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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CORRINE BAKER,

Civil No. 2:15-CV-11629

Petitioner,

v. Honorable George Caram Steeh

SHAWN BREWER,

Respondent.

_________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING 

LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

Corrine Baker, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Huron Valley Women’s 

Correctional Facility in Ypsilanti, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, through her counsel David S. 

Steingold, in which she challenges her conviction for second-degree 

murder, M.C.L.A. 750.317; and second-degree child abuse, M.C.L.A. 

750.136(b)(3). For the reasons that follow, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

I. Background

Petitioner’s case arises out of the tragic death of her four year old son

at the hands of her boyfriend, Brandon Hayes. This Court recites verbatim 
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the relevant facts regarding petitioner’s conviction from the trial judge’s 

lengthy opinion denying her post-conviction relief, since they are presumed 

correct on habeas review. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th 

Cir. 2009):

Over the course of 3–4 days in April, 2010, four-year-old [DC]1

was beaten to death by his mother’s boyfriend, Brandon Hayes. 

The murder took place in an apartment in Argentine Township in 

southern Genesee County. Mr. Hayes went to trial and was 

convicted by a jury of multiple (10) offenses ranging from drug 

possession to 1st degree murder. Mr. Hayes did not appeal any 

of his convictions and he is currently serving life without parole 

on the murder conviction. His judgment of sentence is attached 

as Exhibit 1. Corrine Baker, the mother of [DC], was charged with 

2nd degree murder, MCL 750.317; and 2nd degree child abuse, 

MCL 750.136b (3). In exchange for her testimony at the trial of 

Mr. Hayes, the prosecutor agreed that if she pled guilty to the 

charges, the sentence on 2nd degree murder would not exceed 

13 years on the minimum to 30 years on the maximum. Ms. 

Baker accepted the plea agreement, testified as required, and 

was sentenced to 13 – 30 years. Michigan Department of 

Correction records show her earliest release date to be April 22, 

2023 - approximately 5 years from now. Her judgment of 

sentence is attached as Exhibit 2. The victim in this case, [DC], 

is pictured below. [picture omitted] It is difficult to convey to 

others the manner in which [DC] was murdered. Several 

photographs are being submitted with this opinion. The scope of 

the injuries sustained by [D] is simply incomprehensible. Dr. 

Brian Hunter, M.D. is the Medical Examiner for Genesee County, 

Michigan. Dr. Hunter testified at the preliminary examination held 

for Brandon Hayes. His testimony was made admissible at the 

preliminary examination of Corrine Baker by stipulation of the 

parties. 

1 Because the victim was a minor at the time of the offense, the Court will refer to him by 

his initials only to preserve his privacy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).
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“ ... this is the worse - - worse beating I’ve ever seen 

on any individual at any time during my forensic 

pathology career, and I’ve done over 2,500 

autopsies. And just the sheer number of injuries is 

overwhelming, but when you look at sort of the 

distribution of some of the injuries which I think are 

thermal injuries, burns to the groin area and to the tip 

of the penis, it’s, ah, probably the -- the pain is 

unimaginable, and especially in the back of the left 

hand where you have thermal injuries that are 

severe. It’s as severe as any burn. I mean, when you 

look at burn victims, I see burn victims that have 

already gone to just charred ashes and that’s just one 

step back.” (Pages 192-193) 

Dr. Hunter testified at length regarding the multiple injuries 

sustained by [D]. The photographs which have been included 

with this opinion visually confirm Dr. Hunter’s testimony. 

At the time defendant Baker was witnessing the beatings of her 

son, at the hands of her boyfriend (Brandon Hayes), Baker was 

on absconder status from a drug conviction and a probationary 

sentence in Livingston County, Michigan. As such, she was in no 

position to seek help from the police station, which was within 

walking distance from the apartment she shared with her kids 

and Brandon Hayes. Apparently, she also was in no position to 

knock on the doors of her neighbors and request them to call the 

police on [D]’s behalf. She did nothing. In fact, she hardly did 

anything during the four days of assaults upon her son. A relative 

of hers (who came to her apartment to buy drugs) was the 

individual who finally summoned police assistance. However, by 

then, it was too late. 

* * *

From the time that the assault on [D] began until the time of his 

death (3-4 days) Corrine Baker deflected any suggestion that she 

take [D] to the hospital. Phone calls from her mother urging her 

to take [D] to the doctor were ignored by Ms. Baker. Arnold 

Hayes, the father of Brandon Hayes (the boyfriend), testified that 
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he raised the issue of seeking medical care for [D]’s hand with 

Corrine. He testified that he said “we should take him to 

emergency.” Corrine Baker’s response to him was “I can’t. I can’t 

really do that because they’ll think that I did it.” (July 19, 2010 

Preliminary Exam Transcript at p 49). 

Brandon Delong lived in close proximity to the apartment where 

Brandon Hayes and Corrine Baker were living at the time of the 

incident. Mr. Delong testified that on Saturday, April 10, 2010, at 

approximately 4-5 P.M., he saw Brandon Hayes walk past his 

home. Mr. Hayes was alone. He appeared to be headed towards 

the Sunoco Gas Station on Silver Lake Road. (PE Transcript, p 

67).

Michael Delong testified that he knew Brandon Hayes and 

Corrine Baker. He testified that on “the Saturday before my 

nephew was rushed to the hospital he (Brandon Hayes) had 

walked up to the store.” The store was at the Sunoco Gas 

Station. He testified that Hayes came back from the store 

approximately 15 minutes later. (PE Transcript, p 69-73) 

The next witness to testify was Christine Baker, defendant’s 

younger sister. She and several friends had come to Corrine 

Baker’s apartment. When they knocked on the door Corrine 

came out of the apartment and closed the door behind her. 

Eventually, Christine and her friends were let into the apartment. 

She saw [D]’s face and said it looked “beat up”. The rest of [D]’s 

body was covered with blankets. He appeared to be “sleeping.” 

She was asked “Did you say anything to your sister about [D]’s 

condition?” 

Answer: “I told her that I was gonna call the cops.” 

Question: “What was her response when you said you were 

going to call the cops?” 

Answer: “She shook her head no.” 

Question: “Did she say anything to you?” 
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Answer: “I’ll get in trouble.” 

Question: “Did she say why she would get in trouble?” 

Answer: “No, but I knew why.” 

Question: “Do you remember Corrine saying anything about 

being out of her district?” 

Answer: “Yeah.” 

Question: “What did she say in regards to being out of her 

district?” 

Answer: “I’m out of my district” 

Question: “And what does that mean?” 

Answer: “She’s supposed to be in Livingston County and she 

was living in Genesee.” 

Question: “Did you know why she was supposed to be living in 

Livingston County and not Genesee?” 

Answer: “She was on felony probation.” 

When Christine Baker, defendant’s sister, left the apartment, she 

called Rick Calhoun, [D]’s grandfather. Shortly thereafter, the 

police arrived on the scene. 

Cassandra Miller confirmed Christine Baker’s account as to why 

Corrine Baker did not seek help from the police. Corrine Baker 

told her that she was “not in her district.” (PE p 129- 130). 

The next witness, Rodney Keen, was an uncle to Brandon 

Hayes. He had helped move Corrine Baker and Brandon Hayes 

into the apartment where these events occurred. Some of the 

furniture they were using came from Keen’s house. Mr. Keen was 

at the Baker/Hayes apartment on the Friday when the assaults 

on [D] had just started. He does not remember which hand on 
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[D] was injured but, “his whole hand was all swelled up, big, 

blustery, red looking;” He said he told Corrine “the baby needs 

medical attention and they both told me that they could not do 

that because they had warrants for arrest and they had - - - didn’t 

want Child Protective Services involved.” 

He testified that he confronted Corrine a second time about 

getting medical attention for [D] and on this occasion Brandon 

was not in the room where this conversation was held. Corrine 

did not ask him to do anything further. Later on, the issue of 

whether Corrine had a warrant was brought up again. He testified 

that he was told by her that she had a warrant for her arrest. 

Angelo Panos, police officer with the Argentine Police 

Department was the last witness to testify at Ms. Baker’s 

preliminary examination. While on duty he was approached by 

Richard Calhoun and he was told that he needed help at the 

Pinehurst Apartment complex because there was a child that 

was injured. He recalls the time being approximately 2:30 in the 

afternoon. Apartment complex is just a couple blocks away from 

the Police Department. Upon arrival at the apartment he was 

directed to a bedroom inside and saw a young boy laying on his 

back with a young lady sitting next to him. The young lady was 

Corrine Baker. He said the child appeared to be ‘‘just beat up all 

over”. (PE p 177) He described his first look at [DC] as 

“devastatingly shocking.” He acknowledged that he lost his 

professional demeanor when he turned and said to Corrine 

Baker “What the f*** kind of animals are you? Look at this boy. 

He’s crucified.” 

People v. Baker, No. 10-27347-FC, pp. 1-4, 10-14 (Saginaw County Circuit

Court, March 23, 2018)(ECF No. 21-2, PageID.1602-05, 1611-15). 

Petitioner moved to withdraw her plea on the ground that trial counsel 

was ineffective. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, after which the trial court denied 
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the motion to withdraw the plea. People v. Baker, No. 10-27347-FC 

(Saginaw County Circuit Court, June 25, 2013). Petitioner’s conviction was 

affirmed on appeal. People v. Baker, No. 317395 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 

2013)(Ronayne Krause, J., would grant leave to appeal); lv. den. 496 Mich. 

853 (2014).

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254, which was held in abeyance to permit her to return to the 

state courts to exhaust additional claims. Baker v. Stewart, No. 2:15-CV11629, 2017 WL 2334937 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2017). 

Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, 

which was denied on the merits in a lengthy opinion. People v. Baker, No. 

10-27347-FC (Saginaw County Circuit Court, Mar. 23, 2018)(ECF No. 21-

2). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. 

People v. Baker, No. 343321 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2018); lv. den. 503 

Mich. 955, 923 N.W.2d 243 (2019).

This Court subsequently reopened the case and permitted petitioner 

to amend her petition. The petition was again held in abeyance during the 

pendency of petitioner’s request for a review of her criminal conviction by 

the Michigan Attorney General Office’s Conviction Integrity Unit. (CIU). 
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The case was reopened following completion of that review. Baker v. 

Brewer, No. 2:15-CV-11629, 2020 WL 1952520 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2020). 

Petitioner in her amended petition seeks habeas relief on the 

following grounds:

I. Corrine Baker’s plea was not made knowingly, 

understandably, and voluntarily due to counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, in violation of Ms. Baker’s due process 

rights.

II. Corrine Baker’s due process rights were violated when the 

trial court accepted a guilty plea without a sufficient finding 

of guilt.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal 

law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the 
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Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case 

differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). 

An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision 

unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ 

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.

III. Discussion

A. Claim # 1. The ineffective assistance of counsel/involuntary 

plea claim.

Petitioner first contends that her guilty plea was not knowingly, 

voluntarily, or intelligently made because she was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel.

Initially, the Court observes that petitioner has no federal 

constitutional right to withdraw her guilty plea. See Hynes v. Birkett, 526 F. 

App’x 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2013). Unless a petitioner’s guilty plea otherwise 

violated a clearly-established constitutional right, whether to allow the 

withdrawal of a habeas petitioner’s plea is discretionary with the state trial 

court. See Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748 (E.D. Mich. 
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2005). Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled that post-sentencing ‘buyer’s remorse’ 

is not a valid basis” to set aside an otherwise valid guilty plea. Meek v. 

Bergh, 526 F. App’x 530, 536 (6th Cir. 2013)(internal quotations omitted). 

A guilty plea that is entered in state court must be voluntarily and 

intelligently made. See Shanks, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 749; Doyle v. Scutt, 347 

F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (E.D. Mich. 2004)(both citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 

U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). In order for a plea of guilty to be voluntarily and 

intelligently made, the defendant must be aware of the “relevant 

circumstances and likely consequences” of his or her plea. Hart v. Marion 

Correctional Institution, 927 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991). The defendant 

must also be aware of the maximum sentence that can be imposed for the 

crime for which he or she is pleading guilty. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 

154 (6th Cir. 1994). When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition 

challenging his or her plea of guilty, the state generally satisfies its burden 

by producing a transcript of the state court proceedings showing that the 

plea was made voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 

1993). The factual findings of a state court that the guilty plea was properly 

made are generally accorded a presumption of correctness. The petitioner 

must overcome a heavy burden if the federal court is to overturn these 

findings by the state court. Id. 
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It is only when the consensual character of a guilty plea is called into 

question that the validity of a guilty plea may be impaired. Mabry v. 

Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984). A plea of guilty entered by one fully 

aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 

commitments made to him or her by the court, prosecutor, or his or her own 

counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 

improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 

unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature 

improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (i.e. 

bribes). Id. Federal and state courts will uphold a state court guilty plea if 

the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature 

and consequences of the charges and voluntarily chose to plead guilty. 

See Thirkield v. Pitcher, 199 F. Supp. 2d 637, 652 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

Petitioner’s plea was voluntary and not coerced. Petitioner was 

advised of the charges against her and the possible penalties. Petitioner 

was advised of the plea and sentencing agreement, in which she would 

plea guilty as charged and in exchange for her truthful testimony against 

Hayes, the prosecution would recommend a sentence of 13 to 30 years on 

the second-degree murder charge. (ECF No. 6-6, PageID.440-42); see 

also 8/30/11 Plea Agreement Form, which Baker signed on August 30, 
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2011 and which is submitted as part of the Rule 5 material. Under oath, 

the trial court asked petitioner if she understood the plea and she replied 

affirmatively; she had no questions about the plea agreement or its 

consequences. Petitioner acknowledged that she had reviewed the advice 

of rights form with her counsel and all of the rights she would be giving up 

by pleading guilty. (Id., PageID.441-45). Petitioner was advised of the 

rights that she would waive by pleading guilty. (Id., PageID.445-47). The 

trial court again read the charges to petitioner and she indicated she 

understood; when asked how she wanted to plead, petitioner replied 

“[g]uilty.” When asked whether she understood that by pleading guilty she 

would be giving up all of the rights she would have at trial, petitioner 

answered that she did. Petitioner told the judge that it was her choice to 

plead guilty. Petitioner denied that anyone threatened her or used undue 

influence or force her to plea. Petitioner denied that there were any 

promises used to get her to plea. The trial court asked petitioner if she was 

pleading guilty “freely and voluntarily” and she replied yes. (Id., 

PageID.447-50). The transcript clearly shows that the plea was voluntary.

Petitioner now contends that it was counsel’s ineffectiveness that 

convinced her to plead guilty. Petitioner alleges she was coerced into 

pleading guilty by her defense counsel’s threat that she could be sentenced 
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to up to life in prison or that the judge could at least exceed the sentencing 

guidelines if she went to trial and lost. 

To show that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

under federal constitutional standards, a defendant must satisfy a two 

prong test. First, the defendant must demonstrate that, considering all of 

the circumstances, counsel’s performance was so deficient that the 

attorney was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In so 

doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s 

behavior lies within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

Id. In other words, petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action might be sound trial strategy. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, the defendant must show that such 

performance prejudiced her defense. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the 

defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement for an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
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errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on 

going to trial. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 129 (2011)(citing Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985)). An assessment of whether a 

defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel’s errors “will depend 

largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at 

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Hill to require a 

federal habeas court to always analyze the substance of the habeas 

petitioner’s underlying claim or defense to determine whether but for 

counsel’s error, petitioner would likely have gone to trial instead of pleading 

guilty. See Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2003). The 

petitioner must therefore show a reasonable probability that but for 

counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty, because there 

would have been a reasonable chance that he or she would have been 

acquitted had he or she insisted on going to trial. See Garrison v. Elo, 156 

F. Supp. 2d 815, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The test of whether a defendant 

would have not pleaded guilty if he or she had received different advice 

from counsel “is objective, not subjective and ‘to obtain relief on this type of 

claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 

bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.’” Pilla v. U.S., 
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668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012)(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 

356, 372 (2010)). 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on her ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim, because she failed to show a reasonable probability that 

she could have prevailed had she insisted on going to trial, or that she 

would have received a lesser sentence than she did by pleading guilty. See

Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 750. 

Petitioner’s claim that her counsel coerced her into pleading guilty is 

defeated by the fact that petitioner stated on the record at the plea hearing 

that no threats or coercion had been made to get her to plead guilty. 

Petitioner’s bare claim that she was coerced into pleading guilty is 

insufficient to overcome the presumption of verity which attaches to 

petitioner’s statements during the plea colloquy, in which she denied that 

any threats had been used to get her to enter her plea. See Shanks v. 

Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 750-51. 

Moreover, even if counsel advised petitioner that she could receive 

up to life in prison or at least an above the guidelines range sentence if 

convicted after a trial, “accurate information regarding the possible 

ramifications of proceeding to trial cannot be construed as coercive. 

Rather, it is exactly the kind of accurate information regarding sentencing 
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exposure which the defendant must have in order to make an informed 

decision about whether to accept a plea offer.” U.S. v. Green, 388 F.3d 

918, 923 (6th Cir. 2004). Contrary to counsel’s advice being misleading, 

the information in fact was correct. Second-degree murder is punishable 

by up to life in prison. The trial judge, in denying petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim on post-conviction review, noted that trial 

counsel negotiated a sentencing agreement of 13-30 years. The judge 

observed that this was below the sentencing guidelines range of 22.5 to 

37.5 years and a maximum of life in prison.2 The judge concluded that in 

light of the egregious facts of this case, “an argument could be made that 

[petitioner] received a much better result than she deserved.” (ECF No. 21-

2, PageID.1615). It is clear from the judge’s comments that had petitioner 

gone to trial and lost, she could have faced a sentence of life in prison or at 

least one at the top of the sentencing guidelines.

Petitioner also claims that trial counsel pressured her into pleading 

guilty by showing her gruesome photographs of her deceased son which 

she claims would have been inadmissible at trial.

2 Michigan’s Sentencing Guidelines, unlike the federal sentencing guidelines, only 

provide for a minimum sentence; the maximum is determined by statute. See, e.g., 

Montes v. Trombley, 599 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Petitioner offers no argument to support her claim that these 

photographs would have been inadmissible. Reviewing potential evidence 

with a client during trial preparation and possible plea negotiations is one of 

a defense counsel’s duties.

Petitioner further claims that although she did not want to plead guilty, 

she wanted to testify against Mr. Hayes in his separate trial. Petitioner 

claims that she pleaded guilty only because her trial attorney falsely 

informed her that the only way she could testify against Mr. Hayes is if she 

pleaded guilty first. 

Petitioner is correct that neither Michigan nor federal law would 

prevent her from testifying against Mr. Hayes without pleading guilty. 

However, had petitioner testified against Mr. Hayes at his trial without 

pleading guilty, there is a very real risk that she could have given extremely 

damaging information which could then have been used against her at her 

own trial. Counsel was not ineffective for not advising his client that she 

could testify against her co-defendant at his trial and still go to trial in her 

own case, as this strategy would likely have backfired. See Brent v. State, 

916 S.W.2d 34, 40 (Tex. App. 1995)(Defendant had no right to testify at his 

own murder trial free from impeachment, and defendant’s counsel was thus 

not ineffective for not advising defendant not to testify at trial of 
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codefendant because of the danger that State might impeach the 

defendant in his own trial with his testimony from codefendant’s trial). 

Petitioner next contends that trial counsel misled her into believing 

that she would receive good time credits if she pleaded guilty when such 

credits, in fact, are no longer available in Michigan. Under the Truth in 

Sentencing Law, a defendant is now required to serve his or her minimum 

sentence.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because she “has 

alleged no special circumstances indicating that [she] might have placed 

particular emphasis on [good-time] credit in deciding whether or not to 

plead guilty, particularly when she was looking at significantly more prison 

time after a trial. See Ewing v. United States, 651 F. App’x 405, 411 (6th 

Cir. 2016).

Petitioner also argues that she was coerced into pleading guilty by 

virtue of the fact that counsel failed to attempt to obtain a change of venue 

due to adverse pre-trial publicity, even though her co-defendant was 

successful in obtaining a change of venue to St. Clair County based on the 

negative media coverage of the case in Genesee County. Counsel did file 

a motion for change of venue but never argued it. Petitioner’s claim that 

her plea was involuntary because counsel was ineffective for failing to seek 
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a change of venue is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish prejudice 

because even if a change of venue had been granted, petitioner failed to 

show any reasonable probability that the outcome of her case would have 

been any different in a different venue, given the “overwhelming evidence 

against [petitioner].” See Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 

1999). 

Petitioner next contends that trial counsel gave her inaccurate or 

misleading advice about available defenses.

Petitioner first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

explore a duress defense.

At the time of petitioner’s trial, duress was not a defense to murder in 

Michigan. See People v. Dittis, 157 Mich. App. 38, 40, 403 N.W.2d 94 

(1987); See also Gimotty v. Elo, 40 F. App’x 29, 32 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Recently, the Michigan Supreme Court modified that rule and held that 

duress can be a defense to felony-murder if duress is a defense to the 

underlying felony. People v. Reichard, 505 Mich. 81, 96, 949 N.W.2d 64, 73 

(2020). However, the Michigan Supreme Court in Reichard clarified that a 

“defendant’s duress defense to the underlying felony would only prevent 

the enhancement of second-degree murder to first-degree murder.” Id. 

Duress is still not a defense to second-degree murder in Michigan. Id., at 
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95-96. Because petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, seconddegree murder, duress was an unavailable defense in this case.

Petitioner next contends that trial counsel failed to consider pursuing 

a Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS) defense.

“Michigan law does not permit a defendant to plead battered spouse 

syndrome as a freestanding defense but rather as part of a self-defense 

claim.” Shimel v. Warren, 838 F.3d 685, 699 (6th Cir. 2016)(citing Seaman 

v. Washington, 506 F. App’x 349, 360 (6th Cir. 2012)(citing People v. 

Christel, 449 Mich. 578, 537 N.W.2d 194, 202 (1995)). Had petitioner used 

deadly force against Mr. Hayes to repel his attack against her or her child, 

she may have been able to assert a BWS defense but she could not use 

this defense under Michigan law to defend her failure to protect her child 

from the extensive and severe abuse at Mr. Hayes’ hands. 

Buttressing counsel’s decision to forego a Battered Women’s 

Syndrome Defense is that petitioner’s counsel and co-counsel each spoke 

with an expert on domestic violence, Holly Rosen and Erica Schmittdiel. 

Both experts informed counsel that BWS was not a valid defense to this 

case because “that defense is outdated, and when used, it is to explain 

why a domestic violence victim may kill their abuser in a kill-or-be-killed 

situation.” (6/22/20 Declaration of Holly Rosen, ECF No. 26-1, 
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PageID.3227, ¶ 9; 6/22/20 Declaration of Erica Schmittdiel, ECF No. 26-2, 

PageID.3237, ¶ 9. Rosen and Schmittdiel informed counsel “that a jury 

would most likely not be compassionate and may not acquit Ms. Baker” due 

to several adverse factors, including: 

• Domestic violence is not, and was not at the time, widely 

understood. 

• Mothers are held to a higher standard than fathers or nonbiological parental figures. 

• The police report from Ms. Baker’s case indicated that visitors 

came to the home, asked what was wrong with her son, and she 

said nothing to indicate that he had been harmed. 

• The general public often responds to victims of domestic 

violence with less compassion, and more judgement [sic], when 

they are known to use illegal drugs. 

(6/22/20 Declaration of Holly Rosen, ECF No. 26-1, 

PageID.3227–28, ¶ 10; 6/22/20 Declaration of Erica 

Schmittdiel, ECF No. 26-2, PageID.3237–38, ¶ 10.) 

Finally, Rosen and Schmittdiel noted that while it was not in their area 

of expertise to advise someone whether to plead guilty, in this case, if 

asked for their opinions, both stated “it is possible I agreed a plea might be 

a serious option for [Baker] to consider, given reasons stated in Declaration 

#10.” (6/22/20 Declaration of Holly Rosen, ECF No. 26-1, PageID.3231, ¶ 

16; 6/22/20 Declaration of Erica Schmittdiel, ECF No. 26-2, PageID.3241, ¶ 

16). Although each expert believed that a plea to a child abuse charge 
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rather than second-degree murder was more appropriate, their prior 

statements and reservations about the case remained. Their affidavits 

support counsel’s decision to seek a plea bargain rather than raise a BWS 

defense.

Petitioner thus does not identify any viable defense she had. 

Moreover, the favorable plea bargain that petitioner received weighs 

against a finding that counsel was ineffective for advising a guilty plea. See

Plumaj v. Booker, 629 F. App’x 662, 667 (6th Cir. 2015)(citing Pilla, 668 

F.3d at 373; Haddad v. United States, 486 F. App’x 517, 522 (6th Cir. 

2012)). Furthermore, “the Supreme Court has never held that the benefits 

of a plea agreement alone cannot suffice to answer the prejudice inquiry, 

namely whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 

to trial.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59). 

Petitioner received a very favorable sentence in this case. She risks 

facing decades in prison if her plea is vacated, she goes to trial, and loses. 

Petitioner’s earliest release date is April 22, 2023, only two years from now. 

“The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty 

plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial—imposes its 

own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty 
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pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, 

a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a 

habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less 

favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a 

conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.” 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 372–73 (emphasis original). Were this 

Court to grant the petitioner habeas relief and ordered that her plea be 

vacated, petitioner would be facing the possibility of up to life in prison from 

a judge who has already indicated his negative opinion of petitioner and 

this case. The Court rejects petitioner’s first claim.

B. Claim # 2. The insufficient factual basis claim.

Petitioner next claims that there was an insufficient factual basis to 

support her guilty plea.

A habeas petitioner’s claim that there was an insufficient factual basis 

for a guilty plea is non-cognizable on habeas review. See Watkins v. Lafler, 

517 F. App’x 488, 500 (6th Cir. 2013). There is no federal constitutional 

requirement that a factual basis be established to support a guilty plea. Id. 

While M.C.R. 6.302(D)(1) requires that a factual basis must be elicited from 

a defendant prior to accepting his or her guilty plea, the failure of a 

Michigan trial court to comply this rule does not establish a basis for 
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habeas relief. Id. “[T]he requirement that a sentencing court must satisfy 

itself that a sufficient factual basis supports the guilty plea is not a 

requirement of the Constitution, but rather a requirement created by rules 

and statutes.” United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir.1995). 

The lack of a sufficient factual basis would not render petitioner’s plea 

invalid.

To the extent that petitioner claims that there was insufficient 

evidence to convict her of second-degree murder, her guilty plea waives 

review of such a claim. 

An unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all pre-plea nonjurisdictional constitutional deprivations. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 

258, 267 (1973). By entering a guilty plea, petitioner has waived her right 

to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her of this charge.

See United States v. Manni, 810 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1987); see also U.S. 

v. Hawkins, 8 F. App’x 332, 334 (6th Cir. 2001).

IV. Conclusion 

The Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court will also deny a certificate of appealability to petitioner. In order to 

obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 
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demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition should have been 

resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were adequate 

to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 483-84 (2000). When a district court rejects a habeas petitioner’s 

constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong. Id. at 484. “The district 

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final 

order adverse to the applicant.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 

11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court will deny petitioner a 

certificate of appealability because she failed to make a substantial 

showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. Myers v. Straub, 159 

F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Court will also deny petitioner 

leave to appeal in forma pauperis, because the appeal would be frivolous. 

Id. 

V. ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That a Certificate of Appealability is 

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner will be DENIED leave to 

appeal in forma pauperis.

Dated: May 5, 2021

s/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

May 5, 2021, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Leanne Hosking

Deputy Clerk