

a contr act is void as violative of public policy, w e co n s i d er “ the situation of the parties at the time the contra ct was madeand the pur pose of the c ontrac t.” Hoyt v. Hoyt , 372 S

. W. 2 d 3 0 0 , 303 (Tenn. 1963) (citations omitted). Courts will decline to enfor ce a contra ct on t h e g ro u n d of public policy only when the impropriety is clea r and inhe rent in the contra ct, “not mer ely collater al.” Mattox , 1 99 4 W L 6 98 04 6, a t *5 ; McCallum v. McIsaac , 21 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tenn. 1929) . “The principal that contra cts in contrave ntion of public policy are not enforc eable should be applied w ith caution.” Hom e Be ne fic ial Ass ’n v . W

hite , 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn. 1944) (quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Hardin g Glass Co. , 283 U.S. 353, 356, 357 (1931)) . This is particularly true wher e one w h o , l i k e M r. Guiangan, “ha s had the be nefit of perf ormanc e by the other

party will be permitted to avoid his own promise.” Id. (quoting Twin Pi pe Line Co. , 283 U.S. at 356, 357)). Thus, wefocus on the pur pose and the terms of Mr . Guiangan’ s e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt.

We fi rs t co nsider the pur pose of the c ontrac t. If the pur pose underlying the agre ement contra venes public policy, it will be deemed unenf orce able. See, e.g., Mattox , 1994 WL 698046, at *6 (purposeof contra ct was to a void statutorily required f orf ei t u re o f v ehicle used to transport sto le n p ro pe rty) ; Hom e Be ne fic ial Ass n. , 177 S.W.2d at 546 (contra cts with election to public offic e as consider ation areagainst public intere st). The purpose of Mr. Guiangan’ s employment agre ement with V intage is to enable him to li ve a ndwo rk in the Un ite d St ate s; i n c on sid e ratio n o f Vi nta ge fa c ili tatin g thi s, Mr . G uiang a n a gr e e s to wo rk fo r V int a ge fo r a

thr e e -y e ar t e rm . E mpl oy me nt f or a te rm c e rt a in i s, of co urs e, univ e rs a lly
rec ognized and in no way contr av en es public policy. As with any other c ontrac t, a party who chooses to bre ach a

contra ct may be c alled upon to pay damage s t hat re sult from his breac h. The fac t that Mr. Guiangan may be r equire d under the employment agre ement to pay damages to Vintage if he leave s his e mployment be fore the end of the term in no way constitutes involuntary servitude. Vintage did not see k and could not obtain spec ific performanc e; it could only obtain money damage s. At any rate, t his was not the basis of t he trial c ourt’s finding. Thus, the purpose of Mr. Guiangan’ s employment agre ement does not violate public policy.

W e ne xt co ns ide r the te rm s of Mr . G uiang a n’ s e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt. Ev e n if theov e ra ll purpose of

a contr act is not improper, a particula r term o f t h e co n t ract may violate public policy. See, e.g., Baugh v. Nov ak , No . M 20 08 -0 24 38 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 9 W L 2 47 47 14 , at *6 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Aug. 13, 2009) (contra ctual limit ation on transfe r of stock unde rmined purpose of Tenne ssee statut e or sto c k tr a ns fe rs ); se e als o Bio- Me dic al A pp lic ations of

Te nn., Inc . v . Cha ry , No. W1999- 01727-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1634201, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 13, 2000). As in evaluating the
overa ll purpose of the c ontrac t, the violation of public p o l i cy m u s t b e cle ar and inhere nt in the language of the c ontrac t. See Baugh , 2009 WL 2474714, at *8 (citing Mattox , 1994 WL 698046, at *3-5).

He re , th e on ly t e rm

c on c e iva bly a t is su e state s th a t V int a ge may noti fy imm igr a tio n o ff ic ia ls if it b e lie ve s th a t Mr . G uiang a n’ s visa wa s pro c ur e d withfr aud ule nt i nte nti on s. Ho we ve r, thepu bli cM r

. G ui angan di d no t ar gu e t o t he t r i al court bel ow t hat t hi s provi s i on of t he em pl oy m ent agre em ent vi ol at ed 19 publ i c pol i cy.

A s not ed i n M at t ox , t he t er m “ i l l ega l i t y” has bee n s uppl ant ed i n m oder n ca s es by “une nf or ce abi l i t y on t he 20
g ro u n d s o f p u b lic p o licy ,” b u t t h e m e a n in g re m a in s th e sa m e

. M at t ox , 1994 W L 698046, a t *5 n. 3.

W e expr es s no opi ni on on ot her l ega l t heor i es t hat m i ght ha ve at t ac hed t o V i nt age ’ s ad m i t t edl y w r ongful 21

t hrea t s , s uch as t he do ct r i ne of un cl ean hand s or t ort i ou s i nfl i ct i on of em ot i on al di s t r es s

. Such t heori es w er e nei t her pl ed
nor a r gued i n t he t r i al c our t be l ow , a nd w er e not t he bas i s f or t he t r i al c our t ’ s hol di ng.

M r. G u i an g an argu es on ap p eal t h at t h e em p l o y m en t ag reem en t v i o l at es p u b l i c p o l i cy b ecau se i t i s co n t rary 22

t o T. C. A

. §§ 50- 1- 102 and 50- 2- 104, bot h de al i ng w i t h m i s r epr es ent at i ons r ega r di ng w age s a nd ot her c om pens at i on. T h i s argu m en t i s b ased o n the v ari an ce b et w een the recrui t m en t p ack et a n d the A g reem en t reg arding M r. G u i an g an ’s hous i ng a nd t he var i anc e bet w een t he A gr ee m ent a nd t he l i vi ng s t i pend r ega r di ng M r

. G ui anga n’ s pr e- N CL EX pa y. T h e tri al co u rt’s fi n d i n g o n p u b l i c p o l i cy , as re flected i n i t s w rit t en o rd er, w a s b a se d s q u a r e l y o n V i n t ag e’s th rea t s,
w hi ch t he t r i al c our t f ound a m ount ed t o i nvol unt ar y s er vi t ude. T hus , t he s t at ut es c i t ed by M r

. G ui anga n a r e not pert i nent t o ou r eval uat i on o f t he pu bl i c p ol i cy fi nd i ng

. I n add i t i on , M r

. G ui angan al s o ar gu es t hat V i nt age’ s cond uct
r el at i ve t o t he ho usi ng and pre- N C L E X com pensat i on co nst i t ut es fr aud. M r

. G ui angan , h ow ever , n ever p l ed f r aud as
an affi r m at i ve defens e, as r equi r ed by Tenne s s ee Rul e of Ci vi l Pr oce dur e 8. 03, ne ver r ai s ed f r aud as a de f ens e dur i ng tria l, a n d th e m o tio n to a m e n d h is a n sw e r to in c lu d e fra u d a s a n a f f ir m a ti v e d e fe n se w a s d e n ie d b y th e trial c o u rt. T h e re fo re , t h is d e fe n se is w a iv e d

. See T e n n . R . C iv . P . 1 2 .0 8 ; T e n n . R . C iv . P . 1 5 .0 2

. -17- policy finding in th e t ri al court below does not appe ar to be based on this languagein the Ag re e me nt. Th ere was no e vid e nc e su gg e sti ng tha t Mr . G uiang a n h a d any fr aud ule nt i nte nt i n 19 engaging Vintageto securean employment visa for him, and Vintage e xecutives did not seek enfor ceme nt of this cont ra ct u al t er m

. Rather, a ll of the evidenc e in the re cord indicates that Vi nta ge ’s thr e a ts t o M r. Gui ang a n a bo ut c on ta c tin g im mig ratio n o ff ic ia ls w e repa

rt of the ir mis gu ide d e ff

orts t o p e rs ua de Mr . G uiang a n to re ma in i n Vi nta ge ’s e mpl oy , no t a n atte mpt to f ulf ill Vi nta ge ’s ob lig a tio ns un de r i mmi gr a tio n la ws

. Th us , n e ith e r the pu rp os e no r any te rm of Mr . G uiang a n’ s e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt i s offe nsive to Tennesse e public policy. Rather , Mr. Guiangan’s ar gument and the f inding of the trial
c ou rt be low app e ar t o b e ba se d o n V int a ge ’s ba d be ha vio r in try ing to p re ssu reMr . G uiang a n in to completing his three- year term of employment. Howeve r, Tennessee la w is clea r that, for a contr act to be dee med unenf

orce able a s violative of public policy, “the illega lity must be inherent, not 20
mere ly collatera l.” Mc Cal lum , 21 S.W.2d at 393. Mr. Guiang an h as ci ted no ca se in which a
c on tr a c t is de e me d v iol ati ve of pu bl ic po lic y b e c aus e of be ha vio r o f a

pa rty th a t oc c ur s e

x po st fac to

. W e mus t r e ve rs e thetria l c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng that Mr . G uiang a n’ s e mp lo ym ent agre e me nt i s

21 unenfor cea

ble as violative of public policy, a s the finding is ba s ed on neither the purpose nor the te rm s o f the c on tr a c t. 22
Injun ctiveRelief Finally, Vintage argu es t h at t he trial c ourt err ed by su a s po nte issuing inj unctive re lief against Vintage . A trial court’s decision re garding whe ther to g ra n t i n j u n ctive re lief is revie wed under an abuseof discre tion standard. Bd. of C omm’rs of R oane Coun ty v. Parke r , 88 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Atrial court a buses its discretion when “ its decision is not supported-18-

by the evidenc e, whe n it applies an incorr ect legal standard, [ or] whe n it reac hes a dec ision which is against logic or re asoning that causes an injustice to the pa rty complaining.” Ow e ns v . O we ns , 241 S.W.3d 478, 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) ( citing Bis c an v . Br own , 160 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tenn. 2005)).

Wh en determining whether to gr ant injunctive re lief, the trial c ourt should consider suc h fac tors as the a dequac y of other reme dies, the danger that the plaintiff will suff er irrepa rable harm wi tho ut the inj un c tio n, the be ne fi t to the plaintif f, theha rm to the de fe nd a nt, a ndthepu bli c int e re st. See Zion Hill Baptist Chu rch v. Taylor , No. M2002-03105-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 239760, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2004) ( ci t ing Union Pl anters’ Bank & Trust C

o. v. Memphis Hotel Co. , 13 9 S.W

. 71 5, 71 8– 19 (T e nn. 1 91 1) ; But ts v. City of S. Fu lton , 5 65 S.W .2 d 8 79 , 8 82 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 1977 ); He nry Coun ty v . Sum me rs , 5 47 S.W .2 d 2 47 , 2 51 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 6) ; Kaset v. Combs , 434 S.W .2 d 838 , 841 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 96 8) ; Herbert v. W.G. Bush & C o. , 298 S.W.2d 747 (T en n

. Ct. App. 1956); 42 A M

. J UR

. 2 D Injunctions § 1 4 ( 20 00 ); R OBER T B ANKS , J R

. & J UNE F. E NT MAN , T ENNES S EE C I VI L P ROCE DURE § 4-3(b) (2d ed. 1999)). “ A court’s equitable powe r to grant injunctions should be used sparingly, espec ially when the activity enjoined is not illegal, when the injunction is notreque sted, and whe n it is broader than nece ssary to ac hieve its purposes.” Kersey v. Wilson , No. M200 5 -0 2 1 0 6 -C OA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3952899, at *8 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2006) (c iting Ear

ls v . Ea rls , 4 2 S. W .3 d 8 77 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; Te rry v . T e rry , No. M1999-01630-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 863135 (Te nn. Ct. App. June 29, 2000)).

In this case , the trial court, su a s po nte , enter ed two injun ct i o n s ag ains t Vintage at the
c on c lus ionof

thetria l. T he pa

rtie s w e reno t gi ve n an o pp ortun ity in ad vanc e to sub mit arg ume nts , e ith e r f or or a gains t th e inj un c tio ns

. Re c ruit me nt Ma te ria ls

We c onsider the first injunction i ssued by the trial c ourt, in which Vintage was e njoined from “using rec ruitment packe ts which terms and r epre sentations of fr ee be nefits ar e contr adictory to the
a c tual te rm s u se d ina ny c on tr a c ts pr e se nte d to the e mpl oy e e s of [V int a ge ]. ” Vi nta ge arg ue s that th is injunction should be rever sed beca use, among other rea sons, it is ove rly broad. V intage asse rts that the languageof the injunction prohibits Vintage from ever using the recruitment packet gi ven to Mr. Guiangan, e ven if it changes its employment agre ement to be consistent with the packet, be cause the language of the injunction prec ludes Vintage f rom using rec ruitment packe ts that conflict with “any” contra ct that Vintage ha s ever used. Vintage also states that the injunction preve nts Vintage f rom ever changing the terms of the e mployment agree ment and using rec ruitment packe ts that describe the bene fits that Vintage plans to give. In its findings, the trial court stated that Mr. Guiangan’ s em p l o y m ent agreeme nt “did not include the ‘ fre e’ be nefits listed in the [re cruitment materials], instead and direc tly contrary to the state me nts in the [r e c ru itm e nt m a te ri a ls] , th e

. . . A gr e e me nt .

. . pr ov ide d th a t [ Mr . G uiang a n] wo uld ha ve to p a y f

or ma ny of tho se be ne fi ts. ” It

a lso no te d th a t, i mme diate ly a ft e r M r. Gu ia ng a n c a me to the U.S., he was pr esente d with the “living stipend” document to sign, whi ch changed his preNC LE X p a y f

ro m $9 .0 0 p e r h ou r t o a “ sti pe nd ” arr ang e me nt in whi c h $70 0 pe r mon th of his ov e ra ll stipend was deduc ted for e xpenses, including housing, leaving a net $300 per

month for per sonalI t i s di f fi cul t t o s ee how t he t w o di f f er enc es , t ake n t oget her , w oul d w or k t o M r

. G ui anga n’ s de t r i m ent

. The 23 hous i ng c os t s w er e, of

c our s e, l es s t han hi s pr e- N CL EX pay, bec aus e t hey w er e deduc t ed f r om hi s pr e- N CL EX pa y, alo n g w i t h o t h er c o st s, w ith a n et rem ain i n g am o u n t fo r h i s p erso n al ex p en ses. H o u si n g w as n o t t h e o n l y ex p en se deduc t ed f

r om t he pr e- N CL EX pa y. H ad M r

. G ui anga n r ec ei ved f r ee hous i ng but not pr e- N CL EX pa y, he w oul d ha ve had t o pa y out

- of

- pocke t f or e xpens es s uch as N CL EX t ut or i ng, t r ans por t at i on, a nd dr i ver ’ s t r ai ni ng. -19- expense s. The trial c ourt noted that Mr. Guiangan wa s not told whil e he w as in the Phili ppines that his pre-N CLEX compensation would be change d in this m anner

. It is helpful at this point to re view the sequenc e of c hanges w ith respec t to Mr. Guiangan’ s compensation and benef

its during the s ix-wee k period in which he was preparing to take the N CLEX exam. Therec ruitment materials given to Mr. G uiangan listed th e fo l l o wi n g benef its as “fre e”:
rec ruitme n t , v i s a p ro ce s s i n g , T S E re v i ew , l an g u ag e e x am s , ai rf ar e, an dh o u s i n g u n t i l working. Other benef its were note d in the rec ruitment packe t but wer e not listed as “fr ee.” The re cruitment pac ket did not say t hat an e mployee would be paid any compensation for time spent prepa ring to take the NC LE X e xam. Th e Vi nta ge e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nt w a s c on sis te nt w iththere c ru itm e nt m a te ri a ls
exce pt that it st ated that Mr. G uiangan would be paid “Pre -NCLEX Pay” at a rate of $9 per hour , and that rea s o n ab l e housing costs for up to eight wee ks would be deduc ted from his pre -NCLEX compensation. Fi nally, the day a fter hearrived in the U.S., Mr. Guiangan was a sk ed t o sign the “Living Stipend” document. This stated that he would be paid $9 per hour while pre paring for

the NCLEX exam, but added that expe nses for housing, transportation, and the like w ould be deduc ted “in the amount of $700 pe r month from my gross stipend” and that he would rec eive a “ne t stipend” of $3 00 pe r m on th t o c ov e r h is p e rs on a l e xp e ns e s.
Thus , the re cruitment pac ket listed “fr ee housing” during NCLEX training and in fac t ho us ing wa s n ot f

re e . How e ve r, there c ru itm e nt p a c ke t a lso didno t st a te that Mr . G uiang a n w ou ld be paid f or his time spent prepa

ring for the NCLEX exam, but in fact he w as paid, and the housing costs wer e deducted fr om that pay. Mr. Guiangan did not establish at trial that the overall differe nce betwee n the re cruitment pac ket and the A gree ment worke d to his d et ri m en t

. More importantly, 23 Mr. Guiangan acknow ledged in his testimony that he understood, from the agreeme nt signed months befor e he le ft the Philippi nes, that housing and transportation wo u ld be deduc ted from his pre

NCLEX pay. Under these circumstance s, Mr. Guiangan has not established wr ongdoing by Vintage when the pa

rties enter ed into a contr actua l relationship.

The trial c ourt was rightly c oncerned about Vintage prese nting Mr. Guiangan w ith a “Living Stip e nd ” do c ume nt that ap pear s int e nd e d to e ith e r alte r o r “ c lari fy ” thete rm s o f the pa rt ie s’ employment agre ement. This was give n to Mr. Gui angan f or his signature a fter both pa rties had partially performed and Mr. Guiangan had moved to the U.S

. Howeve r, once again, Mr. G uiangan prese nted no evidenc e that the c hange or “cla rification” in the contra ctual t er ms were detrimental to him. Thus, based on the re cord be fore us, Mr. Guiangan has demonstrated no harm from Vintage
re qu iring him

to e xe c utetheLi vin g St ipe nddo c ume nt. The inj unctive relief is sued by the t rial court does notaff ect Mr. G uiangan. Rathe r, it appea rs int e n d e dt o p r o t e c tf

u t u r e r e c ru i t s , a n dt h u s t o p r o t e c tt h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t

. T h i s i s a n ap p r op ri a te consi deration. See Zion HillBaptist Chu rch , 2 0 0 4 W L 2 3 9 7 6 0 , a t * 5 ( c it a ti o n s o mi tte d). The-20-

injunctive relief

addre sses only t h e re cruitment materials, not the Living St ipend. Howe ver, the evidenc e in the re cord doe s not establish that Vintage enga ged in wrongdoing or that Mr. Guiangan or any othe r re cruit would be h ar m ed by Vintage’s use of similar r ecr uitment packets a nd
e mpl oy me nt a gr e e me nts in the fu tur e . T hu s, wemus t c on c lud e that th e tria l cou rt abu se d it s discretion and va cate the injunction.
Thr e ats
The trial c ourt also enjoined Vintagefrom “thr eate ning to r eport employees to the INS or a simil ar immigration age ncy, or t h re atening deportation or to deny citize nship solely upon an employee’ s decision to seek othe r employment (and not due to any criminal or unl awf ul conduct on the part of that employee which mi ght ordinarily be reported).” Vintage c hallenges this injunction by arguing that there is no showing that Mr. Guiangan would have be en irre para bly harmed in the absenc e of the injunctive relief

. Had it be en given the opportunity to argue against the injunction, Vintage c laims, it m ay havebeen a ble to allay the tria l court’s c oncerns. In addition, Vintage a rgues that th is i nju nc tio n is ov e rl y br oa d. Th e vis a re gu latio ns , Vi nta ge ma int a ins , are de sig ne d to a vo id having a rec ruit become a public char ge by ensuring that rec ruits have a job w hen they ar rive in the U.S., so reporting e mployees to the USCIS whe n they do not f ulfill their contra ctu al o b l i g ations
serve s a legitimate purpose

. W e a gr e e wi th V int a ge that th e rewa s no show ing of ir re pa ra bleha rm to M r. Gu ia ng a n. Th is injunction is di rec ted at Vintage’ s conduct towards other e mployees, and w ill have no ef fec t on Mr. Guiangan. A gain, it appea rs t hat t he trial court’s primary consideration in issuing the injunction was prot ec t i n g t h e public interest, which is a ppropriate . Vintage c ontends that it was not given an opportun ity to a d d r e s s th e trial c o u rt’ s c o n c e r n s ab o u t th e th r e a ts

. T h is c o n te n ti o n s e e ms a t odds wi th V int a ge ’s rathe r s he e pis h a dmi ssi on s at tria l a ndon app e a l th a t thr e a te nin g Mr . G uiang a n w ith deportation and denial of his bid for U .S. citizenship was wr ongful conduc t. Finally, Vintage argues that r eporting employee s who arein the U.S. on employment visas to the USCIS when they leavetheir employment ea rly serve s a legitimate purpose an d Vintage should be allowed to do so. Weagre e. Howeve r, t he injunction does not prohibit Vintage fr om re po rting su c h e mpl oy e e s to the USC IS ; ra the r, it pr oh ibi ts Vin ta ge fr om threatening to employees that they will be re ported to immigration officials.

Be c aus e thi s in

jun c tio n d oe s n ot p ro hib it V in tag e fr om a c tually re po rting e mpl oy e e s to imm igr a tio n o ff

ic ia ls w he n th e y b re a c h th e ir c on tr a c ts, we c a nn ot s a y th a t th e tria l c ou rt abu se d it s discretion in issuing this injunction. Theref ore, the injunction is affirmed.

C ONCL US I ON In sum, we f

ind that the aff

irmative def

ense of unconsciona

bility wa s n ev er ple d by Mr. Guiangan and was waived. In any event, wereve rse the trial co u rt ’s finding that Mr. Guiangan’s employment agre ement is unconsciona ble and that it violates public policy. Thus, we f ind that Mr. Guian g an ’ s e mp lo y me n t ag r e e ment is enforc eable and re verse the trial court’s dismiss al of Vintage ’s
c la im a nd Mr

. Gu ia ng a n’ s c ou nte rc la ims

. Th e c aus e mus t be re ma nd e d fo r fu rthe r pr oc e e din gs in-21-

lig ht o f this ho ldi ng . T he tria l cou rt ’s inj un c tio n c on c e rn ing Vi nta ge ’s us e of re c ru itm e nt p a c ke ts is vacated. The injunction conc erning Vintage ’s threats to employees is aff irmed.

The decision of the trial court is a ffirme d in pa rt, reve rsed in part, and va cate d in part as se t forth abo v e, and the c ause is re manded f or further proc eedings c onsistent with thi s Opinion. The costs of this appea l are taxed one -half to Appe llant V intage Hea lth Resour ces, Inc., and its surety, and one- half to Appe llee Jame s Jose R. Guiangan, f or which e xecution may issue if ne cessa ry.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. KIRBY, JUDGE