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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Criminal Case No. 15-20302 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

v. 

ELSTON WRIGHT 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS [ECF NO. 47] 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Elston Wright’s 

(“Defendant”) motion to suppress and for evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 17.) 

Defendant seeks to suppress evidence deriving from the traffic stop of Defendant 

on March 14, 2015. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17). The government filed a response in 

opposition to the motion. (Pl.’s Resp. Br., ECF No. 19.) On February 3, 2016, an 

evidentiary hearing was held. Supplemental briefs were submitted by the parties 

thereafter. (ECF Nos. 23, 24.) For reasons provided below, Defendant’s motion to 

suppress is DENIED. 

I. Factual Background 

On May 20, 2015, Defendant was indicted and charged with “18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1) – Possession of a Firearm by a Felon.” (Indictment, ECF No. 1.) Officer 

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Michael O’Donnell asserted the following reasons for the stop: (1) defective 

equipment – inoperable license plate light, in violation of MCL § 257.686(2); (2) 

improper right turn in violation of MCL § 257.647(1)(a); and (3) improper lane use 

– traveling in the left passing lane when no other vehicles were present on the 

roadway, in violation of MCL § 257.642(b). (Police Report, ECF No. 17 at Pg. ID 

53.) Thereafter, when Defendant was asked for his license, Defendant admitted to 

not having one, and alternatively provided a Michigan ID card. (Id. at Pg. ID 52.) 

The police report alleges thereafter that Officer O’Donnell asked Defendant if he 

had anything illegal in the vehicle and if he could search the vehicle. (Id.) 

Defendant told Officer O’Donnell that there was nothing illegal in the vehicle and 

he consented to a vehicle search. (Id.) Officer O’Donnell thereafter conducted a 

“consent/inventory search” of the suspect vehicle and found a stolen loaded gun in 

the glove compartment of the vehicle. (Id.) In the police report, Officer O’Donnell 

asserts that he interviewed Defendant in his patrol car and that Defendant 

confessed to possession of the handgun. (Id. at Pg. ID 54.) 

II. Applicable Law 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the 

Government, and an ordinary traffic stop is a “seizure” within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2012). 

Further, a police officer may lawfully stop a car when he or she either has probable 

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cause to believe that a civil traffic violation has occurred or reasonable suspicion of 

an ongoing crime. Id. (citing United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 

2008) (further citations omitted)). 

III. Analysis 

Defendant disputes each of the three proffered reasons for the stop laid out 

in the police report. (Def.’s Mot. ECF No. 17 at Pg. ID 49.) Subsequent to the 

hearing both parties submitted supplemental briefing. The government states in its 

supplemental brief – while not abandoning the officer’s grounds for the stop based 

on an improper turn into the left passing lane, and improper lane use by traveling 

in the left lane – that it “focuses solely on the single aspect for this stop – the nonfunctioning license plate light and the lack of observation of the license plate light 

until after the initiation of the stop of [Defendant’s] car.” Similarly, Defendant 

solely addresses the non-functioning license plate light issue as well. This Court 

will solely address Defendant’s purported violation of Vehicle Code MCL § 

257.686(2), as it is dispositive. 

Officer O’Donnell’s testimony at the hearing revealed that Defendant was 

driving in Flint, MI, at approximately 6:30 a.m. on March 14, 2015. (Hr’g Tr. on 

Pg. 16–17.) Officer O’Donnell testified that he saw that the license plate of 

Defendant’s vehicle was not properly illuminated as required by MCL § 

257.686(2). O’Donnell initiated a traffic stop thereafter. (Id.) 

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 Officer O’Donnell’s testimony – as well as the recording played at the 

suppression hearing – demonstrated that Defendant’s license plate light was out. 

Defendant does not dispute the fact that Officer O’Donnell observed that the 

license plate light was out. Rather, the essential issue before the Court is whether 

Defendant’s operation of a vehicle, with an inoperative license plate light, 

constitutes a violation of MCL § 257.686(2) when there was a legitimate 

temporary paper license plate in the rear window. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at Pg. 

ID 49 ; Def.’s Post Hr’g Br., ECF No.24 at Pg. ID 84.) The parties have provided 

no case law interpreting the relevant portion of the statute. 

 With respect to statutory interpretation, the Sixth Circuit holds the 

following: 

“It is well settled that ‘the starting point for interpreting a statute is the 

language of the statute itself.’ ” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 

L.Ed.2d 306 (1987) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE 

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 

(1980)). “[W]hen the statutory language is plain, [the court] must 

enforce it according to its terms.” *940 Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 

U.S. 113, 118, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009). Departure 

from the plain language of a statute is disfavored and “appropriate 

only in rare cases in which the literal application of the statute will 

produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafter 

or when the statutory language is ambiguous.” Hoge v. Honda of Am. 

Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir.2004) (quotations and 

alterations omitted). Courts should “ ‘resist reading words or elements 

into a statute that do not appear on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Bates v. 

United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 

(1997)). We have acknowledged “[i]t is not the Court's role to address 

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perceived inadequacies in a statute.” Id. (quotations and citations 

omitted). 

Cty. of Oakland v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 716 F.3d 935, 939–40 (6th Cir. 2013) 

MCL § 257.782(2), the statute that formed the basis for the traffic stop in 

this case, MCL § 257.686(2), states in relevant part: 

Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and placed 

so as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and 

render it clearly legible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear. A tail 

lamp or tail lamps, together with any separate lamp for illuminating 

the rear registration plate, shall be wired so as to be lighted whenever 

the head lamps or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted. 

MCL 257.686(2). 

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently interpreted this statute in People v. 

Dennis, No. 321852, 2015 WL 7283173, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015). In 

Dennis, the officer saw that the license plate on the defendant’s vehicle was not 

properly illuminated as required by MCL.257.686(2). Id. at *2. The court held that 

“MCL 257.686(2) provides a legal justification for a traffic stop when a vehicle 

does not have an illuminated license plate.” See id. at *3. 

Defendant provides no Michigan case law in support of his assertion that a 

non-functioning license plate light does not provide a legal justification for a stop 

so long as there is a valid temporary license plate in the rear window. The statute 

clearly indicates that the lamp illuminating the rear registration plate “shall be 

wired as to be lighted.” (Id.) The statutory language is not vague, nor does it 

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suggest or imply that the illumination requirement is optional when there is a 

license plate located elsewhere on the vehicle. The statute solely requires 

functionality. 

Moreover having reviewed the legislative history of the statute, the 

legislative history does not indicate that it was the Legislature’s intent to require a 

functioning light only when a temporary license plate was not present. 

Accordingly, since Defendant’s license plate light did not function, as required 

under the statute, Officer O’Donnell’s observation of Defendant’s nonfunctioning 

license plate light was probable cause for the stop. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s suppression motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: March 18, 2016 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, March 18, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

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