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i 

57–033 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–146] 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND AIR 

FORCE COMBAT AVIATION PROGRAMS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 24, 2010 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

ELIZABETH DRUMMOND, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 24, 2010, Department of the Navy and Air Force Combat 

Aviation Programs ............................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 24, 2010 ................................................................................... 45 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION 

PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 5 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 4 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ............................................................................................. 6 

Fox, Hon. Christine H., Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense ....................................................................... 10 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 11 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 12 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy 

Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Adm. David L. 

Philman, USN, Director of the Air Warfare Division for the U.S. Navy; 

David M. Van Buren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition; and Lt. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, beginning 

on ........................................................................................................................... 34 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B. .................................................................................... 57 

Fox, Hon. Christine H. ..................................................................................... 81 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael .................................................................................... 89 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 49 
Page

IV 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, 

and Rear Adm. David L. Philman ............................................................... 127 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 108 

Taylor, Hon. Gene ............................................................................................. 55 

Van Buren, David M., joint with Lt. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove ................... 173 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Air Force answer to Question 22 from Mr. Smith and F–35 Joint Program 

Office answer to Question 6 from Mr. Smith, April 12, 2010 ................... 197 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 202 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 201 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 201 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brady .......................................................................................................... 226 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 205 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 218 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 228 
(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE COMBAT 

AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINTLY WITH SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, 

March 24, 2010. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. Hearing will come to order. 

Good afternoon. Welcome to the joint hearing for air, land and 

seapower forces. We, as I understand it, will have votes probably 

in the not-too-distant future which will interrupt us. We will try to 

get to do as many opening statements as possible before we have 

to head out for that purpose. 

The subcommittees meet today to receive testimony on the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force budget 

requests for combat aircraft for fiscal year 2011. And we have two 

panels of witnesses today. I will introduce them first and then we 

will have our opening statements from our chairs and ranking 

members, and then turn it over to our first panel for their opening 

statements. 

We have the Honorable Ashton Carter, who is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

We have the Honorable Christine Fox, Director of the Office of 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), also with OSD. 

The Honorable J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation at OSD. 

Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing for 

the Government Accountability Office. 

That is the first panel. 

On the second panel we will have the Honorable Sean Stackley, 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. 

Lieutenant General George Trautman, Deputy Commander of 

the Marine Corps for Aviation. 

Rear Admiral Deke Philman, Director of the Air Warfare Division for the U.S. Navy. 
2 

Mr. David Van Buren, acting Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Acquisition. 

And last but not least, Lieutenant General Philip Breedlove, who 

is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements. 

As I mentioned, we have scheduled this hearing to give members 

the opportunity to address issues related to all combat aircraft programs of the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. We will be having 

another subcommittee hearing in late April to address mobility aircraft programs. 

I have a complete statement. With unanimous consent I will ask 

that it be included in the record, and I will just briefly summarize. 

This committee is very interested in this issue. This is arguably 

the biggest financial issue facing the Department of Defense (DOD) 

in the Armed Services Committee, with the price tag on the Joint 

Strike Fighter (JSF) going forward and the challenges that the program has faced. 

And what we really want to learn today on the committee is 

what the force structure for combat aircraft is and what our plans 

are for meeting that force structure requirement. I am sure some 

members will also be curious about how we arrived at those requirement numbers year to year going forward. 

And then the specifics of how we get there. There are a number 

of different air platforms or aircraft that are going to be factored 

into that, but obviously the big ticket item here is the F–35. Joint 

Strike is meant to replace a fair number of airframes within our 

force, and therefore how it is progressing plays a major role. 

But there are other issues. How long can the F–15s and the F– 

16s last, in your estimation? How many more F–18s might we need 

to buy? And how does all of that combine to give us the force structure that we require for fighter aircraft? 

We need to have a better understanding of that, and the main 

concern is the slippage in the cost overruns within Joint Strike. 

Joint Strike is considerably behind its original schedule and on 

pace to be considerably more expensive. 

And my biggest concern at this point is not just that, though certainly that is a concern. That to a certain degree is the past. The 

future is what is our path forward. And in my study of this issue, 

it has not become clear to me that we have a clear path forward 

that we can confidently assert that we will meet. I am worried 

about whether or not this program will continue to slip to the right, 

it will get more expensive as we go. 

We have laid out a new schedule. Again, it is not clear to this 

committee yet how it is that we have confidence in that schedule. 

As we know, our test aircraft have encountered a variety of different difficulties. I don’t think we yet have a clear idea of this is 

what any one, A, B or C variant, is going to look like, this is what 

we are building, we know we can build it, and we are ready to get 

started. It is quite a ways out before we get to that point. 

One of the aircraft, I believe, was scheduled to start production 

aircraft in 2012; the other two variants are going to be 2016. And 

with all of the testing problems that we have had, with all of the 

cost overrun problems that we have, our committee really needs to 

gain greater confidence that we have a plan going forward. 
3 

Certainly people will study what went wrong in the past, but for 

our purposes right now the most important thing is to know that 

we have restructured a schedule that we can confidently meet, so 

we are not sitting back here again next year going, ‘‘Here is the 

new plan.’’ 

To a certain degree, that is what happened between last year 

and this year. We procured a certain number of the aircraft in the 

fiscal year 2010 budget that after having done it through the authorization and appropriations process, DOD came back to us and 

said, ‘‘We don’t really need that many, because we can’t get there.’’ 

We would rather not keep having that happen every year. This 

is over $10 billion of our acquisition budget, the largest chunk we 

have, and we need to make sure that we are spending it wisely, 

because, as I am sure all of you are aware, we clearly and unequivocally have other needs as well. 

As I said, I have a longer statement for the record that gets into 

some of these details that will be made available, but those are the 

main concerns that we hope to hear from our witnesses today and 

from the questioning period. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. SMITH. And with that—forgive me, I am not sure the protocol 

with two subcommittees here. Do I turn it over to Mr. Taylor or 

to Mr. Bartlett? 

With that, I will turn it over to the chairman of the Seapower 

Subcommittee, Mr. Taylor. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with your permission I would like to—and unanimous consent—I would like to enter 

my statement for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. So ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for calling 

this hearing. Like everyone in this room, we are told that the cost 

of this platform has gone up by 80 percent since 1996, that because 

the cost has gone up so much the anticipated buy has dropped by 

about 535 planes. 

But what is particularly troubling is that, by some estimates, the 

cost of maintaining this aircraft will be 40 percent more than some 

of the legacy platforms that it is replacing. So I would hope that 

those three things could be addressed in today’s hearing. 

Like everyone else, I realize there is a need for the F–35. I would 

also remind our panel and everyone in this room that about the 

time we are buying the F–35, we will have the Ohio replacement 

coming on-line and at an estimated $7 billion per ship. The Social 

Security trust fund will no longer be collecting more than it spends. 

It will be spending more than it collects. The Medicare trust fund 

will be spending more than it collects. 
4 

There will be a lot of problems that our Nation will be facing, 

which means if we need the platform, as a Nation, and I think we 

do, we all have a huge responsibility to make it affordable. 

So I thank you for calling this hearing. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will keep my remarks brief, as we have got a busy schedule today with two panels 

of witnesses and both subcommittees in attendance. 

I welcome all of our witnesses, and thank you for being here 

today. 

This committee has been actively working to try to understand 

the risk the Department is taking in its combat aviation programs. 

I hope that this hearing will clarify some things for us because I 

have some real concerns about the force structure decisions that 

have been made. 

After reviewing the report to Congress on the Combat Air Force 

restructuring plan, it appears to me that the recommendation to 

retire 250 fighters from the Air Force and the subsequent budget 

reductions were made before the Secretary of Defense announced 

he was terminating the F–22 production and before any of us 

learned of the years of delay now forecast in Joint Strike Fighter 

fielding. 

So while the Air Force assumptions back in 2008 led to a conclusion that the short-term risk was manageable, the fact is today 

those assumptions are not reality. 

Despite that, it appears the Air Force is going ahead with the 

plan. 

I also share my colleagues’ concern over the health of the Joint 

Strike Fighter program. This is an enormously expensive program 

that promises a great deal of capability, but I am, frankly, concerned that the cost growth will render it unaffordable in the long 

term. 

In my 18 years in Congress I have seen program after program 

in which the cost grows, the production is reduced to fit inside a 

fixed budget, and the program ends in a spiral that leaves the services well short of their inventory requirements. 

In attempting to manage the risk associated with the JSF program, all of the services appear to be looking for stopgap measures. 

However, to my knowledge, the engineering analysis needed to determine if service life extension programs (SLEP) on our existing 

fighter fleets are a reasonable course of action have not been completed yet, so we don’t know what it will cost, how long it will take, 

or if the resultant service life is worth the investment. 

To make matters worse, it has been very difficult to get programmatic details from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 

the JSF program. That has generated not only a sense of frustration for the committee, but also has elevated our concerns about 

the true state of the program and validity of the proposed restructuring. 
5 

Some have said that the JSF program is too big to fail. I am not 

sure that is wholly accurate. But I do know this is a capability that 

is needed by our war-fighters and is overdue. 

It is critical that we understand the risk in the JSF program in 

the context of the state of the legacy fighter fleets as we continue 

our work on the fiscal year 2011 Defense Authorization Act. I hope 

the witnesses before the committee today will help us do that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward to the discussion. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. Akin now, the ranking member on the Seapower Subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My sincere hope is that during our first panel we will be able to 

reach a common understanding on the progress being made to date 

on the Joint Strike Fighter program, any remaining schedule and 

affordability challenges, and the Department’s plan for managing 

those risks. 

I am particularly concerned about the unprecedented concurrency of testing and production, and am convinced that this is 

a bad idea. 

At the same time, I believe it is just as important that we come 

to a common understanding of the big picture affordability and inventory risk of our Nation’s strike fighters. 

The Department has many competing priorities, including but 

certainly not limited to tactical aviation. Much like shipbuilding, 

we are seeing alarming force structure levels and increased demand on our equipment across the board. Although we may differ 

in terms of our recommendations for balancing Department of Defense’s (DOD) investment against those many priorities, we should 

at least be able to come to agreement on the shortfalls and risks 

we are assuming as a result of our decisions. 

Sadly, to date, the Department has been unable to articulate the 

shortfall it faces in Navy and Marine Corps strike fighters, let 

alone tactical aviation across all the services. Without consensus 

within DOD on the situation, we can hardly hope for a shared definition of the problem between the executive and legislative 

branches. 

Let me show you what I mean. 

On March 2008, the Department briefed the committee the Department of the Navy shortfall was 188 aircraft. That is March 

2008. In March 2009, we are told the shortfall was 312. As if by 

magic, 2 months later, on May 2009, we are told the shortfall was 

only 146. At the beginning of February 2010, Secretary Gates testified the shortfall is only 100 aircraft. Toward the end of February 

the committee was told that the shortfall was 177. Five days later, 

my staff was told the shortfall of 100 was—shortfall was 100 aircraft. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

(SASC) this month, Ms. Fox stated that 100 was an old number, 
6 

and while she could not provide an estimate of the shortfall, it was 

under review. 

Some change to these estimates could be expected as changes are 

made to the JSF program of record and the other fact-of-life issues 

arise. But based on this track record I think it is easy to see how 

we could become concerned that either the Department does not 

know how to handle the viability of the strike fighter inventory or 

the Department is changing the data to mask a problem. 

In response to this uncertainty, the Congress has provided tools 

to the Department to create affordable options to improve the 

strike fighter inventory. Among these is the authority to enter into 

a multi-year contract on Super Hornets and Growlers that can save 

the taxpayers nearly $0.5 billion. Unfortunately, DOD has yet to 

take advantage of this tool, and time is running out. 

Even if the DOD comes to its senses and proceeds with the 

multi-year, the Department of the Navy will still be several hundred planes short. I am baffled by the continued reluctance of senior DOD leadership to honestly address the shortfall. 

My goal today is to achieve that mutual understanding of the 

problem. We could benefit greatly from the panels’ views and updates on this issue. I do look forward to your testimony. The biggest single question I have is, if you and the many other people 

who have appeared as witnesses before this committee over the 

past two years would simply look us in the eye and say, ‘‘You guys 

are congressmen. You are the ones that make the decision about 

what kind of budget we have for defense, and given the amount of 

money you are giving us, this is our best bet as to how we balance 

things,’’ I don’t have a complaint. 

But when all I get is year after year smoke and mirrors and people pretending like there is not a problem and people that pretend 

like they are answering a question and everybody in the room 

knows you are not answering questions, it makes us have a very, 

very low opinion of your ability to actually deal with what the situation is in a rational manner. I hope I make myself at least a little 

bit clear. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Akin. 

And we will begin with Dr. Carter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

with you to discuss DOD’s tactical aircraft programs. 

I have a lengthy and detailed written statement. The Department has also provided you with responses to many questions you 

had in the letter of invitation to us, and we have also provided you 

with several independent reviews that importantly illuminated our 

department-wide review of the Joint Strike Fighter program, which 

is one topic I will be reporting on today. 

So with your leave, in my oral statement I wanted to describe 

the basis for and the main ingredients of the restructuring of the 

Joint Strike Fighter program to put it on a more realistic basis. 
7 

Mr. Chairman, that is your path forward I will attempt to describe. 

And I hope, Mr. Akin, it is a realistic one. But I will do my best 

to describe reality as we judge it to be. 

And also I thought I would touch on the analytical foundation for 

the Department’s decision not to pursue a second engine for the 

Joint Strike Fighter. 

I would, of course, be pleased to answer questions on other topics 

with respect to the force structure requirements. I am pleased to 

talk about that as well. I just thought in view of the time that that 

might be better pursued with the Navy and Air Force panel which 

follows me, but again, I am happy to address that. 

I am accompanied on this panel by Christine Fox, the Director 

of CAPE; Mike Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and on the next panel by the service acquisition executives, 

Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Stackley. All four of those individuals participated in the internal reviews of JSF, which led to its restructuring, and they can all provide additional detail. 

JSF is our largest, as has been noted, critically important program, and it is important for the three services that are going to 

be depending on this aircraft, our international partners and, of 

course, you to know whether after the recent restructuring it is 

now on a realistic and stable path to complete development and 

testing and eventually a full production to produce 2,443 aircraft 

for us, the Marines, the Air Force and the Navy, and 734 for international partners. 

The easiest way to answer this question, I think, is to recount 

the sequence of events over the past several years. Again, full detail is provided in the written statement. But JSF’s development 

began in 2001, and at that time the unit cost of a Joint Strike 

Fighter—there were 2,852 U.S. fighters planned at that time; now 

2,443—was $50 million in 2002 dollars, which would be $59 million 

today. 

In retrospect this estimate may have been unrealistically low, 

something we are trying to avoid in the future by requiring independent cost estimates early in the lifetime of a program, as is required by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act. But in any 

event, by 2007 the estimated cost had grown 36 percent—namely, 

to $69 million in 2002 dollars. 

In late 2008—and this may go to a point you were making earlier, Mr. Bartlett—the first joint estimating team (JET) analysis 

was conducted—JET I. Ms. Fox will describe how this was done, 

but JET I found that JSF’s costs were continuing to rise and that 

the development program was taking longer and therefore costing 

more than projected by the Joint Program Office and the contractor. 

Secretary Gates at that time determined that the JET estimate 

was credible, and early in 2009 he accordingly added $476 million 

to the program—that is, for fiscal year 2010—to try to arrest this 

trend. By November of 2009, a few months ago, JET completed a 

second analysis—JET II—that became one of the foundations for 

the restructuring. 

The JET II’s results were substantially similar to those of JET 

I a year before—namely, the line at Fort Worth was still taking 
8 

longer than planned to produce the initial JSF aircraft, and this 

was delaying flight testing and therefore the ramp-up to full rate 

production, and also costing more money, so that the unit cost of 

the aircraft, which had been $50 million in 2002 dollars, would now 

be as much as $95 million—that is, up to 90 percent cost growth. 

So it was clear in November of last year that if we took the JET 

II estimate as credible, JSF would have a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

Similar results from the JET over two consecutive years clearly indicated to the Department that we needed to take a more forceful 

management action this year than we had taken in light of the 

JET I estimate a year before. 

At about this time also two additional reviews were conducted. 

The JET, by the way, as I indicated, was conducted by Ms. Fox’s 

office. My office sponsored an independent manufacturing review 

team, which looked at the performance of the manufacturing process, and also something we called a joint assessment team, to look 

at the performance of the engine, the F135 engine. 

All of these things came in together late last year, and we accordingly undertook department-wide reviews in November as 

though we were already in Nunn-McCurdy breach. This review continued through December and January, and the result was the restructuring announced by Secretary Gates in February. 

And I realize, if I may say so, during this time we were conducting the review and before the President’s budget was announced, that there was not information available here, and I recognize that some of the comments you made, that that was frustrating. We will attempt to do better in the future. 

But that is what led up to the restructuring that Secretary Gates 

announced in February. And now let me describe the main features 

of that restructuring and the rationale for each. 

First, the Department undertook several steps to stop the development and test program schedule from slipping yet further. There 

were three actions. One was the purchase of an additional aircraft 

to add to test. That is just the physics of getting through the test 

points faster, if you have more test assets. 

So also secondly, the addition—or actually borrowing or loan of 

three developmental aircraft to—I am sorry, three operational test 

aircraft to developmental test—again, to hasten the process of completing developmental test. 

And third, integration of—or, sorry, addition of another software 

integration line to ensure that the writing of mission system software would not become the factor that lengthened the development 

schedule after we tried to take care of the lengthening of the developmental flight test program. 

With these three steps, the schedule slip that had been estimated 

by JET II to be 30 months of schedule slip was reduced to 13 

months, a substantial, though not complete restoral of the original 

schedule. 

Second feature of the restructuring was recognizing that the 

three steps I just described cost money. The Department decided 

to withhold $614 million of fee from the contractor, since it was not 

reasonable for the taxpayer to bear the entire burden of what is, 

after all, disappointing performance by the program. 
9 

I might add that the contractors have been part of this process 

from the beginning and have emphasized their commitment to better performance, and we are expecting that. 

Third, the Department directed that the results of the independent manufacturing review team I described earlier regarding 

the ramp-up to full rate production be adopted, meaning that the 

Joint Strike Fighter program should plan for a somewhat later— 

that is 13 months—and somewhat flatter ramp to full rate production than had been planned. This step had the effect of reducing 

concurrency and the program. 

For us, the Department determined that the JET II estimate, revised to take into account the changes I have already described, 

would be adopted as the program baseline for budgeting purposes 

throughout the future year’s defense program and beyond—that is, 

that we would accept the independent cost estimate as the basis for 

the program. 

And that is the basis, Mr. Chairman, for what we hope and believe is a realistic forecast. I will come back to that point in a moment. But as I have mentioned also, accepting that forecast implies 

a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

Fifth, the Department directed that the position of program executive officer for the Joint Strike Fighter program be elevated to 

three-star rank to give a fresh eye and vigorous management to the 

Joint Strike Fighter. And I am pleased that President Obama has 

nominated Vice Admiral Dave Venlet to this position. 

These five steps, then, are the JSF restructuring in a nutshell. 

We believe that this restructuring puts JSF on a realistic path to 

restore its performance. Over the next few years we will be looking 

closely to the program to show progress against a reasonable set 

of specific objectives according to this overall plan. 

We will be managing aggressively to see if we can improve the 

performance of the program relative to the JET II forecast, including the possibility of buying more than 43 aircraft in fiscal year 

2011 and earlier transition to fixed price production contracts. 

While, Mr. Chairman, the plan is realistic, this is still a challenging program entering its period of flight tests, and these are 

all forecasts—not weather forecasting, but it is program forecasting. Reality is going to get a vote. 

At the same time no fundamental technological problems have 

surfaced in the reviews to date, nor have the capabilities of the aircraft changed. 

In sum, in response to the JET and other estimates of the JSF 

program’s performance and the impending Nunn-McCurdy breach, 

the Department has undertaken a fundamental restructuring of 

the program. We believe it is now on a stronger footing. 

We now turn to the subject of whether two engines should be 

part of the Joint Strike Fighter program rather than one. The Department’s decision not to support the second engine is a judgment 

informed by the analysis conducted by CAPE under Ms. Fox and 

which has been provided to the committee. 

We weighed the very real upfront costs of preparing a second engine for competition, estimated at $2.9 billion, against the possible 

long-term savings produced in the out years from the competition 

assumed in the analysis. The analysis shows that under these as-
10 

sumptions the long-term savings calculated just balanced the large 

upfront investment. 

However, the assumptions that need to be made to produce this 

break-even result are optimistic and in some cases unrealistic. For 

example, the analysis assumes that the second engine quickly follows upon the same learning curve as the first engine, that the additional learning will outweigh the fact that each manufacturer will 

build fewer engines and therefore proceed less far down the learning curve, and perhaps most importantly, that there will be true 

competition. 

A more likely dynamic is a series of split or shared buys, since 

JSF will be procured by a diverse set of customers, many of whom 

are unable or unwilling to purchase from two engine manufacturers. We therefore concluded that the Department is unlikely to realize these long-term savings and that the $2.9 billion required to 

prepare the second engine for competition would be better spent on 

other critical military needs. 

We also considered potential non-financial benefits of having a 

second engine for the F–35, but did not find them compelling. On 

this basis the Department is respectfully requesting that the Congress not direct pursuit of the second engine again this year. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Carter. 

Ms. Fox. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE H. FOX, DIRECTOR OF COST 

ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Ms. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members 

of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

Dr. Carter’s statement and our written testimonies provide you 

with the specific information about the Joint Strike Fighter independent review and the subsequent restructuring. Today I would 

like to quickly emphasize just a few key points. 

First, CAPE conducts independent cost estimates for major weapon systems providing the Secretary and OSD leadership an estimate derived independently from the contractor and the program 

office. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act recently increased the responsibility and authority of CAPE in the conduct of 

these estimates. In the case of JSF, we went one step further and 

built a team of experts from the defense tactical aircraft community. 

Specifically, the Joint Estimating Team, or JET, was composed 

of multifunctional government experts drawn from the Navy, Air 

Force and OSD staff. The members of the team provided technical 

expertise across the areas of air vehicle and mission systems engineering, testing and cost estimation. The JET conducted comprehensive onsite reviews with the prime contractor and each of 

the major subcontractors for the JSF program. 

They then benchmarked this information against past programs 

to forecast the likely path of events going forward. As Dr. Carter 
11 

just explained, the JET conducted two reviews; the first, JET I, 

conducted last year and was made available to the OSD leadership 

and the Congress. This past summer, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the JET I be updated and the result of this update, JET II, were consistent with the findings of JET I and led 

the Secretary to significantly restructure the program as Dr. Carter 

has just described to you. 

It is important to let you know that this restructuring in my 

view is completely aligned with the findings of the JET II and fully 

consistent with Congress’ intent of using realistic cost estimates 

and schedule information to assess and structure a program. In 

particular, the JET worked because it is based on historical comparisons, allows more time for tests and allows for more test points 

than was in the original program allowing for more test discovery. 

It is difficult to mathematically calculate the precise confidence 

levels associated with independent cost estimates prepared for 

major acquisition programs. Based on the rigor of the methods 

used in building CAPE estimates, the strong adherence to the collection and use of historical cost information and the review of the 

applied assumptions, we project that it is about equally likely that 

the JET estimate will prove too low or too high for execution of the 

restructured program as described. 

Finally, I would like to discuss the analysis behind the Secretary’s decision not to fund the alternate engine for JSF. We have 

provided you with more details on this, but quickly I wanted to let 

you know that we were able to conduct a business case analysis of 

the alternate engine and that analysis after accounting for all of 

the—costs to date suggests that we are at the break-even point in 

net present value terms. 

Business case analysis included several optimistic assumptions. 

Dr. Carter has described some. Another is that the start of the 

competitive engine procurement would begin in 2014. CAPE was 

also able to estimate that DOD would have to invest approximately 

$2.9 billion to full fund the alternate engine on a more realistic 

schedule in light of the program restructuring to the point where 

it could participate in a competitive procurement that we now estimate would be in 2017. 

We could not, however, quantify the intangible values of competition that are often cited. Based on the fact that the additional early 

costs to the program are known, but the intangible benefits of competition are speculative. The Secretary decided that we could not 

afford to invest the additional $2.9 billion. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fox can be found in the Appendix on page 81.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Chairman Smith, Chairman Taylor, members of 

the committee, my primary concern is that the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program be structured to conduct robust developmental testing so 

that we will be ready to do the operational testing which will con-
12 

firm the combat capabilities of the aircraft in January 2015 and 

complete that testing in April 2016. 

We don’t want discovery of problems—significant problems to be 

postponed to operational testing because problems discovered that 

late will be more costly and more time-consuming to fix than if 

they are discovered early. The only way to assure that is to have 

a robust developmental test flight program. The changes to the program that Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter have directed are going 

to be key to assuring that that robust developmental flight test program occurs. 

And the important changes that have been made are, of course, 

providing additional flight test aircraft or additional flight test aircraft, providing the resources in time needed to develop, deliver 

and test effective software because the mission system software is 

very complex and provides that combat capability in the aircraft. 

I have to take into account realistically the inevitable discovery 

of problems during flight testing which means you have to have 

sufficient time to do the flight testing. And you have to provide the 

engineering and other resources needed to maintain an adequate 

pace of testing and the changes that have been directed to address 

all of those issues. So my concern is that the developmental flight 

test program be robust, the restructured program takes the steps 

necessary to do that. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 89.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Taylor, distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program and our updated analysis to the competitive engine discussion. 

In brief, Mr. Chairman, even given the strong actions taken by 

the Department to recently restructure the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program, it continues to struggle with increased costs, slow 

progress and risk of not being able to deliver expected capability 

and quantities of aircraft to the war fighter on time. It is also important, I think, to note that setbacks and costs and deliveries of 

the Joint Strike Fighter directly impact modernization plans and 

retirement schedules for our aging legacy aircraft that the fighter 

is slated to replace. 

The recent restructuring increase program acquisition costs by 

$46 billion in then-year dollars compared to the program baseline 

approved in 2007, about $92 billion when compared to the original 

2001 baseline. It also did the things that Dr. Carter went through 

which we think a lot of those things are very important to put— 

to actually putting the program on firm footing and having much 

more reasonable costs and schedule estimates at this point. 

And another thing it did that we found important was it reduced 

near term procurement quantities by as much as 122 aircraft 

which, again, we think helps reduce the risk of buying aircraft that 
13 

may not be through flight test at that time. That is through 2015. 

These actions should put the program on a firmer footing and they 

should establish more reasonable estimates for aircraft deliveries; 

however, there is still substantial overlap between development 

testing and production activities. 

Slowed by manufacturing delays, late aircraft deliveries and low 

productivity, the flight test program has barely begun and only 

completed about 10 percent of its planned sorties through 2009. In 

addition, the program is relying on an extensive, but largely 

unproven network of ground test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate aircraft performance. 

It is developing and integrating very large and complex software 

requirements and is still maturing some of the technologies that 

are essential to the cost savings, the program plans to get in the 

lifecycle due to logistical support requirements. 

With the restructuring in place, the Department still plans to procure up to 307 aircraft at an estimated cost of $58.2 billion 

through 2015 before completing flight testing. We view that as very 

risky. These aircraft are currently being procured using cost reimbursable contracts, which I think the Chairman and the committee 

members understand that that indicates that there is a great deal 

of cost risk still in the aircraft due to many uncertainties the contract doesn’t feel prepared to bid a fixed price. I believe Dr. Carter 

did address that, and I think that the Department now is trying 

to move much more quickly towards fixed price contracts. We are 

hoping that they can do that. That would be good. 

Now, I will turn to the alternate engine discussion. As requested 

for this hearing, we have updated the analysis that we have done 

in the past for this committee to assess whether the changes to the 

Joint Strike Fighter Program that Dr. Carter just discussed have 

impacted the cost and benefits of sole source and competitive scenarios for acquisition and sustainment of the Joint Strike Fighter 

engine. 

Our updated analysis indicates that given certain assumptions, 

competition may reasonably be expected to provide enough savings 

over the life of the engine to offset the investment in developing a 

second engine source. In a sole-source scenario, the engines will 

cost an estimated $62.5 billion in 2002 dollars over the remainder 

of the program. Additional costs are between $4.5 billion and $5.7 

billion may be needed to maintain competition. 

Some of that is the upfront investment that we have discussed 

to get the other contractor through development. I think that is 

somewhere between 1 and $2 billion and the rest of that is due to 

the increased overall costs—the recurring costs per engine that— 

and the learning curve losses that will take place if the competition 

goes forward. We ascertain that the costs—that all of that cost, the 

$4.5 to $5.7 billion could possibly be recouped if competition were 

to generate approximately 10 to 121⁄2 percent savings over the life 

of the program. 

Air Force data from past engine programs where competition was 

introduced into a sole source environment indicates that savings of 

that much or more have been achieved in the past; however, 

whether that happens on this program will ultimately depend on 

the final approach for competition, the number of aircraft eventu-
14 

ally purchased, the ratio of engines awarded to each contractor and 

when the competition actually begins. 

In addition to cost savings, most experts also agree that there 

are other benefits to competition that are not directly tied to savings such as improved contractor responsiveness, engine reliability 

and technical innovation. Currently, both the primary and second 

engine sources have experienced cost growth and delays. The F135 

primary engine development cost is now estimated at approximately $7.3 billion, a 50 percent increase over the current budgeted 

estimate. 

And the most recent unit costs for the conventional engine is now $17.7 million, which is 42 percent higher than the original estimate. Similarly, the unit cost for the short takeoff and vertical 

landing engine rose from $27.6 million to $33.4 million, a 21 percent increase. As planned, the F136 alternate engine development 

is about three years behind the F135 program. It also is facing cost 

and schedule challenges similar to the F135. Both programs have 

experienced about 21-months’ delays for their initial release for 

flight testing. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would 

be happy to entertain questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 108.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. A lot of ground to cover. A lot 

to ask about. Fortunately, there are a lot of members on the committee who are very informed of this program. So we will spread 

that around. But I will start by asking Dr. Carter and Ms. Fox 

about these cost estimates going forward. 

And I realize as you quite accurately said, Dr. Carter, events will 

happen and we will have to adjust to them, but I want to get some 

greater idea for how much we have clarified the picture. I mean, 

going forward, there were a lot of different costs, but as I understand it, you are still looking at to try to estimate which are 

lifecycle estimates, lifecycle costs. There are various military construction pieces. There are issues with the—I am into Mr. Taylor’s 

territory here, but with the C model, I think it is, if I have got that 

right, the one that takes off—the Navy version, what is going to 

do in terms of how we have to adjust aircraft carriers. 

So different military construction pieces. And I understand that 

CAPE is still looking at some of this. Can you give us some idea 

of what you are done with, what you are still looking at in terms 

of what are sort of if you—it is a terrible phrase, but the anticipated surprises that you still haven’t quite been able to calculate? 

Can you turn your mike back—— 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The CAPE estimate upon 

which we base the restructuring was of the development program, 

the ramp-up to production and initial production because that is 

the part—that is the phase that is immediately upon us. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary CARTER. And we had that estimate, and then we had 

another estimate from the program office and the contractor which 

was a—which showed less cost and a more accelerated schedule. 

The essence of accepting the JET estimate is in adopting it is recognizing what I certainly believe, and I know the Secretary does, 
15 

that that is a more credible forecast for those three phases than 

was the program office’s and the contractors’. 

Which was a—which showed less cost and a more accelerated 

schedule. 

The essence of accepting the JET estimate and adopting it is recognizing what I certainly believe, and I know the Secretary does, 

that that is a more credible forecast for those three phases than 

was the program office’s and the contractor’s. 

Beyond that, when we get out beyond production to sustainment, 

that is, of course, many years in the future, so there isn’t a managerial action that needed to be taken at this moment about that, 

but it is something we need to manage going forward—what are 

the costs of these airplanes going to be to operate them in the years 

in the future when they come? Not too early to take a look and 

begin to manage that. 

And that is something we will be looking toward, going forward. 

It doesn’t affect our managerial decisions at the moment, but you 

are absolutely right, that is a phase out there in the future that 

will need to be costed also. 

But we think we have our most realistic estimates of the development, ramp-up to production and production. 

I will repeat what Ms. Fox said about these are so-called in the 

art that her office practices, a 50 percent estimate, meaning—and 

this isn’t math, it is JET that there is in the judgment of the estimators a 50 percent chance that the cost will be greater than estimated and a 50 percent chance less. 

That is why I talk about, it is not weather forecasting, but it is 

forecasting. 

We are giving you our most realistic judgment, and we are trying 

to manage to that realistic—what was quite clear was that the 

path we were on was not realistic. 

Mr. SMITH. Fair enough. 

Dr. Gilmore, Mr. Sullivan, if I could have you deal with a couple 

different aspects of what is one of the central problems at this 

point, we are going to be procuring aircraft while we are still testing them. And there is always a delicate balance there. 

I mean, ideally, you would like to have it tested and know exactly what you have got, and you are good to go. But the rapid pace 

of technology and the changes make that difficult with some of our 

new systems. 

But I want to get a greater idea of the risks involved with that 

plan. Again, our hope is, I think, by 2016—I get my As, Bs and Cs, 

mixed up here, but two out of the three will be ready to go into 

production mode by 2016, or ready to be used at any rate, the other 

one in 2012. 

At the same time, we are sort of testing as we go. How do you 

balance those risks, in terms of what—and it is hard to say, because you don’t know exactly what you are going to figure out in 

the flight testing. On the other hand, we have been testing it for 

a little while and have some idea of what is going on. 

Is it a good risk that is being taken here by saying that we are 

going to, in essence, bet on the come, we are going to start building 

this thing, and we are going to learn as we go and then make 

changes to it as we go? 
16 

What are the risks there? And how realistic do you think the approach that has been laid out? 

Dr. GILMORE. While I would observe that we are really just at 

the beginning of a flight test program now—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE [continuing]. In terms of, you know, total flight 

tests, we have flown in System Development and Demonstration 

(SDD) program, we have flown 37 flights out of over 5,700 that will 

be required. So we are at the beginning now. 

With regard to how many aircraft will be delivered, once flight 

test has begun—and it has just now started—the program will be 

delivering more aircraft than almost any other aircraft program 

have been delivered, as—before flight testing is complete. That is 

just the situation that we are in. 

Obviously, we will know more and more as we go along, and the 

rate of discovery, of knowledge, of accruing knowledge is going to 

increase rapidly under current plans. That is also consistent with 

past history. 

So, I mean, there is concurrency in the program. The concurrency 

is greater than it has been in the past. But there—you know, the 

history of these programs is that there is concurrency. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. That strikes me as a fairly big risk, as described, given how early we are in the testing portion, by comparison, to be making that big a production commitment. 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, on the one hand, there is risk that you could 

run into structural problems and have to fix those, and that 

would—could potentially be time-consuming and costly to fix. 

Now, so far, there is no indication of major structural problems, 

and they have completed a good deal of the ground testing of the 

structure, although that is not completely—that is not completed. 

There is also risk that you could run into problems developing 

the mission systems software. However, if you run into those problems, a lot of those problems can be fixed not by changing the hardware, but by continuing to work on the problems fixing the software and then doing a new software release. 

So a good deal of the risk in this program is associated with developing the mission system software. I mean, for example, the 

mission system software lines of code are 2.5 times in Joint Strike 

Fighter at the current estimate than they were in the F–22. 

But you can fix those kinds of problems without major hardware 

changes in a number of instances. So that that counterbalances 

that risk. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Sullivan, did you have anything to add on that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, our perspective on that is, first of all, there 

is actually in the acquisition policies at the Department a kind of 

a rule that you shouldn’t procure more than 10 percent of your 

total buy in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), which is what they 

are in now. 

And you should try to get the fixed—you know, the fact that 

these are cost-plus contracts say a lot. If the Department can get 

this through a fixed price environment, that will settle a lot of this 

risk. 

But, in addition to that, I think the risk moving forward is the— 

Dr. Gilmore alluded to the complexity of the software. And I think 
17 

it is—there is a lot of risk left in that, because to get to the fullcapability aircraft, which is Block III software, I am not sure how 

far along the program is in doing that. They haven’t even established the lines of code for that. 

So they have got an enormous effort in software. They haven’t 

flown—I think that the development flight test program now has 

probably, basically, got a lot of safety-of-flight issues, and has not 

really started on the full performance envelope of the aircraft. 

So there is risk something is going to happen. 

Mr. SMITH. I am just going to ask one more question, and then 

turn it over my colleagues. And that is, you know, sort of the crux 

of the issue for us in the short term. 

In 2010, we, in response, to your requests, you know, put in a 

certain number of production aircraft procurement. Shortly after 

we authorized and appropriated that, came back and said you only 

needed half of those. 

How confident are you in the number that you are asking for us 

this year? Because on the surface of it, we are not confident at all. 

And that is a big chunk of our budget that we are putting to this. 

And we would hate to do that again, and then have, you know, the 

number change, six months after we did it. 

What is different this year from last year on that issue? 

Secretary CARTER. Is this to me? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Dr. Carter, sir. 

Secretary CARTER. We have slowed the ramp down, considerably, 

going forward. And that was one of the most important decisions 

we made in the restructuring. It was in recognition of some of the 

risk that has been adduced here, and we did try to reduce that 

risk, including the concurrency risk. 

If I—we are trying to strike a balance here, Mr. Chairman, in 

the concurrency issue. 

On the one hand, if you—if we tried to pull the ramp back, the 

ramp-up to production and steepen it unrealistically, we would 

have excessive concurrency and an excessive risk that we would 

discover in the course of flight testing things that had to be retrofitted and fixed and that would be expensive. 

Against that, if we slip the ramp too much or flatten it more 

than we have already, you are adding cost, and adding schedule, 

unnecessarily. 

So we are trying to fix that balance. We think we are in the 

sweet spot of that balancing, as best as we can ascertain it now. 

So we have slipped the ramp and flattened it. We are not recommending slipping it further and flattening it further, because that 

increases cost and delays the delivery of the aircraft to the services. 

We are not recommending keeping the ramp, however, where it 

was before the review began, because that seemed—that not only 

seemed, our judgment was that that was unachievable. 

If I may comment, also, on the fixed price. It is a very important 

point, and I am glad Mr. Sullivan raised it. 

The willingness to go to fixed price is a measure of whether the 

contractor judges that the assembly line is stable and, therefore, 

the contractor is able to predict its performance well enough to 

offer a fixed price. 
18 

So that is an indicator—that is why we are using it, and I indicated that in my opening statement. We want to move to fixed 

price contracts as early as possible in LRIP. That asks the contractor to make a commitment to the stability of the line. The contractor has indicated a willingness to do that. That is a good deal 

for us—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary CARTER. A willingness, but they have not actually done 

it—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yet. 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, we are in negotiations now. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I do have to—if you have something really 

quick—— 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I just wanted, very quickly, to say that 

I think another issue in all this is the ability for them to deliver 

aircraft from—from the manufacturing facility now. That is not 

going well. And—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. And with flight testing, there is 

going to be more design changes. There is an awful lot of design 

change traffic hitting the floor now. So I think manufacturing this 

aircraft moving forward is going to be—that is another one of the 

risks on the program. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sullivan, how long after we started the development of Engine 135 did we start the development of Engine 136? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Umm. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I think—if my memory serves me right, it was 46 

months. Is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I think, approximately, it is about a 3- to 4- 

year lag. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Forty-six is the number I remember. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You said that the 136 was 1 year behind the 135, 

which means in fact, that its development is going better than the 

development of the 135. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, no, sir, I think I may have made a mistake, 

but I think it is three—I said it was three years behind. That is 

what I meant to say, anyway. 

Mr. BARTLETT. It is my understanding that, in fact, the development of the 136 is proceeding faster than the development of 135. 

This 3 years behind 135 is because its development started 46 

months, nearly 4 years behind. So it is, in reality, almost a year 

ahead of the development of the 135. Correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I guess, yes, if taking the—the three—I would 

have to look at that, but, yes, it could be, and we can take a look 

at that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. If you say it is three years behind, that leads people to believe, gee, this is a lousy engine. They are even behind in 

development. 

The fact is, they are, in fact, ahead in development by—— 
19 

* The explanation of the scheduled delays provided by the DOT&E director is contrary to the 

information provided at a later date by the Air Force and F–35 Joint Program Office, shown 

in the Appendix on page 197. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was planned—yes, the program was planned to 

be three years behind so that it could—they could ramp into competition. 

Dr. GILMORE. Congressman Bartlett, the information I have is 

that the development of the 136 is about 2 years behind the schedule that was planned in 2005, which placed—you know, the development of the engine did start, by design, 4 years later than the 

development of the 135, but the 136 is about 2 years behind the 

schedule that the contractor and the program office had laid out as 

recently as 2005. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And how far behind is 135? 

Dr. GILMORE. It is about the same amount behind. 

Mr. BARTLETT. That much or more is my understanding. 

Dr. GILMORE. Yes, it is about the same amount behind. They 

have had—both engines have had similar kinds of problems, the 

kinds of problems that should be expected when you are trying to 

develop and build a high-performance jet engine.* 

Mr. BARTLETT. Dr. Carter, in both your written testimony and 

your oral testimony, you noted that analysis and cost estimates 

done in November of 2009 showed that the program would trigger 

a Nunn-McCurdy breach. How come we didn’t know that then? 

Secretary CARTER. We had received the JET report in November 

2009. It was an estimate at that time. It was very different from 

what we had—our program office was telling us, which was the official baseline at that time. 

It was then, around the turn of the year, that we completed our 

review of the JET estimate, and concluded that the JET estimate, 

and not the program office estimate, was the more realistic of the 

two. 

It was January when the Secretary of Defense adopted the JET 

estimate as the projected way forward. And then he announced 

that in the budget in February. And I—the—and I have stated before that JSF was going to be a Nunn-McCurdy breach. It will be 

a matter of days before the official declaration goes. 

But once we accepted the JET estimate, or adopted that, that 

meant that the program would be in Nunn-McCurdy breach, because the forecast of the program’s progress made in the JET estimate suggested greater than 50 percent cost growth, which is the 

trigger for Nunn-McCurdy. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Are there regulations, written or unwritten, in 

the building that precludes including us as a partner in those discussions? 

Secretary CARTER. I would have to get back to you on the technicality of that. Certainly, in—as a general matter, no, we try 

promptly to keep this committee informed of important developments in programs that are in your purview. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 201.] 

As I said when I—earlier, because of the particular timing of the 

JET estimate and the Department’s deliberations, which were in 

the December-January period leading up to the release of the 
20 

President’s budget, it wasn’t until the President’s budget was released that the—the JET estimate was—which was included in 

that budget—was available. 

We did, however—it is my understanding that the JET estimate, 

even back in 2008, was made available to the committee. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Your statement goes on to say that ‘‘Program management contractors and the Department need to surface, candidly and openly, 

issues with this program as they arise, so that Congress is aware 

of them and they can be addressed.’’ 

In the spirit of that statement, it would have been nice, I think, 

if we would have been a part of that two-month discussion between 

November and January. Would you agree? 

Secretary CARTER. I promise that, going forward, we will be as 

open as we possibly can, and candid about the—what is going on 

in this program. 

I firmly believe, as the acquisition executive, that you have got 

to create a climate in which people are willing to surface issues in 

programs. That is the only way you solve them. 

And that is the only way we can do it—programs are, particularly at this particular inflection point in the transition from development to production, they are going to have issues. And if you 

don’t create an environment in which those things are surfaced, 

you are never going to solve them. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. For members’ information, we have had, 

I think—how many—what, four votes, I think it is called, one 15- 

minute, three fives. We are going to get to Mr. Taylor, at least, before we go, push this up a little bit, and then we will have to take 

a break and come back. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Carter, I have been listening to your rational arguments on the dual sourcing for the engine. And you tell me that, 

because of the huge Research and Development (R&D) costs that, 

even if you get a second source in there, by the time you have 

bought all these engines, you end up with—I think the word you 

used was ‘‘a wash.’’ 

I am curious, since that is the way you have chosen to proceed, 

are you demanding that the vendor, the successful vendor, provide 

to the services a technical data package, that we would own the 

specifications to that engine? 

The reason being is, if R&D is the reason that makes that second 

engine unaffordable, then you are only paying, in effect, for one 

case of R&D. But then you are in a position to take those specifications and see if a second vendor wants to build the engine that you 

have now blessed. 

Have you—and we are doing that with some other things right— 

as we speak—in Navy shipbuilding. Have you pursued that line of 

thought at all? 

And if not, tell me why. 

Secretary CARTER. The—that particular approach to secondsourcing engines was tried once before in the case of the F/A–18 

and was not successful. 
21 

Mr. TAYLOR. Walk me through it. 

Secretary CARTER. Just to answer your specific question, we have 

not required the vendor of the F135 engine to produce the technical 

data package that would allow a build-to-print version of a competitive engine. 

The competitive engine program that has been pursued has been 

an independent development of a second engine. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, I am with you, Dr. Carter, but I am just telling you, without the technical data package—we are paying for this 

research. From what I can tell, we are paying for everything in this 

research, as a Nation. 

Then why should we not have the knowledge that is gained? 

Why should someone have a monopoly on that knowledge for replacing that engine at some point, for fixing that engine at some 

point? 

Wouldn’t it be a wise acquisition tool for our Nation to own that 

technical data package? 

Secretary CARTER. I will get back to you with a specific answer 

to that question. What I can tell you is this, regarding the R&D, 

two things. One is that, with respect to the R&D on the so-called 

second engine, the F136, that is a part of but not all of the cost 

to prepare that to compete. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 201.] 

Secretary CARTER. The other thing that I think may be useful to 

say at this point is that we do value competition in the military jet 

aircraft field and innovation in that field. And we have a number 

of programs to increase the fuel efficiency, the thrust-to-weight and 

other desirable features in the military aircraft engine area. 

So the F135—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. So doesn’t that—okay, so then you just talked yourself into a dual source. So which one is it? 

Secretary CARTER. Not a dual source for the Joint Strike Fighter 

engine. I would like to have more than one, and we do have more 

than one competitor in the military aircraft field. I don’t need to 

have two duplicative engines for the F–35 in order to have two parties in the military jet aircraft engine business. 

I do want that, and some of our tech-base programs, in addition 

to developing technology, have that purpose. 

On the question of the second engine for the F–35, I have the 

greatest respect for people who come to the opposite decision from 

the one we have come to. I know that many people with great expertise do, and I completely respect that point of view. 

It is simply a matter of looking at up-front costs, which are very 

real, and assumed savings as a result of a competitive process that 

is much harder to have confidence would actually produce those 

savings. 

And one just has to make a judgment between those two. We 

made a judgment that the large near-term costs, which displace 

other things we could spend our money on, are not—those costs are 

not outweighed. 

But again, I respect people who come to the other view. We needed to make a judgment between those two cases, and this is the 

judgment that we have made. 
22 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, Mr. Carter, not to belabor this, because there 

are other people with good questions that—but I would like you, 

say, within the next two to three weeks, certainly well before markup of this bill, to visit with me and give me a good reason why we 

should not own that technical data package? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary CARTER. I will get back to you on that. I don’t have a 

good reason, as I sit here now. I promise I will get back to you on 

that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 201.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. Wilson, we will try and get your five minutes in before we 

go over and vote. You are next in line. Mr. Akin had to go somewhere. We will get him as soon as we get back. Mr. Wilson? 

And then, after him, we will go vote and come back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

And, Dr. Carter, last year, the F136 development maturation to 

competition was expected to be completed by 2014. This year there 

is a 3-year F136 schedule delay to 2017. 

Why does the Department believe that the F136 development 

should take an additional 3 years? 

Secretary CARTER. The analysis of the preparation of the F136 

engine for competition was done by CAPE. So if I may ask Ms. Fox 

to answer that question? 

Ms. FOX. Certainly. There are two fundamental factors that have 

caused us to look at moving the competition from 2014 to 2017. 

One has already been touched on, and that is that the 136 is behind their predicted schedule for development. 

And the other is, frankly, the restructuring of the program overall. In order to get the engines in a place where they can compete, 

we need to have some directed buys. They need to be sufficiently 

mature in order to successfully compete. Given that we have 

slowed the ramp and moved the program out, we need planes to 

do that with. 

And so it has just, by mostly the nature of the restructuring, 

pushed it out—plus, some of the delay in the 136, which we want 

to give them time to catch up. It is those two factors. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I thank both of you for being thoughtful on 

that issue. 

And, Mr. Sullivan, you question, in your March report, whether 

the current plan for ramping up production of F–35s is prudent. Do 

you believe procuring fewer F–35s in fiscal year 2011 would decrease the program risk? 

If so, what leads you to believe this? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think we view it as any aircraft that you get out 

of the near term, fiscal year 2011, specifically, would reduce risk 

to the buyer. And we base that on a couple of things. 

Number one, as we said earlier, the lack of development flight 

testing that has been done so far, so that there are still—there is 

a lot of unknowns about the design and about how the software is 

going to work and the hardware is going to work. 

But in addition to that, we think it is prudent because, as I alluded to earlier, they are still having—the contractor is still having 
23 

trouble learning how to build the aircraft. It is not coming down 

the learning curve real well. 

So, in effect, there is, kind of, a backlog of aircraft, as we speak. 

I think, in fiscal year 2010—well, I think there is, like, 28 aircraft 

on order now, and this year, they are asking for another 43. You 

are beginning to get a backlog of aircraft on order that we are not 

sure they are going to be able to build within two years. 

Mr. WILSON. And then, I do want you to have—the communities 

I represent, Beaufort, South Carolina, the Marine Corps Air Station; I represent communities adjacent to McEntire Joint Air Base, 

Eastover, South Carolina. And those communities are—are hopeful 

about F–35s. 

And so any way that we can—I can be supportive, please let me 

know. The communities I represent enjoy the sound of freedom. So 

we would love to have them. 

Secretary CARTER. Congressman, may I make a comment on 

the—in response to the last question? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes. 

Secretary CARTER. There are two kinds of risk here. And I really 

think we need to balance the two risks, at least. We are trying to 

do that. 

One can reduce the risk of the kind that Mr. Sullivan is referring 

to by waiting until all the testing is done and then starting production. That reduces that risk, but it means that you don’t get the 

airplanes until later and they cost more. 

So one can’t talk about only one kind of risk. There are two risks 

here that are being balanced. One is the risk associated with concurrency, which Mr. Sullivan is talking about, which is real, but 

one has to balance against that the risk of slipping the schedule 

and the ramp to the point where production is uneconomical and 

jets are delivered later than they otherwise could be. 

That is the balancing that we are trying to do. So risk has several dimensions to it, and just reducing risk by slipping the program introduces yet another kind of risk. 

We are trying to balance those two, and in the restructured program, have done our level best to strike that balance. 

Mr. WILSON. And I just can’t imagine all the different risk and 

the balancing you have to do. And—but thank you for expediting, 

however. 

I understand the official restructuring acquisition decision memorandum has been recently approved, Dr. Carter. You mentioned 

that, if contractors can execute a development program and/or deliver aircraft at lower costs, you will work with Congress to procure 

additional aircraft. 

What will be the incentives for the contractor and the government team to reach these milestones? 

Secretary CARTER. It is in the interests of the contractor to get 

up that production learning curve, have confidence in the Department of Defense and in you, in the services, in the international 

partners in the ability to produce aircraft. 

So it is very much in their interests to produce more than 43 aircraft in fiscal year 2011, if that is at all possible. We are trying to 

use that incentive to get better performance. And that is a commit-
24 

ment the contractor has made, and I would like to hold them to 

and enjoy the benefits of. 

Mr. SMITH. On that note, we have to go. We will hopefully be 

back in 20 minutes to a half hour. There are four votes, so we are 

about out of time on the first vote, and then we have got the next 

three, so we should be able to maximize our time. 

See you in a few. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. If we could have everybody sort of re-find their seats. 

We are done now. Members should be drifting back in here shortly. 

Want to make sure we maximize our time. Thank you. 

And in the spirit of maximizing our time, I will ask a couple of 

questions while we are waiting for some other members to get 

back. Mr. Akin will be first up when he returns. 

Obviously the main focus of this hearing is the Joint Strike 

Fighter because of the large portion of our fleets that it is going 

to make up. 

But could you talk a little bit about some of the other options in 

terms of how we get to the force structure that we are looking for 

at the various points, 5, 10, 15, 20 years out, and in particular 

what role existing aircraft—the F–18 and the F–15 and the F– 

16s—play in that, and how the slippage to the right of the JSF can 

affect that and how also determinations on things like what is the 

realistic life cycle for existing F–15s and F–16s. Are there ways to 

retrofit them to give them a longer life? 

What sort of—are you playing around with those other pieces as 

well, and how do they fit into our long-term—well, short-term and 

long-term force structure demands? 

And, Dr. Carter, I will let you go ahead and start us off on that. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will do that, and 

then probably ask Ms. Fox, if I may. And then the witnesses in the 

panel that come after us, I know, are prepared to discuss that also. 

A couple of comments on that. One is that our principal effort is 

to restore affordability and schedule to the Joint Strike Fighter. 

That has been the burden of what we have been trying to do over 

the last few months because of the key role it plays in recapitalizing the Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) fleet going forward. 

And it is not just a matter of numbers, I guess is the second comment I would make, Mr. Chairman, it is the capabilities of the aircraft. The aircraft it is replacing are good aircraft also, but the 

Joint Strike Fighter has capabilities that the legacy aircraft don’t, 

and obviously we want to have those capabilities as soon as possible. 

With respect to life extension on legacy aircraft, I know that the 

acquisition executive is prepared to discuss that in detail. 

Mr. SMITH. I will tell you what. Why don’t we do this. I will follow up with him. We have had some other members join us. I want 

to make sure they get a chance to ask that. 

You know, on those follow-up questions later, I am curious, you 

know, what is the threat that we are proposing to counter, the 

need for 22,000 or 2,200 or whatever is it in fighter aircraft and 

how that fits in with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 

threats that we are worried about. 
25 

But I will go to Mr. Marshall now for five minutes and then Mr. 

LoBiondo after him. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I thank the chairman for his line of questioning that I stumbled in on. I do think it is important for us to 

hear, you know, with the recent changes that you have made on 

the ramp and flattening out the F–35, how that also changes other 

things. Obviously, force structure decisions were made with a different contemplated availability of the F–35 in mind. 

I have got no parochial interest in this at all, into the F136 engine. It is almost—it is fascinating to me how this has evolved. If 

we get a new Secretary we are always subject to budget constraints, Secretary Carter, you mentioned just a minute ago, you 

know, which displaces other things. You know, the dollars involved 

in this displacing other things we can spend our money on. 

But we get a new Secretary, a decision is made, comes as a surprise to us, given what we have heard from the Pentagon for years 

concerning the value of the competitive engine. Decision is made to 

cancel it. We fund it that year and request that Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) do a study. CAIG does a study, it comes 

back, we look at the study, we conclude that, okay, well, we should 

continue funding this thing. We just respectfully disagree. 

After plunking a bunch more money into it, just sort of looking 

at the CAIG numbers, looked to us like both then-year and currentyear dollars were either even or positive for the alternate engine. 

And then comes the veto threat over this, which just stunned all 

of us, frankly. It was pretty harsh rhetoric over something that we 

thought was a pretty close call, and it is sort of, because we had 

been funding it repeatedly, had gotten to the point where it was 

in the positive column. 

So you all went back, and now CAPE does a study, I assume 

thinking sort of same people thinking about the same kind of objectives, et cetera, worried about the same kind of things, including 

the three or four things that you mentioned that make you uncomfortable with the projection that currently is available, and it looks 

like it is a wash, present dollars. I don’t know what the then-year 

dollars look like. Maybe it is positive then-year dollars. We were 

only given present dollars. 

And so the decision seems to rest on whether or not you buy all 

these attendant benefits and whether we will actually realize those 

attendant benefits. That is one thing. 

Then the second thing is, are we willing to spend the money? Are 

we willing to say, Gosh, we will find money someplace else or we 

will just run a little red ink in order to avoid, as you put it, displacing other things that are priorities? 

That puts us in a real awkward position. It seems to me that we 

are sort of where we have been for the last four or five years. Nothing has really changed. And consistently we have made this judgment that the alternate engine should be funded. 

Now, I understand from the discussion earlier that the slippage 

in both programs have been about the same. I presume that means 

we are spending more money than we anticipated spending in the 

development of the 135 as well, both of those programs. 

And I am just still at a loss to figure out why—I mean, I can understand that there is, you know, judgment back and forth called 
26 

for, but I am at a loss to figure out why the Department would be 

threatening a veto over this. 

Is that currently the Department’s attitude about it? 

Secretary CARTER. It is. And I think there are two things that 

make what is the—the analytical wash, which is—which you described and I think Ms. Fox has described—there are two other ingredients to the story that I think lie behind the Department’s 

judgment that it is not advisable to proceed with the second engine. 

The two other ingredients are—both of which you have mentioned—one is attendant benefits: Are there attendant, noneconomic, nonfinancial—— 

Mr. SMITH. If I could interrupt. 

Mr. Sullivan, addressing the competition question, will we receive a payback that is valuable from competition, you are skeptical, considering whether or not that will occur. 

Mr. Sullivan notes historically that paybacks in the range of 10 

percent or 12 percent, which is what Mr. Sullivan identified in his 

opinion as being necessary in order to break even dollars-wise, that 

that historically has occurred. 

You don’t think so here? 

Secretary CARTER. That is the other thing. Our judgment is that 

the assumptions that show that payback—historical, analytical— 

are very optimistic. And, therefore, if one accepts that, you have to 

compare very real, very certain upfront costs to hypothesized savings. 

And I—we have not been able to substantiate those hypothesized 

savings. 

Mr. SMITH. It is almost always the case that in trying to spend 

money on any future program, you have to predict benefits of—and 

whether it is economic payback, or, you know, improved security, 

et cetera. I mean, there are all kinds of projections that you make. 

I don’t see why these are really that different. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, making an upfront investment to realize 

savings for the taxpayer in the long run is a very prudent. We do 

it all the time. 

Investing real upfront money against a, to us, not analytically 

well-grounded expectation of future saving, that is where we have 

trouble making that particular—this investment. 

Mr. SMITH. So it is the failure by CAIG to properly analyze this, 

to come up with the right balance—— 

Secretary CARTER. No, I think they have done the best analysis 

that can be done, which is kind of a—it takes learning—I don’t 

want to get too technical about it, but it takes learning curves, the 

way the unit price is reduced with the strength of a buy—— 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. I am going to have to have you wrap this 

up fairly quickly. We are a little over time, and I want to get to 

the next questioner. 

Secretary CARTER. I am sorry. 

Mr. SMITH. But go ahead and complete your thoughts. 

Secretary CARTER. My only point was I think it is the best kind 

of economics textbook, if I may say it, analysis that can be done. 

But that presumes a competition in the out-years, a certain competitive dynamic, that just doesn’t look like it is realistically based. 
27 

Some of the customers will not, in fact, buy whatever engine is 

produced more cheaply in that particular year. They want one engine or the other engine. 

So when one hypothesizes a free and open competition, we are 

concerned that it would actually be a series of directed buys. 

Mr. SMITH. I am going to have to let Mr. Marshall get the last 

word here and then move on. 

Jim, if you have got a word or two here? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I just don’t see why CAIG and the bright 

folks that no doubt make up the group that did the original study 

wouldn’t have been able to think through exactly those risks. 

What has changed that all of a sudden somebody concludes, oh, 

we didn’t think through—their thoughts concerning the value of 

competition are faulty because, as you have just described, that 

they couldn’t have thought that through to start out with? 

Mr. SMITH. And this will have to be continued, I am sorry, at a 

later point. 

Mr. LoBiondo, and then I will get to Mr. Akin after him. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I kind of don’t know where to begin to start. I don’t know how 

other members feel—there aren’t that many here. But I can’t believe what I am hearing. 

I mean, there have been slippages, there have been cost overruns, there have been all kinds of problems, and the—what we are 

being told is just ‘‘spend a little more money, take a little more 

time, don’t worry about it, everything is okay.’’ 

I have been really on this fighter gap issue for some time now, 

and no one can explain how we are going to make this up. 

You all have dug your heels in on this F–35, and I think this is 

going to come back in years to come and haunt us as a monumental mistake to look at what we are doing to our legacy fighters 

and the fighter gap issue—the bathtub issue. 

There is no way anyone has been able to explain for years how 

you are going to make up this gap. 

When these F–16s and F–15s are no longer able to fly and the 

F–35 still have problems because someone hasn’t figured it out, you 

are going to have Air Guard units that are not going to have 

planes. 

And, as someone pointed out earlier, all we are doing when we 

say what we need in terms of numbers is shrinking them down 

when someone points out that we have got a problem. 

I don’t—Mr. Chairman, I don’t know how we get our arms 

around this. 

Mr. Taylor, you talked about it earlier. 

We have got serious, serious fiscal problems that are facing this 

country and we are billions and billions of dollars down the wrong 

track, because somebody made a decision that the F–35 was where 

we were going to put all our eggs into that basket. 

And I am really angry about this. Hearing after hearing, it is the 

same thing—more time slippage, more money, more problems. 

‘‘Just have a little more patience, Congress. We know more than 

you. Working with the vendors, working with the contractors. Don’t 

worry. We are buying these things. We are doing it.’’ 
28 

I will tell you. I hope somebody wakes up on this. I really do. 

I apologize, because I—I had not intended to go this route. But 

I am listening to this, and there is only so much we can take. 

Somebody has got to wake up and start giving us some answers. 

If you are able to give us some answers on what you are doing 

to make up the bathtub issues and how substantively we are going 

to solve that problem, I would be quiet and be calm. 

But I feel like a second grader, being patted on the head, saying, 

‘‘Don’t worry about. Everything is going to be okay. Just go back 

into the classroom and fold your hands. And everything will be 

fine.’’ 

I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from New Jersey. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I mentioned when we started, I had been having a hard time 

trying to get some answers. I guess you are sensing, perhaps, some 

frustration on our committee. And to try to put—to give an overarching kind of sense of what is going on, is we feel like we are 

being given the mushroom treatment over here. 

We are not included. There is not transparency. There is not visibility as to what the decisions are. 

We talked about QDR this morning, and, as I said earlier, we 

live in the political world. We play with budgets, and we make decisions about how much the Department of Defense gets in their 

spending. 

And if you are not getting enough money, we need to know about 

it. If we are going to give you this much money, and you say, 

‘‘Okay, with this much money, here is what we can do to give you 

the least amount of risk,’’ then you have got to tell us, ‘‘Yes, but 

we have left these gaps in here that are a problem.’’ 

And it is our job to go back and get more money for DOD, but 

we can’t do that if we don’t know what is going on. 

And the transparency has been nonexistent. It is like it is transparent as a concrete wall. 

Now, here is one that I—I have asked this question about 21⁄2

years in a row now. I just keep trying it because I think maybe 

somebody can answer it. It is not on JSF, but it is related tightly. 

First of all, what is the status of the DOD cost analysis on F– 

18 multi-year procurement, and will the Department meet the May 

1st contract award deadline? That should be a yes or no. 

Secretary CARTER. We are going to meet the May 1st deadline, 

if we possibly can. The only reason I add as we possibly can, sir, 

is that that is not entirely under our control. It is a matter of the 

interaction with the contractor. 

It is an important discussion that we are having. We had some 

indication from the contractor of a willingness to make an offer 

that we would be interested in, and we are trying to wrap that up 

just as soon as we can, because we understand the deadline. 

If I may comment on the mushroom issue, and to the congressman from New Jersey as well, I kind of felt the same way in November, that is, that we were seeing in the JET estimate a picture 
29 

of the Joint Strike Fighter program so different from the one that 

had been portrayed by the joint program office and the contractor. 

And that is the reason that the Secretary took the action he did. 

So I can very much relate to your anger about it and—— 

Mr. AKIN. The concern we had, sir, was that it wasn’t just in one 

issue. It wasn’t just Joint Strike Fighter. It has been across the 

board in a whole series of different areas. 

So it is not like it is that one program. We know that there is 

certain problems with certain programs, understand that. But this 

has been a broader sense. The Quadrennial Defense Review is not 

just specifically that one plane. It is a whole series. 

And how do you come to the decision of how many ships, how 

many this, how are you balancing that? 

And that—that process is what I am talking about as being 

opaque. It is not just this one program, which also is that way. 

So you are saying you are going to try to meet that deadline to 

the best of your—depending on negotiations with the contractor. 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely. 

Mr. AKIN. Now, here is—next question: There is a memo we got 

from the Navy that says the shortfall is actually 177, but by—they 

think they can reduce it to 100 by several mitigation options. And 

then it says, ‘‘All options are on the table to manage.’’ 

So I asked a simple question before: Is one of the options if we 

don’t have enough F–18s, that is the only thing we are flying off 

of aircraft carriers, is one of the options to buy some more of them? 

It seems like you have got three options: One, you take old ones, 

fix them up; two, you just get by with what you have got, don’t 

have as many airplanes on an aircraft carrier; or, three, you buy 

some new ones. That seems to me to be common sense. 

Now, I asked that specific question, and I asked it three times, 

and never got an answer. 

Are ‘‘all options are on the table,’’ does that mean buying more 

F–18s is an option? Or is it not an option? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we are buying more F–18s. 

Mr. AKIN. I mean beyond what is currently on record, the program of record. Because the program of record—this shortfall is 

after we buy the ones on record. It is still a shortfall. 

Secretary CARTER. That is correct. Well, I want to be very clear. 

And then, of course, Mr. Stackley will be addressing this also. 

The options that we are looking at now, and that we would then 

fund in fiscal year 2012 and beyond are ones designed to prolong 

the life of the existing fleet of F/A–18s until they can be replaced 

by Joint Strike Fighters. 

Mr. AKIN. You say you are talking about rebuilding old planes? 

Secretary CARTER. It is extending the life, the operational life, of 

the F/A–18s. 

Mr. AKIN. But you are not considering buying some new ones instead of that? 

Secretary CARTER. No, the options that are being considered that 

I think were in the—specifically referenced in the quote that you 

are discussing, are options for extending the service life of the F– 

35s—of the F–18s. 

Ms. Fox will be conducting that analysis in the course of the year 

and I really ought to allow her to answer it. 
30 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Well, I am about out of time, so I guess my concern is, we have taken a look at the cost per flight hour doing that, 

and, boy, is that an expensive alternative. 

And I guess the question I have is why wouldn’t you consider the 

alternative of buying a new one if it comes out to be a whole lot 

financially more desirable? But I have never had anybody say, 

‘‘Well, we would consider that.’’ 

I mean, it is obviously logically something you could consider. 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely. 

Mr. AKIN. You either fix up the old one, you go without, or you 

buy a new one. But why not consider buying the new one, because 

to fix up the old one is half the cost of the new one, and you get 

whatever it is—6,000 more hours on the sucker. So I don’t understand that. 

Here is one last question, if you will indulge me just a minute, 

Mr. Chairman: In the previous testimony, the committee has been 

told that the F/A–18 manufacturer submitted a proposal offering a 

10 percent cost savings for multi-year procurement. 

In fact, that is what Secretary Gates said—he had to have 10 

percent, or he wouldn’t be happy. I guess I would take any amount 

of money I could get, if we would get an improvement. 

But, anyway, in your recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), you indicated that a 10 percent saving was 

simply not enough to meet a threshold of interest. But that a savings in the teens would actually be required for a multi-year procurement. 

It appears to me that you are either trying to posture yourself 

to negotiate more savings from the manufacturer or you are arbitrarily setting requirements on the fly. 

What is the basis for now requiring a savings that exceeds 10 

percent? I would like to believe that this figure wasn’t arbitrarily 

chosen, so I would like to see your analysis that supports this new 

figure and would allow you to justify walking away from nearly 

$0.5 billion of savings. 

Do you understand—this is one that was kind of carefully written. Do you understand what we are saying? 

Secretary CARTER. I do. And I can respond very directly to it. The 

Secretary said that 10 percent was the threshold of interest. I 

think that was the phrase I used. Obviously, we would like to get 

as much savings as we possibly can. That is something that is a 

matter of discussion and negotiation with the contractor and also, 

as we do our own independent assessment of what we should pay 

for the aircraft. 

So we are trying to get the best deal for the taxpayer and the 

warfighter—the best deal. And—— 

Mr. AKIN. Now, when you are doing that negotiation, why 

wouldn’t you, in that negotiation, say, ‘‘Hey, if we throw some more 

planes in, instead of fixing up the old ones, what kind of deal will 

you give us?’’ Why wouldn’t you throw that part of the table too? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, at the moment, we are discussing with 

them, very specifically, the planned buy of both E/F models and 

Growlers and trying to leverage the opportunity of—of placing a 

larger order, to see if it is possible that we can get a multi-year 

savings that would warrant taking the action of a multi-year. 
31 

And obviously I would like to get the best deal that we possibly 

can in that regard. 

Mr. AKIN. I understand you are trying to get the best deal, but 

currently you have a program of record you are going to buy some 

planes, the contractor came and said, ‘‘Hey, we can do 10 percent 

to help you on this if you do a multi-year.’’ 

Now, if you are really trying to get the best buy, have the shortfall, and you got a tremendously high cost to rebuild some planes, 

why wouldn’t you at least consider tossing out, ‘‘How about we increase the number of planes we are going to buy, what will you 

give us as a price?’’ 

I mean, the Secretary has said: I like the 80 percent solutions 

instead of the real pricey, big ticket thing. Why don’t we use a little 

of that reasoning to say, if you got a plane at, whatever it is, $50 

million, versus another one that is going to be, what do you think, 

$120 million, when you get done with F–35, and you don’t have the 

F–35 anyway at the time, and you do need some of them, now 

maybe you say, ‘‘Hey, we can’t afford to fill this gap because we 

don’t have enough money.’’ Hey, I can understand that as an answer, but I keep feeling like you are not being rational about the 

way you are approaching it. That is my sense of frustration. 

Secretary CARTER. The analysis certainly compares life extension 

to recapitalization. You are right, that is logical. I think that has 

taken us to looking at different variants of life extension. And I 

don’t—that is analysis that is very straightforward to do and I 

think we can share entirely what the basis of that is as we go forward. And I think that—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. And work on that. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. I just have one more question of this panel, and I will 

see if anyone else has anything, move on to the next one. 

One thing on the alternate engine that we have not talked about 

is the May 2008 Defense Contract Management Agency Fighter 

Engine Industrial Capability Assessment that basically recommended the F136, sort of took Mr. Marshall’s and others’ side 

of that argument, if you will. We have asked for different opinions 

about different studies and it seems your Department has not commented on that one. 

Are you aware of it? And if so, how do you refute it? 

Secretary CARTER. I will need to get back to you on this. This is 

a DCMA analysis. I will get back to you on that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 201.] 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. We will be sure and provide that for you, and 

would very much like your feedback on that particular study. 

Does anyone else have anything for this panel? 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Try to be brief. 

Do you think it is necessary that we maintain the industrial base 

in the sense that fighter engine production is different from other 

engine production? 

Secretary CARTER. I would like to have—and I think the Department wants to have more than one participant in the military jet 
32 

engine business. We have strong contenders now. We have ongoing 

procurements. We have technology base programs, R&D programs 

that are intended to advance the art in military jet engine technology. And all those activities support the industrial base and we 

do want an industrial—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. What would be helpful to me and, I think, the 

committee is if you could take the four reasons why you find the 

projection, you know, that there will be a wash to be unrealistic 

now, and do two things. Flesh them out a little bit more, they are 

very conclusory, and be very specific about why you will maintain, 

for example, an industrial base without the competitive engine. 

And then if you could go back and specifically determine whether 

or not CAIG, when it originally considered all of this, took into account, in trying to make their 50–50 judgment, which is the same 

thing that CAPE does now, took into account the very things that 

you are now suggesting weigh against continuing with the alternate engine. That would be very helpful. 

Ms. FOX. May I add to that, sir, in the estimate that we did in 

2007 and the update we did make several optimistic assumptions. 

And Dr. Carter’s referring to them is accurate. We do delineate 

them in our report and are clear about them in the current. And 

it does bring us to a—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. If I could, Ms. Fox, were you involved in that? 

Ms. FOX. No, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So you are now saying that they were optimistic 

then. 

Ms. FOX. Right. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So you are saying that CAIG, at the time that 

it made these projections intentionally made optimistic—— 

Ms. FOX. No, sir, we didn’t intentionally make optimistic assumptions. We tried to make—— 

Mr. SMITH. If I may—optimistic assumption is a matter of opinion at a certain point. I am sure when they put together the paper 

they didn’t say, ‘‘And these assumptions are optimistic.’’ I am sure 

when they put it together, when they did the study and all the 

studies that Mr. Marshall comes to, they did them based on what 

they thought was going to happen. I mean, your assessment now 

that it is not a good idea is a pessimistic assumption, if you want 

to put it that way. I mean those really are just sort of semantic 

words. 

What would be helpful, and when we are talking about, for instance, the discussion about, you know, it is an optimistic assumption these cost savings are going to come forward, and we put forward and say, ‘‘Well, historically, if you have this sort of competition, a 10 to 12 percent savings is reasonable.’’ That is not just sort 

of pulling it out of the air, that is going back and looking and seeing historically what have we learned. I mean, those are the assumptions you make. I mean, we—I think it would be obvious to 

anybody working on the Joint Strike Fighter that assumptions are 

far, far from guaranteed. We understand that. But to call them optimistic sort of—it really doesn’t help us much unless you can say, 

‘‘Well, gosh, you know, they say that historically you have saved 10 

to 12 percent.’’ 
33 

Well, look, we looked at 10 programs, and really only 7 of them, 

you know, 7 of them saved 5 percent, only 3 of them saved 10 to 

12 percent. That is an actual data point, instead of just continually 

saying to us optimistic assumptions. That is, I believe, what Mr. 

Marshall and certainly what I am looking for. 

Ms. FOX. A few comments, if I might. 

First of all, the analysts that did the analysis in 2007 and updated it now are the ones that gave us all the list of assumptions 

they felt were, let me use the word ‘‘conservative,’’ instead of optimistic. It is no attempt to be in any way disingenuous with the 

analysis. Analysis does have to make assumptions. 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

Ms. FOX. And in 2007 we were trying to put the best case forward for the alternate engine to inform the Secretary’s decision, 

and so we did make conservative assumptions to elicit that. And 

when we updated the analysis we held those assumptions constant 

so we would be comparing apples and apples. 

That is all I am trying to say. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So back to 2007. Were you trying to prove a case 

or were you just trying to do a study? 

Ms. FOX. We were trying to do a study, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So—and the same analysts. So you made your 

best judgment concerning these various issues. Certainly that 

group would have been aware of the issues that are now being specifically discussed. You made your best judgment, it was a frank, 

honest, not optimistic, not pessimistic judgment, and gave it to us. 

And based on that we decided to proceed. 

So that is what we are struggling with right now, the suggestion 

that somehow that group did not accurately—well, two things. One, 

either that group somehow was faulty and it made overly optimistic assumptions. They would probably say, ‘‘No, we don’t think 

we did, we thought we were right on the mark.’’ Or things have 

changed. So that is what we are really struggling with here. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, I think we have beaten the horse sufficiently at this point. So I think I would like to move on to the next 

panel, unless there is something new and different that members 

want to raise that we have not raised with this panel. 

Okay. Thank you very much. 

And we will obviously from this, and I am sure you have been 

taking notes about some of the questions that we have had and get 

specific answers to them. And we know, I mean, this is a very difficult program. It is very expensive, big burden for all of us. Communication between your office and Congress would be important, 

and I would concur with Mr. Akin and some others who have said 

that that communication has been not what it could be to this 

point. 

We all have to make tough decisions here. We just want to make 

sure that we are informed as much as possible so that we can, you 

know, hopefully come up with a plan that we can all agree on. So 

hopefully we will do a better job of that in the future. 

I thank you for your testimony. We will move on to the second 

panel. 

And I will give you a moment to switch out. 
34 

We have introduced this panel previously, but I will fire through 

it again quickly here just so that we know who we are dealing 

with. And the way I read these off will also be the order in which 

you will be asked to testify. 

We have the Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Lieutenant General George Trautman, Deputy Commandant for the Marine Corps 

for Aviation; Rear Admiral Deke Philman, Director of the Air Warfare Division for the U.S. Navy; Mr. David Van Buren, who is the 

acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and 

Lieutenant General Philip Breedlove, who is the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force. 

A lot has been said about this already, as you gentlemen no 

doubt heard. I would ask that—we have your statements. I will by 

unanimous consent submit them all for the record. We will have 

more votes coming up shortly, and I would hope that we could get 

done with this hearing before we do that. 

So it is a very long, complicated way of saying try to be as brief 

as you can. 

And with that, we will go with Mr. Stackley to get us started 

here. 

STATEMENTS OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION; LT. GEN. GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN III, USMC, 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR AVIATION; REAR ADM. DAVID L. PHILMAN, USN, DIRECTOR OF 

AIR WARFARE DIVISION FOR THE U.S. NAVY; DAVID M. VAN 

BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

FOR ACQUISITION; AND LT. GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, 

USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS 

AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Smith, Chairman Taylor, Representatives Bartlett and 

Akin, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Department of the Navy aviation procurement programs. 

The Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 2011 budget requests 

funding to procure 206 aircraft—103 fixed-wing, 100 rotary wing, 

and 3 UAVs. 

Aviation programs represent the Department’s greatest warfare 

investment, and this year program continues recent trends, which 

reflect an increase in our aviation procurement. 

In formulating our investment strategy, we are mindful to balance cost, schedule, performance and risk to ensure the ability to 

meet the warfare—war-fighter’s needs both today and for the future. 

We are leveraging stable procurement in rotary-wing programs 

with continued procurement of the H–60, H–1 and MV–22. We are 

establishing strong technical foundation and putting in place the 

tools to control cost for the P–8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft, E–2D 

Advanced Hawkeye and the 53K Heavy Lift Helicopter programs. 
35 

We are investing in next-generation technologies and opportunities 

that come from unmanned aircraft systems. 

And significantly, we are proceeding with E– and F–18 series 

production to include, as was discussed with the previous panel, 

pursuing multi-year procurement for the 124 aircraft in fiscal year 

2010 through 2013, while completing development and ramping up 

procurement on the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

Our commitment to the JSF program is unequivocal. Now, within 

the framework of the restructured program, it is essential that we 

deliver the cost and schedule performance that matches our commitment to the program. 

The Department has long recognized our ability to affordably 

meet our requirements relies upon our ability to manage the service life of our aviation fleet. As example, the P–3 sustainment. 

With Congress’ help, we are able to ensure that that aging aircraft 

is able to meet our operational requirements while we await the arrival of the more capable P–8A aircraft. 

And equally, similarly, the Department is aggressively managing 

service life of the legacy F/A–18A through D aircraft until its replacement by Joint Strike Fighter. 

And to this end, we are initiating further steps to mitigate the 

impacts of delays associated with a restructured JSF program. 

Again, we thank the subcommittees for this opportunity to discuss Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs and look forward 

to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stackley, General 

Trautman, and Admiral Philman can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General Trautman. 

General TRAUTMAN. I have no opening verbal statement. I will 

just go with Mr. Stackley on this one, sir. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Admiral Philman. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Likewise, sir. I stand with Mr. Stackley’s comments. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thanks very much. We will move on to the Air 

Force then and start with Mr. Van Buren. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very short 

statement. 

Good afternoon, Chairmen Smith and Taylor, Ranking Members 

Bartlett and Akin, and distinguished members of the committee. 

Lieutenant General Breedlove and I thank you for the opportunity 

to address the committee regarding the Air Force’s current and future aviation requirements and capabilities. 

Within acquisition, we are focused on our warfighting customers 

represented by General Breedlove. We are focused on what we buy 

and how we buy it. We are working very hard on the large-scale 

KC–X and F–35 programs, but also equally on the Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms for today’s fight 

such as Project Liberty and the MQ–9 Reaper. 
36 

We have much effort as well on modernizing our aging force. We 

have a robust acquisition improvement program with a key emphasis on affordability of what we buy and a cycle time reduction effort 

of how long it takes us to deliver to our warfighting customer. 

We have made some gains, but we have much work to do. We 

have submitted a combined statement for the record. We look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren and General 

Breedlove can be found in the Appendix on page 173.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity 

to be here today. I join Mr. Van Buren’s remarks. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Starting off, General Breedlove, with you and talking about the 

bomber programs. As you know, we canceled the next generation 

bomber program not long ago, and now we have restarted the process of figuring out what our next generation long-range strike platform is going to look like. 

Two things about that. One, can you walk us through sort of 

what the plans are, and then explain how it is going to be different 

this time. It is, you know, the juxtaposition between canceling one 

year and then starting up a new process for developing it. The next 

does ask for a little bit of an explanation for why that decision was 

made. 

Could you walk us through that? 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I can, and I am happy to do that. The 

Secretary did cancel that program. We began immediately looking 

at what that would mean for our requirements, and the Secretary 

commissioned another group to study what those requirements 

would be, and that group is working vigorously across the Department with the help of the United States Air Force. 

As far as our contributions to that and what this next program 

would look like, some things do not change much in the aggregate, 

and that is that the overall range, payload and stealth capability 

of the aircraft, some of that will remain fairly constant. But the 

program is being given a hard look. We are looking at it, sir, as 

you and I have talked about before, as a family of systems where 

the one platform for the bomber would only be one of the contributions to that family of systems. 

It would be supported probably by a penetrating ISR, an electronic attack capability, a stand-off cruise missile capability, a 

prompt global strike capability, and those are across two different 

services, sir, so it would be a joint family of systems that would 

bring a capability to our Department and to our Nation to take 

care of whichever target set. 

The original bomber was looked at more in the vein of being a 

single penetrating capability. We see that as a capability that one 

might need in certain less-dense target sets. In more-dense target 

sets, it may take the entire family of systems in order to accomplish the mission that we would need. And that, I think, will 

change the work from the first time when we were concentrating 
37 

solely on one penetrating platform, and now how will we get to this 

capability across both naval and Air Force capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

And then my—the force structure question that I was asking the 

previous panel. As I understand it, that was adjusted, I think, this 

year from 2,200 down to 2,000. A couple of questions around that. 

One, why the downward adjustment? What is the threat that we 

are attempting to counter with that force structure? How did it 

change that allowed us to have 200 fewer aircraft? 

And then talk to us a little bit about the F–15s and the F–16s, 

what their service life is going to be and what the variables are 

there? How confident are you that they will get to their service life? 

And if you aren’t confident, what are our plans to sort of make up 

the difference? And is there a period in there, lastly, that we might 

have a shortfall, given where we are at with Joint Strike and with 

the service life of the F–15 and the F–16? 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir, I would be happy to address those. 

To begin with, the 200 delta is during the—after the recent release 

of the QDR and the supporting documents, the ‘‘Guidance to the 

Employment of Force,’’ and in conversations with our OSD counterparts as they were developing those documents, the decision was 

taken that the Department should move from a low to medium or 

moderate threat from that, to a moderate threat. 

In other words, the Department agreed to accept a little higher 

threat as we make these computations. And sir, that equals 200 

aircraft in the modeling. 

Sir, to look at the fighters that you were talking about, the F– 

16s and the F–15s. I would like to just touch first on a question 

that Mr. Bartlett, Congressman Bartlett asked, and that is: How 

do we know what we need? And I want—and I will start my discussion of the F–16s and F–15s by saying we have, sir, started to look 

at all of our platforms. The look at the A–10 is complete and we 

know what we have to do on the A–10. We know we have to reskin 233 of them. 

The look at the F–16C, the air-to-air version, the hard fatiguetesting program is complete. And we know what we have to accomplish in the F–15C. The F–15E is our newest fighter, and we have 

not scheduled that full-scale testing for functional life yet. That will 

be a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 12 initiative, but it 

is the newest fighter, and we are not nearly as far along into the 

period when we would need investigation. 

The F–16, which is the workhorse of our fleet, of course, and has 

some of the oldest fighters associated with it, we are partially funded to look at that, and that look will begin next year in 2011. And 

we, as I said, we have partially funded that full-scale testing. And 

we will finish the funding of that full-scale testing in 2012. And 

this will provide us the data that we need structurally to look at 

those aircraft well before they are obsolescence lives. 

Mr. Chairman, to address the F–15 and the F–16 question that 

you asked, we have made several efforts to look at what we need 

to do to move those fleets to the right, and in some cases to retire 

portions of those fleets and move other portions of the fleet to the 

right. We are electing to make major modifications to 176 of our 

F–15s. Those modifications range from avionics to new Active Elec-
38 

tronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, structural numbers in the 

longerons, which you know we had problems with several years 

back. 

But for the F–15 fleet, 176 of them, we will invest fully to take 

them out to their full economic life. And that will buy them forward into the period where we will know much more about the JSF 

and how we make that time-out. 

For the F–16 fleet, we kind of put them in two categories. We 

have the older models, the block 25s and 30s. We have looked at 

about 136 of those that we will elect to retire. The investment in 

those aircraft is too high in order to buy them forward. The remaining about 50 percent of that fleet, we are looking at a cost of 

about $500,000 to $800,000 apiece or a total cost of about $250 million for the whole fleet, to buy that fleet forward 5 years to cover 

the gaps that we are thinking may occur in that fleet. And that is 

primarily for lower skin repairs. 

For the block 40s and the block 50s, our newer F–16s, those are 

the ones that will be looked the hardest at in this program which 

we initiated in this budget and will finish in the next budget to do 

the detailed fatigue testing, and we will know more about those 

aircraft when that is complete. 

But what we already do know is that we need to invest in avionics and we are closing out this year the (CCIP), common configuration cockpit capability, which brings all of the block 40s and 50s 

up to one standard—a standard that will carry them well into 2020 

or possibly beyond. And we are investing in that, and that program 

is ongoing now. In fact, all of the block 50s are done and we should 

finish the block 40s here in the next 2 years. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General BREEDLOVE. So we have addressed each one those platforms and looked at how we can move them right to lessen the gap 

or risk. 

Mr. SMITH. Understood. That is very thorough, and I appreciate 

your answer. 

I want to make sure I get to Mr. Taylor so I will turn it over 

to Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to keep this 

hopefully in my lane. 

So Secretary Stackley, I thought I heard you say that you had 

plans to mitigate the effects of delaying the F–35. I was wondering 

if you could lay out some of the options that you have in mind and 

the time lines that would trigger those different options. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me break it down into a couple 

of categories. One is managing the fleet of aircraft; and then the 

other is extending the service life for the legacy aircraft. 

In terms of managing the fleet, we look at several things that we 

have ongoing. One is we currently have in place what we refer to 

as TACAIR integration, Navy-Marine Corps, between respective 

services; squadrons both deployed on carriers and expeditionary, 

working the combined service to reduce the burden across the two, 

while separately working the pipeline of aircraft back stateside 

through depot training, et cetera. 

So there is a TACAIR integration piece that is in place today 

that provides a baseline for what our requirements are. And then 
39 

between the Marine Corps, which is referred to as a ‘‘bed-down 

plan’’ for Marine Corps TACAIR, and on the Navy side, the way 

the Navy introduces E and F squadrons to accelerate the introduction of E and F squadrons to replace F–18 legacy aircraft A- and 

C-type aircraft so that they can then go back into a depot pipeline 

for service life extension purposes. 

So there is a fleet management piece, and then on the service life 

extension piece, we have a series of ongoing efforts for the F–18 

that take it from what was originally a 6,000-hour aircraft, we 

have been able to extend its service life out to 8,000 hours through 

a number of sustainment efforts which, depending on what version 

of aircraft you are, that would define what your sustainment effort 

is. 

This would include things like center barrel replacements which 

you may be familiar with. It is a significant upgrade to the early 

version F–18s that will get it out to the 8,000-hour timeframe. But 

as well, to go from 8,000 hours up to 8,600 hours, there is a series 

of inspections that are required where we know what the aircraft 

hot spots are that are of interest. And so an inspection regimen has 

been established to give us confidence in taking the aircraft from 

8,000 out to 8,600 hours. 

So in earlier discussion regarding what the TACAIR shortfall is 

for the Department of the Navy, the baseline hours that go with 

the most recent number that was described, 177, is that we will be 

able to get the legacy F–18 aircraft out to 8,600 hours service life. 

The balance to get from—to drive down below 177 aircraft, that 

is where we need to go. The next step in terms of service life extension is to get it out to 10,000 hours. We have not started—the aircraft have not got to that point in their age and we have not started that SLEP program. That would be a 2012 issue in terms of 

starting to procure kits for inducting the aircraft into that service 

life extension program. 

And this—this SLEP program basically buys an additional 4 to 

5 years of service life on the legacy F–18 aircraft. What we have 

got to carefully determine is the extent of the SLEP. That effort is 

going on today to define the piece parts of the SLEP. 

Mr. SMITH. Sorry, I need to interrupt for just one quick minute. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Votes are on. We have got 15 minutes. We are going 

to use this full 15 minutes as much as possible to get to Mr. Taylor, 

Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Akin. And then it is going to be a good while 

before we can come back, and we will probably have to end the 

hearing at that point. 

So we are going to enter the speed round here, so if we could get 

through all three of those folks, given our time constraints, that 

would be great. 

Go ahead. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

The significant balance of service life extension is the foremost 

SLEP program, POM–12 issue with defining what it would contain 

today, that is everything from the technical details, starting to develop what I would call production-type of packages, and the cost 

estimates. 
40 

Then it is a matter of managing the throughput through the 

SLEP, and it is a significant matter of managing the throughputs 

through the SLEP so that we are not impacting the operational, 

the in-service aircraft by pulling too many aircraft out, but maintaining an efficient throughput at the depot. 

And then there is a timing issue. When we talk about the strike 

fighter shortfall, it is really a period of time from start to finish. 

The numbers that you have quoted are the peak in about a 2017 

timeframe. So what we would be doing is attacking that peak 

through the SLEP program. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If the F–35, like so many other programs, takes 

longer than any of us wants, do you have a backup plan to continue 

buying F–18Es and Fs? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We talked about the 124 aircraft that are 

in the program of record. That multi-year would be in fiscal year 

2010 through 2013 multi-year. So those production lines would remain hot. The front end of the production line would remain hot 

until about the 2013–2014 timeframe. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Lastly, to what extent—as you know, Mr. 

Bartlett and I are both adamant in that, if our Nation pays for 

some research, if our Nation pays to develop something, we ought 

to own those plans in case we ever need to buy parts for that engine, in case the supplier of that engine or whatever burns down, 

is destroyed by an act of God, act of man. 

To what extent are you insistent on—as you have done on the 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program—that we own the technical 

data package to the engine to the F–35? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The same question that you had 

asked Dr. Carter and had an opportunity to discuss a little bit with 

him during a break—there are two pieces to the technical data 

package. I will call it the paper or the electrons that come with 

form, fit, and function, dimensions, characteristics of the engine— 

those are all deliverables associated with the engine development. 

The part that I would say is proprietary—and we do owe you a 

formal response for the record—are processes that are unique in 

the case of the 130 engine and practices, techniques, and tooling 

that goes with those practices and processes for building that engine. 

So while we would own a technical data package that would suggest build-to-print, the processes that go with that—— 

Mr. SMITH. But you will own the specs of what each part in that 

engine looks like; is that correct 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will confirm that, but yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will get back to you formally for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 201.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. A quick question. Would this be adequate for competitive bidding, or would you need more? 
41 

Secretary STACKLEY. That is the concern is it is one thing to have 

a build-to-print drawing, but the processing and the manufacturing 

processes and tooling that go with that—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. But different manufacturers use different processes and tooling. My question is: Is what we own adequate to get 

competitive bidding? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I can’t give you a confident answer today, 

sir. I need to come back to you formally for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 202.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. We would appreciate that very much. 

Do you know how much it will cost to do the service-life extension on these legacy aircraft? And have you included that in the 

budget 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Just a simple—okay. If you have, that is fine. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Oh, no, no, no. Yes, sir, meaning I understand your question. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Service-life extension has many pieces to it. 

So the first part of service-life extension I am going to hit you with 

is the center-barrel replacement. That is late in the budget. There 

is north of a billion dollars for 421 aircraft we are already in process with. 

The second part is planning for the more extensive SLEP program, which takes the aircraft from 8,600 to 10,000 hours. We are 

in that planning phase. That is a POM–12 issue for the Department of the Navy. And in POM–12, we will take a look at not just 

the numbers of the aircraft that we are going to drive through the 

SLEP but the extent of the SLEP for the different versions of the 

aircraft. 

That gets you the airframe, as well, you want capability. So we 

also need to take a look at any upgrades that would be associated 

with an additional 5 years of service life for the F–18s. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. What kind of confidence do you have 

that you will be able to achieve adequate service-life extension? Or 

is this the only option left to you now that the 22 has been cancelled and the 35 is late? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I am going to tell you that we have significant confidence. Now, there is—I want to say—a business case 

that emerges as you go deeper and deeper into a SLEP program. 

In other words, as the aircraft get older, the sustainment cost increases. And when we look at the fleet of aircraft that are under 

consideration for SLEP, to attempt to do them all would not be a 

good—that is not an alternative that we would look at. 

So we have taken the A through D aircraft, and we have shrunk 

the potential aircraft down to the 150 to 280 range that we would 

drive through a SLEP. And that is the range that we will be looking at in POM–12. 

Mr. BARTLETT. One more quick question to which I just need a 

yes or a no answer. Looking at the deep strike heavy bomber, I 

note that the Chinese are able to take out a satellite. I note that 

we are able to take out a missile with a missile. This new airplane 

will fly lower than the satellite and slower than the missile. 
42 

It may be stealthy, sir, but it is still has a cross-sectional area. 

I am not sure that, in this new world that we are entering, that 

the juice is worth the squeezing in producing a new deep strike 

heavy bomber. I think that things may have changed. 

Can you include us in your decision process as to how we decide 

what we are going to do in that area? 

That is the only question I have. If the answer is yes, I am 

pleased. Thank you very much. 

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, I think so. And that goes back to General Breedlove’s discussion of the family assistance. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. I guess we have kind of maybe beat this dead horse 

and still haven’t gotten, really, an answer. I had a chance to see 

those F–18s being taken apart with the cracks in the wings and 

cracks in other parts. And it looks like a pretty tedious process, 

and the numbers saying it is a pretty expensive process. And it just 

seemed to me like common sense that you have got to compare one 

thing with the other and trying to pay a tremendous amount of 

money to get, you know, less than 10 percent more hours on the 

airframe when you can get a whole new airframe. 

And I guess my question is: Are you willing to do the cost analysis at least to compare those two alternatives? Right now, everything I have heard you say is, well, we are going to take a good 

look at taking the old ones and fixing them up. And compared to 

what? Well, compare it to—we are not going to say. 

You know, are we going to compare it to something? Is it a comparison to just not do it at all? Or is it a comparison to buying a 

new one? I have never heard anybody say that yet. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me first describe—the SLEP 

program, under all circumstances, we have got to get the SLEP 

program up, running, and producing. We cannot—when you take a 

look at a shortfall number of 177 aircraft in a 2017 timeframe, you 

cannot buy new out of that shortfall. 

In the economics of SLEP versus buying new, we look at—and 

we are doing the business-case analysis. We look at what it would 

cost to SLEP. And then there is a range of answers there depending on the material condition of the aircraft. So we have a bottom 

number, and we have an upper number. And we believe the answer 

is in between and it will vary by aircraft. 

And when you take that number and you compare it to what it 

would cost to buy new, there is a factor there. 

Mr. AKIN. So you will consider what it costs to buy new then 

when you do that analysis? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would tell you that our analysis—we have 

side-by-side with what a new F–18—the unit recurring fly-away 

cost is, and we can compare that versus what it costs to SLEP. The 

other factor that comes into play is what are we trying to resolve 

in terms of the shortfall. And it is a shortfall that extends from, 

you know, the peak of 2017 and it goes down towards zero in the 

2023 timeframe. 

So the SLEP program overlays that well. When we buy new, we 

are getting more hours, and we are getting those additional service 

hours in a period of time beyond when we have this shortfall. That 

is not a bad thing, but those extra dollars we pay for those extra 
43 

hours are coming away from, potentially, for example, a JSF program which gives us the capability in that timeframe that we believe—the added capability that we believe we need. 

Mr. AKIN. Of course, the SLEP is whatever it is—77 aircraft. The 

other hundred, you have still got the shortfall. So I mean, you 

could make a decision—I just haven’t heard anybody say—I mean, 

if you are going to cost compare, you have got to compare something to something. And it seems to me, to compare—especially if 

you are negotiating a multi-year, if I were a camel trader, I would 

say, well, okay; you give me this percent, what happens if we throw 

a couple more aircraft in, you know, for the negotiation. 

Just toss that out for your consideration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

We are out of time regrettably. I know members have more questions. There are some questions that we have prepared that we will 

submit to you and, for the record, we would like to reflect that. We 

appreciate any answers as quickly as you can get them to us. 

And, obviously, we have a deep interest in this subject matter, 

and we will continue to work with all of you on resolving the issues 

that were raised. 

Thank you. I appreciate your testimony and the questions from 

the members. And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 24, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 24, 2010 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 24, 2010 

(197) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 24, 2010 

(201) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Secretary CARTER. The DCMA Fighter Engine Industrial Capability Assessment 

(ICA) focused on the Industrial Base (IB) and specifically the long-term outlook for 

fighter engine development. DCMA strategic conclusions and recommendations from 

the ICA focused on the inherent risks and/or benefits to the IB of various fighter 

engine procurement scenarios. This included the impact to maintaining a competitive environment. The overall DoD decision to not continue funding of the F136 engine is based on a multitude of other factors that were not within the scope of the 

assessment requirements. The factors, which included budget/mission tradeoffs, acquisition risks, performance, supportability and overall life cycle cost were analyzed 

by the Government Accountability Office and the Cost Analysis Improvement 

Group, now Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation. Positive outlook for engine manufactures in 2008 was largely attributable to commercial and services business; 

however, this workload will only partially sustain specialized skills, processes, facilities and technologies required to design and develop next generation fighter engines. 

At the completion of F135 and F136 SDD programs, industry will be without a 

major fighter engine development program for the first time in over 35 years. This 

is regardless of production strategies. Strategic recommendation included defining 

and funding requirements for next generation engines. The benefits included retaining critical engineering skills and attracting new generation of engineers to refill the 

pipeline. 

Background 

The DCMA Fighter Engine ICA performed in 2008 focused on a limited data set 

and assumptions including existing employment, unique skill sets, competition and 

market forecast. The ICA requirements from the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition included assessing Fighter Engine capabilities at Pratt and Whitney 

(P&W), General Electric (GE) and Rolls Royce (RR), analysis of production scenarios 

at each contractor, market and economic assessment of the commercial and fighter 

engine industrial base and impacts of Research Development Test and Evaluation 

budgets. The production scenarios included F136 engine cancelled, F136 engine cancelled and increased quantities of F–22 engines and F136 reinstated with a JSF engine workload split. Risk was assessed based on the three production scenarios and 

design engineering, commercial engine production and fighter engine production in 

2008, 2012 and 2017. For decades, GE and P&W have had at least one new or derivative fighter engine under development. The ICA concluded that without the F136, 

GE’s unique Fighter Engine design capabilities would erode. This would impact the 

ability of GE to compete on future fighter/combat engine contacts. From a tactical 

level, the study recommended that F136 production is reinstated under FY 2006 

schedule. The ICA revealed that GE and RR were working on Adaptive Versatile 

Engine Technology (ADVENT), developing and demonstrating technologies for next 

generation engines. ADVENT and Highly Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine 

(HEETE) have been among the largest Science and Technology (S&T) efforts in the 

Air Force since 2007. The ICA concluded that ADVENT, HEETE, S&T, Tech Mat 

and Component Improvement Programs are not sufficient to sustain the engineering 

base for fighter engines long term. The ICA shows relatively little difference in outyear risk (2017), regardless of F135/136 engine sales, and revealed if new R&D efforts are not defined and launched at the Program level, design skills would be at 

risk at both GE and P&W. [See page 31.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Secretary CARTER. [The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics met with Representative Taylor on March 15, 2010, to discuss his concerns.] [See pages 21 and 22.] 

Secretary STACKLEY. Under the SDD contract we procured data rights to the majority of the technical data created in developing the engine. This includes rights 

to drawings and specifications. There is still a significant portion of the technical 

data for which we have limited rights. Although limited, these rights are suitable 
202 

for executing a sustainment strategy which includes standing up organic support for 

the F135 engine and components at government depots. Where warranted by business case analysis and consistent with the provisions of existing Memoranda of Understanding, the F–35 program will assess the merits of acquiring the technical data 

that would be required to compete sustainment of parts, components, or subsystems. 

[See page 40.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Secretary STACKLEY. In those cases where the government paid for the development of all the intellectual property contained in the drawing/specifications for an 

engine part, the government retains unlimited rights and could obtain competitive 

bidding. In those cases where the government did not pay for the development of 

all the intellectual property, which is a significant portion of the engine, we acquired 

only those rights needed to sustain the parts throughout their life cycles. The program office will continue to assess the value to the government of paying the substantial up-front costs to procure a competitive data package for engine parts in the 

event that the sustainment strategy needs to be updated based on fleet experience 

or a change in business conditions. 

In those cases where the government paid for the development of all the intellectual property contained in the drawings, specifications, and manufacturing processes for an engine part, the government retains unlimited rights. In those cases 

where the government did not pay for the development of all the intellectual property, which is a significant portion of the engine, we acquired only those rights needed to sustain the parts throughout their life cycles. The program office will continue 

to assess the value to the government of paying the substantial up-front costs to 

procure a competitive data package for engine parts in the event that the 

sustainment strategy needs to be updated based on fleet experience or a change in 

business conditions. 

Regarding tooling, the government paid for the design and procurement of most 

of the tools uniquely needed for manufacturing the F135 and therefore owns the 

special purpose tooling and rights thereto. General purpose tooling used on multiple 

product lines is owned by the manufacturer. [See page 41.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 24, 2010 

(205) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. In the letter of invitation for this hearing, the committee asked if 

there had been any fighter engine industrial base studies that had been completed 

by the Department or on behalf of the Department in the past five years of oneengine and two-engine F–35 programs. 

Your staff-provided response indicated that there have been no studies beyond the 

Department’s 2007 study prepared in response to a congressional requirement. 

Your staff was apparently not aware of a May 2008 Defense Contract Management Agency ‘‘Fighter Engine Industrial Capability Assessment’’ that recommended 

that F136 alternate engine production be reinstated under the fiscal year 2006 

schedule to provide for production deliveries in fiscal year 2010. As you are aware, 

fiscal year 2006 was the last year that the Department of Defense budgeted for the 

alternate engine. In your testimony you indicated you would like to have more than 

one military engine company in the U.S. The DCMA assessment indicates that the 

lack of a major engine development program threatens the survivability of the military engine industrial base after the development of the F135, regardless of whether 

the F136 is funded: At completion of the F–35 SDD program, the F–35 engine manufacturers ‘‘will be without a major fighter engine development program for the first 

time in over 35 years.’’ What is the policy of the Department with regard to maintaining a competitive high performance-low observable engine industrial base and 

what FYDP plan and funding does the Department have to support the Department’s policy? What is your view of the military engine industrial base’s ability to 

develop and produce affordable low-observable high performance engines in a competitive environment absent the F136 program? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. As you know, section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for FY 2008 directed the Department to ensure the ‘‘obligation and expenditure in 

each fiscal year of sufficient annual amounts for the continued development and 

procurement of two options for the propulsion system for the Joint Strike Fighter.’’ 

How do you and the OSD General Counsel view the Department’s conformance 

with section 213 by not including funds in the budget request for a competitive JSF 

engine? 

What is the status of fiscal years 2009 and 2010 procurement and RDT&E appropriated funds specifically directed to the alternate engine? Has the Department 

withheld funding? Why and what are the plans for use of the withheld money? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What has been the impact of funding withholds and uncertain future 

funding on the second engine contractor? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The committee remains concerned that the Department is not complying with the intent of Congress and existing statute in the execution of the F136 

program. The Department’s continued failure to execute authorized and appropriated funding for the F136 makes management of the program unnecessarily difficult and ultimately more expensive for the Department. 

Congress authorized and appropriated $35 million in each of fiscal years 2009 and 

2010 for F135 advance procurement, as specified by the F–35 Joint Program Office 

as the amount needed and executable for the F135 program. The Department later 

determined that procurement funds in fiscal years were premature to need. Given 

the clear intent of Congress to proceed with the alternate engine, why has the Department not reprogrammed the $70 million for alternate engine development? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. As you know, the Department has a LRIP standard of ten percent of 

total production, yet determined in 2001, long before the major delays in the program, that exceeding the ten percent standard was warranted. The procurement 

profile currently planned would result in Congress being required to authorize a cu-
206 

mulative 550 F–35s in 2015, one year before the milestone C decision, for the highest year of annual production in 2016 of any year in the JSF program. What should 

determine LRIP annual and cumulative production rates prior to milestone C, the 

production facility’s ability to produce airplanes or the progress of flight testing? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Affordable life-cycle operating and support costs are a key tenet of the 

JSF program goals. It is critically important that the U.S. and international partners be able to afford future O&S bills. The estimate in the new SAR shows O&S 

costs per flying hour are materially higher than current costs for the F–16, one of 

the aircraft it is to replace. 

Wasn’t the JSF supposed to cost less per flying hour than the aircraft it is replacing? What are the implications and impacts on future budgets if costs are materially 

higher than those for legacy systems? 

What factors are driving increased life cycle cost estimates? 

We understand that the Naval Air Systems Command is projecting even higher 

O&S costs than the program. How much more? What are the key reasons why the 

NAVAIR estimate is higher? Do you agree or disagree with NAVAIR? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Regarding the history of the F135 and F136 test delays due to engine 

anomalies during testing, for each significant finding during SDD testing, please: 1) 

describe the engine anomaly, 2) describe length of delay for redesign/repair, 3) provide the cost impact to the program as a result of this delay, and 4) provide the 

weight growth impact as a result of the necessary modifications to fix the anomaly. 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. In your statement you note that Secretary Gates directed the procurement of an additional carrier version to be used for flight testing, and that three 

early production jets planned for operational test would be loaned to developmental 

test. Of the three early production jets to be loaned to development test, what is 

the model of the aircraft (ie. A, B, or C) that the Joint Estimating Team II recommended, and what model is the Joint Program Office executing for this purpose? 

If they are different, why are they different? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Is ‘‘business case’’ defined anywhere in Department regulations or directives? Is there a requirement as to what the content is for a business case analysis? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. With your statement you attached an enclosure 1 classified in its entirety as ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ and ‘‘Competition Sensitive-Company Proprietary.’’ 

Please provide an updated copy of this document that identifies which paragraphs 

are ‘‘For Official Use Only,’’ ‘‘Competition Sensitive-Company Proprietary,’’ or unclassified. 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Fox, your recent analysis of the alternate engine program shows 

that, on a net present value basis, life-cycle costs to go are the same for either a 

one-engine or two-engine program. DOD’s 2007 alternate engine study considered 

the non-financial factors of a two-engine program, including a hedge against risks 

in development and production, enhanced contractor responsiveness, technological 

innovation, and a more robust industrial base. In your latest analysis, what value 

did you ascribe to these non-financial factors? Why wouldn’t a two-engine F–35 program be the best value since the costs to go for either option are the same? 

Ms. FOX. OSD–CAPE did not assign a value to possible long-term aspirational 

nonfinancial factors in its 2010 update analysis. Rather, OSD–CAPE’s analysis considered the tangible near-term factors that yield a savings in the short term. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Fox, in your statement you note that CAPE concluded that the 

competitive procurement of F136 engines would now begin in 2017, three years later 

than the 2014 date assumed in prior analyses. Last year, the Joint Program Office 

noted a requirement for long-lead procurement funding so that engines could be procured in 2011 with a competition in 2014. What has changed about the F136 program that you now believe there is a three year delay? What information otherwise 

do you base your recommendation on to delay competitive procurement to 2017? 

Why is there necessarily a correlation between F–35 aircraft program delays and 

the ability of the F–35 aircraft program to test F136 engines? How many months 
207 

delay in the F136 program do you attribute primarily to the delay in the F–35 aircraft program? 

Ms. FOX. With the restructured program, the engine competition will slide to 2017 

because additional time is necessary for: (1) completing the development program, 

i.e., SDD, for the alternate engine; (2) funding an engine component improvement 

program to maintain engine currency; (3) performing directed buys of engines from 

the primary and second sources to prepare for a competition, and (4) procuring tooling, support equipment, and spares. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Fox, the Department concurred with GAO’s recommendation in 

their recent report that DOD complete a full independent and comprehensive cost 

estimate for the JSF program. We understand that your CAPE team is continuing 

its good work. What is the status of the CAPE’s work and the schedule for completing it? Will the new estimate be in the December 2009 Selected Acquisition Report? Military construction costs have been seriously under-estimated in past F–35 

SARs. Past SARs projected MILCON from $0.5–$2 billion. Are you making a new 

projection of MILCON? Will it be in the December 2009 SAR? Do you have an idea 

on the order of magnitude of a more complete estimate? What about JSF-related expenses that are not funded through the program? Is your CAPE team looking at potential requirements such as strengthening and heat-shielding carrier decks? What 

about costs for reconfiguring carrier storage and servicing space and special facilities, support equipment, command and control systems for deployed JSF units? Are 

any of these already programmed for funding in the FYDP? What and how much? 

Are there initial projections for these kinds of costs and when they will be needed 

in the budget? 

Ms. FOX. OSD–CAPE will assess MILCON and other JSF-related costs in the program, in accordance with the Nunn-McCurdy certification review, which is scheduled to be complete on 1 Jun 2010. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) is better able to answer 

questions related to the 2009 SAR, which was released on 6 Apr 2010. OSD–CAPE 

will conduct an independent cost analysis of the JSF program in accordance with 

the Nunn-McCurdy certification review. This analysis will conclude on or before 1 

Jun 2010, with a new program baseline (including an estimate of MILCON costs) 

to be provided sometime in the summer. The SAR, published on 6 Apr 2010 does 

not reflect this work. The OSD–CAPE Nunn-McCurdy analysis will not include nonprogram-related costs, e.g., heat shielding. These are potential Service-specific requirements that, if required, will be funded by the Services. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Fox, on the F135 and F136 engine, assuming fully funding the 

respective contractors at a dollar level that can be productively executed, what 

would be the required funding, in then-year dollars, by appropriation, for fiscal year 

2011 and in total for the remainder of the future years defense program, (A) To complete development (B) To prepare for competitive procurement (C) And in what year 

would competition be possible? 

Ms. FOX. OSD–CAPE estimates that $2.9 billion is required through FY 16 to prepare the alternate engine for competition starting in FY 17. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Fox, what was the CAIG’s estimated total cost ($TY), by fiscal 

year, for SDD, procurement, and operation and maintenance funding required for 

both the F135 and F136 engines when the 2007 study was accomplished (actual 

through 2006 and projected thereafter) and for the February 2010 provided update 

the CAPE’s estimated total cost ($TY) for SDD, procurement, and operation and 

maintenance funding, by fiscal year, as currently projected (actual through 2009, 

projected thereafter) for both the F135 and F136 engines? Also, how much of the 

recently determined additional $2.9 billion (to take the F136 program to competition 

in 2017) was included in the 2007 study? If the amounts are higher in the 2010 

analysis, please explain why. 

Ms. FOX. Because question #40 contains two questions, the answers are provided 

in two parts. 

Proposed Response: The Joint Strike Fighter Alternative Engine Acquisition and 

Independent Cost Analyses report prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group in 2007 was prepared in accordance with 

Section 211 of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109–364). The 

statute required preparation of a life-cycle cost estimate. The results of the life-cycle 

cost computations are captured in the following two tables extracted directly from 

the original report. The first table, Table 4 in the original report, shows the costs 

for an F135 only program except for the sunk costs which consists of both F135 and 

F136 funding through FY 2007. 
208 

The second table, Table 5 in the original report, shows the estimated life-cycle 

cost savings associated with competition. 

This life-cycle cost analysis prepared in the FY 2007 report, as specified in law, 

required the estimation and integration of the total development, procurement, and 

operating and support costs over the anticipated life-cycle of the JSF aircraft program. As a result, no breakouts of costs by fiscal year or by appropriation were prepared during the preparation of the FY 2007 report. 

A more recent ‘‘quick update’’ to the 2007 analysis, prepared in February 2010, 

updated two specific areas of SDD costs estimated in the FY 2007 report. First, 

‘‘sunk costs’’ were updated to include the additional appropriations, through FY 

2010, that had been directed by Congress for development of the F136 alternative 

engine. Second, the SDD costs to go were updated based on more recent actual cost 

information from both engine development programs. These changes were incorporated as changes to the original life cycle cost estimates from the 2007 report. Accordingly, breakouts by fiscal year or by appropriation are not available from this 

analysis. 

A revised version of the two tables (i.e., Tables 4 and 5 in the 2007 report) is 

shown below. As expected, the 2010 ‘‘quick update’’ indicates that a competitive engine acquisition strategy becomes slightly more attractive in an economic sense than 

the 2007 analysis. 
209 

2nd question: 

Also, how much of the recently determined additional $2.9 billion (to take the 

F136 program to competition in 2017) was included in the 2007 study? If the 

amounts are higher in the 2010 analysis, please explain why. 

Proposed Response: It is important to note that $2.9B estimate of FY 2011–16 

funding requirements is distinct from the 2007 acquisition study and the 2010 quick 

update analysis described above. Each of these analyses were built on different sets 

of assumptions and accomplished for different purposes. The 2010 $2.9B budget estimate was computed to provide an estimate of the annual funding requirements of 

an alternate engine program in FY 2011–16. It is based on what we believe to be 

the most current program assumptions with respect to aircraft quantities and when 

an engine competition can reasonably be expected to occur. Conversely, the 2007 

study was intended as a more broadly-based, life-cycle, comparative analysis between two alternative acquisition strategies for the JSF propulsion system. The 

2007 study was based on program assumptions current at the time but which have 

since changed. The purpose of the 2007 study was not to provide the foundation for 

short-term budget estimates, but rather to give insight into the relative costs and 

benefits of a single vs competitive source acquisition strategy over a program lifecycle, in accordance with the statutory requirements specified in the 2007 NDAA. 

It is therefore not possible to do an ‘‘apples to apples’’ comparison between the 2007 

acquisition study and the 2010 $2.9B budget estimate. 

There is, however, some overlap in methodologies between the two analyses. The 

2010 $2.9B budget analysis includes the cost to complete development of the F136 

engine; the cost to initiate and continue a component improvement program for the 

alternate engine; the cost to procure alternate engines; and costs to provide for the 

tooling, spares and initial sustainment of the alternate engine. It also includes the 

effects of reduced production efficiencies since the buy would be split over two contractors vice one and neither contractor is able to proceed down a learning curve 

as quickly with smaller quantities. Many of these same costs were explicitly or implicitly accounted for in the 2007 acquisition strategy analysis. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, in your December 2009 report on the F–35 program, you 

found that continued production concurrent with the slow increase in flight test over 

the next two years will commit the DOD and Services to testing, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk. Do you think that this risk has been eliminated with the removal of 122 F–35s in the future years defense program? Would 

reducing the budget request of 43 aircraft for fiscal year 2011 reduce risks further? 

Dr. GILMORE. The removal of aircraft in LRIP lots 5 through 9 has reduced but 

not eliminated the risk to the Services of procuring systems that may need significant modifications resulting from discoveries made during flight test, which, at this 

point, is approximately 3 percent complete. LRIP 5, the lot funded in FY11, includes 

4 IOT&E aircraft, 26 initial training aircraft, and 13 aircraft for other purposes. The 

numbers and delivery schedule for the IOT&E and initial training aircraft should 

not be changed; otherwise, the risks of concurrent development, testing and production would increase. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, the F–35 test program relies to an unprecedented degree 

on modeling, simulation, and similar tools to achieve test requirements normally 

achieved through flight testing. Are you confident in this approach to flight testing 

strategy? How many of these models are there and have they been accredited or 

validated? Is there a need for a backup strategy or is it just a matter of adding 

flight tests? If so, how many additional flight tests would be required to substitute 

for the current flight testing surrogates in the program? 
210 

Dr. GILMORE. There are 28 models and simulations in the JSF modeling and simulation accreditation plans, several of which will be accredited multiple times 

throughout System Design and Demonstration as systems are upgraded (40 total accreditations). The program office has accomplished three accreditations so far, ten 

more accreditations are planned before the end of 2010. It is my understanding that 

the contractor and program office plan to use flight test data during validation of 

the models without dedicating specific flight test missions for this purpose. Although 

possible, it remains to be seen to what degree this will occur and if the models can 

achieve accreditation. The progress made during the next 18 months in actually executing current plans in both the flight testing and model accreditation will be critical to improving my confidence in the development team’s ability to accredit and 

use all the models as planned. The overall flight test program was reduced approximately 4,000 flight test hours when program management changed the test strategy 

to use the labs/models as verification venues. Since then, the flight test plan has 

increased by approximately 1,300 total flight test hours. The difference potentially 

establishes an upper bound for the estimate of additional flight testing needed 

should the labs/models not be accredited. Given the importance of the labs/models, 

the program needs to at least explicitly plan for the flight testing needed to validate 

and accredit them as test venues. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, in comparison with prior defense systems, the JSF development testing will depend much more heavily on ground test labs and computer 

simulations. Are you comfortable with both the in-place resources to do this and 

with this approach in general? How will DOD validate and verify results from test 

venues other than flight tests? 

Dr. GILMORE. The process relies heavily on being able to gather adequate numbers of subject matter experts from within the program office and the services to 

evaluate the validation and accreditation data generated by the contractor team. I 

am concerned about the tempo of validation and accreditation activity that a small 

government team must manage, and the schedule pressure that is likely to occur. 

I am also concerned that the program schedule is predicated heavily on the expectation that modeling and simulation validation efforts will usually be successful on the 

first attempt. That is, I’m concerned that time has not been incorporated within the 

schedule to accommodate the need to fix flaws with models and simulations (M&S) 

that are discovered during the validation process. Historically, the discovery of M&S 

flaws during validation is fairly typical. In the DOT&E FY 2009 annual report, I 

recommended that verification, validation and accreditation of models be subject to 

disciplined government oversight and undergo an independent review. Independent 

review is necessary to assure that verification, validation, and accreditation is rigorous. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, you note that a recent operational assessment determined that the program is on track to achieve operational effectiveness requirements, but not operational suitability requirements. Do you believe the program is 

now taking the right actions to address meeting operational suitability requirements? 

Dr. GILMORE. The Operational Assessment highlighted the need for significant 

work to improve the suitability of all JSF variants before entering IOT&E. Some 

design changes are being proposed and reviewed by the development team, such as 

altering the Autonomic Logistics Information System to enable it to support unit deployments from both main and forward operation locations. My understanding is 

that aircraft design changes are also being considered to address the surface compatibility and external environment effects (such as thermal damage to operating 

surfaces and downwash impact to equipment and personnel) included in the basing 

issues identified in the operational assessment. Sortie generation rate and logistics 

footprint are two contract specifications that will not be validated by flight test data 

before operational test. Performance affecting these requirements, such as reliability 

and maintainability, need to be closely monitored during developmental and operational flight test to confirm the predicted performance is being achieved. Internal 

cooling of JSF aircraft subsystems is also an area that requires continued monitoring of performance as flight test progresses. A change to the design of the fuel 

boost pump is planned for LRIP aircraft to address this problem. Data on the actual 

performance of the JSF thermal management systems in mission systems flight test 

aircraft and production aircraft are needed to confirm this modification fully addresses the problem. The suitability of the weapons system in all of its required 

operational environments needs to be carefully and continuously tracked by the Department as flight test progresses. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, what is your general assessment of the state of development testing and system maturity? Based on current test plans and schedules, do 
211 

you expect DT&E to be sufficiently advanced and robust to allow scheduled initiation of initial operational testing? 

Dr. GILMORE. The re-structure of the JSF program provides the opportunity to 

conduct the robust developmental testing that is a pre-requisite of successful 

IOT&E. With only 3 percent of developmental flight testing complete, the system 

is not yet mature. The first combat capability is not available until Block 2 is delivered in 2012. We are in the process of reviewing the details of the new integrated 

test plan. The need for a number of resource commitments has been identified. Initiating IOT&E of Block 3 capability in accordance with the most recent plan depends 

on providing those resources, delivering the test aircraft to the test centers, and 

timely delivery of effective mission systems software. The re-structured program 

provides the opportunity for these needs to be met. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, how many F–35 aircraft are needed to complete Initial 

Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) in 2016, and how does that number compare with the Department’s low-rate initial production (LRIP) plan? Should there 

be some correlation between the number of aircraft required to complete IOT&E and 

the LRIP plan? 

Dr. GILMORE. Eighteen aircraft, six from each variant, are needed to conduct the 

Block 3 IOT&E, which are procured in LRIP lots 3, 4, and 5. An additional 53 US 

aircraft are planned for initial training at the Eglin training center. Aircraft in addition to these 53 will be needed to support achievement of the Marine Corps, Navy, 

and Air Force initial operational capabilities. LRIP quantities do not need to be limited to IOT&E and training assets. In addition to those purposes, Title 10 also identifies establishing an initial production base and permitting an orderly increase in 

the production rate for the system sufficient to lead to full rate production after successful completion of operational testing as justification for LRIP. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, your report states that ‘‘the mission capability of the 

LRIP systems is unclear.’’ Could you please amplify this statement and how it impacts your testing plans as well as the Services’ initial operational capability plans. 

Dr. GILMORE. The capability that will actually be available when each LRIP aircraft leaves the production line depends on the progress of flight testing. The LRIP 

lot contracts predict based on current plans what that capability will be. However, 

flight testing yields the data used to generate the flight clearances and certifications 

needed by the operational testers, trainers, and fleet pilots to know what flight envelope and mission systems capabilities they will be able to use. Successful deliveries of software providing maintenance capability will also determine the combat 

capability that will be available. Thus, the development and implementation of a realistic, executable test and schedule—which the re-structure enables—is key to providing a clear understanding of the capability provided by LRIP aircraft. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, your report identifies eight important recommendations 

dating back to FY 2007 that have not yet been addressed. Are you expecting action 

on those recommendations? When? Your 2009 report makes additional recommendations. What 1 or 2 are most crucial in your mind and when are these expected to 

be implemented? Overall, how responsive have the JPO and contractors been to 

your team’s efforts? 

Dr. GILMORE. The DOT&E FY09 Annual Report stated that satisfactory progress 

had been made on 11 of 19 recommendations from FY06 through FY08. Four of the 

recommendations concern vulnerability issues and suggest design changes which 

have not been made. It is my understanding that space is available for some of 

these changes pending review of full-up system-level vulnerability test results. The 

remaining four recommendations concern resourcing a realistic test plan. The detailed integrated test review of the restructured test plan, which is in progress now, 

is intended to reveal resource issues that need to be addressed to execute the test 

plan. Adequately building up and maintaining resources at the two test centers 

(Edwards AFB and Patuxent River NAS) in accordance with the expectations for 

flight testing is the most crucial recommendation and I expect that recommendation 

to be implemented by the program’s new leader. The JPO and contracting team 

have been willing to listen to DOT&E observations, provide responses to questions 

and access to information. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore, Clearly, F–35 production will far exceed what is needed 

for operational test and evaluation and the 10 percent standard for low rate initial 

production before initial operational test and evaluation is completed in 2016. The 

path the program is on will result in funding for the highest rate of production of 

any other year in the program in 2016 before the full rate production decision is 

even made. The F–35 contractor argues that the production should be increased, 

stating that it is cheaper to modify airplanes than incur the inefficiencies of lower 

rate production. Please comment. What are your views? 
212 

Dr. GILMORE. The level of concurrency in the program creates high risk until 

flight test demonstrates the performance of the system and operational test confirms the required capability is resident in the system without extensive modifications to the aircraft. Numerous re-design efforts are already underway for all three 

variants. I cannot predict the potential costs of future modifications, but historical 

experience indicates that the sooner in development problems are discovered, the 

easier and less expensive it is to fix them. 

Mr. SMITH. In your statement you say the JSF problems were foreseeable. What 

has been the primary cause of the poor cost and schedule outcomes to date? Have 

the problems been adequately rectified in your view? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We believe the proximate cause of the JSF program’s continuing 

cost and schedule problems can be traced to an acquisition strategy and subsequent 

decisions at key junctures that did not adequately follow the best practices we have 

documented in successful commercial firms and government programs. From the 

start, the JSF acquisition strategy incorporated excessive concurrency, or overlap, 

in development, testing, and production activities increasing risks of poor cost, 

schedule, and performance outcomes. Purchasing aircraft before technologies are 

ready and testing successfully demonstrates that designs are mature and systems 

will perform as intended increases the likelihood and impact of design, manufacturing, and requirements changes resulting in subsequent cost growth, delivery 

delays, and performance shortfalls. In the JSF’s case, the program started system 

development before requisite technologies were ready, started manufacturing test 

aircraft before designs were stable, and moved to production before flight tests have 

adequately demonstrated that the aircraft design meets performance and operational suitability requirements. The late release of engineering drawings resulted 

in a cascading of problems to establish a mature supplier base and manufacturing 

processes, which in turn led to late parts deliveries, inefficient manufacturing processes, and delays in delivering test aircraft. 

Although we note some improvements in the supplier base and reduced out of station work, the impacts from these problems have persisted and are still contributing 

to poor program outcomes. Manufacturing labor hours have continued to increase, 

management reserves have been depleted, and test aircraft have been delivered late, 

contributing to delays in development testing. Poor decisions exacerbated the situation. In late 2007, DOD decided to cut two test aircraft and accelerate the reduction 

in contractor engineering staff in order to replenish management reserves. We disagreed with this plan because the reduction in test assets was not tenable and because the problems causing reserves to be depleted had not first been identified and 

fixed. We also determined that the official program cost estimate was not reliable 

and was understated, and we recommended that a new comprehensive and independent cost estimate through completion of the program be accomplished. DOD disagreed. Since that time, management reserves were again depleted and the Joint 

Estimating Team (JET) determined that program office cost and schedule estimates 

were understated and overly optimistic. The recently announced restructure extends 

the time for testing, and adds back in one test aircraft while providing for the use 

of three production aircraft to supplement development flight testing. Also, due to 

the program’s recent critical Nunn-McCurdy breach, a comprehensive independent 

cost estimate is being prepared. We support the restructure and expect it to improve 

program outcomes in the future, but concurrency is still excessive. The Department 

now plans to procure up to 307 aircraft costing $58.2 billion before completing development testing. Also, the Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) identified major improvements needed to achieve planned production rates and the F135 

Joint Assessment Team (JAT) noted substantial engine cost growth and opportunities to reduce costs; these improvements will require funding and will need time to 

implement and take effect. 

Mr. SMITH. In past reports, the GAO has been critical of the level of concurrency 

in the program with development, test, and production. Do the actions being taken 

as part of the restructure alleviate your concerns? If so why? If not, why not? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The restructure ordered several positive actions, including increasing funding and extending the schedule to complete system development, adding 4 

more development test assets, and reducing near-term procurement. We think these 

and other actions, if effectively implemented, will improve program outcomes, but 

only marginally lessen concurrency. Restructure-related improvements are geared to 

specific functions and do not directly impact the acquisition strategy and concurrency among functions. There is still substantial overlap of development, test, 

and production activities now stretching another 21⁄2 years to April 2016. Even with 

the reduced near-term procurement quantities, the program is still planning to procure as many as 307 aircraft costing $58.2 billion before development flight testing 

is completed. Purchasing aircraft before testing successfully demonstrates that the 
213 

designs are mature and that the weapon system will work as intended increases the 

likelihood and impact of design, manufacturing, and requirements changes resulting 

in subsequent cost growth, delivery delays, and performance shortfalls. 

Mr. SMITH. In your statement and in the past you have been concerned about 

DOD’s use of cost-reimbursement contracts for procurement of low rate initial production. Last year’s report recommended that DOD report to Congress plans to mitigate risks and migrate to fixed price contracts. Why is the program using these 

types of contracts and what are the risks? Does the restructuring adequately address these concerns for now? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The first 3 low-rate production lots are on cost reimbursement contracts, evidently because the knowledge about the JSF design, production processes, 

and costs for labor and material were not yet sufficiently mature and pricing information not yet exact enough for the contractor to assume the risk under a fixedprice contract. Cost reimbursement contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. Cost contracts place most of 

the risk on the buyer—DOD in this case— who is liable to pay more than budgeted 

should labor, material, or other incurred costs be more than expected when the contract was signed. 

The February 24, 2010, JSF program restructure acquisition decision memorandum and related actions direct several positive steps concerning JSF development and low rate procurement contracts. DOD withheld some award fees on the 

development contract and directed revision of the contract structure with the intent 

to reward measurable progress and improved cost and schedule performance compared to the program plan. The decision memorandum also states that future aircraft and engine production contracts should move to fixed-price incentive fee structures as soon as possible. Supplementary information provided us by the Defense 

Director of Portfolio Systems Acquisition discussed (1) possibility of awarding a fixed 

price contract as early as LRIP lot 4 (fiscal year 2010 procurement) and (2) establishment of a Should Cost team to inform negotiation of a fixed price contract for 

LRIP 5 (fiscal year 2011 procurement). While the restructuring did reduce nearterm procurement and establish critical business measure to move to fixed price 

contacts as soon as possible, until fixed price LRIP contracts are negotiated between 

DOD and the prime contractor, the government is still bearing most of the cost risk. 

Mr. SMITH. In the GAO’s F–35 report, you asked Congress to consider a matter 

that asks the Department to submit a tool or ‘‘system maturity matrix’’ for better 

measuring program progress in maturing the weapon system. What is your vision 

of this tool and how do you expect this to help the Congress in its annual deliberation of JSF’s budget request? Has such a tool been used previously and with what 

impact? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congress had similar concerns concerning the concurrency on the 

B–2 program and planned investment in procurement aircraft prior to fully testing 

the aircraft. Congress enacted legislation to control B–2 procurement decisions and 

require the Department to deliver assurances prior to procurement of additional B– 

2s. A key tool was a ‘‘full performance matrix’’ that Congress required DOD to develop and which identified minimum conditions that would be met before making 

annual procurements. The full performance matrix laid out over time how different 

capabilities for the B–2 would be demonstrated in relationship to procurement decisions. Such a tool helped provide visibility for decisionmakers into a program’s 

progress in ensuring the maturity of the weapon system based on expected demonstrated knowledge against a baseline plan thus allowing for more informed investment decisions, and better managed risks of that inherit with a highly concurrent 

development and production program. 

Appendix 1 is a suggested system maturity matrix for the JSF that could be used 

to track annual progress versus plans. Congress could apply the matrix in its annual deliberations on whether to approve, add to, reduce, or restrict the Department’s annual procurement requests. The matrix provides criteria and conditions for 

comparing documented results by year to expected progressive levels of demonstrated weapon system maturity in relationship to planned increases in annual 

future procurement quantities. This matrix should explain how increasing levels of 

demonstrated, quantifiable knowledge about the weapon system maturity at annual 

procurement decision points justify ramp up of procurement quantities, and corresponding increasing funding needs, leading up to full-rate procurement. 

Mr. SMITH. As you know the DOD is requesting funding for 43 aircraft (including 

one for overseas contingency operations) in its FY 2011 budget request, an increase 

of 13 aircraft from last year. Does GAO feel the aircraft system is at a maturity 

point that justifies such an increase? Why or why not? What are the risks? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Considering the increased costs, extended development schedule, 

and corrective actions directed, but not yet implemented, by the recent restructuring 
214 

and the Nunn-McCurdy breach announcement, we believe that a significant ramp 

up in production is not warranted at this time. Increased manufacturing labor 

hours, parts problems, continuing design changes, and late deliveries indicate that 

design and manufacturing processes may lack the maturity needed to efficiently 

produce aircraft at planned rates. As of January 2010, only 4 test aircraft had been 

delivered and the first two production aircraft—ordered in 2007—are expected to be 

delivered later this fall. DOD has already bought 28 production aircraft through fiscal year 2009. Under the current plan, DOD proposes increasing production rates 

by 163 percent from fiscal year 2011 to 2015. DOD wants to buy as many as 307 

aircraft at a total estimated cost of $58.2 billion before development flight testing 

is completed. However, at the same time, it has not been successful in meeting demonstration goals and testing schedules to support increases in production investments, placing billions of dollars at risk as it develops and produces aircraft concurrently. We have reported in the past on several occasions about the risks of producing aircraft before testing demonstrates the design is mature, costs are well understood, and manufacturing activities can support the ramp up in production. As 

the JSF’s program development and test program slips, it further increases the 

chances that costly design changes will surface in the later years of flight testing. 

Reducing fiscal year 2011 procurement would lessen the steep ramp rate and provide the program with more time to implement recommendations made by the Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) commissioned last year to assess the 

program’s manufacturing capabilities and production plans. The IMRT notes that to 

reach the planned production levels, new production transition, risk mitigation, and 

supplier support plans are needed. Without such improvements, there is significant 

risk that the prime contractor will not produce planes according to plan and a backlog of production aircraft will develop. Considering the program’s relatively slow test 

progress and manufacturing performance, procuring less aircraft in fiscal year 2011 

would also better align the manufacturing and testing schedules without unduly disrupting the program. We have submitted Budget Justification Fact Sheets recommending the reduction of 7 total JSF aircraft out of the fiscal year 2011 procurement buy (Two aircraft from each Service’s regular budget request and one aircraft 

from the Air Force’s OCO request.) 

Mr. SMITH. How confident is the GAO that the program will not encounter future 

cost and schedule perturbations? What things should Congress watch as indicators 

that the program is on track to deliver on cost and schedule moving forward? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The program will likely continue to experience cost increases and 

schedule delays despite the recent restructuring’s positive steps. There remains substantial overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD continues 

to push ahead and invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant 

designs are proven and system performance verified. Also, DOD is repricing the procurement program through completion in 2035; this is expected to significantly increase future funding requirements. In addition, the IMRT and JAT identified numerous improvements needed in airframe and engine production, respectively, with 

associated costs and schedule impacts. Further, manufacturing inefficiencies will 

likely prevent the program from meeting the substantial increase in annual procurement quantities until certain steps are taken. Indicators for Congress to focus on 

include (1) test progress as measured by the number of flight test sorties completed, 

flight test hours, and test point burn down; and (2) scheduled versus actual delivery 

of test and production aircraft. 

Mr. SMITH. Members of Congress are perturbed about a general lack of access to 

JSF program information and the Department’s late announcement of cost and 

schedule problems resulting in a major restructuring and Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

How has your access been? In particular, to what extent have you and your team 

had timely visibility into efforts such as the JET, JAT, and IMRT in the past year? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The team generally had poor visibility into the independent reviews conducted by the Joint Estimating Team (JET), Independent Manufacturing 

Assessment Team (IMRT), and the F135 Engine Joint Assessment Team (JAT) until 

very late. We made repeated requests for this information starting in November 

2009, but was not briefed and provided supporting documentation by DOD until 

February 25, 2010. This occurred while our draft report was in processing and we 

ended up delaying issuance by one week, in part, so we could provide more current 

and accurate information about these important reviews. We did not, however, have 

sufficient time to do the necessary follow-up work and analysis to fully evaluate the 

reviews and their significance to the JSF program. We plan to do this during our 

next review starting soon. 

Mr. SMITH. On the F135 and F136 engine, assuming fully funding the respective 

contractors at a dollar level that can be productively executed, what would be the 
215 

1 Refer to GAO–10–478T for details on the scope and methodology of our analysis. 

required funding, in then-year dollars, by appropriation, for fiscal year 2011 and in 

total for the remainder of the future years defense program, 

• To complete development 

• To prepare for competitive procurement 

• And in what year would competition be possible? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. For our engine cost analysis, we did not conduct an independent 

cost estimate to include the required funding for the F135 and F136 and our analysis was not intended to provide a definitive estimate of the total government funding requirement to execute the F135 and F136 programs. The cost analysis was intended to provide a reasonable cost comparison for the completion of system development and demonstration, engine recurring flyaway costs, production support and, 

sustainment on sole source basis and under two different competitive scenarios. It 

was also intended to provide a reasonable estimate of the level savings needed to 

recoup the additional costs of competition given certain assumptions. It was based 

on the best information we had available at the time we conducted our analysis in 

March 2010.1 For our analysis, we assumed that competitive procurement would 

begin in fiscal year 2015. This aligns with the completion of the JSF aircraft program development flight test program and would start the competition with the last 

low-rate initial production aircraft buy. 

Table 1 and 2 below provide the estimated costs we used in our updated analysis 

for the sole source scenario and the additional estimated costs (converted to then 

year dollars) to execute the competitive scenarios (50/50 and 70/30 split of total engine purchases to either contractor) for Fiscal Year 2011 and for the periods Fiscal 

Year 2012 to 2015, respectively. It is important to note that the cost analysis presented in our March 2010 testimony was presented in constant fiscal year 2002 dollars. 

Mr. SMITH. Clearly, F–35 production will far exceed what is needed for operational test and evaluation and the 10 percent standard for low rate initial production before initial operational test and evaluation is completed in 2016. The path 

the program is on will result in funding for the highest rate of production of any 

other year in the program in 2016 before the full rate production decision is even 
216 

2 Rand Corporation, Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons 

(Santa Monica, California, 2004). 

made. The F–35 contractor argues that the production should be increased, stating 

that it is cheaper to modify airplanes than incur the inefficiencies of lower rate production. Please comment. What are your views? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Although officials recently reduced near-term procurement plans, 

DOD still plans significant investments in procuring large quantities of JSF aircraft 

before flight testing proves they will perform as required. We believe this strategy 

contains risk for further cost growth resulting from design changes uncovered from 

flight testing. The cost of discovering design problems during production could be 

significant if testing shows that large, structural components of the aircraft require 

modifications. Design changes needed in one variant could also ripple through the 

other two variants, reducing efficiencies necessary to lower production and operational costs with common parts and manufacturing processes for the three 

variants. The intent of development flight testing is to discover and fix design and 

performance deficiencies during development when it is cheaper to do so than discovering problems and shortfalls during follow-on operational testing and after initial fielding. Purchasing aircraft before testing successfully demonstrates that the 

designs are mature and that the weapon system will work as intended increases the 

likelihood and impact of design, manufacturing, and requirements changes resulting 

in subsequent cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. Systems already built and fielded may require substantial modifications, driving further costs. 

Some of the more stressing and critical testing for the program still lies ahead. 

This includes high angle of attack tests, ship tests, full up mission system tests and 

operational testing. By the time these events occur, the program will have purchased as many as 307 aircraft at a cost of over $58 billion. The program believes 

the risk of major modifications resulting from flight testing is low because of its extensive use of modeling and simulation. As we reported in March 2010, despite the 

extensive network of simulation labs, their ability to substitute for flight testing is 

unproven and the contractor’s progress in reducing program risk is difficult to assess, as many labs and models have yet to be accredited. Rand Corporation reported 

in a 2004 study on testing and evaluation that modeling is not a substitute for flight 

testing.2 Rand found that even in performance areas that are well understood, it 

is not unusual for flight testing to uncover problems that were not apparent in simulations. Examples include flight effects on the wing of the F/A–18 E/F and buffeting of stores externally carried on various aircraft when flown in certain conditions. Additionally, OSD testing officials have indicated that flight testing of each 

variant is necessary to demonstrate designed capabilities. Our past work has found 

that flying quality problems were identified during actual flight testing on programs 

like the F–22A, B–2A, and V–22. 
217 

Mr. SMITH. From an acquisition perspective, with 1,763 Air Force F–35s in the 

current program, and the fact that a one-engine and two-engine F–35 program cost 

the same on a net present value basis, why wouldn’t the Air Force want to choose 

a competitive engine strategy for the F–35 when it would also provide additional 

non-financial factors such as technological innovation, enhanced contractor responsiveness, and a more robust industrial base? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. When was the 1763 F–35A requirement established? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. When the 1763 F–35A aircraft requirement was established, what was 

the IOC at that time and when is the IOC projected now? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. When the 1763 F–35A aircraft requirement was established, what was 

the projected average procurement unit cost ($TY) for the F–35A? Projected average 

unit flyaway cost ($TY)? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. What are the current projected APUC and average unit flyaway costs 

($TY)? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. When the percentage increase in the APUC and flyaway cost are calculated, is the Air Force expecting its budget in the FYDP and extended planning 

period for the F–35A to increase proportionately? 
218 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Does the AF foresee a need to adjust its planned procurement of the 

F–35A proportionately? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. When the Air Force budget was submitted for fiscal year 2009, what 

was the projected F–35A procurement quantity for fiscal year 2010? What was the 

F–35A budget request for procurement for fiscal year 10? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Has a fighter engine ever been required to have the capabilities that 

the F135 and F136 are being required to satisfy? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. How many foreign countries have procured both the F100 and F110? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Air Force official statements express concern that funding of an alternate engine program could result in a decrement of F–35A aircraft in Air Force procurement: (CSAF) ‘‘If you have a fixed program top line for the F–35, if you fund 

the alternate engine out of that top line, it has an inescapable effect of reducing 

aircraft procurement.’’ The JSF program has increased in cost by $100 billion and 

the F135 SDD contract has increased 50 percent. Yet the Air Force continues to 

project a total procurement of 1,763 aircraft. Given this apparent flexibility in the 

AF budget, why is not possible, in order to maintain competition for the F–35 engine 

and a balanced F–35 program, to also fund the F136 engine? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. A May 2008 Defense Contract Management Agency study done on behalf of SAF/AQ, ‘‘Fighter Engine Industrial Capability Assessment,’’ recommended 

that F136 alternate engine production be reinstated under the fiscal year 2006 

schedule to provide for production deliveries in fiscal year 2010. As you are aware, 

fiscal year 2006 was the last year that the Department of Defense budgeted for the 

alternate engine. The DCMA assessment indicates that the lack of a major engine 

development program threatens the survivability of the military engine industrial 

base after the development of the F135, regardless of whether the F136 is funded: 

At completion of the F–35 SDD program, the F–35 engine manufacturers will be 

without a major fighter engine development program for the first time in over 35 

years. What is the policy of the Department of the Air Force with regard to maintaining a competitive high performance engine industrial base and what FYDP plan 

and funding does the Department of the AF have to support its policy? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The committee understands that the Department’s new position on 

long-range strike is that a ‘‘family of systems’’ is required to meet warfighting requirements. Can you explain to the committee why you feel it will be more costeffective to operate and maintain multiple long-range strike platforms rather than 

integrating technologically feasible technologies onto a single platform? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. As it relates to the long-range strike development program, what specifically about sustaining the industrial base workforce concerns you, and how will 

the $200.0 million requested in fiscal year 2011 be applied to address your concerns? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Are service life extension programs (SLEPs) budgeted that will allow 

legacy aircraft to address fighter aircraft inventory requirements? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Carter, during the JSF program restructuring, we understand 

that Secretary Gates directed a withhold of $614 million dollars of award fee from 

the contractor based on the program’s poor performance because he stated that the 

taxpayer shouldn’t be the only one’s held responsible for the cost and schedule over-
219 

run in this cost-plus development contract. However, it’s our understanding that you 

are giving the contractor a chance to recoup $614 million dollar award fee in the 

future. So given the contractor’s poor performance and their ability to recoup the 

award fee, the taxpayer is really going to be paying all of the cost overrun, correct? 

Why does that make sense? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Fox, in terms of percentages, what do you assess the commonality of each of the airframes, missions systems, engines, and vehicle systems 

to be for all three models of JSF aircraft for the phases of development, production 

and operating and support? What is your assessment of how the commonality, or 

lack thereof, is contributing to the increased cost growth for the total ownership 

costs of each of the aircraft and are commonality expectations being realized? 

Ms. FOX. Proposed Response: With respect to Joint Strike Fighter cost estimates, 

the assessment of commonality comes primarily into play with respect to the production cost estimate for the airframe. Assuming more commonality translates into 

lower costs through the application of learning curves. The second JSF Joint Estimating Team (i.e., JET II), led by OSD CAPE, employed a methodology in assessing 

commonality that is based on airframe weight classified as either being common to 

all variants, common to a subset combination of the variants, or unique to individual variants. Through this assessment, the JET II assesses airframe commonality of approximately 25% whereas the joint program office and contractor assessments are greater than 80%. This generates a significant cost difference between the two airframe production cost estimates. 

As part of the Nunn-McCurdy recertification process, OSD/CAPE will re-assess its 

treatment of airframe commonality, including the review of actual contractor production cost data for the early LRIP production aircraft. However, it should be recognized that the actual commonality data is based on a limited number of aircraft 

delivered to date, and that we will not have a better foundation of actuals for Carrier Variant aircraft for another 2–3 years. Similarly, O&S costs should be reduced 

with higher levels of commonality. CAPE has not yet performed a quantitative assessment of commonality related to O&S costs. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Fox, what do you estimate to be the total ownership life-cycle 

costs for the Department of the Navy for the F–35B and F–35C, and what are the 

assumptions that go into that estimate? 

Ms. FOX. We do not have a current estimate of the total life-cycle costs. We expect 

to complete a life-cycle cost estimate later this summer, and will provide the information to the committee at that time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Fox, if the F/A–18E/F aircraft was procured for the Navy, in lieu 

of the F–35C, what do you estimate would be the total ownership life-cycle costs of 

the F/A–18E/F would be, assuming that it would be operated for the planned service-life of the F–35C? 

Ms. FOX. We do not have current estimates of F/A–18E/F total ownership life-cycle 

costs. These calculations are difficult to compute. We are looking at them as part 

of the FY 2012 program review. What we can do is show you a comparison using 

average procurement costs (APUC) between the F–35C and the F/A–18 E/F. 

Consider the table below. The Navy is planning to buy 680 F–35s. They have not 

decided on how that total will be split between variants. For the purpose of this exercise, we assumed a 50/50 split meaning that we assume a total of 340 F–35Cs. 

The F–35 SAR lists an APUC (in 2010 dollars) of $93 million per aircraft for a ‘‘total 

cost’’ of $31.6 billion. If the Navy bought 340 F/A–18 E/Fs at an estimated APUC 

of $90 million per aircraft, the ‘‘total cost’’ would be $30.6 billion. 
220 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Fox, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee two 

weeks ago, you stated that in your estimate, the Navy’s 100 aircraft strike-fighter 

shortfall was an old number. Can you provide us the CAPE estimate for the number 

of strike-fighter aircraft that the Department of the Navy will be short and when 

that shortfall is supposed to peak? 

Ms. FOX. We are in the process of analyzing this question as part of the PB 2012 

program review. We will be happy to show this analysis with you upon completion. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Gilmore, you state in your testimony that because of durability 

issues, the Marine Corps’ current version of the JSF requires a re-design of the 

drive-shaft that connects the main engine to the vertical lift-fan, and the clutch that 

connects the drive-shaft to the lift-fan also needs to be re-designed because of excessive heating issues which could cause it to fail during vertical flight operations. In 

your opinion, how serious do characterize these issues, how long do you assess it 

will take to redesign and test the new drive-shaft and clutch, and how do you assess 

the Marine Corps being able to declare IOC in year 2012? 

Dr. GILMORE. The issues are serious enough that the design must be changed soon 

and incorporated with production plans beginning with the upcoming LRIP lot 4. 

The final nature of these two re-designs is not yet known and all the implications 

are not fully understood. Test aircraft are receiving new instrumentation to collect 

more data on the problems to determine root cause. My understanding is that these 

design changes will be finalized late this year and, in the meantime, the SDD and 

initial LRIP aircraft will have operating limits. The redesigns are needed for the 

system to complete the SDD flight test program and meet operational requirements. 

Successful redesign and implementation by LRIP 4, plus retrofit of prior systems 

may be possible in time for the STOVL IOC in late 2012, but there is little margin 

in the schedule. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Gilmore, we understand that the Logistics Information System 

that is required to pre-flight and trouble-shoot the JSF before and after flight is 

very large and cumbersome and is not suitable for forward deployed operations. 

How do you assess this will affect the Marine Corps’ ability to declare IOC in year 

2012 and when do you expect a suitable forward deployed system will be available 

to support Marine Corps forward-deployed operations? 

Dr. GILMORE. A Logistics Information System which is not designed for deployment will limit all the Services’ abilities to operate from forward bases. As designed, 

the entire squadron operating unit weighs 2,400 pounds and is six feet tall, excluding transportation dolly and packaging material, making it difficult to transport on 

and off ships, or to detachment-type operations at forward operating locations. The 

program office is currently developing deployment procedures for a squadron kit to 

support Marine Corps requirements in 2012, but that kit will have limited capability. It is my understanding that the Marine Corps is reviewing this solution to 

determine if it meets the need for STOVL IOC. The program office has also begun 

a detailed analysis of deployment requirements and is planning to develop, deliver, 

and test a fully deployable solution in the 2014–2015 time frame. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Gilmore, your report mentions that the program’s recent removal 

of shutoff fuses for engine fueldraulics lines coupled with the removal of fire extinguishers has increased the likelihood of combat losses from ballistic threat induced 

fires. Do you believe these items were removed to save cost? Do you believe these 

are prudent actions for a combat aircraft? 

Dr. GILMORE. The JSF program office removed the engine fueldraulics shutoff 

fuses and five of six dry bay fire suppression systems to save weight and costs. 

DOT&E continues to recommend that these features be reinstated and does not 
221 

view their removal as prudent. JSF Live Fire ballistic testing has demonstrated that 

the JSF is vulnerable to threat induced fires. Live Fire testing has also demonstrated that an effective fire suppression system exists and can be installed. Historical combat data indicate that threat induced fire is a leading cause (25 percent) 

of combat aircraft loss. The program office estimates that removal of these systems 

will reduce life cycle costs for the total program by $125M. This equates to the cost 

of less than two aircraft (December 2009 unit cost estimates) losses during combat 

operations over the JSF aircraft’s entire combat service lifetime. The dollar value 

of additional likely combat losses, due to lack of these systems, would more than 

offset these savings. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Gilmore, what are the current aircraft operating limitations for 

the F–35B aircraft participating in the SDD program as it relates to crosswinds, 

monitored parameters, vertical lift performance as it relates to hot gas ingestion, 

thunderstorms, wet and standing water runways, descent rate as it relates to the 

fuel system and icing? Will sufficient aircraft operating limitations be lifted in time 

to support initial pilot aircraft training to support Marine Corps IOC in 2012? 

Dr. GILMORE. I cannot assess when the series of STOVL aircraft operating limitations, or those on the other variants, will be lifted. The new test plan schedule is 

being finalized. As flight test yields a better understanding of performance and 

achievable pace of envelope expansion, a more accurate prediction of the resolution 

for each limitation can be made. Current F–35B SDD aircraft operating limitations 

include the following: 

• Crosswinds. Current limit is between 5 and 15 knots depending on type of test, 

transition points, temperature, engine thrust, conventional or vertical mode, 

airspeed, and whether the aircraft is monitored or unmonitored. For example, 

conventional takeoffs and landings without flying qualities monitoring by control room personnel are limited to 10 knots crosswind component; conventional 

takeoffs and landings with flying qualities monitoring are limited to 15 knots 

crosswind component (See also vertical lift performance—hot gas ingestion.) 

• Monitored parameters. Each test flight tailors the data it collects and monitors 

from over 1,200 parameters depending on the condition, risks and test being accomplished. For example, there are no lift fan engagements unless in contact 

with the control room. 

• Vertical lift performance as it relates to hot gas ingestion. Aircraft operations 

are limited to specific wind components and limitations vary depending on the 

SDD aircraft and what kinds of test points are being pursued. For example, 5 

knots is the maximum wind speed within 22 degrees of the nose and from 

abeam to behind the aircraft for BF–1 performing certain ‘‘initial transition’’ 

vertical landing test points. BF–2, BF–3, and BF–4 cannot perform vertical 

landings with wind components greater than 5 knots for wind directions greater 

than 22 degrees off the nose. Limits for vertical landing envelope expansion in 

BF–1 increase up to 20 knots crosswind component for wind directions within 

30 degrees left of the nose and 45 degrees right of the nose. 

• Thunderstorms. The airplane is restricted from flight within 25 nm of lightning 

due to structural bonding issues. 

• Wet and standing water. Takeoff or landing with standing water in the intended area of runway operations is prohibited. With no engine ice protection 

systems installed, ground operations are prohibited if standing water is present 

within 10 feet of the engine inlet. No lift fan operations are allowed in the presence of rain or above specific relative humidity limits (e.g. 100 percent allowed 

until 80 degrees, then decreasing depending on temperature). 

• Descent rate relative to fuel system. Descents of greater than 5,000 feet are limited to 20,000 feet per minute at idle power, and 10,000 feet per minute if above 

idle power, unless within specific technical parameters monitored by the flight 

test control room, including confirmation that the fuel pressure and vent system 

are working. 

• Icing. With no engine ice protection system installed, no ground operations 

below 40 degrees F with precipitation or standing water present within 10 feet 

of the engine inlet, or dew point within 5 degrees of ambient temperature between ¥4 degrees F and 40 degrees F. Flight in icing conditions in excess of 

30 seconds is prohibited. STOVL lift fan operation in flight in visible moisture 

is also prohibited. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Gilmore, as it relates to potential mishap rates, what do you assess and characterize the risk to be for LRIP 1 aircraft regarding immaturity of the 

aircraft system and in-flight limitations to support initial pilot training, and would 
222 

you expect the potential for Class A mishaps to be higher than historical experiences? 

Dr. GILMORE. At this point, I cannot predict mishap rates for JSF production aircraft. The program is working to close the test points needed before delivery of the 

two LRIP 1 aircraft early next year. These aircraft will have a very limited flight 

envelope and only the initial, limited mission systems capabilities provided by Block 

0.5. The flight envelope will need to be expanded and the mission systems capability 

will need to be upgraded to Block 1 through flight test before the planned crew 

training can begin in mid-2011. The aircraft limitations are being reviewed by the 

training center and Service planners, who are aware of the challenge created by concurrent development and production. Safely increasing capability through flight test, 

adding more aircraft, and continuously training operators and maintainers requires 

tight coordination and planning by the Services and development team. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Stackley, the 30 year aviation plan provides no discussion 

of operational risk as it relates to meeting combatant commander warfighting requirements and the National Defense Strategy . . . how would you characterize, in 

terms of risk, the force structure outlined in the 30 year aviation plan for bombers 

and the ability for the legacy bomber fleet to survive against more advanced integrated air defenses in 2015 and beyond since a new bomber will not be fielded now 

until towards the end of the 2020 decade? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Department of the Navy has no oversight of any bomber 

programs. We defer this question to the Department of the Air Force who manages/ 

oversees all bomber programs. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Stackley, given the lack of ‘‘affordability’’ in the JSF program, have you looked at the option of foregoing development and production for 

the F–35C in favor of buying more F/A–18E/F Super Hornets? 

Secretary STACKLEY. With the SECDEF approved F–35 program restructure, the Department of Defense has added $2.8B across FYDP to fully fund development of 

the program. As part of the restructure, we significantly reduced the production profile to fund these additional System Development and Demonstration requirements, 

accounted for increased costs due to Partner projected procurements moving to the 

right, accounted for higher Joint Estimating Team (JET II) procurement estimates, 

and adjusted the production ramp due to recommendations made by an Independent 

Manufacturing and Resources Team (IMRT). As such, the Department is fully committed to the restructured F–35 program and the existing F–18E/F program of 

record. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Stackley, how do you define ‘‘affordability’’ as it relates to 

the Joint Strike Fighter program and how has the definition and concept of ‘‘affordability’’ changed since the initiation of SDD and present day in which the cost of 

the program is markedly greater? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Affordability needs to account not only for the overall cost 

of a weapon system but the capability any given weapon system provides as measured against existing and emerging threats to the security of the nation. The Department is not satisfied with the cost growth brought forward with the recent F– 

35 program restructure and remains focused on improving upon this cost projection. 

However, the F–35 program is essential towards providing the necessary 5th generation tactical aviation capability needed by the nation and that this capability is 

considered affordable within the resources requested by the FY 2011 President’s 

Budget. This question will be further addressed in the ongoing assessment associated with the Nunn-McCurdy review and certification process. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Stackley, according to NAVAIR, the F–35B and F–35C operations and sustainment cost is predicted to be 40 percent higher than the legacy 

fleet of F/A–18A–D and AV–8B aircraft combined. Do you agree with this assessment? If not, why not? What do you assess the operations and support cost of the 

F–35B and F–35C to be per flight hour? How does this compare to the cost per flight 

hour for the F/A–18E/F? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Understanding and controlling total ownership costs is a priority for the Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our longterm operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft. I have directed my 

leaders to study and understand the total ownership costs of new and existing systems. Early assessments serve to highlight risk areas which need to be managed 

in order to mitigate operations and support costs. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost 

per flight hour is consistent with that intent and will be further informed by other 

service and Department assessments to validate the findings while initiating ‘next 

steps’ to mitigating costs. As well, the unique in-service support plan for JSF poses 

challenges for direct comparison with legacy sustainment costs, and we are taking 

added measures to align bases of estimates. Accordingly, it is not prudent to conclude the total ownership costs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone. The more 
223 

complete analysis will be accomplished in conjunction with the Nunn-McCurdy review and certification process. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Stackley, what do you estimate to be the total ownership 

costs of the F–35B and F–35C for the Navy and Marine Corps? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Understanding and controlling total ownership costs is a priority for the Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our longterm operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft. I have directed my 

leaders to study and understand the total ownership costs of new and existing systems. Early assessments serve to highlight risk areas which need to be managed 

in order to mitigate operations and support costs. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost 

per flight hour is consistent with that intent and will be further informed by other 

service and Department assessments to validate the findings while initiating ‘next 

steps’ to mitigating costs. As well, the unique in-service support plan for JSF poses 

challenges for direct comparison with legacy sustainment costs, and we are taking 

added measures to align bases of estimates. Accordingly, it is not prudent to conclude the total ownership costs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone. The more 

complete analysis will be accomplished in conjunction with the Nunn-McCurdy review and certification process. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Philman and General Trautman, the JSF program office now estimates the JSF will now cost you $112 million per aircraft to buy instead 

of $59 million per aircraft, and Naval Air Systems Command estimates that the JSF 

will cost you $31,000 dollars per hour to operate compared to the current fleet of 

aircraft that costs you $18,000 dollars per hour. How will these increased costs affect your ability to buy and operate JSF given all the other priorities the Navy has 

concerning its challenges to pay for new ships, personnel and operations and maintenance costs for its ships? Wasn’t the JSF originally planned to cost you less than 

your current fleet of tactical aircraft? 

Admiral PHILMAN and General TRAUTMAN. Understanding and controlling total 

ownership costs of new and existing weapon systems are priorities for the Navy in 

order to reduce long term operations and support costs. The most opportune time 

to control such costs is early in the weapon system’s development when actions can 

be taken which will carry over the life of the system. As such, acquisition programs 

are encouraged to study the issue in depth considering many different scenarios. 

While such information taken alone is interesting, it’s true value is realized when 

the entire body of work is analyzed, vetted and formally presented. The release of 

such information piecemeal without benefit of full analysis can be misleading and 

should be avoided. 

The Navy believes that recapitalizing the fleet with the JSF F–35C, delivering a 

true 5th generation strike aircraft combining stealth and enhanced sensors to provide lethal, survivable, and supportable tactical jet aviation strike fighters that complement the F/A–18E/F, provides the most flexibility and striking capability for the 

investment. The JSF will provide a survivable ‘‘Day One’’ strike capability in a denied access environment that can not be accomplished by current legacy aircraft. It 

can be misleading to compare current year procurement costs of aircraft with very 

different capabilities, different quantity assumptions, and at very different stages of 

the acquisition cycle (i.e., F/A–18E/F is nearing the end of production and F–35 is 

early in the production phase (i.e., FY11 is Low Rate Initial Production Lot V and 

Full Rate Production is several years away). 

For the Marine Corps the return on investment in capabilities of the F–35B outweighs the unavoidable legacy aircraft O&S cost increases of not replacing three different aircraft; F/A–18, AV–8B, and EA–6B we will incur as these aircraft age far 

beyond their original service life and require substantial modifications to maintain 

operational relevancy and airworthiness, specifically maintaining safety without 

performance limitations. Supporting three aging and lesser technological different 

type model series aircraft exceeds the cost of operating one common aircraft with 

the depth and synergy provided by a collaborative globally based program. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Philman and General Trautman, the Navy currently operates 6 types of aircraft engines on its carriers and is forecasted to operate 4 engines 

when JSF is fielded. Why would operating an alternate engine be a challenge for 

the Navy or Marine Corps since you are predicting to operate at least 4 engines on 

the carrier now? Also, wouldn’t it be possible for carrier air wings to be outfitted 

with either the F135 or F136 engine which means that during deployments carrier 

air wings would only have either engine on board the carrier? How do you assess 

the operational risk of having only 1 engine type available for the JSF? Are you not 

concerned about potential fleet wide grounding issues due to an unexpected engine 

problem? 

Admiral PHILMAN and General TRAUTMAN. A numerical engine count does not 

provide the full context for this discussion. The JSF engine is the largest tactical 
224 

fighter engine in size and overall logistics footprint in the history of the Department 

of Defense. In comparison to legacy F/A–18E/F (Model F414), the F135 engine is approximate twice the size of the Super Hornet F414 engine. While the performance 

of the F135 engine brings significant performance gains and warfighting advantage, 

it presents logistical challenge for all of the Services—but no more so than to the 

Navy and Marine Corps who operate in already constrained spaces aboard L–Class 

and CVN ships. 

The Navy Department believes the implementation of two JSF engines onboard 

aircraft carriers is suboptimal due to increased operational logistics foot print (LFP). 

Current LFP challenges available hangar deck space due to the JSF engines being 

too large to fit in the aviation bulk storage or jet shop (either F135 or F136). LFP 

problem compounds with both F135 & F136 engines afloat on the same ship, each 

engine has unique support equipment and tools effectively doubling the LFP required for these items. Spotting and supporting two engines will negatively affect 

hangar bay aircraft spotting and maintenance operations. Regardless of the decision 

on an alternate engine, it would be the Navy’s intent to deploy only one engine variant on any one CV. 

The Navy does not fly aircraft that have interchangeable engines. While some 

model types such as the F/A–18 are supported by two distinct engines, they are 

unique to the model series (A/B, C or E/F) and are not interchangeable across series. 

If there is a fleet wide grounding of an aircraft due to engine issues, there is no 

alternate engine to mitigate the problem. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Philman and General Trautman, according to Dr Gilmore’s 

written testimony from panel 1, we understand that unlike all aircraft now in service, the JSF is being designed without a fire-suppression system in its engine bay 

because of aircraft weight issues? Why is this acceptable since all aircraft in operation currently have a fire-suppression system and what level of risk does this pose 

for a single-engine aircraft being unable to put out an engine fire due to a fuel leak 

or enemy ballistic fire? 

Admiral PHILMAN and General TRAUTMAN. The JSF is being designed with an engine bay fire detection and fire suppression system. Several features in the F–35 

vulnerability design resulted in a system that exceeded the specification in the 

Operational Requirements Document (ORD): ‘‘4.1.3.2 The JSF Vulnerability Posture 

shall be better than the F–16C.’’ These unprecedented survivability features led to 

design trades to better balance performance, weight, cost, and risk. These trades included: a ballistic liner, dry bay fire extinguishing, and coolant/hydraulic shutoff 

valves. The resulting design met the ORD requirement with the exception of a 

30mm high-explosive incendiary round typically associated with light anti-aircraft 

artillery. The option to remove these features was fully debated through the requirements process to ensure the true cost benefit was fully evaluated. The identified 

weight and cost penalties (11 lbs and $1.4M) were compared against the minimal 

survivability increases (6%) predicted by the assessment models. The Joint Executive Steering Board (JESB) concurred with this decision and stipulated that an updated Vulnerability Assessment be conducted after the conclusion of the Live Fire 

Testing (2011). The overall survivability posture of the F–35 is without equal due 

to the advanced avionics and sensor suite, fifth generation stealth performance, advanced countermeasures and balanced vulnerability reduction design. The 

functionality and benefit of each design feature is carefully weighed against the 

overall system impact to cost, weight and supportability. After careful, detailed, and 

extensive deliberations the risk posed by removal of these systems was deemed acceptable. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Philman and General Trautman, can you describe for us the 

ship integration challenges and expected costs you foresee for integrating the JSF 

onto Large Deck Amphibs and Aircraft Carriers as it relates to the significant engine thrust, pressure and temperature challenges over what has been experienced 

with legacy aircraft? 

Admiral PHILMAN and General TRAUTMAN. JSF integration on L Class ships is 

progressing on a logical path aligned across engineering, acquisition, and implementation. NAVSEA generated specific ship changes ‘‘Cornerstone Alts’’ to provide shipboard infrastructure (i.e., power, weapons stowage, secure facilities). These cornerstone modifications start in PR–11 ($27M per hull) and are programmed throughout 

the FYDP. External environment impacts are still being evaluated through engineering analysis, land based testing and during Developmental Testing (DT) 1 in 

2nd quarter FY2011. The DT 1 ship will be fully instrumented to collect heat, pressure, noise and velocity data with topside equipment/systems either being temporarily removed or shielded to lower risk to damage. This DT event will assist in defining shipboard mitigation required to meet USMC IOC such as relocating systems, 

material changes and shielding. External environment modifications are a POM–12 
225 

issue ($43M per Hull) and are programmed to support Operational Test in the later 

part of 2012 and our first operational F–35B MEU deployment in 2014. There will 

be an L Class ship available in 2012 with all the F–35B integration modifications 

incorporated to support a shipboard deployment if required. 

Aircraft carrier F–35 integration poses similar challenges for both the STOVL and 

CV variants. There is a large degree of synergy between infrastructure support requirements and design for the shipboard compatibility required for shipboard integration. Environmental effects differ due to the unique take-off and landing characteristics of each variant. The L Class F–35B integration challenges represent the 

most difficult situation for STOVL operations, when combined with the more robust 

CVN design and ship structure we anticipate less effort required for F–35B carrier 

operations. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General Trautman: As you know, the JSF program has experienced 

a 13 month delay in its SDD program, yet the Marine Corps is confident that it 

can still meet IOC for the F–35B in fiscal year 2012, and the Navy and the Air 

Force have officially delayed their IOC’s by two years as a result. And given the 

challenges with JSF ship integration, the fact that JSF has only completed three 

percent of its test sorties. Can you discuss why the Marine Corps is confident that 

it can meet the 2012 date and also what specific capabilities do you expect to have 

in the F–35B at IOC? 

General TRAUTMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Philman: In determining future year strike fighter inventory 

requirements, why is the Department of the Navy using 1,154 aircraft as its requirement, which is derived solely by existing tactical air demand in current operations, and not the Department of the Navy validated requirement of 1,240 strike 

fighter aircraft? Can you explain the rationale of why you are basing future fighter 

requirements on current operational demand? 

Admiral PHILMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Philman: Why is the Navy not planning to buy additional 

F/A–18E/F aircraft to fill the 263 aircraft gap predicted to peak in fiscal year 2017? 

Do you believe that our adversaries will have the ability to detect with their air defenses both stealth and non-stealth aircraft by that date? Has the Navy totally ruled 

out as an option additional Super Hornets? Do you agree with Admiral Mullen’s testimony to the HAC–D on March 24, 2010, that the extension of the F/A–18E/F production line through 2013 will be used as a hedge to mitigate additional cost growth 

and/or schedule slip of the Joint Strike Fighter program? 

Admiral PHILMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Gates stated that previous Next Generation Bomber studies were accomplished to determine ‘‘if ’’ we needed a new bomber, and that the upcoming studies will determine ‘‘what type’’ of bomber we need. However, given the 

progress to date that was made in system design and development (SDD) of the 

Next Generation Bomber platform before it was cancelled, and the fact that the Air 

Force was given formal approval to enter SDD by the same Secretary of Defense 

three years ago, can you explain to us why the Department’s position now is that 

it didn’t know ‘‘what type’’ of bomber was needed? 

Mr. VAN BUREN and General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not 

available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. What requirements and key performance parameters have changed 

that the cancelled Next Generation Bomber platform (NGB), as laid out in the systems requirements document for the NGB, would not have been able to execute or 

meet? 

Mr. VAN BUREN and General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not 

available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Which organization has the lead to reaccomplish the Long Range 

Strike AoA, when is it estimated to be complete and provide a wire diagram of the 

organizational structure of all organizations and agencies involved in the AoA process? 

Mr. VAN BUREN and General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not 

available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Van Buren: The committee understands that the Department’s 

new position on long-range strike is that a ‘‘family of systems’’ is required to meet 

warfighting requirements. Can you explain to the committee why you feel it will be 

more cost-effective to operate and maintain multiple long-range strike platforms 

rather than integrating technologically feasible technologies onto a single platform? 
226 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Van Buren: As it relates to the long-range strike development 

program, what specifically about sustaining the industrial base workforce concerns 

you, and how will the $200.0 million requested in fiscal year 2011 be applied to address your concerns? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. General Breedlove: Secretary Gates cancelled the Air Force’s Next 

Generation Bomber program last April, but now there is $1.7 billion of funding requested in fiscal years 2011 through 2015 for development of a long-range strike 

platform. Can you walk us through your deliberative process of canceling a program 

just 10 months ago and now reinstating funding for development of a Next Generation Bomber platform in this year’s budget? Have requirements or capabilities for 

a new long-range strike platform changed since the previously validated requirements and capabilities of the canceled Next Generation Bomber program? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. General Breedlove: The 30 year aviation plan provides no discussion 

of operational risk as it relates to meeting combatant commander warfighting requirements and the National Defense Strategy . . . how would you characterize, in 

terms of risk, the force structure outlined in the 30 year aviation plan for bombers 

and the ability for the legacy bomber fleet to survive against more advanced integrated air defenses in 2015 and beyond since a new bomber will not be fielded now 

until towards the end of the 2020 decade? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADY 

Mr. BRADY. Dr. Carter, the Alternate JSF engine has been a source of controversy, and both sides have legitimate points. Since the delivery of the aircraft has 

slid, isn’t it possible to have a legitimate competition for the service engine? The 

delays haven’t been engine-related, so how difficult would it be and would there be 

any further delays in having a competition between the two engines? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. BRADY. I have heard from maintainers in the field that as long as the engines 

are interchangeable and differences in tools and procedures are minimal, that having an alternate engine would pose little to no problem in maintaining combat-ready 

aircraft. Operators say that understanding the nuances of two engines (operating 

limits, etc.) make a single engine more practical. What perceptions have you heard 

from the field? 

Secretary CARTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. BRADY. Secretary Stackley, the Alternate JSF engine has been a source of 

controversy, and both sides have legitimate points. Since the delivery of the aircraft 

has slid, isn’t it possible to have a legitimate competition for the service engine? The 

delays haven’t been engine-related, so how difficult would it be and would there be 

any further delays in having a competition between the two engines? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Department of the Navy supports the conclusions of the 

analysis completed by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (D/ 

CAPE) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. D/CAPE estimates that $2.9B 

is required to take the alternate engine to competitive procurement in FY 2017— 

of which $2.5B is required over the next five years. And that the additional costs 

and the burden of maintaining two logistical systems are not offset by the potential 

savings generated through competition—even taking into account the recent F–35 

program restructure. 

Mr. BRADY. Secretary Stackley, I have heard from maintainers in the field that 

as long as the engines are interchangeable and differences in tools and procedures 

are minimal, that having an alternate engine would pose little to no problem in 

maintaining combat-ready aircraft. Operators say that understanding the nuances 

of two engines (operating limits, etc.) make a single engine more practical. What 

perceptions have you heard from the field? 

Secretary STACKLEY. A numerical engine count does not provide the full context 

for this discussion. The JSF engine is the largest tactical fighter engine in size and 

overall logistics footprint in the history of the Department of Defense. In comparison 
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to legacy F/A–18E/F (Model F414), the F135 engine is approximately twice the size 

of the Super Hornet F414 engine. The Navy does not fly aircraft that have interchangeable engines. While some model types such as the F/A–18 are supported by 

two distinct engines, they are unique to the model series (A/B, C or E/F) and are 

not interchangeable across series. While the performance of the F135 engine brings 

significant performance gains and warfighting advantage, it presents logistical challenge for all of the Services—but particularly for the Navy and Marine Corps who 

operate in already constrained spaces aboard L–Class and CVN ships. Our Navy 

personnel are dedicated and will go to great lengths to get the job done. However, 

with the diminishing space and manpower aboard Navy ships, we must look for 

ways to optimize our resources. 

The Department of the Navy believes the implementation of two JSF engines onboard aircraft carriers is suboptimal due to increased operational logistics foot print 

(LFP). Proposed LFP concept of operations will challenge the available hangar deck 

space. This is mainly due to the JSF engines being too large to fit in the aviation 

bulk storage or jet shop (either F135 or F136). LFP problem compounds with both 

F135 & F136 engines afloat on the same ship, each engine has unique support 

equipment and tools effectively doubling the LFP required for these items. Spotting 

and supporting two engines will negatively affect hangar bay aircraft spotting and 

maintenance operations. Regardless of the decision on an alternate engine, it would 

be the Navy’s intent to deploy only one engine variant on any one carrier. 

Mr. BRADY. LTG. Trautman, what’s the long term strategy for EA in support of 

the MAGTF? The EA–6Bs will be over 40 years old by 2020, and with delays in JSF, 

the development of an EA variant of that aircraft seems even further off. Is USMC 

going to shed the role, or are Growlers on the table as an option to provide that 

aircraft and ground force support that Marines are asking for everyday in the field? 

General TRAUTMAN. We certainly are not shedding the EW mission. In fact, the 

emphasis for the entire Marine Corps is becoming more focused on ensuring we 

have EW available to support both ground and air forces down to the lowest tactical 

levels. We are already on a path to fulfill our vision of MAGTF EW: the composite 

of manned and unmanned surface, air, and space-based assets, fully networked and 

collaborating to provide the MAGTF commander the ability to control the electromagnetic spectrum at the time and place of his choosing, at sea or ashore, regardless of the basing posture or environment. 

The Nation has relied upon and will continue to operate with an EW System of 

Systems approach to address the threat, as there is no ‘‘silver bullet,’’ single program solution that fits every scenario. Today our Corps relies upon the EA–6B 

Prowler from the air and a mix of Radio Battalion and the proliferated Counter 

Radio-frequency controlled improvised explosive device EW systems, better known 

as CREW, on the ground to provide MAGTF EW. We are expanding this EW system 

of systems over time. As we build up our concepts of employment and concepts of 

operations (CONEMPS/CONOPS), we see MAGTF EW focusing on addressing and 

mitigating current EW capability gaps and shortfalls to ensure that there will be 

the growth necessary to support all MAGTF operations in the future. Wherever and 

whenever Marines go, they will have access to organic EW capabilities. Our goal is 

to take EW from its current state of low density/high demand (LD/HD) to one of 

high density/high demand (HD/HD). 

We are increasing the number of EA–6Bs in the Corps (by folding in Navy Prowlers as they transition to EA–18Gs) and introducing the Improved Capabilities III 

(ICAP III) upgrade. As part of the transition to ICAP III the Marine EA–6B aircraft 

inventory will be increased to 32. The ICAP III system, or ALQ–218, is the same 

system the US Navy is incorporating in the FA–18F to make it an EA–18G, thus 

maintaining a common capability across the Department of the Navy. The first 

USMC ICAP III aircraft has already been delivered to Marine Tactical Electronic 

Warfare Squadron Four (VMAQ–4) at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. 

While there is no intent to have a mission-specific ‘‘EF–35,’’ all three variants of 

the F–35 come with significant EP, ES and EA capabilities for autonomous operations in the Block 2 aircraft which we will IOC in 2012. In this configuration it 

will not only be able to protect itself in the fighter and attack roles, but also do a 

great job escorting Assault Support assets (helicopters, tiltrotar aircraft, and KC– 

130’s/C–17’s) in hybrid threat environments. The sensors and data fusion capabilities of the F–35 make it a superb platform to host an increased EW capability— 

on par with EA–18Gs—by integrating the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) on the 

platform. 

As advanced EW payloads, such as Intrepid Tiger II Software Reprogrammable 

Payload (SRP), and Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) technologies are developed they 

will be deployed on both our manned and unmanned systems. These technologies 

capitalize on already proven deployed systems. Intrepid Tiger I deployed to OIF on 
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AV–8 & FA–18 and the Pioneer UAS Electronic Attack Payload (PEAPL) demonstrated the art of reality. 

In addition to our Aviation assets, the Marine Corps is expanding its ground 

based EW as well. With the deployment of Communication Emitter Sensing and Attacking System (CESAS), the EW capabilities resident in the Radio Battalions are 

growing beyond the Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS). Additionally, the CREW systems proliferated across the battlefield will also be incorporated 

as EW nodes to collaboratively provide ELINT/COMINT, as well as EA. All together, the Marine Corps is actually expanding EW capabilities across the entire 

MAGTF and is NOT shirking the EW mission. 

Mr. BRADY. The Alternate JSF engine has been a source of controversy, and both 

sides have legitimate points. Since the delivery of the aircraft has slid, isn’t it possible to have a legitimate competition for the service engine? The delays haven’t 

been engine-related, so how difficult would it be and would there be any further 

delays in having a competition between the two engines? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. BRADY. I have heard from maintainers in the field that as long as the engines 

are interchangeable and differences in tools and procedures are minimal, that having an alternate engine would pose little to no problem in maintaining combat-ready 

aircraft. Operators say that understanding the nuances of two engines (operating 

limits, etc.) make a single engine more practical. What perceptions have you heard 

from the field? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. BRADY. What’s the long term strategy for EA in support of the Air Force Expeditionary Wing? In response to the retirement of the EF–111 and seconded by an 

F–117 shootdown over Serbia, the Navy stood up four squadrons in the ’90s to support the USAF and just expanded the purchase of EA–18Gs to maintain sole support of combatant commander requests for EA in support of land and air forces, including USAF. So as the Navy is finalizing plans to enhance its EA capabilities to 

support the joint force, the USAF looks like it’s going down a road travelled before: 

relying on stealth technology until it fails us, then asking the Navy to cover down. 

Is the USAF committed to providing these capabilities at some point? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an update on the status of the reorganization of the weapon systems acquisition organizations under the Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan and explain how this will benefit Air Force acquisition? 

How will this affect the location of current and future jobs? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, as you look at ways to reform the acquisition process 

to ensure greater efficiency and higher performance standards, have you considered 

the advantage of seeking prime contractors located in the vicinity of the Air Force 

research and acquisition organizations with responsibility for the execution of that 

contractor’s program? As you well know, there is considerably inefficiency with contracting officers and other government technical experts shuttling from their offices 

to provide contractor oversight. Moreover, there would be valuable opportunities for 

creative interaction among contractor, contracting staff, and technical experts if all 

were located just a few minutes away. Would you be willing to work with me to 

fashion a pilot program to test the concept? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

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