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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

30 Nebraska Appellate Reports

WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

Amber J. Wood, appellant, v. 

Kenneth A. Bass, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed November 16, 2021. No. A-21-145.

1. Courts: Appeal and Error. The district court and higher appellate 

courts generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors 

appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms 

to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, 

capricious, nor unreasonable.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of 

law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

4. Issue Preclusion: Appeal and Error. The applicability of issue preclusion is a question of law on which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the court below.

5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In construing a statute, a court must 

determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature 

as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its 

plain, ordinary, and popular sense.

7. Trial: Parties: Pleadings. Ordinarily, a party may at any time invoke 

the language of his or her opponent’s pleadings on an issue being tried 

as rendering certain facts indisputable.

8. Pleadings: Waiver. The pleadings in a cause are, for the purposes of use 

in that suit, not mere ordinary admissions but judicial admissions and, as 

such, are a waiver of all controversy insofar as the opponent may desire 

to take advantage of them.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

9. Pleadings. Matters contained in pleadings in other cases are simple 

admissions.

10. Evidence. A simple admission is one that is admissible as evidence of 

the facts alleged therein and may be introduced and considered the same 

as any other evidence.

11. Issue Preclusion. Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of a finally 

determined issue that a party had a prior opportunity to fully and 

fairly litigate.

12. Judgments: Issue Preclusion. Issue preclusion applies where (1) an 

identical issue was decided in a prior action, (2) the prior action resulted 

in a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied was a party or was in privity with a party to the 

prior action, and (4) there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate 

the issue in the prior action.

13. Issue Preclusion. Issue preclusion applies only to issues actually 

litigated.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County, George 

A. Thompson, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County 

Court for Sarpy County, Todd J. Hutton, Judge. Judgment of 

District Court affirmed.

Michael F. Polk, of Watke, Polk & Sena, L.L.P., for appellant.

Jonathan M. Brown, of Walentine O’Toole, L.L.P., for 

appellee.

Riedmann, Bishop, and Arterburn, Judges.

Arterburn, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Amber J. Wood appeals from a decision of the district 

court for Sarpy County which affirmed the county court’s 

determination that Wood was not entitled to relief pursuant to 

her action brought under the Disposition of Personal Property 

Landlord and Tenant Act (Act), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 69‐2301 

to 69‐2314 (Reissue 2018 & Cum. Supp. 2020). The county 

court dismissed the case, finding that Wood did not establish 

that she and Kenneth A. Bass had formed a landlord‐tenant 
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

relationship. As a result, she was not entitled to relief under 

the Act. The district court affirmed. Upon appeal to this court, 

Wood argues that the lower courts erred in determining that a 

landlord‐tenant relationship did not exist between the parties. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Wood and Bass met in 2013 and became involved in an 

“arranged” and, at times, romantic relationship. In 2016, Bass 

invited Wood and her daughter to move into his residence with 

him. The parties’ relationship soured thereafter and ended early 

in 2017. Bass left the residence temporarily and sought to 

remove Wood from the residence. On March 29, Bass provided 

Wood with a “30 Day Notice to Terminate Lease,” requesting 

Wood to vacate the residence by May 1. On June 14, Bass initiated eviction proceedings by filing a complaint for restitution. 

In October, Wood vacated the residence involuntarily, but left 

a significant amount of her personal property inside. Bass did 

not initially grant Wood access to the residence in order for 

her to retrieve her property. Property belonging to Wood was 

placed in the garage by Bass and representatives of Wood were 

then allowed to remove it. However, once she was able to see 

her property, Wood noticed that some items were damaged and 

other items she believed to be hers were missing.

On October 12, 2017, Wood filed a complaint pursuant to 

the Act requesting damages equal to the value of the unreturned personal property, which she asserted was approximately $110,202. Attached to her complaint was a list of the 

property that she alleged was still in Bass’ possession, including multiple beds, televisions, area rugs, furniture, and other 

items which remained in Bass’ residence. Bass filed an answer 

denying the allegations and filed a counterclaim alleging that 

Wood was wrongfully withholding Bass’ personal property 

and requesting that Wood return any of his personal property 

in her possession. Trial was ultimately held on June 29, 2020, 

wherein both Wood and Bass testified.
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

Wood described her relationship with Bass. She explained 

that she and Bass had an “arranged” relationship, wherein 

she would be a companion to Bass for trips and other events. 

In exchange, Bass would purchase gifts for her. She also 

explained that she and Bass engaged in physical intimacy and 

professed that they loved each other. In 2016, Bass approached 

Wood about moving into his residence.

Wood testified as to her understanding of the agreement 

that persuaded her to move into Bass’ residence. Wood 

explained that when Bass approached her about moving into 

his residence in 2016, they had not been speaking to each 

other. According to Wood, she and Bass reached an agreement 

wherein she and her daughter would live in Bass’ house until 

Wood’s daughter graduated from high school, even if their 

relationship ended. She further explained that to live there, 

she agreed to be involved with Bass exclusively, to continue 

to be his companion for events and trips, and to fulfill various 

household duties. She conceded that she did not sign a lease 

prior to moving in.

Bass also testified regarding the arrangement he reached 

with Wood to live in his residence. Bass explained that he 

asked Wood to live with him in an effort to reconcile their 

relationship because he considered himself to be in love with 

Wood. He did not have an expectation that Wood would pay 

money for rent nor did he have her sign a lease. He testified 

that Wood never paid any money for rent. He noted that while 

Wood lived at the residence, he continued to live there and did 

not feel like he was excluded from the residence. When their 

romantic relationship ended in 2017, he attempted to remove 

her from his residence. He consulted a lawyer about the quickest way to remove Wood. He was advised that the quickest way 

was to give her a 30‐day notice to terminate the lease and to 

file a complaint for restitution of the premises. However, Bass 

explained that when he signed the 30‐day notice to terminate 

the lease, he did not believe that he was Wood’s landlord.

Wood testified that prior to Bass’ efforts to remove her, 

Bass had left the residence. She received the 30‐day notice to 
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

terminate the lease in March 2017. The 30‐day notice to terminate the lease stated the following:

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76‐1437(2), you are 

hereby notified that effective May 1, 2017, your landlord, . . . Bass is terminating the month to month tenancy 

regarding the residence . . . . As a result, you are required 

to vacate and surrender possession of the premises. If you 

fail to do so, legal proceedings will be instituted against 

you to recover possession of the premises, to recover 

damages, and to recover attorney fees.

YOU MUST VACATE THE RENTAL PREMISES 

BY NO LATER THAN MAY 1, 2017[.]

However, Wood did not leave the residence by May 1, 2017, 

because, as she testified at trial, she believed that she had an 

agreement to live in the house even if the relationship failed. 

Bass then filed a complaint for restitution in June 2017, in 

which he attached the 30‐day notice to terminate the lease. 

His complaint for restitution stated that “[p]ursuant to a prior 

agreement, [Wood] is residing at [Bass’] residence” and prayed 

for relief including possession of the premises. Although our 

record contains multiple motions to continue and orders with 

respect to the motions to continue, our record does not reflect 

if there was ever a restitution hearing or a judgment entered 

which granted possession of the residence to Bass. Wood 

testified that she could not remember if there was a hearing 

regarding restitution in the eviction proceedings because there 

had been so many delays. Nevertheless, Wood testified that 

the police removed her daughter from the residence in October 

2017 and that Wood was also barred from the residence. After 

leaving the residence, she continued to have discussions with 

Bass regarding possible arrangements if she wanted to stay in 

the house. When she was barred from the residence, she left 

a significant amount of property behind. Wood testified that 

Bass would not, initially, let her back into the residence to 

retrieve her personal property. She emailed Bass a list of property items that she wanted to retrieve. Although at trial Wood 
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

could not remember the date, she testified she was eventually 

allowed to retrieve the property Bass had placed in the garage. 

Wood’s uncle testified that he was allowed to go into the house 

and retrieve some items belonging to Wood’s daughter.

When Wood arrived at the residence, she observed that 

much of her property had been relocated to the garage. Upon 

opening the garage door, she observed that her property was 

in boxes and storage tubs that were stacked on top of each 

other. In addition, she observed damage to some of the items of 

property, including to some of her furniture. She created a list 

of property that was missing from the garage or that was damaged, which list was received into evidence. According to this 

list, she was missing numerous items of furniture, electronics, 

jewelry, and other items.

Bass testified that all of Wood’s property was removed 

from the house and placed in the garage on October 20, 2017. 

At that point, the property was made available to Wood. He 

testified that there was never an expectation Wood would pay 

rent and that no lease existed. He was never precluded from 

entering the residence, but did seek to remove Wood once the 

relationship ended. While he agreed that he signed documents 

identifying himself as “landlord,” he never believed that the 

nature of their relationship was that of a landlord and tenant. 

He testified that he signed the documents on the advice of former counsel.

The county court determined that, in order for Wood to 

recover under §§ 69‐2311 and 69‐2312 of the Act, there must 

be a landlord‐tenant relationship, which Wood failed to prove. 

The county court relied on Reeder v. Reeder, 217 Neb. 120, 

348 N.W.2d 832 (1984), in determining that the parties did 

not impliedly create a landlord‐tenant relationship, but instead 

lived together pursuant to a mutual agreement to live informally with each other as long as their interests remained similar. The county court dismissed Wood’s complaint to recover 

damages and dismissed Bass’ counterclaim requesting his personal property.
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

Wood appealed to the district court alleging that the county 

court erred in dismissing Wood’s complaint. Specifically, 

Wood alleged that the county court erred in failing to find 

Wood and Bass were in a landlord‐tenant relationship. Wood 

argued that Bass was precluded from asserting that there was 

no landlord‐tenant relationship because he judicially admitted that he was the landlord in the course of the eviction 

proceedings. Wood also argued that the eviction proceedings 

conclusively established that Bass was a landlord and Wood 

was a tenant; thus, Bass was estopped, as a matter of law, from 

relitigating the tenancy issues between the parties.

The district court affirmed the decision of the county court 

finding that Wood and Bass did not have a landlord‐tenant relationship. First, the district court found that Wood failed to demonstrate the existence of a rental agreement, that the premises 

were occupied for rent, and that the premises were occupied by 

Wood to the exclusion of others. The district court also found 

that while an express agreement to create a landlord‐tenant 

relationship is not necessary to form a landlord‐tenant relationship, the evidence must indicate that the parties intended to 

impliedly create such an arrangement, which Wood failed to do. 

The district court further found that the prior eviction proceedings were not dispositive in determining that a landlord‐tenant 

relationship was formed. In addition, the district court noted 

that Wood’s collateral estoppel argument failed because there 

was not a final judgment of the eviction proceedings in the 

record. The district court concluded that the county court’s 

decision was supported by competent evidence and was neither 

arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

Wood now appeals to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Wood assigns and argues that the lower courts erred in determining that no landlord‐tenant relationship formed between 

Wood and Bass and in failing to find that Bass was precluded 

from relitigating and denying that a landlord‐tenant relationship existed.
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] The district court and higher appellate courts generally 

review appeals from the county court for error appearing on 

the record. Schaefer Shapiro v. Ball, 305 Neb. 669, 941 N.W.2d 

755 (2020). When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing 

on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to 

the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither 

arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id.

[3] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an 

appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. Egan 

v. County of Lancaster, 308 Neb. 48, 952 N.W.2d 664 (2020).

[4] The applicability of issue preclusion is a question of law 

on which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent 

of the court below. Jordan v. LSF8 Master Participation Trust, 

300 Neb. 523, 915 N.W.2d 399 (2018).

ANALYSIS

Wood’s complaint requested damages for the lost and damaged property pursuant to the Act. Section 69‐2311 of the Act 

requires a residential landlord to surrender to a residential 

tenant any personal property not owned by the landlord that 

has been left on the premises after the tenant has vacated the 

residential premises and the tenant has requested the return of 

the property. Accordingly, Wood must show that Bass was a 

landlord and Wood was a tenant for her to receive the statutory 

relief she requested under the Act.

Language of Act.

[5,6] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation 

to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous. In re Adoption of Yasmin S., 308 

Neb. 771, 956 N.W.2d 704 (2021). In construing a statute, a 

court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent 

of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language 

of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular 

sense. Id.
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WOOD v. BASS

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Under the Act, the definition of “[l]andlord” includes an 

owner of furnished premises for rent. See § 69‐2302(1). The 

definition of “[t]enant” includes a person entitled under a 

rental agreement to occupy any premises for rent to the exclusion of others when such premises are used as a dwelling. See 

§ 69‐2302(6). The term “rent” is not defined under the Act; 

however, Nebraska appellate courts often turn to dictionaries 

to ascertain a word’s plain and ordinary meaning. See McEwen 

v. Nebraska State College Sys., 27 Neb. App. 896, 936 N.W.2d 

786 (2019). Merriam‐Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1054 

(11th ed. 2020) defines “rent” as usually a “fixed periodical 

return made by a tenant or occupant of property to the owner 

for the possession and use thereof”; especially, “an agreed sum 

paid at fixed intervals by a tenant to the landlord.”

Thus, we are tasked with determining whether Wood is a 

tenant and Bass is a landlord based on the foregoing definitions. To show that Wood is a tenant, she would need to show 

she is entitled under a rental agreement to occupy Bass’ house 

for rent to the exclusion of others. We note that Wood failed to 

produce any written rental agreement or lease. Bass testified 

that Wood did not sign a lease. Wood testified that she and Bass 

had an oral agreement that she could live in the residence with 

her daughter. In exchange, Wood would do various household 

duties, be a companion to Bass, and be with Bass exclusively. 

Wood admitted that she never paid any money to Bass to live 

there. Moreover, we note, as we did above, that Wood did not 

have exclusive use of the residence. Only after the romantic 

relationship ended between the parties did Bass attempt to 

remove Wood from the residence. Accordingly, we find that 

Wood failed to establish that she was a tenant and Bass was a 

landlord under the statutory definitions found in the Act.

Implied Landlord‐Tenant Relationship.

We also find, as did the county court and district court, that 

a landlord‐tenant relationship between Wood and Bass cannot 

be implied from the facts of this case. In Reeder v. Reeder, 

217 Neb. 120, 348 N.W.2d 832 (1984), the Nebraska Supreme 
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

Court was tasked with determining whether a landlord‐tenant 

relationship was formed when one of the appellants allowed his 

brother to live in the appellants’ house without an express contractual agreement. The Supreme Court explained that while 

the status of landlord and tenant generally arises from contract, 

an express agreement to create a landlord‐tenant relationship is 

not necessary. See id. Rather, the evidence must indicate that 

the parties intended to impliedly create such an arrangement, 

including that the tenant acquired certain rights and the landlord assumed certain obligations. See id. The Supreme Court, 

citing Friend v. Gem International, Inc., 476 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. 

App. 1971), noted that the essentials of the landlord‐tenant 

relationship are (1) a reversion in the landlord; (2) the creation 

of an estate in the tenant, either at will or for a term less than 

that for which the landlord holds; (3) the transfer of exclusive 

possession and control of the premises to the tenant; and (4) a 

contract, either express or implied between the parties. Reeder 

v. Reeder, supra. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that 

no implied landlord‐tenant relationship could be implied based 

on the facts of that case. See id.

Here, both the county court and the district court determined 

that the parties did not impliedly create a landlord‐tenant 

relationship. We agree with their conclusion. Although Bass 

invited Wood to live with him, he did so in an effort to reconcile their relationship. He did not ask Wood to sign a lease 

nor did he ask her to pay rent. Bass only sought to have Wood 

removed from the residence after their romantic relationship 

ended. While according to Wood, Bass may have left the residence on a temporary and voluntary basis when their relationship faltered, there is no evidence that he was excluded therefrom. Thus, there was not a transfer of exclusive possession 

and control of the premises. Rather, the evidence supports that 

Wood and Bass lived with each other and when the relationship 

ended, Bass sought to reassert his exclusive ownership interest 

in the premises. Accordingly, the county court’s determination 

conforms to the law and was supported by competent evidence 

adduced at trial.
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

Admissions Made by Bass.

Notwithstanding her other arguments as to the establishment of a landlord‐tenant relationship, Wood argues that in 

the prior eviction proceedings, Bass judicially admitted that he 

was Wood’s landlord and that the parties had a prior agreement 

which allowed Wood to live in the residence owned by Bass. 

Based on these purported admissions by Bass in the eviction 

proceedings, Wood argues that the issues of whether a prior 

agreement existed between the parties and that Bass was Wood’s 

landlord have been established and are now indisputable.

[7‐10] It is true that ordinarily, a party may at any time 

invoke the language of his or her opponent’s pleadings on an 

issue being tried as rendering certain facts indisputable. Miller 

v. Radtke, 230 Neb. 561, 432 N.W.2d 542 (1988). The pleadings in a cause are, for the purposes of use in that suit, not mere 

ordinary admissions but judicial admissions and, as such, are a 

waiver of all controversy insofar as the opponent may desire 

to take advantage of them. Knoell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hanson, 

205 Neb. 305, 287 N.W.2d 435 (1980). However, judicial 

admissions must occur within judicial proceedings and within 

the case being tried. State v. Burke, 23 Neb. App. 750, 876 

N.W.2d 922 (2016). Matters contained in pleadings in other 

cases are simple admissions. Cook v. Beermann, 202 Neb. 

447, 276 N.W.2d 84 (1979). A simple admission is one that 

is admissible as evidence of the facts alleged therein and may 

be introduced and considered the same as any other evidence. 

See TNT Cattle Co. v. Fife, 304 Neb. 890, 937 N.W.2d 811 

(2020). Accordingly, a simple admission should be given such 

weight as the trier of fact deems it entitled in the light of the 

pleader’s explanation, if any, of the circumstances under which 

the admissions were made. Id.

In the present case, the admissions from Bass that he was a 

landlord and that there was a prior agreement were made in a 

separate eviction proceeding. Consequently, these admissions 

are simple admissions. The county court had the opportunity 

to consider these simple admissions and weigh the admissions appropriately in light of the explanations given in court. 
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WOOD v. BASS

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 391

Bass testified that at the time that he filed his complaint for 

restitution, he did not believe himself to be in a landlord‐tenant 

relationship with Wood. Instead, he testified that he relied on 

the advice of legal counsel as to how to most quickly remove 

Wood from his residence. He also testified that there was not 

a signed lease and that Wood did not pay any money to him 

while she lived there. He further explained that the purpose of 

Wood’s moving into the residence was to reconcile the relationship because he was in love with Wood. In contrast to Bass’ 

explanation for Wood’s moving in with him, Wood testified 

that the parties had an arrangement where in exchange for her 

living in Bass’ residence, Wood would maintain an exclusive 

relationship with Bass, would continue to attend events with 

him, and would complete various household duties. She further 

testified that Bass promised her that even if the relationship 

became irreparable, she would not have to leave until after her 

daughter graduated from high school.

The county court heard the testimony of both Bass and 

Wood and made a determination as to how much weight to 

give the admissions made by Bass in the eviction pleadings. 

Given the county court’s determination, it apparently believed 

that the greater weight of the testimony presented at trial, 

including Bass’ explanation of how the eviction proceedings 

came about, overcame any of Bass’ admissions made therein. 

The county court clearly considered the testimony of both 

parties that demonstrated that Bass did not require Wood to 

sign a lease or pay money for rent. The court also considered 

Bass’ testimony that he merely sought to remove Wood from 

the residence in the quickest manner available when their 

relationship ended. Appellate courts do not reweigh the testimony or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses on appeal. See

Benjamin v. Bierman, 305 Neb. 879, 943 N.W.2d 283 (2020). 

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the county 

court did not err in finding that the prior admissions made in 

the eviction action were not judicial admissions that were dispositive of determining whether a landlord‐tenant relationship 

was formed between the parties.
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Issue Preclusion.

Wood further argues that Bass is precluded as a matter of 

law, through issue preclusion, from relitigating the landlord‐tenant relationship between the parties because Bass’ eviction 

proceedings against Wood definitively determined any tenancy 

issues with respect to the parties.

[11‐13] Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of a finally 

determined issue that a party had a prior opportunity to fully 

and fairly litigate. Hara v. Reichert, 287 Neb. 577, 843 N.W.2d 

812 (2014). Issue preclusion applies where (1) an identical 

issue was decided in a prior action, (2) the prior action resulted 

in a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom 

the doctrine is to be applied was a party or was in privity with 

a party to the prior action, and (4) there was an opportunity to 

fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action. Id. Issue 

preclusion applies only to issues actually litigated. Id.

In State ex rel. Douglas v. Morrow, 216 Neb. 317, 343 

N.W.2d 903 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed whether 

issue preclusion would apply in a case where the final judgment was not offered by the party seeking to invoke issue 

preclusion. The appellant alleged that the civil action enjoining him from operating or participating in the operation of a 

private school for children without complying with the school 

laws of Nebraska was barred because of his acquittal in a previous criminal prosecution. See id. The appellant placed into 

evidence a record of the testimony offered in the prosecution 

but did not offer any evidence of either the charge filed or the 

exact judgment rendered. Id. The Supreme Court stated that 

the analysis which needs to be made in resolving whether collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies requires a study of 

the operative pleadings and judgment, as well as the evidence 

adduced in a prior proceeding. Id. The court noted that since 

it did not have the operative pleadings and judgment, there 

was a defect in the proof of the prior litigation that prevented 

it from performing the required analysis. The court went on 

to conclude, however, that it was well established that an 
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acquittal or dismissal in a prior criminal prosecution is no bar 

to the prosecution of a later civil action. Id. Therefore, even if 

the appellant had provided an adequate record, the State would 

not have been precluded from bringing the civil action.

Here, Wood has failed to provide an adequate record from 

which a determination of issue preclusion could be made. The 

record supplied from the eviction proceeding contains only the 

complaint for restitution, a general denial, and several motions 

and orders for continuance. The record does not contain either 

the final judgment in the eviction proceeding, the evidence 

adduced in the hearing, or any indication of whether a hearing was conducted. Wood did testify that her daughter was 

removed from the residence and that Wood, herself, was subsequently barred from the residence as well. However, she also 

testified that she does not recall whether a hearing with respect 

to the eviction proceeding occurred. Ultimately, because the 

final judgment and any evidence adduced during a hearing in 

that proceeding was not produced, neither the county court nor 

any reviewing court is able to perform the analysis necessary 

to determine whether issue preclusion can apply. Based on the 

record before us, we cannot say that Wood met her burden of 

proof that issue preclusion would apply in the present case. See

State v. Gerdes, 233 Neb. 528, 446 N.W.2d 224 (1989) (establishing that burden of proof for application of issue preclusion 

is upon litigant who seeks to rely upon doctrine of issue preclusion). Therefore, we find no error by the county court or the 

district court.

CONCLUSION

We find, as did the district court, that the county court did 

not err in determining that the parties were not in a landlord‐tenant relationship. Because Wood’s complaint was brought 

pursuant to the Act, which only applies to litigants in a 

landlord‐tenant relationship, we likewise affirm the decision 

of the district court finding that the county court did not err in 

dismissing Wood’s petition.

Affirmed.