UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Salam Shaker Zora, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Thomas Winn, 

Respondent. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-11550 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

Mag. Judge R. Steven Whalen

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS [1], DENYING THE MOTION FOR AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING [9], AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY 

 Petitioner Salam Zora, confined at the Saginaw Correctional 

Facility in Freeland, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 through his attorneys Daniel E. 

Harold, Mayer Morganroth, and Stuart Friedman. (Dkt. 1.) He has 

also filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 9.) Petitioner 

challenges his conviction for second-degree murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 

750.317, and carrying or possessing a gun when committing a felony, 

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b. 

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 For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is denied. Further, the motion for an evidentiary hearing is 

denied, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. 

I. Background 

 Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder and possessing a 

firearm during a felony after killing his brother-in-law, Najem Matti. 

On September 25, 2009, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree 

murder and felony-firearm. 

 The Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the 

Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas 

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 

F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Defendant’s convictions arise from the January 23, 2009, 

shooting death of his brother-in-law. The victim and his wife 

(defendant’s sister) previously lived in defendant’s home. 

After they moved out, defendant discovered that 

approximately $250,000 was missing from a hideaway at his 

residence. Defendant suspected that the victim stole the 

money. On January 20, 2009, defendant confronted the 

victim about the money and, according to defendant, the 

victim agreed to go to their church later that week to swear 

on a Bible to his innocence. Three days later, defendant went 

to the victim’s residence unannounced to again discuss the 

missing money. Defendant was armed with a gun and was 

accompanied by his two brothers. Defendant ultimately shot 

the victim five times. Three of the gunshots were to the back 

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of the victim’s body. There was no evidence of a struggle in 

the residence. Defendant presented a claim of self-defense 

through himself and his two brothers. The defense theory at 

trial was that the victim charged toward defendant while 

shouting an Arabic war death cry and while holding a 

butcher knife in his raised right hand and a two-pronged 

barbecue fork in his left hand. 

People v. Zora, No. 296508, 2011 WL 2623384, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 

July 5, 2011). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id., leave 

denied 491 Mich. 852 (2012). 

 Petitioner then filed a post-conviction motion for relief from 

judgment, which the trial court denied. People v. Zora, No. 2009-2137-

FC (Macomb Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 28, 2013). The Michigan appellate courts 

denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Zora, No. 321508 (Mich. Ct. 

App. June 11, 2014); People v. Zora, No. 150070, 497 Mich. 1011 (2015). 

 Petitioner now seeks a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner first 

argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 

of counsel because his trial counsel was unprepared, failed to interview 

and call several material witnesses, failed to investigate and present 

exculpatory evidence, and stipulated to the admission of false evidence. 

(Dkt. 1-1 at 19–37.) Next, Petitioner argues he was denied due process 

as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because of prosecutorial 

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misconduct. The prosecutor at trial allegedly presented false evidence, 

concealed evidence, and submitted a false affidavit to the trial court 

regarding what the prosecutor did and did not argue at trial. (Id. at 37–

43.) Third, Petitioner claims he was denied his right to a trial by a fair 

and impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments because the jury was racially and ethnically biased 

against him. (Id. at 43–44.) Finally, Petitioner claims his trial was 

“fundamentally unfair by virtue of the cumulative constitutional 

errors.” (Id. at 44–45.) 

II. Legal Standard 

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following 

standard of review for habeas cases: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 

the adjudication of the claim– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established 

federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or if the state 

court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of 

“materially indistinguishable” facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

405–06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs when a state court 

applies “clearly established federal law” in an “objectively 

unreasonable” manner. Id. at 410. A federal habeas court may not 

“issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. 

 “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions 

be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 

(2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); 

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). “[A] state 

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court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of 

the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 

(2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 To obtain habeas relief, a state prisoner is required to show that 

the state court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 103. A habeas petitioner must be denied relief as long as it 

is within the “realm of possibility” that fairminded jurists could find the 

state court decision reasonable. See Woods v. Etherton, ___U.S.___, 136 

S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016). 

III. Analysis 

Petitioner has raised a number of issues in his petition, and 

respondent argues that at least some of his claims are procedurally 

defaulted. Petitioner has also asked for an evidentiary hearing. Each 

of these issues is discussed in detail below. 

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A. Procedural Default 

 Respondent argues that many of Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally defaulted either because he failed to preserve them during 

trial or because he raised the claims for the first time in his motion for 

post-conviction review and failed to show cause or prejudice, as required 

by Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D), that would excuse him for failing to raise the 

claims on direct appeal. 

 The Supreme Court has held there is no rule “that the proceduralbar issue must invariably be resolved first” or before the merits of the 

potentially defaulted claims. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 

(1997). “Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question 

priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas 

petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated 

issues of state law.” Id. Thus, a federal court may “proceed directly to 

the merits of [the] claim” when “the question of procedural default 

presents a complicated question of [state] law” or “is unnecessary to 

[the] disposition of the case.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 216 (6th 

Cir. 2003). 

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 In this case, many of the allegedly procedurally-defaulted claims 

are similar or related to the non-defaulted claims. As set forth below, 

consideration of the non-defaulted claims will dispose of the allegedly 

defaulted claims and all of the claims lack merit, making the procedural 

default issue “unnecessary to [the] disposition of the case.” Hudson, 351 

F.3d at 216. Accordingly, the Court will adjudicate the merits of all of 

Petitioner’s claims. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Petitioner first alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 

trial counsel for numerous reasons, as set forth below. 

 To show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must satisfy a two-prong test. First, the petitioner must 

demonstrate that, considering all of the circumstances, counsel’s 

performance was so deficient “that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In so doing, the 

petitioner must overcome a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 

is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 

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circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 

strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 

(1955)). Second, the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice by showing 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 

694. “Strickland’s test for prejudice is a demanding one. ‘The 

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 

conceivable.’” Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112). 

 And on habeas review of state court determinations, “[t]he 

question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s 

determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but 

whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher 

threshold.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). Thus, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1), “doubly deferential judicial review” applies to a Strickland

claim brought by a habeas petitioner, id., and “a state court must be 

granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the 

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case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 101. 

 Because of this doubly deferential standard, the Supreme Court 

has indicated that: 

Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of 

equating unreasonableness under Strickland with 

unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, 

the question is not whether counsel’s actions were 

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Thus, a reviewing court must 

“affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons [counsel] may 

have had for proceeding’” as he did. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

196 (2011). 

i. Petitioner’s Claim That Trial Counsel Was 

Unprepared

 Petitioner first argues that his trial counsel, Carl Marlinga, was 

not prepared for trial. Petitioner has submitted Mr. Marlinga’s 

testimony from the post-trial evidentiary hearing – known as a Ginther 

hearing – that counsel felt tired and ill-prepared for trial because he 

had recently finished several other trials and was engaged in other 

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matters. Mr. Marlinga also submitted a post-trial affidavit in which he 

claimed he was ineffective at trial. (Dkt. 1-15.) 

Strickland “calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness 

of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 110. Because a court’s inquiry asks whether 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, a 

defense attorney’s subjective belief that his or her representation was 

inadequate or ineffective “plays no role” in determining whether a 

habeas petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Dugas 

v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 328 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005). Indeed, “some 

excellent lawyers would stipulate to their own ineffectiveness if it might 

help win a client’s release.” Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (2d 

Cir. 2004). Thus, Mr. Marlinga’s post-trial testimony and affidavit are 

not sufficient to show that the state court unreasonably applied 

Strickland in finding Mr. Marlinga was not ineffective. People v. Zora, 

2011 WL 2623384, at *5. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on the ground that counsel has claimed he was illprepared for trial. 

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ii. Petitioner’s Claim Counsel Was Ineffective For 

Failing to Interview or Call Certain Individuals as 

Witnesses 

 Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

interview or call a number of individuals. Petitioner claims these 

individuals would have supported his self-defense claim; his peaceful 

character; and other facts related to his defense. 

 Individuals Supporting Petitioner’s Self-Defense Claim 

 Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective because he failed to 

interview or call to testify five individuals whose testimony would have 

allegedly supported his self-defense claim: the victim’s then-four yearold son, Austin Matti; the victim’s wife and Petitioner’s sister, Manal 

Petros; Petitioner’s other sister, Hana Battris; Petitioner’s cousin, 

Shaban Kejbou; and Petitioner’s employee, James Curry. 

 Petitioner previously raised this claim on appeal with respect to 

these individuals, except Mr. Curry. The Michigan Court of Appeals 

dismissed the claim, stating Petitioner had not submitted any 

documentation at the evidentiary hearing – and also did not call these 

individuals to testify at that hearing – to prove that these individuals 

would have testified in support of his defense. People v. Zora, 2011 WL 

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2623384, at *6. Thus, counsel was not ineffective because Petitioner 

had not demonstrated he was denied a “substantial defense” as nothing 

showed the testimony may have altered the outcome of the trial. Id. 

 The record shows the state court reasonably found counsel was 

not ineffective. First, nothing in the police interview of Austin Matti 

indicates he saw his father threaten or attack Petitioner with a knife. 

(See Dkt. 1-12.) Thus, Austin’s understanding of the events was only 

that a fight occurred and then his father was shot. And given 

Petitioner’s failure to call Austin at the post-trial evidentiary hearing 

and to submit any additional documentation indicating he would have 

testified to facts supporting Petitioner, the state court reasonably found 

that counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Austin as a witness. 

See Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[Petitioner] 

has not introduced affidavits or any other evidence establishing what 

[potential witnesses] would have said. . . . In the absence of any 

evidence showing that they would have offered specific favorable 

testimony, [Petitioner] cannot show prejudice from counsel’s strategy 

recommendation not to introduce this evidence.”). 

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 Second, Petitioner’s sister, Manal Petros, has repeatedly attested 

to the fact that she was in the garage at the time of the confrontation 

between Petitioner and her husband. (Dkt. 1-5.) Thus, any testimony 

she could have provided “would not help exonerate [Petitioner].” 

Pillette v. Berghuis, 408 F. App’x 873, 885–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (petitioner 

argued individual should have been called as a witness to support selfdefense claim in assault with intent to murder case). Consequently, the 

decision not to call her as a witness is not obviously unreasonable trial 

strategy, and it was reasonable for the state court to reject Petitioner’s 

claim. McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 2000) 

(“Strategic choices by counsel, while not necessarily those a federal 

judge in hindsight might make, do not rise to the level of a Sixth 

Amendment violation.”). 

 Third, Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call his other sister, Hana Battris, to testify that the victim 

attacked her with a knife fourteen years earlier. At trial, counsel filed a 

motion to admit Ms. Battris’ testimony, but the trial court denied the 

motion, in part because there was no indication that Petitioner was 

aware of this specific instance of violence. (Tr. of Arg., 8–13 (Sept. 15, 

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2009); Tr. of Arg., 4–6 (Sept. 17, 2009)). Under Michigan law, a 

defendant must know a decedent’s reputation for violence if he or she is 

going to use it to show he or she acted in self-defense. See People v. 

Harris, 458 Mich. 310, 316 (1998). Because the evidence Ms. Battris 

may have presented would have been inadmissible, the state court 

reasonably found counsel was not ineffective for failing to call her as a 

witness. 

 Next, Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective for failing to call 

Petitioner’s cousin, Shaban Kejbou, to testify both about the victim’s 

alleged “temper and aggressive attitude” and about an instance in 

which the victim allegedly stabbed a man with a knife. Petitioner has 

not provided any evidence suggesting he was aware of the stabbing 

incident to which Mr. Kejbou allegedly would have testified. Thus, the 

incident would very likely have been inadmissible under Michigan law. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated that because of Mr. Kejbou’s 

testimony about the victim’s reputation, there is a reasonable 

probability the outcome of his trial would be different. Accordingly, the 

Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably found counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to call Mr. Kejbou. 

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 Finally, Petitioner argues that counsel should have called James 

Curry, Petitioner’s employee, to testify that the victim intimidated 

customers at his store with knives and made statements about his skills 

with a knife and how he could kill someone with a knife. This claim 

was not presented to the state courts and is thus unexhausted. 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). The Court may 

nevertheless deny relief with respect to the unexhausted claim if it can 

determine it lacks merit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Here, as with the 

exhausted claims, Petitioner has not provided information to show he 

was aware of the incidents about which Mr. Curry may have testified. 

Because this evidence would have been inadmissible under Michigan 

law, counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Mr. Curry at trial. 

 Further, there was significant evidence presented at trial to 

negate Petitioner’s self-defense claim and counsel called three witnesses 

– Petitioner and two of his brothers – to present the self-defense claim. 

Under Michigan law, for a defendant’s acts to be considered lawful selfdefense, the evidence must show: (1) the defendant honestly and 

reasonably believed that he or she was in danger; (2) the danger feared 

was death or serious bodily harm or imminent forcible sexual 

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penetration; (3) the action taken appeared at the time to be 

immediately necessary; and (4) the defendant was not the initial 

aggressor. See Blanton v. Elo, 186 F.3d 712, 713 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(citing People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482 (1990)); Johnigan v. Elo, 207 F. 

Supp. 2d 599, 608–09 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (citing People v. Barker, 437 

Mich. 161, 165 (1991); People v. Kemp, 202 Mich. App. 318, 322 (1993); 

People v. Deason, 148 Mich. App. 27, 31 (1985)). And a defendant is not 

entitled to use more force than necessary to defend himself. Johnigan, 

207 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (citing Kemp, 202 Mich. App. at 322). Thus, “a 

killing or use of potentially lethal force will be condoned only when the 

killing or use of potentially lethal force was the only escape from death 

[or] serious bodily harm.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

 At trial, Petitioner and his brothers, Maher Zora and Hamid Zora, 

testified as to the events supporting Petitioner’s self-defense claim. 

They testified that they went to the victim’s house because Petitioner 

believed the victim had stolen $250,000 from him. And when they 

arrived, the victim became angry and asked Petitioner where his gun 

was. Further, all three testified that the victim went into the kitchen 

and came out with a two-headed knife or barbecue fork in his left hand 

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and a knife in his other hand, and charged at Petitioner while 

screaming an Iraqi or Arabic war cry. Finally, Petitioner and his two 

brothers testified that Petitioner shot the victim in self-defense. 

 Despite this testimony, there was substantial evidence introduced 

to show Petitioner did not act in self-defense. Rather, the evidence 

showed Petitioner was angry at the victim for allegedly stealing 

$250,000, and went to confront the victim with a weapon and his two 

brothers. Significantly, Dr. Daniel Spitz, the Macomb County Medical 

Examiner, testified that the victim was shot five times, including three 

times in the back. The victim was not standing when he was shot in the 

back, according to Dr. Spitz. And there were no injuries suggesting a 

struggle or evidence of close-range firing. (Tr. of Arg., 12–19, 52–53 

(Sept. 18, 2009)). And there was no other evidence of a struggle with 

the victim; no blood was recovered from the knife or fork, and both 

utensils were found some distance from the victim’s body. The fact that 

the victim was shot multiple times in the back, particularly when the 

victim was on the ground, undercuts Petitioner’s self-defense claim. 

See, e.g., Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1991). 

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 Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could find Petitioner 

intended to kill or harm the victim and did not act in self-defense, and 

that because Petitioner used excessive force. Further, the trial and 

appeals courts were justified in determining that Petitioner was not 

entitled to claim self-defense under Michigan law. Cf. Sutton v. Bell, 

645 F.3d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 2011) (state court reasonably determined 

that petitioner was not prejudiced at capital murder trial by counsel’s 

failure to object to prosecutor’s improper comment because petitioner’s 

self-defense theory failed as a matter of law). It is unlikely that 

counsel’s “acts and omissions would have caused one to lose confidence 

in the jury’s verdict.” Lewis v. Curtis, 37 F. App’x 154, 159 (6th Cir. 

2002). Thus, the state court reasonably found trial counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to interview or call these individuals to support 

Petitioner’s self-defense claim. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this claim. 

Individuals Supporting Petitioner’s Peaceful Character 

 Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to call Mr. Kejbou and Petitioner’s friend, Rafid Jajawie, to testify to 

Petitioner’s character for peacefulness. Petitioner’s claim was last 

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addressed by the trial court on his motion for post-conviction relief. 

(Dkt. 1-42.) The trial court noted first that Petitioner did not offer any 

affidavits from them or ask them to testify at the Ginther hearing, and 

then held that counsel was not ineffective because Frank Polasky, 

Petitioner’s friend, was called to testify and defense counsel “rebutted 

the People’s witnesses who testified that the victim had a character for 

peacefulness.” (Id. at 4–5.) 

 With his habeas petition, Petitioner has submitted affidavits from 

Mr. Kejbou and Mr. Jajawie. However, they do not undermine the state 

court’s findings. First, Mr. Kejbou’s affidavit does not mention 

Petitioner’s peacefulness (Dkt. 1-24) and Mr. Jajawie’s affidavit 

includes only one sentence as to Petitioner’s nature. (Dkt. 1-31.) 

Generally, “courts should decline second-guessing an attorney’s trial 

strategy,” including whether to call a witness.” Samatar v. Clarridge, 

225 F. App’x 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2007). In this case, the affidavits do not 

adequately demonstrate that these men would have testified favorably 

regarding Petitioner’s character, and given that trial counsel called a 

witness to testify as to Petitioner’s character and cross-examined the 

prosecution’s witnesses regarding the victim’s character, Petitioner has 

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not demonstrated that the state court unreasonably rejected his Sixth 

Amendment claim. See Carson v. United States, 3 F. App’x 321, 324 

(6th Cir. 2001) (affidavits insufficient to show deficient performance 

where petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 

call witnesses). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this 

ground. 

Individuals Supporting Petitioner’s Factual Account of the 

Date of the Shooting 

 Petitioner argues that counsel should have called a number of 

witnesses to testify about three specific facts: (1) the victim stole money 

from Petitioner; (2) the victim and Petitioner had arranged to go to the 

church on the day of the shooting to meet with a priest concerning the 

alleged theft of Petitioner’s money; and (3) Petitioner intended to go to 

Detroit on January 23, 2009 to meet with the Liquor Control 

Commission at his brother Hamid’s store and therefore was not in the 

city solely to confront the victim. 

 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that these facts were 

presented at trial through the testimony of Petitioner and his two 

brothers, and any testimony from the additional witnesses would have 

been cumulative. Thus, “there [was] no reasonable probability that the 

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outcome would have been different” with more testimony, and counsel 

was not ineffective. People v. Zora, 2011 WL 2623384, at *7. 

 As set forth above, whether to call a witness is trial strategy, and 

absent a showing of prejudice, a court should not second-guess the 

strategy. Here, even if these witnesses appeared at trial, a substantial 

amount of evidence related to the events and crime scene negated 

Petitioner’s self-defense claim. United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 

504–05 (6th Cir. 2003) (dismissing ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim for failure to present additional witnesses where defendant 

testified as to facts that other witnesses would address and substantial 

evidence of guilt was admitted). Thus, Petitioner was not prejudiced by 

the absence of these witnesses, and the state court’s determination that 

counsel was not ineffective was reasonable. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. 

iii. Petitioner’s Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For 

Failing to Call A Self-Defense Expert 

Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to call a self-defense expert to testify about the “21 foot rule,” which was 

allegedly taught to defendant during firearms training and instructs a 

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person to shoot an attacker approaching an individual with a knife or 

other edged weapon if he or she is within twenty-one feet. 

 The Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed this claim, finding that 

Petitioner had “failed to make the necessary showing” that the proposed 

testimony would have assisted the trier of fact.” People v. Zora, 2011 

WL 2623384, at *6. Rather, Petitioner’s self-defense claim was 

understandable to the jury without the assistance of an expert, and the 

testimony would not have been relevant to his self-defense claim. Id. 

 As aptly stated by the Michigan Court of Appeals, Petitioner has 

failed to show that an expert was necessary or that the testimony would 

have been relevant. And given the significant evidence presented 

suggesting Petitioner’s guilt, it was reasonable for the state court to 

conclude Petitioner was not prejudiced and counsel was not ineffective. 

See Reynolds v. Bagley, 498 F.3d 549, 557–58 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding as 

reasonable a state court determination that counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to call an expert because petitioner suffered no prejudice). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. 

iv. Petitioner’s Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For 

Agreeing to Evidentiary Stipulation 

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 Finally, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for 

stipulating that no fingerprints, DNA, or blood was found on the knife 

and fork that were recovered at the crime scene. Counsel was allegedly 

ineffective because a latent print was discovered on the fork and no 

testing for DNA or blood was conducted on either instrument. 

Petitioner also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present evidence of the latent print because this would have established 

that the victim had touched the fork and used it to attack him. 

 In rejecting this claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted the 

stipulation was accurate that the print found on the fork had “no latent 

prints of comparison value.” People v. Zora, 2011 WL 2623384, at *2, 5. 

And, although the instruments were not tested for blood and DNA, 

there was no visible evidence of either substance on them. Id. at *5. 

 Because this same evidence would have been introduced by the 

prosecution through a lengthier – and perhaps more damaging – 

process without the stipulation at trial, Petitioner has not demonstrated 

he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision to agree to the stipulation. 

Burke v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 2d 854, 862 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 

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Thus, the state court’s determination that counsel was not ineffective is 

reasonable. 

 With respect to Petitioner’s argument that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of the latent print, as set 

forth above, there were no prints obtained from either instruments that 

could be compared to other individuals’ prints. Further, given the 

substantial amount of evidence admitted that inculpated Petitioner, the 

latent print would have been immaterial to his conviction. Thus, he 

cannot demonstrate the outcome of the trial likely would have been 

different if the latent print were admitted. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to relief on this or his other ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. 

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 Petitioner claims he was denied a fair trial because of 

prosecutorial misconduct. First, the prosecutor allegedly knew 

Petitioner acted in self-defense, but presented false evidence by asking 

trial counsel to stipulate that no fingerprints, DNA, or blood evidence 

was recovered from the knife or barbecue fork. And the prosecutor 

compounded this error by repeating this claim in his closing argument. 

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Second, the prosecutor allegedly told Petitioner’s sister not to appear at 

trial because the prosecutor knew her testimony would exonerate 

Petitioner. Third, Petitioner claims the prosecutor misrepresented the 

evidence when he argued that Petitioner staged the crime scene, 

including by wiping clean the victim’s weapons, so it looked as though 

he had been attacked. Fourth, the prosecutor falsely argued that 

Petitioner flipped the victim onto his stomach and then shot him in the 

back. Fifth, the prosecutor allegedly committed misconduct by arguing 

there was no evidence corroborating Petitioner’s need to be in Detroit on 

the day of the shooting. Finally, the prosecutor allegedly submitted a 

false affidavit to the trial court regarding what was argued during 

opening and closing statements. 

 “Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed deferentially on 

habeas review.” Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)). A 

prosecutor’s improper conduct will be held to violate a criminal 

defendant’s constitutional rights only if they “‘so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. 

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DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)); Parker v. Matthews, 

___U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012) (confirming that Donnelly and 

Darden are the proper standard). 

 The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected each of these claims on 

their merits in a clear, reasoned opinion, which the Court will recite 

verbatim here. 

Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial 

because the prosecutor knowingly presented “false and 

nonexistent” evidence through an erroneous stipulation that 

no fingerprints, DNA, or blood was found on a knife and fork 

that were recovered at the scene. Defendant contends that, 

although trial counsel agreed to the stipulation, it was false 

because a latent print was discovered on the fork, and no 

testing for DNA or blood was actually performed on either 

instrument. 

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for a 

new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v. Cress, 468 

Mich. 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). A trial court abuses 

its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of 

reasonable and principled outcomes. People v. Yost, 278 

Mich.App 341, 379; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). Further, “in order 

for prosecutorial misconduct to constitute constitutional 

error, the misconduct must have so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the conviction a deprivation of liberty 

without due process of law.” People v. Blackmon, 280 

Mich.App 253, 269; 761 NW2d 172 (2008). 

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A prosecutor’s knowing use of false evidence violates a 

defendant’s right to due process. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 

264, 269; 79 S Ct 1173; 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). To prevail 

under Napue, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence 

was actually false; (2) the prosecution knew that the 

evidence was actually false; and (3) that the false testimony 

was material. Id. at 271. “Material” means that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have 

affected the verdict. See People v. Herndon, 246 Mich.App 

371, 417–418; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). 

As an initial matter, defendant’s reliance on a police report 

statement by the victim’s four-year-old son and a letter 

allegedly written by Manal Petros to support defendant’s 

claim that the prosecutor knowingly presented false 

evidence, is misplaced because neither the letter nor the 

police report is part of the lower court record. It is 

impermissible for a party to enlarge the record on appeal. 

People v. Williams, 241 Mich.App 519, 524 n1; 616 NW2d 

710 (2000); see also People v. Seals, 285 Mich.App 1, 20–21; 

776 NW2d 314 (2009). 

In any event, we agree with the trial court that defendant 

has not shown that the stipulation was actually false. The 

parties stipulated that no prints, DNA, or blood were found 

on the victim's knife or fork. It is undisputed that no 

fingerprints were found on the knife. With regard to the 

fork, a latent “lift” was recovered from the stainless steel 

portion of the fork near the tines. The forensic scientist and 

fingerprint expert reported, and later testified at a Ginther

hearing, that the “latent lift” had “no latent prints of 

comparison value.” She explained that a latent lift is not 

synonymous with an identifiable fingerprint, so the 

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statement that there were no fingerprints is accurate. 

Further, although there was no testing for blood or DNA on 

either the knife or the fork, there also is no evidence that 

either substance was on either instrument. 

Furthermore, there is no reasonable likelihood that the 

stipulation affected the jury’s verdict. The evidence shows 

that a latent, unusable lift was discovered on the stainless 

steel portion of the fork near the tines. The scenario 

described by the defense witnesses did not present 

circumstances where the victim’s fingerprint would have 

been transferred to the tines of the fork. Rather, the defense 

witnesses testified that the victim held the fork by the 

handle in his palm, inside his closed fist. Defendant makes 

much of the fact that there was a latent, unusable lift on the 

fork, while ignoring other properly admitted evidence that 

rebuts his self-defense claim. The evidence indicates that 

defendant went to the victim’s house unannounced, 

accompanied by his two brothers, because he believed that 

the victim had stolen $250,000 from him. Defendant 

instigated the confrontation at the victim’s home, and 

brought a loaded weapon to the home. According to the 

defense witnesses, defendant was angry about the victim's 

theft, and the victim refused to go to the church to swear on 

a Bible that he had not taken the money. Defendant 

admitted shooting his gun toward the victim repeatedly. The 

autopsy revealed that the victim was shot five times, none at 

close range. Three shots were to the back, and two of the 

three gunshot wounds to the back occurred while the victim 

was down or close to the floor. There was no evidence of a 

struggle. Given the substantial evidence against defendant, 

to the extent the stipulation could be considered false, it was 

not material. 

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In a related claim, defendant also argues that the prosecutor 

impermissibly used the false stipulation during opening 

statement and closing argument. In opening statement, 

when listing certain “undisputed facts,” the prosecutor 

stated that the fork and knife has “no evidentiary value,” 

and “no fingerprints, no DNA, no blood as to anyone 

involved, possibly involved in this incident.” 

“The purpose of an opening statement is to tell the jury what 

the advocate proposes to show.” People v. Moss, 70 Mich.App 

18, 32; 245 NW2d 389 (1976). Viewed in context, the 

prosecutor's reference during opening statement was 

designed to show that he intended to prove during trial that 

there was no evidence on the fork and knife, and that 

defendant’s self-defense claim was not credible. The 

statement was based on the stipulation, which was accurate; 

therefore, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by 

referring to it during opening statement and closing 

argument. In closing argument, the prosecutor was free to 

argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising 

from it as they related to his theory of the case. See People v. 

Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). 

With regard to closing argument, defendant argues that the 

prosecutor impermissibly used the stipulation to falsely 

assert that the defense witnesses wiped the fork clean and 

staged the scene. We agree that the prosecutor’s remark that 

the fork was clean was inaccurate because a latent lift was 

present. But the defendant bears the burden of showing 

actual prejudice, People v. Pipes, 475 Mich. 267, 274; 715 

NW2d 290 (2006), and reversal is only warranted if the error 

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affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Blackmon, 280 

Mich.App at 269. 

Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s remark did not cause 

defendant’s conviction. The remark was focused on 

establishing the lack of evidence to support defendant’s selfdefense claim. While there was no evidence that the fork and 

knife had been wiped clean, it is true that the victim’s prints 

were not on either instrument, and neither the fork nor the 

knife were found in close proximity to the victim's body. In 

addition, as previously indicated, there was evidence that 

defendant was angry because he believed that the victim had 

stolen a large amount of money from him, that he arrived at 

the victim’s house unannounced and accompanied by his two 

brothers, that he was armed with a weapon, and that he shot 

the victim multiple times, including three times in the back. 

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the 

lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence, and 

that the jury was to decide the case based only on the 

properly admitted evidence. These instructions were 

sufficient to dispel any possible prejudice. People v. Long, 

246 Mich.App 582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). “It is well 

established that jurors are presumed to follow their 

instructions.” People v. Graves, 458 Mich. 476, 486; 581 

NW2d 229 (1998). 

For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to deny 

defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s 

conduct, after first evaluating the accuracy of the stipulation 

and the prosecutor’s comments, was a principled decision 

and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion. 

People v. Zora, 2011 WL 2623384, at *1–4. 

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 In renewing his arguments in this petition, Petitioner raises no 

new arguments, but disagrees with the state court’s findings. “[T]he 

Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the state courts have 

substantial breathing room when considering prosecutorial misconduct 

claims because constitutional line drawing in prosecutorial misconduct 

cases is necessarily imprecise.” Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 516 (6th 

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because 

“the Darden standard is a very general one,” courts have “more leeway . 

. . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Parker, 132 S. 

Ct. at 2155 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Petitioner has not shown that anything in the record refutes the 

state court’s description of what occurred at trial. And even considering 

the interview of Austin Matti and the letter from Manal Petros, he has 

failed to show the state court determination rejecting his prosecutorial 

misconduct claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law. First, as set forth above, Austin Matti’s 

interview indicates that he did not witness the confrontation between 

Petitioner and the victim and therefore could not support Petitioner’s 

claim of self-defense. Second, Ms. Petros’ letter, sent to the trial judge 

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several months after Petitioner’s trial does not state whether it was the 

prosecutor who advised her not to attend the trial. (See Dkt. 1-5.) 

Indeed, Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor told her to stay away is 

inconsistent with Ms. Petros’ admission that the prosecutor subpoenaed 

her for trial. And, as set forth above, she did not witness the 

confrontation between her husband and Petitioner, and therefore could 

not support Petitioner’s claim of self-defense. Thus, Petitioner has 

failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s conduct and 

that the state court determination was unreasonable. 

 Finally, even if the prosecutor submitted a misleading or 

incomplete affidavit to oppose Petitioner’s state post-conviction relief 

motion, Petitioner has not demonstrated he was harmed by the 

affidavit. And, as set forth above, the state courts reviewed the 

transcripts of what was argued during opening and closing statements 

and found any misconduct not to have prejudiced Petitioner. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his 

claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 

D. Brady Violations 

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 Petitioner claims the prosecutor failed to disclose the forensic 

report with information about the latent print found on the barbecue 

fork, and this led defense counsel to erroneously agree to the 

stipulation. He also claims that the prosecutor wrongfully delayed the 

DNA testing of the victim’s clothing and then withheld the result until 

after the trial. Finally, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor “concealed” the 

interview of Austin Matti and Petitioner’s phone records that 

supposedly corroborated that he was in Detroit for meetings on the day 

the victim was killed there. (Dkt. 1-1 at 42.) 

 The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the first of these claims on 

the merits. 

There is no indication that the prosecutor suppressed the 

forensic report. During post-trial proceedings, the prosecutor 

averred that the report would have been provided to the 

defense thorough discovery. Defense counsel acknowledged 

that it was possible that the forensic report was misplaced 

among the more than 200 pages of discovery provided to the 

defense. He also acknowledged that he knew from a police 

report that a latent print was found on the fork, and that the 

knife and fork were being tested. Thus, the defense was 

aware of the latent lift and the testing, and defendant could 

have followed through to obtain the report with reasonable 

diligence had he planned to review it. Indeed, trial counsel 

admitted that he did not consider the forensic report 

relevant to defendant's case. Moreover, given the substance 

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35 

of the forensic report and the overwhelming evidence against 

defendant, the absence of the forensic report was not the 

difference between conviction and acquittal. 

People v. Zora, 2011 WL 2623384, at *3. 

 A habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing the prosecution 

withheld exculpatory evidence. See Bell v. Howes, 703 F.3d 848, 853 

(6th Cir. 2012). Here, Petitioner has made only conclusory statements 

that the prosecutor concealed the forensic report. In fact, defense 

counsel admitted he may have received it but misplaced it. Thus, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the prosecutor concealed the 

report, and therefore failed to show that the state court determination 

rejecting his claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law. 

 Similarly, Petitioner has not provided any evidence to show the 

prosecutor withheld or delayed the DNA testing of the victim’s clothes, 

the police report and interview of Austin Matti, or his cell phone 

records. Even if the prosecutor did withhold these documents, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the evidence provided would be 

exculpatory or material to his guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 

(1963) (defendant must show that the state withheld exculpatory 

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evidence and that the evidence was material either to guilt or to 

punishment irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution). 

Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A “reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985). 

 The “cumulative effect of the [allegedly undisclosed] evidence” was 

not material to Petitioner’s conviction. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 

419, 440 (1995) (cumulative effect of evidence is the “touchstone” of 

assessing materiality of Brady violations). First, if the DNA report 

says, as Petitioner contends, there was blood on the clothing, it 

undermines his own testimony that the victim never stabbed or injured 

anyone. Thus, the report would not necessarily exculpate him, and if 

introduced at trial, it may have only damaged his credibility and his 

self-defense theory. Second, as set forth above, Austin Matti’s interview 

would not exonerate Petitioner. Finally, the cell phone records may 

establish that Petitioner had a reason to be in Detroit, but they do not 

directly address the confrontation between Petitioner and the victim. 

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Thus, these three pieces of information, when viewed together, show 

there is not a reasonable probability they would undermine confidence 

in the guilty verdict – or even support Petitioner’s self-defense claim – 

especially given the substantial amount of evidence admitted that 

suggested Petitioner’s guilt. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his 

Brady violation claims. 

E. Jury Bias 

 Petitioner claims that the jurors were biased against him because 

he was Chaldean. Petitioner raised similar jury bias claims on direct 

appeal, but did not present this specific claim to the state courts. 

However, because the Court can determine the claim lacks merit, the 

Court will address the claim and deny relief. 

 To support his claim, Petitioner has presented the affidavit of 

Dale Barr, dated March 27, 2013. (Dkt. 1-16.) Mr. Barr served as an 

alternate juror during Petitioner’s trial. He claims that during the 

trial, a seated juror commented, “[T]hose people can’t control 

themselves even when they are in the courthouse.” (Id. at 2.) The 

comment was allegedly made after the jurors witnessed a fight at the 

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courthouse between “some individuals who resembled people of Middle 

Eastern decent [sic].” (Id.) Mr. Barr further claims, “From my 

experience with and among the jurors at Mr. Zora’s trial, the jurors as a 

whole relied upon a discriminatory presumption against Mr. Zora that, 

because Mr. Zora is Chaldean/Middle Eastern and because of the money 

that Mr. Zora alleged was stolen from him, Mr. Zora must have made 

that money illegally and, therefore, must be guilty.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. “[T]he partiality 

of a petit jury is evaluated in light of the persons who are ultimately 

empaneled and sworn, and not by those who are excused from service.” 

Dell v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Here, the 

juror who allegedly commented about “those people” was removed for 

cause before the jury was empaneled and sworn. See People v. Zora, 

2011 WL 2623384, at *7. Thus, this potential juror’s comments cannot 

be used to evaluate any bias of the jury that deliberated and convicted 

Petitioner. Dell, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 655. 

 Petitioner’s remaining bias claim regarding the “jury as a whole” 

is unsupported. First, “[b]ias in this context is ‘actual bias,’ or bias in 

fact,” and a “petitioner must show that the jurors were actually biased 

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39 

against him.” Holder v. Palmer, 586 F.3d 328, 339 (6th Cir. 2009). Mr. 

Barr’s affidavit provides no more than a conclusory statement about his 

belief that the jury was biased against Petitioner, and Petitioner has 

provided no additional information to support his claim. Second, Mr. 

Barr was an alternate juror and did not participate in deliberations, 

and his affidavit is therefore insufficient to establish the jury was 

biased against Petitioner. See Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 637 (6th 

Cir. 2003). In sum, the record does not show Petitioner was denied a 

fair trial, see id., and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his jury bias 

claims. 

F. Cumulative Error 

 Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief because of 

cumulative error. The Sixth Circuit has held, however, that “not even 

constitutional errors that would not individually support habeas relief 

can be cumulated to support habeas relief.” Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 

250, 256 (6th Cir. 2005). Even if the Court did consider the alleged 

errors cumulatively, Petitioner’s claim would fail because of the 

substantial amount of evidence of his guilt admitted at trial. 

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Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the grounds of 

cumulative error. Id. 

IV. Petitioner’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner has filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. “In 

deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must 

consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the 

petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant 

to federal habeas relief.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. But “a petition may 

be summarily dismissed if the record clearly indicates that the 

petitioner’s claims are either barred from review or without merit.” 

Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 459–60 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilson 

v. Kemna, 12 F.3d 145, 146 (8th Cir. 1994)). 

 As set forth above, Petitioner’s claims lack merit, and he is 

therefore not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner’s motion for 

an evidentiary hearing is denied. 

V. Conclusion 

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 The Court will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus on its 

merits. And the Court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Strayhorn v. 

Booker, 718 F. Supp. 2d 846, 875 (E.D. Mich. 2010). To obtain a 

certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 

demonstrate this denial after a district court has rejected a habeas 

petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong. Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 For the reasons stated in this opinion, Petitioner has failed to 

make a substantial showing of the denial of his constitutional rights, 

and the Court will therefore deny Petitioner a certificate of 

appealability. 

 

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Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED 

WITH PREJUDICE. (Dkt. 1.) The motion for an evidentiary hearing 

(Dkt. 9) is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 10, 2017 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 10, 2017. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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