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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MICHAEL T. McLAUGHLIN, 

 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-11607 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

 

JOHN H. WILSON et. al., 

 Defendants. 

 / 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 

AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF #6) AND MOTION TO AMEND THE 

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR RECONSIDERATION 

(ECF #7) 

 Plaintiff Michael T. McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”), a prisoner currently 

confined at the Southern Desert Correctional Center in Indian Springs, Nevada, 

filed this pro-se civil-rights action on May 1, 2015. (See the “Complaint,” ECF 

#1.) McLaughlin alleged that Defendants John H. Wilson (“Wilson”) and Lari 

Zeka (“Zeka”) violated his civil rights by defrauding him through a legal research 

scheme. (See id. at 4, Pg. ID 4.) McLaughlin brought the action “pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 ... seek[ing] to redress the violation of civil rights secured by the 

Constitution of the United States.” (Id. at 2, Pg. ID 2.) McLaughlin also applied to 

proceed in forma pauperis and for the appointment of counsel. (See ECF ##2-3.) 

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 On May 13, 2015, the Court granted McLaughlin’s application to proceed in 

forma pauperis, denied his motion for the appointment of counsel, and summarily 

dismissed the Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) (the “Dismissal Order”). (See ECF #5.) The Court noted that “[t]o 

establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish 

‘both that 1) []he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States and 2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of 

state law.’” (Dismissal Order at 3-4, Pg. ID 36-37 (quoting Redding v. St. Eward, 

241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001)).) The Court determined that “McLaughlin’s 

allegations against Wilson and Zeka fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted because McLaughlin has not pleaded that either Wilson or Zeka acted 

under the color of state law or were involved in a ‘joint activity with state 

officials.’” (Id. at 4, Pg. ID 37 (quoting Goodell v. Anthony, 157 F.Supp.2d 799, 

800 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).) 

 McLaughlin has now filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint 

(the “Motion for Leave to Amend”) and a motion to alter or amend the judgment 

or, in the alternative, for reconsideration (the “Motion to Alter or Amend the 

Judgment”). (See ECF ##6-7.) The Court construes both motions as requests to 

alter or amend the Dismissal Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

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59(e). See, e.g., Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2002) 

(construing post-judgment motion seeking leave to file amended complaint as a 

Rule 59(e) motion); Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1047 (6th 

Cir. 2001) (construing motion for reconsideration as a Rule 59(e) motion). 

“A court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend if there is: (1) a 

clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in 

controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Intera Corp. v. 

Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir.2005) (citing GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l 

Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir.1999)). However, “[t]he court will not 

grant [a] motion[] for ... reconsideration that merely present[s] the same issues 

ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant 

must not only demonstrate a palpable defect ... but also show that correcting the 

defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). 

See also Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 463 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir. 

2006) (“palpable defect” standard under L.R. 7.1 is consistent with grounds for 

amending or altering judgment under Rule 59(e)). Indeed, Rule 59(e) motions “are 

not intended as a vehicle to relitigate previously considered issues ... and are not 

the proper vehicle to attempt to obtain a reversal of judgment by offering the same 

arguments previously presented.” Kenneth Henes Special Projects Procurement v. 

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Continental Biomass Industries, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 721, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 

McLaughlin makes two arguments in his motions. First, McLaughlin argues 

that the Court held his pro se Complaint to an overly-stringent standard when it 

dismissed his § 1983 claim for failing to allege that Wilson and Zeka acted “under 

the color of state law.” (See ECF #2 at Pg. ID 40.) McLaughlin appears to assume 

that the Court dismissed his Complaint solely because he failed to include the 

words “under the color of state law.” Not so. The Court dismissed the Complaint 

because the factual allegations failed to state a claim under § 1983. “[A] complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim of relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). McLaughlin’s Complaint 

contained insufficient factual allegations to support a plausible inference that 

Wilson and Zeka acted under the color of state law. Indeed, it is clear from 

McLaughlin’s allegations against Wilson and Zeka that he complains of purely 

private conduct. (See ECF #6 at 3-4, Pg. ID 41-42.) Accordingly, even if 

McLaughlin’s Complaint had included the words “under the color of state law,” it 

still would not have stated a § 1983 claim. 

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Second, McLaughlin contends that the Court erred by dismissing his 

Complaint without providing him an opportunity to amend. (See ECF #6 at 2-4, 

Pg. ID 40-42.) But McLaughlin has not identified any specific ways in which he 

would amend his Complaint to state a viable claim, if granted leave to amend. 

Indeed, McLaughlin’s motions largely rehash the same allegations and arguments 

that he made in his Complaint and that the Court found insufficient to state a § 

1983 claim in the Dismissal Order. 

Accordingly, McLaughlin has not demonstrated that the Court erred when it 

dismissed his Complaint. And even if McLaughlin did identify a palpable defect 

in the Dismissal Order, McLaughlin has not shown that correcting the defect would 

result in a different disposition of the case. Under these circumstances, 

McLaughlin is not entitled to alteration, amendment, or reconsideration of the 

Dismissal Order. 

McLaughlin may have a legal remedy for the allegedly-wrongful conduct by 

Wilson and Zeka. For instance, he may be able to assert a claim against them in a 

state court. But McLaughlin’s allegations in this action do not provide a basis for 

relief pursuant to § 1983 in this Court. 

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 For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 

Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF #6) and the Motion to Alter or Amend the 

Judgment (ECF #7) are DENIED. 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: June 16, 2015 

 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on June 16, 2015, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113

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