UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

March 15, 2007

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-12: TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS

INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN NUCLEAR

POWER REACTOR LICENSEES AND FIRST

RESPONDERS

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have

permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed

from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to

provide addressees information for achieving tactical communications interoperability between

licensees, Federal, State, and local first responders in the event of an emergency at a nuclear

power reactor. It is expected that recipients of this document will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to enhance tactical

communications interoperability. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC

regulatory requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

For the purpose of this IN, interoperability and tactical interoperable communications are terms

defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In general, interoperability refers

to the ability of emergency responders to work seamlessly with other systems or products

without any special effort. Wireless communications interoperability specifically refers to the

ability of emergency response officials to share information via voice and data signals on

demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized (Ref. 1). Tactical interoperable

communications is defined as the rapid provision of on-scene, incident-based, mission-critical

voice communications among all first responder agencies (i.e., emergency medical services

[EMS], fire, and law enforcement), as appropriate for the incident (Ref. 2).

There may be unforeseen instances where licensees may deplete their typical communication

resources such as land lines, cellular phones, or radio frequencies to the point where they need

to rely on a more robust system to maintain tactical communications interoperability with their

stakeholders, especially first responders. Policies, training, exercises, and procedures also play

a vital role in achieving tactical communications interoperability and ensure that a steady flow of

critical information is maintained between the licensee and first responders.

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Various examples of lapses in effective tactical communications interoperability have been

documented by response organizations. Specific examples include the responses to the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and to Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005. These

events have generated valuable lessons for Federal, State, and local response organizations. 

These lessons learned can apply to a major event response at a nuclear power reactor site

(i.e., hurricane, terrorist attack).

The following examples of enhanced communications are provided as a means for other

licensees, in coordination with State and local response agencies, to self-identify ways to

improve tactical communications interoperability. Each of the examples is intended to describe

different scenarios and challenges, and solutions implemented through collaboration with

Federal, State, and local public safety officials. 

Exelon Nuclear (Mid-West)

Exelon Nuclear (Mid-West) sites have enhanced tactical communications interoperability by

integrating their systems and processes in partnership with a broad range of State-wide

communications enhancements implemented by the State of Illinois. These enhancements

were coordinated by the State of Illinois Communications Committee using funding available

through the DHS Office of Training and Grants. Enhancements made to communications

capabilities to ensure interoperability include: 

 • Deploying mobile command vehicles around the State to provide work space for various

response agencies at the incident scene, as well as communications gear to patch

together local agency radio frequencies; 

 • Providing 700/800 MHz radios and digital very high frequency (VHF) radios to response

agencies in the State of Illinois to facilitate communications with first responders; 

 • Providing a satellite-based warning and alert system, capable of receiving simultaneous,

authenticated text messages from the State Emergency Operations Center, to county

emergency management agencies and other public safety agencies; 

 • Providing all hospitals in the State of Illinois with Medical Emergency Radio System of

Illinois radio units; and 

 • Providing transmitters and equipment to counties that did not have access to the State’s

inter-agency radio system (Illinois Radio Emergency Assistance Channel) to allow

response agencies within that county to communicate with each other.

Since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the State of Illinois has opened a new State

Emergency Operations Center. This center merges the State Incident Response Center, the

Illinois Emergency Management Agency 24-hour Communications Center, the Statewide

Terrorism and Intelligence Center, and the State Radiological Emergency Assessment Center

under a common facility. 

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (TPNP), in the State of

Florida, installed dedicated phone lines and other wireless communication methods to improve

tactical communications interoperability with local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) and State

and local response organizations. These modifications were subsequently evaluated following
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the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This evaluation revealed that responding

organizations’ communication equipment, in many cases, were not compatible or interoperable. 

TPNP subsequently procured a modular interface/interconnect system, available on-site, that

allowed for the patching of various licensee and first responder radio frequencies, cellular

phones, satellite phones, and land lines. A few challenges surfaced during the implementation

of this patching process. The licensee recognized the need to collaborate with the vendor in

developing procedures, installing the equipment in a weather-tight enclosure, testing the

equipment, and training of TPNP staff on equipment and procedural usage. An in-house

subject matter expert collaborated with the vendor and resolved these issues. Another

challenge related to site-shared frequencies with the LLEA was resolved when the LLEA

recognized the benefits of sharing radio frequencies with the licensee.

Fermi 2 Nuclear Generating Station 

Prior to 2000, Fermi 2 had one base station on the same frequency as Monroe County,

Michigan, the site’s host county. In preparation for millennial computer problems (i.e., Y2K or

year 2000 problems), the licensee purchased radio units, similar to ones owned by the Michigan

State Police, to aid in communications interoperability. This acquisition supported a similar

investment by Monroe County. The County used DHS grant resources to acquire the same

800 MHz radio system as the Michigan State Police and thus achieved interoperability between

local response units in the county and within the State. Subsequently, Fermi 2 purchased base

stations and additional portable units similar to the Michigan State Police radio system, thereby

further enhancing the site’s tactical communications interoperability with the county and the

State. 

Currently, the Fermi 2 security organization performs daily system radio checks with the county. 

Fermi 2 intends to assess the system performance and user proficiency during upcoming

security-related emergency preparedness drills.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) security organization has achieved a higher

level of tactical communications interoperability through enhancements to its 800-MHz

communication system. These enhancements involved the reprogramming of LLEA radios with

licensee communication software that improved communications with the licensee. The LLEA

was able to re-configure the channel frequency which the licensee was using into their existing

and newly purchased portable radios. The communications system works by creating an

additional CCNPP security channel for LLEA to switch to when they are enroute to respond to

an incident at the plant. These enhancements allow for the lines of communication with LLEA

responders to remain open and facilitate the appropriate handling of incident command and

control. This communications system can also be used to improve outside response to the site

by incorporating another frequency for local fire departments and EMS personnel.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

For the initial licensing of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), the licensee acquired radios,

as part of its site-trunked 800-MHz radio system, which shared at least one frequency with the

local fire department to ensure better communications during incident responses. More
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recently, local county authorities upgraded their radios to a digital (i.e., more efficient) 800-MHz

system and partnered with the PNPP site to ensure compatibility. In a joint effort between

PNPP and Lake County, Ohio, county departments reprogrammed their digital radios so that

both PNPP and the local fire department had at least two channels that were programmed to

operate in their common frequencies. PNPP further enhanced its capability to create additional

patched frequencies by using the county’s “Viper” frequency matching system and the State of

Ohio’s Buckeye State Sheriff Association Communication Vehicle. This capability was available

to patch in additional responders into PNPP’s security and the fire brigade common tracked

frequencies, such as county LLEAs, and fire, medical, and FBI responders.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

In addition to the examples provided above, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania)

has upgraded its communications capabilities since September 11, 2001. Pennsylvania

deployed an 800-MHz, non-scannable, encrypted data and voice system, which uses a virtual

Internet protocol network to create stable platforms for interoperable communications.

Pennsylvania has offered nuclear power reactor licensees within the Commonwealth access to

the system by means of providing a secure user profile that allows the site to become a party to

the Talk Group involved in the overall response to an incident. These prearranged Talk Groups

include the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, LLEAs, fire departments,

emergency medical services, hospitals, and other local response organizations. This system,

as designed, allows continuous communication with all stakeholders making possible the

exchange of voice and data, as needed. For example, the Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Protection through its Bureau of Radiation Protection is currently structured to

use this system to maintain interoperability between field teams during any response to

incidents at a commercial power reactor facility.

BACKGROUND

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, communications interoperability has

gradually improved nationally (Ref. 3). This improvement is partially due to financial support by

DHS and through coordinated efforts among Federal, State, and local first responders and

public safety officials. Nuclear power reactor sites rely on Federal, State and local first

responder resources to support the licensee’s response to an emergency. As such, effective

tactical communications is essential in the coordination of these offsite resources.

The DHS Office of Grants and Training (G&T) Interoperable Communications Technical

Assistance Program (ICTAP) is designed to enhance interoperable communications between

Federal, State, and local emergency responders and public safety officials (Ref. 4). The goal of

ICTAP is to enable local public safety agencies to communicate as they prevent or respond to

weapons of mass destruction attacks. ICTAP is associated with the Urban Area Security

Initiative (UASI) program. ICTAP works with State and local coordinating bodies to assess gaps

in the current communications infrastructure and determine the technical requirements for

designing an interoperable communications system. Recently, ICTAP has supported the

development of a Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) for 75 urban areas and

designated multi-jurisdictional metropolitan areas. 
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ICTAP and G&T are working together with SAFECOM to develop national interoperable

communications guidance. SAFECOM, a DHS program within the Under Secretary for Science

and Technology, has dedicated its resources to the selected UASI sites. Therefore these

resources are unavailable for private entities (Ref. 5). For example; under these guidelines,

SAFECOM has partnered with the Commonwealth of Virginia and developed a strategic plan for

improving Statewide communications interoperability, which is identified as the Statewide

Interoperability Communications Planning (SICP) methodology. SICP methodology uses a

10-phase collaborative planning process, shadowed by SAFECOM as the technical expert, to

develop and adopt key essential initiatives for a Statewide strategic plan (Ref. 6). 

Nuclear power reactor licensees that are located near the selected UASI sites could benefit

from the ongoing efforts to improve communications interoperability. However, these benefits

are currently hampered by the existing variations of governance structures, interoperable

equipment, equipment policies and procedures, incident communications resource plans, and

communications unit leadership (Ref. 7). Nevertheless, key essential initiatives, such as the

SICP methodology plan template, can be used as a tool by any organization committed to

improve communications interoperability, including NRC power reactor licensees and their

respective stakeholders.

In addition to the references provided in this IN, addressees can access more information

related to improving tactical communications interoperability at the following W eb sites:

 • Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/ta_ictap.htm

 • Office of Grants and Training 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/

 • Interoperable Communications User’s Handbook

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/equipment_interopcomm.htm

• Lessons Learned Information Sharing

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/

• SAFECOM

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/

• Interoperability Continuum

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitybasics/

1190_interoperabilitycontinuum.htm

• Interoperability Library (Interoperability in Virginia)

http://www.interoperability.virginia.gov/library.html
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DISCUSSION

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.54(q) requires nuclear power

plant licensees to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans that meet the standards in

10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Planning standard

10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) states that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal

response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

These requirements are amplified in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, “Criteria for

Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in

Support of Nuclear Power Plants,” Section II, “Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria,”

Subsection F, “Emergency Communications”. Subsection F.1 states that: 1) Each organization

shall establish reliable primary and backup means of communication for licensee, local, and

State response organizations and 2) such systems should be selected to be compatible with

one another. Additionally, Subsection F.3 states that each organization shall conduct periodic

testing of the entire emergency communication system (i.e., to ensure prompt communications

among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public).

Currently, no NRC requirements directly address or mandate communications interoperability

between nuclear power reactor licensees and first responders. Nevertheless, establishing such

communications interoperability could enhance a licensee’s ability to respond to an event or

emergency. 

NRC’s phone line conferencing system through the Headquarters Operations Center (HOC) is

available to all stakeholders who need to establish communications with each other, whenever

a need arises to address matters related to NRC-licensed facilities or materials. The NRC HOC

can always be reached on a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week basis.

REFERENCES

1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. SAFECOM: Interoperability. 

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/interoperability/default.htm.

2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Tactical Interoperable Communications

Scorecards Summary Report and Findings, January 2007.

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grants-scorecard-report-010207.pdf

3. Chertoff, M. May 8, 2006, Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at

the Tactical Interoperable Communications Conference. 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0281.shtm.

4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interoperable Communications Technical

Assistance Program (ICTAP). http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/ta_ictap.htm
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5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: G&T Information Bulletin No. 205,

March 23, 2006. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/info205.pdf

6. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, SAFECOM, Interoperability Case Studies: 

Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP) Methodology.

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitycasestudies/1223_sta

tewidecommunications.htm

7. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ICTAP Fact Sheet.

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/ICTAP_Fact_Sheet.pdf

CONCLUSION

This IN is intended to provide information for achieving tactical communications interoperability

and is presented solely to share information among nuclear industry stakeholders. It does not

contain a definitive solution to the wide range of current challenges to tactical communications

interoperability between power reactor licensees and Federal, State, and local first responders. 

This IN does not endorse specific tools, methods, or equipment that may be used to enhance

tactical communications interoperability. 

CONTACTS 

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any

questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA/

Michael J. Case, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Arlon O. Costa, NSIR Michael D. McCoppin, NSIR

301-415-6402 301-415-2737

E-mail: aoc@nrc.gov E-mail: mdm2@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site,

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.