1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-15-00005-CR

____________________

JAGGARD DONTAE BOULDIN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 253rd District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CR28724

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jaggard Dontae Bouldin (Bouldin) pleaded guilty to theft of a tractor valued 

at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, a third-degree felony. See Act of May 

23, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 295, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 804, 804-05 (amended 

2011, 2015) (current version at Tex. Penal Code § 31.03)). The trial court deferred 

the adjudication of Bouldin’s guilt, placed Bouldin on community supervision for 

five years, and assessed a $1,000 fine. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to 

revoke community supervision. During the hearing on the State’s motion to 
2

revoke, Bouldin pleaded “true[]” to alleged violations 1 and 2 of the terms of his 

community supervision, and the State agreed to abandon alleged violations 3, 4, 5, 

and 6. The trial court found that Bouldin had violated the terms and conditions of 

his probation. After a hearing on punishment, the trial court revoked Bouldin’s 

community supervision, adjudicated Bouldin’s guilt, and sentenced him to five

years in prison. Bouldin timely filed a notice of appeal.

Bouldin’s appellate counsel filed a brief that presents counsel’s professional 

evaluation of the record and concludes the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1978). We granted an extension of time for Bouldin to file a pro se brief. Bouldin

did not file a pro se brief in response.

We have determined that this appeal is wholly frivolous. We have 

independently examined the entire appellate record in this matter, and we agree 

that no arguable issues support an appeal. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to 

order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Compare Stafford v. State, 

813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

However, the trial court’s judgment includes an error that is capable of being 

reformed without the involvement of the trial court. The trial court determined that 

Bouldin was indigent, but then rendered an award of attorney’s fees even though 
3

there was no evidence before the court to show that Bouldin’s indigency status had 

changed. Absent a change in a defendant’s status as an indigent, a trial court is not 

authorized to impose an award of attorney’s fees in the judgment against a 

defendant who remains indigent when the judgment is pronounced. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2014); see also Wiley v. 

State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Roberts v. State, 327 S.W.3d 

880, 884 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.).

We asked the parties whether they would agree to the deletion of the award

of attorney’s fees. In response to our correspondence, counsel for the State agreed

that the award should be deleted, and Bouldin did not respond. We are authorized 

by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to render the judgment the trial court 

should have rendered. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2, 43.3. Because the matter is not 

contested and the record does not support the award, we modify the judgment the 

trial court rendered by deleting the award of $450.00 in attorney’s fees. We affirm 

the trial court’s judgment as modified.1

 

1 Bouldin may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for 

discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.
4

AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.

_________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON

 Justice

Submitted on November 13, 2015

Opinion Delivered December 9, 2015

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.