DAMON BIGELOW v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 37565)
Alvord, Keller and Dennis, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of several criminal and motor vehicle charges, filed a second petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus, claiming that his criminal trial counsel, Z, and his first habeas counsel, T, had rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that T failed to raise claims that Z improperly advised and inadequately represented him during plea negotiations and during his plea canvass, and failed to file a motion for an examination for entry into acertain diversionary substance abuse program. Thepetitioneralso alleged that T failed to raise a claim that Z was ineffective for failing to request three days of presentence confinement credit. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition and, thereafter, denied his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’sjudgment. On appeal to this court, the petitioner claimed, interalia, that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification and improperly denied his habeas petition. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the issues he raised

were debatable amongjurists ofreason, that a court could resolve those issues differently, or that the questions he raised deserved encouragement to proceed further, and, accordingly, his appeal was dismissed: the record supported the habeas court’s factual findings underlying its conclusionthat Z provided appropriate advice pertainingto the petitioner’s guiltyplea, as Z testified about the petitioner’s willingness to accept certain of the state’s plea offers, and about matters that Z generally discusses with clients, such as the petitioner, in preparation of a plea canvass, including those pertaining to the charges against them and the possible sentences they could receive; moreover, notwithstanding the petitioner’s claim that had Z failed to adequately investigate the death ofa certain witness on whom the state relied, significant other evidence supported the petitioner’s underlying convictions, and nothing in the record suggested that the petitioner would have opted for a trial, as he had several pending cases that exposed him to significant jail time; furthermore, the court’s findings with respect to the petitioner’s claim regarding Z’s failure to file a motion for examination for entry into the substance abuse program were not clearly erroneous, as the court could creditZ’stestimonythatno informationwaspresentedto himthatwould support a good faith basis to request such an examination, and Z did not improperlyfailto seek three days ofpresentence confinement credit for time that the petitioner spent in lockup, as his discharge date would have remained unchanged because his longest concurrent sentence was not the one to which the credit applied. Argued April 5—officially released August 1, 2017

Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Fuger, J .; judgment denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed

. David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. SedenskyIII , state’s attorney, andAngelaR. Macchiarulo, senior assistantstate’s attorney, forthe appellee (respondent).Opinion DENNIS, J. The petitioner, Damon Bigelow, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, thepetitioner claims thatthe habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2) improperly denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that counsel in both his underlying criminal prosecution and his first habeas proceeding rendered ineffective assistance. Because the petitionerhas failed to demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal,
we dismiss the appeal.
The following facts underlying the petitioner’s convictions were set forth previously by this court. ‘‘In early 2008, the petitioner was a defendant in a number of criminal and motor vehicle matters pending in the Superior Court.1 On September 24, 2008, while the petitioner was representing himself, the state extended a pleabargaintohimthatwouldhaveresolvedallpending charges in exchange forguiltypleas andatotal effective sentence of forty years incarceration, execution suspended after fifteen years, to be followed by a five year period of probation. The petitioner, who was free on bond, was given time to consider the offer. ‘‘Two days later, on September 26, 2008, the police executed a search and seizure warrant stemming from suspected drug trafficking activities at the petitioner’s condominium. During the execution ofthe search warrant, the petitioner was arrested after police found a large quantity of heroin in a bedroom.2 As a result of the additional charges, the state modified its original plea offer to reflect the new drug charges. Considering only the drug cases, the petitioner at trial would have faced forty-six years ofmandatory minimum incarceration with amaximum sentence oflife. The state’s modified plea offer proposed that the petitioner actually
serve twenty years as opposed to the original offer of fifteen. ‘‘On October 1, 2008, the petitioner retained the services of Attorney Eugene Zingaro. Although the petitioner initially appeared willing to accept the state’s modified plea offer, Zingaro ultimately was successful in restoring the original plea offer.’’ (Footnotes in original.)Bigelowv. CommissionerofCorrection, 146Conn. App. 737, 739, 80 A.3d 84 (2013). During the sentencing hearing, the court thoroughly canvassed the petitioner, determinedthat his pleas were knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and acceptedthem.3 ‘‘On November 12, 2008, thepetitioneracceptedthe originaloffer,pleadedguilty, and was sentenced to forty years incarceration, execution suspended after fifteen years, followed by fiveyears of probation.’’ Id., 739–40. Following his convictions, the petitionerbroughttwo petitions for writs of habeas corpus.4 The petitioner’s second such petition was filed on July 5, 2012, and amended for the final time on September 14, 2014. In essence, thepetitionerarguedthathisfirsthabeas counsel, Melissa Toddy, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim regarding the deficient performance of his trial counsel, Zingaro. Specifically, the petitionerallegedthatToddy shouldhave pursued such
aclaimbecause Zingaro renderedineffective assistance in failing (1) to properly advise him regarding his guilty plea, (2) to file an application to participate in a drug treatment program on his behalf, (3) to seekjail credit for three days that he spent in local lockup, and (4) to properlyinvestigate the death ofaninformant onwhom the state relied.
Inthe secondhabeas trial, whichis the subject ofthis appeal, the court heard testimony from the petitioner, Zingaro, andToddy. Followingthetrial, the courtissued
a memorandum of decision denying the petitioner’s claims ofineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court subsequently denied the petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. As an initial matter, we set forth the standard of reviewandthe legalprinciplesthatguide ourresolution of the petitioner’s appeal. ‘‘In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), we concluded that [General Statutes] § 52-470 (b) prevents a reviewing courtfromhearingthe merits ofahabeas appealfollowing the denial of certification to appeal unless the petitioner establishes that the denial of certification constituted an abuse of discretion by the habeas court. In Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994), we incorporated the factors adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991),
as the appropriate standard for determining whether thehabeas courtabusedits discretionin denyingcertification to appeal. This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

. . . Apetitioner who establishes an abuse ofdiscretion through one ofthe factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

. . . In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits ofthe petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marksomitted.) Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 203, 214–15, 72 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 928, 78 A.3d 145 (2013). ‘‘We examinethepetitioner’sunderlyingclaimofineffective assistance of counsel in order to determine whetherthe habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certificationto appeal. Our standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment on ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims is well settled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review ofwhether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted aviolation ofthe petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hankerson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 150 Conn. App. 362, 367, 90 A.3d 368, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100 A.3d 852 (2014).
With respect to the petitioner’s substantive claims, ‘‘[i]t is well established that [a] criminal defendant is constitutionallyentitledto adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings

. . . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.

. . . As enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

. . . A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components: a performance prongandaprejudiceprong. To satisfytheperformance prong

. . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.

. . . To satisfy the second prong of Strickland, that his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, the petitioner must establish that, as a result of his trial counsel’s deficient performance, there remains a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict that resulted in his appeal.

. . . The second prong is thus satisfied if the petitioner can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for that ineffectiveness, the outcome would have been different.

. . . An ineffective assistance of counselclaimwillsucceedonlyifbothprongs [ofStrickland]
are satisfied.

. . . The court, however, may decide against a petitioner on either prong, whichever is easier.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 813, 823, 153 A.3d 8 (2016), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 904, 156 A.3d 536 (2017).
The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certificationto appeal because it improperly rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal because, in the first habeas proceeding, Toddy failed to raise claims that Zingaro rendered ineffective assistance in that he failed (1) to adequately advise and represent him duringpleanegotiations and in connectionwith his eventual guiltyplea, (2) to file amotionfor examination under a substance abuse diversionary program,5 and (3) to request presentence confinement credit of three days.
Weturntothe merits ofthepetitioner’s claims, recognizingthatthe claimed deficientperformance regarding hisfirsthabeas counselmustfailifthe claims ofineffective assistance of his trial counsel are without merit. SeeLozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 842–43, 613 A.2d 818 (1992).
I
The petitioner first claims that Zingaro inadequately advised him throughout the plea negotiation and ineffectively represented him when he pleaded guilty. Specifically, he argues that Zingaro rendered ineffective assistance because he failed (1) to ensure that there
was a proper factual and evidentiary basis for each of the charged offenses, (2) to adequately inform the petitioner of the minimum and maximum sentence for eachcharge,6and (3)to adequatelyinvestigatethe death of Nicklaus Larson.7 The habeas court concluded that Zingaroprovidedappropriate advicerelatingtothepetitioner’sguiltypleaonthebasis ofthepetitioner’sfailure to satisfy his burden of proof under Strickland

. We agree with the habeas court. ‘‘For ineffectiveness claims resulting from guilty pleas, weapplythestandardsetforthinHillv.Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), which modifiedStrickland’s prejudice prong.’’ Baillargeonv. CommissionerofCorrection, 67Conn.App. 716, 721, 789 A.2d 1046 (2002). ‘‘To satisfy the performance prong, the petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

. . . A petitioner who accepts counsel’s advice to plead guilty has the burden of demonstrating
on habeas appeal that the advice was not within the range ofcompetence demandedofattorneysin criminal
cases.

. . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

. . . Reasonable probability does not require the petitioner to show that counsel’s deficient conductmore likelythannot altered the outcome in the case, but he must establish aprobability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

. . . The Hill court noted that [i]n many guilty plea cases, the prejudice inquiry will closely resemblethe inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffectiveassistance challenges to convictions obtained through
atrial. For example, where the alleged error ofcounsel is a failure to investigate

. . . the determination whether the error prejudiced the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend
on the likelihood that discovery ofthe evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McClellan v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 103 Conn. App. 159, 162, 927 A.2d 992 (2007).
At the plea hearing, the petitioner responded in the affirmative to Judge Reynolds’ canvass, which asked him, inter alia, whether he was entering the pleavoluntarily, whether he had had discussions regarding the plea with Zingaro pertaining to the elements of the charged offenses, the evidence the state had, and whether Zingaro discussed the possible penalties, including maximum periods of incarceration the charges carried.8 At the conclusion of the canvass, the court found that the petitioner’s pleawas made ‘‘freely, voluntarily, intelligently

. . . with the effective assistance of counsel, and [that] a factual basis does exist to support [the plea].’’ The court then accepted the guilty plea as to each charge, and the petitioner did not object. ‘‘A court may properly rely on

. . . the responses of the [petitioner] at the time [he] responded to the trial court’s plea canvass

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carey v. Commissioner of Correction, 86 Conn. App. 180, 185, 860 A.2d 776 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 915, 866 A.2d 1283 (2005).9 ‘‘It is appropriate to presume that in most cases counsel routinely explains the consequences of a plea agreement.’’ Toles

v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn. App. 717, 727, 967 A.2d 576, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 906, 978 A.2d 1114 (2009).
In support of his argument that his guilty plea was not knowingly made, the petitioner primarily points to his testimony that he gave at the second habeas trial regarding Zingaro’s failure (1) to explain to him the minimum and maximum sentence for each offense, and (2) to ensure that there was adequate evidentiary support for the charged offenses. That testimony clearly conflicts with the statements that the petitioner made during the plea canvass. More importantly, however, the habeas court discredited the petitioner’s testimony and concluded that ‘‘Zingaro provided appropriate advice.’’ These findings are supported by the record. Zingaro testified at the second habeas proceeding that his usual practice in 2008, the time he represented thepetitioner, withrespecttopreparinghis clientspriorto a plea canvass, was that he would discuss with his client the ‘‘charges he was pleading to, the sentences, the total combined, the total effective sentence, which charges were mandatory, [and] which carried mandatory time.’’ Zingaro further testified that he did not believe that the state’s recitation of the facts during the petitioner’s plea hearing were inaccurate. He also testified that if there was an error in the state’s recitation of the facts or if the evidence did not support the charges brought against the petitioner, he would have raisedthoseissuestothe court. Moreover, Zingarotestified that the petitioner would have accepted the state’s second offer of forty years imprisonment, suspended after twenty years, and had no second thoughts about accepting the third offer of forty years imprisonment, suspended after fifteen years. On the basis ofthe court’s canvass and its finding of guilty at the plea hearing, without objection from the petitioner, in addition to Zingaro’s testimony at the habeasproceeding, we concludethatthe habeas court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Next, we briefly discuss the petitioner’s argument that Zingaro failed to adequately investigate Larson’s death. Atthe habeastrial, Zingarotestifiedthatthe state
was not exclusively relying on Larson’s testimony to prove its case because it had other evidence, including
a written statement from Larson, and the testimony of severalpolice officers who witnessed drugtransactions betweenthepetitionerandLarson. InZingaro’s opinion, the death of Larson did not significantly impact the state’s case against the petitioner as a result.
In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court stated: ‘‘The evidence alleged to have been withheld by the prosecuting authority is the death ofa Mr. Nicklaus Larson, the person to whom the petitioner sold drugs
on his last arrest. Unfortunately for the petitioner’s argument, the state clearly disclosed that fact in the recitation offacts preceding the plea canvass before his plea was accepted.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The court further stated: ‘‘[T]he testimony by Mr. Larson was not critical to the state proving that charge, as there were several hand-to-hand transactions observed by the undercover police officers. It is clear that the trial defense counsel made due diligence in investigating and understanding the facts surrounding the state’s obviously strong case against the petitioner. This cannotformthebasisforanycomplaintofineffective assistance of trial defense counsel.’’
We agree with the habeas court’s conclusion relating to this claim and need only address the petitioner’s failure to satisfy the prejudice prong under Strickland

. SeeSandersv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 169 Conn. App. 821–23. Other than the petitioner’s own testimony, nothing in the record suggests that the petitioner would have opted for trial. At the time of thepetitioner’s guiltyplea, the petitioner had several pending criminal cases that exposed him to significant jail time. The petitioner’s guilty plea ultimately consolidated and disposed ofhis numerous pending cases into
a sentence of forty years of imprisonment, execution suspended after fifteen years. The habeas court stated that ‘‘[a]ccepting this pretrial offer was prudent,’’ given the substantialjail time he would have otherwise faced. Moreover, although Larson’s death certainly did not strengthen the state’s case, there was significant evidence supportingthepetitioner’s convictions, including the testimony of several undercover officers who witnessedthepetitionerengageinhand-to-handdrugtransactions. Simply put, even ifwe were to assume that the petitioner and his counsel were unaware of Larson’s death, thepetitioner’s claimthathewouldhavepursued
ajurytrial is speculative at best. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
II
ThepetitionernextarguesthatZingarorenderedineffective assistancebyfailingtofileamotionforexamination for alcohol or drug dependency pursuant to the Connecticut Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission’s diversionary program (CADAC).10 Specifically, he contends that Zingaro rendered ineffective assistance because he should have investigated the petitioner’s personal history pertaining to substance abuse and should have determined whether the petitioner would have benefited from the program. We disagree.
In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that ‘‘in order to even be eligible for

. . . CADAC one must be addicted to substances at the time of the offense. This record before this court is devoid ofany evidence, with the exception of the petitioner’s own self-serving testimony, that the petitioner was even using drugs, much less being addicted to them. In addition, the testimony at this habeas trial from [Zingaro] and the testimony at the petitioner’s first habeas trial clearly show thattheinstantproceedingisthefirsttimethattherehas been any issue surrounding the petitioner’s potential substance abuse addiction. This court, therefore, concludes that any allegation of drug addiction was never brought to the attention ofthe trial defense counsel, so therewouldnotevenhavebeenanyreasontoconsidera CADAC application. Furthermore, merely making an application for CADAC does not guarantee that such
an application would have been accepted by the trial court. Given the large number of criminal files that the petitioner had amassed, his reputation as the major drug dealer in Danbury, the large bond placed upon him, and comments by the trial court, it would appear to be most likely, indeed almost a certainty, that a CADAC application would have been rejected by the trial court, even had the examination shown he was addicted to substances at the time he committed hisoffenses (an unlikely finding based upon the totality of the evidence). The interests ofjustice would not have been served bytreatment. To summarize, it is clearthat [Zingaro] did not have a good faith basis to make a request for a [diversionary program] examination and, further, had one been made it is unlikely that it would have been granted even if made.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
With respect to Zingaro’s testimony, the court noted that he ‘‘went to great lengths to describe his observations of the physical condition of the petitioner

. . . and his opinion that there was no way this man was a drug abuser. Second, the testimony by [Zingaro] is that
no information was ever presented to him to support
a suspicion that a [diversionary program] examination would reveal a substance abuse issue.’’ The court expressly credited Zingaro’s testimony and found that ‘‘the statements by the petitioner are rejected as being unworthy of belief.’’ ‘‘Asanappellatecourt, wedonotreevaluatethe credibility of testimony, nor will we do so in this case. The habeasjudge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

. . . Furthermore, we are entitled to presume that the trial court acted properly and considered all the evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis inoriginal; internalquotationmarksomitted.)Palmenta

v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn. App. 702, 707–708, 99 A.3d 1254, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 941, 103 A.3d 164 (2014).
The court expresslycreditedZingaro’stestimonythat his personal observations did not lead him to conclude thatthepetitionerwasabusingdrugsatthetimeZingaro represented him. Further, the only evidence suggesting otherwise was the petitioner’s testimony, which the courtdeclinedto credit. Becausethe habeas courtisthe sole arbiterofcredibilitydeterminations, andnothingin the record suggests that the court did not consider all of the evidence, we thus conclude that the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal with respect to this claim.
III Finally, thepetitionerargues thathe receivedineffective assistance of counsel because Zingaro failed to seek jail credit for three days that he spent in local lockup. This argument fails for the following reasons. In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court rejected the petitioner’s claim regardingjail credit and stated: ‘‘It is true that the petitioner was arrested on [September 26, 2008] and held in the local lockup until his arraignment in court on [September 29, 2008]. It is also true that in order for the petitioner to receive any credit for those three days, his counsel should haverequesteditatthetime ofsentencingsothelocallockup credit could have been noted onthe mittimus. Itis clear that [Zingaro] did not make such a request and that normally this court would have found that to be deficient performance. But since this local lockup credit applied only to Docket No. CR-08-0133512 and the sentence on that docket was five years concurrent to the other sentences, this three day credit would not have resulted in any reduction ofthe time that the petitioner
was required to serve. Consequently, there is no prejudice accruing to the petitioner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The following legal principles guide our analysis. ‘‘If
more than one sentence is imposed on a prisoner, the respondent calculates the incarceration period and discharge date by applying the provisions of General Statutes § 53a-38 (b), whichprovidesinrelevantpart: Where
a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfiedby discharge ofthe term which has the longest term to run

. . . . The merger concept embodied in this provision simply requires that the respondent compare the length of each sentence, after adjustment for its authorized credits, in order to ascertain which is the longest for the purpose of determining the prisoner’s discharge date.

. . . The merger process does not alter the fact that concurrent sentences remain separate terms ofimprisonmentwhichthelegislaturehaspermittedtobe served at one time.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 808, 819, 860 A.2d 715 (2004).
Even if the petitioner received the claimed presentence confinement credit, that credit applied only to his sentence relating to Docket No. CR-08-0133512. As noted in the preceding paragraph, when sentences run concurrently, ‘‘the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to
run

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a38 (b). That merger process clearly precludes the petitioner from showing any prejudice resulting from any alleged deficient performance because his discharge date ultimatelyremains unchanged. SeeHarrisv. CommissionerofCorrection, supra, 271 Conn. 823. In short, the lockup credit, if applied, would not affect the petitioner’s discharge date because the longest term to run was not his sentence relating to Docket No. CR-08- 0133512. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion
as it relates to this claim.
In sum, the petitioner has failed to establish that the issues he raised are debatable amongjurists ofreason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that the questions he raised are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Patterson v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 30, 34,89A.3d 1018 (2014). In light ofourforegoing conclusion that the petitioner’s claims against his trial counsel are without merit, the claims pertaining to his first habeas counsel necessarily fail. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 ‘‘Thepetitionerwas chargedwithmultiple countsofpossessionofnarcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), assault ofapolice officer in violation ofGeneral Statutes § 53a-167c, and disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183.’’ Bigelow v. Commissioner of Correction, 146 Conn. App. 737, 739 n.1, 80 A.3d 84 (2013).

2 ‘‘The petitioner was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sellinviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 21a-278 (b).’’Bigelowv. Commissioner of Correction, 146 Conn. App. 737, 739 n.2, 80 A.3d 84 (2013).

3 The transcript of the plea canvass provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Court: Do you understand everything that’s going on here today? ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, ma’am. ‘‘The Court: Have you had enough time to speak with your attorney? ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, ma’am. ‘‘The Court: Did your attorney explain to you the elements of all these offenses, the evidence the state has, and the possible penalties to you, including maximum periods of incarceration? ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, ma’am. ‘‘The Court: All right. Now, AttorneyZingaro, didyouhave time to do that? ‘‘Attorney Zingaro: Yes I did, Your Honor. ‘‘The Court: All right. Are you satisfied with the services ofyour attorney? ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, ma’am.

. . . ‘‘The Court: Okay. Do you understand, sir, by pleading guilty in all of these files, you have waived certain rights? ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, ma’am.’’

4 In the petitioner’s first petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he alleged that his trial counsel was burdened by a conflict of interest as a result of having represented him and his brother at the same time. Bigelow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 146 Conn. App. 740–41. The habeas court deniedthepetition forawrit ofhabeas corpus, butgrantedthepetition for certification to appeal. Id., 740. The petitioner appealed from that denial, and this court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. Id., 744.

5 See General Statutes § 17a-693 et seq. 6 The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, argues that this court is precluded from reviewing the petitioner’s claim that Zingaro rendered ineffectiveassistancewhenhefailedtoinformthepetitionerofthemaximum andminimumpenaltiesbecausethis claimwasnotraisedbefore anddecided by the habeas court. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that thepetitioner’sargumentisinextricablyintertwinedwiththelegalarguments and claims litigated before and decided by the habeas court. Accordingly,

we conclude that this claim is reviewable on appeal. See Michael T

. v. Commissioner of Correction, 319 Conn. 623, 635 n.7, 126 A.3d 558 (2015).

7 Larson was a confidential informant to whom the petitioner sold drugs

on his last arrest before he pleaded guilty in the underlying case. 8 See footnote 3 of this opinion.
9 ‘‘In a related area, our Supreme Court has stated that the court need not advise a defendant of every possible consequence of a plea. Although

a defendant must be aware of the direct consequences of a plea, the scope of direct consequences is very narrow.

. . . In Connecticut, the direct consequences of a defendant’s plea include only the mandatory minimum and maximum possible sentences

. . . the maximum possible consecutive sentence

. . . the possibility of additional punishment imposed because of previous conviction(s)

. . . and the fact that the particular offense does not permit a sentence to be suspended.

. . . The failure to inform a defendant as to all possible indirect and collateral consequences does not render a plea unintelligent or involuntary in a constitutional sense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Toles v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 113 Conn. App. 717, 727 n.5, 967 A.2d 576, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 906, 978 A.2d 1114 (2009).10 See General Statutes § 17a-693 et seq.