U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

57–664 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–115] 

FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FULL COMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JANUARY 20, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

DAVE KILDEE, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN CHAPLA, Professional Staff Member 

JAMES WEISS, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, January 20, 2010, Findings of the Department of Defense Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood .............................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, January 20, 2010 ................................................................................ 37 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2010 

FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT 

REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Clark, Adm. Vern, USN (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval Operations .................... 6 

West, Hon. Togo, Former Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Former Secretary of the Army ............................................................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 44 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 41 

West, Hon. Togo, joint with Adm. Vern Clark ............................................... 46 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 20, 2010. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room HVC 

210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. On November 5, 2009, a gunman 

opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. 

In line at the center were soldiers preparing for deployment to combat zones overseas by completing last-minute administrative tasks. 

Thirteen people were killed and 43 were wounded on the U.S. 

Army base on United States soil. 

The alleged gunman, Army Major Nidal Hasan is an active duty 

Army psychiatrist. As of today, he has been charged under Article 

118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice with 13 counts of premeditated murder and Article 80 of attempted premeditated murder. 

I am troubled by the fact that it would appear that some of the 

circumstances that led to the shooting were the result of military 

officers not following existing policies and procedures. Specifically 

there are numerous stories in the press, NPR, AP, MSNBC, CNN, 

Fox News and others, that the alleged shooter’s raters and senior 

raters failed to document negative information in his official record. 

We have questions. 

Why did it happen? Could it have been prevented? Was the response adequate? More importantly, we all share the same intent 

to ensure that everything possible is done, that this does not happen again. There are several task forces and panels examining 

these very questions. 

Today we hear from the first of these groups to issue a report. 

The independent review related to Fort Hood—Secretary Gates 

chartered the review soon after the shooting and gave them 45 

days to quickly examine the Department of Defense’s programs, 

policies and procedures related to force protection, emergency response, and support of health care providers, and oversight on the 

alleged perpetrator prior to the shooting. 

To co-chair this independent review, Secretary Gates picked two 

seasoned senior leaders. One is the Secretary of Veteran Affairs 
2 

and Secretary of the Army, Togo West; and the former Chief of 

Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for your service and look forward to 

hearing your findings. 

It is also worth noting that Secretary West is no stranger to this 

type of initial review. He co-chaired the independent review group 

created by Secretary Gates following the disclosure of deficiencies 

regarding Walter Reed in 2007. We hope our witnesses will address 

the adequacy of our force protection, emergency response policies to 

identify service members with radical or violent tendencies before 

they may hurt others. I am particularly concerned, though, about 

the system of officer evaluation in the Army and other services. 

The performance report—the Army calls it the OER—must accurately reflect the strengths and weaknesses of officers. Problems 

must not be passed from one assignment to another. 

This hearing continues the committee’s oversight of these issues 

that began in several briefings at the end of last year. We will continue this oversight in the coming weeks and months. I said from 

the outset that we must take great care that our inquiries into the 

shooting do not compromise or imperil the prosecution of the alleged gunman in any way. We will continue our inquiries in a 

thoughtful and deliberative manner that will not undermine the 

legal case against the alleged shooter. 

I would also remind the members of the conditions under which 

the Department shared the annex associated with this report, that 

we would not discuss its contents publicly and ask that members 

respect those conditions. The primary concern of this committee is 

the safety of all those who serve and/or support our armed forces. 

We owe this to our service members and the Department of Defense [DOD] civilians and, of course, the family members. 

At this time, I turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. 

McKeon, the gentleman from California, for his remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary West and Admiral Clark, I join Chairman Skelton in 

welcoming you and thanking you, again, for answering, once again, 

the call to duty to serve your country. You had a short time to develop your findings and recommendations, and I compliment both 

of you with regard to their breadth and scope. 

In short, you have documented and highlighted the lack of preparedness by the Department of Defense and by this nation to first 

recognize and then deal effectively and comprehensively with the 

existing and growing internal domestic terrorist threat. This threat 

is not a Department of Defense problem alone. As your report 

points out, an integrated synchronized nationwide effort will be 

necessary to ensure national preparedness to prevent and respond 

to future domestic acts of terror. 

Major Hasan may have been an individual actor in the Fort Hood 

shooting, but the radicalization of an officer who took an oath to 
3 

support and defend the constitution of the United States against all 

enemy, foreign and domestic and to bear truth, faith, and allegiance to the Constitution should send shock waves through all 

Americans as to the power and reach of an enemy like Al Qaeda 

in Yemen to generate such radicalism among other U.S. citizens. 

Al Qaeda in Yemen declared war on the United States with the 

attack on the USS Cole in 2000. While the U.S. has taken actions 

to curb their power and influence as an external threat, this nation 

and its allies seemingly have also taken action to assist in the organization’s growth. 

For example, in 2006, the escape of 23 members of Al Qaeda 

from a maximum security Yemeni prison, including several who attacked the Cole, led to the formation of Al Qaeda on the Arabian 

Peninsula. The 2007 release from Guantanamo Bay of Said Ali 

Shari, one of the first detainees at that prison, allowed him to join 

Al Qaeda in Yemen and to help plan the Christmas Day attack on 

Northwest Flight 253. 

Moreover, the nation has not learned the lesson from September 

11th that organizations that have information about potential or 

actual terrorists must share that information with all who might 

act to prevent terrorist activities. As is becoming apparent, such 

was not the case in either the November attack by Major Hasan, 

who had Internet contact with Al Qaeda in Yemen, or the attempted Christmas day bombing of Northwest Flight 253 by a terrorist acting under orders of Al Qaeda in Yemen. 

With regard to the Fort Hood shootings, your report is clear that 

Major Hasan’s supervisors were aware of his shortcomings as an 

officer and medical professional and failed to act appropriately, and 

the report is strangely silent on whether or not Major Hasan gave 

any clear evidence of his radicalization or whether there were any 

substantive clues about that radicalization that his supervisors 

should have acted upon. I hope that your testimony will address 

these issues. 

The report also points out numerous personnel policy shortfalls 

that contribute to the Department’s unpreparedness to deal with 

internal threats. Among the many findings, there was criticism of 

current policies, practices and procedures related to identifying potentially violent behaviors, information sharing, the accommodation 

of religious practices, counterintelligence activities in cyber space, 

and definitions of and responses to prohibited activities. 

Although you make no specific recommendations as to how to resolve these issues, you are clearly suggesting that these policies, 

practices and procedures need to be refocused, tightened and implemented with renewed vigor. Such a course of action suggests the 

possibility for closer government scrutiny by DOD and other agencies, for example, of various electronic social media, such as 

Facebook, Twitter and Web pages and e-mails of U.S. citizens. The 

report is silent on how much initiative should be balanced against 

the First Amendment and privacy concerns. I would be interested 

in your views on this issue. 

Finally, you made six recommendations for immediate action. I 

would hope that, in your testimony and the follow-on questions, 

you could address three of them in detail and why you singled out 

these three from among all the other recommendations for imme-
4 

diate action: Number one, the need to synchronize continental 

United States DOD emergency management systems with the national emergency framework; two, the DOD enhancement of the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force; and three, the creation of a DOD entity to concentrate in one place the DOD effort to gather, analyze 

and interpret data useful for identifying indicators of potential violent action and to create a comprehensive and usable catalog of 

those indicators that can be updated continuously and made available throughout the DOD and the military services. 

In closing, I want to thank you again for your past and continuing service to this nation. Your report is a significant first step 

in identifying the areas that need to be improved if this nation is 

to be safe from internal domestic terrorist activities. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Now the witnesses. 

The Honorable Togo West. 

Secretary West. 

Secretary WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might, Mr. 

Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Make sure the—— 

Secretary WEST. There we go. I have it now. Thank you, sir. I 

wonder if you have our written statement, I wondered if we can 

submit it to you for inclusion in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. Both written statements will be submitted in the record without objection. 

Secretary WEST. We will take just a few minutes, Admiral Clark 

and I, to hit some highlights that we would like to call to your attention. I will go first, and then, with your permission, he will pick 

up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. We look forward to it. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOGO WEST, FORMER SECRETARY OF 

THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

Secretary WEST. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services, as pointed 

out, more than two months ago, on November 5th, 13 people died, 

12 members of the uniformed military and one civilian; and 43 

were wounded from a lone gunman who walked into the Soldier 

Readiness Center in Fort Hood and began firing. It was a day of 

tragedy, and it will be remembered as such. 

Shortly after that event, Secretary Gates empanelled this review 

and asked Admiral Clark and me to chair it, and as has already 

been noted, we did so, and the report has been submitted to him, 

and it is now before you. 

They asked us to take a careful look at personnel policies, at procedures for force protection, emergency response measures and support of those who provide medical care to those who serve. He also 

asked us to take a look at how the Army applied its policies and 

procedures to the alleged perpetrator. 
5 

Briefly, we organized ourselves into five teams, each led by a 

senior official, and each was assigned one of those—the first four 

tasks and also the fifth task. The reports from each of those are 

in the report before you as taken by us and viewed by us, edited 

by us and changed to reflect—and modified to reflect our view on 

what could be concluded, what could be findings, what could be recommendations. 

There is, in the beginning, on Chapter 1, a one-page summary 

of what we saw and found and concluded with respect to the alleged perpetrator. And as the chairman has noted, the remainder 

of it, the details are in the restricted annex, which is available to 

you. 

We did not, because there was already underway, look into the 

intelligence aspects. That was assigned to a different review, and 

we were directed in our terms of reference to avoid interfering with 

it. 

We did not, because it is under control of military justice authorities, look into the criminal aspects of this matter. Again, we were 

instructed not to interfere with that, and similarly the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] has had a separate review going forward to look into the sharing of information portions that have to 

do with them. 

Nonetheless, our mandate was widespread. It was directed towards having us look to find gaps and deficiencies, as the Secretary 

mentioned, in policies, procedures, practices by the Department of 

Defense and the services across the board. 

With respect to the alleged perpetrator, you will note that we 

state openly in Chapter 1 that several military officers did not 

apply Army policies to the alleged perpetrator. We also recommended that that finding and similar findings that are reflected 

in the annex be referred by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army for review as to responsibility, accountability, 

and such other action as he shall deem appropriate. He has done 

so. The referral has been made. The Army has that review underway now. 

Before I turn this over to Admiral Clark to fill in some details 

with respect to the review and the report that you have, three observations I think are important to point out. First, what we 

learned is that there is never enough preparation. There is never 

too much preparation. Authorities at Fort Hood had already anticipated a possible mass casualty event, as reflected in their emergency response plans. And their response on that day showed that 

preparation. 

Two minutes and 40 seconds after the 911 call was received, first 

responders were on the scene of the shooting. By first responders, 

I refer specifically to members of the Fort Hood security team. A 

minute and a half after their arrival, the assailant was incapacitated. Two minutes and 50 seconds later, two ambulances and an 

incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived and began 

to provide life-saving health care. With that response, lives were 

saved. 

And yet 13 people died. Scores more were wounded. We can prepare better. We must plan with greater attention and we must 
6 

make the effort to look around the corners of our future and anticipate the next potential event in order to deflect it. 

Secondly, we need to pay attention to today’s hazards. The fact 

is, we need to understand the forces that cause an individual to 

radicalize, to commit violent acts, and thereby to make us vulnerable from within. 

Thirdly, there is much in this report that is about violence, violence by a service member against his or her colleagues. The effort 

is to detect the indicators that one might commit acts of violence, 

to catalog them, to make them available of the persons who need 

to know what are the indicators and where have the indicators 

been noted and then to prepare ourselves to act when that evidence 

is before us, to make it available to our commanders so that they 

can act and to be clear about their authority. 

On further note, as has been pointed out, we were asked to do 

this report within 45 days. The Secretary clearly had in mind that 

there would be follow-on reviews of what we would come up with. 

For that reason, although we have cast our net widely, there is— 

there were also boundaries simply in terms of what the 129 or so 

souls who are committed to our leadership could accomplish. And 

thus you will find there is space left for the follow-on reviews. 

Often our recommendations account in terms with the need to 

pay closer attention and to closer review that. 

That, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member and members of 

the committee, is how we structured ourselves. 

And now if I may turn to Admiral Clark. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary West and Admiral 

Clark can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we welcome you at our hearing. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. VERN CLARK, USN (RET.), FORMER 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, it is a privilege to be here 

again today to take this opportunity to talk to you about the review 

that Secretary West and myself have co-led. So let me get right to 

it. I know you have questions. 

First, let me talk briefly about force protection. The principal 

message is this: There are many policies, dozens of policies, in the 

Department about force protection. We have built lots of barriers 

since 9/11. That said, existing policies are not optimized for the internal threat, and the threat that we saw, witnessed at the Fort 

Hood incident was evolving inside the barriers. 

Second, let’s talk about ID-ing employees who can be a threat in 

this kind of circumstance. It is a difficult challenge. The reality is 

that there is insufficient knowledge and guidance to identify individuals. Guidance concerning workplace violence and the potential 

for self-radicalization or radicalization in general, as Secretary 

West indicated, is insufficient, and the key here is that we focused 

on violence of any kind. What we found was a lack of clarity for 

comprehensive indicators which then limit the commanders’ or the 

supervisor’s ability to recognize these potential threats, and so it 

doesn’t matter if we are looking at somebody who might be inclined 
7 

to hurt themselves—and by the way, the Secretary of Defense had 

that specifically in our terms of reference, incidents of suicide or 

criminal and gang behavior or somebody advocating supremacist 

activity and doctrine or family violence or the evolving threat, like 

radicalization, identifying the key indicators is critical to focusing 

the force on the threat. 

So our focus was on violence that comes from any kind of behavior. But what we found especially was that policies on the internal 

threat are inadequate. Prohibited behaviors and actions need to be 

addressed. And our report says specifically that such guidance exists, but it is incomplete for the day in which we live. 

Let me talk briefly about information sharing. The Secretary of 

Defense indicated Friday in his reaction to our review that we saw 

a requirement to create the ability to adapt rapidly in the changing 

security environment which exists today. Anticipating new threats, 

bringing a widely continuously evolving range of tools and techniques and programs into play. Robust information sharing is absolutely critical. Along with that, the command-and-control system to 

convert information into real decisions and real actions. It requires 

active information gathering, and we must remove the barriers, all 

of the barriers. Information sharing is a key element allowing decision makers to connect the dots. We have got to get the information, these indicators, to the appropriate levels of command. 

And let me speak briefly about the response that we saw at Fort 

Hood because the Secretary asked us to address emergency response. As Secretary West has indicated, we were impressed with 

what we saw at Fort Hood. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I served for 37 years. Secretary West and 

I went down there on the second day after the formation of our 

team. What I saw was the best after-action report I have ever seen 

in my life. With the kind of candor that was impressive. Lots of 

good news there. 

The base personnel were prepared. They were trained. They took 

appropriate action. Their action was prompt, as the Secretary indicated. Their response to the active shooter was impressive. There 

were courageous acts. The first responders, the local law enforcement personnel, DOD civilians, health care providers, all of their 

actions prevented greater loss. 

That said, we still believe it can be done better. We have got to 

focus on better tools for commanders, focus on violence prevention 

in whatever form it exists. We must adapt and evolve to the rapid 

change. We must understand that there is no single point solution 

here. Change is going to continue at a rapid pace. We have to share 

information so the right people can connect the dots and exercise 

against the most stressing and pressing scenarios to make sure 

that we have it right. 

So we were impressed with what we saw at Fort Hood, both the 

military and civilians on base as well as those in the community 

who were key players in the outcome of November 5th. And all of 

this reminds us of the greatness of our people, the strength of our 

nation, and resiliency and character of our people. 

So, speaking for Secretary West on this point, and the rest of the 

team, our hearts go out to the families of those that were lost and 

those that were wounded in this incident. And the thrust of our ac-
8 

tivity, of our effort, has been to do everything we know how to do, 

to help the Secretary of Defense put the spotlight on those immediate areas that need to be addressed in phase two of his organized 

effort. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Clark and Secretary 

West can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. 

Secretary West, Admiral Clark, we thank you for your very thorough and telling testimony. It appears to me that there were two 

disconnects that lead to a major question. Disconnect number one 

is the actual performance of the alleged shooter on the one hand, 

and the OER and academic evaluation. The second disconnect 

would be one of intelligence-type, whether that reaches the right 

superiors or not, which leads to the bottom line question, which 

was a great deal overlooked because this was a medical person in 

a special area in which there is a shortage. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary WEST. Mr. Chairman, I pause just for a minute because I am trying to reflect on how much my answer takes me into 

discussion of an area we have covered in the annex rather than the 

report. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do your best. 

Secretary WEST. Thanks for encouragement. But I would think 

that we could say, in general, as to the way officers are evaluated, 

especially medical officers, and the way that is reported, that what 

we have concluded and have said to the Secretary of Defense, that 

is this: First, the disconnect you noted is correct. That is what we 

mean when we say that the policies were not applied, that things 

witnessed were not always reported where they needed to be reported, and that, in fact, there are contradictory indications. 

And with respect to the second—and we recommended to the 

Secretary of Defense that he take some public steps about this, 

that we had to say to the force—or he had to say to the force—the 

Department has to say to the force, evaluations make a difference, 

and we can’t do the job of leading or protecting against threats if 

honest evaluations are not done by those who have the duty, the 

information, and the authority to do so. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. A major piece of this, Mr. Chairman, is what is 

part of the record. In our report, we don’t tell the Secretary of Defense what parts to make, what should go into the record. We say, 

he asked us for gaps and weaknesses. And so we said, look, if an 

individual’s track history doesn’t stay with them, that leaves you 

open to potential weaknesses and gaps. So there are certain things 

that are required by regulation that cannot move from station to 

station with an individual. That is something that needs to be 

looked at. 

With regard to the issue of performance appraisal, we all know 

that performance appraisal is a challenge in any environment. 

That said, we used specific terms to say things that we wanted to 

connote. We didn’t use just the term leadership. We used the term 

‘‘officership’’. 
9 

If you look on Page six and seven of our report, we say specifically what we think happened here. We believe that some of the 

signs were clearly missed, or they were ignored. I cannot tell you 

which, and I can’t go further than that because of the nature of the 

restrictions that are—of the information that is in the restricted 

annex. 

But there is no doubt in my mind or Secretary West’s mind that 

there are issues here, and if there were not so, we would not have 

said that to the Secretary of Defense. 

With regard to the intelligence matters, there—so we didn’t do 

the intelligence review. The President had already outlined and authorized a review, and we were given specific guidance: Do not 

interfere. 

That said, Mr. Chairman, since our review team—began this action, there have been a number of things in the public domain that 

tell us that they—there is agreement that the dissemination of information process needs to be improved, and there was a release 

on Friday by the FBI that talked about the improvements that are 

going to be made and are being made in cooperation with the Department of Defense. 

Our encouragement was this: We didn’t tell them exactly how to 

do this. By the way, we don’t do policy. We were reviewing policy. 

You want people that are going to do policy to be confirmed by the 

Congress, not two people who are called on to do this in a matter 

of few weeks, I believe. In fact, I am sure of that, having been 

there. So what I am suggesting is, we suggested whatever that outcome is, what needs to be done is to ensure that the right information gets in the hands of the operational command to give them a 

chance to connect the dots. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Burgess, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all committee members have had an opportunity to ask 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, the concern that I think all of us feel 

probably most keenly is, are there other potential threats out 

there? Do we have other potential people that are in the system 

and the system is not adequately working to find them, and are we 

open to further problems such as we have seen? The report was 

strangely silent on whether or not Major Hasan gave any clear evidence of his radicalization or whether there were any substantive 

clues about that radicalization that his supervisors should have 

acted upon. 

We know from media reports of at least three instances where 

he acted in a manner, in hindsight, which should have raised concerns about his allegiance to the United States, possibly prompted 

action by his supervisors. His statement that Sharia law trumped 

the Constitution, his religious discussions with patients and his 

presentation to his colleagues that equated suicide bombers to service members who died for this Nation. 
10 

What substantive evidence did your review turn up regarding 

Major Hasan’s actions or statements that gave or should have 

given his supervisors any indication of his radicalization? To what 

degree did the three instances I cited in my opening to this question arouse concern by Major Hasan’s supervisors about the appropriateness of such statements or actions and what was done with 

regard to those concerns? What policies, practices, and procedures 

limited or blocked the ability of Major Hasan’s supervisors to appropriately assess his developing radicalization? And then I am 

concerned if political correctness was involved here and if the need 

for psychiatrists maybe overlooked some things. Those are kind of 

my major concerns. 

Secretary WEST. Mr. McKeon, let me try to answer that. And I 

will try to answer, remembering there is a military justice investigation underway and that I need to be careful not to deal in evidence that will be used there. 

First of all, let me say that, overall, I believe that in the restricted annex, you will find a discussion of items you mentioned. 

But on the question of whether signals were missed, whether there 

were indications, let me say this: We have said in the open report, 

in our—in the chapter we devoted to it and also in our executive 

summary, and in fact I just heard the Admiral talk and refer to 

that language again: Some signs were missed. Others appeared to 

have been ignored. 

The fact is that there was evidence and that is what we are referring to for signs for senior officials to see, to note and react to. 

We explain those in specifics in the annex. And our concern is yes, 

there are policies in place that should have made the reaction to 

them possible. It should make that reaction possible throughout 

the force. And yet, we have indications that they were not acted 

upon, the need for properly recording in either the SSAER, the 

Senior Service School Academic Evaluation or in the OER, the officer efficiency report. SSAERs are used in all the military schools. 

That is how we evaluate them, both academically and as officers, 

to have those accurately reflect what is happening is an important 

tool for telling future commanders what has happened but also for 

making judgments on those officers as they progress. 

Secondly, I would add this. Again, perhaps as important as anything is once recorded, the information needs to be—to get to the 

people who have to make decisions. I think Admiral Clark already 

pointed out the fact that we have several policies that say—and we 

mention this in our report—or practices that keep us from keeping 

certain kinds of information beyond the period in the person’s life, 

in the service member’s life in which that is recorded. If there has 

been alcohol or drug use and a rehabilitation program, that information is not forwarded in the files, it is no longer in there after 

that is done. And there are other kinds of information as to which 

we have policies that specifically exclude keeping them and making 

them available in the file to go forward. We recommend that be 

looked at. 

There are times when it is important for us to be aware of 

changed circumstances. And the circumstances we face today—I 

thought you were going to ask about this when you first mentioned 

it—could this happen again? Could an incident happen again? As 
11 

long as there are humans serving in the armed forces of the United 

States or anywhere else, in government and throughout our society, 

self-radicalization, becoming upset because you believe that you 

have been inappropriately treated in your workplace, prejudices of 

one sort or another can lead to violent acts. We need to equip our 

force and our commanders with the ability to detect it by getting 

them the information that you refer to and by equipping them to 

act on it. 

Mr. MCKEON. If I may, the things that you addressed, the alcohol or other prior things are things that affect the workplace don’t 

address the radicalization and that seems to be the real crux of 

this. And that is the thing I think we need to be mindful of as we 

move forward. Admiral. 

Secretary WEST. May I just say you are right and I should have 

mentioned the fact that those are also indicators, that is what gets 

said, how one relates to one’s colleagues and professors, a view that 

suggests a willingness to act on that. I am sorry. You wanted 

to—— 

Admiral CLARK. And I concur with your assessment also. And I 

align myself with Secretary West’s comments. I won’t repeat all of 

those. I could answer your question in a very fulsome way if we 

were in a closed session, and we are not, and would welcome the 

opportunity to do that, because there are real answers to your 

questions. And those will be spoken to in the right time, when it 

is—there is authorization to release that kind of information. 

Let me just make one comment about your question, are there 

others out there? I want to make sure that it is clear why I don’t 

have an answer to that, that the answer to that would not be evident by researching the clarity and viability of the policies, which 

is fundamentally what we have done. The Secretary asked us to 

find these weaknesses on our core and our structure and our architecture. And so I don’t know how to express the breadth of that 

over the course of this whole discussion. It sometimes doesn’t come 

through with just the way the written word comes out. 

But that answer specifically has to come from the collection of 

intel sources. We did not pursue intel at all by direction, and we 

weren’t seeking to—our task was—he sent us in a different direction. He sent us there, specifically, though, to help equip the rest 

of the Department so they wouldn’t go off on a broad fan hunt 

themselves, that they could put the crosshairs on the areas they 

had to go after first. 

And so as a follow on to the things that Secretary West addressed, it is clear that your question about—so what does the nature and the breadth of this look like, that question has to be answered. And we simply—we didn’t go there because we weren’t interested in it. We went there because that was not our task and 

we really—I do not have an answer for you. 

That said, the things that Secretary West commented on, we do 

believe that there are indicators, and those indicators need to be 

examined because the issue of self-radicalization is one that is new 

to us in many, many ways, and I listed that—a series of kinds of 

behaviors that could lead to violence that are well documented in 

policy and in directives and programs. Such is not the case when 
12 

we talk about self-radicalization. That needs to be addressed with 

speed. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are now into the five-minute rule. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary West, Chief 

Clark. Thank you so much for joining us, and thank you for your 

service. 

Maybe we can go back a little bit and you can inform the committee as to how he got his promotion, his evaluation, his performance. Was he promoted by a board? How do you promote him from 

a captain to a field grade officer major? Were there several members sitting on this board that recommended that he be promoted? 

Maybe you can give us some insight as to how that was done. 

Secretary WEST. Congressman Ortiz, again, trying to be mindful 

on our part, that we have explored this in some detail in the restricted annex, which I believe is available to you, and that we 

want to be careful not to delve and talk in this session about things 

that will have an effect on the military’s investigation. The standard practice for consideration for military medical officers in the 

Army is, yes, they are promoted. They are considered by a promotion board. That board considers their officer evaluation reports, 

and it also considers the record from their academic training, 

SSAERs, as I mentioned. So they make their judgments based on 

that, and that happens in the case of every medical officer, and so 

it would have happened in the case of this officer. 

Mr. ORTIZ. There are several members sitting on this board. Are 

they allowed to come up with a dissenting view that maybe they 

were not all in agreement, that this individual should be promoted? 

Admiral CLARK. These boards are controlled by statute directive. 

In my time as the chief, this was one of the always very important 

things that the Secretary of the service and myself considered, including specifics about the guidance that went to the board, and 

the board then functions in accordance with the guidance it gets 

from the service Secretary. 

The statutory process precludes controls, is a better way to say 

it, controls in very exacting terms the kinds of information that can 

come before the board. And this is to ensure that everybody has an 

equal opportunity to promotion and all the things that go with that 

that has been developed over the years. 

If you take our comment on pages six and seven of the report, 

when we comment on the fact that it is our view that some things 

were missed or overlooked, that can give you a glimpse inside of 

what our opinion is. And again, I would love—I don’t like the idea 

that I am inhibited in what I am allowed to talk to about in an 

open hearing about this. I might wish it was otherwise. But I 

would just say to you this: You can take comfort in the process if 

that communicates to you. You can take comfort in the process. 

What they are allowed to review is what is specifically in the 

OERs or any material that the member chooses to put in front of 

the board. And there is a very exacting process that has to occur 

if there is other information that is going to be placed in front of 
13 

the board. And that is all I can say in an open hearing. And with 

the restricted nature—— 

Mr. ORTIZ. I understand. And the reason I ask this question, I 

was just wondering whether, when this board met and maybe if 

there were dissenting views, if they were able to filter all the way 

to the chain of command? 

Admiral CLARK. I can only repeat what I said. I wish I could say 

more. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Well, thank you so much. I don’t want to take too 

much time. But thank you for your service. And I just hope that 

we can get to the bottom of it, and the reason I am asking these 

questions is because, not only should we be worried about our soldiers who might turn out to be bad apples like this guy, but we 

saw the killings of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] in Afghanistan. And we are just wondering if we can also—and maybe 

this is not in your line—but I worry about our service people in Afghanistan and Iraq and hoping that we don’t get those bad people 

to be able to infiltrate our soldiers before they do something like 

this. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. Bartlett from Maryland. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your service. 

I have a button with a message which I cherish. It was given to 

me by Hap Baker, who was a principal architect for the guidance 

system for the Patriot missile. I knew him primarily in his role as 

an unapologetic defender of the Second Amendment right, and I 

never saw Hap Baker without his hat and his button on that said, 

‘‘politically incorrect and proud of it.’’ Indeed, that button was such 

a part of Hap Baker, that I attended his funeral and was pleased 

to see that it was there on him in his casket. I probably should be 

wearing that button today because maybe I am going to be politically incorrect. 

I suspect that these officers might have felt that they were following policy because they had two policies which were in conflict. 

One of them was to be politically correct [PC] and not appear to 

profile. The other was to offer an honest competent evaluation of 

the performance of the officer. Now, one cannot get inside their 

head, but I would suspect that they may have given more weight 

to the politically correct policy that you don’t profile. 

By the way, we do profile, and people understand that. If you are 

looking for a rapist, you are probably not looking too hard at preadolescent males and women. I suspect if the ethnicity had been 

different here, that the policies might have been applied differently. How do we get a proper balance between political correctness and the obligation to honestly and fairly evaluate? 

Secretary WEST. Do you care who you get your answer from, 

Congressman? May I take that on? 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir? 

Secretary WEST. Were you addressing that to me or the Admiral? 

Mr. BARTLETT. To both of you. 

Secretary WEST. Then I will take it on. I hear the term politically 

correct all the time. And I know that people think they know what 

it means, but I am not so sure. I think what we are talking about, 
14 

quite frankly, is, how do we do what we have to do to get the information to spot people who are likely to harm our service members, 

on the one hand, versus, how are we careful that in so doing we 

are not taking steps that lump people into a group and keep us not 

from favoring them but from attributing characteristics to the entire group and thus convicting one person before we actually learn 

what is happening with that person? 

So I don’t think there is a real tension here that we can’t deal 

with if we realize this: In our force, we are already handicapped 

in trying to identify a potential violator by the fact that if it is a 

member of a military family, if he or she is a member of the military family who wears a uniform, they have access to our installations. They don’t get searched. They have their cards. They put 

them in, and they get in. So the way that we stop them is to identify them ahead of time. 

And I think that if we made these recommendations in our report, that we can look for objective indicators. If you have objective 

indicators, if you catalog them—that is why we recommend it—an 

ongoing organization to do just like that, look at the indicators that 

a person might commit violence, make them available, and make 

our decisions on that basis, we will be able to get the job done. And 

we won’t have to worry about PC or any other short-term expressions that suggest that we are not looking at them because they 

are in a group. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I think that the average American would like us 

to be a little politically incorrect in circumstances like this if it is 

going to result in better security. 

Would you agree, Admiral? 

Admiral CLARK. I absolutely believe that the people of the United 

States expect, and they should expect, that we will pursue the best 

security posture that we know how to possess. And certainly our 

people deserve nothing less. My take on this is that this is especially challenging, and this is why I refer to the Secretary of Defense, again, commenting on the nature, the rapidly changing environment in the last decade. The fourth generation warfare scheme 

is that our enemy intends to go after—pursue us in the scenes, and 

the inside, internal threat is an area that our review suggests very 

clearly that we have done an inadequate job identifying these indicators. 

Our focus is on identify the behavior so we equip and enable the 

commanders. I love one of the things that the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the day our panel, our review was 

set up, one of the reporters said Admiral, what are you—how do 

you look at this? And he came out clearly and boldly and said, I 

expect commanders and leaders in organizations to understand 

what is going on in their command and for the chain of command 

to be functioning in a vibrant way and that is the answer to these 

kinds of problems and challenges. The reality is that the guidance 

on what kind of behaviors to look for for the self-radicalized individual are inadequate. 

I will tell you that already some have already been published; I 

saw a review of one, and a message that went out in the U.S. Army 

yesterday. We have to move fast and this is the requirement. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Dr. Snyder. 
15 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary West and Admiral Clark, it is great to see you both again, you have been great 

public servants for many, many years. I want to ask this issue that 

has come up in the discussions about the fact that we have an 

annex, which I did go and look at in this discussion today. I think 

this is going to be a frustrating experience trying to figure out 

where to go for the American people and policymakers if we have 

this dichotomy between a discussion and hear common generalities, 

versus talking about a specific case. I need to understand—by the 

way, that is not a classified document, it is for official use only. It 

is one thing if we had out in that room the criminal case file, interrogation, whatever is there. 

But in fact, what you all are conducting is an administrative proceeding based on the records that are in the military in order to 

problem solve. And it is not clear to me why the American people 

are not entitled to see because it is part of the problem-solving 

process, these unredacted reviews, career reviews or academic reports, or college transcripts, or whatever is in that record as part 

of an administrative proceeding. 

You are not putting those things out there, we have—you know, 

he did this performance in college and we have concluded then, 

based on that, that he is a criminal. I mean, help me with that. 

Here is the problem, you say it is it not the right time to have this 

discussion. When is the right time going to be? Will it be after I 

assume there will be a criminal trial, although that may not be, 

there can still be adjudication of—I am not talking about this case, 

but there is always going to be a potential question is someone 

mentally fit to go to trial, where will this all go? 

I don’t know what the right time is going to be for the American 

people and the people in Texas and the military to have the kind 

of public discussion of this specific case. If I was a family member, 

I would not be satisfied with go to the annex and we will discuss 

it. I would want to know what happened with this specific case. So 

when is the right time, where is your advice coming from that we 

cannot—that you cannot in an administrative proceeding just put 

the documents out there of things that clearly occurred before the 

criminal investigation. So where does your advice come from and 

what was your specific advice with regard to an annex versus specific documents? 

Secretary WEST. Congressman, there are several aspects, but I 

think I can do them quickly. First of all, the specific question, 

where is the advice coming from, it is coming from the DOD lawyers. Secondly, what would it be based on? Well, it is based on a 

couple of things: First, yes, the annex is FOUO [for official use 

only]. What is contained in it has two effects. One is that much of 

it is from officer efficiency reports and the like, those are specifically protected. Secondly, the overall concern that is what contained in there will have an effect on the military justice proceedings. And on that score, we have already been warned not to 

discuss that openly. It is available to you. 

Thirdly, I would point out that even the annex, as you point out 

is redacted, is only redacted as to names. Everything else that we 

wrote is there disclosed, what happened as we found out, what we 

recommended, what is in the record, all disclosed in that annex. 
16 

And I think, fourthly, the question, well, when is the time to discuss it. Yes, you have given the answer, it is after the conclusion 

of the military justice proceedings which may be a trial, I assume 

that is what everyone is preparing for, but I don’t know it. 

I would make one other observation. We were not asked to find 

out what happened. We were asked to assure the Secretary of Defense that there were not gaps or deficiencies in the policies, practices, or procedures that would help us either identify such a person and deal with them, or protect the force, or be prepared for 

mass casualties going forward, or support military caregivers. And 

also to look specifically at how the Army applied its policies to the 

alleged—— 

Dr. SNYDER. That is where the gap is here today, because we can 

go back there and try to sort all this out in the annex, but it is 

going to be a frustrating thing for the American people to try to 

sort out where the policies applied, should the policies be different. 

I think lawyers, for the most part, will say this may upset the 

criminal trial, but we have got to be sure we are not throwing that 

net out so broadly of protection that it’s going to keep us from making America safer, our military safer and avoiding these kinds of 

tragedies. I am not clear that we are at that point today with this 

publication of this annex. 

Admiral CLARK. May I make one very quick observation? In 

order for the American people to understand this part of the process, so we have five teams and one of the teams dealt with the 

issues as prescribed in the terms of reference and as Secretary 

West has indicated. Look at the gaps, look at the weaknesses and 

look at the application here so that it is clear that we thought 

through the longer term process, the person that headed that effort 

for us was a four-star general from the United States Army. 

And it is not just coincidence that he has already been given the 

task by the Secretary of the Army. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense refer this, the findings that we have in hand to 

the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army has 

named that same officer to proceed with the case in order to speed 

the process and rapidly come to a judgment of accountability. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the Admiral and General, thank you, thank you very much. I have had 

the privilege of being with you in previous years when you were 

in uniform and it is a pleasure to see today and this important 

work that you have done to try to get to the bottom of the tragedy 

that happened at Fort Hood. 

I saw today in the Express, and it is not earthshaking news, but 

AP Hasan sanitized history. I want to take my question in a little 

different direction. I know those who evaluated his performances 

are probably hurting very badly because maybe they did not see 

what they should have seen or reported what they did see in his 

actions, but I am very—want to know the environment of where 

these psychiatrists in the military were working. 

And let me explain that. There is no excuse for what happened, 

none, and you have already pointed that out and you have made 

recommendations that I know that the Secretary of Defense and 
17 

the Secretary of Army will follow many of those recommendations. 

I know there is an investigation going on by the military as this 

relates to what criminal actions might have taken place, but is 

there an environment where we have more and more of our troops 

with PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] and more and more 

of our troops with TBI [traumatic brain injury] and other mental 

problems from going deployment after deployment after deployment. 

It is an environment that because we have not as many psychiatrists as we need in the military that maybe, and this would be 

your opinion, if that is anything you looked at in the investigation, 

but is an environment that we need to have these psychiatrists, we 

need to have these psychiatrists to help the families and to help 

the military. And so maybe, that is no excuse, maybe what should 

have been a red flag was not a red flag. I will ask you both if you 

would respond to that. 

Secretary WEST. I think I will give you my answer rather briefly 

Congressman, and then let Admiral Clark speak. I think you very 

well articulate what could have been a possibility or more specifically what could be a situation that we face today. 

Admiral CLARK. You identify one of the things that I am not sure 

a lot of people understand and our report says that United States 

military has had people in the combat zone for 20 years, virtually 

20 years. And so we all need to understand that there is stress on 

the force. Now one of the things that—and so I agree with you that 

these are realities, and these people—we came to the conclusion, 

and by the way the Secretary gave us specific instructions to go 

look at the care of the health care givers and we haven’t addressed 

that today, we are of a conviction that they largely have been treated as a separate group. 

We believe they need to be treated just like the combatants do. 

They need the same kinds of programs and support and all that 

goes with that. And so we did not look at TBI, PTSD, the Secretary 

had a view, I guess, that he didn’t need our view on that, he must 

have looked at that and he had that where he needed it. And so 

we came to the conclusion that these people are a critical part of 

the readiness posture of the United States military and so great 

care is required and programs to support them are required. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank both the gentlemen 

for being here today and their responses to each member’s questions. Thank you for your answers to my question. I hope that my 

colleagues did hear as I think I heard your response very clearly. 

Thank you and with that I would yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, once again for your continued service to our country. 

I want to ask you from a different angle something that I may 

be wrong on or it may be something to think and I didn’t know 

whether you really had a chance to look at this incident. I think 

it is important for us to understand how we protect our forces internally, as you said, but I am looking more at this as an administrative issue, and certainly one section of it was what my colleague 
18 

just talked about, our need for psychologists and people in the military and how difficult it is to get them in there. 

But I am looking at more at a sense of supervisor to somebody 

who works in this particular case the alleged attacker, because on 

the day that this happened as I was driving in the car, I heard a 

radio station where one of the direct supervisors for the last year 

and a half, he had now retired a Colonel, I believe, who had now 

retired and had been out of the military for about six months, was 

on a radio talk show talking about this alleged attacker. And I 

don’t know if you all got that interview, but he went on and on 

about a half an hour about all the signs he had seen with respect 

to this alleged attacker. And how he never reported it. 

And so, I mean, I think it comes down to two things: One, it is 

always difficult as a manager, and if you go and you ask or you 

go and take a look at the surveys and ask what is the toughest 

part of being a manager, it is the firing of people or demoting of 

people, or the turning in of people. It doesn’t make any of us feel 

good. So there is that just human reaction of, you know, I have 

somebody here who is crazy and how am I going to move him on— 

and we tend to move them on versus how do I fire him. 

Then there is the whole legal issues of how do we go about firing 

someone and how difficult it is to do that. So my question is, did 

you take a look at that? Especially with the whole issue of how 

much you can damage the career of somebody who has made the 

military career, and certainly I have heard from several soldiers of 

personal experiences where they are going to seek some help with 

a psychologist, for example, within the military, has come back to 

damage their career so much to the point where they have had to 

get out of the military. 

So were you given that information about this talk show and this 

particular gentleman and how he referred and how he saw all 

these signs and how he never did anything about it? And the only 

thing that gentleman said was, I couldn’t wait fast enough to retire 

because this guy was a walking time bomb. 

And more importantly, when you look at administrative proceedings, do you have any recommendations of how we get to this 

very basic, I am a manager, but I don’t want to hurt this guy’s career, but he might be a crackpot? 

Admiral CLARK. I wish to goodness that I was not constrained 

about talking about this. You might imagine how I feel about this 

having served 37 years and making the judgment that we have 

made in here. We said to use the word officership, we weren’t just 

talking about the alleged perpetrator. They were responsible for developing him and educating him and training him and developing 

him in the field of medicine, and as an officer in the United States 

Army. Our impression and the words in our report are as straightforward as we can say them. It needed work. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Any comments, Secretary? 

Secretary WEST. Yes, I would add this, with respect to your question about having heard or known something about that conversation you had, it is not specifically referred to in our report or in 

any of the information furnished to us. I have no doubt that the 

Colonel of whom you spoke was interviewed and the results of that 

interview are part of what is in our annex. 
19 

So I don’t think that what that Colonel had to say if he was indeed a supervisor has been lost or missed, that has now become 

part of the record for the military justice review frankly. 

Secondly, on the broader question of how, if we are going to—I 

am rephrasing it a bit, but if we are going to propose all these 

things designed to get this information and act on it, are we sure 

we are not pushing commanders and supervisors to damage the careers of those that is to whom they make a hasty judgment or a 

judgment based on not enough information. And that tension has 

certainly been there in the discussion especially in the team that 

did the work that supports our Chapter 2, which is on personnel 

policies and practices. In fact, we have a section called ‘‘barriers to 

taking action’’ on the information, because there is this tension. 

I had one officer by the way, and I am taking too long, who is 

actually in this room, who talked to me quite candidly about the 

tough decisions a commander makes in deciding when to move on 

information and when not. What will that do to the career of the 

person? Is it fair to record it? And that is even part of the policies 

on what we do or do not pass along from command to command, 

from section of a person’s career to the next station. All those concerns are in there. And yes, you are right, we are in this report 

pushing for a relook at that very balance. And so the danger you 

mention is quite possibly there. Because we are saying it may be 

more important under the circumstances that we face today to look 

harder for the information and once we get it, to consider whether 

we don’t need to, they make sure it is passed along to the right 

places and perhaps acted on, but the danger you mention is there. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the gentleman, and you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing may be a little frustrating for some people, maybe to our witnesses because 

some of you feel somewhat constrained by you have been told to 

talk just in a particular specific area, fortunately we are not constrained and don’t seem to fit into boxes very easily anyway. 

The term political correctness has come up a number of times 

this morning and it seems to be a high on my mind. It seems to 

me, standing back looking at the forest from a distance, you have 

a guy who was Muslim, okay. But we also know that some percentage of these guys get radical and they are the ones who start wars 

and things in the Middle East and blow people up. 

We have one of them who works for the military and he got radical on us and shot a bunch of people, that seems to be just the 

simple face of it, maybe that is not politically correct but the appears to be the facts. 

So my question is as I read through all this report, there is nothing that really makes any reference to theology or religion or what 

drives this guy. And I suppose maybe there is a difference of opinion, maybe some people think that somebody committed a crime, 

like someone just goes whacky in the office and decides to shoot 

some people, and perhaps the other perspective is that we are dealing with an act of war or an act of terror where someone, because 

of an ideological motivation, decided that something tripped him 

and decided it was time to do holy war. 
20 

You have been tasked, though, gentlemen, with looking at procedure, it seems to me, that procedure would have to take a look at 

people who are potentially time bombs, even if it is a time bomb 

motivated by theology or by some sort of radical religious view. And 

so my questions are several: First, was it an act of terror? Mostly 

looking for a yes or no. 

Second of all, procedurally, is it possible for us to say, hey, watch 

out for people that are from a certain sect of Mohammed or whatever it is that potentially can go crazy, and can we specifically look 

at that when you are looking at somebody’s performance appraisal 

and watch for that. I guess people would call it profiling, but some 

people would also call it common sense. And those are my two 

main questions, if you could hit those quickly because I have another one or two. 

Secretary WEST. I will be quick and I will go directly to the second one first. It is always possible to look at acts or statements and 

it doesn’t matter whether their statements of I don’t like that guy 

because of the way he walks or the color of his hair, or I have a 

concern and it is based on what I believe my religion tells me to 

do. I do not think religion or theology are off bounds when we look 

at indicators of potential violence. 

With respect to—— 

Mr. AKIN. So procedurally we can do that, it is not illegal when 

you are reviewing somebody’s profile or their jacket comes before 

you and this guy happens to be this and this, and you go okay, 

watch, we are okay to say to look at it more closely. 

Secretary WEST. Well, years ago I was the DOD general counsel, 

I am not today so I am not going to opine on it legally. I am just 

going to say we recommend that we look at all the indicators. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Is it an act of terror as the first question? 

Secretary WEST. I am going to pass on that one. I was not asked 

to do that, I wasn’t asked to try to determine it. I know this, the 

people who died were terrified and the people who were wounded 

were, too. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, sir. Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. Secretary West’s answer to the question is exactly right. And my early focus in my opening statement about violence and indicators is all about the subject that you are raising 

to us. And I notch down all different kinds of categories of people 

that the focus is violence. We didn’t care where it came from. We 

wanted to come forward with recommendations that said go look at 

this. In an area of self-radicalizations the indicators are not understood and therefore we do not react that well because we have not 

spent the time to talk within the Department about what those indicators are. 

As I indicated just Friday the Army’s publishing the best that 

they have got today. Our recommendation says you need to put together a group of people and look at this long term. This isn’t going 

to stop, this is not a single point solution. 

Mr. AKIN. Admiral, could I just cut in because my clock is running pretty tight here. I still don’t think we have this figured out. 

And part of what concerns me is that after this event at Fort Hood 

we had this guy Louie Soffi speaking, Louie Soffi is part of the Islamic society of North America, and according to the Justice De-
21 

partment, is connected with the Muslim brotherhood. We are talking about a guy who is one of these money launderers who is a radical Islamist, and he is speaking to make people feel better at Fort 

Hood about Islam. 

I think we need to build in somehow the political correctness is 

overriding looking at the common sense that there are factors that 

drive this behavior and that has to be built into the model, I am 

out of time. I would like a response, Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. May I? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Admiral CLARK. This is a two-way street, we know that we have 

over 3,500 Islamic believers serving effectively and faithfully. And 

so the street runs both ways. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And Mr. Secretary, Admiral Clark, 

thank you for taking on this assignment. 

Secretary West, it is my understanding that prior to this service, 

you were on the Walter Reed, the group that looked at Walter Reed 

and the independent review group, it is my understanding and this 

really picks up on something Admiral Clark said as well, in that 

looking at the care of the mental health professionals or providers 

or professionals overall, they looked at the issue of provider fatigue, 

medical provider fatigue. 

What can you tell us about what you saw in that instance and 

the review and the questions that were raised, have we made 

progress? I know that Admiral Clark was saying yes, we need to 

look at those, and how we are treating and dealing with this issue. 

What have we done? 

Secretary WEST. I had the answer for you until you asked me, 

‘‘What have we done?’’ Because I think we need to be able to give 

you that answer more specifically than I can today. I remember sitting in a hearing two years ago at Bethesda Naval—at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda and seeing a health care 

professional, an officer stand up in the stands and say it is good 

that you’re here and that you are looking at the care that we provide to those who have served and have been wounded, but keep 

in mind and your term is a good one about the fatigue for the caregivers and its effect on us, because if we are not whole in body and 

soul and mind and all those things then we don’t deliver the best 

of care. 

So it was very powerful and it was one of the reasons why I believe the Secretary included it in terms of reference this time. What 

we found is that whatever is being done, more of it needs to be 

done and our recommendations say that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you have any way of knowing how we are monitoring that? Who is overseeing that to understand the extent to 

which we do have a lot of people hurting out there who are in 

tough positions? 

Secretary WEST. I think professionals that have periodic surveys 

and the like, but in terms of a real look, this may have been one 

of the first ones that had this much chance to look at it, and so 

that is why we devoted so much time to it in our discussion, but 

I don’t know how on an ongoing basis it is monitored other than 

the way they are assessed as they developed professionally. 
22 

Admiral CLARK. Let me just add one thought, this is a real challenge because when unique 1H’s go deploy, the whole group—the 

person’s chain of command at home base don’t go with them in the 

medical sense very often, you know they go as individuals. We 

found—so we examined the policies and what we see is that when 

the person gets home, who assumes responsibility for the monitoring function, that is something that needs to be examined. 

And then also look at policy in a way they are put in place. For 

example, in order to care for the combatants there is a policy in 

one of services where the docs coming home go. In order to provide 

continuity of care for the combatants, they go with them to their 

home—that extends their deployment, there is a cost to that. I am 

not saying it is the wrong policy, it might well be the right policy, 

but somebody has to examine this. And as I said, we have not 

treated the docs, the medical personnel, like the combatants in 

terms of the kind of programs and processes to support them that 

the combatants have. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I know there are some practices of embedding physicians with national guard, for example, as part of 

TRICARE, and that sounds great, but there may be some 

downsizing. 

Getting to another personnel issue, because I think it has been 

addressed about the appropriate judgment and standards of 

officership as you spoke about and we know and even not necessarily in the military, but in medical school, generally, that it is 

difficult to perhaps not—inhibit a person’s career in some way, and 

that that has its downside in terms of the processes, personnel 

practices, we have talked about that you have to go through. 

Are you are you—part of what you look at also to say how many 

times have we intervened in careers to suggest that people are in 

the wrong place. Is that something that as you looked at this, you 

have identified that yes, in fact we see this is actually working, or 

in fact, it doesn’t look as if that is happening in many instances 

at all? 

Admiral CLARK. I fully expect the phase two examination where 

they drill deeper has to look at this, because we raised the foundation for it to be looked at in our report. What I really believe has 

to happen is that they need to understand the process that they 

have. What we found is there is the educational side of this, the 

doc side of this, and that is one review group. And then there is 

the officer side of this. The Secretary and I were having a discussion one afternoon talking about the specifics of this and wondering 

about the what-ifs. There is no way to know if this counseling had 

occurred, if that kind—what was it like? 

And the core of our institution is that we grow and develop people, we are proud of what happens when young people in the 

United States of America go serve, what mom and dad and aunts 

and uncles see about how they have grown when they get home. 

That is the essence of what officership is about and creating and 

establishing and enforcing standards. We suggest it be looked at. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady, Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, we thank 

you again for your service, you are good and decent men who have 
23 

done good things for our country. Sometimes, though, we see today 

the American people oftentimes feel that we don’t ask the questions 

that they wish we would ask and they constantly say you ask the 

questions you want to ask, but you don’t ask the ones that are really on our mind. 

And they have indicated recently they are not going to tolerate 

that anymore, so we struggle here to try to get our arms around 

the questions that is really of concern to them. And here is what 

they seem to be saying to me, they are concerned about individual 

acts of violence and that is what we talk about. But even more concern to them is when those individual acts of violence have an association or support from a more orchestrated, long-standing patterns 

of violence that are sort of woven into tapestry of concern to the 

American people that seems to be missing from your report. 

Let me be specific on that. If we have had—I don’t want to focus 

on the individual shooter, but if he had been a, Republican, no one 

would have argued okay, the Republican party caused him to do 

this, if had he been a Democrat, the same thing. No right-minded 

person. But as Mr. Akin mentioned earlier, there are radical Muslim extremist groups that with objective indicators, because we 

hear them on our streets interviewed by TV cameras. We read 

their threats and we sit corroborated in acts of terrorism. 

My question to you is this, I want to go back to the political correctness issue. Mr. Secretary, I want to give you a definition of it 

because you said we didn’t have one. Political correctness is really 

the failure to say or do something that might offend anyone, even 

if that statement or action is true and can be beneficial if stated 

or done. My question is not as to the shooter, but why didn’t we 

at least ask the question in this report, whether that political correctness kept any of the military personnel from applying their 

policies the way they would have done. 

That looks like to me it should have been a question asked. And 

even more particularly, my question to both of you is did we ask 

them if that political correctness kept them or impacted them from 

applying their policies. 

Secretary WEST. The question we asked was, ‘‘Did you apply your 

policies?’’ And the question we asked in our review of the facts we 

got was, ‘‘And if not, can we tell why not?’’ Which is, I think, another way of getting to yours and you will see about three paragraphs in our restricted annex that go to that, what kind of considerations were being taken into account when they failed to act? I 

think you’ll find that we cover your concern. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Admiral CLARK. My response to that would go along these lines, 

that in the open annex we stress and focus the indicators for prohibited actions and activities. Here is the instruction, DOD instruction, and in our view it needs work. When I ask myself that question, I get to—I probably don’t use the words that you would use, 

maybe I would, maybe I wouldn’t, that is not the point. The point 

is we were focusing on violence. Violence that would generate from 

any source, do we have it covered, do we have the guidelines in 

place so that commanders know what the reaches of their authority 

are and what indicators they can say, ‘‘That one crosses the line.’’ 
24 

In our view—and then I talked about information sharing, see 

this is a puzzle that fits together and if they do not have all the 

information that would allow them to connect the dots, they won’t 

get the right answer. Our conclusion is that these areas require immediate focus. 

Mr. FORBES. And we want to get that balance both of you talked 

about, but to get it, we have got to make certain we are not going 

too far on one side with actual policies where even by implication 

are keeping us from getting the answers that we need. Thank you 

both. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. And thank you both for being 

here. I am going to disagree with my colleagues when we talk 

about political correctness, because I don’t think that is really what 

this is about. I think it is about lack of leadership, lack of common 

sense, lack of awareness, a lot of other things. 

When you talk about officership, Admiral, I can remember when 

my husband was an Army officer, you were responsible for everything around you, not simply for your own behavior, but you were 

responsible to notice and work with others and to report. And there 

is a commonsense element here that is really missing. So right now 

I would like to focus on that. I want to know what is going to happen to the officers and the people around him. Those who saw 

things, what was their responsibility to each other, the responsibility to his country, the responsibility to the Army? What are we 

doing about them? And you can hand them training manual after 

training manual, you and I both know that if the light is not on, 

it doesn’t matter. 

So I am more concerned about that. I don’t know if it is an unwillingness or unawareness, I am not sure exactly what is wrong 

there, but I worry mostly about that. And it is the same thing with 

the recent attempt for bombing, most of us sitting there would say, 

sure I can add one, one, and one. Uh-huh, I am not confused, I can 

get there. And the same thing here with all the different pieces. I 

know we talked about connecting the dots, but I really don’t think 

you needed the whole tapestry to recognize that we had a problem 

here. 

And I was very upset hearing my colleague talk about somebody 

who observed that and I am not sure what he did with it, because 

I didn’t hear the interview that they were talking about, but I really worry about the rest of us that are sitting there and can’t add 

one, one, and one and get to the right answer. So if you would both 

please comment on that. 

Admiral CLARK. Well, I think your comments are very insightful, 

and I would be in alignment with your comments completely. You 

can’t legislate good behavior, but you lay out by directive standards 

and guidelines and then leaders take over. So we use the term 

officership because we wanted to differentiate just between leaders 

and the requirement that an officer has that is even beyond what 

leaders are required to do, to create the environment for success for 

our people. So with regard to suggesting that the connection of the 

dots all had to be done to solve all the problems, we haven’t said 

or we haven’t taken that position. We have said that there were 

indicators that were there and they were either missed or, on page 
25 

six and seven, I spoke to earlier. So clearly, the essence of the institution is about leadership. 

I talked about the growth and development aspect of it, but then 

helping people along the road on the growth and development process with the kind of feedback that oftentimes changes their life, 

changes their future. And so that is why I find myself in alignment. That said, we were asked to look at gaps and weaknesses. 

And we can see that there were things that would have made it 

even more clear had the dots been connected. And then we talk 

about information sharing, we are not just talking about information sharing across agencies, we are talking about what happens 

from command to command. Information does not move because it 

is kept in local files and not as part of the official record. And we 

believe that in order to deal with this evolving threat that the Secretary, his words were that this really evolved in the last decade, 

but you the changing threat, what happens when you have the alleged perpetrator being a field grade officer inside a member of the 

family. 

Well, this changes the fabric. We believe that you can’t leave a 

stone unturned. And a stone unturned means give them every tool 

we know how to give them. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

Secretary WEST. I think I would follow the Admiral’s lead on all 

of that, but especially on one with reference to page seven of our 

report. I think there is no clearer indication of the fact that we 

share your view about the responsibilities of leadership of supervisors, of officers when they are being responsible for those under 

their command or under their supervision. We have two bullets 

there, both of them Mr. McKeon asked about in his opening comments. And that is, first, that the Secretary communicate directly 

to the force, and to commanders, and to all, the necessity to be part 

of what is happening with those around them who are under their 

supervision, whether it is supervision—in reaching out and seeing 

and knowing what is happening to them, how they are developing. 

And then secondly, the second bullet to communicate, how important it is to be honest and complete in our evaluations of those 

whom we are supposed to supervise and to be responsible for it. 

Those two things, I think, go directly to taking responsibility for 

those for whom you are responsible. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Yes, each of us has to use our eyes and ears. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for 

your service and for being here today. A couple of points, I was 

looking at your report, I think it’s in the executive summary here, 

and by the way, I did go look at the annex which is useful, but I 

have some sympathy with what my colleague from Arkansas, Dr. 

Snyder, said about, since that is redacted, the names out, it would 

be kind of nice if we could see it. But I am looking at page 6 in 

the report here and it says, as directed in the terms of reference 

we reviewed the accession, training, education, supervision and 

promotion of the alleged perpetrator of the incident at Fort Hood. 

I know that is how we talk and there are lawyers everywhere, 

so we have an alleged perpetrator and we have an incident. But 
26 

I think picking up with Mr. Forbes’ comments, most Americans say 

we had a brutal mass murder, not an incident. And as you pointed 

out, Mr. Secretary, certainly the victims, those killed and wounded 

and their families and those around were indeed terrorized, whether that is an act of terror or not, we need another lawyer to sort 

that out for us. 

And so I think following up again on Mr. Forbes’s comments, the 

American people recognize the 9/11 Commission was correct years 

ago when it said we have an enemy, and that enemy is Islamist 

extremists, their words. And the concern is that we may not be 

paying attention to the fact that the alleged perpetrator was, in 

fact, an Islamist extremist and how he was radicalized whether 

self-radicalized or radicalized by an imam in Yemen. I suppose it 

is still being looked at as probably a matter for the trial, so we 

don’t need to go into that. 

But I think there is some frustration out there, and you have 

heard some of it out here from us, that we seem to be overlooking 

what is the 800-pound gorilla or the elephant in the room. That 

this is something more than a random act of violence with an alleged perpetrator, and it is certainly more than an incident. You 

said, Mr. Secretary, that you thought we need to look at ways of 

carrying this information forward and I think you are on to something there. I know many, many years ago, when I was a second 

lieutenant in the Marines we were asked to keep a platoon commander’s notebook. And in that platoon commander’s notebook we 

had every Marine’s name and number and the wife’s name and 

dog’s name and kept track of things so we knew who those Marines 

were in our platoon, we would keep track of it. 

And then because of FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] came 

out that you can’t do that, because those little notebooks with your 

comments will be taken away and made public. And I think that 

from that time it seemed the next 25 years that I served, and Admiral you served so many more, and thank you for that by the way, 

that ability to keep track of our men and women has gone further 

and further away from the little platoon commander’s notebook to 

the fact that you can’t keep track in the major events that occurred 

in the lives of our men and women in uniform. So the question to 

you is, I can’t quite track it here, but have you made a specific recommendation to do something specific about some statute, or is 

that part of the reference that you have made for action by the Secretary of Army or something? Can you address that? 

Admiral CLARK. The part that has referred to the Secretary of 

the Army is the specifics about determining the accountability and 

take measures as he deems required. So we step forward, and I indicated before, I believe you were here when we talk about in order 

to speed that process in a manner in which we manage ourselves 

and our structure in organization, so with have coherency and continuity in a person that is not only collected all of our information 

that steps forward and does the next phase also. 

You know, your comments about the platoon commander’s notebook remind me, again, of what officership is all about. And it also 

aligns itself with what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

said on day one, hey, I expect the chain of command to function 

effectively and know what is going on in the unit and in the group. 
27 

Mr. KLINE. With respect, if I may, I only have got 20 seconds. 

But the point is that officership needs some tools and that platoon 

commander’s notebook was part of it. So the question is, is there 

a recommendation that we take some legislative action that would 

allow for simplicity’s sake that platoon commander’s notebook to be 

reinstated because it is not there now? 

Admiral CLARK. And you see our reference throughout talking 

about giving them the tools that they need and the gaps that exist. 

And so measures that have occurred because of interpretations is 

what policy review is all about. And so if it requires your kind of 

action, then it is exciting to know that there are people in the Congress who are ready to lead that effort. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Taylor. 

Secretary WEST. May I? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please respond. 

Secretary WEST. In the back of our report, there is appendix C 

that lists for your convenience all the findings and recommendations by chapter and by subject, 2.8 or 2.9 of that is recommendations, carries a recommendation that I think goes to what you said, 

the ability to collect information and to carry it forward, so that is 

part of what you had. The second thing is you mentioned that the 

victims and the wounded were terrorized, I think my language was 

terrified. In both cases, I think we acknowledged that they died 

and were wounded with courage, honor and dignity. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, gentleman from Mississippi. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for your continued service to 

the nation. Admiral, I am going to—I think this is the first time 

you have appeared before this committee out of uniform, so you are 

free to speak your mind. 

Admiral CLARK. Yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Could this have happened on your watch and regardless of how you answer that, why and what is the message for 

the base commanders who are still in uniform? 

Admiral CLARK. Well, since we judge today that the policies and 

the programs and the procedures to guidance on unauthorized and 

prohibited activities are inadequate today, then I would suggest 

that they were inadequate when I served too. And that is the what 

and the why. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And your specific recommendations now that you 

are out of uniform. 

Admiral CLARK. My recommendations are focus on the behaviors 

and focus on anything—we are talking about protecting our people 

and our workplace, focus on the violence indicators. And then once 

you do that somebody said, does it include this, does it include 

that? Of course it does. It includes anything that is going to create 

harm for our people. Go deal with it, create the guidance on the 

indicators and empower and enable the commander so they can 

take the actions they need and connect the dots. 

Mr. TAYLOR. In the case of this individual, did anyone—did any 

of his coworkers or did any of his patients raise an alarm flag and 

say I think this guy is dangerous? 

Admiral CLARK. I wrote this down at the top of my page, I am 

constrained. I cannot—— 
28 

Mr. TAYLOR. I really don’t think you are. 

Admiral CLARK. I’m sorry, I am. My interpretation of it is I am. 

By the way, this is not my report, we have turned it over. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I am asking you, Vern Clark, not Admiral 

Clark, you, Vern Clark, former CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], 

an opportunity to talk to the American public, did anybody in his 

command or patients raise a red flag that, I think, this man is dangerous? 

Admiral CLARK. And I am here representing the work of this review. If you want to invite me back for another day to have discussions about other topics, I am here representing this review and 

representing this review, this area of discussion, I am restricted, 

and I would be happy to talk about it in closed session. 

Mr. TAYLOR. You are invited back at your convenience, and I 

wish you would say it today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank 

you both for your long service to this country, but I want to start 

out saying how offensive the notion of this review in its classification ought to be to the American people. This is just another incident in a long pattern before this committee of information that is 

withheld from the public that is neither germane to national security interests in terms of its classification, nor is it impending on 

any legal processes. I read it, it is just merely a finding of facts 

prior to the event. And it ought to be available to the American 

public. 

And so I think we have classification. It ought to be politically 

embarrassing and that ought to be a classification top secret, secret, confidential, politically embarrassing. Because the majority of 

information that has come before this committee that has been 

classified is merely classified because it is politically embarrassing. 

General Mukasey had said right after the incident that after 

these people were killed that it was a great tragedy but would be 

a greater tragedy if, in fact, we overreacted. And I think he was 

referring obviously to the Muslim Americans currently serving in 

the military. I served during the Cold War both in the Army and 

Marine Corps, and there was a counterintelligence strategy for 

what we could detect individuals who had sympathies with those 

who might be ideologically aligned to our opposition at the time, 

Marxist communism. 

We no relationship with a series of organizations that, in fact, 

were aligned, directly or indirectly with our adversaries at that 

time again during the Cold War. It would seem to me that we are 

at war now, and whether we called it the global war on terror or 

whether we call it overseas contingency operations with a version 

of radical Islam that has somehow morphed into a political ideology 

that has declared war on the United States. 

And so do you see that out of your recommendation that we are, 

in fact, have been able to have a system of counterintelligence that 

looks at linkages, looks at objective patterns and behavior to try to 

decipher these sympathies with those who are aligned as enemies 

to this country. 

Secretary WEST. I think the quick answer, Congressman, is yes, 

I think to some extent Secretary Gates even touched on that kind 
29 

of an idea in his statement the other day when he released a report. The fact is we do have to respond today to today’s imperatives, and those imperatives include the possibility, that is why we 

are doing this, that an incident like this could occur again or worse, 

several, several at different installations and that they could be 

part of a coordinated effort. 

So we need to look at now at what Admiral Clark just again reemphasized as the indicators and then collect them and make them 

available so the people can use them as match sticks as they evaluate what is happening in their units. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. I reinforce my earlier comments. Certainly that 

kind of collection is authorized in certain circumstances, and although those are not a part of this committee’s work but other committees in the Congress. It is a matter of, in the public domain, 

that improvements need to be made in that regard and that is all 

then about information sharing and might press the point earlier 

in response to another question inside the Department and in 

interagency domain to help commanders connect the dots. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me say in closing, thank you for your testimony, I served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps in 

2005 and 2006, and I served with the Muslim Americans there and 

I was impressed with their service and dedication to their country. 

I do believe that they would want a counterintelligence operation 

to where there would be no question about their loyalty to this 

country, but I think they are a valuable asset to the Armed Forces 

of the United States. Thank you again. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you gentlemen 

for being here this morning and for the work you have done. I 

apologize, but I have my own hearing so I got here late, but I did 

want to cover two areas that I think—if they have already been 

covered I apologize. The first one is the sharing of information. In 

terms of, I guess, the kind of intelligence that we know we have 

and have the capability to evaluate internally, you are—let me 

start there, what are your recommendations in terms of how much 

we haven’t shared and how much we should? 

Admiral CLARK. Good to see you again, sir. 

In the entire area of information sharing, our recommendation is, 

and the simplest way to say it is, take down the barriers. Get rid 

of them. And make sure you do it inside the Department, too. But 

certainly do it in the interagency process. 

I have in front of me an immediate release, FBI release, on Friday, saying a series of things are going to be done. In your other 

committee, I know this is going to be something you are going to 

look at. Now, other investigations have occurred. The President 

chartered an examination of the intelligence process. I am sure 

that is the subject of your other work. But my response would be 

just as it was to Mr. Taylor; I am not here to represent that report. 

I am here to represent this report. 

But our recommendation is we need the barriers removed. We 

need to make sure that—we are going to hold the commanders responsible. And to do that, we need to make sure that they have the 

tools, and sometimes the tool is maybe a risk-assessment tool that 
30 

helps them look at a series of diverse information. Other times it 

is straightforward raw intelligence. And so, remove the barriers, is 

the simplest way I know how to say it, sir. 

Secretary WEST. I would say we have two information sharing 

problems that we address in our report. The first, as the Admiral 

alluded to, is amongst ourselves within the Department of Defense 

from one commander to another, from one command level to another, to get the information that is needed to make assessments 

there. 

The second one I also alluded to and the product of one of the 

FBI investigations is sharing between agencies. And there, again, 

we saw some breakdowns, and we made some specific recommendations for some improvements, including increasing the operation of 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

Mr. REYES. Like Mr. Taylor, I hope we get an opportunity to 

have you back where you are not constrained by just reporting 

back on this report. The other issue—because as you probably 

know, I represent Fort Bliss, and I get a chance to talk to soldiers 

and their families. One—and I am curious to hear your thoughts. 

One of the things that they are conflicted about is the fact that, 

before they deploy, they are expected to read up and know about 

the country they are going to, Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The incident at Fort Hood has sent I guess a chill down that 

says, if you are looking at the Internet to learn more, you may either become susceptible to radicalization, you may be getting the 

wrong information, you may—somebody may be monitoring it that 

may reflect negatively on them. How do we draw a balance on 

making sure that our troops going overseas into these areas are as 

knowledgeable as possible but yet don’t have this cloud over them 

about the work that they do on their own through the Internet? 

Secretary WEST. I think that raises a good question, Congressman. 

I have to say that I don’t think we either discussed it or analyzed 

that particular part of the balance, if you will, in preparing our report. We have been focusing, frankly, on whether even in that research I will have to say or that—those connections—there are indicators that need to be—that we need to be aware of and at least 

evaluate. Your point as to whether there is a kind of, what, and 

interim effect or an inhibitor in leading up to prepare is, I think, 

a valid one. I guess my answer is, if we pursue our research on the 

Internet with honest hearts and good intention, I think that is likely to show itself. 

But if there are repeated efforts that lead to a growing 

radicalization, remember, it is not just that it is a collection of indicators, a whole host of them that are needed to be read. I think 

if they are read properly, then we should be able to separate the 

wheat from the chaff. But the people who are in danger of selfradicalization and therefore of violent acts and those who are simply preparing to go, now that may not be the most satisfactory explanation, but it is the best one I have. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentleman, thank you. 
31 

Admiral, good to see you this afternoon. 

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned understanding the forces of 

radicalization and/or self-radicalization. 

Admiral, you indicated key indicators of violence, lofty terms. 

Certainly easier said than done. The clarity of hindsight allows 

us in most instances to weave a Tinkers to Evers to Chance connect-the-dots program that would say, oh, yeah, surely had we done 

that, we could have stopped whatever incident might have gotten 

involved. But in the fog of the present, the unclarity of the ongoing, 

of the day-to-day, we ought to always strive to get better at whatever it is we are doing. And if we have got your report, great, and 

as we plug in those things. 

But I am concerned that—and Secretary West, you may have 

just called for a constant surveillance of Internet activity by all of 

us. Do we want to live in a country that creates a surveillance program of thoughts and ideas and those kinds of activities in our 

quest to be safe? There is a movie out there—I think Tom Cruise 

starred in it—where they set in place a system to anticipate crime, 

and they would go and punish folks who they thought would commit a crime in the future before it was committed just because it 

occurred between their ears. 

So I don’t want to build an unrealistic expectation that in a free 

America, in an America where the—where our protections under 

the Constitution allow us to think and say and express, that we 

don’t sacrifice that in this quest to be safe because I don’t know 

that you will ever get there and you won’t be safe enough, and I 

don’t know that I want to live in a world where I can’t go to the 

Internet with some expectation of anonymity to look for things on 

the Internet if I am searching for bombs or whatever. But just to 

create that expectation and prepare the American people’s mind 

that we, in fact, in the military, Department of Defense, could in 

fact surveil our people so closely that a fratricide incident will 

never occur or that if it does occur, we have spectacular failure of 

command; I don’t know that I believe we can do that. Just your 

comments. 

Secretary WEST. I am not sure, Congressman, that I called for 

it. But I certainly acknowledge that I understood the Congressman’s concern and the concern of events by his people. Because we 

do advocate looking for the indicators and recording them and having an entity that can make a collection of what kinds of indicators 

we are to be looking for. 

You solved the problems I had with your question because we are 

not calling for it for the American people. We are talking about the 

fact when people are part of the military family, they come privileged to enter our facilities by just inserting a card. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So they sacrifice their—— 

Secretary WEST. Some things. That is already established. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I understand that. But the more they sacrifice in 

terms of their personal freedoms and personal privacies, the less 

attractive the uniforms will be. 

Secretary WEST. I think you are right. 

Admiral CLARK. And I would love to comment on that. I don’t 

want to align myself with the movie. That is not where I want to 

go. And you don’t either. 
32 

Mr. CONAWAY. I don’t remember the name of the movie. 

Admiral CLARK. I don’t know either. I haven’t seen it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Chilling. 

Admiral CLARK. What I do believe is we could have done better 

on this one. So we want to do as well as we know how to do. And 

the keyword again is this balance thing. And this is why we took 

great care not to define exact outcomes but to say, Mr. Secretary, 

as you look at this, this is an area you need to put the spotlight 

on when you look at the policy, programs, and procedures. We believe there is fruit to be harvested here, and then people in responsible positions in the administration make the decision about what 

that balance is going to be. And we believe that that is going to 

require everybody to challenge the assumptions and then move forward, and certainly the Congress has a role to play in all of that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I think understanding the radicalization process, 

I think what—you look at a fellow, Hasan, all of the advantages 

that he had, born here, grew up here, all of the educational advantages he had; how did he decide to do what he did? Allegedly—I 

am a CPA [Certified Professional Accountant], not a lawyer, so I 

can talk a little clearer, perhaps. Anyway, thanks for your comments this morning. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I am the last member here, so I guess I am the end of 

the totem pole. So, hopefully, I just think that, though, if we are 

ending here, we need to get back to the beginning, and that is what 

the chairman said. And I think that you have seen consistency on 

both sides of the aisle here. A lot of the questions we have over 

here are a lot of the questions that were raised on the other side. 

And I think the chairman, though, said it best at the beginning, 

what we have here are two issues that the American people in my 

district, and I am sure across this country, are concerned with, and 

that deals with the breakdown between communication of the federal agencies, the Department of Defense, the Department of the 

Army, the FBI and the CIA, whoever should have known about 

these things or been communicating. I mean, after 9/11, as we all 

know, that is why we have Homeland Security, so we don’t have 

these breakdowns in communication between federal agencies. 

That is one thing that is not acceptable to the American people. 

So those questions and those solutions as we move forward, and 

I understand that you are under restriction. I am a former judge 

advocate. I served at Fort Hood. I was in the First Calvary Division, and my son was born at the hospital that Major Hasan 

worked at. So it is very emotional for me to sit here. But as a lawyer, I understand what your restrictions are and what the Army— 

I always say that—to people that are quick to react to this situation, what the Army has done or not done. And my initial pushback 

is we need to give the Army the benefit of the doubt that we are 

doing things the right way, and we are not purposely doing things 

to expose people to risk or danger that we can do better. And I 

think that, with this review, hopefully, that that is true. 

And whether or not you can address that specifically that we will 

get better and that as, Admiral, you said that if we had inadequate 
33 

policies, that those dots will be connected, and we will address 

them in the future. 

The one question, though, I did have with that, Admiral, and I 

don’t know if you are specifically saying that, you alluded to the 

fact that commanders will be held responsible. And I don’t know 

if that means retrospectively because there were things missed. 

But I don’t really understand what you mean when you said that 

if the policy is inadequate, but we are going to hold commanders 

responsible. How can you hold commanders responsible if the policy 

was what it was? 

Admiral CLARK. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify. Certainly what happens when issues like this come up and hearings 

are held, the judgment is, did the commander do what he could do 

with the tools that he had? That is what I am saying. If it is within 

the ability of the commander to have the information that is required or to take the actions or to pursue the lines of inquiry, then 

they are held accountable. If they do not have, which is certainly 

the case in a number of these things that we are citing today where 

policy, we believe, was inadequate, then that is another story. And 

as a former judge advocate, you know how you would advise the 

commander when they came before you. 

Mr. ROONEY. And I will say, I didn’t finish my point with the 

chairman. The second point was, what may or may not have been 

missed with regard to Major Hasan and how we connect those dots 

and have the correct policy that is adequate, and what we can expect from our commanders moving forward? So those are the two 

things that I think the American people quite simply want to 

know. And I will just—if I could clean up a few things here because 

I have a minute left. 

Mr. West, absolutely, a terrorist act could have been one of the 

charges referred here. Whether or not it is or it isn’t, I don’t actually know. I know that there is murder, premeditated, attempted 

murder charges here. But within the rules and scope of the law, 

terrorist act is certainly evident here. I am not going to question 

why it was or was not charged. But you are right. 

Secretary WEST. We are not there. It may well be charged. 

Mr. ROONEY. I do just want to close with this. I think with this 

idea that has been raised a few times here with political correctness versus good order and discipline, I sort of disagree a little bit 

with what was just said. All of these guys wearing the uniform behind you understand that when they sign up, they are sacrificing 

a lot of constitutional rights, that the rest of us—that is part of sacrifice. That is part of service. And we know that when we are signing our name on the dotted line and filing—and getting into formation every morning. That is part of the deal. 

But I just think that it needs to be—I think it needs to be remembered that the Supreme Court has upheld time and time again 

that for the sake of good order and discipline, sacrificing some of 

the rights that we civilians have, including political correctness for 

the sake of—it might not be all politically correct in the military, 

that the military gets to do that, to keep us safe. So, with that, I 

will just thank you for your service and for your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 
34 

Admiral CLARK. Very briefly. And our report points out that 

there are differences between uniform members and civilians in the 

Department. And I then refer back to Mr. McKeon’s comments 

early on that this is not just an issue in the Department of Defense. And so if you look at the kind of threat that we are describing, we are talking about a challenge to us as a people. And so we 

didn’t say, go change those rules; don’t change that mix. But we did 

point out that it is different. And so if when we then examine the 

whole force protection of the environment, we have to understand 

what we have and we have to make judgments and those judgments have to be made on balance, and then those policies have 

to be defined and in an enabling way that goes back to the point 

that we pressed here: Let’s equip and enable the commander, the 

leaders in these institutions so that they can lead the command 

with the context of good order and discipline and all that goes with 

that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon, final comments. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, thank you for being here and for being able to answer 

some questions and not being able to answer questions. I don’t 

know if we all understand all of that. But it is what it is. I said 

in my opening statement that an officer takes an oath to support 

and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I also said in my questioning that the 

media reports that we have been given, one of them was that Major 

Hasan had made a statement that Sharia law trumped the Constitution. What I want to know is, if you can answer that, did he, 

in fact, say that? Yes or no. 

Admiral CLARK. Sir, it is in the restricted annex. Any reference 

to anything that he might have said that we decided to cite. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. If somebody is an officer in the armed services and they make a statement such as I quoted that would indicate opposition to the oath that they took as an officer, why would 

they then have a right to be promoted to higher rank, or why are 

they even indeed left as an officer in the service? 

Secretary WEST. I think it is fair to say that statements like that 

are indicators that ought not be missed and that ought to be taken 

into account in making decisions on precisely what you said. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

Admiral CLARK. May I clarify that I didn’t say whether that such 

a comment was in the restricted annex? Any comments that he 

might have said that we decided to include in the annex are in that 

restricted section, and I would personally enjoy a fulsome discussion on that particular subject. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me ask, in summary, if you agree with my comments that 

we have all been frustrated, as you know, by our inability to discuss all aspects of the shooting at Fort Hood? 

Some things are clear. More needs to be done to identify and document behavior that suggests an individual may present a danger. 

We need to carefully examine what new tools or authorities may 

be needed to address this. Do you agree with that? 
35 

Secretary WEST. You said it better than we wrote it, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral CLARK. I align completely with your words. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We also heard there was a failure in what the independent review, your independent review, has described as officership; that at 

least in the case of Major Hasan, military officers failed to accurately document Major Hasan’s performance and abilities in his 

academic and his military evaluations. Do you agree with that? 

Secretary WEST. That is with greater detail than we said it, sir. 

What we said is they failed to apply Army policies to the perpetrator, and they also—there are inconsistencies in what they wrote. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. Secretary West is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask as a last question, I think it is very, 

very important. Your term officership, I think across the board, 

those in uniform should fully understand that term. Would each of 

you give the definition of that term one more time? 

Secretary WEST. I am going to let Admiral Clark go first. It is 

a term that he uses most often. And then I will give my view. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. We talked about it at length inside our review. 

And just a couple of days ago, one of the staff members came up 

and provided me with this instruction that has it in it. And it happens to be from the Uniform Services University of the Health 

Sciences. And if you would like, we can provide it to you. But it 

talks—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like that to be part of the record? 

Admiral CLARK. That is fine. That is—I agree with everything 

that is in here, and it talks about all of the elements that unify 

the role of a commissioned officer in the United States of America, 

and talks about upholding the Constitution and the oath, and then 

the standards and all of the things that we would expect that go 

with leadership and a person who decides to live the lifestyle of 

service in the role of leadership supporting the goals and objectives 

and the principles and values of the United States of America. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I know Mr. McKeon joins me, as well as all of the members of 

the committee, in thanking you for your service on this panel, your 

leadership, and of course the fact that you have been such outstanding American leaders in the past. Thank you very, very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JANUARY 20, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JANUARY 20, 2010 

(41) 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 

Æ