UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PARRISH REDD,

Plaintiff, No. 14-14340

v. District Judge Marianne O. Battani

Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen

TERRANCE VAILS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

 /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On November 12, 2014, Plaintiff Parrish Redd filed a pro se civil complaint

alleging copyright infringement. Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss on the

Pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) filed by Defendants Marty Peters and Chris Hugan

[Doc. #79] and Defendant Terrance Vails [Doc. #80],1 which have been referred for a

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons

discussed below, I recommend that both motions be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff’s

complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. I further recommend that Defendants

Donnie James Overton, Alonzo L. Everett, and Robert Spearman, Jr. be sua sponte

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and that Mr. Redd be barred from filing any future

1

 Defendant Vails, who is proceeding without counsel, has adopted and

incorporated the arguments of Defendants Peters and Hugan.

-1-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 1 of 9 Pg ID 1210
complaints against these Defendants or involving the film “Pawn Shop” without first

requesting and obtaining leave of the Court.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that he owns the copyright on a movie and a screenplay titled

“Pawn Shop.” Complaint [Doc. #1], ¶¶ 7-8. He alleges that Defendants have reproduced,

distributed, and displayed his copyright protected work, resulting in economic harm to

him and the unjust enrichment of the Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 9-19. He brings a claim of

Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, et seq.

On April 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a previous copyright infringement lawsuit in this

Court, also involving the Pawn Shop film and screenplay, and naming Messrs. Hugans

and Peters, as well as Ozone Music and Sound.2

 His co-plaintiff was Paris Deior Studios,

LLC. See E.D. Mich. No. 13-11809. The case was assigned to the Hon. Arthur J.

Tarnow. On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed yet another Pawn Shop/copyright action in this

Court, titled Paris Deior Studios, LLC v. Music Video Distributors, Inc., E.D. Mich. No.

13-12315. That case was initially assigned to the Honorable Victoria A. Roberts, who

reassigned it to Judge Tarnow as a companion case. Judge Tarnow permitted Fidelity

Capital Group (“Fidelity”) to intervene. Fidelity claimed an interest in the Copyrighted

Work.

On November 18, 2013, Judge Tarnow granted summary judgment to all

2

 Hugans and Peters are agents of Defendant Ozone.

-2-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 2 of 9 Pg ID 1211
Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement. No. 13-11819, Doc. #46. 

Judge Tarnow found the following facts: (1) On September 1, 2009, Plaintiff and the coauthors of the Copyrighted Work (“Pawn Shop”) transferred the exclusive right to the

copyrighted work to Paris Deior Studios, LLC (“Paris Deior”); (2) the purchase

agreement effecting this transfer provided “that Plaintiff Paris Deior alone has the right to

any cause of action relating to the Copyrighted Work”; (3) Paris Deior’s rights to the

Copyrighted Work “were subsequently transferred to Defendant Fidelity through the state

court default judgments against both Plaintiff Paris Deior and Plaintiff Redd”; 

(4) on February 29, 2012, the state court entered a default judgment in favor of Fidelity

and against Paris Deior, giving Fidelity full and exclusive use of the Copyrighted Work,

and allowing Fidelity to file a lien with the U.S. Copyright Office. Paris Deior never

appealed the default judgment; (5) Plaintiff Redd’s claims that the recordation of the

default judgment with the Copyright Office and the default judgment itself were falsified

“are not supported by the evidence”; (6) On September 14, 2012, Fidelity recorded its

judgment lien on the Copyrighted Work with the Copyright Office; and (7) On December

3, 2012, the state court entered a default judgment in favor of Fidelity and against

Plaintiff Redd, giving Fidelity full use of the Copyrighted Work to recoup its damages.

Judge Tarnow then ruled as follows:

“Because Defendants have shown that all rights to the Copyrighted Work

were transferred to now dismissed Plaintiff Paris Dieor and then to

Defendant Fidelity, there are no material questions of fact as to Plaintiff’s

copyright infringement claim. Therefore, Defendants’ Motions for

-3-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 3 of 9 Pg ID 1212
Summary Judgment are GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Copyright

Infringement claim.” Id. at 9.

Defendants now seek dismissal based on res judicata.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is subject to the same standards of review as a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1998). Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) provides

for dismissal of a complaint “for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff’s

factual allegations as true, and asks whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to

legal relief. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2001). 

In assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the court must first determine

whether a complaint contains factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., 556 U.S. at 676

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S 544, 555 (2007)). Second, the facts that

are pled must show a “plausible” claim for relief, which the Court described as follows:

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as

the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But

-4-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 4 of 9 Pg ID 1213
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not

shown–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants Hugan, Peters, and Vails

Defendants seek dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Under federal law, the

application of res judicata based on a prior judgment brings into play the following

elements: (1) a final judgment on the merits of the earlier action; (2) the claims asserted in

both suits are sufficiently related and founded upon the same transaction, arise out of the

same nucleus of operative facts, and seek redress for essentially the same basic wrong;

and (3) both actions involve the same parties or their privies. Coleman v. Martin, 363 F.

Supp. 2d 894, 901 (E.D. Mich. 2005), citing Kale v. Combined Insurance Co. of America,

924 F.2d 1161, 1165 (1st Cir.1991). To be in privity with a party to the earlier action, it is

only necessary that the current Defendant’s interests were adequately represented by a

defendant in the earlier action. United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir.

2007)(citing Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 481

(6th Cir.1992)).

Under this test, the Defendants are entitled to dismissal on the basis of res

judicata. Defendants Peters and Hugans were named defendants in the prior case before

Judge Tarnow, No. 13-11819. There was a final judgment on the merits in that case when

Judge Tarnow entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The claim asserted

-5-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 5 of 9 Pg ID 1214
in the previous suit is identical to the claim asserted in the present case–copyright

infringement regarding the film “Pawn Shop,” the same Copyrighted Work that is the

subject of the present case. The operative facts underlying both cases are identical.

Moreover, although Terrance Vails was not a defendant in the previous action, his

interests were adequately represented by Peters and Hugans, who prevailed based on

Judge Tarnow’s finding that by virtue of state court judgments, Plaintiff did not have an

interest in the Copyrighted Work. This finding completely vindicated Vail’s interests. In

addition, Judge Tarnow rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the state court default judgment

against him was fraudulent.

In his responses to the Defendants’ motions [Doc. #82 and #83], Plaintiff does not

address the res judicata argument or the impact of his previous lawsuit before Judge

Tarnow. Rather, he argues that Defendants are barred from contesting liability because

they are in default. They are not. Plaintiff has filed numerous, repetitive motions for

default judgment, all of which have been denied. In my Report and Recommendation of

January 29, 2016, I recounted the many unsuccessful motions for default judgment that

Plaintiff had filed up to that point, and I stated:

“We’ve been through this too many times. The Court has already ruled that

Plaintiff is not entitled to a Clerk’s entry of default or a default judgment,

and has clearly explained the basis of those rulings to Plaintiff. The present

motions should be denied in short order.”

Defendants Hugan, Peters, and Vails are therefore entitled to dismissal. 

-6-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 6 of 9 Pg ID 1215
B. Defendants Overton, Everett, and Spearman

Defendants Donnie James Overton, Alonzo L. Everett, and Robert Spearman, Jr.

have not been served. Nevertheless, the Court may sua sponte dismiss the claims against

them as frivolous, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). This Court has the inherent authority to

dismiss a frivolous case. “[A] district court may, at any time, dismiss sua sponte a

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible,

attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”

Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,

536 (1974)). As as both Judge Tarnow and the state court ruled, Plaintiff no longer has an

enforceable interest in the Copyrighted Work. That being the case, he cannot sustain a

claim of copyright infringement. His complaint is therefore “devoid of merit” and “no

longer open to discussion.” These Defendants should therefore be dismissed.

C. Defendants’ Request for Injunctive Relief

Defendants also request the Plaintiff be enjoined from filing further lawsuits

against them. To be sure, Plaintiff’s litigation tactics in this case and in other cases have

been abusive, and his unsubstantiated claims of fraud and chicanery have unnecessarily

multiplied the Defendants’ legal costs. However, rather than enjoining Plaintiff from

filing any further lawsuits, the remedy that would strike a more appropriate balance

between Plaintiff’s right to file a lawsuit and Defendants’ interest in being free of

-7-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 7 of 9 Pg ID 1216
harassment would be to require Plaintiff to obtain leave of the court before filing any

further actions regarding these Defendants or “Pawn Shop.”

IV. CONCLUSION

I recommend that Defendants Hugan and Peters’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #79]

and Defendant Terrance Vails’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #80] be GRANTED, and that

these Defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I further recommend that Defendants Donnie James Overton, Alonzo L. Everett,

and Robert Spearman, Jr. be sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

I further recommend that Plaintiff Parrish Redd, or any entity owned or controlled

by him, be barred from filing any future complaints against the Defendants in this case, or

involving the film “Pawn Shop,” unless he first requests and obtains leave of the Court.

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen

(14) days of service of a copy hereof, including weekends and intervening holidays, as

provided for in 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file

specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932

F.2d 505 (6th

 Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th

 Cir. 1981). Filing of

objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not

preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis

-8-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 8 of 9 Pg ID 1217
v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th

 Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local

231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy

of any objections is to be served upon this Magistrate Judge.

Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed

objections, including weekends and intervening holidays, the opposing party may file a

response. The response shall be not more than twenty (20) pages in length unless by

motion and order such page limit is extended by the court. The response shall address

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections.

s/R. Steven Whalen 

R. STEVEN WHALEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: February 21, 2017

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record on

February 21, 2017, electronically and/or by U.S. mail.

s/Carolyn M. Ciesla 

Case Manager 

-9-

2:14-cv-14340-MOB-RSW Doc # 86 Filed 02/21/17 Pg 9 of 9 Pg ID 1218