J-A03005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PETER ALLEN O'FLYNN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 599 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 26, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001190-2019

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2023

Appellant, Peter Allen O’Flynn, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury 

trial convictions for theft by unlawful taking, recklessly endangering another 

person (“REAP”), false identification to law enforcement authorities, 

aggravated assault of a police officer, fleeing or attempting to elude a police

officer, and accidents involving damage to attended vehicle.1 We affirm.

In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as 

follows:

The following testimony was presented at trial. On 

December 31, 2018, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Officer 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a); 2705; 4914(a); 2702(a)(6); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§

3733(a); and 3743(a), respectively. 
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Daniel Francis Boyd of the Springfield Township Police 

Department was dispatched to the Parkway Inn on 

Baltimore Pike in Springfield, Delaware County, to 

investigate a domestic assault in progress. The description 

of the actors he received from dispatch was a Caucasian 

male and female, both dressed in black. Upon his arrival, 

Officer Boyd observed two people matching that description 

in front of Michael’s Crafts Store. As he approached in a 

marked patrol car and in full uniform, both suspects started 

walking across the street. Officer Boyd exited his patrol 

vehicle and asked them to come back and talk with him. 

Officer Boyd spoke to the male suspect. Officer Boyd asked 

him if he and his girlfriend had been fighting; he replied 

“no.” Officer Boyd observed fresh scratch marks around his 

neck which were bleeding, indicating a recent physical 

altercation. Officer Boyd asked his name and [Appellant] 

replied “Michael Meehock.” [Appellant] also denied having 

any identification on his person. Officer Cesanek from 

Morton Borough Police Department arrived as a back-up 

officer. She ran the name through NCIC. The name Michael 

Meehock with the date of birth provided came back with “no 

record found.” The Officer testified that this is common 

when a person is being deceptive about their identity. 

Officer Boyd then spelled the name [Appellant] provided him 

out loud; [Appellant] confirmed the spelling. Officer 

Cesanek ran the information a second time and it still came 

back as “no record found.” Officer Boyd informed 

[Appellant] that he was being deceptive about his identity. 

Officer Boyd told [Appellant] he was under police 

investigation for disorderly conduct and possibly for assault. 

After the warning, [Appellant] provided the fake name and 

date of birth two more times. Officer Boyd then spoke with 

the female and informed her that her boyfriend was getting 

himself in trouble by not giving his real name. She said his 

name is Pete but refused to provide his last name.

Sergeant McKinney arrived on the scene. He told 

[Appellant] that he was not giving the police accurate 

information. [Appellant] was advised he was going to be 

charged with another crime if the police continued to get “no 

record found” on the name provided. He further informed 

[Appellant] that he was going to be detained and taken to 

the police station for a Live Scan to determine his identity. 

At that point, [Appellant] said his real name is Peter O’Flynn. 
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As Officer Boyd was writing the information in his notepad, 

he heard Officer Cesanek say “don’t do it.” At that moment, 

[Appellant] jumped to his feet and ran across Baltimore 

Pike. Officer Boyd identified [Appellant] as the defendant 

from a JNET photo which was admitted into evidence.

After [Appellant] took off on foot, Officer Cesanek and 

Officer Boyd gave chase after him. As he ran through 721 

Saxer Avenue, Officer Boyd heard Officer Cesanek say that 

[Appellant] was getting into a car. Officer Boyd saw 

[Appellant] inside a Mercedes which was pulling out of the 

driveway. Officer Boyd ran to the side of the car and tried 

to open the door. [Appellant] continued to back up. Officer 

Boyd was directly in front of the vehicle. [Appellant] 

accelerated the vehicle and nearly struck Officer Boyd, 

forcing him to jump out of the way to avoid being hit. Officer 

Boyd testified the car came close enough to him to put him 

in fear for his life. [Appellant] made a left out of the 

driveway and another left onto Saxer Avenue. Sergeant 

McKinney then gave chase in a marked patrol vehicle.

Detective Leah Cesanek is employed by the Yeadon Borough 

Police Department. At the time of this incident, she was 

employed by the Morton Borough Police Department as a 

patrol officer. She was dispatched to assist in an 

investigation of a domestic disturbance with the Springfield 

Township Police Department. Officer Cesanek’s account of 

her interaction with [Appellant] providing false identification 

information was similar to Officer Boyd’s testimony. She 

testified she ran [Appellant’s] information a total of three 

times before [Appellant] admitted his identity. Detective 

Cesanek also identified [Appellant] from a JNET photo which 

was admitted into evidence. Detective Cesanek’s account 

of [Appellant’s] flight and foot pursuit also mirrored Officer 

Boyd’s account. She observed [Appellant] enter a Mercedes 

sedan and almost strike Officer Boyd as he pulled out of the 

driveway to flee the area. Detective Cesanek relayed a radio 

transmission that [Appellant] almost struck Officer Boyd and 

other officers should use caution if encountering him. 

Detective Cesanek was wearing a body camera. The 

recording was admitted into evidence and published to the 

jury in its entirety. 

Sergeant Andrew McKinney is employed by the Springfield 
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Township Police Department. On December 31, 2018 he 

was dispatched to Michael’s Craft Store for a reported 

domestic between a male and female in Springfield, 

Delaware County. He confirmed Officer Boyd and Detective 

Cesanek’s accounts of [Appellant] providing false 

identification information and then fleeing on foot. When 

[Appellant] fled, Sergeant McKinney’s car was parked in the 

Michael’s parking lot. Sergeant McKinney ran back to his 

car, activated the lights and siren and exited the parking lot 

on to Baltimore Pike. At that time, he saw [Appellant] in an 

old tan Mercedes coming at him. Sergeant McKinney tried 

to stop him, but [Appellant] cut across the front of his 

vehicle and proceeded eastbound on Baltimore Pike. 

[Appellant] was travelling at a high rate of speed. He 

observed [Appellant] go through a steady red light at 

Baltimore Pike and Andrew Road. [Appellant] then smashed 

the front end of a car in that intersection and kept going; 

leaving the other vehicle disabled in the roadway. Sergeant 

McKinney continued after [Appellant]. After [Appellant] 

went through a red light at the next block, Sergeant 

McKinney determined the pursuit was too dangerous and 

discontinued it. After he terminated the pursuit, Sergeant 

McKinney returned to the accident scene. Sergeant 

McKinney also identified the defendant as [Appellant].

Mr. Mark Santoro was making a bread delivery at the Swiss 

Farms on Baltimore Pike in Springfield on December 31, 

2018, at approximately 10:00 a.m. He saw someone run 

across the street in between two of the residences. Then he 

saw two police officers chasing that person. Not long after 

that, he saw both officers retreating from a car “whipping” 

out of the driveway. He testified that one of the officers had 

to leap out of the way to avoid being hit by the car. The car

then proceeded through the intersection of Baltimore Pike 

and Saxer Avenue against the red light. The car then made 

a left on Baltimore Pike heading towards Lansdowne. 

Mr. David Nguyen lives at 717 Saxer Avenue, Springfield, 

Delaware County, Pennsylvania. On December 31, 2018, at 

approximately 10:00 a.m. his 1985 Mercedes Benz 3-D, 

champagne color, was taken from his residence without his 

permission. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/20/22, at 1-7) (internal citations omitted).
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Procedurally, a jury convicted Appellant of the above-mentioned 

offenses on September 1, 2021. The court sentenced Appellant on January 

26, 2022, to an aggregate term of 45 to 90 months’ imprisonment plus five 

years’ probation. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on February 23, 

2022. On February 28, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

which Appellant timely filed on March 16, 2022.

Appellant raises five issues for our review:

1. Did the [c]ourt, after acknowledging on the record that 

[Appellant] had psychological problems, fail to protect his 

rights by having him examined before or during trial, rather 

than postponing it until after a guilty verdict?

2. Were the rights of appellate review compromised by an 

inefficient system that makes complete appellate review 

impossible?

3. Was there evidence to convict [Appellant] of both [REAP]

and Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer where there was 

no requisite Mens Rea?

4. Did the [c]ourt err by allowing the False Identification to 

go to a jury when the Police Officer acknowledged that 

[Appellant] gave correct information after being advised 

that he was under investigation?

5. When the [c]ourt insisted erroneously that [Appellant] 

kept changing his mind about a bench or jury trial when he 

never decided on a jury trial, did the [c]ourt err [i]n not 

allowing the bench trial?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel made numerous 

motions for a mistrial and for a competency evaluation throughout the 
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proceedings. Appellant asserts that he was unable to aid in his defense. 

Appellant complains his behavior during trial demonstrated that he was 

incompetent to stand trial. Appellant emphasizes “the abuse he heaped upon 

the judge and his attorney, his talking to jurors from the defense table, and 

his staring at the jury” as signs of his incompetence. (Id. at 32). Appellant 

claims that even the court recognized Appellant’s need for a psychologist, but 

then the judge refused to order a psychological or psychiatric exam to 

determine if Appellant was competent to stand trial. Appellant maintains that 

his attorney pleaded for the court to order a competency evaluation. Appellant 

avers that his attorney could not even concentrate based on Appellant’s 

numerous outbursts. Appellant contends the court erroneously decided 

Appellant’s outbursts were volitional and not the result of incompetency. 

Appellant insists that his actions compelled the jury to convict him. Appellant 

submits that the court’s order directing a psychological evaluation after trial 

was insufficient, as the relevant inquiry is whether Appellant was competent 

at the time of trial. Appellant concludes the court erred by failing to order a 

competency evaluation during trial, and this Court must grant relief. We 

disagree.

“The matter of granting or denying a continuance is within the discretion 

of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 671 

(Pa.Super. 2013). “[T]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude 

in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the 
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witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this 

burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons.” Id.

(internal citation omitted). “Accordingly, a trial court exceeds its 

constitutional authority only when it exercises its discretion to deny a 

continuance on the basis of an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon 

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Id. at 671-72 

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Further:

A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. 

Thus, the burden is on Appellant to prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that he was incompetent to 

stand trial. In order to prove that he was incompetent, 

Appellant must establish that he was either unable to 

understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to 

participate in his own defense.

Commonwealth v. Rainey, 593 Pa. 67, 101-02, 928 A.2d 215, 236 (2007)

(internal citations omitted).

Instantly, the record shows that on the first day of trial, Appellant 

refused to get dressed for trial. The court instructed Appellant to get dressed 

before he appeared in front of the jury. At that time, defense counsel 

requested a continuance to seek a competency evaluation for Appellant based 

on some of Appellant’s behaviors. The Commonwealth objected, suggesting 

that Appellant’s actions were volitional and not the product of any mental 

health issues. The court denied the continuance request, noting that Appellant 

appeared to be misbehaving in order to delay trial. (See N.T. Trial, 8/31/21, 
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at 7-8). During voir dire and following open arguments, Appellant made 

several loud outbursts. The court then warned Appellant outside the presence 

of the jury that if Appellant did not stop misbehaving, the judge would remove 

him from the courtroom. Appellant had another outburst during Officer Boyd’s 

testimony. At that point, defense counsel requested a mistrial, which the 

court denied. The court stated that Appellant’s behavior was “definitely 

volitional,” and that Appellant was an “obstructionist.” (See id. at 93-94). 

The court then removed Appellant from the courtroom. 

On the second day of trial, Appellant told the judge that he was “not 

competent for trial today” and dissatisfied with counsel’s representation. 

Appellant stated he was not in the “right mental state of mind for trial.” (N.T. 

Trial, 9/1/21, at 3). Defense counsel requested a mistrial once again and a

mental health evaluation for Appellant. The court denied counsel’s requests 

and removed Appellant from the courtroom.

In evaluating Appellant’s claim on appeal, the court explained:

Here, the court did not deny the continuance in an 

unreasoning or arbitrary way. Rather, the court determined 

[Appellant] was willfully attempting to delay trial by 

obstructing the proceeding every way he could think of... 

The court found: “There is nothing left but to have a jury 

trial and I think that [Appellant] is just upset that that day 

has finally come. He is trying to avoid facing a jury trial and 

I think that the time has come to continue forward with this 

case. So, I appreciate what you put on the record, and we 

will go forward with the case.” N.T. 08/31/2021 pp. 7, 8. 

...

(Trial Court Opinion at 9-10).
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The record supports the court’s analysis. Throughout numerous pretrial proceedings, Appellant participated, conversed with the court, and did 

not disrupt the proceedings. Nevertheless, Appellant made several pre-trial 

requests for new counsel and equivocated regarding whether he wanted a jury 

or bench trial. As discussed in more detail infra, Appellant’s indecisiveness 

regarding whether he wanted a bench or jury trial compelled the court to grant 

numerous continuances, which postponed the trial date. Looking at 

Appellant’s behavior at trial in the context of his behavior during earlier pretrial proceedings, the record supports the court’s statement that Appellant 

was adamant to delay trial and made several outbursts at trial as a last-ditch

attempt to delay the proceedings. Nothing in the record shows that Appellant 

was unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him. 

See Rainey, supra. The court gave Appellant multiple opportunities to 

participate in his defense, but he chose to disregard the court’s warnings and 

to disrupt the proceedings. See id. On this record, we cannot say the court 

abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s continuance request for a 

competency evaluation. See Sandusky, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that there are more than 100

instances where the court reporter noted the word “inaudible” during the twoday trial. Appellant asserts that the court reporter did not disclose how long 

each “inaudible” instance lasted. Appellant contends that a complete and 

untarnished record is required for this Court to evaluate Appellant’s appeal. 
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Appellant claims “[t]his Court should not speculate when a person’s very 

freedom might depend on those missing words.” (Appellant’s Brief at 45). 

Appellant concludes the record is inadequate to conduct appellate review, and 

this Court must remand for a full and complete record. We disagree. 

“[T]o be entitled to relief due to the incompleteness of the trial record

the defendant must make some potentially meritorious challenge which 

cannot be adequately reviewed due to the deficiency in the transcript.” 

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 618 Pa. 262, 332, 55 A.3d 1108, 1150

(2012). Moreover, our Rules of Appellate Procedure permit corrections to a 

transcript under the following circumstances:

Rule 1922. Transcription of Notes of Testimony

* * *

(c) Corrections to transcript. If a transcript contains an 

error or is an incomplete representation of the proceedings, 

the omission or misstatement may be corrected by the 

following means:

(1) By objection. A party may file a written objection to the 

filed transcript. Any party may answer the objection. The 

trial court shall resolve the objections and then direct that 

the transcript as corrected be made a part of the record and 

transmitted to the appellate court.

(2) By stipulation of the parties filed in the trial court. If the

trial court clerk has already certified the record, the parties 

shall file in the appellate court a copy of any stipulation filed 

pursuant to this rule, and the trial court shall direct that the 

transcript as corrected be made a part of the record and 

transmitted to the appellate court.

(3) By the trial court or, if the record has already been 

transmitted to the appellate court, by the appellate court or 
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trial court on remand, with notice to all parties and an 

opportunity to be heard.

Pa.R.A.P. 1922(c).

Instantly, we initially observe that Appellant did not object to any 

deficiencies in the transcripts until the filing of his appellate brief. Appellant 

did not file an objection in the trial court or seek to reach a stipulation with 

counsel concerning any omissions in the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 1922(c)(1), 

(2). Arguably, Appellant’s claim is waived on this basis. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Stanton, 440 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa.Super. 1982) (stating: 

“At the very least, it is clear that Appellant failed to interpose an appropriate 

objection in accordance with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1922, and 

Appellant is bound by the transcript, as lodged”). Further, Appellant fails to 

identify a potentially meritorious challenge which cannot be adequately 

reviewed due to the deficiency in the transcript. See Sepulveda, supra. In 

any event, we have carefully reviewed the relevant transcripts in this case. 

Although Appellant emphasizes each time the court reporter wrote the word 

“inaudible,” our review of this appeal was not hampered by these instances. 

Rather, we were able to review all evidence adduced at trial as well as the 

pre-trial proceedings necessary to resolve each of Appellant’s appellate 

claims. Therefore, Appellant’s second issue on appeal merits no relief.

In his third issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of aggravated assault on a police officer. Appellant asserts that 

the officer put himself in a dangerous situation by chasing after Appellant 
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when he took off in the stolen vehicle. Appellant claims he honked the horn 

to alert the officer of the danger. Appellant contends the officer “may have 

been saved from being hit by the car by the effort of [Appellant] to avoid 

hitting him.” (Appellant’s Brief at 47). Appellant emphasizes that he lacked 

the mens rea to injure the officer. Appellant maintains he was not trying to 

cause the officer any harm but was merely trying to escape. Appellant submits 

the jury convicted Appellant based on his disruptive behavior during trial and 

not the evidence adduced at trial. Appellant concludes the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his aggravated assault conviction, and this Court must 

reverse. We disagree.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard 

of review is as follows: 

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the 

crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that 

the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a 

crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where 

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. 
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Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that 

of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld. 

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 

2013)). 

The Crimes Code defines the offense of aggravated assault in pertinent 

part as follows:

§ 2702. Aggravated assault

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of aggravated 

assault if he:

* * *

(6) attempts by physical menace to put any of the officers, 

agents, employees or other persons enumerated in 

subsection (c), while in the performance of duty, in fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(6). Subsection (c) of this statute includes a police 

officer. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(c)(1). “Serious bodily injury” is “bodily 

injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, 

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 

any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. “A person is ‘menacing’

for purposes of an aggravated assault conviction if, based upon a totality of 

the circumstances, the behavior is ‘frightening activity.’” Commonwealth v. 

Evans, 260 A.3d 98 (Pa.Super. filed July 20, 2021), 2021 WL 3056666 at *11
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(unpublished memorandum).2

Instantly, the court analyzed this claim as follows:

Looking at the evidence presented in this case, Officer Boyd 

saw [Appellant] inside a Mercedes pulling out of the 

driveway. Officer Boyd ran to the side of the car and tried 

to open the door. [Appellant] continued to back up. Officer 

Boyd was directly in front of the vehicle. [Appellant] 

accelerated the vehicle and nearly struck Officer Boyd, 

forcing him to jump out of the way to avoid being hit. Officer 

Boyd testified the car came close enough to him to put him 

in fear for his life. This incident was witnessed by Detective 

Cesanek and Mark Santoro who both testified similarly 

about the incident. In addition, there was Detective 

Cesanek’s body cam recording which was published to the 

jury. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient for the 

jury as factfinder to conclude that all the elements of the 

crime of Aggravated Assault were established beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

(Trial Court Opinion at 13). The record supports the court’s analysis. Viewed 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for aggravated 

assault. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(6); Sebolka, supra.

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that at the time Officer Boyd 

approached Appellant, no crime had been committed. Appellant asserts that 

when Officer Boyd asked Appellant for his name, Appellant was not under 

investigation. Appellant claims that once Officer Boyd told Appellant that he 

was under investigation, Appellant gave the correct information. Appellant 

____________________________________________

2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may cite to and rely on unpublished 

decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).
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emphasizes that it is not illegal to give a police officer a false identification 

until that person is told he is under investigation. Appellant concludes the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for false identification to law 

enforcement, and this Court must reverse. We disagree.

The Crimes Code defines the offense of false identification to law 

enforcement authorities as follows:

§ 4914. False identification to law enforcement 

authorities

(a) Offense defined.—A person commits an offense if he 

furnishes law enforcement authorities with false information 

about his identity after being informed by a law enforcement 

officer who is in uniform or who has identified himself as a 

law enforcement officer that the person is the subject of an 

official investigation of a violation of law.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914(a). 

Instantly, the court addressed this issue as follows:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the evidence was sufficient to prove each of these elements 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The first element is 

unequivocally met; Officer Boyd arrived in a marked patrol 

car and was in uniform. The second element is also met 

since Officer Boyd expressly informed [Appellant] that he 

was the subject of an official investigation for disorderly 

conduct and possibly domestic assault. Still [Appellant] 

persisted in providing false information and claimed he had 

no identification on him. [Appellant] was not, therefore, 

solely under investigation as to his identity, as he claims 

was the case. The third element, too, is met because 

[Appellant] furnished Officer Boyd a false name and date of 

birth, after being informed, multiple times, that he was the 

subject of an official investigation of a violation of law. 

Again, [Appellant’s] claim of insufficient evidence is 

meritless.
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(Trial Court Opinion at 14-15). 

The record supports the court’s analysis. Although Appellant claims that 

he provided his correct name after being told he was under official 

investigation, Officer Boyd testified otherwise. To be sure, Officer Boyd 

clarified on re-direct examination that Appellant initially gave the name 

“Michael Meehock” two times to the officer. The officer then told Appellant 

that he was under investigation for a possible assault and disorderly conduct 

and that he would be charged if he continued to provide false information. 

Thereafter, Appellant “twice more gave...the name Michael Meehock[.]” (N.T. 

Trial, 8/31/21, at 131). It was only after Sergeant McKinney subsequently

informed Appellant that he was going to have to come to the station and 

undergo a Live Scan, that Appellant provided his true identity. (Id.) 

Essentially, Appellant asks us to disregard Officer Boyd’s testimony in favor of 

Appellant’s claim that he furnished his correct name after the officer told him 

he was the subject of an official investigation. We will not usurp the role of 

the jurors as fact-finders, who resolved any conflict regarding the timing of 

events in favor of the Commonwealth. See Sebolka, supra. Viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for false identification to law 

enforcement authorities. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914(a); Sebolka, supra.

In his final issue, Appellant initially acknowledges that there is no 

absolute right to a bench trial. Nevertheless, Appellant argues that he did not 
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want a jury trial. Appellant claims the record belies the court’s statements 

that Appellant kept changing his mind regarding whether he wanted a jury 

trial. Appellant insists that no one fully explained to him what rights he would 

be giving up if he waived his right to a jury trial, which had initially confused 

Appellant. Appellant maintains that he ultimately decided he wanted a bench 

trial, the court erred by requiring Appellant to proceed to a jury trial, and this 

Court must grant a new trial. We disagree. 

Unlike a jury trial, there is no constitutional right to a bench trial. 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 614 Pa. 1, 51, 36 A.3d 24, 54 (2011), cert. 

denied, 568 U.S. 833, 133 S.Ct. 122 (2012). Moreover, the decision to grant 

or deny a bench trial is within the discretion of the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Merrick, 488 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa.Super. 1985). 

Instantly, the record discloses the following events relevant to this 

issue. At a hearing on August 10, 2020, defense counsel asked Appellant if 

he wanted a bench or jury trial. Appellant said he was unsure and asked for 

more time to decide. The court said that was okay and scheduled the next 

court date. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/10/20, at 5-6). On October 20, 2020, 

defense counsel informed the court that Appellant was still unsure whether he 

wanted to proceed with a bench or jury trial and that Appellant had not given 

a specific answer yet. The court said it would go forward with a jury trial then

and set a status conference date. (See N.T. Hearing, 10/20/20, at 4). 

Appellant appeared before the court on January 11, 2021. At that time, 
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defense counsel represented that Appellant wanted a jury trial. Appellant 

disagreed and said he was “not too sure” if he wanted a jury trial and denied 

having told defense counsel that he wanted a jury trial. The court set another 

listing date. (See N.T. Hearing, 1/11/21, at 3-4). The parties appeared 

before the court again on March 15, 2021. Defense counsel told the court 

that Appellant wanted a bench trial. Appellant said he wished he knew more 

information so he could decide. Appellant then confirmed that he wanted a 

bench trial. The court informed Appellant he would have to sign a jury trial 

waiver form to proceed with a bench trial. The court scheduled the bench trial 

for May 19, 2021. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/15/21, at 3-9).

The parties appeared for the scheduled bench trial on May 19, 2021. At 

that time, defense counsel informed the court that Appellant had refused to 

sign the jury trial waiver form. The court said it would schedule a jury trial 

instead. Appellant then said he was ready to go forward with the bench trial 

that day. The court told Appellant that if he wanted to proceed with the bench 

trial, he would have to sign the jury trial waiver form and participate in the 

oral waiver colloquy. Appellant refused to do so. The court then asked 

defense counsel to speak with Appellant in private. Following their 

conversation, defense counsel informed the court that Appellant was not fully 

ready to waive his right to a jury trial. Appellant interjected that he wanted 

to proceed with a bench trial that day but did not want to sign the waiver 

form. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/19/21, at 3-9). Therefore, the court scheduled 
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the matter for a jury trial. 

On August 31, 2021, Appellant appeared for his jury trial. Appellant 

told the court that he did not want a jury trial and wanted a bench trial instead. 

The court informed Appellant that he gave up that chance already and denied 

Appellant’s request. (See N.T. Trial, 8/31/21, at 4-5).

Here, the record makes clear that Appellant had ample opportunity to 

decide whether he wanted to proceed with a jury trial or bench trial. Although 

Appellant insists on appeal that he wanted a bench trial, Appellant refused to 

sign the jury trial waiver form necessary to do so. Under these circumstances, 

the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s request for a 

bench trial. See Merrick, supra. Rather, the court properly proceeded with 

a jury trial to protect Appellant’s constitutional right, because Appellant would 

not sign the jury trial waiver form. See Sanchez, supra. Therefore, 

Appellant’s final issue merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2023