UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

CASSANDRA J. BRUCE,

Plaintiff,

v

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, DANIEL H. 

HEYNS, MILLICENT 

WARREN, JOANN KOCISKY, 

MS. DICK, MR. BURNETT, 

RUO COOK, ARUS PERRY, 

UNNAMED EMPLOYEES OF

HURON VALLEY 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, 

UNNAMED EMPLOYEES OF 

HURON VALLEY 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY’S 

HEALTHCARE AND 

OPTOMETRY 

DEPARTMENTS, 

Defendants.

NO. 2:15-cv-11194

HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

MAG. MICHAEL HLUCHANIUK

Teresa J. Gorman (P61001)

Attorney for Plaintiff 

363 W. Big Beaver Rd. Suite 215

Troy, MI 48083

(248) 457-6005

A. Peter Govorchin (P31161)

Attorney for Defendant MDOC

Michigan Department of Attorney General

Corrections Division

P.O. Box 30217

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7021

/

DEFENDANT MDOC’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM

Case 2:15-cv-11194-GAD-MJH ECF No. 3 filed 04/21/15 PageID.29 Page 1 of 22
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Defendant MDOC brings this motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6) and asks the Court to enter an order dismissing Plaintiff’s 

complaint with prejudice and granting judgment in its favor, for the 

reason that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted, as more fully set forth in Defendant’s accompanying brief. 

Defendant MDOC to the best of its’ knowledge is the only Defendant 

named in Plaintiff’s complaint to have been served. 

WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court 

grant its motion and issue an order entering judgment in its favor, 

dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against it with prejudice, and awarding 

further relief as this Court finds just and proper. 

Respectfully submitted,

Bill Schuette

Attorney General

/s/ A. Peter Govorchin

Assistant Attorney General

Attorney for MDOC Defendants

Corrections Division

P.O. Box 30217

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7021

P31161

Dated: April 21, 2015

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

CASSANDRA J. BRUCE,

Plaintiff,

v

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, DANIEL H. 

HEYNS, MILLICENT 

WARREN, JOANN KOCISKY, 

MS. DICK, MR. BURNETT, 

RUO COOK, ARUS PERRY, 

UNNAMED EMPLOYEES OF

HURON VALLEY 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, 

UNNAMED EMPLOYEES OF 

HURON VALLEY 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY’S 

HEALTHCARE AND 

OPTOMETRY 

DEPARTMENTS, 

Defendants.

NO. 2:15-cv-11194

HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

MAG. MICHAEL HLUCHANIUK 

Teresa J. Gorman (P61001)

Attorney for Plaintiff 

363 W. Big Beaver Rd. Suite 215

Troy, MI 48083

(248) 457-6005

A. Peter Govorchin (P31161)

Attorney for Defendant MDOC

Michigan Department of Attorney General

Corrections Division

P.O. Box 30217

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7021

/

DEFENDANT MDOC’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION 

TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

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i

CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights act, does not contain

an applicable statute of limitations. Federal courts, including 

the Supreme Court apply the most analogous state limitations 

period to § 1983 claims. Michigan has adopted a 3 year statute 

of limitations for personal injury claims. Should the Court 

dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as she failed to bring it within 

the applicable 3 year limitations period? 

Defendant’s answer “Yes.” 

II. The Americans with Disabilities Act does not contain an 

applicable statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has held that the most analogous state statute of 

limitations for personal injury is applicable to claims brought 

under the ADA. Michigan has adopted a 3 year limitations 

period of personal injury claims. Should the Court dismiss 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim, as she failed to bring it within the 

applicable 3 year limitations period?

Defendant’s answer “Yes.” 

III. Under Article III to the United States Constitution, federal 

courts may only consider a live controversy. A case is moot 

when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome of the case, which occurs when the court is unable to 

provide any relief to redress the Plaintiff’s alleged injury. Here, 

the Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

is moot, as she was afforded relief. Should the Court dismiss 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim against the Defendants, where a 

judgment in favor of the Plaintiff would not provide her any 

relief to redress her alleged injury? 

Defendant’s answer “Yes.” 

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IV. The Americans with Disabilities Act does not allow for the 

recovery of punitive damages, nor does the ADA allow for the 

recovery of compensatory damages in suits brought against 

individuals. Here, Plaintiff is suing individuals, and requests

to recover compensatory and punitive damages. Should the 

Court dismiss Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, and 

dismiss Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages to the 

extent she is suing individuals under the ADA? 

Defendant’s answer “Yes.” 

CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

I. Statute of Limitations and Claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 

Under 42 USC § 1983 federal courts look to the pertinent 

limitations period, which is determined by state law for personal-injury 

torts. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Wilson v. Garcia, 

471 U.S. 261 (1985) (reversed on other grounds). The Sixth Circuit 

Court of Appeals has held “that Michigan's three year statute of 

limitations for personal injury claims, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 

600.5805(8) . . . governs section 1983 actions when the cause of action 

arises in Michigan.” McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 

905 (6th Cir. 1988).

II. Statute of Limitations and Claims under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act 

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“Because there is no statute of limitations under the ADA, courts 

must borrow a statute of limitations from the most analogous state 

cause of action.” McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 663-64 (6th 

Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has applied the statute of limitations for 

personal injury actions to an ADA claim . . . . Id.

III. Mootness and the Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or 

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. L.A. Cnty. 

v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 

U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). A party does not have a legally cognizable 

interest in the outcome of a case when the court cannot provide any 

relief that would redress the alleged injury. Id. 

IV. Damages recovery in suits brought under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act

The ADA does not impose liability upon individuals acting in their 

individual capacities. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 501 n. 7 (6th Cir. 

2009). Furthermore, Punitive damages may not be awarded in suits 

brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Barnes v. Gorman, 

536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). 

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STATEMENT OF FACTS 

This civil rights action brought by a former prisoner is a textbook 

example of a person sitting on their rights and failing to take action 

when it was pertinent to do so. This case is brought by Cassandra 

Bruce # 502798 (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a parolee currently under the 

supervisory authority of the Michigan Department of Corrections. 

Plaintiff alleges violations of her rights under the Eighth Amendment, 

Fourteenth Amendment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

Defendant MDOC to the best of its’ knowledge is the only Defendant 

named in Plaintiff’s complaint to have been served. 

The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s complaint took place while she

was incarcerated at the Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility

(WHV) located in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Plaintiff is presently on parole,

and is under the supervision of the Michigan Department of Corrections

Genesse-Flint parole office. 

Plaintiff’s action centers on her alleged mistreatment, and the 

mistreatment of her vision impairment while incarcerated at WHV. 

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that on or around February 2, 2007, 

she first experienced blurred vision after waking up with it. (Dk. # 1,

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2

Pg. ID 5). Plaintiff alleges she sent a request for a vision check, and 

was subsequently seen for an optometric vision screening on or around 

April 4, 2007. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 5). The vision screen revealed Plaintiff 

had developed cataracts, and as a result, she was referred to a nonMDOC physician, Dr. Lavery of TLC Eyecare and Laser Centers. (Dk. # 

1, Pg. ID 5). Plaintiff alleges she underwent a second optometric vision 

screening on July 24, 2007, which resulted in a second referral to Dr. 

Lavery. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 5). 

Plaintiff had the appointment with Dr. Lavery on August 21, 

2007. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 6). Dr. Lavery diagnosed Plaintiff with cataracts 

in both eyes, and recommended she undergo surgical procedures to have 

the cataracts removed. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 6). Plaintiff states that by 

September 2007, she was no longer able to participate in building trade 

courses due to her vision impairment, and as a result, Plaintiff was 

placed on unemployable status. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 6). Plaintiff alleges she 

filed grievances regarding her unemployable status, asserting she was 

placed on regular as opposed to medical unemployable status. (Dk. # 1,

Pg. ID 7). Plaintiff asserts her placement on regular unemployable 

status caused her injury. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 7). 

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Plaintiff had a third appointment with Dr. Lavery on or around 

March 21, 2008, at which point it was determined Plaintiff’s cataracts 

had totally impaired her vision. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 8). Shortly thereafter, 

on April 23, 2008, Plaintiff underwent a cataract removal procedure for 

her left eye, and on April 30, 2008, the same procedure for her right eye. 

(Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 8). Plaintiff alleges that by not having the cataract 

removal surgery immediately after she was diagnosed, she suffered

significant injury. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 8). Plaintiff delayed bringing her 

suit until almost 7 to 8 years after the events she alleges gave rise to 

her injury occurred. Plaintiff claims the delay in filing suit was because 

she feared “further discrimination, harassment and retaliation.” (Dk. # 

1, Pg. ID 9). 

ARGUMENT 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court “may dismiss a 

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set 

of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hison v. 

King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing, Conley v. Gibson, 335 

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) requires the [c]ourt to construe the complaint in the light most 

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favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint’s factual 

allegations as true and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly 

can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle 

relief.” Grindstaff v. Green, 113 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing

Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990)). However, “the [c]ourt need not 

accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” 

Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); 

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976). The court is 

“required to accept only well-pleaded facts as true, not the legal 

conclusions that may be alleged or that may be drawn from the pleaded 

facts.” Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1971). 

I. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is barred as she failed to 

bring it within the applicable 3 year statute of 

limitations. 

Federal courts assessing statute of limitations arguments under 

42 USC § 1983 look to the pertinent limitations period determined by 

state law for personal-injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 

(2007); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (reversed on other 

grounds). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “that Michigan's 

Case 2:15-cv-11194-GAD-MJH ECF No. 3 filed 04/21/15 PageID.38 Page 10 of 22
5

three year statute of limitations for personal injury claims contained in

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8) . . . governs section 1983 actions when 

the cause of action arises in Michigan.” McCune v. City of Grand 

Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1988).

Michigan has set a three year statute of limitations for personal 

injury actions. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8). Moreover, in 

1993, the Michigan Legislature passed an amendment to the state’s 

tolling statute that removed imprisonment as a disability, 1993 Public 

Act 78, effective April 1, 1994. Codified in Mich. Comp. Laws § 

600.5851(9), the amendment provides:

If a person was serving a term of imprisonment on the 

effective date of the 1993 amendatory act that added this 

subsection, and that person has a cause of action to which

the disability of imprisonment would have been applicable 

under the former provisions of this section, an entry may be 

made or an action may be brought under this act for that 

cause of action within 1 year after the effective date of the 

1993 amendatory act that added this subsection, or within 

any other applicable period of limitation provided by law.

The question of when a civil rights claim accrues is a matter of 

federal law. LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 

1097, 1107 (6th Cir. 1995); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.

1984). Generally, a civil rights action accrues for statute of limitations 

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purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

that is the basis of his action. Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 

1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991); Sevier 742 F.2d at 273. “A plaintiff has 

reasons to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through 

the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Sevier 742 F.2d at 273.

Plaintiff filed this case on March 30, 2015. Contrarily, Plaintiff’s 

complaint states that the incidents which gave rise to her cause of 

action occurred between 2007 and 2008. Plaintiff asserts in her 

complaint that she had knowledge of her vision impairment and her 

alleged injury during 2007 and 2008, yet despite her knowledge, waited 

to bring suit until more than 7 years after her claim accrued. (Dk. # 1,

Pg. ID 5-9). More specifically, Plaintiff states in her complaint that on 

February 2, 2007, she first became aware of a vision problem when she 

awoke to discover her vision was blurred. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 5, ¶ 22). 

February 2, 2007, is a full 8 years and 2 months from the date Plaintiff 

filed her complaint, well beyond the 3 year period of the statute of 

limitations. 

Even assuming February 2, 2007, was not the date Plaintiff 

became aware of her vision problem, Plaintiff surely knew by April 4, 

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2007, when she underwent a vision screening and was diagnosed with 

cataracts. April 4, 2007, was almost a full 8 years from the date 

Plaintiff filed her complaint, well beyond the 3 year period of the 

statute of limitations. Plaintiff may assert she was not fully aware of 

her injury until after her July 24, 2007 optometric screening, which 

revealed her vision had become more impaired; Plaintiff was again 

referred to Dr. Lavery. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 5). Unfortunately for Plaintiff, 

July 2007, was approximately 7 years and 8 months before the date 

Plaintiff filed her complaint, this too was well beyond the 3 year period 

of the statute of limitations. 

Plaintiff may assert her injury did not come until September 2007, 

when she was unable to continue her building trades courses due to her 

vision. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 6, ¶ 33). However, September 2007 is too

attenuated from March 30, 2015, to avoid being barred by the statute of 

limitations. Plaintiff may even assert her injury did not arise until 

November 14, 2007, when she filed a grievance related to her placement 

on regular rather than medical unemployable status, which she alleges 

resulted in her being denied privileges. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 7, ¶¶ 36-37). 

Even then, November 14, 2007, was approximately 7 years and 4.5 

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months from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint, well beyond the 3 

year period of the statute of limitations. 

Even assuming Plaintiff did not become “aware” of her injury until 

her 2008 cataract surgeries that is also too attenuated from the date 

she filed her complaint to constitute a claim not barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are clearly stale 

because her complaint was not filed until March 30, 2015. Given her 

filing date, claims that accrued prior to March 30, 2012, are barred by 

the statute of limitations. Therefore, this Court should dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims, as Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which 

relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. Plaintiff’s ADA claim is barred as she failed to bring it 

within the applicable 3 year statute of limitations. 

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits a 

public entity from discriminating against disabled individuals and 

states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

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Because there is no statute of limitations under the ADA, courts 

must borrow a statute of limitations from the most analogous state 

cause of action. McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 663-64 (6th 

Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit “has previously applied the statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions to an ADA claim . . . .” Id. The

McCormick Court analyzed Lewis v. Fayette County Detention Ctr., No. 

99–5538, 2000 WL 556132, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2000) (unpublished 

case), in which [t]he Court observed:

State statutes of limitations for personal injuries govern claims 

under the federal constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 [105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254] (1985). 

Under the same Wilson analysis, courts faced with ADA or 

Rehabilitation Act claims have also looked to the state's statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions.

Id. (citing Everett v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409-10 (11th 

Cir.1998); Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 550-51 

(7th Cir.1996)).

Again, Plaintiff did not file her complaint until March 30, 2015. 

Plaintiff’s complaint states that the incidents which gave rise to her 

cause of action occurred between 2007 and 2008. Plaintiff asserts in her 

complaint that she had knowledge of her vision impairment and her 

alleged injury during 2007 and 2008, yet despite her knowledge, waited 

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to bring suit until more than 7 years later. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 5-9). 

Plaintiff states in her complaint that on February 2, 2007, she first 

became aware of a vision problem when she awoke to discover her 

vision was blurred. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 5, ¶ 22). February 2, 2007, is a full 

8 years and 2 months from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint, well 

beyond the 3 year period of the statute of limitations. 

Plaintiff may assert she was not aware of her injury until 

September 2007, when she was discontinued from her building trade’s 

courses due to her vision impairment. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 6, ¶ 33). 

However, September 2007, is too attenuated from March 30, 2015, to 

qualify as a valid claim under the applicable statute of limitations. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff may assert her injury did not arise until 

November 14, 2007, when she filed a grievance related to her placement 

on regular rather than medical unemployable status, which she alleges 

resulted in her being denied certain privileges. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 7, ¶¶ 36-

37). Unfortunately, November 14, 2007, was approximately 7 years and

4.5 months from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint, well beyond the 3 

year period of the statute of limitations. Even assuming Plaintiff did 

not become “aware” of her injury until 2008, that time frame is too 

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attenuated from the date she filed her complaint to bring her claim 

within the applicable period of limitations. 

All told, Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act are clearly stale and because her complaint was not filed until 

March 30, 2015, claims that accrued prior to March 30, 2012, are barred 

by the statute of limitations. Therefore, this Court should dismiss 

Plaintiff’s ADA claims as the complaint fails to state a claim for which 

relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

III. Plaintiff’s ADA claim is moot as a judgment in her favor 

would not provide her with any cognizable recovery. 

A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the 

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. L.A. Cnty. v.

Davis, 440 US 625, 631 (1979), (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 US 

486, 496 (1969)). The Supreme Court has created a two-part test to 

determine whether a case is moot:

(1) When it can be said with assurance that “there is no 

reasonable expectation” that the alleged violation will recur, and

(2) When interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably 

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.

L.A. Cnty 440 U.S. at 631 (citations omitted). Additionally, “[A] case is 

moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a 

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legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Harmon v. Holder 758 F.3d 

728, 733 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing L.A. Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 

(1972)). A party has a cognizable interest in the outcome if he has 

“suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the 

government and if the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Harmon 758 F.3d at 733. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff’s alleged injury is unlikely to be redressed by 

favorable judicial determination, as she underwent a surgical procedure 

to correct her vision, allowing her to continue her normal prison 

routine. (See Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 8, ¶¶ 48-49). Moreover, Plaintiff is no 

longer in prison, as she has been on parole for a little over one year. As 

a result, any claims for injunctive relief Plaintiff may have are moot. 

Plaintiff’s alleged injury appears to be the result of her placement on 

regular as opposed to medical unemployable status. Plaintiff asserts 

that as a result of this she was not allowed to perform her porter duties, 

was harassed by MDOC employees, and denied certain privileges, 

which she alleges was tantamount to punishment. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 7). 

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Under the Supreme Court’s mootness test, it is the Defendants’ 

burden to prove that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged 

violation will recur and that any interim relief has eradicated the 

effects of the alleged violation. Under the first prong of the test, there is 

no reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will suffer another incident of 

the sort described in her complaint. Plaintiff’s denial of privileges, 

inability to continue her coursework, and inability to work in a prison 

assignment were linked to her vision impairment, which has been

surgically corrected. Under the second prong of the test, it can be said 

that Plaintiff has been afforded relief, because she had surgery to 

remove her cataracts, which allowed her to resume a normal prison 

routine. Plaintiff’s subsequent parole has mooted any claim for 

injunctive relief as she is no longer available for any prison work 

assignment. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s ADA claim is moot as her alleged injury 

cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Plaintiff’s alleged 

injury has already been addressed she has been provided corrective 

surgery, and any judgment in her favor would not provide Plaintiff with 

any cognizable relief.

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IV. Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their 

individual capacities are not cognizable, as the ADA 

does not allow for recovery from individuals; Plaintiff’s 

claim for punitive damages under the ADA is not 

cognizable as the ADA bars the recovery of punitive 

damages.

The ADA does not impose liability upon individuals acting in their 

individual capacities. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 501 n.7 (6th Cir. 

2009). Title II of the ADA does not, provide for suit against a public 

official acting in his individual capacity. Id. Furthermore, in Barnes v. 

Gorman, the Supreme Court held that “punitive damages may not be 

awarded in suits brought under the ADA. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 

181, 189 (2002). The Sixth Circuit has also held that “punitive damages 

are not available under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and so are not 

available . . . under Title II of the ADA. Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 

F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1998); Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 

F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 1996). 

Here, Plaintiff has sued the Defendants in both their individual 

and official capacities. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 2-4). Consequently, the 

Americans with Disabilities Act does not impose liability upon 

individuals in their individual capacities. As a result, Plaintiff’s request 

for relief fails to the extent she is requesting relief against the 

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Defendants in their individual capacities. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s 

complaint contains a request for punitive damages. (Dk. # 1, Pg. ID 11). 

To the extent Plaintiff requests punitive damages as to her ADA claim, 

her request cannot be recognized. The ADA does not allow for the 

recovery of punitive damages. 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

WHEREFORE, Defendant MDOC respectfully requests that this 

Court grant its’ motion and issue an order entering judgment in its

favor, dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against it with prejudice, and 

awarding further relief as this Court finds just and proper. 

Respectfully submitted,

Bill Schuette

Attorney General

/s/ A. Peter Govorchin

Assistant Attorney General

Attorney for MDOC Defendants

Corrections Division

P.O. Box 30217

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7021

P31161

Dated: April 21, 2015

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 21, 2015, I electronically filed the 

foregoing paper with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system 

which will send notification of such filing as well as via US Mail to all 

non-ECF participants.

/s/ A. Peter Govorchin

Assistant Attorney General

Attorney for MDOC Defendants

Corrections Division

P.O. Box 30217

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7021

govorchinp@michigan.gov

P31161

2015-0107135-A/Bruce, Cassandra/Motion to Dismiss

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