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Final Technical Report 

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 

OF THE IMPACTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA 

ON GULF OF MEXICO COASTAL FISHING COMMUNITIES

Submitted to: 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE

SOUTHEAST REGIONAL OFFICE

263 13TH AVENUE SOUTH

ST. PETERSBURG, FL 33701 

CONTRACT # WC133F-06-CN-0003 

Submitted by: 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT, INC. 

2166 Avenida de la Playa, Suite F 

La Jolla, California 92037 

March 2007 
March 15, 2007 

Palma Ingles, Ph.D. Mike Travis, Ph.D. Susan Abbott-Jamieson, Ph.D. 

NMFS/SERO NMFS/SERO Office of Science and Technology 

263 13th Avenue South 263 13th Avenue South NOAA/National Marine Fisheries 

St. Petersburg, FL 33701 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 1315 East-West Hwy. 

Silver Spring, MD 20910

Dear Drs. Ingles, Travis, and Abbott-Jamieson: 

In accordance with the terms of our contract with the NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), we are submitting the enclosed Final Technical Report entitled PRELIMINARY 

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON GULF OF MEXICO COASTAL FISHING 

COMMUNITIES in compliance with the terms of Contract WC133F-06-CN-0003 awarded October 

13, 2005 

We wish to again acknowledge, and express our appreciation for, the on-the-scene field 

involvement of NMFS staff, the close guidance and oversight offered at all stages of the process, 

and for the highly detailed and valuable critical comment offered on previous iterations of this 

study report. It is our hope that this report will serve as the foundation for monitoring of what 

are certain to be ongoing social and economic impacts of Hurricane Katrina. 

We look forward to working with you again on future projects. 

Sincerely, 

John S. Petterson, Ph.D. 

Principal Investigator 

Impact Assessment, Inc. 

2166 AVENIDA DE LA PLAYA, SUITE F y LA JOLLA, CA 92037 

TELEPHONE (858) 459-0142 y FACSIMILE (858) 459-9461 y E-MAIL IAI@SAN.RR.COM
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research on which this report is founded began within the first week following 

landfall of Hurricane Katrina and continued until early July 2006. This early phase of 

work proved vital to the ultimate detail and utility of the preliminary impact assessment 

and to the quality of the overall report - and credit must go to NOAA’s National Marine 

Fisheries Service (NMFS) senior staff for the accelerated decision-making, contract 

scoping, and award that made early field work possible. 

We wish to thank Patrick Moore, and his University of West Florida public history 

graduate students, for helping to assemble and field the research efforts carried out in 

coastal Alabama and Mississippi during the initial weeks following landfall. Special 

thanks are also owed to the IAI field team that arrived in Houston during the evacuation 

and were able to document the sequence and consequences of the "resettlement" process 

through to the last evacuee – and then into ten-month field research program. The team 

of Terra Tolley, Tibora Girczyc-Blum, Katherine Rodela, Laura Stanley, James Philipp, 

Jennifer Smith, Edward Glazier, and Pamela Godde was responsible for collecting, 

organizing, and preparing the research results. Their commitment to the research and 

their perseverance under extremely difficult field conditions is acknowledged and much 

appreciated. Laura and Pam are due special thanks for final integration of the results. 

Susan Abbott-Jamieson, Senior Social Scientist, NMFS Office of Science and 

Technology, Headquarters, and Palma Ingles, Social Scientist, NMFS Southeast Regional 

Office, both deserve special credit for enduring the harsh conditions and inevitable 

difficulties of fieldwork in remote locations. Their observations and field notes derived 

from work in some of the hardest hit areas proved to be of great utility in developing our 

analysis. We also wish to thank NMFS Southeast Fisheries Science Center for allowing 

Bichnga Boulet to work directly with the field team as both a research assistant and 

Vietnamese translator. Her dedication to the task at hand and her familiarity with the 

communities were invaluable in our efforts to collect detailed information about the 

effects of the hurricane on persons of Vietnamese ancestry in all three affected states. 

Most importantly, the members of the research team wish to acknowledge the unflinching 

and generous participation of over 2,000 field informants, businessmen, fishermen, 

residents and municipal, parish, county, state, and federal government officials, including 

over 600 formal interviews. Under the most difficult of conditions, informants eagerly 

gave of their time, energy, and thought in the hope of improving the quality and utility of 

the study results. 

 

Finally, we wish to extend our appreciation and special thanks to contract monitors Susan 

Abbott-Jamieson, Rita Curtis, Palma Ingles, and Michael Travis who were so dedicated 

in providing their expertise and attention to detail over the course of this intensive effort. 

John S. Petterson, Ph.D. 

Principal Investigator 

March 2007
Executive Summary 

This report documents the impacts of Hurricane Katrina on 38 fishing-involved communities in 

affected areas of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. It was prepared for the Southeast 

Regional Office of NOAA Fisheries as an extension of the agency’s fishing community profiling 

program.

1

 The work was undertaken by Impact Assessment, Inc. (IAI), a research firm 

specializing in maritime social science along the coastal zone of the U.S. IAI researchers were 

deployed to investigate the effects of the hurricane soon after Katrina made landfall, and 

continued to document and monitor conditions during the autumn and winter months of 2005, 

and during the spring and early summer months of 2006. This report describes the nature and 

findings of the research through July 2006, with clear acknowledgement that the effects of the 

storm continue to unfold as fishery participants throughout the region adapt to radically altered 

conditions in a perennially challenging industry. 

 Background. The landfall of Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005 resulted in one of the 

worst natural disasters in the history of the United States. The physical effects of the storm were 

disastrous throughout much of coastal Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama and, in fact, life 

continues in a state of disruption throughout the region nearly a year later. Moreover, the event 

exacerbated various social problems and economic trends that were notable prior to August 

2005. In the case of marine fisheries, the storm accelerated a regional trend of significant decline 

in participation and production that had begun in 2001. For large vessel operators especially, 

this was a period of significant challenges. Surging imports of shrimp had led to diminishing 

market prices for domestic products and fuel costs had increased dramatically over previous 

years. Moreover, coastal development and gentrification were in some cases already reducing 

the availability of waterfront property for use by the industry. Thus, when the winds and storm 

surge from Hurricane Katrina ruined much of the commercial fishing fleet and infrastructure in 

the region, many participants were already on the brink of departure from the industry. 

While we in no way intend to trivialize the destruction and loss incurred by Hurricane Rita 

(September 24, 2005), our emphasis in this report is on the effects of Katrina (August 29, 2005), 

the first of the two devastating storms to hit the region within a period of three weeks. 

Therefore, while Rita served to magnify and aggravate impacts in an already compromised 

region, most of the consequences we will be addressing here resulted from Katrina in the states 

of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The following section summarizes the key impacts of 

this storm on the commercial and recreational fisheries in each state. 

 

1

 NOAA Fisheries community research is an ongoing project being conducted around the nation in order to identify 

fishing communities per the stipulations in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and 

National Standard 8. 
LOUISIANA 

Synopsis of Key Impacts on Louisiana State Fisheries 

• Thousands of commercial vessels lost and damaged throughout coastal Louisiana; 

• Commercial landing revenues in 2005 (Sept-Dec) declined 32 percent from the same 

period in 2004; 

• Losses to Louisiana’s seafood industry are estimated at $1.3 billion (annual total retail 

value); 

• ~ 40,000 recreational vessels throughout the state were lost; 

• Loss of revenue to the recreational fishing industry in the study parishes is estimated at 

$145 million; 

• Estimated losses to the charter boat industry include $13 million in lost trips and $8 

million for lost and damaged charter vessels; 

• Damages to the farmed alligator industry are estimated at $4 million; 

• Lack of ice, diminished processing and cold-storage capacity, infrastructure damage, 

debris in the water, fuel costs, and scarcity of marine supplies and services have severely 

constrained recovery efforts; 

• Accelerated labor shortages have also significantly constrained production capacity: 

processors in the affected parishes have lost between 35 and 40 percent of their labor 

force. 
MISSISSIPPI 

Synopsis of Key Impacts on Mississippi State Fisheries 

• All seafood dealerships along the Mississippi Gulf Coast were seriously damaged or 

destroyed, including six of Biloxi’s largest seafood processing plants; 

• Damages to seafood processing plants and seafood dealers are estimated at $101 million; 

• 90 percent of primary oyster reefs were destroyed; 

• Seafood processors and retailers rely on out-of-state product; 

• Commercial landings revenues in 2005 (Sept.- Dec.) represent a 79 percent decline in 

revenue from the same period in 2004; 

• Hurricane-related impacts to Mississippi’s marine fisheries are estimated at nearly $484 

million; 

• Damages to the resident commercial fishing fleet are estimated at $35 million. One 

hundred percent of these economic losses occurred in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson 

Counties; 

• Within the study counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson alone, 87 percent of 

commercial vessels were damaged. 

• Estimated economic impacts to the recreational fleet amounted to $160 million; 

• 74 charter boats were damaged/destroyed; damages/losses amount to $2 million; 

• Charter vessel operators lost nearly 5,000 trips in 2005 valued at $7.5 million; 

• So far, aid from FEMA and the SBA for charter boat operators has not materialized; 

• The majority of Mississippi Gulf Coast marinas, harbors, roads, and bridges were 

seriously damaged or destroyed; the remaining infrastructure is insufficient to support 

tourism. Accommodations are particularly scarce; 

• Fuel, ice, and other marine-based supplies are in short supply; 

• Significant labor shortages slow recovery efforts; dependency upon immigrant labor 

sharply increases. 
ALABAMA 

Synopsis of Key Impacts on Alabama State Fisheries 

• Many commercial fishing vessels were beached, damaged, or destroyed; Katrina 

destroyed 60 percent of the commercial shrimp boats in Bayou La Batre; 

• Commercial landings revenues in 2005 (Sept.- Dec.) represent a 20 percent decline in 

revenue from the same period in 2004; 

• While only 20 percent of state oyster beds were damaged, the oyster fishery continues to 

depend on harvests from oyster beds in neighboring waters, particularly Mobile Bay and 

the Mississippi Sound; 

• The few operational industrial processors are understaffed and cannot handle the high 

volumes of product coming to them from all over the Gulf Coast; 

• Based on loss of product and revenue, estimated losses for seafood processing facilities in 

Mobile and Bon Secour total $23 million; 

• Hurricane Katrina damaged/destroyed 24 charter boats in Alabama. Total 

damages/losses amount to $436 thousand; 

• Although Alabama’s charter fleet remained mostly intact, nearly 84 percent of charter 

boat operators received trip cancellations in the months following the storm; these vessel 

operators lost over 5 thousand trips valued at $5.3 million; 

• Total projected losses to 133 Alabama Charter Boats = $20 million; 

• Fuel costs and historically low shrimp prices have been the key factors in keeping Bayou 

La Batre’s remaining commercial vessel fleet moored through at least May 2006; 

• Escalating labor shortages contribute to poor post-Katrina production rates. 

Challenges to Recovery for the Commercial and Recreational Fishing Industries in 

Hurricane Katrina Impacted Gulf Coast States. 

In the context of historical trends within the Gulf States’ commercial and recreational fishing 

industry, Hurricane Katrina accelerated but did not introduce the current challenges to recovery. 

Rather, this devastating storm brought into sharp relief the struggles commercial shrimpers are 

having, such as rising costs and shrinking revenues, labor shortages, and loss of marine-based 

infrastructure and services due to coastal development and erosion. The future of the industry 

depends on how these economic and social concerns are addressed. While the nuances of these 

problems are particular to each Gulf state, the accelerated trends noted in this section are 

overarching and largely shared by commercial fishery participants across the Gulf.
• Declining Shrimp Prices – Despite an abundance of shrimp in the post-Katrina waters, 

prohibitively low shrimp prices, combined with increasing overhead costs, are 

discouraging some shrimpers from participating in the industry. 

• Escalating Fuel Costs – Rising fuel prices, in concert with declining shrimp prices, make 

breaking-even exceedingly difficult. In recent years, operating costs are commonly said 

to surpass revenues. 

• Coastal Erosion – Accelerated loss of coastal marshland and damage to wetlands has 

disrupted shellfish grounds and nursery grounds for juvenile finfish; intensified land 

conservation efforts may also disrupt long-standing fishing practices. 

• Coastal Gentrification – Coastal development is proceeding at an unprecedented pace as 

developers replace destroyed public fishing marinas, harbors, and other vital fishing 

infrastructure and services with high rise condominiums and private marinas. Lack of 

infrastructure and affordable housing is pushing many fishery participants further inland 

and/or out of the industry altogether. 

• Accelerated Shift from Commercial to Recreational Fishing Activities - Recreational 

fishing has become increasingly significant in economic terms throughout much of the 

Gulf of Mexico; the hurricanes have magnified and accelerated this shift from reliance on 

commercial fishing activities to recreational, leisure, and tourism-related activities and 

services. 

• Labor Shortages - With many residents displaced, preoccupied with individual recovery 

concerns, or taking temporary, but lucrative, jobs in construction, unemployment levels 

have increased in all three Katrina-ravaged states—despite the high number of employers 

looking to hire. Seafood processors, fishing crews, restaurants, and retailers are 

particularly understaffed. 

• Rising Insurance costs - Rising insurance costs over the last several years have 

disproportionately increased commercial fishery participants’ operational costs. 

Balanced against rising fuel prices and diminishing returns, insurance is increasingly 

viewed as an unaffordable luxury; the commercial fishing industry in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Alabama is presently underinsured. 

• Overcapitalization – Overcapitalization has largely driven the commercial fishing 

industry in the Gulf Coast states for the last 50 years and contributed to its decline. Many 

fishermen who took advantage of attractive loan packages in the 1990s now find 

themselves strapped as they struggle to make both boat and home payments in the 

uncertain and financially challenging post-Katrina environment. 

• Inadequate Financial Assistance – Fishery participants need government aid programs 

to help them recover from Katrina’s destructive forces. Such aid has not sufficiently 

materialized. Although funds have been allocated to aid in the recovery of oyster and 

shrimp grounds, the extent of aid to be expended on reconstruction of marine 

infrastructure and direct assistance to fishery participants remains unclear. 

• Flagging morale - The lengthy and uncertain recovery process is exacting an emotional 

and psychological toll on many fishery participants. 
 Hurricane Katrina has exacerbated preexisting disincentives for participating in the 

commercial fishing industry in the Gulf of Mexico. Some participants have already left the 

industry as a result of the storms and are unlikely to return, and some fishing-oriented villages 

are struggling to rebuild but are not guaranteed to recover. The likely manner and extent of 

future participation in the commercial fishing industry is uncertain. 
xi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cover Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

A. HURRICANE KATRINA: GULF STATES FISHERIES IMPACT REPORT . . . . . . . . 1

I. Introduction ......................................................1

II. Research Methods .................................................2

III. Industry Trends Preceding Hurricane Katrina ............................9

IV. Demographic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B. PRE-HURRICANE KATRINA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMERCIAL AND

RECREATIONAL FISHING INDUSTRIES IN LOUISIANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

I. Primary Fishing Industries in Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

II. Primary Fisheries and Production Levels in Coastal Louisiana: 

1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

III. Recreational and Commercial Fishing Industries and Participants in Louisiana 42

C. HURRICANE KATRINA: LOUISIANA STATE FISHERIES IMPACT . . . . . . . . . . . 47

I. Geography of Storm Surge and Winds Associated with Hurricane 

Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

II. Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Louisiana’s Marine-based 

Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

III. Estimated Economic Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Louisiana’s Fisheries 

and Related Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

IV. Response and Adaptation to Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

D. PRE-HURRICANE KATRINA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMERCIAL AND

RECREATIONAL FISHING INDUSTRIES IN MISSISSIPPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

I. Primary Fishing Industries in Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

II. Primary Fisheries and Production Levels in Coastal Mississippi: 

1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

III. Recreational and Commercial Fishing Industries and Participants in 

 Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
xii

E. HURRICANE KATRINA: MISSISSIPPI STATE FISHERIES IMPACT . . . . . . . . . . 152

I. Geography of Storm Surge and Winds Associated with Hurricane 

Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

II. Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s Marine-based 

Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

III. Estimated Economic Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s Fisheries 

and Related Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

IV. Response and Adaptation to Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

F. PRE-HURRICANE KATRINA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMERCIAL AND

RECREATIONAL FISHING INDUSTRIES IN ALABAMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

I. Primary Fishing Industries in Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

II. Primary Fisheries and Production Levels in Coastal Alabama: 

1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

 III. Recreational and Commercial Fishing Industries and Participants in 

 Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

G. HURRICANE KATRINA: ALABAMA STATE FISHERIES IMPACT . . . . . . . . . . . 208

I. Geography of Storm Surge and Winds Associated with Hurricane 

Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

II. Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Alabama’s Marine-based 

Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

III. Estimated Economic Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Alabama’s Fisheries 

and Related Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

IV. Response and Adaptation to Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

H. OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON THE FISHING

INDUSTRIES IN THE STATES OF LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI,

AND ALABAMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

I. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

J. APPENDIX A: UNIVERSE OF 58 POTENTIAL STUDY COMMUNITIES . . . . . . 260

K. APPENDIX B: FIELD PROTOCOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

L. APPENDIX C: KEY INFORMANT DEMOGRAPHICS BY STATE AND STUDY

COMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
xiii

M. APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

N. REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
xiv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Study Communities in Coastal Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama ...3

Table 2: Time Frame for Conducting Field Work ..........................8

Table 3: Gulf of Mexico Commercial Fishing Revenue: 2004 ................9

Table 4: Shrimp Imports, by Major Countries of Origin, 2003 and 2004 . . . . . . . 12

Table 5: Resident Populations in Study Parishes, Pre- and Post-Katrina: 

Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Table 6: Resident Populations in Study Counties, Pre- and Post-Katrina: 

Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Table 7: Resident Populations in Study Counties, Pre- and Post-Katrina: 

Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 8: Commercial Landings in Louisiana, Thousands of Pounds, and 

Thousands of Current Dollars: 2000-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Table 9: Pounds and Value of all Commercial Landings in the United States 

and Louisiana: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Table 10: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Louisiana Ports and 

Ranking by U.S. Dollars: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Table 11: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Louisiana Ports and 

Ranking By Pounds: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Table 12: Pounds and Value of Louisiana Shrimp Harvest: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . 36

Table 13: Oyster Landings for Louisiana by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . 38

Table 14: Estimated Louisiana Crawfish Aquaculture Production by Selected 

Study Parishes: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Table 15: Commercial Shrimp Licenses in Louisiana by Parish (Top 12): 2005 . . 46

Table 16: Labor Losses among Large-Scale Processing Plants in Affected 

Louisiana Parishes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Table 17: Employment Loss by Parish in Select Seafood Processing and 

Offloading Facilities: April 2004 and April 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Table 18: Licensed Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers by Parish: 2004 . . . . . . . . . 66

Table 19: Employment Loss by Parish in Select Seafood Retail Facilities:

April 2004 and April 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Table 20: Pre- and Post-Katrina Status of Select Industry Infrastructure in 

Southeast Louisiana: 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Table 21: Hurricane Effects on Ice Plant Production of Select Facilities in 

Louisiana: May 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Table 22: Operational Status of Louisiana’s Recreational and Commercial 

 Marinas in the Five Study Parishes: May 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Table 23: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Barataria, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 

2005, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Table 24: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Grand 

Isle, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . 77
xv

Table 25: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Gretna, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 77

Table 26: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Lafitte, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 78

Table 27: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in

Westwego, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Table 28: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Cut 

Off, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . 80

Table 29: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Galliano, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005,

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Table 30: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Golden

Meadow, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Table 31: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Larose,

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 83

Table 32: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Leeville,

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 83

Table 33: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Port

Fourchon, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Table 34: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in BurasEmpire, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 85

Table 35: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Pointe 

a la Hache, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Table 36: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Port

Sulphur, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 86

Table 37: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in VeniceBoothville, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Table 38: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Chalmette, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Table 39: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Delacroix, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Table 40: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in

Yscloskey, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Table 41: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Hopedale, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xvi

Table 42: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Chauvin, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Table 43: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in 

Cocodrie, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 

2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Table 44: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Dulac,

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 93

Table 45: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Houma, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 94

 Table 46: Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Theriot, 

LA, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Table 47: State Licensed Resident Commercial Fishing Vessels by Town and 

Parish of Study Communities, Pre- and Post-Katrina, as of March 1: 

2004, 2005 and 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Table 48: State Licensed Resident Commercial Fishing Vessels by Parish-wide 

Total, Pre- and Post-Katrina, as of March 1: 2004, 2005, and 2006 . . . 114

Table 49: Pre-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings, Five-Year Average: 

2000-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Table 50: Projected Fisheries Losses for Heavily Impacted Parishes: Jefferson, 

Lower Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, 

and St. Tammany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Table 51: Louisiana Post-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings: 2000-2005 . . . . 117

Table 52: Pre-Katrina Annual Dockside Value of Oysters for Severely Impacted 

Parishes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Table 53: Estimated Oyster Industry Total Losses for Severely Impacted 

Parishes, Retail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Table 54: Licensed Charter Vessels by Parish: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Table 55: Recreational Fishing Licenses in 2004 and Estimated Loss of Revenue 

to the Recreational Fishing Industry in the Six Parishes Most Impacted 

by Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Table 56: Total Projected Losses to 398 Louisiana Charter Boats from Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Table 57: Commercial Landings in Mississippi, Thousands of Pounds, and 

Thousands of Current Dollars: 2000-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Table 58: Economic Impact of Mississippi Commercial Seafood Industry 

by Sector: 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Table 59: Plant-gate Values and Number of Workers Employed in Mississippi

Seafood Processing Plants: 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Table 60: Pounds and Value of all Commercial Landings in the United States and 

Mississippi: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Table 61: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Mississippi Ports and 

Ranking by U.S. Dollars: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
xvii

Table 62: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Mississippi Ports and 

Ranking by Pounds: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Table 63: Pounds and Value of Mississippi Shrimp Harvest: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . 136

Table 64: Economic Impact of Mississippi Commercial Shrimp Industry by 

Sector: 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Table 65: Oyster Landings for Mississippi by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . 140

Table 66: Economic Impact of Mississippi Commercial Oyster Industry by 

Sector: 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Table 67: Licensed Resident Mississippi Commercial Shrimping Units: 2005 . . 148

Table 68: Licensed Resident Mississippi Commercial Fishing Units, Net of 

Multiple Licenses: 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Table 69: Number of Pre-Katrina Seafood Processing Plants, Mississippi: 2005 . 159

Table 70: Status of Major Biloxi Processors: May 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Table 71: Number of Pre-Katrina Licensed Seafood Dealers, Mississippi: 

2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Table 72: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Biloxi, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 172

Table 73: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Pass Christian,

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 173

Table 74: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in D’Iberville, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 174

Table 75: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Gulfport,

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 174

Table 76: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Long Beach,

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 175

Table 77: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Moss Point, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 176

Table 78: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Pascagoula, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 176

Table 79: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Bay St. Louis,

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 177

Table 80: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Waveland, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . 177

Table 81: State Estimates of Hurricane Related Impacts to Mississippi Marine 

Fisheries as of November 3, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Table 82: Mississippi Post-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings: 2000-2005 . . . 183

Table 83: Estimated Total Damage to the Mississippi Seafood Processing 

Plants and Seafood Dealers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Table 84: Estimated Total Damage to Resident Licensed Mississippi 

Commercial Fishing Vessels from Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Table 85: Estimated Net Damage to Resident Licensed Mississippi Commercial 

Fishing Vessels from Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Table 86: Total Projected Losses to 98 Mississippi Charter Boats from 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
xviii

Table 87: Commercial Landings in Alabama, Thousands of Pounds, and 

Thousands of Current Dollars: 2001-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Table 88: Pounds and Value of all Commercial Landings in the United States and

Alabama: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Table 89: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Alabama Ports and 

 Ranking by U.S. Dollars: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Table 90: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Alabama Ports and 

Ranking by Pounds: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Table 91: Pounds and Value of Alabama Shrimp Harvest: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . 202

Table 92: Oyster Landings for Alabama by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . 203

Table 93: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at an Individual U.S. Port: 

 Bayou La Batre, Alabama, 2000-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Table 94: Total Commercial Fishery Landings at an Individual U.S. Port: 

 Bon Secour-Gulf Shores, Alabama, 2000-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Table 95: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Bayou La 

Batre, Alabama, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . 226

Table 96: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Bon Secour, 

 Alabama, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 227

Table 97: Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Mobile, 

 Alabama, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 . . . . . . . 228

Table 98: Total Losses from Katrina to the Alabama Seafood Industry: 

 September 2005-December 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Table 99: Alabama Post-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings: 2000-2005 . . . . . 231

Table 100: Total Projected Losses to 133 Alabama Charter Boats from Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Table 101: Purchasing Changes of Mobile Seafood Dealers, Post-Katrina . . . . . . 235

Table 102: Louisiana: Combined Presence and Operation Status of Select Fishing

Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Jefferson, Lafourche, Plaquemines,

St. Bernard, and Terrebonne Parishes, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina:

2004 and 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Table 103: Mississippi: Combined Presence and Operational Status of Select Fishing

Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson

Counties, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004 and 2006 . . . . . . . . . 241

Table 104: Alabama: Combined Presence and Operational Status of Select Fishing

Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Baldwin and Mobile Counties, Preand Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004 and 2006 Purchasing Changes of

Mobile Seafood Dealers, Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
xix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Trends in Average Price of U.S. Diesel Fuel vs. Nominal Price 

Nominal Price for the Northern Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Figure 2: Shrimp Import Trends in the United States: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Figure 3: Percent in Poverty by Census 2000 Block Group for Areas in Louisiana

Affected by Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Figure 4: New Orleans Census 2000 Block Groups by Median Household Income, 

 Percent below Poverty Level, Percent African American, and Inundation 

 Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Figure 5: New Orleans Census 2000 Block Groups by Percent Renters, Housing 

Costs, Mortgage Holders, and Inundation Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Figure 6: Coastal Mississippi: Median Income, Percent in Poverty, and Inundation 

 Areas by Census 2000 Block Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 6b: Coastal Mississippi: Percent African American, Population Density, and

Estimated Storm Surge by Census 2000 Block Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Figure 7: Coastal Mississippi: Percent of Renters and Mortgage Holders in 

Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Figure 8: Coastal Alabama: Population Density and the Percentage of Residents

Ages 65+ in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Figure 9: Coastal Alabama: Poverty Levels, Median Household Income, Percentage

of African-Americans, and Inundation Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Figure 10: Coastal Alabama: Percent of Renters and Mortgage Holders in Hurricane

Katrina Affected Areas in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Figure 11: Map of Louisiana and Study Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Figure 12: Shrimp Landings by Pound and Region: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Figure 13: Louisiana’s Shrimp Harvest by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . 37

Figure 14: Oyster Landings by Region: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Figure 15: Louisiana’s Oyster Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . 39

Figure 16: Pounds and Value of Louisiana Crawfish: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Figure 17: Charter and Support Facilities of the Southeast Louisiana Coast and 

Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Figure 18: Commercial Fishing Permit Holders of the Southeast Louisiana Coast 

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Figure 19: Southeast Louisiana Coast: Population Density by Census 2000 Block 

Groups of Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Figure 20: Venice, Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Figure 21: Lafitte (Jefferson Parish) in the Wake of Wind Damage from Hurricane 

Katrina and Surge Damage by Hurricane Rita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Figure 22: Port Sulphur, Processing Plant: Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Figure 23: Port Sulphur, Processing Plant (zoom): Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Figure 24: Port of Venice, IAI Overflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Figure 25: Buras-Venice: At the Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
xx

Figure 26: Yscloskey: Natural Gas Liquid Extraction Plant, Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . 55

Figure 27: Jean Lafitte: Post Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Figure 28: Golden Meadow Shrimper who had Moored his Vessel in Bayou

Lafourche prior to Katrina Resuming Work Immediately after the 

Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Figure 29: Seafood Processors of the Southeast Louisiana Coast and Hurricane 

Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Figure 30: Severely Damaged Seafood Processing Equipment in Jefferson Parish . 62

Figure 31: Seafood Retailers and Wholesalers of the Southeast Louisiana Coast and

Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Figure 32: Damage to Fisheries Infrastructure in Southwest Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 33: Marinas of the Southeast Louisiana Coast and Hurricane Katrina 

Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Figure 34: Marina in Lafourche Parish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Figure 35: Blackie Campo’s Marina, Yscloskey, October 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Figure 36: Boat Builders, Brokers, and Maintenance and Repair Facilities of the 

Southeast Louisiana Coast and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . 74

Figure 37: Index Map Wrecked and Sunken Vessels in Louisiana from Post

Hurricane Katrina Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Figure 38: Frame 1: Slidell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Figure 39: Frame 2: Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Figure 40: Frame 3: New Orleans (west) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Figure 41: Frame 4: New Orleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Figure 42: Frame 5: Belle Chasse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Figure 43: Frame 6: Delacroix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Figure 44: Frame 7: Port Sulphur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Figure 45: Frame 8: Empire and Orchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Figure 46: Frame 8a: Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Figure 47: Frame 8b: Orchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Figure 48a: Terrebonne Parish: Frame 9: Houma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Figure 48b: Terrebonne Parish: Frame 10: Galliano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Figure 48c: Terrebonne Parish: Frame 11: Grand Isle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Figure 49: Venice Fisherman Showing a Photo of Damage to Local Venice 

Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Figure 50: Offloading Dock in St. Bernard Parish with Grounded Vessels 

Blocking Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Figure 51: Pre- and Post-Storm Landings’ Values (in millions of dollars) . . . . . . . 115

Figure 52: Venice in September 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Figure 53: Louisiana Shrimp Management Zones 1, 2 and 3; and Study Parishes in 

Each Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Figure 54: Boat for Sale: Cut Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Figure 55: Seafood Transport Vehicle, a Vital Service following the Hurricanes . 129

Figure 56: Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas of the Mississippi Coast . . . . . . . . . 132

Figure 57: Shrimp Landings in the Gulf Coast States (in millions): 2000-2004 . . 137
xxi

Figure 58: Mississippi’s Shrimp Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . 138

Figure 59: Mississippi’s Oyster Landings in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . 140

Figure 60: Fish Hatcheries and Aquaculture of the Mississippi Coast in Hurricane 

 Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Figure 61: Marinas and Charter Services of the Mississippi Coast in Hurricane 

Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Figure 62: Commercial Fishing Permit Holders of the Mississippi Coast in 

Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Figure 63: Number of Commercial Oyster Fishery Participants, Mississippi: 

1992-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Figure 64: Boat Builders & Brokers of the Mississippi Coast in Hurricane Katrina 

Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Figure 65: Port of Pascagoula, West Harbor, Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Figure 66: Biloxi: Pre-Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Figure 67: Biloxi: Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Figure 68: Coastal Mississippi: Estimated Storm Surge and Flooding, Transportation

Infrastructure, and Population Density in Hurricane Katrina Affected 

Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Figure 69: Seafood Processors of the Mississippi Coast in Hurricane Katrina 

Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Figure 70: Seafood Retailers and Wholesalers of the Mississippi Coast in Hurricane

Katrina Affected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Figure 71: Small Craft Harbor, Front Bay, Biloxi, MS: November 2005 . . . . . . . . 167

Figure 72: Small Craft Harbor, Front Bay, Biloxi, MS: May 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Figure 73: Recreational Harbor, Point Cadet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Figure 74: Gulfport: Pre-Katrina (aerial view) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Figure 75: Gulfport: Post-Katrina (aerial view) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Figure 76: Fuel Truck from Louisiana Fueling Boats in Pass Christian, 

Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Figure 77: Vietnamese Shrimpers on Boat in Biloxi, MS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Figure 78: Howard Avenue (three blocks from Point Cadet), Biloxi, MS . . . . . . . 180

Figure 79: Biloxi Bay, Mississippi, Ocean Going Vessels Sunk or Swept Inland 

by the Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Figure 80: Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, Ocean Going Vessels Sunk or Swept Inland 

by the Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Figure 81: Industrial Canal, Gulfport, Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Figure 82: Shrimp Boat for Sale in Biloxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Figure 83: Sign Advertising Shrimper’s Wares in Front of House . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Figure 84: Shrimp Sales in Parking Lot, Biloxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Figure 85: Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas of the Alabama Coast ........... 198

Figure 86: Percentage of Total Pounds of Shrimp Landed Annually in Alabama, 

 the Four Remaining Gulf States and the United States: 1995-2004 . . . 201

Figure 87: Alabama’s Shrimp Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . 202
xxii

Figure 88: Percentage of Total Pounds of Oyster Landed Annually in Alabama, and

 the Four Remaining Gulf States and the United States: 1995-2004 . . . 204

Figure 89: Alabama’s Oyster Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 . . . . . . . . 205

Figure 90: Fishermen and Fishing Facilities, Commercial and Recreation, of the

Southwest Alabama Coast (Estimated Storm Surge and Flooding, Boat

Brokers, Maintenance & Repair, Marinas and Marine Charter, and

Permitted Fishermen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Figure 91: NOAA Slosh Model; Hurricane Katrina, Mobile Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Figure 92: Coastal Southwest Alabama Demographics by Census 2000 Block Group

(Estimated Storm Surge and Flooding, Median Income, 

Percent in Poverty, Percent African American) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Figure 93: Bayou La Batre, Entrance to the Bayou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Figure 94: Coden (Near Bayou La Batre) and Entrance to Bayou Coden, 

Post-storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Figure 95: Bayou La Batre, Dockside, During Storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Figure 96: Bayou La Batre, Dockside, Post-storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Figure 97: Bayou La Batre, Landside, During Storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Figure 98: Bayou La Batre, Landside, Post-storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Figure 99: Grounded Shrimping Vessel: Bayou La Batre, Post-Katrina . . . . . . . . 214

Figure 100: Seafood Processing & Sales, and Fish Hatcheries of the Southwest 

Alabama Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Figure 101: Employment Figures at Four Small Seafood Processing Facilities, 

 in Bayou La Batre at Three Points in Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Figure 102: A Shrimp Vessel under Repair in Bayou La Batre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Figure 103: Fishermen Offloading Post-storm Harvest in Bayou La Batre . . . . . . . 220

Figure 104: Oyster Shell Mounds Lining Bayou La Batre Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Figure 105: Bayou la Batre, Alabama, Ocean Going Vessels Sunk or Swept 

Inland by the Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

Figure 106: Bayou La Batre, Post-Katrina Clean-up Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Figure 107: Re-fueled and Re-iced Vessel Leaving Bayou La Batre . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Figure 108: Profit and Loss Margins for “Vessel X,” a Commercial Shrimping 

Vessel in Bayou La Batre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Figure 109: Nets in Need of a Dip: Bayou La Batre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Figure 110: Bayou La Batre Site Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Figure 111: “CAT Fleet”: Repossessed Caterpillar-financed Fishing Vessels, 

Bayou La Batre, Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Figure 112: A Blessed Boat, Bayou La Batre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
A. Hurricane Katrina: Gulf States Fisheries Impact Report 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 The following pages document the impacts of Hurricane Katrina on 38 fishing-involved 

communities in affected areas of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The report was prepared 

for the Southeast Regional Office of NOAA Fisheries as an extension of the agency’s fishing 

community profiling program.1 The work was undertaken by Impact Assessment, Inc. (IAI), a 

research firm specializing in maritime social science along the coastal zone of the U.S. IAI 

researchers were deployed to investigate the effects of the hurricane soon after Katrina made 

landfall, and continued to document and monitor conditions during the autumn and winter 

months of 2005, and during the spring and early summer months of 2006. This report describes 

the nature and findings of the research through July 2006, with clear acknowledgement that the 

effects of the storm continue to unfold as fishery participants throughout the region adapt to 

radically altered conditions in a perennially challenging industry. 

 Background. The landfall of Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005 resulted in one of the 

worst natural disasters in the history of the United States. The physical effects of the storm were 

disastrous throughout much of coastal Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and in fact life 

continues in a state of disruption throughout the region nearly a year later. Moreover, the event 

exacerbated various social problems and economic trends that were notable prior to August 

2005. In the case of marine fisheries, the storm accelerated a regional trend of significant decline 

in participation and production that had begun in 2001. For large vessel operators especially, 

this was a period of significant challenges. Surging imports of shrimp had led to diminishing 

market prices for domestic products; fuel costs had increased dramatically over previous years; 

and shrimp were not superabundant - especially between 2001 and 2002. Moreover, coastal 

development and gentrification were in some cases already reducing the availability of 

waterfront property for use by the industry. Thus, when the winds and storm surge from 

Hurricane Katrina ruined much of the commercial fishing fleet and infrastructure in the region, 

thereby opening the coast to further development, many participants were already on the brink of 

departure from the industry. 

Understanding of this context is critical to a valid assessment of Katrina’s effects. The following 

pages describe that context, with special focus on the status of commercial fisheries in coastal 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama prior to and following landfall. Based on that description 

and on a wide range of pertinent data, we also provide a preliminary assessment of the effects of 

the storm on these once highly productive forms of enterprise and activity. Given the massive 

extent and broad geographic scope of Katrina’s effects, descriptive emphasis is necessarily 

applied to those parishes and counties in which commercial fisheries were most clearly and 

severely affected. Pre-existing conditions and the affects of the storm on the region’s charter and 

recreational fisheries are also documented. 

 

1

 NOAA Fisheries community research has been and is being conducted around the nation in order to identify 

fishing communities per stipulations in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and 

National Standard 8. 

1
Additionally, while we in no way intend to trivialize the destruction and loss incurred by Rita 

(September 24, 2005), our emphasis in this report is on the effects of Katrina (August 29, 2005), 

the first of the two devastating storms to hit the region within a period of three weeks. 

Therefore, while Rita served to magnify and aggravate impacts in an already compromised 

region, in particular the western parts of Louisiana (primarily Calcasieu, Cameron, and 

Vermilion Parishes) and the northeastern part of Texas, most of the consequences we will be 

addressing here resulted from Katrina. Hence, in an attempt to minimize confusion, we refer to 

only Hurricane Katrina when describing and discussing the impacts of the storm on the Gulf 

Coast fishing communities in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

We begin by describing the methodological approach used to conduct the research across the 

affected region. This approach included a range of primary and secondary source methods 

appropriate to the topical issues and field situations at hand. Next, we discuss regional 

geophysical attributes and economic trends that are most clearly relevant to description and 

assessment of the fishing industries in the current context. This is followed by an overview 

description of the pre-Katrina status of the fishing industries in each of the three affected states. 

This is then followed by descriptive analysis of the preliminary effects of the storm on the 

region's fishery participants and infrastructure and services and on the economic and social 

configuration of the fisheries in general. The report concludes with a discussion of the many 

challenges confronting commercial and recreational fishing industries in the region as the 

participants seek to recover from a storm that was unprecedented in geographic scope and 

combined effects of wind and storm surge. 

II. RESEARCH METHODS 

 Goal and Objectives. The research described in this report was conducted to assist 

NOAA Fisheries in its efforts to assess the social and economic impacts of Hurricane Katrina as 

these relate to the conduct of marine fisheries in the affected region. A series of interrelated 

objectives were developed to meet this overarching goal. These involved: (1) initial 

characterization of the effects of the storm on fishing-related businesses and infrastructure in 

communities directly affected by the storm, (2) highly-focused and in-depth examination of the 

immediate and short-term social and economic impacts of the event, and (3) documentation of 

the major financial, material, technical, and logistical impediments to recovery, and analysis of 

the prospects for recovery. 

 Study Communities. IAI focused its efforts in 38 study communities in 10 parishes or 

counties across the affected region. The research team examined 26 communities in Louisiana, 

nine in Mississippi, and three in Alabama (see Table 1). 

2
Table 1. Study Communities in Coastal Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 

State County/Parish Study Communities 

Alabama Mobile Mobile, Bayou La Batre 

Alabama Baldwin Bon Secour 

Mississippi Jackson Moss Point, Pascagoula 

Mississippi Harrison Biloxi, Gulfport, D’Iberville, Long Beach, 

Pass Christian 

Mississippi Hancock Bay St. Louis, Waveland 

Louisiana St. Bernard Chalmette, Delacroix, Hopedale, Yscloskey 

Louisiana Plaquemines Boothville, Buras, Empire, Point a la Hache, 

Port Sulphur, Venice 

Louisiana Jefferson Barataria, Grand Isle, Gretna, Lafitte, Westwego 

Louisiana Lafourche Cut-Off, Galliano, Golden Meadow, Larose, Leeville, 

Port Fourchon 

Louisiana Terrebonne Chauvin, Cocodrie, Dulac, Houma, Theriot 

Selection criteria for the study communities included the following: (a) historic and ongoing 

community involvement in marine fisheries, (b) proximity to the storm surge and associated 

damage propagated by Katrina2

, (c) physical accessibility and/or the availability of key 

informants, and (d) the health and safety of our research team. Selection of the study 

communities was also informed by an earlier research program conducted for NOAA Fisheries 

by IAI. The research was designed to identify communities that are differently involved in 

fishing-related industries across the region. That effort resulted in a four-volume, 2,000 page 

report describing social, economic, and demographic attributes of 335 towns and cities across the 

Gulf of Mexico in the states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida (Impact 

Assessment, Inc. 2005a, 2005b, and 2005c). For this present study, the issues of physical 

access, the availability of key informants, and health and safety were particularly limiting in 

some cases and resulted in the exclusion of a few potential study communities. For example, 

New Orleans was excluded because the magnitude of devastation in this city rendered fieldwork 

both dangerous and impractical. Additionally, our selection criteria eliminated New Orleans as a 

potential study community because it is only a “tangentially-involved” fishing community; that 

is it is a 

place in which fishing clearly plays an ancillary role to other forms of economic and 

social activity. While there may be small sub-groups of residents who are active in 

fishing and related industry, the scope of those activities are minor relative to the local 

social and economic mainstream. The activities of residents of sub-communities in the 

greater New Orleans area, such as Bucktown, Lake Catherine, South End, Little Woods, 

 

2 "Damaged" areas are those identified by FEMA and the Dartmouth Flood Observatory as flooded or with storm 

damage ranging from moderate to catastrophic. 

3
and Venetian Isles, are highly focused on fishing, but that enterprise is insignificant in 

scale when weighed against the overall economy and social activities of New Orleans in 

total (IAI 2005: 609). 

Of the 335 towns and cities described in the 2005 research effort, 150 were located in the three 

states most directly impacted by Hurricane Katrina: Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Given 

practical constraints to completing the current project in both a timely fashion and within 

financial bounds, we focused on coastal communities located in parishes and counties where 

marine-related activities and/or infrastructure experienced serious disruption (limiting our 

universe of potential study communities to 94) and had received a designation as a primarily- or 

secondarily-involved fishing community in 20053

 (further streamlining our universe of potential 

study communities to 58). Then, relying on breaking news reports and on-the-ground 

discussions, we eliminated the following cases: 10 communities because their fishing-related 

industries reportedly were not significantly disrupted by Hurricane Katrina, 6 damaged 

communities because of difficulties physically accessing the location and/or a lack of access to 

key informants, 3 because they could be considered as part of a larger metro region or in tandem 

with a neighboring damaged community, and 1 because of limited time and fiscal resources. 

Additionally, based on our discussions with key informants and our on-the-ground analysis, we 

decided to add four “tangentially-involved” communities because of (1) the significant role they 

played in supporting the marine-related economies of neighboring communities, and (2) the 

significant disruption to the fishing-related industries they support as a result of Hurricane 

Katrina. In the final analysis, we selected 19 primarily-involved fishing communities, 14 

secondarily-involved fishing communities, and 5 tangentially-involved fishing communities (see 

Appendix A). 

Per contract requirements, field staff conducted in-depth ethnographic research in a sufficient 

number and type of communities as needed to ensure full representation of the variable effects of 

the storm. Field staff was ultimately situated in satellite offices in safe and strategic locations 

from which they were able to conduct ongoing research forays into adjacent towns, cities, and 

rural areas. These “home base” communities were Bayou La Batre in Alabama, Biloxi and Pass 

Christian in Mississippi, and Venice and Grand Isle in Louisiana. 

Data Collection Rationale and Approach. The project methodology was configured 

based on NOAA Fisheries' need for assessment of changes in the conduct of marine fisheries 

subsequent to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. Given the aforementioned trend of ongoing 

challenges and decline in participation and production in many of the area's commercial 

fisheries, this required some mechanism for discerning hurricane effects from pre-existing 

conditions in fishing, offloading, processing, distribution, and wholesale and retail sales of 

 

3 As defined during the IAI research effort (2005), “primarily-involved” fishing communities are cities/towns where 

there remains an observable collective focus on fishing and its associated industries, even though the economies and 

primary foci of social interaction in such places may be mixed to greater and lesser degrees. In “secondarilyinvolved” communities the significance of commercial fishing and associated industry is important, but, 

demonstrably, secondary to other economic emphases. Included in this type are places in which sub-groups of 

residents are very active in fishing and related industry, but hidden in economic scale and focus of collective social 

interaction by those activities of the surrounding population that are not related to fishing (609: 2005). 

4
seafood. We therefore set out to collect valid information about the conduct of marine fisheries 

both prior to and following the storm. This would enable a natural experimental pre-test posttest analysis, with the storm as the (unfortunate) agent of change. The challenges inherent in this 

classic impact assessment design should be noted at the outset in conjunction with our 

methodological solutions. 

First, although it has long been known that a storm of the magnitude of Katrina could ultimately 

affect the region, its eventual timing, movement, and full scope of effects were quite obviously 

unknowable. Thus, information most useful for comprehensive social and economic assessment 

was not immediately available for all affected communities of interest. This basic problem was 

overcome within the practical limitations of available time and resources through retrospective 

collection of pertinent primary source data, and through compilation and use of existing data 

such as those previously collected by IAI in the communities and those maintained by local, 

county/parish, state, and federal agencies across the region. Forethought, ongoing interaction 

with SERO staff (the NMFS Southeast Regional Office), and persistence in what were often 

highly challenging field settings ultimately enabled collection and compilation of necessary and 

sufficient data for describing and assessing the effects of the hurricane. 

Second, as noted above, marine fisheries and communities in the storm-affected region had 

already undergone or were undergoing (often rapid) change by the time Katrina made landfall. It 

was therefore necessary that close attention be paid to collection of data that would enable 

analysis of pertinent pre-existing trends in the fisheries and communities, even those involving 

change into the summer months of 2005. This also was accomplished through retrospective 

collection of data, with especial attention to identification and compilation of data indicative of 

the changes occurring in the years and months prior to the hurricane, and data descriptive of the 

larger social and economic context of those changes. 

Third, the hurricane led to a range of effects which varied by community per pre-existing 

conditions and relative proximity to wind and storm surge. The problem of sub-regional 

availability was addressed by working in communities that would enable analysts to infer the 

nature of changes prior to and following the hurricane across the larger region of interest. 

Finally, it was clear from the start that the extensive damage and number of displaced residents 

in the study communities presented unique challenges to fieldwork and data collection. This 

challenge was addressed through the flexibility and persistence of the field team. That team 

often found themselves working with people whose homes were damaged or demolished, whose 

jobs had been deferred or lost, and whose lives had been fundamentally disrupted. Data 

collection procedures were thus necessarily adaptive, and researchers quickly became adept and 

flexible in very challenging circumstances. As such, we were able to consistently acquire the 

data needed for effective analysis of the effects of the hurricane vis-à-vis other, ongoing sources 

of change in the region.

 Field Teams. Field research for the Hurricane Katrina Impact Study began in the days 

immediately following Katrina’s landfall on August 23, 2005, in Houston and along Gulf of 

Mexico between Louisiana and Alabama. Following NOAA project authorization, the IAI 

Principal Investigator engaged the assistance of the University of West Florida Public History 

5
Graduate Program under the direction of Dr. Patrick K. Moore. This decision was based on 

recently completed collaborative projects undertaken under the direction of IAI for both the 

Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA). These graduate students were recruited on the basis of their 

specialized local knowledge, and their expertise and training in oral history, community history 

assessment, and field experience. 

Field assignments were based upon the experience and training status of each candidate, their 

desire (and willingness) to participate in a complex and potentially dangerous environment, and 

their abilities to adapt to changing research protocols and conditions. Project development and 

training initially occurred in late August, 2005 in Pensacola, Florida under the direction of John 

Petterson, Patrick Moore, Ed Glazier, Pamela Godde, and Laura Stanley of the IAI professional 

team. Training and project development included establishing research protocols for data 

acquisition and transmission; developing methods for locating and identifying pertinent subjects, 

often displaced by the storm and without access to electronic communications; establishing 

access procedures with local, state, and federal law enforcement and agencies to enter restricted 

roads, coastal areas, and facilities; and addressing issues associated with ethical concerns, 

confidentiality, and crisis-management techniques. Arriving in the field, often the first “official” 

contact with anybody outside the immediate community, field workers found themselves not 

only collecting data, but providing basic information on conditions and support services for 

individuals isolated without power, water, gasoline, or operational communications resources. 

Because of these circumstances, team meetings were often held several times a week, sometimes 

multiple times a day, to disseminate information on changing conditions and to redirect and 

refocus the research protocols in response to the evolving information associated with the 

afflicted disaster areas (see Appendix B). 

Following intensive fieldwork, compilation, review, and analysis of incoming data led to 

development of a preliminary impact report in January 2006. The draft report served as a basis 

for configuring the next phase of fieldwork, and for further refinement of the research protocols. 

A special-communities field visit was arranged for the purposes of conducting interviews with 

Vietnamese-speaking shrimp harvesters in Bayou La Batre, Alabama, Biloxi, Mississippi, and in 

St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes in Louisiana. This was made possible through the efforts 

of a NOAA Fisheries staff member who introduced IAI to a language translator with extensive 

knowledge of the fleets of interest. A range of additional interviews and ethnographic exercises 

were also conducted at this time. Similar work was conducted throughout the successive stages 

of fieldwork in the region. 

Primary Source Data Collection and Sampling Methods. Much of the primary source 

data were obtained through formal and informal interview methods, and through observation 

while in the study communities. This primary source data was critical in establishing the preKatrina presence and post-Katrina operational capacity of marine-related infrastructure and 

services within the study communities, as well as the ways in which fishery participants adapted 

to the significant disruption to their industry activities. During initial field site visits, study 

teams engaged willing participants in informal, open-ended interviews. A snowball or network 

sampling technique was subsequently used to identify respondents knowledgeable of factors and 

issues pertinent for purposes of description and assessment. Once rapport was developed with 

6
key informants, additional interviews were arranged and conducted at their convenience. 

Research participants included persons in the harvesting, processing, and distribution sectors of 

the region's commercial fisheries, persons involved in the recreational fishing industry, 

government officials, and local residents not directly involved in the fishing industry. Over 615 

interviews were conducted in the affected regions, including 150 interviews with captains and 

crew in the harvesting sector (see Appendix C). 

Secondary Source Data Collection and Analysis. As part of our survey of hurricane 

related damages, we constructed a database that would allow comparison of the status of marinerelated infrastructure and services in each study community prior to and following the hurricane. 

So as to create the most complete and accurate database possible, we relied on four crossvalidating methods of data collection: (1) interviews with knowledgeable residents, (2) public 

and private information sources such as phone directories, waterfront planning documents, and 

information from chambers of commerce, (3) previous research conducted by IAI, and (4) field 

observation and attendance at local meetings and other relevant venues where recovery and 

related issues were discussed. 

Our work with government agencies also yielded valuable archival data. Representatives in 

federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. 

Coast Guard (USCG), and in state agencies such as the Mississippi Department of Marine 

Resources (MDMR) and Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), provided 

critically important secondary source data regarding, for example, trends in the number of 

licensed vessels, the location and number of post-hurricane salvaged vessels, and processor 

contact information. Additional secondary data were compiled from official documentation of 

federal hearings, various published reports, historical documents, and recent newspaper articles. 

Finally, we gathered extensive data from the U.S. Census Bureau and from a private data source 

regarding fishing-related businesses in the area. 

 Confidentiality. Efforts to protect the anonymity of respondents and the confidentiality 

of the information they so graciously provided were enacted throughout the course of the project. 

Certain interviews are paraphrased in this report, but names are not provided and such 

information is presented only where respondents signed consent forms authorizing IAI to 

judiciously and confidentially include their responses. 

Time Frame. The fieldwork conducted for this research occurred in four stages over the 

course of the nine months following landfall of the hurricane. These were: September to 

December 2005, January through February 2006, March 2006, and April through May 2006. A 

series of follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone during June 2006 (see Table 2 

below). 

7
Table 2: Time Frame for Conducting Field Work 

Stage Nature of work Location of Teams 

Fall 2005 

Document primary impacts of storm and 

potential secondary impacts; storm 

responses and reasons; locate redistribution patterns within the support 

sector of industry and consequent shifts in 

social and economic networks. 

Three teams located in each of the 

three Gulf states. Site visits to all 

study communities. Observation 

focused in Bayou La Batre, Biloxi, 

and Grand Isle. 

Winter 2005-

2006 

Document primary and secondary impacts 

of storm; study of inter- and intragovernmental relations and issues 

concerning post-disaster recovery; 

interview Vietnamese-speaking 

communities in three states; interview 

English-speaking informants with attention 

to economic, social, and political impacts 

and concomitant coping strategies. 

Visits to all study communities 

with concentrated focus in Bayou 

La Batre and Biloxi, and 

Plaquemines and St. Bernard 

Parishes in Louisiana. 

Early Spring 

2006 

Document secondary and tertiary impacts 

of storm; monitor impacts. 

Visits to all study communities; 

Extended stays in Bayou La Batre, 

Biloxi, and Plaquemines Parish 

Mid-Late 

Spring to May 

2006 

Monitor changes associated with start of 

shrimp season; conduct ongoing monitoring 

across region. 

Visits to all study communities 

with the exception of Grand Isle, 

and those in Terrebonne Parish 

where contact was made by phone. 

 

Challenges in the Field. As might be expected given the nature and extent of damage 

resulting from the hurricane, field staff encountered numerous challenges during the various 

stages of data collection. These included the basic difficulty of navigating between communities 

using road maps that had been rendered obsolete by the hurricane and along roads and bridges 

that were blocked by debris or destroyed by the forces of water and wind. Staff also encountered 

communication problems resulting from power outages and downed phone lines, and continually 

dealt with the challenge of maintaining contact with informants who had no working telephone, 

computer, or physical address. 

 

Establishing and maintaining contact with displaced fishery participants was particularly 

challenging. Many fishery participants had lost both homes and vessels and thus were 

preoccupied with recovery. This involved boat salvage and repair efforts, filing of insurance 

claims, contacting various government agencies for loans, temporary assistance, and emergency 

disaster funds, and so on. As fishermen began returning to their homes and harbors, and cell 

towers and power lines were slowly re-established, contacting them became less problematic. 

Some prospective informants remained too preoccupied with recovery to engage in this research, 

and others were reluctant to provide certain kinds of information. For example, some oil and gas 

industry representatives were reluctant to provide information about the effects of the hurricane 

on offshore facilities, and despite assurances of confidentiality and adherence to the rule of three, 

8
and some persons in the fishing industry were reluctant to release information about production, 

employment, and market conditions. This was in fact not atypical of other research conducted in 

the region. Some non-response is anticipated in all social research, and despite the added 

exigencies of hurricane response, we generally encountered broad understanding and acceptance 

of our efforts in the field. 

Of interest from a linguistic perspective, there were notable differences in use of fishing industry 

terminology across the study areas. For example, residents in one community termed facilities 

that offload and pack seafood from vessels as “sheds,” while others referred to these as “offloaders”. Terms for ice facilities, shrimp peelers, and various other infrastructure and processes 

also varied. While such differences in terminology may seem unimportant to outside observers, 

certain terms often connote specific meaning for industry insiders. This required that field staff 

remain attentive to variation in usage within and between sectors, communities, and sub-regions, 

and collaborate on meaning during the analytical phase of the research. However, to improve 

inter-interviewer communication and data collection, IAI also attempted to standardize 

terminology use among field staff, wherever possible (see Appendix D). 

Finally, the highly seasonal nature of the industry affected our ability to capture an absolutely 

accurate accounting of some marine-based services. For example, in some cases our 

enumeration work may have missed boats that were at sea during the field visits, resulting in 

lower counts than might otherwise be typical. Similarly, the number of vessels included in postKatrina counts may reflect the fact that some captains left or arrived in anticipation of the storm, 

resulting in higher or lower counts that might otherwise be normal, as the case may be. 

Problems associated with enumeration of vessels and fishery participants may be solved over 

time through effective monitoring and understanding of long-term trends in the fisheries and 

communities of interest. We have made solid inroads in this regard. 

III. INDUSTRY TRENDS PRECEDING HURRICANE KATRINA 

The commercial and recreational fisheries of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 

constitute important components of each state’s economy. Revenue is generated both directly 

and indirectly through a variety of fisheries and sectors. Table 3 below is provided as one 

indication of the importance of marine fisheries in the region. It depicts total revenue generated 

through commercial landings for each of the Gulf States in 2004. 

Table 3. Gulf of Mexico Commercial Fishing Revenue: 2004 

Revenue by State or Region in Dollars Species Alabama Louisiana Mississippi Florida Gulf Texas 

Oyster 2,120,392 34,893,978 6,073,242 2,883,422 14,954,140

Shrimp 29,196,628 139,176,331 26,524,987 34,032,690 137,673,711

Finfish 5,718,251 100,995,026 11,192,325 110,934,000 13,580,377

Total 37,035,271 275,065,335 43,790,554 147,850,112 166,208,228

<Total: 669,949,500> 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

9
Harvest, processing, and distribution of seafood are critically important to communities affected 

by Hurricane Katrina, and seafood products produced in the region are important to the nation as 

a whole. For instance, in 2004, Louisiana led the nation in production of blue crab with 26 

percent of all landings, the Gulf region led in production of oysters with 65 percent of all 

landings, and the Gulf region led in domestic shrimp production with 83 percent of all landings, 

with most landings occurring in Louisiana (NMFS 2005c: xii-xiii). 

 

In recent years, however, several economic, socio-demographic, and geophysical factors have 

threatened these important fisheries. These include: (1) the continuing downward spiral of 

market values, especially for domestically-landed shrimp, (2) escalating fuel and other 

operational costs, and (3) changing conditions and opportunities resulting from coastal 

development and shoreline erosion in the region. While these factors and trends predate the 

2005 hurricane season, Hurricane Katrina clearly accelerated problematic change in the region, 

and furthered the challenges faced by participants in the region's commercial fishing industry. 

 The Shrimp Market. The price of domestically-caught seafood, most notably shrimp, 

has plummeted in recent years (Maitzels 1992; Marks 2005; Robbins 2003). Decline in value 

has accelerated since 2001, with prices falling markedly lower than at any point since 1950. The 

situation undoubtedly relates to trends in global commodity transactions, and the effects of farmraised shrimp imports entering U.S. markets at the beginning of the 21st century. Indicative of 

the dramatic downward trend, Marks (2005) describes the trajectory of shrimp prices in the Gulf 

of Mexico between 1980 and 2003: 

In 1980, average nominal Gulf of Mexico shrimp prices were $1.63 per pound, and $1.43 

in 2003; however, factoring in CPI adjustments (1982-84=100), the price of shrimp was 

$1.98 in 1980 but only $0.78 in 2003, constituting a 60 percent decline. Shrimpers were 

in effect working for less than half the money they were almost a quarter century earlier. 

The average price of Gulf of Mexico shrimp in 2003 was (in CPI adjusted terms) $0.78, 

while in 1950, the earliest year for which NMFS maintains public records, it was $0.91, a 

decline of 14 percent. The average CPI adjusted shrimp price in 2003 was $0.58, and in 

1950 it was $0.87, a decline of 33 percent. 

While some slight improvement in the situation occurred between 2003 and 2005, this appears 

largely countered by concurrent increases in fuels costs, as depicted in Figure 1 below. 

10
Figure 1. Trends in Average Price of U.S. Diesel Fuel vs. Nominal Price Nominal 

Price (dollars per pound, Penaeid species only, headless, July) for the Northern 

Gulf (Alabama, Louisiana, & Mississippi). 

Source: U.S. Department of Energy 2005; NMFS 2005d. 

Travis and Griffin (2004) report that economic conditions deteriorated dramatically for the entire 

Gulf shrimp fleet toward the end of 2001, and that the situation related to the combined effects of 

the faltering macroeconomic context post-9/11, increasing fuel prices, problems with abundance 

of shrimp, and surging shrimp imports which depressed domestic prices by as much as 28 

percent. Haby et al. (2003) assert that the primary factor affecting the trawl fleet was flooding of 

the domestic market with large farm-raised shrimp, enabled by favorable tariff and exchange rate 

conditions. The domestic share of the shrimp supply had decreased from around 45 percent in 

1980 to around 15 percent in 2001. Imports have truly surged in recent years, with a 17.5 

percent increase reported for 2003. As noted in Table 4 below, many countries are now 

providing shrimp to domestic markets. 
 Table 4. Shrimp Imports, by Major Countries of Origin, 2003 and 2004 

Country 2003 Volume 

(thousand pounds)

2004 Volume 

(thousand pounds)

Percent of Total 

Imports in 2004 

Thailand 293,697 291,318 25 

China 178,597 145,451 13 

Indonesia 47,758 103,541 9 

India 100,241 90,397 8 

Vietnam 126,496 81,788 7 

Ecuador 75,020 82,692 7 

Mexico 56,204 63,909 6 

Total (all countries) 1,112,207 1,141,138 100 

 Source: NMFS 2005c 

Considered in terms of tonnage, shrimp imported to the United States increased steadily and 

dramatically between 1995 and 2004 (see Figure 2 below). 

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Imported Shrimp Trends (metric tons)

 Figure 2: Shrimp Import Trends in the United States: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005d. 

12
As foreign-caught shrimp sales continued to rise, increasing by 50 percent from 345,000 tons to 

517,000 between 2000 and 2004, the total value of that shrimp actually declined by $100 million 

dollars, from $3.8 billion to $3.7 billion. As Marks points out, the per pound price of imported 

shrimp declined by 35 percent from $5.50 to $3.57 over this same period (2005). 

 Fuel Costs. The price of diesel fuel has increased over the last several decades as the 

commodity has shifted from a petroleum by-product to an important consumer good. Unlike the 

agriculture industry, which was able to diversify its energy inputs, the fishing industry continues 

to rely upon diesel fuel and therefore its remaining participants have had to adapt to associated 

increases in cost. 

While the price of gasoline increased steadily during the latter half of the 20th century, diesel fuel 

prices accelerated rapidly between 1950 and 1970, and steadily between 1970 and 2005. 

According to long-term fishery participants working in the study region, the price of diesel fuel 

increased significantly in the Gulf of Mexico during the period 1955 to 1975, with prices rising 

from 3 cents to 53 cents per gallon over the period. According to the U.S. Department of Energy 

(USDOE 2005), the nationwide average price for marine diesel fuel increased by 34 percent 

between 1995 and 2000, from $1.11 to $1.49 per gallon. Following a brief drop in average 

prices in 2002 (to $1.32 a gallon), prices rebounded to $1.81 per gallon by 2004. 

 Coastal Development. The conversion of coastal space for development of homes, 

condominiums, and large casinos has increasingly displaced low-income fishery participants and 

waterfront fishing businesses. Diminished space at the waterfront is an important issue for 

commercial fishing interests across the region. Given that extensive coastal areas are used by the 

oil and natural gas industry in Louisiana, availability of high ground for fishing-related 

infrastructure and services is further limited in that state. The situation has led to escalation of 

the value of developable coastal properties across the region. In many cases, buyers build 

expensive homes, driving tax rates and the value of adjacent lands even higher. In Louisiana, 

this has historically occurred in the outlying New Orleans area as wealthy urbanites sought 

second homes along the coast. The trend is now occurring elsewhere, however, and currently 

there are four primary regions in Southeast Louisiana where coastal gentrification is taking 

place: South Plaquemines Parish (Venice); South Lafourche Parish (Port Fourchon); South 

Jefferson Parish (Grand Isle); and South Terrebonne Parish (Cocodrie). 

Gentrification has also been occurring in Alabama’s coastal Baldwin County. Condominium 

developments have been steadily increasing since 1995, primarily in the southeastern coastal 

communities of Orange Beach, Gulf Shores, and Bon Secour. Historically, this region has 

hosted a large charter fishing fleet. Charter guides initially benefited from the influx of new 

residents and second homeowners settling along the coast, but are ultimately being priced out of 

the area as developers purchase existing marinas and dock space and replace them with luxury 

housing. 

 Coastal Erosion. While coastal erosion has been occurring in each of the Gulf Coast 

states discussed in this report, it is a particularly pressing concern in Louisiana where the rate of 

erosion is unprecedented. Louisiana has lost approximately 19,000 square miles of coastal 

terrain since the 1930s. Coastal erosion in Louisiana accounts for the loss of 25 to 40 square 

13
miles of land each year, and 80 percent of total coastal wetland erosion in the United States 

(Louisiana Coast 1993). Many argue that rapid erosion and associated saltwater intrusion is 

stressing various fisheries in the region. 

Stakeholders articulate concerns with varying degrees of justification about many aspects of life 

along the Louisiana coast: commercial fishing and harvesting of furbearers and alligators; 

ecotourism and recreational hunting and fishing; endangered species; water quality; navigation 

corridors and port facilities; flooding and hurricane storm surges; and traditional ties to land and 

sea. According to Louisiana Vision 20/20 (2003), the total public use value of coastal lands and 

activities is estimated to exceed $37 billion by 2050. 

Erosion has also been altering the Mississippi coastline. Even before Katrina, Hurricanes 

Camille (1969) and George (1998) accelerated the retreat of lands along the Mississippi 

shoreline (Meyer-Arendt 1991; Schmid 1999; Schmid and Yassin 1999). 

IV. DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW

The nature and extent of demographic changes following the 2005 hurricane season are 

still being assessed by agencies throughout the region. Storm-related out-migration was 

dramatic in several parishes and counties, and in the case of St. Bernard Parish in Louisiana, it 

was extreme. In other less severely impacted counties, such as Mobile and Baldwin Counties in 

Alabama, demographic change was not as remarkable and not clearly attributable to the effects 

of the hurricanes. 

The U.S. Census Bureau released its “Special Population Estimates for Impacted Counties in the 

Gulf Coast Area” on January 1, 2006. While we rely, for the most part, on the accuracy of these 

Census estimates for the purpose of the present demographic impact overview, there are a 

number of important caveats to their use. First, and most importantly, the Census estimates 

could not assess the “nature” of residency reported. That is, while tens of thousands of 

individuals evacuated the Gulf Coast before and following the hurricane, tens of thousands more 

have subsequently been drawn into the area in search of the now plentiful employment and 

business opportunities associated with reconstruction and relief efforts. Many of the new 

“inhabitants” of New Orleans, and coastal Mississippi, for example, are temporary residents 

seeking employment, and a great many are of foreign nationality. We need to keep these two 

countervailing effects clearly in mind, particularly as impacts are monitored over time. 

For purposes of clarity (and consistency) this overview reports on the basis of parishes or 

counties. In effect, each of the different parishes experienced the hurricane as a consequence of 

its geophysical setting (e.g., coastal, interior, insular, peninsular, riverside, or lakeside) in 

relation to the hurricane forces (e.g., overtopping or undermining of river, lake, or tidal levee 

protections; coastal, insular, or peninsular inundations; wind and rain; tornadoes) affecting that 

particular geography. This is of particular importance from the perspective of understanding the 

reports and data that have been collected and reported since the hurricane. For example, Orleans 

Parish (sometimes misidentified as “New Orleans Parish”), is geographically constrained, very 

14
heavily populated, and contains the areas hardest hit by the post-hurricane flooding. In 

comparison, St. Bernard Parish, which extends from the urban outskirts of the City of New 

Orleans to well out into the Gulf, received a direct and massive blow from storm surge, a 10-20 

foot overflow in some areas, and residual flooding in the wake of Katrina. Plaquemines Parish 

extends from the outskirts of New Orleans out along the Mississippi River to its terminus in the 

Gulf. The entire parish suffered a complete overflow of between 10 and 20 feet, destroying 

virtually every home, building, port and docking facility. Lafourche and Terrebonne Parishes 

experienced the direct storm surge impacts, flooding, and associated property, livestock, and 

infrastructure destruction over a broad, but relatively sparsely populated, area. 

 

The third, and perhaps most important variable, concerns the social and economic characteristics 

of the affected areas. Simply stated, the social and economic baseline conditions of affected 

coastal areas were not equal. These social, economic, and demographic differences were well 

reflected in previous censuses, in community descriptions compiled just prior to the hurricane 

(IAI 2005a; IAI 2005b; IAI 2005c), and in many published reports. From the perspective of 

understanding the distribution and relative severity of the resulting human consequences of 

Hurricane Katrina, we must first identify the specific nature of the impacting agent (e.g., tornado, 

wind, storm surge, flooding), the precise geographic location of those effects, and, finally, the 

specific social vulnerabilities at that location. 

While this report is not intended to quantify, or analyze in depth, the social vulnerabilities from 

which the human impacts of Hurricane Katrina arose, the following preliminary discussion and 

demographic analyses are needed in order to understand the general characteristics of Hurricane 

Katrina’s impacts and their distribution. 

General Characteristics. First, the physical consequences of Hurricane Katrina fell 

primarily on the Louisiana parishes of St. Bernard, Jefferson, Plaquemines, Lafourche, 

Terrebonne, St. Tammany, and Orleans (the latter two of which do not contain primarily- or 

secondarily-involved fishing communities and therefore are not a focus of this analysis). In 

Mississippi, the counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson bore the brunt of the hurricane 

storm surge, flooding, and wind damage. Virtually all of the damage sustained from storm surge 

in Alabama centered on Mobile and Baldwin Counties. 

 Louisiana Synopsis. As reported in the U.S. Special Census, Orleans Parish lost an 

estimated 278,833 residents as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina, from 437,186 residents in 

June of 2005 to 158,353 residents in January 2006, a loss of nearly 64 percent. The loss of 

278,833 residents represents a crushing impact on the City of New Orleans, the core community 

of Orleans Parish. In terms of relative severity, however, it was St. Bernard Parish that 

experienced the greatest relative demographic impact of the hurricane, losing nearly 95 percent 

of its population, or a total of 61,215 residents out of a total population of 64,576. Plaquemines 

Parish is reported to have lost 29 percent of its total permanent population, from 28,282 in July, 

2005 to 20,164 in January 2006 (our field experience, including several visits since January, 

however, lead us to question this particular enumeration). Jefferson Parish experienced an 8 

percent loss in population, from 448,578 to 411,305 residents in January 2006 – representing an 

absolute population loss of 37,273. Terrebonne Parish’s population increased by 1 percent 

(Table 5). 

15
Table 5. Resident Populations in Study Parishes, Pre- and Post-Katrina: Louisiana 

Parish Time 1 

2004 

Time 2 

July 2005 

Time 3 

Dec. 2005 

% Change 

between Time 2 

and Time 3 

Jefferson 448,843 448,578 411,305 (8.3%) 

Lafourche 90,319 90,543 91,153 0.6% 

Plaquemines 28,258 28,282 20,164 (28.7%) 

St. Bernard 64,848 64,576 3,361 (94.8%) 

Terrebonne 105,041 106,078 107,291 1.1% 

 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2006. 

 Mississippi Synopsis: A similar pattern of population changes occurs in Mississippi. 

The three principally impacted Mississippi counties are Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson. 

Hurricane Katrina, when it first struck the Gulf Coast mainland, struck with full fury in Hancock 

County. Over the period July 2005-January 2006, Hancock County lost 24 percent of its 

population – from 46,240 to 35,129 (a loss of 11,111 residents). Harrison County, however, lost 

30,713 residents, a far larger number than Hancock County, but representing only 16 percent of 

its total population (declining from 186,530 to 155,817 during the 6-month period). Jackson 

County lost 7,938 residents, or about 6 percent of its population, from 134,249 in 2005 to 

126,311 over the same period of time (Table 6). 

Table 6. Resident Populations in Study Counties, Pre- and Post-Katrina: Mississippi 

County Time 1 

2004 

Time 2 

July 2005 

Time 3 

Dec. 2005 

% Change 

between Time 2 

and Time 3 

Hancock 45,428 46,240 35,129 (24.0%) 

Harrison 185,178 186,530 155,817 (16.4%) 

Jackson 133,020 134,249 126,311 (5.9%) 

 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2006. 

 Alabama Synopsis: While Mobile County was among the largest affected regions in 

Alabama, its principal population centers were mostly protected from storm surge (because of 

direction) and flooding (because of intervening habitat). Out of a total population estimated at 

393,585 in July 2005, an estimated 391,251 were present in January 2006 representing a total 

loss of 2,334 (a combination of both out-migration plus in-migration minus estimated mortality). 

Despite direct flooding in Bayou La Batre, Bayou Coden, and the western halves of Dauphin 

Island and Gulf Shores, the coastal counties of Alabama did not register significant loss. 

Certainly, the homes that were occupied in Bayou La Batre prior to the hurricane do not appear 

to be registered in this census. A number of variables would have an affect, including land 

allocation within the county. Because most houses could not have been fully reconstructed nor 

reoccupied by January 2006, it is our belief that the rudimentary counts may not have captured 

16
occupation, employment, and resulting immigration. Perhaps a similar explanation could hold 

for the areas of Dauphin Island and Gulf Shores where the highly seasonal population was 

already at minimum levels when the hurricane struck, and for the most part, have yet to return to 

pre-hurricane season densities (Table 7). 

Table 7. Resident Populations in Study Counties, Pre- and Post-Katrina: Alabama 

County Time 1 

2004 

Time 2 

July 2005 

Time 3 

Dec. 2005 

% Change 

between Time 2 

and Time 3 

Baldwin 154,456 160,354 160,573 0.1% 

Mobile 392,265 393,585 391,251 (0.6%) 

 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2006. 

 Preliminary Assessment of Vulnerability. The full demographic impacts of these 

distributions, however, are not reflected in these summary numbers. This is because those that 

suffered the greatest human losses, in terms of severity of the consequences, were 

disproportionately distributed among the poor, the undereducated, the unemployed, the 

underemployed, and minorities (Logan 2006). The issue of greatest importance in this 

demographic overview analysis is the issue of relative vulnerability. We do not pursue analysis 

of the cause of the distributional skew of the social and economic impacts from Hurricane 

Katrina. 

 

With these understandings in mind, we provide geographic information system (GIS) analyses 

and depictions for the coastal areas of the three affected states of the distribution of affected 

populations by relative indicators of poverty, ethnicity, and by home ownership status. In terms 

of this demographic overview, we concentrated here only on the coastal communities directly 

affected by the storm surge. This analysis thus provides a “baseline” portrait of the impact of 

Hurricanes Katrina on population shifts and changing characteristics in the Gulf Region in the 

immediate months following the storms. 

It is important to note, however, that the U.S. Census Special Assessment, as well as the 

following GIS analysis, is founded on U.S. Census 2000 databases, and therefore neither offers a 

comparison of 2005 data with 2006 data. This is not an unimportant issue, since over a five-year 

period the populations of all of these areas have increased considerably. The point here is that 

the following comparisons systematically understate the numerical significance of the 

differences between pre- and post-Katrina demography Hurricane Katrina. 

 Louisiana. Figure 3 represents the distribution of population in Southeast Louisiana by

density and by poverty levels prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

17
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

59

90

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Pecent in Poverty

20 - 30

10 - 20

0 - 10

60 - 70

50 - 60

70 - 80

40 - 50

80 - 90

90 - 100

30 - 40

Percent in Poverty by Census 2000 Block Group

for Areas in Louisiana Affected by Hurricane Katrina

Very low density block groups not mapped.

18
In the New Orleans metropolitan area, hurricane-induced loss produced a population that is more 

white, affluent, and transitory than the pre-hurricane population. These changes resulted from the 

disproportionate out-migration and slower return of lower-income and black residents from the 

entire metropolitan area after the storms. 

The following figures focus in on several demographic characteristics of New Orleans’ residents 

prior to the storm. Figure 4 maps year 2000 median household income, poverty levels and 

ethnicity, while Figure 5 depicts homeownership characteristics in that year. 

19
Percent below the Poverty L

Percent African American

Post Hurricane Katrina

Inundation and Blockgroups

10 10

10

A B

C D

10

B C

D

20 - 30

30 - 40

> 0 - 10

10 - 20

40 - 50

New Orleans

Census 2000 Blockgroups 70 - 80

80 - 90

50 - 60

60 - 70

90 - 100

Median Household Income A

Thousands of dollars per year

0 2 4 6 8 10 1

Miles

100 - 201

90 - 100

80 - 90

70 - 80

60 - 70

50 - 60

40 - 50

30 - 40

20 - 30

0 - 20

20
Renters: Housing Costs exc

Mortgage Holders: Housing 

of gross income

Post Hurricane Katrina

Inundation and Tracts

10 10

10

A B

C D

10

B C

D

New Orleans

Census 2000 Blockgroups Note that Fannie Mae regards 28% of gros

as the limit of permissible mortgage burde

Percent Renters A

20 - 30

30 - 40

> 0 - 10

10 - 20

40 - 50

70 - 80

80 - 90

50 - 60

60 - 70

90 - 100 0 2 4 6 8 10 1

Miles

21
Mississippi. In contrast, counties along the Mississippi coast lost a sizeable share of 

their white residents and homeowners after the hurricane, while other Gulf Coast metro areas, 

especially those that gained residents, experienced relatively minor overall shifting in their 

demographic profiles. Figure 6a maps poverty levels and median household income of coastal 

Mississippi residents prior to the storm, as well as estimated storm surge and flooding. Figure 6b 

shows population density and the percent of African American residents in the inundation areas 

of coastal Mississippi by Census 2000 block groups. Figure 7 details by block group the percent 

of renters and mortgage holders whose housing costs exceeded 40 percent of their gross income 

in 2000 in Hurricane Katrina affected areas of coastal Mississippi. 

 

22
Statewide

Population Density

10

10

10

49

Gulfport

Biloxi

Jackson

and Hurricane Katrina

Coastal Mississippi

0 3 6 9 12 15 1.5

Miles

0 3 6 15 9 12

Miles

Note: This graphic has a resolution of

300 dpi, allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Hurricane Katrina

Estimated Storm Surge and Flooding

Percent in Poverty

Missis

49

49

Bay St Louis

Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay St Louis

Median Income

Census 2000 Block Groups

Local Roads and Arterials

Interstate Highway

Low density blockgroups not mapped

for sake of clarity.

Estimated storm surge

Estimated post storm flooding

Median Income

Percent in Poverty

100-110,000

80-100,000

40-60,000

20-40,000

to 20,000 60-80,000

20 - 30

to 10

10 - 20

30 - 40

40 - 50

50 - 60

60 - 70

23
Statewide

Population Density

10

10

10

49

Gulfport

Biloxi

Jackson

and Hurricane Katrina

Coastal Mississippi

0 3 6 9 12 15 1.5

Miles

0 3 6 15 9 12

Miles

Note: This graphic has a resolution of

300 dpi, allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Hurricane Katrina

Estimated Storm Surge and Flooding

Population Density

Census 2000 Block Groups

Missis

49

49

Bay St Louis

Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay St Louis

Percent African American

Local Roads and Arterials

Interstate Highway

Estimated storm surge

Estimated post storm flooding

Low density blockgroups not mapped

for sake of clarity

20 - 30 70 - 80

50 - 60

60 - 70

to 10

10 - 20

80 - 90

90 - 100

30 - 40

40 - 50

Percent African American

Persons per hectare

Census 2000 Block Groups

20 - 25

10 - 15

15 - 20

5 - 10

> 0 - 1

1 - 5

24
Statewide

Population Density

10

10

49

Gulfport

Biloxi

Jackson

and Hurricane Katrina

Coastal Mississippi

Note: This graphic has a resolution of

300 dpi, allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Local Roads and Arterials

Interstate Highway

Missis

49

Bay St Louis

Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay St Louis

Census 2000 Block Groups

Percent of mortgage holders whose cost

of housing exceeds 40% of gross income.

Note that Fannie Mae regards 28% of

gross income as the limit of permissible

mortgage burden.

Percent of renters whose cost of

housing exceeds 40% of gross income.

10

49

Percent of households

who are renters.

Percent Categories

0 3 6 9 12 15 1.5

Miles

Low density blockgroups not mapped

for sake of clarity

20 - 30 70 - 80

50 - 60

60 - 70

to 10

10 - 20

80 - 90

90 - 100

30 - 40

40 - 50

25
Alabama. Finally, in coastal Alabama, demographic change was not as remarkable as in 

the two other affected Gulf States and not clearly attributable to the effects of the hurricanes. 

The following figures depict several demographic characteristics of coastal Alabama residents 

prior to the storm. Figure 8 maps population density and the percentage of residents over the age 

of 65 in the year 2000, while Figure 9 indicates poverty levels, median household income, and 

the percentage of African-American residents prior to Hurricane Katrina. Both images also 

provide estimates of storm surge and post-storm flooding. Figure 10 details by block group the 

percent of renters and mortgage holders whose housing costs exceeded 40 percent of their gross 

income in 2000 in Hurricane Katrina affected areas of coastal Alabama. 

26
0 

Census 2000 Block Group Demographics

Population Density 

Note: This 

a resolutio

allowing th

zoom in .

Low density block groups not mapped.

Dauphin Island

Bayou La Batre

M

D

Bayou La Batre

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

65

10

98

65

10

98

10

98

Estimated Storm Surge

and Flooding

30-40

to 10

10-20

Percent Over Age 64

40-50

50-60

Population Density

Persons per hectare

1 - 5

5 - 10

20 - 30

30 - 40

40 - 50 10 - 20

Mobile

Bay

Mobile

Bay

of the Alabama Coast in Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm

Flooding

27
0 

Percentage Categories

Percent

in Poverty Median Household Income 

No

a r

all

zo

Dauphin Island

Bayou La Batre

P

M

D

Bayou La Batre

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

65

10

98

65

10

98

10

98

First and Third Maps

Blue: Surge

Green: Flooding

Mobile

Bay

Mobile

Bay

Low density block groups not mapped.

Median Income

100-110,000

80-100,000

40-60,000

20-40,000

to 20,000 60-80,000

40-50

to 10

10-20

30-40

50-60

50-60

60-70

70-80

80-90

90-100

Census 2000 Block Group Demographics

of the Alabama Coast in Hurricane Katrina Affected Are

28
0 

Percentage Categories

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Inset Map

Percent

Renters

Renters with housing costs

exceeding 40% gross income

Mo

exc

Note

reso

allow

zoom 

Low density block groups not mapped.

Dauphin Island

Bayou La Batre

M

D

Bayou La Batre

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

65

10

98

65

10

98

10

98

Mobile

Bay

Mobile

Bay

40-50

to 10

10-20

30-40

50-60

50-60

60-70

70-80

80-90

90-10

H

0

ousing Economics by Census 2000 Block Group

The Alabama Coast, Affected by Hurricane Katrina

29
B. Pre-Hurricane Katrina: An Overview of the Commercial and 

Recreational Fishing Industries in Louisiana. 

30
ST TAMMANY

ST CHARLES

LAFOURCHE

JEFFERSON

ST BERNARD

PLAQUEMINES

TERREBONNE

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

ORLEANS

ST JOHN

THE BAPTIST

TANGIOPA

LIVINGSTON

Houma

Dulac

Buras

Venice

Larose

Gretna

Empire Theriot

Lafitte

Cut Off

Chauvin

Westwego

Leeville

Hopedale

Galliano

Cocodrie

Yscloskey

Delacroix

Chalmette

Barataria

Grand Isle

Boothville

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Golden Meadow

Pointe a la Hache

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300 dpi, allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

of Southeast Louisiana

M si s si s pi pi

Lake Pontchartrain

Lake

Salvador

Lake

Maurepas
I. PRIMARY FISHING INDUSTRIES IN LOUISIANA

Louisiana’s commercial and recreational fishing industries constitute key components of the 

national fisheries economy. In 2003, fishing, hunting, and boating had a total state economic 

impact of $7.1 billion and provided 77,690 jobs (Reeves 2005). Of these industries, commercial 

fishing had the greatest economic impact, injecting a total of $2.6 billion into the state's economy 

and accounting for some 30,000 jobs (Louisiana Sea Grant 2005a). In this same year, the 

recreational angling business generated $895 million in retail sales and employed 17,000 persons 

(Louisiana Sea Grant 2005a; Reeves 2005). The charter boat industry in Louisiana is also 

economically important. In 2003, saltwater fishery participants spent a total of $28 million on 

charter fishing trips (Louisiana Sea Grant 2005a).

Shrimp, oyster, crab, menhaden, and finfish are the primary marine fisheries in Louisiana. 

Farmed and wild crawfish, catfish, and alligator are also economically significant. The revenue 

generated by the oyster (Eastern) and shrimp (brown and white) fisheries is the highest among all 

the Gulf Coast states in which oysters and shrimp are commercially harvested. Between 2000 

and 2004, inclusive, commercial landings in Louisiana had an average ex-vessel value of $329 

million (Table 8). 

 

Table 8. Commercial Landings in Louisiana (all species combined), Thousands 

of Pounds (live weights), and Thousands of Current Dollars: 2000-2004 

Year Pounds Value 

2000 1,359,156 $420,975 

2001 1,195,622 $347,247 

2002 1,305,922 $306,726 

2003 1,189,992 $294,352 

2004 1,096,582 $275,065 

<5 Year Average> <1,229,455> <$328,873> 

 Source: NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings Database; 

 2005 data is preliminary. 

Commercial Landings in Louisiana between 1995 and 2004. Between 1995 and 2004, 

Louisiana’s fisheries (all species combined) produced 13 percent of the nation’s seafood harvest, 

on average (Table 9). In 2004, commercial fisheries in Louisiana produced nearly 1.1 billion 

pounds of fish (all species combined), with a value of $275 million (NMFS 2005a). 

32
Table 9. Pounds and Value of all Commercial Landings in the 

United States and Louisiana: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds 

(all species), 

U.S. 

Value 

(in billions), 

U.S. 

Pounds 

(all species), 

Louisiana 

Value 

(in millions), 

Louisiana 

% of Total 

U.S. lbs. 

from LA 

% of 

Total U.S. 

Value 

from LA 

1995 9,912,807,044 $3,826,360,342 1,128,577,118 $315,833,002 11.4% 8.2% 

1996 9,643,821,438 $3,564,587,048 1,136,721,165 $270,800,782 11.8% 7.6% 

1997 9,951,898,930 $3,592,218,307 1,425,886,505 $317,152,354 14.3% 8.8% 

1998 9,332,712,602 $3,221,433,652 1,131,977,817 $311,855,620 12.1% 9.7% 

1999 9,409,192,065 $3,575,730,880 1,524,728,384 $336,963,461 16.2% 9.4% 

2000 9,142,633,213 $3,674,425,002 1,359,156,036 $420,974,997 14.9% 11.4% 

2001 9,511,750,925 $3,243,655,393 1,195,622,124 $347,246,659 12.6% 10.7% 

2002 9,428,867,963 $3,191,297,481 1,305,921,816 $306,726,051 13.8% 9.6% 

2003 9,515,048,681 $3,371,930,855 1,189,991,546 $294,352,001 12.5% 8.7% 

2004 10,084,780,228 $3,816,500,440 1,096,581,770 $275,065,335 11.8% 7.2% 

<10 Year 

Averages> <9,593,228,233> <$3,508,517,784> <1,249,516,428> <$319,697,026> <13.1%> <9.1%> 

Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Top Seafood-producing Ports. Plaquemines, Vermilion, Cameron, Jefferson, 

Terrebonne, and Lafourche have long been the leading seafood-producing parishes in Louisiana. 

Together, these ports account for roughly 83 percent of all seafood produced in the state each 

year. The top producing ports in Louisiana for shrimp are: Venice-Empire, Dulac-Chauvin, 

Grand Isle, Lafitte, Cameron, Delacroix, Delcambre, Intracoastal City, and Morgan CityBerwick. The ports at Venice-Empire and Cameron are also top in oyster production. 

Tables 10 and 11 below rank the top-producing ports in Louisiana in terms of landings and 

value. Each also identifies the ranking of each port in relation to the top performing ports in the 

United States (please note that the terms “value” and “revenue” are used interchangeably 

throughout this report when referencing dollar amounts). 

Historically, Empire-Venice has been a particularly productive port, ranking third in the nation in 

terms of pounds landed in 2004, and sixth in terms of value. 

33
Table 10. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Louisiana Ports 

and Ranking* by U.S. Dollars: 2004 

Port Parish U.S. Rank 

by Value 

Value in 

Millions 

Pounds in 

Millions 

Empire-Venice Plaquemines 6th $60.2 379.0 

Dulac-Chauvin Terrebonne 11th $42.8 40.4 

Golden Meadow-Leeville Lafourche 18th $31.6 26.1 

Cameron Cameron 24th $27.6 243.1 

Delcambre Iberia 36th $20.7 14.5 

Intracoastal City Vermilion 39th $20.3 301.8 

Delacroix-Yscloskey St. Bernard 50th $14.4 12.0 

Grand Isle Jefferson 51st $14.2 12.5 

Lafitte-Barataria Jefferson 59th $10.9 8.8 

Morgan City-Berwick St. Mary 75th $ 6.6 17.8 

 * There are 97 ranked ports in the United States. 

 Source: NMFS 2005b. 

Table 11. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Louisiana Ports 

and Ranking* by Pounds: 2004

Port Parish U.S. Rank 

by Pounds 

Pounds in 

Millions 

Value in 

Millions 

Empire-Venice Plaquemines 3rd 379.0 $60.2 

Intracoastal City Vermilion 5th 301.8 $20.3 

Cameron Cameron 6th 243.1 $27.6 

Dulac-Chauvin Terrebonne 23rd 40.4 $42.8 

Golden Meadow-Leeville Lafourche 35th 26.1 $31.6 

Morgan City-Berwick St. Mary 44th 17.8 $ 6.6 

Delcambre Iberia 50th 14.5 $20.7 

Grand Isle Jefferson 53rd 12.5 $14.2 

Delacroix-Yscloskey St. Bernard 56th 12.0 $14.4 

Lafitte-Barataria Jefferson 62nd 8.8 $10.9 

 * There are 97 ranked ports in the United States. 

 Source: NMFS 2005b. 

34
II. PRIMARY FISHERIES AND PRODUCTION LEVELS IN COASTAL 

 LOUISIANA: 1995 TO 2004 

 Shrimp Production. The commercial shrimping industry in Louisiana has historically 

led the Gulf and the nation in shrimp landings (Figure 12). 

0%

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U.S. Gulf LA

 Figure 12: Shrimp Landings by Pounds and Region: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Over the past decade (1995-2004), shrimp landings in Louisiana have averaged 46 percent of all 

shrimp landings in the Gulf of Mexico. These landings had an average ex-vessel value of $163 

million (heads-on) (see Table 12). 

In 2004, the most recent year for which national data are currently available, a total of 317 

million pounds of shrimp worth $446 million dollars were landed in the U.S. In this same year, 

134 million pounds or 42 percent of these U.S. shrimp were landed in Louisiana, with a value of 

$139 million (heads-on) (NMFS 2005a). Of the five Gulf Coast states, Louisiana ranks first in 

terms of shrimp production (NMFS 2005a). 

35
Table 12. Pounds and Value of Louisiana Shrimp* Harvest: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds Value Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Pounds 

Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Value 

1995 98,367,687 $167,140,630 41.9 35.5 

1996 90,608,480 $128,030,131 40.2 30.6 

1997 93,234,396 $149,894,267 43.8 32.8 

1998 111,995,607 $159,176,385 42.4 32.8 

1999 121,003,740 $171,481,148 50.0 35.8 

2000 145,384,688 $253,032,194 50.4 38.6 

2001 124,812,770 $187,968,710 48.5 37.8 

2002 107,794,921 $141,213,327 46.1 36.6 

2003 125,730,160 $135,152,868 49.0 37.0 

2004 134,290,113 $139,157,862 52.2 37.9 

<10 Year 

Average> <115,325,155> <$163,226,599> <46.4> <35.5> 

*Brown, White, and Other. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

As assessed for recent years, Louisiana’s shrimp fishery peaked in 2000, with 145 million 

pounds of shrimp valued at $253 million dollars (Figure 13). However, ex-vessel prices paid for 

Gulf of Mexico shrimp have been in a state of decline, with average per pound prices falling 

from $2.26 to $1.64 between 1997 and 2002. As a result, gross revenue declined significantly 

from $654 million to $381 million in this region during the period (NMFS 2004). This decline 

relates in part to ongoing increases in seafood imports, especially shrimp, and concomitant 

effects on local, regional, and national seafood market conditions. 

36
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 Figure 13: Louisiana’s Shrimp Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

 Oyster Production. Oyster production contributes significantly to Louisiana’s fisheries 

economy. According to the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), the 

Louisiana industry is the largest in the nation. The majority of Louisiana-harvested oysters are 

processed out of state or sent directly to restaurants. Over the past decade (1995-2004), oyster 

beds in Louisiana have produced an average of 57 percent of all the oysters harvested in the Gulf 

of Mexico. The average annual value of this ten-year harvest was $30 million dollars (Table 13). 

37
Table 13. Oyster Landings for Louisiana by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004

Year Pounds Value Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Pounds 

Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Value 

1995 13,800,076 $25,837,277 62.8 65.9 

1996 12,934,925 $26,675,678 58.0 59.5 

1997 13,221,705 $29,770,615 58.6 62.0 

1998 12,856,173 $30,994,392 65.9 69.4 

1999 12,128,187 $25,776,785 53.8 55.8 

2000 12,702,767 $27,497,878 49.3 51.8 

2001 15,132,631 $31,853,824 59.1 60.9 

2002 13,961,579 $30,318,456 57.9 59.7 

2003 13,606,883 $33,368,831 50.3 54.1 

2004 13,902,704 $34,893,978 55.5 57.3 

<10 Year 

Average> <13,424,763> <$29,698,771> <57.1> <59.6> 

Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Louisiana ranks first both in the Gulf and in the nation in terms of oyster production (NMFS 

2005a). In 2004, a total of 27 million pounds of oysters valued at $72 million dollars were 

landed in the U.S; 93 percent of these oysters came from the Gulf of Mexico, of which over half 

came from Louisiana grounds (see Figure 14). Between 2002 and 2004, 62 percent of 

Louisiana’s oyster harvest came from private leases (270,677 acres); and 38 percent from public 

grounds (33,852 acres). The three-year value of these leases totaled $206,811,000 (private 

grounds = $128,233,428; public grounds = $78,577,572) (LDWF 2005). 

0%

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 Figure 14: Oyster Landings by Region: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

38
With regard to concentration of effort in oyster harvest and leased oyster acres, Plaquemines 

Parish is ranked first, with 3,502 commercial permits and 40,600 acres. Terrebonne is second in 

terms of permits and leased acres, with 92,023 acres and 2,238 permits. St. Bernard, Jefferson, 

and Lafourche rank third, fourth, and fifth, respectively (LDWF 2005). 

Unlike participants in the Louisiana-based shrimp industry, who often report struggling with 

regulations (e.g., open seasons, species, and by-catch) and increasing competition from foreign 

markets, Louisiana oyster harvesters have experienced relatively profitable and stable conditions. 

Ex-vessel landings have remained fairly constant while product value has increased (Figure 15). 

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 Figure 15: Louisiana’s Oyster Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Aquaculture. Louisiana is also home to highly diversified aquaculture industries, and 

these lead the nation in crawfish, oyster, and alligator sales. Tilapia, redfish, ornamental fish, 

fish bait, minnows, and soft-shell crabs are also farmed extensively. Buffalo fish and gar are 

important freshwater fisheries, some component of which is farmed. The Louisiana State 

University Agricultural Center (LSUAC) reported that the total value of all aquaculture 

production in the State of Louisiana equaled $212 million in 2004. This total includes farm 

value plus value-added through processing and marketing (LSUAC 2004a). 

39
Acreage for farm-raised crawfish in Louisiana fluctuates from season to season, as do harvest 

and value (see Figure 16). For example, in 2002, the state had a reported 1,135 farmed and 

1,068 wild crawfish producers, with over 106,650 acres of state land concentrated in Lafourche 

and Terrebonne parishes devoted to production. In that year, nearly 74.5 million pounds of 

crawfish were farmed, with a gross farm value of over $56.5 million. By 2004, there were 1,226 

farmed and 1,481 wild crawfish producers, harvesting 78 million pounds of crawfish on 118,250 

acres of state land. However, despite an increase in the number of landings, gross farm value 

dropped to $46.5 million (LSUAC 2005a). In recent years, diminished production in the 

crawfish processing sector is indicative of fewer channels for marketing small and medium 

crawfish, amidst higher industry demand for large crawfish (LSUAC 2004a). 

Fluctuations in acreage and production of farmed crawfish are partially attributable to the 

success or depression of the previous season’s rice crops. In years when returns are poor, many 

rice farmers will use their land for crawfish farming. 

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 Figure 16: Pounds and Value (in millions) of Louisiana Crawfish (farmed only): 1995-2004. 

 Source: LSUAC 2005a. 

40
The top five crawfish producing parishes in the state are: St. Martin, Acadia, Jefferson Davis, 

Vermilion, and St. Landry. Together, these five parishes produced 67 percent of all farmed 

crawfish in Louisiana in 2004 (LSUAC 2005a). Table 14 below lists the five study parishes and 

identifies the extent of their involvement in crawfish aquaculture. 

Table 14. Estimated Louisiana Crawfish Aquaculture Production by Selected 

Study Parishes: 2004 

Parish State 

Ranking 

by Acres 

(of 10) 

State 

Ranking 

by 

Production

(of 10) 

Crawfish 

Producers

Crawfish 

Acres 

Crawfish 

Pounds 

Crawfish 

Value 

Jefferson 0 0 0 0 0 $0 

Lafourche 8 7 57 6,393 4,539,030 $2,723,418 

Plaquemines 0 0 0 0 0 $0 

St. Bernard 0 0 0 0 0 $0 

Terrebonne 0 0 14 528 369,600 $221,760 

5 Parish Total n/a n/a 71 6,921 4,908,630 $2,945,178 

Percent of 

State Total 

n/a n/a 6 6 7 7 

State Totals n/a n/a 1,226 118,250 69,546,680 $41,728,008 

n/a = not applicable. 

Source: LSUAC 2005a. 

Louisiana is fourth in the nation in terms of channel catfish production. In 2004, 53 producers 

farmed 31.5 million pounds of catfish on 7,525 acres of land, with a gross farm value of $21.4 

million (LSUAC 2004a). Value and production of this product varies cyclically and seasonally. 

Recently, value has decreased due to high volume of imported catfish filets and prolific catfish 

production in neighboring Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas. The continued viability of this 

industry reportedly depends on programs for channeling capital into new acreage (currently 

diminishing), and providing financial assistance to new farmers wishing to purchase or lease 

existing ponds as established catfish farmers retire (LSUAC 2004a). Catfish production in 

Louisiana is most extensive in East Carroll, Franklin, Madison, Morehouse, Richland, Tensas, 

and Washington Parishes, all of which are located in the northeast corner of the state. Residents 

in the five parishes examined in this report are minimally involved in catfish production. 

The value of farmed alligator continues to rise. Farmed alligator had a gross farm value of $14.2 

million in 2002; in 2004, gross farm value was $18.4 million (LSUAC 2004a). Vermilion Parish 

is the top producer of farmed alligator in the state, followed by Terrebonne and Lafourche 

Parishes. In 2004, 298,981 feet of alligator with a gross farm value of $5,082,991 were produced 

in Vermilion Parish. In that year, Terrebonne produced 199,981 feet of farmed alligator with a 

gross farm value of $3,386,273; Lafourche produced 169,696 feet with a gross farm value of 

$2,884,846 (LSUAC 2004c). 

41
III. RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRIES AND 

 PARTICIPANTS IN LOUISIANA 

Recreational and Charter Fisheries. Louisiana ranks in the top ten states in terms of the 

number of registered recreational vessels. In 2004, there were 324,900 registered recreational 

boats in Louisiana (LDWF 2005). Annual revenues from recreational angling and charter boat 

fishing in Louisiana are substantial. In 2003, recreational fishing in Louisiana generated a total 

of $895 million in retail sales, with a total state combined economic effect of $1.6 billion dollars 

(includes multiplier effect). In that year, recreational fishing and associated marine services 

supported 17,000 jobs, and paid out $395 million dollars in salaries and wages. Further, 

recreational fishing generated some $120 million in sales and motor fuel, state, and federal 

income tax revenues (American Sportfishing Association 2004). 

According to the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission (GSMFC 2005), there were an 

estimated 532 charter vessels operating in Louisiana in 2004. In that year, 1.1 million anglers 

took a total of 4.8 million recreational fishing trips in Louisiana (NMFS 2005c). Figure 17 

provides GIS analysis of the charter and support facilities located in Southeast Louisiana prior to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

42
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

59

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in . Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Charter or Support Facility

90

18 Locations

Berwick &

Morgan City

36 Locations

Galliano &

Golden Meadow

Large symbol for clusters too

close to map

Charter and Support Facilities

of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

43
Commercial Fishery Participants. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2004), 

approximately 17,000 or 0.09 percent of the employed civilian population in Louisiana identified 

farming, fishing, and forestry occupations as their primary source of income. This figure is 

largely unchanged from the Census 2000 report (0.08 percent). However, empirical research 

suggests that the actual number of commercial fishery participants in Louisiana may be higher 

than recorded according to Census criteria. Many commercial fishermen work on a part-time 

basis, supplementing their incomes with second or even third jobs, and, therefore, do not claim 

fishing as their primary occupation. 

Preliminary data released in 2004 by NMFS (Southeast Region) indicate a total of 8,433 

commercial fishery participants in the State of Louisiana (1,033 federal permits and 7,400 state 

licenses). Of the federal permits, 757 were for shrimp (NMFS SEFSC 2004). In that same year, 

the LDWF reports a total of 7,679 resident shrimpers (commercial and recreational combined) in 

the State of Louisiana. In 2005, the number of state licensed shrimpers (combined) dropped to 

6,694 (LDWF 2006a). Figure 18 provides GIS analysis of the commercial fishing permit holders 

located in coastal Southeast Louisiana and areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. 

44
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

59

90

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Commercial Fishing Permit Holder

10

New Orleans Area

Commercial Fishing Permit Holders

of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

45
Terrebonne, Jefferson, Lafourche, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes have the highest 

number of resident shrimp license holders in the state; some 66 percent of all state shrimpers 

reside in these parishes (LDWF 2006a). In all, there were 4,935 state-licensed vessels and 4,767 

state-licensed commercial fishermen (all species combined) with addresses in these parishes 

when Hurricane Katrina made landfall (Table 15) (LDWF 2006a). 

Table 15. Commercial Shrimp Licenses in Louisiana by Parish (Top 12): 2005 

Parish Rank by 

Number of 

Licenses 

Number of 

Licenses 

2005 

Percent of 

Statewide 

Total 

Change in # 

between 1989 

and 2005 

% Change 

between 1989 

and 2005 

Terrebonne 1 1,234 18.4 (1,428) -53.6% 

Jefferson 2 1,120 16.7 (1,836) -62.1% 

Lafourche 3 901 13.5 (1,078) -54.5% 

Plaquemines 4 732 10.9 (279) -27.6% 

St. Bernard 5 437 6.5 (698) -61.5% 

St. Mary 6 239 3.6 (476) -66.6% 

St. Tammany 7 235 3.5 (394) -62.6% 

Orleans 8 217 3.2 (535) -71.1% 

Vermilion 9 210 3.1 (393) -65.2% 

Iberia 10 189 2.8 (370) -66.2% 

St. Charles 11 165 2.5 (224) -57.6% 

Cameron 12 133 2.0 (202) -60.3% 

Remaining 

46 Parishes 

Combined 

-- 882 13.3 (913) -49.1% 

Statewide 

(58 Parish) 

Total 

-- 6,694 100.0 (8,826) -53.5% 

Source: LDWF 2006a. 

46
C. Hurricane Katrina: Louisiana State Fisheries Impact

I. GEOGRAPHY OF STORM SURGE AND WINDS ASSOCIATED WITH 

 HURRICANE KATRINA 

Hurricane Katrina, one of the most destructive storms in our nation’s history, made 

landfall along the Central Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005. With rain bands up to 300 miles long, 

an eye 32 miles wide (ten is typical for a storm of this magnitude), and winds extending roughly 

105 miles from its center many Gulf Coast communities experienced extensive damage. In 

Louisiana, the eye passed near Buras and Empire with Category 4 winds. As the pin-wheeling 

storm crossed the Breton and Chandeleur Sounds to the east, it decimated thousands of acres of 

oyster reefs and wetlands.

Figure 19 depicts, at the level of block groups, the pre-Katrina distribution of the year 2000 

population in Southeast Louisiana in relation to the storm surge, inundation, or flooding 

associated with Hurricane Katrina. 

47
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

90

10

59

55

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Population Density by Census 2000 Blockgroup

of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

Persons per Hectare

25 - 50

10 - 25

1 - 10

0.1 - 1

50 - 100

50 - 75

100 - 200

48
Residents of communities in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes experienced severe wind and 

storm surge damage. Officials estimate that the storm surge in Pointe a la Hache was over 14 

feet. Many areas in southeast Louisiana were completely submerged (Figure 20). 

 Figure 20: Venice, Louisiana. 

 Source: IAI Staff, September 2005. 

Grand Isle, located due west of Venice in Jefferson Parish, also was hard-hit, receiving 12 feet of 

storm surge from Barataria Bay to the north, rather than from the ocean to the south. This surge, 

created by the southwest quadrant of Hurricane Katrina pushing water across the shallow bay, 

literally swept away numerous homes in this area. Long-time residents reported that, to their 

knowledge, this was the first time flooding occurred from the bay side. Hurricane Rita, which 

occurred on September 24, 2005, caused even more extensive damage to areas previously 

affected by Katrina. This second powerful storm further complicated already challenging 

recovery efforts (Figure 21). 

 

49
 Figure 21: Lafitte (Jefferson Parish) in the Wake of Wind Damage from Hurricane 

 Katrina and Surge Damage by Hurricane Rita. 

 Source: IAI Staff, September 2005. 

Louisiana has only experienced one storm with stronger sustained winds than Hurricane Katrina 

in recent history—Hurricane Camille (August 1969). This hurricane made landfall in 

Mississippi as a Category 5 storm and caused considerable damage to both Mississippi and 

Louisiana. Hurricane Betsy (1965) is another key point of reference for long-term Gulf Coast 

residents. With gusts up to 160 mph, this hurricane made landfall in southeast Louisiana, 

destroying almost every building in Grand Isle. 

Figures 22 through 27 provide an aerial survey of some of the infrastructure damage that resulted 

from Hurricane Katrina. 

50
Port Sulfur: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Port Sulfur: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

51
Port Sulfur: Post-Katrina

Processing Plant (zoom)

IAI: October, 2005

Port Sulfur: Post-Katrina

Processing Plant (zoom)

IAI: October, 2005

52
53
54
Yscloskey: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Yscloskey: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Storm Surge line Storm Surge line

Natural gas liquid 

extraction plant

Natural gas liquid 

extraction plant

55
1

Jean Lafitte: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Jean Lafitte: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

56
 Preparing for the Storm. In the two days preceding Hurricane Katrina (August 27-28, 

2005), fishermen in Louisiana generally adopted one of two plans for minimizing damage to 

their boats. They either tightly moored their boats at their home docks, or they moved their 

vessels up into the bayous and lock systems. Most generally, Plaquemines Parish fishermen and 

St. Bernard Parish fishermen remained moored at their home ports. Many, in fact, had already 

off-loaded at facilities further west (Grand Isle and Dulac) in anticipation of the storm and had 

returned home in order to secure belongings. While most of the boats moored in the bayous in 

the aftermath of Katrina were from Grand Isle, Bayou Lafourche, and Dulac/Cocodrie, many 

also came from St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes. Others unable to move in time moored at 

the public docks in Port Fourchon and off-loading areas in Port Fourchon and Leeville. Many 

from south Terrebonne Parish relocated their boats to Houma for safekeeping. 

One’s decision to steam inland prior to a storm or remain in one’s home port can be complicated 

by many indeterminate factors. Moving up to the Lafitte/Barataria area potentially means that, 

following a storm, one’s vessel could be trapped inside by fallen bridges, excess debris in the 

water, or newly-created sand bars. Should a fisherman be caught inshore after a storm, he risks 

losing productive work days. Significantly, many fishermen believe good fishing follows stormy 

weather. 

Interviews with fishermen throughout southeast Louisiana reveal four primary reasons for 

returning to one’s home port: (1) limited experience with hurricanes of this magnitude; (2) 

sufficient experience with hurricanes in general to know that they often randomly alter course; 

(3) in the case of Venice/Empire fishermen, lack of an established tradition of moving up-bayou 

prior to major hurricanes; and (4) anticipation of large catches in the days following the storms 

(the “jack-pot”). All individuals interviewed explained that, although they were aware of the 

storm’s magnitude, they did not anticipate the damage it would incur. As the mean age of 

fishermen presently fishing Louisiana waters is about 45 years, most are too young to remember 

much about the hugely destructive Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969). Furthermore, 

the majority of fishery participants of Vietnamese ancestry who settled along the Gulf Coast in 

the late 1970s had never experienced a hurricane of this magnitude. 

On the other hand, Cajun fishermen have grown up listening to stories about Hurricane Betsy 

and Camille. These “danger narratives” may contribute to the boat relocation along the inland 

waterway system, particularly Bayou Lafourche, in Lafourche Parish. This water body is 

protected by the northern lock located south of Larose and the southern lock located just north of 

Leeville. This lock system provides protection against storms; even during Hurricane Katrina, it 

proved ample protection. More than half of the southeast Cajun fleet moored inside this lock 

system and sustained comparatively minimal impacts to their vessels. The remaining boats 

relocated to the Barataria/Lafitte area, which provided substantial protection for the moored 

vessels from Katrina’s winds (Figure 28). 

57
 Figure 28: Golden Meadow Shrimper who had Moored his Vessel in Bayou 

 Lafourche prior to Katrina Resuming Work Immediately after the Storm. 

 Source: IAI Staff, September 2005. 

II. EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON LOUISIANA’S MARINE-BASED 

 INFRASTRUCTURE

 The wind and water damage caused by Hurricane Katrina initially led to closure of the 

state’s commercial fishing industry. Infrastructure associated with commercial and recreational 

fishing, maritime transportation, and the petrochemical industry was particularly hard-hit. All 

along this coastal region of Louisiana, marinas, icehouses, boat launches, docks, piers, seafood 

restaurants, vessels, bait and tackle shops, and processors were either destroyed or rendered 

inoperable. 

Commercial and recreational fishery participants in the hardest hit areas of St. Bernard and 

Plaquemines Parishes have endured extremely difficult challenges as they struggle to recover. In 

Plaquemines Parish, for example, nearly 100 percent of its marine-based infrastructure was 

destroyed. In Venice, alone, nearly 1,000 fishing vessels and a majority of homes were 

obliterated. Much of this parish still lacked electricity, water, phone service, supply centers, and 

medical services as of mid-June, 2006. This absence of infrastructure prevents displaced 

residents from returning; many continue to reside with friends and relatives outside of the area in 

neighboring Belle Chasse, Gretna, Westwego, or Harvey. 

The absence of services has also hindered the recovery of Plaquemines’ seafood industry. Most 

critical has been the lack of ice. Since Katrina, most offloading facilities have had to truck their 

58
ice in from great distances and rely on makeshift strategies to resume even limited operations. A 

main power line installed in April 2006 needed for supplying power to the offloading facilities 

located in the southernmost area of Plaquemines had yet to be hooked up as of May 2006, as the 

demand for electricians in the area exceeds their availability to provide service. 

The recovery of the Plaquemines commercial fishing industry also remains constrained by a lack 

of federal assistance for upgrading its levee system, without which puts the region at high risk 

for serious wind and water damage from future and inevitable storms. While the Bush 

administration has approved more than $3.5 billion for repairing New Orleans’ levee system, it is 

reluctant to provide the additional estimated $1.6 billion to $2.9 billion the Army Corps of 

Engineers says is needed to protect the residents of Plaquemines (Alpert and Powell 2006). 

Officials argue that the combination of damaged levees and loss of barrier islands and wetlands 

from Katrina have left Plaquemines Parish–and nearly 15,000 residents–especially vulnerable to 

flooding from storms that are Category 3 or higher. While only 2 percent of the region’s local 

population resides in Plaquemines, it is a major hub for the seafood, charter, and oil industries. 

Thus, the degree to which these industries can recover strongly hinges upon the commitment the 

current administration will make to fund its recovery (Alpert and Powell 2006). Additionally, 

without adequate flood protection, residents may not be able to get flood insurance, and without 

flood insurance they may not rebuild. 

The infrastructure in St. Bernard Parish was also awaiting repair as of June 2006. Although 

electricity was partially restored in the inland communities of Delacroix and Hopedale between 

March and May 2006, many bayou-side communities were still relying on generators for power, 

and some offloading facilities still lacked water service. As of May 2006, only two of six offloaders in St. Bernard Parish had resumed operations, and one of these off-loaders was relying 

on a generator to make ends meet for the 2006 shrimp season: 

My ice machine could be ready if we had power. Yesterday, we unloaded 6,000 pounds 

[of shrimp], getting mostly 80-100 count, from 30 to 40 people in the last three days. Ice 

costs $15 a block at Amigo Ice. My freezers would be okay if we had power; we need to 

repair the walk-in coolers (Personal Communication, IAI, St. Bernard Parish, May 14, 

2006). 

State officials in the most severely damaged coastal parishes all made the same claims: 

infrastructure damage, debris in the water, fuel costs, lack of marine supplies and services, and 

labor shortages continue to hamper recovery efforts. The diminished processing and coldstorage capacity along the coast has further impeded industry recovery (CNREP 2005). 

Diesel fuel, however, has gradually become more available in Venice where all supply centers 

were destroyed. Since May 2006, shrimpers have been able to purchase some diesel from Stone 

Fuel located at the Coast Guard Station (Personal Communication, IAI, LDWF, May 03, 2006). 

Seafood Processors. The report Fisheries of the United States 2004 identified a total of 

90 seafood processors (14 shrimp) located throughout the State of Louisiana employing 2,273 

workers in 2003 (NMFS 2005c). These processors ranged from comparatively large corporate 

operations, such as the Bumble Bee Cannery in St. Bernard Parish, to small backyard enterprises. 

59
Fisheries of the United States 2004 also identified 114 wholesale seafood plants employing 732 

workers in 2003 (NMFS 2005c). Figure 29 depicts the seafood processors located along the 

southeast coast of Louisiana prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

60
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

59

90

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Seafood Processor

Peelers

Ice Provider

Pr

Ice

Pr

Pr

Ice

Pr

Pr

Ice

Ice

Ice

Ice

10

Pr

Seafood Processors

of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

New Orleans Area

61
Bumble Bee Cannery in Violet (St. Bernard Parish) and Piazza Seafoods in New Orleans 

(Orleans Parish), the two largest seafood processors in coastal Louisiana, were left inoperable by 

Hurricane Katrina. Owners of Bumble Bee—the last processor in the country to can 

domestically-caught shrimp landed in U.S. waters— has permanently closed due to the costs 

associated with rebuilding. A long-time employee explained that the facility had been 

experiencing challenges prior to the hurricane, and that Katrina may simply have sounded the 

death knell (Foster 2005) (Figure 30). 

 Figure 30: Severely Damaged Seafood Processing Equipment in Jefferson Parish. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

Although the total damage to this industry is still under assessment, the number of processors 

that existed in coastal Louisiana prior to the storms provides a baseline for assessing this impact. 

Thirty-one of Louisiana’s 64 parishes are federally recognized as affected by Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita. Eighty-three percent of Louisiana’s seafood processing establishments and all eight of 

its seafood canning factories were located in a hurricane-affected parish (Harrison and Sambidi 

2005). 

Accelerated labor shortages in the seafood industry correlate with facility damage. The 

combined effect of demand and supply pressures on the local labor market is notable. On 

average, processors in the affected parishes have lost between 35 and 40 percent of their labor 

force to the aftermath of Katrina (Table 16). To compensate for this loss, many employers have 

increased their reliance on immigrant labor (IAI, Field Observations, October 2005-May 2006). 

While an increased reliance on immigrant labor is an industry trend that predates Katrina, it is 

one that has become even more prevalent as operators struggle to reduce expenses in light of the 

62
cumulative effects of the storm. Indeed, many functioning processors continue to work at 

reduced capacity due to labor shortages. 

Table 16. Labor Losses among Large-Scale Processing Plants in Affected Louisiana 

Parishes 

Number of 

Processors 

Parish Employees 

as of 

8/28/05 

Employees 

after 

8/29/05 

Operational 

Status as of 

Nov. 2005 

Operational 

Status as of 

May 2006 

8 Terrebonne 385 167 Operating Operating 

2 Jefferson 170 108 Operating Operating 

3 Lafourche, 

Orleans, 

St. Bernard 

250 35 2 inoperable, 

1 operating 

2 operating, 

1 out of 

business 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 & 2006. 

Jefferson Parish experienced a 56 percent labor loss in its seafood retail sector and a 33 percent 

decline in its processing, offloading, and wholesale sectors between 2004 and 2006 (Table 17). 

Two Jefferson Parish communities –Lafitte and Gretna– experienced a 50 percent labor decline 

in their processing and offloading sectors between 2004 and 2006: Lafitte lost 72 employees; 

Gretna lost 20 (IAI, Field Observations, May 2006). Employment in Lafourche and Terrebonne 

Parishes also declined in these sectors, although their losses were primarily in processing, 

offloading, and wholesale rather than in retail. Some of these labor losses are due to Katrina, 

while others are related to general downward trends in the industry. 

Table 17. Employment Loss by Parish in Select Seafood Processing 

and Offloading Facilities*: April 2004 and April 2006 

Community # of 

Facilities 

# of 2004 

Employees 

# of 2006 

Employees 

% Change, 

2004 to 2006 

Jefferson Parish 

Barataria, Grand Isle, Lafitte, 

Gretna, Westwego 

12 360 157 -56% 

Lafourche Parish 

Cut Off, Leeville, Galliano, 

Golden Meadow, Port 

Fourchon 

 9 98 66 -33% 

Terrebonne Parish 

Chauvin, Cocodrie, Dulac, 

Theriot 

19 604 372 -38% 

 * Includes processors, off-loaders, and wholesalers. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2006. 

63
Seafood Dealers. Figure 31 maps the location of seafood retailers and wholesalers in 

southeast Louisiana prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

64
St Tammany Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

59

90

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Seafood Dealer

10

Seafood Retailers and Wholesalers

of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

New Orleans Area

65
About 33 percent of the state’s wholesale and retail seafood dealers were located in parishes 

where the hurricane made landfall (Table 18) (Alford 2005a; LDWF 2005). These parishes 

include the study communities located within Jefferson, lower Lafourche (includes all 

communities south of Cut Off), Plaquemines, and St. Bernard. 

Table 18. Licensed Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers by Parish: 2004 

Parish Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers 

Jefferson 143 

Lower Lafourche 36 

Plaquemines 58 

St. Bernard 51 

Orleans 69 

St Tammany 69 

Total 426 

Percent of State 32.5% 

 Source: LDWF September 7, 2005. 

Employment at seafood retail facilities has also fallen in the wake of Katrina, although its 

incipient decline predates this storm (Table 19). 

Table 19. Employment Loss by Parish in Select Seafood Retail Facilities: 

April 2004 and April 2006 

 

Community # of 

Facilities

# of 2004 

Employees 

# of 2006 

Employees 

% Change, 

2004 to 

2006 

Jefferson Parish 

Barataria, Grand Isle, Lafitte, 

Gretna, Westwego 28 134 90 -33% 

Lafourche Parish 

Cut Off, Leeville, Galliano, 

Golden Meadow, Port Fourchon 10 58 52 -10% 

Terrebonne Parish 

Chauvin, Cocodrie, Dulac, 

Theriot 3 13 13 0% 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2006. 

Off-loading facilities associated with wholesale seafood distributors and processors constitute a 

large portion of Louisiana’s seafood industry infrastructure. At least 50 such facilities served 

participants in each of the five study parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, Lafourche, 

66
and Terrebonne. The majority of these facilities catered to the shrimp industry. Most offloading 

facilities in Louisiana also produce their own ice for their commercial fleet and packing (Figure 

32). 

VENICE/BOOTHVILLE

EMPIRE/BURAS XXX

XXXX

GRAND ISLE

XXX

PORT 

FOURCHON

X

LEEVILLE XXXXX

COCODRIE/CHAUVIN

DULAC

XXX XXXXX

LAFITTE/BARATARIA

XXXXX

9xPeelers (2nd

largest in GOM)

12xPeelers 

(largest in GOM)

WESTWEGO

5xPeelers

6xPeelers

6xPeelers

12xPeelers (total)

7xPeelers (total)

PORT SULPHUR X

POINTE A LA 

HACHE

XXXXX

XXXXXXX

XXXXXX

III

I

I

iiii

I

iiii

iii

 Figure 32: Damage to Fisheries Infrastructure in Southwest Louisiana (X=Off-loading 

 Sheds; I= Ice Plants; O = Processors). (All Infrastructure East of Dotted Line 

 was Significantly Disrupted.) 

 Source: Base map courtesy of Louisiana Map Online; Facility detail courtesy of IAI staff 

 2005. 

Katrina destroyed or incapacitated the majority of ice-plants in Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and 

Jefferson Parishes. In this study, an “ice-plant” refers to those facilities that produce and sell ice 

to fishermen. An off-loading facility may also produce its own ice, but it is usually for in-house 

use only. Prior to Katrina, there were eight ice-plants in Plaquemines Parish: seven small 

facilities in Venice/Boothville and Buras/Empire, producing approximately 30 tons of ice per 

facility per day, and one larger facility in Port Sulphur. In St. Bernard Parish, there was only one 

plant in Yscloskey that produced substantial amounts of ice. Jefferson Parish had five ice plants: 

two in Lafitte and three in Grand Isle. Together, these five plants produced nearly 300 tons of 

ice per day, pre-Katrina. Finally, there was one ice plant in Lafourche Parish in Leeville. In all, 

there were 15 major facilities selling ice to fishermen in these four coastal parishes. 

67
Unfortunately, the storm initially put 12 of these 15 ice plants out of commission, thereby 

incapacitating the commercial and recreational fishing industries in the region. As small- and 

medium-sized boats with little on-vessel cold storage capacity comprise the majority of the 

Louisiana fleet, ice plants and storage sheds are critical to the industry’s success (Table 20). 

Table 20. Pre- and Post-Katrina Status of Select Industry Infrastructure 

in Southeast Louisiana: 2005 

Parish(es) Number 

of 

Processing 

Plants 

Number 

of Ice 

Plants 

Number 

of Offloading 

Sheds 

% of Open 

Facilities 

(combined), 

Dec. 1, 2005 

% of Closed Facilities 

(combined), 

Dec. 1, 2005 

Terrebonne 8 0 5 100 0 

Jefferson, 

Lafourche, 

Plaquemines, 

St. Bernard 

4 15 40 46 

54 

(10 ice plants, 21 

off-loading sheds, 1 

processing plant) 

Total 12 15 45 55 45 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005. 

Although 8 of these 15 ice plants had fully resumed operations by May 2006, they were unable 

to meet the demand for ice which escalated precipitously following the start of the 2006 shrimp 

season (Table 21). As of mid-June 2006, the limited supply of ice continues to curtail the fishing 

efforts of commercial shrimpers who are trying to earn a living (IAI, Field Observations, 2006). 

Since the storm, much local effort has gone into addressing the storm-related destruction of icemaking and ice storage capacity. On August 23, 2006, Shell Oil donated $500,000 to the 

Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Foundation assist with the recovery effort. These monies will 

be used to cover the costs of purchase, delivery and installation of three industrial ice machines. 

Because Chalmette is the regional ice hub of southeast Louisiana, the two of the new machines, 

capable of producing 20 tons of ice per day, will be located in Chalmette, St. Bernard Parish; the 

third will be located in Cameron, Cameron Parish (Ewell 2006). 

68
Table 21. Hurricane Effects on Ice Plant Production of Select Facilities 

in Louisiana: May 2006 

Parish(es) Number of 

Facilities 

Pre-Storm 

Production 

Tons/Day 

Post Storm 

Production 

Tons/Day 

Operational Status, 

May 2006 

Jefferson 6 ~330 ~465 6 operating 

St. Bernard, Lafourche, 

Plaquemines 

5 ~320 ~60 3 operating, 

2 out of business 

Source: IAI Field Observations, 2005 & 2006. 

Two of the facilities in Jefferson Parish invested in new, larger ice production machines after 

Katrina destroyed their old equipment, thereby increasing their post-storm ice production 

capacity. As Jefferson Parish is the last place to stop for ice before heading out to sea, those two 

facilities serve as a strategically important offloading and supply hub for ice-dependent vessels 

that would otherwise have to travel to Barataria Bay to meet their service needs (IAI, Field 

Observations, 2006). 

Marinas. Hurricane Katrina also caused major structural damage to many of the marinas 

in southeast Louisiana. There are approximately 80 recreational marinas in coastal Louisiana, 22 

of which are located in the five study parishes. While there are some large, well-appointed 

marinas that can accommodate 100-plus vessels, most are small “mom and pop” operations with 

limited slips (>50) and amenities. The latter are common in rural areas of the study parishes 

(Louisiana Sea Grant 2006a). Figure 33 depicts the location of the marinas along the southeast 

coast of Louisiana prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

69
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

New Orleans

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

59

90

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in . Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Marina

Small Marina

Small Marinas are those with 50 or fewer slips.

This distinction can only be made for Louisiana.

Marinas of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

70
As of May 2006, 80 recreational marinas in coastal Louisiana are fully operational; 27 are 

partially operational, and 46 remain closed. Of the 21 marinas located in the study parishes, the 

majority (81%) have reopened for business, if only partially. Within these study parishes, three 

marinas in St. Bernard Parish (Yscloskey, St. Bernard) and one in Plaquemines Parish (Empire) 

remain closed, while one in Lafourche Parish (Galliano), one in Jefferson Parish (Grand Isle), 

and one in St. Bernard (Hopedale) are partially operational (Figure 34) (Table 22) (Louisiana 

Sea Grant 2006a). 

 

 Figure 34: Marina in Lafourche Parish. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

 

71
Table 22. Operational Status of Louisiana’s Recreational and Commercial Marinas in the 

Five Study Parishes: May 2006 

Marina Parish Community Status 

Bridge Side Marina & 

Cabins 

Jefferson Grand Isle Open 

Gulf Stream Marina Jefferson Grand Isle Partially operational 

Sand Dollar, Inc., 

Motel & Marina 

Jefferson Grand Isle Open 

Cochiara Marina Jefferson Lafitte Open 

Lafitte C-Way Marina Jefferson Lafitte Open 

Belle Pass Marina Lafourche Golden Meadow Open 

Bobby Lynn's Marina Lafourche Golden Meadow Open 

Kajun Sportsman Lafourche Golden Meadow Open 

Griffin's Marina & Ice Lafourche Galliano Partially operational 

Irvin P. Melancon 

Rec. Boat Launch 

Lafourche Galliano Open 

Cypress Cove Marina Plaquemines Venice Open 

Delta Marina Plaquemines Empire Closed; clean up in 

progress 

Riverside Marina & 

Guide Service 

Plaquemines Buras Open 

Gulf Outlet Marina St. Bernard Chalmette Closed 

Pip's Place Marina St. Bernard St. Bernard Closed 

Blackie Campo’s 

Marina 

St. Bernard Yscloskey Closed 

Breton Sound Marina St. Bernard Hopedale Partially operational 

Boudreaux’s Four 

Point Marina 

Terrebonne Dulac Open 

CoCo Marina Terrebonne Chauvin Open 

Pointe-Aux-Chien 

Marina 

Terrebonne Montegut Open 

T-Irv's Marina Terrebonne Dulac Open 

Source: Louisiana Sea Grant 2006a. 

The Breton Sound Marina in St. Bernard Parish was able to resume partial operations in June 

2006 by securing ice from Houma and dead bait from the north shore. Their utilities have been 

restored and they plan to rebuild. At that same time, nearby Joe’s Landing marina in Lafitte 

experienced a surge in business as it absorbed customers who previously frequented other nowclosed marinas. Blackie Campo’s Marina in Yscloskey, however, may not reopen (Figure 35). 

In business for nearly a century, this marina lost its hoist to the storm and cannot afford to spend 

the $500,000 to replace it and still break even. The owners of Blackie’s are considering 

reopening on a much smaller scale, offering only bait and fuel in the future (Associated Press 

2006a). 

72
 Figure 35. Blackie Campo’s Marina, Yscloskey, October 2005. 

 Source: Photo courtesy of Chuck Rogers, New Orleans resident 

 (http://www.macchuck.com/index.html). 

Figure 36 below details the location of the boat builders and related maintenance and repair 

facilities along the southeast coast of Louisiana. Only one remained out of business as a result of 

Hurricane Katrina as of June 2006. 

73
St Tammany

Tangipahoa

St John the Baptist

St Charles

Lafourche

Jefferson

St Bernard

Plaquemines

Terrebonne

Baton Rouge

0 10 20 5

Miles

10

55

90

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Boat Builders & Brokers,

Maintenance and Repair

Slidell: 28 locations, 9

estimated in flood zone

Mandeville:

18 locations, none

estimated in flood zone

Houma:

43 locations

Berwick & Morgan City:

19 locations

10

Large symbol for clusters too close to map

156 locations in the

New Orleans area

New Orleans Area

Boat Builders, Brokers and Maintenance

of the Southeast Louisiana Coast

and Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

74
Tables 23 through 46 below provide the number and status of marine-related infrastructure and 

services in Louisiana both before and after Hurricane Katrina, through May 2006. It must be 

stressed, however, that total damages to Louisiana’s commercial and recreational fisheries are 

still being assessed. Additionally, currently available damage and/or loss estimates sometimes 

vary or even conflict between reporting agencies due to differences in data collection and 

assessment methods, and the units of analysis included or excluded for measurement. Further, 

the profound and widespread nature of the damage means that many factors confound the 

provision of a definitive loss assessment. Some of these confounding factors or limitations 

include: the difficulty in contacting displaced fishery participants to assess their damages, the 

need to rely on historical data to make projections about long-term economic losses, and the 

uncertain nature of the reconstruction process. The following sections provide and discuss both 

actual and projected damages and losses to various components of Louisiana’s commercial and 

recreational fisheries as a result of Hurricane Katrina, but do not attempt a total or final 

quantification. 

75
Infrastructure Tables 23 through 46 for Louisiana Study Communities in Five Parishes: 

Jefferson, Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and Terrebonne 

Note: Selection of infrastructure/service/vessel items in each table varies by community and is 

based on the presence of the infrastructure/service item in each community at the time of 

original pre-Katrina data collection. 

Also, extreme caution must be taken in the use of visual observation for obtaining vessel counts 

because of the many reasons vessels might or might not be present at the time of observation. 

Therefore, both increases and decreases in the number of vessels observed at any particular 

dock in the months following Hurricane Katrina may correlate with events and circumstances 

unrelated to the effects of the storm. 

JEFFERSON PARISH 

Table 23. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Barataria, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 2 1 1 1 1 rebuilding

Offloading facility 1 0 0 1 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramp 1 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational docks & marinas 1 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments 1 1 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats ~25 ~20 n/a ~20 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~100 ~60 n/a ~40 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

76
Table 24. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Grand Isle, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 1 0 1 1 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish 

house 

2 2 2 2 Blanchard & 

Estay 

Ice houses 2 0 1 1 One is 

operating; one 

is rebuilding 

Fishing pier 1 0 0 0 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 5 0 2 2 -- 

Offloading facilities 2 2 2 2 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 6 0 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments Several 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 7 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 2 0 0 0 -- 

Trucking operations 2 0 2 2 -- 

Charter/party boats ~25 0 n/a ~9 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~240 ~10 n/a ~50 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

Table 25. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Gretna, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post- Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Air fill stations (diving) 1 0 0 0 -- 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 0 1 1 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 6* 3 6 6 *All non-dockside 

Bait & tackle/fishing 

supplies 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood restaurants 8 6 8 8 -- 

Seafood retail markets 9 4 5 5 -- 

Charter/party boats ~20 ~15 n/a ~15 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~16 ~15 n/a ~15 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

77
Table 26. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Lafitte, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post- Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments

Air fill stations (diving) 1 0 0 0 -- 

Boat yards/boat builders 2 2 2 2 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 6 5 5 5 1 

rebuilding 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

2 1 2 2 -- 

Ice houses 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing piers 2 0 2 2 -- 

Marine railways/haul-out 

facilities 

1 0 1 1 -- 

Offloading facilities 6 5 5 5 -- 

Net makers 3 0 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 10 5 8 8 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 1 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

1 0 1 1 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 5 1 5 5 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 1 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 2 0 2 2 -- 

Charter/party boats ~25 ~25 n/a ~25 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~800 ~200 n/a ~60 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

78
Table 27. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Westwego, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments

Air fill stations (diving) 1 1 1 1 -- 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 1 1 1 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

2 2 2 2 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

2 1 2 2 -- 

Net makers 2 2 2 2 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational docks & marinas 1 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 3 3 3 3 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments 1 1 1 1 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 7 7 7 7 -- 

Seafood retail markets 17 17 17 17 -- 

Trucking operations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 2 0 2 2 -- 

Charter/party boats ~30 0 n/a ~10 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~135 ~80 n/a ~80 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

79
LAFOURCHE PARISH 

Table 28. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Cut Off, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post- Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities Several Several Several Several Vessels dock 

along bayou 

Net makers 1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood restaurants 4 4 4 4 -- 

Seafood retail markets 5 3 3 3 -- 

Trucking operations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Charter/party boats Few Few n/a Few -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~30 ~150 n/a ~70 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

80
Table 29. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Galliano, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post- Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Air fill stations (diving) 1 1 1 1 -- 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 1 1 1 -- 

Commercial docking facilities Many Many Many Many Vessels dock all 

along the bayou 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

5 5 5 5 -- 

Fishing associations 

(recreational/commercial) 

3 3 3 3 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

1 0 1 1 -- 

Ice houses 1 1 1 1 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

3 0 3 3 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 6 0 6 6 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 1 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Charter/party boats Few Few n/a Few -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~100 ~100 n/a ~50 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

81
Table 30. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Golden 

Meadow, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 6 5 6 6 -- 

Commercial docking 

facilities 

3 3 3 3 Most vessels dock 

in nearby 

Leeville, and 

along the bayou. 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

3 3 3 3 -- 

Fishing associations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

1 1 0 0 Oyster 

Fishing pier 3 0 3 3 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 3 3 3 3 -- 

Marine railways/haul-out 

facilities 

3 3 3 3 -- 

Offloading facilities 3 1 2 2 -- 

Net makers 1 1 1 1 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries 

office (port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 2 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 3 3 3 3 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

3-4 1 3-4 3-4 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 3 2 3 3 -- 

Seafood retail markets 6 0 5 5 -- 

Trucking operations 2 2 2 2 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 2 0 2 2 -- 

Charter/party boats ~15 ~15 n/a ~15 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~390 ~200 n/a ~100 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

82
Table 31. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Larose, Louisiana 

Pre-and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

3 3 3 3 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 2 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing 

supplies 

2 2 2 2 -- 

Seafood restaurants 3 3 3 3 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 1 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 3 3 3 3 -- 

Charter/party boats ~35 ~70 n/a ~35 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~70 ~90 n/a ~70 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

Table 32. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Leeville, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 6 5 5 5 -- 

Fish processors/peelers 1 1 1 1 -- 

Hotels/Inns/Cabins (dockside) 2 1 1 1 -- 

Marine railways/haul-out 

facilities 

7 7 7 7 -- 

Offloading facilities 6 5 5 5 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 3 3 3 3 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood restaurants 1 0 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 4 4 4 4 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a 0 n/a 0 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~150 ~60 n/a ~120 -- 

 n/a = Not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

83
Table 33. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Port Fourchon, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 1 1 1 1 (Bollinger) 

Commercial docking facilities 2 2 2 2 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

2 2 2 2 -- 

Fisheries research laboratories 1 1 1 1 LUMCON* 

Hotels/Inns/Cabins (dockside) 1 0 1 1 -- 

Offloading facilities 1 1 1 1 Semioperational 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 4 2 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 0 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments 1 0 1 1 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 2 0 2 2 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 0 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Charter/party boats ~4 0 n/a ~4 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~40 0 n/a ~40 -- 

* Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

84
PLAQUEMINES PARISH 

Table 34. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Buras-Empire, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 1* 1* 1* *Now a staging area 

for salvaged boats 

Commercial docking facilities 5 0 3 3 Semi-operational 

Marine supply 2 0 0 0 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish 

house 

2 0 0 0 -- 

Ice houses 6 0 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 7 0 1 1 -- 

Net makers 4 0 0 0 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 0 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

6 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 8 0 1 1 Semi-operational 

Seafood retail markets 2 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood transport 1 0 0 0 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 12 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats 12 0 0 0 -- 

Commercial fishing vessels 450 0 n/a 44 -- 

 n/a = not available 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

85
Table 35. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Pointe a la 

Hache, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 1 0 0 0 -- 

Fisheries research laboratories 1 0 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 1 0 0 0 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 0 0 0 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood restaurants 1 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 0 0 0 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 2 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats 30 0 0 0 -- 

Commercial fishing boats 80 0 30 30 -- 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

Table 36. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Port Sulphur, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

 2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 1 0 1 1 Semi-operational 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

1 0 0 0 -- 

Fishing associations 3 3 3 3 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

4 0 2 2 -- 

Ice houses 1 0 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 1 0 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 3 0 0 0 Private land; paid access 

Recreational docks/marinas 3 0 0 0 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood restaurants 3 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 4 0 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 1 0 0 0 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 2 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats ~10 0 n/a n/a -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~260 0 n/a ~50 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

86
Table 37. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in VeniceBoothville, Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 2 0 2 2 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 5 0 2 2 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

1 0 0 0 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish 

house 

6 0 3 3 -- 

Ice houses 4 0 1 1 Semioperational 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 1 0 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 4 0 3 3 -- 

Net makers 2 0 0 0 -- 

Public boat ramps 7 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 0 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments Several * 0 0 1 *Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 1 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats ~100 0 n/a ~20 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~600 0 n/a ~120 -- 

 n/a = Not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

87
ST. BERNARD PARISH 

Table 38. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Chalmette, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 2 1* 1 1 *Inoperable 

Commercial docking facilities 3 0 1 1 -- 

Fishing associations Several Several Several Several -- 

Fishing Gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

1 0 0 0 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

3 0 1 1 -- 

Ice houses 1 0 1 1 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 1 0 0 0 -- 

Marine railways/haul-out 

facilities 

1 0 1 1 -- 

Offloading facilities 3 0 0 0 -- 

Net makers 2 0 0 0 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational docks & marinas 2 0 0 0 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 5 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

 4+ 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 3 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 7 0 0 0 -- 

Trucking operations 4 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats ~10 0 n/a n/a -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~130 0 n/a n/a -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

88
Table 39. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Delacroix, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 4 0 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 4 0 2* 2* *No electricity 

Public boat ramps 2 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments 2 0 0 0 Per annum 

Charter/party boats n/a 0 n/a 0 -- 

Commercial fishing boats n/a 0 n/a ~30 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

Table 40. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Yscloskey, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 5 0 2 2 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

1 0 0 0 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish 

house 

 5* 0 0 2 *Small shrimp 

off-loaders who 

also wholesale 

Ice houses 1 0 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 6 0 2 2 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood restaurants 1 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a 0 n/a 0 -- 

Commercial fishing boats n/a 0 n/a ~15 Crab boats 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

89
Table 41. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Hopedale, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

 2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 3 0 0 0 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

2 0 0 0 -- 

Fishing associations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Ice houses 1 0 0 0 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 1 0 0 0 R.V. Park 

Offloading facilities 7 0 4 4 Oysters, working 

off slabs; no 

electricity 

Public boat ramps 3 0 1 1 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 3 0 1 1 1 rebuilding 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 3 0 1 1 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

1 0 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats 5 0 0 0 -- 

Commercial boats ~30 0 ~15 ~15 -- 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

90
TERREBONNE PARISH 

Table 42. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Chauvin, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 1 1 1 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 5 5 5 5 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing associations 

(recreational/commercial) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

6 2 5 5 -- 

Fisheries research 

laboratories 

1 1 1 1 LUMCON* 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 2 2 2 2 -- 

Offloading facilities 10 10 10 10 -- 

Net makers 1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 2 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 3 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 3 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

2 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 3 0 2 2 -- 

Seafood retail markets 2 0 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 5 5 5 5 With docks 

Charter/party boats ~15 ~15 n/a ~15 -- 

Commercial fishing boats 100+ 100+ n/a 100+ -- 

 * Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

91
Table 43. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Cocodrie, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 3 2 3 3 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

1 0 1 1 -- 

Fisheries research laboratories 1 1 1 1 LUMCON* 

Ice houses 1 0 1 1 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 3 1 3 3 -- 

Offloading facilities 2 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 1 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 1 2 2 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournament 

Several 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 3 0 3 3 -- 

Charter/party boats Few Few Few Few -- 

Commercial fishing boats Few Few Few Few -- 

 * Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

92
Table 44. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Dulac, 

Louisiana, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 3 3 3 3 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 9 7 8 8 Off-loaders 

Fishing gear, electronics, welding, & 

other repair 

2 2 2 2 -- 

Fishing associations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish house 5 5 5 5 -- 

Ice houses 4 4 3 3 -- 

Marine railways/haul-out facilities 2 2 2 2 -- 

Offloading facilities 9 7 8 8 -- 

Public boat ramps 3 2 3 3 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 1 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational fishing tournaments Several 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 2 2 2 2 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 1 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 6 4 5 5 -- 

Charter/party boats ~15 ~15 n/a ~15 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~100 ~100 n/a ~100 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

93
Table 45. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Houma, Louisiana 

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Air fill stations (diving) 2 1 2 2 -- 

Boat yards/boat builders Several Several Several Several 1 large; all oil 

support 

Commercial docking facilities 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

5 5 5 5 -- 

Fishing associations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

6 6 6 6 -- 

Fisheries research laboratories 1 1 1 1 LUMCON* 

Marine railways/haul-out 

facilities 

Several 

 

Several Several Several 6 motor 

freight carriers

Offloading facilities 1 0 1 1 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 LDWF 

Public boat ramps 2 2 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 2 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 4 4 4 4 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

18-24 0 0 0 Per annum 

Seafood restaurants 30 30 30 30 -- 

Seafood retail markets 20 15 20 20 -- 

Trucking operations Several Several Several Several -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 5 4 5 5 -- 

Charter/party boats 45 10 ~12 ~12 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~250 ~50 ~50 ~50 -- 

*Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium 

Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

94
Table 46. Presence of Select Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Theriot, LA 

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Air fill stations (diving) 1 1 1 1 -- 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 1 1 1 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 4 4 4 4 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, other repair 

3 3 3 3 -- 

Fishing associations 

(recreational/commercial) 

Several Several Several Several -- 

Fish processors, Wholesale 

fish house 

4 4 4 4 -- 

Ice houses 3 3 3 3 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 50 0 50 50 Private camp 

units 

Marine railways/haul-out 

facilities 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Offloading facilities 4 4 4 4 -- 

Net makers 2 0 2 2 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 2 2 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 3 1 3 3 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

1 0 1 1 1 per month 

in summer 

Sea Grant Extension office 1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood restaurants 2 1 2 2 -- 

Seafood retail markets 1 1 1 1 -- 

Trucking operations 3 3 3 3 -- 

Charter/party boats ~5 ~5 n/a ~5 -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~30 ~30 n/a ~30 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 and 2006. 

Vessel Damage. As most official counts only include lost or destroyed boats, the total 

number of commercial fishing vessels damaged by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is still not 

definitive. Yet, it is safe to say that thousands of commercial and recreational fishery 

participants and their vessels have been significantly and detrimentally affected. The following 

figures (37-48) show the observed pattern of vessel sinking and stranding following the storm. 

95
1 Slidell

2 Reserve

3 New Orleans

(West)

4 New Orleans

5 Belle Chase

6 Delacroix

7 Port Sulpher

8 Empire & Orchard

10 Galliano

11 Grand Isle

9 Houma

0 10 25

Mi

10

55

59

90

Note: These graphic are high resolution

(300 dpi) and intended for zoom in .

10

Wrecked and Sunken Vessels in Louisiana

from Post Hurricane Katrina Surveys

Index Map Source: NOAA, 2006 (courtesy, Doug Helton)

96
20 boats

Mississippi

01234

Miles

1: Slidell

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

10

12

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Slidell

Deer

Island

Lacombie

North Shore

McClane

City

Bonfuca

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

Tug or Towing Vessel

St Tammany Parish

Figure 38

97
2: Reserve

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel 10

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

01234

Miles

Reserve

Edgard

St James

Gramercy

Oubre

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

St John the Baptist Parish

Figure 39

98
47 Barges

10 Barges

10

01234

Miles

Metarie

310

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

3: New Orleans (West)

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Platform

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Tug or Towing Vessel

River Ridge

Plaza

La Place

Destrehan

Hahnville

Orleans Parish

Figure 40

99
40 Barges

20 Barges

2 Tugs

35 Boats

10

New Orleans

01234

Miles

4: New Orleans

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel

Platform

Jack-up Rig

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Arabi

10

610

East Gentilly

McDonoghville

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

Orleans Parish

Figure 41

100
01234

Miles

5: Belle Chase

Belle

Chasse

Alliance

Jean

Lafitte

Estelle

Note: These graphics are high resolution

and intended for zoom-in.

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Plaquemines

Parish

Figure 42

101
01234

Miles

6: Delacroix

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Delacroix

Toca Shell Beach

Wood Lake

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

St Bernard Parish

Figure 43

102
11 boats

27 Boats

23 Barges

67 Barges

15 Barges

01234

Miles

7: Port Sulphur

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel

Platform

Jack-up Rig

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Port Sulphur

Happy Jack

Davant

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

Plaquemines

Parish

Figure 44

103
408 Boats

8 Barges

1 Tug1 Jack-up Rig 19 Boats

2 Barges

156 Boats

19 Barges

2 Tugs2 Jack-up Rigs

17 Boats21 Barges

3 Jack-up Rigs1 Platform

136 Boats

14 Barges

11 Boats

01234

Miles

8: Empire & Orchard

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel

Platform

Jack-up Rig

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Empire

Surprise

Buras

Boothville

Orchard

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

See Map 8A

See Map 8B

Plaquemines

Parish

Figure 45

104
0 100 200 300 400

Yards

8A: Empire

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel

Platform

Jack-up Rig

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: These graphics are high resolutionand intended for zoom-in.

Empire

Plaquemines

Parish

Figure 46

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Note: These graphics are high resolution

and intended for zoom-in.

8B: Orchard

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Tug or Towing Vessel

Platform

Jack-up Rig

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Orchard

Plaquemines

Parish

Figure 47

106
01234

Miles

9: Houma

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: These graphics are high resolution

and intended for zoom-in.

Terrebonne

Parish

Theriot

Chauvin

Dulac

Houma

Figure 48

107
01234

Miles

10: Galliano

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: These graphics are high resolution

and intended for zoom-in.

Cut Off

Golden Meadow

Leeville

Galliano

Terrebonne

Parish

Figure 49

108
Grand Isle

01234

Miles

11: Grand Isle

Commercial and private boats

of all types.

Barge

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: These graphics are high resolution

and intended for zoom-in.

Terrebonne

Parish

Figure 50

109
As indicated by the observed pattern of damage, vessels moored in St. Bernard and Plaquemines 

Parishes were more impacted by Hurricane Katrina than were those moored in parishes to the 

west of the passage of the storm’s center. At the end of October, 2005, U.S. Coast Guard Wreck 

and Salvage Group representatives estimated that about 200 commercial boats from Empire and 

another 100 from Venice, both in Plaquemines Parish, were in need of salvage. In this same 

month, officials estimated that between 200 and 300 commercial vessels needed to be removed 

from the water in St. Bernard Parish, and that another couple of hundred required salvaging in 

the Grand Isle area in Lafourche Parish, and in the Slidell and Mandeville areas north and east of 

New Orleans. Figure 49 depicts the storm-related damage to a fisherman’s vessel in Venice, 

Louisiana. 

 Figure 49: Venice Fisherman Showing a Photo of Damage to Local Venice Vessels. 

 Source: IAI Staff, September 2005. 

LDWF officials estimate that an additional 35,000 recreational fishing vessels throughout 

Louisiana were lost or destroyed by the hurricanes, with some 3,000 in lower Plaquemines Parish 

alone (Brown 2005; Canulette 2006). This estimate does not include boats that sustained 

significant damage but were not total losses (Canulette 2006). However, the Coast Guard’s job 

description does not include the removal of land-locked or wrecked recreational boats, nor does 

the agency have sufficient funding to do so. Likely this task will fall to private salvage 

companies or to whatever arrangements boat owners can make on their own. 

In Venice, salvaged commercial boats are being relocated to a parish-owned boat repair yard; 

but, once repaired there is no way to return the boat to the water. The boatyard lost its launching 

equipment to the storm, and replacements are both expensive and difficult to come by; used 

“Travelifts” from recent years sell for around $100,000, and there are few local dealers who sell 

110
such large machinery. In mid-March 2006, however, the residents of Plaquemines Parish 

received a 60-ton Marine Travelift, used to move fishing boats in and out of the water as a gift 

from the city of Valdez in Alaska. The following agencies coordinated the relocation effort: the 

Louisiana, Washington, and Alaska Sea Grant programs, FEMA, LDWF, the Pacific Coast 

Congress of Harbormasters, the Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board, and the 

Valdez Port Authority. The Alaska Fishing Industry Relief Mission contributed funding toward 

the lift’s transportation (Louisiana Sea Grant 2006b) 

In some cases, vessel salvage complications have impeded the recovery efforts of other fishery 

participants in excess of the vessel owner. For example, as shown below in Figure 50, grounded 

vessels block the staging area of an offloading dock. This otherwise operable facility could have 

resumed operations as early as October 2005 if the boat salvage issue had been resolved. As of 

May 2006, however, this vessel remained in need of salvage (Personal Communication, IAI, 

May 2006). 

 Figure 50. Offloading Dock in St. Bernard Parish with Grounded Vessels 

 Blocking Operations. 

 Source: IAI Staff, November 2005. 

Under the terms of the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (1974, amended 

1988), FEMA has charged the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Army Corps of Engineers 

(ACE) with spearheading the vessel removal project. Working under an $85 million contract, 

the USCG has brought in salvage firms with five heavy-lift, barge-based cranes to lead the 

commercial vessel cleanup (Brown 2005). To qualify for salvage assistance from the USCG or 

ACE, commercial and recreational vessels must be impeding either a commercial waterway or 

levy, or pose an immediate hazard to human life or public health or safety. Vessels that do not 

111
meet these criteria must make other arrangements for salvage. In December 2005, vessels that 

met the federal salvage guidelines were assigned a case number, which was then spray painted 

on the side of the boat. Roughly 788 vessels in Plaquemines and 118 in St. Bernard Parishes 

received case numbers. However, receiving a USCG case number turned out to be no guarantee 

of receiving salvage services, as some disappointed fishermen discovered. Rather, a case 

number indicated only that one’s vessel has been assessed by the USCG and, funds providing, 

may be eligible for salvage (Farrell and Gaude 2006). As of January 3, 2006 the Coast Guard 

had identified 2,266 commercial vessels in Louisiana in need of salvage, of which 725 had 

already been salvaged by the USCG or the owners themselves (Farrell and Gaude 2006). 

The number of bureaucratic agencies and jurisdictions involved in the salvage efforts has also 

complicated the recovery process. For the most part, the USCG spearheaded the salvage of boats 

that are blocking navigable commercial waterways from September 2005 through June 2006. In 

July, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) assumed the lead position in 

the recovery effort (LSU AgCenter, Personal Communication, July 19, 2006). The removal of 

vessels obstructing roads and highways, however, falls to the Department of Transportation 

(DOT) unless they are leaking fuel or pose environmental hazards. In the latter case, DOT needs 

to follow EPA guidelines and/or coordinate efforts with the USCG. Once salvaged, boats are 

relocated to a staging area for further inspection, processing, and/or owner notification. 

Departmental guidelines, which can vary widely between agencies, dictate the specific protocols 

for these salvage operations and generate copious paperwork, including required forms and 

documents. For fishery participants lacking English or literacy skills, such paperwork is 

daunting. 

Many boats in both Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes were still awaiting salvage as of May 

2006. In St. Bernard, the USCG cannot find enough state-owned staging areas to which to 

relocate these damaged vessels. Negotiations with private entities for rental space were 

underway but progressing slowly (Personal Communication, IAI, May 2006). 

By contrast, boats moored to the west of Plaquemines Parish sustained less extensive damage. 

Based on queries with 50 full-time fishermen in Lafourche, Jefferson, and Terrebonne Parishes, 

it was determined that about two dozen vessels were damaged, and that a total of $250,000 in 

damages was experienced across the group. Only 24 vessels in these areas received USCG case 

numbers, while the majority of the fishermen suffered “minor” or “no damage.” Only one 

reported a loss in income ($500 per day) due to time off for repairs. 

One ramification of all this vessel damage and loss is the temporary or perhaps permanent egress 

of fishermen from the industry. One indication of this trend is the change in the number of 

licensed resident commercial fishing vessels between 2004 and 2006. Table 47 below illustrates 

the changes in vessel licenses between March 2004 and March 2006 for the communities under 

consideration in this report. In terms of percentages, St. Bernard Parish has experienced the 

greatest decline in licensed resident commercial fishing vessels. During that period licensed 

vessels in St. Bernard Parish declined by 44 percent or 29 boats. However, in terms of sheer 

volume, Plaquemines Parish experienced a much greater loss, losing 273 or 38 percent of its 

licensed vessels (Table 48). 

112
Table 47. State Licensed Resident Commercial Fishing Vessels by Town and Parish of 

Study Communities, Pre- and Post-Katrina, as of March 1: 2004, 2005, and 2006 

Community 2004 

Licenses 

as of 

March 1 

2005 

Licenses 

as of 

March 1 

2006 

Licenses as 

of March 1 

2004-2005 

Average 

2006 

# Change 

from 

2004-05 

Average 

2006 

% Change 

from 

2004-05 

Average 

Jefferson Parish 

Barataria 96 113 110 105 5 4.8% 

Lafitte 141 152 148 147 1 1.0% 

Grand Isle 56 61 41 59 (18) -30.5% 

Gretna 53 54 46 54 (8) -14.8% 

Westwego 49 51 53 50 3 6.0% 

Parish Total 395 431 398 413 (15) -4.1% 

Lafourche Parish* 

Cut Off 191 172 179 182 (3) -1.6% 

Galliano 97 94 92 96 (4) -4.1% 

Gold. Meadow 109 99 109 102 7 6.8% 

Larose 33 29 30 31 (1) -3.2% 

Parish Total 430 394 410 412 (2) -0.5% 

Plaquemines Parish 

Boothville 85 81 47 83 (36) -43.4% 

Buras 276 267 160 272 (112) -41.1% 

Empire 152 163 128 158 (30) -19.0% 

Pt. a la Hache 16 17 3 17 (14) -82.3% 

Port Sulphur 91 91 48 91 (43) -47.2% 

Venice 93 90 54 92 (38) -41.3% 

Parish Total 713 709 440 711 (271) -38.4% 

St. Bernard Parish* 

Chalmette 67 63 36 65 (29) -55.3% 

Hopedale 1 1 1 1 0 0.0% 

Parish Total 68 64 37 66 (29) -43.9% 

Terrebonne Parish 

Chauvin 226 216 235 221 14 6.3% 

Cocodrie 1 1 1 1 1 0.0% 

Dulac 73 67 83 70 13 18.5% 

Houma 255 264 269 260 9 3.4% 

Theriot 101 107 110 104 4 3.8% 

Parish Total 656 655 698 656 42 6.4% 

*Commercial license data for Leeville and Port Lafourche in Lafourche Parish, and Yscloskey 

 and Delacroix in St. Bernard Parish are not available at this time. 

 Source: LDWF, Personal Communication, May 2006. 

113
Table 48. State Licensed Resident Commercial Fishing Vessels by Parish-wide Total, 

Pre- and Post-Katrina, as of March 1: 2004, 2005, and 2006 

Parish 2004 

Licenses 

as of 

March 1 

2005 

Licenses

 as of 

March 1

2006 

Licenses 

as of 

March 1

2004- 

2005 

Average

2006 

# Change 

from 2004-05 

Average 

2006 

% Change 

from 

2004-05 

Average 

Jefferson 395 431 398 413 (15) -4.1% 

Lafourche* 430 394 410 412 (2) -0.5% 

Plaquemines 713 709 440 711 (271) -38.4% 

St. Bernard* 68 64 37 66 (29) -43.9% 

Terrebonne 656 655 698 656 42 6.4% 

Total 2,262 2,253 1,983 2,258 (275) -12.2% 

 *Commercial license data for Leeville and Port Lafourche in Lafourche Parish, and Yscloskey 

 and Delacroix in St. Bernard Parish are not available at this time. 

 Source: LDWF, Personal Communication, 2006. 

III. ESTIMATED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON 

 LOUISIANA’S FISHERIES AND RELATED INDUSTRIES

 

 Commercial Landings. As indicated in Figure 51 below, seafood landings in Southeast 

Louisiana shifted to the west in the months following the storm. Fishery participants who 

harvested out of Barataria Bay and Breton Sound before Katrina were traveling to Lafitte in 

north Jefferson Parish and to Leeville in Lafourche Parish, or to Cocodrie or Dulac in 

Terrebonne Parish in order to off-load their products. Two off-loading sheds in Hopedale (St. 

Bernard Parish) and two in Venice (Plaquemines Parish) resumed operations in early December 

2005. However, as these sheds were only operating at about 30 percent of their former capacity, 

overall landings’ values in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes both declined to nearly zero 

following the hurricane, while they increased in the adjacent parishes. 

114
0

10

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30

40

50

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70

St. Bernard Plaquemines N. Jeff. Lafourche Terrebonne

Pre-storm Post-storm

0

10

20

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40

50

60

70

St. Bernard Plaquemines N. Jeff. Lafourche Terrebonne

Pre-storm Post-storm

 Figure 51: Pre- and Post-Storm Landings’ Values (in millions of dollars). 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005. 

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) representatives offered a preliminary 

assessment of damages to Louisiana’s fisheries in the first week following Hurricane Katrina. 

First, Table 49 provides the five-year average value of dockside landings of commercial shrimp, 

crabs, and finfish for the six month interval (Sept. 1-Feb 28) and entire year (Sept. 1-Aug. 31) 

total. The figures are averages for the period 2000 to 2004 for the most severely impacted 

parishes of Jefferson, Lower Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany. 

Table 49. Pre-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings, Five-year Average: 2000-2004

Fishery 6 Month Interval 12 Month 

Crab $5,092,813 $12,297,617

Freshwater Fish $54,652 $189,019

Menhaden $3,806,250 $14,050,883

Saltwater Fish $5,319,153 $11,836,588

Shrimp $29,554,270 $81,054,864

Total $43,827,138 $119,428,971

Source: LDWF September 7, 2005. 

Table 50 below depicts projected losses for the study parishes based on the ex-vessel value of 

lost sales resulting from experienced and projected disruption of fishing activities. Direct losses 

to the resource base were not considered in the projections. The figures derive from LDWF trip 

ticket landings and value data averaged over the period 2000 to 2004 (LDWF 2005). 

115
Table 50. Projected Fisheries Losses for Heavily Impacted Parishes: Jefferson, Lower 

Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany 

Fishery Losses at 6-Month Interval 

 (Sept. 1, 2005-March 1,2006) 

Losses at One Year 

(Sept. 1, 2005-Aug. 31, 2006) 

Crab $33,866,078 $81,776,427

Freshwater Fish $363,424 $1,256,934

Menhaden $25,310,719 $93,435,257

Saltwater Fish $35,371,188 $78,710,687

Shrimp $196,529,345 $538,996,879

Total $291,440,753 $791,176,185

 Source: LDWF September 7, 2005. 

With regard to changes in fishing effort, an analysis of trip ticket data undertaken by the LDWF 

reveals that the average number of trips taken during September 2004 was 31,393, with 4,891 

boats leaving port. By contrast, only 5,656 trips were taken in September 2005, with just 1,092 

vessels leaving port (IAI, Personal Communication, October 30, 2005). 

In mid-September 2005, Louisiana officials estimated ex-vessel losses at $81 million for shrimp, 

$44 million for oysters, $12 million for crab, and $11 million for saltwater fish over the next 12 

months. These figures represent loss of product only, and exclude losses associated with 

damaged boats, gear, processing plants, and other marine-related infrastructure (Alford 2005a). 

By October 15, LDWF representatives indicated that the damage was worse than previously 

estimated, and that 80 percent of the projected seafood harvest for the year following the 

hurricanes would be lost. Estimated losses were revised to $1.3 billion. This figure is based on 

year 2003 total commercial and recreational retail sales of $2.85 billion, and derives from 

“historical data using previous losses sustained after hurricanes averaged over the past five 

years,” and aerial and on-the-ground assessments (Advocate 2005). 

The Center for Natural Resource Economics and Policy (CNREP) in late November assessed exvessel revenue losses as even higher than previously estimated by the LDWF. The CNREP 

assessment increased the LDWF’s projected one-year economic losses for the commercial 

shrimp fishery to $90.4 million and $18.7 million for the crab fishery, but reassessed the 

projected one-year loss to the oyster fishery downward to $27.5 million from $44 million (2005). 

The reduced loss estimate for the oyster fishery likely follows from the much earlier than 

anticipated reopening of state oyster beds in mid-October after repeated chemical and 

microbiological tests by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals declared them safe 

for consumption. 

 

More recently, preliminary data from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on 

commercial landings in Louisiana (all species combined) indicate that, in the last 4 months of 

2005, landings revenue received was just over $69.5 million dollars. This figure represents a 32 

percent decline in revenue from the same period in 2004, and a 36 percent decline from the five 

116
year average for the same period (see Table 51) (NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings 

Database; 2005 data is preliminary). 

Table 51. Louisiana Post-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings: 2000-2005 

Fishery Year September-October November-December 4-Month Interval

Shrimp 2000-2004 Average $40,956,405 $23,073,927 $64,030,333 

 2004 $36,534,732 $25,117,676 $61,652,408 

 2005 $23,702,857 $26,960,090 $50,662,947 

Percentage Change in Shrimp Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -42% 17% -21% 

 2004 to 2005 -35% 7% -18% 

Oyster 2000-2004 Average $5,743,466 $4,638,972 $10,382,438 

 2004 $6,044,654 $5,881,901 $11,926,555 

 2005 $1,878,528 $3,014,519 $4,893,047 

Percentage Change in Oyster Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -67% -35% -53% 

 2004 to 2005 -69% -49% -59% 

All Other 2000-2004 Average $22,963,110 $10,504,629 $33,467,739 

 2004 $18,058,522 $9,954,720 $28,013,242 

 2005 $6,156,848 $7,817,397 $13,974,245 

Percentage Change in All Other Species Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -73% -26% -58% 

 2004 to 2005 -66% -21% -50% 

Total 2000-2004 Average $69,662,110 $38,217,528 $107,879,638 

 2004 $60,638,522 $40,954,297 $101,592,819 

 2005 $31,738,848 $37,792,006 $69,530,854 

Percentage Change in All Species Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -54% -1% -36% 

 2004 to 2005 -48% -8% -32% 

Source: NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings Database; 2005 data is preliminary. 

The significant distributional impacts that occurred are discussed next. 

Shrimp. Commercial shrimp operators working from or delivering to Louisiana (and 

Alabama and Mississippi) ports accounted for nearly half of all shrimp production in the nation. 

Unfortunately, winds or storm surge associated with Hurricane Katrina destroyed or severely 

damaged many processing facilities, ice plants, off-loading and storage facilities, and seafood 

transport vehicles and routes throughout Louisiana (and Alabama and Mississippi) during the 

end of the peak harvesting season for shrimp, which generally runs from about May to October. 

117
Moreover, numerous shrimp trawlers remained incapacitated, beached or trapped by debris 

blocking shipping channels (Buck 2005), as of June 2006 (IAI, Field Observations, June 2006). 

As pointed out earlier, the Empire-Venice region is one of the top shrimp and oyster producing 

areas in Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico as a whole. It is also a leading U.S. port in terms of 

overall seafood landings and ex-vessel value. The Empire-Venice region was also among the 

hardest hit regions in both the state and the Gulf (Figure 52). In October 2005, local officials 

estimated that approximately two-thirds of Empire’s fishing fleet was out of commission due to 

damage or total loss (Wulfhorst 2005). Others described the Plaquemines Parish area fleet as 

decimated, with only 10 percent of vessels and infrastructure still functional. The economic 

impact of this damage is significant - landings at this port were valued at $60.2 million in 2004 

(NMFS 2005b). 

 Figure 52: Venice in September 2005. 

 Source: Photo courtesy of Alidore Leon Marmade, resident of Lafitte, LA. 

2006 Shrimp Season. After hearing public comment from members of the Louisiana 

fishing industry in April 2006, the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, Marine Fisheries Division 

subsequently declared a state of emergency in accordance with the emergency provisions of R.S. 

49:953(B) and R.S. 49:967 of the Administrative Procedure Act. This Act allows the Wildlife 

and Fisheries Commission to use emergency procedures to set shrimp seasons. 

The 2006 Louisiana Spring shrimp season opened in Shrimp Management Zone 2 on May 4. 

Zone 2 includes state waters from the eastern shore of South Pass of the Mississippi River to the 

western shore of Vermilion Bay and Southwest Pass at Marsh Island. This Zone remained 

118
open through June 13. The Shrimp Management Zone 1, which includes state waters from the 

Mississippi/Louisiana state line to the eastern shore of South Pass of the Mississippi River, 

opened on May 15. Zone 3, which includes state waters from the western shore of Vermilion 

Bay and Southwest Pass at Marsh Island to the Louisiana/Texas line, opened on May 22 (Figure 

53) (LDWF 2006). 

Figure 53. Louisiana Shrimp Management Zones, 1, 2, and 3; and Study Parishes in each Zone. 

Source: IAI 2006.
Since the start of this season, shrimpers trawling in Vermilion Bay in the Terrebonne Basin have 

been reporting high-volume catches of large, white shrimp. However, in nearby Barataria Basin, 

shrimpers report that the shrimp are unusually small (McKnight 2006). Such fluctuations are 

considered normal. 

The 2006 commercial shrimping fleet is substantially diminished from that of the 2005 fleet. 

According to an off-loader in Venice, “there used to be between 450 and 500 boats in the water 

between Venice and Buras (Plaquemines Parish, Zone 1), with about 150 to 200 boats docked in 

the Venice Marina at the start of shrimp season”. In 2006, however, there were between 20 and 

30 boats. Another off-loader offered that his operation typically bought product from about 200 

boats last year, but was now buying from about 30. Many more boats were observed in Lafitte 

(Jefferson Parish, Zone 2), where roughly 200 boats were working the area. Jefferson Parish is 

one of the few areas in southeast Louisiana where fishery participants were able to directly 

offload and purchase ice and some supplies during this 2006 season (IAI, Field Observations, 

May 2006). 

High fuel costs and the difficulty of obtaining marine-related supplies contributed to a poor 

turnout of shrimping vessels this season. In part, the observed fleet was also smaller at the start 

of the 2006 shrimp season because many more shrimpers than usual reportedly were 

coordinating their trips with the new moon phase, when larger tidal ranges “stir up” the shrimp 

and make them easier to catch. Although many shrimpers often coordinated their trips with the 

moon phases in the past, more were reportedly doing so because of higher fuel costs and the need 

for greater catch certainty (McKnight 2006). 

However, the reduced number of vessels shrimping in Gulf waters was, in some ways, a silver 

lining for those who were still capable of fishing. For instance, the storm surges from Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita reportedly resulted in higher volumes of shrimp per unit effort in specific areas. 

Additionally, some captains and crew were operating in certain fisheries with less competition 

from their affected counterparts, and/or in closer proximity to viable infrastructure. 

At the same time, the resulting abundance further depressed product price. Consequently, many 

shrimpers were finding it difficult to keep up with their bills. One second-generation shrimper 

recalled that in 1999, one pound of headless shrimp sold for $7.20 per pound; in 2006, the same 

quantity, regardless of size, was fetching $3.90 per pound. One processor explained that the 

declining prices that they were paying for shrimp was linked to a lack of operational capital, 

which was forcing processors to get the shrimp to market faster and at lower prices (Newsom 

2006). 

The demand for ice sharply increased following the start of Louisiana’s shrimping season in 

May. Additionally, increased competition for scarce resources, in this case ice, created user 

conflicts. For example, only two facilities in Jefferson Parish, both of which are located in 

Grand Isle, would sell ice to anybody– as opposed to a select clientele, such as the shrimpers 

with whom they had existing business arrangements. Consequently, “outsiders,” who then had 

to travel to other locales for ice, were at a competitive disadvantage as they lost fuel and catchtime in their search for ice. Many vessels traveled to Bayou La Batre or Bon Secour in Alabama, 

for example, to secure the ice they needed to shrimp in Louisiana waters. 

120
Offloading facilities in Lafitte and Venice, Louisiana were also relying in part on Bayou La 

Batre or Bon Secour in Alabama for ice. In reciprocal fashion, processors in Bayou La Batre 

were relying on the fresh shrimp they could buy from off-loaders in northeast Louisiana. An offloader describes her frustration with that situation: 

We have offloaded 50-60 boats since the opening [of shrimp season], producing 200 

blocks of ice a day, unloading 30,000 pounds of shrimp a day, and we have a major 

problem with lack of labor. We need more people to offload, and we don’t have enough 

ice to sell to other fishermen than those that we offload, and usually not even enough for 

them. I send fishermen to my aunt (a major Venice-based off-loader) for ice. We are 

sending fishermen all over the Gulf for ice the same way we send shrimp all over the 

Gulf (Personal Communication, IAI, Jefferson Parish, May 15, 2006). 

Another off-loader from Jefferson Parish explains how this critical ice shortage affected his 

business: 

We are getting ice from Dulac (Terrebonne Parish). We buy ice for $8.50 a block, but 

have to pay an extra $500 per truck, plus fuel, and time for driver, so it costs about 

$15.00 per block, and we have to give it to many of the fishermen for free just to get 

them on the water (Personal Communication, IAI, Jefferson Parish, May 15, 2006). 

The few operational processors in-state quickly became glutted with product within the first two 

weeks of the new season. Therefore, off-loading facilities in Louisiana also had to sell their 

shrimp to other processors in other Gulf Coast states (IAI, Field Observations, May 2006). 

This glut of product, however, did not assure huge revenues for the processors. Persistent labor 

shortages mean less operational capacity: “The fishermen want to go out and offload but the 

processor doesn’t have enough staff to run 24 hours; they can only run 12,” notes a Lafitte 

fisherman (Personal Communication, IAI, Lafitte, May 15, 2006). Additionally, a lack of cold 

storage facilities and the difficulty of obtaining ice meant that processors could not purchase any 

more shrimp than they could immediately store on premises. 

At the same time, however, some other processors claimed that they could not buy enough 

product to sustain operations because fewer fishery participants were working the waters in the 

2006 season. One off-loader in Venice explained that, with fewer vessels working, he only 

offloaded ten small boats and five larger vessels in the first two weeks of the 2006 shrimp 

season; 60 to 100 boats would be typical at this same time, pre-Katrina. Other processors 

complained that the low market price for domestic shrimp made it difficult to turn a profit and 

further depressed ex-vessel prices. For example, one large processor in Lafitte was paying offloaders in Venice $1.20 to $1.34 for 16-20 count (heads-on) – the price was $3.25 in 2000– and a 

little over $0.50 for 80-100 count in May 2006. These prices left little room for either the 

shrimper or the off-loader to profit. Many fishery participants blame the flood of farmed and 

foreign shrimp on the market for such low prices and assert that marketing efforts to promote 

consumption of wild-caught domestic shrimp need to be greatly stepped-up. 

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As a result of the low market price, many shrimpers cut out the “middle man” wherever possible 

and sold their wares directly to the consumer. A key official with LDWF confirmed this trend, 

noting that, post-Katrina, more shrimpers were purchasing the $20 retail license permitting them 

to bypass the docks and sell shrimp directly to the public, where they could command a higher 

price (McKnight 2006). 

Understandably, frustration levels with consistently poor market conditions, exacerbated by 

Katrina, are on the rise. Many shrimpers describe themselves as “fed up” – an affective state 

was materially evidenced in the numerous shrimp boats that were for sale (Figure 54). In May 

2006, 33 percent or 19 of the 57 shrimp boats observed along Highway LA 1 between Leeville 

and Galliano were for sale, as were 35 percent or 7 of the 20 boats observed between Galliano 

and Cut Off (IAI, Field Observations, May 2006). 

 Figure 54. Boat for Sale: Cut Off. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

Oysters. On August 30, 2005, Louisiana officials mandated emergency closure of 

essentially all of its oyster beds. Harvest Areas 2-4, 8-13 and 24-28, and the West Cove 

Conditional Management Areas and Lower Calcasieu Conditional Management Area remained 

closed through most of October. 

The lack of available product was immediately felt by area restaurant operators. Given high 

local demand for shellfish, many restaurant owners and buyers were forced to purchase oysters 

and other shellfish from non-local dealers since local beds were closed (Hackenburg 2005). In 

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the months following Katrina, some restaurateurs experienced low sales because of public fears 

of oyster contamination following the hurricanes and associated oil spills. A restaurant owner 

from Lafourche Parish described this challenging situation: “Not only are we unable to open 

because of no labor, lack of tourism, and loss, but where are we getting the oysters from? Prices 

have gone up, I can’t afford to buy them, and people don’t want to eat them” (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Lafourche, October 03, 2005). 

According to the Louisiana Oyster Task Force, a 100 to 110 pound sack of oysters at the dock 

cost about $20 before the hurricanes, but climbed to between $26 and $30 after the storms (Solet 

2005). Interviews with oystermen in Terrebonne Parish put the price of shucked oysters in midNovember, 2005 at $7.50-$8.00 a pound; the same oysters were fetching $4.70 per pound during 

the 2005 summer months. 

Following extensive testing for bacterial and chemical contamination, the Louisiana Department 

of Health and Hospitals (DHH) reopened private oyster grounds east of the Mississippi River. 

These included Harvest Areas 14 through 23, opened on October 22, 2005 and 1 and 5 through 7, 

opened on October 24, 2005. These areas are located in St. Bernard, Plaquemines, (west) 

Lafourche, and Terrebonne Parishes. Shellfish Harvest Area 2, located in St. Bernard Parish, 

was reopened for harvesting on November 5, 2005. This was one of the most heavily damaged 

oyster grounds. Private farms west of Bayou Lafourche in Lafourche Parish, and all beds in 

Terrebonne Parish were also open for harvest on this date. Only one public oyster bed in the 

State of Louisiana –Sister Lake in south Terrebonne Parish – was allowed to reopen at this time 

(LDWF 2005). 

Louisiana is one of the nation’s leading oyster producers. Early predictions held that as much as 

two-thirds of the state’s beds were detrimentally affected by the season's hurricanes and that 

damaged beds could take up to two years to return to life, as oysters die or diminish significantly 

when their beds are upturned by storm surge or silted over by storm-driven mud and sand 

(Louisiana Sea Grant 2005a; Wulfhorst 2005). Meanwhile, the Louisiana Oyster Task Force, 

together with the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, estimated oyster mortality 

would reach 99 percent in Jefferson, Lower Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and 

St. Tammany Parishes. Direct losses of available oyster resources in these areas are projected to 

exceed $205 million. The cost of recovery for Louisiana’s public oyster grounds will likely 

exceed $120 million dollars, with $26 million going toward reef rehabilitation and 

transplantation. Restoration of private leases is estimated at $60 million (Louisiana Sea Grant 

2005b). 

Dire projections notwithstanding, interviews with oyster harvesters in Terrebonne Parish in 

December 2005 revealed that participants battled through caked mud and debris to reach the 

beds. Some report having managed successful harvests in certain areas. 

Table 52 depicts the pre-Katrina annual dockside value of oysters, based on a five-year average 

(2000-2004) over 6-month (Sept. 1-Feb 28), 12-month (Sept. 1-Aug. 31), and 24-month periods 

in what would become the most severely impacted parishes (Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, 

Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany). The 24-month period is included since oysters 

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take a minimum of two years to mature from larvae to market size. Table 53 illustrates the 

estimated losses to this fishery based on recent trends in retail value. 

Table 52. Pre-Katrina Annual Dockside Value of Oysters for Severely Impacted Parishes 

Fishery 6 Month Interval 12 Months 24 Months 

Oyster $11,354,791 $22,288,536 $44,577,072 

Source: LDWF 2005. 

Table 53. Estimated Oyster Industry Total Losses for Severely Impacted Parishes, Retail 

Fishery 6 Month Interval 12 Months 24 Months 

Oyster $75,506,843 $148,213,824 $296,427,648 

Source: LDWF 2005. 

Fishery participants in this industry remain hopeful about its recovery. According to one local 

oysterman, “funding from Hurricane Ivan was going to be used to rehabilitate reefs; now it is 

going to be used to rehabilitate fishermen and oyster beds” (Personal Communication, IAI, 

Delacroix, May 4, 2006). 

 Aquaculture. The farmed alligator industry is the component of Louisiana’s aquaculture 

industry that will likely be most affected by Hurricane Katrina. Much of industry takes place in 

parishes damaged by Katrina: Plaquemines, St. Bernard, Orleans and St. Tammany Parishes. 

Damage to the farmed alligator industry from Hurricane Katrina is preliminarily estimated at 

$3,797,091 (LSUAC 2005b). This assessment is based on 2004 farm-gate values (the alligator’s 

retail value after all selling costs have been estimated and deducted from the market price) and 

the Louisiana State University Agricultural Center’s assessment of potential revenue losses. Not 

included in this estimate is infrastructure damage ($7 million) and the as of yet unknown 

implications of saltwater intrusion on alligator egg production in the coastal marshes (LSUAC 

2005b). Importantly, these eggs are the source of all hatchlings used in the farmed alligator 

industry (Personal Communication, LSUAC, June 13, 2006). According to officials at LDWF, 

Hurricane Katrina may impact wild nest production and future egg collections in 

Plaquemines, St. Bernard, Orleans and St. Tammany Parishes. In these parishes an 

estimated 3,700 nests are produced on privately owned wetlands while an estimated 750 

nests are produced on public lands. While all permitted 2005 egg collection activities 

were completed prior to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, it is anticipated that the 2006 

nest production and subsequent egg collections will be impacted. The marshes in 

Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes in the area of the Caernarvon Freshwater 

Diversion were damaged by storm surge and saltwater intrusion. Initial aerial 

observations indicated significant physical marsh damage to large areas of vegetated 

wetlands. This area has been particularly productive in recent years and nest production 

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may be impacted significantly in selected areas in 2006 and in future years (Elsey et al., 

2006). 

Recreational and Charter Fishing Industries. The charter boat industry in Louisiana 

was heavily impacted by Katrina. In 2004, there were 515 charter and guide vessels registered in 

Louisiana. Sixty-three percent of these vessels were registered in the six parishes most severely 

impacted by Hurricane Katrina (Table 54). According to LSU Agricultural Center economists, 

this industry will lose $27 million in revenue in 2006 as a result of the storms (CNREP 2005). 

Table 54. Licensed Charter Vessels by Parish: 2004 

Parish Charter Vessels 

Jefferson 79 

Lower Lafourche 30 

Plaquemines 157 

St. Bernard 43 

St Tammany 13 

Orleans 3 

Total 325 

Percent of State 63.1% 

 Source: LDWF September 7, 2005. 

Alternatively, LDWF provides an estimate of loss based only on revenue associated with fishingrelated retail sales. The retail value of losses listed below do not include direct losses to the 

resource base, only losses to the industry in terms of lost sales related to fishing activity (Table 

55). “These calculations were based on the numbers of recreational license holders in that area 

as a fraction of the statewide license base, and with retail estimates based on a study by 

Southwick and Associates estimating 2003 values for recreational fishing in Louisiana” (LDWF 

2005: 4). 

Table 55. Recreational Fishing Licenses in 2004 and Estimated Loss of Revenue to the 

Recreational Fishing Industry in the Six Parishes Most Impacted 

by Hurricane Katrina 

 

Parish Recreational Fishing 

Licenses 

Estimated Loss of 

Revenue to the Retail 

Industry 

St. Bernard 15,921 $19,910,788 

Jefferson 65,836 $85,058,147 

Plaquemines 20,373 $19,495,632 

Lafourche 16,220 $20,238,825 

St. Tammany 33,374 $42,273,996 

Orleans 9,252 $12,640,357 

Total 160,976 $199,517,744 

 Source: LDWF September 7, 2005. 

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One charter boat operator in Jefferson Parish had 17 boats ranging from 24-38 feet and employed 

several captains prior to Katrina. Despite steaming his fleet to Houma for safe-keeping in 

preparation for the storm, he still lost many boats, and each lost vessel cost him roughly 

$200,000. This operator provides insight into the importance of recreational fishing 

infrastructure and the effects of its loss: 

All captains and their private businesses are out of work. There are no motels in 

area. The chartering market is devastated. We have lost bait; lost freezers...we 

have to buy from Alabama and Florida. We lost 2,500 pounds of recreational fish 

bait, and we've been out of business since August 29th. The chartering community 

usually goes strong until October 31st (Personal Communication, IAI, Jefferson 

Parish, November 17, 2005). 

One of the biggest challenges facing the charter fishing industry is the lack of infrastructure. 

Motels for housing clientele are severely damaged; bait has been extremely difficult to locate; 

and without New Orleans as a functioning tourist destination, fishing-related tourism in the 

general region is down significantly. A 30-year veteran of the St. Bernard Parish charter fishing 

industry stated, “I don’t have any customers now because there aren’t any hotels, or restaurants 

to house [customers]”. A displaced charter fisherman, from Venice, tried to relocate to Lafitte, 

but explained, “all the marinas were ruined in Venice and now there is too much competition in 

Lafitte; I’m out of business” (Personal Communication, IAI, Lafitte, October 25, 2005). A local 

charter boat guide from Plaquemines Parish estimated that 250 guide boat operators in southeast 

Louisiana were out of work as of November 2005 (Robertson 2005). 

Fishing guides working out of mid-coastal Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes to the west of 

Plaquemines were faring somewhat better. One charter boat guide in Houma asserted that 

fishing guides and marinas in these parishes have been absorbing the bulk of the recreational 

fishing business in Louisiana, given the infrastructure and habitat damage sustained across the 

rest of the coast (Robertson 2005). 

Fortunately, the charter industry in Louisiana is seasonal in nature. Most charter fishermen 

interviewed for this study prepare in the winter months for potential business in the spring, which 

typically includes fishing tournaments and rodeos. However, some charter operations continue 

working in winter, despite often adverse weather conditions. For such guides, the winter of 2005 

was uncertain; one charter captain stated: 

I don’t know how I am going to make it through [this] winter. [My fleet] used to 

take as many as 100 clients out a day. Our main source of business is people from 

New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Texas. We used to have 38-40 employees, now 

[we have] just two (Personal Communication, IAI, October 25, 2005). 

The total economic losses to this industry are still being determined. To better assess damages 

and costs, the National Association of Charter Boat Operators (NACO) has conducted an 

economic loss survey among its industry members across the Gulf region. NACO has asked 

charter boat captains to estimate income lost due to lost charters and damage to their boats from 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In Louisiana, NACO conducted surveys with 398 of the state’s 470 

126
identified licensed charter boat vessels. Of those sampled, 315 are guide boats, 75 are six 

passenger charter boats and 8 are multi-passenger charter boats. One hundred thirty-seven 

operate in federal waters, 226 operate in state waters, (Louisiana state waters extend 3 miles 

offshore) and 328 operate in inshore waters. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (but primarily Katrina) 

damaged 81 of these charter boats and totaled 83. Of these lost and damaged vessels, 

losses/damages amounted to $7,851,310; insured losses totaled 47 percent. According to NACO, 

these vessel operators lost 19,459 trips valued at nearly $13 million (Walker et al. 2006). 

Nevertheless, charter boat operators in Louisiana remain optimistic about their future 

participation in this industry. Some 360 or 90 percent of the 398 guide boat owners who 

responded to this survey expect to continue in business; the remainder does not plan to continue 

in business, are not sure if they will continue, or did not respond to this question (Walker et al. 

2006). 

Table 56 shows the overall projected economic loss to the State of Louisiana from the losses 

incurred by her charter boat fleet (Walker et al. 2006: 108). NACO included in this analysis lost 

trips immediately following the storms, physical loss to vessels, one lodge and some tackle 

losses, support personnel lost trip gross income and the projected gross lost income to owners 

only that was reported for the year following the storms (Walker et al. 2006: 108). 

Table 56. Total Projected Losses to 398 Louisiana Charter Boats from 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita* 

Lost Trips (up to submittal of survey) $12,729,400 

Physical Damage $7,851,310 

Physical loss to lodge and tackle $1,033,100 

Support Personnel Loss $1,914,388 

Annual Income Loss for 1 year (after survey was submitted) $28,233,550 

Total $51,761,748 

 *Data only available for both storms combined. 

 Source: Walker et al. (2006). 

127
IV. RESPONSE AND ADAPTATION TO HURRICANE KATRINA 

 Fishermen responded to post-Katrina conditions based on the resources that remained 

available to them, their particular fishery adaptation, and the nature of physical impacts to their 

specific location or fishery. The principal adaptation strategies employed fall into five (5) broad 

categories: (1) cooperation with others in the fishing industry; (2) reliance on make-shift 

strategies that involved local community members rather than remote government support; (3) 

local government assistance; (4) concentration of fishing effort in viable off-loading areas; and 

(5) reliance on the region's oil and gas industry for alternative forms of employment. 

1. Cooperation with others in the fishing industry. Although Katrina damaged much of 

the marine-related infrastructure and initially put many fishing operations out of commission, 

some commercial fishing participants and enterprises were able to resume activities to varying 

extents by December 2005 by pooling resources and drawing on firmly established social 

networks. For example, in the aftermath of the storm, there was extensive collaborative effort 

between fishery participants and shrimp/fish shed owners. In the case of Griffin’s seafood, for 

example, 20 fishermen who traditionally sell to the shed joined forces with another 20 fishermen 

from other destroyed sheds in the Venice/Buras area and rebuilt Griffin’s facility in Leeville. 

With lumber brought in from Florida and equipment brought down from storage in the north, the 

business was rebuilt and able to resume operations within weeks of the storm. 

Another example of inter-occupational cooperation involved the efforts of a Grand Isle shed 

owner who brought in a truck to off-load any catches being made during the first three weeks 

following Katrina. This proprietor was motivated not only by his business interests, but also by 

his sense of loyalty to his fishermen, who had large catches but no off-loading facility. This 

effort, in fact, stimulated the re-establishment of Venice Seafood Exchange. The shed owner 

detailed his surprise the first time he made the pick-up when, upon having to write a single pay 

check for the full load, the fishermen decided among themselves how the check would be 

divided. This reportedly was the first time anyone had ever witnessed this level of cooperation. 

Some off-loading facility operators extended use of their facilities to other operators who lost 

their own. For example, Blanchard’s shed in Grand Isle moved operations to Leeville, sharing a 

facility with Griffin’s. This cooperative endeavor permitted the Grand Isle operator to maintain 

a large portion of his fleet while his facility and ice plant are being rebuilt. 

Shed and ice-plant owners have also relied on loans from family, personal savings, or interindustry loans to remain operational. One marine operator explained that “the insurance 

company never showed up, so I spent $54,000 out of own pocket to repair the dock” (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Jefferson Parish, November 11, 2005). Examples of inter-industry loans 

include loans made by shed operators to fishermen for fuel and ice, and loans by processing 

plants to shed owners for general machinery repairs. Regarding the former, the extreme rise in 

fuel costs made it impossible for many fishery participants, now financially challenged by the 

cost of repairs, to re-enter the fishery in question. In some cases, shed operators helped fishery 

participants finance their fuel costs by offering long-term (e.g., two year) loans. In doing so, 

shed operators and area processors helped to maintain a steady supply of fish. Interviews with 

128
area fishery participants reveal that financial assistance is commonplace among suppliers and 

consumers, and off-loaders and processors with well-established relationships. 

2. Reliance on make-shift strategies. Many fishery participants have had to rely on their 

own ingenuity to remain viable participants in the region's fisheries. One important adaptation in 

the post-Katrina environment includes using small generators to make ice. For example, the 

Venice Seafood Exchange (VSE) in Plaquemines Parish was the only off-loading shed in this 

area able to resume operations within the one month of Katrina. However, substantial damage to 

electrical equipment forced VSE personnel to rely on generators for electricity and ice trucked in 

from Lafitte Frozen Foods, some 53 miles away. This “jerry-rigged” operation, in fact, typified 

local reliance on trucks during the post-storm period (Figure 55). 

 Figure 55: Seafood Transport Vehicle, a Vital Service following the Hurricanes. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

Additionally, given obstacles to selling through normal channels, many commercial fishery 

participants have been selling seafood directly from the back of vehicles. In many instances, 

chain stores have opened up parking lots to allow fishermen to sell their goods directly to the 

public. 

 

3. Local government assistance. Subsequent to the retreat of storm waters from the lowlying areas, many fishery participants and their families have been hoping for federal and state 

assistance. However, the extent of support in Louisiana is said to have remained comparably 

less than that in adjacent affected states. For instance, FEMA’s assurance that trailers would be 

provided for homeless fishing families reportedly has been slow to manifest relative to other, less 

dramatically affected areas. Moreover, many Southeast Louisiana residents report feeling 

129
overlooked, in part as a result of media attention paid to New Orleans. The situation has led to 

increasing interaction between fishery participants and local leadership, with the objective of 

securing timely external assistance of some sort. The mayors of Jefferson Parish and the 

presidents of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, Lafourche, and Terrebonne, have subsequently 

become highly engaged with local efforts to rebuild local fishery infrastructure and capacity. 

 4. Concentration of fishing effort in viable offloading areas. The Louisiana shrimp 

industry may be seen as a network of relatedness between fishermen, offloading docks, ice 

plants, and processing/peeling plants. The interdependence of various industry operators is clear. 

For example, only one off-loading facility in the Venice/Boothville area had resumed operations, 

albeit in limited capacity, one month after Katrina. By early November, a second offloading 

facility in this area and two in the devastated St. Bernard Parish region had been re-established. 

In order to compensate for the relative paucity of off-loading facilities in this area of formerly 

highly active wholesale seafood distribution, other facilities in alternative locations accepted 

much higher volumes of product than usual. While buyers welcomed the extra product, many 

operations were already operating at maximum capacity as they struggled to meet the demands 

of a now highly concentrated business. 

 5. Reliance on oil industry for alternative employment. The fishing and oil and gas 

industries have long had a symbiotic relationship in Louisiana. Throughout the mid- to late1980s, the coastal seafood industry in Louisiana expanded, while the offshore oil and gas 

production industry underwent a period of decline. Subsequent to this downturn, many 

unemployed oil workers turned to commercial fishing for employment, as many already owned 

boats and fishing gear. Oilfield workers typically worked seven days on and seven days off, or a 

similar configuration, and commercially fished during their off days. According to one fishery 

participant, “fishing was a safety net for getting laid-off and vice versa”. Following a lay-off, it 

was relatively easy to convert their vessels and experience into full-time fishing operations. One 

fisherman from Lafourche Parish noted that the oil industry is often regarded as a safety net for 

many fishery participants: 

Everyone wants to work on the oil boats, ‘cause they are actually making money that 

way. If I did it again, I would work for oil companies and become a millionaire. Many of 

my buddies are in oil now. It used to be they worked for Exxon in the off-season of 

fishing. Now it is all oil. Can’t compete with the foreign import of shrimp. Gotta try 

domestic oil now (Personal Communication, Cut Off, October 25, 2005). 

Many Cajuns who inhabit southern Jefferson, Lafourche, and Terrebonne Parishes may occupy 

both fields of work, with one brother working as a fisherman and another as an oil worker, or 

with each working at least part time in the both industries. More recently, however, the balance 

is shifting toward work in the oil and gas industry, as related by a Cajun fisherman in Grand Isle: 

[The] fishing industry used to have a platform, now that is gone. A lot of them are taking 

their rigs and going into oil. In other places, fishermen have gotten federal money for 

doing clean up. In St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parish money will be available for 

oystermen to do clean up. Here, we just rely on the oil business (Personal 

Communication, Grand Isle, October 25, 2005). 

130
D. Pre-Hurricane Katrina: An Overview of the Commercial and 

Recreational Fishing Industries in Mississippi 

131
Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay

St Louis

0 5 10 

Miles

10

59

49

Note: This graphic has a resolution of

300 dpi, allowing the viewer to zoom in .

HANCOCK

HARRISON

JACKSON

D'Iberville

Long Beach

Pass Christian

90

Pascagoula

River

Louisiana

Waveland

Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

of the Mississippi Coast

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I. PRIMARY FISHING INDUSTRIES IN MISSISSIPPI

 There are three major seafood ports in coastal Mississippi: Biloxi, Pascagoula/Moss 

Point, and Gulfport. Shrimp, oysters, crabs, and finfish constitute the state’s primary commercial 

fisheries in which producers and processors participate. Landings coming through these ports 

averaged about 203 million pounds per year between 1994 and 2004. The annual value of these 

fisheries is approximately $44 million. When including the multiplier effect, the total economic 

impact of the industry on the state exceeds $450 million annually (NMFS 2005a; Mississippi 

State University Sea Grant, No date). Shrimp production generates the highest annual revenue, 

bringing in $27 million in 2004 (NMFS, SEFSC 2005). The oyster fishery brought in $6 million 

dollars in 2004. In this same year, the crab fishery contributed $3 million dollars, while the 

menhaden and edible finfish market accounted for the remainder of the revenue (NMFS SEFSC 

2005; Mississippi State University Sea Grant, No date). Between 2000 and 2004, inclusive, 

commercial landings in Mississippi had an average ex-vessel value of $49 million (Table 57). 

Table 57. Commercial Landings in Mississippi (all species combined), Thousands of 

Pounds (live weights), and Thousands of Current Dollars: 2000-2004 

Year Pounds Value 

2000 217,744 $58,715 

2001 213,889 $50,561 

2002 217,968 $47,565 

2003 213,469 $46,149 

2004 183,762 $43,791 

<5 Year Average> <209,366> <$49,356> 

 Source: NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings Database; 

 2005 data is preliminary. 

While Mississippi is not the most abundant Gulf Coast state seafood producer, the total direct, 

indirect, and induced economic value of this industry to the state is considerable (see Table 58 

below). In 2003, the production sector of the Mississippi commercial seafood industry–which 

includes harvesting and processing–employed 6,230 persons and had a statewide economic 

impact of $403 million dollars. The distribution sector, which includes wholesaling, restaurant, 

and retailing, employed 10,588 persons and accounted for $497 million in earnings. Together, 

these sub-sectors awarded $279 million in labor compensation and paid $42 million in state 

taxes. The restaurant and processing sub-sectors are particularly active, supporting a total of 74 

percent of all jobs in this industry (Posadas 2005a). 

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Table 58. Economic Impact of Mississippi Commercial Seafood Industry by Sector: 2003 

Sector Output Employment Labor Income State Taxes 

 $M Percent Jobs Percent $M Percent $M Percent 

Harvesting 66.8 7% 2,472 15% 39.7 14% 2.2 5% 

Processing 336.5 37% 3,758 22% 75.2 27% 7.8 19% 

Wholesaling 55.8 6% 436 3% 14.6 5% 4.2 10% 

Restaurant 384.4 43% 8,791 52% 122.8 44% 21.1 50% 

Retailing 57.2 6% 1,361 8% 26.8 10% 6.7 16% 

Total 900.8 100% 16,818 100% 279.3 100% 42.2 100% 

Production Sector 403.4 45% 6,230 37% 115.0 41% 10.1 24% 

Distribution 

Sector 497.4 55% 10,588 63% 164.3 59% 32.1 76% 

Source: Posadas 2005a. 

According to Posadas (2006a), the combined plant-gate value of Mississippi’s seafood 

processing plants in 2003 totaled nearly $338 million dollars (Table 59). In that year, 69 

processing plants employed almost 2,600 workers (Posadas 2006a). 

Table 59. Plant-gate Values* and Number of Workers Employed in 

Mississippi Seafood Processing Plants: 2003 

Category Plant-gate Values Number of Workers 

Shrimp $73,402,922 503 

Oysters $9,181,372 288 

Crabs $838,128 78 

Foodfish $84,432,502 1,082 

Total $337,863,746 2,582 

 *Plant-gate value = retail value after all selling costs have been estimated and deducted 

 from the market price. 

 Source: Posadas 2006a. 

Commercial Landings in Mississippi between 1995 and 2004. Between 1995 and 2004, 

Mississippi’s fisheries (all species combined) produced on average 2 percent of the nation’s 

seafood harvest. In 2004, Mississippi’s commercial fisheries produced 184 million pounds of 

fish (all species combined), with a value of $44 million (NMFS 2005a). Of the five Gulf Coast 

states, Mississippi ranked fourth in terms of annual seafood production revenue in 2004. Total 

seafood landings coming through Mississippi state ports has been decreasing since 2000 (Table 

60).

 

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Table 60. Pounds and Value of all Commercial Landings in the 

United States and Mississippi: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds 

(all species), 

U.S. 

Value 

(in billions), 

U.S. 

Pounds 

(all species), 

Mississippi 

Value 

(in millions), 

Mississippi 

% of Total 

 U.S. Lbs. 

from MS 

% of Total 

U.S. Value 

from MS 

1995 9,912,807,044 $3,826,360,342 144,897,569 $41,704,923 1.5% 1.1% 

1996 9,643,821,438 $3,564,587,048 162,362,302 $35,022,604 1.7% 1.0% 

1997 9,951,898,930 $3,592,218,307 180,395,328 $47,645,089 1.8% 1.3% 

1998 9,332,712,602 $3,221,433,652 210,690,418 $48,320,740 2.3% 1.5% 

1999 9,409,192,065 $3,575,730,880 267,561,885 $48,529,722 2.8% 1.3% 

2000 9,142,633,213 $3,674,425,002 217,743,660 $58,714,947 2.4% 1.6% 

2001 9,511,750,925 $3,243,655,393 213,888,537 $50,560,590 2.2% 1.5% 

2002 9,428,867,963 $3,191,297,481 217,967,609 $47,565,219 2.3% 1.5% 

2003 9,515,048,681 $3,371,930,855 213,468,811 $46,148,637 2.2% 1.4% 

2004 9,664,977,837 $3,714,515,156 183,761,862 $43,790,554 1.9% 1.2% 

<10 Year 

Averages> <9,593,229,233> <$3,508,517,784> <201,273,798> <$46,800,302> <2.1%> <1.3%> 

Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Top Seafood-Producing Ports in Mississippi. Jackson and Harrison are the leading 

seafood producing counties in the State of Mississippi. Pascagoula-Moss Point (Jackson) and 

Gulfport-Biloxi (Harrison) are the top producing state ports (NMFS 2005b). Tables 61 and 62 

below rank the top-producing ports in Mississippi in terms of landings and value. Each also 

identifies the ranking of each port in relation to the top performing ports in the United States. 

Historically, Pascagoula-Moss Point has been a particularly productive port, ranking eighth of 97 

ports in the nation in terms of pounds landed in 2004, and 57th in terms of value (NMFS 2005b). 

Table 61. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Mississippi Ports 

and Ranking* by U.S. Dollars: 2004 

Port County U.S. Rank by 

Value 

Value in 

Millions 

Pounds in 

Millions 

Gulfport-Biloxi Harrison 26th $26.2 16.3 

Pascagoula-Moss Point Jackson 57th $11.9 162.8 

* There are 97 ranked ports in the United States. 

Source: NMFS 2005b. 

135
Table 62. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Mississippi Ports 

and Ranking* by Pounds: 2004 

Port County Rank of Port in 

U.S.* by Pounds 

Pounds in 

Millions 

Value in 

Millions 

Pascagoula-Moss Point Jackson 8th 162.8 $11.9 

Gulfport-Biloxi Harrison 46th 16.3 $26.2 

* There are 97 ranked ports in the United States. 

Source: NMFS 2005b. 

II. PRIMARY FISHERIES AND PRODUCTION LEVELS IN COASTAL 

 MISSISSIPPI: 1995 TO 2004

 Shrimp Production. The commercial shrimp fishery is a vital contributor to 

Mississippi’s seafood industry. Brown, white, and pink shrimp are the most widely harvested, 

with brown shrimp constituting 85 percent of the annual harvest (MDMR, No date). Annual 

commercial landings for the State of Mississippi average about 17 million pounds (NMFS 

2005a). 

Over the past decade (1995-2004), shrimp landings in Mississippi have averaged 6 percent of all 

shrimp harvested in the Gulf of Mexico. These landings had an average ex-vessel value of $29 

million dollars (heads-on) (Table 63) (NMFS 2005a). 

Table 63. Pounds and Value of Mississippi Shrimp Harvest*: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds Value Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Pounds 

Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Value 

1995 15,409,938 $29,018,763 6.6% 6.2% 

1996 10,384,211 $20,485,757 4.6% 4.9% 

1997 12,339,047 $30,251,332 5.8% 6.6% 

1998 16,082,976 $32,853,742 6.1% 6.7% 

1999 14,461,139 $29,354,111 5.9% 6.1% 

2000 14,793,949 $38,257,585 5.1% 5.8% 

2001 15,915,059 $31,541,871 6.2% 6.3% 

2002 16,821,526 $29,910,101 7.2% 7.7% 

2003 17,560,228 $25,619,197 6.8% 7.0% 

2004 18,195,623 $26,524,987 7.1% 7.2% 

<Average> <15,196,370> <$29,381,745> <6.1%> <6.4%> 

*Brown, White, and Other. 

Source: NMFS 2005a. 

136
In 2004, the most recent year for which national data was available when writing this report, 18 

million pounds or 7 percent of all U.S. shrimp landings (317 million pounds) were landed in 

Mississippi, with a value of $26 million (heads-on) (NMFS 2005a). Of the five Gulf Coast 

states, Mississippi ranks fifth in terms of shrimp production (Figure 57) (NMFS 2005a). 

0

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 Figure 57. Shrimp Landings in the Gulf Coast States (in millions): 2000-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

While the contribution of Mississippi’s shrimp fishery to the Gulf Coast harvest has remained 

more or less constant between 1995 and 2004, the value of this harvest has been steadily 

decreasing relative to pounds landed. As assessed for recent years, Mississippi’s shrimp fishery 

peaked in 2000, with 15 million pounds of shrimp valued at $38 million dollars. In 2001, 

however, 16 million pounds of landings fetched only $32 million dollars. In 2002, 17 million 

pounds of shrimp had an ex-vessel value of $30 million, and by 2004, the dockside value of 18 

million pounds of shrimp dropped to $27 million (Figure 58) (NMFS 2005a). The increase of 

imported shrimp into the U.S. market has contributed to falling dockside values since 2000. 

137
0

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 Figure 58. Mississippi’s Shrimp Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

 The production and distribution sectors of the shrimping industry are economically 

compelling (see Table 64). In 2003, the production sector of the Mississippi commercial shrimp 

industry–which includes harvesting and processing–employed 2,102 persons and had a statewide 

economic impact of $129 million dollars. The distribution sector—which includes wholesaling, 

restaurant, and retailing—employed 7,337 persons and accounted for $344 million in earnings. 

Together, these sub-sectors awarded $150 million in wages and paid $25 million in state taxes. 

The restaurant and harvesting sub-sectors are particularly active, supporting a total of 79 percent 

of all jobs in this industry (Posadas 2005b). 

138
Table 64. Economic Impact of Mississippi Commercial Shrimp Industry by Sector: 2003 

Sector Output Employment Labor Income State Taxes 

 Value* Percent Jobs Percent Value* Percent Value* Percent

Harvesting 34.8 7% 1,285 14% 20.7 14% 1.1 5% 

Processing 94.2 20% 817 9% 16.3 11% 1.7 7% 

Wholesaling 37.9 8% 297 3% 9.9 7% 2.9 12% 

Restaurant 268.6 57% 6,143 65% 85.8 57% 14.8 59% 

Retailing 37.7 8% 897 10% 17.6 12% 4.4 18% 

Total 473.1 100% 9,439 100% 150.4 100% 25.0 100% 

Production 

Sector 129.0 27% 2,102 22% 37.0 25% 2.9 11% 

Distribution 

Sector 344.2 73% 7,337 78% 113.4 75% 22.1 89% 

* Value in millions of dollars. 

 Source: Posadas 2005b. 

Oyster Production. Oysters are an economically and culturally important state fishery. 

Biloxi was once heralded as the “oyster capital of the world”. While this is no longer the case, 

oyster production in Biloxi remains energetic. According to Mississippi State University Sea 

Grant (MSUSG), the direct, indirect, and induced value of the state’s oyster production 

component was approximately $22 million in 2003, with a value-added direct annual impact of 

$6 million because the majority of the harvest is consumed within the state (MSUSG, No date; 

Posadas 2005c). The distribution sector was valued at $78 million in 2003 (Posadas 2005c). 

Mississippi’s commercial oyster industry includes harvesting, processing, and distribution 

components. Annual oyster harvests can fluctuate widely from year to year primarily because of 

variations in the natural environment. Due to variability in production levels, the number of 

state-issued oyster licenses sold each year can range from 200 to 700 in any given year 

(MSUSG, No date). Over the past decade, oyster beds in Mississippi have produced an average 

of 10 percent of all the oysters harvested in the Gulf of Mexico. The average annual value of this 

ten-year harvest was $4 million dollars (Table 65). 

139
Table 65. Oyster Landings for Mississippi by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds Value Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Pounds 

Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Value 

1995 1,327,100 $1,658,189 6.0% 4.2% 

1996 1,623,778 $2,498,025 7.3% 5.6% 

1997 2,093,148 $2,671,554 9.3% 5.6% 

1998 1,344,688 $2,188,072 6.9% 4.9% 

1999 1,407,809 $2,205,895 6.2% 4.8% 

2000 3,548,240 $6,113,303 13.8% 11.5% 

2001 2,653,270 $4,195,464 10.3% 8.0% 

2002 2,737,839 $4,455,647 11.3% 8.8% 

2003 4,042,136 $7,227,588 14.9% 11.7% 

2004 3,029,391 $6,073,242 12.1% 10.0% 

<10 Year 

Average> <2,380,740> <$3,928,698> <9.8%> <7.5%> 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

As assessed for recent years, Mississippi oyster production peaked in 2003 with 4 million pounds 

of oysters, valued at $7 million. The dockside value of oysters cultivated in Mississippi state 

waters (as well as other Gulf of Mexico states), can vary when consumer groups concerned with 

the health risks of eating raw oysters increase their activities, or when harvest areas are closed 

due to increased levels of pollution associated with coastal development (MSUSG, No date). 

However, the ratio of oyster landings to value has remained mostly constant over the last decade 

(Figure 59). 

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 Figure 59. Mississippi’s Oyster Landings in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

140
More oysters are processed in Mississippi than produced. Approximately 80 percent of oysters 

processed in Mississippi are harvested in other Gulf Coast states (MSUSG, No date). In 2003, 

the total plant-gate value of oyster products handled by ten oyster processing plants in coastal 

Mississippi equaled $22 million (Posadas 2005c). The oyster distribution sector, which includes 

wholesaling, retailing, and restaurant establishments, produced $78 million in economic output 

in 2003, and paid $5 million in indirect business taxes (Table 66) (Posadas 2005c). This sector 

also supported 1,658 jobs, paying $26 million in compensation. While economically profitable, 

this industry’s dependence on oysters from other states limits expansion—especially in the wake 

of Hurricane Katrina. 

Table 66. Economic Impact of Mississippi Commercial Oyster Industry by Sector: 2003 

Sector Output Employment Labor Income State Taxes 

 $M Percent Jobs Percent $M Percent $M Percent

Harvesting 10.4 10% 387 18% 6.2 18% 0.3 6% 

Processing 11.8 12% 102 5% 2.0 6% 0.2 4% 

Wholesaling 8.7 9% 68 3% 2.3 7% 0.7 12% 

Restaurant 60.2 60% 1,377 64% 19.2 57% 3.3 59% 

Retailing 8.9 9% 213 10% 4.1 12% 1.0 19% 

Total 100.1 100% 2,147 100% 34.0 100% 5.6 100% 

Production 

Sector 22.2 22% 489 23% 8.2 24% 0.7 10% 

Distribution 

Sector 77.9 78% 1,658 77% 25.7 76% 4.9 90% 

 Source: Posadas 2005c. 

Aquaculture. Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana are the nation’s top four 

performing states in terms of farmed catfish production. Of these four southern states, 

Mississippi ranked first in small, medium, and large food-sized catfish production, raising 162 

million pounds in 2005. In comparison, Arkansas, which ranked second for catfish production, 

produced 52 million pounds of farmed catfish, all sizes, in this same year (USDA 2005). Figure 

60 maps the location of fish hatcheries and fish farms in Mississippi. 

Mississippi produces 75 percent of all domestically farmed catfish in the nation. In 2005, there 

were 95,100 acres of water surface used for farming catfish (foodsize, fingerlings, and broodfish 

combined). Five thousand pounds per acre per year is the usual production, but some farmers 

harvest in excess of 7,000 pounds per acre. The farm production value of catfish in Mississippi 

is estimated at $224 million per year (Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce, No 

date). 

Catfish production in Mississippi is most extensive in the counties of Sunflower (24,500 acres), 

Humphreys (21,300 acres), Leflore (16,400 acres), Washington (6,800 acres), and Noxubee 

(6,300 acres) (Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce, No date). These counties 

are located in the northwestern part of the state. Due to their inland location, the farmed catfish 

industry in these counties was not disrupted by Hurricane Katrina. 

141
Bay

St Louis

Gulfport

Biloxi

in Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

0 5 10 2.5

Mil

10

59

49

Fish Hatcheries and Aquaculture of the Mississippi Coast

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

St Peter Projects

Wildlife Rehabilitation

Society

Michael Trawl Co.

Creel's Trawl Co.

Custom Pack, Inc

Se

Ward Bayou

Wildlife

Management

Fish Hatchery

Aquaculture

142
III. RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRIES AND 

 PARTICIPANTS IN MISSISSIPPI

Recreational and Charter Fisheries. Recreational fishing and charter boating are major 

contributors to the state’s tourism-based economy. Approximately one-quarter of recreational 

fishing in Mississippi occurs in coastal waters (NMFS 2005c). According to the Mississippi 

State University, Sea Grant Program, commercial sports fishing has a statewide economic impact 

of $35.9 million (MSUSG, No date). The revenues generated by recreational and charter fishing 

activities in Mississippi increase each year. In 2001, approximately 600,000 recreational anglers 

(75% resident, 25% non-resident) spent approximately $211 million dollars on trip-related 

expenses (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 2002). In 2003, recreational fishing in Mississippi 

generated a total of $219 million in retail sales for a total state combined economic effect of 

$423 million dollars (includes multiplier effect). In that year, recreational fishing and associated 

marine services supported nearly 4,600 jobs, and paid out $100 million dollars in wages. 

Further, recreational fishing generated some $31 million in sales and motor fuel, state, and 

federal income tax revenues (American Sportfishing Association 2004). Figure 61 provides the 

pre-Katrina location of marinas and charter services along the Mississippi coast. 

143
Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay

St Louis

in Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

0 5 10 2.5

Mil

10

59

49

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Marinas and Charter Services of the Mississippi Coast Marinas

Charter Companies

144
The approximately 18 saltwater fishing tournaments held each year throughout coastal 

Mississippi attract both resident and out-of-state anglers (MDMR, No date). According to 

NMFS (2005c) some 400,000 licensed recreational fishery participants (315,610 residents; 

63,650 non-residents) took 1.1 million trips and caught 2.7 million pounds of fish in Mississippi 

in 2004. Of these recreational outings, 12,300 were charter boat trips. Bass, crappie, and blue 

gill were the most popular recreational catches. 

Long a popular local and tourist destination, Biloxi has been the main hub for charter boat 

fishing in Mississippi. Historically, the majority of visitors have come from the Midwest and 

Southeastern states. Increasingly, however, charter boat guides are using the Internet to advertise 

their services and are drawing clients nationwide. In 2005, there were 100 members registered 

with the Mississippi Charter Boat Captains Association. In Biloxi, there were 75 fully licensed 

charter boat operators, with the majority holding a federal reef fish permit. 

In the Biloxi fleet, there are three main types of charter vessels, “Six Packs,” “T-Boats,” and 

“Chandeleur Boats.” “Six Packs” are licensed “OPUV” (Operation Passenger Uninspected 

Vessels) charters that carry up to six passengers. Six Packs comprise the majority of the Biloxi 

charter fleet. “T-Boats” are multi-passenger vessels; some of the larger models carrying between 

20 and 40 passengers. There are approximately six T-Boat captains in the Biloxi fleet who make 

a living solely running charter trips. “Chandeleur Boats” are unique to the Mississippi charter 

industry. Chandeleur Boats are so called because they charter three to four day trips to the 

Chandeleur Islands off the coast of Louisiana; passengers sleep aboard the “Mothership.” The 

“Mothership,” which is generally more than 50 feet in length, carries several smaller skiffs from 

which clients can fish. There were 14 Chandeleur boats in the pre-Katrina Biloxi fleet (IAI, 

Field Observations, Biloxi, October 2005). 

The majority of charter fishing in Biloxi takes place in three areas: the Back Bay (freshwater); 

inside the islands (state waters); and offshore (federal waters). There are four “charter boat” 

seasons: spring (April-May), summer (June-August); fall (September-October); and winter 

(November-March). In the spring, recreational fishermen typically fish for cobia (“lemon-fish”) 

inside state waters, and small sharks, bonnethead, bull sharks, and Atlantic angel sharks outside 

of state waters. During the summer season, charter fishing participants target red fish (“red 

drum”) inshore, and tarpon, jack crevalle, and shark offshore. In the fall, king mackerel and red 

snapper are the main targets. Winter fishing is weather-dependent, with white and speckled 

trout, ground mullet, red fish, and mackerel as the primary catches. 

Clearly, recreational and sport fishing are economically important to the state economy. 

MSUSG further anticipates that this industry will grow 18.5 percent in Mississippi by the year 

2025. In support of this industry’s growth, the federal government has in the past apportioned 

nearly $2 million dollars per year to Mississippi’s state recreational fishery. These funds have 

been used to improve and maintain access to fishing-related infrastructure such as fishing piers 

and boat ramps (MSUSG, No date). 

 Commercial Fishery Participants. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2004), 

approximately 15,495 or 1.3 percent of the employed civilian population in Mississippi identified 

farming, fishing, and forestry occupations as their primary source of income. In 2000, 14,462 or 

145
1.2 percent of the employed civilian population in this state claimed farming, fishing, and 

forestry occupations as their primary source of income (U.S. Census Bureau 2000; U.S. Census 

Bureau 2004). 

Preliminary data from NMFS (2005e) indicates that there were 351 federally-permitted and 750 

state-permitted fishing vessels (all species) in Mississippi in 2004. In 2004, the state issued a 

total of 688 commercial shrimping licenses: 512 resident and 176 non-resident. These vessels 

averaged 46.7 feet in length and were licensed to harvest an average of 1.8 species. Figure 62 

details the location of commercial fishing permit holders along the Mississippi coast prior to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

146
Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay

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Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Commercial Fishing Permit Holders

in Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

Commercial Fishing Permit Holders

147
In 2005, there were 662 licensed commercial shrimping vessels in the Mississippi fishing fleet in 

(Table 67). Nearly 45 percent of these vessels were licensed to Harrison County residents. 

Almost 30 percent of this fleet was licensed to Jackson County residents, and 18 percent to 

Hancock County residents (Posadas 2006b). 

Table 67. Licensed Resident Mississippi Commercial Shrimping Units: 2005 

County <30 Feet 30-45 Feet >45 Feet Total Percent 

Hancock 50 49 23 122 18.4% 

Harrison 47 80 168 295 44.6% 

Jackson 47 72 76 195 29.5% 

Others 35 10 5 50 7.6% 

Total 179 211 272 662 100.0% 

Source: Posadas 2006b. 

The licensed resident commercial fleet in Mississippi in 2005 numbered 1,030 (Table 68). 

Nearly 94 percent of all commercially licensed vessels in 2005 were located in the coastal 

counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson, with 40 percent licensed to residents of Harrison 

County, alone (Posadas 2006b). Nearly two-thirds (64%) of all licensed vessels were engaged in 

shrimping, with 93 percent located in Hancock (18%), Harrison (45%), and Jackson (30%) 

Counties (Posadas 2006b). 

Table 68. Licensed Resident Mississippi Commercial Fishing Units, 

Net of Multiple Licenses: 2005 

County Number Percent Average # of 

Licenses per Vessel 

Average Length 

of Vessel (ft.) 

Hancock 220 21.4% 1.7 39.3 

Harrison 418 40.6% 1.8 53.4 

Jackson 326 31.7% 2.0 39.0 

Others 66 6.4% 1.2 19.5 

Total 1,030 100.0% 1.8 46.7 

 Source: Posadas 2006b. 

Prior to Katrina, a commercial shrimping fleet of approximately 180 fishing vessels (70-95 feet) 

served the Biloxi processing and marketing sector. The Biloxi shrimp fleet delivered to three 

primary buyers: P & M Seafood (with about 60 vessels), Golden Gulf Coast (with approximately 

80 vessels), and R.A. Lesso (with some 30 vessels) (IAI, Field Observations, October-November 

2005). 

148
Ninety-five percent of commercial shrimpers in Biloxi are Vietnamese (IAI, Field Observations, 

Biloxi, October 2005). Most came to Mississippi as refugees from the Vietnam War and settled 

in Point Cadet in East Biloxi. Approximately 80 percent of Biloxi’s Vietnamese population 

worked in the fishing industry; the remaining 20 percent worked in the casinos that surround 

Point Cadet and on offshore oil rigs (IAI, Field Observations, Biloxi, October 2005; Worden 

2005). 

The Pass Christian or “western” Mississippi fishery consists primarily of oysters– there is only 

one large shrimp processor in this region. Pass Christian’s on-shore processing sector consists 

mainly of brokers who buy oysters and shrimp from the harvesters. These brokers also ice and 

transport the seafood to nearby processing plants, mainly in Biloxi. A comparatively modest 

number of large fishing vessels (50) serve the Pass Christian area. Most of Pass Christian’s 

fishermen are oyster harvesters who rely heavily on additional income earned from shrimping or 

other second jobs (IAI, Field Observations, October-November 2005). 

There are typically fewer commercial oyster harvesters than shrimpers. Variance in the number 

of commercial oyster fishery participants in any given year is typical for the industry. Between 

1992 and 2002, the number of oyster harvesters ranged from 250 to 500, with an average of 350 

participants. In 2002, there were some 350 commercial oyster men and women in Mississippi. 

The change in numbers of oyster participants is largely due to wide variations in production 

levels. Figure 63 also reveals an increase in dredge use by fishermen as a preferred method of 

harvesting. 

0

100

200

300

400

1992199319941995199619971998

1999200020012002

Tongers Dredgers

0

100

200

300

400

1992199319941995199619971998

1999200020012002

Tongers Dredgers

 Figure 63. Number of Commercial Oyster Fishery Participants, Mississippi: 1992-2002. 

 Source: Posadas 2005c. 

149
Additional Infrastructure. Figure 64 identifies the pre-Katrina location of boat builders 

and related facilities in coastal Mississippi. 

150
Gulfport

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Estimated Storm Surge

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allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Boat Builders & Brokers, Maintenance

and Repair in Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

Boat Builders & Brokers of the Mississippi Coast

151
E. Hurricane Katrina: Mississippi State Fisheries Impact 

I. GEOGRAPHY OF STORM SURGE AND WINDS ASSOCIATED WITH 

 HURRICANE KATRINA 

 Hurricane Katrina caused severe flooding and wind damage throughout much of coastal 

Mississippi. In Hancock and Harrison Counties, storm surge damage extended from north of the 

bayous to Interstate Highway 10. The storm surge rose to 28 feet in Hancock County, 26 feet at 

the Biloxi River at Wotham, and 16 feet in Pascagoula. Flooding in the eastern part of Pass 

Christian exceeded 20 feet above ground level. According to the National Weather Service 

Forecast Office, “Severe damage was seen near and up to 76 miles east of the center of Katrina” 

(2005). The following figures (65 through 67) provide aerial representations of some of the 

Katrina affected areas in coastal Mississippi. Figure 68 provides an indication of pre-Katrina 

population density and the percent of African-American residents living in coastal Mississippi in 

2000. It also depicts estimated Katrina-related storm surge and flooding in these areas.

152
153
42

Biloxi

NOAA: Aug. 21, 2005

Biloxi

NOAA: Aug. 21, 2005

Boat 

Harbor/Storage

Boat 

Harbor/Storage

Community Community

Bridge Bridge

Casinos Casinos

154
43

Biloxi Post Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Biloxi Post Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Boat 

Harbor/Storage

Boat 

Harbor/Storage

Bridge: US-90 Bridge: US-90

Community Community Casinos Casinos

155
Statewide

Population Density

10

CSX RR

Illinois

Central RR

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St Louis

Gulfport

Biloxi

10

10

90

49

Bay

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Gulfport

Biloxi

Jackson

Persons per hectare

Estimated storm surge Estimated post storm flooding

and Hurricane Katrina

Coastal Mississippi

Census 2000 Block Groups

0 3 6 9 12 15 1.5

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Transportation Infrastructure

Population Density

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20 - 25

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ocal Roads and Arterials

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Railroad Line

Hurricane Katrina

Estimated Storm Surge and Flooding

Population Density

Census 2000 Block Groups

Transportation Infrastructure

Missis

156
II. EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON MISSISSIPPI’S MARINE-BASED 

 INFRASTRUCTURE 

The marine-related infrastructure in the coastal counties of Harrison, Hancock, and 

Jackson supports various marine-based industries, ranging from harvesting and production to 

processing. The seafood processing and distribution sectors are particularly active in this state 

(Figure 69). 

157
Gulfport

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Seafood Processors of the Mississippi Coast

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Seafood Processor

158
Seafood Processing. Harrison County is the center of Mississippi’s seafood processing 

industry. The bulk of shrimp processing occurs in Biloxi (east Mississippi), while Pass Christian 

(west Mississippi) specializes in oyster production. The Biloxi industry is by far the largest of 

the two market systems. Much of the shrimp processed in Biloxi is imported from Louisiana, 

Texas, Thailand, and India (NMFS and Mississippi Department of Seafood Resources 2005). 

There were 69 licensed seafood processing establishments in Mississippi in 2005, pre-Katrina 

(Table 69). The majority of the processing plants (57 or 83%) were located in the 3 coastal 

counties, with 34 facilities in Harrison County, 14 facilities in Jackson County, and 9 in Hancock 

County (Posadas 2006a). 

Table 69. Number of Pre-Katrina Seafood Processing Plants, 

Mississippi: 2005 

Licensed Seafood Processing 

Plants 

County 

Number Percent 

Hancock 9 13.0% 

Harrison 34 49.3% 

Jackson 14 20.3% 

Others 12 17.3% 

Total 69 100.0% 

 Source: Posadas 2006a. 

Within Harrison County, the majority of seafood processing facilities were located in Biloxi 

(Posadas 2006a). Prior to Katrina, there were 18 seafood processors, 15 of which processed only 

shrimp, in Biloxi (IAI, Field Observations, October 2005; Posadas, No date; Posadas 2006a). 

Seven of these plants employed up to 40 full-time employees and 100 seasonal employees (IAI, 

Field Observations, October 2005). The remaining plants were smaller, family-run businesses 

with five to eight employees. 

The seven large processing facilities freeze, package, and distribute the majority of shrimp 

landed each year by the “eastern Mississippi fleet” (IAI, Field Observations, October-November 

2005). Approximately 75 percent (n=390) of the total on-shore processing sector labor force 

(N=505) worked for one of these seven major processors (IAI, Field Observations, OctoberNovember 2005). Distributors, who typically purchase product at the dock and deliver it to the 

principal processors, employed another 15 percent of the industry workers. “Brokers,” who 

purchase product at the docks and deliver or “truck” it to any number of distant U.S. markets, 

comprised the remaining 10 percent of on-shore processing employment. Although a few of the 

processors and dealers in Biloxi are almost entirely dependent on domestic shrimp, most rely on 

a “mixed” market, importing 50 to 90 percent of their product (IAI, Field Observations, OctoberNovember 2005). 

159
Six of Biloxi’s largest seafood processing plants were destroyed (Newsom 2006). Table 70 

provides the operational status of the major seafood processors in Biloxi as of May 2006. 

Table 70. Status of Major Biloxi Processors: May 2006 

Processors Location Status Comments 

R.A. Fayard 

Seafood 

Biloxi Closed Sold site to Boomtown Casinos. 

Currently operating in Harvey, LA. 

Rebuilding new facility in Biloxi. 

J & W Seafood Biloxi Closed -- 

C.F. Gollot Brothers Biloxi Closed Currently operating out of Harvey, LA. 

Global Seafood 

Technologies 

Biloxi Closed Trying to relocate 

R.A. Lesso Biloxi Open Sells ice to others. 

Gulf Pride Biloxi Open Shared its facility with 2 other processors 

between Sept. 2005 and May 2006 

Suarez/M & M Biloxi Open Moving into former “Ole Biloxi” site. 

Adding 2 new peelers. 

Golden Gulf Biloxi Open Shared its facility with 2 other processors 

between Sept. 2005 and May 2006 

Weem’s Brothers Biloxi Closed -- 

Shemper Seafood Biloxi Closed -- 

Biloxi Freezing & 

Processing, Inc. 

Biloxi Closed -- 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, May 2006. 

In May 2006, the four operating plants were processing about 200,000 pounds of shrimp from 

non-Mississippi waters everyday– about half of what they did before Katrina (Keller 2006b). 

In Pass Christian (Hancock County), the principal oyster processor sustained severe damage, but 

was able to resume limited operations by the end of October 2005. Prior to Katrina, most of the 

oysters processed in Pass Christian came from Mississippi oyster reefs, supplemented by oysters 

from Western Louisiana and Texas. In the months following the storm, however, all of their 

supply came from the Houma area of Louisiana and Texas (IAI, Field Observations, OctoberDecember 2005). 

 

160
Estimates of recovery time for each facility vary from a few months, for those with relatively 

minor damage, to more than one year. Facility owners base their recovery time estimates on the 

provision that required materials, supplies, equipment, and employees will be available–and 

affordable. These estimates also assume that the processors will be able to purchase seafood as 

fishing is resumed. However, a failure in any one of these essential fishery components or 

recovery efforts could disrupt all recovery. For instance, the hint of contaminated product, a 

regulatory constraint on fishing, continually escalating fuel prices, debris-related closures, falling 

prices for product, or any number of other disruptions could significantly delay recovery. For 

the oyster industry, the destruction of the primary oyster reefs, both off the immediate coast of 

Mississippi and off the coast of Louisiana (the principal source of U.S. oysters), will almost 

certainly create a two-year hiatus in the delivery of Gulf oysters to market. 

Two of the now-closed processors in Biloxi–Weems and Del Seaway– were in the process of 

selling their businesses when Katrina made landfall; Katrina merely closed the deal. Gollott’s 

Seafood in D’Iberville is one of the Coast’s oldest seafood processing plants. This is the first 

season since Hurricane Camille in 1969 that they have not been open. Gollott’s, which is 

planning to build a new processing plant 30-feet above sea level, had hoped to be open by the 

start of shrimp season, but construction delays pushed their grand reopening off until at least July 

20064

 (WLOX 2006). 

By January 2006, there were four operational seafood processing plants in coastal Mississippi: 

two in Biloxi, one in Pascagoula, and one in Pass Christian. Only one facility, however, was 

able to find affordable and reliable labor; three of the four remain understaffed relative to their 

pre-Katrina employment levels. That processing plant has been dependent upon immigrant 

laborers who are participants in the H2B Visa program since Katrina, but is still understaffed. 

Typically, H2B Visa employees return to their country of origin during the usually slow winter 

months, but with few operational processors on the coast this winter, work was still plentiful and 

many H2B Visa employees took advantage of this unusually plentiful labor opportunity. 

According to an executive of this processing plant, “Without [H2B Visa employees), we would 

be greatly hurt” (Personal Communication, IAI, Mississippi, January 11, 2006). 

Processors describe their industry as “in turmoil and looking for answers”; inflated property 

values means less affordable real estate available for processors along the Mississippi Coast (IAI, 

Field Observations, October 2006). In response to this problem, the Harrison County 

Development Commission (HCDC) is pursuing the establishment of an industrial park dedicated 

to seafood production. Since current regulations do not require processing plants to be on the 

waterfront, seafood could be trucked in. However, the project is still in its early stages and 

developers must address the lack of pier space, and secure funding (Newsom 2006). Meetings 

on the seafood industrial park first occurred during January 2006 (Kessie 2006). On June 7, 

2006, the HCDC received $180,000 from the U.S. Economic Development Administration to 

conduct an engineering site survey to find the best location within the county for the park. An 

HCDC commissioner indicates that land north of Interstate 10 is a likely location. Once built, 

this park will be open to any Gulf Coast processing company (Keller 2006a). 

 

4

 Gollot’s was still closed and unable to process orders as of January 2007. 

161
Seafood Dealers. There were 141 licensed seafood dealers (commercial and retail, 

combined) in Mississippi in 2005 prior to Katrina’s arrival (Figure 70) (Posadas 2006a). 

162
Gulfport

Biloxi

Bay

St Louis

of the Mississippi Coast

0 5 10 2.5

Mile

10

59

49

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Seafood Retailers and Wholesalers

Seafood Dealer

in Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

163
More than half (79 or 56%) of these dealers were located in the three coastal counties of 

Hancock (19 dealers), Harrison (39 dealers), and Jackson (21 dealers) (Table 71) (Posadas 

2006a). 

Table 71. Number of Pre-Katrina Licensed Seafood Dealers, 

Mississippi: 2005 

County Licensed Seafood Dealers 

Number Percent 

Hancock 19 13.5% 

Harrison 39 27.7% 

Jackson 21 14.9% 

Others 62 44.0% 

Total 141 100.0% 

 Source: Posadas 2006a. 

Hurricane Katrina seriously damaged or destroyed all of the seafood dealerships along the 

Mississippi Gulf Coast. In Pass Christian, Katrina destroyed the facilities of all eleven major 

seafood brokers and dealers located at the harbor, including Jerry Forte Seafood, Kimball’s 

Seafood, and Pass Purchasing Seafood Company. In Biloxi, nine wholesale seafood dealerships 

were severely damaged. Six of these wholesale dealers were unable to resume operations until 

March 2006 (IAI, Field Observations, May 2006). 

 Shrimp. Commercial shrimpers in Mississippi are struggling to survive and rebuild in 

the wake of the storms, and it remains to be seen how many will remain in the industry. One 65-

year old shrimper describes the post-Katrina industry; 

The future of Biloxi seafood looks bleak. The shrimp looks good, but there is no ice, fuel 

docks, original slips (to dock boats) are busted up and we have tons of debris. I am not 

going to make it out this year because I have to repair my boat now that I have made my 

home livable. There is nothing consistent but problems down here (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Biloxi, May 5, 2006). 

In the first few months after Katrina, few shrimpers resumed operations because essential 

marine-related infrastructure and services, such as ice and fuel, were non-existent. Additionally, 

many fishermen were focused on repairing homes as well as boats and resettling their families 

and could not make fishing their first priority. In early November, for example, only six 

shrimpers (four in Biloxi; two in Pascagoula) were shrimping consistently. These few shrimpers 

were using fuel they had purchased prior to the storm or were traveling to Alabama to buy it. 

These shrimpers were also traveling inland for ice and trucking it back to Biloxi – all time and 

expense consuming activities. With only a few processors and dealers operating, however, there 

were few commercial buyers; a condition which served to further discourage erstwhile shrimpers 

who might otherwise consider fishing. Instead, most working shrimpers sold white shrimp off 

their boats directly to consumers at a rate of $3 to $4 dollars per pound for smaller sizes and $4 

164
to $6 for the larger variety. They explained that “cutting out the middleman” was the only way 

to cover the high costs of operations and make a profit. 

The month of May marked the opening of the 2006 shrimp season in Louisiana. In the first half 

of this month, approximately 35-40 vessels from Biloxi (about 15 percent of the pre-Katrina 

fleet) and ten vessels from Pass Christian left port to join other shrimpers in Louisiana. Of these 

vessels, approximately 33 were large freezer vessels and 17 were smaller trawlers. The majority 

of the large freezer vessels (30) were Vietnamese-owned boats from the Back Bay. These large 

vessels represent approximately 75 percent of the total operational freezer boat fleet in Biloxi; 

the remaining vessels are either in need of repair or the owners could not afford the overhead 

required for a shrimping trip to Louisiana. 

Many of the smaller vessels returned within 48 hours of their trip, explaining that the scarcity of 

ice, the high cost of fuel, the number of shrimpers competing in state waters, and the poor 

catches did not justify staying out longer. There are at least two reasons why these 

comparatively small boats with lower operational costs have more difficulty competing for 

shrimp in the post-Katrina environment than do the freezer vessels. First, unlike the freezer 

boats which have their own freezer compartment aboard for ice (hence the name, “freezer 

vessel”), the smaller boats hold only a limited amount of ice. Once melted, it must be 

replenished to protect freshly-caught shrimp against spoilage. However, there were only two 

places in south Louisiana in May 2006 that were selling ice to anyone (“outsiders”), as opposed 

to a select (“insider”) clientele. The difficulty in obtaining fuel was discouraging to outsider 

shrimpers. Second, small boats also have small fuel tanks, and motoring between Mississippi 

and Louisiana burns a great deal of fuel. In comparison, large vessels can hold up to several 

weeks of fuel and typically do not have to worry about refueling while in the waters on a single 

trip. Thus, despite having higher overhead costs, larger freezer vessels have a competitive 

advantage over smaller boats that cannot afford to stay in the waters long enough to catch 

enough shrimp to profit–or reliably purchase fuel. 

At the start of the shrimp season in August 2005, the Mississippi Department of Marine 

Resources (MDMR) conducted an aerial survey. They observed a total of 603 shrimp boats, 

representing an increase from 2004 when the MDMR tallied 538 shrimp boats. The majority of 

these boats congregated in the Petit Bois, Cat, and Horn islands areas (Gulf Coast Fisherman 

2005). 

At the start of the shrimp season in Mississippi on June 7, 2006, however, the MDMR observed 

only 306 shrimp boats in their aerial survey of the waters. This represents a 50 percent decrease 

from 2005. The majority of these boats were congregated in the Petit Bois and Horn islands 

areas, where waters were still a landmine of debris (WLOX 2006). 

As of May 31, 2006, MDMR had issued 215 commercial shrimping licenses. Last year at that 

same time, MDMR had issued 588 commercial shrimping licenses. This change represents a 63 

percent decline (Keller 2006b). 

 Oysters. Pass Christian’s oyster reefs were among the largest on the Mississippi Gulf 

Coast (Coast Chamber 2003). Prior to this storm, some $15 million in oysters and $5 million in 

165
shrimp came through the Pass Christian Marina each year (Leslie 2005). Following the storm, 

the Mississippi Gulf Coast oyster fleet was completely shut down, with 50 percent of vessels in 

Pass Christian destroyed. According to the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources 

(MDMR), Hurricane Katrina damaged and disrupted approximately 90 percent of these oyster 

beds. Although there are active beds, oysters are not expected to mature for two years. At this 

point, the future of the commercial fishing industry in this Gulf Coast area is unknown. 

Although state oyster beds were initially closed to fishing because of pollution and debris 

concerns immediately following the storm, biologists quickly concluded that water pollution was 

not a public health concern and soon reopened state waters. However, debris in the water 

continued to be a major concern as of May 2006 – especially to shrimpers working inshore. 

Debris removal efforts have been inconsistent. Along the eastern shoreline of Pascagoula, for 

example, initial efforts by the Coast Guard in the days following Katrina to clean local 

waterways were abruptly halted by inter-agency bureaucracy and have yet to resume as of May 

2006. In the interim, individual boat building companies began doing much of the debris 

removal (Personal Communication, IAI, Processor, Pascagoula, May 2006). In Biloxi, the Army 

Corps of Engineers cleared the Back Bay’s major channels in the weeks after the storm, but very 

little clean-up has taken place in the Front Bay. The tremendous amount of debris still left in the 

water concerns small craft fishermen who do not want to damage their boats or gear. A 60-year 

old shrimper moored at the Small Craft Harbor describes the local clean-up efforts: 

We have been waiting for the city, or DMR to come clean up the water, but we know 

that’s not going to happen, so we will be pulling debris with our first shrimp trawls. The 

lucky will come home with nets. We will be doing the clean up ourselves. It’s a gamble 

(Personal Communication, IAI, Biloxi, May 2006). 

 Marinas. Several marinas in Biloxi were also damaged by Katrina. Both the Small Craft 

Harbor in Biloxi’s Front Bay and the Biloxi Back Bay commercial marina lost about half of their 

slips (Figure 71). The Point Cadet recreational harbor lost 22 of its 299 slips. By May 2006, 

however, the Small Craft Harbor, which docked up to 50 boats before the storm, was under 

repair and docking up to 37 boats (Figure 72). Also by May, 50 of Back Bay’s 70 slips were 

available for use, and the Point Cadet marina was semi-operational and docking 175 boats 

(Figure 73), but lacking power and supplies. Fuel, bait, ice, and tackle were only minimally 

available. Fifty of the boats docking here are charter boats. These charters offer construction 

workers an opportunity to engage in recreational fishing as a break from their work. The Point 

Cadet Marina intends to build at least 20 more slips to house the bigger 40-to-60 foot boats, as 

demand for such slips is growing (Jones 2006). 

166
 Figure 71. Small Craft Harbor, Front Bay, Biloxi, MS: November 2005. 

 Source: IAI Staff, November 2005. 

 Figure 72. Small Craft Harbor, Front Bay, Biloxi: May 2006. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

167
 Figure 73. Recreational Harbor, Point Cadet. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

The Gulfport Harbor sustained much greater damage; it was virtually destroyed with most of its 

buildings literally blown or swept away (Figures 74 and 75). The harbor was home to a number 

of boat sales and repair yards including Kremer Marine, Ability Marine, and Competition 

Marine, and to dock constructors Coastal Marine Construction (Martin 2005). 

168
38

Docks and Harbor Docks and Harbor

Vessel at Dock Vessel at Dock

Shipping Shipping 

Containers Containers

Gulfport: Pre-Katrina

NOAA: Aug 21, 2005

Gulfport: Pre-Katrina

NOAA: Aug 21, 2005

169
39

Gulfport: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Gulfport: Post-Katrina

NOAA: Aug. 31, 2005

Shipping Shipping 

Containers Containers

Dock Damage Dock Damage

Beached Vessel Beached Vessel

170
 Charter Boats. Biloxi’s charter industry faces huge obstacles in the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina because of the significant damage to the marine-related infrastructure. The majority of 

the marinas on the Mississippi Gulf Coast were either seriously damaged or destroyed; the 

remaining few are only semi-operational and lack fuel docks and electricity. Major harbors, 

roads, and bridges were destroyed; and the remaining infrastructure is insufficient to support 

tourism. Accommodations are particularly scarce. Rooms at the three operating casino hotels 

are full, and most of the smaller motels along Highway 90 were destroyed; motels on I-10 and I49 are fully occupied by construction and recovery personnel. Tourists who otherwise might 

have booked a three-day trip are now driving in from other locations for day trips. Effectively, 

all charter operations in Biloxi were shutdown through the end of November 2005. 

The President of the Mississippi Charter Boat Association estimates that 50 percent of the charter 

fleet in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, combined was damaged, with ten percent damaged 

in Mississippi alone. Formerly, 150 charter boats operated out of the Biloxi area. As of June 

2006, there were a few charters operating in Biloxi from the Point Cadet Harbor, the one fully 

operational public marina in Biloxi. Additionally, there was only one commercial fuel facility 

open at that time. The lack of accommodations and restaurants are deterring tourists from 

booking charter trips. Most of the current clientele are construction and recovery personnel who 

are working in the area (IAI, Field Observation, June 2006).

 Additional Infrastructure Damage. Biloxi’s harbor infrastructure was significantly 

impacted by Hurricane Katrina’s powerful storm surge. All seven public piers in Biloxi received 

some sort of damage, including the four piers which provided anglers with immediate access to 

the Sound. All three of Biloxi’s marine haul-out facilities and ice plants were destroyed (IAI, 

Field Observations 2005; Newsom 2006). By mid-November 2005, three of Biloxi’s four 

commercial docks were operating at only 60 percent, with the fourth operating at 80 percent 

(Table 72). 

171
Table 72. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Biloxi, Mississippi, 

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 3 0 1 1 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 4 1 1 1 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 6 1 1 1 Point Cadet is 

open 

Fishing Gear, electronics, 

welding, and other repair 

4 0 4 4 -- 

Fishing associations 

(recreational/commercial) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Fish processors 18 2* 2* 4 *Two facilities 

open with three 

processors 

operating at 

each. 

Major offloading facilities 5 1 1 1 -- 

Fisheries research laboratories 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing monuments 1* 0 0 0 *The “Golden 

Fisherman” was 

destroyed 

Fishing pier 7 2 2 3 Public piers. 

Marine railways/haul out 

facilities 

3 0 1 1 -- 

Maritime museums 1 0 0 0 -- 

Net makers 2 0 1 1 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

2 1 2 2 -- 

Public boat ramps 7 2 6 6 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 5 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 7 0 0 0 -- 

Recreational fishing 

Tournaments 

9 0 3 3 -- 

Seafood retail markets 3 1 3 3 -- 

Seafood wholesale dealers 9 2 6 6 -- 

Trucking operations 1 1 1 1 -- 

Charter/party boats 65 20 30 30 -- 

Commercial boats 180 300 20 20 -- 

 Source: IAI, Field Operations, 2005 & 2006. 

172
Much of Biloxi’s marine-related infrastructure and services had yet to be restored as of May 

2006 (IAI, Field Observations, May-June 2006). Difficulty in finding construction crews was 

delaying much of the restoration work, as the majority of construction workers were engaged 

rebuilding businesses and homes (Jones 2006). 

Marine-related infrastructure and services in Pass Christian also had not returned to their preKatrina capacities. As of May 2006, all six fishing piers and fishing supplies stores remained 

closed; only two of the public boat ramps were operable. Additionally, just one of five 

wholesale seafood dealers had resumed business. About half of the commercial fishing vessels 

licensed to Pass Christian residents still needed salvage and/or repair (Table 73). 

Table 73. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Pass Christian, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

 2006 

Comments 

Docking facilities 

(commercial) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, and other repair 

5 0 0 0 -- 

Fish processors 1 1 1 1 -- 

Fishing pier 6 0 0 0 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries 

office (port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 4 2 2 2 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing 

supplies 

3 0 0 0 -- 

Sea Grant Extension 

office 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood retail markets 6 0 0 0 -- 

Seafood wholesale dealers 5 0 1 1 -- 

Charter/party boats 1 1 0 0 -- 

Commercial boats 55 30 25 25 Moored at the marina 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Tables 74 through 80 provide data on the marine-related infrastructure and services in the other 

study communities surveyed for this study. Counts for these communities were conducted in 

October 2004, October 2005, and June 2006. 

173
Harrison County 

Table 74. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in D’Iberville, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 

Docking facilities 

(commercial) 

4 0 1 

Major processors 2 0 1 

Other processors 3 0 1 

NMFS or state fisheries 

office (port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 

Seafood wholesale dealers 5 0 2 

Charter/party boats n/a n/a n/a 

Commercial boats ~50 0 n/a 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Table 75. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Gulfport, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

 

 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 

Boat yards/boat builders 1 0 1 

Recreational docking facilities 1 0 1 

Fishing gear, electronics, welding, 

and other repair 

2 0 0 

Hotels/Inns (dockside/ocean front) 20 0 5 

Public Boat Ramps 1 0 1 

Bait & Tackle/fishing supplies 2 0 0 

Seafood restaurants 10 3 10 

Seafood retail markets 4 0 0 

Charter/party boats n/a 0 0 

Commercial boats n/a 0 0 

174
Table 76. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Long Beach, 

Mississippi Pre-and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 Comments 

Commercial docking 

facilities 

1 0 0 -- 

Seafood processors 1 0 0 -- 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 2 0 0 -- 

Offloading facilities 1 0 0 -- 

Public boat ramps 2 0 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 0 0 The city plans to 

rebuild. 

Bait & tackle/fishing 

supplies 

2 0 0 Waiting for the harbor 

to be rebuilt before 

 reopening. 

Seafood restaurants 9 n/a 3 At least four have 

 moved inland. 

Seafood retail markets 4 0 1 -- 

Trucking operations 1 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats 4 0 4 -- 

Commercial fishing boats n/a 0 0 -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

175
Jackson County

Table 77. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Moss Point, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 Comments 

Boat yard/boat builder 4 n/a 2 -- 

Commercial docking facilities 1 0 1 -- 

Seafood processors 1 0 1 Oyster and crab 

Fishing piers 2 0 2 -- 

Offloading facilities 1 0 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 5 0 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 5 0 3 One is rebuilding. 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 0 1 -- 

Seafood restaurants 4 0 4 -- 

Seafood retail markets 4 0 1 3 permanently 

closed. 

Charter/party boats n/a n/a n/a -- 

Commercial fishing boats n/a n/a n/a -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Table 78. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Pascagoula, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005 & 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 Comment 

Boat yards/boat builders 3 3 3 -- 

Docking facilities (commercial) 4 1 1 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, welding, 

and other repair 

2 1 2 -- 

Seafood processors 1 1 1 Semi-operational

NMFS or state fisheries office 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 1 2 -- 

Sea Grant Extension office 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood retail markets 5 1 3 -- 

Seafood wholesale dealers 5 2 2 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a n/a n/a -- 

Commercial fishing boats n/a n/a n/a -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

176
Hancock County 

Table 79. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Bay St. Louis, 

Mississippi, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 Comments 

Commercial docking 

facilities 

1 0 0 -- 

Major processors 1 0 0 Carmel Seafood 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 2 0 0 Bay Marina lost lodge 

in storm; docks & 

RV park open 

Offloading facilities 1 0 0 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 0 1 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 5 0 3 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing 

supplies 

3 0 0 -- 

Seafood restaurants 7 0 1 -- 

Seafood retail markets 5 0 1 -- 

Trucking operations 1 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a 0 2 -- 

Commercial boats n/a 0 5 Oyster beds closed 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Table 80. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Waveland, Mississippi 

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005 June 2006 Comments 

Seafood restaurants 9 0 0 -- 

Seafood retail markets 4 0 0 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a 0 0 -- 

Commercial boats n/a 0 0 -- 

 n/a = not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Coastal Mississippi was still experiencing shortages of marine-based supplies and products as of 

May 2006. Many vessels in Pass Christian, for example, were relying on fuel trucks from 

Louisiana, while vessels in Biloxi were steaming to Alabama for fuel (Figure 76). A few of the 

smaller vessels in Biloxi were able to purchase fuel locally from a small fuel owner “by 

177
appointment only,” while others – ostensibly on the outside of this political and social network– 

had to go to Alabama. Ice was also difficult to come by at that time. However, because 

relatively few shrimpers went out during the 2006 shrimp season, those who needed ice were 

able to obtain it either from a processor in Biloxi or one in Pascagoula. Finally, Mississippi 

seafood processors and retailers continued to rely on out-of-state product. In Pass Christian, 

processors were buying their oysters from Hopedale, Louisiana, while shrimp retailers in Biloxi 

were primarily getting their product from Bayou La Batre, Alabama. 

 

 Figure 76. Fuel-truck from Louisiana Fueling Boats in Pass Christian, Mississippi. 

 Source: IAI Staff, 2006. 

 Special Population Effects. The commercial fishing fleet in Mississippi is multicultural, consisting predominantly of first generation American men and women who selfidentify as “Vietnamese” or “Croatian”. Other participants include Americans whose families 

have participated in fishing in the region for generations. Ethnic cleavages are evident in the 

individual fisheries. 

Before Katrina, there were nearly 2,000 Vietnamese-Americans living in Biloxi, accounting for 

35 percent of Mississippi’s entire Vietnamese population. The majority lived in the Point Cadet 

area. Most of the Vietnamese immigrants who lived in Biloxi, as well as the rest of the Gulf 

Coast, arrived as refugees between 1970 and 1980, some of them as “boat people”. Almost all 

were Southern Vietnamese fleeing the Communist takeover. Many of these refugees were also 

fishermen in their native land, who continued to earn their living with fishing in the U.S. Like 

other Asian-American groups, the Gulf Coast Vietnamese fishing population has achieved a 

178
“functional level” of adaptation, assimilating where needed and utilizing skills from their 

homeland. 

In recent years, as much as 80 percent of Vietnamese-Americans living in Biloxi worked in the 

fishing industry– the remainder worked in retail, on offshore oil rigs, and the casinos that 

surround Point Cadet. While Cajun and Croatian immigrants once dominated Biloxi’s seafood 

industry, Vietnamese comprised 95 percent of shrimpers along the Mississippi coast (Figure 77). 

In many cases, fathers and sons shrimped, while mothers and daughters worked in the processing 

plants or on the docks alongside their husbands (IAI, Field Observations, October-December 

2005). 

 Figure 77. Vietnamese Shrimpers on Boat in Biloxi, MS. 

 Source: IAI Staff, January 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina almost entirely destroyed the marine-based infrastructure and dwellings in the 

Point Cadet area (Figure 78). Having lost both homes and boats, much of the VietnameseAmerican community was displaced. 

179
 Figure 78. Howard Avenue (three blocks from Point Cadet), Biloxi, MS. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

When it became clear that Katrina would likely make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane, many of 

the Point Cadet women and children fled to the homes of out-of-state family and friends or rode 

out the storm at one of the local churches or Buddhist temples. These facilities also served as a 

central meeting place for community members after the storm, providing a place for community 

connection, and a headquarters for coordinating action and relief efforts. Many of the men 

stayed behind on their boats hoping to protect their investments. In later interviews with IAI 

field workers, several shrimpers explained this potentially self-destructive decision by saying: 

“That’s all we’ve got is these boats. One of these big boats, they cost $700,000. Even if it sank, 

we’d still owe the payment; these boats are everything to us” (Personal Communication, IAI, 

Point Cadet, September 2005). 

The storm destroyed about one-third of the Point Cadet shrimp fleet – one-third of the larger 

vessels had already been repossessed by the SBA the previous year– and about one-third 

remained operable. Some of the intact fleet went out at least a few times to shrimp in the first 

few months after the storm, but with the low price of shrimp, high price of fuel, and no local 

places to offload, many opted not to fish. 

 

Several factors complicate both the short- and long-term recovery efforts of this community. 

Language, literacy, and cultural competency issues are the greatest barriers VietnameseAmericans face when trying to access FEMA or other forms of federal assistance. FEMA forms 

are currently only available in English, and there have been few or no translators and interpreters 

at FEMA and Red Cross registration centers (Tang 2005). Many first generation Vietnamese 

also do not realize they may be eligible for loans and grants from the government to help them 

rebuild boats and homes, or lack experience seeking federal aid and completing standardized 

180
forms. Additionally, the Vietnamese tend to rely on extended kin and informal community 

networks for financial assistance rather than on other formal distributional networks. These 

factors combine to produce an ethnic enclave that is not plugged into mainstream sources of aid, 

and cannot access resources outside of their neighborhood. 

Housing is now a particular challenge for those who want to return. About two-thirds of this 

Vietnamese community were living in motels, with relatives in nearby states, or went back to 

Vietnam in January. Many of the remaining one-third –mostly men–were living out of cars or in 

tents pitched on their property. Most said they wanted to return to Point Cadet, but did not have 

a place to live during the rebuilding process; most also lack insurance. Some who owned lots are 

funding their rebuilding efforts with cash. 

As coastal development makes affordable housing increasingly difficult to find, the Point Cadet 

fishing families will need governmental intervention if they are to remain in this area. 

Increasing property values and waterfront development mean force many of these shrimpers to 

find other places to dock and sell their catches (Schwartz 2006). Biloxi officials do describe 

themselves as “working” to protect the interests of shrimpers who fear displacement (Wilemon 

2006). Mayor Holloway acknowledges that, “If they don’t have a place to dock, they’re not 

going to come back. I don’t want that to happen. The Vietnamese community is an important 

part of Biloxi” (Wilemon 2006). Nonetheless, there are trade-offs between the shrimping 

industry and waterfront development that Biloxi faces. Recovery options include constraining 

waterfront development, accepting an accelerated decline of their shrimping industry, or 

relocating the industry’s infrastructure elsewhere. 

Because the Vietnamese came to this country as a result of war, they feel things can always be 

worse. Immigrant narratives largely told and retold within the family unit and to close friends, 

now take the form of, “We came here with nothing, and we can start with nothing once more”. 

Although many of the fishermen have lost homes, boats, and deck hands, faith in rebuilding is 

strong. “We can survive anything,” Vietnamese fishermen often say. 

Individual recovery efforts, however, can only be as successful as their civic leaders’ 

commitment to, and investment in, rebuilding essential marine-based infrastructure and services, 

including, but not limited to, access to loading, unloading, ice and fuel, and repair facilities. 

These fishermen need safe access to state and federal fishing waters without undue risk and the 

uncertainties associated with the debris brought by the hurricanes. 

 

III. ESTIMATED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON 

 MISSISSIPPI’S FISHERIES AND RELATED INDUSTRIES 

 Estimates of the economic effects of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s commercial and 

recreational fishing industries vary, sometimes widely, depending on the units of analysis 

included in a particular estimate. For example, in his presentation before the House 

Subcommittee on Fisheries and Oceans on December 15, 2005, Corky Perret, Vice-Chairman of 

Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, estimated hurricane-related impacts to 

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Mississippi’s marine fisheries at nearly $484 million (Table 81) (Gulf of Mexico Fishery 

Management Council 2005). 

Table 81. State Estimates of Hurricane Related Impacts to Mississippi 

Marine Fisheries as of November 3, 2005 

Marine-related Commodity or 

Infrastructure 

Estimated Loss 

Dockside Revenue Loss $31 million 

Loss of Economic Output associated with 

Dockside Revenue Loss 

$98 million 

Pier Replacement $9 million 

Menhaden Fishery Net Replacement $700 thousand 

Economic Output Associated with Marine 

Recreational Expenditures 

$293 million 

Seafood Dealer and Processor Facilities Losses $43 million 

Seafood Product Losses $9 million 

Total $484 million 

 Source: Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council 2005. 

Alternatively, the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory (GCRL) estimates the economic losses to 

Mississippi commercial and recreational fishing industries at around $170 to $200 million. 

However, this estimate does not include infrastructure damages to marinas, piers, ice houses, 

wharves, boat ramps, and related marine-based businesses. The GCRL based their preliminary 

estimates on interviews with roughly 25 percent of commercial fishery participants who work 

out of the Mississippi Sound. These fishermen additionally estimate damage to the fleet alone at 

$50 million. Interviews with 30 percent of the processors and dealers estimate losses to their 

segment of the industry at $120 million (Surratt 2005). 

More recently, preliminary data from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on 

commercial landings (all species combined) in Mississippi indicate that, in the last four months 

of 2005, landings revenue received for all species combined was just over $4.5 million dollars. 

This figure represents a 79 percent decline in revenue from the same period in 2004, and a 78 

percent decline from the five-year average for the same period (see Table 82) (NMFS SEFSC 

Accumulated Landings Database; 2005 data is preliminary). 

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Table 82. Mississippi Post-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings: 2000-2005 

Fishery Year September-October November-December 4-Month Interval

Shrimp 2000-2004 Average $6,108,982 $4,335,555 $10,444,537 

 2004 $5,461,637 $5,081,666 $10,543,303 

 2005 $429,653 $2,185,196 $2,614,849 

Percentage Change in Shrimp Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -93% -50% -75% 

 2004 to 2005 -92% -57% -75% 

Oyster 2000-2004 Average $1,738,236 $5,613,049 $7,351,285 

 2004 $2,298,655 $6,073,242 $8,371,897 

 2005 $0,000 $1,447,132 $1,447,132 

Percentage Change in Oyster Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -100% -74% -80% 

 2004 to 2005 -100% -76% -83% 

All Other 2000-2004 Average $3,091,480 $296,513 $3,387,994 

 2004 $2,247,949 $239,544 $2,487,493 

 2005 $413,877 $86,867 $500,744 

Percentage Change in All Other Species Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -87% -71% -85% 

 2004 to 2005 -82% -64% -80% 

Total 2000-2004 Average $10,938,698 $10,245,117 $21,183,815 

 2004 $10,008,241 $11,394,452 $21,402,693 

 2005 $843,530 $3,719,195 $4,562,725 

Percentage Change in All Species Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -92% -64% -78% 

 2004 to 2005 -92% -67% -79% 

Source: NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings Database; 2005 data is preliminary. 

 Seafood Processing and Seafood Dealers. There were 69 seafood processing plants and 

79 wholesale seafood operations in Mississippi employing roughly 2,600 people prior to Katrina 

in 2005 (Posadas 2005). Processing plants and seafood dealers in Harrison County reported the 

most damage from Hurricane Katrina, with damage at $45.6 million for processing plants and 

$20.3 million for seafood dealers. Hancock County reported the second highest amount of 

damage, with $15.4 million for processing plants and $8.5 million for seafood dealers (Table 83). 

Buildings and equipment accounted for 72 percent of all incurred damage (Posadas 2006a). 

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Table 83. Estimated Total Damage to the Mississippi Seafood Processing Plants and 

Seafood Dealers 

County Seafood Processing Plants Seafood Dealers 

 # of Plants Average Total $ # of Dealers Average Total $ 

Hancock 9 1,706,167 15,355,500 19 446,680 8,486,920 

Harrison 34 1,340,058 45,561,962 39 264,935 10,332,481 

Jackson 14 610,222 8,543,111 21 101,361 2,128,586 

Others 12 22,400 201,600 72 36,835 1,263,602 

Total 69 1,127,937 77,827,681 141 151,157 21,313,205 

Total Projected Damage for the Above Sectors $101,259,884

Source: Posadas 2006a. 

Commercial Vessel Damage. Estimates of damage and loss to Mississippi’s commercial 

fleet of approximately 1,100 vessels range from 40 percent by the Mississippi Department of 

Marine Resources (Keesie 2006) to 87 percent by the Mississippi State University-Coastal 

Research and Extension Center (Posadas 2006b). The majority of this fleet was located in the 

three study counties: Harrison, Hancock, and Jackson (Figures 79 and 80). 

184
Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flood

> 50 - 100 foot Vessel

> 30 - 50 foot Vessel

< 30 foot or unknown Vessel

> 100 foot Vessel

by the Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge

Ocean Going Vessels Sunk or Swept Inland

Biloxi Bay, Mississippi

90

Biloxi

Gulfport

D

90

0 1 0.5

M

10

10

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Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding > 50 - 100 foot Vessel

> 30 - 50 foot Vessel

< 30 foot or unknown Vessel

> 100 foot Vessel

90

10

10

90

Bay St Louis

0 1 0.5

by the Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge

Ocean Going Vessels Sunk or Swept Inland

Bay St Louis, Mississippi

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According to Posadas (2006), 89 percent of the 376 commercially registered vessels in Harrison 

County were damaged, as were 88 percent of its 278 commercially registered shrimping vessels. 

In Hancock County, 89 percent of its 220 commercially registered vessels were damaged. In 

Jackson County, 82 percent of the 326 licensed commercial fishing units suffered damages 

(Figure 81). Of the 40 boats that were moored in the Pass Christian marina when Katrina made 

landfall, only two survived intact; the rest are in pieces (Leslie 2005). 

 Figure 81. Industrial Canal, Gulfport, Mississippi. 

 Source: IAI Staff, November 2005. 

In February 2006, Posadas estimated the damage to the resident Mississippi commercial fishing 

fleet at $35.3 million (Table 85). One hundred percent of these economic losses occurred in 

Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties. Harrison County reported most of the damage, with 

losses amounting to $18.6 million. The damage to fishing units in Hancock County reached $5.6 

million. Total damage in Jackson County approached $6.4 million. Damage to boats, fishing 

gear, and other accessories accounts for 97 percent of all reported losses (Posadas 2006b). 

187
Table 84. Estimated Total Damage to Resident Licensed Mississippi Commercial 

Fishing Vessels from Hurricane Katrina

County # of Vessels % of Vessels 

Damaged 

Average Damage Total Damage 

Hancock 220 89% $25,523 $ 5,615,106 

Harrison 418 88% $44,557 $18,624,956 

Jackson 326 82% $19,627 $ 6,398,340 

Others 66 0% $ 0 $ 0 

Total 1,030 87% $34,268 $35,296,545 

 Source: Posadas 2006b. 

Net damage to fishing vessels located in Harrison County equaled $17.5 million. Hancock 

County reported net damage amounting to $5.6 million. Net damage in Jackson County was 

$6.2 million (Table 85). As of February 2006, insurance payments had covered only about 5 

percent of the total damage (net damage = $33.6 million). The vast majority of vessel owners 

did not have insurance or did not expect to receive any insurance payments to cover damage 

(Posadas 2006b). 

Table 85. Estimated Net Damage to Resident Licensed Mississippi Commercial 

 Fishing Vessels from Hurricane Katrina 

County Number of Vessels Average Damage Total Damage 

Hancock 220 $25,457 $ 5,600,439 

Harrison 418 $41,786 $17,466,352 

Jackson 326 $19,127 $ 6,235,340 

Others 66 $ 0 $ 0 

Total 1,030 $32,619 $33,597,148 

 Source: Posadas 2006b. 

Recreational Vessel Damage. Recreational vessels in several coastal Mississippi 

counties also incurred significant damage as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Pre-Katrina, there 

were 57,189 recreational vessels in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties. Estimated 

impacts to the recreational fleet amounted to $160 million. This estimate includes $56 million for 

the vessels themselves, $25 million for the engines, $39 million for boat storage, and other triprelated losses (Jones 2006). 

Both commercial and recreational fishery participants are facing significant challenges as they 

attempt to repair their boats. Lacking insurance, many must pay steep prices for repair if they 

are unable to do it themselves. Others are selling their boats and leaving the industry (Figure 

82). The nearest operational boatyards are in Mobile, Alabama (about 55 miles) or Pensacola, 

Florida (100 miles); damaged boats must be towed. Many vessels damaged by the storm are still 

in need of salvage and/or repair. 
 Figure 82. Shrimp Boat for Sale in Biloxi. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

Charter Boats. While the total economic losses to this industry are still being 

determined, NACO’s economic loss survey conducted in late 2005 provides some preliminary 

damage assessments for the Mississippi fleet. In Mississippi, NACO conducted surveys with 98 

of the state’s 120 identified licensed charter boat vessels. Of those sampled, 11 are guide boats, 

55 are “six-pack” charter boats, 15 are multi-passenger charter boats, 3 are head boats (tour 

vessels), and 14 are Chandeleur Boats. Sixty-three of these vessels operate in federal waters, 87 

operate in state waters (up to 3 miles offshore), and 47 operate in inshore waters 

Hurricane Katrina damaged 64 and totaled 10 charter boats in Mississippi. Of those lost and 

damaged vessels, damages/losses amounted to $2,015,450; insured losses totaled 32 percent. 

According to NACO, these vessel operators lost 4,978 trips valued at $7.5 million (Walker et al. 

2006). Nevertheless, charter boat operators in Mississippi remain optimistic about their future 

participation in this industry. Approximately 91 operators or 92 percent anticipate remaining in 

business; the remainder does not plan to continue in business, are not sure if they will continue, 

or did not respond to this question (Walker et al. 2006). 

Table 86 shows the overall projected economic loss to the State of Mississippi from the losses 

incurred by her charter boat fleet (Walker et al. 2006: 138). NACO included in this analysis lost 

trips immediately following the storms, physical loss to vessels, support personnel lost trip gross 

income and the projected gross lost income that was reported for the year following the storms to 

owners only (Walker et al. 2006: 138). 

189
Table 86. Total Projected Losses to 98 Mississippi Charter Boats from 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita* 

Lost Trips (up to submittal of survey) $7,516,816 

Physical Damage $2,015,450 

Support Personnel Loss $857,300 

Annual Income Loss for 1 year (after survey was submitted) $8,356,500 

Total $18,746,066 

 * Data available only for both storms combined. 

 Source: Walker et al. (2006). 

 

Despite the stated optimism of charter boat operators regarding the post-Katrina future of this 

industry the charter boat industry has been challenged by a number of obstacles over the last 

decade, which has arguably limited its expansion. These obstacles include: increasing numbers 

of regulations, rising competition, laws prohibiting private artificial reef development, the red 

snapper moratorium, rapidly rising fuel prices, the aftermath of recent hurricanes, and decreasing 

levels of tourism. During interviews, many guides described the Mississippi charter industry as 

“in decline” even before Hurricane Katrina. They explain that, to make ends meet, they have 

been cutting corners by shutting down operations during the winter, catching their own bait, 

limiting their charters to inshore fishing, or supplementing their income with marsh tours in the 

winter. Some of these guides are advocates of private reef development to increase fish 

population and decrease competition (IAI, Field Observations, Biloxi, October 2005). 

Mississippi’s coastal communities will likely need financial assistance to restore the 

infrastructure so crucial to the survival of its tourism industry. The recovery process for this 

industry has been slow-going and problematic. Aid from FEMA and the SBA has not been 

forthcoming so far for charter boat operators. As most for-hire guides have small businesses that 

operate on marginal profits, they cannot survive a four to six month wait for assistance. 

Complicating the prospects for recovery, many of the charter boats are under-insured due to the 

prohibitive cost of marine hull insurance (Mannina 2005). 

To help charter boat operators regain an economic foothold, Mannina suggests that NMFS be 

“flexible in fishery permits and renewals and should waive renewal fees for the next three years” 

(Mannina 2005). Mannina further advocates that, 

NMFS develop a vessel and permit buyout plan with provisions for retraining 

participating fishermen so that those unable to return to their profession can find new 

forms of employment. Congress’ disaster response should be coupled with a voluntary 

buyout program to address the overcapitalization issues plaguing commercial and 

recreational fisheries such as the red snapper industry (Mannina 2005). 

Without such assistance, Mannina concludes, fishing communities and the charter boat industry 

in coastal Mississippi are in danger of losing the economic benefits associated with tourism. 

190
 Casino Industry Effects. Pre-Katrina, there were 21 land-based and nine waterfront state 

casinos in Mississippi. In 2004, Mississippi state casinos earned $2.7 billion in casino revenues, 

placing it third behind Nevada and New Jersey ($10.3 billion and $4.8 billion, respectively). 

This figure does not include the state income taxes paid by the 17,000 people employed by the 

gaming industry, the sales taxes paid by the casinos, the property taxes they pay, and indirect 

economic benefits. Biloxi has the third-largest gaming industry and is one of the top ten tourist 

destinations in the nation (Coast Chamber 2003). 

The tourism and gaming industries on the Mississippi Gulf Coast were particularly hard hit by 

Hurricane Katrina, wiping out 70 percent of the state’s tax base (CBS News 2005). All 13 hotelcasinos in this region were destroyed; including seven in Biloxi (Associated Press 2005a). PreKatrina, casino revenues in Biloxi earned $611 million for the state, $185 million for the city, 

and $73 million for city and county schools (Associated Press 2006b). The executive director of 

the Mississippi Gaming Commission claims that the state loses about $500,000 in revenue every 

day that the Biloxi-area casinos are closed, not counting the revenue attached to the hotels and 

restaurants serving the casinos (Abraham 2005). 

Nevertheless, Biloxi’s books remain in the black. The city had the foresight or good fortune to 

take out a $10 million dollar business interruption policy in June 2005, paying only $93,000 in 

premiums when Hurricane Katrina struck. These funds will help to offset losses of casino 

revenue (Wilemon 2006). 

While Mayor Ray Nagin’s plans to revive New Orleans’ destroyed economy with casinos were 

met with strong opposition, Biloxi Mayor A.J. Holloway has been successful in rallying city 

officials, residents, and developers around a plan to turn Biloxi into “another Las Vegas.” 

Indeed, Holloway asserts that “legalized gaming is going to be what saves us” (Rivlin 2005). To 

facilitate this plan, Governor Haley Barbour signed legislation allowing casinos to build up to 

800 feet inland. Civic leaders anticipate that the new land-based casinos will provide an 

economic boon for the region, bringing in much-needed jobs and tax revenues (Associated Press 

2005a). 

All nine casinos in Biloxi said they intend to rebuild, and most are planning bigger, more 

elaborate establishments. Harrah’s Entertainment, the largest gaming company in the world, 

intends to invest upward of $1 billion dollars in two new land-based casino-hotels – an 

investment that rivals the scale of Las Vegas casino-resort projects (Wilemon 2006). At least a 

dozen developers have expressed interest in building casinos in Biloxi since the storms. A 

Mississippi Gaming Commission executive predicts that Biloxi will have three or four more new 

gaming halls by 2007 (Rivlin 2005). For example, the Isle of Capri Casinos has proposed a new 

2,500-room hotel casino on the north side of U.S. 90 in Point Cadet. This new resort would be 

three times larger than its current casino. However, this city-owned land is believed to be the 

most valuable in Biloxi, and the city will likely entertain other offers. Indeed, it has already 

rejected two offers to lease the land to Ameristar and Landry’s Restaurant earlier this year. City 

officials indicate that the winning proposal will have to agree to help cover the expense of 

relocating the Seafood Industry Museum, which is located on city land in Point Cadet, and create 

twice the number of gaming positions of a pre-Katrina casino (Wilemon 2005b). 

191
Gaming officials conservatively project that by 2008 Mississippi’s coastal casinos will generate 

$2 billion in profits and contribute over $240 million in taxes per year to the state and county 

(Rivlin 2005). Indeed, they have already made rapid progress in this direction. In midDecember, three of Biloxi’s hurricane damaged casinos– the Imperial Palace, the Palace Casino, 

and the Isle of Capri–reopened to large and eager crowds (Wilemon 2005a). 

However, Katrina also has accelerated Biloxi’s transformation into a regional gambling center. 

And, while gaming has increased local employment opportunities at restaurants, hotels, and 

entertainment venues associated with the casino-resorts, the growth of dockside gaming has had 

severe consequences for the commercial seafood industry. In his study of the effects of dockside 

gaming on the Mississippi fishing industry, Posadas (1993) located a number of key negative 

effects, including: the closure of fishery support services; the concomitant decline in the volume 

and value of Mississippi’s commercial landings; a reduction of the size of the commercial fishing 

fleet and the number of commercial fishing licenses issued; considerable decline in seafood 

processing capacity and employment due to a decrease in values of fishery products and lesser 

value added; a decline in the average volume and nominal values of fishery products processed 

by each plant; a downward adjustment in the region’s economy in terms of output, jobs and 

income related to commercial fishing; and decline in income and employment in the seafood 

processing sector in coastal Mississippi. Indeed, the construction of water-front casinos already 

has displaced three offloading docks since the early 1990s, either putting them out of business or 

pushing offloading efforts to the Back Bay area. The inability of the fishing industry to compete 

with rising rent and/or property taxes in an area slated for development of the recreational sector 

ultimately means an end to the physical presence of commercial fisheries on the central 

Mississippi waterfront. It also means a beginning to the end of Biloxi’s cultural and historical 

relationship with shrimping. 

Additionally, the growth of the casino-resort industry puts increasing pressure upon older, noncasino hotels. While the revenue generated by expanding casino-resorts will lead Biloxi’s 

recovery efforts, they will also confront “mom and pop” non-casino beach front hotels with 

serious competition. According to the Hotel, Motel and Lodging Association, 51 of the noncasino beach front hotels in Gulfport and Biloxi are either destroyed or too damaged to reopen, 

while eight are operating at diminished capacity. In Biloxi, non-beach front hotel rooms are 

down to 388 from 3,252, post-Katrina. In Gulfport, the post-Katrina drop is from 2,468 to 1,099. 

According to one long time hotel operator, many area hotels were built after Hurricane Camille 

in 1969 on elevations considered sufficient by those who had not experienced this storm. 

Compliance with new post-Katrina regulations that require hotels to be elevated at least 28-feet 

above sea level will cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, thus effectively pricing many small 

hotel owners out of the market. Smaller property owners also are receiving offers from 

corporations and condominium developers to buy their land, and at least nine were considering 

these buyout offers (Thomas 2006). 

 

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IV. RESPONSE AND ADAPTATION TO HURRICANE KATRINA

 Following the storms, fishery participant responses to post-Katrina conditions depended 

upon the resources that remained available to them, their particular fishery niche, and the nature 

of physical impacts to their specific location or fishery. Their principal coping strategies fall into 

four broad categories: (1) concentration of efforts in viable processing areas; (2) reliance on 

make-shift strategies and traditional techniques; (3) reliance on community support; and (4) 

utilization of federal, state, and local government assistance.

1. Cooperation with others in the fishing industry. As of January 2006, about 8 percent 

of the Mississippi fleet had resumed harvesting operations. Unlike eastern Louisiana, which has 

concentrated its efforts on re-establishing offloading facilities in strategic places to keep the 

shrimp industry operating, Mississippi has been slow to regroup. With only two operational 

processing plants (Golden Gulf in Biloxi and Pascagoula Ice and Freezer), offloading efforts 

redistributed primarily to Bayou La Batre, Alabama to the east, and Venice, Grand Isle, Lafitte, 

Dulac, and Chauvin in Louisiana to the west. These two processors shared their facilities with 

several other processors whose facilities were out of commission until May 2006 when they were 

able to return to their plants. Through these cooperative efforts, seafood processors were able to 

elevate production levels in the wake of Katrina.

2. Reliance on make-shift strategies. Hurricane Katrina effectively put all seafood 

retailers in Biloxi out of business. Many fishery participants have had to rely on their own 

ingenuity to remain viable participants in the region's fisheries. These make-shift techniques 

include: (1) selling directly from vessels, vehicles, or from home; (2) offloading at public docks 

using personal ice chests and wheel-barrows; and (3) exchanging mechanical and construction 

services for boat repair. 

The first retailers to resume operations did not reopen until the end of December 2005. Given 

the obstacles to selling through normal channels, many small scale commercial fishery 

participants have been selling seafood directly from their homes (Figure 83 below). 

193
 Figure 83. Sign Advertising Shrimper’s Wares in Front of House. 

 Source: IAI Staff, January 2006. 

Many grocers were also allowing fishermen to sell their fish “straight off the boat” to hungry 

customers in the parking lots of their markets. This informal buyer-seller relationship served all 

members of the community: fishery participants had a much-needed venue to sell their wares, 

consumers had access to a culturally and nutritionally important local product, and grocers, some 

of whose stores lacked electricity or were partially boarded up, were able to attract a muchneeded clientele to their stores with the fishermen in the parking lot (Figure 84). 

194
 Figure 84. Shrimp Sales in Parking Lot, Biloxi. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

Another make-shift adaptation included the barter of services for boat repair in the absence of 

cash. The cost of hiring skilled labor is exorbitantly high, and a luxury many financially 

strapped fishery participants were not able to immediately afford. Thus, bartering skills for 

equipment has become an important means of rebuilding boats and, in the process of doing so, 

has fostered a renewed sense of community. For example, a welder will fix his co-fisherman’s 

mast in exchange for fiberglass repair, while a fisherman that is a particularly skilled electrician 

might exchange his talents for hull repair. Welders and electricians needed to repair GPS 

equipment were in particular demand. Such acts of trade exchange have been witnessed all 

along the damaged Mississippi coastline. 

 3. Reliance on community support. The creation of an informal financial institution 

built with communal funds for lending money to close friends and family, particularly in times of 

crisis, is a common practice among Vietnamese-American shrimping community members in 

coastal Mississippi. In this practice, everyone from the group puts a set amount of money into 

“the bucket” (an actual bucket) each month. The bucket acts as a savings account without the 

advantage of interest. The group records how much each individual pays in. When a loan is 

needed, members can request to borrow money from the fund, at a set interest rate. Should two 

people need to borrow funds at the same time, the loan goes to the person who bids a higher 

interest. Typically, however, these community-determined interest rates are much lower than 

those offered through formal lending institutions. 

Community funds offer something mainstream financing institutions cannot: relatively 

restriction-free and rapidly processed loans. This source of immediate financial support has 

195
become critically important to Vietnamese shrimpers in the post-Katrina environment. Some 

fishermen interviewed explained that they sought loans from the community fund instead of 

pursuing insurance claims or SBA loans, since these two financial pathways are slow to process 

claims, if they are processed at all. Thus, reliance on one’s community rather than on more 

distant, private or government source of aid not only expedited the recovery process, but 

provided a source of psychological sustenance. However, with so many demands upon this 

funding system, the “bucket” is now empty, and borrowers will need to look outside of their 

immediate network to fund longer term recovery needs and those unmet by insurance. 

4. Local government assistance. Since the retreat of storm waters from the low-lying 

areas of the State, many fishery participants have accessed financial aid, housing, and 

employment assistance offered through the federal, state, and local governments. However, ease 

of access to such assistance programs varies by ethnic group. While FEMA has served as a 

significant resource for all in this region, both Caucasian and Vietnamese fishery participants 

have experienced difficulty navigating FEMA’s bureaucratic waters. 

 

For example, although FEMA was notoriously slow in securing and setting up trailers for the 

displaced, once positioned, FEMA trailers provided much needed shelter for persons in 

otherwise dire situations. Trailers allowed displaced fishing families to move off their boats and 

begin to repair damages. Approximately 105,000 displaced Mississippians had been placed in 

38,000 FEMA trailers along the Mississippi Gulf Coast as of May 2006 (FEMA 2006). 

Federal and State government-funded jobs also have provided many unemployed fishery 

participants with alternative, temporary work opportunities. Construction jobs have been 

particularly profitable. Fishermen and women are often by necessity “Jacks and Jills of alltrades” and many therefore can perform construction, welding, machine, and electrical work. 

Such skills proved valuable in this time of limited fishing activities. The MDMR also provided a 

boost to the local fishing economy by providing unemployed oystermen with temporary research 

positions. These research positions involved the mapping of the state’s oyster reefs using GPS 

transects to assess the sediment quality on the floor of the Mississippi Sound. Vessel captains 

reportedly received a stipend of $600 per day for their efforts. 

196
F. Pre-Hurricane Katrina: An Overview of the Commercial and 

Recreational Fishing Industries in Alabama. 

197
10

65

98

Bayou

la Batre

Dauphin Island

98

Mobile

Pritchard

Saraland

Daphne

Fairhope

Gulf Shores

Bonne

Secour

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Heron

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Hurricane Katrina Affected Areas

of the Alabama Coast

198
I. PRIMARY FISHING INDUSTRIES IN ALABAMA 

 

In the State of Alabama, the majority of commercial fishing and seafood processing 

industry activity takes place in the highly productive ports of Bon Secour and Bayou La Batre. 

These ports annually contribute roughly 93 percent of the state’s commercially produced 

seafood. There are four primary commercial fisheries in Alabama in which producers and 

processors participate: shrimp, oysters, finfish and crabs. Between 2000 and 2004, inclusive, 

commercial landings in Alabama had an average ex-vessel value of $44 million (Table 87).

Table 87. Commercial Landings in Alabama (all species combined), Thousands 

of Pounds (live weights), and Thousands of Current Dollars: 2000-2004 

Year Pounds Value 

2000 30,530 $64,075 

2001 25,858 $44,941 

2002 23,658 $35,925 

2003 25,535 $36,844 

2004 26,559 $37,035 

<5 Year Average> <26,428> <$43,764> 

 Source: NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings Database; 

 2005 data is preliminary. 

 Commercial Landings in Alabama between 1995 and 2004. Between 1995 and 2004, 

Alabama’s fisheries (all species combined) produced 0.3 percent of the nation’s seafood landings 

(Table 88). In 2004, commercial fisheries in Alabama produced about 27 million pounds of fish, 

with a value of $37 million dollars (NMFS 2005a). Of the five Gulf Coast states, Alabama’s 

seafood production industry ranked last in terms of total annual revenue generated in 2004. 

199
Table 88. Pounds and Value of all Commercial Landings in the 

United States and Alabama: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds 

(all species), 

U.S. 

Value 

(in billions), 

U.S. 

Pounds 

(all species), 

Alabama) 

Value 

(in millions), 

Alabama 

% of total 

U.S. lbs. 

from AL 

% of total 

U.S. Value 

from AL 

1995 9,912,807,044 $3,826,360,342 28,740,210 $49,874,071 0.3% 1.3% 

1996 9,643,821,438 $3,564,587,048 26,578,650 $38,341,730 0.3% 1.1% 

1997 9,951,898,930 $3,592,218,307 24,952,436 $43,264,471 0.3% 1.2% 

1998 9,332,712,602 $3,221,433,652 30,098,924 $47,013,377 0.3% 1.5% 

1999 9,409,192,065 $3,575,730,880 27,438,244 $50,488,086 0.3% 1.4% 

2000 9,142,633,213 $3,674,425,002 30,530,385 $64,075,386 0.3% 1.7% 

2001 9,511,750,925 $3,243,655,393 25,858,342 $44,941,006 0.3% 1.4% 

2002 9,428,867,963 $3,191,297,481 23,658,021 $35,925,479 0.2% 1.1% 

2003 9,515,048,681 $3,371,930,855 25,534,971 $36,843,888 0.3% 1.1% 

2004 9,664,977,837 $3,714,515,156 26,558,704 $37,035,271 0.3% 1.0% 

<10 Year 

Averages> <9,551,532,004> <$3,498,259,060> <26,553,044> <$44,503,997> <0.3%> <1.3%> 

Source: NMFS 2005a. 

 Top Seafood-Producing Ports in Alabama. Tables 89 and 90 depict the value and 

pounds of dockside landings for Bayou La Batre and Bon-Secour in 2004. They also identify the 

ranking of each port in relation to the top performing ports in the United States. Historically, 

Bayou La Batre has been a particularly productive port, ranking 40th out of 97 ports in the nation 

in terms of pounds landed and 23rd in terms of revenue in 2004. 

Table 89. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Alabama Ports 

and Ranking by U.S. Dollars: 2004 

Port County U.S. Rank 

by Value 

Value in Millions Pounds in Millions

Bayou La Batre Mobile 23rd $28.4 19.1 

Bon Secour-Gulf Shores Baldwin 72th $7.0 6.0 

 Source: NMFS 2005b. 

Table 90. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at Select Alabama Ports 

and Ranking by Pounds: 2004 

Port County U.S. Rank 

by Pounds

Pounds in Millions Value in Millions

Bayou La Batre Mobile 40th 19.1 $28.4 

Bon Secour-Gulf Shores Baldwin 77th 6.0 $7.0 

 Source: NMFS 2005b. 

200
II. PRIMARY FISHERIES AND PRODUCTION LEVELS IN COASTAL 

 ALABAMA: 1995 TO 2004 

Shrimp Production. Alabama produces an average of 7 percent of all shrimp harvested 

from the Gulf. Figure 86 compares the percentage of the pounds of shrimp landed in Alabama to 

the percentage of shrimp landed in the four remaining Gulf States, and to the United States as a 

whole, between 1995 and 2004, inclusive. Of the five Gulf Coast states, Alabama ranks fourth in 

terms of the annual revenue its commercial shrimping industry generates. 

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 Figure 86. Percentage of Total Pounds of Shrimp Landed Annually in Alabama, the Four 

 Remaining Gulf States and the United States: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Over the past decade (1995-2004), shrimp landings in Alabama have had an average ex-vessel 

value of $39 million dollars (Table 91). In 2004, the most recent year for which national data are 

currently available, a total of 317 million pounds of shrimp worth $446 million dollars (headson) were landed in the U.S. In this same year, 16 million pounds or 5 percent of this U.S. shrimp 

was landed in Alabama state waters, with a value of $29 million (NMFS 2005a). 

201
Table 91. Pounds and Value of Alabama Shrimp* Harvest: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds Value Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Pounds 

Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Value 

1995 20,466,758 $45,088,938 8.7% 9.6% 

1996 16,556,103 $32,984,225 7.3% 7.9% 

1997 13,551,650 $37,229,793 6.4% 8.1% 

1998 20,094,344 $42,276,989 7.6% 8.7% 

1999 17,721,221 $44,668,558 7.3% 9.3% 

2000 20,103,457 $56,661,066 7.0% 8.6% 

2001 16,565,677 $38,592,085 6.4% 7.8% 

2002 14,857,115 $29,602,637 6.3% 7.7% 

2003 15,769,627 $30,284,382 6.1% 8.3% 

2004 16,064,334 $29,196,628 6.2% 7.9% 

<Average> <17,175,028> <$38,658,530 <6.9> <8.4> 

*Brown, White, and Other. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

As assessed for recent years, Alabama’s shrimp fishery peaked in 2000, with 20 million pounds 

of shrimp valued at nearly $57 million dollars. However, ex-vessel prices paid for Gulf of 

Mexico shrimp have been in a state of decline, dropping precipitously in 2001 and 2002. This 

decline relates in part to ongoing increases in imported shrimp and concomitant effects on local, 

regional, and national seafood market conditions (Figure 87). 

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 Figure 87. Alabama’s Shrimp Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

202
 Oyster Production. Relative to other states that commercially harvest oysters, Alabama’s 

oyster fishery is rather small. In recent decades, Alabama has produced only about 1 percent of 

the nation’s oyster supply. Still, the Eastern Oyster is an economically important fishery in 

Alabama. Over the past decade, oyster beds in Alabama have produced nearly 3 percent of all 

oysters harvested in the Gulf of Mexico. These oysters had an average value of nearly $1.4 

million dollars (Table 92). 

Table 92. Oyster Landings for Alabama by Pounds and Value: 1995-2004 

Year Pounds Value Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Pounds 

Percent of Gulf 

Harvest/Value 

1995 709,992 $1,117,548 3.2% 2.8% 

1996 620,910 $1,193,043 2.8% 2.6% 

1997 695,320 $1,397,908 3.1% 2.9% 

1998 340,186 $783,499 1.7% 1.7% 

1999 363,863 $888,785 1.6% 1.9% 

2000 791,908 $1,755,475 3.1% 3.3% 

2001 574,902 $1,235,314 2.2% 2.4% 

2002 759,194 $1,602,331 3.1% 3.1% 

2003 815,530 $1,622,785 3.0% 2.6% 

2004 908,181 $2,120,392 3.6% 3.5% 

Average <657,999> <$1,371,708> <2.7%> <2.7%> 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

In 2004, the most recent year for which national oyster data was available when writing this 

report, Alabama produced nearly 4 percent of the nation’s 27 million pounds of oysters. This 

increase in production is related to the near collapse of oyster populations and harvests in 

Chesapeake Bay in 2003 and 2004 (Raines 2004). Nevertheless, despite this spike in production, 

Alabama ranks last in Gulf Coast oyster production; Louisiana ranks first (NMFS 2005a). 

Figure 88 compares the percentage of the pounds of oysters landed in Alabama to the percentage 

of oysters landed in the four remaining Gulf States, and to the United States as a whole between 

1995 and 2004, inclusive. 

203
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 Figure 88. Percentage of Total Pounds of Oysters Landed Annually in Alabama, and the 

 Four Remaining Gulf States and the United States: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

The dockside value of Alabama’s oysters has remained fairly constant in relation to pounds 

harvested between 1995 and 2004. However, the product value of this fishery sharply increased 

in 2004 (Figure 89). 

204
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 Figure 89. Alabama’s Oyster Harvest in Pounds and Value: 1995-2004. 

 Source: NMFS 2005a. 

Aquaculture. Aquaculture in Alabama had an overall state economic impact of $275 

million dollars in 2004 (ACES 2005). Catfish is the primary fishery. In that year, more than 145 

million pounds of catfish were produced. According to the Alabama Cooperative Extension 

System (ACES), there were over 26,000 water acres of fish farms in Alabama in 2004. In that 

year, some 300 producers –200 of which are considered “large scale”– provided more than 3,000 

jobs in production and processing. Alabama is second only to Mississippi in U.S. catfish 

production. 

While all counties in Alabama engage in some form of commercial aquaculture, producing 

upward of 25 aquatic species, residents in Mobile and Baldwin Counties are only minimally 

dependent on catfish farming (ACES 2005). Catfish production in Alabama is most extensive in 

Hale, Dallas, Perry, Montgomery, and Wilcox Counties, all of which are located along the 

Alabama River Basin (Clean Water Partnership 2004). 

205
III. RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRIES AND 

 PARTICIPANTS IN ALABAMA 

 Recreational and Charter Fisheries. Recreational angling and charter boat fishing 

generate millions of dollars in sales and revenue in Alabama each year. In 2003, fishing trips 

had a total combined economic effect of $1.6 billion dollars (multiplier effect included), with 

$831 million in retail sales. In that year, recreational and charter fishing supported nearly 19,000 

jobs, paying out $399 million in wages. Further, recreational fishing generated approximately 

$99.5 million in sales and motor fuel, state, and federal income tax revenues (American 

Sportfishing Association 2004). 

According to NMFS (2004), 191 registered for-hire vessels took residents and visitors on a total 

of 72,000 charter trips in Alabama waters in 2004. In that year, 806,000 recreational anglers 

took 2.1 million outings and landed 8.9 million pounds of fish (Steinbeck et al. 2004). 

Commercial Fishery Participants. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2004), 

approximately 9,500 or 0.04 percent of the employed civilian population in Alabama identified 

farming, fishing, and forestry occupations as their primary sources of income. This figure 

reflects a 50 percent decrease from the Census 2000 report when 0.08 percent of the labor force 

worked in this sector. 

Preliminary data released in 2004 by NMFS (Southeast Region), documents a total of 1,732 

commercial fishing vessels in the State of Alabama (432 federally- and 1,300 state-permitted). 

Of the federally issued permits, 196 were for shrimping (NMFS SEFSC 2004). 

Figure 90 provides GIS analysis detailing location of the fishermen and related marine-based 

facilities along the southwest coast of Alabama. 

 

206
Boat Brokers,

Maintenance & Repair

Estimated Storm Surge

and Flooding

Marinas and Marine Charter Permitted Fishermen

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in . Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding 0 3 6 12 18 24

Miles

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

10

65

98

Bon

Secour

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Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

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Bayou La Batre

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Fairhope

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Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

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98

Bon

Secour

Fishermen and Fishing Facilities

Commercial and Recreational Marinas

Boat Sales and Maintenance

Permitted Commerical Fishermen

Charter Companies of the Southwest Alabama Coast

207
G. Hurricane Katrina: Alabama State Fisheries Impact Report 

I. GEOGRAPHY OF STORM SURGE AND WINDS ASSOCIATED WITH 

 HURRICANE KATRINA 

Alabama’s coastline is low-lying and prone to damage from storm surge during major 

hurricanes. Bayou La Batre sits at 7-feet above sea level, and Gulf Shores at 9-feet above sea 

level. The Mobile State Docks reported storm surge of 11.5 feet of water in Mobile, the highest 

in this zone, and surge as much as 12-13 feet high in Bayou La Batre. However, locals in Bayou 

La Batre also pointed out high-water marks in excess of 20 feet (Figures 91 and 92). 

 Figure 91. NOAA Slosh Model; Hurricane Katrina, Mobile Bay. 

 Source: NOAA 2005. 

208
Percent Breaks for lower maps

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Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding

Low density block groups not mapped

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Median Income

40-60,000

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80-100,000

100-110,000

0 3 6 12 18 24

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Coastal Southwest Alabama Demographics

By Census 2000 Block Group

Median Income

Estimated Storm Surge

and Flooding

Percent

African American

Fairhope

Daphne

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Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

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98

Bon

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Fairhope

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Bayou La Batre

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Percent in Poverty

209
Hurricanes Ivan in 2004 and Katrina in 2005 are the largest storms to have hit the Alabama 

coastline in recent history. Despite the damage Ivan inflicted, many locals believe that Katrina’s 

wrath was the more devastating (Figures 93 through 98). As one Bayou La Batre fisherman 

stated, “Ivan was a drop in the bucket compared to Katrina; it was nothing but a wind swell” 

(Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, December 20, 2005). According to Medlin et 

al. (2005): 

Many homes were completely engulfed by Katrina’s surge in Bayou La Batre. The surge 

in Mobile Bay led to inundation of downtown Mobile causing the imposition of a duskto-dawn curfew. The Mobile State Docks’ surge value of 11.45 feet was extremely close 

to being the highest value ever recorded (which was 11.6 feet on July 5, 1916). 

Figure 93. Coden (near Bayou La Batre) and Entrance to Bayou Coden, Post-storm 

Surge (aerial) 

 

210
Figure 94. Bayou la Batre, Entrance to the Bayou. 

 Source: NOAA, September 2005. 

211
 Figure 95. Bayou La Batre, Dockside, During Storm Surge. 

 Source: Courtesy of Local Bayou La Batre Resident, September 2005. 

 Figure 96. Bayou La Batre, Dockside, Post-storm Surge. 

 Source: Courtesy of Local Bayou La Batre Resident, September 2005. 

212
 Figure 97. Bayou La Batre, Landside, During Storm Surge. 

 Source: Courtesy of Local Bayou La Batre Resident, September 2005. 

 Figure 98. Bayou La Batre, Landside, Post-storm Surge. 

 Source: Courtesy of Local Bayou La Batre Resident, September 2005. 

213
Preparing for the Storm. Traditionally, commercial fishery participants in Alabama 

have tied-up their vessels in local ports or moved them further inland via Mobile Bay for 

protection from a hurricane. Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, however, the majority of 

commercial and charter fishermen left their vessels in Bayou La Batre believing they were out of 

the storm’s projected trajectory. Most fishermen did not anticipate the level of storm surge that 

would strike their coastline and so elected to stay in their home ports. Some felt that moving to 

Mobile Bay would simply be responding to a “cry wolf” scenario. Consequently, many boats, 

particularly those not strongly secured, were beached, damaged, or destroyed (Figure 99). 

 Figure 99: Grounded Shrimping Vessel: Bayou La Batre, Post-Katrina. 

 Source: IAI Staff, September 2005. 

Although coastal Alabama has not suffered the direct brunt of major hurricanes in the past, 

Bayou La Batre has experienced repeated storm surge and repeated flooding. In response, 

several fishing families have recently moved northward. One area net shop owner summarizes 

local responses to hurricanes as, “Run from Dennis, run from Ivan, run from Katrina. People 

sold out because they’re tired of storms” (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, 

October 07, 2005). These relocations have caused the local demographics to shift. Previously 

populated by multi-generational Caucasians, this coastal area is primarily inhabited by first or 

second-generational Vietnamese fishermen. Those who could afford to move inland or up the 

coast have already done so. 

 

214
II. EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON ALABAMA’S MARINE-BASED 

 INFRASTRUCTURE 

Alabama’s seafood industry is centered in Bayou La Batre. Landings in this port 

generated a combined annual economic effect of $350 million prior to Katrina. Until this storm, 

Bayou La Batre was the nation’s number one processor of oysters and crabmeat and a leader in 

shrimp production. The shipbuilding industry is also very active in this area, generating $100 

million in revenue per year. 

In 2004, Bayou La Batre fishery participants caught 19 million pounds of fish with a market 

value of $28 million dollars (Table 93). In that same year, it ranked 17th of all commercial ports 

in the nation in terms of dollars (NMFS 2004). 

Table 93. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at an Individual U. S. Port: 

Bayou La Batre, Alabama, 2000-2004 

Year Pounds in Millions Value in Millions 

2000 23.0 $48.9 

2001 18.0 $38.9 

2002 17.1 $27.4 

2003 18.5 $30.8 

2004 19.1 $28.4 

 Source: NMFS 2005b. 

According to a local official, nearly 80 percent of the Bayou La Batre labor force worked in 

some aspect of the commercial seafood industry prior to Katrina in occupations such as seafood 

processing, net making and boat building (Kim et al., 2005). Another local official estimates that 

75 percent of shrimpers lost their primary source of income in the months following Katrina due 

to the significant amount of structural damage to local harbors and vessels (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, December 20, 2005). 

Alabama’s second major commercial seaport is located in Bon Secour. Bon Secour is a small, 

close-knit fishing community where the fishing industry employs a large number of residents. 

Its seafood facilities include two central shrimp and seafood processing facilities and three 

wholesale businesses; five in total. Family businesses and long-standing community 

relationships characterize the town’s fishing industry (IAI, Field Observations, October 2005). 

In 2004, Bon Secour fishery participants caught 6 million pounds of fish with a market value of 

$7 million dollars (Table 94). In that year, Bon Secour ranked 67th of all commercial ports in the 

nation in terms of revenue (NMFS 2004). 

215
Table 94. Total Commercial Fishery Landings at an Individual U. S. Port: 

Bon Secour-Gulf Shores, Alabama, 2000-2004 

Year Pounds in Millions Value in Millions 

2000 5.5 $12.5 

2001 6.0 $8.9 

2002 3.8 $7.0 

2003 4.1 $7.9 

2004 6.0 $7.0 

 Source: NMFS 2005b. 

Seafood Processing. Seafood processing historically has been the state’s most 

economically important industry component. The NMFS report Fisheries of the United States, 

2004 identified 69 seafood processing plants in Alabama, employing 1,222 persons, and 26 

wholesale establishments, employing 427 persons in 2003 (NMFS 2005c). Of these, 13 (large 

facilities) or 19 percent were located in the Alabama study communities: one in Mobile and five 

in Bon Secour (Baldwin County), and seven in Bayou La Batre (Mobile County). Only two of 

the processors in Bayou La Batre are industrial seafood processing plants. Bayou La Batre is the 

central commercial fishing harbor for Alabama and largest oyster and crabmeat processor in the 

nation. Figure 100 shows the pre-Katrina location of seafood processors and dealers, and fish 

hatcheries along the southwest coast of Alabama. 

216
Seafood Processors

Estimated Storm Surge

and Flooding

Seafood Wholesalers

and Retailers Hatcheries

Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in . Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Flooding 0 3 6 12 18 24

Miles

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

10

65

98

Bon

Secour

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

10

65

98

Bon

Secour

Graham Fisheries

Bon Secour Nat'l

Wildlife Refuge

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

10

65

98

Bon

Secour

Fairhope

Daphne

Pritchard

Mobile

Bayou La Batre

Dauphin Island

Gulf Shores

10

65

98

Bon

Secour

Seafood Processing & Sales

and Fish Hatcheries

Seafood Processor

Seafood Seller

Hatchery of the Southwest Alabama Coast

217
The two largest seafood processing plants in Bayou La Batre were initially put out of 

commission by the storm, but reopened for business mid-October. Both processors, however, 

were overwhelmed by the high volume of vessels coming to them from all over the northern Gulf 

Coast trying to unload their product. Complicating matters, storage for the excess shrimp was 

non-existent. One processor contends that the lack of cold storage has been one of the most 

important and overlooked issues facing the industry. The primary seafood storage facility in 

Mobile is operational, but has been at its full capacity of 12 million pounds since even before 

Katrina hit; the second largest storage facility in Mobile filled up its 1.3 million-pound freezer in 

mid-November (Personal Communication, IAI, December 1, 2005). Industry participants 

describe the region as “log-jammed;” every operational cold storage shed is full. Processors 

explain that they have only been able to buy about half of the catch vessels are trying to offload 

(Henderson 2005b). These conditions continued to characterize the industry in this region as of 

May 2006. 

Labor shortages have also contributed to poor post-Katrina production rates. Although labor 

shortages within the industry predate Katrina, they have escalated in its wake. Processors 

identify this as one of the leading factors contributing to underproduction in their plants. Figure 

101 below highlights the post-Katrina labor loss within four of the smaller seafood processing 

facilities. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

Bayou la Bayou la Batre

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2004

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. May 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 200

Emp. Oct. 

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

Bayou la Bayou la Batre

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

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(-56%)

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(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

Bayou la Bayou la Batre

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2004

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. May 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

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35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

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(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 200

Emp. Oct. 

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

0

5

10

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20

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30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

Bayou la Bayou la Batre

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2004

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. May 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 200

Emp. Oct. 

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

Bayou la Bayou la Batre

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

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(-56%)

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(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

0

5

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15

20

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40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. Oct. 2006

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

Bayou la Bayou la Batre

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 2004

Emp. Oct. 2005

Emp. May 2006

0

5

10

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35

40

1 Facility

(-57%)

2 Facility

(-13%)

3 Facility

(-56%)

4 Facility

(-92%)

Emp. Oct. 200

Emp. Oct. 

Emp. May 2006

Post-Katrina Labor Loss: Katrina Labor Loss: 

 Figure 101. Employment Figures at Four Small Seafood Processing Facilities 

 in Bayou La Batre at Three Points in Time. 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, 2005 & 2006. 

218
Shrimp. There were few shrimpers out in the waters in the first few months after the 

storm; those with intact trawlers, however, were catching tremendous amounts of shrimp. One 

commercial shrimper explained that, comparatively, at the same time last year there were more 

than one dozen trawlers out shrimping. In December 2005 there were only three. With less 

competition, these shrimpers were catching upwards of 3,000 pounds a day, whereas they were 

only catching 1,000 pounds per day last year at this time (Figures 102 and 103). 

 Figure 102. A Shrimp Vessel under Repair in Bayou La Batre. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

219
 Figure 103. Fisherman Offloading Post-storm Harvest in Bayou La Batre. 

 Source: IAI Staff, 2005. 

These shrimpers, however, are not getting rich; one local shrimper describes shrimp sales as 

“terrible, now” (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, December 19, 2005). PostKatrina shrimp sales have been down because, as mentioned previously, the few operational 

industrial processors are understaffed and cannot handle high volumes of product. 

Fuel costs are also keeping shrimpers out of the waters in all affected Gulf Coast states. 

However, commercial shrimpers in Alabama reportedly received funds from the Saudi Arabian 

Oil Company to help them with this struggle. These benefactors donated the equivalent of 

600,000 gallons of diesel valued at approximately $1.2 million; it is also roughly equivalent to 

the amount of diesel used by state shrimp trawlers in an average month. 

Administered through the Organized Seafood Association of Alabama and/or the Southern 

Shrimp Alliance beginning in early February 2006, these funds were distributed to shrimpers as 

fuel vouchers (Associated Press 2005b). These vouchers made it possible for one offloading 

facility to send ten small boats from Bayou La Batre (ranging in size from 40-60 feet) to 

Louisiana in May at the start of shrimp season. Another offloading facility owner used the 

vouchers to send 27 of his freezer vessels to Louisiana. However, most large freezer vessel 

owners elected not to shrimp until June, believing that they would be assured of high quality, 

large shrimp at that time. Larger shrimp means more profit – or at least more money with which 

to cover the cost of their operations. In May, the size of the catch was typically 31-35 per pound, 

which had an ex-vessel, heads-on, price of $1.15. One informant reports, “Fishermen aren’t 

220
enthused to go out at all; but, we need to keep working” (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou 

La Batre, May 18, 2006). 

While the commercial fishing industry in coastal Alabama appears to be on the road to recovery, 

rising overhead costs and fuel prices threaten to undermine its overall and long-term stability. 

Although the price of fuel began dropping in November after spiking in September, fuel costs, in 

combination with historically low shrimp prices, have kept Bayou La Batre’s large vessel fleet 

moored through at least May 2006. In May, commercial diesel fuel sold for approximately $2.32 

a gallon. Consequently, only the few shrimpers who could afford the upfront fuel costs for the 

longer trips into Louisiana state waters participated in this state’s spring shrimp season. 

Oysters. In contrast, the collapse of the oyster fisheries in Louisiana and Mississippi has 

resulted in an economic boon for Alabama harvesters. Although Alabama’s oyster beds are still 

recovering from Hurricane Ivan (2004), that wiped out 80 percent of its harvest, these beds came 

through Hurricane Katrina with relatively little damage. Biologists estimate that perhaps only 20 

percent of state oyster beds were damaged, with an 80 percent survival rate in the Cedar Point 

reefs surrounding the Dauphin Island Bridge (Raines 2005). 

Alabama’s state leases reopened on September 22 after biologists completed testing the state’s 

reefs for pathogens and pollutants. When demand for oysters approached their seasonal holiday 

peak, prices for Alabama’s oysters tripled over what they were at this same time in 2004. In July 

of 2004, Alabama’s oysters sold for about $10 per sack of 200. After Katrina, in September 

2005, they sold for almost $30 per sack (Raines 2005). In June 2006, oystermen were selling 

their product in-shell to processors for roughly $3.50 per pound; processors were selling their 

shucked product to retail seafood dealers for $9.99 per pound (Personal Communication, IAI, 

Bayou La Batre, June 27, 2006). 

Local fishery participants described post-Katrina oyster production in Bayou La Batre as strong, 

despite the fact that many processing and unloading docks were destroyed (Figure 104). A major 

oyster processor in coastal Alabama, who buys in the shell and then sells to a wholesaler on the 

East Coast, states that he was buying 122 bushels of oysters a day in December 2005, an 

uncommon situation: “Before Katrina, Alabama oysters made up 10 percent of what I processed; 

now it makes 90 percent. Presently, we dredge around Portersville on public reefs, but before 

the storm we worked only in private leased beds” (Personal Communication, IAI, Alabama, 

December 20, 2005). 

221
 Figure 104. Oyster Shell Mounds Lining Bayou La Batre Harbor. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

In some cases, harvest rates were uninterrupted or improved because state officials began 

allowing commercial harvesters to use mechanical dredgers in state waters as of October 3, 2005. 

Nevertheless, only a small percentage of the approximately 600 oystermen in the region could 

afford the $2,000 it costs to rig up a mechanical dredging operation (Personal Communication, 

IAI, Bayou La Batre, December 20, 2005). To make ends meet, many Alabama oystermen 

engaged in public reef restoration and bottom cultivation. NOAA and FEMA funded these 

exploratory research projects to ascertain the whereabouts and assess the health of remaining 

state oyster beds and help unemployed fishery participants earn a living. Overall, oystermen and 

women in this area remain optimistic about the future of this fishery: 

There is a predicted elevated tropical activity in the next few years. We are trying to plant 

areas that are protected, especially in Herring Bay and Porterville, places that have 

natural barriers. They historically survive erosion. Put shells in the right place and it 

should be okay (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, December 20, 2005). 

In the meantime, the oyster fishery continues to depend on harvests from oyster beds in state and 

neighboring waters, particularly Mobile Bay and the Mississippi Sound. While catch rates 

increased in the months after Katrina, production rates declined, primarily because of persistent 

labor shortages. One oyster processor explains that production rates in 2006 trail about 25 

percent behind pre-storm efforts. To compensate for this shortage, he has suspended his oyster 

shucking and shrimp packaging services. Instead, he offers only icing and oyster packing and 

222
shipping, all of which are less labor intensive activities. Still, his adaptations speak to the 

resiliency of the commercial fishing participants in this community; despite challenges, nearly 70 

percent of Bayou La Batre’s “mom-and pop” oyster processing operations have resumed postKatrina operations to some degree as of May 2006 (Personal Communication, IAI, Oyster 

Processor, Bayou La Batre, May 2006). 

However, it must be noted that many small-scale processors, including oyster shuckers and crab 

pickers, suffered serious economic setbacks as a result of the storm. In 2004, there were 

approximately 50 small-scale oyster, shrimp, and crab processing plants in Bayou La Batre. 

After the storms, only half of these remained operational. In part, the current demise of these 

smaller operations is a consequence of “shallow roots,” whereas the major processing plants in 

Bayou La Batre are all family-owned, operated, and transferred across generations. These 

characteristics translated into a more immediate social and economic advantage after the storm 

than was available to many of the smaller, less established businesses. 

 Commercial Vessels. City officials initially estimated that Katrina destroyed 60 percent 

of the commercial shrimp boats in Bayou La Batre (Pemberton 2005). According to the U.S. 

Coast Guard’s (USCG) Gulf Strike team, between 72 and 80 commercial fishing vessels in 

Bayou La Batre were damaged, beached, or submerged by the storm (Figure 105). The USCG 

first removed ten of these vessels from the waters because of fuel leaks (Mitchell 2005b). 

Understandably, local fishermen are concerned about the short and long term effects of such 

contaminants on their catch. 

223
Note: This graphic has a resolution of 300 dpi,

allowing the viewer to zoom in .

Bayou

La Batre

Estimated Storm Surge

Estimated Post Storm Floo

> 50 - 100 foot Vessel

> 30 - 50 foot Vessel

< 30 foot or unknown Vessel

> 100 foot Vessel

0 0.25 0.5 0.125

Mile

by the Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge

Ocean Going Vessels Sunk or Swept Inland

Bayou La Batre, Alabama

224
 Charter Boat Effects. Charter boat operators also incurred sizeable losses as a result of 

Hurricane Katrina. Nearly 84 percent received trip cancellations in the weeks and months 

following the storm (Chang et al. 2006). As in other storms, however, many owners/operators of 

for-hire vessels in Alabama heeded the broadcast weather warnings and took extra precaution to 

dock and secure their vessels. Through interviews, Chang et al. discovered that most of the 

charter fleet remained intact (2006: 26). However, several marinas throughout Baldwin County 

experienced minor damage which required temporary closure, thus underscoring a primary 

concern of many for-hire operators in Alabama: diminishing dock space. Following Hurricane 

Ivan in September 2004, many dock/marina owners sold their property to condominium 

developers. Hurricane Katrina may accelerate this trend of limiting public access as marina 

owners weigh the costs and benefits of continuing their businesses (Chang et al. 2006). 

Other Infrastructure Damage. Table 95 provides a snapshot of Bayou La Batre’s 

marine-related infrastructure and services both pre-Katrina and at several points in time after the 

storm. The most recent update for this community was conducted in May 2006 (IAI, Field 

Observations, 2005 & 2006). 

Only one processor in Bayou La Batre –one of the largest–had not reopened as of May 2006. 

This processor, which employed some 110 workers, reportedly was “on its way out anyway,” 

due to increasing competition (Personal Communication with Processor, IAI, Bayou La Batre, 

October 2005). 

 

However, two-thirds of the commercial docking facilities damaged by the storm in Bayou La 

Batre had not resumed operations as of May 2006. In part, recovery for this infrastructure is 

stymied by a lack of funding coupled with the reported tripling of construction prices in the area. 

225
Table 95. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services and Boats in Bayou La Batre, 

Alabama, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 12 4 4 4 Includes State and 

Private Docks 

Fishing associations 4 4 4 4 -- 

Major processors (shrimp) 7 2 6 6 -- 

Other seafood processors 

(oyster and crab) 

50 25 30 30 Operating at 50% due 

to lack of product 

and/or employees 

Hotels/Inns (dockside) 1 1 1 1 -- 

Marine railways/haul out 

facilities 

3 3 3 3 -- 

Offloading facilities 15 1 12 12 -- 

Net makers 3 1 3 3 -- 

Public boat ramps 3 3 3 3 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 0 1 1 -- 

Recreational fishing 

tournaments 

2 0 0 2* *Planned for summer 

Seafood restaurants 1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood retail markets 5 1 5 5 -- 

Trucking operations 4 4 4 4 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a n/a n/a n/a -- 

Commercial fishing boats ~250 ~100 ~200 n/a -- 

 n/a = Not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Operations, 2005 & 2006. 

 In Bon Secour, recovery for the commercial processing industry and some fishery 

participants in coastal Alabama is well underway. The vast majority of marine-related facilities 

sustained only slight damage from an eight to ten foot storm surge during Hurricane Katrina. 

Therefore, most were able to resume operations within weeks of the storm. Only one 

recreational marina and the town’s solitary seafood restaurant remained closed longer; the latter 

primarily because of the difficulty its owner had in finding a reliable supply of fresh seafood. 

Table 96 provides infrastructure and service data for Bon Secour, pre- and post-Katrina. Table 

97 provides infrastructure and service data for Mobile. For this city, counts were taken in 

October 2004 and 2005, and in June 2006. 

226
Table 96. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Bon Secour, Alabama, 

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

March 

2006 

May 

2006 

Comments 

Commercial docking facilities 4 4 4 4 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, 

welding, 

other repair 

2 0 2 2 -- 

Fish processors 2 2 2 2 -- 

Marine railways/haul out 

facilities 

1 1 1 1 -- 

Offloading facilities 4 4* 4* 4* *Not operating at full 

capacity 

Net makers 2 2 2 2 -- 

Recreational docks/marinas 1 0 0 0 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 1 1 1 1 -- 

Seafood restaurants 1 0 1 1 -- 

Seafood retail markets 3 3 3 3 -- 

Trucking operations 4 4 4 4 -- 

Site-seeing/pleasure tours 2 0 2 2 -- 

Charter/party boats n/a n/a n/a n/a -- 

Commercial fishing boats n/a n/a n/a n/a -- 

n/a = not available. 

Source: IAI, Field Operations, 2005 & 2006. 

227
Table 97. Presence of Fishing Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Mobile, Alabama, 

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004, 2005, 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 

2004 

Oct. 

2005 

June 

2006 

Comments 

Boat yards/boat builders 2 2 2 -- 

Recreational docking facilities 5 5 5 -- 

Fishing gear, electronics, welding, 

& other repair 

16 16 16 -- 

Fish processors 1 1 1 -- 

NMFS or state fisheries office 

(port agent, etc.) 

1 1 1 -- 

Public boat ramps 1 1 1 -- 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 4 4 4 -- 

Seafood retail markets 20 12 19 -- 

Seafood wholesale dealers 3 3 3 -- 

Charter/party boats 10+ n/a n/a -- 

Commercial boats n/a n/a n/a -- 

 n/a= not available. 

 Source: IAI, Field Operations, 2005 & 2006. 

III. ESTIMATED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON 

 ALABAMA FISHERIES AND RELATED INDUSTRIES 

 According to the Organized Seafood Association of Alabama (OSAA), the 13 seafood 

processing facilities in Mobile and Bon Secour had combined annual sales of $123 million in 

2004. Thus, based on loss of product and revenue, total estimated losses are $22.9 million 

(income loss = $8.8 million; inventory loss = 2.8 million; repair cost = $7.8 million; employee’s 

lost salary = $3.5 million) (OSAA 2005). 

The Bayou La Batre production center estimates its total industry losses at $7.2 million (loss of 

production = $4.1 thousand; deductible and uninsured losses = $1.5 million; loss of crew shares 

= $1.6 million). Together, these facilities represent 85 percent of Alabama’s producing facilities 

and vessels (OSAA 2005). 

Alternatively, Table 98 below enumerates Chang et al’s. (2006) estimated direct and indirect 

losses to the Alabama seafood industry. For several reasons, these authors offer a significantly 

higher estimate of industry losses than do others. First, Chang et al.’s analysis focuses more 

broadly on “losses” rather than “costs”. Conventionally, “costs” is a subset of losses that are 

reimbursed by insurance companies and governments (Chang et al. 2006: 6). Second, there are 

two areas where Chang et al. may have biased samples. Chang et al. derive their estimates from 

data collected in the most damaged regions of Alabama—Baldwin and Mobile Counties. Their 

respondents may not be representative of the state’s total affected population. Additionally, the 

228
data were collected by the Alabama Marine Resources Division using telephone interviews and 

questionnaires completed by commercial and recreational fishermen, charter boat operators, and 

seafood processors. Yet, both the decision to reply and the capacity to respond introduce an 

element of self-selection into the sample collection. Thus, these respondents may not have been 

typical of the total population. Chang et al. derived their loss estimates from averages obtained 

from this sample and then multiplied their results by the total number of potential fishery 

participants in each sector in the area. For example, the loss estimates derived for the 210 

shrimp fishermen in Baldwin and Mobile Counties were extrapolated from the responses of the 

52 shrimp fishermen who participated in this research. An average was obtained from the 52 

responses and then multiplied by 210. Third, the figures provided by Chang et al. exclude the 

multiplier effect from their analysis. These researchers contend that, because Bayou La Batre is 

a small town of 2,313, any multiplier effect is likely to be negligible (2006: iii). 

Table 98. Total Losses from Katrina to the Alabama Seafood 

Industry: September 2005-December 2005 

Loss Items Sub-category 

Net value of damages on boats & 

facilities: 

 Dealers & Processors $19,742,000 

 Shrimp fishermen $ 7,890,000 

 Other fishermen $ 5,613,000 

 Charter boats $ 4,097,000 

Subtotal $37,342,000 

Less Insurance Coverage <$12,732,000> 

Subtotal $24,610,000 

Vessel removal: $3,840,000 

Lost inventories: 

 Dealers & Processors $ 3,409,000 

 Shrimp fishermen $ 9,838,000 

 Other fishermen $ 3,968,000 

 Charter boats $ 3,304,000 

Subtotal $20,519,000 

Wages & invoices unpaid: 

 Dealers & Processors $3,934,000 

 Shrimp fishermen $ 399,000 

 Other fishermen $ 819,000 

 Charter boats $ 695,000 

Subtotal $5,847,000 

Lost revenues & future lost sales: 

 Dealers & Processors $29,393,000 

 Fishermen $18,885,000 

 Charter boat operators $ 9,156,000 

Subtotal $57,434,000 

Total Actual Losses $112,250,000 

 Source: Chang et al. 2006. 

229
Seafood processing plant loss estimates are based on the assumption of 100 percent loss of 

revenues, inventories, and wages in September 2005, 75 percent loss in October 2005, 50 percent 

loss in November 2005, and 25 percent loss in December and 2006 (Chang et al. 2006: 16). 

Economic losses to fishermen are based on the same assumptions. Chang et al. caution, 

however, that the availability of assistance will have a direct impact on the loss estimate. If the 

speed of assistance is delayed, the loss estimate is likely to be higher due primarily to the 

continued increase of lost sales resulting in the loss of some dealers and/or processors (2006: iii). 

More recently, preliminary data from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on 

commercial landings in Alabama indicate that, in the last four months of 2005, landings revenue 

received (all species combined) was just over $16 million dollars. This figure represents a 20 

percent decline in revenue from the same period in 2004, and an 8 percent decline from the five 

year average for the same period. An increased demand for and price surge of Alabama oysters 

following the closure of state oyster beds in Mississippi and Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina 

likely accounts for this slight increase in overall value despite the decrease in overall dockside

landings. However, it is also worth noting that the figure for total landings (all species 

combined) in Alabama in 2005 (22 million lbs.) was still below that for 2004 (27 million lbs.), 

despite the fact that many fishermen from Louisiana and Mississippi had offloaded their catch in 

Alabama during the months following the hurricane (Table 99). 

230
Table 99. Alabama Post-Katrina Value of Dockside Landings: 2000-2005 

Fishery Year September-October November-December 4-Month Interval

Shrimp 2000-2004 Average $7,681,433 $5,203,468 $12,884,901 

 2004 $7,360,418 $4,011,898 $11,372,316 

 2005 $4,946,175 $8,426,867 $13,373,042 

Percentage Change in Shrimp Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -36% 62% 4% 

 2004 to 2005 -33% 110% 18% 

Oyster 2000-2004 Average $297,796 $283,338 $581,135 

 2004 $378,417 $196,561 $574,978 

 2005 $266,850 $926,853 $1,193,703 

Percentage Change in Oyster Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -10% 227% 105% 

 2004 to 2005 -29% 372% 108% 

All Other 2000-2004 Average $803,523 $857,307 $1,660,829 

 2004 $731,299 $891,813 $1,623,112 

 2005 $872,709 $853,369 $1,726,078 

Percentage Change in All Other Species Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 9% 0% 4% 

 2004 to 2005 19% -4% 6% 

Total 2000-2004 Average $8,782,752 $6,344,113 $15,126,865 

 2004 $8,470,134 $5,100,272 $13,570,406 

 2005 $6,085,734 $10,207,089 $16,292,823 

Percentage Change in All Species Landings Revenue 

 5-Year Avg. to 2005 -31% 61% 8% 

 2004 to 2005 -28% 100% 20% 

Source: NMFS SEFSC Accumulated Landings Database; 2005 data is preliminary. 

The significant distributional impacts which occurred are discussed next. 

 Charter Boat Industry. In late 2005, the National Association of Charter Operators 

(NACO) conducted a survey among Gulf Coast charter boat operators to determine the extent of 

economic losses as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In Alabama, NACO conducted 

surveys with 133 of the state’s 180 identified licensed charter boat vessels. Of those sampled, 46 

are guide boats, 53 are “six-pack” charter boats, 29 are multi-passenger charter boats, and 5 are 

head boats. Ninety-two operators reported fishing in federal waters, 79 in State waters, (up to 

three miles offshore) and 54 in inshore waters. 

231
Hurricane Katrina damaged 22 and completely destroyed two charter boats in Alabama. Of 

these lost and damaged vessels, total damages/losses amounted to $436,390; insured losses 

totaled 64 percent. According to NACO, these vessel operators lost 5,253 trips valued at $5.3 

million (Walker et al. 2006). Nevertheless, charter boat operators in Alabama remain optimistic 

about their future participation in this industry. Some 120 operators or 90 percent anticipate 

remaining in business; the remainder does not plan to continue in business, are not sure if they 

will continue, or did not respond to this question (Walker et al. 2006). 

Table 100 shows the overall projected economic loss to the State of Alabama from the losses 

incurred by its charter boat fleet (Walker et al. 2006: 138). NACO included in this analysis lost 

trips immediately following the storms, physical loss to vessels, support personnel lost trip gross 

income and the projected gross lost income that was reported for the year following the storms to 

owners only (Walker et al. 2006: 138). 

Table 100. Total Projected Losses to 133 Alabama Charter Boats from 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita* 

Lost Trips (up to submittal of survey) $ 5,321,600 

Physical Damage $436,390 

Support Personnel Loss $1,165,225 

Annual Income Loss for 1 year (after survey was submitted) $12,976,998 

Total $19,900,213 

 * Data only available for both storms combined. 

 Source: Walker et al. (2006). 

IV. RESPONSE AND ADAPTATION TO HURRICANE KATRINA 

In several respects, Hurricane Ivan left the State of Alabama better prepared to handle 

Katrina’s post-storm impacts. First, the state was able to quickly establish relief, clean-up, and 

rebuilding contracts. For example, debris removal contracts were more easily secured in 

Alabama than in other areas because of pre-established relations with local primary contractors 

responsible for cleaning up after Ivan. The Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural 

Resources (ADCNR), which had previously secured emergency funding from FEMA, was thus 

able to begin clean-up efforts immediately following the storm (Figure 106). Most beneficially, 

these contracts provided unemployed fishermen with an opportunity for immediate short-term 

employment removing debris. 

232
 Figure 106. Bayou La Batre, Post-Katrina Clean-up Efforts. 

 Source: IAI Staff, September 2005. 

In several other respects, however, Hurricane Ivan undercut individual and local abilities to 

respond to Katrina’s aftermath. Many state and county funding sources used to finance 

rebuilding efforts were depleted after Ivan. And, many fishery participants had already taken 

loans to repair vessels and homes damaged by Ivan and exhausted their personal savings. A key 

informant summarizes the situation: 

Problem here is there is no cash flow. Normally in fishing communities everybody helps 

everybody, but since Ivan, everyone has spent savings and used up loans. Everything is 

now cash basis. No reserves for banks, no finances (Personal Communication, IAI, 

Bayou La Batre, May 07, 2006). 

Fishery participants in Baldwin and Mobile Counties have been drawing upon a variety of 

coping strategies to address the impacts of Hurricane Katrina, exacerbated by a post-Ivan 

backdrop. These strategies include: (1) using small fishing vessels to meet government funded 

clean-up efforts; (2) minimizing harvest efforts where revenue potential is diminished; (3) 

concentrating purchase efforts outside the state; (4) increasing reliance on government aid 

programs; and (5) increasing reliance on community support. 

 1. Use of small fishing vessels to meet government-funded clean-up efforts. The Army 

Corp of Engineers (undertaking critical navigation channel dredging of Dauphin Island Bay, 

Mobile Harbor, and various waterways), the Environmental Protection Agency, and FEMA were 

233
working together to fund and operationalize various clean-up efforts along coastal Alabama. 

More than 2.8 million cubic yards out of an estimated 3.2 million cubic yards of storm-related 

debris have been collected statewide (FEMA 2005). Debris removal efforts have focused on 

Mobile and Baldwin Counties, particularly in the Bayou La Batre and Dauphin Island areas. An 

ADCNR official estimates that expenditures for the marine debris removal project will approach 

$20 million. 

 

FEMA funds released to Alabama state officials in late September were used to hire four 

contractors– three out of Mobile and one from North Carolina–for overseeing debris removal. 

These four contractors subcontracted with about 200 local vessels to do the work. Small vessels, 

like shrimp boats that require less fuel, were ideal candidates for the job. One local contractor 

subcontracted with about 70 boats (36 of which were shrimp boats), employing some 108 shrimp 

fishermen (deckhands and captains) over the clean-up period. Two charter boats were hired to 

monitor the efforts. Pay ranged from $90 to $200 for an acre of clean-up area. 

Although this contract was cancelled one month later in late October, the work provided many 

small-vessel fishermen with a much-needed opportunity to earn income far in excess of what 

they would have earned shrimping. High fuel prices following the storms–which spiked to 

nearly $3.00 a gallon– made breaking even a difficult task. Thus, fishery participants with small 

operations (and small vessels) who were willing and able to participate in government-funded 

clean-up programs were better positioned to withstand industry disruptions in the aftermath of 

Katrina. 

 2. Minimizing harvesting efforts where the potential for revenue is diminished. 

Fishermen, particularly those with large, freezer vessels, curtailed offshore outings as another 

way to adapt to the post-Katrina climate of high fuel prices and low revenues. Offshore trips 

noticeably dropped during September, when diesel fuel prices exceeded the “break-even point”. 

On average, before the price of fuel increased in post-Katrina era, a single trip might consume 

between $22,000 and $30,000 in fuel, roughly half of total revenue. After Katrina, fuel costs for 

an average single trip approached $45,000. Moreover, the majority of fishery participants 

interviewed for this research emphasized that the price of diesel must drop to less than $1.00 per 

gallon, if the domestic shrimp industry is to robustly recover; diesel fuel must sell for less than 

$2.00 per gallon if a commercial shrimper is just to survive. 

3. Concentration of purchasing efforts outside the state. High fuel prices and closed 

fishing grounds put most large vessel operators out of commission in the months following the 

storm. At the same time, smaller vessel operators discovered that working for contractors 

funded by FEMA in the water-based debris removal effort was more profitable than fishing. The 

net effect of these occupational shifts was a lack of product for local seafood wholesalers and 

retailers. 

One way that seafood retailers have been able to adapt to this lack is by purchasing product from 

outside the area. One mullet and flounder retailer in Bayou La Batre now buys fish from 

Houston instead of local venues; “can’t get no fish” is the local lament (Table 101). 

 

234
Table 101. Purchasing Changes of Mobile Seafood Dealers, Post-Katrina 

Community Product Pre-Katrina 

Purchasing Sources 

Post-Katrina 

Purchasing Sources

Bayou La Batre Mullet, flounder Bayou La Batre Houston 

Bayou La Batre Flounder, shrimp Bayou La Batre and 

local fisheries 

Bayou La Batre and 

local fisheries 

Bayou La Batre Shrimp, mullet, trout Bayou La Batre East coast 

Bayou La Batre Shrimp, crab, trout, 

flounder, mullet 

Bayou La Batre East coast 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations, December, 2005. 

At the same time, operational seafood processors and dealers in Mobile and Bon Secour have 

been profiting as they absorb product previously processed and sold out of Bayou La Batre and 

Biloxi, Mississippi. Indeed, the complaint in these areas is the opposite of that issued in Bayou 

La Batre: “too much fish”. In these cities, processors have been having a difficult time simply 

keeping up with the increase in demand. Many dealers in Mobile additionally report that 

demand for seafood increased as evacuees from other parts of the Gulf swelled the local 

population. As the Alabama shrimp season had not yet opened as of May 2006, all local 

processors were relying on out-of-state shrimp. 

 

Nine months after Hurricane Katrina, Mobile and Baldwin County seafood processors, ice 

suppliers, and fuel dispensers continued to experience increased demand for its marine-related 

services and supplies. In particular, the opening of the Louisiana shrimp season in Shrimp 

Management Zone 2 on May 4 accelerated precipitously such demands, as marine-based supplies 

and services remained hard to come by in southeast Louisiana (Figure 107). Indeed, trucks from 

as far away as Texas were trucking in shrimp to Bayou La Batre for processing and trucking out 

fuel and ice. One fuel merchant reported that roughly 40 percent to 50 percent of his customers 

were coming from Louisiana, 25 percent from Mississippi, and the rest from Texas and Alabama 

(Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, May 11, 2006). Ice sales were also 

skyrocketing. One ice house in Bayou La Batre received an order from commercial fishery 

participants in Louisiana for 16 pallets of ice on the first day of the shrimp season. On that day, 

this icehouse sold roughly 57,000 pounds of ice to two storage sheds in Louisiana. In May 2006, 

this icehouse was producing approximately 80 bars of ice per hour, the equivalent of 170-200 

blocks of ice per day (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, May 11, 2006). 

235
 Figure 107. Re-fueled and Re-iced Vessel Leaving Bayou La Batre 

 and to Louisiana Waters for the Opening of Shrimp Season. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

Unlike other parts of the Gulf Coast (e.g., southeast Louisiana) that suffered severe shortages of 

marine-based fuel supplies in the wake of Katrina, coastal Alabama had access to fuel supplies 

within a month of the storm. Significantly, this access facilitated the relatively rapid recovery of 

Bayou La Batre’s and Bon Secour’s commercial fishing industries. 

 4. Reliance on government aid programs. As discussed above, fishery participants need 

government aid programs to help them recover from Katrina’s destructive forces. Government 

funded debris removal contracts in Alabama provided for some a quick and ready source of 

income. The FEMA trailer and Red Cross meal programs in this state have also relieved some of 

the financial strain for affected persons. 

Alabama’s seafood retailers also require some federal assistance for recovery. Recently, a 

special “post-Katrina” federal provision was instituted permitting needy individuals to purchase 

hot meals with food stamps. Mobile seafood dealers report a significant increase in the number 

of customers presently using food stamps to buy hot meals. This revision in federal legislation 

has helped to stimulate the local seafood retail economy. 

 5. Reliance on community support. Community cohesion characterizes many fishing 

communities in Alabama; a quality that becomes readily apparent during times of trouble. For 

example, in addition to supplying hot meals for displaced individuals on a regular basis, many 

faith-based agencies in Bayou La Batre also cooperatively provided special Thanksgiving 

dinners for community members (Findley 2005). 

236
H. Overview of the Impacts of Hurricane Katrina on the Fishing Industries in 

the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 

 From the Mississippi Sound through the Louisiana Delta, Hurricane Katrina decimated 

commercial and recreational fishery infrastructure. Not only was commerce affected, thousands 

of fishery participants were displaced. Losses to man-made, marine-based infrastructure are 

estimated at $330 million throughout the Gulf. Incomplete commercial fishing trips added 

another estimated $490 million in lost dockside commercial revenues (NMFS 2005). While 

damage was widespread along the Gulf Coast, the fishing industries in Southeast Louisiana, 

coastal Mississippi and Alabama experienced the greatest amount of storm-related damage. 

Hurricane Katrina also disrupted the charter-boat industry in this region—destroying nearly half 

of the Gulf Coast fleet. An estimated 50 percent of the charter fleet in Mississippi, Alabama, and 

Louisiana, combined was damaged. Gulf-wide losses of recreational fishing trips resulted in 

$990 million in foregone economic activity, which includes lost revenues from restaurants, 

lodging, marinas, and general tourism (NMFS 2005). One of the biggest challenges facing the 

charter-fishing industry is the lack of support infrastructure. Motels for housing clientele are 

severely damaged; bait has been extremely difficult to locate; and without New Orleans as a 

functioning tourist destination, fishing-related tourism in the general region is down 

significantly. 

Gulf Coast ports were also directly affected. Port infrastructure in Gulfport (Harrison County, 

MS), and Plaquemines (Plaquemines Parish, LA) all sustained massive damage, whereas the 

ports at Port Fourchon (Lafourche Parish, LA), St. Bernard (St. Bernard Parish, LA), Mobile 

(Mobile County, AL), and Pascagoula (Jackson County, MS) sustained significant, although less 

severe, damage. These impacts have contributed to the shifting concentration of commercial 

shipping and fishing support activities and infrastructure to the west (to central Louisiana), east 

(to Alabama and Florida) and, to a lesser extent, north of New Orleans to Baton Rouge. The 

following sections provide a brief state by state overview of some of the key impacts sustained 

by the commercial and recreational fishing industries as a result of Hurricane Katrina. 

237
LOUISIANA 

Synopsis of Key Impacts on Louisiana State Fisheries 

• Thousands of commercial vessels lost and damaged throughout coastal Louisiana; 

• Commercial landing revenues in 2005 (Sept-Dec) declined 32 percent from the same 

period in 2004; 

• Losses to Louisiana’s seafood industry are estimated at $1.3 billion (annual total retail 

value); 

• ~ 40,000 recreational vessels throughout the state were lost; 

• Loss of revenue to the recreational fishing industry in the study parishes is estimated at 

$145 million; 

• Estimated losses to the charter boat industry include $13 million in lost trips and $8 

million for lost and damaged charter vessels; 

• Damages to the farmed alligator industry are estimated at $4 million; 

• Lack of ice, diminished processing and cold-storage capacity, infrastructure damage, 

debris in the water, fuel costs, and scarcity of marine supplies and services have severely 

constrained recovery efforts; 

• Accelerated labor shortages have also significantly constrained production capacity: 

processors in the affected parishes have lost between 35 and 40 percent of their labor 

force. 

Hurricane Katrina significantly disrupted fishing communities along Louisiana’s southeastern 

coast. Table 102 below provides a before and after snapshot of the marine-related infrastructure 

and services in the five study parishes, and their operational status as of May 2006. The state’s 

shrimp and oyster fisheries were particularly hard hit. Marinas, icehouses, boat launches, docks, 

piers, seafood restaurants, vessels, bait and tackle shops, and processors were largely destroyed 

in these areas—crippling local commercial and recreational fishing industries. Few commercial 

fishery participants in the area had anything left with which to fish. Although the shrimp fishery 

is thriving in the post-Katrina environment (in terms of volume), fishery participants with both 

intact vessels and the ability to reach the fishing grounds had no reliable means for distributing 

or marketing the product. At the same time, as much as two-thirds of the state’s oyster beds were 

detrimentally affected by the season’s hurricanes; damaged beds could take up to two years to 

return to life, as oysters die or diminish significantly when beds are upturned by storm surge or 

silted over by storm-driven mud and sand (Louisiana Sea Grant College Program [LSGCP] 

2005; Wulfhorst 2005). Seafood landings have necessarily shifted west to Texas and east to 

Mississippi and Alabama. State officials estimate Katrina-related losses to Louisiana’s seafood 

industry at about 40 percent of the industry’s annual total retail value or $1.3 billion (Wulfhorst 

2005). 

238
Table 102. Louisiana: Combined Presence and Operational Status of Select Fishing 

Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Jefferson, Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and 

Terrebonne Parishes, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004 and 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 May 2006 % Operable 

Air fill stations (diving) 7 5 71 

Boat yards/boat builders 22 20 91 

Commercial docking facilities 74 52 70 

Fishing gear, and repair materials 30 24 80 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish house 52 39 75 

Ice houses 25 12 48 

Fishing pier 7 5 71 

Offloading facility 72 49 68 

Marine railways/haul-out facilities 15 15 100 

Hotels/Inns (dockside and/or catering to 

recreational fishermen) 

 75 68 91 

Net makers 16 6 38 

Public boat ramp 55 31 56 

Recreational docks & marinas 42 21 50 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 43 28 65 

Recreational fishing tournaments 58 11 19 

Seafood restaurants 123 96 78 

Seafood retail markets 71 42 59 

Charter/party boats ~406 ~207 ~50 

Commercial fishing boats ~4,661 ~1,234 ~26 

Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Lack of ice, diminished processing and cold-storage capacity, infrastructure damage, debris in 

the water, fuel costs, and scarcity of marine supplies and services severely constrained recovery 

efforts. As of May 2006, approximately 63 percent of the marine-related infrastructure and 

services in the five study parishes had resumed operations or were considered operational. The 

figures listed above, however, obscure the extent to which these facilities have been able to 

resume operations consonant with their pre-Katrina production capacities. For example, while 

75 percent of the seafood processors reported being operational, the vast majority of them were 

operating at severely reduced levels due to significant labor shortages. Labor shortages have 

also undercut the operational capacities of seafood restaurants and retail markets. In addition, 

seafood restaurants and retail markets were often unable to meet the public’s ongoing demand 

for seafood in the months following Katrina because of the disrupted seafood supply. Many of 

the ice houses that had resumed operations also were functioning below their pre-Katrina 

capacities and, in some cases, were still relying on generators for electricity. Fifty percent of 

recreational docks and marina, and 70 percent of commercial docks had reopened by May 2006, 

but with significantly less dockage space and amenities. 

239
Recovery of the commercial and recreational fishing industries in Plaquemines Parish, where 

nearly 100 percent of the marine-related infrastructure (and much of the housing) was destroyed, 

remains particularly uncertain. There, recovery is undermined by a lack of federal assistance 

needed to upgrade its levee system. However, the Army Corps of Engineers is not likely to 

advocate spending between $1.6 billion and $2.9 billion to build miles of higher levees in south 

Plaquemines where some 4,000 people live. Plaquemines Parish residents who stay will have to 

raise their homes 14 feet to be eligible for federal flood insurance. And, although the offshore 

oil and gas production, commercial seafood and sport fishing tourism industries historically have 

been very active–and economically important– in this coastal parish, without sufficient 

protective barriers there is less incentive to invest in infrastructure. 

MISSISSIPPI 

Synopsis of Key Impacts on Mississippi State Fisheries

• All seafood dealerships along the Mississippi Gulf Coast were seriously damaged or 

destroyed, including six of Biloxi’s largest seafood processing plants; 

• Damages to seafood processing plants and seafood dealers are estimated at $101 million; 

• 90 percent of primary oyster reefs were destroyed; 

• Seafood processors and retailers rely on out-of-state product; 

• Commercial landings revenues in 2005 (Sept.- Dec.) represent a 79 percent decline in 

revenue from the same period in 2004; 

• Hurricane-related impacts to Mississippi’s marine fisheries are estimated at nearly $484 

million; 

• Damages to the resident commercial fishing fleet are estimated at $35 million. One 

hundred percent of these economic losses occurred in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson 

Counties; 

• Across the state, estimates of damage and loss to Mississippi’s total commercial fleet of 

approximately 1,100 vessels range from 40 percent to 87 percent; 

• Within the study counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson alone, 87 percent of 

commercial vessels were damaged. Loss estimates for damages to the boats in these 

three counties approach $160 million; 

• 74 charter boats were damaged/destroyed; damages/losses amount to $2 million; 

• Charter vessel operators lost nearly 5,000 trips in 2005 valued at $7.5 million; 

• So far, aid from FEMA and the SBA for charter boat operators has not been available; 

• The majority of Mississippi Gulf Coast marinas, harbors, roads, and bridges were 

seriously damaged or destroyed; the remaining infrastructure is insufficient to support 

tourism. Accommodations are particularly scarce; 

• Fuel, ice, and other marine-based supplies are in short supply; 

• Significant labor shortages slow recovery efforts; dependency upon immigrant labor 

sharply increases. 

240
Hurricane Katrina seriously damaged fisheries in Biloxi, Gulfport, and Pascagoula, rendering 70 

percent of the state’s commercial fleet and most of its seafood dealers and major seafood 

processing plants inoperable (Mississippi State University, Sea Grant Program 2005). First year 

losses to Mississippi’s commercial and recreational fishing industries are estimated at $170 to 

$200 million. This estimate does not include an additional $10 million dollars needed to repair 

damaged marinas, piers, ice houses, wharves, boat ramps, and related marine-based businesses. 

Estimates of recovery time for each facility vary from a few months, for those with relatively 

minor damage, to more than one year. Facility owners base their recovery estimates on the 

assumption that required materials, supplies, equipment, and employees will be available–and 

affordable. These estimates also assume that the processors will be able to purchase seafood as 

fishing is resumed. Table 103 below provides a before and after snapshot of the marine-related 

infrastructure and services in the three study counties, and their operational status as of May 

2006. 

Table 103. Mississippi: Combined Presence and Operational Status of Select Fishing 

Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties, 

 Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004 and 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 May 2006 % Operable 

Boat yards/boat builders 11 7 64 

Commercial docking facilities 16 5 31 

Fishing gear, electronics, welding, other 

repair 

 13 6 46 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish house 43 14 33 

Fishing pier 15 5 33 

Offloading facility 8 2 25 

Marine railways/haul-out facilities 3 1 33 

Hotels/Inns (dockside or catering to 

recreational fishermen) 

 24 5 21 

Net makers 2 1 50 

Public boat ramp 20 14 70 

Recreational docks & marinas 17 8 47 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 20 3 15 

Recreational fishing tournaments 9 3 33 

Seafood restaurants 39 18 46 

Seafood retail markets 35 9 26 

Charter/party boats ~74 ~34 ~46 

Commercial fishing boats ~235 ~45 ~19 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Even more so than in Louisiana, recovery efforts along the Mississippi Gulf Coast are 

constrained by lack of ice, increased fuel costs, diminished offloading, processing and coldstorage capacity, infrastructure damage, and scarcity of marine supplies and services. As of May 

2006, only about 38 percent of the marine-related infrastructure and services in Hancock, 

241
Harrison, and Jackson Counties had resumed operations to varying extents. Nonetheless, 

operational offloading facilities, seafood processors, and commercial docking facilities are still 

in short supply. Most open businesses have been operating at maximum capacity; although acute 

labor shortages prevent most from attaining pre-Katrina production levels. In some communities 

the shortages are transformational. Notably, in Biloxi, seafood processors will likely be forced to 

move inland by developers, and, the lack of infrastructure and affordable housing almost ensures 

that commercial fishing participants—once the corner stone of the Point Cadet area—will not be 

coming back. 

ALABAMA 

Synopsis of Key Impacts on Alabama State Fisheries 

• Many commercial fishing vessels were beached, damaged, or destroyed; Katrina 

destroyed 60 percent of the commercial shrimp boats in Bayou La Batre; 

• Commercial landings revenues in 2005 (Sept.- Dec.) represent a 20 percent decline in 

revenue from the same period in 2004; 

• While only 20 percent of state oyster beds were damaged, the oyster fishery continues to 

depend on harvests from oyster beds in neighboring waters, particularly Mobile Bay and 

the Mississippi Sound; 

• The few operational industrial processors are understaffed and cannot handle the high 

volumes of product coming to them from all over the Gulf Coast; 

• Based on loss of product and revenue, estimated losses for seafood processing facilities in 

Mobile and Bon Secour total $23 million; 

• Hurricane Katrina damaged/destroyed 24 charter boats in Alabama. Total 

damages/losses amount to $436 thousand; 

• Although Alabama’s charter fleet remained mostly intact, nearly 84 percent of charter 

boat operators received trip cancellations in the months following the storm; these vessel 

operators lost over 5 thousand trips valued at $5.3 million; 

• Total projected losses to 133 Alabama Charter Boats = $20 million; 

• Fuel costs and historically low shrimp prices have been the key factors in keeping Bayou 

La Batre’s remaining commercial vessel fleet moored through at least May 2006; 

• Escalating labor shortages contribute to poor post-Katrina production rates. 

Because Louisiana and Mississippi bore the brunt of Hurricane Katrina, Alabama’s Gulf Coast 

marine-based infrastructure sustained relatively less damage than did the infrastructure in either 

Louisiana or Mississippi (Table 104). Nevertheless, many seafood processors, retailers, and 

vessels in coastal Alabama sustained serious damages and losses. For example, Katrina 

destroyed 60 percent of the commercial shrimp fleet in Bayou La Batre, one of Alabama’s top 

producing ports. As a result, approximately 75 percent of shrimpers lost their primary source of 

income in the months following the storm. However, some sectors benefited from diminished 

competition. Hence, the collapse of the oyster fisheries in Louisiana and Mississippi resulted in 

an economic boon for Alabama harvesters, with prices for Alabama’s oysters tripling after 

Katrina from what they were in 2004 at this time (Raines 2005). 

242
Table 104. Alabama: Combined Presence and Operational Status of Select Fishing 

Infrastructure, Services, and Boats in Baldwin and Mobile Counties, 

 Pre- and Post-Hurricane Katrina: 2004 and 2006 

Infrastructure or Service Oct. 2004 May 2006 % Operable 

Boat yards/boat builders 2 2 100 

Commercial docking facilities 16 8 50 

Fishing gear, electronics, welding, other 

repair 

 18 18 100 

Fish processors, Wholesale fish house 63 42 67 

Offloading facility 19 16 84 

Marine railways/haul-out facilities 4 4 100 

Hotels/Inns (dockside or catering to 

recreational fishermen) 

 1 1 100 

Net makers 5 5 100 

Public boat ramp 4 4 100 

Recreational docks & marinas 6 5 83 

Bait & tackle/fishing supplies 2 2 100 

Recreational fishing tournaments 2 2 100 

Seafood restaurants 2 2 100 

Seafood retail markets 28 27 96 

Charter/party boats ~180 ~158 ~88 

Commercial fishing boats n/a n/a n/a 

 n/a = not available 

 Source: IAI, Field Observations 2005 & 2006. 

Because of their exposed location, Alabama’s docks and marinas, seafood processors and boats 

took the hardest hit from Katrina. As of May 2006, only 50 percent of commercial docking 

facilities and 67 percent of seafood/fish processors had resumed operations. In part, recovery for 

this infrastructure is stymied by a lack of funding coupled with the reported tripling of 

construction prices in the area. Overall, however, coastal Alabama is well on the road to 

recovery. Unlike other parts of the Gulf Coast (e.g., southeast Louisiana) that suffered severe 

shortages of marine-based fuel supplies in the wake of Katrina, coastal Alabama had access to 

fuel supplies within a month of the storm. Significantly, this access allowed the relatively rapid 

recovery of Bayou La Batre’s and Bon Secour’s commercial fishing industries. As of May 2006, 

approximately 91 percent of the overall marine-related infrastructure and services in Baldwin 

and Mobile Counties had resumed operations. 

243
I. Interim Conclusions 

 In the context of historical trends within the Gulf states’ commercial and recreational 

fishing industry, Hurricane Katrina accelerated but did not introduce recent challenges. Rather, 

this devastating storm brought into sharp relief the struggles commercial shrimpers are having, 

for example, with rising costs and shrinking revenues, labor shortages, and loss of marine-based 

infrastructure and services due to coastal development and erosion. The future of the industry 

depends on how these economic and social concerns play out. While the nuances of these 

problems are particular to each Gulf state, the accelerated trends discussed in this section are 

overarching and largely shared by commercial fishery participants across the Gulf. 

Declining Shrimp Prices. Arguably, the greatest threat in recent years to commercial 

fishery participants has been the widening margin between rising costs and decreasing revenues. 

While numerous factors affect both costs and revenues, escalating fuel costs and declining exvessel prices of shrimp are two of this decade’s most critical determinants. 

Already in decline in recent years, shrimp prices continue to fall in the aftermath of Katrina, and 

in some areas, are prohibitively low. According to a dealer in southeast Louisiana, the price for 

shrimp is essentially set by a large processing facility, at $1.50 per pound (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Lafourche Parish, November 7, 2005). One processing plant owner, who 

has worked in the industry for at least four decades, describes the last few years as “the worst” he 

has seen: 

Four years ago, it was all domestic shrimp from independent shrimp vessel owners...This 

year would have been a better year, until hurricanes came. So many plants have been 

demolished due to storms. We couldn’t fish...What’s happened to us is we lost our 

market share, more and more imports throughout the last 30 years. We saw domestic 

[shrimp] go from 60 percent of the market in the late 60s and 70s. In 1980 it was 50/50 

[domestic to foreign shrimp], then the Chinese got online and flooded the market. The 

number of processors and vessels are diminishing. If prices of shrimp crept back up you 

would see it grow again. It’s been a painful downsizing the last 10-12 years. Worst 

years I can remember...2002, 2003, 2004. From late 2001 to 2004, it’s been devastating 

years. Never thought I would see such bad fishing years in all my life...Time to leave the 

shrimping business, after all those generations. What has happened to the plant is typical 

of the industry (Personal Communication, IAI, Lafourche Parish, November 7, 2005). 

In Biloxi, fishery participants also point out that prices for shrimp no longer vary much 

according to size. Despite less supply and constant demand, brokers were paying $1.40 for 

21/25 and 26/35 count head on shrimp– and only five cents more than 41/50 count head on 

shrimp– in January 2006. Many fishermen expressed dismay and frustration, not only with the 

low price, but also with the lack of broker discernment regarding product quality or size 

(Personal Communication, IAI, Biloxi, January 10, 2006). 

244
 Fuel Costs. Interviews with fishermen along the Gulf Coast confirm their concern with 

escalating fuel costs, especially in concert with declining shrimp prices in the post-Katrina 

environment when the price of marine diesel fuel rose to $3.00 per gallon (USDOE 2005). This 

increase further crippled many fishing operations in the Gulf. We illustrate the scope of effect 

for individual operators with the following hypothetical example. Although capacities vary 

extensively, the fuel tank of a distant water trawl vessel (~80 feet in length) often holds in the 

range of 20,000 gallons of fuel. Fueling such a vessel in 2000 would have cost in the range of 

$13,000, but given price increases, it would have cost nearly $24,000 to fill such a tank in 2005 

even prior to Katrina. Given the lack of available fuel and loss of fuel docks following the 

hurricane, filling this hypothetical tank would cost about $75,000 in the months immediately 

following Katrina. Prices have resolved somewhat, though one fisherman in Biloxi laments that 

he paid 80 cents per gallon for diesel in 1999 and $2.40 in January of 2006 (Newsom 2006). By 

June 2006, diesel fuel was selling for between $2.50 and $2.75 per gallon in the study region. 

One Pass Christian fisherman comparatively noted that diesel fuel cost less than $1.00 per gallon 

in 2000, while one pound of in-season medium shrimp (heads-on) sold for about $4.00; in 2005, 

however, diesel fuel sold for about $3.00 a gallon, while the same medium-sized shrimp fetched 

about $1.50 per pound. 

In recent years, fixed trip costs are commonly said to exceed revenues. According to one longterm shrimper, if fuel costs exceed much more than one-third of total expenses, net income is 

small and the enterprise precarious. Figure 108 below illustrates this scenario. The records 

show that, between January and August 2005, one vessel grossed a total of $146,934, but netted 

only $5,756. Fuel costs accounted for roughly 36 percent of total expenses, with 24 percent of 

the gross going toward crew share. The remaining 20 percent covered insurance and supply 

costs. When fuel costs increase, as they did in the months following Katrina, returns are further 

diminished (IAI, Field Observations, January 2006). 

 

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“Vessel X” 

Profit and Loss 

January through August 2005 

 Jan-Aug 05 % of Income

Ordinary Income Expense 

 Income 

SALES 146,934.32 100.00% 

Total Income 146,934.32 100.00% 

Expense 

 Accounting Fees 775.00 0.5% 

 Automobile Expense 1,174.87 0.8% 

 Bank Service Charges 1,194.96 0.8% 

 Contributions 221.00 0.2% 

 Crew Share 35,139.33 23.9% 

 Dues and Subscriptions 34.00 0.0% 

 FUEL, OIL 52,164,70 35.5% 

 Groceries 5,424.18 3.7% 

Insurance 14,212.24 9.7% 

Interest Expense 514.64 0.4% 

Licenses and Permits 1,485.00 1.0% 

Miscellaneous 1,100.00 0.7% 

Net Expense 6,097.51 4.1% 

Repairs 

 Equipment Repairs 421.05 0.3% 

 Repairs – Other 5,054.15 3.4% 

Total Repairs 5,475.20 3.7% 

 Supplies 13,520.14 9.2% 

Telephone 751.75 0.5% 

Travel and Entertainment 

 Travel/mileage expense 268.73 0.2% 

 Travel and Ent. – Other 1,625.19 1.1% 

Total Travel and Ent. 1,893.92 1.3% 

 

Total Expense 141,178.44 96.1% 

Net Ordinary Income 5,755.88 3.9% 

Net Income 5,755.88 3.9% 

Figure 108. Profit and Loss Margins for “Vessel X,” a Commercial Shrimping Vessel in 

 Bayou La Batre. 

Source: IAI, Field Interview, January 2006. 

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In addition to fuel, however, fishermen have to figure in other production costs such as labor, 

crew share, repairs, supplies, and groceries. And, as they did before Katrina, fishermen continue 

to weigh the costs of production against potential revenue. One shrimper further explains this 

struggle, “With the current price of fuel, you can’t make it. You got to catch two pounds of 

shrimp to pay for one gallon of fuel every time you go out” (Personal Communication, IAI, 

Galliano, October 22, 2005). Another shrimper expresses how such rising overhead costs 

accumulate and contribute to a growing and shared sense of uncertainty about continued 

participation in this industry: 

There ain’t no future in the shrimp industry. Price of shrimp has gone down and with the 

overhead prices, we can’t even dip our nets. Prices of everything has gone up, from 

webbing prices to fuel. We’re hanging on, but we have to skimp on everything. We 

can’t even make all the same (i.e., “normal”) repairs. I don’t know if we’re going to 

recover (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, May 2006). 

The soaring cost of fuel has even affected local net-menders who dip nets in a petroleum-based 

substance (Figure 109). Consequently, the increase in fuel prices is financially squeezing small 

net-shop owners as well. 

 Figure 109. Nets in Need of a Dip: Bayou La Batre. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

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Coastal Erosion. Landsat images from September and October reveal that Hurricane 

Katrina converted approximately 39 square miles of marshland around the upper and central 

portions of Breton Sound into open water. This area, located southeast of New Orleans adjacent 

to St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, had already lost 21 square miles or 16 percent of its 

land area between 1956 and 2004, with an additional 47 square miles of marsh lost during that 

period throughout the Ponchartrain, Pearl River, Barataria, and Terrebonne Basins. Storm surge 

from Katrina also submerged 14 square miles of marshlands along the Mississippi Delta. 

Scientists expect that much of this loss will be permanent (U.S. Geological Survey 2005). This 

accelerated loss of marshlands means loss of protection from future flood and storm events, and 

significant changes in ecosystems and habitats associated with shrimp, oysters, crabs, and other 

commercially valuable species. 

The lower Pearl River Basin in Mississippi lost six square miles of wetlands following Katrina 

(Brown 2005). Coastal erosion has direct consequences for fishing interests in Mississippi in 

that damage to coastal wetlands disrupts shellfish grounds and nursery grounds for juvenile 

finfish. Indirect consequences include intensified conservation efforts, which may ultimately 

disrupt or displace long-standing fishing practices and their practitioners. 

(Click link for map of Upper Breton Sound Potential Land Loss after Hurricane Katrina at: 

http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/hurricane/breton_poststkatrina_letter.pdf.) 

 

Gentrification. Coastal gentrification has accelerated in all three storm-affected states. 

Typically, increased recreational fishing and boating activities and infrastructure accompany 

gentrification. While this can provide new opportunities for displaced commercial fishermen, 

such opportunities are not infinite. Grand Isle has long been a getaway for residents and tourists 

alike, with guides and charter operators increasingly catering to this clientele. Charter operations 

in Venice and Cocodrie have maintained a largely corporate clientele. With charter operations in 

both Venice and Cocodrie severely damaged by Katrina, many charter boat captains and guides 

are relocating to Grand Isle, at least temporarily. The ultimate effects of the storm on the trend 

toward gentrification and changes in the distribution of recreational fishing activities along the 

Louisiana coast remain uncertain at this point in time. 

Coastal Mississippi is experiencing an unprecedented growth as developers replace public 

fishing marinas and harbors with high rise condominiums and private marinas. Harrison County 

and Hancock County are two of the fastest growing counties in the nation, and the coastal 

portion of Biloxi is the site of an unprecedented, city-supported, post-Katrina land boom. 

According to a high-ranking governmental official, coastal land sold for $1.5 million an acre just 

prior to August 2005. The value of this same property reportedly has now risen to between $2 

million to $5 million per acre. Moreover, prior to the landfall of Katrina, condominium 

developers had proposed building some 3,000 units in the Biloxi area. Toward the end of 2005, 

the proposed total number of units had risen to 9,587. Developers and architects explain that the 

information provided in the detailed Biloxi Land Development Ordinance makes it particularly 

easy to follow the necessary steps for gaining official approval for their projects (Newsom 2005). 

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To accommodate this pro-development climate, representatives of the City of Biloxi are 

considering a proposal to allow an increase in housing density from 30 units per acre to 40 units 

per acre for development projects located on more than ten acres of land. The proposal would 

also allow an increase in the density of waterfront units from the existing allowance of 30 units 

per acre to 110 units per acre (Newsom 2005). At this point, however, demand is speculative 

and opponents argue that overpriced units could flood the market and potentially stall the 

hurricane recovery process. Nevertheless, the arrival of speculators has led to questions about 

the future of what remains of the bungalow-style homes and neighborhoods that comprise one of 

the region’s oldest waterfront communities. Developers have not proposed affordable housing 

arrangements in areas ruined by the hurricane. Escalating land values, proposed requirements 

for building at higher elevations, and property ownership issues present obstacles to the creation 

of low-income or affordable housing (Wilemon 2006). Many former residents with limited 

resources may not be able to reestablish themselves in the area. 

Long-term employment opportunities in the fishing industry also appear to be waning. It is 

difficult to parse hurricane effects and ongoing trends in this regard, but it is clear that the 

hurricane is part of the problem. For instance, insurance companies reportedly are not fully 

remunerating hurricane damages, and seafood processors in Biloxi’s Back Bay and Point Cadet 

are adapting in part by rapidly selling their piers and waterfront properties to developers. But 

again, the trend was pre-existing and the hurricane is best seen as an accelerating factor in that it 

has been a disincentive for already struggling processors and a source of opportunity for capitalladen developers. A city official in Biloxi explains the situation from his perspective: 

They [the processors] are getting offers for $2 million an acre, and it is tough to turn the 

casinos down with that kind of offer. Casinos have gotten so big the last few years. It 

started with three river boats, went to barges.... Everything has changed. Prices are 

terribly higher, for property tax and such. It is almost unaffordable for the normal person 

to survive now. Property taxes have definitely gone up with casinos. We get $20 million 

in gaming revenue annually, and then sales tax and property tax (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Biloxi, December 2005).

Many fishery participants in this area believe that Biloxi and Gulfport will become popular areas 

for people who wish to purchase second homes. The push for new development is particularly 

strong in areas that have been cleared of old structures by Katrina, such as East Biloxi. 

According to one Biloxi official, approximately 5,000 people in the city lost their homes, and 

some 75 percent of homeowners in East Biloxi were displaced. Given that so many fishermen 

formerly resided in East Biloxi, and given changing values of land and property in the area, the 

future of this community and its commercial fisheries remain highly uncertain. 

The future may be brighter for participants in the region's charter fishing industry, though many 

operations were detrimentally affected by the storms of 2005. The roughly 100 licensed charter 

boats in Mississippi reported an estimated $2.1 million in storm damages. Similarly, commercial 

live bait dealers suffered $3.8 million in estimated damages (Mississippi State University Sea 

Grant, No date). 

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The 2005 hurricane season accelerated gentrification in coastal Alabama as well. Land 

speculators are rapidly buying damaged and destroyed waterfront properties there, with plans to 

replace public marinas and docking areas with high rise and luxury condominiums. This is 

occurring in Bayou La Batre and Coden in Mobile County, and in Orange Beach, Gulf Shores, 

and Bon Secour in Baldwin County. 

Ongoing investment and development along the coast of Bayou La Batre have accelerated in the 

wake of Katrina. For example, one development group is in the process of purchasing (or 

optioning) bayou and coastal property for future residential development. This property includes 

city-owned coastal land that had served as commercial docks prior to destruction by Katrina. 

The group plans to build 6,000 waterfront condominiums with the stated intention of 

“diversifying” the community. Some commercial fishery participants report dismay at the plans. 

As stated by one informant: 

Land used to be [for] city docks, unloading shrimp and other seafood. That’s all over 

now. There isn’t a future for shrimp. These people can’t operate. Most shrimp boats 

have [already] been seized (Personal Communication, IAI, February 2006). 

Should the sale go through, the development will undoubtedly further marginalize the 

commercial fishing industry in the region (see Figure 110). The net effect will be what Siegel 

refers to as a “clean slate” in post-Katrina Bayou La Batre: 

Communities can be re-organized, not just rebuilt. But officials will be tempted to 

exclude the poorest “least productive” segments . . . making the area appear cleaner, 

providing safer environs for tourists, and reducing continuing demand for social services. 

This could mean gentrification on a scale unimagined elsewhere (Siegel 2005: 3). 

250
 

 Figure 110. Bayou La Batre Site Plan. 

 Source: City of Bayou La Batre. 

Labor Shortages. Even before the storms, seafood processors were having difficulty 

securing affordable, reliable labor. Now, with many residents displaced, preoccupied with 

individual recovery concerns, or taking temporary, but lucrative, jobs in construction, 

unemployment levels have increased in all three Katrina-ravaged states—despite the high 

number of employers looking to hire. For example, in the first month following Katrina, 

unemployment rates in Jackson, Harrison and Hancock Counties in Mississippi ranged from 23 

to 24.2 percent. By November 2005, unemployment rates for these three counties had fallen 

somewhat to 20.6 percent in Hancock County, 20.2 percent in Harrison County and 14.1 in 

Jackson County (Goodman and Joyner 2006). Still, however, employers complain that they are 

unable to find the help they need. 

In addition to housing shortages and the high number of residents that remain displaced, some 

employers blame the thinning labor pool on extended state unemployment disaster-relief benefits 

(which averaged about $210 per week). For Katrina victims, these benefits expired on June 3, 

2006; how this will change the prevailing labor conditions remains to be seen. In the meantime, 

all Gulf Coast fishermen interviewed voiced a concern about the difficulty of finding enough 

people to crew their boat. In January 2006, fishery participants with operational vessels made 

due with a crew of two or three instead of the usual four. In many cases, family members or 

inexperienced workers are filling in for experienced labor. Such improvisation is now typical 

along much of the Katrina-damaged Gulf Coast (IAI, Field Observations, October-December 

2005). 

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Competition for affordable labor between employment sectors also makes finding workers 

difficult in the post-Katrina environment. For example, the gaming industry can afford to pay 

higher wages and overtime to meet its demand for employees. According to one informant, an 

individual can find work in any one of Biloxi’s or Gulfport’s casinos for $10.00 an hour, and is 

guaranteed ten hours of work a day, plus overtime; labor conditions that the processors cannot 

match. 

Other industry participants blame the shrinking workforce on federally-funded debris clean-up 

contracts. Offering better pay than most processing plant positions, these temporary clean-up 

positions have lured many laborers away from their regular jobs in both marine-based and non 

marine-based enterprises. Consequently, many short-staffed processors have been operating at 

less than full capacity. One processor remarks: “I used to employ 35 people personally; now I 

only have 11. I have Mexican H2B workers, but they all left for debris clean up and refused to 

come back after all the money I spent getting them here” (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou 

La Batre, March 08, 2006). 

In addition to contributing to a labor shortage, government-funded debris removal contacts mean 

that there is less product on the market for processing. One seafood processor pointedly 

identifies FEMA as more of a hindrance than a help to the fishing industry – “First we had 

Katrina, then we had FEMA” (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, October 7, 2005). 

Consequently, seafood processors—particularly those in coastal Alabama— must buy product 

from the East Coast and Texas, further undermining the recovery of the local fishing economy. 

Until the labor pool increases, many employers are offsetting their labor shortages where 

possible with H2B Visa laborers. By importing workers, some processors have been able to hire 

enough affordable labor to keep pace with the significant increase in product. Most, however, 

remain understaffed; hiring processes have been hampered by the gross lack of affordable or 

available housing. 

Historically, working as a laborer in an off-loading shed, a processing plant, or on a shrimp boat 

provided more than just income; it was a way to maintain connections to a heritage or family 

tradition. While members of many fishing families desire to remain in this industry, others are 

realizing that they can no longer afford to do so. Fewer young adults are choosing this line of 

work, viewing the industry as much work for little reward. Consequently, finding workers to 

occupy primarily minimum or low-wage positions –essential to maintaining low operation costs 

–is increasingly difficult. Processors and off-loaders are thus relying more upon their own 

extended families and immigrant labor for critically important but “low status” labor. 

 Insurance. Rising insurance costs over the last several years have also burdened 

commercial fishery participants, disproportionately increasing their operational costs. Balanced 

against rising fuel prices and diminishing returns, shrimpers increasingly view insurance as a 

luxury they cannot afford. As a result, the commercial fishing industry in Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Alabama is presently underinsured. Based on findings from fieldwork conducted by IAI in 

these states between September and November 2005, less than 40 percent of research 

participants carried some form of insurance for their fishing operation. Although the majority of 

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off-loading facility operators and processors were insured, coverage reportedly is substantially 

less now than in times past. 

According to fishermen in the Biloxi area, insurance costs range from $20,000 to $30,000 a year, 

depending on the type of vessel. However, while it may prove cost effective to insure newer and 

factory constructed steel-hulled boats, a shrimper from Pass Christian insists that it is not cost 

effective to insure older, large wood-hulled shrimping vessels. For example, his 1976 vessel has 

a value of approximately $30,000, an amount roughly equal to its annual insurance costs. Thus, 

if his vessel is destroyed, he could not afford to purchase a new boat. Another shrimper, whose 

vessel sustained $40,000 in wind damage from Katrina, cannot afford the $10,000 deductible on 

his $500,000 policy. 

Additionally, in the post-Katrina environment, many fishery participants are discovering that 

having insurance is no assurance of receiving recovery benefits. While financial institutions 

mandate insurance coverage on a financed vessel, some insurance companies have not been 

forthcoming with due compensation. Interviews with fishery participants all along the Gulf 

Coast reveal that few insurance companies responded to claims and those that did often rejected 

them. In many instances, insurance companies rejected the claims if vessels damaged by 

Katrina’s winds were further damaged by Rita’s waters. Despite the fact that wind caused the 

flooding, insurance companies have refused to pay if the owner did not also carry flood 

insurance. Such poor service delivery serves as a disincentive for future insurance investment. 

Some individuals have begun to take matters into their own hands, applying make-shift solutions 

to move their operations forward (IAI, Field Observations, October-December 2005). 

Additionally serving as a disincentive to buying insurance are instances in which commercial 

fishery participants are, in effect, penalized for having it. In Louisiana, for example, FEMA 

contracted with the U.S. Coast Guard Wreck and Salvage Group for the removal of commercial 

vessels from navigable waters. Once salvaged, insured boat owners are expected to reimburse 

the agency about—and sometimes in excess of— $50,000 for this service. Once the fees are 

deducted from the fishermen’s policies, many are left with insufficient insurance monies to cover 

essential repairs. In contrast, uninsured vessel owners are not charged for salvage services 

underwritten by FEMA (Brown 2005). 

 Overcapitalization. Declining profits are making it increasingly difficult for fishery 

participants to meet their financial responsibilities. Even before Katrina cut a devastating path 

across the Gulf coastline, many fishery participants were struggling to make ends meet. Some of 

the financing issues they currently confront are linked to larger trends in the American economy 

and, more specifically, to the history of U.S. loan programs. Fishermen who took advantage of 

creative financing packages offered, for example, through the Small Business Administration 

(SBA) and Caterpillar, Inc. in the late 1980s and early 1990s were able to secure relatively large 

(80-feet or more) freezer vessels. However, many also found themselves quickly strapped by the 

15-year pay-back terms that required hefty monthly payments, often in addition to a home 

mortgage. 

In the aftermath of Katrina, fishermen are increasingly concerned with their ability to pay both 

insurance and monthly bank notes on their vessels and homes. This concern is not unfounded: 

253
thousands of vessels were put out of commission by Hurricane Katrina leaving many shrimpers 

unable to earn a living. Many shrimpers now face the unfortunate position of investing whatever 

savings they have into boat repairs or making loan payments on a seriously damaged vessel. 

Consequently, bank repossession rates of commercial vessels in the wake of Katrina have 

escalated. In Bayou La Batre, for example, one major lender recently repossessed 25 vessels and 

tied-up another 67 boats. These boats had an average purchase price of about $800,000 (Figure 

111) (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, October 07, 2005). In Biloxi, over 25 

percent of the roughly 48 boats previously moored at the public docks were recently repossessed. 

Worried that his vessel may suffer the same fate, a fisherman confides, “I can’t lose the boat, or I 

will lose everything” (Personal Communication, IAI, Biloxi, January10, 2006). 

In the first few months following the storms, a relative handful of shrimpers with operational 

vessels went out hoping to catch enough shrimp to make their monthly loan payments. 

However, these fishermen also ran the risk of losing money every time they went out to fish. For 

example, one Biloxi vessel captain recently had revenues of only $30,000 while gas, loan 

payment, insurance, city dock fees, groceries and crew expenses came to $60,000. These returns 

discourage hard-working fishermen who must make up losses on future trips. Further, these 

shrimpers report contending with rising gear and equipment costs: 

Materials have gone up; oil goes up everyday since 2002. Webbing and nets only 

changed in the last couple of years because oil went up. Gorilla nets [large trolling nets 

used in the offshore oil industry] cost four to five thousand dollars. Basic shrimping nets 

cost $18,000 now. They were $300 less last year. Nobody’s trawling, because you can’t 

afford shrimp and ice (Personal Communication, IAI, Galliano, October 22, 2005). 

Overcapitalization has contributed to poor credit histories. As a result, many fishermen have had 

difficulty obtaining SBA loans to repair damaged boats or purchase new ones. Local shrimpers 

interviewed for this research claim that it is almost impossible for a fishery-related business to 

receive a loan; “We have received zero assistance. There were a few hundred SBA loan 

applications, and only three were accepted” (Personal Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, 

March 08, 2006). However, even if SBA loans were forthcoming, these short-term funds are not 

sufficient to help fishermen who require long-term assistance to purchase new or repair damaged 

gear, restore living quarters and vessels, and return to fishing (Wadlow 2006). 

254
 Figure 111. "CAT Fleet": Repossessed Caterpillar-financed Fishing Vessels: Bayou La 

 Batre, Alabama. 

 Source: IAI Staff, October 2005. 

Overcapitalization has largely driven the commercial fishing industry in the Gulf Coast states for 

the last fifty years and contributed to its decline. Federal assistance programs, combined with 

technological advances in navigational and refrigeration systems have encouraged the continued 

growth of this industry. Between 1966 and 1987, the U.S. commercial fleet expanded from 

roughly 12,000 to 23,000 vessels. Now, with ever-increasing competition for resources and 

declining revenues, the problems associated with overcapitalization are becoming visibly 

manifest (Buck 1995). Hurricane Katrina may prove a breaking point for many fishery 

participants already suffering the consequences of the declining fish market and financial 

environment. 

 Financial Assistance. Financial aid to help restore Gulf Coast fisheries and assist 

struggling commercial fishery participants has not been forthcoming. As of May 2006, the 

“failure of the fishery” in the Gulf of Mexico issued on September 9, 2005 by Secretary of 

Commerce Carlos Gutierrez has resulted in virtually no aid for Gulf Coast fishery participants. 

A $1.1 billion dollar Gulf Coast fisheries relief package proposed by Senator Shelby, RTuscaloosa earlier in 2006 was rejected by the House. Predictably, commercial fishery 

participants’ optimism about their recovery prospects remain dampened and some fishermen are 

255
losing hope that they will be able to remain in this industry. A key executive of a prominent 

commercial fishing association describes the problem: 

There’s no playbook...nobody in government knows exactly what [a failure of the 

fishery] means. [Agencies] haven’t done anything. The way things are set up, they don’t 

have the ability to do anything... federal fishery laws talk about providing disaster relief, 

but they don’t say what it is, and there’s no money there for it (Wadlow 2006). 

Informal interviews conducted in May by IAI captured the frustration of many informants at the 

government’s seeming lack of interest in helping them rebuild. In Pascagoula, for example, a 4th

generation seafood dealer describes his community’s frustration with the lack of government 

assistance, “The government hasn't given us anything. If we are going to survive we are going to 

do it by ourselves” (Personal Communication, IAI, Pascagoula, May 11, 2006). A 65-year old 

shrimper echoed the sentiment: 

In ’69 [after Camille] there were wood boats. People helped each other rebuild. Now 

people can’t make their bank notes or help each other weld a 100 ft steel hull... You 

either have to accept loss or deny it, and then move on. Now, everything is red tape. We 

can’t get loans, the water and the boats are regulated... We can’t get the momentum we 

need to go back out [shrimping] because we have no normalcy. Our emotions are 

running high. Like WWII, this is going to affect us for a long time (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Biloxi, January 17, 2006). 

In mid-June 2006, Congress authorized $120 million in funding for oyster and shrimp bed 

restoration along the Gulf Coast. Louisiana will receive $50 million, Mississippi is earmarked to 

receive $35 million, Alabama will get $28 million; Florida and Texas will receive $4 million and 

$3 million respectively. The remaining funds will be used for debris surveys, research, and 

unspecified aid for the fishermen. Much of the distribution will be handled by the Gulf States 

Marine Fisheries Commission, headquartered in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. The Commission 

and the National Marine Fisheries Service will also receive funds for cooperative research. The 

Commission will get $7 million for cooperative research, while NMFS will receive $1 million 

for the same purpose (Reilly 2006). 

Morale. The lengthy and uncertain recovery process is exacting an emotional and 

psychological toll on many fishery participants. IAI field researchers increasingly described 

their interviewees as seemingly depressed, distracted, and sometimes surly. Poor attendance at 

this year’s Blessing of the Fleet held on May 6 in Bayou La Batre is but one indication of waning 

morale and increasing uncertainty. Only 25 vessels participated in the 2006 boat parade and 

ritual blessing; some 50 vessels participated in 2005 (Figure 112). Many fishery participants 

simply could not afford to take their boats out. One shrimper explains, “We don’t even have 

enough money to rebuild our homes. We are unemployed and stir crazy” (Personal 

Communication, IAI, Bayou La Batre, May 8, 2006). 

256
 Figure 112. A Blessed Boat, Bayou La Batre. 

 Source: IAI Staff, May 2006. 

Adding to the already mounting concerns about the future, shrimpers in this area apprehensively 

note the unseasonably warm May waters. Local fishermen correlate rising temperatures with an 

early and intense hurricane season. The possibility of another storm equal to or worse than 

Katrina is causing some to reconsider their commitment to remaining in this profession. 

 In conclusion, Hurricane Katrina has exacerbated preexisting disincentives for 

participating in the commercial fishing industry in the Gulf of Mexico. While major fisheries in 

the Gulf region may eventually attain some measure of former status, this will require a long 

period of adaptation that may not bode well for vulnerable fishery participants and certain 

fishing-involved communities in the particularly hard-hit areas. Indeed, some participants have 

already left the industry as a result of the storms and are unlikely to return, and some fishingoriented villages are struggling to rebuild but will not easily recover. Given that we may be 

entering a period of heightened climatic challenges (Patz et al. 2005), and given the deleterious 

consequences of the hurricane season of 2005 amidst pre-existing trends of decline, the future 

health of commercial fisheries in the region appears uncertain. 

 

257
Indicative of major changes and pressures in the commercial fishing industry throughout the 

Gulf of Mexico, the number of commercial fishermen active in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 

Alabama has diminished by nearly 50 percent over the last 15 years. In Mississippi, one 

informant-processor has watched his competitors dwindle from 50 to 25 operations since 1990. 

Most participants in the harvest sector who have left the industry in recent years report having 

been forced from their businesses by challenging market conditions, diminishing availability of 

processors, and lack of affordable labor. Moreover, the value of the waterfront and coastal lands 

has accelerated, effectively reducing the availability of vital infrastructure and services, and 

limiting access to the fishing grounds. Again, all of these problems were exacerbated by the 

highly destructive tropical weather systems of 2005. 

Recreational fishing has become increasingly significant in economic terms throughout much of 

the Gulf of Mexico, and the hurricanes have magnified and accelerated the shift, already 

underway, from reliance on commercial fishing activities to recreational, leisure, and tourismrelated activities and services. The commercial fishing industry has increasingly been nudged 

aside. Given that so many pressures now affect participants in the commercial fishing industry, 

and that current trends tend to favor recreational fishing interests, issues associated with the 

value and use of coastal lands and waterfront properties clearly will remain a source of 

continuing tension between the fleets. Coexistence of casinos, condominiums, commercial 

fishing operations, and recreational fishing fleets will be challenging at best, and return to the 

days of the commercial fishing waterfront is highly unlikely throughout the region. 

The likely manner and extent of future participation in the commercial fishing industry is 

uncertain. Fewer young people are entering commercial fisheries and associated industries. 

Virtually all shrimp trawl operators interviewed in the Biloxi and Moss Point areas stated that 

they would prefer that their children enter professions other than fishing. Many secondgeneration Vietnamese-Americans are pursuing higher education and have already chosen 

different occupational paths than their parents who have been so avidly involved in commercial 

fishing. The trend of decline notwithstanding, many long-time commercial fishery participants 

are reluctant to leave the only life they have ever known. One processor, whose family has been 

in the industry for more than 60 years, offered the following assertion: 

My granddaddy opened this place in the 1920s, my father ran it, my brother and I ran it, 

and now my nephews are going to buy us out. We may have to change, but we will 

survive. The seafood industry is like a family. It’s a way of life. As a way of life, it 

can’t easily be abandoned. 

For many individual fishermen, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were likely pivotal sources of 

additional pressure in an ongoing struggle against the effects of market challenges, increasing 

overhead costs, tightening regulations, and competition for space and access at the waterfront. 

By way of contrast, many well-established seafood processing and distribution firms will likely 

remain in the hands of families that have been able to retain the social and economic capital to 

survive such pressures and destructive natural events such as Katrina and Rita. 

Given low operational costs and flexibility in operations, small vessel fishery participants may 

prove relatively resilient in adapting to storms and the range of ongoing pressures affecting 

258
commercial fishing operations throughout the Gulf of Mexico. Moreover, while we can 

anticipate that many businesses in the distribution sector will continue to focus on the purchase 

and sale of imported and farm-raised products, this could change in the event that consumers 

express demand for and willingness to value domestically landed wild seafood. 

Short and long-term recovery of the commercial fishing industries in the Gulf of Mexico is 

related to a range of uncertain factors. Federal assistance to fishing-oriented communities is one 

such uncertainty. At the time of this writing, none of the nearly $100 billion approved for storm 

relief has been directly expended on assisting recovery of the region’s fishing industries (Brown 

2006). Although funds have been allocated to aid in the recovery of oyster and shrimp grounds, 

the extent of aid to be expended on reconstruction of marine infrastructure and direct assistance 

to fishery participants remains unclear (Taylor 2006). 

Indeed, the future as a whole remains uncertain for fishery participants throughout the Gulf of 

Mexico. Future natural events and social and economic processes and consequences are difficult 

to predict. But it is our hope that this document will contribute to a reduction in uncertainty 

about the effects of the destructive hurricane season of 2005 and the cogent challenges that have 

confronted and continue to challenge fishery participants across the region. Ideally, the report 

and associated data will also be used as a platform for monitoring and documenting further 

change and adaptive response as we approach the first anniversary of one of the worst natural 

disasters in the nation's history and, ominously, the peak months of a new hurricane season. 

259
J. APPENDIX A: Universe of 58 Potential Study Communities 

State County or 

Parish 

Potential Study 

Communities 

Level of 

Involvement 

with Fishing 

Industries 

Selected as 

Study 

Community 

Rationale 

AL Mobile Mobile Secondarily Yes 

Sustained serious 

damage/important as a 

processing hub 

 Bayou La Batre Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Coden Primarily No Considered in tandem with the 

greater Bayou La Batre area 

 Dauphin Island Primarily No Physical access problems 

 Grand Bay 

Primarily No Considered in tandem with 

Bayou La Batre where Grand 

Bay vessels moor 

 Irvington Primarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Theodore Secondarily No Part of the Mobile Metro area 

AL Baldwin Bon Secour Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Daphne Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Fairhope 

Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted/part of 

the Mobile Metro area 

 Foley Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Gulf Shores Primarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Orange Beach Primarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

MS Jackson Moss Point Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Pascagoula Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Gautier 

Secondarily No Physical access problems/ 

Difficulty finding key 

informants 

 Ocean Springs 

Primarily No Physical access problems/ 

Difficulty finding key 

informants 

MS Harrison Biloxi Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 D’Iberville Tangentially Yes Part of the disrupted 

Gulfport/Biloxi metro area 

 Gulfport Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Long Beach Secondarily Yes Part of the disrupted 

Gulfport/Biloxi metro area 

260
Appendix A (cont.) 

MS Hancock Bay St. Louis Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Waveland Tangentially Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Lakeshore Primarily No Difficulty finding key 

informants 

 Pass Christian Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

LA St. Bernard Chalmette Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Delacroix Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Hopedale -- Yes 

While not a designated 

“fishing-involved” 

community, nearby Yscloskey 

offloads much of its catch in 

Hopedale and moors its 

commercial fleet there. 

 Yscloskey Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Violet Secondarily No Difficulty finding key 

informants 

 St. Bernard Primarily No Difficulty finding key 

informants 

LA Plaquemines Boothville Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Buras Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Empire Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Pointe a la Hache Tangentially Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Port Sulphur Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Venice Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

LA Jefferson Barataria Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Grand Isle Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Gretna Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Lafitte Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Marrero Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Metairie Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Westwego Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

potentially disrupted 

261
Appendix A (cont.) 

LA Lafourche Cut-Off Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Galliano Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Golden Meadow Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Larose Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Leeville Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Lockport Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Port Fourchon Tangentially Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

LA Terrebonne Bourg Secondarily No Fishing-related industries not

significantly disrupted 

 Chauvin Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Cocodrie Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Dulac Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Houma Primarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

 Montegut Primarily No Limited time/fiscal resources 

 Theriot Secondarily Yes Fishing-related industries 

significantly disrupted 

262
K. APPENDIX B: Field Protocols 

(1) Protocol for Data Collection: Fishing-related Infrastructure

Code: Date: 

Name: Contact Info.: 

Community: Job Title: 

Name of Dock/Harbor/Location: 

1. How long have you been in this job? How many people worked and currently work with you 

(e.g., dock/port workers)? 

2. How much do you produce annually? 

3. Can you describe the infrastructure of the port/harbor? 

4. How was the industry doing before Katrina? 

5. What are your immediate industry-related challenges to recovery? 

6. What is your estimate of damage? Approximate costs to replace or repair damaged facilities, 

equipment, and/or infrastructure? 

7. What do you think is the likelihood of reconstruction? Any expected timeline? 

8. Are there plans for collaboration with any agencies or companies? 

9. Other Contacts/Phone Numbers 

I give IAI permission to record and use this information in their study on the human social and economic 

impacts of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. I understand my name will not be used in any portion of 

their report and that complete confidentiality of this information will be maintained in its storage and use 

otherwise. 

 

Signature Date 

263
(2) Protocol for Data Collection: Fishing-related Facilities

Code: Date: 

Name: Contact Info.: 

Community: Job Title: 

Name of Business/Work Location: 

1. What are the principal activities of your job? How many people were employed with you? 

2. What were the pre-Katrina assets of the company? Previous value? Estimated costs of 

damage? 

 -Land: 

 -Buildings: 

 -Vessels: 

 -Processors/Machinery: 

3. Did you have adequate insurance coverage on business? Is it sufficient to rebuild? 

4. Why did you initially choose to locate your business here? Which of those factors still apply? 

5. Do you plan on rebuilding? If so, in the same community? If not, then where? 

6. Do you plan on rebuilding your home? If so, in the same community? If not, where will you 

move? 

7. What are the most important factors to you in deciding to rebuild? Timeframe for rebuilding? 

8. Are you expecting supplementary coverage from other sources to rebuild your home, your 

vessel, or to buy a new vessel? 

9. Before Katirna, to whom did you sell (e.g., local dealer, fixed based operator, retail/wholesale 

market, etc.)? Have you had contact with your buyers recently? If so, do you know of their 

plans? Contact Information? 

10. Are you in contact with other fishermen from your community? Do you know of their plans? 

Contact information? 

I give IAI permission to record and use this information in their study on the human social and economic 

impacts of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. I understand my name will not be used in any portion of 

their report and that complete confidentiality of this information will be maintained in its storage and use 

otherwise. 

 

Signature Date 

264
(3) Protocol for Data Collection: County/Parish, and Municipal Officials

Code: Date: 

Name: Contact Info.: 

Community: Job Title: 

Name of Office/Branch/Agency: 

1. How long have you been in this job? What are the principal responsibilities of this position? 

How many people work in your office/agency? 

2. What is the average annual budget for your office? Revenues and expenditures? Copies of 

past year’s revenues and expenditures? Who has this information? 

3. Has your office done any sort of preliminary damage assessment of this community? 

 Estimates on percentages of damaged and/or destroyed: 

-Homes? -Businesses? -Schools? -Hospitals? 

4. Do you have a sense of the status of the following services: 

 -Roads? -Power/electricity? -Water systems? -Sewage? -Communication services? 

5. What is the likelihood of reconstruction? Has your office discussed reconstruction plans? 

6. Is there any expected timeline for reconstruction projects? Does the community/municipal 

government have an estimate of planned expenditures for the next 6 months? The next year? 

Copies of this information? 

7. Has your office spoken with any other agencies or groups about rebuilding plans? Does the 

community/county/parish anticipate receiving external sources of funding to support 

reconstruction projects? 

8. Do you have a sense of how many people are currently here in the community? What 

communication does the city/county/parish have with its citizens? 

9. Contacts/Phone Numbers 

I give IAI permission to record and use this information in their study on the human social and economic 

impacts of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. I understand my name will not be used in any portion of 

their report and that complete confidentiality of this information will be maintained in its storage and use 

otherwise. 

 

Signature Date 

265
(4) Protocol for Data Collection: General Employers 

Code: Date: 

Name: Contact Info.: 

Community: Job Title: 

Name and address of Business: 

1. How long have you been in this job? What are the principal responsibilities of this position? 

2. Is the business currently operating? If so, at what approximate capacity? 

3. How was the company affected by the hurricane? 

 - What were your principal assets (buildings, cars, etc.) before Katrina? Approximate 

 value? 

- Degree of damage? Approximate costs for repair? 

 - Do you have sufficient insurance to cover those costs? 

4. How many people were employed by the company before the hurricane? How many people, 

 if any, are currently employed with the company? 

 

5. What is the likelihood of rebuilding/re-opening the business in this community? If not, 

 where? 

6. What are the incentives to rebuilding? Disincentives? 

7. When do you expect to begin reconstruction? Anticipated timeline? 

8. What is the status of similar businesses in the area? Who is your counterpart at those 

companies? Contacts/Phone Numbers? 

I give IAI permission to record and use this information in their study on the human social and economic 

impacts of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. I understand my name will not be used in any portion of 

their report and that complete confidentiality of this information will be maintained in its storage and use 

otherwise. 

 

Signature Date

266
(5) Protocol for Data Collection: Hotel/Casino 

Code: Date: 

Name: Contact Info.: 

Community: Job Title: 

Name of Business: 

1. How long have you been in this job? 

 -How many people were employed in the business before Katrina? 

2. Capacity/volume of customers 

- Number of hotel rooms? 

 - Average occupancy before the hurricane? 

 - Size and description of (Casino) facility? 

 - Average volume of customers? 

3. Estimate of the damages to the facility? Approximate costs? Is the business sufficiently 

 insured to cover those costs? 

4. What is the likelihood of rebuilding the hotel/casino? In this community? If not, where? 

5. What are the incentives to rebuilding? Disincentives? 

6. Any expected timeline for reconstruction? 

7. What is the status of other hotels/casinos in the area? Who is your counterpart at the other 

hotels/casinos? Contacts/Phone Numbers? 

I give IAI permission to record and use this information in their study on the human social and economic 

impacts of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. I understand my name will not be used in any portion of 

their report and that complete confidentiality of this information will be maintained in its storage and use 

otherwise. 

 

Signature Date

267
L. APPENDIX C: 

Key Informant Demographics by State and Study Community 

Interviews by State and Study Community 

Total Interviews with Key Informants: Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama 

Profession Male/Female Caucasian Asian Black Hispanic Total 

Seafood Retailers 109/44 140 5 5 3 153 

Seafood Processors 137/25 138 19 0 5 162 

Fishermen 236/17 165 66 9 13 253 

Port Harbor Officers 7/1 8 0 0 0 8 

Federal, State, and 

City Government 

Officials/Employees 

17/6 21 2 0 0 23 

Other 16/1 15 1 0 1 17 

Total 522/94 487 93 14 22 616 

% White

% Asian

% Black

79 % Hispanic

2 4

15

 Percent of Total Interviews by Sex. Percent of Total Interviews by Ethnicity. 

% Retailers

% Processors

% Fisherm en

% Govt.

Others

41

25

26

4 4

Percent of Total Interviews by Profession.

% Male

% Female

15

85

268
Interviews by State: Louisiana 

State of Louisiana 

Profession Male/Female Caucasian Asian Black Hispanic Total 

Seafood Retailers 64/36 94 1 4 1 100 

Seafood Processors 71/11 66 14 0 2 82 

Fishermen 99/5 81 12 3 8 104 

Port Harbor Officers 2/0 2 0 0 0 2 

Federal Government 

Officials/Employees 

2/0 1 1 0 0 2 

City Government 

Officials/Employees 

2/0 2 0 0 0 2 

Marina Owners 4/0 4 0 0 0 4 

Other 1/0 1 0 0 0 1 

Total 245/52 251 28 7 11 297 

% White

% Asian

% Black

% Hispanic 85

2 4

9

 Percent of Interviews in Louisiana by Sex. Percent of Interviews in Louisiana 

 by Ethnicity. 

% Retailers

% Processors

% Fishermen

% Other

35 34

28

4

Percent of Interviews in Louisiana by Profession.

% Male

% Female

18

82

269
Interviews by Study Community: Louisiana 

State of Louisiana: Study Communities 

Community Seafood 

Retailers 

Seafood 

Processors 

Fishermen Port 

Harbor 

Officers 

Federal, State, or 

City Government 

Officials/Employees

Marina 

Owners 

Other Total

Barataria -- 1 3 -- -- 1 -- 5 

Boothville 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 

Buras -- 3 2 -- 2 -- -- 7 

Chalmette 2 5 -- 1 -- -- -- 8 

Chauvin 4 4 2 -- -- -- -- 10 

Cocodrie 1 4 3 -- -- -- -- 8 

Cut Off 2 -- 13 -- -- -- -- 15 

Delacroix 5 3 4 -- -- -- -- 12 

Dulac 2 9 5 -- -- -- -- 16 

Empire -- 5 10 1 -- -- -- 16 

Galliano 3 -- 4 -- -- -- -- 7 

Grand Isle 6 3 5 -- 1 2 1 18 

Gretna 9 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9 

Golden 

Meadow 

14 2 8 -- -- -- -- 24 

Hopedale -- 5 4 -- -- -- -- 9 

Houma 15 3 -- -- -- -- -- 18 

Lafitte 2 10 18 -- -- -- -- 30 

Larose 2 3 -- -- -- -- -- 5 

Leeville 4 3 -- -- -- -- -- 7 

Pointe a la 

Hache 

-- 1 2 -- -- -- -- 3 

Port 

Fourchon 

1 1 4 -- -- 1 -- 7 

Port Sulphur 3 4 -- -- -- -- -- 7 

Theriot 3 4 7 -- -- -- -- 14 

Venice 1 5 -- -- -- -- -- 6 

Westwego 19 1 -- -- 1 -- -- 21 

Yscloskey -- 3 10 -- -- -- -- 13 

Total 100 82 104 2 4 4 1 297 

270
Interviews by State: Mississippi 

State of Mississippi 

Profession Male/Female Caucasian Asian Black Hispanic Total 

Seafood Retailers 17/2 16 3 0 0 19 

Seafood Processors 38/4 37 2 0 3 42 

Fishermen 87/7 56 35 3 0 94 

Port Harbor Officers 4/1 5 0 0 0 5 

Federal Government 

Officials/Employees 

0/1 1 0 0 0 1 

State Government 

Officials/Employees 

3/0 3 0 0 0 3 

City Government 

Officials/Employees 

1/0 1 0 0 0 1 

Marina Owners 1/0 1 0 0 0 1 

Other 3/0 2 1 0 0 3 

Total 154/15 122 41 3 3 169 

% White

% Asian

% Black

72 % Hispanic

2 2

24

 Percent of Interviews in Mississippi by Sex. Percent of Interviews in Mississippi 

 by Ethnicity. 

% Retailers

% Processors

% Fisherm en

% Other 56

25

8 11

Percent of Interviews in Mississippi by Profession. 

% Male

% Female

10

90

271
Interviews by Study Community: Mississippi 

State of Mississippi: Study Communities 

Community Seafood 

Retailers 

Seafood 

Processors 

Fishermen Port 

Harbor 

Officers 

Federal, State, or 

City Government 

Officials/Employees 

Marina 

Owners 

Other Total

Bay St. 

Louis/Waveland 

1 -- 2 -- -- 1 -- 4 

Biloxi 8 20 61 3 5 -- 2 99 

D’Iberville -- 5 -- -- -- -- -- 5 

Gulfport 2 -- 7 -- -- -- -- 9 

Long Beach -- 1 3 1 -- -- -- 5 

Moss Point -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1 

Ocean Springs -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1 

Pascagoula 2 8 9 1 -- -- -- 20 

Pass Christian 6 6 12 -- -- -- 1 25 

Total 19 42 94 5 5 1 3 169 

272
Interviews by State: Alabama 

State of Alabama 

Profession Male/Female Caucasian Asian Black Hispanic Total 

Seafood Retailers 28/6 30 1 1 2 34 

Seafood Processors 28/10 35 3 0 0 38 

Fishermen 50/5 28 19 3 5 55 

Port Harbor Officers 1/0 1 0 0 0 1 

Federal Government 

Officials/Employees 

1/0 1 0 0 0 1 

City Government 

Officials/Employees 

8/5 12 1 0 0 13 

Net Mender 2/0 1 0 0 1 2 

Other 5/1 6 0 0 0 6 

Total 123/27 114 24 4 8 150 

% White

% Asian

% Black

% Hispanic 76

5 3

16

 Percent of Interviews in Alabama by Sex. Percent of Interviews in Alabama 

 by Ethnicity. 

% Retailers

% Processors

% Fishermen

Gov. Officials

Other

37 25

23

6

9

Percent of Interviews in Alabama by Profession. 

% Male

% Female

18

82

273
Interviews by Study Community: Alabama 

State of Alabama: Study Communities 

Community Seafood 

Retailers 

Seafood 

Processors 

Fishermen Port 

Harbor 

Officers

Federal, State, or 

City Government 

Officials/Employees 

Net 

Menders 

Other Total

Bayou La 

Batre 

33 33 50 1 14 2 6 139 

Bon Secour 1 5 5 -- -- -- -- 11 

Total 34 38 55 1 14 2 6 150 

274
M. APPENDIX D: Glossary of Terms 

Boatyard/Boat builder – a facility that builds boats, including oil support vessels, freight 

vessels, and commercial and recreational boats. 

Dock/Marina – a public or private (e.g., casino) facility used to moor a fleet of commercial or 

recreational vessels. A dock or marina may or may not have other facilities, such as a supply 

shop or loading ramp. 

Facility – a physical building that serves as a site for offloading, processing, or selling seafood 

product. A facility is distinguished from a business, as one or more businesses may operate in 

the same facility. 

Ice House/Plant – a facility that produces ice for purposes of sale. An ice house may be also be 

an offloading or processing facility or a facility that produces ice in excess of its operational 

needs and sells it, often along with other products (i.e., fuel or bait). Normally, an ice house that 

is also an offloading facility produces in excess of 30 tons of ice daily. 

Offloader – a facility that offloads seafood product from fishing vessels and that ices, packs, 

and/or transports whole, or de-headed, seafood product. 

Operational – capable of operation, but not necessarily in operation; having the necessary 

infrastructure (e.g., electricity and machinery) to be in operation, but lacking the external, 

support infrastructure or conditions sufficient to facilitate operations. 

Processing Plant – a facility that transforms raw seafood into salable product ready for 

distribution through the processes of peeling or drying (shrimp), shucking, steaming, and/or 

canning (oysters), or picking (crab). A facility that only de-heads and packs shrimp is not 

considered a processing plant in this study, nor is a retail facility that prepares seafood for sale to 

the public. 

Retailer – a dealer or vendor of seafood product who purchases from wholesalers and sells in 

small quantities to the general public. 

Wholesaler – a dealer or vendor of seafood product who purchases from fishermen, offloader, or 

from other wholesalers (e.g., processing plant) and sells in large quantities to retailers. A 

fisherman is not considered a wholesaler in this study. 

275
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