S. Hrg. 110–1038 

NUCLEAR TERRORISM—2008 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2008—THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S HOMELAND 

SECURITY ROLE: HOW THE MILITARY CAN AND 

SHOULD CONTRIBUTE 

APRIL 2, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: ASSESSING THE THREAT TO 

THE HOMELAND 

APRIL 15, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: CONFRONTING THE 

CHALLENGES OF THE DAY AFTER 

MAY 15, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PROVIDING MEDICAL CARE 

AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN THE AFTERMATH 

JUNE 26, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PROVIDING MEDICAL 

CARE AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN THE 

AFTERMATH—THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 

JULY 16, 2008—THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE: 

ARE WE BUILDING DOMESTIC DEFENSES THAT WILL MAKE 

THE NATION SAFER FROM NUCLEAR TERRORISM? 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2008—PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: HARD 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TROUBLED INVESTMENTS 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
NUCLEAR TERRORISM—2008 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

41–450 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 110–1038 

NUCLEAR TERRORISM—2008 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2008—THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S HOMELAND 

SECURITY ROLE: HOW THE MILITARY CAN AND 

SHOULD CONTRIBUTE 

APRIL 2, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: ASSESSING THE THREAT TO 

THE HOMELAND 

APRIL 15, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: CONFRONTING THE 

CHALLENGES OF THE DAY AFTER 

MAY 15, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PROVIDING MEDICAL CARE 

AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN THE AFTERMATH 

JUNE 26, 2008—NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PROVIDING MEDICAL 

CARE AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN THE 

AFTERMATH—THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 

JULY 16, 2008—THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE: 

ARE WE BUILDING DOMESTIC DEFENSES THAT WILL 

MAKE THE NATION SAFER FROM NUCLEAR TERRORISM? 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2008—PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: HARD 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM TROUBLED INVESTMENTS 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

KEVIN J. LANDY, Chief Counsel 

ERIC P. ANDERSEN, Counsel 

JONATHAN M. KRADEN, Counsel 

F. JAMES MCGEE, Professional Staff Member 

AARON M. FIROVED, Professional Staff Member 

ALISTAIR READER, Professional Staff Member 

MARC B. CAPPELLINI, FBI Detailee 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ASHA A. MATHEW, Minority Senior Counsel 

JOHN K. GRANT, Minority Counsel 

KEYUR B. PARIKH, Minority Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTOPHER P. COLE, Minority FBI Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman................................................... 1, 33, 69, 105, 133, 167, 193 

Senator Collins ................................................................... 3, 34, 70, 107, 134, 169 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 18 

Senator Akaka............................................................................................... 45, 195 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 49 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 100 

Senator Warner............................................................................................. 41, 101 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Obama, April 2, 2008 ......................................................................... 223 

Senator Collins, September 25, 2008 .............................................................. 224 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 

Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret.), Chairman, Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves ................................................................. 5 

Major General E. Gordon Stump, ANG (Ret.), Commissioner, Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves ................................................................. 10 

Lieutenant General James E. Sherrard III, AFR (Ret.), Commissioner, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves ................................................... 12 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008 

Charles E. Allen, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and Chief 

Intelligence Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .......................... 35 

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 

U.S. Department of Energy ................................................................................. 38 

Matthew Bunn, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 

University ............................................................................................................. 54 

Gary A. Ackerman, Research Director, National Consortium for the Study 

of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland ................ 58 

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 2008 

Hon. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, John F. 

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ....................................... 72 

Cham E. Dallas, Ph.D., Director, Institute for Health Management and Mass 

Destruction Defense, University of Georgia ....................................................... 78 

Roger C. Molander, Ph.D., Senior Research Scientist, RAND Corporation ........ 83 

John R. Gibb, Director, New York State Emergency Management Office .......... 87 

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2008 

Irwin Redlener, M.D., Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, 

Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University .................................. 109 

Ira Helfand, M.D., Co-Founder and Past President, Physicians for Social 

Responsibility ....................................................................................................... 112 

Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President, Disaster Services, American Red 

Cross ...................................................................................................................... 116

John Ullyot, Senior Vice President, Media Relations and Issues Management, 

Hill and Knowlton, Inc. ....................................................................................... 119 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
Page

IV 

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2008 

Hon. R. David Paulison, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .............................................. 136 

Hon. W. Craig Vanderwagen, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ................................ 138 

Hon. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .......................... 141 

James H. Schwartz, Fire Chief of Arlington County, Virginia ............................ 145 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2008 

Mark Mullen, Assistant Director for Architecture, Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................. 170 

Charles Gallaway, Ph.D., Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 172 

David C. Maurer, Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 174 

Dana A. Shea, Ph.D., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Resources, 

Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service, Library 

of Congress ........................................................................................................... 176 

Robert F. Nesbit, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Center for 

Integrated Intelligence Systems, The MITRE Corporation .............................. 179 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 

Eugene E. Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 196 

Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 198 

Thomas S. Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................................................................... 199 

Thomas B. Cochran, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. .............................................................................. 202 

Richard L. Wagner, Jr., Ph.D., Chairman, Nuclear Defense Working Group, 

Center for the Study of the Presidency (testifying in his personal capacity) .. 204 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Ackerman, Gary A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 58 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 405 

Allen, Charles E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 379 

Aloise, Eugene E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 196 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 715 

Becker, Joseph C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 116 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 511 

Bunn, Matthew, Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 54 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 390 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 72 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 417 

Cochran, Thomas B., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 202 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 746 

Dallas, Cham E., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 78 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 429 

Gallaway, Charles, Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 172 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Mullen .................................................... 647 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
Page

V 

Gibb, John R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 87 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 455 

Helfand, Ira, M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 112 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 469 

Maurer, David C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 174 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 657 

McHale, Hon. Paul: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 141 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 615 

Molander, Roger C., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 83 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 446 

Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 385 

Mullen, Mark: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 170 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Gallaway ................................................ 647 

Nesbit, Robert F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 179 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 705 

Oxford, Vayl S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 198 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 731 

Paulison, Hon. R. David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 136 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 590 

Punaro, Major General Arnold L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General Sherrard, and General Stump, with attachments ..................................................................... 225 

Redlener, Irwin, M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 109 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 463 

Schwartz, James H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 145 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 638 

Shea, Dana A., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 176 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 675 

Sherrard, Lieutenant General James E. III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General Sherrard, and General Stump, with attachments ..................................................................... 225 

Stump, Major General E. Gordon: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General Sherrard, and General Stump, with attachments ..................................................................... 225 

Ullyot, John: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 119 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 543 

Vanderwagen, Hon. W. Craig: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 138 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 603 

Wagner, Richard L., Jr., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 204 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 773 

Winkowski, Thomas S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 199 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 740 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
Page

VI 

APPENDIX 

Excerpts from the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves, January 31, 2008 ......................................................................... 257 

Report of the American Red Cross titled ‘‘Mass Care Implementation Requirements for the Catastrophic Incident Supplement of the National Response 

Plan,’’ December 2004, submitted by Mr. Becker .............................................. 517 

Report titled ‘‘The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress,’’ July 16, 2008, submitted for the Record by Mr. Shea .......................... 681 

Pictures submitted for the Record by Mr. Dallas ................................................. 443 

Charts submitted for the Record by Senator Lieberman, July 16, 2008 ............. 708 

Post-Hearing Statement for the Record by Mr. Galloway, July 16, 2008 ........... 712 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record on February 13 from: 

Mr. Mowatt-Larssen ......................................................................................... 781 

Mr. Bunn ........................................................................................................... 786 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record on April 15 from: 

Dr. Carter .......................................................................................................... 790 

Dr. Dallas .......................................................................................................... 793 

Dr. Molander ..................................................................................................... 799 

Mr. Gibb ............................................................................................................ 805 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record on May 15 from: 

Dr. Redlener ...................................................................................................... 810 

Dr. Helfand ....................................................................................................... 812 

Mr. Becker ......................................................................................................... 815 

Mr. Ullyot .......................................................................................................... 821 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record on June 26 from: 

Mr. Paulison ...................................................................................................... 824 

Admiral Vanderwagen ..................................................................................... 837 

Mr. McHale ....................................................................................................... 857 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record on September 25 from: 

Mr. Aloise .......................................................................................................... 870 

Mr. Oxford ......................................................................................................... 876 

Mr. Wagner ....................................................................................................... 889 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(1) 

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S HOMELAND 

SECURITY ROLE: HOW THE MILITARY 

CAN AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Pryor, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and thank you for being 

here. 

It struck me, Senator Collins, that I do not know whether this 

is a statement or not, but our sister committee on the House side 

this morning is hearing testimony from Roger Clemens on another 

question with probably a lot more media attention. I would like to 

say, not to diminish my concern about the use of steroids in baseball, but I do think focusing on our National Guard and Reserves, 

particularly on our homeland security, may be considerably more 

important in the long run. 

Senator COLLINS. I would agree with the Chairman’s assessment. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. This hearing is actually the 

first in a series our Committee will hold on the grave and genuine 

threat that terrorists will get their hands on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclear weapons, and attack our 

homeland with them. The best response to this threat is, of course, 

to stop the terrorists from getting and using those weapons of mass 

destruction, and that is what so much of our intelligence and military forces are focused on. But, unfortunately, we cannot guarantee 

that our efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons in America will always succeed. 

Consider the following. The National Intelligence Estimate of 

July 2007 warned that ‘‘al-Qaeda will continue to try to acquire 

and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in 

attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it 

deems is sufficient capability.’’ 

Just last weekend, Mohamed El Baradei, the Chief Officer of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reinforced that specific threat when he said, ‘‘This, to me, is the most danger we are 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
2 

facing today. Because any country, even if they have nuclear weapons, would continue to have a rational approach.’’ Parenthetically, 

I am not so sure about that in all countries, but going on with the 

quote, ‘‘They know if they use a nuclear weapon, that as a nation, 

they will be pulverized. For an extremist group, there is no concept 

of deterrence. If they have it, they will use it.’’ 

El Baradei went on to say that the IAEA handles about 150 

cases a year involving trafficking of nuclear material and that some 

material reported stolen is never recovered. He added, ‘‘A lot of the 

material recovered has never been reported stolen.’’ 

It is in that context that we convene today. Today, we are going 

to hear testimony about the recent report from the Commission on 

the National Guard and Reserves, which concludes that our government is not adequately prepared to respond to a WMD attack 

on our homeland. 

In its final report released on January 31, 2008, the Commission 

said: ‘‘Because the nation has not adequately resourced its forces 

designated for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not 

have sufficient trained, ready forces available. This is an appalling 

gap that places the nation and its citizens at greater risk.’’ 

I would add that the gap is not only appalling, it is unacceptable. 

Today, we are going to hear from the Commission Chairman, our 

friend and colleague, retired Marine Major General Arnold L. 

Punaro and two of his fellow commissioners, Retired Air Force 

Lieutenant General James E. Sherrard III and Retired Army National Guard Major General E. Gordon Stump. 

We thank you for coming and we thank you for your service to 

our country, and especially for your hard work over the last 2 years 

on the enormous task that you took on. 

Your sweeping report, which is the first congressionally mandated reevaluation of the Guard and Reserves since the Korean 

War, makes 95 recommendations on reforms needed to help the 

National Guard and Reserves effectively perform their missions 

both in defense of the homeland and on battlefields overseas. 

We, in Congress, obviously still need to carefully assess your 95 

recommendations, but I want you to know this morning that I certainly agree with the Commission’s overall vision. 

As Chairman of this Committee, and as a member of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, along with Senator Collins on both, I 

will work to ensure that our Guard and Reserve members and their 

families are treated with the respect and gratitude they deserve for 

their patriotic service, that we ease the burdens of their service as 

much as possible, and that all the members of the Guard and Reserves and their families get each and every consideration and benefit they have been promised as members of what I would call our 

modern-day Minutemen, who are ready to serve, ready to leave 

their homes and families on short notice to defend this Nation. 

Today, the Committee will focus on the seven very important, 

specific, and in some cases somewhat controversial recommendations the Commission made regarding homeland security and the 

role of the Guard and Reserves, including your recommendation 

that the Department of Defense (DOD) make its civil support a 

mission equal in priority to its war-fighting missions, and that govVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
3 

ernors be allowed to command Federal military efforts in their 

States. 

The Commission has recognized that the Guard and Reserves, 

forward deployed in communities across the Nation, are uniquely 

suited to homeland missions, and has called for them to play a priority role in disaster response. 

That recommendation raises the larger important question about 

how to rebalance the Guard’s capability so that it can be prepared 

for its domestic response, but maintain its necessary critical role 

overseas. 

Many of the Commission’s recommendations are just common 

sense, like recommendation six: ‘‘The Secretary of Defense should 

ensure that forces identified as rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained and equipped to the highest levels of 

readiness.’’ 

Hurricane Katrina showed how important a coordinated military 

response is to a disaster. 

The Department of Defense’s commitment of personnel and resources to Hurricane Katrina was large: More than 20 naval vessels, almost 300 helicopters, and 70,000 troops, including 50,000 

National Guard troops, deployed to the Gulf Coast in the 10 days 

following the storm. 

But to those stranded on their rooftops, or in the Superdome and 

Convention Center without adequate supplies or sanitation for 

days, those resources came too slowly. 

The challenges of response to a nuclear, biological, or chemical 

attack where only the Department of Defense has the medical assets, logistical capability, and sheer manpower needed to respond 

would, of course, be immense and urgent. The key players—the National Guard Bureau, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other Federal agencies, and States and localities—must be integrated seamlessly in 

order to be ready to respond effectively. 

Are we as ready as we should be? The Commission says no, and 

I find its answer to be convincing. Of course, together, that gives 

us a responsibility to fix that. 

I look forward to your testimony and I am happy now to call on 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The conclusion of the Commission on National Guard and Reserves that there is ‘‘an appalling gap’’ in our Nation’s preparedness for chemical, biological, or nuclear terrorism, underscores this 

Committee’s longstanding concern and is a call to action. 

According to the Commission, America also remains far from 

having a practical and effective system for integrating military 

forces into our all-hazards homeland security plans. Commission 

members told the Armed Services Committee last week that we 

have not achieved the level of planning and coordination that we 

need to deal with such a catastrophe. This lack of preparedness, 

the Commission stated, ‘‘puts the Nation and its citizens at greater 

risk.’’ 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
4 

Whether a catastrophe is caused by the indifferent forces of nature or by the calculated malevolence of humans, we must have 

workable, coordinated, tested plans that integrate capabilities not 

only across the Federal Government, but also with States and localities to ensure an effective response. 

As we saw during our investigation of the response to Hurricane 

Katrina, a catastrophe can overwhelm response capabilities in a 

devastated region. Given the numbers, locations, and capabilities of 

the National Guard and Reserve units throughout the country, 

they are an obvious and essential part of any large-scale coordinated response. 

Our exhaustive investigation into the Hurricane Katrina disaster 

confirmed the enormous contributions made by Guard, Reserve, 

and active-duty troops in the wake of that hurricane. But our investigation also revealed serious shortcomings in the systems for 

controlling and coordinating the work of these troops. 

For example, then-head of Northern Command Admiral Timothy 

Keating testified before us that he had limited situational awareness of Guard units even as he was deploying active-duty units to 

the Gulf region. Our Hurricane Katrina investigation also found 

poor coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would you like to take a minute? 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, since I am losing my voice, I 

am going to put the rest of my statement in the record, which is 

probably a relief to you, as well—— [Laughter.] 

Since we have a 10:30 a.m. vote. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is not substantively a relief to 

me because I always benefit from your statement, Senator Collins, 

but I know there is a lot of that going around. 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. 

[The remainder of the prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS (CONTINUED) 

It found limited awareness at DHS of the military’s capabilities in an emergency. 

It found a cumbersome process for making mission assignments. It found inadequate military training in the National Response Plan and in the National Incident 

Management System. I could expand the list, but the point is simply this: The lack 

of planning between DOD and DHS seriously hindered and delayed the response. 

As the Commission’s final report to Congress correctly notes, defining the National Guard’s role in civil support raises ‘‘extremely complex’’ issues. That is why, 

in crafting the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, this Committee 

acted to address many coordination concerns. A key reform was assigning a military 

liaison to every Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional office. 

This reform has already paid dividends. I saw this first-hand at a FEMA (Region 

I) exercise last year. Another provision of our reform act helps responses move more 

quickly, thanks to the use of more than 20 pre-scripted mission assignments that 

FEMA can issue to the military and other responders. These are great steps forward. 

Even if Congress provided by statute that civil support during homeland disasters 

is a core competency and a primary responsibility of the Department of Defense, 

however, thorny questions would remain. Defining the appropriate roles and authorities of State governors, especially in multi-State catastrophes, and making the 

Guard and Reserve a stronger presence in homeland-defense planning at a time 

when so many units are deployed overseas are among the difficult challenges. 

And even when these difficult questions are answered, we face a practical challenge: Our National Guard forces are stretched too thin. General Punaro has said 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
5 

1The joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General Sherrard, and General Stump, 

with attachments, appears in the Appendix on page 225. 2The Executive Summary from the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves appears in the Appendix on page 257. 

that last year’s 88-percent-unready rating for Guard units has probably worsened 

because of the ‘‘treadmill’’ of extended and repeated overseas deployments. 

Congress needs to do more to promote Guard recruitment, retention, training, 

equipping, and compensation. We call upon the brave men and women of the National Guard to augment the active-duty forces, as members of a Maine National 

Guard training team are now doing in Afghanistan. We ask them to support disaster recovery, as Maine Army and Air Guard personnel did after Hurricane 

Katrina. Congress must ensure that the Guard can perform both missions effectively. 

The Department of Defense has expressed concerns that civil support responsibilities could undermine the Guard’s combat capability. Yet the engineering, communications, medical, logistical, policing, and other civil-support tasks required after a 

catastrophic earthquake, fire, or flood involve many of the same skills needed to perform those functions in a war zone. Temporary assignments in civil-support roles 

could actually enhance a unit’s proficiency for supporting combat operations. 

Congress must do nothing, however, to undercut the military’s capability to deter 

foreign aggression and to fight if deterrence fails. Defeating armed threats to the 

Nation will always be the military’s first mission. But the breadth of our military’s 

skills and its deployment across the Nation require that America’s military is prepared to effectively augment civilian responses when catastrophe strikes in the 

homeland. 

Finally, I would suggest to my colleagues that the ‘‘appalling gap’’ identified by 

the Commission should be a clarion call for us. Whatever view we take of the specific recommendations of the Commission, we can agree with the point General 

Punaro made at the Armed Services Committee hearing—we must have some plan. 

This Committee has already taken legislative action to avert a repetition of the days 

following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, when civilian officials were improvising command and logistics arrangements with the military in the midst of chaos. 

I am pleased that FEMA now has military liaisons to help from the outset with 

the critical tasks of coordination. We must build on this progress by ensuring that 

the Guard and Reserves are ready to assist civil authorities under clear and workable plans. 

I look forward to hearing more of our witnesses’ thoughts on these matters. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We do have a vote at 10:30 this morning, 

so my hope is that we can at least get through the opening statements before we have to vote and then, of course, we will come 

back for the questions. 

General Punaro, it is great to see you, a long-time friend and 

public servant, Chief of Staff—is that the actual title you had? I 

always thought of you as the Chief of Staff of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee—— 

General PUNARO. Chief cook and bottle washer. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Well, you did some good cooking and 

bottle washing during the time that Sam Nunn was our Chairman, 

which was a great time. Anyway, thanks for your service here and 

we welcome your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMCR 

(RET.),1 CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD 

AND RESERVES 

General PUNARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. 

Of course, we are privileged to be here this morning to present our 

final report and I would ask consent that our full statements, as 

well as an executive summary of our report,2 be entered into the 

record and we will just give very short verbal summaries. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
6 

General PUNARO. I am accompanied this morning by two fellow 

Commissioners, Lieutenant General Jimmy Sherrard and Major 

General Gordon Stump. We also have in the audience two of our 

fellow commissioners, Commissioner Will Ball, our former Secretary of the Navy and a distinguished Senate staffer, and also Don 

Stockton, a Missouri businessman and a longstanding member of 

the Air Reserve, giving us moral support and watching our backs. 

Our witnesses today, General Sherrard and General Stump, have 

distinguished careers and unique expertise in the subject matter, 

and we want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank Senator Collins for the support you gave our Commission in doing the work, 

but in particular for the strong bipartisan leadership this Committee has shown over the years in improving the Nation’s capabilities to protect and defend the Nation, as you indicated, but then 

as important, to manage and recover in crisis situations. 

This Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee—and 

there is a Defense Appropriations Subcommittee—have always enjoyed a strong cross-over membership, a feature that in my judgment has resulted in significant enhancements to our overall national security. 

As you mentioned, I spent many days as a young staffer sitting 

back up there as a Governmental Affairs Committee staffer. That 

was my first assignment for Senator Nunn. Obviously, I did not 

measure up to the high standards required of a Governmental Affairs Committee staffer, and I was demoted over to the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is exactly the way we see it here. 

[Laughter.] 

General PUNARO. Yes. I thought that might be the case, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I also want to mention congratulations on receiving the Minuteman Award tonight from one of our military’s most distinguished 

associations. It is very apropos that the word ‘‘Minuteman’’ is very 

important, and hearing your opening statement, the Minuteman 

concept means that our forces here in the United States, particularly our National Guard, have to be at the ready at all times. The 

award is not called the ‘‘We Are Working On It’’ Award. It is not 

called, ‘‘It Will Take a Year,’’ or ‘‘It Will Take a Month,’’ or ‘‘It Will 

Take a Week’’ Award, it is called the Minuteman Award, and one 

of the things that we will talk to you about this morning is we need 

our Guard and Reserve forces here in the homeland to be at the 

most ready when the Nation is least ready, and so it is a concept 

we want to spend some time talking about this morning. 

I also want to take a few moments to say a few words about the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), since you are the Committee of jurisdiction to oversee them. That agency has been a terrific help to our Commission. Its work has been thorough, objective, 

and professional, and I know all 12 Commissioners thank the GAO 

and its fine leader, Comptroller General David Walker, for the tremendous job they have done in helping us fulfill our responsibilities. They did a landmark piece of analysis looking at the cost of 

the Guard and Reserves as compared to the cost of the active forces 

as well as some analysis for us on equipment and readiness, and 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
7 

in fact, the GAO has written dozens and dozens of reports in this 

homeland area in addition to the work they have done for us. 

So the 95 recommendations in our final report, they address our 

initial charter and also engage more deeply with issues we addressed in our March 1 interim report, specifically our concerns 

with respect to the sustainability of an Operational Reserve, our 

recommendations to codify and put in statute the Department of 

Defense’s role in the homeland, and then our focus on the inadequacy of the planning and resourcing processes to address threats 

in the homeland. 

The statute directed us that we examine how best the Guard and 

Reserves could be used for the homeland missions, so that was an 

actual charter that we had, not one that we took on. I am sure we 

would have, but it was Congress who asked us to specifically look 

at that. 

We tried to look at the problems that needed to be fixed and put 

suggested solutions out there. As you have indicated, many of these 

problems are extremely complex. Some of them have been around 

since the beginning of the republic. The issue of who is in charge, 

the Federal Government or the State governors, that question has 

been around for a long time and people of good character and conscience will disagree with some of the solutions we proposed. 

We believe our mandate from Congress was to report what we 

found and we did that. We understand that additional analysis by 

DOD, DHS, Congress, and this Committee could lead to alternative 

remedies. We welcome that. We know our recommendations can be 

improved on. We are not hung up on our recommendations. We are 

hung up on fixing the problems. 

Fewer than half of our 95 recommendations require legislation. 

There are a lot of areas in which DOD could make changes right 

away, and Congress could enact some immediate statutory 

changes, as well, particularly in this area of homeland defense. I 

believe the timing and the substance is right for those areas. 

I want to emphasize that our recommendations are in no way a 

critique of officials currently serving in Congress or the Pentagon 

or their predecessors in previous Administrations. Most of these 

problems have developed over decades and decades, or, as you 

pointed out, are a result of these new emerging threats that have 

just come upon us and we need to respond to. 

It is not a report card and the Commission’s mandate didn’t ask 

us to catalog how far we have come, and we have come a long way 

since September 11, 2001, thanks to the work of the Pentagon, this 

Committee, and others in Congress, but we were asked to take a 

snapshot of where we are, make a recommendation on where we 

need to go, and so it will be up to the Congress, DHS, and DOD 

to make the ultimate determination about that end state and how 

much of the gap between where we are and where we think we 

ought to be that you are committed to addressing. 

We were thorough and all encompassing in our approach. We 

had 17 days of public hearings, 115 witnesses, 42 Commission 

meetings, 850 interviews with public officials and other subject 

matter experts. We knew that all official wisdom in Washington 

wasn’t the only thing, so we got out of the Beltway. We had site 

visits, field visits. We met with employers, families, and individual 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
8 

Guard members. We heard from battalion commanders, company 

commanders, sergeants, and everybody that could bring wisdom. 

And I want to add, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, that the 

12 members of the Commission brought 288 years of total service 

in the uniform of our military and an additional 186 years of nonmilitary government service, individuals like our Secretary of the 

Navy and the White House, and we have many years of private 

sector experience, as well. So we felt like we had a lot of expertise 

to bring to bear on the problem. We weren’t newcomers in this 

area. We had a lot of firsthand experience on our Commission in 

emergency management as well as commanding the military. The 

three of us have commanded military organizations that have responded to homeland scenarios as well as overseas scenarios. 

So I am going to focus very quickly on our conclusion—No. 1 is 

that we believe there is a compelling case to create what is called 

an Operational Guard and Reserve. This is profoundly different 

than the Strategic Reserve of the peak of the Cold War and it is 

important for people to understand how profound the change that 

is required. 

We all served in the Guard and Reserves when they were strategic. We have served in the Guard and Reserves in an operational 

capacity. Just because a unit gets called up and deploys in an operation and is engaged operationally overseas doesn’t mean that our 

Guard and Reserves are operational. By operational, we mean that 

we have to have a change in all the laws, rules, regulations, funding mechanisms, training, recruiting, retention, promotion, to basically ensure that we change the construct for how that Guard and 

Reserves are viewed on a day-to-day basis, how it is supported, 

how it is funded, particularly in these areas in the homeland so it 

can be operational when it is required and so it can be sustainable. 

It is currently not sustainable in the way we are approaching it 

right now. 

And I do not believe that this is that controversial. The Special 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major General Tommy Dyches, made just such a statement when we started 

our Commission 2 years ago. We were huge skeptics, the 12 Commissioners, because we knew how profound a change you would 

have to have to have a true Operational Guard and Reserve. Over 

the course of the 2 years, we came around to making that our conclusion; we have kind of backed into this. We kind of back-door 

evolved into it. There has been no public debate. Congress hasn’t 

required it by statute. And so we believe that is a requirement, 

that Congress, who has the responsibility under the Constitution to 

give prioritization and direction to the Department of Defense—and 

this is where the Department says they are, so this shouldn’t be 

something that the Department would push back on. 

There are three compelling reasons why we need an Operational 

Guard and Reserve. First, it is the only fire break we have right 

now to having to go back to the draft. If it had not been for the 

600,000 Guard and Reserve personnel that were mobilized, and 

most of them sent overseas for Iraq and Afghanistan and other activities, or the 61 million man days they provided in 2006, which 

is the equivalent of another 168,000 people on full-time active 

duty—and by the way, that 600,000 doesn’t include the 55,000 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
9 

members of the National Guard that the Guard Bureau self-deployed to Hurricane Katrina—you would have had to go back to the 

draft if you wanted to maintain the force levels that our combatant 

commanders required overseas. 

That shouldn’t surprise anybody because the Gates Commission 

that recommended going away from the draft in 1970 made that 

comment. The all-volunteer force was not designed for sustained 

combat. So that is reason No. 1, to have an Operational Guard and 

Reserve, so we can maintain that fire break. 

Second, is the threats in the homeland. You have pointed them 

out in your opening statements. Admiral McConnell testified last 

week. Secretary Chertoff gave a press conference the other day. I 

mean, the threat is real, it is compelling, and it is not going to go 

away. Regrettably, and there is a lot being done to preempt and 

protect, but as the Chairman pointed out, we have to be ready 

when the balloon goes up. We cannot take a year. We cannot take 

a month. We cannot take a week. 

So the Guard and Reserves have a tremendous operational advantage, economic advantage, and military skills advantage over 

the active component in doing this mission. They are in the communities. They are hazardous material coordinators. They are experts in these areas. They know the geography. They are close by. 

And the third compelling reason is they are much more economical. You can put in the Guard and Reserves the same capability 

you can put in the active components for 70 percent less than it 

costs to have it on active duty. If you had to put 600,000 more people on our active duty military, it is a trillion dollars. 

So those are the three compelling reasons to have an Operational 

Reserve, and we are going to shift now and General Stump is going 

to pick up on our conclusion No. 2, I think it is important. I would 

like to read the conclusion because we do not believe it is controversial. We believe it is right where we need to be. 

The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect 

American lives and property in the homeland. DOD must improve 

its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in the response 

to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a 

wide geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities. As part of DOD, the National 

Guard and Reserves should play the lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, other Federal agencies, and States 

in addressing these threats of equal or higher priority. That is our 

conclusion, followed by a series of recommendations of how to go 

about that. 

We believe that this should be codified in law, the Department 

of Defense’s responsibility to provide support for civil authorities. 

This is a role that the Department, up until now, historically, has 

pushed back on and could push back on the future. The fact that 

we have the most proactive Secretary of Defense that I can recall 

in my lifetime in Secretary Robert Gates and a very dynamic leader in the Homeland Security Assistant Secretary Paul McHale, 

they are cracking skulls and pushing the bureaucracy every day. 

We know this is important. 

We know Congress sets the priorities. The Department of Defense doesn’t self-set their own strategy and priority. They get it 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
10 

1The joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General Sherrard, and General Stump, 

with attachments, appears in the Appendix on page 225. 

from the American people through the Congress. We believe this 

needs to be codified to ensure that we keep moving forward as we 

build on the progress that has already been made and we close that 

gap in terms of where we need to go. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being given the opportunity and 

General Stump will follow up and talk about the homeland. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, General Punaro. A good beginning. 

General Stump, do you want to go next? 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL E. GORDON STUMP, ANG 

(RET.),1 COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL 

GUARD AND RESERVES 

General STUMP. Yes, sir. I will get right to some of the recommendations and quickly go through those. I know you have got 

the vote coming up. 

We think that the DHS should generate civil support requirements for DOD which should validate them as appropriate. The 

Commission believes that the Department of Homeland Security is 

the agency responsible for coordinating preparedness initially to 

generate requirements for DOD, and DOD will then validate for 

DHS those requirements it agrees it should take on. This should 

be a collaborative inter-agency process. If you do not have a requirement, then you as Congress do not know what to fund, and 

this is an important requirement and this is something that hasn’t 

been done. So we put that in the report and we think that is extremely important. 

We talked about the Department of Defense should have codified 

responsibilities for taking on the civil support authority. 

Consistent with their warfighting task, the National Guard and 

the Reserves should be the lead agency for the homeland security. 

When something happens, it doesn’t matter what we do or anybody 

does. The first soldier on the ground in any catastrophe is going 

to be the National Guard. That is just the way it is. The governors 

have their local people who are responsible. When they run out of 

those resources, they go to the National Guard, then they go to 

their State compacts, and from there they go to the Federal Government. So that, we believe, should be codified. 

We also believe that the National Guard must continue to have 

a warfighting mission as well as the Reserves. Without it, as we 

indicated before, you would have to go back to the draft. So we are 

not saying that it just should be a homeland defense force. They 

must also be available for the wartime mission. 

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces identified as 

rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, 

and equipped to the highest levels of readiness, and if I can indulge 

you for just a second, I will go through a brief description. 

USNORTHCOM has a Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF–CS). It 

is a standing joint task force staffed by 160 persons and commanded by a two-star Army National Guard general in Title 10 

status. They plan and integrate DOD support for domestic, chemVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
11 

ical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive device consequence management. In the event of a domestic attack, the JTF– 

CS would deploy to the incident site to exercise command and control over the Federal military sources. This particular task force is 

in being and fully resourced. 

The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 

Teams (WMD–CSTs), which you, Congress, have authorized, are 

22-member National Guard units operation in Title 32 status. The 

WMD–CSTs are tasked with identifying agents or substances, assessing the consequence of the event, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests from the State and the Federal 

Government. Congress has authorized 55 of those and they are up 

and running, operational, and fully funded, but they are only 22 

men and all they do is identify the source. 

The Marine Corps has a Chemical-Biological Incident Response 

Force, a Title 10 unit consisting of several hundred personnel capable of providing capabilities for agent detection and identification, 

casualty research, search and rescue, personal documentation, 

emergency medical care, and stabilization of contaminated personnel. Again, just one unit, about 400 people. 

The National Guard has stood up what we call the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), National Guard Force 

Packages created to assist local, State, and Federal authorities in 

consequence management and fill the anticipated gap from the 6 

to 72 hours from the first response to Federal response to a catastrophic event. The Guard knows that the governor is going to call 

them and they are going to have to be there. They combine four 

elements from the National Guard. They have search and extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and control. Seventeen of these units are in existence. They come from existing National Guard force structure. Twelve of these are in assigned 

FEMA regions. Again, small forces for the 6 to 72-hour time frame 

when a weapons of mass destruction happens. 

Now, the last one identified by USNORTHCOM is the Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive 

(CBRNE) Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs), 

three Title 10 force packages consisting of several thousand joint 

personnel from separate units identified and organized to perform 

the consequence management missions with capabilities including 

medical, decontamination, communications, logistics, transportation, and public affairs. The National Guard will probably make 

up most of these operating in Title 10 forces. Two are notional. One 

has been put on the ground. But these are not funded and trained, 

and we need to fund and train these to go for the weapons of mass 

destruction. 

And then, of course, the last recommendation, which is probably 

one of the most controversial and was one that we felt should be 

put into policy or statute, is allowing the governors under certain 

circumstances to direct the efforts of Federal military forces within 

their State responding to an emergency. As Senator Collins indicated, we had an operational control situation with Hurricane 

Katrina. USNORTHCOM sent forces in when the 50,000 National 

Guard people were not enough to respond to the incident. Title 10 

forces came in and it was good. We had a ship offshore that was 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
12 

1The joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General Sherrard, and General Stump, 

with attachments, appears in the Appendix on page 225. 

doing the medical end of it. But we also had forces within Louisiana and within Mississippi that were responding and they 

weren’t under the same command and control. 

But we believe that the States should work out agreements in 

advance as part of their planning processes specifying circumstances under which Title 10 forces could be temporarily placed 

under the direction of the Adjutant General in order to prevent the 

potential confusion of having two chains of command. It could be 

done through certified dual-hatted National Guard General Officers. There is a program out there where the Army says, we will 

dual-hat you. We will send you through a training program so that 

you can command and control both Title 10 and Title 32 forces. 

Every State has a General Officer that has done this. During the 

G–8 Conference in Georgia, it worked out perfectly well. But we 

have received a lot of push-back, as you can imagine, from 

USNORTHCOM and from the active Army. 

In addition, American forces are placed under the operational 

control of foreign commanders, and there is a lot that has been 

studied on this and that was perfectly acceptable. So we, as a Commission, believe that—now, this doesn’t mean that the governor is 

going to oversee the 82nd Airborne during their training before 

they go deploy. All we are saying is that we need to cut these forces 

to the commanders for unity of command. 

So those are briefly some of our recommendations,. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. That is really thought provoking and I appreciate the common-sense way in which you put 

it forward based on your experience. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. General Sherrard, thanks for being here. 

We welcome you. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES E. SHERRARD 

III, AFR (RET.),1 COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

General SHERRARD. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much for the 

opportunity to address the Committee. 

Sir, I would like to, again, trying to be very short and concise for 

you, to hit some key points as you have looked and heard from our 

Chairman’s discussion. Our Commission had a very broad experience base, I myself having spent many years in the Air Force Reserve, having come to the Reserves from active duty. I have had 

the chance to operate from the Federal side, the Title 10 side of the 

Reserve component, of the Reserve forces. 

In our deliberations as a Commission, we thought there were 

some very unique capabilities and opportunities to utilize these 

forces but found that there are certain constraints that we believe 

can be rectified to allow those forces to assist the National Guard 

in the very efforts that Commissioner Stump has already addressed. They will be the first. But we do believe that, as he said, 

the National Guard and the Reserve forces should be the backbone 

of that initial response because they live there. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
13 

And from having commanded two Air Reserve installations, I can 

tell you firsthand my fire departments had mutual aid agreements 

and they could respond to support various other fire departments, 

but I didn’t have the authority to just send my people downtown. 

I won’t tell you they didn’t go downtown and help. I would never 

say that because we are going to respond to the needs of the community as best we can, particularly if life is in danger. But we need 

to have a mechanism where this other group, the Air Force Reserve, the Navy Reserve, Marine Corps, and Army Reserve, who 

have great capabilities that can be offered to whatever natural or 

manmade disaster we may be addressing. 

We have proposed in one of our recommendations a mobilization 

authority similar to that that the Coast Guard has under DHS 

where you will be able to utilize the people for a maximum of 60 

days in a 4-month period, or 120 days in a 2-year period, and let 

them be there with that capability that they possess. 

We also talked in our March 1 report as well as in our final report about the structure of USNORTHCOM in terms of more National Guard and Reserve staff and capabilities, people with credentials that can come in there and do that. We also recommended 

that the commander and/or deputy commander be a National 

Guard or Reserve officer. Congress has taken some action where it 

says it should be a National Guardsman. We, as a Commission, believe it still should be considered as both because there are certainly people inside the Reserve forces who may have every credential that you want to either be that commander and/or deputy commander. 

Commissioner Stump talked about readiness. Readiness is certainly something key for all of us, and the key part of that that we 

have recommended in our report is manning the organizations from 

a full-time support perspective where you can allow them to be 

fully combat-capable. You cannot man a force at C–3 and then expect them to be C–1, or fund them at a C–3 level and expect them 

to be fully combat-ready. And that ties in with equipment and 

training. 

And the very last issue that we have in there that we would love 

to have the chance to address later with you is the issue of as we 

continue our models in the future for the Army Force Generation 

(ARFORGEN) of the way the Army is going to do their force generation to continue to do operations worldwide, and the Marine 

Corps has theirs, we do not believe that going to the old standard 

mobilization process is the right way to do business. If you have 

to, absolutely. But we do think there are some new, innovative 

ideas, a contractual obligation with members of the Reserve forces, 

the Reserve components, that could, in fact, help fill that bill, and 

we know that the most important thing of all is to be there and 

be prepared to do what the American public needs at any given moment of a natural disaster or a manmade disaster, and we do believe incorporating these forces together is the right thing for us to 

do for the American people, too. 

So I look forward to your comments, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks again very much for very helpful 

testimony. Thanks for your service. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
14 

The vote hasn’t gone off at 10:30 as scheduled. This will shock 

you, General Punaro, I know—— [Laughter.] 

Based on your many years here in the Senate, you would be 

amazed how often something does not happen at the time it is supposed to. 

Would you like to proceed with your questioning first, Senator 

Collins? 

Senator COLLINS. Go right ahead, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. We will do 6 minutes and then we 

will go as far as we can go before the vote goes off. 

General Punaro, I wanted to ask you first to answer a few definitional questions. We live with them, but I want everybody to understand what we mean. Talk just a bit about what is the difference between Strategic Guard and Reserve and Operational. 

General PUNARO. I will just talk in not Pentagon ‘‘bureaucratese’’ 

but just from a commander’s perspective. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO. Strategic Guard and Reserve meant that you 

would go once in a lifetime, once in a generation. If the Soviet Warsaw Pact attacked NATO, we had a commitment to have 10 divisions of active duty forces, on the ground in 10 days, and then over 

the next 6 to 8 months, the Guard and Reserve would be mobilized, 

then trained, then equipped, then brought up to full speed and sent 

forward. So they were kept at a very low state of readiness with 

few exceptions. 

There were some units, obviously, but the bulk of the Guard and 

Reserves in a strategic posture was kept at—as General Sherrard 

said, your highest state of readiness is called C–1. C–2 is right 

below that. You want your units to be at least C–2, hopefully C– 

1. At C–3 and C–4, you need a lot of additional equipment, training, people, and time to get that unit to actually go into combat, 

just like the 6 months we take right now to train up active duty 

units and Guard and Reserve units before they go to Afghanistan 

and Iraq. They do not just pick up one day and are gone. 

So strategic meant that you resourced them at a low level, recognizing that the scenario was such that they would have plenty of 

time to prepare, train, etc., and go into the fight. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

General PUNARO. Now, in your promotion systems, your recruiting systems, your equipment readiness posture, everything was 

maintained at a lower state of readiness. So now you switch and 

say, we are going to have this Operational Guard and Reserve, 

meaning much more of the organizations have to be maintained at 

that highest level of readiness. There are four key measures that 

tell you if a military unit is ready. 

One is personnel. It is the number of people that you have in the 

unit, that is required because a unit basically takes its standards 

from its mission. So you tell a unit, a Marine infantry battalion, 

here are the things you are going to have to do. So that unit is designed and trained to those mission-essential tasks list. So then 

you rate that unit against that. Personnel is, at least 90 percent. 

Not only do you have to have the right number, you have to have 

them trained in the right skills. If you have the people and they 

are not trained, they are not combat-ready. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
15 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think I have got it, and that is very 

helpful. In other words, for a long time in the Cold War we were 

dealing in a strategic environment where you would have to be 

ready to go into Europe in the case of a Warsaw Pact invasion, but 

that was a relatively small percentage of the forces at that highest 

level. Today, what we are really talking about is the demand for 

readiness is high. As you all testified to, and I do not know that 

the American people appreciate this enough, without the Guard 

and Reserves, we would have to have a draft to meet the security 

challenges that we are facing today. So the Guard and Reserves 

make an enormous difference. 

Let me ask you one other definitional question, because I want 

to ask a specific question about it. What does civil support mean? 

General PUNARO. I am going to let General Stump take that one 

because it basically—go ahead, General Stump. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead, General. That is good. 

General STUMP. Basically, civil support, when you have an incident, probably 60 or 70 percent of the incidents that happen are 

handled by the mayor, the fire department, and the police department and so forth. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General STUMP. But when those resources are expended and 

there is no other place to go, then we have what we call support 

to civil authorities. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General STUMP. So this is what the National Guard, the governor—as the Adjutant General, I knew if something happened, my 

phone was going to ring and I was going to have to send the National Guard out there, and that is where we have support to the 

civil authorities. So basically, it is responding to an incident and 

helping the civil authorities reconcile that incident—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Here at home. 

General STUMP. Here at home, yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Under the current doctrine for civil support, the Department of Defense relies on capabilities that are programmed for warfighting missions to perform these domestic missions of civil support where necessary. From one perspective, there 

is a lot of logic to that. Helicopter pilots train for combat and they 

also perform search and rescue and logistical support missions and 

so on. 

At a hearing last July, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Peter Verga told this Committee that it would be a false choice to 

have parallel sets of capabilities for domestic support and overseas 

warfighting and that instead we should use the existing capabilities to enable the civilian agencies to respond more effectively. Because I know the Commission came down differently, why does the 

Commission believe that is the wrong model and why do you recommend that the Department of Defense, as you do quite strongly, 

develop unique capabilities for this civil support mission at home? 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, we went into this in considerable detail, took a lot of testimony on it, and we believe that in our 

record is compelling evidence that the old adage of if we are ready 

for the big one, we are ready for the little one—if we are ready for 

the away game, we are ready for the home game—none of the three 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
16 

of us and none of our 12 Commissioners buy that. And yes, there 

are some dual-capable forces, meaning utility helicopters that are 

good in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are good in Arkansas, Connecticut, and Maine. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO. And seven-ton trucks. But in the situations we 

face, what we never had before were the 15 planning scenarios that 

DHS has articulated of the threats that our Nation needs to meet 

at home. 

DHS has not yet defined the requirements that the various government agencies, including the Department of Defense, need to 

meet. So I am not sure that we know what all the requirements 

are. Then DOD would have to take those requirements and validate them. 

But here is the bottom line, Mr. Chairman. A member of the 

82nd Airborne who has a helmet, a flak jacket, and a bayonet and 

is the world’s finest person at putting a bayonet in the heart of a 

terrorist, you do not send into a nuclear contaminated environment. That is not the capability you can use. You have to have 

highly skilled, highly trained forces with all the right equipment. 

So the scenarios we face at home now are radically different than 

the ones we faced 10 years ago when the old adage was if you are 

ready for the away game, you are ready for the home game. Certainly, you are going to maximize your dual-capable forces. Certainly, a brigade combat team is going to be useful in a homeland 

scenario at some part in that scenario. They certainly are not very 

useful in going in immediately into a nuclear, chemical, or biologically-contaminated environment. So I would say that is kind of 

the bottom line. 

General STUMP. I do not think, and what they said was to generate a specific set of parallel forces that are only going to be dedicated to the homeland defense issue. I agree with that, that there 

can be dual missioning and not all of these forces are going to be 

deployed at the same time. However, there are some unique requirements and that is what the civil support teams have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General STUMP. Those are not deployable units. There are 55 of 

those and probably nuclear decontamination and things of this nature should be unique. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up. Thank you very much. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Stump, I want to turn to the recommendation that you 

have made which is perhaps the most controversial. There are several, actually, that could vie for that top prize, but that is the recommendation that governors be allowed to have operational control 

of active duty troops temporarily during an emergency. 

Now, when we investigated the flawed response to Hurricane 

Katrina, as I was starting to say in my opening statement, we 

found enormous problems with lack of coordination, command and 

control, lack of situational awareness, lack of visibility. We found 

that DHS had no idea what the military’s capabilities were, what 

was available. We found a very cumbersome process for mission assignments to DOD. We found inadequate military training. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
17 

And the legislation that we drafted and which became law addressed many of those coordination problems. For example, we put, 

in every regional FEMA office, a full-time military liaison and that 

has made a difference. I saw it in Region 1 during exercises recently, where we had active duty Guard troops, first responders, 

State emergency managers, and the coordination was far superior 

to what we have seen. 

This raises the question in my mind of whether the answer really 

needs to be putting the governor in charge, which is extremely controversial and which DOD is adamantly opposed to, or whether a 

lot of the issues that you have recognized could be solved through 

better planning and then having exercises together. 

I met with Assistant Secretary McHale this week, and he outlined a possible scenario where you would have DOD provide trainers to the States to help come up with coordinated plans because 

one of the things that we learned is you need coordination across 

the civil agencies as well as the military. 

So how much of this could be solved by simply having better 

planning, more exercises, as opposed to changing the command 

structure? 

General STUMP. Well, first, I agree 100 percent on better planning and more exercises. We got into the Hurricane Katrina situation because we never had an exercise—— 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. 

General STUMP [continuing]. That looked at something like that 

and we had to cobble together something. Now, when you cobble 

together 50,000 National Guard troops from 50 different States and 

then bring the active duty in besides all of that, there is going to 

be some confusion. And so we agree 100 percent that there has to 

be better coordination and more exercises that involve not only the 

National Guard, but the Reserves, the State response forces, and 

USNORTHCOM, and there is some confusion there because when 

the governor runs out of resources, then they go to USNORTHCOM 

and in comes the Title 10, and as a military person, generally, you 

need to have one agency or one person in command or operational 

control in order to coordinate the activities of all those people who 

are joining in on that particular exercise. 

And it is our opinion that every single incident that happens in 

the United States is going to start with the governor. That is just 

plain the way it is. Now, when it gets completely out of control, like 

a weapon of mass destruction where you would have 100,000 or 

200,000 casualties and they would completely be overwhelmed, in 

the beginning, the governor will be in control. He won’t last long, 

or she, but at that point in time, when they are completely overrun, then obviously the Title 10 forces will come in and they will 

be in control. 

But I still believe for unity of command, there is no reason why 

you couldn’t have these exercises for something minor and incorporate the Reserves and the National Guard under the command 

and control of that particular State and that particular governor so 

you have one unity of command. 

Now, you can do all the coordinating and so forth, and that is 

what the active duty comes back and says, we will coordinate what 

is going on and so forth, but you still have the principle of one perVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
18 

son command and control, and I think that we still believe that 

there is nothing wrong with it, in just these limited circumstances, 

and especially with the Reserve components, where if we get these 

other changes made that we will be able to bring the truck unit 

from the State and the Marines that have high-wheel trucks into 

these situations under the command and control. 

I really do not think it is a huge problem. These dual-hatted people have commanded Title 10 forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They 

have been leaders and controlled National Guard troops from other 

States. For this limited amount of time—and the number of active 

duty forces in Hurricane Katrina was—the time they were there 

was really limited and not nearly as long as what the National 

Guard forces were. So we still think that you need a unity of command. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Senator Pryor, good morning and welcome. Thanks for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Good morning and thank you both for doing this. 

I want to thank the Commission members here for spending your 

time and efforts and expertise pulling this report together. 

Let me start, if I can, with you, General Punaro. A few moments 

ago, you said that DHS has not defined the requirements that they 

needed to define for DOD to understand what to do in a time of 

a domestic emergency. Could you elaborate on that? What kind of 

requirements are you talking about there? 

General PUNARO. Senator, under the legislation that created 

DHS and under legislation Congress passed last year out of this 

Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, DHS is required to look at these 15 all-hazard scenarios they have for Federal, State, and local response, and let us work on some of the catastrophic scenarios. They need to look and say, OK, our view is— 

and this would all be done in a cooperative way, working with 

DOD, working with the Guard, working with USNORTHCOM in 

developing the requirements—the Centers for Disease Control are 

going to have this piece. FEMA has this piece. But here is what 

we think the Department of Defense needs to bring to the Nation’s 

response in this particular scenario and this is what we think the 

requirements are. 

DOD cannot come up with their own requirements. They are not 

the lead Federal agency, DHS is. Then DOD would take those— 

they probably would have worked with them in a cooperative way 

in advance—and they would validate whether or not they agree 

with them and say, yes, this is a valid requirement for the Department of Defense to do. 

In the Department of Defense, as great an outfit as it is, if you 

do not have a valid requirement, it never gets into the planning, 

programming, and budgeting system, which is the best in the 

world. The fiscal year Defense Plan, the Five Year, or the Future 

Year Defense Plan, you do not get it in there unless Congress adds 

it if it is not a valid requirement. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
19 

General PUNARO. So if DHS never generates the requirement, 

then DOD can never validate it. And so I would say to you there 

are two huge gaps right now. One of them is in the inbox of the 

Department of Homeland Security and that is generating the requirements. The other one is the contingency planning that Senator Collins alluded to. 

All three of us commanded units that were in the war plans or 

contingency plans to defend the Korean Peninsula—it has got a 

name. I won’t use it here today. It has a number. We all know 

what it is. You say the number, and bang, you know immediately. 

The Fourth Marine Division that I commanded, I knew for the defense of the Korean Peninsula every single unit that had to go, 

what piece of equipment they had to have, when they needed to be 

at their station of initial assignment, and those things are worked 

on in exercises year after year after year. And these are contingency plans like this. 

They have a command and control annex, Senator Collins, and 

you work out, OK, the governor is going to be in charge for this 

part, and then when it gets to this part, the Federal Government 

takes over. So it has a command and control annex, and we three, 

as well as other Commissioners, we know contingency plans when 

we see them and we do not have the kind of contingency plans we 

need for the catastrophic weapons of mass destruction. 

So with DHS and USNORTHCOM, that is where the Bunsen 

burner needs to be lit in terms of moving this ball. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me interrupt right there. Do you know why 

DHS has not initiated this, why they have not put out the requirements that they are supposed to? 

General PUNARO. I think that one would be kind of psychologically evaluating DHS, so probably above our pay grade. I mean, 

we certainly do not see the sense of urgency that we feel you would 

have, particularly when you hear what Admiral McConnell and 

Secretary Chertoff have talked about the real and pressing threat 

is. General Blum testified before this Committee not 6 months ago 

in answer to a question from Senator Lieberman about our readiness for a catastrophe. He says, ‘‘No, our current situation places 

the Nation at great risk.’’ 

So how do you translate that into a large government organization? How do you get the nuclear reactor to send the message to 

the propeller to get that thing moving at warp speed? You are the 

Committee of oversight. You probably have a better ability to do 

that. 

Senator PRYOR. So there is no good reason that you are aware 

of on why this hasn’t been done by DHS. Is there any justification 

for it not being done that you all are aware of? 

General PUNARO. I certainly do not understand. First of all, let 

me say again in fairness, there has been a lot of progress, not just 

in DOD, not just in USNORTHCOM, but at DHS. They have the 

15 all-hazard planning scenarios. They have a new National Response Plan. They have a lot of other documents. So, I mean, it is 

not like they haven’t been beavering away at this. But the problem 

is you either have a requirement or you do not and we do not have 

them. If you do not have a requirement, DOD cannot validate it. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
20 

If DOD doesn’t validate it, it is not going to get funded. If it doesn’t 

get funded, the Nation is not going to have the capability. 

Senator PRYOR. So let me just make sure I understand what you 

are saying, because I do not want to put words in your mouth. Are 

you telling the Committee today that if there were a major terrorist 

attack on U.S. soil today, we would not have clearly-defined roles 

between DOD and DHS? 

General PUNARO. Well, what we said in our report, Senator, was 

we do not have sufficiently trained and ready personnel to respond 

in a satisfactory fashion and we found that to be an appalling gap. 

But in terms of trying to sort out, between DOD and DHS and everybody, we weren’t looking at a fault-finding or a finger-pointing 

situation. We were giving an assessment. And by the way, U.S. 

Northern Command ran a major exercise last spring called Ardent 

Sentry which looked at our abilities to respond to a natural disaster and also a nuclear disaster, and the after-action reports, I am 

sure, would be available to this Committee, and I think those afteraction reports would be pretty consistent with what we say in our 

report. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. I 

guess we have a little more time. 

Let me go back to the conversation we had about developing civil 

support capabilities and I wanted to ask you the other end of it, 

which is what is your assessment of the effect that your proposed 

approach would have on the capability for the warfighting forces to 

perform their missions. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, we do not believe beefing up the 

capability of the Department of Defense to respond to the civil support missions, particularly if they are given a higher priority—and 

Secretary Gates has said that they have a higher priority and these 

civil support things need to be funded—we do not see it as a takeaway. We see it as an addition. 

For example, the capabilities that we need in the National Guard 

for the high-end catastrophic response, particularly on WMD, these 

need to be funded and these need to be put in the budget. They 

would be highly-specialized forces. They would be targeted at this 

mission. It wouldn’t be a take-away from the overseas combatant 

mission. So a lot of it is dual-capable. A lot of it is if you get the 

Guard unit up to its higher state of equipping and manning, that 

unit is not only more capable for here at home, but it is also more 

capable for its overseas mission. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you would say that it would actually 

improve the warfighting capability of our forces? 

General PUNARO. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, because if you make 

the Guard and Reserves—we said we need to move away from the 

old categories of the way we look at the Reserves—the Ready Reserve, Selective Reserve, and Stand-By Reserve—and create two 

new categories, an Operational Reserve and a Strategic Reserve. 

Those units then that DOD put in the Operational Reserve, based 

on their mission and their requirements, would be funded at these 

higher levels of readiness. They would be more ready for the overseas missions. They would be just as ready for the homeland duties. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
21 

The key change is, and one this Committee has pointed out, the 

home mission requires every bit as high a state of readiness of our 

forces as we have in the Ready Battalion of the 82nd Airborne that 

is on that strip down at Fort Bragg ready to go anywhere in the 

world on a 24/7 notice. You need that capability in our Guard and 

Reserve to respond to these compelling threats that we now face 

at home. It is not a take-away, it is an addition. 

General STUMP. And sir, the Senate allocated $1.2 billion, I believe, in 2005 for dual-use equipment—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is right. 

General STUMP [continuing]. In the National Guard that was 

very beneficial to not only the home mission, but the overseas mission. In many instances, the National Guard only sees the equipment when they hit the ground in Iraq and this is not a good situation. It is much harder to do post-mobilization training if you do 

not have the equipment to train on before you go over there. But 

because of the equipment shortages we have, many times, the National Guard soldiers going to post-mobilization training are seeing 

the equipment for the first time and this equipment could be used 

as dual-use equipment. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good point. General Sherrard, let me ask 

you a different question, which is to talk a bit about the Commission’s recommendation that a majority of the positions at the 

Northern Command be filled by Guard and Reserve personnel, and 

speak, if you would, about how the Commission members believe 

that would improve the Northern Command’s ability to coordinate 

among the many players responding to a domestic catastrophe, 

which is, of course, now part of its relatively recent new authority. 

General SHERRARD. Yes, sir. We do believe that is important because of their experience and their knowledge of what the capabilities those particular organizations can bring. Part of that would 

certainly help improve the identification somewhere in the Combat 

Readiness Reporting Status System of what capabilities the unit 

can present. But it drives back to the question that was raised earlier. You have to know what the requirements are for what capabilities you can provide so it all becomes a complete package that 

you would have there. 

The real key to success, we believe, is understanding what they 

have, understanding what capabilities exist maybe within two 

blocks of where the incident is, and those are things that are absolutely essential if we are going to be able to respond properly. And 

we do believe that the men and women that are in the National 

Guard and Reserves today live that each and every day. They are 

there and they know the capabilities that they have. They know 

how to respond and they have that working relationship, and if you 

can transfer that to the headquarters level, it only makes it a better organization for everyone to understand what the capabilities 

that these people can bring. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, could I add briefly—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure, please. 

General PUNARO. This really goes back to this concept of the traditional view by the Department and by our government, not just 

the Department of Defense, if you are ready for the away game, 

you are ready for the home game. Well, the home game in the peak 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
22 

of the Cold War was strategic nuclear deterrence. We didn’t face 

the kind of threats we face today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO. USNORTHCOM is the home combat and command. It is not the away combat and command. They make a distinction between homeland security, homeland defense, and civil 

support. We are talking about civil support. It has traditionally 

been a low priority for the Department of Defense because it is not 

homeland defense. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO. Secretary Gates is changing that. But when 

you have people who grew up in the away game scenario and who 

do not have the training and experience to deal with these many 

more difficult homeland civil support scenarios, it is not that they 

are not terrific people and terrific commanders. The people at 

USNORTHCOM work every day to improve this Nation’s defense, 

no question about it. 

They do not know what they do not know, and again, in our military, we put people in for specialized skills. Everybody knows what 

a dynamic leader Lieutenant General Blum is, the head of the National Guard. He is a warrior. He has fought overseas in combat. 

He has done civil support. No one in their right mind would put 

General Blum in charge of a nuclear carrier battle group. He 

doesn’t know the first thing about it, and he would admit it. 

So USNORTHCOM is a specialized command. There are unified 

commands and specified commands. It really is more of a specified 

command. It has a very targeted mission. That mission, first responding in complex situations, is every bit as complicated as responding overseas. We haven’t culturally come to that point yet in 

the Department of Defense in Northern Command. So you need to 

put military officers that have grown up in the civil support arena, 

that know this and have experience, you need more of them at the 

Northern Command and you need them in the leadership positions. 

The component commands for Northern Command could be headed by Guard and Reserve personnel. So it is really, over time, you 

have just got to shift the experience base and the capacity of these 

individuals to basically deal with this civil support mission. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is great. Thank you. Very provocative thoughts. It is very important that we push the envelope here 

because of the changed threat environment that we are living in 

here at home. 

Senator Collins, the vote just went off, but we have some time, 

so please go forward. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. General Punaro, are we facing a 

practical challenge if we were to implement your recommendations, 

and that is that our National Guard forces are already stretched 

too thin because of the repeated and extended deployments overseas? Is it really practical to expect the National Guard and the active duty military to treat civil support as an equal priority to 

homeland defense and the warfighting capabilities? Would that not 

require a far bigger Guard than we now have? 

General PUNARO. You raise a superb point and one that the Department of Defense worries about a lot, and none of us want to 

see the Department of Defense become the temporary manpower 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
23 

agency for every problem, every ill the Nation has. Far from it. We 

do not suggest that. We focus in on the catastrophic where we 

know only the Department of Defense—and everybody knows it, 

they never like to admit it—has the capacity, the skills, the training, and the ability to respond in those areas. 

For a lot of the 15 planning scenarios, the Guard units are perfectly capable of responding today. Now, they need to be brought 

back up to speed from their deployments and everything, but for 

most of them that they are going to respond to, we have the right 

numbers and the right ability. 

But we do not have the forces we need for the catastrophic. So 

you are going to have to add that in. It is not just a question of 

resting up the folks we have and giving them a little more time to 

refit and reset. It is a question of basically building the capacity 

once we know what the requirements are from DHS, once DOD 

validates them, and DOD is, frankly, anticipating those requirements. To give DOD some credit here, they are not waiting on 

DHS. They probably lost their patience a little bit. They are saying, 

we have got to build this capacity. It is not funded yet. 

So I would say that if you in this Committee and the Armed 

Services Committee proscribe this very carefully in the statute as 

we recommend, I think you will avoid the concern that DOD would 

be rushing to the sound of every fire bell, which is certainly not 

what we suggest. 

The second thing is the Reserves. For example, when the Amtrak 

train went off a trestle in Mobile, Alabama, the first responders 

were the Third Force Reconnaissance Company of the U.S. Marine 

Corps and the Fourth Marine Division Reservists because they 

happened to be the closest to the scene. They had scuba gear. They 

were trained to operate in that kind of environment. That is the 

kind of thing we are talking about where governors ought to have 

the ability to use them and we ought to be able to mobilize them 

for the limited natural disasters because they are close by. 

So there is plenty of capacity in our military today to respond to 

everything but the catastrophic, so we are focused on the catastrophic and building the capability we need there. 

General STUMP. Just to add one point to that—— 

Senator COLLINS. Yes. 

General STUMP. But we need the equipment and we need the 

full-time manning. We are at 61 percent now, and if we are going 

to continue to be the dual-use National Guard that the American 

public expects of us, we are going to have to equip them with the 

equipment and provide the full-time manning and the resources 

available to do that. 

Senator COLLINS. Very good point. Just very quickly because we 

do need to go vote, General Stump, I want to follow up on your description of what the current capabilities are. As I understand it, 

these civil support teams, which are 22-member teams, really are 

reconnaissance teams. They go out. They do sampling. But they are 

not really response, is that correct? 

General STUMP. That is correct. There are only 22 full-time people there, and all they do is go out and they can tell you what sort 

of a chemical release was there, and they also have a tremendous 

amount of communication equipment. So they are very good for 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
24 

being a communication node. But they do not have any of the other 

requirements, other than just identifying what there are. So no, 

they have a very limited capability. 

Senator COLLINS. That is what my understanding is, as well. 

They are very valuable, but they are not really a response team in 

the larger sense. But Northern Command has said that over the 

next year, specific active duty Guard and Reserve units will be 

trained, equipped, and assigned to a three-tiered response force 

and that will total about 4,000 troops. Have you looked at that capability, and if so, what do you think of it? 

General STUMP. That is a good capability, but they also said they 

need three of them. Two of them are notional and one of them, they 

are putting together now. I think that is a great step going forward. As I indicated, the CERFPs that the National Guard has, 

which are only battalion-sized, 17 of which are in existence, would 

only cover that first 72 hours of the response. You need something 

bigger after that and these forces that you just identified are the 

ones that would be the follow-on. However, there is only one that 

has been identified and beginning to be resourced now, and even 

Northern Command indicates we probably should have at least 

three of them. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

Gentlemen, we are going to recess. If you have the time, I will 

come back as soon as possible and we will do a few more questions. 

But it has been very beneficial so far. 

General PUNARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The Committee will stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, thanks very much for your patience. 

I just have a few more questions. 

The Committee, as you know, does a great deal of work on homeland security preparedness. One framework for preparedness entails the following construct: Planning to identify what tasks must 

be performed, who will perform them, and what capabilities and resources will be required to perform them. Then obviously ascertaining what capabilities you have, determining the gaps in what 

you need, and then resourcing to fill those gaps and exercising to 

make sure we continually get better. So this is an ongoing process, 

in some sense one which is never complete. We are always trying 

to improve. 

General Punaro, am I right in saying that your report finds gaps, 

some significant, in all phases of this process? Could you comment 

a bit in detail and give your assessment of how we can reasonably 

see to it that those who are operational tackle all these tasks with 

the urgency that is necessary given the current threat environment? 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, I think you have summed it up 

very nicely. As I understand the preparedness cycle, at least looking at it from a military mind, basically, the first thing you do is 

plan. We have suggested in our report that there could be significant improvements in the planning phase in all of the activities 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
25 

that are involved, not just Federal—State, local, DHS, DOD, 

USNORTHCOM, and the domestic agencies. So the planning cycle 

of preparedness could use a lot of improvements. 

Once you do the planning, and part of the planning would be 

identifying the requirements, then you organize, train, and equip. 

Certainly, we have suggested that we need better organizations 

and maybe better bureaucratic organization as well as better organizations or units that are going to respond to the various contingencies. For example, on the catastrophic scale that General Stump 

alluded to, the DOD is identified. Those need to be funded and 

brought into existence. 

And obviously you need to train, as Senator Collins said. The No. 

1 thing in the military and in all these areas is train, train, train, 

train, train, and you learn a lot when you train, and then obviously 

you equip, as well. Then you exercise. So that is the next part, and 

you are getting to see. In fact, I think USNORTHCOM should get 

tremendous credit for this exercise they put together, Ardent Sentry—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO [continuing]. Which was a multi-State, very 

complicated exercise that included both the low end and the high 

end, and I can tell you they learned a lot, and that is why you do 

these exercises. They are not designed to be finger-pointing exercises. They are designed to learn, and we need to get the whole 

government involved in the kind of exercises that our Department 

of Defense and the U.S. Northern Command is leading, and you 

evaluate and improve. And, of course, we probably aren’t doing 

enough evaluating and improving, at least at the pace that we see. 

So I would say, Mr. Chairman, each one of those phases could 

be improved. We have come a long way. The thing that worries us 

or bothers us, or I do not know if those are the right adjectives— 

I would say in my personal view, the thing that surprises me is the 

lack of a sense of urgency in some part of those outfits that need 

to be involved in the preparedness cycle, and I certainly do not consider that to be in the Department of Defense. They have a sense 

of urgency about these missions, particularly since Secretary Gates 

has arrived. So that would be my quick summary. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I hear you, and that is obviously a 

real concern because we know and they know that the threat continues to be very clear and present, so the response needs to be urgent. 

I wonder if either one of the Generals wishes to add anything. 

General SHERRARD. If I might, I would like to just add to that 

because I agree completely with everything Chairman Punaro just 

mentioned, but I would tell you it is absolutely essential for the 

members of a unit to know what their requirements to train to 

are—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General SHERRARD [continuing]. And when you identify those, 

then they have a standard and that standard needs to be reported, 

also, so that everyone knows it. We do this, particularly General 

Stump and I both being blue-suiters from the past, it is not uncommon for us to have organizations that we call them dual-task or 

dual-DOC, Design Operational Capabilities (DOC), where you have 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
26 

two different missions. It does not impair your ability to do the 

other one at all, and I would see that any type of mission that you 

are trying to do in support of our homeland missions here, it only 

enhances other warfighting capability, because frankly, they are 

both warfighting in the end and that is what we have to make certain. 

But you have to define it and then everyone knows the standard 

that they must be exercising and training to meet so that it is not 

a pick-up game if and when you are called to come do something. 

You know exactly the capabilities you are qualified to do and what 

equipment you have to have with you, or have identified what your 

shortfalls are and it being in the budgeting process and the procurement side so that you can get the things that are necessary for 

you to do your job. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

General STUMP. I agree, and it all gets back to requirements 

again. If you do not know what the requirements are, you cannot 

train to them and then you are not going to be ready for them. In 

Michigan, for instance, we had a contingency plan in case there 

was a riot in Detroit, and we had task forces set up, we had command and control, we had where you were going to go and so forth, 

and so at least we had a plan that was out there. And when you 

do not have the defined requirements—we have the 15 scenarios 

that are out there, but they have not come to the National Guard 

in large response other than the one Ardent Sentry exercise to determine what those requirements are going to be. So if we do not 

know what the requirements are, we cannot train to them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go on, in a way, back to a question 

we asked about the Northern Command but a little broader, which 

is about coordination of the different elements of our government 

in this. The Adjutant General of Maine was here last year, and 

what he said was—‘‘it sounds like it could have been a Casey 

Stengel, which is that getting good players is easy. Getting the 

players to play as a good team is the hard part. And then he said 

we have got great players.’’ Obviously, that was the end of the 

quote, suggesting that we do not have the kind of teamwork we 

need now. 

In your observations, in your work on the Commission over the 

last couple of years, what is your judgment about the ability of the 

players to work together as a team, to understand what each is 

doing, or should do, and then how to work together when a disaster 

or attack occurs? 

General PUNARO. Well, I would say there would be two parts. 

One would be the ‘‘before it happens’’ part, and unfortunately, we 

have a lot of the traditional ‘‘been there forever.’’ It doesn’t matter 

who is running the government, the kind of bureaucratic approach 

or the organizational and institutional approaches to issues, particularly when you are looking for the kind of dramatic change that 

has to occur to meet these new threats here in the homeland, our 

government bureaucracies are resistant to change and they look for 

ways to say no rather than ways to say yes, and that has hampered a lot of the coordination and planning that has to occur. 

Now, you can have people at the top that are saying, do it, and 

they have a hard time sometimes translating their nuclear energy 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
27 

into the system to get the changes to occur. Let us say you have 

an incident. I think we find, particularly in our Department of Defense, they certainly go to the sounds of the gun. They are going 

to bring whatever they have as quickly as they can whether there 

was good prior planning, coordination, contingency plans, and I 

think the rest of the government—you all are a better judge of 

FEMA and the domestic side than we are, but it is our experience 

in catastrophes small and large, our Nation responds and our government responds well. 

The problem is that we know what the requirements are in a 

strategic sense for these catastrophic situations. We know where 

we are today and we know we have a long way to go. Just saying 

everybody is going to show up and do the very level best they can 

is not good enough. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

General PUNARO. And so we have to fix that and we have to have 

ways, and I think some of our recommendations—codifying in statute—it is Congress that directs the Department of Defense and 

gives the Department its funding and its priorities. Codifying that 

civil support is an equal priority will help those in the Department 

of Defense at the top—Secretary Gates, Assistant Secretary 

McHale, Admiral Mullen—who are trying to turn those institutions 

in the right direction. 

You are the oversight Committee for DHS and you have made a 

lot of changes, lessons learned after Hurricane Katrina. Lighting 

the Bunsen burner under DHS is something that really needs to 

happen, particularly in the high-end scenarios because Secretary 

Chertoff’s concern, as he has expressed publicly, does not appear to 

us to be translated into the day-to-day workings of the institutions 

that he is responsible for on an urgent enough basis. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is a really important and unsettling conclusion, I must say. Somebody I talked to about your report who admires what you did, raised with me the question of is 

it clear who is in charge in these cases? I guess it goes back to 

Casey Stengel, which is that he knew he was the manager. At the 

time, Steinbrenner didn’t own the Yankees, so he knew that he was 

in charge. 

But this is somebody who has been in the military service and 

said—this is about planning, but I will ask you it make it more 

generally—he said, well, if I was raising the question about who 

was in charge of the planning and operation if there was a crisis 

in Korea or the Taiwan Straits, it would be pretty clear who I 

would go to at the Pentagon. It would be very clear. It is not clear 

if there was a WMD attack on an American city who would be in 

charge of the planning and operational response. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, everybody is in charge and nobody is in charge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is what we worry about. 

General PUNARO. They all want to profess they are in charge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO. But then if you sat right down, and that is why 

we say—our recommendation on the governors really is one in the 

planning process. You work all this stuff out in advance. If Congress directed the creation of a National Governors Council to adVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
28 

vise the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security on these civil support matters, we would expect the National 

Governors Association (NGA) would pick governors that have the 

lead for that Association. They have governors that are leads for 

the Guard and Reserve. They have governors that lead for the 

homeland. 

This is why it is so important. In other words, they could all sit 

down and work this out. It has been a nagging problem for our Republic for hundreds of years, and we had a margin for error in 

years past. You had some slack time in the kind of threats we 

faced in the homeland. We do not have that margin for error anymore, as you pointed out so compellingly about what the terrorists 

want to do in this country. There is no margin for error. 

They need to all sit down together, work on it, and say, OK, let 

us say it is the planning scenario, the big one that DHS has described. Let us all agree that we know if that happens—because we 

know what the consequence is going to be. They have spelled it out 

in the documents. Let us agree that in that particular scenario, 

here is the command and control. Here is the way we are going to 

do it. Let us get agreement in advance and then design the plans 

and test the plans and operate the plans in that fashion. 

You can also say for the 95 percent of the activities in the country that fall in the civil support, where the Guard operates in State 

status and sometimes in Title 32 status, the governor is perfectly 

capable and had been in charge of that for a hundred years. We 

need to now give them the ability to pick up some of the Federallevel Reserve capabilities that we have, the Nation pays for, in 

those more limited scenarios. 

So I think our view is that there is no reason men and women 

of goodwill facing the kind of threats we face cannot put this historic reluctance to basically solve this problem behind them, sit 

down as adults, and work it out in advance. The Nation requires 

it. If we do not do it, no matter how much money we throw at the 

problem, we are not going to be as prepared as we need to be. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. General Sherrard, do you want to 

add something? 

General SHERRARD. Just one quick comment, sir, related to that, 

and it ties right in with it. In our warfighting missions and training for all that, the key words that we always talk about, are that 

we train the way we are going to fight so that there is never any 

doubt about what you are going to be responsible for doing and 

then who will, in fact, be directing that. 

There is a tremendous amount of capability out there that is 

available if we can just have the direction or the protocols laid out 

as to who is going to do what. The men and women are responding. 

They responded on September 11, 2001, put on uniforms and 

showed up to do things in New York City—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General SHERRARD [continuing]. But we had no authority. We 

had no orders. We had nothing. But there is a way to go do that 

well in advance of what the exercise would be, and as Chairman 

Punaro said, those can be laid out, but it is critical that the way 

you are going to fight better be the way you train so that it doesn’t 

change and suddenly you say, oh, this is a different program. There 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
29 

should only be one program and that is to make sure we are successful. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a good point. The discussion that 

we have had, a lot of it has been about an increasing role for the 

Department of Defense personnel in homeland defense, homeland 

security, or responding to attacks. In most cases, I think the understanding is that the DOD personnel would be acting in support of 

the Department of Homeland Security. I wonder if there are cases 

that are so extreme, catastrophic—and during our investigation of 

Katrina we began to distinguish, and I think you have to, between 

a natural disaster, which is no fun, and a catastrophic event, as 

Hurricane Katrina was or as obviously a nuclear detonation in an 

American city would be. Those are the kinds of occasions when our 

planning ought to contemplate whether the Department of Defense, 

because of its immense resources, actually would be the lead agency at least for some period of time? 

General PUNARO. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, as you put it correctly, we should contemplate, we should plan, we should think 

about it. Let us take scenario No. 1—the high-end catastrophic 

event. The Department of Defense will bring the preponderance of 

the force to basically mitigate and deal with the recovery efforts. 

It will require the medical community, it will require the Centers 

for Disease Control, it will require FEMA, it will require all elements of the Federal Government, but the bulk of the capability is 

going to come from the Department of Defense because the devastation is so great that you have no communications, you have no 

water, you have mass casualties, you have mass problems, and so 

is that a scenario where, for whatever period of time would be appropriate—I mean, first of all, common sense tells you that, as 

General Stump says, the governor is going to be in charge initially, 

but he is going to realize very quickly that it is above his pay 

grade, as good as our governors are, and so it is going to be federalized pretty quickly. 

Once it is federalized, do you want to have the person who has 

the preponderance of the force in charge or do you want to have 

the designated lead Federal agency, DHS or FEMA, who under the 

statute is in charge, but they didn’t bring the preponderance of the 

force. Our military training tells us typically the person that brings 

the preponderance of the force usually is the one that has the command and control. I think, and again, why cannot this be worked 

out in advance? 

I believe our governors are responsible under our laws for the 

health and welfare of the people in their State. They are going to 

want to do everything they can to protect that health and welfare. 

They know that in these catastrophic situations, it is going to overwhelm their ability to be able to do what they are supposed to do 

and they are going to want the Federal help and the Federal help 

is going to come as quickly as we can make it available. 

This is the thing that puzzled us, why in the world the whole 

thing continues to be an institutional argument as opposed to sitting people of good character down and saying, let us walk through 

these catastrophic situations and let us sort out these age-old problems. The taxpayer pays. They do not care whether it is active 

duty, Guard or Reserve, Centers for Disease Control, or FEMA. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
30 

They are paying all the bills. Our Nation owes them an obligation 

to give them the very best coordinated response possible. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. All they want is to be protected—— 

General PUNARO. That is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. And have the government respond to it. No, I couldn’t agree with you more. We saw this in our 

investigation of Hurricane Katrina. It is regrettable that we still 

haven’t seen that kind of working through by different elements of 

the Federal Government because it is critically important. I admire 

you. 

Senator Collins and I, on the way over for the vote, we were saying that we really appreciate the report and the work you have 

done because, to put it mildly, it is not conventional thinking. You 

took on some of the status quo—I gather you found that in your 

appearance before the Armed Services Committee—but you know 

you are making us think, and particularly the question about the 

governor having authority for at least some period of time over 

Title 10 troops is one of those third rails here, and yet you are forcing us to consider this argument, is not unity of command in a crisis, catastrophic perhaps, more important than essentially organizational pride or turf? And the other thing you have done, and it 

is very important to force us to think about this, is that there have 

been a lot of cases where Title 10 personnel have been under the 

command of non-Title 10 and even non-American commanding officers when it served the larger purpose, obviously. 

I unfortunately have to go on, unless you want to make some 

closing comments. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to pick up on that 

because I think you are really onto something here and this—we 

didn’t go this far in the Commission report, but as I hear you 

thinking out loud, the first thing I would say is, as you know from 

your long service on both of these committees, the government institutions usually are not in favor of fairly significant change. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PUNARO. When Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act in 1986, there was not one sitting political official or military 

official who supported those changes. They opposed them all. But 

if the Department of Defense knew that they were going to own the 

big-end catastrophic event, if they knew that—now I am not saying 

for one second they would roger up to that or say that, but if they 

knew and if the President and the Congress decided that they were 

going to own that problem, I guarantee you would see the kind of 

urgency, attention, coordination, planning, training, and equipping 

that would have us prepared to deal with those situations because 

that is the way they are. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true. 

General PUNARO. But let us face it. No other outfit of government is like that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No. The more I watch our military, it is 

unique in its responsiveness and, of course, also in its resilience, 

as we are seeing now in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

I thank the three of you for your service and for the testimony. 

We are going to spend some time on this alongside our investigation about the threat of nuclear terrorism and response preparedVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
31 

ness. I think Senator Collins and I are interested in doing some appropriate legislating here. So the danger for the three of you is that 

you will be asked again to testify before us, but certainly to help 

us as we go forward to make sure it comes out the right way. 

You have each served your country for a long period of time. I 

think this is some very significant service you have given and I appreciate it greatly. 

We will keep the record open for 15 days and there may be some 

other Members of the Committee that want to submit questions to 

you for the record and maybe that you want to add some statements yourselves. 

But I cannot thank you enough, and with that, I will adjourn the 

hearing. 

General PUNARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(33) 

NUCLEAR TERRORISM: ASSESSING THE 

THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Tester, Collins, 

and Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and thanks to all of you for 

being here. Apologies for the condition of my throat. I am in what 

I am pleased to say appears to be the final stages of a head cold. 

This is the second in a series of hearings this Committee is holding to examine the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on our homeland and to ask what the Federal Government is doing to prevent 

such an attack and how well prepared it is to respond to the catastrophic results of such an attack. In this post-September 11, 2001, 

world, it is our duty as elected officials to think about the previously unimaginable, to ask the previously unthinkable questions, 

and then to push for unprecedented answers and preventive action. 

Our first hearing in this series focused on the important role of 

the Defense Department and specifically the National Guard and 

Reserves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. My conclusion 

from that hearing was that our government is not adequately prepared today to do everything that will need to be done if, God forbid, a nuclear terrorist attack on America ever occurs. 

This morning in this public hearing, we are going to look at the 

threat of nuclear terrorism itself, that is to evaluate the nature and 

seriousness of the threat as defined by the intent and capability of 

terrorists to acquire the necessary materials and carry out an attack on America using nuclear weapons. 

This afternoon, our Committee will reconvene in a closed session 

to hear classified testimony on this subject. 

Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups have obviously made no secret of their desire to destroy us and our way of life. We are going 

to hear this morning that al-Qaida has also demonstrated a clear 

intent to develop and use nuclear weapons to achieve its violent 

jihadist goals. We know, for instance, that al-Qaida has tried to recruit people with nuclear expertise and al-Qaida has tried to obtain 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
34 

specialized nuclear materials. This is daunting and jarring information, but it is our responsibility to bring it forth and then to do 

something about it. 

On our first panel, we are going to hear from Charles Allen, 

Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the Chief Intelligence Officer at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Director of the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence for the Department of Energy (DOE). Mr. Allen 

and Mr. Mowatt-Larssen are two of the most respected intelligence 

experts in our government and they will discuss their assessment 

of the current threat and its likely evolution in the coming years. 

May I say for our Committee, and many more, that our country is 

fortunate to have people of your caliber serving us and focused on 

this issue. 

Our purpose today is not to encourage unrealistic fears, but rather to confront the fearful realities that we face in the world today 

so that we together can deal with them in defense of our country, 

our people, and our way of life. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The consequences 

of a nuclear attack on one of our major cities are nearly unimaginable. If a 10-kiloton nuclear device were detonated at noon in 

Manhattan’s Times Square, half-a-million lives would be instantly 

extinguished. All buildings within a half-mile radius would be destroyed. The economic and psychological impacts would also be devastating. 

Yet the threat of terrorists acquiring and using such a weapon 

is very real. Given their goal of causing as much death and destruction as possible, al-Qaida and other terrorist groups continue 

to seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To 

be sure, our terrorist enemies have many other weapons more 

readily at their disposal. Improvised explosive weapons, the terrorists’ weapon of choice, have killed thousands and continue to 

threaten our troops and civilians around the world. Chemical weapons, such as sarin gas, have been directed against targets such as 

the Tokyo subway system. Dirty bombs using readily available radiological waste could also have serious consequences over a far 

more limited area than a nuclear blast. 

Still, the concentrated force of a nuclear explosion, the radioactive contamination of the target and surrounding areas, and the 

psychological and economic impact of such an attack places nuclear 

terrorism in a category all its own. That is why we are holding this 

hearing to examine closely the scope and nature of this threat. 

More than 30 years ago, the Federal Office of Technology Assessment concluded that: ‘‘A small group of people, none of whom have 

ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design 

and build a crude nuclear explosive device.’’ That is, with a machine shop and less than 100 pounds of enriched uranium, terrorists conceivably could assemble an atomic bomb that could deliver 

about two-thirds the explosive force of the bomb that devastated 

Hiroshima in 1945. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
35 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Allen appears in the Appendix on page 379. 

Of course, even determined and resourceful terrorists face significant challenges in obtaining the material to be used to construct 

a bomb, in assembling the device, in transporting it, and in successfully detonating it. Terrorists could avoid some of these difficulties by procuring an existing weapon, which is why nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts are so important. Moreover, our 

Nation has taken many actions to decrease their chances of success 

even further. For example, we have installed radiation detection 

monitors in the Nation’s 22 largest seaports. 

The probability may be low that terrorists could successfully 

stage a nuclear attack. Indeed, their current plans likely include 

much less technologically difficult options. But a nuclear attack 

would fulfill al-Qaida’s goal of a spectacular attack, and it is a possibility that we cannot ignore. As one of our witnesses has written, 

‘‘Nuclear terrorism remains a real and urgent danger.’’ 

Our efforts must include robust intelligence initiatives to identify 

those groups like al-Qaida that may be planning such attacks and 

to disrupt their operations before they can succeed. Close interagency cooperation and information sharing with our allies can 

help to counter this threat. 

We must also plan as effective a response as possible to such a 

devastating attack. The National Response framework provides the 

foundation on which DHS, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), Department of Defense, and other critical agencies 

coordinate their resources to deal with the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack. But we know already that they 

would confront overwhelmed or obliterated local response capabilities, mass casualties, evacuations, and demands for food and shelter. This Committee therefore continues to assess the adequacy of 

preparation and response capabilities. 

Today’s witnesses will help us take the measure of the threat. 

That judgment, in turn, can guide our thinking on the adequacy of 

the intelligence, diplomatic, technical, and other measures that we 

use to secure nuclear weapons, prevent theft and black market 

sales, detect radioactive shipments, penetrate terrorist networks, 

discourage nuclear proliferation, and otherwise counter this threat. 

Today’s hearing, as well as those to follow, will help us ensure 

that our policy options are grounded in the best information and 

analysis that we can muster. I commend the Chairman for convening this hearing, and I join him in welcoming our distinguished 

witnesses. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. I 

thank Senator Akaka and Senator Carper for being here. 

Mr. Allen, we invite your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN,1 UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS AND CHIEF INTELLIGENCE 

OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ALLEN. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for calling this hearing 

today and focusing on something of extreme importance, and that 

is nuclear terrorism. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
36 

One of the gravest concerns that I have is the entry of a nuclear 

device or materials into the United States. The Secretary and all 

elements of the Department of Homeland Security, I can assure 

you, take this threat very seriously. My office assesses global 

threat in the homeland context in order to provide tailored, timely, 

and actionable intelligence in support of the Department’s prevention, protection, and response operations. 

As a member of the intelligence community, the Department of 

Homeland Security has an important role to play in nuclear terrorism issues, but we do not do it alone. Our colleagues who focus 

on foreign nuclear intelligence, especially the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, provide us with 

the basis to conduct homeland-specific assessments of nuclear terrorism matters, and it is a great pleasure to be here with my old 

and good friend, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. 

Before discussing the specifics of how DHS views the nuclear 

threat, I want to distinguish that when we assess threats to the 

homeland, we integrate intelligence-based threat information with 

knowledge of our vulnerability to attack, as Senator Collins pointed 

out. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in our systems, if exploited by 

our adversaries could cause potentially grave adverse effects to our 

country. Threats, on the other hand, are posed by adversaries who 

have both the intent to exploit our vulnerabilities and to cause us 

harm. 

Terrorists have been telling us for years that they are seeking to 

attack the United States and our allies with weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as Senator Lieberman pointed out. A high priority concern for my office is the potential for a 

nuclear device or nuclear material to enter U.S. ports or cross U.S. 

borders. As the Chief Intelligence Officer of DHS, my job is to analyze and produce intelligence to inform operations that prevent nuclear material and devices from reaching our borders, to protect 

against the potential that they do, and respond swiftly and effectively in the event a terrorist nuclear device reaches our homeland. 

Currently, I do not believe that any terrorist organization has a 

nuclear device. However, that assessment could change if terrorist 

groups are able to acquire nuclear materials and skilled personnel. 

The primary obstacle to the development of a nuclear device by a 

terrorist is the acquisition of a sufficient quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material. Additional obstacles include recruiting properly trained experts, designing and assembling a nuclear device, 

and transporting that device to the intended target in the United 

States without detection. 

If a terrorist group were to obtain sufficient quality of nuclear 

material, the challenges of executing a successful attack, although 

complex, are not insurmountable. Thus, actions taken to secure nuclear materials and combat smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear 

materials globally is the most critical action needed to prevent nuclear material and terrorist nuclear devices from reaching our 

homeland. 

My office also analyzes global threat information, such as trends 

in nuclear material smuggling, in order to enhance border security 

and domestic security operations. We provide technical and threat 

information to help borders and immigration security personnel 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
37 

identify and interdict nuclear materials and persons with the capability or intent to cause us harm. 

Given the technical nature of nuclear devices and broad customer 

base, DHS intelligence is providing baseline information to our 

State, local, Tribal, and private sector partners on how a field officer might identify components of a nuclear device and differentiate 

radiological from nuclear devices, training on the potential effects 

of a nuclear device, and ensuring that our partners understand the 

range of impacts from a specific device. 

Although our first priority is to prevent a nuclear device from 

reaching our shores, we also work to ensure that Federal, State, 

local, and Tribal partners are ready to detect a nuclear device or 

materials that may arrive in the United States and reduce the likelihood that they enter the country. Our primary nuclear-related 

protection effort is to support the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and its operation. DNDO, in partnership with the Department of Energy and other agencies, is responsible for the development of the global nuclear detection architecture and integrating 

U.S. Government efforts on technical nuclear forensics, two activities that require tailored intelligence support. 

My office works with our intelligence community colleagues to 

provide intelligence and form risk-based assessments about materials, people, capabilities, and tactics to help the DNDO and others 

make sound operational, policy, and planning decisions. We also 

educate and inform State, local, and Tribal decisionmakers about 

the threat and provide technical reach-back to those entities to 

help them understand and respond to threats. 

Although we strive to prevent and protect against radiological 

and nuclear threats, we must also be prepared to respond quickly 

and effectively if a terrorist group does acquire or use a nuclear device. A terrorist-designed nuclear device is likely to be less complex 

and have less impact than nuclear stockpile weapons of the United 

States, Russia, and other nations, but this is not to say that such 

a device should be considered any less of a weapons of mass destruction. 

A terrorist attack that results in a nuclear detonation in the 

United States or anywhere else in the world, regardless of yield, 

will change the course of history. A nuclear attack may produce 

thousands of casualties, cause massive economic and infrastructure 

damage, invoke social disruption, and possibly render critical areas 

uninhabitable, at least in the near term. When considering nuclear 

threats, we must recognize that although the likelihood that a terrorist group could successfully execute an attack on the homeland 

may be very small, the consequences, regardless of the magnitude 

of the attack, will be extremely grave. 

My office supports Federal preparedness and response by ensuring planning documents and exercises are based on an appropriate 

understanding of the nuclear terrorist threat. Finally, after an attack, we provide intelligence, technical forensics, and DHS operational information to attribute radiological or nuclear attacks. 

In sum, the Department of Homeland Security’s intelligence enterprise works closely with their intelligence community colleagues 

to provide Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners with the inforVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
38 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen appears in the Appendix on page 385. 

mation they need to prevent, protect against, and prepare for the 

nuclear threat that we face today in the United States. 

Thank you for your support of homeland security intelligence. I 

look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Allen, for that excellent 

opening statement. 

Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN,1 DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you 

for the invitation to appear before you on this subject of critical importance, the threat of nuclear terrorism. 

Mr. Chairman, before I introduce my statement before the Committee, please allow me to set my testimony in an overall context 

of how I view this problem. 

Although much of this testimony is focused on the current threat 

posed by al-Qaida and its associates, I believe this is a strategic 

problem that is a permanent fixture of the age in which we live. 

We will need far-sighted, long-term solutions. We must enlist the 

best minds in and out of government, at home and abroad, from 

people of all persuasions, if we are to effectively exclude the possibility of the world living through a nuclear attack. 

And I believe in order to be successful, we must out-think our 

enemy. This will require decisive, aggressive, proactive, and creative action. I thank the Committee for stimulating this kind of 

discussion, not just in the intelligence community, but more broadly so that we can get a greater basis of understanding for the kind 

of solutions that are going to be required. 

With that introduction, please allow me to introduce this statement. The 20th Century was defined by nuclear races between 

states, but it is my view that the 21st Century will be defined first 

by the desire and then by the ability of non-states to procure or develop crude nuclear weapons. In the early years of the 21st Century, we are likely to be tested in our ability to prevent the first 

non-state efforts to develop and detonate a nuclear weapon. 

Prior to the attacks of Septemer 11, 2001, we had only very limited information on al-Qaida’s long-term strategic plan and it was 

not clear at that time that al-Qaida had serious nuclear ambitions. 

The threat of non-state use of a nuclear weapon was viewed largely 

by the intelligence community in the context of the nongovernmental organization Umma Tameer-e-Nau, which was run by two 

nuclear scientists, and where it could have intersected with alQaida or the now-dismantled nuclear network built by A.Q. Khan. 

The intelligence community prior to September 11, 2001, remained concerned about the security of former Soviet nuclear 

weapons and nuclear materials, but there was no coherent look at 

the idea of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Many people in the intelligence community believed that it was too hard for 

terrorists to develop a nuclear bomb. There was an assumption 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
39 

with the intelligence community that nuclear material was too 

hard to obtain, and even if they had the material, nuclear weapons 

are too sophisticated to be built without an industrial complex supporting the effort. 

We should not, however, assume that the technology of a nuclear 

weapon is beyond the grasp of a terrorist group. There are several 

differences between a state nuclear weapon program and one that 

a terrorist group might pursue. A state would want a regular supply of uranium or plutonium that it controls. A state would want 

a reliable weapon that would detonate only when and where the 

state chooses. A terrorist group does not need this kind of surety 

and consistency that a state desires. A terrorist group needs only 

to produce a nuclear yield once to change history. 

Our post-September 11, 2001, successes against the Taliban in 

Afghanistan yielded volumes of information that completely 

changed our view of al-Qaida’s nuclear program. We learned that 

al-Qaida wants a weapon to use, not to sustain and build a stockpile, as most states would. The nuclear threats that surfaced in 

June 2002 and continued through the fall of 2003 demonstrated 

that al-Qaida’s desire for a nuclear capability may have survived 

their removal from the Afghanistan safe haven. 

Today, al-Qaida’s nuclear intent remains clear. Al-Qaida obtained a fatwa in May 2003 that approved the use of weapons of 

mass destruction. Al-Qaida spokesman Suleyman abu Ghayth declared that it is al-Qaida’s right to kill four million Americans in 

retaliation for Muslim deaths that al-Qaida blames on the United 

States. Osama bin Laden said in 1998 that it was an Islamic duty 

to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 

In 2006, bin Laden reiterated his statement that al-Qaida will 

return to the United States. Al-Qaida has a track record of returning to finish a job they started. They failed at the World Trade 

Center in 1993. They came back in 2001. They canceled plans for 

chemical attacks in the United States in 2003. We do not yet know 

when and where they intend to strike us next, but our past experience strongly suggests they are seeking an attack that will be more 

spectacular than September 11, 2001. 

To delve a little into how they may be thinking about the nuclear 

option, at any given moment, al-Qaida probably has attack plans 

in development. September 11, 2001, was planned when the U.S.S. 

Cole was attacked in Yemen and when our embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, were attacked in Africa. An 

al-Qaida nuclear attack would be in the planning stages at the 

same time as several other plots, and only al-Qaida’s most senior 

leadership will know which plot will be approved. 

In keeping with al-Qaida’s normal management structures, such 

as the role of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in the September 11, 

2001, attacks, there is probably a single individual in charge, overseeing the effort to obtain materials and expertise. Some experts 

may have joined al-Qaida years ago, long before the world began 

paying adequate attention to the proliferation of the kinds of technologies that could yield a terrorist nuclear weapon. 

The September 11, 2001, plot was operationally very straightforward. It had a very small footprint, was highly compartmented. 

Al-Qaida’s nuclear effort would be just as compartmented and probVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
40 

ably would not require the involvement of more than the small 

number of operatives who carried out September 11, 2001. 

A prototypical al-Qaida nuclear attack would have the following 

components: Approval and oversight from al-Qaida’s most senior 

leadership with possible assistance from other groups; a planner 

responsible for organizing the material, expertise, and fabrication 

of a device; an operational support facilitator responsible for arranging travel, money, documents, food, and other necessities for 

the cell; assets in the United States or within range of other Western targets to case locations for an attack and to help move the attack team into place; and finally, the attack team itself. 

The task for the intelligence community is not easy. We must 

find something that is tactical in size but strategic in impact. We 

must find a plot with its networks that cut across traditional lines 

of counterproliferation and counterterrorism. We must stop something from happening that we have never seen happen before. 

Beyond the basics I have outlined here, we do not know what a 

terrorist plot might look like. There is, however, a choke point in 

the terrorist effort to develop a nuclear capability. It is impossible 

to build a nuclear weapon without fissile material. A state has the 

time and resources to build a large infrastructure required to make 

nuclear material. A terrorist group needs only to steal or buy it. We 

see incidences every month of seizures, and although many of these 

incidents do not involve weapons-grade materials, this occurrence 

means that we collectively have not done enough to suppress traffic 

and secure the security of material worldwide. 

Along with other members of the U.S. intelligence community, 

the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence recognizes the urgency of this threat. Terrorist acquisition 

of a nuclear device would be, again, an unprecedented event. To 

this end, let me outline a few of the things that we are doing in 

the Department of Energy. 

On August 28, 2006, the national-level Nuclear Materials Information Program was established via Presidential Directive. This 

program is an interagency effort managed by the Department of 

Energy in close coordination with the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and all agencies under the Director of National Intelligence. The specifics of this program are classified, but the goal is 

to consolidate all-source information pertaining to nuclear materials worldwide and their security status. This will help us understand the gaps in our current knowledge and ensure the information is made available to all Federal departments and agencies. 

DOE’s work to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism is not limited to intelligence. Several offices within the National Nuclear Security Administration are dedicated to understanding the improvised nuclear device threat; to securing nuclear materials and 

eliminating excess stockpiles; to deterring, detecting, and interdicting illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; and should the unimaginable action, to ensure that we stand ready to disarm a nuclear device, manage the consequences of the event, and to conduct 

forensic analysis to identify all those responsible. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation, Material Protection Control and AccountVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
41 

ing (MPC&A) program, works to upgrade security at nuclear sites, 

particularly those in Russia and other states of the former Soviet 

Union. In line with our view that preventing terrorist access to material is the most effective way of preventing nuclear terrorism, we 

continue to give very high priority to those efforts to bolster security. Throughout its 15-year history, the MPC&A program has 

worked with Russian and other former Soviet Union counterparts 

to secure nuclear material through upgrades to physical protection. 

In addition to work at 50 nuclear material sites in Russia, DOE 

has helped upgrade security at all Russian Navy sites and all Strategic Rocket Forces nuclear sites, and they have begun upgrading 

nine nuclear weapons sites in the 12th Main Directorate. 

In 2004, the Nuclear Security Administration began the Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative to accelerate efforts to address the dangers posted by nuclear and radiological materials at civilian sites 

worldwide through conversion of research reactors from highly enriched uranium to low enriched fuel, removal of excess nuclear and 

radiological materials, and protection of at-risk nuclear and radiological materials from theft. 

Our Second Line of Defense (SLD) program installs radiation detection equipment at fixed borders at land, sea, airports, and 

equips major shipment ports with detection equipment. SLD and 

Megaports are also training border guards and Customs officials to 

use this equipment. 

These efforts in their totality build a necessary solid foundation 

of strong policies and best practices to prevent nuclear proliferation. We are also working with foreign governments to strengthen 

standards for physical protection, to strengthen export control, and 

to strengthen safeguards on nuclear material worldwide. 

In closing, we must get nuclear materials off the black market 

and take every possible step to stop global trafficking in these materials. It must be a global effort incorporating police, intelligence 

services, militaries, government agencies and ministries, and dedicated citizens across the world. In addition, we need broad information sharing across every front, between government and private 

sector, among foreign partners, including those who were previously our adversaries. Al-Qaida thinks and plans dynamically 

and they rarely follow straightforward linear paths to their targets. 

We need to be just as flexible and dynamic in our response. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. The cumulative effect of the testimony of the two of you is, to put it mildly, sobering. 

The two of you are not prone to rhetorical excesses, but I think you 

have set out a series of realistic statements that call on us to both 

evaluate and react. 

We will do 6-minute rounds and I will begin now, but Mr. Allen, 

I just want to come back and try to summarize—— 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I make a parliamentary 

inquiry? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, sir. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. I have known Mr. Allen for many years. I tried 

to follow your statement. It tracked the written one provided to the 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
42 

Committee, but I wonder if we could have a copy of his abbreviated 

statement because it seems to me there were some very poignant 

comments that I might not be able to find—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is an excellent idea. If you have 

it, I will ask one of our staff to come down and get a copy. 

Senator WARNER. I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. ALLEN. We have a copy and we will provide it to the Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will get it right to you. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It could be one of your better selling 

statements, Mr. Allen. 

Let me just try to put in order what we have been told. Mr. 

Allen, you indicated on the encouraging side that you do not believe any terrorist group now has a nuclear device, is that right? 

Mr. ALLEN. I do not think we have sufficient evidence to make 

a firm decision, but that is my personal judgment. At the same 

time, as my friend, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen has indicated, there has 

been a long-term effort, particularly by al-Qaida, to develop an improvised nuclear device. I think that is a long-term aspiration. We 

can talk obviously in more detail in a classified session, but when 

I started working this back in—we saw bin Laden’s statement back 

in February 1998, and of course I have here the statement by this 

ultra extremist cleric back in 2003, the one that I think that Mr. 

Mowatt-Larssen referred to. It is pretty clear their intent—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ALLEN [continuing]. And capability is something that we can 

talk in a classified session. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think that summarizes it well, and I believe that coincides with Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s testimony, which is 

that we do not have evidence that there is a terrorist group with 

a nuclear device or nuclear capability now. But is it true that neither of you have any doubt that al-Qaida and perhaps other terrorist groups are attempting to gain nuclear capability? 

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that al-Qaida would 

like to obtain nuclear capability. I think the evidence and their 

statements that they have made over many years publicly indicate 

this, and I think that based on the National Intelligence Director’s 

views and others that have been issued, if you recall, the estimate 

that was issued in July of last year, on al-Qaida’s terrorist threat 

to the homeland, said that al-Qaida would like to have weapons of 

mass destruction and if it acquired them, it would use them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ALLEN. That is an unclassified key judgment, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, sir. And there is no reason not to believe the public statements that they are making about this intention? 

Mr. ALLEN. I take seriously many of their comments. Some of 

them are rhetorical—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ALLEN [continuing]. But in this case, I take it very seriously. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, to 

just talk for a moment about the significance of the fatwa issued 

by the Saudi cleric Nasir al-Albani in 2003 that both you and Mr. 

Allen have referred to. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
43 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First, I believe its 

significance is that when al-Qaida comes to a point in its thought 

process that it feels a need for a fatwa or a religious justification 

for an action, it has in our experience meant that they are well 

along the way of considering that action and need a justification to 

the Muslim world to use, in this case, weapons of mass destruction. 

We see that groundwork having been very clearly laid before September 11, 2001, which represented an escalation of their war with 

the United States by bringing their war to our shores. 

Similarly, they have done this in the past when they needed a 

fatwa or justification to attack Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia. 

They needed a religious ruling on that, and WMD falls in that 

same category. 

So it would be a grave error to underestimate the significance in 

May 2003, at a time when we were at a heightened threat, both 

at Saudi Arabia and at home, that this fatwa was issued by a radical Saudi cleric who subsequently retracted his fatwa on Saudi television but, in fact, represents a very clear and compelling statement by al-Qaida that it regards this as a weapon that it seriously 

is considering using. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. I thank you for that. 

Did you want to add something to that, Mr. Allen? 

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir. I think Mr. Mowatt-Larssen speaks very eloquently on this threat. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I want to go to the security 

of nuclear materials question, and just to put it in a realistic context, in the second panel, we are going to hear testimony from Matthew Bunn that includes a detailed description of the incident that 

is public and has been reported in the press that occurred last November. Four individuals brazenly attempted and in part succeeded, in infiltrating a nuclear facility in South Africa, bypassing 

security systems, and ultimately gaining access to the emergency 

control room. 

What can you tell us you know about that event and more broadly what it says about the security of nuclear materials globally? 

You both have been very clear about the fact that if there is a 

choke point here, it clearly is not choking al-Qaida and the other 

terrorist groups off from gaining the necessary nuclear materials 

with which they would make a device. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In the South Africa 

case, this is an ongoing investigation, if you will, ongoing work. 

That and related incidents that we have where we are concerned 

about possible breaches, I think are best left to the next session—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN [continuing]. But in a more general sense, 

we have concerns about the availability of material. There are publicly reported instances where actual weapons-usable material over 

the last several years has turned up missing. The intelligence community is dealing with our foreign partners on many of those right 

now. So we are not talking about a theoretical threat presented 

from insider access to facilities and/or theft of material. 

In this case, we simply must go out and find it before it finds 

us in terms of getting to a terrorist group, and that is one of our 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
44 

biggest challenges in the intelligence community, being proactive, 

where we are out locating, finding, and taking possession of any 

material that may be on the loose, knowing as we are sitting here 

today that we are, in fact, dealing with confirmed instances that 

relate to possibly missing nuclear materials. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up, but I want to just ask a 

quick question and ask for a quick answer. Is there an established 

framework of international cooperation in the pursuit of protecting 

nuclear materials? In other words, are we getting help from allies 

and others in the world? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. We are in various programs. I would say 

comprehensively, there is work yet to be done—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN [continuing]. At the intelligence level and 

others. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will come back to that. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, I am going to 

follow up on the questions that the Chairman just asked you. Obviously, keeping nuclear weapons or material from being stolen is a 

very important tool for preventing nuclear terrorism. Our next witness, Mr. Bunn, also wrote in an analysis last fall that the myriad 

routes across the world’s scantily-protected borders makes nuclear 

smuggling almost impossible to stop. 

Let me ask you two questions which flow from the conversation 

you have had with the Chairman as well as Mr. Bunn’s column. 

First, does the U.S. Government have a comprehensive list assessing which facilities around the world pose the most serious risks 

of nuclear theft? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Senator Collins, yes, we have a program 

called the Nuclear Materials Information Program. It was created 

in August 2006. It is in development. It is not at that comprehensive level yet to give you the assurance that we have this problem 

in hand. By no means am I suggesting that. We do have a plan. 

We are working the plan. We have prioritized this program to focus 

on countries and facilities that we regard in the intelligence community to be of the highest risk. So we have, in fact, identified the 

high-risk sites. We have identified what type of material is there. 

We have an ongoing assessment—it is being updated every day— 

on the status at the highest priority level. 

It is a work in progress. It is going to take a number of years 

to complete. But I would say we have a plan, but I would not disagree with Mr. Bunn’s assertion that we have a long way to go to 

feel good about smuggling of nuclear material. 

Senator COLLINS. Second, in general terms, where are the sites 

that pose the highest risk of nuclear theft today? I am trying to get 

a sense of whether the risks are more concentrated in a country 

like Pakistan or nuclear weapons in Russia, or whether the problem is domestic as well, perhaps college campuses that have nuclear reactors for research purposes and may not have them as secure. Give us your assessment of where, in general, the sites posing 

the most concern are located. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Well, clearly, we know that every state 

with nuclear material takes the security of material utmost seriVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
45 

ously, including the governments of Pakistan, Russia, the United 

States, and other countries. That said, obviously our biggest concern are states that potentially are less stable or where there is a 

greater interest by terrorists to acquire the material, and of course, 

we prioritize and pay the most attention to those countries. 

In our scope of how we look at nuclear materials globally, we include the United States in that category. We do not exclude the 

possibility that the problem could happen at home, whether it is 

the expertise or material. 

But yes, we have a very clear prioritization. I would be happy to 

get into more details on the progress we are making in the next 

session. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Allen, the well-documented 

proliferation activities of the former Pakistani chief nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan have highlighted the increased threat of nuclear 

terrorism. To what extent is the intelligence community concerned 

about the past activities of A.Q. Khan or other similarly knowledgeable scientists who might be willing to collaborate with terrorist organizations? 

Mr. ALLEN. That is a great question, Senator, and having someone who followed A.Q. Khan as my friend, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, did 

over a period of years, we believe that there are still some issues 

yet to be resolved with the A.Q. Khan network. Fortunately, that 

network was severely disrupted and most of the people are no 

longer able to conduct that kind of activity. It was really becoming 

sort of the one-stop shopping for the provision of nuclear designs 

and centrifuges, as it has been well publicized. 

At times, and we might talk a little about it, there are scientists 

around the world who may hold radical views, the insider threat, 

who might take materials or other kinds of hard, very complex 

equipment like centrifuges. I think, again, we have to have a regimen that is not only here in the United States, which we do have, 

but worldwide to prevent these kinds of scientists who really become the rogue scientists. And A.Q. Khan became an extraordinary 

rogue scientist who reached around the world globally, not only in 

the Middle East but in East Asia, as you are well aware. The A.Q. 

Khan situation, I think, is something we want to stop in the future, 

and it has got to take great cooperation with all civilized countries. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Akaka, 

and then we will go to Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

tell you that it is a pleasure to see such a distinguished group of 

witnesses here today appearing before this Committee and I want 

you to know that I applaud your efforts to bring more attention to 

our policies and programs and especially trying to help the public 

to understand what we are trying to do here. This is a good step 

in that direction. 

I ask you to include my full statement in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
46 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to see such distinguished witnesses 

appearing before the Committee today, and I share your interest and concern on 

this issue. I applaud your efforts to bring more attention to our policies and programs aimed at deterring nuclear terrorism. 

I have long been concerned with the threat of nuclear terrorism. In 2001, as the 

Chairman of the International Security Subcommittee, one issue that I focused on, 

and held several hearings on, was the protection of radioactive sources that could 

be used in so-called dirty bombs. A 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

report that I requested, titled ‘‘Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security 

of Sealed Radioactive Sources’’ (GAO–03–804), disclosed that the United States did 

not reliably keep track of or account for radioactive sources. According to the report, 

a quarter to half a million of Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) radiological sources are 

estimated to exist in the United States and approximately 24,000 new sources are 

annually added. These sources, in use throughout the United States and often not 

well secured, have the potential to become the base material for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), the formal name for a dirty bomb. As a result of the hearings 

and GAO report, Senator Bingaman and I introduced The Low Level Radioactive 

Waste Act to promote the safe and secure disposal of low-level radioactive waste. 

I am pleased to say that some of our proposals were included in the 2005 Energy 

Policy Act. 

Internationally, the problem of securing both low level radioactive sources and 

highly enriched uranium is compounded by its growing availability. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) reported 252 incidents of theft or loss of nuclear and other radioactive materials in 

2006, accounting for 20 percent of the reported incidents since the database was created in 1995. It is difficult to say if the problem is growing or if improved reporting 

is making it more noticeable. In any case, the numbers represent a significant problem and one which, as our witnesses today observe, has caught the attention of terrorists. 

I am convinced there are two lines of defense against possible nuclear terrorism 

threats. First, we must continue to secure radiological sources, even low-level ones, 

within our own country. After all, why should a terrorist go to the trouble of bringing radioactive material in when he can find it here? But the second front is the 

most difficult and, in the long-term, provides the greatest threat. This is the risk 

of unsecured nuclear and radiological sources abroad. 

Our witnesses today cite a number of initiatives to improve security of foreign 

sources of nuclear radioactive material, including the Department of Energy’s Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program and the Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Now is the time, I believe, to take a fresh look at how 

we can enhance the capabilities of our current domestic programs and international 

efforts to secure, monitor, and control nuclear material. 

We are on the verge of a major expansion in the number of nuclear power plants. 

By 2030, there may be as much as a 60 percent increase in the number of operating 

nuclear reactors. In addition to answering the demand for more energy, nuclear 

technology will find greater use throughout the world in food safety and medical applications. This will also create a much larger nuclear waste issue. For instance, the 

volume of spent reactor fuel is expected to double between now and 2020. 

The growing use of nuclear applications and nuclear power production increases 

the risk that radiological sources or nuclear weapons end up in the hands of terrorists. To contain this danger, we need to examine ways that agencies, such as the 

IAEA, can be strengthened to meet the proliferation concerns generated by increased use of nuclear material. Two areas offer immediate opportunities to improve 

nuclear security but only if the IAEA’s budget is expanded to meet this larger role: 

increasing nuclear and radiological accountability and expanding verification activities. 

Accounting for and tracking nuclear and radiological materials is the cornerstone 

for greater security. One possibility is to create a comprehensive international database of nuclear and radiological sources. The IAEA could require that new materials 

be put on this list as they are created, and tracked as they are transported to their 

end user, and finally moved into safe disposal. Although this program would be voluntary, would require considerable additional funding, and would be challenging to 

implement, it would set the international community on a path to greater security 

that will become even more crucial in the future. 

To prevent the theft, loss, or diversion of highly radioactive material, a more robust verification regime is required. To match the projected increase of nuclear reactors, the IAEA will need more inspectors armed with uniform inspection standards 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
47 

and with better technical tools. For example, the IAEA has negotiated comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and additional protocols (AP) designed to ensure 

that nuclear programs are used only for peaceful purposes. However, thirty states 

party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have not implemented CSAs and approximately 100 states have not adopted the APs. This points to the difficulty in 

monitoring potential nuclear diversions. But even where the IAEA does have access 

agreements, it will need advanced technical tools to keep up with the increasing sophistication of nuclear design and efforts to hide secret nuclear weapons programs. 

A critical barrier to making these reforms is the IAEA’s zero real growth budget. 

An unintended consequence of this United Nations-wide budget requirement is the 

prevention of critical investment in the IAEA’s human capital, infrastructure, and 

equipment. The United States needs to take the lead in addressing these issues if 

we are going to be successful in preventing what we all believe is the inevitable consequence of not confronting in a comprehensive strategy the domestic and international threat of nuclear terrorism. 

I would again like to thank the Chairman for arranging this hearing and helping 

the public understand the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Larssen, if you do not mind, I have a series 

of questions here for you and especially want to hear your assessment on Dr. Matthew Bunn’s written testimony. He will be appearing here, but I just want to hear about his mention that, and I am 

quoting from him, ‘‘India has rejected offers of nuclear security cooperation.’’ Do you agree with this assessment? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. First, I would like to say that I have 

great respect for Dr. Bunn. I have had interactions with him and 

his colleagues and I believe that kind of cooperation between government and nongovernment agencies is essential, particularly in 

sharing our views and the expertise outside the government. 

I think the problem of India in this regard as the intelligence 

community would look at it—of course, we pay attention to policy— 

is to expand this from what could be a very simplistic discussion 

of a problem in the former Soviet Union and Pakistan to ensure 

that every country, whether it be India, the United States, or another country, could be potentially part of this small network of 

countries where terrorists can obtain material or expertise, so the 

decisions that states make in a world where there is an increased 

dependence on nuclear power and proliferation of nuclear weapons 

all will exacerbate in the future the ability of a terrorist group at 

some point in time to reach that threshold where they may have 

a mushroom cloud. So my comment would be that certainly India 

is in the sphere of concern, as any country that has nuclear power 

and nuclear weapons. 

Senator AKAKA. My follow-up to that is if it needs to be done, 

how can we encourage India’s cooperation? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Sir, I will leave that to the policymakers 

in terms of specifics—but I know that it is an area of interest in 

the intelligence world. Of course, we try to support the policymakers with the information they might need to make the right decisions. So I wouldn’t presume to get into that. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Larssen, in Dr. Bunn’s testimony, he states, 

‘‘The promising nuclear security dialogue with China does not yet 

appear to have led to major improvements in security there.’’ Do 

you agree with that, and if so, why haven’t there been any major 

improvements in Chinese nuclear security? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Well, I wouldn’t want to sit here and assess China or any specific country other than to say China is 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
48 

among the countries with whom we have intensified our dialogue. 

At the intelligence level we can deal with the potential implications 

of the security challenges in that country as well as our other allies 

in this. I do believe that our Chinese counterparts do take this 

problem very seriously and take security of nuclear material very 

seriously. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Larssen, Dr. Bunn argues that, ‘‘U.S. programs largely ignore caches of highly enriched uranium in wealthy 

developed countries, though some of these, too, are dangerously insecure.’’ Do you agree that our nonproliferation programs have 

failed to address nuclear security in wealthy developed countries? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. I wouldn’t go that far. To the extent my 

opinion is germane, I would say that we share a concern that all 

nuclear material must be secured, not just looking at weapons-type 

material. But the important scope that we need to take to this is 

to ensure that, over time, all nuclear material is secured at the 

highest possible level. 

Senator AKAKA. As you know, Mr. Larssen, the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna plays a strong role in 

monitoring nuclear developments. In your opinion, what should the 

IAEA’s priorities be in confronting the threat of nuclear terrorism? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. To be honest, Senator, I haven’t thought 

about IAEA’s responsibilities in this context. I am well aware of the 

work they are doing in countries like Iran and elsewhere where 

this is, in fact, an extended aspect of the problem to the degree 

that we are also concerned about the nexus between states and 

groups, but I wouldn’t want to provide a critique of the IAEA. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Allen, today’s Washington Post has an article about state and local fusion centers which receive information 

on terrorists. Nuclear intelligence tends to be highly sensitive and 

compartmentalized. How are you ensuring that state and local centers will be able to receive such sensitive information, if necessary? 

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, our responsibility there is to work with 

State and local government, the fusion centers, to ensure that they 

understand the threat. We are not there to provide them with sensitive details dealing with the design, but we are there to help 

them understand the level of the threat, to understand how to 

identify a threat, because our state and local fusion centers consist 

of a lot of first responders who may be able at the very local level 

to detect something where a person or group of people who are trying to put together a device—it could even be radiological materials, they need not be things that are part of an improvised nuclear device. 

So it is educational. We do training. We give them a basic training and we also provide them with assessments which they can use 

to understand the level of the threat and what they should look for, 

how they should look for devices or the assembly of such kinds of 

equipment. So it is a very rich educational effort we have with 

State and local governments, and we do clear them up to the level 

of ‘‘secret’’ in order to provide them with the information that they 

need, and we do it on a very regular basis. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen, and thank you, 

Mr. Larssen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
49 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Collins, for holding this hearing. Thank you gentlemen for 

being here. 

I would agree with the Chairman, the testimony today is a bit 

sobering. I am here for many reasons, but one of the main reasons 

I am here is because of security with our borders, in particular the 

Northern border. As you folks know, Montana has a long border 

with Canada, more than 500 miles, and while Montana may not be 

at the top of the list of candidates for a terrorist strike, a major 

nuclear attack, anywhere in this country would, as Mr. Allen said, 

change the course of history. 

My major concern and what I would like to ask the witnesses 

about is the ability of terrorists to transport a nuclear device or 

amounts of nuclear material across the border. We have heard the 

testimony from Charles Allen, and Mr. Allen, I have to say, as in 

our first meeting, I am very impressed with you. You know your 

stuff and I appreciate you being on board. I think you are a real 

asset to this country. 

I understand that DHS has delayed the deployment of nuclear 

detection equipment into the field because it is not working as well 

as advertised. This is a $1.2 billion program that is not delivering 

the kind of protection that has been testified to that we so desperately need. I am just wondering where that is in process. 

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Tester, it is good to see you. A lot of detection equipment, I think, as Senator Collins indicated, has been deployed out to various ports and to various large cities, what we call 

the Urban Assistance Cities. I would have to defer that certainly 

to Mr. Oxford, who runs the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

and let him respond to that. Obviously, as you develop more advanced equipment, sometimes you have technical problems, but I 

would defer on that since I do the intelligence and I do not do the 

development and production of devices. 

Senator TESTER. That would be fine. Thank you. Their oversight 

to these programs, hopefully it is there and hopefully we can get 

this up and running, if not now, very soon, particularly because reports in the Canadian press have reported that 75 pieces of radiological material have been missing in the last several years. 

Mr. Larssen, do you know if that is weapons-grade stuff? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Senator Tester, of the seizures that are 

reported in the press, you will find various figures. IAEA holds 

some. Other organizations do. All those figures of seizures that 

have been publicly reported do include some instances where weapons-grade material was part of that, so the answer is yes. 

Senator TESTER. I think, Mr. Allen, you know about this, when 

we talked some months ago, we talked about security on the border. I just want to let you know that I do not think things improved very much in my neck of the woods as far as the security 

there. I look forward to working with you to make that come to reality because quite honestly, from a dollars spent standpoint, it is 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
50 

a minimal amount of money to get that border secured and I am 

particularly concerned about it. 

Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, how is our relationship with the Canadians? Are they stepping up to the plate? Are you getting what you 

need from them? Do they have the same level of concern about terrorist threats there that we have and are they working with us? 

Are they providing the resources? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Senator Tester, I would say the easy answer to that is yes, they do take it extremely seriously, and in our 

own interaction as well as more broadly in the intelligence community by the agencies that conduct liaison more regularly with our 

Canadian counterparts, I do not think there is any question that 

they understand this problem and take the issue very seriously, 

particularly securing the borders. 

Senator TESTER. So you would put Canada on that list that Senator Collins mentioned of countries that you are concerned about 

as far as access to nuclear material? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. I would always put on the list any location where you have long borders and you can smuggle material 

across borders, whether that be the Southern border or Northern 

border. We have a big problem in terms of trying to secure those 

borders, particularly if sophisticated smuggling networks get involved in trying to smuggle these materials. So I think we understand that it is an immense challenge and we have to do work on 

that. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Mr. Allen. 

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, we have developed a very excellent relationship, and you are right. We have a lot of work to do jointly with 

our Canadian partners on the borders. That was something I was 

looking at yesterday, and we certainly can come back and talk to 

you in a classified arena. 

Senator TESTER. I would love to. 

Mr. ALLEN. We work very closely with the Canadian Border 

Services agency and other intelligence agencies. I met last week 

with a group of Canadians where we talked about some joint assessment projects. 

Senator TESTER. Good. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Senator, just to follow up, the response 

specifically to that question, though, that specific instance of missing material, we do not believe that they were weapons-usable. 

Senator TESTER. OK. They were not weapons—none of the 75? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. We do not believe. 

Senator TESTER. OK. All right. The last question, and Mr. Allen, 

you might want to answer it. If it applies to you, Mr. MowattLarssen, you can answer. It deals with our partners in the communities, our Tribal governments, our county sheriffs, whether it is on 

the Northern border with Montana or Maine or whether it is on the 

Southern border with Arizona or New Mexico. Are we taking the 

steps necessary to be able to get their help when you talk about 

potential transport of nuclear material, specifically nuclear material, into this country? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, we have talked about this at the State level 

and with the fusion centers and with local law enforcement. We 

have a lot of work to do there. Our relationships are only deepVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
51 

ening. I spoke 2 weeks ago at the National Fusion Center Conference in San Francisco, where we really committed ourselves to 

further information sharing. I meet frequently with law enforcement officers throughout the country. But we have much to do in 

this arena, and I will be very candid there. 

Senator TESTER. And then you may not even want to answer this 

question in that case, for any number of reasons, but are you confident that they are a player in this at this point in time, or are 

they insignificant as far as border security goes? 

Mr. ALLEN. They are an extraordinary player, whether it is the 

Northern border or the Southern border, whether it is Texas, Arizona, or California. The local officials, first responders, sheriffs, police departments are extraordinarily helpful and the relationship is 

rich. 

We held a conference last year with fusion centers and local law 

enforcement out in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at a 

classified level, and we had a weapons of mass destruction conference that Dr. McCarthy, who is on my staff, helped chair that 

session. Sir, our relationships are deepening. We have been at this 

2 years, and we need to be at it more years. 

Senator TESTER. You have some more work to do. Finally, and 

this is not a question, it is just a comment. I would like to get together with you, Mr. Allen, and discuss that Northern border issue, 

classified if need be, because I have an incredible amount of concern about it. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. I personally do not live that far from it. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. I will follow up, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Tester. If 

there is interest in the Committee, we will just do a short second 

round with these two witnesses because we have a second panel. 

Mr. Allen, from your experience and expertise in intelligence 

have documented the reality of the nuclear terrorist threat for us 

this morning. I wanted to ask you, what are the one or two most 

significant things that Congress can do to not only help you, but 

the agencies that you work with, to prevent an attack from occurring? 

Mr. ALLEN. I believe first and foremost, your continuing support, 

which Congress has been, I think, very much engaged as securing 

these materials overseas—at CIA, we worked with Mr. MowattLarssen and others on this issue to secure materials. The programs 

that you all have supported very generously is not the only answer, 

because it is a multi-layered effort to prevent fissile material or a 

weapon coming into the country, but to me, that is one of the good 

things you can do. And, of course, the continuing support you give 

to the intelligence community and to my intelligence activities, I 

am very grateful for that. 

This is going to be a long-term, and I think Mr. Mowatt-Larssen 

captured it very well in his opening statement where he put that 

strategic chapeau over the entire effort. We are into this for decades to come and we have got to work at it in great collaboration 

and with great transparency with the Congress. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Good answer. Mr. MowattLarssen. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
52 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Senator Lieberman, I think Mr. Allen 

captured my thoughts eloquently. I would just add that it is really 

about the material, as he said, and making sure that we deny material access through the net effect of everything we are doing. And 

second, focusing on the people who smuggle the material and work 

with other governments to criminalize that activity. Currently, the 

crime is not proportional to the consequences if people traffic in 

this material and it gets in terrorists’ hands. I think we have a lot 

of work to do internationally to raise the stakes for the people who 

are involved in nuclear terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Interesting. Are our laws sufficient to 

that task here in the United States, to create punishment for the 

kind of crimes you are talking about? 

Mr. ALLEN. I believe our laws are sufficient. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ALLEN. We just now need to work very hard at ferreting out 

any efforts to bring into this country or develop within the country 

because we know how dangerous even a radiological bomb could be 

and the consequences here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Again, it is outside of your direct 

purview, but am I correct that both of your Departments are involved in reaching out to other nations’ governments, particularly 

countries that may have nuclear materials in an attempt to secure 

their presence? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In the Department of 

Energy, it is a broad intersection of the policy programs, primarily 

in the National Nuclear Security Agency, which I outlined some of 

the highlights. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. On the intelligence level, we work with 

our intelligence community counterparts. We try to come at our foreign partners around the world on the intelligence level as one. We 

do a pretty good job of that, bringing 16 agencies to, for example, 

the key countries with really a single-minded purpose, which is 

sharing information more broadly than we have traditionally, even 

with some of our old adversaries, because this is a common threat. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. ALLEN. And, of course, the Department of Homeland Security 

has the Secure Freight Initiative. Worldwide, it has the Container 

Security Initiative. There is just an enormous amount of effort 

internationally that the Secretary and his leadership conducts day 

to day, week to week, with our foreign partners to try to control 

dangerous materials. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, absolutely. I remember not so long 

ago Secretary Chertoff was before us testifying at that table and 

one of the Members asked him a trite question, but it does get to 

a sense of priorities and concerns. What keeps you up at night, of 

all the range of threats that this country faces post-September 11, 

2001? He quickly said, the detonation by a terrorist group of a nuclear device in an American city. So that, I think, reflects the priority that the Department gives it and also the reality of the 

threat. 

Mr. ALLEN. I agree with the Secretary. I worried about that long 

before I ever met the Secretary. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
53 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have two 

more questions that I would like to ask our witnesses today. 

Mr. Allen, starting again where the Chairman left off, I would 

like to get a better sense of how the analysis of the threat that you 

do and other intelligence agencies do influence the investment decisions of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. In other words, 

there is obviously communication that you give on the threat, on 

intelligence, but I am unclear how this threat information and advice actually influences the investment decisions of DNDO. Could 

you talk to us about that? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think it is not only our assessment, but as 

you know, there are some very powerful analytic capabilities within 

other agencies, like the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Counterterrorism Center, and I believe in the classified session you will have Mr. Leiter there. But the combination of this, 

and as we look out strategically at what this country will face, has 

a profound effect on the decisionmaking not only of the Secretary, 

but of the Director and his staff of the DNDO as far as looking at 

more advanced systems to avoid false positives, to make sure our 

equipment can really detect materials. We face some very serious 

challenges in shielded materials and there is technology being 

looked at to try to defeat those who would shield materials as they 

are brought into the country. So I think we have a direct influence, 

but we do it in partnership, particularly with the Department of 

Energy. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, in your statement, you 

discussed how the 20th Century was defined by a nuclear arms 

race between states and that the 21st Century will be defined first 

by the desire and then by the ability of non-states to procure developed crude nuclear weapons. Now, in the Cold War scenario, the 

ability to attribute an attack to a state actor was fairly straightforward and thus that served as a powerful deterrent from one nation attacking another with nuclear weapons. But that appears to 

no longer be the case, given the complex nature of the threat posed 

by terrorist groups. To what extent does the ability to attribute the 

nuclear material that would be used by a terrorist group in constructing a weapon serve as a deterrent to a state that might provide the material? 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Senator Collins, I think that is an excellent question. Certainly, one of the most complex problems we have 

is to define the attribution issue, preferably before the event, in 

terms of whether it happens in the context of intelligence information or interdiction or information that a group has obtained this 

kind of material or we get a sample from, say, an agent or these 

kinds of things. 

In the event of an attribution, we are working to do the basics 

right now to ensure we pull all these things together so we can find 

what we know, and I can address this in more depth in the next 

session. 

I would also add that we shouldn’t, in my view, give up on the 

notion of deterrence applied to this problem. It is going to be different than ‘‘mutually assured destruction,’’ perhaps, but one aspect of it is the weapon. A weapon of mass destruction in the hands 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
54 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Bunn appears in the Appendix on page 390. 

of a terrorist group will only be useful if the group believes it can 

fulfill its aims with those weapons. I believe we have a chance to 

deter, whether it is al-Qaida, or even change in the longer term to 

the extent that it is unpalatable for any faith, any country, or any 

individual in the world to believe that a nuclear weapon can solve 

our problems. 

So we often talk about the nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist as being undeterrable. If they have it, they will use it. I 

would just suggest here that we need to think really hard and do 

a lot more work in devising a strategic doctrine that will govern 

how we respond, whether it is in the attribution context or the deterrence. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Those were 

two characteristically good questions. 

Thank you both, and we look forward to seeing you this afternoon at the closed session. 

We will now call the second panel, the frequently mentioned Dr. 

Matthew Bunn, a Senior Research Associate for the Project on 

Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Bunn is the author of the ‘‘Securing the Bomb’’ series, 

a yearly treatise on the supply side of special nuclear materials. 

Joining Dr. Bunn is Gary Ackerman, apparently not our colleague from the House of Representatives. We know that because 

he is not wearing a flower in his lapel. He is Research Director for 

the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. Mr. Ackerman is currently working on a project exploring the decisionmaking processes 

of terrorist organizations. 

We thank you both for being here, and Dr. Bunn, we would ask 

you to go first. 

TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BUNN, PH.D.,1 SENIOR RESEARCH 

ASSOCIATE, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Dr. BUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, everyone. It is a pleasure to be here to talk about what 

I, like our previous panel, believe is a very real danger to the 

United States today. 

My message is simple. This is a real danger. But on the other 

hand, there are specific steps we can take that I think can greatly 

reduce the risk to the United States. 

On the night of November 8, 2007, two teams attacked the nuclear facility at Pelindaba in South Africa, where there are hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), bomb-grade 

highly enriched uranium. While one of the teams was chased off by 

the security forces, the other team penetrated the site without setting off alarms, proceeded to the emergency control center, shot a 

man named Anton Gerber there in the chest. He then raised the 

first alarm and they spent a total of 45 minutes inside the secure 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
55 

perimeter before retracing their steps and going back out through 

the hole they had cut in the fence and disappearing into the forest. 

While we do not know that they were after the HEU at that site, 

this nonetheless is, I think, a clear reminder that inadequately-secured nuclear material is not just a Russia problem, it is a global 

problem. We urgently need a global effort to ensure that all of 

these stockpiles are secured against the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose. 

Now, we have heard already that the answer to the question, do 

terrorists want nuclear weapons, is yes. Al-Qaida has repeatedly 

attempted to get nuclear weapons material and nuclear expertise. 

We have heard already that it is plausible that terrorists could 

make a crude nuclear bomb if they got the nuclear material, as 

Senator Collins noted. An Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) study 

summarizing numbers of government studies pointed out that it 

might take only a small group of people who had never had access 

to classified information before, in machine shop-type facilities. 

I believe that the answer to, could terrorists plausibly get the 

material, is unfortunately also yes. This kind of material exists in 

dozens of countries, in hundreds of buildings. The total amount of 

material in the world is enough to make approximately 200,000 nuclear bombs. The security for it ranges from excellent to appalling. 

Based on the unclassified information available, I think the three 

areas of highest risk in my view are Russia, Pakistan, and the 

highly enriched uranium-fueled research reactors around the 

world. 

In Russia and the former Soviet Union, security has improved 

dramatically, I would say, from the dark days of the early to mid1990s. I do not think there is any facility in Russia anymore where 

one person could simply stuff nuclear material in his pocket and 

walk off, as occurred in the 1990s. But Russia has the world’s largest stockpiles scattered in the world’s largest number of buildings 

and bunkers, security that in my judgment has improved from poor 

to medium but still has quite significant weaknesses, and very substantial threats that these security systems must cope with, including insider conspiracies at a wide range of different types of facilities in Russia, not necessarily nuclear facilities but a pattern of 

insider theft conspiracies, and also large outsider attacks, such as 

at Beslan. 

As just one example of the insider threat, in 2006, President 

Putin fired a Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) general by the 

name of Sergey Shlyapuzhnikov, who was one of those charged 

with law and order in the closed nuclear cities, for helping to organize smuggling in and out of the closed nuclear cities. 

Pakistan has a small nuclear stockpile, believed to be heavily 

guarded, but it faces even larger threats, from insiders with a demonstrated willingness to sell practically anything to practically anyone and also large outsider attacks. 

Highly enriched uranium-fueled research reactors: There are 

about 130 of these in dozens of countries around the world still 

using highly enriched uranium as their fuel. Most of them have 

very minor security in place. Many of them have only modest stockpiles of material and many of them have material that would reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
56 

quire some chemical processing to be used in a bomb, but nonetheless I believe they pose a very substantial risk. 

If they got the material and they managed to make it into a 

bomb, could they somehow deliver it to Washington, New York, or 

another major city somewhere around the world? Here also I think, 

in my view, the answer is yes. The length of our border, the diversity of the means of transport, the huge scale of the legitimate traffic across our borders, and the ease of shielding the radiation from 

these materials, which might be very small—the amount, even for 

a very inefficient, crude gun-type bomb, you are talking about a 

six-pack of nuclear material, and that is something, unfortunately, 

that is easy to hide. 

And then we have heard just how horrifying it would be if the 

bomb did, in fact, go off in one of our cities. This is something that 

would change America and the world forever. In particular, one has 

to recall that the moment after a nuclear bomb goes off, someone, 

either the perpetrator or another terrorist group, is going to call up 

and say, ‘‘I have got five more and they are already hidden in U.S. 

cities and I am going to start setting them off unless you do X, Y, 

and Z.’’ And with one bomb having just gone off, they will have 

substantial credibility, and the prospect for panic, uncontrolled 

mass evacuation of our cities, economic chaos and disruption is, I 

think, very great. 

Fortunately, there is a good deal of good news, as well. I guess 

Mr. Ackerman will talk about that some more—there is no convincing evidence yet that any terrorist group has gotten the nuclear materials to make a bomb or the expertise to make a nuclear 

bomb. Making a nuclear bomb, even if you got the material, would 

be, I think, the most technically challenging thing that any terrorist group has ever succeeded in doing, and the obstacles may be 

daunting enough to lead many terrorists, even determined ones, to 

focus on other things. 

A key additional piece of good news is the successes that our programs to improve nuclear security around the world are having. 

We have an alphabet soup of programs related to nuclear terrorism 

now in place, from Cooperative Threat Reduction to the Global Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, and these are making real 

contributions. There is no doubt in my mind that the risk of nuclear terrorism today is much lower than it would have been had 

these programs never existed. But all that good news comes with 

the caveat, ‘‘as far as we know.’’ 

Taking that all into account, what is the probability of nuclear 

terrorism? The short answer is, nobody knows. Former Secretary of 

Defense William Perry is one of those who thinks it is more than 

50 percent over the next 10 years. Even if that is wildly wrong, 

even if it is only 1 percent over the next 10 years, given the consequences, that is enough to justify very focused action. 

So what can we do to reduce that risk? In my view, these facts 

lead to the conclusion that we have to do everything within our 

power to ensure that all caches of nuclear weapons and nuclear 

materials needed to make them everywhere are secure and accounted for to standards sufficient to protect them against the 

threats terrorists and thieves have shown they can pose, in ways 

that will work, and ways that will last. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
57 

So all caches means we need to go beyond just Russia. We need 

to have our nuclear security programs cover the world. We need to 

eliminate the gaps in existing programs. For example, the Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative is only planning to return to the 

United States a small fraction of the U.S.-origin highly enriched 

uranium that exists in other countries. 

We need to work with other countries on drastically reducing the 

number of places where these materials exist, so that we can 

achieve more security at lower cost. In particular, I think we 

should not be encouraging other countries to pursue reprocessing 

of plutonium, which will expand the number of places, and I think, 

unfortunately, our current approaches to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership have that effect. 

Although we have to go beyond Russia, we do need a strong nuclear security partnership with Russia, including establishing joint 

U.S.-Russian teams that would help other states around the world 

upgrade security, and I think we need to keep in mind the need 

for such a partnership with Russia as we consider other actions 

that affect Russian interests. 

Finally, we need to establish global nuclear security effective 

standards because nuclear security is only as strong as its weakest 

link. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 already requires every 

state to provide appropriate effective security for their stockpiles. 

If we can define what that means, what the essential elements are, 

and help states put those in place, we will be getting somewhere. 

We need to work with Russia and with other countries around 

the world to make sure that they put the incentives, the resources, 

and the organizations in place so that the security we put in place 

now will be sustained over the long haul after our assistance 

phases out and that we can get rid of guards patrolling without 

ammunition in their guns and staff propping open security doors 

for convenience. 

There is also a great deal that we need to do that goes beyond 

nuclear security, including some of the things that were discussed 

in the first panel, in terms of stopping nuclear smuggling and stopping the other elements of a terrorist nuclear plot. 

Now, there are steps we can take within the United States. I 

won’t go into them in great detail, but we need to remember that 

if we want to lead the world to convince them to secure their stockpiles and convert their research reactors to use fuels that cannot 

be used in a bomb, we need to do the same ourselves. We need to 

be moving more quickly to convert our own research reactors. We 

need to change the security rules for those reactors while they still 

have highly enriched uranium so that they have effective security 

in place. We need to provide incentives to shift away from the use 

of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production. We need 

to close the gap that allows facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that have bomb-grade material to protect 

against much lower threats than facilities with identical material 

at the Department of Energy. 

I think we need a strengthened nuclear forensics effort on the attribution front. We need additional funding and more of it that gets 

out to the labs. Some of the labs working on pre-detonation forenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
58 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman appears in the Appendix on page 405. 

sics have actually had to lay off staff recently because of funding 

constraints. 

I believe we need a modified approach to cargo scanning of the 

large containers that focuses not on ensuring that every single container gets scanned, but that every single container has a good 

chance of getting scanned and that you have high-quality scanning 

and that you have a mechanism in place to take action when you 

have a detection. We need to also focus on going beyond the official 

ports of entry, which as Mr. Mowatt-Larssen mentioned is a gigantic challenge. 

We do need to work on the preparedness for an attack, which 

will be addressed in subsequent hearings. None of this is going to 

be easy. We need to put in place someone in the White House with 

the ear of the President who has the full-time responsibility for 

leading the efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and keeping that 

on the front burner at the White House every day. There is not 

such a person today. President Bush has not appointed anyone to 

the position that Congress created last year, the WMD Coordinator. 

We need to lay the groundwork so that the next President will appoint such a person that can hit the ground running. Congress also 

ought to get around to establishing the WMD Commission that was 

established in that legislation. 

So in short, there are a wide range of things that we need to do. 

We need to build the sense of urgency with our partners around 

the world, but with a sensible strategy with adequate resources 

and with sustained high-level leadership, I think we can reduce 

this risk dramatically during the course of the next presidential 

term. 

Thank you. Sorry for going over my time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, thank you. Very interesting, very 

helpful testimony. 

Mr. Ackerman, thanks for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF GARY A. ACKERMAN,1 NATIONAL CONSORTIUM 

FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, thank you very much for inviting me to speak today on the 

threat of nuclear terrorism. While it may not currently constitute 

the most likely threat to U.S. security from non-state actors, the 

prospects of terrorists detonating a nuclear device on American soil 

sometime within the next quarter century is real and growing. 

As many of the fellow witnesses have mentioned, such an attack 

on the homeland would represent a game-changing event far exceeding the impact of September 11, 2001, on the Nation. Besides 

the obvious physical devastation and catastrophic loss of life, a successful act of nuclear terrorism would represent the apogee of individual destructive capacity and, in a sense, the consumerization of 

the ultimate military power. 

Therefore, we cannot afford to wait for the first nuclear terrorist 

attack to occur before we act against the threat, and I commend 

the Committee for being proactive in this regard. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
59 

While there are many dimensions of the problem, today I will 

focus on the threat of terrorists detonating a fission or fusion explosive on American soil, and particularly on the so-called demand 

side of the threat, which includes the identities, motives, and capabilities of potential perpetrators. Also, in the interest of discouraging entrenched patterns of thinking, during the course of my remarks, I will refer to several ‘‘Black Swan Events,’’ a term used to 

describe those events which, although highly improbable, would 

have the effect of completely upsetting existing trends and expectations. 

I have discussed general issues of motivation and intent more 

fully in my written testimony and here I will only reiterate two key 

points. First, that we should not assume that the desire to inflict 

mass casualties is necessarily the sole or even predominant motive 

for resorting to a nuclear option. Second, terrorists might have a 

far lower bar for success in the nuclear realm than would a state, 

with even a partial fizzle being almost as good as a full detonation. 

At present, the universe of non-state actors seeking to acquire 

and use nuclear weapons appears to be confined to violent 

jihadists, a movement exemplified by the al-Qaida network, and 

one that is growing in size and scope and spawning a host of radical offshoots and followers. In a survey I recently conducted, almost three-quarters of the experts polled ranked Sunni jihadists as 

the most likely of 13 types of actors, including states, to successfully perpetrate a catastrophic WMD attack within the next 10 

years. 

Jihadists have, since the mid-1990s, made at least 10 statements 

advocating the possession or use of nuclear weapons, and there 

have been at least a dozen reports of jihadist attempts to acquire 

nuclear weapons, fissile material, or associated technical knowledge. While only a handful of these have been confirmed, when 

taken together with the strategic and religious justifications and 

the production of online technical manuals, there is evidence of a 

prolonged and enduring interest in nuclear weapons by jihadists. 

In the longer term, the jihadists may be joined by other groups 

of extremists, including radical domestic groups. The real Black 

Swan in this regard would be the appearance of an as yet unidentified unorthodox religious cult with apocalyptic tendencies. While 

our intelligence capabilities have undoubtedly improved since the 

1990s, when we were not even aware of the Japanese Aum 

Shinrikyo cult, the trouble is that it remains incredibly difficult to 

detect the one or two true threats amongst the literally thousands 

of obscure religious groups operating worldwide today. 

A second Black Swan is that a terrorist group who would not 

otherwise pursue nuclear weapons may be propelled to consider the 

nuclear option more seriously if the opportunity arose for easy acquisition of weapons or materials, for instance, following governmental collapse in a nuclear weapons state. 

Nuclear weapons will not, in my opinion, be the first choice or 

perhaps even the 20th choice of most terrorists, and even for the 

few who do proceed down this path, many technical, supply-side, 

and even strategic hurdles persist, making it easier and more cost 

effective for most of these terrorists to resort to alternative means. 

Yet both the terrorists themselves and the political, social, and, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
60 

perhaps most importantly, technological landscape are continually 

reshaping into novel and unexpected forms. I will, therefore, offer 

a few thoughts on how the threat of nuclear terrorism is evolving 

and how it might respond to global dynamics. 

The first concern is the terrorists’ learning curve. While knowledge of the precise specifications and tricks of the trade involved 

in nuclear weapons production can and should continue to be kept 

secret, the diffusion of broader knowledge and skill sets relevant to 

nuclear weapons, such as metallurgy, explosives engineering, and 

precision machining, is inevitable, especially in light of increasing 

radicalization at home and the global reach of the information revolution. This means that more of the terrorists of tomorrow are likely to be a lot more technically proficient than those of today, allowing for the accumulation, even if through trial and error, of nuclear 

knowledge and skills amongst radicals. 

As an initial indicator of this trend, a recent analysis of online 

jihadist documents that deal explicitly with nuclear weapons has 

revealed that while their knowledge is still below par, there have 

been significant advances in the understanding of nuclear issues 

within the general jihadist community in only a few short years. 

Second, even if jihadist planners feel constrained at present by 

the potentially alienating effects the use of nuclear weapons might 

have on the less radical members of the Ummah, there are signs 

that any existing constraints are lessening. The progression of 

jihadist statements in the past several years reflects the erosion of 

existing Islamic norms against mass killing on the scale associated 

with nuclear weapons. The upper limits on allowable casualties 

proclaimed by jihadists also seem to be on the rise, from a 2002 

statement claiming the right to kill four million Americans up to 

a figure of 10 million in a 2003 fatwa. 

The most prominent Black Swan related to the evolution of nuclear terrorism would be technological. While I am currently unaware of any viable technology which would allow even the most 

sophisticated terrorists to enrich their own uranium without detection, there is always the slim possibility that a technological breakthrough sometime in the next decade or two might make indigenous enrichment feasible. If so, this could change many groups’ calculations with respect to the efficacy of nuclear weapons. Studies 

of the diffusion of innovations show us that overall changes in terrorist behavior with respect to weapon selection could then be both 

sudden and permanent. 

I will now offer some recommendations for effective public policy 

responses to counter the demand side of the threat. 

The first line of defense, on the demand side is to identify our 

adversaries and detect their intentions to use nuclear weapons long 

before their plans can have any chance of success. Efforts throughout the government have been initiated to perform this task, but 

these often receive far less attention and resources than the latest 

technologies for detecting radioactive materials. A dedicated program of net assessment using standardized threat analysis methodologies to detect those groups and individuals of greatest concern 

would enable us to avoid the nasty surprise of a homegrown Aum 

Shinrikyo. As an example of what even preliminary research into 

this area can reveal, recent work by me and my colleagues has 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
61 

found that the more highly networked a terrorist group is, the 

more likely they are to pursue chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear weapons. 

While we may not be able to deter the terrorists themselves by 

the threat of retribution, the one saving grace is that terrorists, at 

least at the moment, cannot produce their own fissile material. 

This means that those pursuing a nuclear weapon capability must 

almost always rely on the assistance of others, whether these are 

government leaders, insiders at a nuclear facility, or illicit traffickers. It is these potential facilitators of nuclear terrorism, people 

who are not yet completely committed to the terrorist cause, whose 

actions we can deter. The most obvious way to do this is to credibly 

demonstrate that their participation in any part of the nuclear 

chain will be identified and that retribution will be swift and certain, and I unfortunately cannot say this has been the case so far. 

However, this approach is not the only side of the equation to 

which we must pay attention. Our policies can influence the calculations of potential facilitators, especially those who have an existing ideological affinity for terrorists. For instance, we might seek 

to avoid or reorient those actions which would galvanize large numbers of Muslim scientists into feeling that they are obligated to 

take a more active role in the jihad. Also, while bolstering international nonproliferation norms and taboos against the use of nuclear weapons may have little direct impact on the behavior of the 

terrorists themselves, these might go a long way towards encouraging others, including criminals, states, and scientists, to refrain 

from making it easier for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons. 

The threat of nuclear terrorism also means that we must unfortunately reacquaint ourselves with the Cold War notion, as Senator 

Lieberman mentioned, of thinking about the unthinkable. This 

means moving beyond the current focus on questions of whether 

terrorists will succeed in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. 

For example, if jihadists do eventually succeed in acquiring nuclear 

weapons, what then? They would face many of the same command 

and control dilemmas as a state would and their choices could have 

vital implications for our policy response. 

So, for example, if we were to find out that al-Qaida has a nuclear weapon, should we launch a preemptive strike to decapitate 

its leadership in the federally-administered tribal areas of Pakistan, or would this make things worse and ensure that the weapon 

is detonated? The answer might differ depending on exactly which 

group of jihadists obtains a weapon, but the point is that we should 

consider and analyze such issues and our options far in advance of 

the President receiving the news that terrorists have the bomb and 

we find ourselves in the midst of a crisis. 

In closing, since much of the risk of nuclear terrorism rests on 

supply side factors that I have not dealt with today but have been 

covered by Dr. Bunn and the other witnesses, I will not offer any 

numerical estimate of the overall threat, but I will state my belief 

that, at least among certain of the more fanatic subsets of our terrorist adversaries, the motivation to use nuclear weapons against 

the United States certainly exists and shows no signs of diminishing within the coming decades. It can therefore be expected that, 

barring some dramatic change in either radical ideologies or the 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
62 

amount of fissile material worldwide, we will see additional attempts by terrorists to acquire and perhaps even use nuclear weapons on American soil. 

I would like to thank the Committee once again for giving me the 

opportunity to share some of my thoughts with you today, and I am 

happy to make myself available to discuss any of these matters further. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much for very interesting 

testimony. 

Let me pick up on something you said, Mr. Ackerman. This is of 

interest to this Committee because we have done a series of hearings on Islamist radicalization within this country and the tactics 

that are being used and how can we try to break through to prevent an act of terrorism. You suggested at one point the possibility, 

if I heard you correctly, of outreach to scientists within the Islamic 

world to deter them, if you will, from getting involved in this kind 

of WMD activity. Did I hear you right, and if so, just develop it a 

little bit more for the Committee. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think that deterrence in this regard could be 

both a carrot and a stick. The stick obviously is to have unequivocal declarative policies that we will have swift and certain retribution against anybody that does get involved in nuclear terrorism in 

any way, shape, or form. 

But on the other hand, the carrot of this would not be so much 

that we are offering something, but that there are many people 

who are sympathetic toward the extremist viewpoint who have not 

taken it upon themselves to necessarily become active in the jihad, 

because within the radical Islamic theology, for instance, an offensive jihad does not create an individual duty to participate. You 

can just sympathize. But once you think that there is a defensive 

jihad, that you are protecting Islam, then you are obligated as an 

individual to take part. 

So for a scientist that may have some sympathies, an example 

are those two Pakistani scientists that we have heard about that 

went to bin Laden, similar scientists might have these sympathies 

but are not willing to risk their careers and their freedom, etc., at 

the moment to act on it. However, certain acts that we take, for 

instance, if we invade a Muslim country, could push them to the 

point where they are now saying, I have no other choice based on 

my beliefs but to use my skills and knowledge and access, and if 

they are a nuclear scientist, they could then assist the jihadists. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We have talked a lot this morning about 

one of the choke points here being to stop the terrorist groups from 

getting nuclear materials. Let us assume for a moment that a terrorist group does obtain nuclear materials. What is the level of expertise that they require to then convert those materials into even 

what we would consider a primitive nuclear device? In testimony 

earlier, as I believe Mr. Allen said, I thought convincingly, if a nuclear device is set off by a terrorist group, regardless of whether it 

is considered primitive or sophisticated, it will alter history. 

So my question is, and I am getting to the point of whether there 

is another choke point you are suggesting, how much expertise do 

these groups need once they get the material to make a weapon? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
63 

Dr. BUNN. This would be one of the most challenging, probably 

the most technically challenging kinds of attacks for a terrorist to 

pull off. They are going to need someone who can understand processing and casting uranium, machining uranium. They are going to 

need someone, if they are making a gun-type bomb, who understands ballistics of the cannon that essentially fires a shell of highly enriched uranium into a container of highly enriched uranium. 

The bomb that obliterated Hiroshima, for example, was essentially 

a cannon that fired a shell of highly enriched uranium into rings 

of highly enriched uranium. 

It is not something that is trivial to do. Unfortunately, a wide 

range of government studies have concluded that it is plausible 

once they had the nuclear material. As Mr. Mowatt-Larssen pointed out, it is very different making a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear bomb than it is making a safe, reliable series of nuclear 

bombs that a state might want to have in its arsenal. And even for 

that more challenging objective, for most nuclear weapons programs, 90 percent or more of the total effort is devoted to making 

the nuclear material. So once you have the nuclear material, you 

are over the hardest part. 

But you are absolutely right that there are additional things that 

we should look at. We should look at trying to stop the recruiting 

and trying to stop the financing. This is going to be one of the more 

expensive terrorist operations. I think this will have as many indicators and potential things we might be able to see through intelligence as any terrorist plot because it will be a large and complex 

terrorist plot. Unfortunately, we cannot necessarily assume that it 

will be large and complex enough that we will see it in time, but 

I think there are quite a number of chances that we might be able 

to. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is the general assumption, Mr. Ackerman, 

in the field of experts in this subject that if a terrorist group obtained nuclear materials, it would not have a particular problem in 

also bringing in the expertise necessary to assemble that material 

into a weapon? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. This is a very interesting question, Senator. It 

really depends on the terrorist group themselves. Many terrorist 

groups just simply do not have the logistical, financial, and other 

capabilities, even if you gave them 20 kilograms of enriched uranium, to create a bomb. However, the more technically proficient 

of our terrorist enemies, and I am looking particularly at the core 

element of al-Qaida, they have vast networks of expertise that they 

can tap into and they do not necessarily need a weapons scientist. 

The famous experiment from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory showed that even graduate students with some degree of 

physics knowledge but no weapons knowledge could come up with 

a decent design for a bomb. Yes, it would be difficult. They may not 

have a complete chance of success, but I do think that they could 

assemble the capabilities to actually fashion a working nuclear 

weapon. 

Dr. BUNN. One of the things that I think is worth considering for 

Congress here is that I think this changes a little bit how you 

think about how we should target our scientist redirection programs, because it may not be that the only threat is the guy who 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
64 

could be the Oppenheimer of a third world weapon program. You 

may also be worried about the technician who really knows how to 

machine uranium. You may also be worried about the technician 

or the guard who knows how the security system works and would 

be capable of leaving the alarm off at night so that somebody could 

come in the back door. 

And that is a totally different set of people than we have ever 

really thought about trying to engage in countries like Russia and 

Pakistan and so on before in terms of these scientist redirection 

programs. So it is something worth pondering, at least, whether we 

are focused where we need to be. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Very helpful. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Bunn, let me begin by thanking you for your comments on 

the effectiveness of the 100 percent scanning of cargo containers. 

I believe that Congress made a real mistake in going in that direction last year. I thought the risk-based, layered security approach 

of the SAFE Port Act was far more effective and a better targeting 

of resources. So I very much appreciate your comments on that. 

I asked our previous witness about some comments that you 

made in your very good report of last September about whether the 

U.S. Government is compiling a comprehensive, prioritized, riskbased list of troubling sites across the globe, and the witnesses 

have indicated that work has begun on that. Could you give us 

your assessment to the extent that you are aware of what they are 

doing, of how far along we are in what seems to be a very important process to guide our work? 

Dr. BUNN. Well, let me begin my answer to that by saying my 

clearances haven’t been active for some time, so that constrains 

greatly the detail of my knowledge of what Mr. Mowatt-Larssen 

and his colleagues are doing. 

But within that constraint, I am very enthusiastic about what 

they are doing. I have been calling for creating—it is probably not 

a single database, it is probably a complex of knowledge, but something that would have everything we know about the quantity and 

quality of nuclear material and nuclear weapons at different places 

around the world, everything we know about how secure those facilities are, and then also everything we know about the threats 

that those facilities face because you could easily imagine that a security system that was perfectly adequate in Canada wouldn’t be 

adequate in Pakistan because the mujahideen can bring a lot more 

force to bear in Pakistan than they can in Canada. 

It is my understanding that they are putting that together right 

now, that they are doing it in a prioritized way so that a lot of the 

things that you would guess offhand would be the highest-risk sites 

are already deeply analyzed in their Nuclear Materials Information 

Program. So my hat is off to them. My Clinton-era colleagues do 

not like to hear it, but it is actually true now that the Bush Administration has done greatly more than we managed to get done in 

the Clinton years on a variety of these programs to secure nuclear 

material and now to collect intelligence on it and so on. I think we 

have to give credit where credit is due. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Dr. BUNN. I think there is a lot more yet to be done. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
65 

Senator COLLINS. Right. Exactly. Mr. Ackerman, I was intrigued 

by your notion of the Black Swans because it brought to mind another memorable phrase and that is the ‘‘failure of imagination,’’ 

which the 9/11 Commission pointed to as one of the problems with 

anticipating the attacks on our country in 2001, and your Black 

Swans are trying to help us think of unlikely but still possible 

events that could happen. 

Now, one of the factors that would help facilitate nuclear terrorism that you identified is the advancement of technology that 

will inevitably make nuclear devices easier to design and build. 

What efforts can you undertake to counter advances in technology? 

That seems like a very difficult one. You obviously cannot stop 

science. You cannot stop the progression of technology. What suggestions do you have for mitigating that trend? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is an excellent question, Senator. In terms 

of the dangers posed by technology, it is not just the technologies 

themselves, but it is also how the adversaries will react to those 

technologies. Will they adopt them? Will they even be aware of 

them? Because we could create a very dangerous technology, but if 

nobody is aware of it, it is no threat. 

There are no technologies, and I can talk on this point in more 

detail but I would rather not do it in a public session, on exactly 

which technologies, but there are no technologies that are currently 

mature enough to enable this. But there are candidate technologies 

that may one day be mature enough. I think that some of those 

technologies can be controlled. They do not have any other applications but enriching nuclear material. 

Other potential technologies might come from a completely different sector or from the health sector or from the industrial sector. 

It might just be one of those things where somebody says, oh, there 

is a way. Nobody ever thought of doing this before. We can now do 

it. Once the genie is out of the bottle, once the first paper is written 

on this or once it arrives on the Internet, I think there is very little 

we can do. 

But what I do think we need to do is to look at that particular 

day and at least come up with contingencies because on that day, 

the securing of other fissile materials becomes a lot less central to 

the problem. It then becomes one part of a much larger problem. 

So I think that what we need to do is think creatively about how 

we deal with that. But there are no easy answers. 

Senator COLLINS. And there may be countertechnologies that are 

also advancing that give us more means to detect, deter, prevent 

such an attack also. Dr. Bunn. 

Dr. BUNN. I would argue that some of the near-term things in 

terms of the spread that Dr. Ackerman was talking about of more 

people having precision machining capabilities, more people having 

explosive engineering capabilities, is to some extent inevitable. But 

to the extent that our broader counterterrorism efforts succeed, especially in winning hearts and minds among technical experts who 

know a lot about explosives or know a lot about machining or 

things like that, then we can still, I think, hold the line or even 

reduce the ability of terrorist groups to get access to the people who 

know how to do the precision machining and the people who know 

how to do the explosives. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
66 

So I think there is an inevitable dispersion of that kind of knowledge, but it is not inevitable that it disperses into the hands of the 

most dangerous adversaries. At least, we can affect the rate at 

which that happens, I think. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Excellent testimony. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Dr. Bunn, I believe you mentioned, quite correctly with justification, that the WMD coordinator at the White House authorized by 

law has not been filled, nor has Congress acted on a WMD Commission, similarly. And you mentioned in your testimony the alphabet soup of various Federal agencies we have involved in this problem in one way or another. Do you have any thoughts about what 

ways in which we might better organize our effort to deter a nuclear terrorist attack on our homeland? 

Dr. BUNN. Well, I have long felt that it is very important to have 

someone in the White House with at least access to the President 

when they need it, maybe a Deputy National Security Advisor, who 

is full-time on this problem because right now there is literally nobody in the U.S. Government who has full-time responsibility for 

leading all of the different disparate efforts of our effort to prevent 

nuclear terrorism. There is, in a certain sense, nobody in charge. 

There are very capable people in charge of certain parts of the 

problem. We have heard from some of them today. But there is nobody in charge of the overall problem, and that means that a lot 

of gaps between one program or another, a lot of overlaps, a lot of 

opportunities that aren’t within the boundary of a particular program and its way of thinking get missed. And it also leads to situations where an issue really needs to be esclated to the presidential 

levels, for the President to call up one of his counterparts and say, 

look, you have to do this, where that call does not get made. Often 

it does not happen. 

Just as one example, we built this, what some people call the 

plutonium palace, a fissile material storage facility at Mayak in 

Russia. It was completed in late 2003, and there wasn’t a gram of 

plutonium that was put into it until July 2006. It is almost 3 years 

later, and that is 3 years that were happening after September 11, 

2001, after the Russians had acknowledged that terrorist teams 

were casing their nuclear weapon storage facilities. I am reasonably confident that neither President Bush nor President Putin actually knew that was true during that time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Why did that happen? 

Dr. BUNN. There were a variety of small bureaucratic disputes 

between the United States and Russia, but also bureaucratic bungling on the Russian side, yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. BUNN. To this day, it remains true that we haven’t managed 

to agree on the transparency measures that the United States was 

supposed to have for the material that would be placed in that facility. The combination of current U.S. policy and current Russian 

policy, even if the transparency measures get agreed, will lead to 

that facility always being three-quarters empty because of—I can 

go into the details of that, if you would like—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is OK. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
67 

Dr. BUNN. But also, the Russians were not getting around to 

processing the material into the form that they were willing to 

have transparency measures to be applied so that they could put 

it into the facility, and not getting around to putting in place a security force that would make the facility secure. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is helpful. So really, filling that position in the White House—— 

Dr. BUNN. I think is key. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Either before this Administration ends or beginning in the next one, it is critical. 

Dr. BUNN. Not only filling the position, but making sure it focuses, because frankly, I will be candid, one of the concerns I had 

with the way it was written in the legislation is it is supposed to 

cover all weapons of mass destruction proliferation and weapons of 

mass destruction terrorism, and issues like Iran and North Korea, 

they are going to force themselves to the front pages every day. I 

believe they are already getting high enough level attention that— 

I have problems with our policies on those, but it is not lack of 

high-level attention that is the problem on those. And so I think 

it really needs to focus on the things that aren’t getting enough 

high-level attention, including, in my view, nuclear terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Collins, do you have other questions? 

Senator COLLINS. No, thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I want to thank both of you for your written and oral testimony. It has been a productive, if sobering, morning. Senator Collins talked about the failure of imagination that 

the 9/11 Commission pointed to prior to September 11, 2001. Part 

of making sure that we find a strong space both between the extreme of overreacting and overimagining the worst and failing to 

imagine what is not only possible but is happening now is for us 

to hold public hearings like this in which we are dealing with difficult subjects. It is sometimes difficult to hear and contemplate the 

reality. It is also difficult in the sense that we want to do this in 

a way that doesn’t in any way compromise classified material or security. But I believe we have done that this morning. I thank the 

four witnesses very much. 

We are going to continue this series of public hearings on this 

subject, but more immediately, we will reconvene the Committee 

this afternoon in closed session to continue this work. 

I am going to leave the record of the hearing open for 15 days 

in case Members of the Committee have additional written questions they want to ask the witnesses or if the witnesses want to 

submit additional testimony for the record. Until then, thank you 

very much for the significant contribution you have made this 

morning. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(69) 

NUCLEAR TERRORISM: CONFRONTING THE 

CHALLENGES OF THE DAY AFTER 

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Room SD– 

342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Pryor, Collins, and Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The Committee will come to order. 

Good morning and welcome to our hearing. This is the third in 

the series of hearings this Committee is holding to examine the 

threat of the nuclear terrorist attack on America’s homeland, what 

the Federal Government is doing to prevent such an attack and 

how prepared our government is to respond to the challenges our 

Nation would face if efforts to prevent such a nuclear terrorist attack should fail. 

At our last hearing, we asked the basic question of how serious 

the threat of nuclear terrorism is, and top intelligence officials of 

our government answered that it is serious, that terrorist groups 

have demonstrated a clear intent to develop and use nuclear weapons to achieve their extremist goals. 

These top terrorism officials also said that they were convinced 

that if terrorists acquire enough of the special nuclear materials 

they have sought and are seeking, they were capable of building at 

least a crude nuclear device. 

So against the backdrop of what the best information we could 

gather says is the reality of the threat of nuclear terrorism inside 

America, today we are going to look at the consequences of a nuclear attack and the challenges that our Nation would face in the 

days and weeks thereafter. 

While our primary national goal, of course, must be the prevention of such an attack, we must also prepare for the possibility that 

a determined terrorist will succeed despite our best efforts. 

An adequate response to such a catastrophe will require marshaling the full resources of our country, including all levels of government, the private sector and, indeed, individual Americans. 

The detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major city would obviously have a devastating effect. According to the Department of 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
70 

Homeland Security’s National Planning Scenario, although we cannot know the exact yield, of course, from a nuclear weapon acquired by terrorists, a detonation would kill an enormous number 

of people from the cumulative effects of the initial blast, the ensuing fires, and the spread of lethal radiation. 

Millions of people could be displaced for extended periods of time, 

especially if panic caused by the blast leads to an exodus of people 

from nearby areas not otherwise affected. 

The economic damage from such an attack could be as much as 

a trillion dollars, according to a study by the RAND Corporation. 

The challenges our country would face in the days after a nuclear 

attack are massive and unprecedented. Essential response resources would be severely damaged or perhaps destroyed. Our 

country’s medical system would have to handle a sudden surge in 

casualties unlike anything it has previously experienced. And the 

Nation’s government and private sector could face great difficulties 

meeting the basic needs of many Americans. 

Coordination among Federal, State, and local government entities would be vital. But those governments themselves could be 

compromised and the communications infrastructures that they 

oversee and operate could be badly damaged. First responders, trying to address the damage and help the injured, would risk radiation exposure themselves. 

Maintaining law and order would, of course, be a necessary prerequisite to providing emergency care and much else involved in a 

response. Logistical challenges would be huge. Effective communication with the public could save lives and lessen the panic but, 

of course, only if it was done in a way that was credible and 

reached affected communities. 

The scenarios we are discussing today are very hard for us to 

contemplate, and so emotionally traumatic and unsettling that it is 

tempting to want to push them aside. However, now is the time to 

have this difficult conversation, to ask the tough questions, then to 

get answers as best we can and, of course, to take preparatory and 

preventive action. 

The actions that are taken now, I think, can save many thousands of lives in the event of this nuclear catastrophe and will, in 

many other ways, reduce the damage to our country from such an 

attack. This is why we hold this hearing and why we are so grateful to the distinguished and experienced and thoughtful panel of 

expert witnesses who are before us today. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by commending you for undertaking this very challenging series of hearings. This is an extraordinarily important 

issue. I often think that Congress sometimes focuses too much on 

minor issues. Certainly the threat of nuclear terrorism is a compelling and urgent challenge for our country and I commend you for 

your leadership on this. 

The Committee’s previous hearings have made clear that preventing such an attack must, indeed, be an urgent and compelling 

priority for our country. It is also clear that we must consider the 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
71 

response that would be necessary in the terrible setting of death 

and devastation that our Nation would confront if such an attack 

were to succeed. As the report from the Harvard-Stanford Preventive Defense Project makes clear, the day after a terrorist nuclear 

attack is ‘‘a grim prospect to contemplate, but policymakers have 

no choice.’’ 

A 10-kiloton device, a plausible yield for a bomb constructed by 

terrorists, could be smuggled into a seaport as cargo, flown over a 

city in a private plane, or driven into a city in a truck. 

Now, we hope that the improvements we have made in port security and other areas would make that difficult to carry out but we 

cannot exclude the possibility of such a successful enterprise. 

When detonated, this bomb could instantly kill many thousands 

and destroy buildings within a half-mile radius. In the aftermath, 

we would confront overwhelmed and obliterated local response capabilities, mass casualties, evacuations, and demands for food and 

shelter. Great numbers of people would be in urgent need of medical attention and decontamination. The economic and psychological impacts would also be devastating. 

In some respects, planning and response for a terrorist nuclear 

attack would resemble that of any catastrophic disaster. In other 

respects, however, including the intensity of shock in the target 

area, the initial pulse of radiation, and the subsequent fallout, a 

nuclear attack would have its own special horrors that demand 

specific preparations. 

These preparations ought to include well-thought-out measures 

to deal with non-physical damage. A nuclear attack in a major 

American city would be an unprecedented event with profound 

emotional and psychological ramifications. Our preparations must 

include plans for providing steady flows of accurate information 

and for addressing the psychological as well as tremendous physical injury. 

No region of the country is immune to this threat. An attack 

would undoubtedly require a regional and Federal response to supplement overwhelmed State and local capabilities. These are powerful reasons to ensure that responders across the country are supported at high levels of preparedness and that we maintain the allhazards focus of the National Response Framework. 

Just as the Hurricane Katrina disaster drew in first responders 

from around the country, including people from my own State of 

Maine, far from the disaster site, a nuclear strike in any American 

city would require resources from well beyond the immediate area. 

These resources would clearly include military units. As my colleagues will recall, however, in January the National Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves warned that because this Nation has not adequately resourced its forces designated for response 

to weapons of mass destruction, there is ‘‘an appalling gap’’ in readiness. 

Now, the commander of the Northern Command takes issue with 

that as do some other experts but the fact is that we still have a 

long ways to go to in resourcing and designating units that would 

be ready to come to the rescue. 

We must also carefully consider the political and economic consequences of such an attack. Without careful and diligent conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
72 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Carter with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

417. 

tinuity-of-government planning, critical services and the rule of 

law, at least in the affected areas, would be severely diminished. 

Our commercial and financial sectors must also plan to mitigate 

the initial losses and to provide for timely resumption of the economy. 

To be sure, no level of readiness will prevent the horrendous toll 

of death, injury, property damage, economic disruption, and political upheaval that would inevitably follow a nuclear attack. But 

proper planning can ease the suffering and mitigate the losses. 

And while it is understandable that our first priority has to be 

the physical impact, I am also eager to hear from our witnesses 

today what we should be doing to address the psychological, the 

governmental, the rule of law, and the economic consequences as 

well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins, for that very 

thoughtful statement. 

I appreciate again the witnesses that are here. We have a distinguished panel including Dr. Ash Carter of Harvard, Co-Director of 

the Preventive Defense Project, and, of course, previously an executive at our own Department of Defense. 

Dr. Cham Dallas, Director of the University of Georgia, Institute 

for Health Management and Mass Destruction Defense. 

Dr. Roger Molander, Senior Research Scientist at the RAND Corporation. 

And John Gibb, Director of the New York State Emergency Management Office. 

These witnesses have looked at the serious subject that we are 

contemplating this morning from various different perspectives and 

published important pieces of work in response, and we are delighted that you are here today. We welcome you. 

Dr. Carter, it would be an honor to start with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER,1 CO-DIRECTOR, 

PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT, JOHN F. KENNEDY 

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and thank 

you, Senator Collins, for inviting me to testify before you today on 

the findings of the Harvard-Stanford Preventive Defense Project’s 

so-called Day After Project which explored and analyzed actions 

that would need to be taken by the government in the 24 hours 

after a nuclear detonation in a U.S. city. 

I really applaud you for giving coverage in this Committee to this 

terrible prospect. I also regret that you have to. But no one can calculate the probability that a nuclear weapon will go off sometime 

in an American city but it is reasonable to surmise that probability 

has increased in the last few years, increased because North Korea 

has gone nuclear. Iran looks like it might follow. Seventeen years 

after the end of the Cold War, Russia’s stockpile of materials and 

bombs is still not completely secured. Pakistan, which has already 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
73 

shown itself to be a vendor with the wherewithal to export nuclear 

weapons technology, is unstable. 

And we are all expecting that enrichment and reprocessing which 

are the underlying technologies to make highly enriched uranium 

and plutonium will spread worldwide with the spread of nuclear 

power, which is one of the palliative or preventive steps necessary 

to prevent climate change. 

So for all of these reasons you can forecast that this probability, 

dire as it is and incalculable as it is, is probably increasing. And 

at the same time in the last 5 years global terrorism has obviously 

been on the rise. 

So you put these two things together, more material to be stolen 

or sold and more people intent upon mass destruction, and you 

have a greater probability of nuclear terrorism. 

In 2005, former Senator Sam Nunn, framed the need for Washington to do better at changing this math of greater and greater 

probability with a provocative question. ‘‘On the day after a nuclear 

weapon goes off in an American city,’’ he asked, ‘‘what would we 

wish we had done to prevent it?’’ 

But in view of the increased risk in recent years, I and my collaborators, and they are former Secretary of Defense William Perry 

and former Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Director Michael May, decided we needed to ask a follow-on question to Sam 

Nunn’s question, namely, ‘‘What should we actually do on the Day 

After?’’ Not what we wish we had done. What would we actually 

do? What steps can and should our government take now to be prepared for this awful contingency? 

And accordingly, we convened a workshop in Washington of leading government and non-government experts to consider this question under the auspices of the Preventive Defense Project, and my 

testimony summarizes the report of this workshop, which was authored by myself, Mr. May, and Mr. Perry. The workshop itself was 

off-the-record, and none of its participants, a very distinguished 

group who are listed at the end of my written testimony, is responsible for its content. The work was sponsored by the generosity of 

several foundations and received no government funds. 

But I also want to mention that I just recently wrapped up a review which I co-chaired with Ambassador Robert Joseph for the 

Department of Defense of the programs of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which has important responsibilities for this circumstance, including critical technical capabilities. That report will 

be available shortly after it undergoes security review. 

Nothing I can tell you, Senators, from our report would make the 

Day After anything less than the worst day we have had in the Republic. No greater failure of our government’s duty to national security could occur than to let this catastrophic event befall our people. Yet it also turns out that much could be done to save lives, to 

reduce the cost to the country as a whole, and ensure that our Nation, and civilization more broadly, endures. After all, the underlying dynamic would remain a few terrorists acting against the rest 

of us. 

I would like to summarize our findings about what could be done 

in five headings. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
74 

But first I just want to make a ‘‘zeroth’’ point, and I know you 

have covered this before in your hearing but I just cannot pass it 

over. A consideration of the realities of the Day After makes it such 

that your strongest recommendation or my strongest recommendation to a President who finds himself or herself in this position is: 

‘‘If I were in your shoes, I would not be in your shoes.’’ 

Terrorism probably cannot ever be entirely eradicated because it 

has its sources in the aberrant motivations of small groups of people or even individuals. But nuclear terrorism can be eradicated. 

The reason for this is a fortunate blessing of nature. Making a nuclear bomb requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, 

and neither of these metals occurs in nature. They have to be manmade. 

Nature’s second gift is to make it comparatively difficult to make 

either one. Enrichment and reprocessing are beyond the capabilities of even the most sophisticated terrorist group. Such a group 

must obtain HEU or plutonium from the comparatively few governments—you can almost count them with two hands—that have 

taken the time and treasure to accomplish enrichment or reprocessing. If these governments safeguard their materials, there can be 

no nuclear terrorism. 

But after that, the laws of nature grow unkind. It is not beyond 

the ken of a competent terrorist group to make a bomb once it gets 

the material, especially if it is uranium. It is very difficult to detect 

these metals in transit, since neither is highly radioactive. And no 

vaccine can protect against the blast and radiation from a detonation. There is, therefore, no more important national security imperative than to prevent ‘‘loose nukes’’ at the source. 

And since Mr. Perry, Mr. May, and I spent many years and much 

effort as have the two of you, Senators, at prevention, I just needed 

to say that. 

But let me move on to our five principal findings. They refer to 

the circumstance of a 10-kiloton weapon detonated at ground level 

or in a building in a major American city. 

This is the same yield range as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

weapons and would represent a successful design effort by the perpetrators. North Korea, it appears, did not do as well in its underground test in 2007. 

The effects, however, would be very different from the World War 

II bombings since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were detonated high in the air over Japan and resulted in far less fallout. 

Our first finding might seem obvious, but it is still not fully reflected in government planning. The scale of this disaster would 

quickly overwhelm even the most prepared city and State governments. To avoid repeating the Hurricane Katrina fiasco on a much 

larger scale, Washington should not pretend that in the instance of 

nuclear terrorism its role can be solely to support State and local 

responders. And State and local governments, even though their 

actions to save lives and prevent panic in the first hours would be 

essential, must abandon the pretense that they could remain in 

charge and in control. 

The Federal Government, led by the Department of Homeland 

Security, should have plans that foresee it stepping in quickly, taking full responsibility, and devoting all of its resources. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
75 

Related to this finding is that the assets of the Department of 

Defense (DOD) will be required in the Federal response, including 

for law enforcement. Now, as a DOD person myself, it was understandable to me that in the early days after September 11, 2001, 

DOD showed reticence to involve itself in the homeland security response. It had, after all, conflicts in Afghanistan and looming in 

Iraq on its hands and it feared a raid on the defense budget for 

homeland security. But that period has passed, and DOD should 

re-engage on the homeland security front. 

I am encouraged by some signs I see that Secretary Gates is 

doing just that. 

Our second set of findings has to do with the immediate effects 

of the detonation, and much more will be said about this and from 

a position of much greater expertise by the witness who follows so 

I will truncate what I say. The gist of it is this. 

Within a circle about two miles in diameter, the length of the 

Mall, the devastation from the blast would be near total. Then just 

downwind of that circle, in a cigar-shaped area a few miles long, 

fallout would be severe enough to submit people who lived there to 

lethal doses of radiation even if they took modest precautions. 

If these people knew who they were, and on a clear day they 

could tell by looking in the sky who they were, they would have 

to evacuate quickly to avoid lethal exposure. 

But elsewhere in the city, where most of the inhabitants would, 

in fact, be working or sleeping, people would have more choices 

that emergency planners would need to manage. People upwind 

would not need to take any action. Downwind, but outside of the 

‘‘hot’’ cigar, the best move for many people would be not to move 

at all but to seek moderate shelter somewhere where either mass 

shields them or distance attenuates the radiation reaching them. 

The worst thing for people to do in much of the downwind area 

would be to take to the highways at the same time, allowing the 

dust to settle on them when they were unsheltered and stuck in 

traffic, and by the way, impeding the emergency response. 

Now, this is an important technical fact. The radiation dose rate 

would drop off roughly in proportion to the passage of time so that 

after 3 days one could take three times as long to evacuate. Sheltering for this period of time would not be difficult and should not 

be compared to the Dr. Strangelove mineshaft-type civil defense 

shelters of the 1950s. 

Managing the optimal mix of evacuation and sheltering would be 

the responsibility of the government which would need to quickly 

predict the path of the plume, advise citizens, close some roads, 

and so on. 

Our third set of findings deals with the long-term effects of the 

detonation, which are dominated by the problem of radiation. Radiation is unique to nuclear terrorism and uniquely frightening to 

most people. People far enough downwind that the radiation did 

not present an immediate danger could leave their homes or stay 

in their homes, leave for a while and come back, come back briefly 

to recover a pet or valuables, or never live in the area again. Their 

choices would be determined by the dose of radiation they would 

be willing to absorb. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
76 

The doses far downwind, less than 50 rems total dose, would not 

make people die or even get sick. Instead, these so-called low to 

moderate doses would only raise their statistical chance of getting 

cancer later in life and dying from it—raising that chance from 20 

percent, which is the chance we all have on average of dying of 

cancer. You have got to go somehow, and a fifth of the time it is 

by cancer. That probability could rise from 20 percent to something 

higher: 21 percent, 22 percent, up to 30 percent at the maximum 

survivable exposure. 

For the great majority of people downwind, the chance would be 

small enough, let us say 20.1 percent, that they would not notice 

it themselves but the public health authorities would notice, years 

later, a greater cancer death rate in this population. 

A critical matter related to low- and moderate-dose exposure 

which is the major issue for most of the people in the city affected 

has to do with the choices for first responders and troops sent to 

the stricken city. Few of those first responders would choose to 

have their chance of dying of cancer rise from 20 percent to 30 percent. But in the case of smaller probabilities, a first responder 

might be willing to go into the radiation zone for a short time. 

Protocols already exist that provide for higher permitted doses 

for workers in nuclear industries than for the public at large. These 

choices can ultimately only be made by individuals, but the protocols they follow must give them the best chance to know which 

areas are hotter than others and how long they can stay in the 

zone to accomplish their duties. 

Once a first responder has absorbed the permitted dose, he or 

she could no longer serve in the zone. All this obviously has huge 

implications for the competence of the response, for how it is 

planned, and for how many personnel must be rotated in and out 

of the zone. 

Our fourth finding is perhaps the most important of all. It is the 

unpleasant fact that the first detonation probably will not be the 

last or at least it will not feel that way. Let me explain. 

If terrorists manage to find enough material for a bomb, or to 

steal or buy a bomb, who is to say they did not get two, or three, 

or four from the same source? There is no technical or operational 

reason why nuclear terrorism should come one-at-a-time. 

What is absolutely clear is that terrorists will claim to have more 

after they detonate the first one. After all, their intent is to sow 

terror. Public officials will, therefore, have to behave as though 

there are more. The public surely will. Said differently, nuclear terrorism will not seem like an incident, but instead like a syndrome 

or campaign of terror. So people in other cities than the one struck 

will want to evacuate or at least move their children out of the cities, as the British did in World War II. 

To prevent a second, third, and fourth detonation, the U.S. Government, by now itself relocated out of Washington, will be desperately trying to find the terrorists and trace the source of the 

bombs. We know that the investigation must and surely will, aided 

by such things as radiochemical forensics, ultimately lead to a government somewhere, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, or any one of 

a dozen or so governments that operate hundreds of facilities 

where bombs or fissile material are stored, since, as I said before, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
77 

the terrorists surely did not make the HEU or plutonium but instead stole, bought, or otherwise obtained it from a government facility somewhere. 

It has become something of a fad to say that the United States 

will retaliate against any government found to be the source of a 

bomb detonated on the United States. And, of course, it would be 

a reasonable thing to consider if the government involved was in 

any way witting in the plot. But on the Day After, our national interest will take us in another direction—one of cooperation, not 

threats—since we will desperately need the help of those governments to track down the remaining bombs and put the campaign 

of nuclear terrorism to an end. 

Our fifth and last set of findings has to do with the effects of the 

outbreak of nuclear terrorism on our society and government. Both 

of you have mentioned this very important topic. 

I believe that the U.S. Government itself, in a form recognizable 

to the citizenry as constitutional, would survive even if the first 

bomb struck Washington. On my first job in the Pentagon working 

for Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, I had some involvement with the continuity of government effort to deal with the far 

more daunting task of what we called ‘‘surviving the national command authority’’ under a rain of 3,000 equivalent megatons of Soviet missile warheads. 

Then again in the Clinton Administration after the Cold War 

ended, I saw this effort adapted to contingencies like nuclear terrorism. I am not current on these efforts, but I would be very surprised, especially after September 11, 2001, if they were not robust 

and well thought-out. 

A bigger issue is survival of governance itself, of the people’s 

sense of well-being and safety, that their institutions were competent to respond to the emergency and protect them, that important things had been thought through in advance, that they were 

given good advice about how to act on the Day After, and ultimately, that they could raise their children in big urban settlements. This is another reason, besides saving lives and property on 

the Day After, for us to think now about our response. 

It is also important that we anticipate now our natural impulse 

on the Day After to over-react. We should resolve now that any extraordinary measures taken on the Day After have a sunset clause 

and that they undergo a total review periodically to see if they continue to strike the right balance between responding to nuclear terrorism and other objectives that constitute the good life in civil society. 

This is also an appropriate note on which to close. The more competent and capable our government is on the Day After, and the 

more quickly and surely it can bring the campaign of nuclear terror 

to an end and make sure its recurrence is much less likely than 

it is now, and the less it is prone to panic and over-reaction, the 

less this awful event needs to lead to a change in our way of life. 

That is why it is important for the Congress and this Committee 

to address the Day After. 

Thank you for having me. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
78 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Dallas appears in the Appendix on page 429. 

2The posters referenced by Dr. Dallas appear in the Appendix on page 443. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Dr. Carter. You and your colleagues have done a great service by forcing yourselves to think 

through these matters and it is very helpful to us. 

Incidently, the Committee at its next hearing will invite people 

in the Federal Government who have responsibility for the Day 

After to come in and talk to us about what they are doing, and also 

we are going to ask them about some of the suggestions that you 

make today. 

Dr. Dallas, thanks for being here and we welcome your testimony 

now. 

STATEMENT OF CHAM DALLAS, PH.D.,1 DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE 

FOR HEALTH MANAGEMENT AND MASS DESTRUCTION DEFENSE, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 

Mr. DALLAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for inviting us and for 

bringing this important topic out in the open. 

After hundreds of lectures I have given on this, I have actually 

seen a decrease in interest, if anything, and I really appreciate 

your bringing it to the fore. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Why do you think the interest is decreasing? 

Mr. DALLAS. I think it is just a diminution since September 11, 

2001. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DALLAS. I have given lecturers to literally thousands of medical personnel, and they are starting to drift back to other interests. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Although, would you say that the threat 

is probably greater today than it was on September 11, 2001? 

Mr. DALLAS. I definitely conclude that the threat is greater and 

is increasing steadily with each passing year just with the march 

of technology. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please proceed. 

Mr. DALLAS. In that vein, the threat, posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, within the 

United States has grown significantly in recent years and will continue to grow, focuses attention on the medical and public health 

disaster capabilities of the Nation in a large scale crisis. 

The expected initial use of nuclear weapons will be with relatively smaller devices, from a 1 to 10-kiloton explosive yield comparable to 1,000 to 10,000 tons of TNT, with New York and Washington, DC, as the most likely targets. 

The simulation of the detonation of either a 1-kiloton or a 10-kiloton nuclear device near the White House is presented on these 

posters over here on your right, in order to demonstrate the relative impacts of health outcomes and recommendations made for 

emergency response to this threat.2

There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass 

casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds, including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
79 

portive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. 

Among the consequences of this outcome would be the probable 

loss of command and control, mass casualties that will now have 

to be treated in an unorganized response in hospitals on the periphery of the disaster, as well as the other expected chaotic outcomes from inadequate administration in a crisis. 

Vigorous, creative, and accelerated training and coordination 

among the Federal agencies tasked for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response, military resources, academic institutions, 

and local responders will be critical for a large scale WMD response. 

I would like you to turn your attention to the posters we prepared. We prepared these particular simulations specifically for 

this hearing. That is what we do in the institute. 

You will notice from a 10-kiloton device, detonated near the 

White House, and we used the detonation point as the closest location one can drive a vehicle up to the corner of 17th and Pennsylvania. 

It could be expected that there would be at least 150,000 serious 

injuries, 100,000 fatalities on a typical day, like say, today. That 

is without the things like the Pope’s visit going on where you have 

even more people in town. 

Depending on the resources made available at the time, it is likely that there will be an attempt to evacuate as many as 500,000 

people from the area, though the efficacy of such an attempt is dubious. 

At least 100,000 people would need decontamination by current 

standards. Though once again, it is dubious that adequate decontamination would be feasible in a timely fashion. 

By comparison in a more densely populated urban area like, let 

us say, New York and Chicago, the casualties would be four to 

eight times higher because of the density of the population and 

other factors. So four times higher in Chicago and eight times higher in New York. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Again these are consequences from a 10- 

kiloton device. 

Mr. DALLAS. Which is a relatively small device. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is the point I wanted to make. It is 

relatively small comparable to those that were deployed on Japan. 

Mr. DALLAS. Yes, they are slightly smaller than the ones we used 

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DALLAS. I was asked to do these particular simulations and 

the 10-kiloton device is what I did. 

It is likely this is the first device that we will see. These are the 

devices that, for instance, Pakistan has done. They have done these 

sizes and slightly larger. It is kind of a first generation device. 

And the blast and thermal injuries, using this density comparison, will probably be a little bit less. They would be probably two 

to four times higher in New York and Chicago. 

In this picture here, you can see the blast zone in a circular area 

around the detonation point and you can see the extreme blast 

zone in the middle and the mass fire zone in the middle. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
80 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Give us some guidance as to the colors on 

the poster. 

Mr. DALLAS. Yes, sir. You will notice the dark blue. You will notice the two salient geographic pictures here are a circle around the 

detonation point on the White House and then the conical plume 

which exudes like a comet tail which now, as you can see, covers 

where we are sitting now at the Capitol and the Senate Dirksen 

building. The circle in the middle involves the blast zone. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is the green circle? 

Mr. DALLAS. Yes, sir. The green circle and then you will see the 

dark blue in the middle is the mass fire zone where, due to the intense radiant heat, most of the buildings in that central area will 

be expected to spontaneously incinerate causing a mass fire phenomenon. 

You can get mass fire phenomenon without nuclear weapons as 

we did with the fire bombs in Yokohama and Dresden during 

World War II. They are very devastating, but the same principle 

is also in play here with a nuclear weapon detonation where you 

have this mass fire zone in the dark blue area you see in the middle and then the blast zone which exudes out further. 

Now you can see going out to the Washington Monument, including the first line of buildings around the White House. 

Then there is the conical-shaped plume which goes out, and you 

can see the dark purple is the 90 percent death area, the death 

plume area, where you can expect, if people do not remove themselves from the area, that 90 percent would die. 

And you can see the colors as the rainbow exudes out from the 

center there would be 80, 70, 60, 50, and decreasing with the diminishing of the particles there. 

Now, one of the important issues here is that with proper communication people can flee from the plume area. There is a latent 

period where people can get out. For instance, in this exact plume 

area, if there is a detonation now down at the White House and 

we knew the direction of the wind, you could actually run perpendicular to the plume and escape, although if you are in the yellow 

circle—you notice the yellow circle exuding out beyond. It goes far 

beyond the green. That is the blast zone for glass. 

The buildings, the glass shattered in them. It creates a great 

number of injuries. Optomologists will be in great demand here. 

That will be one of the physician groups that we will have the least 

of and will be needing the most of. 

If you would remove the 10-kiloton device simulation chart, you 

will see and notice now the chart of a 1-kiloton device detonation 

in the exact same location, and you can see that the mass fire zone, 

of course, is much smaller. The blast zone for blast and trauma injuries is also smaller and then you still have a large area for glass 

detonation. 

It is hard to imagine what this would look like. You get some of 

this in tornadoes and hurricanes, but it would be a sea of broken 

glass all around this area here. 

The plume is probably the area that you can see here that is 

much smaller. You can see it is not one tenth of the area. You still 

get significant bang for your buck with a 1-kiloton device, but you 

can see the plume is much narrower, but, as you can see the wind 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
81 

direction on this particular day, it still encompasses the Senate 

building. 

So with one weapon you would eliminate the pinnacle of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government all with 

one device. 

Finally, if you will show us the third simulation. Oh, by the way, 

on the bottom there, this is Dr. William Bell, holding the simulations. Dr. Bell is in our group. He has extensive experience 

throughout the world in actual mass casualty events. 

And you will notice the inset at the bottom, we are only on the 

short scale here in the immediate foreground, you will see that the 

plume actually goes out for many a miles in a narrow shape, depending on the direction of the wind at the time. You can see that 

the 90 percent fatality death plume and 50 percent fatality death 

plume will go out for many miles into the countryside. 

And finally, on this third simulation, there is a lot more detail 

in these where you can see the windows in the buildings because 

we are up closer now with a higher resolution. You can see in the 

top figure is the thermal profile where you have the first, second, 

and third degree burn zones. 

First degree burns would be where you have the minor burns. 

Second degree burns, of course, are where blistering occurs, and 

third degree burns are where there is disruption of the skin entirely. 

We would be putting a great deal of our medical care to be centered in those second and third degree burn zones, really limiting 

the area where we would have to concentrate our efforts. 

If I could go on to recommendations. There is little doubt that 

the nuclear weapon event will exceed the emergency response system capacity that we are going to have. There is no doubt about 

this. 

So what do we do about it? We would then go out and find the 

large number of professional groups that have extensive health 

care experience that are not typically employed in emergency medicine but have extensive training already. We can give them some 

limited focus training. We are working with the American Medical 

Association on this now. 

Pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians, for instance, take many of 

the same core health care courses as do the physicians and nurses. 

So with a certain level of additional training, these ancillary health 

care workers could be incorporated in the response. 

I will tell you that we looked at the numbers on this, and even 

if we get all the pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians, veterinarian 

technicians, and these other people, we still will only have a fraction of the medical care personnel that we will need for dealing 

with even one of these smaller nuclear weapons. 

The media training is going to provide considerable opportunities 

to reach a large number of potential health care and security providers for recruitment into high consequence medical support. 

Indeed, we will need a marketing approach to approach potential 

populations for recruits. I am talking about regular citizens. 

In this situation that you are looking at now on this simulation, 

there are a lot of people who will be on their own in the first 24 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
82 

hours. There will not be anyone there to help them, and we can recruit these individuals. 

In this city there is a very significant, minority population that 

is outside the downtown zone, and these individuals can be approached, and we have talked to Howard University, for instance, 

about this and recruited individuals to respond and to help themselves essentially in this crisis that is coming. 

Among the issues related, are mass casualty medical care in the 

event of a major catastrophe for the thousands of internally displaced persons who are displaced from their homes for a lengthy 

period of time. These people are going to need to be sheltered, fed, 

given potable water, non-food items, and basic health care. 

Security will have to be provided in adequate numbers to protect 

them from theft and from assaults, which we are seeing in camps 

around the world, both of which reach alarming rates during crisis 

situations. 

We will also need to pre-position stockpiles of narcotics for use 

in mass burn care. I can tell you, if you want to ask me the question what keeps me up at night worrying, it is the mass burn care 

because it is the one area that we are the least prepared for. We 

are use to the typical hospital in a large city, which has one or two 

open burn beds on any day and that is it, and we are going to have 

thousands of burn victims. 

And so we are going to pre-position narcotics. It is a difficult 

thing to do because people want to steal them, but we can put 

them in police stations, military depots and have them forward positioned like the medical care people are doing in Iraq right now. 

The medical response in Iraq is actually quite amazing and it is 

because of forward positioning of personnel and material. We would 

need to do that also because we can guess where these narcotics 

will be needed. 

We will need to rapidly mobilize medical resources in using air 

evacuation capability. We can pre-position and look for places 

where we can land C–130 transport planes, long straight sections 

of runway we can make out of roads, and that way we can get 

rapid ingress and egress—ingress, of course, of medical care personnel that will assemble very quickly and then egress of the patients. Without that, we will not be able to reach them. 

Finally, the conversion of military vessels to civilian emergency 

response: Historically, emergency response and relief efforts for disasters in coastal zones have consisted primarily of the mobilization 

of land based operations and assets, supplemented by available 

Navy and Coast Guard vessels. 

The unusually heavy 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons exposed 

enormous weaknesses in this current land-based coastal disaster 

response operation. 

So one solution to this would be to convert military vessels, slated for removal from military service, to a new role as civilian emergency response vessels dedicated to responding to large-scale disasters in the coastal zones. 

In order to maintain cost effectiveness, these platforms could be 

privately built and operated while being deployed and supervised 

at the Federal level so as not to adversely affect current disaster 

planning and operational preparedness. This could be integrated 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
83 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Molander appears in the Appendix on page 446. 

with a train-based system as well so you could reach in past the 

coastal region. 

This could provide a modern maritime emergency response platform capable of responding and providing disaster response and recovery to a coastal area of more than 15,000 square miles. These 

ships could address a number of problems inherent in the areas of 

mass casualty response including providing improvements in response capability and care of casualties, consumables, provision 

distribution, field distribution, transportation safety and overall 

site command and control. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Dr. Dallas. You raised a lot 

of questions which we look forward to asking you. 

Dr. Molander, thanks for being here and we welcome your testimony now about your work at the RAND Corporation. 

STATEMENT OF ROGER C. MOLANDER, PH.D.,1 SENIOR 

RESEARCH SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. MOLANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, 

for the opportunity to address the Committee. It is a very important subject as you know. 

Much of what I will have to say today will focus on three topics: 

First, certain characteristics of nuclear terrorist attacks that warrant special emphasis, and we have already heard some of that; 

second, the potential for major private sector contribution in meeting needs both inside and outside the impacted area; and third, the 

broader economic implications of such an attack for the region and 

the country as a whole. 

My remarks will draw on several RAND studies on the subject 

that are noted in my written testimony, including in particular a 

RAND research effort supported by the DHS that several years ago 

addressed the impact of a nuclear terrorism attack on the Port of 

Long Beach, California, a particularly unusual target. 

The effort that we undertook featured what we call a strategic 

planning exercise which involved senior representatives from the 

government and from private sector emergency response organizations and a wide range of critical infrastructures. 

A later version of the exercise was also conducted with congressional leaders and another version with representatives of the insurance industry. 

I want to emphasize that we did not select this particular scenario target as the most likely of a terrorist attack but rather as 

an attack, such as against New York or Washington, that would 

have what we call a profound strategic impact on the United 

States, not just because of the immediate impact but also because 

of the cascading effects, some of which you have heard about. 

Just to clarify the challenge in this kind of attack, the Ports of 

Long Beach and Los Angeles, side by side, handle roughly 70 percent of the total container traffic coming into the West Coast. 

In the exercise scenario we used, like those you have heard, a 

Hiroshima-sized 10-kiloton bomb is exploded in a shipping container on a pier at the Port of Long Beach. The area of immediately 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
84 

Hiroshima-like damage would be several kilometers in diameter, as 

you have heard, but unlike the situation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki which, as Dr. Carter mentioned where the weapons were exploded some 1,000 feet above the ground, the mushroom cloud that 

in this case would rise to a height of roughly 20,000 feet in about 

10 minutes would be highly radioactive, having pulled up a large 

amount of radioactivity from the ground. 

The path of the fallout will depend upon prevailing winds at 

20,000 feet and would be highly uncertain and not immediately 

well known. 

The eventual area of serious contamination, you have seen some 

of the tracks there, could be roughly 200 square miles, roughly half 

the area inside the Washington beltway. 

As you can envision in the situation like this, people would 

quickly see or learn about the attack and begin to spontaneously 

evacuate from a major portion of the L.A. basin. I do not think we 

can expect people to wait around for clarification on where the 

plume might be going. 

There will be, in fact, initially much misinformation and confusion about both the effects of the detonation, its size and the location, and the consequences of the fallout. People will make individual decisions about what to do. 

Gridlock will almost certainly ensue on almost all freeways and 

exits from L.A. as gas stations are quickly exhausted and cars on 

the freeways run short on gas. 

In a matter of hours at various points in some rough ring around 

the L.A. basin, probably as many as several million people will 

have largely come to a stop, no longer moving except maybe for a 

few people trying to move on foot. 

A major recovery problem will quickly emerge that is unique to 

this attack because of the resultant fallout contamination of most 

of the petroleum refineries in the L.A. basin that serves southern 

and central California, Nevada and Arizona. 

And here is the important point. No pipelines flow from other 

parts of the United States into this region. As a consequence, the 

situation there, with these refineries shut down, will produce an 

acute gasoline shortage for the entire region, including Nevada and 

Arizona, a major impact on response and recovery activities, and 

a government response that will likely produce immediate restrictions on gasoline distribution nationwide and probably rationing. 

In this context, with the concern about the risk of weapons at 

other ports that are already within the United States, this is a 

major problem. The President can be expected to close all ports, all 

airports as well, for an indefinite period and order the immediate 

inspection of all rail and truck traffic carrying containers that are 

already in the United States and have left U.S. ports. Those containers, as you know, will move all the way to the East Coast, some 

of them. 

Let me give you an overview of the most severe challenges that 

emerged in the comments of these expert participants that took 

part in these exercises about what would prevail in this situation. 

First, in terms of assistance to the affected areas, the logistics 

problems will be huge. That is quite self-evident and the Federal 

and State assets would be over-matched. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
85 

Only the private sector, in possession of extraordinary logistics 

capability, will be able to really have a major impact on the demands here in the affected area. They will be crucially concerned 

with effective coordination with government authorities both at the 

State and local level as to how these private sector assets would 

be used. 

As noted, effective medical care will present an immediate challenge in part because of the fallout and the occurrence of contaminated people in various areas and in addition, as mentioned, burn 

victims would be a very serious problem and cannot be moved very 

quickly, and radiation victims must have surgery urgently to avoid 

infection. 

Only the private sector and its medical capabilities has the assets to respond to these demands. Hospitals have just-in-time inventories like everybody else and would run out of supplies quickly, 

putting a premium on the gasoline problem and private sector 

transport assets for moving medical supplies into the region. 

Credentialing medical care personnel from outside the area and 

establishing ad hoc medical facilities may also face problems in 

particular in terms of liability protection as we are concerned about 

this in parts of these facilities. 

In terms of infrastructure impacts an early assessment of damage to the critical infrastructures, like electricity, telecommunications and water, would be urgently needed. Fortunately, it would 

appear that most of the damage to sectors like telecommunications 

and electricity would be restricted to the immediate region around 

the port which would not be soon re-occupied, with few cascading 

effects in those areas, at least, to other parts of the electricity and 

telecommunications grid in the L.A. region. 

But in terms of the transportation sector, companies would be 

looking for information from the government on when ports will reopen and the location of staging areas where shipping containers 

would have to be sent to be inspected. But also the government 

would also want to know from business what transportation capacity exists, of what character and where it is. 

A global coordination effort would clearly be needed to redirect 

U.S. container traffic which is now sitting off of all U.S. ports to 

other less capable ports and to establish delivery priorities for key 

goods. 

All of these challenges highlight the need for effective government and private sector communications in the immediate post-attack period and preparations for that kind of challenge. 

The refinery shutdowns in Los Angeles and the temporary halt 

of all crude imports through ports will create a major fuel crisis, 

I mentioned, with the serious implications for both distribution networks and for markets. The evacuation from Hurricane Rita emphasized this kind of problem with gasoline. 

Finally, and of major concern, there will be the need to allocate 

critical relief resources that are largely in the hands of the private 

sector, food, water, ice, and temporary shelter. This will require an 

extraordinary amount of guidance and coordination from the Federal and State governments about priorities—we had a window on 

that with Hurricane Katrina—and a potential waiver, and I emVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
86 

phasize this, of antitrust regulations and other rules to enable 

emergency contracting authorities to do more effective planning. 

In terms of long term economic implications, this is all very highly speculative as you can well imagine. But in addition to keeping 

the global shipping supply chain operating, financial decisionmakers would face a difficult challenge in restoring orderly economic relationships. 

While the business community would certainly want ports to reopen as soon as possible, harsh realities would face the financial 

community and might prove a barrier. In particular, the attack 

could deliver a crippling blow to segments of the insurance companies. You saw the experience the insurance companies had with 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Insurance against nuclear attack would be in short supply or 

highly limited without major government guarantees. The attack 

would also threaten the financial industry at large as many loans 

and mortgages in southern California in the fallout zone or nearby 

would face possible default without government assistance. 

Although these economic outcomes are difficult to predict, these 

hypothetical consequences suggest important vulnerabilities that 

need to be addressed in advance. 

In conclusion, let me say that if there is any good news in this 

assessment, it is the possibility that the United States can, in principle, improve preparedness for such a major incident by drawing 

on available private sector capabilities provided, and I emphasize 

this, that mechanisms are in place to do so effectively and legal 

and regulatory barriers that might otherwise prevent it are identified and removed. 

In particular, it seems clear that to deal with the prospect of 

such an attack, industry would need some sort of prior conditional 

relief from existing antitrust regulations to more effectively plan 

for and contribute to a coordinated relief effort. Certainly something like the pre-negotiated voluntary agreements that are established under the Defense Production Act is one example. 

Obviously, as I mentioned, a key factor is the establishment, in 

advance, of effective communications links between the government 

and the private sector; and here I would emphasize, from long experience with exercises, testing of these links in the joint government-private sector plans in realistic emergency response environments. 

Clearly, detailed analysis of these kinds of demands, which I congratulate you on looking into with individuals and government 

agencies responsible for this, will be crucial in setting priorities 

and establishing realistic performance expectations both for government and the private sector. 

Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Molander. I want to repeat 

again what I said with our first two witnesses. This is chilling 

stuff, but it is actually comforting, if I may use that uncomfortable 

term here, to know that you and your colleagues have been thinking about this possibility of a nuclear attack within the United 

States and thinking pro-actively about what we want to be ready 

to do the Day After. 

So I thank you. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
87 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Gibb appears in the Appendix on page 455. 

Mr. Gibb is the Director of the New York State Emergency Management Office. So he obviously deals in a hands-on way with 

emergency management, and from that perspective we welcome 

your testimony now on this subject. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. GIBB,1 DIRECTOR, NEW YORK STATE 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE 

Mr. GIBB. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins, 

for again hosting this discussion. 

A nuclear detonation would be an absolute catastrophic and overwhelming event and would require immediate large scale Federal 

response and I think it is our challenge as emergency planners at 

the State and local level to ensure that all the resources that we 

would need to bring to bear for this type of incident could be tied 

together as efficiently as possible. 

The Incident Command System (ICS) component of the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) has given the response community the platform that we need to build these large response organizations to respond to an event of this scope. 

In New York State, we have used the Incident Command System 

as the State Disaster Management System since 1996 and it is a 

mandate that Governor Patterson has continued for our State 

agencies. 

New York City’s use of the Citywide Incident Management System, we believe, is another best practice for having in place a scalable, unified command system that will give response organizations 

the best chance to integrate local, State, regional, and national resources that would be required to respond to a nuclear incident of 

this type. The basic tenets of incident command are chain of command, unity of command, unity of effort, and unity of results. Having an efficient span of control will be key to organizing and conducting a response to this incident. 

And I would look at this incident as one big problem and then 

a thousand other incidents in the surrounding area that would 

have to be dealt with. 

In New York, now we are shifting our focus from the mass training of the response community or in the incident command system 

to building additional command and control support teams that can 

be deployed to incident sites, and I think that Federal NIMS implementation and guidance should recognize the need to have additional deployable assets from State and local government that 

could respond to a region in need. 

I am sure you are familiar with the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which is the vehicle by which States 

share resources. EMAC has had a great project over the past year 

to identify missions and deployable assets that States can ask for 

and States can be organized to respond with. 

Local, State and national operations centers, I think, all recognize the absolute necessity to have a common operational picture 

or processes and communications in place so that everyone that is 

involved in response can see the incident and its implications in an 

accurate and similar way. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
88 

In an event of this type, as has been stated, life saving decisions 

will need to be based on accurate assessments of radiation levels 

and downwind projections. There is a detonation. How quickly will 

we know it was a nuclear device? 

I do not think we have in our State cadre the expertise to look 

at a damaged area and to know right away that it was a 20-kiloton 

highly enriched uranium detonation or 10-kiloton or 1-kiloton. 

Many members of our response community now have radiation 

detection equipment as part of their toolbox for local responses so 

we will quickly know there was radioactive materials involved but 

its extent, I think, will be a challenge to get a handle on. 

A big challenge for us in the early hours would be how do we organize a response to gather this radiological data, analyze it, and 

be able to translate that into credible information for the responders and for the public. 

New York State, and I think a lot of States, would have to build 

on the capabilities for responding to incidents at nuclear power 

plants. And our State health department has expertise, again, in 

analyzing radiological data and converting that into protective action decisions for the general public. 

We are also fortunate to host a National Guard Civil Support 

Team. We would like to have a second one in New York State to 

be dedicated to New York City and we hope that approval can be 

gained from the Senate. 

As I said, post-September 11, 2001, investments in homeland security funding, at least in our State, have added additional radiological detection equipment to our arsenal in some parts of the 

State, but to take the data that would be coming into emergency 

operation centers, collecting and analyzing would be our challenge. 

Commitment to and use of common national assessment models 

would help alleviate this problem. Next spring, we are hosting an 

exercise with the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center (FRMAC) to test our ability to be able to integrate State and 

Federal and local assessment efforts for a radiological incident. 

As was noted, a key to this response would be to be able to provide credible information to the community. I want to give you an 

example of how just trying to solve one problem in this catastrophic 

area is a huge load. 

In New York State, we have developed New York Alert, which 

is a web-based, all hazards alert notification system. It is state-ofthe-art. It allows a local official or State official to notify the public 

using e-mail, activating the emergency alert system, sending text 

messages to cell phones, blast faxes, posting to a website, any potential means that people can be notified, those gateways have 

been included in New York Alert. 

It is currently the alert notification platform for 55 of our State 

university campuses and all 25 of the City University of New York 

campuses. We have 1.2 million subscriber records already built into 

New York Alert. 

But it has taken a substantial commitment of State funds to 

build and maintain that capability, and this year, Governor Patterson, even in a lean budget year, is committing in excess of $5 million to be able to maintain this kind of critical capability to be able 

to provide emergency information to the public. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
89 

I think it would be important looking nationally to help build on, 

again, these alert notification best practices and make sure that we 

can make investments using a host of Federal funds that might be 

available. 

We will also really be challenged by the exposures of our emergency workers, and I think one of the lessons of September 11, 

2001, was that we have an absolute responsibility to protect our 

emergency workers to the extent possible. 

I agree with Dr. Carter that right now, many of the guidance we 

use to protect our emergency workers in terms of the exposures 

they can receive are set very low. 

In New York State right now for a nuclear power plant response, 

we would limit the exposure of an emergency worker to probably 

5 rems as opposed to an event of this type where we might need 

to be in a position of authorizing exposures in excess of 100 rems 

to be able to marshal the resources we need to respond to the 

event, and although those exposures would be voluntary, putting in 

place new policy guidance, I think, would be important to helping 

States to plan for that. 

I just want to re-emphasize the need for continued planning and 

discussion and investment in the subject area. The Urban Area Security Initiative, which you have been very supportive of, I think 

is the right vehicle, the regional transportation security working 

groups, a great vehicle to continue these planning efforts. 

Commissioner Joe Bruno, from the New York City Office of 

Emergency Management, is leading a great regional effort this year 

to implement the Regional Catastrophic Planning Grant that is 

new this year, addressing between eight and a dozen really critical 

regional issues associated with different functions involved in a regional response. 

And I would also encourage in your next hearing that the Federal Government assets that are involved in this planning that 

their work needs to be transparent and done in conjunction with 

State and local planners if we are going to have any chance to respond successfully to this event. 

I would also agree that the stockpiles that we have in place—including the strategic national stockpile, the pre-position equipment 

program, and the FEMA distribution hubs—need to be looked at in 

terms of how this scenario will play out, and those stockpiles 

should be re-examined to see what critical ingredients we are missing. 

So once again, I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Gibb, for what you are doing 

and for some of the thoughts and suggestions that you had. 

In scheduling the hearing and calling it Nuclear Terrorism: Confronting the Challenges of the Day After, the premise is that there 

will be a Day After, and even if I may reference the area of fiction, 

the discussion today says it is not really fiction. 

I remember watching the episode of ‘‘24’’ with Jack Bauer when 

the terrorists were attempting to set up the nuclear weapons and 

then the weapon actually went off, and they could not stop them. 

I was stunned. I could not believe that had actually happened. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
90 

And then my second reaction was, I was surprised anyway that 

although there was terrible devastation, the country went on, and 

I think that is an important reality and one that we are speaking 

to here today, which is how can we be prepared to make sure that 

if this ever happens that the country will go on as strong as possible with minimal damage, as little damage as possible. 

So I thought I would ask each of you to cite and describe, if you 

want, what is the most important thing you think the Federal Government can do to be prepared to respond to the Day After, and 

if one of your predecessors picks your first choice, give me your second choice. 

Dr. Carter. 

Dr. CARTER. Well, I am going to take the overwhelming first 

choice which is that the Federal Government really has to step up 

to the inevitable fact that this situation will overwhelm the State 

and local first responders. 

You can argue about hurricanes, you can argue about other circumstances or even in case of radiological weapons that is a smaller kind of thing, but a nuclear weapon is uniquely destructive. 

Anybody looking around will know it was a nuclear weapon that 

went off. Nothing does what these things do, and it will ipso facto 

implicate the full Federal response and it just should be a reflex. 

This is not analogous to a lot of other emergencies. It is an order 

of magnitude greater. So that is the single thing I would say, and 

if I may just get a second one in. 

I do not want to lose sight of something that I said earlier which 

is, that it is not going to feel like only one. It is going to feel like 

there are more. 

So on the Day After it is not all about the city struck. Everybody 

is going to feel that they are next and they are going to be wondering what they do, too. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. And what you are saying is that 

also has to be part of the Federal responsibility? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. What will we do here if a weapon goes off in 

New York? What will they do in New York if one goes off here because they are certainly going to feel that it is them next? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just a quick follow up, do you accept, and 

I guess you actually said this in your opening testimony, that the 

Department of Homeland Security should be the lead agency? 

Dr. CARTER. Yes. It is the lead agency for planning, thinking this 

thing through. It is not the lead agency for executing. The State 

and local governments are critical on the first day. So it is not that 

the Federal Government ought to take away their sense of responsibility or the critical duties they would have. It would be 

supplementing and ultimately overcoming those capabilities on the 

subsequent days. 

Within the Federal Government, it is the Department of Defense 

that has most of the assets. So DHS can do the planning and so 

forth, but when it comes to rotating 100,000 people in and out of 

this zone where everybody can only stay for a day or two before 

they have gotten their permitted dose and that is the end of their 

service, you need hundreds of thousands of people, and you are 

only going to get them from the Department of Defense. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
91 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. Incidentally, we had testimony 

earlier from the Commander of the Northern Command, which now 

has responsibility for homeland security through the Department of 

Defense, and for this big task they are not where they want to be, 

but they are a lot more ready than they certainly were before September 11, 2001. 

And as you know, they are standing up three units over the next 

year and a half for 4,000 troops each with the unique responsibility 

to be prepared to move into an area hit by a weapon of mass destruction to handle the response. 

Dr. Dallas. 

Mr. DALLAS. I appreciate you bringing up the ‘‘24’’ episode. My 

family is a rabid fan of that show. And I had the same reaction you 

did. What it brought to my mind, and since you mentioned it, was 

the amazing power of the media. That is not necessarily, of course, 

a Federal response, but there could be some encouragement there 

for some mass training or conditioning of the public. The misconceptions of the public about radiation are incredible, the amount 

of misconceptions people really have about what it really does. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You mean the public may think it is going 

to be worse than it really would be for most people? 

Mr. DALLAS. Well, that is correct. My big fear is that—we have 

these simulations that we put up here and we showed the very limited areas. You will notice that the 10-kiloton device, there are 

large areas outside of the immediate area that are unaffected. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In Washington? 

Mr. DALLAS. In Washington, DC. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In this city, right. 

Mr. DALLAS. And would occur also in New York, if we get these 

smaller weapons to begin with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What I mean is, this does not devastate 

the whole city? 

Mr. DALLAS. That is right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And in fact, there are whole areas of the 

District that are not affected even by a blast around the White 

House? 

Mr. DALLAS. That is correct. You can see in the insets from the 

other simulations that even though it is a very devastated area, it 

is a narrow area and people have in their minds—and we know 

this from academic treatises that have looked into this—the severe 

psychosis almost that will be involved in the population. I am 

afraid the four of us here will not be in front of a lot of national 

news outlets. They will have other individuals that will give simulations, quite frankly that will be inaccurate, showing a much 

wider distribution of a low level exposure which will not cause any 

health effects. 

Like Mr. Gibb was just saying about raising that level from 5 to 

100 rems or whatever it is, I am afraid that they are going to be 

on the media outlets distributions showing 2 and 3 rems exposure 

around the country and people are actually thinking that is dangerous when it is not. So that is one area that would be on some 

kind of plan that is not going to scare people more but will bring 

that level—I mean, it is amazing the misconceptions people have 

birth defects, for instance. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
92 

I spent 10 years at Chernobyl, in and out of there, and found out 

how not to do an emergency response. The Soviet city made every 

mistake possible. But we learned a lot from them. For instance, 

there were no birth defects at all. Yet if you ask 99 out of 100 

Americans, they were convinced that there were birth defects. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me move on. So, therefore, I take it 

your priority there would be in a sense within the priority that Dr. 

Carter talked about, which is to be prepared either before or certainly right afterward, to get the truth out about the limited impact, though serious devastation, of a blast. 

Mr. DALLAS. Yes, sir. I would have to say medically, I already 

mentioned before, burn care is a nightmare here and we are completely unprepared. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is something that you would want. 

That would be a priority for the country to try to get better prepared because there is a limited number of places where burn victims really can be handled anywhere in the country. 

Mr. DALLAS. That is correct. Ninety-five percent of the burn victims will not receive medical care and most of those will die, where 

we are right now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am over my time. But let me see if I can 

ask the other two witnesses for a quick response. 

Mr. Molander. 

Mr. MOLANDER. Sure. About getting good information out, I 

would say, good luck and I think a lot of people will make their 

own judgments about it. There would be a terrible uncertainty. You 

do not know if it is a 1-, 10-, or 30-kiloton device that just went 

off. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MOLANDER. To answer your question, I would say your opportunity is to look at what the Congress can do, not what the Executive Branch should be doing. 

A couple of years after the first exercise that I described, we 

tried to do another exercise under DHS aegis to bring together 

again critical infrastructure owners and operators to look at some 

of this cooperation with the government, with the private sector. 

It stalled out, mostly because by this time the general counsels 

of the oil and gas companies advised their leaders who had come 

to a previous exercise that maybe they just should not do it before 

they get caught in an antitrust assertion. 

I think there is a real problem here with the cooperation that is 

going to be necessary to do the kind of planning that is going to 

marshal the real strength of this country which is in the private 

sector. No matter how many troops or National Guards or whatever you provide radiation training for, the kind of challenge that 

we face can only be, if you will, met with an extraordinary contribution from the private sector, and that is going to take planning. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a great suggestion. We have actually done that in some limited areas to try to exempt entities from 

antitrust prosecution when they are cooperating, when we are asking them to cooperate for the public good. 

Mr. Gibb. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
93 

Mr. GIBB. Stockpiling of critical supplies and equipment. The key 

to protecting emergency workers is through having the dosimetry 

available to each responding person. 

Right now, I probably have 13,000 high range dosimeters in our 

facility in Albany, New York. They are from the Cold War. They 

are 50 or 60 years old. They work, but the reliability is an issue. 

Medical supplies, pharmaceuticals that would be key to treating 

patients with radiological related injuries, we are not going to be 

able to generate, I think, very quickly; and if existing Federal 

stockpiles could be augmented to have better capability, that would 

help everybody across the board. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Dr. Dallas, your testimony makes clear that hospitals in the immediate vicinity of an attack would be completely overwhelmed and 

unable to cope and may well be obliterated themselves. 

And indeed, in a smaller way we saw evidence of this when we 

investigated the failed response to Hurricane Katrina where very 

quickly only three hospitals were not incapacitated in the New Orleans area and the State only had two trauma centers, one of 

which was rendered inoperable by the rising flood water. 

So that raises real questions to me about the abilities of hospitals 

in the wider region to ramp up to respond to this kind of attack. 

When I was in Jerusalem a couple of years ago, I toured Hadassah Hospital there and I was so impressed with their planning and 

capabilities to deal with decontamination, for example, or to care 

for victims of a mass attack. They had procedures for totally converting their children’s ward into a decontamination ward. 

Does any American hospital, to your knowledge, have that degree 

of planning and capabilities that I saw in Israel? 

Mr. DALLAS. The simple answer to that would be no. We worked 

together with the Israeli Defense Force and the hospitals in Israel. 

As a matter of fact, we worked closely with the American Medical 

Association giving training to health care personnel throughout the 

Nation, and right now we are using the Israeli model for trauma 

and explosive events because they have the most experience in 

dealing with attacks on civilian populations and we do not. We do 

not have that kind of experience. 

We are good at train wrecks and car wrecks, but the answer is, 

we did a study on examining American cities, and unfortunately 

our hospitals are all concentrated in downtown areas. The pattern 

we followed over time is that hospitals that were already downtown, they just keep getting larger and larger. 

And so in any conceivable nuclear attack, we looked at 20 different cities, six of them are published in the open scientific literature. In even relatively small nuclear devices, we lose about half 

of our hospital beds and probably half of our best trauma medical 

care personnel in most of these attacks if they focus on downtown 

areas which we are anticipating. So it is a real problem for us. 

But even the surviving hospitals, if you look at the ratio of potential victims and patients to health care personnel, it is staggering, 

if they can even get to the hospital. 

You mentioned the Hurricane Katrina response. We have looked 

at those hospitals; and when you ask those 12 hospitals that went 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
94 

down and were no longer able to respond, what was the one item, 

if you gave them 20 things that they would want to do if you threw 

money at them—it is security. 

Nine out of 12 of those hospitals when given a choice of 20 to 25 

different items, whether it is more physicians, more doctors, better 

health care plan, they say it is security. Security went down. In 

nine out of 12 of these hospitals, they closed because of security. 

They want people with guns basically is what they are talking 

about. So security is a major issue for these hospitals which is a 

gaping vacuum in response that we have right now. 

Israel is a really excellent example for us to follow. We have not 

significantly done that. We have come a long way since September 

11, 2001, particularly with physicians and nurses, paramedics and, 

of course, the first responders who have really come forward from 

then, but the actual hospitals themselves are rather weak. 

My organization has tested dozens and dozens of hospitals and 

we have got a long way to go. That is a major weak point. 

Senator COLLINS. I think it is as well. I was struck by the high 

level of preparedness at this hospital in Jerusalem versus even our 

best hospitals here in terms of being able to ramp up and respond. 

I do think this is an area where we have a lot to learn and I am 

hopeful that an office that has been duly created as a result of legislation that the Chairman and I authored within the Department 

of Homeland Security is going to allow us to learn more from 

Israel’s experience and share more ideas with a country that unfortunately has more experience in responding to terrorism than virtually anywhere. 

Dr. Carter, you raised an excellent point that after the first blast, 

the threat of a second blast could terrorize the Nation and hamper 

the response. Even if the terrorists did not really have a second 

bomb ready to be detonated, the fear would be that they did and 

we would have to act as if they did. That has consequences for our 

deployment of first responders, emergency managers, health care 

personnel. 

If Washington has been the subject of a blast and yet there is 

a threat from terrorists that they are going to blow up New York 

and L.A. next, how do decisionmakers decide how to allocate resources? 

Obviously, we would start the international effort that you mentioned in your testimony to try to track down the perpetrators and 

avert a subsequent attack. But there is a very real immediate challenge of where to hold back possible resources because you may, in 

fact, have to cope with a second or third attack. 

Dr. CARTER. It is an excellent question and there is no easy answer to it because there are only so many resources to go around. 

What we tried to think through a little bit in our Day After report—and I think DHS really needs to do more on this—is how the 

other cities can prepare themselves and take action to minimize 

their vulnerability while the emergency is being resolved. 

I mean at some point we will police up all these loose weapons 

and resolve the situation. During that period, other cities will feel 

that they are next and they need to posture themselves so that 

they are less consumptive of resources than the first which got hit 

with no warning. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
95 

So the only thing I can say is that the subsequent draw on this 

pool of emergency responders should be less than the other cities 

if we have a thoughtful protocol for every city to respond to the 

now very real possibility that they are next. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. We will do 

one more round of questions. I want to pick up with a quick followup to you, Dr. Dallas. 

I was interested when you said the No. 1 concern from hospitals 

in this case was for security. I take it what they are thinking about 

is being overwhelmed by the people coming to the hospital demanding treatment. 

Mr. DALLAS. Yes. Well, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the 

‘‘worried well,’’ we called them, crowded into the hospitals, and 

they formed a barrier where the real sick people could not get in. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, they are worried, but they 

are really OK? 

Mr. DALLAS. Yes, they are fine. We have a term that is kind of 

merged. Like bio-terrorism is a term they merged. Recently worried 

well is a new term that we have. 

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, though, it was also the criminal element that broke into the hospitals and, of course, the first 

place they go for is the pharmacy and they rush the pharmacy. 

They clear out the narcotics and there was no one to stop them. 

The average age of a hospital security guard in the United States 

is 68 and those individuals are not armed. It is one of those huge 

gaps that we have, that we do not have security for hospitals because thankfully we are a society that has not required it for the 

most part. 

But going into these mass casualty situations that will not be the 

case as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Mr. Gibb, from your operational 

perspective, do you want to add anything to what more we might 

be doing, should be doing to prepare law enforcement authorities, 

agencies including obviously State and locals for unique responsibilities in case of this kind of catastrophe? 

Mr. GIBB. In New York, we have been fortunate to have the Securing the Cities Program and funding. Prior to that we had a pilot 

program working with DHS that allowed us, in the New York 

metro area, to purchase additional radiological detection equipment 

and train law enforcement officers in basics of radiation. 

While that is a prevention related program, it helped us to build 

a capacity and capabilities that could be used after a detonation, 

and also for the scenario that you just mentioned where if we were 

looking for second devices or other devices, it is absolutely critical 

that the law enforcement community understand and be equipped 

to be able to, as best as possible, search for and find the next weapon. 

So I guess I would argue that that program is absolutely necessary to equip our Nation’s security forces and allow them to be 

able to undertake this task. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for that answer. That was helpful. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
96 

Dr. Molander, I was impressed in your testimony about the importance you placed on preparatory coordination with the private 

sector. I wanted to ask you to go into that a little bit more. I mean, 

it was an interesting suggestion. Actually I think it was maybe Dr. 

Dallas who made it. I guess in regard to this quasi private sector 

that we ought to be thinking about how to prepare ancillary health 

care workers who are not traditionally emergency medical workers 

to be prepared to be emergency medical workers in the case of a 

nuclear terrorist incident. But that is more quasi public. 

Talk a little bit in more detail about what you think the Federal 

Government can best do to begin to engage the private sector in 

being ready help us to respond on the Day After. 

Mr. MOLANDER. I am aware of efforts that are underway at the 

Department of Homeland Security to do just that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Mr. MOLANDER. You might say that unfortunately DHS and the 

private sector was denied the opportunity to test some of these 

emerging capabilities in the absence of a hurricane season the last 

two seasons was good news and bad news. 

It is quite clear, as we have come to see, that there is a limited 

area that would be affected by one of these devices. Of course, the 

whole country would be concerned about the second bomb and 

things of that character. But the ability to move some of America’s 

vast private sector assets, medical care is just one of them, into the 

region and to anticipate just where you might deploy these assets 

is essential. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And give us a couple of examples. 

Mr. MOLANDER. For example, you will have a large area that is 

evacuated and a major portion of that area could be re-occupied 

fairly quickly except it would probably be a matter of security problems in terms of having people come back and not knowing which 

sections of, say, the L.A. basin could be really re-occupied. 

In order to be able to slowly re-occupy and maybe open some gas 

stations, you would like to have a coordinated effort where Mobil 

opens a gas station over there, Wal-Mart opens their store over 

there, Exxon opens that gas station over there, and K-Mart or Target opens a facility over there that could provide food and other 

means which would allow re-occupation of these areas that were 

initially evacuated. I think these are the kind of things that the 

private sector could contribute to. 

Also, regarding the kind of things I mentioned about transportation. It is very hard to know. The United States has such a large 

number of choice targets, if you will. But the kind of attack that 

I described could also take place against Houston or another place 

where there is a large amount of petroleum refineries nearby and 

negate the ability to bring in and to have the fuel to really mount 

the massive relief effort that you would like. 

In order to be prepared for that, the transportation sector in this 

country would really need to have an amazing amount of cooperation and collaboration with the Federal Government in advance. It 

is really a planning problem. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In advance to be ready? 

Mr. MOLANDER. If you do not have it done in advance, then you 

get an example like Hurricane Katrina. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
97 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Carter, in the work that you and your 

group have done, did you draw any lessons about the preparatory 

relations or work that should be done with the private sector? 

Dr. CARTER. Not nearly in the depth that Mr. Molander has 

done. 

One aspect that we looked at which he mentions also was the insurance industry which is a terribly important one and how the 

issues of long term radiation are handled by the insurance industry 

is going to be a very significant thing in the long run, to repeat 

what Mr. Molander already said. 

There is going to be a vast area wherein people will, if they resettle there, be exposed to larger doses of radiation than they 

would have had if no bomb gone off. We are all exposed to a little 

low level radiation every day. 

And essentially there is going to be a market in exposure, and 

if you are a physicist like me and Dr. Dallas, well, we will probably 

be willing to live in places where other people will not. We will 

trade up, in real estate terms, under these circumstances, and people who are more risk averse, more frightened, or less well informed will not, and that is a very odd thing to think about, but 

it is such an unusual circumstance because the effect is so long 

lasting. 

This effect will last for many years, possibly a decade or so, and 

people will be making individual choices on the basis of their individual understanding and knowledge, and their individual willingness to accept risks. 

And over time that is going to be the private investment and insurance overlay and over time that is going to be a public policy 

overlay. 

Inevitably, there will have to be public policy made that makes 

this more fair and equitable among people who are making different assessments of their risk. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. I have one more question but I 

going to yield to Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Go ahead. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Here is my question because you have all 

focused on the fact that one of the most important elements in the 

Day After will be communications. For the moment, I am not talking about communication among emergency responders but communication to the public obviously in the area affected. 

For instance, it would be important for people in the case of a 

10-kiloton weapon being exploded near the White House, for people 

in outlying areas of Washington to know they do not have to rush 

to the highways. 

Nationally you would want to, in the midst of this devastating 

event, nonetheless, assure people that the country was surviving 

and we are going on. 

The first instinct of a lot of people, of course, will be to turn on 

the television or the radio if you are in your car. I wonder whether, 

maybe this is already happening, whether it is important for the 

Federal Government to call in people from the various networks, 

cable, broadcast and talk about a scenario, how they would handle 

because maybe you wondered whether people like you who have 

had experience with this will be the ones they will look to for exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
98 

pert advice. Maybe they should know. They need to know that 

there are people like you out there so in this awful event that they 

will call on you. I wonder if you have a response. 

Dr. Carter. 

Dr. CARTER. We gave some thought to that. It is probably not 

reasonable to have the aspiration to train the general public on the 

effects of radiation. But it is not that complicated a subject. It is 

reasonable for important public officials to have some basic understanding. It is reasonable for there to be some designated individuals in each location who have been given that training and who 

can speak authoritatively. 

Most news outlets today have somebody who specializes in homeland security and terrorism, and it is reasonable that those reporters will have or can have understanding. 

And since there are going to be the channels, it is going to be 

through public officials, emergency responders, and the press 

speaking that a lot of the ignorance and fear that surrounds radiation can be at least softened if not dispelled. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Obviously this can be done without compromising any networks’ freedom of speech. You want to call them 

to be ready for what they will want to do, which is to honestly 

serve the public and avoid panic. 

Mr. GIBB. Senator, I think one of the challenges would be that 

we would have very conflicting messages for the public which 

unsettles people. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. GIBB. Under current Federal guidance that we use for radiological emergencies, the levels of exposure that we tell the public 

they should be willing to accept are very low. 

We would risk relocating a population to avoid a 1 rem exposure 

to radiation. We would permanently relocate a population to avoid 

a 2 rem exposure, based on current guidance. That is sort of a 

basis of our plans. 

Then in the aftermath of this event we will be shifting the message to say, and we could expose everybody in this room to 50 rems 

of radiation, 50 rems of exposure right now. We could go to the 

nearest medical center. We could be tested for days and they are 

not going to detect any changes as Dr. Carter noted, but getting 

that message to the public and where it goes against guidance that 

we have developed as a Nation, that is a big challenge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I really over deferred to Senator Collins’ courtesy. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I could not help but think as we 

are talking about the public’s understanding and as we hear all of 

our witnesses predict that most members of the public would immediately begin fleeing when, in fact, sheltering in place for many 

of them is the better option, that we have actually gone backwards 

in the public’s understanding of what to do in the event of a nuclear attack. 

Perhaps it is because I grew up in northern Maine next to an air 

base that had B–52s and everyone knew nuclear weapons were 

there. I remember in the 1950s and early 1960s being instructed 

in school as to what to do. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
99 

Now, granted the duck and cover approach was not going to be 

of much use, but I recall going home and being upset with my father that we did not have a bomb shelter in the basement of our 

house, fully equipped and stocked with water and supplies, as 

many families did back then. Many families knew ironically in the 

1950s that the answer was not to get into your car and start driving but rather to try to shelter and to be prepared to survive for 

a while on your own. 

Now, obviously if you are in the immediate blast area that all becomes academic, but it is interesting because I think the public, in 

many ways, is less prepared today than we were at the height of 

the Cold War. 

And at the height of the Cold War we were dealing with predictable, relatively speaking, state actors. We were not dealing with 

the threat of terrorist groups having access to nuclear devices. 

So I just mentioned that because I think there is a lot that we 

need to do to get the public more involved. We tend to focus on the 

emergency managers, the first responders, etc., but we need also to 

educate the public. 

I do want to turn, Mr. Gibb, to the issue of the health risk for 

first responders; and as Dr. Carter had said, once first responders 

have reached a certain dose, they could no longer serve in the zone. 

As the State emergency manager, how prepared do you think 

that first responders are to operate in a post-nuclear attack scenario? 

Mr. GIBB. It is training that we used to do a lot of that we do 

not focus a lot of effort on now in terms of preparing local emergency workers in the basics of radiation, having the dosimetry 

available immediately to them so that they can perform their task 

in an environment where there is either existing radiation or contamination. It exists best, I think, in those areas around our commercial nuclear power plants where there is very involved planning 

and certainly every hazardous material response team as part of 

their toolbox has the ability to deal with radiation incidents. PostSeptember 11, 2001, we built out and distributed 170 WMD response trailers throughout our State. 

But even in those trailers where we try to look at the broad 

range of hazards, we probably had two Geiger counters and maybe 

15 electronic dosimeters. So we have a better stockpile. It would 

take a while to put them in place. 

I think the danger to first responders is that in the early hours, 

most of the responders to the incident, we would have no way of 

gauging what exposures they are receiving or what exposures they 

received until they either became ill or we were able to do sort of 

a back calculations post-event that we could make estimates. 

So I think the answer to your question is not very well prepared 

to respond in this kind of environment. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Dr. Molander, let me just ask you 

a very quick question because I totally agree with you about the 

need to involve the private sector. 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina we saw that it was the private 

sector companies that were best prepared and responded to the 

challenge much better than government at all levels was able to do 

so. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
100 

When this Committee wrote the SAFE Port Act in 2006, we 

asked DHS to establish protocols for restarting our ports in the 

event of an attack. Senator Lieberman and I have been somewhat 

critical of the Department for not involving the private sector more 

in the development of those protocols. 

I know you did the exercise involving a possible attack on Long 

Beach. What is your assessment of the Department’s involvement 

of the private sector in responding to an attack on our ports? 

Mr. MOLANDER. I know the effort has been made. I can tell you 

that I am not up to date. I would not want to attempt to give you 

a real evaluation, but I know that, as I mentioned earlier, that the 

government and the private sector face a mutual problem in the extent to which they can do prior planning because, I think, to be 

really effective, it would involve, if this is the correct term, but 

some kind of collusion between, say, companies in the same business in order to allocate and distribute the response challenge in 

an effective manner. 

In terms of particular ports, I know that obviously with the port 

authorities, probably a lot can be done between the government 

and the port authorities. But I think still, if there is an attack of 

this kind on a port, it is going to close the port indefinitely. 

I think, as I mentioned, the capacity and the plans for moving 

whatever shipping was supposed to go into that port whether it is 

Galveston, Long Beach, L.A., or wherever, to another place, will be 

a major challenge, not just because of the fear that you do not want 

to open any other ports until you have some more assurance that 

there might not be a second bomb, but also the reality that there 

could be a second bomb and the fact that lots of ports, for example, 

the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach have deep water capability that very few other ports in the United States have. So there 

are real limits to what you can do in terms of shifting deliveries 

between ports. 

I think DHS is well aware of the problem, I think, but I am not 

sure just how far along they are in achieving the kind of goals that 

you set out for them. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Carper and Senator Warner, thanks for being here. We 

were obviously thinking the normally unthinkable, but I think everyone agrees it is important to do that. So thanks for entering the 

discussion. 

Senator Carper and then we will go to Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To our witnesses, welcome. This is one of several hearings. Like 

most of my colleagues, we have a number of hearings to attend and 

I apologize for not being here when you made your presentations, 

and if you addressed these, I would just ask your indulgence. 

The first question is basic. There is a device that explodes and 

it sends radioactive material—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Carper, forgive me for doing this. 

Senator CARPER. That question has already been asked? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No. I would never monitor. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
101 

Senator Warner has to leave urgently, but there is one question 

he would like to ask. 

Senator CARPER. Go right ahead. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Knowing you, I knew I could interrupt. 

Senator CARPER. I am happy to yield. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. I have had the privilege of working many years 

with Ash Carter and welcome you back to familiar grounds. 

I do hope that you, in your work, will take into consideration implementation of the role of the National Guard and the U.S. military in these incidents. It should be a part of the study here in the 

Committee, I say to our distinguished Chairman and Ranking 

Member. 

I am working to make sure that they are able to do things. How 

should they be accessed and when? That is for a later date and I 

thank you the distinguished Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you, 

Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. You are quite welcome. 

Back to my question. A device has exploded and there is a plume 

that goes in the air. How do we notify folks who might live in the 

direction in which the plume is headed so that they might take the 

appropriate precautions? Dr. Carter. 

Dr. CARTER. It is an excellent question and it is a capability that 

is entirely within our power to provide within minutes in every municipality where this occurs. 

We have not quite done that yet, but the capability exists. It has 

been developed at the national laboratories. It is not rocket science. 

It is weather, and for the same reason that they can open and close 

runways and vector airplanes in and out and so forth, weather is 

so well known in a real time basis that you can decide where that 

plume is going. Is it going north, south, east, or west? Is it going 

to be a wide plume or long narrow plume, depending on whether 

the winds are variable and so forth. 

There is no reason why that information cannot be made available to emergency responders within minutes. And that is one of 

a long list of things that it ought to be our aspiration to be able 

to do. We are not quite there yet but there is no reason why we 

cannot do it. 

Mr. DALLAS. Senator Carper, I might point you to the simulations we have here on the poster board which show that. We were 

able to do it for this demonstration for Washington, and Dr. Carter 

is right. There are a lot of people that can do this and there are 

systems too. You could even inform parts of the public as reverse 

September 11, 2001, telephoning system where you could actually 

target certain people and tell them to flee and target others and 

tell them to stay, and this is certainly within our capabilities if we 

were to put more effort into it. 

Senator CARPER. How do you practice something like that? 

Mr. DALLAS. There is a danger in scaring the public with that 

sort of thing. 

Senator CARPER. I understand. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
102 

Mr. DALLAS. But we are doing hospital exercises all the time now 

where we have patients that look pretty bad showing up at the 

emergency room and that seems to have gone fairly well. We can 

expand those exercises and make them larger. We can do that. 

Senator CARPER. It is going back to the days of Orson Welles. I 

recall it is possible to scare people pretty badly and this is certainly 

one that we could have an unintended consequence. 

But how do we actually get the word out to people? A Reverse 

911? That seems to make sense. Are there any others that come 

to mind? Mr. Gibb. 

Mr. GIBB. Senator, in New York, we have developed our own system. It is called New York Alert. I talked about this earlier. But 

it allows either a local official or a State official to create one message and to activate the emergency alert system. It sends a message to folks’ cell phones in the form of a text message. It sends 

out e-mails automatically, and actually calls people’s homes or 

their cell phones and gives them the recorded message. It is pretty 

robust. We can send out 80,000 e-mails simultaneously. We have 

the state-of-the-art ability to issue text messages, limited by the infrastructure that is in place. But from a technology standpoint, it 

is very doable with big recurring costs. 

Senator CARPER. That is reassuring. 

What advice would you have for people, if there ever is such an 

incident, who might have the misfortune of living in an area where 

a plume is heading? What advice would you have for them? 

Mr. MOLANDER. You would want to have some idea about the 

magnitude of the radiation coming in your direction. And it has 

been mentioned, there will be some capability to project the direction of the plume. 

How fast that happens, we are really not sure. It is also possible, 

of course, that you are going to be racing against the media which 

would be instantly on top of this. CNN will have an expert on this 

faster, I think, than you can go through a government process. 

Senator CARPER. Maybe one of you. 

Mr. MOLANDER. Maybe somebody that is in Georgia. 

There is also a real concern about conflicting views about what 

to do and that will really confuse people. The possibility exists that 

you will not know for sure just what the winds are at 20,000 feet 

because that is really determinative about what will happen. 

There was an exercise here a couple of years ago called Top Off 

in which I believe the mayor of Seattle was facing a decision about 

what kind of message to put out on a dirty bomb situation. And 

he was first presented with one description of the plume, and after 

some passage of time, a more sophisticated description of where the 

plume was going to go and, of course, it was not a nice long ellipse. 

It instead had some texture to it, and he stopped the exercise because he did not know which one of these should be the communication. 

So I think we are going to have a real problem with uncertainty. 

And as I mentioned earlier, there is going to be real uncertainty 

early on about the size of the weapon and characteristics which 

will also affect what to do. 

So you better get a lot of information whether you want to shelter in place or not for awhile would probably be the first thing. So 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
103 

maybe for a little while I shelter in place. But I want to get information fast and probably get out of there. People err on the side 

of safety I am sure. 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Carter. 

Dr. CARTER. I would just like to add to that. It is an excellent 

answer. I think we ought to be clear. I do not know whether people 

will do this or not and whether they will be told to do the right 

thing. As to what the right thing is, I want to put it very crudely, 

and I hope my co-panelists will not disagree with this. 

But there are roughly three areas here. There is that hot wisp 

downwind, and people there have to get out because if they stay 

there, they are going to get too much radiation. 

Then there is the larger cigar, which is also downwind. For many 

people in that area the best thing to do would be to stay home for 

a few days, not months like the kind of shelter you wanted your 

father to build during the Cold War. This is a whole different 

thing. Just for a few days until the dose rates subside. And then 

outside of that cigar, people do not have to go anywhere at all. 

If you could get everybody to know where they are, are they in 

zone one, two or three, and you could get them to do the right thing 

you could save an awful lot of anguish and lives. 

But that is the right thing. That is the right mental picture for 

our public officials to have, and there is no reason why they cannot 

have that and communicate that. 

Getting people to do the optimal thing is another matter. 

I wanted to add one other thing. You mentioned communication, 

which is also kind of a technical fact. But when a nuclear weapon 

is exploded at altitude, it creates something called an electromagnetic pulse, which is in all of the movies, and it causes widespread outages of electronics. 

This is a ground burst and there is a very limited region of electromagnetic pulse. I only say that because after this bomb goes off 

you will turn on the radio and there will be a lot of radio stations 

on the air and you can listen to WTOP. This is not that old 1950s 

circumstance that Senator Collins was mentioning where you 

turned on the radio and there was a little beep and it said this is 

an emergency message. 

All the media will be on. You can turn your television on, your 

television will be on. You can turn your radio on. So there will be 

an abundance of opportunity for public officials to get the right 

message across, and so there is no technical reason why people 

cannot get information that they need. 

Mr. GIBB. Could I just add something? 

Senator CARPER. A closing word. Go ahead, Mr. Gibb. 

Mr. GIBB. The plume projection is not the end all. That gives decisionmakers early information, if they know what the source term 

was, about where the plume probably is. But you have to go out 

and find it. You have to go out and determine using radiological instrumentation where the radiation is and where it is not and factor 

that back in to make sure your protective actions are good enough. 

You have to confirm that the places that you are sending people 

to, there is no radiation there. So that the plume projections we absolutely rely on in the first instance. But marshaling the Federal, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
104 

State and local resources to go out and do the on-the-ground assessments to know where the radiation is. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks to each of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much to this panel. I feel it 

is my obligation as Chairman to certify for the record that during 

the 1950s Senator Collins was a very little girl. 

Senator COLLINS. That is true. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Probably very good too. 

Your testimony was excellent. I cannot thank this panel enough. 

This was very informed, methodical and it was not intended to 

panic anybody but just deal with the realities. You made a lot of 

very good suggestions in your written testimony which you presented to us this morning. So I cannot thank you enough. 

Your reward for this extraordinary testimony will be that we will 

be back in touch with you to ask you to help us shape the response 

legislatively and perhaps to help shape the response of the Executive Branch as well. 

We are going to leave the record of the hearing open for 15 days. 

If any of the Members want to submit questions to you in writing 

or if you want to add anything to your testimony in writing. 

In the meantime I thank you again, very much, for what you contributed. 

Senator Collins, do you want to say anything? 

Senator COLLINS. No, thank you. Excellent hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(105) 

NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PROVIDING MEDICAL 

CARE AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS 

IN THE AFTERMATH 

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. This is the fourth in a series of hearings in which we are exploring our country’s capacity 

to react to a terrorist detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city. 

Some may think that it is effectively impossible that terrorists 

could acquire such a devastating weapon, but our previous hearings have shown that terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons—that desire is clear and their capacity to do so is real. 

At our last hearing, we learned that a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon 

blast in a major American city would have a devastating effect on 

life and property, but we also learned something that at least for 

me was counterintuitive, which was that much of the city would 

probably survive. The effect on the area of direct impact would be 

horrific. Thousands and thousands would be killed. But we also 

learned that outside that area of direct impact in a major American 

city, thousands and thousands more can be saved if we are prepared to respond quickly and effectively. 

Helping survivors in and around the blast area will require a 

planned, prepared, and coordinated response by all levels of government. The Federal Government will have to bring all of its capabilities to the area that has been attacked quickly because local 

government will inevitably be overwhelmed. As our witnesses will 

make clear today, we do not presently have either enough coordinated planning or enough assets in place to respond adequately to 

a terrorist nuclear attack. In other words, we are not ready to save 

the thousands of American lives we know can be saved in the 

dreadful event of a nuclear terrorist attack on an American city. 

For example, we know that among the survivors will be many 

burn victims, but on any given day we also know that there are 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
106 

only 200 open burn beds across our entire Nation. We know that 

our medical surge capacity is grossly insufficient, but we have no 

plan for dealing with these kinds of casualties, certainly not in 

these kinds of numbers. That has to change. 

The sad truth is that many of our most valuable resources across 

the Nation will go unused in a nuclear catastrophe because of a 

lack of prior planning and coordination. We must decide before an 

attack how we can bring the entire Nation’s resources to bear as 

quickly as possible, including some that are the focus of our hearing this morning, such as medical care, mobile care facilities, and 

pharmaceutical supplies. We need to find innovative ways to treat 

people in alternative settings until they can be safely transferred 

to traditional hospital settings. We must integrate and utilize medical volunteers, but first, of course, we have got to undertake a 

frank assessment of what our medical surge capability is across the 

private, civilian, and military sectors of our country. 

We know that we will need to feed and shelter a large number 

of people who are not injured but who have been forced from their 

homes. This morning, the American Red Cross, the largest provider 

of shelter and feeding in disasters, will tell us that it has been 

forced to cut its national staff by 40 percent because of shrinking 

resources available to it, and that leaves not just the Red Cross, 

but America even less prepared to deal with a disaster or catastrophe of the kind we are discussing than we were just a short time 

ago. We need to make sure that the Red Cross and other national 

and community-based organizations are included in planning efforts, and I think based on Mr. Becker’s testimony, we need to 

begin to ask ourselves whether the Federal Government should be 

giving direct Federal financial assistance to the Red Cross, because 

it is obviously carrying out a public function. 

We need to ask tough questions as to how we are going to decontaminate a large number of people so they do not make other displaced citizens sick. We have got to integrate the logistical and 

supply capabilities of our Federal and private partners with the 

volunteer organizations that are actually supplying the beds, the 

bread, and the emotional comfort. 

And then we have to acknowledge that the single most effective 

way to save lives immediately after a nuclear explosion may be 

through effective communications. You need to have systems in 

place to advise people in and around the area of the radioactive 

plume whether they should stay put or evacuate. This determination must be made almost immediately and must be disseminated 

without delay through media networks that will reach the whole 

public in terms that everyone can understand. We cannot wait, and 

we certainly cannot rely on canned, untested messages when the 

stakes are so high. 

Finally, we must acknowledge that the government cannot do it 

all. We have got to convince the American people to be prepared, 

to accept the fact that they are responsible in some measure for 

their own family’s preparedness in all the ways that we have discussed. These preparations, of course, will be useful not just in case 

of a terrorist nuclear attack, but also a chemical or biological attack, or a natural disaster that forces people to shelter in place 

until help arrives. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
107 

The bottom line is that we know now that the possibility of a terrorist attack using nuclear weapons within the United States of 

America, while it is hard to absorb, is definitely a real possibility. 

So we must begin asking the tough questions and then making the 

right preparations because the Day After will be too late. 

That is why we hold these hearings. That is why we are grateful 

to have the experts who are with us as witnesses today, and why 

when these hearings are over we look forward to presenting recommendations both to our colleagues in Congress and to the Executive Branch of government, and indeed even to the private sector, 

to see how we can best work together to prepare for these dreadful 

possibilities. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This Committee’s 

earlier hearings explored the frightening possibility that terrorists 

could detonate a nuclear bomb in an American city. With a nuclear 

device small enough to be transported in a truck, terrorists could 

inflict thousands of casualties and cause terrible destruction. 

As I indicated at our last hearing, our top priority must be to improve the diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts that 

limit nuclear proliferation, safeguard weapons-grade nuclear material, and thwart terrorist plots. If detection and interception fail, 

however, we simply must be ready for the aftermath. 

Half a century ago, Cold War duck-and-cover drills and signs 

marking subways as shelters were widely seen as futile gestures 

given the nuclear missiles that would fly in an all-out U.S.-Soviet 

war. But a terrorist attack on a large American city would likely 

be a different scenario. A ground-level detonation of a 10-kiloton 

device equivalent to 10,000 tons of TNT, and small by the morbid 

standards of these weapons, would destroy nearly everything within a half-mile radius. But as the Chairman indicated, we have 

learned that large portions of the target city would still be standing 

and would contain hundreds of thousands of survivors. 

Today, then, we examine the urgent question of what would have 

to be done quickly and effectively to aid those survivors. We know 

that great numbers of people would need decontamination, medical 

care, food, shelter, and social services. Most would need guidance 

on sheltering in place versus evacuation. First responders and medical personnel would need to know where to deploy. 

Effective planning and training for a large-scale and well-coordinated mass care response are vital. This effort requires coordination among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of 

Defense (DOD), State and local emergency managers, first responders, and key players in the private sector. 

This Committee heard compelling testimony on the need for response planning last October when Dr. Tara O’Toole of the Center 

for Biodiversity in Pittsburgh testified on our lack of readiness to 

respond to a bioterrorism attack. Well, many of the challenges are 

very similar. Dr. O’Toole cautioned us that we simply were not 

ready to respond. She also told us that a nuclear or biological attack, including the fear of subsequent attacks, are the only two 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
108 

kinds of assaults that could really destabilize the United States of 

America. 

Responding to that threat will require more than deploying first 

responders and materials. In the chaotic and terrifying aftermath 

of a nuclear blast, providing timely, accurate, and actionable information would literally be a matter of life and death. People would 

need to know what has happened, where to find help, whether 

their immediate circumstances dictate evacuation or sheltering in 

place, and what to do next to protect themselves and their families. 

How important would it be to communicate accurate, trusted information? For people gripped by an overwhelming urge to flee, it 

could be critical, and most people would be gripped by an overwhelming urge to flee. The Department of Homeland Security has 

calculated that people who would try to flee Washington in the first 

24 hours after a terrorist nuclear attack could expose themselves 

to seven times the radiation of those who shelter for just 3 days 

in their basements before leaving. I would wage that very few people in this city know that critical fact. 

The real life importance of effective crisis communication was 

also illustrated in the Three-Mile Island nuclear reactor core incident in Pennsylvania in 1979. Dartmouth College physicist John 

Kemeny headed a presidential commission to investigate the response. The Kemeny Commission report found confusion and weakness among information sources and a lack of understanding 

among many reporters that resulted in the public being poorly 

served. A commission task force noted problems including delayed 

or incorrect information, conflicting official statements, overly technical statements, and a lack of coordination. These problems aggravated public confusion, fear, and emotional stress, consequences 

that obviously would have been far more serious if the Three-Mile 

Island incident had caused any casualties. 

A terrorist nuclear attack would give us the worst of both worlds, 

mass casualties and the response problems surpassing those of 

Hurricane Katrina plus the dangerous invisible threat of nuclear 

radiation. Clearly, our response plans for mass care, food, shelter, 

and accurate communication must be in place. They cannot succeed 

without a carefully planned system for giving people clear and accurate information. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership on this important 

subject and I look forward to hearing our witnesses. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins, for 

that excellent opening statement. 

We are pleased to have such a good group of witnesses before us 

and we will begin with Dr. Irwin Redlener, who returns. He is a 

recidivist at this Committee. 

Dr. REDLENER. Exactly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. He is Director of the Center for Disaster 

Preparedness and a Professor at Columbia University in New York. 

Dr. Redlener, thank you. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
109 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Redlener appears in the Appendix on page 463. 

TESTIMONY OF IRWIN REDLENER, M.D.,1 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, MAILMAN 

SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Dr. REDLENER. Thanks, Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins. 

Senator, among the most concerning realities of our Nation’s disaster planning agenda in general has been the apparent failure to 

grasp or develop adequate plans to mitigate and respond to a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon. At this point in time, I am 

sorry to say that few, if any, major U.S. urban centers have taken 

on the admittedly daunting challenge of planning for a meaningful 

public health response to a nuclear detonation, even if they have 

actively and effectively planned for other types of natural or terrorrelated disasters. 

This Committee has previously heard testimony addressing the 

consequences of nuclear terrorism, so I will focus on, first, understanding the impediments that inhibit rational response planning 

for the nuclear threat, the notion of survivability, and finally, what 

the Congress might be able to do to alleviate some of these barriers. 

One important reason that we have neglected nuclear terrorism 

is the persistence of three long-held misconceptions or myths regarding nuclear threats in the age of terrorism. It is not just a matter of capacity, it is a matter of mindset. 

First of all, there is the myth of extreme improbability. This 

issue was introduced in previous hearings here, but I will tell you 

that I commonly hear emergency planners say something on the 

order of, nuclear terrorism is highly improbable and we want to 

focus on those disasters that are more likely to occur. But unfortunately, like other terror threats, there is simply no reliable means 

of determining probability with respect to when or if a terrorist 

might detonate a nuclear weapon in a location seen to be high 

value. So it is virtually impossible to objectively compare relative 

risks of nuclear terrorism for New York or Washington or Los Angeles versus other large-scale disasters. 

The second is the myth of planning futility. Unique among potential disaster scenarios, radiological events, particularly nuclear explosions, are shrouded in a special level of dread that is deeply 

rooted in images developed, and understandably so, during the 

Cold War, as you mentioned. From 1945 through the 1980s, vast 

arsenals of mega-ton-level nuclear weapons were amassed by the 

Soviet Union and its allies on one side and the United States and 

its allies on the other, and at its peak, more than 60,000 nuclear 

warheads were in the combined arsenals, and an attack or a perceived attack by one side would trigger a counterattack by the 

other and thousands of high-yield nuclear weapons would indeed 

have obliterated the two major antagonists and many other countries, as well. 

So it is this vision of the nuclear armageddon that has been sustained well beyond the end of the Cold War to the point where it 

has actually permeated and deeply seated itself in the public consciousness. In fact, this perspective has actually impaired the vision of planners as well as citizens, many of whom have adopted 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
110 

a sense of fatalism and hopelessness rather than take the rational 

steps necessary to ensure maximum survival in the event of nuclear terrorism. 

The counterpoint, however, is that while all-out nuclear war with 

the Soviets truly would not have been survivable in any meaningful way, nuclear terrorism, as both of you have pointed out, on the 

other hand, that would deploy a single relatively low-yield smuggled or crudely constructed bomb, while fatal for many citizens, to 

be sure, would be survivable by many more people if we plan appropriately. 

The third myth, which is most important, I think, for this Committee, is the myth of Federal rescue, or put another way, that the 

cavalry is not on its way. First, it is clear that the public at large 

harbors entirely unreasonable expectations regarding the rapidity 

and efficiency of disaster response systems in general. A study conducted last year by our own National Center in New York showed 

that more than one in three Americans believe that in the event 

of a catastrophic disaster, help would arrive within one hour, and 

in fact, something like two-thirds of Americans think that help 

would arrive in the first few hours no matter what the catastrophe 

was. These beliefs persist in spite of information from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Red Cross, and many 

other organizations that help may not be on the scene for more 

than a day under many scenarios, and in some cases, the public is 

asked to be able to survive and self-care for 72 hours or more. 

But it is not just the citizens who have these beliefs. Unrealistic 

expectations may also be seen among professional disaster planners. In fact, there is a widely-held belief that Federal teams will 

somehow be immediately available to assist local efforts in managing and maybe overseeing the consequences of nuclear terrorism. 

And certainly while it is true that Federal response teams from a 

wide range of agencies, including the Departments of Defense and 

Energy, do exist, many operate in the capacity of law enforcement 

or counterterrorism and military response. But relatively few assets can be expected to provide timely, very large-scale medical 

triage, major hospital care, and so forth. 

The National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civilian Support Teams, for instance, are available for rapid assessment and technical advice, but not to add appreciably to the actual 

medical response capacity. And on the civilian side, the National 

Medical Response Team, consisting of 60 highly trained medical 

and technical specialists, is available and trained to enter hot zones 

for decontamination of affected patients, but they would be a drop 

in a very large bucket. 

That said, in last month’s testimony before this Committee, John 

Gibb of New York State’s Emergency Management Office said there 

is no ready system in place or planned that will result in victims 

from this type of event receiving pre-hospital or definitive care in 

any reasonable time frame. New York, like all other States, has on 

some level realized that substantial response capacity to nuclear 

terrorism is simply not available within their own borders and 

their only hope is to count on Federal resources. 

Unfortunately, in my judgment, there is something akin to utter 

confusion out there with respect to the role of the Federal GovernVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
111 

ment around planning for and response to a nuclear detonation. 

There is little understanding, for instance, of how and when Federal resources, DOD and civilian-based, are deployed and under 

what legal authorities. In addition, there remains substantial confusion about operational capacity in terms of personnel, expertise, 

medical countermeasures, and so forth. We have every reason to 

believe that even if the total Federal capacity was coordinated, it 

would be insufficient to meet the needs of potentially hundreds of 

thousands of nuclear survivors with trauma, burns, and radiation 

injuries. 

I would like to say a word or two about this notion of survival 

that both of you touched on, and it is really a very straightforward 

concept that should be guiding our preparedness efforts. As was 

made abundantly clear from the testimonies heard in previous panels, the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon during a work 

day in downtown Washington, DC, or New York would immediately 

kill 100,000 to several hundred thousand people. But really, in scenarios like this, within a radius of a half-a-mile from ground zero, 

it is truly a lethal zone and there is no survival possible. From a 

half a mile to two miles, we are still seeing extraordinary fatalities 

and life-threatening injuries. And then beyond eight to 10 miles, 

we have a relatively safe zone in terms of prompt injuries and fatalities. It is that gray zone, almost like a nuclear gray zone, between two miles and eight miles where the survival of hundreds of 

thousands of people will be directly affected by the degree of planning and citizen awareness that we have put in place. 

The planned strategies for optimal survival, and you have 

touched on a couple of them, have to do with an informed emergency response system, including among Federal agencies and voluntary organizations, an appropriately stocked shelter system, and 

other ideas and strategies that I won’t detail. 

But I want to conclude with a couple of remarks about planning 

for nuclear terrorism from the Federal perspective. While the prevention of catastrophic terrorism through sophisticated intelligence 

gathering, counterterrorism measures, and detection is the ideal 

solution, this will never be foolproof no matter what steps are 

taken. In the meantime, Congress should strongly consider expanding funding and support for four key measures. 

First of all, we need to enhance our understanding of the barriers 

to nuclear preparedness planning. As I said in the beginning, this 

is not just about resources and capacity. It is about changing a 

mindset that will actually allow planners to do what they need to 

do. 

Second, we need a lot more support for research on the critical 

workforce needs and resiliency of populations in order to make sure 

that our plans are based on provable, objective criteria that would 

actually work under the scenarios that we are talking about. 

Third, we need to provide States and at-risk urban areas with 

greatly enhanced stockpiling and distribution capacity for medical 

countermeasures as well as a contingency system needed to assure 

availability of emergency care for injured survivors. There is just 

no way that the vast majority, or any, really, of our major urban 

areas can handle this on their own. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
112 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Helfand with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

469. 

And finally, we need to substantially bolster the capacity and 

clarify the authority of the Federal Government to deploy massive 

resources in the event of a nuclear terror attack anywhere in the 

Nation, and I think we have compounded the problem by allowing 

this confusion and legal questions to persist while we are trying to 

understand how we would best and most effectively deploy Federal 

resources to help the cities and States, which obviously would not 

be able to handle such an event on their own. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Redlener. That was an excellent beginning. 

Our next witness is Dr. Ira Helfand, who is the Co-Founder and 

Past President of Physicians for Social Responsibility. Thanks for 

being here. 

TESTIMONY OF IRA HELFAND, M.D.,1 CO-FOUNDER AND PAST 

PRESIDENT, PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 

Dr. HELFAND. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins, for allowing me to share my concerns this morning about the 

lack of preparation for nuclear terrorism and also to share with you 

some suggestions I have for improving our preparedness. 

The threat has been clear to us for some time and I think the 

thing that is most perplexing is why we have not acted more aggressively at the Federal level. Even before September 11, early in 

2001, the Department of Energy task force warned that the most 

urgent national security threat to the United States today is the 

danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home. 

That was more than 7 years ago and we still, at this point, do not 

have a plan in place. 

I have a number of specific recommendations that I would like 

to make, but if I could, I would like to just very briefly go over a 

scenario that I am going to be working from. In October of 2001, 

shortly after September 11, 2001, the British Medical Journal 

asked me and several of my colleagues at Physicians for Social 

Responsiblity (PSR) to prepare a description of the medical effects 

of a nuclear terrorist attack. The conclusions are similar to those 

which both of you have alluded to and which Dr. Redlener has referred to, as well. Just to be precise, because the recommendations 

that I am going to offer flow from the scenario, we assume that a 

terrorist attack involved the shipment of a nuclear device about 

Hiroshima-size to the Port of New York and that this device was 

detonated in the harbor before the ship actually docked. This is 

not, I need to emphasize, a worst-case scenario because much of 

the blast effect in this attack is dissipated over the Hudson River. 

But nonetheless, the blast in our model would kill 52,000 people 

directly from heat and mechanical injury. An additional 238,000 

people would be exposed to radiation emanating directly from the 

explosion. Of these, 44,000 would suffer radiation sickness and 

10,000 would receive lethal doses of radiation from which they 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
113 

could not recover. These acute casualties would occur no matter 

what we had done to prepare for a terrorist attack. But there 

would be several thousand people with burns and mechanical injuries who could survive if we had done our planning well and there 

would also be tens of thousands of people with radiation sickness 

who are in that category. 

In addition, another 1.5 million people would be exposed to radioactive fallout from the explosion, not the direct radiation coming 

out of the bomb itself but the fallout that this ground-level blast 

would generate. A million-and-a-half people would be exposed to 

this fallout across Manhattan, Queens, and Long Island. As many 

as 200,000 people in this group would die if they were not safely 

evacuated or sheltered. But if they were protected, they could survive, and that is the crux of the issue. 

As catastrophic as this attack had been, and this is a point which 

you both made, a terrorist attack would not necessarily be fatal to 

everyone. Many people could be saved if we had done our planning 

properly. 

There are two broad goals that we need to take into account in 

doing our preparation. One is to minimize casualties and the other 

is to care for those who do get injured despite our efforts to protect 

them. 

With regard to minimizing casualties, the most important task in 

terms of the number of lives saved is to protect people from avoidable radiation exposure. In most situations, that would involve getting people to shelter, as Senator Collins has talked about, getting 

them to go into the basement or the first story of the building that 

they are in and stay there for 72 to 96 hours. But in some cases, 

depending on local conditions and particularly on the local weather 

conditions, it might be better to try to evacuate these people. And 

so the first thing we need to do is to have in place a clearly designated central coordinating authority to make that decision, to determine do we shelter or do we evacuate. 

Second, we need to establish clear criteria to guide this authority 

in making that decision. This is not going to be a good time for improvising. We have to have a clear set of guidelines for under what 

circumstances you would adopt which course of action. 

Third, there needs to be a clear chain of command to carry out 

that decision once it is made. We believe that authority needs to 

be Federal and needs to be vested in the Secretary of Homeland 

Security or his or her designee. We also need to have in place the 

resources to manage an evacuation or to support a population sheltering in their basements for several days. Most of these people 

will not have stockpiles of food or water. It will be necessary for 

adequately protected personnel to deliver these materials on a massive scale. In the New York model that was published in the British Medical Journal, we would be talking of several million people 

who would need this kind of support. 

We also need to have in place the means of effectively communicating to people in order to evacuate or in order to shelter in 

place, and we need to do enough prior education, as Senator Collins 

suggested, so that people ordered to shelter in place will know that 

this is a wise thing to do and won’t just jump in their car and try 

to drive away as fast as they can. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
114 

With regard to caring for the people who are injured despite our 

best efforts, we have to understand that there will be tens of thousands in that category and we need to provide both the personnel, 

the facilities, and the medical supplies to take care of them. 

With regard to personnel, we need to develop an adequate National Disaster Medical System. Currently, the Health and Human 

Services Department maintains some 50 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) of doctors, nurses, and other health professionals. The concept is right, but the existing system must be 

greatly expanded to be able to deal with a disaster on the scale of 

a terrorist attack. 

Even if we were able to successfully protect most people from radiation exposure, in the scenario that we have developed, there 

would be 44,000 cases of radiation sickness caused by the radiation 

coming directly from the explosion and several thousand people 

with crush injuries and burn injuries, about 50,000 patients in all. 

A Level One DMAT is supposed to be able to care for 250 patients, 

and that implies that we would need to have as many as 200 

DMATs available and on stand-by at all times. At the current time, 

there are 50 and only a small fraction are actually on stand-by at 

any given moment. 

In addition, we need to establish a mechanism for quickly mobilizing existing military medical teams and for rapidly integrating 

volunteer health professionals. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, 

many traveled to New Orleans and couldn’t be used because the 

mechanisms weren’t in place to absorb them. 

With regard to facilities, it is critically important that hospitals 

not be the site of triage and first care. I work in an emergency 

room (ER). My ER, like most ERs, is packed all the time. An influx 

of frantic, wounded people from a nuclear explosion would just shut 

the place down. We would be able to do nothing. Rather, instead 

of bringing people to the ERs, we need to set up a system of Disaster Medical Care Centers at community sites that are easily accessible by ambulances, by patients, and by care providers. Things 

like convention centers and sports facilities are possible candidates 

for this role. Again, using the British Medical Journal scenario, we 

would need to have these facilities able to care for approximately 

50,000 people. 

We would recommend that centers of this sort be established in 

high-risk urban areas, such as New York and Washington. Planning for these centers would need to take into account the fact that 

the centers might well be destroyed in the blast or that they might 

lie in areas that are heavily contaminated with radiation, and so 

we probably need to have several different centers in a major metropolitan area. 

And in addition, we would need to establish mobile field hospitals to be used in case the Disaster Medical Care Centers were 

taken out in the initial attack, or if terrorists chose to attack a lesslikely target that we hadn’t planned for—Oklahoma City or Portland or Hartford, someplace where a Disaster Medical Care Center 

might not have been built. These mobile field hospitals would obviously be dual-use and they would be quite valuable to use in civilian natural disasters like hurricanes or an earthquake in California, as well. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
115 

Finally, with regard to supplies, DMATs, we have to understand, 

have enough equipment to take care of their patients for 72 hours, 

and this is clearly not enough. Patients with radiation sickness, 

with burns, require enormous amounts of medical equipment—intravenous fluids, pain medication, blood products, and so on. We 

need to have adequate stockpiles of these materials available because the DMATs’ supplies will be quickly exhausted. And again, 

we need to have supplies on hand to deal with tens of thousands 

of people, understanding that many of these people are going to require intensive care for weeks, if not months. 

Also, we will need to preposition radiation protection monitoring 

equipment for people to use in dealing with the situation that they 

are going to be facing. 

If we believe that the nuclear threat is real and if we are truly 

committed to doing what is needed, these are some of the specific 

steps which I believe we need to put in place. They are going to 

involve a lot of work, but they are not rocket science. They do, however, need to be implemented. To that end, PSR would recommend 

that the Homeland Security Department establish a working group 

that is charged with implementing these measures in a short and 

specified time frame, probably no more than 6 months. 

In closing, if I could, I would like to make two final points. First, 

even with the very best of planning, a nuclear terrorist attack 

would clearly be a catastrophe which is without precedent in our 

national history and with consequences we can barely imagine. 

While we must plan on how to deal with the aftermath, it is even 

more important that we focus on prevention. Specifically, we must 

take steps to limit the availability of nuclear weapons and fissile 

material by upgrading the security at all sites where these materials are stored. We have been working on this problem for more 

than a decade and we have made some substantial progress, but 

we need to get the job finished. 

Second, as important as is the threat of nuclear terrorism, I 

think we have to understand that this is not the greatest nuclear 

threat that we face. Nuclear weapons states still possess more than 

20,000 nuclear weapons. Several thousand of those in the U.S. and 

Russian arsenals are on hair-trigger alert. They can be fired in 15 

minutes. A study that PSR prepared just a few years ago showed 

that if only 300 of those warheads hit American cities, they would 

kill 100 million people in the first 30 minutes and our Nation 

would effectively cease to exist. 

I think that it is urgently in the security interest of the United 

States to eliminate all of these nuclear weapons, and to that end, 

the United States must lead all nuclear weapon states in meeting 

our legal obligations under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to set a time table for reducing and ultimately eliminating these weapons. 

Thanks very much again for the opportunity to speak with you 

this morning. I would be happy to answer any questions you might 

have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Helfand. That was very helpful, particularly the specificity of your recommendations about 

what might be done now, including beginning with a working group 

at DHS. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
116 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Becker with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

511. 

Joseph Becker is the Senior Vice President for Preparedness and 

Response at the American Red Cross and we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. BECKER,1 SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, DISASTER SERVICES, AMERICAN RED CROSS 

Mr. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. I 

lead the American Red Cross Disaster Relief, and I appreciate the 

opportunity to share in this conversation today on such an important issue. My comments are from the perspective of a non-governmental organization (NGO), and my focus will be on the issue of 

mass care in the early days of an event. 

In addition to what the speakers before me have contributed, I 

would add more observations about our country’s readiness to respond. While delivering medical assistance will be the greatest 

challenge following an attack, delivering mass care for the well will 

have its own tremendous challenges. 

I would like to be very clear up front. The Nation is not ready 

to respond to an attack involving a nuclear device. We have the 

supplies and resources to provide mass care spread across this 

country, and those services include feeding, sheltering, distributing 

supplies, emergency first aid, mental health, and reuniting families. We have the supplies that an event like this would require, 

but there are unique consequences that a nuclear event would 

present that would make a response incredibly difficult and I hope 

today’s hearing will enhance our collective efforts in finding solutions for these challenges. 

It is important to distinguish between our ability to deliver mass 

care on the scale needed and our ability to deliver mass care in the 

environment of a nuclear terrorist incident. When you look at the 

example that we have been using with 300,000 displaced, 100,000 

requiring shelters, a million meals a day required to feed the people, and unknown numbers that need basic supplies, a planning 

presumption that may or may not be accurate is that these people 

will evacuate over a wide area and need care across quite a few 

States. Can we feed and shelter and care for that number of people 

in this scenario? Yes, we have the national capabilities that exceed 

those requirements, but as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, the ability to move those effectively into the affected area and coordinate 

that response is not in place. 

If this were a natural disaster, like a hurricane, where we had 

advance notice and could plan our response and move people and 

resources ahead, we could ensure a swift response on this scale. 

But a nuclear scenario is going to be very different. In a no-notice 

terrorist incident, it is going to take too long to scale the response. 

Two key variables are going to determine how well we do. The 

first is what buildings survive and if they are usable for shelters. 

The availability of large auditoriums, arenas, or other mega-shelters will largely dictate the success of the sheltering operation. 

Whether the needed shelter buildings survive the blast and are 

safe to use is doubtful. And for those who flee, what capacities are 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
117 

in the other cities and States that they go to? That will dictate how 

long it takes to get the shelter and feeding to scale in a no-notice 

event. 

Second, if the facilities are available, will the volunteers that are 

needed show up? Mass care is delivered by volunteers, not paid responders, and we have no experience, we have no data that will tell 

us if they are willing to put themselves potentially in harm’s way 

and serve. In many cases, paid first responders have served in uncertain environments. We do not know about volunteers. 

And here is where it gets harder. Assume we have enough big 

buildings or that we can move people to where they are. Assume 

that nearby supplies survive the blast and that we can bring more 

in quickly, and those are big assumptions, and assume that volunteers step forward to immediately care for those in need. Even if 

the people in the buildings and the supplies survive and we can 

use them quickly, there are other limiting factors that are going to 

present huge challenges. Very quickly, there are five more issues 

in a nuclear event that we are not ready to deal with as a country. 

The most worrisome aspect of the response, and you indicated it, 

is public information. The national capacity to deliver timely and 

appropriate public messages in a nuclear scenario is not in place. 

We have repeatedly demonstrated in drills and exercises an inability to quickly decide on and deliver the right message and have it 

be a consistent message to the public. Should I shelter in place? 

Should I go? What should I do? It takes too long to produce public 

information from Federal sources and local authorities are each on 

their own in the earliest hours to give appropriate direction to citizens. The obvious result will be conflicting information and public 

confusion during an event. 

Second is citizen preparedness. We have not made a large and 

effective investment in telling American citizens ahead of time 

what to do in such an event. We need to make it easy for Americans to know and have available in advance what steps to take in 

a nuclear event. The information has been developed. Great pieces 

exist. But the average family has no understanding and will rely 

on just-in-time information, which we agree is going to be confusing, at best. 

A third very critical limiting factor is decontamination. Decontamination capabilities vary widely from city to city, and you will 

remember that a basic premise in any community plan is that the 

shelter should not allow its citizens in until they have passed 

through decontamination. If the decontamination doesn’t happen in 

a short period of time, which is likely to be the case, you will have 

large numbers of people standing outside of a shelter desperate to 

get out from under what is falling from the sky. Law enforcement 

is going to have little option but to let them in, perhaps compromising the integrity of the shelters. Shelters will become the focal 

point of public anxiousness and anger during an event. And it is 

also very plausible that people with particular needs, people with 

disabilities, and people with no transportation are not going to get 

the right care. 

The fourth issue for mass care in a nuclear terrorism event is 

going to be the duration. As we saw in Hurricane Katrina, when 

large numbers of people are cared for in shelters and there are no 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
118 

empty motels and no vacant housing, short-term shelters become 

long-term housing and that is not an appropriate way to care for 

citizens for months and months and months after a disaster. We 

need a national housing strategy and it needs to have a menu of 

approved options that we can move quickly to after a disaster. Absent a housing strategy, a large public building with a cot and a 

blanket and a caring volunteer is going to be my home for way too 

long. 

My final observation is that we tend to treat building readiness 

for a scenario like this as a one-time event. One-time purchases of 

supplies and equipment are needed, but this is an ongoing expense. 

Mass care is delivered by volunteers. For catastrophic mass care 

delivery, a state of readiness requires a large number of volunteers 

to be trained and ready to respond. Volunteers are not free. 

In addition to those five observations, I come with three appeals. 

The first has to do with worker protection. As I said, mass care is 

delivered by volunteers and the country needs to protect these people who step forward to serve the public good. These are health 

care volunteers, mass care workers, and others who suffer longterm medical consequences. We need to agree in advance that the 

government will step in and protect workers from the health risks 

that they may face in a pandemic environment or a chemical or biological event or other catastrophic disasters. This is not just a Red 

Cross issue. This is a sector issue and all the volunteers that step 

forward need to be protected. If we want them to show up, we have 

to provide this. 

Second, we need to consider organizational protections for the 

NGO sector. I will use the Red Cross as an example. In a chemical 

or biological event, we will be asked to put volunteers in potentially 

dangerous circumstances and the people who they are serving. This 

could result in future claims against nonprofit organizations and 

we need protection from those claims so that we can supply the 

needed volunteers and catastrophic response. 

Third, the Red Cross recognizes the importance of government 

funding for NGOs to build the capacity to respond to large-scale 

events, and I appreciate your comments to that effect, Mr. Chairman. Our work is made possible by public donations, and the public is very generous in funding our large-scale responses. But asking donors to pay for warehouses, call centers, IT systems, and the 

like, that is another matter, and it is unrealistic to expect public 

donations on the scale required to keep the state of readiness that 

is needed. We do need government help with this. 

To offer some insight into the amount of money it would take, 

in December 2004, the Red Cross prepared a report for DHS entitled, ‘‘Mass Care Implementation Requirements For the Catastrophic Incident Supplement.’’ This report addressed the needs of 

responding to catastrophic disasters, what it would take to feed 

and shelter 300,000 people for a 90-day period across 30 metro 

areas. The total cost in 2004 was estimated at approximately $180 

million just for the first 5 years. 

Now, the Red Cross has invested considerably in its readiness in 

the last years, but preparing for this type of event remains extraordinarily complex and increasingly expensive. While significant investments have been made in government since September 11, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
119 

1The Red Cross report submitted by Mr. Becker appears in the Appendix on page 517. 

2The prepared statement of Mr. Ullyot with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

543. 

2001, such government investments do not build the needed mass 

care capability of the country. I would ask, please, to put that mass 

care cost analysis from 2004 in the record, if I could.1

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. Thank you. 

Mr. BECKER. Last, Mr. Chairman, the Red Cross is obligated 

under the National Response Framework (NRF) to have staff in 

FEMA regional offices as well as people to support Federal agencies with which we partner in time of disaster. The costs to coordinate with State and Federal Government would be about $7 million 

annually, and while these positions bring value to the community’s 

response, they were not sustainable under our current budget, as 

you indicated earlier. We respectfully request that Congress authorize and appropriate funding to cover these critical positions, as 

well. A state of readiness requires mass care coordination between 

the Red Cross and the Federal Government and this has a price. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, thank you so much for the opportunity to share thoughts on this important topic, and I look forward 

to your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Becker. Again, very specifically helpful testimony. 

Our final witness on the panel is John Ullyot, a Senior Vice 

President at Hill and Knowlton who will discuss crisis communications. He is thoroughly prepared to do this since he previously 

worked for Senator Warner, no stranger to crises—— 

Mr. ULLYOT. Absolutely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. As Director of Communications for the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is good to see 

you, and thank you for your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN ULLYOT,2 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

MEDIA RELATIONS AND ISSUES MANAGEMENT, HILL AND 

KNOWLTON, INC. 

Mr. ULLYOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Members of the Committee. I am pleased to testify in front of you 

today on behalf of Hill and Knowlton as this panel examines the 

issue of nuclear terrorism and providing a strategy for clear communications that will save as many lives as possible in the aftermath of such an event. 

As the Committee has already received a copy of my formal testimony, I will devote my time before you today to summarizing the 

main points, and I will be happy to address the Committee’s questions after that. 

This Committee has taken a real leadership role in ensuring that 

our Nation is as prepared as possible for nuclear terrorism and 

other large-scale emergencies. Likewise, the Administration with 

the Department of Homeland Security in the lead has made solid 

efforts aimed at improving the means of communication in the 

event of a terrorist attack. 

My testimony today aims at delivering our perspective of best 

practices of emergency response and communications planning and 

a discussion of the forces that will affect our government’s ability 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
120 

to communicate effectively with all Americans, both in advance of 

an attack as part of a public education program, as well as in the 

event an attack occurs. We recognize in many respects our views 

are aligned with work that the Federal Government as well as 

many State and local governments, already have underway. 

It is important to note that our firm was not asked by this Committee to evaluate the current state of communications preparedness of the Federal Government but rather to give our best collective thinking as an agency with global expertise in crisis communications of how we would advise the government and this Committee on communications planning for an event of this magnitude. 

As a preface to my testimony this morning, I believe it is instructive for us to examine the events of the past 2 weeks, namely the 

natural disasters that struck Burma and China. While the death 

and destruction in these instances were not due to acts of terrorism, they carry important communications lessons. 

In Burma, where a military regime tightly controls information, 

the rest of the world struggled to learn the extent of the impact of 

the cyclone. Contrast that with the devastating earthquake that 

struck China earlier this week, where the broad access to wireless 

and digital communications, including cell phone, cameras, and 

streaming video, meant that vast amounts of information flowed 

across China and around the world. 

We believe these efforts offer a cautionary tale for those of us involved in communications planning. The fact of the matter is that 

because of such new technology, we need to be prepared for an 

overabundance of information, information that moves faster than 

any government agency, first responder, or traditional news organization can move. If such technology and information is managed 

properly, the result can save lives. If not, the outcome can be confusion, chaos, and panic. 

In today’s world, such technology cannot be controlled short of 

shutting down or disabling networks. Therefore, we need to test 

our plans and systems to ensure that they are designed for such 

a scenario in order to break through the clutter and noise. In short, 

accurate and timely information can prove as vital as shelter, medical care, and food supplies in times of disaster. 

In preparation for this hearing, our firm commissioned a nationwide survey to provide a benchmark of current awareness of issues 

relating to the scenario of the detonation of a lower-yield nuclear 

device in a major American city. An expanded version of the results 

is included in my formal testimony, but I would like to highlight 

three key findings of our research. 

First, almost half of all Americans believe they are not equipped 

today with sufficient information from the government about what 

they should do in the event of an attack. 

Second, the closer people are to an actual attack, the more likely 

they are to look to and rely on information from local emergency 

management authorities as opposed to Federal responders, authorities, leaders, and spokespeople. 

And third, of all the types of information provided in the aftermath of an attack, people surveyed placed a premium on messages 

that are accurate, giving the full facts no matter how negative, and 

then far down the line, information that is timely, and then comVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
121 

paratively fewer are interested in more abstract, general information, such as how the Nation will respond to the attack. So accuracy, no matter how negative, is what people say they are interested in in such a scenario. 

With all of this in mind, then, the question is what should the 

government focus on in the area of improving communications to 

save as many lives as possible. In my formal testimony, I devote 

a significant amount of time to discussing the following nine areas. 

For the purpose of my remarks to you this morning, however, I 

only have time to delve into a few of these, but the nine areas that 

I discussed in the formal testimony are as follows: The role of interagency coordination; pre-event message development; stakeholder 

identification; spokesperson identification and preparation; involving media and digital organizations; the importance of public-private partnerships; the importance of education and awareness efforts, which has been touched on by other panelists here; the criticality of the period immediately after an event in communications; 

and then training and lessons learned. So I will just discuss a few 

of those before concluding. 

First, on the role of interagency coordination, by establishing the 

DHS, this Committee and the Congress has long recognized the importance of the interagency approach in establishing clear lines of 

responsibility and coordination in disaster preparedness and response. The interagency approach remains just as critical in the 

area of communications planning for disasters, including in an act 

of or for an act of nuclear terrorism. 

Although we have not conducted enough analysis to make a specific recommendation to the Committee in this area, the Committee 

could consider as part of a subsequent review such issues as the 

adequacy of funding for communications planning at the interagency level, the optimum structure in the interagency for organizing that planning, and the sufficiency of emergency communications integration across all levels of government. 

Next, on spokesperson identification and preparation, as noted 

earlier, our research indicates that the closer people are to a nuclear terrorist attack, the more likely they will look to local authorities as the most trusted spokespeople and for the primary 

sources for trusted information on how to respond. What this suggests is a need for a planning approach that recognizes the literally 

hundreds or even thousands of possible local spokesmen across all 

50 States. If we are to ensure an adequate standard of communications across all of these levels and geographic areas, then a plan 

will need to be put in place to identify these possible spokesmen, 

even down to the precinct level, down to the local community level, 

together with a means of engagement, standardized training, and 

information sharing. 

Next, on involving media and digital organizations, historically, 

news media organizations have been a vital conduit of emergency 

response information, but as we saw this week, the rapid expansion 

of digital and wireless communications, cellphone cameras, wireless 

communications means that information can be sent around the 

world as it happens, bypassing government resources and spokesmen as well as the traditional news media. This speaks to the likelihood of an overwhelming demand for immediate information, parVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
122 

ticularly those directly affected, following a major incident that will 

tax even the most robust systems. 

This is not to suggest, however, that we are disregarding the influence of the traditional media. As we saw on September 11, 2001, 

in the event of a national emergency, people will tune in first to 

the broadcast media for immediate information and will return to 

it on a regular basis for updates. In fact, in times of national emergency, television networks have become the modern day version of 

the old town green where people gather to collect information and 

to share experiences. You will forgive my New England reference. 

But for these reasons—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We thought it was very clever of you. 

Mr. ULLYOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For these reasons, it is 

important our communications plans recognize the need to have a 

means of providing sufficient content and spokesmen for these networks so as to ensure a stream of accurate and contextual information. 

Equally important, we must recognize the new world order in 

which digital communications, such as cellphone cameras, blogs, 

streaming video, etc., are increasingly becoming primary sources of 

information. 

And a note on the importance of education and awareness efforts. 

As I noted earlier, and other panelists did as well, our survey 

shows that almost half of our population believes it does not have 

adequate information to deal with a scenario such as a nuclear terrorist attack. For this reason, the task of public education is second 

to none in importance, but it is also the most challenging. How do 

we connect with a population that is already suffering from information overload generally? Seven years after September 11, 2001, 

with the public becoming numb to the ongoing warnings about the 

terror threat, how do we connect with Americans without alarming 

them? And how do we break through the barriers of cynicism and 

mistrust in the wake of Hurricane Katrina? 

I would be wrong if I told you that we have the answers to these 

questions today, but we would encourage Federal, State, and local 

authorities to sustain, if not to expand, the public education and 

awareness initiatives. 

Last, on the criticality of the period immediately after an event, 

as we saw during the initial hours and days following September 

11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina, the volume of uncertainty and 

misinformation in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack may likely 

far outweigh the amount of accurate, credible, and balanced information. At the same time, this is the period of a national crisis 

when the public’s appetite for information is the most acute. 

One of the lessons from Hurricane Katrina is the need for wholly 

aligned coordination and communication among Federal, State, and 

local authorities. While politics is an inevitable force that will impact public perceptions of government response, I think we can all 

agree that the collapse of coordinated communications fed the cynicism and lack of trust in the response in Hurricane Katrina 

amongst the public and the news media. In short, the cacophony 

of Hurricane Katrina must be replaced with a symphony of communications in which all instruments work together. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
123 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, 

it has been a privilege to be able to outline our thinking for you 

as this Committee considers how governments and first responders 

at all levels can communicate most effectively to save lives in the 

event of a nuclear attack. We believe this Committee and the Department of Homeland Security have accomplished a great deal in 

terms of preparing our Nation for such an event. The opportunity 

now is to build on this progress by ensuring that the communications planning recognizes the powerful technological and societal 

forces that have fundamentally changed the manner in which the 

public receives and shares information and by identifying those remaining barriers to effective communications. 

Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ullyot. Thanks 

also to Hill and Knowlton for the resources you expended to do that 

survey. That is very helpful, and if you do not mind, we will share 

it, of course, with the Department of Homeland Security and other 

relevant agencies. 

Mr. ULLYOT. Sure. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let us do 8-minute rounds of questions, 

since it is only Senator Collins and I this morning. 

Dr. Redlener, let me begin with you. I appreciate your three 

myths that you outlined at the beginning, the extreme improbability of the event, a myth, the futility of planning, which is a 

myth, and also the myth that the Federal Government would come 

rapidly to the rescue because even though we are beginning to 

work at it, it is going to be difficult to do that quickly. But I wanted to ask you whether you agree or do not that it is nonetheless 

the Federal Government that has to stimulate, require, and support planning at the State and local levels so that they will be 

ready to come to the rescue. 

Dr. REDLENER. Well, I agree very strongly with that. We have an 

odd situation now with respect to disaster planning. A nuclear terrorist attack, for example, is in my mind a national problem—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. REDLENER [continuing]. Requiring really significant Federal 

oversight and Federal intervention, both in the planning phase and 

the response phase, because as we said, local jurisdictions cannot 

handle this at all. But we have created a system where there is a 

minimum of Federal guidance and a maximum of local discretion 

to the point that I got a call less than 2 months ago from one of 

the senior officials in New York City’s Office of Emergency Management asking if I would come down and care to discuss with 

them—they were beginning to think about what they would do in 

the event of a nuclear detonation. 

Now, many years after September 11, 2001, I think it should not 

be up to Los Angeles or Washington, DC, or Chicago or New York 

as to whether or not there will be planning and effective planning 

for nuclear terrorism. If the Federal Government as part of national security feels that those are target-potential cities, I think it 

is the Federal Government’s responsibility to figure out a way to 

override what is otherwise local discretion. So we are using a model 

that works for designing a school system, which is here is some 

Federal support, but do what you need to do in Indiana. That 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
124 

model doesn’t work when it comes to providing significant preparedness and protection for the American population around 

things like terrorism or major disasters. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Are there any governmental or private 

entities in major metropolitan areas that are involved in or beginning to plan for the response to a nuclear terrorist attack? 

Dr. REDLENER. There are some discussions in some cities 

and—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which are they? 

Dr. REDLENER. Well, New York, for one. Los Angeles is another 

one that I am aware of, and I think Washington, DC. But they are 

at a very primitive state in most of these places because they are 

dealing with unbelievable inadequacies of capacity, and really, if 

you couple that with the myths that I was talking about, you get 

people left to their own devices who would really rather talk about 

how to evacuate from a coastal storm rather than deal with a nuclear terrorist attack. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I will tell you of a confirmation hearing we held yesterday. I do not mean to highlight and focus on the 

gentleman, who is an excellent administrator, Paul Schneider. At 

his confirmation hearing yesterday for Deputy Secretary of DHS, 

he is really excellent, I asked him this question about nuclear preparedness, ‘‘Are we prepared for a nuclear terrorist attack?’’ He 

kept coming back to tell the Committee about how prepared we 

were for a hurricane. Now, part of that is that they have not gotten 

to it really, and part of it, I think, is that there is a hesitancy to 

do that. 

Do you agree that in the current organization of the Federal Government, the Department of Homeland Security is the place where 

this responsibility should be centered administratively? 

Dr. REDLENER. Let me put it this way—in the United States, we 

have a tremendous challenge of figuring out responsibilities when 

it comes to public health response—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. REDLENER [continuing]. Between HHS and DHS. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. REDLENER. That requires kind of a higher level of leadership 

to say, you have been talking between the two agencies. You have 

been talking for a couple of years now about this, and there are 

things that keep shifting back and forth. The DMATs that Dr. 

Helfand was talking about, one time they were under DHS, now 

they are under HHS, and it is just too confusing. I think we need 

to tighten that up and have some oversight that says—in a certain 

way, it does not really matter to me so much as long as one is taking full responsibility—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. REDLENER [continuing]. And there is a difference of roles between the two, but DHS could be doing a lot more. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I realized after I asked the question 

I was getting you into that ongoing controversy. What I really 

meant is not that everything will be done by the Department of 

Homeland Security, but that it will be the overall coordinating 

agency. 

Dr. REDLENER. Yes. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
125 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. For instance, it is clear that the Department of Defense will have a lot of responsibilities in response to a 

nuclear attack. But still, DHS would have that homeland response. 

Does everyone agree that DHS should be the central coordinating 

agency? 

Dr. HELFAND. Is that not what they were set up for? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, exactly. Good answer. 

Second, and Dr. Helfand, I was going to ask you this question of 

how do we organize, how do we prepare for a medical surge capacity to deal with a catastrophe of this scope? In other words, with 

all that has been said, how do we prepare on this scale because 

when we are talking about potentially tens of thousands of people 

being sick—forget for a moment the complicating factor of the need 

to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination to others—we 

just do not have the hospital space. We do not have the professional help. I mentioned the statistic about the startling shortage 

of available burn units around the country, let alone in a particular 

area that may be hit. So how do we begin to prepare a contingency 

plan for a disaster of this scope medically? 

Dr. HELFAND. Well, I think it is going to be extremely difficult, 

but the pieces are those that I suggested, I think, in my testimony. 

We need to provide first for the personnel, and the DMAT model, 

I think, is a fine one to use. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. HELFAND. We just need to expand it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We need more of them. 

Dr. HELFAND. We need more of them, and we need to have more 

of them on stand-by at any one time. 

Probably the most difficult piece is going to be the facility piece 

because as you have just correctly suggested, hospitals are already 

stuffed. They cannot take care of the patients they have now and 

there is no surge capacity. There is probably a negative surge capacity. We do not have enough space at the moment for the patients that we have now. 

I think that the only real solution to that is going to be this combination of disaster medical centers and field hospitals, and it is 

going to be sort of expensive, but it is not going to be that expensive compared to other things that we have spent money on in the 

name of protecting ourselves from terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You mean expensive in terms of having 

the stand-by capability? 

Dr. HELFAND. That is right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And part of it, I take it, is simply requiring or incentivizing local areas to think about this and designate 

facilities or sites that need to be available, and then to the extent 

that they are capable, stocking them with supplies that would be 

available. 

Dr. HELFAND. Yes. I mean, again, I am a doctor, not a government official—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. That is why you are making so much 

sense. [Laughter.] 

Dr. HELFAND [continuing]. But I think really this is not something that cities are going to do very well on their own, and I think 

this probably, as Dr. Redlener just suggested, is going to have to 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
126 

be a Federal mandate and it is going to have to take Federal funding. I cannot imagine a city facing the kinds of constraints that 

most cities face now, spending a lot of money on buying ventilators 

and medical supplies to sit in a warehouse in a sports stadium 

against this potential availability—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. For a potentiality that most people do not 

want to believe is real. 

Dr. REDLENER. That is right. So I think probably the Federal 

Government is going to have to step in, mandate it, and fund it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up on this round. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Let me pick up where the Chairman left off, Dr. Helfand. In talking about the challenge of assembling the teams of medical personnel, you outlined very well your 

vision of having field hospitals that would be in stadiums, perhaps, 

since hospitals do not have that kind of surge capabilities. As you 

said, however, we only have 50 DMATs in the country right now. 

Do we need to broaden our concept of medical personnel beyond the 

typical members of DMATs? And by this, I mean looking at people 

with medical training who are not necessarily physicians and 

nurses but might be able to assist in providing care. 

I was struck in the aftermath of the failed response to Hurricane 

Katrina by conversations that I had with home health care nurses 

who said that had they been tapped, they could have been enormously helpful in identifying individuals who were disabled and 

homebound. They know where they are because they serve them 

everyday. But no one tapped into their knowledge. No one helped 

reach out to home health nurses, who are not traditionally members of DMATs. Even those who have training in the care of animals, like veterinarians, not traditional members, but when we are 

talking about taking care of people in this gray area where we may 

have to provide care to 100,000 individuals who are sick, their 

training might well be helpful. 

What do you think of expanding our reach to medical personnel 

that are not traditionally involved in DMATs? 

Dr. HELFAND. Well, I think that we want to mobilize any resources that we can in this endeavor, but I have a couple of qualifying comments on that. One is that a lot of these people that we 

are going to be using them to take care of are going to be very sick 

and they are going to need really skilled, trained doctors and 

nurses and other health professionals to do that job. 

The flip side of that is that the 50 DMATs have about, I think, 

50 to 60 members each. That is only 3,000 people. We have a very 

large pool of doctors and nurses relative to that. I think that there 

is a lot of room to increase the DMATs, drawing on traditional 

highly trained health professionals. There is not a lot that goes on 

to try to attract people to joining these. I mean, you have to look 

for the DMAT system. There is not a very active recruiting effort. 

So I think that we might be able to recruit substantial numbers of 

very highly qualified and highly trained people to them if we 

trained more aggressively. But then beyond that, looking to other 

types of professionals and people in the community, certainly we 

should mobilize whatever resources we can. 

Senator COLLINS. Dr. Redlener. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
127 

Dr. REDLENER. Well, a couple of other points just to amplify what 

Dr. Helfand was just saying. First of all, the DMATs are not actually trained to do radiation contaminated injury care for people, 

and it is really only these specialized National Medical Response 

Teams that are, and there are even fewer of those than the DMAT 

teams. The problem is that if you take large numbers of people, 

even physicians not to mention alternate care providers, they may 

not have and they probably will not have even a little bit of training in terms of how to deal with, say, radiation contaminated 

wounds. It is a very complicated, specialized skill that we do not 

have. 

But the bigger issue is, and we have done some studies on this, 

the ability and willingness of health professionals to work in an 

area of contamination, whether it is working in a hospital where 

there has been pandemic patients or patients with radiation contamination. We do not know much about that, but I will tell you 

this, that when we did some studies, and there need to be a lot 

more of these, we found that under certain scenarios, no more than 

30 to 35 percent of health personnel would actually show up or stay 

at work because they were concerned about their own safety, concerned about their families, and so forth. 

So if a hospital thinks it is prepared and dependent upon, say, 

85 percent of people showing up for work, they will be rudely surprised in an actual event finding that only a third of the people are 

showing up. So there are strategies to mitigate that, but we need 

a lot more work to figure out what actually would happen in those 

kind of events. 

Senator COLLINS. And that actually brings me to the communications part of this, which is so, so critical. Mr. Ullyot, your survey 

is fascinating because I would have thought that most people would 

trust national figures or the President coming on television rather 

than the local emergency manager, and I think that is very valuable information for us to have. 

It is also evident from all of your testimony that the communications strategy is so important. I have participated in two FEMA exercises that were regional exercises. One was in the Chairman’s 

home State, and in that exercise, there was a lot of emphasis on 

communication. In fact, there were even people playing CNN reporters who were putting a lot of pressure on the local and State 

elected officials to provide information right now, that kind of pressure that would be there in an actual emergency. 

By contrast, the second exercise that I attended, which was in 

Rhode Island and Massachusetts, to my knowledge did not have a 

communications aspect as part of the drill, or at least not that I 

observed. Should that not always be part of the exercises? Should 

there not be a communications aspect whenever we are doing training exercises? 

Mr. ULLYOT. Absolutely, Senator Collins, whenever it is a coordinated response. I mean, I think there is an argument for having 

just the medical aspect or other aspects tested individually to just 

get them ready for a larger training exercise, but whenever there 

is a large coordinated exercise that tests multiple agencies or multiple responders in the local, State, and Federal groups, it is our 

view that it is absolutely essential to involve communications planVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
128 

ning, and we go into that very broadly in our written statement, 

and we touched on it earlier today. 

I think it is important when you go back to the earlier point 

about trusting the local communities, usually in big exercises such 

as TOPOFF and the other major exercises that are done at the 

Federal level, they do make sure to involve State and local principals in order to test their communications ability, but it is important to do that with really local and even community leaders, driving down to really the precinct level, because our polling and other 

research shows that is who people will look to most in times of 

emergency, mayors and others. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, really important 

points. We are going to do a second round of 6 minutes each. Unfortunately, we have a vote going off soon, so we will see if we can 

get a round for each of us in. 

Well, let me ask a general question before I get back to communications. As we hear this, we are dealing with a situation where 

we are all accepting that a nuclear attack on an American city by 

a terrorist group is a real possibility. Second, that there will be a 

horrific loss of life. But third, if we are prepared, we can save a 

lot of lives, a multiple of how many tragically will be lost. 

So as I listen, and we talk about preparedness, one of the key 

immediate decisions will be to advise the people outside the immediate area of impact, the so-called gray zone, whether they should 

evacuate or stay in place. So let me ask you, I presume that there 

is not an organized way in which most American cities are prepared to make that decision now, is that correct? 

Dr. HELFAND. Correct. 

Dr. REDLENER. Correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. And in the normal course, exactly 

the officials that the people in the local areas will most trust will 

not be able to make the decision even though they are the real authority figures, like the chief of police or the fire chief. How do we 

want to prepare major metropolitan areas to make that decision in 

a timely fashion? Who has the expertise to do it? Dr. Redlener. 

Dr. REDLENER. As it turns out, with this as in many other largescale disasters, citizens are actually the first responders, and informing and forewarning citizens about this, as uncomfortable as 

it is—I have my own kids who are living now and working in New 

York City. There are things that I want them to know and I want 

all citizens to know about—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Since three of my four children are living 

in New York City, also, what do you want them to know? 

Dr. REDLENER. We should talk. [Laughter.] 

I mean there are issues about, for example, attempting not to 

stare into the fireball. We are going to have to revert to the old 

duck-and-cover if you are anywhere near the explosion. You have 

15 to 20 minutes to get out of the way after the blast before the 

really acute high-level radiation kills you, and some people, if they 

know which direction to go in and there is a way of knowing which 

direction to go in, can actually get themselves out of some degree 

of harm’s way. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
129 

So there is a series of things. The issue of 24 hours, trying to escape after that 15 or 20 minutes for the next 24 hours is probably 

lethal in many circumstances. We would rather have you stay and 

shelter in place and so forth. You want to be above the ninth or 

tenth floor because radiation settles and so forth. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, those are all very important and 

those will be subjects of communication to the public, but if this 

happened in a major American city, what information would the officials need in order to make the judgment about whether people 

should stay where they are or evacuate? Dr. Helfand. 

Dr. HELFAND. Well, I think in most cases, they are going to want 

to shelter because of the experience that we have, that people who 

try to evacuate are more likely to get a heavier radiation exposure. 

There are certain environmental and weather conditions that 

might make it that certain people would want to evacuate. If you 

knew the wind was going to be blowing from the west reliably for 

the next 3 days, then people to the west of the explosion ought to 

get out of the area because they are not going to be getting fallout 

right then. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Of course, they are going to need somebody to tell them that the wind is going to be blowing from the 

west. 

Dr. HELFAND. Exactly, and I personally do not have a lot of confidence that officials at a city level are going to be able to do this. 

They may need to be the messengers. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. HELFAND. But I think the decision is going to have to be 

made by somebody who is set up in a command center. This is an 

attack. This is like a nuclear war. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. War. 

Dr. HELFAND. We have to respond to this in that way. There 

needs to be a command center set up. Somebody gets the weather 

forecast real time from the National Weather Service and says, 

look, the wind is going to blow in New York absolutely from the 

west for the next 36 hours. People in New Jersey should get out 

of there and people in Queens and Manhattan should go into their 

basements. And they send that to the chief of police or the mayor 

who gets on the radio. And that obviously has to be set up in advance so that the mayor knows that he is going to be getting this 

information and be supplied with this decision that he can then 

communicate. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Ullyot, you were going to say something, and then we will—— 

Mr. ULLYOT. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a really quick communications point. To that end, let us say you are recommending to 

some of the community, let us say downwind, to shelter in place 

and others who are farther to take a different course of action, such 

as evacuating. We have in the written testimony how the mental 

noise really takes over when there is a situation of high emotion, 

and you cannot imagine a situation of higher emotion than a nuclear terrorist attack, you would say. 

A lot of the processes that are in place are for Reverse 911 calls, 

or Emergency Broadcast System, and these types of direct communications from the local authorities straight out to the community. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
130 

It was used in the California wildfires. It is used at universities. 

It is used in many situations to good effect. 

In this type of a situation, those types of messages that would 

go out over that type of system, provided it were there, would be 

very complicated for people to take on board because you would be 

saying, everybody west of the Potomac, do one action. Everybody 

east of the Potomac, or north, take this following action. And somebody could hear the first message, hang up the phone, and do exactly the opposite because of all that mental noise. So you are trying to send sort of mixed and very complicated messages, which are 

life-saving messages, and you are assuming that people will take 

them on board, and that is just not going to happen, according to 

research. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Becker. 

Mr. BECKER. And I would add to that, once the blast happens, 

that quarterback, that county emergency manager who is in that 

operations center is not going to have the information he or she 

needs to make that decision. So it is going to be very crude at that 

point. You are going to be describing geographies that are going to 

be wrong. They are going to be wrong. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You need to start doing that quickly. 

Mr. BECKER. They do, and they are not going to have the information they need to make the decisions at first. Is it a blast or is 

it a nuclear event? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. BECKER. As that evolves over time, we have lost the time to 

save those lives. We have lost the time to protect those people the 

way it sequences. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Becker, the Red Cross has had a lot of financial difficulties lately that have led to staff cutbacks. What is 

your current capability to respond if there were an attack of the 

type that we have been discussing today? 

Mr. BECKER. We have made significant cuts. We are in bad economic times like a lot of other organizations. What we have not cut 

is what we do for people in disaster. When you look at the metrics, 

what we are capable of, we have supplies on hand to shelter 

500,000 people and sustain that for a 6-day period of time. We 

have prepackaged meals on hand to serve those 500,000 people for 

the first 6 days. 

We have the capabilities, but I would suggest in this event those 

are spread across the country. When we have made our recent 

budget cuts, we did not touch what we do for people in disaster, 

but we have cut the growth in capacity in local communities. It 

does not help that of those 500,000 cots and blankets, some of them 

are in Reno and some of them are in Hattiesburg when the event 

is in Washington, DC. 

What is local is what matters most, and what we have been investing in is local capacity in our chapters and that is the need 

going forward. You can have a scalable national system, but things 

that arrive 2 days later are too late, and what we have been trying 

to build is our local capacity in our high risk parts of the country, 

and that is where we have ceased making the investments with the 

budget constraints that you are talking about. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
131 

Senator COLLINS. Then wouldn’t that hamper your ability to respond to this kind of attack? It sounds like you have, nationwide, 

the same capabilities, but if you have had to cut back on your investments in local capabilities, all disasters are local in the first 24 

hours. 

Mr. BECKER. It would hamper us in a no-notice event like this. 

For example, a hurricane, you know it is coming. We have 2 to 3 

days to move people in. But on a no-notice terrorist incident, that 

is what I was saying in my testimony, it is going to take us longer 

to scale up than we want because none of these communities have 

in them what is needed. And even if they have the buildings and 

even if things are usable, we still have to supplement that, and we 

are presuming we can move things into these communities at a 

time when the roads are clogged and airports are clogged. It is 

going to be very problematic. We have a national system, but local 

capacity is what matters in an incident like this. 

Senator COLLINS. I will say that I am very sympathetic to your 

request for Federal funding for the Red Cross personnel that are 

in the FEMA regional offices. When the Chairman and I wrote the 

reforms of FEMA in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, we put a lot 

of emphasis on the regional offices and having DOD personnel stationed there, having Red Cross staff stationed there because that 

is how you are going to get the improved response, that kind of coordinated response. So I just wanted to let you know that I am 

very sympathetic to that request. 

Mr. BECKER. Thank you for your support. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. I want to ask 

a final question before we go over to the Senate. Mr. Ullyot, I used 

to hear tests on the radio of the Emergency Broadcast System. 

What is the status of that? Of course, there was never any real content to it, so part of what we need to do in preparation is to educate and prepare pretty much every broadcast network and local 

TV and radio station as to what to do if, God forbid, this happens. 

Mr. ULLYOT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We talked in our testimony 

about the importance of involving the Federal Government with 

the national broadcast cable channels, the broadcast networks, the 

radio networks, etc. 

To your question about the Emergency Broadcast System, there 

are a lot of people who are communications experts on the infrastructure side who are a lot better at this, but my understanding 

is that the Emergency Broadcast System is still in place. It is a legacy system. But it has never been used to communicate a message, 

even though it has been set up since, I believe, the 1950s, but even 

on September 11, 2001, there was no need because, once again, 

people were turning to the broadcast networks—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ULLYOT [continuing]. And there was no need to implement. 

But that is still up, and I think the technologies that we talked 

about a little bit earlier about Reverse 911 calls, etc., those are 

very encouraging in terms of breaking through the clutter that you 

are going to get. But the question is really how will you involve the 

local leaders and when do you pull the trigger in terms of specific 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
132 

messages that, as Dr. Helfand said, could be advised in this type 

of a situation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, thank you. You have been excellent 

witnesses. I cannot remember another hearing where I not only felt 

that the witnesses educated the Committee well, but also had as 

many specific and constructive suggestions that we can include in 

our recommendations when we get to that stage. So I really appreciate your presence, but also the effort that you put into it and the 

experience that you brought to the table. 

We are going to leave the record of this hearing open for 15 days 

in case you want to add anything to the record or Senator Collins 

or I or any of the other Members of the Committee would like to 

submit questions to you in writing. 

Senator Collins, do you want to add anything? 

Senator COLLINS. No, thank you. Great hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(133) 

NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PROVIDING MEDICAL 

CARE AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN THE 

AFTERMATH—THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning, and welcome to this hearing. Thanks very much for being here. 

This is the fifth in a series of hearings this Committee has held 

to examine a question that it is natural to want to turn away from, 

but we really cannot. And that is, what is the state of our Nation’s 

preparedness to mount an effective response to a terrorist detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major American city? 

While working to prevent such an attack is and, of course, will 

continue to be our top priority, we know that the risk is real, and 

we cannot act as if we can fully eliminate that risk. A nuclear attack on our homeland would be sudden and swift. It would be devastating and deadly. Failure to develop and test a comprehensive 

plan for dealing with the aftermath would only magnify its impact. 

In this hearing, ‘‘Nuclear Terrorism: Providing Medical Care and 

Meeting Basic Needs in the Aftermath,’’ we will examine some very 

specific public health and public safety challenges we know we will 

face, and ask what our state of preparedness to respond is at this 

time. 

After a terrorist nuclear attack, local and State emergency responders would clearly be the first on the scene and, therefore, 

should adequately plan for the important medical and mass care 

responsibilities that they would need to fulfill in the first days after 

such an attack. In that regard, we are very pleased to have with 

us to testify this morning Chief James Schwartz, the Fire Chief of 

Arlington County, Virginia, which has to be considered a high-risk 

target area because it is adjacent to the District of Columbia and 

is the home of the Pentagon. 

However, because no one State, county, or municipality has the 

capabilities to respond fully to the catastrophic consequences of a 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
134 

nuclear attack in the United States, a rapid, coordinated response 

by the Federal Government will be critically necessary across the 

full range of medical and mass care missions. 

To better understand how prepared the Federal Government is 

to assume that role and what we can do together to make sure we 

are better prepared, we are very pleased to hear testimony today 

from Administrator David Paulison of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for the overall governmental response and is also the lead agency for mass sheltering 

and feeding of displaced populations; the Assistant Secretary for 

Preparedness and Response, Rear Admiral Craig Vanderhagen 

from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which 

has the lead role in providing medical care and addressing public 

health consequences; and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale. The Department of Defense (DOD) is 

charged with a variety of supporting and some lead roles in their 

responsibility for support of civilian authorities in these circumstances. 

So this is an important hearing. We look forward to your testimony and then asking some questions. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and for continuing the Committee’s important 

work on nuclear terrorism. I notice, as I look at the press tables 

today, that they are not jammed with people, and yet if we failed 

to do this kind of work, the consequences are so enormous. So I salute you for tackling a very difficult, a very consequential issue and 

focusing the Committee’s work on nuclear terrorism. 

Discussions of nuclear terrorism tend to overlook an important 

point. As Dr. Michael Robbins, a professor of radiation oncology at 

the Wake Forest University School of Medicine, has cautioned, the 

vast majority of general practitioners, emergency responders, and 

even many radiologists have little understanding of the health consequences of a radiological or nuclear event. 

As this Committee considers the challenges of responding to a 

terrorist nuclear attack on an American city, his caution reminds 

us of the vast scale of these challenges; that is, not only the general 

public but also the medical community is ill-prepared to face the 

terrible consequences of such an attack. 

Our earlier hearings on this subject, not to mention the latest 

news stories on the activities of the Pakistani nuclear secrets seller, A.Q. Khan, have left little room for doubt that technical and delivery options for such an attack are within the reach of terrorists. 

Previous witnesses have given us chilling testimony on the scale 

and nature of response challenges to a terrorist nuclear attack. 

They would include not only mass casualties and immense strain 

on local response capabilities, but also specific radiation-related 

challenges such as mass triage and burn care, decontamination, 

fallout plume modeling, and shelter or evacuation decisions. 

One of the key recommendations that emerged from our prior 

hearings is the need for surge capacity for medical care for tens of 

thousands of injured people. Options for providing that surge caVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
135 

pacity include field hospitals for triaging patients, as well as 

prepositioning medications, supplies, and equipment at large public 

facilities, such as convention centers or stadiums. 

If such a disastrous attack should occur, a well-planned, vigorous, and coordinated, effective response by Federal agencies will 

be critical to augmenting the local and State preparedness effort, 

as well as the nonprofit partners and the private sector organizations that would be involved. 

Besides having access to resources throughout the country, the 

Federal Government can provide situational awareness and coordination that are critical to an effective response. Today’s hearing 

gives us an opportunity to hear firsthand how the key Federal 

agencies and departments are planning and preparing responses to 

a possible terrorist nuclear attack. I, too, like the Chairman, am 

particularly pleased that the panel includes Fire Chief James 

Schwartz of Arlington, Virginia. His experiences in tactical command of the response to the September 11, 2001, attack on the 

Pentagon and his department’s training for possible nuclear incidents will be very valuable to this Committee’s deliberations. 

Arlington is, of course, part of the National Capital Region and 

participates in extensive regional planning with Washington, DC, 

Maryland, and the rest of Virginia. Nonetheless, it was Arlington 

firefighters who were first on the scene at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. And today, their plans assume no direct Federal 

support for the first 24 to 72 hours after a catastrophe. This standard of preparation is commendable and should serve as a model for 

first responders in parts of the country where Federal assets are 

less concentrated. 

One of my concerns is that there is a misperception among many 

State and local responders that if there is a nuclear attack, somehow Federal resources and Federal first responders in the military 

will immediately be on the scene. But, in fact, regardless of the 

kind of disaster, it is always the State and local first responders 

who are first on the scene, and it always will be that way. 

I am very pleased with the improvements that we are making. 

I want to commend FEMA’s Administrator, Chief Paulison, for effectively implementing many of the reforms that the Chairman and 

I authored as a result of our investigation into the failed and 

flawed response to Hurricane Katrina. 

I am going to put the rest of my statement in the record because 

I am eager to hear our witnesses. But thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for calling this important hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks to you, Senator Collins, for your 

statement. Thank you for being, as always, a great co-leader in this 

effort. I was just thinking yesterday, somebody in the media asked 

me to document some of the things I had accomplished as Chairman of this Committee. And I started by mentioning something 

that I was quite proud of. And they said, ‘‘But Senator Collins was 

Chairman when that happened.’’ I said, ‘‘You know, the difference 

blurs.’’ 

Senator COLLINS. It is all one effort. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So thank you. We are glad to have the 

panel here, and we look forward to your testimony. Chief Paulison, 

why don’t you begin. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
136 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Paulison appears in the Appendix on page 590. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. R. DAVID PAULISON,1 ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PAULISON. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking 

Member Collins. I, too, want to thank you for holding this series 

of hearings. These are important for our country, for its protection. 

And the fact that you have taken on this very challenging type of 

subject is commendable, and I appreciate it very much. 

A terrorist attack involving an improvised nuclear device (IND), 

like the one described in our National Planning Scenario 1 involving a 10-kiloton device, would present a scale and complexity of 

concentrated destruction that would demand unprecedented cooperation at all levels of government, our nonprofits in the private 

sector, as Senator Collins pointed out. These scenarios represent 

the greatest danger facing the United States and do have the highest priority in coordinated Federal planning, its training, its exercises, and grant investments. The State and local governments have received $23 billion in preparedness grants to build all-hazard capabilities. In the past 4 

years alone, fully $350 million in Department of Homeland Security grant programs have been invested in projects related to radiological and nuclear preparedness as well as decontamination, which 

we know is going to be a major issue for us. We have trained more 

than 33,000 students in related courses, conducted numerous exercises, and in 2010, we will conduct a national exercise preparing 

for such a device, an IND device over 10-kiloton measures. 

Our national emergency response system customarily operates on 

two basic principles: On request services and load redistribution. 

The affected jurisdictions typically request specific assistance to address urgent needs that exceed their capacity. Mutual aid agreements and Federal assistance provide the means of procedures to 

redistribute the demand across our Nation’s robust but highly decentralized emergency response system. While this has been effective, the detonation of an IND would decimate local response and 

that coordination. 

We have been hard at work ensuring that our preparedness and 

response is scaled to these scenarios. FEMA has new authorities 

that you have given us as new resources and the National Incident 

Management System and National Response Framework exemplify 

how we have recalibrated our plans, our policies, and procedures 

to those ends. 

While existing plans are in place today, we are developing an Integrated Planning System in close coordination with our State and 

local partners. This system will establish a process to develop Federal plans and to ensure their integration with State and local 

plans. And since I submitted my written testimony, we have just 

finished the National Response Framework Incident Annexes, including the updates to the Catastrophic Incident Annex, Nuclear/ 

Radiological Incident Annex, and also the Mass Evacuation Annex. 

These plans outline specific response to a nuclear attack. 

Under these plans, FEMA will immediately push pre-designated 

resources to a Federal Mobilization Center or staging area near the 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
137 

incident area and begin key action that I detail in my submitted 

testimony. Upon arrival, these resources will be redeployed to the 

incident area and integrated into the response operations when requested and approved by—and in collaboration with—appropriate 

State or local incident command authorities, if, in fact, they are intact. 

FEMA’s primary responsibility is to work with the affected 

States to identify the needs and to task, through our Mission Assignments, the appropriate Federal agency to fulfill these needs. 

And as you are well aware, we have expanded the use of our PreScripted Mission Assignments. In 2006, FEMA had only 44 PreScripted Mission Assignments with two Federal agencies. Today, 

we have 244 in coordination with 31 different Federal departments 

and agencies. 

A key mission identified in the National Response Framework is 

the evaluation, the coordination, and delivery of mass care and 

emergency assistance through FEMA, our Federal, State, and local 

partners, our non-governmental agencies, the private sector, and 

our contract support. Known as Emergency Support Function 6 

(ESF–6), this process provides basic life-sustaining assistance to individuals, households, and household pets that have been affected 

by disaster. Containment is crucial to avoiding spreading the contaminant to the unaffected population and to ensure safe participation of relief agency staff. 

The Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the 

Department of Health and Human Services are the ones that will 

be responsible for determining if or when individuals and families 

can or will be evacuated from areas impacted by nuclear attack. 

And I have provided greater detail in my written testimony on how 

ESF–6 really works. 

In conclusion, let me assure you that FEMA does have a sense 

of urgency and a determined resolve to build on the knowledge derived from previous disaster events and also from the Federal- and 

State-level exercises that we have been holding over the last several years. Today, our operations and programs reflect the lessons 

learned from the past and are based on a collaborative approach 

to disaster response and recovery. And I need to emphasize that. 

One of my favorite quotes is from Harry Truman, who said, ‘‘It is 

amazing how much you can accomplish when you do not care who 

gets the credit.’’ 

FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security continue to 

work with our State and local governments, as well as our Federal 

partners who are sitting at this table, and our non-governmental 

organizations and voluntary agencies to improve our capabilities 

and work proactively to protect the American people. 

Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity today, and I am 

pleased to answer any questions you might have. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Chief. That is a good beginning. 

I want to just take from what you said that you view this as the 

greatest danger to the United States. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir, I do. It is one of those issues that is a 

low probability but has a tremendously high impact. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
138 

1The prepared statement of Admiral Vanderwagen appears in the Appendix on page 603. 

Mr. PAULISON. And we have to prepare for it, and that is what 

we are doing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is what has motivated Senator Collins and me to do this series of hearings. I remember once—I think 

it was last year—we asked Secretary Chertoff the perennial question about what keeps you up at night in terms of your responsibilities, and he said a terrorist nuclear detonation or a radiological 

dirty bomb within the United States. 

The second point, which I did not mention in my opening statement but has come out in earlier hearing testimony, is the counterintuitive fact that a lot of lives can be saved in an area that is 

quite close to the point of detonation if there is an adequate and 

immediate response ready. In other words, even if, God forbid, a 

bomb went off in the center of Washington, DC, hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved within the city limits if we move 

quickly enough in a lot of different areas. 

So that is my own introduction, Admiral Vanderwagen, with 

thanks for your willingness to continue your service to our country 

at HHS. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. W. CRAIG VANDERWAGEN,1 ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. It is a blessing, sir. I appreciate the opportunity. 

I want to say, first and foremost, that we work very closely under 

the direction and guidance of Chief Paulison and his group; that is, 

we have the responsibility under law for Emergency Support Function 8, which is the public health and medical response to a disaster or emergency. But that has to work under the coordination 

and direction of FEMA and DHS. And I think the relationships 

have improved tremendously, just to echo something that I think 

Chief Paulison mentioned. 

Our responsibility in Health and Human Services under the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act really gives us an enterprise-wide responsibility with regard to this and to other hazardous 

events that we can deal with. And what do I mean by that? What 

I mean is we have the responsibility to understand the research 

pipeline and those good research ideas for countermeasures that we 

can use in events to treat people, to prevent illness where we can 

and to take those good ideas through advanced development so that 

we have safe and effective products that we can use in events to 

treat people appropriately. Then we have to think about where we 

store those and how we get them rapidly to sites, and then last, 

we need to think about the delivery platforms; that is, what are the 

capabilities that exist in communities, in States, and in the Federal 

environment to assure that we have a national delivery platform 

that will meet the challenge of a given event? 

In the case of an IND, this is indeed one of the most catastrophic 

events that we could endure. There are other events that will challenge us in much the same way that have broader geographic impact and have a temporal time course that is long, involved, and 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
139 

challenging, like a pandemic. There are other biological events that 

could be of this order of magnitude. A spray of anthrax over Long 

Island could lead to 300,000 deaths in 5 days if we do not intervene 

properly. 

So there are catastrophic events, and then there are catastrophic 

events. An IND would kill, indeed, tens of thousands of individuals 

just with blast, burn, and traumatic effects, not to mention radiation. That is a significant challenge, and in that environment our 

strategic goals are the following: Compassionate and appropriate 

care for the families of those who have died; appropriate care for 

as many people as we can provide for those who have been directly 

injured by the blast, the radiation, and by the burn effects of such 

an event; to deal with that portion of the population that may have 

radiation exposure but is not sure what their illness may look like; 

and, last, to deal with the mental health and spiritual impacts of 

such an event on the population that is affected, one could say the 

Nation at large. 

In order to accomplish that, we have developed playbooks that 

start with a set of assumptions about what we would be dealing 

with, a 10-kiloton device at the intersection of 14th and Constitution as an example, and what are the specific actions that would 

be required, the missions that need to be met in a tactical environment to meet the needs of those strategic objectives. The challenge 

here is operationally linking those tactical means in a meaningful 

way to achieve those strategic goals. 

Medical surge is not a uniform event. We have learned much 

from Tel Aviv and other experiences in Israel. We have learned 

from Madrid. We have learned from London that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have a surge requirement associated with them. 

No one has dealt with something of this scope, however, so we really do not have a ton of guidance on how to approach this kind of 

mass surge event. 

There have been many improvements over the last 5 years. The 

Congress has provided support to the States in the form of the Hospital Preparedness Grant Program and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness grants for medical and public health response. 

I just want to tell you that if we look back at 2002, there was a 

very limited infrastructure for integrated mass care. Now we have 

87 percent of all U.S. hospitals participating in the program that 

would bring about mass care. 

In 2002, there was no known identified surge bed capacity. 

Through the National Disaster Medical Service (NDMS) system, we 

can provide 30,000 beds, but under the Hospital Preparedness Program we have over 200,000 beds identified for surge capability 

around the country. 

As far as decontamination goes, two-thirds of the hospitals in 

2002 reported they really did not have any ability to decontaminate 

people effectively. By 2006, nationwide, hospitals had the collective 

capability to decontaminate over 400,000 people within 3 hours. Of 

course, this does not account for transportation and related issues 

to get people to decontamination sites. 

So there have been many steps forward to bring about progress. 

The issue of medical personnel’s knowledge is an important and 

critical one to us as well. So not only with our HHS colleagues but 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
140 

with the national treatment group in this area, we have published 

numerous articles now in the medical literature that run from very 

specialized journals like Blood, which is targeted to hematologists 

and oncologists, to the American Journal of Disaster Medicine to 

Prehospital Emergency Care that describe for them what they 

should be looking for and what the critical decision points would 

be for them in providing care. 

In addition to that, we have developed an online, just-in-time 

training package called the Radiological Event Medical Management Program that describes in great detail how clinicians in an 

emergency room or in a family practice can approach the issue of 

doing the appropriate clinical assessment and diagnosis of their patient and what the treatment options and locations will be. 

So we have moved forward significantly in the last 5 years. 

There are now extensive burn bed networks and expansion for 

surge capacity. I was just in New Jersey last week, and St. Barnabas Medical Center, for instance, has developed an alliance with 

burn centers up and down the East Coast for definitive care and 

patient transport in a surge environment. In addition to that, all 

the Level 1 and Level 2 trauma facilities in New Jersey have 

agreed to and identified means to act as surge capacity for uniquely demanding trauma and burn-related patients. 

So we have made significant progress forward. The big book sitting here is not all preparation for this hearing. But, in fact, twothirds of it are the playbooks that we have for dealing with radiation dispersal devices and for improvised nuclear devices. In the 

post-Hurricane Katrina world, with the passage of the Pandemic 

and All Hazards Preparedness Act and the strengthening and the 

improvement of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA, 

we have come a long way but gaps persist. There are gaps in the 

research base. If one thinks about the amount of research that is 

invested in cardiac disease, in diabetes, in infectious disease, the 

amount invested in research in this area is extremely small. That 

means we have less of a pipeline for product development so that 

we can have the appropriate medications to treat people. However, 

we have issued a request for proposals for new medications for 

treating people who have acute radiation syndrome. We had almost 

a score of offerers, and we will probably award contracts for development of these products to probably about half of those offerers. 

We think there is real movement forward in the arena of development of medications. There are gaps yet to be filled in the delivery platform capability. Clearly, we need to do more training. 

Clearly, communities need to take on the very difficult challenges 

of how they will address high-demand requirements against lowavailability assets. Those community discussions need to occur before events occur so that there are clear pathways forward in how 

they will use very low-availability assets to meet an overwhelming 

demand because I am not convinced that there is enough money in 

the system to buy all the beds we would like to have, to buy all 

the expertise that we would like to have. Therefore, people will 

have to do a lot of cross-coverage, interdisciplinary work, and they 

will have to make difficult decisions about high-demand and lowavailability assets. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
141 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McHale appears in the Appendix on page 615. 

Having said that, great progress has been made. There is a path 

forward for meeting many of these gaps. Some of that is technology 

catch-up. Some of that is appropriate funding levels for that advanced development. But I am very optimistic—I have been all 

around the country in the last 4 months from Buffalo to Miami to 

Honolulu to Seattle—because people are taking this very seriously 

and putting the work in to try and deal with how they will operationally use their tactical means to achieve those strategic objectives. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be with you today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Admiral. I appreciate 

the progress report, and obviously we will have questions about 

what to do next. 

Secretary McHale, welcome back. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. PAUL MCHALE,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICAS’ SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MCHALE. Good to be back, sir. Chairman Lieberman and 

Senator Collins, thank you for the opportunity to address you today 

on the Department of Defense’s capabilities and substantial 

progress in preparing for a terrorist nuclear attack on an American 

city. Mr. Chairman, I previously submitted my formal testimony for 

the record, and in the interest of moving to questions as quickly as 

possible, I will simply summarize my statement at this point. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Let me say for the record that 

the statements you have been good enough to prepare will be printed in full in our Committee record. 

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, sir. 

The greatest threat in today’s security environment is the nexus 

between transnational terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons proliferation, 

particularly the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As noted in our 

Department’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 

which was published in June 2005, ‘‘Terrorists will seek to employ 

asymmetric means to penetrate our defenses and exploit the openness of our society to their advantage. By attacking our citizens, 

our economic institutions, our physical infrastructure, and our social fabric, they seek to destroy American democracy. We dare not 

underestimate the devastation that terrorists seek to bring to 

Americans at home.’’ 

As noted by Senator Lieberman earlier, our preeminent national 

security goal is to prevent a terrorist nuclear attack. In support of 

this objective, DOD assists civil authorities to detect, identify, neutralize, dismantle, and dispose of nuclear threats before they can 

reach our borders and, if they have penetrated our borders, before 

they can be employed against our Nation. Still, as you correctly 

noted 2 months ago, Mr. Chairman, ‘‘we must also prepare for the 

possibility that a determined terrorist will succeed despite our best 

efforts.’’ 

It is that chilling reality that brings us together this morning. 

Should the terrorists succeed, we will face a challenge of appalling 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
142 

and unprecedented magnitude involving thousands of casualties, 

more than 1 million evacuees, and contamination of up to 3,000 

square miles. We—Federal, State, and local governments, non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross, and the private sector—must be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to save 

the thousands of lives placed at risk in the wake of a nuclear attack. DOD’s chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highyield explosive (CBRNE) response capabilities are the best funded, 

best equipped, and best trained in the world. During the past 7 

years, DOD has developed unprecedented CBRNE response capabilities and has trained to employ these capabilities in rapid support of civil authorities to help save lives. 

Within the Federal Government, the Department of Homeland 

Security has the primary responsibility to coordinate the national 

effort to prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist CBRNE attacks. If terrorists were to attack an 

American city with a nuclear weapon, the Department of Defense, 

at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate and consistent with the law and the imperative to maintain our Department’s warfighting readiness, will provide critical 

nuclear consequence management support to civil authorities as 

part of the comprehensive national response to a nuclear incident. 

Within DOD, several entities would play a key role in the response to a terrorist nuclear attack on an American city. For example, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs, I am responsible, by law, for coordinating DOD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials responding to threats involving CBRNE weapons or related materials 

or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, 

dismantling, and disposing of CBRNE weapons and related materials. 

Two combatant commands are responsible for actually employing 

Federal military forces to provide defense support to civil authorities, including responses to domestic terrorist nuclear attacks. The 

Commander of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is 

responsible for supporting civil responses to terrorist nuclear attacks in the lower 48 States and in Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands. The Commander of U.S. Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) is responsible for Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, 

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and insular 

territories throughout the Pacific Ocean. 

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is responsible for facilitating State coordination and employment of non-federalized National Guard units and personnel in support of Emergency Management Assistance Compacts. 

As stated in the 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support, DOD ‘‘will be prepared to provide forces and capabilities 

in support of domestic CBRNE consequence management, with an 

emphasis on preparing for multiple, simultaneous mass casualty 

incidents.’’ The Defense Department has developed significant capabilities to contribute to the response to a terrorist nuclear attack 

on an American city. I have provided a detailed description of these 

capabilities in my written statement, but I would like to highlight 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
143 

three specific capabilities that have been developed or enhanced 

since September 11, 2001. 

National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams (CSTs) are teams of 22 highly skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air National Guard who are federally 

resourced, trained, and certified, and operate under the command 

and control of a State governor. The WMD–CSTs support civil authorities at a CBRNE incident site by identifying CBRNE agents 

or substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on-site authorities on effective response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for State and Federal support. They 

are, in effect, reconnaissance forces. These 22 men and women proceed to the site of the event—in this case, a nuclear attack—and 

utilizing the training and the very sophisticated capabilities that 

have been provided to them, they conduct an assessment so that 

they can better inform follow-on forces as to the nature of the contaminant and its persistent character. 

When our Nation was attacked on September 11, 2001, there 

were only nine CSTs. Today, we have a WMD–CST in each State 

and territory, including two in California, for a total of 55 CSTs. 

Currently, 53 of these CSTs have been certified by the Secretary 

of Defense. The remaining two teams, in Guam and the Virgin Islands, are expected to be certified late this year. 

The second capability I would like to emphasize is the National 

Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages—CERFPs— 

which were established after September 11, 2001, and are task-organized units of 200 to 400 personnel with combat support and 

service support mission essential tasks that, in conjunction with 

the CSTs, assist local, State, and Federal authorities in CBRNE 

consequence management: Casualty search and extraction, medical 

triage, casualty decontamination, and emergency medical treatment. The CERFPs, which operate on State Active Duty status, on 

duty under Title 32, or in extraordinary circumstances, under Title 

10, are designed to fill the 6- to 72-hour gap in capabilities between 

the first local and State response and the Federal response following a CBRNE incident. There are currently 17 CERFPs, of 

which 16 are trained and ready to respond to CBRNE incidents in 

the 10 FEMA regions. The Virginia CERFP just completed training 

and is undergoing its evaluation today. 

The third capability involves the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs), which includes elements of the 

U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force as 

well as all the Military Departments’ CBRNE response capabilities, 

and this is a force of 4,000 to 6,000 personnel that can be quickly 

tailored to provide a coordinated Federal military response to a 

specific CBRNE incident. The CCMRFs are Title 10, U.S. Code, 

joint forces capable of responding to a wide range of CBRNE attacks against the American people with a widerange of services, including radiological assessment, decontamination, and security of a 

contaminated site; medical triage, treatment, and care; and transportation and logistical support. 

DOD recognizes that terrorists often strike multiple simultaneous targets; therefore, DOD is identifying and sourcing three 

CCMRFs to improve our Nation’s CBRNE response capability. The 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
144 

first CCMRF is to be fielded this October. I want to emphasize at 

this point, when considered and combined, the CSTs, CERFPs, and 

CCMRFs will provide more than 20,000 specifically trained military personnel whose primary mission will be domestic catastrophic 

response. This is a fundamental change in military culture and capability. 

Mr. Chairman, in your invitation you asked what could be done 

to prepare our country to respond to an act of nuclear terrorism 

and to mitigate its consequences more effectively. My answer is ‘‘realistic and detailed operational planning.’’ As you stated, Mr. 

Chairman, last month, ‘‘Helping survivors in and around the blast 

area will require a planned, prepared, and coordinated response by 

all levels of government.’’ 

In accordance with Annex I of Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 8, the Federal Government is developing plans for responding to the 15 National Planning Scenarios. However, that will 

only give us a Federal response. We must achieve an integrated, 

synchronized response that gives us a truly national response to a 

future catastrophic incident. To pursue this end, DOD has 

partnered with DHS to develop the Task Force for Emergency 

Readiness (TFER) concept. The TFER is under the direct leadership of the governor and the State emergency management structure. It would operate under the authority and supervision of the 

Adjutant General and other emergency managers of the State. It 

would be a focal point for coordinated planning to produce State 

plans tailored to the unique strengths and vulnerabilities of each 

individual State and to facilitate the integration and synchronization of local, State, regional, Federal, and private sector incident 

planning. Each State’s TFER will provide a scalable flexible planning capability, tailored to fit its unique needs for a catastrophic 

response and suited to its unique jurisdictional requirements. 

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I would emphasize the importance of achieving that integrated planning, not simply at the 

Federal level but down to the State and local level. I would emphasize that with the CSTs, the CERFPs, and the CCMRFs, we will 

have 20,000 military personnel prepared for the primary mission of 

domestic catastrophic response. These are capabilities that did not 

exist on September 11, 2001. With a recognition of that improvement, nonetheless, the daunting requirements associated with a 

catastrophic response to a nuclear event leaves zero room for complacency, no matter how good we are, no matter how much better 

we have become, we must get better than we are today. We are not 

yet adequately prepared. With the initiation of some of the concepts that I and others have described, progress can be achieved, 

and with your help, we look forward to it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Secretary McHale. 

That was very well said. I totally agree. 

Chief Schwartz, thanks for being here. You are unique on the 

panel, and you represent a very unique part of the country, so we 

appreciate your perspective. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
145 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Schwartz appears in the Appendix on page 638. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. SCHWARTZ,1 FIRE CHIEF OF 

ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins. 

Thank you both for the opportunity to be here today and be a part 

of this discussion. I am here representing a slightly different perspective, that of local government, as we try to integrate our efforts 

with our partners to my right. 

I also today represent the nearly 13,000 members of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) who, of course, are on 

the front lines protecting their communities every day—communities both large and small. 

While we have been fortunate to not experience the kind of event 

we are discussing today, obviously, as has been made clear by the 

previous comments, preparedness and building our response capabilities is of paramount importance, and we hope that we will see 

this hearing as a useful step in identifying remaining gaps in our 

preparedness and response capabilities. The fire service does recommend that capabilities continue to develop within an all-hazards 

framework, however, so that we can maximize these very limited 

resources. 

I have been asked to discuss the operational response at the local 

level to a scenario involving a response to an explosive yield of 10- 

kilotons or less. As many of us know, the initial blast, the ensuing 

fires, structural collapse, as well as the spread of radiation would 

entail significant casualties, but we would, as has been said, be left 

with many survivors. Those survivors, however, would suffer from 

severe burns and trauma and would be in need of enormous 

amounts of critical care as well as radiological decontamination. 

We also have a very key responsibility to communicate with the 

rest of our population as to what threats remain to them, especially 

as it relates to evacuation. 

I also want to touch for a few moments on the aspects of preparedness because, obviously, preparedness and response go hand 

in hand. While fire departments need to gear up for, as has been 

mentioned, these low-probability but high-consequence events, one 

of the things that local responders need is a real understanding of 

the probability of these kinds of threats. We make risk management decisions every day, and those risk management decisions 

help us to allocate very scarce resources. And how we train for this 

and other possibilities, really is driven by how we understand the 

possibility of the threat. 

In Arlington County, the Metropolitan Medical Response System 

(MMRS) has facilitated close coordination between fire, law enforcement, public health, hospitals, and the medical community, 

and also across those professional boundaries as well as bridging 

boundaries that sometimes occur between jurisdictions and between different levels of government, the State and Federal entities. 

Federal assistance through the Urban Area Security Initiative 

(UASI) grant program has enabled Arlington County and its partners in the National Capital Region to purchase equipment, enhance training and communications infrastructure, and develop a 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
146 

better system to respond to a nuclear incident. It is important to 

train our first responders and exercise the response system to test 

our planning, training, and equipment. We recently conducted a 

very small-scale tabletop exercise in the National Capital Region 

around just such a scenario as we are talking about today and 

identified once again enormous gaps that still need to be filled. 

However, we do recognize that preparedness is an ongoing process 

and that America’s first responders have a lot to do, in partnership 

with the Federal Government, to better prepare our Nation for this 

kind of threat. 

In many ways, the response to a nuclear incident would resemble 

the kind of response to any other large-scale disaster or catastrophe. It is important to understand that the response to most incidents—whether they are wrought by man or by nature—is strikingly similar. This is the underlying premise behind the all-hazards 

perspective. Whether we are responding to a hurricane, a chemical 

spill, or a nuclear explosion, the fire service will rely on the same 

scalable response framework, which includes the Incident Command System and the National Incident Management System. 

While first responders employ the same all-hazards incident management system to all disasters—in fact, all responses every single 

day—the unprecedented and catastrophic scale of a nuclear incident would present considerable challenges. 

The real cornerstone of an emergency event such as we are discussing today is that local government is charged with leading the 

response, in partnership with our State and Federal colleagues. 

But the initial response to a nuclear or radiological explosion is 

likely to resemble that of a conventional hazardous materials response. It may not, in fact, be immediately clear to many responders exactly what it is that they are dealing with. It should be noted 

that while responders in Arlington County are fortunate to have 

radiation detection equipment—purchased through some of the 

Federal grant programs—many first responders around the country 

do not have such radiation detection equipment and do not have 

some of the same capabilities that we have put together here in the 

National Capital Region. 

In Arlington and other jurisdictions in the National Capital Region, our CBRNE response will be managed much like a hazardous 

materials incident with the mass casualty implications that have 

been described so far. In all of these situations, a huge challenge 

will be minimizing the potential for panic and minimizing additional exposure to folks in our community, and then, of course, providing prudent medical treatment to those casualties. 

Our response to a CBRNE incident includes the combined and 

integrated capabilities that have really grown out of our MMRS 

collaborative processes in Arlington. And I should note that we 

have, again, through UASI dollars, pushed out the framework of 

MMRS to the entire Northern Virginia area so that the communities of Fairfax, Alexandria, Loudon, and Prince William have all 

gone through the same developmental process that we have done 

in Arlington under the Federal program and have achieved some 

of the same capabilities that we have been fortunate enough to integrate in Arlington County. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
147 

Our response includes specific protocols for responding to explosive devices, including those that involve radiological agents. In 

fact, we have created a regional protocol for dealing with radiological incidents that has been accepted by all the response agencies in the National Capital Region and has enabled us to really 

build on our procedures down to the detailed level of how we will 

detect the presence of radiological elements, how we will monitor 

the exposure of responders, and how we will deal with the replenishment of those forces based on the kind of response that we are 

engaged in. 

We also have the benefit here in the National Capital Region of 

having a highly specialized team, the National Medical Response 

Team in the National Capital Region, which is made up, again, of 

local responders, but it is a team that has Federal funding and 

support for just these kinds of events. 

We, in Arlington and, in fact, in the entire National Capital Region are very fortunate to have a very robust mutual aid system. 

This is going to be important because mutual aid, as has been stated before, is going to be a vital resource in these kinds of responses. No local jurisdiction, even the largest cities, are going to 

be able to deal with this kind of an incident by themselves. 

We have a very robust mutual aid system in Northern Virginia. 

It is actually an automatic aid system where we share resources 

every single day, and we have, through those relationships that 

have existed for over 30 years, really built a system that relies on 

mutual trust and shared learning so that we are all looking at the 

same circumstances. And, of course, we have among the best voice 

interoperability, best voice communication systems in the Nation 

among our first responder agencies in the National Capital Region. 

As we talk about the response and we look at the magnitude of 

this kind of incident, obviously beyond our regional partners in mutual aid, we will be calling on additional assistance, calling the 

State, accessing statewide mutual aid, and, of course, the State will 

in all likelihood be calling the Federal Government asking for additional resources there. We may employ the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to get additional resources, and 

without a doubt, in an instance like this, we would see a Stafford 

Act declaration for disaster. 

We would also look to the Federal Government to provide, as 

Secretary McHale discussed, the Civil Support Teams as an initial 

part of a response, as well as the CERFPs and the Consequence 

Management Response Teams that are currently being built. 

One of the areas that we really look for the Federal Government 

to provide is technical assistance. While we have very robust capabilities to detect radiation in a scenario like this, we have meager 

capabilities to do plume modeling. I am very fortunate in Arlington 

to be partnered with the Pentagon Force Protection Agency out of 

the Pentagon, and so I get very robust capabilities in terms of 

plume modeling and an ability to see what the downstream effects 

will be from the kind of radiation fallout that we would see in an 

event like this. Many other communities do not have such sophisticated capabilities, and we would be looking for the Radiological Assessment Program Teams to be coming from the Department of EnVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
148 

ergy as well as DOD assets to help us in assessing those downstream impacts of the radiological fallout. 

Again, communication is going to be extremely important, and I 

know the Committee is interested in how we are going to communicate with the public. I will touch on that just briefly. All of the 

jurisdictions in the National Capital Region with grant dollars have 

acquired capabilities to communicate with our communities. First 

among those is text messaging systems. In Arlington, a system that 

is called Arlington Alert enables us to contact subscribers. My testimony actually refers to 16,000. I was informed this morning that 

in Arlington County alone we have 25,000 subscribers to our text 

message alerting system so that we can send rapid text messages 

to those subscribers. 

In this kind of event, most of those initial messages, which literally would be put out within the first couple of minutes of an incident like this, would probably be directing people to shelter in 

place until we could get more formal plans to direct them to other 

areas of safety. 

We also have the ability to use our telephone system, Reverse 

911, to actually encircle a specific area within our communities and 

target their telephones to give them a message and give them more 

specific information about the information that we want them to 

know about. 

And Arlington, like some other communities in the Nation, has 

also established their own AM radio station so that we can specifically communicate with citizens of Arlington. We are acutely aware 

that in a community like Arlington, as urbanized as we are, we are 

still likely to get lost in the larger media market of the National 

Capital Region, and citizens in our community want to hear specifically from their leaders as to what actions they can be taking. 

I do note that I am out of time. All of my written comments have 

been submitted to the Committee. So though I am over my time, 

I would like to go over a couple of recommendations that we see 

as vitally important, and perhaps it will help with the discussion 

as we go on. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. 

In terms of sharing meaningful information regarding threats, as 

I stated before, the Department of Homeland Security and the 

broader intelligence community must strive toward meaningful information sharing and collaboration so that those at the local level 

understand exactly what the threats are, and we will be able to 

make distinctions about the varying levels of risk posed by each of 

these threats. 

We encourage greater cooperation and engagement between the 

Federal Government and non-Federal stakeholders. The Department of Homeland Security has improved immensely its attempts 

to reach out to State and local officials and responders. However, 

the Federal Government must devote greater focus to achieving a 

truly collaborative approach to addressing vital preparedness and 

response issues. And, again, I point to the framework established 

by MMRS. It is a fantastic framework to get just that kind of information and collaborative sharing. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
149 

In addition to that, to facilitate cooperative engagement, the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies should consider 

hosting symposia that can really be focused on shared learning. Do 

regional symposia and bring together responders from all levels of 

government, and let us have a meaningful discussion not from a 

top-down perspective, but a meaningful discussion about the 

threats and what capabilities exist to respond to those threats. 

And I would also ask the Committee to review the latest white 

paper of the National Homeland Security Consortium of which the 

IAFC is a member. That paper addresses how to manage these 

threats in the 21st Century. We think it is a very valuable approach. 

We need to develop best practices for enhancing medical surge 

capacity and responding to mass casualty events. This is a problem 

that is extremely vexing for all of us dealing with the issue of surge 

capacity and the number of medical casualties in an incident like 

this. Can we put together perhaps some groups of experts to develop some templates, some guidance that could be handed off to 

local and State government so that they could better prepare for 

these kinds of incidents? 

And then looking at Federal predictive modeling capabilities, especially around plume modeling, how can we share that information with critical decisionmakers on the ground during an incident? 

Last, I want to commend DOD for their efforts, as I mentioned 

before, around the Defense Consequence Management Response 

Teams. Several of us on the interagency board got a briefing by 

USNORTHCOM on this a couple of weeks ago. We are extremely 

encouraged and think that this is exactly the direction that the Department of Defense should be headed in, in support of civil authorities. We applaud their efforts and we look forward to more information sharing on those efforts. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much again for the opportunity today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Chief. And I must say that I am 

impressed by the amount of activity going on in preparation for response to a terrorist nuclear attack on a major American city. Obviously, there are enormous challenges and things that are yet undone, but I appreciate the four opening statements because they 

show that a lot is being done. 

I wanted to ask you, Chief, whether you have ever coordinated 

with local law enforcement in other cities that are probably potential targets. I am thinking of New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I think most of my experience with law enforcement is in the National Capital Region. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I have regular conversations with fire chiefs in 

other metropolitan areas, and as they get information from their 

police chiefs, there is a lot of information exchange. 

Again, we like to see a framework or a way to sort of facilitate 

some of that collaboration because we do recognize that these 

issues of boundaries, the silos that we all work in every single day, 

are vitally important to the services that we deliver to our communities every day. But we are going to have to look a lot harder during a crisis. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
150 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And you accept the responsibility for the 

initial response at the local level. Is that right? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Absolutely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I know Senator Collins mentioned it 

in her opening statement. Over what time period do you think that 

you and your local forces will be primarily responsible for a response? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. All of our assumptions are that we will be largely 

on our own for the first 24 to 72 hours, and that is despite our 

proximity to the Federal city. We see that as a given. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very important. And could you 

itemize the major functions you think you will have to carry out 

during that period of time? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. They are establishing or isolating the area initially involved in the explosion, dealing with the casualties on the 

periphery of that explosion, those that have the most survivability—we have, quite frankly, meager resources to apply to the 

number of casualties that we would envision initially—and dealing 

with those casualties. Informing the public about what actions we 

need them to take is absolutely vital. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, very important. Right. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Yes. And then asking for additional assistance 

going directly to the State, getting the governor to ask for additional assistance from the Federal Government, and getting all of 

this effort really spun up, getting it moving in a positive direction. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So at what point would you expect that 

Federal help would arrive? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I would see something like a CST probably arriving some time along 6 to 8 hours. We have the benefit and I think 

we will see in an incident—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And you have one right there in Virginia. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. We have one in Richmond. There is also one in 

the National Capital Region. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Actually, it is part of the DC National Guard. So 

we can expect to see that, I think, very quickly and get some of 

that technical expertise, again, because I already have the capabilities through our work with Pentagon force protection, I have some 

of that plume modeling that I am going to need very early on. 

But I think that I should also note that we will see members of 

the Radiological Assessment Teams (RAT) that come out of DOE, 

we will see those, I think, probably in the first 8 hours or so. And, 

that is where we will start to prepare for the larger Federal response that I will not anticipate seeing for largely another 48 hours 

or so. 

I am looking forward to the Consequence Management Teams 

coming from DOD, but I understand we are probably 3 days out 

from seeing those 4,500 people at my doorstep. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Let me ask about this question of 

surge capacity because as someone said here earlier, a terrorist nuclear attack is a low-probability event, but if it happens, of course, 

it is of an enormously impact. And I want to ask you, Admiral, to 

talk a little about this. You mentioned some of the numbers of preparedness to respond. I think you said there were 400,000 people 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
151 

nationwide that have the ability to be involved in decontamination. 

But then the question obviously is: How do you get an adequate 

number of people to the site attacked quickly enough? Are we capable of doing that? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, I agree with Chief Schwartz that 

a reasonable assumption is that 24- to 72-hour time frame for full 

coverage, and he has already covered some of the mitigation effects 

that he can draw from DOD. 

Our operational plan right now is to begin delivery of pharmaceutical supplies, medical supplies, burn supplies, etc., within a 12- 

hour period, and personnel in that 12- to 24-hour period. And that 

would include personnel that are specialized in emergency triage 

capability. That would be the DMAT teams. It would include the 

Disaster Mortuary Assistance Group because we are talking about 

significant numbers of deaths here. It would include drawdown 

against our uniforms that could provide more street-corner primary 

care triage kinds of activities for the walking wounded. 

So we think that we can start to deliver pharmaceutical supplies 

and push them in that 12- to 24-hour period. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you have the transportation capability 

to move people that quickly? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Transportation for that particular 

charge is there. The challenge here is evacuation of patients for definitive care, recognizing that, say, here in the National Capital Region, we are going to have a finite number of beds for trauma, for 

burns, and for radiation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Our DOD colleagues assist us in that, 

and there is pre-scripted activity built into the operational plans. 

We are working with the—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Again, for transportation. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. With Department of Defense assets. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Exactly, their airframes and some medical personnel. We have contracts now for ground and air transportation with private air and ground ambulance capability. We are 

working with the Department of Transportation on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet for wide-bodied mothballed aircraft so that we have 

the aircraft. We have specialized teams now trained in the Disaster 

Medical Assistance Group. In Hawaii, for instance, the Coast 

Guard provides the airframes; we provide the medical personnel. 

We are not there yet, but the operational activity is ramping up 

to assure that we have appropriately trained teams and appropriately capable air assets and ground assets to move equipment, 

people, and supplies in an appropriate time frame. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In the pre-scripted planning that you are 

doing, do you focus on major American cities that are more likely 

to be the target of a nuclear or radiological attack? Or do you have 

a system set up to move these personnel surge, medical personnel 

anywhere in the country that this might happen? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, there are 72 cities identified within the Cities Readiness Initiative, which focuses on the unique 

risks of larger urban populations, and, indeed, we are trying to regionalize our supply caches so that we are in closer proximity rathVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00159 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
152 

er than depending upon it all to come from one or two national 

caches. And the same thing is true for people. There are currently 

something on the order of magnitude of more than 100 teams in 

the NDMS system, including the mortuary folks, the veterinary 

folks, the emergency medical folks, and the DMATs. Those are 

spotted all around the country, and we would pull the people that 

were closest to the event. 

For the World Trade Center, for instance, we had three teams on 

the ground in New York City within 16 hours, but those included 

teams that came from Connecticut and could get in by ground, and 

teams that came from Massachusetts and New Jersey, again, who 

could get there on the ground. And that is our overall strategy, is 

to pull from the teams that are closest proximity initially, and then 

bring in other teams to fill. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up on this round. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chief Paulison, one of the issues that came up in the previous 

hearings was the importance of communicating effective, accurate 

information about whether people should shelter in place or evacuate. And we learned at our previous hearing that in many cases, 

sheltering in place is the right decision, and I do not think that is 

intuitive to people at all. I think most people’s first reaction is to 

flee. 

Now, we have talked a lot about the importance of the plume 

modeling so that you know how to make an accurate decision in 

that regard. But what our witnesses told us in the previous hearing 

is that it was not clear who makes that decision and who should 

communicate that decision. 

Tell us what you think or what you are doing to clarify the confusion on the very essential communication piece of the strategy because accurate, believable, and timely communication literally 

would make the difference in saving potentially thousands of lives. 

Mr. PAULISON. Senator, no question about it. The communication 

piece in all of our 15 scenarios is extremely important. We have 

laid out a communication plan for each one of those, particularly 

with a nuclear incident. Chief Schwartz accurately pointed out that 

the message has to be to shelter in place until your local officials 

give you information on whether to evacuate or not. 

The difficulty is going to be, quite frankly, if you do have a large 

nuclear device, such as a 10-kiloton bomb go off, communications 

systems are not going to be what they should be. We do not know 

if the radios are going to work. We do not know if the telephones 

are going to work or television is going to work or what is going 

to work and what is not going to work. 

So it is really going to fall in those first few hours on the local 

community leaders who have a responsibility for making a decision 

on evacuation to get that message out. 

We are going to be providing and are providing information to 

them of what that should be. We have protective action guidelines 

that are coming out very shortly that will give some very clear direction on first responder decisionmaking, on exposure guidelines, 

on clean-up and decontamination procedures and things like that, 

and those will be coming out very shortly. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
153 

Senator COLLINS. Is that the common alerting protocol that the 

Chairman and I have also written to you about? 

Mr. PAULISON. That is correct. Again, the Integrated Public Alert 

and Warning (IPAW) system we are talking about in Arlington 

County has most of that already. They have the ability to activate 

BlackBerrys and cell phones. I live in Arlington—I actually live in 

Florida, but my wife says I live up here. I get Reverse 911 calls 

all the time anytime there is a weather alert. So they have a very 

robust system in place. What we do not know is if that system is 

going to work after there is an explosion like that. And so that is 

the thing we really do not have a handle on. 

I think your assumption is correct. Most people intuitively will 

want to flee, but, quite frankly, they should shelter in place until 

they are told what to do because we do not know—they may be 

going from a safe place into harm’s way going through a plume. 

Senator COLLINS. But is it clear who has the responsibility for 

communicating that information? 

Mr. PAULISON. I think for the first several hours, it is the local 

community that has that responsibility, and the State, if the local 

community has been decapitated. But very shortly after that, the 

Federal Government is going to have to step in and work with the 

State to provide those lines of communication. 

Senator COLLINS. Chief Schwartz, do you think it is clear who 

has responsibility for, first of all, making the decision on what the 

population should do and, second, communicating that? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I think in communities such as mine, it is. I 

think there is still more work to be done, again, through these collaborative processes so that everybody comes to that common understanding because as we said in part of our earlier comments, I 

am not sure that many communities are even focusing on this kind 

of an incident as a potential reality. 

Senator COLLINS. I think you are very unusual, the level of planning that you have done, the preparedness, the experience. You are 

close to the capital area. You are part of the Capital Region. And 

I am impressed with what you have done, extremely impressed, but 

I do not think you are typical. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I can appreciate that, Senator. One of the things 

that the IAFC has done—and we are beta testing right now something we call the ‘‘Fire Chief’s Checklist for Terrorism.’’ One of the 

things we are trying to do is get out to fire chiefs all across this 

country their responsibility to ask these hard questions, work with 

their partners in their jurisdictions or in their regions, and come 

to some solutions around some of these problems because I appreciate that we may be unusual, but we would like to think, too, that 

we, along with some others that have advanced some of these concepts, that we can provide a way forward, some guidance for other 

communities that need to do the same thing. 

Again, I would urge that we consider just how real this threat 

is for even some metropolitan communities who are trying to make 

very tough resource decisions, and how they are going to apportion 

their time around threats that they see as relatively small in probability. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. PAULISON. Senator, can I make one more comment? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
154 

Senator COLLINS. Yes. 

Mr. PAULISON. Under our Emergency Support Function-15 (ESF– 

15), we really do have good, solid communication plans in place and 

protocols laid out. And what we really need to do, I think, based 

on what you are observing, is that we need to do a better job of 

getting those protocols out to local communities so everyone understands how that system is going to fall in place. But they are in 

place. We do have those. We have been working very hard to develop those since Hurricane Katrina and to make sure that those— 

because I think what you said earlier is that communication is 

going to be extremely important. People want to know what is 

going on. They want to know what to do, and they want to know 

what the right thing to do is. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Doctor, you talked about your efforts to educate the medical profession and other health care providers about radiological issues. 

And I was impressed that you are using specialized medical publications and an online training course. For example, are you working with the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Nurses Association (ANA)? It seems to me that a way to educate health care professionals is through continuing education 

courses, which all of them have to take as a condition of their licensure. When I was in State government, I oversaw the licensing 

board, so I am very familiar with that whole aspect. 

Have you thought of developing and disseminating through State 

licensing boards a standard course that could be offered in States 

across this country for which medical professionals could receive 

continuing education credit? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, specifically, no. 

Senator COLLINS. Good idea, though. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Yes, good idea. [Laughter.] 

The fact of the matter is that part of the funding that went into 

Public Health Emergency Preparedness went through the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), part of HHS, to schools 

of public health to develop these kind of curricula for various 

events. The curricula exist, but we have not formally reached out 

to the credentialing organizations, for instance, and suggested to 

them that they make it sort of a required part of licensure. Easy 

enough to do through the Federal licensure organization that 

brings together all the State licensure groups to do that. 

I have been impressed—last week, again, when I was in New 

Jersey, I went to Burlington Community College up there, and 

their president is now president of the National Association of 

Community Colleges. And I asked the question: How do we utilize 

community colleges to more effectively outreach this kind of educational awareness of issues? Because 85 percent of first responder 

training occurs in a community college environment. So we are exploring other means, but that is an idea that we had not pursued. 

Could I comment on one or two things? One is the National Governors Association (NGA) is working with us now to try to develop 

a non-classified briefing for elected officials so that we can help develop a greater understanding among elected officials, at least in 

a non-classified way, what are the risks that they really have. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
155 

Second, Chief Schwartz’s idea of regional dialogue is extremely 

important here. There are a number of active regional organizations in the Northeast. Your State is a participant in that. They 

have already negotiated agreements for mutual aid with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick as well as the United States. We could use 

those regional organizations in a much more effective way, I think. 

Those were ideas based on Chief Schwartz’s recommendation, 

which I support, and ideas that you and the Chairman have 

brought forth. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Just so I clarify my comment, I 

was not suggesting that it be a condition of licensure, but it could 

be an available course under continuing education requirements of 

taking so many credits of some continuing education courses. I believe that if you developed a course in this area, States would be 

very happy to have that as one of the offerings and that you would 

reach far more medical professionals. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

Secretary McHale, let me ask you a question or two. In the work 

that our staff did in preparing for the hearing, perhaps you will not 

be surprised to hear that there was a concern expressed by people 

who think about this that the Department of Defense, notwithstanding the commitments that you mentioned in your opening 

statement, treats civil support, which is the readiness to come to 

the response of the civilian population in a catastrophic attack of 

this kind, as secondary mission to its warfighting mission. This in 

some ways seems logical, and yet I want to raise the question 

about whether after September 11, 2001, that is still appropriate, 

since that decision to treat civil support as a secondary mission 

probably means the Department has limited resources to devote to 

that. In your own testimony today with regard to civil support, you 

make various commitments, and then you say ‘‘as appropriate and 

consistent with the law and the imperative to maintain the Department’s readiness’’—perfectly understandable—‘‘will provide support 

to civil authorities.’’ 

As you know, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves testified about its report, and made the point that the current threats to the homeland mean that the homeland is now part 

of the battlefield. They testified that civil support should become a 

primary mission and recommended that Congress codify such civil 

support as a responsibility of DOD. 

So let me ask you to comment on that, whether civil support is 

considered a secondary mission to the warfighting mission in the 

Department today, whether we ought to codify it as a primary mission and, therefore, hopefully set a predicate for increased resources to be committed to this critical function. Because I think 

in the end, most of us feel that only the Department has the scope 

of assets available for responding to either a catastrophic natural 

disaster or a catastrophic unnatural disaster such as a terrorist nuclear attack. 

Mr. MCHALE. Senator, about 30 years ago when I was studying 

for my bar exam, I was taught that an attorney, to be ethical, had 

a duty of candor to the tribunal, and I will in that spirit be completely candid in my response to your question. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
156 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCHALE. Up until September 11, 2001, I believe that civil 

support was considered a secondary mission. I think that at that 

point in time, there was a failure to recognize that in the 21st Century, when our adversaries recognized that we have conventional 

military capabilities that are unparalleled, even dominant in some 

ways, that our adversaries would, therefore, turn to asymmetric attacks, particularly attacks on the U.S. homeland, where the intent 

would not be to necessarily degrade our warfighting capability but, 

rather, to cripple the American spirit, to demoralize the American 

people through casualties that would be seen as unbearable. September 11, 2001, I think, was a recognition of that horrific insight 

on the part of our adversaries. And so I think coming out of two 

centuries of warfighting experience where the defense of the Nation 

really meant power projection overseas, our Department was culturally resistant to the warfighting concept of the 21st Century, 

which is that, unfortunately, because of our adversaries’ decisionmaking process, we are now very much a part of a global conflict 

where the preeminent battle space of that conflict is the U.S. homeland from their point of view. 

Having, I think, admitted with some candor that pre-September 

11, 2001, our perspective was inappropriate to the 21st Century, let 

me give you a rock solid assurance that all of that has changed in 

the last 5 years, and that the observations that have been given 

to you were once true, but they are no longer. Arnie Punaro is a 

very good friend of mine, and I worked closely with him during the 

development of the report of the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves. It was a very good report. There were some 

issues where we took exception, somewhat heatedly, I think, in a 

public forum initially, but cooler heads have prevailed, and there 

is now recognition that General Punaro and his staff made a fine 

contribution to the public dialogue. 

Secretary Gates agreed with 21 out of the first 23 recommendations presented in their interim report, and I was present in the 

room when General Punaro asked the Secretary of Defense to clarify our Department’s assessment of the civil support mission, 

whether we considered it to be equal to our warfighting responsibility. And Secretary Gates, without a moment’s hesitation, said 

that the domestic security of the American people is not simply a 

mission requirement co-equal with overseas warfighting; it is the 

primary mission of the Department of Defense and superior in its 

importance when compared to all other missions. It is ultimately 

why we exist, to protect American citizens here at home. 

And so as far as the issue of statutorily recognizing that importance, I am an agnostic on that. There may be some benefit in that, 

but I can tell you that the practical effect has already been 

achieved, which is why we now have capabilities, cited in my earlier response, that we did not have. Nobody would have believed 

pre-September 11, 2001, that 20,000 military personnel would have 

as their primary mission domestic catastrophic response, and yet 

that is, in fact, the capability that we are in the process of developing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your response and the quote 

from Secretary Gates because though the focus of the American 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
157 

military is different, as you quite accurately restate our history, 

than it was for the preceding couple of centuries, it is certainly 

what the Framers of the Constitution must have had in mind when 

they talked about the responsibility to provide for the common defense. 

You also encouraged me to believe—and I appreciate your agnosticism—that therefore, in this post-September 11, 2001, world, the 

law ought to catch up with the reality of the Department’s focus 

and we ought to codify this civil support function, as one at least 

equal—and, I appreciate what the Secretary said—in some real 

way even superior. So I thank you for that. 

I want to, if I may, just go ahead, with your indulgence, ask a 

different question to Chief Paulison. This is about mass care, 

FEMA’s responsibility to provide for sheltering and feeding of evacuees. At our last hearing, we heard that the Red Cross is the Nation’s largest provider of mass care but that, frankly, they are having financial difficulties, and their ability to respond as fully as 

they have in the past is in some question. Certainly their ability 

to respond to a catastrophic incident of this kind is. 

So I want to ask you to talk for a moment, Chief, about where 

you think FEMA is and, therefore, where the country is, in our 

planning and capabilities to shelter and feed evacuees from a nuclear attack. 

Mr. PAULISON. It is definitely an issue that I have been having 

regular conversations with the Red Cross on. In fact, I talked to 

their new President and CEO yesterday, welcomed her on board 

and committed our continued 100 percent support for that agency. 

They play a tremendous role in sheltering people in the aftermath 

of any type of disaster, and this country needs to make sure that 

agency stays viable because they are invaluable to us. 

There are two different issues. I read Mr. Becker’s testimony 

when he made those comments, and the sheltering of people during 

a natural disaster is not going to be the major issue. The major 

issue is going to be the capability of sheltering people in a nuclear 

event because of their lack of ability to make sure that people who 

come into the shelter have been decontaminated, and how they are 

going to do that. And that is where we need to work with them 

very closely, and that is one of the reasons we made the phone call 

yesterday to talk about that particular issue. 

The Department of Defense is going to be a major player for us 

in any type of event like this because like you very clearly pointed 

out, they have a lot of the resources to help us, particularly with 

the decontamination side. 

We also have put a lot of money into decontamination. If it is 

around the country, it will fall on fire departments like Arlington 

and others, and most of the major cities have plans in place to be 

able to decontaminate people. 

The Red Cross has assured me that they will be able to work 

with us to shelter people. We just need to make sure that we can 

work with them to make sure that we can decontaminate people 

prior to them going into the shelters. So it is an issue we are working on. I do not have all the answers yet, but it is something—it 

is right up on top of our dance card as far as how we are going 

to handle this. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
158 

I would like to point out, too, that I do agree with Mr. McHale 

about the primary mission of the military needs to be the defense 

of our country, and particularly the domestic side of it. We need to 

make sure, though, that the lead agency in these disasters is still 

the Department of Homeland Security, and I think he will agree 

with me on that. 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes. 

Mr. PAULISON. I do not think what we want is a military takeover just because it was a nuclear event as opposed to a natural 

disaster. I think that would confuse things and not work as 

smoothly as we have put in place over these last couple years. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is an important point, and I take it you 

agree, Secretary McHale. 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, sir. The Department of Defense has an enormously important role to play in rapidly bringing resources to bear 

in response to the catastrophic consequences of the attack. There 

is no need for the Department of Defense to be the lead Federal 

agency in that response. We provide the muscle. We provide the capability. We have to be able to operationally apply the resources. 

We can do all of that, as Mr. Paulison indicated, in support of a 

lead Federal agency, in this case the Department of Homeland Security. We do not believe that their leadership role in this area in 

any way impairs our operational response. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very good. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Secretary McHale, we talked earlier about those first responders 

from the State and local level who first appear on the scene. Right 

behind them is always the National Guard because the first thing 

the governors do when there is a catastrophic event, and that they 

would certainly do in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, is to 

call up the National Guard. 

For the last year or so, the Committee has repeatedly heard that 

the National Guard is seriously underequipped. General Blum, for 

example, testified that 88 percent of the Army National Guard 

were ‘‘very poorly equipped’’ to perform a civil support function. At 

a hearing that this Committee held, we had the Adjutant Generals 

from a couple States, including Maine, who said that we were at 

significant risk. 

A year later, I continue to hear troubling assessments about the 

current readiness of the National Guard to provide civil support 

services. You have talked a lot this morning—and I agree with 

you—that we have come a long way when you look at the Civil 

Support Teams or CERFP, but the National Guard’s readiness is 

still an issue. 

Could you comment on where you think we are in terms of the 

role that the National Guard would inevitably be called upon to 

play and the preparedness of the Guard? 

Mr. MCHALE. In our Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support, published in June 2005, we placed ‘‘a focused reliance’’ on 

our Reserve component forces for these kinds of missions with a 

particular emphasis upon the central role of the National Guard. 

So, Senator, your question is quite appropriate in terms of how well 

prepared is our central capability to execute the missions that are 

reflected in that strategy. We have pinned the rose on the National 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
159 

Guard. Have we given the National Guard the resources, the capabilities that they require to execute the mission? 

Even in the context of Hurricane Katrina, about 70 percent of 

our force that we deployed, which was the largest, fastest civil support mission in the United States, came out of the National Guard, 

about 70 percent, 50,000 of the 72,000 forces. 

I checked with the National Guard this morning, and I guess the 

best summary I can give you is that there are indeed unmet 

resourcing requirements, and in my view, there is a critical unmet 

requirement for integrated planning so that National Guard capabilities can be correctly fused with State and local capabilities in 

the civilian sector, public and private, and the Title 10 capabilities 

that we would deploy under USNORTHCOM command and control. 

We do not have integrated planning yet at the State and local 

level, so let me backstep just a moment. When I asked about personnel for the 10-kiloton nuclear mission, I was informed by the 

Guard Bureau this morning that we have 88 percent of the people 

that we would need for the foreseeable mission requirements associated with a 10-kiloton nuclear response. I said, that is fine, but 

where do we stand in terms of equipment? We have the people. Are 

they properly equipped? And the answer is, ‘‘Not yet,’’ and that is 

a truthful, candid answer to this Committee. I am sure it is not 

surprising for you to hear it. 

The fact is we have made enormous progress. Steve Blum has 

shown terrific leadership. We have gone from a resourcing and 

equipment availability in the 50 percentiles up to about 62 percent 

at the present time, and under his leadership and with appropriate 

funding, hopefully, from the Congress, it will move up to about 72 

percent. That is the best equipped the Guard will ever have been, 

both in terms of quality and quantity, in the National Guard’s history. But that does indicate that there are shortfalls that would 

need to be addressed in order to have an adequate response to a 

nuclear event. So we have made progress, but consistent with the 

plan that General Blum has laid out, we have further initiatives 

that have yet to be achieved. 

On the second point, if I may very briefly, it is so important that 

we move from the strategic level down to the practical level of operational and tactical capabilities, and the concept that we are now 

pushing forward under the leadership of DHS is to create a Task 

Force for Emergency Readiness within each State where the Adjutant General would play the leadership role, along with other 

emergency managers, to ensure that the plan, let’s say, in the 

State of Maine to address a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation would be 

properly integrated into all State and local capabilities to include 

coordination with USNORTHCOM and FEMA. 

We have not yet achieved that—we are pretty good at the poetry 

of strategy. We are not very good at the level of practical, tactical 

planning to deliver the capabilities in a timely manner. And so 

with that candid recognition, I can also assure you we are on the 

cusp of achieving that integrated planning through the concept of 

the Task Force for Emergency Readiness, which has received widespread support within the National Guard. 

Senator COLLINS. We are, however, going to have to get those 

planners down to the State level. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
160 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes. 

Senator COLLINS. You and I have talked about that before. And 

the problem is that most National Guard bureaus at the State level 

simply do not have that capacity. DOD is awash with planners. 

That is what DOD does in addition to its other responsibilities. 

Mr. MCHALE. The reason why the Adjutants General like this 

approach is that we take DOD planners—we will have about 450 

Reserve component DOD planners, officers who will be trained in 

the planning process and who will as part of their monthly drill obligation serve alongside National Guardsmen under the immediate 

supervision of the Adjutant General so that DOD planning capacity 

can migrate to the State level. 

We are a helping hand, but the leadership, the authority, and 

the accountability must ultimately be vested in the State government. And so we want to be as helpful as we can be without being 

intrusive in that process, and the Task Force for Emergency Readiness creates that kind of integrated planning capability. 

Senator COLLINS. And when do you see that actually going into 

effect? I think it is a great plan. I think it makes a great deal of 

sense, but as far as States actually seeing DOD planners working 

side by side with them. 

Mr. MCHALE. Again, we are in a supporting role. Mr. Paulison 

and I spoke about it as recently as 10 minutes before this hearing. 

I have also been working very closely with Harvey Johnson, Mr. 

Paulison’s deputy, to make this a reality. 

We, in fact, have developed a pilot program, and I would anticipate that DHS would announce that the pilot program later this 

year would be initiated in approximately a half-dozen States 

where, frankly, we are going to bend over backwards to make sure 

it is a success in those States because if it is, it will be much like 

the Civil Support Teams. We had nine of them back in September 

2001. We have 55 of them authorized today. If the first half-dozen 

or so Task Forces for Emergency Readiness work in those five 

States, I have no doubt that the Adjutants General and emergency 

managers will spread the gospel. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chief Schwartz, my final question is for you. The Metropolitan 

Medical Response System program is a small grant program at 

DHS and FEMA compared to many of the other homeland security 

grant programs. But it is a program that is directly relevant to the 

issues we are talking about today. 

It is my understanding that it provided just $300,000 to 124 

urban areas that it covered this year, including Arlington County. 

It is a program that gives a great deal of discretion to local communities about how exactly they use it, which I think is a strength. 

But give us your assessment of the MMRS program. How valuable 

is it to you? Should it be expanded? Are we underfunding it at 

$300,000? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I would tell you that it is probably as meager as 

the funds are, they are some of the best-spent funds in all of our 

efforts around homeland security. I would note that it is the only 

Federal program that creates a bridge between what government 

is going to do in a crisis and what the private health care community is going to do. We do not have anything else that facilitates 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
161 

a collaboration between the private health care community as a full 

partner in a response to something like the events we are talking 

about today, and many others that we could envision, and what 

those of us represented at this table are also going to do. So it has 

great strength, great value there. 

This may be a controversial comment, but I would have taken a 

program like the Urban Area Security Initiative and placed it 

under a framework like MMRS as opposed to the other way 

around. We have UASI and then we tell UASI cities to go work 

with their MMRS partners; whereas, the framework of MMRS, the 

goals that it sets out, however they need to be adjusted at the local 

level, I think is a far better approach to the kinds of issues that 

we are discussing today. 

In its original form, it was geared toward the human health consequences that result from a weapon of mass destruction. I think 

that whether it is a weapon of mass destruction or a naturally occurring crisis, as we said before, in an all-hazards environment the 

problems are all virtually the same. 

My job as a fire chief is to come to work in my community every 

single day and focus on the health and well-being of the citizens 

of and visitors to Arlington County. That may be because the 

threat is from a fire or an emergency medical incident. It may be 

because it is a public health outbreak, and then my role is slightly 

different, but no less important, to support my partners in public 

health. And if we have not done a good job of integrating our capabilities in that response, then we are all going to be going in different directions, and I think that ill serves our citizens. 

So I think that the way MMRS is structured, I think that the 

goals that it lays out provide us with a far better approach to managing problems like we are talking about today. And I oftentimes 

say it is not about the MM; it is about the RS. It is about building 

a better response system, and as a part of that, we obviously focus 

on the medical well-being of those we serve. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

The testimony that you presented today tells me that a lot is 

going on to prepare to respond to a terrorist nuclear attack in an 

American city, but also that none of you thinks we are where we 

want to be or need to be. 

So I want to ask each of you to do this. This is a classic. If you 

had a scale from 1 to 10 and 1 was totally unprepared—which it 

is also clear we are not—and 10 was totally prepared—which it is 

clear we are not—tell me where you think we are on that scale. 

And then what are your priorities or what should be our priorities 

for how to get as close to 10 as we can? In other words, what are 

the priorities of unmet needs? So, Chief, since you are the top guy 

and in charge, we are going to let you start first. 

Mr. PAULISON. I thought you were in charge. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I will answer afterward. 

Mr. PAULISON. We are not at a 10, no question about it. I think 

everybody at this table recognizes that and everyone in this room 

recognizes that. But we have made a tremendous amount of 

progress, and the fact that we are focusing on this is an important 

issue. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
162 

I would say, if I had to put us somewhere, between a 7 and 8. 

I think we know where we need to go, so that is key. And we are 

putting things in place to try to get there, and we are having some 

significant successes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So what are your priorities for the unmet 

needs? 

Mr. PAULISON. Again, in all candor, we have worked very hard 

to develop these partnerships, and that is what made us successful 

in the disasters that we have had. We have not had another Hurricane Katrina, but the fact that everyone is at the table supporting 

the effort to respond is important. So my priorities would be that 

as we transition into this next Administration, not to lose that. 

That is going to be the key. And in all seriousness, that is going 

to be the key for this government at the local, State, and Federal 

level to continue what we started. 

The surge capacity, getting equipment out there, the National 

Guard, the planning systems—all those things are important, but 

they will not happen if we do not continue the partnership that we 

have developed. And we have taken down the barriers. For the 

most part, we have gotten rid of the stovepipes. I wish that you 

could see the video conferences that we have every day at noontime 

when we are having these disasters and see the players at the 

table. And it is the top people from every agency. General Renuart 

is sitting there, General Blum, all of them from the partners we 

have not traditionally had good relationships with—not bad relationships, we just—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. 

Mr. PAULISON. So if I had my number one priority I had to pick, 

that would be it, that this continue on and we keep working together to protect this country. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Admiral where would you put us, 

and what is your top unmet priority? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, thanks for the opportunity. I think 

that we are probably at around a 6, maybe a 5. We are in that midrange where I think we have really started to identify assets and 

so on. 

I think I would echo Chief Paulison’s view and what we have 

heard from both Assistant Secretary McHale and from Chief 

Schwartz, that continued collaborative processes in the articulation 

of a National Response Plan, not a State, Federal, local, but a National Response Plan is critically important. Part of that is through 

strengthening regional dialogue, because, again, for large-scale 

events like this, resources draw across in a regional environment— 

we saw it with the floods. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. They were able to either manage it on 

their own, locally and State, or they reached across with EMAC to 

their neighbors, and they got the help they needed. They did not 

really need a ton of Federal support for certain aspects of this. And 

I think strengthening that regional capability is a priority. 

For me, in particular, I am concerned about the development of 

more tools. The research pipeline that I talked about and the advanced development of appropriate medical tools to advance our capability to be able to more effectively treat people, we do not have 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
163 

much in the toolbox at this point for dealing with acute radiation 

sickness. So I think that the two things, collaborative processes 

across our national spectrum and the development of some more 

tools through research and advanced development, I think are the 

two critical pieces. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Helpful. Thank you. Assistant Secretary 

McHale. 

Mr. MCHALE. Sir, I would say that a nuclear event is exponentially more challenging than any other scenario that I can envision, 

certainly much more challenging than the other 14 national planning scenarios. And so specifically in the context of a nuclear event, 

I would say on September 11, 2001, we would have struggled to be 

a 2. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MCHALE. Today we are probably a 5, and to improve our capabilities in the face of a challenge that is almost impossible to calculate—the consequences of a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation in the 

heart of a major American city, I think from a DOD standpoint, 

now that we have designed the right kind of capabilities—we have 

USNORTHCOM, we have the CSTs, the CERFPs, and we are 

building the CCMRFs—we have to bring an operational reality to 

the concepts that we have developed. 

There is some operational reality there today. I do not want to 

communicate to our adversaries that we are ill prepared. But we 

are going to get much better than the significant capabilities we 

have. But then, most importantly, to move from a 5 to an 8—and 

I find an 8 to be an incredible achievement in the face of these 

kinds of challenges—we have to get realistic, detailed planning at 

the State and local level so that we properly communicate to our 

partners at the State and local level what it is we can deliver and 

how fast we can deliver it. They can inform us as to where they 

see their shortfalls, and you cannot do that with a virtual presence. 

You need a planning capacity that is a focal point that exists in a 

real building with real people every day doing the planning. And 

if we do that for the first of the 15 scenarios, I believe that we can 

move from a 5 to an 8 with deliverable capabilities. 

For the other national planning scenarios, including the WMD 

scenarios, I think that we are much better prepared, probably a 6, 

7, maybe an 8 today, with the capacity to move to a 9 through the 

same kind of improvements. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is great. Thank you. Chief Schwartz. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I would say, again, representing the locals, that 

it is probably in the 4 to 5 range. And I realize we are being somewhat arbitrary here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. It is an impression. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. In terms of specific next steps, if you had asked 

me first, I know I would have initiated the same theme that you 

have heard through these three comments, and that is, regionalism. And what I would say as a practical action step is 

incentivize regionalism through some of our grant programs and 

stop defining regionalism as two jurisdictions willing to work together, and instead incentivize it by asking the States to form real 

response regions within their confines, have those regions work collaboratively within the MMRS kind of framework to submit to the 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
164 

States as part of their submission to Homeland Security for their 

grants exactly what the threats and risks are for each of the regions, be they natural or manmade, what capabilities they have to 

address those, and how they would use additional resources to 

build that capacity. 

And I would ask those regions to do that really on three levels. 

What are the daily threats that they face, everything from those 

things that we serve our communities with every day—fires, crime, 

those sorts of things—and whether or not our resources are adequate to do that? Because if we do not have adequate capabilities 

there, we cannot possibly be expected to respond adequately to 

higher levels of emergency. Then what are the risks that are inherent to our region? Are they coastal storms? Are they flooding? Are 

they the threat of terrorism? And last, put in provisions for how 

regions will go help each other. In a 10-kiloton kind of incident 

where a significant portion of a region would be taken out, where 

are they going to look for assistance, and how can that assistance 

be provided in a meaningful way? 

So I would say incentive regionalism through our grant programs, stop just laying it out there and letting people decide, force 

it through the grant guidance, make the States come up with real 

meaningful response regions where there are already relationships 

or where relationships need to be facilitated, and go forward from 

there. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very helpful. I appreciate it. It is 

interesting, each of you mentioned the partnerships at the Federal 

level, but also across the Federal, State, county, and local levels. 

And I think the regional approach is a very practical idea. Obviously, we are going to be able to surge more quickly from within 

a region. As one of you described—I think it might have been you, 

Admiral—some of the first teams to surge into New York after the 

World Trade Center attack were from the surrounding region. 

Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I do not have anything further. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, we thank you all. This is going to 

be a continuing focus of our Committee. In the next hearing we are 

going to go back to the prevention side and take a look at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). But thanks for what you 

are doing. 

Chief, I do not want to miss the opportunity, while we have you 

here, first to say that, as we joked before, the fact that nobody is 

criticizing FEMA and its response to the Midwest floods means 

that you must be doing a great job. And that makes Senator Collins and me very proud since we worked so hard post-Hurricane 

Katrina to reform FEMA, and you have really carried out those reforms. So I wanted to say thank you. In fact, to stop being facetious 

about it, I know that you are doing a great job. But do you want 

to say anything briefly about your experience here in response to 

this latest series of natural disasters? 

Mr. PAULISON. I do, and I appreciate the opportunity, Senator. 

The unprecedented flooding—and we were lucky that all the States 

affected had a great emergency management system in place. All 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
165 

the governors were personally involved, so the response piece of it 

went very well. 

The culture change that we have put in FEMA of leaning forward, getting out there early, prepositioning supplies, and not 

waiting for the governors to ask for them before we started moving 

supplies really paid off tremendously in this particular event. 

The difficult piece is yet to come. Less than 10 percent of the 

homeowners have flood insurance, so 90 percent of those people 

flooded may not have the funds to rebuild their homes. The maximum amount they can get from FEMA is $28,800 if they qualify 

for everything that is there. If they had flood insurance, they could 

have gotten up to $250,000 for the home and up to $100,000 for 

the contents, and that would have obviously put their home back 

in the shape that it was before the floods. 

So we are going to have a difficult time. I say ‘‘we,’’ and that is 

a collective ‘‘we,’’ the State, local, and Federal levels. What are we 

going to do to make sure people have decent housing? And where 

are we going to put people and how are we going to get them back 

on their feet when there was not adequate insurance in place for 

them to do that on their own? So that is what we are going to 

struggle with. 

So I do appreciate the comments, but I am sure that as we get 

into the recovery piece of it, we may get some negative comments. 

[Laughter.] 

So just be prepared. But we are going to do the best we can. I 

have told all the governors that we are going to work as hard as 

we can to do everything we can legally do to help them and their 

States get back in shape. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, if I could just second your comments. I cannot imagine a greater turnaround than we have seen 

with FEMA. It does not mean that there are not still problems. It 

does not mean that there are not still issues and challenges that 

need to be addressed. But the change in leadership combined with 

the extensive reforms that this Committee put in place are paying 

dividends, and we have seen it, and thank goodness we did do all 

of the reforms and such capable new leadership was brought in, because our country has been challenged with natural disasters the 

likes of which I have never seen before, including my home State 

of Maine, where we had flooding this spring in northern Maine 

that was unlike anything in the State’s history. 

So I want to second your praise and thanks to Chief Paulison 

and to all of the rank-and-file FEMA members who are working so 

hard each and every day. 

As I listen to this panel, it helps me be confident that we have 

so many people who are working so hard for our Nation, and you 

do not get thanked often. There is so much anti-bureaucracy, antiWashington feeling in this country. And I think if the people of this 

Nation could all have heard this hearing and the seriousness and 

dedication that is represented by each of our panelists and by all 

the people that you represent, the men and women who are working hard each and every day to protect this country, it would be 

very heartening to the people of this Nation. We may not get the 

headlines and the attention, and that is typical when you are doing 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
166 

a good job, as all of you are. But, in fact, I want you to know that 

this Committee does pay attention to your work, and we do appreciate it, and you are making a difference each and every day. So 

thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. I could not agree 

with you more. I was looking at the four of you thinking you are 

living every day with an awesome responsibility that the positions 

that you hold have given you in terms of daily events, but then the 

unthinkable cataclysmic event may occur, and we live with that as 

a possibility, unfortunately, in our time. And, we cannot thank you 

enough for the way in which you are dispatching that responsibility. I was raised with an expression that the reward of a good 

deed is the deed itself. So even if you are not getting headlines, I 

hope you feel the satisfaction and the reward of all the good deeds 

that you do to protect the security of the American people every 

day. 

The record of the hearing will be held open for 15 days if you 

want to add anything to your testimony or we want to ask you any 

more questions, but bottom line, thank you very much, and we look 

forward to working with you in our shared goal of protecting the 

homeland security of the American people. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(167) 

THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION 

ARCHITECTURE: ARE WE BUILDING 

DOMESTIC DEFENSES THAT WILL MAKE THE 

NATION SAFER FROM NUCLEAR TERRORISM? 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. Thank you all for being here. 

This is the sixth in a series of hearings held by this Committee 

to examine the threats posed by nuclear terrorism and what our 

government is doing to protect us from it. 

In previous hearings we have examined our state of preparedness if a nuclear detonation occurred in a major American city: 

Who would help the local first responders who would be clearly 

overwhelmed? What kind of follow-up medical response capabilities 

does our Nation have to treat the wounded? And the numbers there 

will run into the thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands. 

Do we have a clear communication strategy to let the public know 

exactly what they need to do to protect themselves after an attack? 

Should they move or shelter in place, for instance? 

We have learned a lot in all of these hearings, and I would say 

that, speaking in summary, we have learned that a lot of work is 

being done to protect the American people from this threat, but we 

have a lot more work to do before we can rest easy, or anything 

approximating resting easy. 

As we have said in each one of our previous hearings, our first 

priority must continue to be to prevent terrorists from obtaining 

the means, methods, and pathways of attacking us with nuclear 

weapons in the first place. And that is what we are going to focus 

on at today’s hearing, which is the first, as far as we understand, 

that any committee of Congress has held on the so-called global nuclear detection architecture. We are going to review today the Federal Government’s efforts to detect and thwart trafficking in nuclear materials so the terrorists never get their hands on a nuclear 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
168 

weapon or, if they do, that we make sure that they are blocked 

from getting into the United States. 

The danger of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon is real. Between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed incidents of illicit 

trafficking in nuclear materials. Eighteen of these cases involved 

weapons grade materials, and another 124 involved material capable of making a so-called dirty bomb that would use conventional 

explosives to spread nuclear material. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with 

designing the nuclear detection architecture to protect us from this 

threat. It is a multi-agency effort created by a Presidential Directive in April 2005 and housed within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). 

As we will hear from our witnesses, the responsibilities of the 

DNDO are daunting. Its first job was to perform an inventory of 

the 74 different Federal programs spread over the Department of 

Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State 

and to try to create from these a unified system where all the different agencies were working together to protect America. 

The reach of these programs is wide and layered, including efforts abroad, efforts at the border, and, of course, activities within 

our homeland. Many of these programs predate the establishment 

of the DNDO. 

This is a significant effort, certainly as measured in dollars 

spent. During the last fiscal year, these programs cost a total of 

$2.8 billion—$1.1 billion to combat smuggling and secure nuclear 

materials held abroad, $220 million to detect materials at the border, $900 million for detection efforts within the United States, and 

$575 million for cross-cutting activities that support many of the 

other programs, like research and development, into detection technologies. 

The goal of a layered system, as I understand it, is that each 

point of the system will offer another opportunity to detect and 

thwart terrorists before they can acquire a nuclear weapon or to 

stop them before it can be smuggled into the United States. 

But the system we have in place now, I conclude, is incomplete. 

As we are going to hear today, our global nuclear detection architecture—this ‘‘system of systems,’’ as one of our witnesses calls it— 

may have both needless redundancies and/or dangerous gaps, 

which I suppose in this case is the worst of both worlds. Even if 

each program was working precisely as planned, holes apparently 

exist in this layered security net that could allow determined terrorists to get their hands on weapons grade nuclear material and 

bring it into the United States. 

DNDO’s job is to help find and plug those gaps. But that job is 

made significantly more difficult by the fact that DNDO is just a 

coordinating agency and has no effective power to order or implement desired changes. 

DNDO has no authority to alter or direct the spending requests 

for programs that are critical to the architecture and little ability 

to ensure that money is spent efficiently and contributes to the 

overall contours of the architecture that DNDO itself has designed. 

Therefore, I think we are at a point where we have got to ask 

today whether DNDO needs more authority to review and perhaps 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
169 

even approve budgets and plans of the participating agencies as 

well as having authority to make sure that the billions of dollars 

that we have spent and will spend, must spend, are spent effectively. 

So I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony. We have an excellent panel here. The challenges posed are serious and our response 

to those challenges must be as serious, coordinated, and purposive. 

And I look forward to both hearing from the witnesses what is happening now and, of course, any suggestions they have, particularly 

with regard to legislation, about how we might improve the status 

quo to make it better. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The global nuclear detection architecture overseen by the DNDO 

is a vital component of our Nation’s defenses against a terrorist nuclear attack. That architecture is an elaborate and expansive structure involving the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and 

Homeland Security. Its operations encompass work by crews of 

Coast Guard vessels, Customs and Border Protection cargo screeners at U.S. and foreign seaports, and many others, all compromising a multi-layered defensive screen to detect nuclear materials. 

The SAFE Port Act, which I co-authored, enhanced such efforts 

by requiring that all cargo containers be scanned for radiation at 

the 22 largest American seaports, covering 98 percent of cargo coming into this country. That law also strengthened the Container Security Initiative, which targets inspection of high-risk cargo at foreign ports. 

The architecture’s multi-layered, cross-departmental, international orientation against multiple and shifting threats relies on 

a ‘‘system of systems.’’ Assessing the effectiveness of that approach 

is the purpose of this hearing. 

Today’s witnesses can give us valuable insights into the challenges that the DNDO confronts, and which Congress must consider, as we make additional decisions about structure, resources, 

operations, and authorities of our global nuclear detection architecture. 

Detecting nuclear materials in transit, at seaports, and ports of 

entry before they reach target areas and can be detonated is obviously of the highest priority. As the recent example of drug smugglers using submersibles to smuggle tons of cocaine demonstrates, 

however, our enemies seek ways to avoid our efforts. They have 

many options: Using all-terrain vehicles to cross the long stretches 

of wooded land borders in Maine and Minnesota, for example; piloting small boats into isolated inlets along our coast; or flying small 

aircraft low over unpopulated areas to land on fields in the Southwest. 

Technologies and multi-layered defenses can help, but we can 

never be sure of blocking every path that determined enemies 

might select to reach targets in our homeland. 

That sobering conclusion clearly underscores the need to keep intelligence and law enforcement capabilities at the highest levels of 

skills and readiness. It also highlights the importance of reducing 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
170 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Mullen and Mr. Gallaway appears in the Appendix on 

page 647. 

the chances that nuclear materials can ever be obtained by terrorists. 

Our first line of defense must be working with domestic and foreign partners to ensure that nuclear materials are secured and accounted for, and to use our best diplomatic efforts to prevent or 

minimize nuclear proliferation. The more effectively we can pursue 

those efforts, the lighter will be the burden that rests on our global 

nuclear detection architecture. Nevertheless, we know that those 

efforts are imperfect, and, thus, we must make sure that the architecture is as strong and robust as possible. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins, for that thoughtful statement. 

We will go now to the panel of witnesses. We have five, so we 

are going to give you all 10 minutes. Please try to keep within the 

10 minutes. There will be a special award for those who come in 

under 10 minutes. It may not be until the next world, as my late 

mother would say, but you will definitely be rewarded. 

We are going to begin with Mark Mullen, Assistant Director for 

Architecture at the DNDO, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Good morning, and thank you for your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK MULLEN,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR 

ARCHITECTURE, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MULLEN. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, and Ranking 

Member Collins. My name is Mark Mullen. I am the Assistant Director for Architecture in the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. 

Thanks for the invitation to meet with you today and tell you about 

the work we have been doing to develop an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture because that, in fact, is our main job 

in my office. 

Our job basically is to figure out how to strengthen our defenses 

against nuclear terrorism by improving the detection systems 

around the world that give us opportunities to detect and interdict 

nuclear threats on their way to targets in the United States. We 

do this in partnership with other agencies in the U.S. Government 

as well as other domestic and international organizations and partners. We work closely with State and local law enforcement agencies in the United States, and we also, through our partners and 

other U.S. Government agencies, work closely with other countries 

that have nuclear detection systems. And it is through the integration of all these activities that we think we can maximize the effectiveness of the nuclear detection architecture. 

Detection is only one of many technical, operational, and policy 

measures that are used to combat nuclear terrorism, but it is an 

important one, and it is one where there are a lot of improvements 

underway. And there is a lot of room for strengthening our architecture by focusing on the nuclear detection aspects. And that, in 

fact, is what the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was set up to 

do. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
171 

In my office, in the Architecture Office, we started our work on 

the global nuclear detection architecture right away, as soon as 

DNDO was set up in April 2005. And the first thing we did was 

to take stock, what we call the ‘‘baseline architecture analysis.’’ We 

assembled as much information as we could about what was already being done at that time to detect and interdict radiological 

and nuclear threats. Not surprisingly, we found a lot was already 

being done, both domestically and internationally. We found, for 

example, that in 2005 there were more than 70 U.S. Government 

programs across multiple agencies, totaling at that time about $2.5 

billion a year; that number has increased now to where it is approaching about $3 billion. All these programs were already in 

place working and contributing in various ways to the global nuclear detection architecture. 

We also found that thousands of detectors had already been deployed, both domestically and internationally, and plans were underway at that time to expand those deployments significantly. 

We also found, however, that there were some gaps and vulnerabilities that were not being fully addressed and in some cases 

were not being addressed at all. And so that was really the starting 

point for the next stage in our work. 

We immediately began developing solutions to fill the most significant gaps that we had identified in our baseline analysis, and 

to do this we partnered with agencies that have operational responsibility and the domain expertise to begin filling in some of these 

areas where we had identified vulnerabilities. For example, for the 

land border in between the ports of entry, we teamed up with the 

Border Patrol, and we have been working with them to develop solutions for that domain. And for the small maritime issues that 

Senator Collins alluded to, we have been working with the Coast 

Guard in particular, and other agencies as well, to try and address 

the small maritime vulnerabilities. Together with our partners, we 

examined these vulnerabilities and various options for starting to 

address them. 

The result of this work was a series of initiatives that DNDO has 

launched with our partners over the last few years. Now they are 

in various stages of implementation to begin to reduce the nuclear 

risks associated with these vulnerable pathways. And Dr. Gallaway 

in a moment will describe briefly several of these initiatives and 

present the status of them as they exist today. 

To sum up, I would just like to reiterate that DNDO’s work to 

develop and enhance the global nuclear detection architecture has 

proceeded in three stages: First, the baseline architecture analysis 

where we took stock, we took an inventory, as the Senator said; 

second was the options analysis phase where we began to try and 

identify solutions to begin to fill the gaps, and we have made considerable progress in that direction; third is the implementation 

phase, and that is what we are in right now where, through pilot 

projects and initial deployments, which Dr. Gallaway will elaborate 

on, we have begun to introduce new detection systems and concepts 

of operation into practice, and where we are continuing to improve 

and strengthen the systems based on experience we are gaining 

through the implementations as well as ongoing evaluations. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
172 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Gallaway and Mr. Mullen appears in the Appendix on 

page 647. 

I would like to stress one final point, and that is, the importance 

of a phased approach to building and strengthening the nuclear detection architecture with a near-term perspective and also with a 

long-term perspective. Not only are technologies and systems improving all the time based on research and development, testing 

and evaluation, and practical experience that we are gaining in the 

field, but the threat is also evolving in ways that may be difficult 

to predict if we look 5 or 10 years in the future. Therefore, we need 

to continually update and strengthen the architecture in the near 

term and long term as new options and challenges arise. Dr. 

Gallaway in the next presentation will expand on the progress we 

are making and give a status on that. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Mullen. Good beginning. 

Just out of curiosity, I always wonder how people get to positions 

like this. What is your own background in terms of training and 

experience? 

Mr. MULLEN. I am a nuclear engineer. I have worked in this area 

for more than 30 years. I am actually detailed to DNDO from the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory as a technical adviser, and I have 

worked over many years on a wide range of different nuclear security and nuclear threat reduction programs, including several that 

you mentioned in your opening remarks. I spent quite a few years 

in the 1990s, for example, working in Russia on the nuclear security and material protection control and accounting programs, and 

I came to DNDO at the beginning because I thought there were 

some important problems there that I could contribute to. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is great. It sounds like you are actually qualified for this job, which is reassuring. [Laughter.] 

Dr. Chuck Gallaway, Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Thanks, Dr. Gallaway. Please proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES GALLAWAY, PH.D.,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins. The question you posed—Are we building domestic defenses that will make us safer?—is obviously a critical 

one. 

To get right to the point, I believe the answer is yes, we are safer 

from nuclear terrorism today than we were 3 years ago when we 

formed the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Of course, we recognize that there is still a lot of work to be done. 

Mr. Mullen’s analysis has shown that greater security can be 

achieved by focusing on all three layers of the architecture: Overseas, at the border, and within the United States. Our colleagues 

at the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the 

Department of State are responsible for implementing the overseas 

layer. I will briefly discuss several programs that DNDO has impleVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
173 

mented on the domestic front—in other words, at our borders and 

within the United States. 

Starting with the border layer, cargo security has been our major 

emphasis to date. As mentioned just a few moments ago, 3 years 

ago only 22 percent of the cargo at seaports was being scanned. In 

December 2007, DHS met the congressionally mandated goal in the 

SAFE Port Act of scanning all incoming containerized cargo with 

radiation portal monitors at the Nation’s top 22 seaports. That represents 98 percent of all incoming containerized cargo. Future work 

will entail finishing the remainder of the port work as well as moving into cargo challenges including on-dock rail, bulk cargo, and 

international rail. 

Guided by the analysis of the baseline global nuclear detection 

architecture, we have expanded into the aviation pathway. We 

have equipped every Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer 

who meets an international general aviation flight with detection 

equipment. This pathway is complicated, and we are working with 

CBP, our Federal partners, and our international partners to potentially push out our borders by screening flights overseas. 

Another important pathway identified in the architecture work is 

the maritime vector. We have acquired and delivered radiological/ 

nuclear detection equipment to all Coast Guard boarding teams. 

We have initiated pilot projects in the Puget Sound and the San 

Diego area. We are currently conducting a test campaign to characterize the performance of radiological/nuclear detection equipment 

in the maritime environment. This work will guide our future maritime programs. 

A third pathway driven by the architecture study and still in its 

formative stage is non-port-of-entry land crossings. We are working 

closely with Customs and Border Protection to develop options and 

conduct field evaluations of relocatable and personal detectors for 

use by the Border Patrol along the Southern and the Northern borders. So let’s leave the border layer and move towards the interior 

layer of the architecture. 

At the regional level, we have worked closely with nine States 

and the District of Columbia on the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot. This pilot deployed fixed detection systems at weigh 

stations as well as augmentation by mobile systems. Throughout 

the country, we have a vigorous training and exercise program. In 

the last 3 years, we have trained over 7,000 State and local officials 

in preventative radiological/nuclear detection through a host of different courses. 

Staying with layered defense concept, we have developed an approach to defend a potential high-value target such as the New 

York City region. The Securing the Cities Initiative enables State 

and local jurisdiction, along with Federal partners, to coordinate 

and execute preventative radiological/nuclear detection screening 

operations. Lessons learned in the New York City region will serve 

as a model for future work across the country. 

In conclusion, we are safer today than we were 3 years ago when 

DNDO was established. Guided by the analysis of the global nuclear detection architecture, we are taking a measured, balanced 

approach across multiple layers. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
174 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer appears in the Appendix on page 657. 

Our work at DNDO along with the cooperative efforts of our 

partners within DHS, throughout the U.S. Government, and within 

State and local governments, are making our Nation safer from nuclear terrorism. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gallaway. I 

appreciate the statement, and we will now move on to David 

Maurer, Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. MAURER,1 ACTING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MAURER. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member Collins. I am glad to be here today to testify on 

DNDO’s efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. 

As you well know, preventing the smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials and devices into the United States is one of this 

country’s top national security priorities. Several Federal, State, 

and local agencies as well as foreign governments are involved in 

addressing this threat. 

To better integrate these efforts, DNDO was required to develop 

and enhance global nuclear detection architecture in coordination 

with the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and other Federal 

agencies. For the past few months, we have been reviewing 

DNDO’s progress in developing this architecture. Our work is still 

underway, so my statement today provides our preliminary observations on DNDO’s efforts. We plan to issue our final report to you 

and other congressional requesters in January 2009. 

This morning, I will discuss three facets of DNDO’s efforts: First, 

its status; second, the challenges DNDO and other Federal agencies face; and, third, the cost of the various programs that comprise 

the architecture. 

Regarding status, we found that DNDO has developed an initial 

architecture but lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide 

how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture. Specifically, 

DNDO has coordinated with the Departments of Defense, Energy, 

and State to identify 74 Federal programs that combat smuggling 

of nuclear or radiological material. DNDO has identified gaps in 

this architecture, such as land border crossings into the United 

States between formal ports of entry and has started to develop 

programs to address these gaps. 

Our preliminary observation is that these pilot programs appear 

to be a step in the right direction. However, DNDO has not developed an overarching strategic plan to guide the transition from the 

initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture. As a result, DNDO lacks a strategic road map with clearly established 

goals, responsibilities, resource needs, and mechanisms for assessing progress along the way. 

It is only fair to point out that developing an enhanced architecture is not an easy task. DNDO and other Federal agencies face 

a number of coordination, technological, and management challenges. I would like to highlight three. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
175 

First, DNDO will need to avoid the implementation and coordination problems that initially plagued U.S.-funded nuclear detection programs overseas. Although there have been recent improvements in these overseas programs, DNDO will need to closely examine its domestic efforts to ensure they do not suffer similar problems. 

Second, radiation detection technology has limitations, and even 

improved, more advance equipment would need to be closely integrated with proper training, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement operations to effectively combat nuclear smuggling. 

Third, DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture 

that depends on program implemented by other agencies. As a result, DNDO may face challenges, ensuring that the individual programs within the architecture are effectively integrated and coordinated. 

Finally, there is the important issue of how much this is going 

to cost. Looking back, according to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for the 74 programs in the 

architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, a little over $1 billion was for 

international programs, $220 million was for programs at the U.S. 

border, $900 million was for security and detection activities within 

the United States, and $575 million funded a number of cross-cutting activities. 

Looking forward, the future costs for DNDO and the other Federal agencies to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in these amounts. In other 

words, no one really knows what an enhanced architecture would 

cost. What is clear is that DNDO has an important and complex 

task. Developing a global nuclear detection architecture involves 

coordinating a vast array of programs and technological resources 

that span the globe. While DNDO’s vision of a more comprehensive 

architecture is laudable, to achieve this goal it will need to address 

a number of key challenges. What is more, implementing an enhanced architecture will likely cost billions of dollars, take several 

years, and rely on the expertise and resources of agencies and programs across the government. 

Moving forward, DNDO should work closely with its counterparts 

within DHS as well as in other departments to develop a comprehensive strategic plan to help safeguard the investments made 

to date, more closely link future goals with the resources necessary 

to achieve those goals, and enhance the architecture’s ability to operate in a more cohesive and integrated fashion. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Maurer. That was an excellent statement, and we want to get back to some of the questions 

you raised. 

Next is Dr. Dana Shea, specialist in science and technology at 

the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Good morning. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
176 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Shea with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

675. 

TESTIMONY OF DANA A. SHEA, PH.D.,1 SPECIALIST IN SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, RESOURCES, SCIENCE, AND INDUSTRY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Mr. SHEA. Good morning. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and other Members of the Committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before the Committee today. My testimony today has three parts: First, I will provide a brief overview 

of the requirement to develop a global nuclear detection architecture; second, I will summarize the approach taken by the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office; and, third, I will identify several policy 

issues that may be of interest to the Committee. 

To start with the overview, the SAFE Port Act of 2006 gave 

DNDO the statutory responsibility to develop an ‘‘enhanced global 

nuclear detection architecture.’’ This architecture is to be implemented by multiple Federal agencies, including the Departments of 

State, Homeland Security, Energy, and Defense. Similar language 

was included in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14. This 

Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within 

the Department of Homeland Security in 2005. Neither the Presidential Directive nor the SAFE Port Act explicitly defined the global nuclear detection architecture. To meet their statutory responsibility, DNDO interpreted this phrase. Their global nuclear detection architecture consists at least of Federal detection systems deployed domestically and overseas, the programs that support them, 

the data they generate, the mechanisms that coordinate them, and 

a systems engineering-based process for future growth and development. 

The global nuclear detection architecture aims to prevent the 

detonation of a radiological or nuclear weapon within the United 

States. It is a system of systems, that is, a structure that aligns 

detection systems and the programs that support them into geographically based layers. The architecture has both physical and 

conceptual components. The physical component is composed of the 

sensor systems deployed by Federal agencies. The conceptual component is the mechanism for organizing and analyzing program capabilities in this system-of-systems context. 

The DNDO global nuclear detection architecture has three layers—exterior, border, and interior—and each layer is composed of 

several sublayers and provides an independent opportunity to detect the radiological or nuclear threat. It is likely that no single 

layer will provide perfect detection, but the combination of these 

less than perfect layers may be sufficient to detect the threat. Several Federal programs are aligned with each architecture layer and 

experts may compare architecture requirements and program capabilities to identify gaps in the architecture. Such a gap analysis is 

one example of the benefits of creating an overarching architecture. 

The DNDO has identified baseline funding and participation levels in the architecture. According to DNDO, the global nuclear detection architecture has been used to identify gaps in the Nation’s 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
177 

abilities to detect radiological and nuclear materials, and these 

identified gaps are in the process of being addressed. 

I will discuss four key issues facing decisionmakers when considering the global nuclear detection architecture and its use: First, 

the architecture’s ability to meet its primary goal of detecting radiological and nuclear material; second, the prioritization of current 

and future investments in the architecture; third, the criteria for 

policymakers to judge the architecture’s success; and, last, DNDO’s 

ability to sustain and evolve the architecture in the future. 

A failure of the architecture will likely become readily apparent, 

and the success of the architecture may not be so clear. The success 

of the architecture will depend on efforts beyond detecting these 

materials. The DNDO has identified the protection of radiological 

and nuclear sources as part of the global nuclear detection architecture. These components beyond detection require the coordination 

and cooperation of multiple agencies, potentially in multiple countries, and the ability to correlate and combine data from multiple 

sources. Accurate information gathered by DNDO regarding the 

performance and benefits of the architecture’s programs is essential 

to the architecture’s effectiveness. However, such information may 

be difficult to generate, measure, or even estimate. Absent such 

validated information, policymakers may find judgments regarding 

success in meeting architecture goals hard to make. Congress may 

face the issue of what constitutes an acceptable level of risk in the 

architecture. It is unlikely that any single sublayer in the architecture will be 100 percent effective. What constitutes an acceptable 

level of risk will likely be a major policymaking decision, especially 

in the case where additional small benefit may come at substantial 

cost. 

The system-of-systems approach embodied in the global nuclear 

detection architecture can be a powerful tool for prioritization and 

planning. If DNDO can establish an overall view of radiological and 

nuclear detection, it may attempt to optimize the total architecture. 

It might do this both by refining investment in existing programs 

as well as identifying areas where investment in new programs 

would yield particular benefit. A key component of this approach 

is the development of an accurate representation of the architecture, a model. The DNDO might use this model to identify tradeoffs and alternative approaches, establish the risk reduction benefits and economic costs of these approaches, and inform policymakers’ critical decisions regarding further investment. 

These architecture priorities may not exactly align with the priorities of the participating agencies or their individual programs. 

The DNDO is a coordinating office, not an implementing agency, 

and does not control the budgets of other agencies or have the ability to require other agencies to revise or adjust their funding investments. Therefore, a key issue for Congress is priority setting 

for the global nuclear detection architecture’s implementation. Policymakers may need to choose between future agency priorities and 

supporting architecture needs. Congressional comparison of architecture priorities and participating agency program activities may 

be a key component of the architecture’s effective implementation. 

One possible mechanism to achieve such oversight is to provide 

the DNDO Director with the authority to review and assess the 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
178 

budgets of other participating agencies. Another mechanism might 

be to require the compilation and submission of an annual, unified 

global nuclear detection architecture budget supplement. Linking 

the identification and reporting of the architecture to the budget 

cycle could provide Congress with insight into how the priorities of 

the architecture are being implemented by the various participating agencies. Congress would also obtain an overarching view of 

the implications of changing funding levels among programs. 

The robustness of the global nuclear detection architecture likely 

depends on three factors: The information DNDO receives from 

other agencies; DNDO’s interpretation of that information; and 

DNDO’s continual reassessment of the architecture based on this 

information. 

Strategic goals, metrics, and benchmarks for the architecture are 

needed to assure that important aspects of other agency activities 

are provided and incorporated. Without these metrics and benchmarks, factors not essential to the mission of the architecture may 

become the criteria by which success is judged. 

Congress could solicit from DNDO timelines, milestones, and 

funding estimates for portions of the architecture along with a series of implementation alternatives. By identifying the different 

stages for implementation of the architecture, Congress may be 

able to determine what qualifies as a near-term success while still 

allowing for growth and completion of longer-term goals. 

The DNDO has identified the architecture as having an evolving 

component to it, where future iterations of the architecture may 

address concerns that cannot be best addressed with current technology. The DNDO draws upon subject matter experts and 

detailees from other agencies to provide unique expertise and necessary interagency input and coordination. This use of detailees 

may pose challenges to the maintenance of the architecture due to 

the limited duration of their positions. Congressional oversight of 

the architecture’s evolution is a key component to its maintenance. 

Congress might require DNDO to provide detailed reports identifying DNDO’s long-term vision for the architecture. Such reports 

might provide Congress with the information necessary to balance 

the long-term goals of the architecture with other policy objectives 

under consideration. Congress might also address the issue of 

maintaining institutional knowledge by requiring DNDO to identify 

those positions best filled by permanent staff and to establish specific mechanisms to maintain this knowledge. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would 

be happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of 

the Committee might have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Dr. Shea. Really 

through you to CRS and, Mr. Maurer, through you to GAO, thanks 

to both of your agencies for the really extraordinary work that you 

do in assisting this Committee and Congress generally in carrying 

out our oversight responsibilities. I thank you for the statements 

you have made today, which will be very helpful to us. 

Our final witness is Robert Nesbit, Senior Vice President and 

General Manager, Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems at 

the MITRE Corporation. Mr. Nesbit has served, as I understand it, 

as chairman of a panel convened by the Defense Science Board at 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
179 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Nesbit appears in the Appendix on page 705. 

the Pentagon to review the specific question of protecting our 

homeland from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). So you are an 

ideal witness for us. We thank you for being here and look forward 

to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT F. NESBIT,1 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND GENERAL MANAGER, CENTER FOR INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS, THE MITRE CORPORATION 

Mr. NESBIT. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking 

Member Collins. My name is Bob Nesbit. I work for the MITRE 

Corporation in Boston, Massachusetts, and have been a member of 

the Defense Science Board for the last 10 years. 

The Board conducted a study to examine the best strategies to 

employ against the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Larry Lynn and I served as the co-chairs with members 

from industry, academia, the Federal Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), and the National Laboratories. The 

findings and recommendations of the Board are advisory. They do 

not represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

We examined attacks in three distinct time frames—during the 

planning and preparation, while the attack would be in progress, 

and in the aftermath of the event. For the nuclear terror topic of 

today’s hearing, one finding clearly stands out. If a terrorist or 

rogue state somehow gains possession of a nuclear device and intends to use it against the United States, we are in big trouble. 

Our recommendations, therefore, stressed doing everything possible 

to prevent acquisition since once this happens it would be most difficult to detect in transit, stop, and secure the device prior to detonation. 

We recommend increased effort in three pre-attack areas: First, 

the area of intelligence. The intelligence analysts we met with said 

they have less information on this subject today than they did prior 

to September 11, 2001. We recommend that improved intelligence 

on these threats to include greater emphasis on tracking key individuals who have specific technical expertise; increased fielding of 

deep penetration and close access intelligence sources and methods; 

more persistent surveillance assets to include tagging tracking and 

locating; and in-depth analysis to create a better understanding of 

adversary motives and intentions. 

Second, we recommend that we develop diplomatic, economic, 

and military response options to serve as a deterrent against the 

original source of the nuclear device or material. The President has 

clearly articulated a policy about this, but we do not have response 

options. To make these options credible will require improved 

forensics to be able to identify the original source. Extended planning and publication of the outline of the response options will 

make U.S. intentions perfectly clear to all. 

Third, we recommended strengthening and broadening international cooperative efforts in non-proliferation and increased security of nuclear materials, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 

and other special diplomatic efforts. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
180 

We were very taken with the take-down of the A.Q. Khan network and the Libyan program. It was a remarkable success based 

on intelligence, diplomacy, and, most importantly, international cooperation. It is likely the highest value nuclear counterproliferation 

operation in the last 10 years. It stands as a real model of what 

we ought to be doing more and more of. 

As a second priority, we recommend increased emphasis in consequence management following an attack. I was pleased to see 

that you held a hearing on this subject a couple weeks ago. You 

came to the same conclusion we did, that, unfortunately, if you are 

at the point of the blast, there is not much that can be done, but 

there is a lot that can be done to limit total casualties—some estimate by as much as a half if we had the proper medical response. 

We need radically increased medical surge capabilities to treat radiation exposure and deal with trauma and burns. Many more people with first-level disaster training are needed to stabilize the injured until professional medical care is available. And DOD personnel may be required to deal with quarantine of affected areas 

and eventual decontamination. 

Finally, in our study we determined that detecting a nuclear device in transit is very difficult. The physics of the situation makes 

the sensor technology quite challenging, and if the perpetrator is 

clever and uses shielding, non-obvious entry paths and transit 

means, or employs salvage fuzing to initiate the weapon upon detection, it would make detection prior to detonation even less likely. 

A terrorist group that was adept enough to acquire a nuclear device or material should be assumed to have a similar skill level in 

carrying out the attack. While we did not endorse deploying a large 

number of fixed, pre-emplaced radiation detectors throughout the 

United States, we did conclude that we ought to make terrorist 

planning more difficult by selectively deploying these detectors to 

small areas cued by intelligence or heightened alerts; near certain 

key portals, high-value targets, or special events; but, most particularly, in a mobile randomized, non-overt manner, but the existence 

of which is publicized, to add complexity to the offense. 

We derived this strategy using a fairly quantitative approach. 

DHS produced 14 potential scenarios in which terrorists might use 

WMD against the United States. We estimated the most probable 

beneficial impact in terms of lives saved and injuries and economic 

loss avoided if each defensive alternative were employed against 

each scenario. The sum of those benefits over all 14 scenarios provided a measure of impact. The individual approaches were then 

ranked based on their value, which was a combination of the impact and the cost of implementing the defensive approach. 

This concludes my prepared statement, and I thank you very 

much for your invitation to testify. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Nesbit, for that 

testimony, which was unsettling but if that is the way you see it, 

it is important that you said that to us. We will have 7-minute 

rounds of questions. 

I want to go back to something you said in your testimony, and 

I quote, ‘‘If a terrorist or rogue state somehow gains possession of 

a nuclear device and intends to use it against the United States, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
181 

we are in big trouble.’’ Just develop that a bit more. Are we in big 

trouble because you are skeptical of our ability to stop a terrorist 

group from getting a device into the country? 

Mr. NESBIT. Our reasoning on this was that if a terrorist got his 

hands on a nuclear device, that would be a really big deal. That 

shows a level of skill way beyond the normal terrorist that we deal 

with. And if they have that level of skill, expertise, and financing 

to be able to get their hands on the device, they could be really 

clever about how they got it into the United States. It is such a 

big country, and it is so hard to defend against everything. We 

thought that the probability of them getting it in or exploding it 

upon detection was fairly high, that it is likely they could get past 

the defenses. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Let me just ask, how do you, therefore, evaluate the progress that we have made so far? For instance, 

screening cargo, as Dr. Gallaway indicated, coming in by water and 

at least radiation monitoring of all flights that come in, is that constructive? 

Mr. NESBIT. It is definitely constructive. There is still a long way 

to go there, but, I mean, it has only been 5 or 6 years, and the 

progress made in the technology of the devices has improved; the 

false alarm rate has gone down; the deployments are up. But it is 

just really a tough problem. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So that leads you obviously to try to stop 

it over there before it gets near here, and the interest in expanded 

or improved intelligence, which I think is very well placed. Did 

your panel meet with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) or 

other heads of intelligence? 

Mr. NESBIT. Yes, we did. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And it is on the basis of that that you 

would argue that they need more help in these areas? 

Mr. NESBIT. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I was interested in your second recommendation, developing and deploying diplomatic, economic, and 

military response options. Presumably, we have those. In other 

words, but no, you say not. 

Mr. NESBIT. We could not find in the Department of Defense any 

plans for what we would do if we were attacked with a nuclear 

weapon and we determined the source. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, not the option if we find 

out that a terrorist has a nuclear device somewhere in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Mr. NESBIT. No. If a terrorist got a weapon from North Korea 

and it exploded in the United States, what would our response be 

to the North Koreans. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So this is by way of deterrence. 

Mr. NESBIT. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, if we found out that you, 

North Korea, were complicit in a terrorist nuclear attack against 

the United States, what could you expect us to do? 

Mr. NESBIT. Right. In the Cold War, as you well know, we not 

only had a policy of deterrence, we had an organization that 

planned, practiced, was well qualified, and had options laid out in 

great detail, and that proved to be a very valuable deterrent. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
182 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate those answers. 

Dr. Gallaway, let me move to you and ask first for a quick general response to what Mr. Nesbit has said. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I agree in principle with what he has said. We 

support the idea of deterring a terrorist all the way from the point 

where he may acquire a weapon through interdiction or through 

transit; and then, finally, if, in fact, the weapon is used, that we 

try to mitigate the effects of the detonation as much as possible. 

So I am very much in sync with what he has proposed. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Mullen, let me ask you this because 

Dr. Gallaway has reported, and, of course, this Committee has followed with appreciation, the increasing efforts to detect the movement of radiological material in another country by cargo ship and 

through commercial aviation or established aviation. I understand 

that in developing the baseline architecture in 2005, you and your 

colleagues concluded that the general aviation pathway and the 

small maritime pathways posed a serious risk and actually needed 

to be a priority. In other words, we have a big country. There are 

a lot of places where small boats can come in and a lot of places 

where small private aircraft can come in. 

Let me ask you first to discuss, if I am right, that conclusion and 

what the basis of the conclusion was. 

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct. We did identify those two pathways 

as particularly important ones for additional work. Let me start 

first with the small maritime craft. 

As you are probably aware, there are more than 13 million small 

boats in the United States, and by small boats, we define that as 

less than 300 gross tons. And we have a very effective Coast 

Guard, but the number of boats and the 95,000 miles of coastline 

and inland waterways present just a huge area to cover for the 

Coast Guard. And so if you look at the number of boarding teams 

and the number of Coast Guard vessels and officers compared to 

the size of the problem, you can see right away that it is a very 

daunting challenge. So we wanted to team up with the Coast 

Guard and see what we could do together to try and deal with that 

pathway, and we have made some progress in that direction. 

So that is really what is behind the emphasis on small maritime 

craft—the size of the job compared to the capabilities that we have 

at this time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I presume underlying all this discussion 

is our conclusion that if a terrorist or terrorist group got hold of 

a nuclear device, it would likely be a small nuclear device and, 

therefore, capable of being brought into the country by a small boat 

or a small aircraft. Is that correct? 

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct. There would not be a constraint on 

the size of the aircraft or the boat for being able to transport a nuclear device. 

Now, let me answer the second part of your question on aviation. 

It turns out that there are approximately 400 flights a day of generally small—sometimes it is larger aircraft, but privately owned— 

aircraft that enter the United States from other countries, most of 

them from Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean, but also some longrange flights. And in the past, this form of aviation was relatively 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
183 

lightly regulated compared to commercial aviation, the large airlines that we are most familiar with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. MULLEN. And so in terms of a programmatic gap, it had not 

gotten the kind of attention that some of the other pathways had, 

and so we identified that as something that needed a closer look, 

and we have, in fact, done that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am going to ask Senator Collins for her 

indulgence so I can continue this line of questioning, and then she 

can continue as long as she wants in her line of questioning. 

I have seen some records that show that in November 2005, 

DNDO staff briefed Vice President Cheney and the Homeland Security Council on the need to emphasize defenses against the risk 

that a terrorist group would use a private aircraft or a small boat 

to deliver an improvised nuclear weapon. What would you describe 

in this open setting about the response of the Homeland Security 

Council and the White House to those briefings? 

Mr. MULLEN. What I think you are referring to, Senator, is the 

briefings that we did on a fairly wide basis on what we called our 

baseline architecture analysis—we completed that analysis in November 2005, and we briefed all of our partner agencies as well as 

various officials and committees in the administration, and—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So these were not—— 

Mr. MULLEN [continuing]. They basically endorsed our—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me just interrupt just for clarity. You 

are saying that the two meetings that I have mentioned were not 

exclusive, that you were briefing many people at this time. 

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. MULLEN. And in essence, they endorsed our baseline analysis 

and encouraged us, as we have identified these vulnerabilities, to 

go ahead and begin tackling these vulnerabilities and attempting 

to identify solutions that could then be implemented. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So this is an enormous task, of course, because of the enormity of our country and the number of boats and 

small aircraft coming in. In brief, how would you describe the 

progress we are making as a result of those briefings in regard to 

small boats and small planes? 

Mr. MULLEN. I think we are making good progress. We have put 

together in the small maritime area a joint program with the Coast 

Guard as well as with State and local partners to begin to build 

out detection capabilities in the major seaports. As Dr. Gallaway 

mentioned, we are launching that through a series of pilot projects 

initially on the West Coast. Dr. Gallaway mentioned the Puget 

Sound area and San Diego. We have similar pilot activities in New 

York City and several other locations. And what we are doing 

through this process is expanding the coverage, as we say of radiation detection, so that we can get more detectors in the hands of 

more people, not just the Coast Guard but State and local law enforcement, and we are also, through the Small Vessel Security 

Strategy that Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen has talked 

about, reaching out to partners in the private sector who can also 

serve as eyes and ears to help extend our ability to detect susVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
184 

picious activities and perhaps target and focus the radiation detectors toward anomalous situations that would be identified there. 

So I think we are making good progress on the small maritime 

front, although certainly we have quite a ways to go given the size 

of the problem. And likewise with aviation, I think we are making 

good headway. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would I be correct in concluding, nonetheless, that our priority thus far has been on the ports of entry, that 

is to say, the cargo screening, for instance, at our major ports 

where we have made substantial progress? Or has this other work 

with small boats and small planes come up as an equal priority 

now? 

Mr. MULLEN. I would say broadening the architecture to cover 

more pathways, such as the ones that we have just been discussing, is a high priority. The ports of entry were programs that 

had started actually before DNDO was even set up in 2005, and 

they had a large amount of momentum behind them, and they have 

been going forward. But I think we are beginning to shift the balance to cover more broadly all of the pathways instead of a focus 

on ports of entry only. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much. Thank you, Senator 

Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Nesbit, I want to follow up with you on the issue of setting 

priorities. Obviously, part of the challenge that we face is allocating 

limited resources to reduce our vulnerabilities to all types of 

WMDs. And this is an area where the Defense Science Board has 

done a lot of work and discussed this topic in terms of prevention, 

response, mitigation, recovery, as well as detection. 

The Defense Science Board report from the summer of 2005 proposes a system to prevent nuclear attack that obviously includes 

more than just relying on detection. The system that you recommended includes enhanced intelligence capabilities, an improved 

counterproliferation regime, and greater domestic preparedness, 

and these are all issues that this Committee has been examining 

and held hearings on. 

Give us your advice on how we should allocate resources across 

those five areas of prevention, response, mitigation, recovery, and 

detection. 

Mr. NESBIT. In the report we had some detailed numbers on that 

very issue across all the WMD modalities. We thought the number 

one area needing increased emphasis was on the prevention of acquisition. So in the intelligence area, in the diplomatic area, that 

was far and away, we thought, the most under-resourced in this 

topic. And, second, we thought the consequence management following the event would be the second priority. 

We had specific numbers in there that across all the modalities 

totaled up to $44.1 billion. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Now, looking within DNDO, DNDO 

reported to Congress that the Federal Government spent approximately $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 for 74 programs included in 

the global nuclear detection architecture. And of this amount, $1.1 

billion was allocated to combating international nuclear smuggling 

and $220 million was devoted to border security measures. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
185 

I am going to ask Mr. Shea and Mr. Maurer this question as 

well, but let me start with you, Mr. Nesbit. Looking within DNDO 

on the allocation of funding on fighting nuclear smuggling versus 

border security measures, do you think that the priorities are right 

within DNDO? 

Mr. NESBIT. We recommended that more emphasis be placed on 

mobile non-overt sensing. So instead of these large things that sat 

there every day, you had things that could move around, that terrorists would not know where they might be, and that if you 

shipped something and it took 3 weeks to get to the United States, 

you would have no idea whether you would be detected or not. We 

thought that was a critical element that ought to be high on their 

list. 

Senator COLLINS. Actually, the University of Maine is developing 

a smart sensor that can be placed on a container to monitor en 

route, detect any tampering, and also detect radiological, biological, 

or chemical contamination or danger materials. It is fascinating 

work because that is a big challenge. 

Mr. Shea, Mr. Maurer, the same question for you. Within DNDO, 

the allocation of funding for international nuclear smuggling versus 

border security measures, do we have it right? Mr. Shea. 

Mr. SHEA. Thank you for that question, Senator Collins. As I understand DNDO’s allocation of program investment to their architecture, these are the programmatic budget numbers for the programs in other agencies that are aligned to DNDO’s baseline architecture. And so to a great extent, the budget that is being spent 

in these layers that DNDO has identified are other agency budgets, 

especially in the area outside of the United States. And I think 

what the best balance in the architecture is will be an output of 

further refinement and optimization of the global nuclear detection 

architecture, and it will be an identification of priorities from this 

baseline moving forward. And so I think that would be something 

that would come out of DNDO’s further analysis of this initial 

baseline. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Maurer, has GAO looked at that aspect of 

DNDO yet, the allocation across the various programs? 

Mr. MAURER. We have not done a detailed analysis of the various 

allocations of funds, but I think it is difficult to really make an assessment of whether or not they are making the right resource allocation decisions absent having some kind of strategic plan that 

clearly lays out their priorities. One of the things we are calling for 

today is developing an overarching strategic plan that would really 

initiate a debate within the Administration, hopefully involving the 

Congress as well, about where those resource allocation decisions 

should be made. For example, should there be more emphasis on 

the international programs or should there be more emphasis on 

the domestic programs? 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Gallaway, you mentioned that the Coast Guard boarding 

teams are equipped with radiation devices, and that obviously is 

very important. An important layer of the nuclear detection architecture is the role played by first responders, by State and local police, firefighters and other emergency response personnel. Our previous hearings have made very clear that they are the ones who 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
186 

1The post-hearing response for the Record submitted by Mr. Galloway appears in the Appendix on page 712. 

are going to be first on the scene if there were a nuclear incident 

or the explosion of a dirty bomb. And, thus, they need access to effective radiation detection equipment to protect themselves and 

also to provide situational awareness to the public and to the leaders who are making the decision. 

What steps has DNDO taken to ensure that State and local responders have effective radiation detection equipment available? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Senator Collins, right now the DNDO mission 

has been pretty much exclusively focused on preventative radiological/nuclear detection—in other words, preventing the use of a 

nuclear weapon. 

We have not entered into the response and recovery part, which 

I think is what you are asking about. The Department is leading 

an interagency discussion right now to figure out how the Executive Branch should deal with response and the different roles and 

responsibilities, and then within DHS, we are going through a discussion to decide who is responsible or not for the various components. 

Senator COLLINS. Is DNDO responsible for testing and evaluation of detection equipment in order to make the acquisition decisions as far as which equipment should be made available to the 

Coast Guard and CBP, for example? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes, ma’am. But we are focused on the equipment that would be used to detect a weapon before it is detonated. 

Senator COLLINS. But wouldn’t that kind of equipment and the 

information about standards and testing be very helpful, for example, to the New York Police Department, which has a robust effort 

to detect as well as to respond? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I guess I would argue that the detection equipment you need before an event is aimed at finding the device or 

finding the radiological materials; whereas, when we are doing detection after an event, that is for public safety and personal health 

of the first responders, as you mentioned, and also subsequently 

the public that might come back into the area. And so it is two very 

different missions, the basic detection technology might be similar, 

but I think it would be employed in very different ways. And also, 

the standards are very different. 

For example, in response and recovery, many of the standards 

have already been set over many years by Federal agencies. I 

would recommend that we would build on those and come up with 

maybe some overarching ones now. 

Senator COLLINS. I guess what I would suggest to you is that 

even when we are talking about detection and not looking at response, involving State and local first responders is a very important part of the architecture and of our ability to detect—— 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I am sorry, ma’am. I misunderstood.1 We engage 

the State and local folks. For example, with the Securing the Cities 

Initiative in the New York City region, we have State involvement, 

local involvement, as well as Federal involvement. And they are 

working very closely together to develop the detection technology 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
187 

that would be used by all of the local responders, both police and 

firefighters but, again, from a preventative perspective. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Those were good questions and good answers. 

I appreciate the discussion about the budget goals that you have, 

Mr. Nesbit. Dr. Gallaway, do you have any response to that? I am 

sure every Federal Government agency would like more money, but 

this is really a priority concern because of the consequences of 

what we are talking about. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I guess I would just like to re-emphasize, DNDO 

has an overarching role, as Mr. Mullen laid out, to develop the architecture. But when it comes to what the different departments 

contribute to that architecture, we do not have any direct statutory 

control over that. And so we talk with our colleagues in the other 

departments, and we may suggest to them an increased emphasis 

in the area, but we do not have any direct control over that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So that leads to the next obvious question 

about whether DNDO has sufficient authority to do what needs to 

be done. It is doing what it was intended to do, which is with regard to the overall architecture. But do you think the whole system 

and basically the goal of protecting the American people from a nuclear terrorist attack would be benefited if DNDO had other authorities? And let me be specific. The first is one you have talked 

about, whether you had some budget authority, at least to approve 

if not to comment on, but ideally to approve the budget submissions of the agencies that you are coordinating. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Sir, in principle, I think it would be a good idea. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I think in reality it would be very difficult to actually implement and make effective, and the reason I say that is 

we can work informally with our colleagues in the other departments, and we can come up with what we think may be the best 

plan. But then each of them will go through their respective budgeting process in their departments. Those departments will then 

submit their budgets to their respective committees in Congress. 

And all along the way, there are a variety of priorities within each 

of those stovepipes that are all competing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. I hear you. Look, I know I have 

put you in an awkward position with your colleagues in the other 

agencies, but this is so important that it seems to me we want to 

make sure that the funding is going where it should, and that each 

of the component agencies will naturally advocate for themselves. 

And just to me it seems that somebody over there should have the 

big view and allocate priorities. 

I wonder if I could invite Mr. Maurer and Dr. Shea to comment 

on this. I know, Mr. Maurer, you have testified that DNDO lacks 

that overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve its 

goals, and I appreciate that and I agree with you. What about the 

next step, which is some kind of budget authority? 

Mr. MAURER. We issued a report in January 2005 that partially 

addresses that issue. Back then we were asked to take a look at 

the overall U.S. effort to address nonproliferation. We looked specifically at State Department, Defense Department, Department of 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
188 

Energy, and what we found then is that there was really a need 

for a White House-level strategy to guide and direct those efforts. 

That may be called for here as well, and we have not completed 

our work looking at DNDO’s efforts. But I would say that it is a 

definite challenge for an organization within DHS to try to influence or direct the activities of other Cabinet departments. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Shea, in offering your answer, I want 

to note that Section 1107 of the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act, which was passed in 2007, requires that 

each agency conduct self-assessments related to its support of the 

global nuclear detection architecture and that the results of these 

be reported to Congress as part of a joint interagency annual review, and that at the request of the Committee, the CRS has evaluated the joint interagency annual review. So I wanted to ask you 

to share with us what your evaluation is as you answer the overall 

question of whether DNDO should be strengthened with budget authority or perhaps even some greater coordination of implementation authority. 

Mr. SHEA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the issue at 

hand here is whether or not there can be forward planning for the 

global nuclear detection architecture when the priorities of the architecture, as GAO has stated, have not been set and a strategy 

document and benchmarks have not been laid out in an overarching manner in such a document. 

The self-assessments in the review report that you asked us to 

look at did not provide information with regard to future budget 

years, for example. As a consequence, the optimization of these programs in the future, synergies between these programs, and the 

identification of whether or not the programs are meeting the goals 

of the architecture, while they still may be meeting their programmatic goals, those issues are somewhat still unresolved. 

The point that was brought up by Dr. Gallaway regarding the 

difficulties of organizing budgets across the Federal Government 

might be addressed by, as I mentioned in my testimony, a global 

nuclear detection architecture budget supplement which would consolidate all of the information regarding these programs and the 

different agencies in one location. That might provide a common 

ground for all of the various parts of Congress that are looking at 

this issue to understand the implications of these program funding 

decisions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me finally on this round, Dr. 

Gallaway, ask whether short of budget authority you are able to or 

have developed plans that might be suggestions for the component 

agencies as to where they should be investing their funds to meet 

the overall goals of the architecture that DNDO has described? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, the annual report that Mr. 

Mullen drafted and we submitted recently brought together for the 

first time all the various components and presented it to the Congress. I was pleased by the participation by all the departments in 

that process. I am optimistic that as we do the next version of that, 

we will actually get better. I am also hopeful that in that process 

we will start actually having a better dialogue with our partners 

and that we may actually make some progress on our own on workVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
189 

ing together within the departments and improving the overall architecture. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Gallaway, the Science and Technology Directorate within the 

Department of Homeland Security has expertise and is responsible 

for testing and evaluating a wide range of homeland security technology that will be used by the Department to respond to a wide 

range of threats. In light of that, does it make sense for DNDO to 

also have responsibility for testing and evaluation? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes, I think there is a reason for having two sets 

of testing organizations. As we are developing a new device, we 

need to do what we call developmental testing. And this is where 

the program office is making sure that the device is progressing 

logically as it moves towards a final system. I think that kind of 

testing should definitely be done by the program office. 

On the other hand, the operational testing to assure that the device meets the requirements of the end customer, should be done 

by an independent organization. We are now starting down that 

road with one of our new detection systems where we are going to 

the operational test authority within the Science and Technology 

Directorate, George Ryan, and he will be leading the operational 

testing of our new device. And so I am very comfortable with that 

relationship where we do the developmental testing and an independent organization does the operational testing. 

Senator COLLINS. The GAO has been quite critical of DNDO’s 

testing of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) monitor, which 

has been going on since 2005. Last year, DHS indicated that it was 

nearing certification of the system, but then operational and other 

concerns were raised by Customs and Border Protection, and the 

Secretary’s certification was delayed until sometime this year. 

Does that suggest that DNDO does not have a sufficiently welldefined and rigorous testing and evaluation program? What went 

wrong on the ASP testing? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Well, the ASP testing that was done last year 

was done all within DNDO. We learned a tremendous amount during that process. We actually think some of the criticism of the 

testing that was done was not well founded. 

With that said, we are in the process right now of going through 

the ASP test series. We have just come out of system qualification 

testing, which is actually done by the vendors. As we speak, we 

have just moved into technical performance testing at the Nevada 

test site. Very shortly, we will do a test readiness review to move 

into integration testing, which will be done at Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory, which we call integration testing where we 

see that all the parts work together. 

Assuming everything continues to look good at that point, the 

systems will be handed to Customs and Border Protection for a 

field validation where their folks actually run them at ports of 

entry to assure that they are meeting their needs. And then, finally, and getting back to the operational test component, an independent tester from the Science and Technology Directorate will 

come in and do an operational test to assure that the systems are 

working to meet the requirements that were laid down. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
190 

So I think we have laid down a very rigorous series of testing. 

We have run this system through probably the most rigorous series 

of tests that have ever been conducted on a nuclear detection device. And we are confident that the systems will be well tested. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Mullen, my last question is for you. In response to questions from the Chairman, you indicated that you 

were on loan to the DNDO from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, I believe. 

Mr. MULLEN. Los Alamos. 

Senator COLLINS. Sorry, I meant the Los Alamos National Laboratory. I imagine there is competition there, so that was probably 

a terrible error for me to make. 

In any event, that reminded me that DNDO has chosen to be 

staffed with detailees from multiple Federal agencies, including the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Energy, 

the Coast Guard, and CBP. And on the one hand, I think that is 

a very appropriate approach that strengthens the interagency connections that allows, much as the National Counterterrorism Center does, analysts to share information. It helps form a common 

culture. It encourages information sharing, breaks down those 

stovepipes. That is on the plus side. 

The negative side is that detailees go home, they go back to their 

originating agencies, and you lose some continuity, some institutional knowledge within the office being staffed by the detailees. 

Since you are a detailee, I am interested in what your assessment is of the strengths and weaknesses and, on balance, is this 

a good way for us to be staffing DNDO? 

Mr. MULLEN. I think it is a very good way to be staffing DNDO 

provided we do it properly. Just to give my own perspective on it, 

in the work that I have done in the Architecture Directorate, we 

have benefited tremendously from having detailees from the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and their contributions have really been indispensable in trying to get our arms 

around this global nuclear detection architecture. It just would not 

be possible to do it properly without having that kind of broad participation and input. So that is the plus side, as you say. 

If you had only detailees, then as you say, you would be in big 

trouble when they start to rotate out. So what you need in practice 

is a balance. You need a certain number of permanent Federal employees that will provide the institutional memory over time, but 

a continual infusion of detailee expertise is also extremely important. In the case of somebody like myself, for example, the way we 

handle that is through succession planning so that at a certain 

point when it is time for me to go back home, we will already have 

groomed and in place people that are ready to step in and carry 

out the job that I have been doing. 

So it can be done. It is a question of striking the right balance, 

but it is really indispensable to have that kind of input. 

Senator COLLINS. I agree that having that input from detailees 

enriches the entire organization. In fact, I think we need to do 

more of that throughout the Federal Government, but particularly 

within the intelligence community. But you have raised the key 

issue, which is, have we struck the right balance between staffing 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
191 

with detailees versus what you call those core employees? From 

your observations, have we struck the right balance in staffing 

DNDO? 

Mr. MULLEN. I would say yes. Both within my own office and 

more broadly across DNDO, we have put a lot of effort over the last 

couple of years into recruiting permanent staff that will help us to 

maintain that balance. In my office, for example, we were quite 

shorthanded in 2005, but we now have a cadre of permanent Federal staff to balance the detailee staff. And I think it is a good mix 

now. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. I just want to 

follow up, and then we are going to have to adjourn the hearing. 

Dr. Gallaway, do you want to add anything to Mr. Mullen’s answer to Senator Collins’ question? In other words, speaking for 

DNDO overall, do you have any plans to, for instance, increase the 

permanent staffing as the years go on? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Thank you for the opportunity to jump in on this 

issue. We are very comfortable with the mix that we have right 

now. As Mr. Mullen mentioned, it has evolved with time, and we 

think we have struck a good balance at this point. So our biggest 

challenge, quite frankly, is to just stay fully manned because employees with the talent set that we are looking for or with the skill 

set that we need are often hard to hire into the Federal Government. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do any of you, Mr. Maurer, Dr. Shea, or 

Mr. Nesbit, have an opinion on the balance between the permanent 

staff and the detailees? 

Mr. MAURER. It is certainly something we are going to be looking 

into as we continue our work looking at it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I understand. Dr. Shea. 

Mr. SHEA. I think that another aspect could be considered by 

DNDO. Beyond the succession planning that Mr. Mullen referred 

to is documentation. This is another way of maintaining institutional knowledge by documenting decisions, both the reason why 

one did make a decision in one way, but also the reasons that other 

alternatives were rejected. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Nesbit. 

Mr. NESBIT. I do not have a real opinion. The only thing I would 

note is on our study we had three people from DHS in the DNDO 

on the study, and they were very impressive individuals. Several 

of them were detailees. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. I want to thank the five of you. It 

has been a very educational and actually encouraging hearing in 

the sense that there is a lot going on. I hope it is encouraging to 

those in the general public who are maybe paying attention to it. 

And, frankly, I hope it is obviously discouraging to any terrorist 

groups that are attempting to gain nuclear weapons capacity. But, 

of course, we have a lot more to do, and in some ways, though this 

is the stuff of—I was going to say ‘‘movies,’’ but it is really TV, ‘‘24’’ 

drama. There is a very small inner group of people who really care 

about this and worry about this—that is what I really mean—and 

work on this every day. We depend on you not only for what you 

do every day—because the consequences of failure here are so disVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00199 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
192 

astrous for our country—but also to come forward and speak to 

people like Senator Collins and me, if you think that you do not 

have enough authority or you do not have enough resources, because we really want to be supportive. 

Do you have anything you would like to say? 

Senator COLLINS. I do not. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I thank you, Senator Collins, for your cooperation and the joint venture we have on this, and so much else. 

We are going to keep the record of this hearing open for 15 days 

so that Members of the Committee may submit additional questions or you may have additional testimony that you would like to 

include in the record. 

With that, I thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(193) 

PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: 

HARD LESSONS LEARNED FROM 

TROUBLED INVESTMENTS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. 

Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman and Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. Sorry not to be here right at 9:30. I apologize, and also for 

the Ranking Member, Senator Collins, who in the press of the close 

of this session will be unable to be with us this morning, but will 

file statements and questions for the record. I thank all the witnesses for being here. 

This is the seventh in a series of hearings held by this Committee to examine the very real and present threats and challenges 

posed by the possibilities of nuclear terrorism against the United 

States. 

With today’s hearing, we will specifically examine the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office’s management of the two main programs 

designed to detect and thwart the smuggling of nuclear materials 

into the United States: The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) 

monitors and the Cargo Automated Advanced Radiography System 

(CAARS). 

I hope we can also use some of our time to examine the overall 

problems the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has experienced with the hope that we can together make it a more effective organization and create a blueprint the next Administration 

can use to move forward. 

The programs administered by DNDO are a mission where failure is, quite literally, not an option because the danger of terrorists 

acquiring a nuclear weapon, we know from previous hearings that 

we have held on this subject, is real and present. 

Between 1993 and 2006 there were 1,080 confirmed incidents of 

illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, with 18 of these cases involving weapons-grade materials and another 124 involving material 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
194 

capable of making a so-called ‘‘dirty bomb’’ that would use conventional explosives to spread nuclear material. This is serious stuff. 

ASP and CAARS were supposed to work in tandem, scanning all 

cargo coming by air, sea, and land for nuclear material. 

ASP was designed to detect unshielded nuclear materials with 

greater accuracy and fewer false alarms than the portal monitors 

now in use. 

CAARS was designed to complement the ASP system by detecting high-density materials that terrorists could use to shield radiation from nuclear materials from ASP detection. 

These programs looked very promising when announced just a 

few years ago, but it now seems that neither is likely to live up to 

expectations, which does leave our Nation at risk, especially the 

unprotected areas that lay outside of the established land, air, and 

sea ports of entry. 

Let me start by saying a little more about ASP. According to a 

tough and disturbing report from the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO), that we will hear about this morning, the price of 

ASP has ballooned from an estimated $1.2 billion 2 years ago to 

as much as $3.8 billion today and apparently no less than $3.1 billion. It is also behind schedule and, apparently, will not be deployed as aggressively as initially planned. For instance, it will not 

be used to screen rail cars and extra-wide trucks, leaving dangerous gaps that can be exploited by terrorists that, apparently at 

this point, DNDO does not know how to fill. 

The short life of the ASP program has raised fundamental questions that need to be answered, most importantly how much can 

the system be improved to improve our security against nuclear 

terrorism? 

The current generation portal monitors—that is, the ones that 

are being used—apparently do an excellent job of detecting radiation. But they do not identify the type of radioisotope or determine whether it is harmless or dangerous. That much we do know. 

DNDO advocated the ASP program as a means of reducing the 

rate of false alarms from the current portal monitoring system. But 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials, who are the ones 

that will deploy and operate the radiation portal monitors system, 

have concluded that the false alarm rate of the current generation 

of portal monitors does not present a serious operational problem. 

Second, I am concerned about the consequences of what the 

GAO’s report tells us about DNDO’s recent decision not to develop 

the other variations of the ASP system. 

Previously, we had understood that these ASP programs were 

going to provide a ‘‘family’’ of 12 systems of various sizes and configurations that were supposed to fill other gaps in the domestic 

nuclear detection architecture, by mounting these ASP sensors on 

the roofs, for instance, of Border Patrol trucks or building ASP sensors into mobile devices. So I would like to know here this morning 

what DNDO’s plans are moving forward. 

I would also like to know how much DNDO now thinks a complete system that covers not just ports, but also general aviation, 

small-craft maritime activities, and unprotected land border areas, 

which have to be part of a comprehensive system to detect and preVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00202 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
195 

vent the smuggling of nuclear material, is going to cost and when 

we can reasonably expect it to be deployed. I am also concerned about the future of the $1.3 billion CAARS 

program. The CAARS system was supposed to have delivered 20 

units this year, but as far as I can determine, it has essentially 

been abandoned following technical difficulties that would have 

made the system too complex to deploy in domestic ports. 

DNDO has called this a ‘‘course correction’’ and now refers to the 

effort as the Joint Integrated Non-Intrusive Inspection Program 

(JINII), with dramatically scaled-down goals. 

CAARS was supposed to be the next generation of an automated 

x-ray technology that could detect shielded nuclear material, a 

critically important function. However, this program also seems to 

have failed to live up to its promise. 

DNDO says it has halted the CAARS acquisition, apparently decided to start over, and is now considering using already available 

technology. So I want to know what has transpired over the last 

2 years which has left us basically where we were 2 years ago. 

I must say I am troubled. Two years ago, ASP and CAARS were 

being described by the DNDO as absolute necessities in the quest 

to secure our Nation from nuclear terrorism. They were going to 

represent DNDO 2.0, if I can put it that way. But now both are 

in jeopardy. 

Finally, on a matter of process, I want to express my concern 

about GAO investigators’ claim that DNDO refused to provide the 

kind of detailed documentation needed by GAO to prepare an accurate report, and that DNDO also instructed its contractors to 

refuse to cooperate with GAO. 

GAO works for Congress and the American people. These are vitally important programs, and the importance of GAO’s work in 

helping Congress oversee them cannot be underestimated. So I 

want to say publicly here how important I believe it is that DNDO 

fully cooperate with GAO in its investigations. 

As we explore these questions, I also want the witnesses to help 

us with the broader and really most critical question. This Committee is not about ‘‘gotcha’’ investigations. It is about getting the 

work of government and homeland security right. So the ultimate 

question is that: How do we get DNDO back on the right track? 

I must say with all the criticism of DNDO, I want to note that 

it is a relatively new agency, formed by executive order just 3 years 

ago, and it has an enormously difficult task it has been given. 

But the point I want to make finally is that its mission is critical 

to our homeland security against a clear and present danger. And 

as I said at the outset, failure is not an acceptable option. So I 

want to say that I intend to be both DNDO’s strongest supporter 

and its toughest critic in the years ahead to make sure that together we get this right. 

I welcome our witnesses. I also thank Senator Akaka for being 

here, and I will call on him now if he has an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins for 

holding this hearing. Nuclear terrorism is among the most critical, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
196 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise appears in the Appendix on page 715. 

long-term threats facing the United States. I believe that securing 

nuclear and radioactive materials at their source is the most important step we can take in preventing nuclear terrorism. 

Our work overseas, especially in the states of the former Soviet 

Union, has dramatically reduced the availability of nuclear materials. Ongoing interagency efforts domestically are securing radioactive source materials used in civilian applications. 

Nuclear detection systems are also a key part of the architecture 

to keep unsecured nuclear materials out of the United States. 

When used alongside intelligence, law enforcement, and counterproliferation techniques, and informed by risk assessment, we will 

best deter terrorists from smuggling dangerous nuclear material 

into the United States. 

Finally, our investments in radiography and nuclear detection 

equipment should be developed and deployed in accordance with a 

strategic plan with maximum involvement with interagency partners and in a transparent and responsible manner. 

I am concerned that the ASP and the CAARS programs have not 

lived up to the expectations of Congress and the American people. 

GAO’s findings are especially troubling since they indicate that the 

true program costs of ASP may be over $1 billion more than DNDO 

was willing to admit. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, let me add my welcome to the witnesses, and I look forward to hearing from them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Akaka. I appreciate your statement very much. 

We will go right to the witnesses now, beginning with Eugene 

Aloise, Managing Director of the Natural Resources and Environment Team at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Thanks 

again for your work on our behalf, and we look forward now to your 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE E. ALOISE,1 DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to 

be here today to discuss the plan of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) to develop and deploy advanced portal monitors at 

the Nation’s borders to prevent nuclear material from being smuggled into the United States. 

According to DHS, the current system of radiation detection 

equipment is effective and does not impede the flow of commerce. 

However, DHS wants to improve the capabilities of the existing 

system with the new equipment. 

One of the major drawbacks of the new equipment, which is still 

undergoing extensive testing, is the substantially higher costs compared to their existing system of radiation detection equipment. 

Today I will discuss our recent report on the potential cost of deploying radiation detection equipment nationwide and the preliminary findings of our ongoing review of DNDO’s current testing campaign that started in April of this year. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
197 

These tests are critically important because they will serve as 

the support for a congressionally mandated certification by the Secretary of Homeland Security as to the effectiveness of the equipment. Presently, that certification is scheduled for late November, 

although, as I will discuss, that date is looking less likely as each 

day goes by. 

Regarding cost, GAO developed its own cost estimate of DNDO’s 

program because DNDO’s past and current estimates were based 

on flawed methodologies and, therefore, were not reliable. Our 

analysis shows that from 2007 through 2017, the cost of DNDO’s 

program to equip U.S. ports of entry with radiation detection 

equipment will likely be about $3 billion. Our estimate is based on 

the cost of DNDO implementing its 2006 project execution plan, the 

most recent official documentation of the program. 

DNDO officials have told us that the agency is now following a 

scaled-back ASP deployment strategy; that is, it will only be deploying the standard cargo portal and eliminating other portal 

types, such as train and mobile portals. Also, DNDO officials told 

us that even this scaled-back ASP deployment strategy could 

change dramatically, depending on the outcome of ongoing testing, 

and that an entirely new technology might be needed to cover the 

areas where ASPs may not work. 

We estimate the cost of DHS’s scaled-back ASP deployment strategy to be about $2 billion. However, this estimate is based on limited documentation provided to us by DHS, namely, a one-page 

spread sheet. 

The frequent changes in DNDO’s deployment strategy and the 

lack of detailed documentation supporting it makes it difficult to 

assess the cost of the ASP program. Our report recommended that 

the Secretary direct DNDO to update its program plan, revise its 

cost estimate, and communicate these changes to the Congress. 

DHS has agreed with our recommendations. 

Regarding testing, we are pleased that DNDO has made progress 

on a number of problems we identified in the previous rounds of 

ASP testing, of which we were highly critical. In particular, it appears that DNDO has improved the procedures used at the Nevada 

test site to provide a fairer comparison between ASPs and currentgeneration equipment. However, we have identified some potential 

areas of concern with the current round of testing. We are hopeful 

these concerns can be resolved before certification occurs. 

First, DHS’s criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness seems to set a low bar for improvement. Specifically, it 

requires that ASPs perform at least as well as current equipment 

when nuclear material is present in cargo, but does not specify an 

actual improvement. 

Second, the schedule leading up to certification does not allow for 

completion of some tests that could provide critical information on 

the performance of ASPs. It is our view that DHS and the Congress 

need as much information as possible regarding the effectiveness of 

this equipment before deploying it to our borders. 

Finally, the current testing schedule leading up to certification is 

highly compressed and is running about 8 weeks or more late. Specifically, DHS has pushed back the certification date from SepVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00205 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
198 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

731. 

tember to late November, but this still leaves little time for analysis and review of results. 

Furthermore, field validation tests will not start until October, 

which makes it unlikely that DHS can complete field validation 

and still go to certification in November. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me state that for over 2 years 

now, GAO has been asking three fundamental questions regarding 

the ASPs. One, does the equipment work? Two, how much will it 

cost the taxpayer? And, three, does the marginal increase in security gained with the new equipment justify its very high cost? 

This last question is particularly important in an era of tight 

budgets because the effort to upgrade equipment that we know 

works, even though it has limitations, may divert scarce resources 

from addressing higher risks. 

That concludes my remarks. We would be happy to respond to 

any questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Aloise, for the questions you 

have raised and the work you have done. 

Next we will hear directly from Vayl Oxford, who is the Director 

of DNDO, with some answers to those questions. 

TESTIMONY OF VAYL S. OXFORD,1 DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC 

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. OXFORD. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman and Senator 

Akaka. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. 

Mr. OXFORD. I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to come before you today and discuss the progress we have 

made regarding our address of the nuclear threat. I am also 

pleased to be joined by my colleague, Assistant Commissioner Tom 

Winkowski, with whom I have worked very closely to ensure that 

the operational user receives the capabilities needed to address the 

threat posed by both nuclear and radiological terrorism. 

In respect to the Committee’s time, I would like to curtail my 

opening comments and just highlight a few key points. 

The nuclear threat is real and growing, as the Chairman has 

said. The United States has a comprehensive strategy in place to 

put together a layered defense to combat this threat that includes 

several key factors. We have increased intelligence collection and 

analysis against the threat. We have a focused interdiction program against illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and expertise. 

We are working to prevent the import into and use of nuclear 

weapons materials against the United States. We are improving 

our nuclear forensic capabilities to support both deterrence and attribution. And we are increasing our focus on response and recovery capabilities to minimize casualties should prevention fail. 

DNDO’s role in preventing the import and use of nuclear weapons against the United States is a critical component of this overall 

strategy and represents a domestic layered strategy to reduce the 

risk of nuclear terrorism. We are working closely with both CBP 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
199 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Winkowski appears in the Appendix on page 740. 

and the Department of Energy (DOE) to address the vulnerabilities 

of the current systems and to evaluate the performance of new systems. We have a rigorous process in place, which I will be glad to 

address during the course of the hearing, to test new systems, 

evaluate their cost, and make recommendations to the Secretary 

that provide the best solution to secure the Nation against a nuclear threat. 

I am confident that the steps we are taking are sound and will 

lead to a well-reasoned recommendation to the Secretary once all 

of our testing is complete. 

Mr. Chairman, we take this responsibility very seriously, and we 

will ensure that our taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. While some 

may argue that these systems are too costly, we must be able to 

weigh the balance of the capability and cost of current systems and 

the improved capability and cost of new systems against the cost 

and damage of a nuclear weapon detonating in a U.S. city. 

Given the threat and known limitations of current systems, there 

is a real sense of urgency to complete the work necessary to make 

a sufficiently informed decision and begin deploying these systems 

to enhance the defense of this Nation. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening comments. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK, Mr. Oxford. Thanks. Obviously, we 

will have a lot of questions for you. Thank you. 

Now we go to Thomas Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

Thanks for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI,1 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Thank you and good morning, Chairman 

Lieberman and Senator Akaka. Thank you for the opportunity to 

discuss CBP’s efforts to strengthen supply chain security while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Committee for 

the strong support you provided for important CBP initiatives over 

the past year and ask for your continued support of other important CBP initiatives, such as the Security Filing requirement, better known as ‘‘10+2.’’ Your support has enabled CBP to make significant progress in securing our borders and protect our Nation 

against the threat of terrorism. 

CBP has made tremendous progress in ensuring that supply 

chains importing goods into the United States are more secure 

against potential exploitation by terrorist groups aiming to deliver 

weapons of mass effect. CBP uses a multi-layered approach to ensure the integrity of the supply chains from the points of loading 

through arrival at U.S. ports of entry. The multi-layered defense is 

built upon interrelated initiatives, which include the 24-hour rule, 

the Automated Targeting System, non-intrusive inspection equipment and radiation portal monitors, the Container Security IniVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
200 

tiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C– 

TPAT) initiative. These complementary layers enhance security 

and protect our Nation. 

Prior to September 11, 2001, not a single Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) and only 64 large-scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) 

systems were deployed to our Nation’s borders. By October 2002, 

CBP had deployed the first RPM at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. 

Currently, 94 percent of trucks arriving through the Northern 

border ports, 100 percent through the Southern border ports, and 

98 percent of arriving sea containers are scanned by our radiation 

portal technologies. CBP scans 97 percent of all cargo arriving in 

the United States by land and sea using RPMs. 

In addition, CBP officers now scan 100 percent of general aviation aircraft arriving in the United States from foreign destinations 

using handheld radiation identification devices. We believe this is 

real progress. 

I also am pleased to report to this Committee that on September 

8, 2008, our first RPM deployment within the airport cargo environment was commissioned at Dulles International Airport. This 

milestone deployment allows CBP to scan 100 percent of all air 

cargo terminating at Dulles. CBP plans to deploy radiation portal 

systems to 30 of our Nation’s airports, which will result in the 

scanning of 99 percent of all air cargo entering the commerce of the 

United States for nuclear and radiological materials. 

In addition to the significant strides made in the area of radiation detection technology, CBP also continues to deploy non-intrusive inspection systems. NII technology serves as a force multiplier 

that allows officers to detect possible anomalies between the contents of the container and the manifest. To date, CBP NII systems 

have been utilized to conduct more than 26 million exams resulting 

in over 6,800 narcotics seizures with a total weight of in excess of 

2.2 million pounds. 

The CBP NII Acquisition Plan is continuously being reevaluated 

as available technology is constantly being assessed against the 

evolving threat. To help refine our acquisition strategy, we consider 

factors such as traffic volume, types and density levels of imported 

commodities, port infrastructure constraints, an appropriate mix of 

equipment, and cost-effectiveness of available technology. 

As you know, in fiscal year 2006, financial management of RPM 

efforts transitioned from CBP to the DNDO. I am happy to report 

that, even though the procurement role changed, the collaborative 

working relationship did not. CBP maintains an active consultation 

role in the research, development, and deployment of RPM technology and looks forward to a continued, positive relationship with 

Director Oxford and his staff. 

The first-generation RPM systems, although very sensitive, do 

have limitations. While they alert CBP officers to the presence of 

radiation, a secondary exam is necessary to positively identify the 

location and specific isotope causing the alert. In the event that a 

CBP officer is unable to positively resolve the alert, scientific reachback is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

The ASP system is expected to enhance our detection capability, 

while significantly reducing the number of secondary exams due to 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
201 

its ability to distinguish between actual threats and natural or 

medical radiation sources that are not security threats. 

It should be noted that, out of the approximately 275 million conveyances scanned with RPMs to date, CBP officers have responded 

to and resolved over 1.5 million alarms. As a specific example, the 

Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach, our Nation’s largest seaport, adjudicated nearly 115,000 radiological alarms last year, which translates to between 400 and 600 adjudications on a typical weekday. 

The ASP’s ability to make the distinction between naturally occurring and real security alarms is expected to significantly reduce the 

burden of responding to benign, nuisance alarms—mostly generated by everyday products found at a home improvement center—thus, allowing us to focus our staffing and resources on highrisk shipments and other border security initiatives. 

CBP has worked closely with DNDO in the development and 

operational testing of the ASP. CBP’s focus for operational testing 

is to determine that those systems can be deployed and are acceptable and effective in our operational environments. Specifically, 

CBP has provided DNDO with functional requirements for the ASP 

and has actively engaged in every step of testing, including performance testing at the Nevada test site and the integration testing 

currently ongoing at a mock port of entry at the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, today I have addressed CBP’s commitment to investing in new and emerging detection technology, along with some of the very positive steps we 

have taken towards enhancing cargo security. As the scope of 

CBP’s mission increases, we must continue to maintain our tactical 

edge by integrating new technology into our ports of entry. Working in collaboration with DNDO and other agency partners to identify emerging technology is a priority for CBP. 

Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity for me to testify, 

and I will be looking forward to answering your questions. Thank 

you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Winkowski, and I just want 

to say after listening to you and Mr. Oxford, that we are focused 

on shortcomings and cost overruns in these two programs that improve the technology—and there is a lot of technical vocabulary 

here. But for anybody listening, the point that both of you make, 

which I do want to stress here for a moment, is that our concerns 

about these two programs does not mean that everything is coming 

in here undetected, that intelligence is the first level of defense 

against nuclear terrorism—and I think it is one that we have really 

improved our capacity on as a result of the reforms of our intelligence community in response to the 9/11 Commission Report— 

and interdiction obviously abroad is the second. And then the question is to stop smuggling into this country. 

As you indicated, Mr. Winkowski, we are checking most of what 

is coming in here. How do you deal with the number of radiological 

false alarms you have? And how do we develop a better capacity 

to see and find radiological material that may be shielded and that 

would not show up in a radiological test? And that is what these 

investments are about. So we will come back to that during the 

question and answer period, but I wanted to stress, with all of our 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
202 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cochran with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

746. 

concerns about the effectiveness of these two programs, notwithstanding those real concerns, that we are not saying the Nation is 

undefended at this point. We have considerably raised our defenses 

since September 11, 2001. 

Next we have two witnesses in a sense from outside, and we 

really welcome their independent testimony. First is Dr. Thomas 

Cochran, who is a Senior Scientist at the Nuclear Program of the 

National Resources Defense Council (NRDC). 

Dr. Cochran, thanks for being here, and we invite your testimony 

now. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS B. COCHRAN, PH.D.,1 SENIOR SCIENTIST, NUCLEAR PROGRAM, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Akaka. 

Thank you for providing the NRDC with the opportunity to present 

our views on the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals that are currently 

being considered for deployment at ports and border crossings. 

Before summarizing our conclusions, please permit me to submit 

for the record several documents I have provided your staff, including a recent Scientific American article prepared by my colleague, 

Matthew McKinzie, and myself. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, those will be entered 

into the record in full. 

Mr. COCHRAN. I will just summarize the summary in my written 

statement. 

The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors are not cost-effective. Additional units should not be purchased. The limited number 

of ASP monitors already purchased should be used for continued 

field testing and research and development. 

A crude nuclear device constructed with highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) poses the greatest risk of mass destruction by terrorists to 

the United States. 

Neither the ASPs nor the currently deployed RPMs can reliably 

detect lightly shielded, significant quantities of highly enriched 

uranium. 

Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement you mentioned that 

the current generation of detectors does a good job in detecting radiation. That is true for many types of radiation, but, unfortunately, the physics is against us when it comes to the material that 

is of most importance, and that is highly enriched uranium. And 

these detectors, as well as the newer ASPs, do not reliably detect 

highly enriched uranium—if the threat has the wherewithal to develop an improvised nuclear explosive device out of HEU, that 

same threat would have the wherewithal to defeat these systems 

almost 100 percent of the time, even if they were guaranteed to be 

screened. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Those are the current systems that you 

are talking about? 

Mr. COCHRAN. And the advanced. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And the advanced, too? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
203 

Mr. COCHRAN. Where I perhaps part ways is that the current 

systems have two problems, not one problem. They do not reliably 

detect the primary threat material, and they have a large false 

alarm rate. The new systems are designed to reduce the wrong 

problem—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The false alarm rate. 

Mr. COCHRAN. They are designed to reduce the false alarm rate, 

and I think they will be able to do that in due course, if not already. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But they do not increase our capacity to 

detect highly enriched uranium? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Not significantly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Marginally, yes, but not significantly. 

Therefore, the thrust of my testimony is that the priorities of the 

Federal Government are not right yet, is that we need to place a 

much higher priority on eliminating sources of material. As Senator Akaka mentioned, this is the primary thing we ought to be 

doing, and I agree with him. 

I do not think we are going to solve this threat problem by pouring more money into advanced methods of detecting radiation from 

materials coming across the borders because the physics is simply 

against us with respect to the material that represents by far the 

greatest threat. 

Now, with regard to the false alarm rate improvements, there is 

no evidence that the potential benefits of the ASP monitors in reducing the false alarm rate and improving the accuracy of alarm 

resolution is cost-effective. And as noted by Mr. Aloise, the current 

systems appear to be adequate in terms of the fact that they are 

not delaying commerce significantly in the current screening process. 

For purposes of certifying the ASPs, the Department of Homeland Security has defined ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness,’’ the requirement for certification, primarily in terms of its 

ability to reduce the false alarm rate, rather than in terms of its 

ability to increase the probability of detecting HEU. Consequently, 

the process is rigged to ensure certification of the ASPs even 

though they will not significantly increase the probability of detecting nuclear weapon-usable HEU and plutonium; even though the 

reduction in the false alarm rate and an improvement in the accuracy of alarm resolution is not cost-effective. 

Some of this I have already covered so I will not repeat myself. 

In my view, the President of the United States should declare, 

backed with the full weight of our diplomacy, that the United 

States seeks—in the interest of and in cooperation with all nations—to achieve as quickly as possible a global ban on the civil 

use of HEU. I can think of no civil use of HEU that justifies the 

risk associated with its use anywhere on the globe. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, it is not necessary for the 

production of electricity, for instance. 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is not. And all of our reactors and most of the 

vast majority of reactors used around the world use low-enriched 

uranium. And it is not necessary for research and test reactors. We 

have some that use HEU. Many of those are being converted. We 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
204 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Wagner appears in the Appendix on page 773. 

have programs to convert them in the government. But, I do not 

think we give enough attention to eliminating for all times in the 

future the civil use of this material. We banned nuclear testing. We 

ought to ban civil use of HEU. It is not sufficient just to say we 

need to improve the security of its use abroad. We need to get it 

out of commerce, period. 

Mr. Chairman, I will stop there and answer your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Cochran. Am I hearing you 

correctly that you are saying that at this point not only have we 

not developed these two advanced technology systems to detect the 

most serious threat, highly enriched uranium, but from your point 

of expertise, you are saying it is not really possible to do it, that 

as you said, the physics is against us? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, in theory, given enough time and money, 

you can detect anything. I mean, you can go into the containers 

and take everything out and so forth. In the real world, I think the 

physics is against us in terms of deploying cost-effective systems 

and for detection of highly enriched uranium because people who 

would know how to design and construct an improved nuclear explosive device will certainly know how to defeat these systems. 

Setting aside the first problem, they probably will not come 

through the portals. We have more than 10 million people in this 

country who did not come through the portals. But even if you are 

assured the material is coming through the portals, smart people 

can design ways to beat the system. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. COCHRAN. And so we ought to put the priorities, really high 

priorities at eliminating the material. If there is no material, it 

cannot hurt you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Eliminating the material, 

and also, if I recall from your Scientific American article, we need 

to do even more aggressively what we are doing now, which is 

through intelligence and law enforcement to stop the smuggling. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Absolutely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very helpful to understand. 

Our final witness on the panel is Dr. Richard Wagner, Chairman 

of the Nuclear Defense Working Group at the Center for the Study 

of Presidency, and I want to note for the record, Dr. Wagner, that 

you are testifying this morning in your personal capacity. We 

thank you for being here and look forward to your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD L. WAGNER, JR., PH.D.,1 CHAIRMAN, 

NUCLEAR DEFENSE WORKING GROUP, CENTER FOR THE 

STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY (TESTIFYING IN HIS PERSONAL 

CAPACITY) 

Mr. WAGNER. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and Senator 

Akaka. Coming last is always an opportunity and a problem. Let 

me say I, too, would like to submit a prepared statement for the 

record, which I will try hard to aim toward the specific question of 

the management of ASP and its utility. 

Let me say a few things which will appear disjointed, but then 

maybe we can weave them together later. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
205 

I agree with Tom Cochran that we ought to do everything that 

the Nation and the international community can do to take HEU 

off the table. I do not think it is a zero sum game between doing 

all those things and doing the things we are talking about here this 

morning. We can do both. Sometimes it is posed as an either/or decision. It is not either/or. We have to do both. 

I also believe that it is going to be very hard to take HEU off 

the table, and it is going to be hard to eliminate the possibility of 

improvised nuclear devices, as I believe you do too, sir. So I think 

we have to be able to detect and interdict attempts to smuggle 

them. 

Radiation detection is only one of the means. You referred to intelligence and what I will call upstream interdiction. I think that 

is crucially important. We are making progress in doing that better. There is a long way to go, but we are making progress. 

I think there is a kind of a synergism between the ability to detect radiation from the threats coming into the country and the efficacy of the upstream measures. If you raise the bar for what the 

threat has to do to evade detection, that is in some measure increasing the signatures that the threat operation has that can then 

be detected upstream and interdicted upstream. 

There is a narrower synergy, and you alluded to it in your opening statement, and Mr. Oxford mentioned it, which is between radiography and improved radiation detection. If we can increase the 

ability of detectors at portals and elsewhere to detect lightly shielded materials, and then detect shields themselves through radiography, perhaps we can pin it between the two and cover a large 

part of the threat spectrum. 

We are a long ways from being able to do that. The current detectors at portals are deficient in both regards that Dr. Cochran 

mentioned—too many false alarms and not sensitive enough. 

I believe that ASP is the right next step to take, but I am going 

to qualify that in just a minute. 

There is a lot more that can be done, I believe, with improving 

radiation detection technology beyond ASP. ASP should not be 

viewed as the last and final step, the best step in radiation detection technology for portals or for other applications. I think that 

with research and development (R&D) of the sort that DNDO, 

DOD, and DOE are now really pursuing much more vigorously 

than they were a few years ago, we can get radiation detection improvements that are kind of on the order of a factor of 10. I cannot 

exactly say what I mean by a factor of 10, but you ought to think 

that there is a factor of 10 yet to go beyond ASP. 

I hope that will come along in time to make ASP procurements 

wasted. I hope it will. But I do not think we ought to count on it. 

So I think that ASP is a good interim step, and against this threat, 

it is worth a billion dollars or a couple of billion dollars to take the 

interim step. 

Now, one reason it is a good interim step is because of the history—and there is a history of detecting objects that somebody does 

not want to have detected using radiation detection. I think you 

might want to explore that history, but you would have to do it in 

closed hearings. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
206 

The theme that runs through that history is that operators learn 

from experience. You give them an improved piece of hardware, 

and they go out and they iterate their operations and iterate the 

details of the hardware you have given them, and they get better 

at it—in some cases, better than the theory might have predicted. 

The wet-ware in the operators’ heads is able to learn how to use 

the detectors better. 

So the way I would think about the ASP procurement is that it 

should be what I called in my prepared statement ‘‘an expanding 

spiral development,’’ not just spiral in the sense of one generation 

after the next, but what I would do is, about now, buy—I do not 

know what the right number is—10 or 30 ASP systems, put them 

in the field with the CBP people, and let them start to learn. Get 

them to think how to modify their operations to use them better. 

Feed that experience back into the next spiral, modify the software 

to improve its performance, and make it more in conformance with 

what the operators have learned, and continue that until either we 

have ASP, or something like ASP, fully deployed or something better comes along. 

One last thing about the ASP management. I think that the contractual arrangements for doing ASP were based on the perception 

that it could be what I will call ‘‘a relatively cut-and-dried procurement’’—design, specify, lay out a test program, go through the test 

program, if it works buy it all. I think that is the wrong contractual 

model for a thing like ASP. Mr. Oxford inherited ASP from a predecessor organization, and because it was urgent—and I believe it 

is urgent, although I have not talked to Mr. Oxford about it—but 

I think he carried it on the way it was because that seemed the 

fastest way. 

I think that the ASP procurement should have been structured 

more like an R&D procurement and less like a ‘‘test once and buy 

it all’’ procurement. In an R&D procurement, one recognizes the 

first law of R&D, which is that you cannot simultaneously specify 

the objective of the procurement, what it will cost, and its schedule. 

I think that there are contractual mechanisms that allow you to be 

more flexible among those things and not create the expectations 

that I think have been created by the procurement-like nature of 

the ASP contract, that have introduced some heat and noise into 

the process, and made it hard for you to oversee this process. 

That is maybe as much as I can usefully say right now, sir. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Wagner. A very thoughtful 

and helpful statement. We will begin a round of questioning now. 

I think I would like to first ask both Mr. Oxford and Mr. Aloise 

to respond to the larger point that Dr. Cochran has made, which 

is that it is not that it is ultimately impossible, but it is so difficult 

to detect and so costly to detect highly enriched uranium that in 

some sense we are spending too much money when we would be 

better off spending money on intelligence, interdiction, and, of 

course, political efforts to ban highly enriched uranium. Both of you 

give me your reaction to that as a matter of overall strategy in our 

nuclear counterterrorism program. Mr. Oxford, will you go first? 

Mr. OXFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is clearly a very 

complex question that requires some attention. First of all, we are 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
207 

advocates at DNDO and at DHS for an overall layered strategy. We 

are advocates for helping ensure that we do a better job overseas 

with material security. 

I have quotes from both Governor Kean as the Vice Chairman of 

the 9/11 Commission and former Senator Sam Nunn recently, 

when questioned by the WMD Commission, that I will paraphrase 

instead of reading. In Governor Kean’s case, when he testified 21⁄2

years ago in front of a Senate committee, he said we had been into 

the work overseas of securing material for 14 years. He felt like 

there was at least another 14 years to get it done right. Does this 

country have 14 years to wait for that to evolve? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What is your answer to that? 

Mr. OXFORD. I think he is right, but I think we have got to continue to plod along. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You think we do not have 14 years. 

Mr. OXFORD. I do not think we have 14 years. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. OXFORD. And I think we need to continue the layered approach. We need to continue to seek progress overseas where possible. It is not going to be possible in my mind for the United 

States to mandate that. We have got to continue to work collaboratively with a host of nations. There are over 40 countries that 

have highly enriched uranium. I know you would have to seek cooperative agreements and a time schedule that would make sense. 

Otherwise, I feel like we are outsourcing our security to others, and 

the pace may not be commensurate with what we need. 

Senator Nunn recently—as the WMD Commission is going about 

its business for Congress—said he thinks we are worse off than we 

were 7 years ago in this regard. So I think there is a reason to support—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In regard to the interdiction and material 

security of ‘‘loose nukes.’’ 

Mr. OXFORD. Yes, sir. So I endorse what Dr. Cochran is saying 

in principle. It is the operational practicality of getting that done 

on a timely basis that is in the best interest of U.S. security that 

I would argue with. 

Second, from a technical point of view, as you already pointed 

out in your opening statement, we believe that a combination of 

ASP and not necessarily CAARS but radiography in operations at 

our ports of entry have a high probability of success against highly 

enriched uranium. And, again, I cannot give you the details in an 

open forum. We know what the current ASP systems can do. At 

what point does the shielding now become a problem for an ASPlike system? And we are looking at success against certain weapon 

designs that have highly enriched uranium about which Dr. Cochran is not privy to the classified details. 

We then need to know where we leverage the radiography aspects that will get to the high-density materials that are indicative 

of either the shielding that is blocking HEU or the highly enriched 

uranium itself. So we think the combination of x-ray systems and 

the passive detectors are the right approach to enhancing domestic 

security. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Aloise, do you want to enter this discussion? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
208 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes. GAO has always said that the way to go is— 

and many experts believe, if not all experts—that we should secure 

it at the source first and foremost. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ALOISE. That is the best thing to do. 

Regarding these systems, we have always thought that the ASP 

was sort of an advanced R&D program that was prematurely rolled 

out into an acquisition program. And I would differ with Mr. Oxford on one thing. I do not think we know what the ASPs can do 

yet, and that is what all the testing is about, especially when they 

are in the field. Those were the questions we asked from the beginning: Does it work? How much will it cost? And is the marginal increase in security worth the cost? We have higher risks to address. 

So, we need to go on with the testing. We need to see if these 

things work. And then we need to make the determination if ASPs 

are worth the cost. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go to the second part of what 

moves us now to the advanced technologies. Mr. Winkowski, the 

numbers you cited of what we would call false alarms, radiological 

false alarms, are quite large. If I remember correctly, 600 a day at 

Long Beach, California. Is that right? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it seems to me what I am hearing from 

GAO and yourself—well, let me just ask the question. How much 

of a problem is that operationally? It seems like a large number, 

but as I indicated in my opening statement, I am under the impression that Customs and Border Protection thinks it is manageable. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, it is a large number, and when you are 

looking at 400 to 600 in a place like Los Angeles-Long Beach, California, that means you have resources dedicated day in and day out 

to—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Take one minute and just describe what 

happens. Describe a false alarm and then what you do. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, what happens is the container comes 

through the primary RPM. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The truck goes through the portal monitor, right? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Right. And then an alert goes through a secondary RPM. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The alarm goes off. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Right. And if the alarm goes off in the secondary, then what we have to do to adjudicate is officers have to 

go with their radioisotope identifier (RIID). 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Handheld. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Handheld. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. And scan the container. 

Now, a couple issues that concern me is: One, the RIID was really never made for that type of business. It was made more for vehicles and mail. 

Two, the thing I do not think we talk enough about or stress 

enough is that you just cannot stand there next to the container 

and walk around with it. In order to get a good, accurate reading 

to find the isotope and location, officers have to actually get up on 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
209 

a ladder or stairs in order to make sure that we are evenly scanning that particular container. 

So when you start multiplying that—and then if there are some 

questions in the reach-back to LSS—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What is LSS? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That is Laboratory and Scientific Services that 

actually reads it and says this is a false alarm, this is just naturally occurring radiation material. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That adds delays to the release of that freight. 

And when you are talking about just-in-time inventories, and when 

you are talking about all those types of very sensitive issues, that 

adds up. Plus getting an accurate reading with that handheld RIID 

with an ASP-type system, it is read by the panels. You have a good 

reading from the standpoint of that container being saturated by 

that particular system. 

So from an operator’s standpoint, this is important to us. Whether it is an ASP or an ASP-like system, that is perhaps one of the 

questions here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. And I understand you have 

to always weigh the interruption to commerce as against, obviously, the extraordinary threat of nuclear terrorism. 

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And ask some understanding, of course, 

from people in commerce. 

Just a final question because my time has run out. How many 

times do you actually open up the container? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Depending on the identification of the source, it 

depends. If it is just a naturally occurring material, such as tile, 

it may not necessarily be opened. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which the handheld monitor would show 

you? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But other times you do open it. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I will ask Senator Akaka’s indulgence just 

for a moment. Mr. Aloise, do you have a point of view on this as 

to the operational feasibility of how much of a problem is the high 

number of false alarms with the current equipment. 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, we can only talk about our observations of the 

places we have been. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ALOISE. And I do not disagree with anything that has been 

said. But we have been to 14 or so ports. We have visited these 

places all over the world, and we have talked to CBP, and obviously it takes time, but no one has ever said that it impedes the 

flow of commerce. 

And regarding this system, CBP’s procedures with the reachback, if there is anything at all they discover, that conveyance does 

not leave until that is resolved. So they will de-van if they have to. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ALOISE. So, to us that is an advantage of this system. We 

have talked to truck drivers, we have talked to owners of trucking 

companies. In fact, they were happy to have it done because they 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
210 

live in this country, too. They do not want to be taking anything 

into this country that they should not be. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is important to hear, and obviously, from our point of view, we would say it is worth some slight 

disruption in the flow of commerce to protect us from the potential 

of a nuclear incident in an American city. 

Thank you. 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, could I add something to that? Because one of the things that we did respond to from both CBP, 

DOE, and the GAO from the 2007 testing that we conducted to 

what we have done in 2008 is there is a concern that this ‘‘NORM 

material,’’ as it is referred to, the normally occurring radioactive 

material, can mask actual special nuclear material threats. So we 

have the compounding problem of does the handheld device now 

just react to what the NORM material is and still miss the threat. 

A lot of ASP testing that we have been conducting this year is to 

find out can we make that distinction between two types of radiation and make the distinction between threat material and then 

normally occurring material that could confuse other detectors. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Winkowski, then Dr. Cochran, and 

then we go to Senator Akaka. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Just one moment. I agree that the trade community, the people in this country, they want us to do this, and 

there is no argument on that. But when we get down to the unnecessary impediment of commerce, my point is these containers are 

going into secondary unnecessarily because the RPMs cannot identify it. Otherwise, that container would be on the highway down 

the road. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. So if you had a more sophisticated, 

more capable initial monitor, you could avoid some of the false 

alarms. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Right. So if I were a member of the trade community sitting here and saying you are unnecessarily impeding because you are doing things to a container that do not necessarily 

need to be done—it is getting delayed in secondary. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Dr. Cochran. 

Mr. COCHRAN. I wish to respond to two comments Mr. Oxford 

made, one about the time it is taking to eliminate some of the 

sources of nuclear weapon materials, HEU in particular. I agree 

that it has been slow. It has been much faster since September 11, 

2001. The programs actually started 30 years ago. It was called the 

Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR). But 

there is a lot more we could do. 

For example, we send highly enriched uranium to Canada to 

make molybdenum-99 to recover technetium-99, which is the most 

dominant medical isotope in the world. And we do it because we 

do not have a domestic source of molybdenum-99 and technetium99. And the University of Missouri Research Reactor Center would 

like to get into the commercial business of making it, and they do 

not have the money. We could get out of the business of shipping 

highly enriched uranium to Canada if the Congress and the Department of Energy would accelerate that program. And we can accelerate that program, and we could have done it in this budget 

cycle, but we did not. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
211 

Now, the President of the United States went on the television 

last night and made about a speech about the urgency to solve the 

economic problem. He has never been on the television to make a 

speech about the urgency of eliminating highly enriched uranium 

from commerce. We can accelerate that program if the Federal 

Government would give it the urgency that it requires. 

Finally, Mr. Oxford said that I do not have access to classified 

information, and he knows that a combination of ASP and CAARS 

can find efficiently highly enriched uranium in commerce. I will tell 

you, I do not need access to the classified information because I 

know a little bit of physics, and I can beat his ASP and CAARS 

systems 100 percent of the time, virtually, with what I know about 

how to design improvised nuclear explosive devices. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Akaka, I have gone way over on my time, so please take 

as much time as you need on this round. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have 

always been generous. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak about an issue that has 

not been given the proper attention, and that is our nuclear and 

radioactive materials and how we deal with them. I thank you for 

holding this hearing on trying to prevent nuclear terrorism and to 

learn from our witnesses, from their experiences and even from 

some procedures that have not worked as well. 

One thing that comes to mind here, Mr. Chairman: Is there a 

strategic plan? I mentioned it in my opening statement, and I believe that any one of you can answer this. I believe that there are 

efforts to do that, but I believe that there is not a strategic plan. 

Is there a strategic plan? Where is it? Is it coming soon, a strategic plan to deal with preventing nuclear terrorism? 

Mr. OXFORD. Senator Akaka, I am not sure exactly what is referred to as a ‘‘strategic plan,’’ because a lot of different things 

come to mind when I think of people putting strategic plans together that become coffee table books that do not really have much 

content. They are high, lofty goals. What we work on is a layered 

strategy that looks at each of the potential threat pathways, and 

we identify goals and objectives to address each of those threat 

pathways. 

One of the things that we have acknowledged with CBP and others is that we wanted to secure our ports of entry first, and as Mr. 

Winkowski said in his opening statement, we have started to address other potential threat pathways into this country, like the 

general aviation threat. We are working the small maritime craft 

threat jointly with CBP and the U.S. Coast Guard to look at interdicting threats that may come through craft smaller than the large 

merchant ships that you see, things that are below 300 gross vehicle tons. 

So we are addressing this in a layered strategy. It is not tied to 

the ASP program. It is tied to whatever the best solution may be 

associated with how we do both the operations and the technical 

aspects of that. So we look at it as a layered approach, and so we 

do have strategies in each of those various layers. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
212 

Senator AKAKA. And the reason I pose that question is in my 

statement I mentioned securing nuclear and radioactive material 

at its source, and Dr. Cochran did mention about HEU, highly—— 

Mr. COCHRAN. Highly enriched uranium. 

Senator AKAKA. Enriched uranium, and that it is one that has 

not been detected. And so I do not know whether something like 

that belongs in a plan and whether a strategic plan would be one 

where we would try to work with other nations as well to get to 

wherever the sources are to try to prevent it from happening there. 

Mr. OXFORD. And, Senator, if I could, the responsibility for doing 

that as part of the U.S. Government’s response to this threat is 

within the Department of Energy that is working overseas with a 

variety of nations to help secure sources overseas, so I would invite 

you to consult with the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) in terms of what their plan is to do that. 

Senator AKAKA. Do you think a strategic plan would be needed? 

Mr. OXFORD. Again, tying all these different things together, it 

would be a useful thing to do. 

Mr. ALOISE. Senator Akaka, if I may? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes, Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. A couple of years ago, GAO issued a report calling 

for a strategic plan at the top levels of the government, combining 

all of the programs of NNSA, DHS, DOD, and the National Research Council (NRC). The State Department was supposed to head 

up that effort, and they have come up with one. We have not 

looked at it recently. 

Also, earlier this year we did call for the development of a strategic plan for the global nuclear architecture, which is all this radiation detection equipment worldwide we are talking about, and I 

believe DHS agreed that they would do that. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Wagner, Mr. Oxford stated that there is now 

a director of ASP Operational Test and Evaluation. Based on your 

experience in DOD, do you believe that having an Operational Test 

and Evaluation Office is important to the success of the ASP program? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes, sir. I think that is important not only for ASP 

but for the whole ensuing range of developments. There is an art, 

of course, to how you do operational testing and development testing and where the line between the two is. And I think the question of exactly how you draw the line is maybe a little bit deeper 

than we can go here this morning. But I think in general, yes, an 

Office of Operational Testing is a good thing to have. 

It may be a little late for ASP. I think that we ought to think 

about the ASP product as being one of sequential cycles, where you 

deploy a few, get field experience with those, feed that back, upgrade the hardware for the next round of buying, and so on, until 

finally you have reached the end. 

The role and the distinction there between development testing 

and operational testing is a little fuzzy. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me ask any one of the panelists who wish 

to comment on this, do you think all major acquisition programs 

would benefit from a similar office? Why or why not? 

Mr. OXFORD. Senator, if I can address that, first of all, this now 

has become Department policy, so within DHS, this Director for 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
213 

Operational Testing would be applied to all major acquisitions that 

go through the Investment Review Board. So we just happen to be 

the first program to overlay the operational test feature on this, 

but you will see that in other endeavors within the Department as 

well. So it is not just a DNDO operational testing. It is the Department’s operational testing entity that would be applied to all major 

programs. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Oxford, you mentioned that technology to 

distinguish automatically between low-density, non-threat materials and higher-density materials is under development. This 

sounds like important technology to counter the threat posed by 

nuclear smuggling. 

How long will it be until this CAARS technology is ready for 

demonstration testing and evaluation? 

Mr. OXFORD. Thank you for the question because I would like to 

refer back to what the Chairman mentioned in his opening statement about what we call the CAARS course correction. What we 

recognize is that because we have a variety of R&D elements within DNDO, we have the CAARS program that was pursuing some 

rather aggressive technical goals, and we also have some exploratory research that is evaluating other radiographical concepts. We 

recognized that the pace of development was moving so quickly 

that we did not want to restrict future acquisitions to just the three 

CAARS contractors. So what we did within the CAARS program is 

we took out some of these sub-goals. For example, at one time we 

were looking for 120-vehicle throughput for each CAARS machine 

per hour in support of CBP operations. That was driving the 

CAARS vendors down certain paths without worrying about the detection challenge. 

We had other detection concepts that were proceeding in parallel 

to this, so what we have done with the CAARS program and, as 

the Chairman referred to it, the JINII program, the Joint Integrated NII Program, is we have opened up the door for additional 

competition with these other parallel radiography systems. We will 

do a test in 2009 to look at how suitable those concepts are to meet 

the similar goals to what we had in the CAARS program. So we 

have opened up the door for competition to help get the best value 

for the government. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Oxford, Mr. Aloise in his testimony mentioned that your submissions to the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) for budget years 2008 and 2009 describe an ASP sister program that includes land crossings, seaports, rail lines, airports, and other ports of entry. How are you planning to provide 

this type of nuclear detection capability for these other potential 

smuggling routes? 

Mr. OXFORD. Again, thank you for the question because we are 

working very closely with CBP as we look at every one of these 

operational issues because one of the things that I like to mention 

is that the developer cannot do this on his own. We have got to 

work with the operational community. 

And let me just mention rail as an example. There are 37 highpriority rail crossings coming into the United States from our 

northern and southern allies. It is a very difficult proposition to do 

detection at the border once the train is put together. So it puts 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
214 

an operational burden on CBP, and I will ask Mr. Winkowski to 

address some of that. But if you do a detection, you have an alarm 

of a long train coming across, for example, the Northern border. 

Now you have to figure out how to separate that one car from the 

entire train. 

So what we chose to do when we did the change in the ASP program was to go back and study the rail problem from top to bottom, and we may end up in a situation where we have to ask our 

Canadian partners, for example, to do some of the scanning of the 

rail cars before the train is actually assembled so we are not putting the burden right at the border itself; we are working in cooperation with our allies to deal with the problem, as opposed to 

putting the burden on our partners at the Northern border. That 

is just one example of how we have to go back and look at every 

one of these venues. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I ask one more 

question? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Winkowski and Mr. Oxford, the new JINII 

program appears to accommodate both detection for radiological 

threats and contraband. What assurance do we have that the JINII 

program will focus first and foremost on nuclear detection for rapid 

short-term deployment? 

Mr. OXFORD. Senator Akaka, I do not think we can choose the 

priorities. I will let Mr. Winkowski talk about it. I think we do 

have to make some priority decisions. I think what we are looking 

for is the ability to do the nuclear mission while not diminishing 

the capability to look at other contraband like people, drugs, explosives, and those kinds of things. 

So I think there is a way that we can balance this, and that is 

why we wanted an integrated program to do both the nuclear and 

the conventional mission CBP has. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. And, Senator, all I would add to that is I agree 

with what the Director is saying, and we need technology that can 

find the shielding piece, as well as making sure that we are addressing our traditional mission on the drug side and all the other 

issues that we deal with. 

So, working collaboratively with the DNDO is what we do, and 

as the operator, we will put down our requirements on what we 

need, and then we leave it up to the scientists and the scientific 

community to come in and address that. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your responses. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka, for your excellent 

questions. We will do one more round of questions this morning. 

Director Oxford, the suggestion was made, I believe by Dr. Wagner, about the possibility of putting some of the ASP units into deployment as a matter of testing to see how they do and to advance 

the goals that you have. 

Mr. WAGNER. As a matter of learning more than testing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I accept the amendment. [Laughter.] 

Thank you. In your filing this year for the office, the so-called 

congressional justification, you indicate that DNDO has already 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
215 

purchased 76 low-rate production models of the ASP monitor, and 

that approximately 45 of those are now sitting in warehouses. 

I wonder what you would say about deploying those monitors 

and letting CBP officers use them for a year or so to find out how 

they perform in a variety of settings. I mean, in a sense, would 

that not be the equivalent of the spiral in the ASP program that 

Dr. Wagner has suggested? 

Mr. OXFORD. Based on the way, Mr. Chairman, that you have 

stated it, that would meet his requirement. I am not sure that I 

agree with that kind of spiral approach. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So talk about that. 

Mr. OXFORD. I do not think the pace of the software development 

is going to be so rapid that we would want to do that. Right now, 

we are trying to accommodate addressing of the threat through 

both our testing as well as the CBP functionalities. So when we 

take the recommendation of the Secretary later this year, he will 

have an option to deploy at whatever pace, once he thinks these 

machines actually do represent an increase in operational effectiveness, and clearly he could dictate one of kind of deployment strategy versus another, and we are going to give him those options. 

We do believe in a spiral approach, and what we would do—it 

is a matter of, first of all, these systems will take a while to 

produce. Once we make a production order, for example, and the 

Secretary says go, it is a 6-month period of time before the systems 

actually would show up and be able to be deployed. 

So in the interim, we would deploy those first 45. CBP would 

start to get information from those. The software then could start 

to be adapted if there were issues that arose from that. But I do 

not think doing 30 at a time, first of all, works from a performance 

point of view, nor is it cost-effective for the government to buy 

small amounts and then have to reorder systems. And I think it 

is awkward for CBP—and I will let Mr. Winkowski address this— 

to deal with small batches of systems coming into the field. Now 

they have to manage multiple systems. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you would prefer for now to have those 

45 units sitting in the warehouse? 

Mr. OXFORD. We are prohibited from deploying those by the appropriations law that we are living with until the Secretary makes 

the certification decision. But they would be the first 45 that would 

be deployed. So they would be available for deployment immediately. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I see. I understand now that you have 

clarified it. If you did not have that certification requirement that 

the appropriations process has put on you, would you more 

proactively deploy those 45—— 

Mr. OXFORD. We had actually discussed that at one time with 

CBP to go ahead and get those into the operational environment 

and locations where they would feel comfortable evaluating them 

for a while. We were prohibited by the appropriations law from 

doing a parallel deployment until all testing and certification was 

done. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you did not reach a judgment as to 

whether or not, if the certification process was not there, you would 

deploy those units now? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
216 

Mr. OXFORD. Well, again, when the law came out, we did not continue the discussion. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You never reached a point of judgment. 

Mr. OXFORD. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Aloise, do you have an opinion on this 

question about the deployment of these units that are sitting there 

now? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, we think that it would be a good idea to deploy 

some of these for testing, as has been suggested, and learning for 

at least 6 months or a year. And I think most experts we talked 

to thought that was a reasonable period. 

In our view, to rush these out before you know they work could 

cause more havoc at the border than not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ALOISE. Last year’s validation test did not go well, and we 

are back to doing it again. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you agree that—I have not spent time 

on this—the certification process that the Appropriations Committees put on DNDO prohibits them from doing the testing before the 

certification? 

Mr. ALOISE. I would imagine that DNDO could approach the 

Committee staffers and ask them for an exception to that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is it worth doing that, Mr. Oxford? 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, we did that. They were afraid that 

what we would be doing is a slowly phased deployment as opposed 

to an evaluation. So there is actually a phrase in the appropriations law that prohibits that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. OXFORD. And because we could learn some of that even while 

we were going through some of the testing, we would have been 

doing that over the course of this last calendar year. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Winkowski, what is your point of 

view on—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, as the operator, testing is fine. But if I am 

going to be given a system that is unstable, if I am going to be 

given a system that does not meet some of my demands, all that 

does is add a burden onto the men and women that are on the 

ground making the system go day in and day out. And we want a 

system that is stable. I agree with what Dr. Wagner is saying, that 

sometimes you just have to put it in the field, and we ought to see 

how it works in a real live environment. But we have to make sure 

that we measure that and we do not deliver to the men and women 

of CBP field operations in the ports of entry a system that is unstable and is going to do nothing but add problems and complications. 

As I said, we are going to be there with the screwdriver fixing 

it day in and day out. So many systems on software, to reboot it 

and to reinstall software can take 7 or 8 minutes. That is the kiss 

of death in my business from the standpoint of delays. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think probably most people do not know 

that—you are operating on that quick a time frame. This is minutes you are talking about. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Absolutely—seconds. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
217 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Wagner, I would like to get you into 

this discussion, and if I can invite you to elaborate on some statements you made in your prepared testimony, which I found very 

interesting, which was to contrast the procurement system of the 

DNDO with the procurement system of the Manhattan Project, let 

us say, and to suggest that, interestingly, these are both nuclear 

related, of course, in this case—not to develop a nuclear weapon 

but to protect us from one being used to attack Americans. So talk 

about that a little bit. If I heard you right, you think that we may 

be too tight in procurement in the model that we have now. 

Mr. WAGNER. I think that the Federal Government in general, as 

my prepared statement said, over the last 10 or 20 years has 

changed what was once a flexible procurement system into one that 

is too bureaucratic, too rule-bound. There are some situations 

where it is good to do that and other situations where it is harmful, 

and I think in general these technologies are a place where it is 

harmful. 

In my prepared statement, I listed 10 or so characteristics of a 

more flexible procurement process. One of them is getting the system developers, the guys in the white coats, out in the field with 

the operators where they can learn together. 

I would say about the CBP people, if they are anything like the 

uniformed military, some of them will welcome the opportunity to 

work with developers and make the system better. DOD for years— 

I am a few years out of date on it—had the 9th Infantry Division 

at Fort Lewis, Washington, that was the experimental division. 

The 9th Infantry Division was supposed to be prepared to go to 

war, and they had to train as if they were going to go to war, but 

they understood that they were going to take things to war that 

were pretty experimental and learn how to use them, and learn 

how to use them in training beforehand. 

I think that this nuclear threat should be thought of as so much 

a part of dealing with the normal flow of cargo into this country 

that it would not be a bad idea for CBP to put together kind of an 

operational/experimental entity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very thoughtful and provocative 

and fresh point of view, which I think as we turn this problem over 

to the next Administration, we ought to think about part of this 

problem is that Congress and the Budget Office put restrictions on 

offices like DNDO because we are worried about waste. On the 

other hand, we may be overbureaucratizing to the point that we 

are frustrating the realization of the urgent goals that we have. 

So, I am going to go back and look at the specific recommendations you make about how we might turn this somewhat in the direction of the more flexible procurement model. 

Mr. WAGNER. Can I make one other suggestion about how to 

walk down this line a little further? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. WAGNER. I was in the Pentagon—it was in 1985 or 1986— 

when the Competition in Contracting Act was passed and signed 

by the President. It was intended to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse 

and get a better product via competition. It was largely aimed at 

DOD, although I think maybe other agencies too. The Congress ofVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00225 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
218 

fered to DOD the opportunity to exempt R&D from many of the 

strictures of the act, and DOD chose not to exempt R&D. 

If I were going to start to delve into this, I would go back and 

look at that particular juncture and see why the Congress thought 

it was a good idea to exempt R&D and maybe why DOD thought 

it was not a good idea. I think that might be a good place to start. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good point. Thank you. 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, could I address that quickly? Because I know Dr. Wagner and I have chatted about this a couple 

of times where he refers to this as ‘‘bending the FAR,’’ which, of 

course, as a government official, I cannot bend the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). So I think there are some flexibilities that 

may be useful as some of these programs across the U.S. Government go forward. But I would like to point out that what was 

talked about as an 8-week delay in the program is really because 

of one of the features that Dr. Wagner mentioned, and that is, we 

have an immersed CBP in the program to the point that we are 

not going forward until the operator is comfortable with this system. And we are committed to not taking a recommendation to the 

Secretary until we both have met the technical objectives of the 

program and the operational objectives, at least the one feature 

that Dr. Wagner mentions, to make sure the developer and the 

users are hand in hand as a feature of the program. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very good point. We know on 

this Committee that some of the problems that we have had with 

the investment we have made in another area, which is the socalled virtual or electronic fence at the Southern border, are the result, some of us conclude, in part of the fact that the private contractors went ahead without effectively any involvement by the 

Customs and Border Protection, and they would have avoided a lot 

of problems if they had had that consultation. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Winkowski, Mr. Oxford testified that CAARS units are too 

large and complex to be operationally effective. To what extent did 

CBP and DNDO collaborate when this decision was made? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. My understanding—and Senator, this is before 

my time as the Assistant Commissioner—is that we became engaged with DNDO on CAARS back in late 2005, worked with 

DNDO, talked about the footprint, and then I believe the course 

correction was in about 2007, if I remember correctly. 

So we were at the table, but our concern was that the footprint 

was too big. As I was saying, for all your trucks to go through a 

car-wash type system, as I call it, and the driver comes out and you 

do your scan, realistically that presents a tremendous amount of 

problems from a cycle time. 

So our position was that we really needed a different technology 

that was more flexible and did not have such a big footprint and 

require so much handling. 

Senator AKAKA. In terms of the CAARS system being too large, 

what percentage of our port facilities would not be able to accommodate it? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
219 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. It is a big footprint, 60-by-160, as I recall. I 

would say that if you went with the CAARS on the blueprint, most 

of the seaports could not handle the footprint. 

Senator AKAKA. In Dr. Wagner’s testimony, he stated that the 

United States should be putting even more resources into countering the threat of nuclear smuggling, including detection and 

interdiction of attacks. Which threats can be best countered by 

technology like the ASP system? 

Mr. WAGNER. That is a tough question. There are a lot of different threats and different ways of shielding different materials. 

It is a very complicated question to find that part of the threat that 

you can imagine just barely dealing with today and designing a 

system to deal with that, knowing that there is a lot more threat 

that you cannot deal with today that is going to have to come later. 

The art in this game of managing R&D and getting it into the 

field to beat this threat is in properly picking the threat you choose 

to beat this year and putting something in place to do that, and 

at the same time starting development for a threat that you know 

you cannot beat this year, but will hope to beat later. 

Forty years ago, I went through that same kind of problem in the 

first phase of missile defense. This is a lot harder than missile defense. There is more diversity of possible things that an attacker 

could do. I think that an approach to doing it—I think I am not 

giving you the answer you wanted—is to develop better systems 

analysis tools, computer models, for instance, of the whole sequence 

of how the threat might approach and how the defense might 

choose to defend in-depth and begin to learn from what those tell 

you to develop both operational plans and the strategic plans that 

you talked about. 

Mr. Oxford and his counterparts in DOD and DOE are building 

such systems analysis tools. They know that they need to do that. 

They are coming slowly. If there were a single place where I would 

put more emphasis, it is on bringing those along so that we could 

answer those kinds of questions better 2 years from now. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, let me ask a question that deals with resources and money. Do you believe the current resources to counter 

the threat of nuclear smuggling are properly distributed? 

Mr. WAGNER. Your first question was, I think, are there enough, 

and now you asked are they properly distributed? Let me answer 

the properly distributed part in two ways. 

Mr. Oxford has quite properly, over the last years in DNDO, 

started to put more emphasis on non-cargo flow paths. Senator 

Lieberman referred to civil aviation and small craft and maritime 

approaches. I think that is a proper next thing to work on. I might 

have wanted to start working on it sooner. 

My own opinion is that the Nation as a whole ought to be putting 

even more emphasis on stopping this threat overseas. I would not 

do that to the detriment of defending at our borders and in-depth 

inside the country. But I think more emphasis ought to be put on 

doing it overseas, from intelligence to covert operations to whatever. 

On another dimension of whether there are enough resources, 

when I go out to the labs and an occasional contractor and talk to 

the principal investigators of these detector development projects, 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
220 

my general sense is that many of those projects are underfunded, 

that the principal investigators and the government people who are 

allocating the funding are required to choose among alternative 

paths prematurely, before they have explored them enough. 

Now, that is a matter of judgment on my part, but the way I 

would approach this from this Committee’s point of view is to expect about a year from now that very good questions be addressed 

on a more analytic basis, and to prepare a year from now for the 

possibility that on the basis of that analysis you might want to see 

the Appropriations Committees increase the funding in this area 

substantially. 

Right now, it is my judgment, I would like to see it—but you 

should not follow that until you can back it up with better analysis 

and you ought to be working hard to get that better analysis. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. OXFORD. Senator, could I address one of your questions? Because we have enjoyed great support from the Congress. When I 

first stood up DNDO and we brought together some resources that 

had been within the Department from multiple components, we 

had about a $195 million budget, which was probably the most this 

country has spent on nuclear detection in two decades. I cannot 

give you statistics on that per se, but I know there was not much 

money going to the National Laboratories for this specific mission. 

We are now at a level of about $561 million, so we have enjoyed 

good success. We are reluctant to just come in and ask for lots of 

money without some foundation, as Dr. Wagner said. 

There are some impending crises in this country, though, and 

that has to do with the nuclear expertise that is rapidly dwindling 

across our entire complex. NNSA Administrator Tom D’Agostino 

and I are working this collectively along with some colleagues in 

DOD. We are losing nuclear engineers; we are losing nuclear weapons designers across the complex as the support for the nuclear 

weapons program goes down. These programs, like ours, are riding 

on the backs of the nuclear weapons complex. So I think we need 

to figure out that we do not have unintended consequences of going 

from what has been apparently an offensive mission to know that 

we are in the defensive posture, that we do not diminish one to the 

detriment to the other too drastically. We need about 100 Ph.D.s 

per year coming out of our colleges and universities to reinvigorate 

that complex so we can take on the kind of challenges that you are 

asking about. So there are some issues that resource-wise that are 

kind of lower level than the programs we have been talking about 

today, but really portend for the future of this country. 

Senator AKAKA. I know I have exceeded my time, Mr. Chairman. 

May I ask one more question? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Winkowski. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Senator, if I could just elaborate a little bit on 

what Dr. Wagner said. He had mentioned about doing this overseas, and as I had mentioned in my opening statement, we have 

a layered approach, whether it is a 24-hour rule or it is an automatic targeting system. But one of those layers is what we call the 

Container Security Initiative (CSI), as well as the Secure Freight 

Initiative (SFI), where we have pushed a lot of our processing overVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 041450 PO 00000 Frm 00228 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41450.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
221 

seas in 58 locations, and it accounts for about 86 percent of the 

freight that comes into the United States now, which has had some 

type of screening, if you will. I am not here to say that everything 

has gone through a RPM or even a NII device, but we are in these 

58 countries, and under the SAFE Port Act with the Secure Freight 

Initiative, we are doing scanning, for example, in Pakistan, Port of 

Cortes, Honduras, and Southampton. Now, they are small footprints and we are doing some in Hong Kong, not all of Hong Kong, 

but we have one lane there in Hong Kong, and we do have the APS 

system up and running in Southampton in secondary. So I think 

Dr. Wagner’s point is very important, that we have to look at pushing this overseas, and, of course, we have the 100-percent standing 

requirement in July 2012, which is a real challenge, but we are 

looking at our high-trade risk corridors to see if we can put in some 

type of protocols like we have in Pakistan, where everything is 

being scanned and everything is going through an RPM type of device. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Oxford, in DNDO’s response to GAO’s cost 

estimate report, your office claimed that GAO incorrectly assumed 

that DNDO picks up operation and maintenance costs. DNDO asserted that it is U.S. Customs and Border Protection that covers 

these costs. If you consider the operation and maintenance costs 

borne by CBP along with the $2.1 billion cost estimate DNDO advocates, is this cost close to the range that GAO presented? 

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Aloise and I have chatted about this recently. 

We are conducting a full lifecycle cost estimate that will include 

many of the same elements that their estimate has. Some of the 

documents have been referred to in the past; for example, the $1.2 

billion number that was really the ceiling on the contracts available for acquisition and R&D. So it was not representative of the 

lifecycle cost estimate and never was intended to do so. The $2.1 

billion that you have seen referenced was actually predicated on 

the OMB 300 requirement where we go in and it is the DNDO portion of that program, and it spans a different lifecycle than what 

the GAO analysis did. It is only 8 years. That is what OMB requires when we submit it. 

So before we go to the Secretary, we are doing a full-blown 

lifecycle cost estimate for the 11-year time period that is required 

to do this, in a way very consistent with what the GAO has done. 

It is premature for me to say what that outcome is going to be, because we are also doing it along four pathways, and that is, whatever the deployment options the Secretary may want to visit, we 

want a lifecycle cost estimate that would account for the current 

generation of RPMs and ASP systems across four different deployment strategies so he has options to choose from as opposed to a 

one-point solution. 

So in the next month or two, we will have something that is 

more of a comparison with GAO, and we will be glad to share what 

the actual relative numbers are at that time. 

Senator AKAKA. I really appreciate the responses from the panel, 

and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Thanks for 

your excellent questions. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
222 

This is a time here in Congress where we go from urgent matter 

to urgent matter, and I have got to go now to some discussions 

about the national economic crisis. But I want to thank all of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Aloise, at the outset for the very important work 

that GAO has done here. 

I think this has been a very good and constructive discussion. I 

would say for my part it has helped me better understand the decisions that have been made and the ones that have to be made. And 

there are many more questions that I have, and other Members of 

the Committee may have as well. So we are going to keep the 

record of the hearing open for 15 days so we may submit some 

questions to you asking you to respond in writing. 

We also give you the opportunity during those days to add additional testimony as you see fit. But you made a really constructive 

and important contribution to our discussion of this critical element 

of national security. Whenever we deal with this problem, I always 

remember that last year at one of the first hearings of this session, 

Secretary Chertoff was a witness, and someone on the Committee 

asked him the classic and perhaps trite, but very important, question: ‘‘What element of homeland security keeps you up at night, 

Mr. Secretary?’’ And he said, ‘‘It is my concern about a nuclear 

weapon or dirty bomb being smuggled into the United States and 

exploded in an American city.’’ And that has led to these seven 

hearings. They have been very helpful. Obviously, Director Oxford, 

you and DNDO play a very important role here, including the coordination of other R&D and other efforts going on in other departments. 

So my intention is that after we complete the questions and answers that we will file, the Committee will make a series of observations and recommendations to the incoming Administration, particularly the incoming Secretary of Homeland Security, as to where 

we hope that they will go with this to expedite this program. 

But for now, I thank all of you for what you have contributed certainly this morning, and with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(223) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARACK OBAMA 

APRIL 2, 2008 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and for giving us an opportunity to gather more information on the threat of nuclear terrorism. I also appreciate the willingness of the panelists to give their perspectives on this critical national security issue. 

We know Al-Qaeda has made it a goal to acquire a nuclear weapon. If a sophisticated terrorist group obtained the right amount of plutonium or highly enriched 

uranium, it could potentially construct a crude nuclear device that could destroy the 

heart of any major city in the United States. While significant progress has been 

made in securing nuclear materials, there are still large stockpiles that remain vulnerable to theft. In the civilian sector alone, there are an estimated 60 tons of highly enriched uranium, enough to make over 1,000 nuclear bombs, spread out at facilities in over 40 countries around the world. Many of these facilities do not have adequate physical security. 

There have been an alarming number of attempted exchanges of small quantities 

of dangerous nuclear materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

confirmed 16 incidents between 1993 and 2005 that involved trafficking in relatively 

small amounts of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. That is 16 incidents too 

many, in my opinion, and 16 incidents that should not have been allowed to happen. 

And those are just the incidents that we know about. How many cases are there 

that we do not know about? 

It is imperative that we build and lead a truly global effort to secure, consolidate, 

and reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material to prevent 

them from falling into the wrong hands. It is also essential that we make preventing 

nuclear terrorism a top national security priority—with the resources, diplomatic effort and funding to match the threat. 

I traveled to the former Soviet Union with Senator Richard Lugar in 2005 to investigate the dangers posed by unsecured weapons. Building on this experience, 

Senator Lugar and I introduced legislation that was signed into law in January 

2007 to help other nations detect and stop the transfer of weapons of mass destruction. 

Last year, I worked with Senator Chuck Hagel to introduce a broad bill that seeks 

to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, and stop the spread 

of nuclear weapons and related technology. One provision, which was signed into 

law as part of the FY2008 omnibus appropriations bill, requires the President to 

submit to Congress a comprehensive plan for ensuring that all nuclear weapons and 

weapons-usable material at vulnerable sites around the world are secure by 2012 

to keep them out of the hands of terrorists. 

I will continue to push for stronger efforts to secure nuclear stockpiles and look 

forward to working with the committee on a range of initiatives to prevent terrorists 

from acquiring and using a nuclear device against our homeland. 

Thank you. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
224 

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing to continue the Committee’s 

work on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Today we will hear testimony about a 

much-criticized DHS program to deploy advanced radiation-detection technology at 

our ports of entry. 

Detecting nuclear materials at ports of entry—before they enter the stream of 

commerce—must be a high priority. The SAFE Port Act, which I co-authored, enhanced the Federal Government’s ability to detect illicit radiological materials by requiring that all cargo containers be scanned for radiation at the 22 largest U.S. seaports. This mandate covers 98 percent of cargo coming into the United States. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has now completed deployment of the required radiation portal monitors. These first-general portal monitors detect radiation from any type of material in a cargo container and, as a result, are often set 

off by innocent sources of trace radiation such as ceramic tiles or even kitty litter. 

CBP officers then have to resolve the alarms through sometimes time-consuming 

measures. 

To avoid these delays and to be able to react more quickly to potentially dangerous materials, DHS has spent the last few years developing next-generation technology that will determine the type of radiation that is being emitted. If effective, 

this will allow CBP officers to know immediately if a cargo container contains innocent or potentially threatening materials. 

The DHS office responsible for making decisions about the development, testing, 

evaluation, and acquisition of detection equipment is the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). This Office must make well-informed and threat-based investment decisions to meet the challenge of interdicting illicit material at our Nation’s 

borders and within our country. Given our Nation’s significant investment in this 

critical area, DNDO must also serve as a responsible steward of taxpayers’ dollars. 

In the past, DNDO has been criticized for its management of technology-development programs. It has responded to concerns of a disconnect between laboratory 

testing and real-world operational use by engaging CBP in the development and 

testing process. 

DNDO’s technological development efforts support not only CBP screening officers 

at U.S. ports, but CBP officers at 58 foreign seaports, Coast Guard crews on the 

high seas, and local law enforcement cooperating in targeted detection efforts 

around our major cities. Successful development and acquisition of equipment by 

DNDO is vital for nuclear-detection efforts that other DHS components and local 

governments are implementing. 

Our witnesses today can give us valuable insights into the challenges that the 

DNDO and its partners confront—challenges which Congress must examine as we 

consider our Nation’s investments in an effective nuclear-detection architecture. I 

look forward to their testimony. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
225 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.001
226 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.002
227 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.003
228 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.004
229 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.005
230 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.006
231 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.007
232 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.008
233 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.009
234 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.010
235 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.011
236 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.012
237 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.013
238 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.014
239 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.015
240 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.016
241 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.017
242 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.018
243 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.019
244 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.020
245 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.021
246 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.022
247 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.023
248 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.024
249 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.025
250 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.026
251 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.027
252 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.028
253 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.029
254 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.033
255 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.034
256 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.035
257 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.036
258 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.037
259 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.038
260 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.039
261 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.040
262 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.041
263 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.042
264 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.043
265 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.044
266 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.045
267 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.046
268 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.047
269 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.048
270 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.049
271 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.050
272 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.051
273 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.052
274 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.053
275 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.054
276 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.055
277 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.056
278 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.057
279 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.058
280 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.059
281 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.060
282 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.061
283 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.062
284 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.063
285 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.064
286 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.065
287 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.066
288 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.067
289 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.068
290 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.069
291 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.070
292 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.071
293 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.072
294 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.073
295 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.074
296 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.075
297 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.076
298 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.077
299 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.078
300 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.079
301 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.080
302 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.081
303 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.082
304 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.083
305 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.084
306 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.085
307 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.086
308 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.087
309 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.088
310 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.089
311 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.090
312 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.091
313 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.092
314 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.093
315 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.094
316 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.095
317 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.096
318 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.097
319 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.098
320 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.099
321 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.100
322 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.101
323 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.102
324 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.103
325 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.104
326 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.105
327 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.106
328 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.107
329 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.108
330 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.109
331 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.110
332 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.111
333 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.112
334 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.113
335 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.114
336 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.115
337 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.116
338 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.117
339 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.118
340 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.119
341 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.120
342 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.121
343 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.122
344 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.123
345 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.124
346 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.125
347 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.126
348 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.127
349 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.128
350 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.129
351 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.130
352 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.131
353 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.132
354 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.133
355 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.134
356 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.135
357 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.136
358 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.137
359 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.138
360 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.139
361 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.140
362 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.141
363 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.142
364 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.143
365 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.144
366 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.145
367 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.146
368 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.147
369 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.148
370 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.149
371 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.150
372 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.151
373 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.152
374 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.153
375 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.154
376 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.155
377 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.156
378 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.157
379 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.158
380 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.159
381 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.160
382 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.161
383 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.162
384 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.163
385 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.164
386 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.165
387 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.166
388 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.167
389 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.168
390 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.169
391 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.170
392 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.171
393 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.172
394 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.173
395 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.174
396 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.175
397 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.176
398 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.177
399 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.178
400 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.179
401 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.180
402 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.181
403 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.182
404 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.183
405 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.184
406 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.185
407 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.186
408 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.187
409 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.188
410 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.189
411 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.190
412 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.191
413 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.192
414 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.193
415 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.194
416 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.195
417 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.196
418 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.197
419 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.198
420 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.199
421 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.200
422 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.202
423 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.203
424 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.204
425 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.205
426 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.206
427 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.207
428 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.208
429 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.209
430 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.210
431 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.211
432 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.212
433 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.213
434 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.214
435 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.215
436 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.216
437 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.217
438 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.218
439 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.219
440 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.220
441 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.221
442 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.222
443 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.223
444 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.224
445 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.225
446 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.226
447 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.227
448 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.228
449 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.229
450 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.230
451 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.231
452 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.232
453 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.233
454 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.234
455 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.235
456 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.236
457 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.237
458 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.238
459 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.239
460 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.240
461 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.241
462 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.242
463 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.243
464 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.244
465 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.245
466 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.246
467 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.247
468 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.248
469 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.249
470 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.250
471 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.251
472 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.252
473 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.253
474 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.254
475 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.255
476 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.256
477 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.257
478 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.258
479 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.259
480 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.260
481 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.261
482 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.262
483 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.263
484 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.264
485 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.265
486 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.266
487 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.267
488 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.268
489 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.269
490 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.270
491 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.271
492 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.272
493 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.273
494 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.274
495 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.275
496 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.276
497 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.277
498 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.278
499 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.279
500 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.280
501 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.281
502 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.282
503 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.283
504 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.284
505 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.285
506 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.286
507 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.287
508 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.288
509 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.289
510 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.290
511 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.291
512 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.292
513 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.293
514 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.294
515 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.295
516 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.296
517 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.297
518 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.298
519 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.299
520 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.300
521 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.301
522 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.302
523 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.303
524 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.304
525 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.305
526 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.306
527 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.307
528 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.308
529 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.309
530 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.310
531 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.311
532 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.312
533 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.313
534 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.314
535 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.315
536 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.316
537 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.317
538 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.318
539 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.319
540 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.320
541 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.321
542 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.322
543 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.323
544 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.324
545 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.325
546 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.326
547 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.327
548 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.328
549 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.329
550 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.330
551 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.331
552 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.332
553 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.333
554 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.334
555 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.335
556 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.336
557 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.337
558 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.338
559 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.339
560 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.340
561 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.341
562 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.342
563 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.343
564 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.344
565 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.345
566 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.346
567 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.347
568 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.348
569 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.349
570 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.350
571 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.351
572 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.352
573 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.353
574 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.354
575 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.355
576 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.356
577 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.357
578 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.358
579 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.359
580 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.360
581 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.361
582 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.362
583 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.363
584 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.364
585 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.365
586 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.366
587 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.367
588 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.368
589 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.369
590 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.370
591 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.371
592 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.372
593 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.373
594 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.374
595 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.375
596 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.376
597 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.377
598 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.378
599 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.379
600 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.380
601 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.381
602 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.382
603 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.383
604 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.384
605 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.385
606 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.386
607 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.387
608 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.388
609 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.389
610 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.390
611 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.391
612 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.392
613 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.393
614 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.394
615 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.395
616 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.396
617 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.397
618 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.398
619 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.399
620 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.400
621 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.401
622 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.402
623 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.403
624 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.404
625 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.405
626 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.406
627 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.407
628 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.408
629 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.409
630 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.410
631 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.411
632 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.412
633 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.413
634 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.414
635 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.415
636 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.416
637 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.417
638 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.418
639 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.419
640 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.420
641 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.421
642 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.422
643 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.423
644 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.424
645 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.425
646 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.426
647 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.516
648 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.517
649 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.518
650 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.519
651 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.520
652 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.521
653 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.522
654 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.523
655 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.524
656 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.525
657 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.526
658 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.527
659 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.528
660 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.529
661 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.530
662 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.531
663 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.532
664 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.533
665 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.534
666 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.535
667 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.536
668 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.537
669 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.538
670 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.539
671 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.540
672 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.541
673 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.542
674 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.543
675 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.544
676 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.545
677 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.546
678 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.547
679 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.548
680 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.549
681 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.550
682 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.551
683 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.552
684 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.553
685 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.554
686 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.555
687 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.556
688 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.557
689 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.558
690 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.559
691 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.560
692 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.561
693 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.562
694 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.563
695 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.564
696 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.565
697 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.566
698 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.567
699 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.568
700 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.569
701 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.570
702 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.571
703 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.572
704 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.573
705 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.574
706 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.575
707 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.576
708 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.577
709 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.578
710 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.579
711 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.580
712 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.581
713 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.582
714 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.583
715 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.584
716 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.585
717 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.586
718 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.587
719 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.588
720 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.589
721 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.590
722 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.591
723 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.592
724 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.593
725 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.594
726 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.595
727 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.596
728 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.597
729 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.598
730 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.599
731 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.600
732 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.601
733 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.602
734 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.603
735 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.604
736 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.605
737 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.606
738 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.648
739 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.649
740 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.607
741 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.608
742 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.609
743 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.610
744 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.611
745 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.612
746 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.613
747 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.614
748 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.615
749 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.616
750 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.617
751 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.618
752 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.619
753 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.628
754 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.629
755 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.630
756 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.631
757 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.632
758 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.633
759 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.634
760 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.635
761 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.636
762 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.637
763 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.638
764 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.639
765 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.640
766 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.641
767 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.642
768 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.643
769 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.644
770 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.645
771 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.646
772 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.647
773 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.620
774 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.621
775 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.622
776 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.623
777 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.624
778 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.625
779 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.626
780 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.627
781 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.427
782 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.428
783 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.429
784 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.430
785 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.431
786 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.432
787 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.433
788 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.434
789 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.435
790 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.436
791 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.437
792 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.438
793 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.439
794 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.440
795 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.441
796 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.442
797 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.443
798 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.444
799 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.445
800 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.446
801 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.447
802 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.448
803 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.449
804 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.450
805 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.451
806 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.452
807 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.453
808 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.454
809 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.455
810 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.456
811 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.457
812 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.458
813 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.459
814 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.460
815 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.461
816 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.462
817 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.463
818 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.464
819 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.465
820 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.466
821 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.467
822 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.468
823 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.469
824 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.470
825 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.471
826 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.472
827 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.473
828 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.474
829 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.475
830 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.476
831 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.477
832 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.478
833 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.479
834 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.480
835 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.481
836 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.482
837 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.483
838 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.484
839 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.485
840 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.486
841 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.487
842 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.488
843 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.489
844 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.490
845 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.491
846 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.492
847 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.493
848 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.494
849 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.495
850 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.496
851 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.497
852 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.498
853 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.499
854 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.500
855 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.501
856 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.502
857 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.503
858 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.504
859 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.505
860 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.506
861 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.507
862 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.508
863 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.509
864 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.510
865 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.511
866 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.512
867 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.513
868 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.514
869 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.515
870 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.650
871 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.651
872 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.652
873 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.653
874 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.654
875 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.655
876 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.656
877 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.657
878 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.658
879 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.659
880 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.660
881 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.661
882 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.662
883 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.663
884 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.664
885 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.665
886 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.666
887 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.667
888 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.668
889 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.669
890 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.670
891 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.671
892 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.672
893 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.673
894 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.674
895 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.675
896 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.676
897 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.677
898 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.678
899 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.679
900 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.680
901 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.681
902 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.682
903 

Æ 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER41450.683