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57–827 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–571 

CONTRACTING IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY: AN 

EXAMINATION OF THE BLACKWATERPARAVANT CONTRACT AND THE NEED FOR 

OVERSIGHT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

CONTRACTING IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BLACKWATERPARAVANT CONTRACT AND THE NEED FOR OVERSIGHT

FEBRUARY 24, 2010

Page 

Walker, John R., Former Program Manager, Paravant ....................................... 15 

McCracken, Brian C. Former Vice President, Paravant; Current Afghanistan 

Country Manager, Raytheon Technical Services Company .............................. 15 

Wakefield, COL Bradley V., USA (Ret.), Former Chief of Training and Education, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan ........................ 16 

Ograyensek, Steven M., Contracting Officer, U.S. Army Program Executive 

Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation ...................................... 16 

Roitz, Fred, Former Vice President for Contracts and Compliance, 

Blackwater; Current Executive Vice President of Contracts and Chief Sales 

Officer, Xe Services, LLC ..................................................................................... 51 

Blake, Dr. James T., Program Executive Officer and Head of Contracting 

Activity, U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, 

and Instrumentation ............................................................................................ 59 

Tab 1 ......................................................................................................................... 98 

Tab 2 ......................................................................................................................... 99 

Tab 3 ......................................................................................................................... 103 

Tab 4 ......................................................................................................................... 105 

Tab 5 ......................................................................................................................... 108 

Tab 6 ......................................................................................................................... 110 

Tab 7 ......................................................................................................................... 111 

Tab 8 ......................................................................................................................... 115 

Tab 9 ......................................................................................................................... 121 

Tab 10 ....................................................................................................................... 125 

Tab 11 ....................................................................................................................... 129 

Tab 12 ....................................................................................................................... 130 

Tab 13 ....................................................................................................................... 133 

Tab 14 ....................................................................................................................... 134 

Tab 15 ....................................................................................................................... 136 

Tab 16 ....................................................................................................................... 145 

Tab 17 ....................................................................................................................... 151 

Tab 18 ....................................................................................................................... 152 

Tab 19 ....................................................................................................................... 154 

Tab 20 ....................................................................................................................... 155 

Tab 21 ....................................................................................................................... 158 

Tab 22 ....................................................................................................................... 168 

Tab 23 ....................................................................................................................... 170 

Tab 24 ....................................................................................................................... 171 

Tab 25 ....................................................................................................................... 172 

Tab 26 ....................................................................................................................... 174 

Tab 27 ....................................................................................................................... 175 

Tab 28 ....................................................................................................................... 180 

Tab 29 ....................................................................................................................... 181 

Tab 30 ....................................................................................................................... 183 

Tab 31 ....................................................................................................................... 185 

Tab 32 ....................................................................................................................... 187 

(III) 

Page

IV 

Tab 33 ....................................................................................................................... 188 

Tab 34 ....................................................................................................................... 189 

Tab 35 ....................................................................................................................... 196 

Tab 36 ....................................................................................................................... 209 

Tab 37 ....................................................................................................................... 212 

Tab 38 ....................................................................................................................... 217 

(1) 

CONTRACTING IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY: 

AN EXAMINATION OF THE BLACKWATERPARAVANT CONTRACT AND THE NEED FOR 

OVERSIGHT 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Ben Nelson, 

McCaskill, Begich, Burris, McCain, LeMieux, and Burr. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Howard H. Hoege III, counsel; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; John W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; 

and David M. Morriss, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Christine G. Lang, and 

Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Senator Ben 

Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Lindsay Kavanaugh, 

assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian 

Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Kevin Kane, assistant to 

Senator Burr. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

A primary objective of our effort in Afghanistan is to strengthen 

Afghanistan’s government and security forces so they can take the 

lead in securing their nation. The President has ordered the deployment of approximately 30,000 additional U.S. troops to help 

achieve our goals in Afghanistan. While most attention has understandably been focused on those 30,000 troops and their mission, 

insufficient attention has been paid to the more than 100,000 contractor personnel who are operating in Afghanistan. From training 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to guarding our forward 

2 

operating bases, contractor personnel perform mission-critical 

tasks. 

While we distinguish between American servicemembers and 

contractor personnel, Afghan civilians often do not. As John Nagl 

and Richard Fontaine of the Center for New American Security put 

it, ‘‘Local populations draw little or no distinction between American troops and the contractors employed by them; an act committed by one can have the same effect on local or national opinion 

as an act carried out by the other.’’ 

In the fight against the Taliban, the perception of us by the Afghans is crucial. As General McChrystal said in August of last 

year, ‘‘The Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we 

are in a struggle for their support.’’ If we are going to win that 

struggle, we need to know that our contractor personnel are adequately screened, supervised, and held accountable because the Afghan people will hold us responsible for their actions. 

Most contractor personnel act responsibly and within the rules to 

help us execute the mission, often at great risk to their own safety. 

Today’s hearing, however, will examine contract activities which 

fell far short of our requirements. 

In the fall of 2008, the company called Paravant entered into a 

subcontract with Raytheon to perform weapons training for the Afghan National Army (ANA). I emphasize the words weapons training. I am going to use the names Blackwater and Paravant interchangeably, as there is no meaningful distinction between the two. 

According to former Paravant Vice President Brian McCracken, 

who is with us here this morning, Paravant and Blackwater were 

‘‘one and the same.’’ He said Paravant was created in 2008 to avoid 

the ‘‘baggage’’ associated with the Blackwater name. 

It has been widely reported that on May 5, 2009, two men working for Paravant in Afghanistan fired their weapons killing two Afghan civilians. The commanding general for the Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A), then-Major General 

Richard Formica, said that it appeared that the contractor personnel involved in the May 5, 2009, shooting had ‘‘violated alcohol 

consumption policies, were not authorized to possess weapons, violated use of force rules, and violated movement control policies.’’ 

According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the May 5, 2009, 

shooting impacted ‘‘the national security interests of the United 

States.’’ 

One media report said the shooting turned an entire neighborhood against U.S. presence and quoted a local elder saying, ‘‘If they 

keep killing civilians, I’m sure some Afghans will decide to become 

insurgents.’’ 

While the May 5, 2009, incident is widely known, our investigation focused on what has not been adequately looked at, which is 

the environment that led up to that May 5, 2009, incident. That 

environment gave rise to a reckless shooting in December 2008 

that seriously injured a Paravant trainer. Our investigation also 

uncovered significant evidence of Blackwater’s disregard for rules 

governing the acquisition of weapons in Afghanistan and a failed 

personnel vetting process that resulted in weapons being placed in 

the hands of people who should not have been hired. 

3 

This morning, we will also hear about failures in U.S. Government oversight that allowed these problems to fester. 

On December 9, 2008, 5 months before the May 5, 2009, shooting, a Paravant training team working at Camp Darulaman was 

conducting unauthorized activities with AK–47s when, according to 

Paravant Program Manager Johnnie Walker, who is with us here 

this morning, the team leader, on that unauthorized activity, decided to get on the back of a moving vehicle with a loaded AK–47 

and ‘‘ride it like a stagecoach.’’ The vehicle hit a bump and the 

team leader’s AK–47 discharged, shooting another Paravant trainer 

in the head and seriously injuring the man, who then was flown 

to Germany a few days later partially paralyzed. 

The reckless disregard for weapon safety is particularly striking, 

given that Paravant was hired to teach the ANA how to safely use 

their weapons. At the time of the shooting, the men were not engaged in anything relating to the training for which they were 

hired. There were no Afghans present on that training exercise. 

The next day, a report of the shooting, apparently written by Mr. 

Walker, was emailed to Steven Ograyensek, also present, who is a 

contracting officer at the Program Executive Office, Simulation, 

Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI). That office is responsible for several contracts relating to the training of the ANSF. 

The report identified the ‘‘immediate and contributing causes’’ of 

the shooting as ‘‘operating equipment improperly or without authority’’ and ‘‘improper technique.’’ The report also indicated that 

the ‘‘policies, procedures, and plans were not followed,’’ and that 

‘‘safety training was not followed.’’ But it also indicated—and here 

I am quoting from this report—that members of the training team 

at Camp Dubs, which was the nickname for that camp, were ‘‘conducting routine training.’’ In the comment section, the report said 

that ‘‘the accident occurred during a normal training evolution and 

normal range safety procedures were in place at the time of the accident.’’ 

This incident is indicative of an environment at Paravant, with 

Dubs, and that was shown by a senior Blackwater executive, Jim 

Sierawski, who later acknowledged that in that environment there 

was ‘‘no regard for policies, rules, or adherence to regulations in 

country.’’ That is at Tab 2 of the exhibits before us. 

The report written by Mr. McCracken is at Tab 4. 

The report sent to PEO STRI, and the contracting office there, 

failed to set off alarm bells or even produce a response. In fact, 

PEO STRI only became aware of this report in an October 2009 

meeting with our staff. If the incident had been properly investigated, it would have become obvious that Paravant personnel 

were using weapons in a reckless manner, with inadequate supervision, and carrying weapons they were not authorized to carry. If 

corrective actions had been taken in December 2008, the May 2009 

shooting possibly could have been avoided. 

Now, where did Blackwater get the AK–47s? One of our most important missions in Afghanistan is training and equipping the 

ANSF so that they can take the lead in securing their own country. 

The Afghan National Police (ANP) store weapons and ammunition 

at a depot called Bunker 22, a U.S.-operated facility near Kabul. 

A November 19, 2009, letter from Central Command (CENTCOM) 

4 

Commander David Petraeus, states, ‘‘There is no current or past 

policy, order, directive, or instruction that allows U.S. military contractors or subcontractors in Afghanistan to use weapons stored at 

22 Bunkers’’ [Tab 8]. Again, those weapons were for the Afghan 

National Police (ANP). 

Despite having no authority to do so, Blackwater acquired AK– 

47s from Bunker 22 to arm its personnel and distributed them to 

personnel among various Blackwater operations in Afghanistan 

[Tab 15]. In total, Blackwater acquired several hundred weapons 

from Bunker 22, including more than 500 AK–47s. 

J.D. Stratton, Blackwater’s armorer, and Ricky Chambers, 

Blackwater’s Afghanistan country manager, were both involved in 

the acquisition of weapons from Bunker 22. Both men have refused 

to appear voluntarily this morning and have said to us through 

their attorneys that they would invoke the Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination if we subpoenaed them [Tabs 34 and 35]. 

Now, who are the personnel that Blackwater entrusted the weapons to? The company’s proposal said that Blackwater had a ‘‘robust 

recruiting and rigorous screening process’’ to identify and vet the 

most qualified candidates and carefully check them for ‘‘character, 

integrity, reliability, and professionalism.’’ 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

Chairman LEVIN. The records of Christopher Drotleff and Justin 

Cannon, who are the two Paravant personnel who have been indicted for the May 5, 2009, shooting, show that the company fell 

far short of that or any reasonable standard for vetting personnel. 

A recent court order said that Mr. Drotleff’s military record included assault, insubordinate conduct, absence without leave, larceny, and wrongful appropriation. Mr. Drotleff’s criminal record, 

after his discharge from the military, included convictions for assault, battery, resisting arrest, and drunk driving. In ordering that 

Mr. Drotleff be detained pending his trial, that court referenced his 

‘‘extensive criminal history’’ and ‘‘propensity for violence.’’ 

A January 15, 2010, Associated Press report noted that Justin 

Cannon, who is the other man indicted for the May 2009 shooting, 

was discharged from the U.S. military after he was absent without 

leave and tested positive for cocaine. 

Back in September 2006, Blackwater fired another Paravant 

trainer, Sebastian Kucharski, and placed him on its own ‘‘do not 

use’’ list for an alcohol-fueled incident that ended in a fight with 

another contractor [Tab 18]. Blackwater’s own computer records 

state do not hire this man, do not use Mr. Kucharski. Despite that, 

Mr. Kucharski was hired by Paravant in 2008 and worked for the 

company in Afghanistan until he was fired again in May 2009 for 

another altercation, this time with a military person. 

After the May 2009 shooting incident, Raytheon issued a showcause notice to Paravant for, among other things, failing to exercise 

‘‘sufficient command, control, and oversight of its personnel’’ [Tab 

20]. Paravant’s response stated that ‘‘if [Raytheon] believes that 

Paravant has an obligation to supervise all subcontractor personnel 

at all times . . . Paravant will need to submit a request for equitable 

adjustment for the additional personnel, security, and other costs 

5 

of providing such 24/7 supervision throughout Afghanistan’’ [Tab 

21]. Now, I believe the company’s attempt to absolve itself of responsibility for supervising its own personnel is flat-out unacceptable. 

Government oversight was also lacking. Army contracting personnel at PEO STRI said that one way they monitored the contractor’s performance was from their office in Florida, and that was by 

checking in with Colonel Wakefield at CSTC–A in Kabul. However, 

Colonel Wakefield, who is also with us this morning, told the committee that Task Force (TF) Phoenix, a subordinate command, had 

oversight responsibility. Even after the May 2009 incident, a review of policies at Camp Alamo uncovered continuing ‘‘uncertainty’’ 

as to what ‘‘authorities and responsibilities are over contractors,’’ 

including ‘‘disciplinary issues’’ [Tab 25]. 

In a November 2009 memo on the mission in Afghanistan, General McChrystal said that ‘‘the people are the prize’’ and that 

‘‘every interaction with the population, whether positive or negative, influences the Afghans’ perception.’’ 

The contractors hired to support our mission must understand 

the need to act accordingly and be held accountable. The support 

of individuals and communities all over Afghanistan are at stake. 

Irresponsible acts by contractor personnel can hurt the mission and 

put our troops in harm’s way. 

The examination that we have conducted of Blackwater-Paravant 

operations revealed multiple irresponsible acts and troubling gaps 

in government oversight. There are over 100,000 Department of 

Defense (DOD) contractor personnel operating in Afghanistan. If 

we fail to make sure that contractors like Blackwater play by the 

rules and live up to their commitments, we will be doing a disservice to our troops by making their already difficult and dangerous job even more so. 

As to Blackwater-Paravant: Their personnel engaged in a reckless use of weapons. They violated the command’s rules regarding 

obtaining and carrying weapons. Their vetting of personnel was not 

only sloppy, but also dangerous. 

The Army had inadequate oversight of the Paravant contract and 

their operations. Had the contracting officer of the Army stepped 

in back in December 2008, when the first reckless shooting occurred, the May 2009 incident, which DOJ prosecutors have said 

negatively impacted our national security interests, could possibly 

have been avoided. 

Now, in addition to these remarks, I’m going to be putting the 

lengthy statement, which I have written, in the record, along with 

supporting materials. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

President Obama has said that a primary objective of our effort in Afghanistan 

is to strengthen Afghanistan’s government and security forces so that they can take 

the lead in securing their nation. The President has ordered the deployment of approximately 30,000 additional U.S. troops to help achieve our goals in Afghanistan. 

While most attention has understandably been focused on those 30,000 troops, attention also needs to be paid to the thousands of contractor personnel who are operating in Afghanistan. From training Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 

guarding our forward operating bases, contractor personnel are performing missioncritical tasks. According to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in the last quarter 

6 

of fiscal year 2009 alone, the number of Department of Defense (DOD) contractor 

personnel increased by 30,000, bringing the total number in Afghanistan to more 

than 100,000. 

While we distinguish between American servicemembers and contractor personnel, Afghan civilians often do not. As John Nagl and Richard Fontaine of the 

Center for New American Security put it: ‘‘local populations draw little or no distinction between American troops and the contractors employed by them; an act committed by one can have the same effect on local or national opinion as an act carried 

out by the other.’’ 

In the fight against the Taliban, the perception of Afghans is crucial. As General 

Stanley McChrystal said in August of last year ‘‘the Afghan people will decide who 

wins this fight, and we . . . are in a struggle for their support.’’ If we are going to 

win that struggle, we need to know that our contractor personnel are adequately 

screened, supervised, and held accountable—because in the end the Afghan people 

will hold us responsible for their actions. 

Most contractor personnel act responsibly and within the rules to help us execute 

the mission, often at great risk to their own safety. Today’s hearing, however, will 

explore contract activities which fell far short of our requirements. 

In the fall of 2008, a company called Paravant entered into a subcontract with 

Raytheon Technical Services Company to perform weapons training for the Afghan 

National Army (ANA). The statement of work governing Paravant’s performance 

was developed by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC– 

A) and contracted out by the U.S. Army’s Program Executive Office Simulation 

Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) to Raytheon. 

Paravant was created in 2008 by Erik Prince Investments (the company which is 

now named Xe). I’m going to use the names ‘‘Blackwater’’ and ‘‘Paravant’’ interchangeably. I do that for clarity as there is no meaningful distinction between the 

two. At the time Paravant was awarded its one and only subcontract, it had no employees. In Afghanistan, the company operated under Blackwater’s license and 

shared a bank account with Blackwater. Former Paravant Vice President Brian 

McCracken reported to Blackwater personnel. According to Mr. McCracken, 

Raytheon paid Blackwater for services rendered by Paravant and Paravant relied 

on Blackwater for its billing. Paravant and Blackwater were ‘‘one and the same,’’ 

according to Mr. McCracken, and he added, Paravant was only created to avoid the 

‘‘baggage’’ associated with the Blackwater name. 

It has been widely reported that on May 5, 2009, Justin Cannon and Christopher 

Drotleff, two men working for Paravant in Afghanistan, fired their weapons, killing 

two Afghan civilians and injuring a third. In reviewing the Army’s investigation of 

the incident, then-CSTC–A Commanding General Richard Formica said that it appeared that the contractor personnel involved had ‘‘violated alcohol consumption 

policies, were not authorized to possess weapons, violated use of force rules, and violated movement control policies’’ [Tab 1]. According to the Department of Justice 

prosecutors, the May 5, 2009 shooting ‘‘caused diplomatic difficulties for U.S. State 

Department representatives in Afghanistan’’ and impacted ‘‘the national security interests of the United States.’’ According to one media report, the shooting ‘‘turned 

an entire neighborhood against the U.S. presence’’ and quoted a local elder as saying, ‘‘if they keep killing civilians, I’m sure some Afghans will decide to become insurgents.’’ 

On January 6, 2010, Mr. Cannon and Mr. Drotleff were indicted on firearm and 

homicide charges for their involvement in the May 5th shooting. Responsibility for 

litigating those charges is with the Department of Justice. Today’s hearing will 

focus on Blackwater-Paravant’s conduct and operations in Afghanistan. As acknowledged by a Blackwater senior executive after the May 5th shooting, an environment 

was created at Paravant which had ‘‘no regard for policies, rules, or adherence to 

regulations in country’’ [Tab 2]. 

Our investigation dug into the events that occurred before the May 5th shooting. 

We will hear how that environment developed and also discuss failures in U.S. Government oversight that allowed it to persist. In particular, we will hear about 

Blackwater personnel’s reckless use of weapons, its disregard for the rules governing the acquisition of weapons in Afghanistan, and failures in the company’s vetting process that resulted in those weapons being placed in the hands of people who 

never should have possessed them. 

SHOOTING INCIDENT IN DECEMBER 2008

Five months before the May 5, 2009 shooting, there was another tragic shooting 

involving Paravant personnel. The shooting took place on December 9, 2008 at the 

range at Camp Darulaman during totally unauthorized activities. 

7 

Paravant Program Manager Johnnie Walker told committee staff that on December 9, 2008, the Paravant training team working at Camp Darulaman decided that 

it was ‘‘going to learn how to shoot’’ from a vehicle when, in what Walker described 

as a ‘‘wild idea,’’ the training team leader decided to get on the back of a moving 

car with a loaded AK–47 and ‘‘ride it like a stagecoach.’’ The vehicle subsequently 

hit a bump, causing the team leader’s AK–47 to discharge, seriously injuring one 

of the Paravant trainers on his team. The reckless disregard for weapons safety is 

particularly striking given that he and his team were hired for the specific purpose 

of teaching the ANA how to safely use their weapons. 

In a memo to then-Paravant’s Vice President Brian McCracken on December 10, 

2008, Walker said ‘‘everyone on the team showed poor judgment’’ by allowing the 

unauthorized activities and ‘‘should share some fault in the incident’’ [Tab 3]. While 

Russell Cannon, the team leader who shot his colleague was fired, the entire team 

was not fired despite their ‘‘fault in the incident.’’ 

On the same day the shooting occurred, Paravant reported the incident to 

Raytheon, which in turn filed a report in a system used by the Army’s PEO STRI 

to monitor the Raytheon contract. The report identified the ‘‘immediate and contributing causes’’ of the shooting as: ‘‘Operating equipment improperly or without authority’’ and ‘‘improper technique.’’ The report also indicated that ‘‘policies/procedures/plans were not followed,’’ and that ‘‘safety training [was] not followed’’ [Tab 

4]. The same report was emailed to Steven Ograyensek, the contracting officer with 

responsibility for the Raytheon contract at PEO STRI, on December 10, 2008. 

Paravant Program Manager Johnnie Walker also spoke to Colonel Wakefield, the 

Chief of Training and Education for the ANSF at CSTC–A, about the incident. 

The report showing the reckless use of an unauthorized weapon failed to set off 

alarm bells at PEO STRI. In fact, PEO STRI apparently only learned that they had 

been sent Paravant’s report of the shooting when asked about it by committee staff 

in an October 19, 2009 meeting. Colonel Wakefield has also said that Paravant personnel should not have been carrying weapons, but there is no indication that 

CSTC–A investigated the shooting. 

If the shooting had been investigated, PEO STRI would have seen that Paravant 

personnel were using weapons improperly and unsafely, with inadequate supervision, and that they were carrying weapons that they weren’t even supposed to 

have. If corrective actions had been taken in December, the May 2009 shooting 

could have been avoided. 

DISREGARD FOR RULES ON WEAPONS

Blackwater operated in Afghanistan without sufficient oversight or supervision 

and with almost no consideration of the rules it was legally obligated to follow. The 

means by which Blackwater acquired weapons for its contractor personnel in Afghanistan showed just how little regard company personnel had for those rules. 

Just 2 days before the December 9, 2008 shooting in which a Paravant team leader recklessly discharged his AK–47, Blackwater had distributed AK–47s to Paravant 

personnel who weren’t authorized to have them. 

Blackwater initially furnished Paravant personnel with pistols diverted from 

Blackwater’s contract with Lockheed Martin. According to emails, the weapons belonged ‘‘to a title 10 contract not associated with Paravant’’ [Tab 5]. Documents suggest that Blackwater senior managers knew that diverting the weapons from that 

other subcontract to the Raytheon subcontract was unauthorized. On top of that, 

Blackwater personnel distributed the pistols knowing they did not even have authority to carry those weapons. A November 6, 2008 email from Paravant Vice 

President Brian McCracken states: ‘‘I got sidearms for everyone. . . We have not yet 

received formal permission from the Army to carry weapons yet but I will take my 

chances’’ [Tab 6]. 

In November 2008, Ricky Chambers, Blackwater’s Afghanistan country manager 

told Paravant that they had to return the weapons to Blackwater’s weapons storage 

facility apparently because the company was ‘‘expecting an investigation into 

Blackwater accountability in Iraq resulting from a lawsuit, and fear[ed] it will impact Blackwater accountability procedures in Afghanistan’’ [Tab 5.] Emails show 

that Blackwater personnel considered seeking CSTC–A Colonel Bradley Wakefield’s 

approval to use weapons from the separate Lockheed subcontract (Blackwater) on 

the Raytheon subcontract (Blackwater-Paravant). At the time, Colonel Wakefield 

was the Chief of Training and Education for the ANSF at CSTC–A and had written 

the statement of work for the Paravant contract. Ricky Chambers advised against 

consulting Colonel Wakefield about transferring the weapons noting that he ‘‘may 

ask too many questions’’ [Tab 7]. 

8 

Instead, Chambers suggested getting the weapons from a place called ‘‘Bunker 

22.’’ He again advised, however, against consulting Colonel Wakefield. Mr. Chambers declined the committee’s request to be interviewed or to appear at this hearing. 

He formally notified the committee through his attorney that he would invoke his 

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 

According to documents and interviews with staff, Jeff Gibson, Blackwater’s Vice 

President for International Training and Operations, Brian McCracken, the Vice 

President in charge of Paravant, and Johnnie Walker, Paravant’s Program Manager 

in Afghanistan, all reportedly agreed to try to obtain weapons from Bunker 22. 

BUNKER 22

One of our most important missions in Afghanistan is training and equipping the 

ANSF so they can take the lead in securing their own country. Bunker 22, or 22 

Bunkers as it’s referred to by the military, is a U.S. operated facility in Pol-e Charki 

near Kabul, Afghanistan that stores weapons and ammunition for use by the Afghan National Police (ANP). According to a November 19, 2009, letter from 

CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, ‘‘there is no current or past written policy, order, directive, or instruction that allows U.S. military contractors or 

subcontractors in Afghanistan to use weapons stored at 22 Bunkers’’ [Tab 8]. The 

weapons at 22 Bunkers are there for the mission-critical purpose of arming the 

ANP, not to arm contractors. Diverting weapons intended for the ANP exacerbates 

a problem of lack of resources and equipment for the ANP, which General 

McChrystal has spoken of recently. 

According to a lawyer for Blackwater, however, the company acquired weapons 

from Bunker 22 for use by each of its training, security, and aviation companies in 

Afghanistan. In fact, by November 2008 when Ricky Chambers suggested the company acquire weapons for Paravant from Bunker 22, Blackwater personnel had previously acquired several hundred weapons, including more than 500 AK–47s, from 

the facility on multiple occasions. 

In a January 14, 2010 letter to the committee, a lawyer for Blackwater described 

two of those occasions [Tab 9]. According to the company, J.D. Stratton, thenBlackwater’s armorer in Afghanistan, ‘‘encountered his friend and former Navy colleague Greg Sailer at Bunker 22’’ and subsequently asked Chief Warrant Officer 

Sailer, a U.S. mentor at the facility, to provide Blackwater with weapons from 

Bunker 22. Blackwater informed the committee that Mr. Stratton sought the weapons from Chief Warrant Officer Sailer after Mr. Chambers, the Company’s Country 

Manager, asked him to do so. According to the letter from Blackwater, Chambers 

made the request because he intended on arming contractor personnel with those 

weapons. 

Mr. Stratton declined to be interviewed by committee staff, stating through his 

attorney that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 

if subpoenaed. Mr. Stratton’s lawyer also advised the committee that Stratton would 

invoke his Fifth Amendment right if subpoenaed to testify at today’s hearing. 

According to Blackwater’s January 14, 2010 letter to the committee, in December 

2007, Stratton went to Bunker 22, where Chief Warrant Officer Sailer met him outside the facility with 6 crates containing a total of approximately 150 AK–47s. According to their letter, ‘‘no paperwork or receipts were completed to document the 

transfer of weapons’’ [Tab 9]. 

In January 2008, according to the same Blackwater letter, Stratton and others retrieved another approximately 150 to 175 AK–47s from Bunker 22. The company 

said that, as with their December acquisition, no documentation was completed to 

take custody of the weapons. 

Chief Warrant Officer Sailer spoke with committee staff by video teleconference 

from Kabul on December 12, 2009, prior to the committee’s receipt of Blackwater’s 

letter. In his interview, Chief Warrant Officer Sailer acknowledged transferring 

weapons to Blackwater, although he did not recall specific instances. In his interview, Sailer said that he thought the weapons he provided were to be transferred 

to the ANP for their use—not for Blackwater personnel. According to Sailer, in his 

interview, neither Stratton nor any other Blackwater representative told him that 

Blackwater intended to use the Bunker 22 weapons to arm its own personnel. He 

subsequently added, in response to written questions, that he did ‘‘not recall ever 

having a conversation with anyone picking up weapons from 22 Bunkers regarding 

the intended use of the weapons’’ [Tab 16]. Chief Warrant Officer Sailer said it 

would be inappropriate for Blackwater personnel to use weapons acquired from 

Bunker 22 for themselves. Committee staff sought to speak with Sailer again after 

receiving Blackwater’s January 14, 2010 letter. Chief Warrant Officer Sailer is currently deployed to Afghanistan. 

9 

DOD was unable to find any paperwork documenting either the December 2007 

or January 2008 transfers of weapons from Bunker 22 to Blackwater. DOD did, 

however, provide hand receipts indicating that 211 AK–47s were issued by Chief 

Warrant Officer Sailer to Blackwater’s Counternarcotics Training Unit (CNTU), an 

ANP program, on September 20, 2008 [Tab 10]. While paperwork indicated that the 

weapons were drawn by a representative of Blackwater’s CNTU program, a December 7, 2008 Blackwater memo indicates that some of those weapons were subsequently issued by Blackwater to Paravant [Tab 11]. Blackwater’s then-Vice President for International Training and Operations, Jeff Gibson, told the committee that 

with his approval, the Blackwater staff used Bunker 22 weapons as a source of 

weapons on the Paravant contract. In total, CSTC–A has told the committee that 

out of 154 AK–47s and pistols shown on Blackwater-Paravant weapons inventories, 

nearly 100 of those weapons were drawn from Bunker 22 [Tab 10]. 

In his November 19, 2009, letter to the committee, General Petraeus said since 

January 2008, ANP logistics officers are ‘‘required to personally sign for any weapons issued to the ANP.’’ So, by September 2008 when Chief Sailer signed over more 

than 200 AK–47s to Blackwater, a transfer of weapons from Bunker 22 to a contractor for any purpose would not have been permitted. It is not even clear who took 

custody of the weapons in September 2008. Receipts show that the guns were issued 

to an ‘‘Eric Cartman’’ or ‘‘Carjman’’ from ‘‘BW CNTU’’—shorthand for Blackwater, 

Counter Narcotics Training Unit [Tab 10]. In a February 4, 2010 letter to the committee, a lawyer for Blackwater said it has no records of a person named Eric 

Cartman or Carjman having ever been employed by the company [Tab 14]. 

Paravant’s Program Manager Johnnie Walker said that initially Stratton provided 

him with two crates of weapons from Bunker 22, which Walker then distributed to 

Paravant personnel. According to Walker, the first stop for each new Paravant hire 

that arrived in theater was to his office to pick up an AK–47. Paravant personnel 

kept their weapons from Bunker 22 until after the May 5, 2009 shooting incident, 

when Paravant was directed by the Army, Raytheon, and its own management to 

collect all weapons issued to the contractor personnel. 

Records show that Blackwater’s armorer, JD Stratton, returned 71 ‘‘unserviceable’’ AK–47s to Bunker 22 on June 2, 2009 [Tab 12]. In a June 3, 2009, letter to 

Raytheon, Paravant’s new Director, Hugh Middleton, claimed that ‘‘all AK–47s previously issued to Paravant were returned to the ‘Bunker 22’ facility from which they 

came’’ [Tab 13]. As recently as February 20, 2010, a Blackwater lawyer maintained 

in a letter to the committee, that the company had ‘‘return[ed] all Bunker 22 firearms that had been issued to Paravant personnel’’ [Tab 15]. 

But records obtained by the committee prove the company’s statements to be 

false. The committee tracked an example of how one AK–47 made its way from 

Bunker 22 to Blackwater. That AK–47 was not returned to the Afghan Government 

until January 25, 2010, after committee staff began inquiring about the status of 

those weapons, and more than 7 months after the company represented that it had 

turned in all such weapons [Tab 33]. 

The AK–47, serial number 18010491, was assigned to Paravant Deputy Program 

Manager Jose Trevino. Pictures provided to the committee show him with one of the 

crates of AK–47s from Bunker 22. Documents from CSTC–A and Blackwater show 

that Trevino’s weapon was among the 211 AK–47s signed out from Bunker 22 in 

September 2008 by the Blackwater CNTU by an ‘‘Eric Cartman’’ or ‘‘Carjman.’’ A 

December 7, 2008, memo shows that the AK–47 was issued by Blackwater’s armorer 

JD Stratton, to Paravant’s Program Manager Johnnie Walker [Tab 11]. A March 1, 

2009 inventory of Paravant weapons indicates that the AK–47 was assigned to 

Trevino [Tab 17]. An inventory provided by Blackwater just this week shows that 

it was not returned to the Afghan Government until January 25, 2010. Again, the 

company first represented that it had returned all such weapons on June 3, 2009 

[Tab 15]. 

Committee staff has repeatedly asked for information and records on the hundreds of other weapons obtained by Blackwater from Bunker 22 as well as the pistols Blackwater diverted to Paravant from its other subcontract. In a letter to the 

committee on February 20, 2010, an attorney representing Blackwater reported that 

390 weapons were turned in less than 1 month ago, on January 25, 2010. The 

Blackwater letter also reported that beginning ‘‘in or around January 2010 the Company explored arrangements for the remaining Bunker 22 firearms in its possession 

. . . to be demilitarized’’ or destroyed, which the company said it did in February. 

A Blackwater representative visited CSTC–A on February 18—just last week—to inquire about returning additional weapons the company had acquired from Bunker 

22. Again, this comes after repeated inquiries by committee staff to Blackwater 

about the weapons it acquired from Bunker 22, and after the representation that 

all such weapons used by Paravant had been turned in. These are weapons that beVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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longed to the ANP—not Blackwater. It is only on the eve of this hearing that the 

company is giving the majority of them back to the Afghan Government. 

PERSONNEL

Who were these people Blackwater gave weapons to? Blackwater’s proposal for its 

contract describes a robust recruitment process which allows the company to ‘‘identify and vet’’ the most ‘‘qualified candidates,’’ whose key attributes are ‘‘character, 

integrity, reliability, and professionalism.’’ Paravant’s contract with Raytheon required that the company ‘‘ensure that its personnel . . . behave at all times in accordance with the highest professional and ethical standards.’’ [Information retained in 

committee files.] So what do we know about the individuals that were actually hired 

for the Paravant contract? 

The records of Christopher Drotleff and Justin Cannon, the two Paravant personnel indicted for the May 5, 2009 shooting, show that in these cases the company 

fell well short of any reasonable standard for vetting personnel, let alone the one 

promised in their proposal. A court order directing that Mr. Drotleff be detained 

during trial concluded that his military record was ‘‘abysmal.’’ That record apparently included assault, insubordinate conduct, absence without leave, failure to obey 

order or regulation, larceny and wrongful appropriation. Drotleff’s criminal record 

after his discharge from the military included convictions for reckless driving, disturbing the peace, assault and battery, driving while intoxicated, resisting arrest, 

and trespassing. In ordering that Drotleff be detained during his ongoing trial, the 

court explicitly referenced his ‘‘extensive criminal history’’ and ‘‘propensity for violence.’’ 

Public reports reveal red flags in the military record of Paravant contractor Justin 

Cannon, who was also indicted for the May 5, 2009 shooting. A January 15, 2010 

Associated Press report noted that Cannon was discharged from the U.S. military 

after he was absent without leave for 22 days and tested positive for cocaine. While 

the proposal for the Paravant contract—which was signed by Vice President for 

Contracts and Compliance Mr. Fred Roitz—stated that the company maintained a 

copy of the military service records of each of its independent contractors, the company has informed the committee that it does not have those records for Cannon 

or Drotleff in their files. 

Another example is Sebastian Kucharski, a Paravant assistant Team Leader. Mr. 

Kucharski was fired from Blackwater’s security contract in Iraq for an alcohol-fueled 

incident that ended in a fight between him and another contractor. He had been 

on Blackwater’s own internal ‘‘Do Not Use’’ list since September 2006. Despite being 

on the list, he was hired for Paravant, where he worked until being fired for yet 

another altercation, this time with military personnel on May 4, 2009 [Tab 18]. Karl 

Newman, the Team Leader for the Paravant personnel based at Camp Alamo—including Cannon, Drotleff, and Kucharski—was also ‘‘thrown off the contract by the 

U.S. Army’’ when he was fired after attempting to pull rank on an U.S. Army lieutenant. Paravant’s own Project Manager in Afghanistan, Johnnie Walker, was characterized by company management as having been ‘‘exceptionally ineffective’’ before 

the May 5th shooting incident, but was fired for ‘‘violating General Order 1, no 

drinking’’ and ‘‘doing so repetitively, cultivat[ing] an environment that indirectly 

lead to’’ the May 5, 2009 shooting incident [Tab 19]. 

During the course of the year-long contract, other Paravant personnel were fired 

for ‘‘unprofessionalism,’’ ‘‘alcohol use,’’ and drug use, including one Paravant contractor observed ‘‘with a canvas pack of steroids and needles,’’ and another who was 

fired several weeks after being stopped at the airport with steroids. Still others were 

cited for ‘‘attitude problem[s],’’ ‘‘failure to comply with policy,’’ and storing ‘‘an illegally purchased vehicle on [a Forward Operating Base].’’ 

LACK OF SUPERVISION AND OVERSIGHT

After the May 2009 shooting incident, Raytheon issued a show cause notice to 

Paravant for, among other things, a failure to exercise ‘‘sufficient command, control, 

and oversight of its personnel’’ [Tab 20]. Paravant’s response to the Raytheon letter 

is deeply troubling. According to Paravant, ‘‘If [Raytheon] believes that Paravant 

has an obligation to supervise all subcontractor personnel at all times . . . Paravant 

will need to submit a request for equitable adjustment for the additional personnel, 

security, and other costs of providing such ‘24–7’ supervision throughout Afghanistan’’ [Tab 21]. The company’s attempt to absolve itself of responsibility to supervise 

the actions of its personnel is particularly troubling given the statement by a 

Blackwater senior manager that the company’s leadership in Afghanistan had created an environment ‘‘with no regard for policies, rules, or adherence to regulations 

in country’’ and the company’s contractual obligation to see to it that its personnel 

11 

‘‘behave[d] at all times in accordance with the highest professional and ethical 

standards.’’ 

While it was shirking its responsibility to oversee its contractors, Blackwater was 

also apparently shortchanging Uncle Sam. Despite the compelling evidence that 

Paravant ‘‘independent contractors’’ were actually company employees, Blackwater 

withheld no income taxes and paid no Social Security, Medicare, or unemployment 

tax for them. Blackwater’s longstanding effort to use the independent contractor 

designation to gain government business while avoiding payment of taxes was described in a March 10, 2008 memo from then-chairman of the committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Henry Waxman. The company’s classification of 

independent contractors is also currently pending before an Internal Revenue Service administrative proceeding. 

U.S. Government oversight was also lacking in the events leading up to the May 

5th shooting, a fact acknowledged by CSTC–A Commanding General Richard Formica, who said that the Army’s investigation into the May 2009 incident ‘‘raised serious issues concerning an apparent lack of contractor oversight’’ [Tab 1]. 

Before the May 5th shooting, the Army’s PEO STRI, which has responsibility for more than $3 billion annually in training and other contracts, did not have a contracting officer representative in theater, as they do now, and told the committee 

that they relied on a Dutch officer to act as a Technical Officer Representative to 

oversee the contract. Colonel Wakefield, however, told the committee that a Dutch 

officer worked on his staff at CSTC–A, but that he had ‘‘no idea’’ how someone could 

have thought that the officer was overseeing the contract. Colonel Wakefield said 

that he knew of no one on CSTC–A staff that was supposed to oversee this particular contract. 

PEO STRI staff also said that they monitored the contractors’ performance from 

their office in Florida by calling and checking in with Colonel Wakefield at CSTC– 

A CJ7. Colonel Wakefield informed the committee that Task Force Phoenix, a subordinate command had oversight responsibility and he did not travel to the training 

sites to observe Paravant personnel. 

On the ground, the subordinate commands seemed unclear as to their authorities 

or responsibilities. A commander of another subordinate command—Lieutenant 

Colonel Brian Redmon, the Combined Training Advisory Group (CTAG) Commander 

of the Kabul Military Training Center at Camp Alamo—said he believed that the 

Paravant personnel at Camp Alamo reported to CSTC–A CJ7. In a February 12, 

2009, email to his superiors, Lieutenant Colonel Redmon sought, without success, 

to clarify his responsibility for contractor personnel living at Camp Alamo that he 

said did not report to him [Tab 23]. 

Emails from late April 2009 show that approximately 6 months into the contract, 

there was still confusion about oversight of Paravant personnel. When issues arose 

about a shortage of contractor personnel performing at one training site and concerns were raised as to whether they were performing up to U.S. Army standards, 

the Chief of the Afghan National Army Training and Education (CJ7) at CSTC–A 

said that Brian McCracken, who had recently moved from Paravant to Raytheon, 

would be responsible for monitoring Paravant and would be coordinating oversight 

of the contracts. Until his arrival in Afghanistan in late April 2009, no one from 

Raytheon had been stationed in country to monitor Paravant, apparently resulting 

in months of inadequate supervision. But even if Raytheon had provided proper supervision, contractors monitoring contractors does not take the place of government 

oversight. 

Following the May 5th incident, a review of policies at Camp Alamo uncovered 

continuing ‘‘uncertainty’’ as to what the ‘‘authorities and responsibilities are over 

contractors,’’ particularly for disciplinary issues. Brigadier Neil Baverstock, GBR, 

the CTAG Commander, said in a July 6, 2009, letter to Major General Formica that 

he was concerned that ‘‘grey areas remain relating to wider issues of responsibility 

and authority when it comes to policing contractor behavior.’’ In that letter, Brigadier Baverstock called for ‘‘explicit guidance from CSTC–A on this issue’’ [Tab 25]. 

The carrying of weapons by the Paravant personnel exemplifies the lack of government oversight. The only way in which contract personnel are authorized to 

carry weapons in Afghanistan is by obtaining that authority from CENTCOM. Gaining CENTCOM weapons authority is not just some technical requirement. It’s there 

for an important reason. Commanders need to know when and where armed personnel are operating in their battlespace. DOD arming requirements contained in 

Paravant’s contract required their armed personnel to file a communication plan 

that spells out how they will coordinate movement with military authorities and request assistance in the event they are attacked. When incidents happen—and they 

inevitably do in war zone—it is our troops who are often sent into the fight. Failing 

to follow and enforce the rules relative to carrying weapons puts our military perVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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sonnel at risk. In Paravant’s case, company personnel carried weapons without 

CENTCOM authority. Unfortunately, those in a position to exercise oversight—and 

who either knew or should have known that weapons were being carried without 

authority—did not act until after two tragic shooting incidents. 

On December 3, 2008, before even the first shooting incident, Raytheon notified 

staff responsible for their contract oversight at the PEO STRI by email that 

Paravant personnel were carrying weapons without authority [Tab 26]. Raytheon 

asked PEO STRI to check into this issue because Paravant personnel were ‘‘routinely getting stopped and having to surrender weapons.’’ Despite the email notice, 

PEO STRI apparently failed to take action to prevent Paravant personnel from carrying weapons until they met CENTCOM rules and authority was granted. 

In fact, in an email sent in early January 2009, PEO STRI asked Colonel Wakefield if Paravant personnel were ‘‘authorized to carry a weapon 24/7 or is it during 

the workday only.’’ Colonel Wakefield replied that the Paravant personnel did ‘‘not 

have CENTCOM/[Headquarters, Department of the Army] approval’’ to carry weapons [Tab 27]. PEO STRI subsequently informed Raytheon that they could not authorize weapons until they received approval from CENTCOM, but again they apparently did not tell Raytheon to take steps so their subcontractor-Paravant’s personnel did not carry weapons until that approval was received. 

In Afghanistan, military personnel regularly saw Paravant personnel carrying 

weapons. Colonel Wakefield told the committee that he observed Paravant Program 

Manager Johnnie Walker and Deputy Jose Trevino at Camp Phoenix with a team 

of Paravant contractors carrying weapons. Although his account is disputed by 

Johnnie Walker, Colonel Wakefield told the committee that he advised Walker and 

Trevino that ‘‘Paravant personnel were not authorized to have weapons’’ without 

CENTCOM approval and ‘‘instructed [them] to ensure that the weapons were secured and not issued until [the CENTCOM Commander’s] approval was obtained.’’ 

Approximately a week later, Colonel Wakefield said he was advised by Colonel 

Mark Heffner that he had observed Paravant personnel carrying weapons. Colonel 

Wakefield told committee staff he again told Walker to secure the weapons and had 

no reason to doubt at that time that Walker would do so. 

Until the May 2009 shooting, few other attempts were apparently made to enforce 

the policy requiring CENTCOM approval. The Commanding General at Camp 

Alamo, Lieutenant Colonel Redmon told the committee that he ‘‘observe[d] Paravant 

contractors carrying weapons when not conducting training activities.’’ Lieutenant 

Colonel Sean Nikkila, a senior operations officer responsible for mentoring ANA officers and the Army’s investigating officer for the May 5, 2009 shooting, acknowledged the same. According to Lieutenant Colonel Nikkila: ‘‘We had never requested 

to view their letter of authorization (LOAs) [indicating CENTCOM weapons approval]. Before the [investigation], I didn’t even know that they carried a letter of 

authorization. I really was unaware of . . . the rules of what it is to be a contractor 

in that theater. It wasn’t [un]til after the incident that we got copies of their LOAs 

that we were able to see that they weren’t authorized to carry a weapon.’’ Paravant 

contract personnel, he told the committee, were ‘‘probably poorly supervised,’’ and 

the Army is ‘‘partly responsible for that; we should have had better control.’’ 

IMPACT ON THE MISSION

The May 5, 2009 incident had an immediate, tangible impact on the training mission. The day after the incident occurred, the U.S. Army initiated an investigation. 

Then-Raytheon program manager Brian McCracken told the committee that 

Blackwater was not ‘‘as forthcoming as we wished they had been after the incident.’’ 

He added: ‘‘I think it is obvious that they were trying to get their people out of the 

country without telling anybody about it . . . they didn’t think it was going to come 

to light.’’ Likewise, Lieutenant Colonel Nikkila stated in his report that the 

‘‘Paravant contractors at [Camp] Alamo, Afghanistan did not report the incidents of 

5 May 2009 until confronted’’ by him the next morning [Tab 28]. 

According to Lieutenant Colonel Nikkila, the result of the lack of cooperation was 

a protracted investigation that drew scarce resources and manpower from the local 

unit’s mission of mentoring and training the ANA. All told, he said ‘‘we los[t] 30 

days of work’’ out of a 10-month tour to conduct the investigation. According to LTC 

Nikkila, trips to locate evidence and to local hospitals to locate the victims of the 

shootings—which he said could have been avoided if Blackwater reported the incident promptly—also unnecessarily exposed U.S. soldiers to danger. 

CONCLUSION

In a November 2009 memo on the mission in Afghanistan, General McChrystal 

said ‘‘The People are the Prize’’ and that ‘‘every interaction with the population, 

13 

whether positive or negative, influences the Afghans’ perceptions.’’ The contractors 

we hire to support our mission need to understand that, act accordingly, and be held 

accountable if they do not. Even one irresponsible act by contractor personnel can 

hurt the mission and put our troops in harm’s way. 

Our examination of the Paravant contract revealed multiple irresponsible acts by 

our contractors and troubling gaps in government oversight. There are over 100,000 

contractors operating in Afghanistan. If we don’t fix the problems of oversight and 

make sure contractors like Blackwater play by the rules and live up to their commitments—we’ll be doing a disservice to our troops by making their already difficult 

and dangerous job even more so. 

WITNESS PANELS

This morning we will hear from two panels of witnesses. On the first panel are 

former Paravant Program Manager, John R. Walker; former Paravant Vice President and current Raytheon Program Manager, Brian McCracken; Colonel Bradley 

Wakefield (Ret.), former Chief of Training and Education, CSTC–A CJ7; and Steven 

Ograyensek, contracting officer at the U.S. Army’s PEO STRI. As I mentioned, the 

committee asked Jerry D. Stratton, Jr., Blackwater’s former armorer, and Ricky 

Chambers, Blackwater’s country manager in Afghanistan, to testify on this panel. 

We were advised that they would invoke their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to all questions. The committee also asked Chief Warrant 

Officer Gregory Sailer to testify on this panel but, for reasons I have already stated, 

he is in Afghanistan and was not made available by DOD by video teleconference. 

He has, however, answered written questions. On the second panel, we will hear 

from Mr. Fred Roitz, former Blackwater Vice President for Contracts and Compliance and current Xe Services LLC Executive Vice President of Contracts and Chief 

Sales Officer and Dr. James Blake, Program Executive Officer and Head of Contracting Activity at PEO STRI. 

Chairman LEVIN. I will also place in the record correspondence 

relating to the two witnesses: Jerry Stratton, Blackwater’s former 

armorer, who is still a company employee, and Ricky Chambers, 

Blackwater’s former Afghanistan manager. Again, both men said 

they would formally invoke their Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination if subpoenaed. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[See Tabs 34 through 35.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. 

I understand that several of you have traveled a great distance 

to be here, including one of you who has come all the way from Afghanistan. I thank you for your cooperation with the committee’s 

efforts to fully understand the role that contractors play in our 

fight in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize ahead of time. I have a Homeland Security Committee hearing starting in about 40 minutes, and 

I may not be able to remain with you for the entire committee 

hearing. I apologize for that. This is a very important hearing. 

Chairman LEVIN. We all understand that and those conflicting 

commitments. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Training the ANSF is critical to our success in this war. We must 

ensure that our Afghan partners have the capability to decisively 

defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda in order to create the security necessary for the Afghan Government to provide essential services and 

good governance to its people. Obviously, time is important and we 

14 

have to build this capacity rapidly. We have to prepare the ANSF 

to take the lead in this fight so the Afghan people can have the 

confidence in the ability of their own institutions to protect them 

and so we can begin the process of drawing down our forces with 

confidence that Afghanistan will not again become a haven for 

international terrorism. 

Only a mature and capable ANA and ANP force can bring security, stability, and peace to the people of Afghanistan. Only when 

that force is trained, ready, and capable will victory be assured. 

As we train and equip the ANSF, we have a concurrent obligation to the American taxpayer. Too many scarce taxpayer dollars 

were squandered during the rebuilding of Iraq. I hope we have 

learned lessons from our experience there. 

The same difficult circumstances exist in Afghanistan which has 

an even less developed infrastructure, a more difficult and complex 

geography, and a domestic political environment and tribal structure that have been shattered for years by constant violence. 

Despite these demanding challenges, we cannot compound the 

problem by tolerating poor performance and poor management 

practices by private sector companies that are a crucial part of our 

overall effort in Afghanistan. Given the stakes and the primary 

focus of our counterinsurgency strategy to protect the Afghan people, we must not tolerate gross misbehavior or criminal misconduct 

by individual civilian contractor employees. We cannot afford to tolerate lax oversight by Government entities directly responsible for 

policing these companies and civilian employees in Afghanistan. 

Keeping these objectives in mind, I look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses in greater detail about performance by the contractor 

and DOD agencies responsible for oversight during the training of 

ANSF under this contract. While this particular set of facts may 

be unique, I expect that the difficulties experienced and the potential for an impact on our counterinsurgency efforts will be instructive in considering the broader use of private contractors on the 

battlefield. 

I look forward to hearing how the contract was managed on site 

and how the contractors were overseen by the responsible Government entities. Certainly the events of May 5, 2009, were a tragedy 

that cost the lives of two innocent Afghan civilians and critically 

injured a third. I expect that we will discuss individual misconduct 

and lack of appropriate corporate and DOD oversight that contributed to this incident. 

However, if we only focus on assigning blame for what went 

wrong in this discrete case, we will miss an opportunity to identify 

the lessons learned and the necessary changes that must be made 

to ensure that the use of private contractors enhance our ability to 

accomplish our mission rather than detract from it. 

Our objective is to build up and train the ANSF so that we can 

establish sufficient security to begin to reduce the reliance of U.S. 

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat forces. We 

must avoid the kinds of mistakes that undercut our efforts to protect and earn the trust of the Afghan people. We have a window 

of opportunity to turn the tide in Afghanistan. We must seize it, 

and we must ensure that everything we do promotes that goal. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

15 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

We are going to be hearing from two panels of witnesses this 

morning, and we are going to be interrupted, we believe, by two 

votes, which could occur somewhere in the next half hour or hour. 

What we will do when those votes come is we will work to the end 

of the first vote. At least, I will be doing this. My colleagues obviously will gauge their own schedules and their own ins-and-outs 

the best they can. But what I intend to do is to keep going here 

through the near end of the first vote and then vote at the beginning of the second vote and then return. So my colleagues can figure out what they are able to do, given these hectic schedules, and 

we appreciate everybody’s understanding of that. 

The first panel is the following: the former Paravant Program 

Manager, John Walker; the former Paravant Vice President and 

current Raytheon Program Manager, Brian McCracken; Colonel 

Bradley Wakefield, who is retired now, the former Chief of Training and Education of the CSTC–A, in Afghanistan again; and Steven Ograyensek, the Contracting Officer at the U.S. Army’s PEO 

STRI. That’s what we will be calling PEO STRI. They had the oversight responsibility on the Raytheon contract that Paravant was 

hired under. 

I will introduce the second panel when it is their turn. 

We will now call on our first panel to see if they have any opening statements. If they do, we would appreciate your limiting your 

opening statement to 5 minutes. I think we have a lighting system 

here. So you might be given a minute warning, if that is the system used in this room. The yellow would go on a minute before 5 

minutes are up, and then the red light would go on at the end of 

5 minutes. 

Your entire statements, of course, will be made part of the 

record, if you have a written statement to present. 

We thank you for being with us this morning, and we will call 

first on you, Mr. Walker, to see if you have an opening statement. 

If you could turn your mic on, I think there is probably a button 

on those mics. You can leave the buttons on all the time. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. WALKER, FORMER PROGRAM 

MANAGER, PARAVANT 

Mr. WALKER. Actually I just have some questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Why do we not wait until the time 

comes for your questions, and then you will be able to respond at 

that time. You do not have an opening statement? 

Mr. WALKER. I do not have an opening statement. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. McCracken, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. A very brief one, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN C. MCCRACKEN, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT, PARAVANT; CURRENT AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY MANAGER, RAYTHEON TECHNICAL SERVICES COMPANY 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I just want to say thank you to the committee 

for inviting me to come here and shed some light on this important 

issue of oversight and look at the things that happened in the past 

16 

and also look at how we are working today and into the future to 

make sure that we never have an event like this again and we provide a good service for our country. 

That is all. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you, and you are a current program 

manager at Raytheon. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. That is correct, sir, in Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. In Afghanistan. Thank you. 

Colonel Wakefield. 

STATEMENT OF COL BRADLEY V. WAKEFIELD, USA (RET.), 

FORMER CHIEF OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION, COMBINED 

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, good morning and thank you to the committee also for the opportunity to discuss this issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. If I may, I do not have a prepared opening 

statement, but from January 2008 to January 2009, as you noted, 

I was the Chief of Training and Education for ANSF Development. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

In that, I was responsible for the development of programs and 

policies which facilitated training and education of both the ANA 

and ANP, to include a wide variety of subjects such as Afghan literacy, English language training, training of fire departments, and 

training supporting the fielding of the NATO weapons and the 

uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 

(HMMWVs), both of which were programs decided or made purchases decided prior to my arrival. That is how I am related to this 

issue. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, Mr. Ograyensek, do you have an opening statement, sir? 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN M. OGRAYENSEK, CONTRACTING OFFICER, U.S. ARMY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR SIMULATION, TRAINING, AND INSTRUMENTATION 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Yes, Senator, I do have a prepared statement. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony 

today. 

Chairman LEVIN. Put your mic on, if you would. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. The opportunity to provide testimony today on 

the important issue of oversight of Raytheon Technical Services 

Company and their subcontractor, Paravant Limited Liability Corporation under the Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support 

(FOCUS) contract. 

I serve as a division chief for the PEO STRI Acquisition Center 

in support of program manager field operations responsible for the 

Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

In addition to that, I have responsibilities for Flight School 21 

and other service contracts in my division. 

My division awarded and administered contract actions for training services totaling $1 billion in fiscal year 2008 and $1.4 billion 

17 

in 2009. I have the assistance of 26 contracting professionals, including 16 senior specialists and 10 contracting interns. 

I was the contracting officer for the task order (TO) modification 

issued for the ANA weapons training program under the 

Warfighter FOCUS contract. The Warfighter FOCUS is a contract 

for training services. It is not a contract for private security services. It was awarded on June 6, 2007, to a team of contractors 

known as the Warrior Training Alliance, led by Raytheon Technical 

Services Company (RTSC), the prime contractor. The contractor 

has a maximum 10-year period of performance, consisting of a base 

period and 1-year options. It is an indefinite delivery/indefinite 

quantity contract with fixed price, award fee, cost reimbursement, 

and time and material provisions for TOs. The contract ceiling is 

$11.2 billion. We are scheduled to enter the third year of performance for these services on May 1, 2010. 

The contract provides for integrated life-cycle contract support 

and services for training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations 

and training support worldwide. It provides worldwide instructional services, as well as operations maintenance and sustainment 

of training systems used by the U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine 

Corps, Navy, multi-coalition forces, and foreign military sales 

(FMS) cases. 

One of the FMS cases is for the CSTC–A, FMS requirement for 

the ANA weapons training. 

The Warfighter FOCUS contract currently provides worldwide 

support at over 600 locations with over 6,000 contractor service employees. 

The TO for this particular CSTC–A ANA training program is 1 

of 2,300 active line items that we are currently administering 

under the contract, in addition to placement of new orders. 

I regret the loss of life suffered by the two Afghan citizens and 

the sorrow this has brought to their families. 

I have carefully reviewed what has been reported about the incident and what could possibly have been done to prevent the incident. As a result of our study, I believe we have put in place corrective actions that would ensure critical incidents of this nature are 

reported by the contractor and received by multiple PEO STRI decisionmakers which would enable them to take appropriate action. 

As part of our continuing efforts to increase the oversight of the 

Warfighter FOCUS contract, specifically in Afghanistan, the PEO 

engaged with CSTC–A in February 2009, as soon as it was determined that the requirement was growing in scope. As a result, an 

active duty officer from PEO STRI arrived in Afghanistan on May 

18, 2009. We maintain a continuous active duty military officer 

presence in Afghanistan in support of this mission. 

We have also reviewed and made changes to the contract accident and incident reporting process. These changes include the requirements for RTSC to inform all noncontracting officers on the 

Warfighter FOCUS contract, in addition to the program manager, 

deputy program manager, and contracting officer’s representative 

by email within 24 hours of the time an accident or incident occurs. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today 

and for the support Congress and members of the committee have 

provided for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. 

18 

I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Blake and Mr. Ograyensek 

follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES T. BLAKE AND STEVEN M. OGRAYENSEK

Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today on the important issue 

of oversight of Raytheon Technical Services Company (RTSC) and their subcontractor, Paravant LLC under the Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

I serve as the Army’s Program Executive Officer for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (PEO STRI). In that capacity, I am responsible for the acquisition of 

training services as well as production, fielding and sustainment of training systems. Mr. Ograyensek serves as a Division Chief for the PEO STRI Acquisition Center. He also functions as Contracting Officer for specifically assigned training services under the Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

THE WARFIGHTER FOCUS CONTRACT

Warfighter FOCUS is a contract for training services. It was awarded on June 6, 

2007 to a team of Contractors known as the ‘‘Warrior Training Alliance,’’ led by 

RTSC, the prime contractor. The Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract 

has a maximum 10 year period of performance, consisting of a base period followed 

by 1-year options with a total contract ceiling of $11.2 billion. We are scheduled to 

enter the third year of performance on May 1, 2010. 

The training services provided under Warfighter FOCUS contribute greatly to 

preparing our Warfighters for deployments. From the time our young men and 

women enter the Army, they rely on these services to train in their assigned military occupational skills (MOS). 

The Warfighter FOCUS contract provides for integrated life-cycle contractor support and services for training aids, devices, simulators and simulations and training 

support worldwide. It provides worldwide operations maintenance sustainment and 

instructional support of training systems used by the U.S. Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy, multi-national coalition forces and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). 

This contract does not provide private security contractors. 

ESTABLISHING SUPPORT UNDER WARFIGHTER FOCUS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

WEAPONS TRAINING

PEO STRI provides training services under Warfighter FOCUS in support of the 

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command’s mission to train the Afghan National Army (ANA). These training services include literacy training, driver training and weapons training. As previously stated, the 

Warfighter FOCUS contract does not provide private security contractors. 

On April 7, 2008, CSTC–A sent a Memorandum of Request (MOR) through the 

U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) chain of command requesting 

establishment of an FMS case for training the ANA. Attached to the MOR was the 

statement of work for the ANA Weapons Training Program. USASAC officially assigned the work to PEO STRI on June 13, 2008. 

On May 30, 2008, PEO STRI sent a draft request for proposal to RTSC. Between 

May 30 and August 19, RTSC was provided a final request for proposal and conducted a subcontract competition among its subcontractors. On August 20, PEO 

STRI received and evaluated Raytheon’s proposal. The ANA Weapons Training Program was awarded under Warfighter FOCUS on September 5. Letters of Authorization to the Paravant LLC employees were issued prior to deployment to Afghanistan. The Period of Performance began on September 15, 2008. On September 16– 

18, 2008, PEO STRI, RTSC and RTSC’s subcontractor Paravant LLC conducted the 

start of work site visit in Afghanistan. 

PEO STRI’S OVERSIGHT OF THE ANA WEAPONS TRAINING PROGRAM

Weapons training began on November 17, 2008. As part of PEO STRI’s oversight; 

routine site visits, teleconferences, email correspondence, and program management 

reviews were conducted and CSTC–A leadership indicated that they were very 

pleased with the performance of the contractor’s execution of this training service. 

On December 3, 2008, the PEO STRI Project Director received an email from the 

RTSC program manager. The email requested the contractor’s Letters of Authorization be updated to allow the Paravant employees to carry arms in Afghanistan because Paravant employees were being routinely stopped and had to surrender weapons. The response from the PEO STRI Project Director was that no weapons were 

19 

authorized to be carried until CSTC–A validated the requirement and obtained 

weapons authorization from the combatant commander. CSTC–A never obtained approval and never requested PEO STRI revise the LOAs. 

Between December 2008 and January 2009, PEO STRI communicated with 

CSTC–A to confirm that weapons authorizations had not been approved by the combatant commander in accordance with theater policy. As a result of this communication, on January 7, 2009, PEO STRI formally informed RTSC that weapons were 

not authorized, and no LOAs would reflect weapons authorized. 

In February 2009, PEO STRI initiated personnel actions to deploy an Active Duty 

Officer to Afghanistan in support of the CSTC–A mission. On March 18, 2009, we 

informed CSTC–A that a PEO STRI representative had been identified to provide 

contractor oversight in Afghanistan. The PEO STRI representative reported for duty 

in Kabul on May 18, 2009. We have had a continuous Active Duty Military Officer 

presence in Afghanistan in support of this mission. 

On May 7, 2009, RTSC informed PEO STRI of the May 5 shooting incident. From 

May 7 through July 27, PEO STRI conducted an investigation into the incident and 

was in constant formal communications with RTSC to include the issuance of a letter of concern on June 1, 2009. On July 17, 2009, in response to PEO STRI’s letter 

of concern, RTSC informed PEO STRI that they would not renew the Paravant subcontract. On July 28, 2009, PEO STRI formally notified RTSC that this corrective 

action was acceptable subject to change based on the results of the Army’s continuing investigation. Effective September 15, 2009, Paravant LLC was no longer 

performing on the Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today and for the support Congress and the members of this committee have provided for our soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines. 

I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

The votes are on and we are in the second part of the first vote. 

So let us have a 10-minute first round, and then we are going to 

take a break. So I will ask my questions, and then we are going 

to have to take a break during the end of the first vote and beginning of the second vote. We will be recessing at that time unless 

there is somebody here. We will recess in about 8 to 10 minutes 

here for about 15 or 20 minutes. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Mr. Chairman, in terms of my questioning, I would be safe to leave now and come back immediately 

after the second vote begins? 

Chairman LEVIN. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Let me ask you first, Mr. McCracken. Before you became Vice 

President of Paravant, you were the head of recruiting, I believe, 

at Blackwater. In your interview with staff, you indicated that you 

became dissatisfied with the attitude that you determined existed 

at Blackwater, and you took the job at Paravant because you were 

told that it was going to separate from Blackwater. I believe at 

that point, you joined the company Paravant in about September 

2008, if I am accurate so far. 

Out in the field in Afghanistan, did you find out later that there 

were practical differences between Blackwater and Paravant, or 

that they were interchangeable and people in Afghanistan talked 

about the Paravant contract as though it were the Blackwater contract? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. You had hoped that there would be a difference 

between the two. You became dissatisfied. As I understand it, you 

are now with Raytheon. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. That too is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

20 

Chairman LEVIN. Then when did that shift take place? When did 

you leave Paravant for Raytheon to become their current country 

manager? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Sir, after I came back from Afghanistan in January, I gave my resignation to Blackwater, and I still remained for 

about 30 days or so. I was hoping to do a turnover with my relief. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now, as I understand it, you wrote a report, which is Tab 4. Do 

you have that tab in front of you? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is a report which—let me go to Mr. Walker first. Mr. Walker, let me ask you. 

You have spoken with staff. My understanding of what you 

said—let me try to summarize it. You wrote a report about this incident in December 2008. That is Tab 3, which is in front of you. 

That is your report to Mr. McCracken dated December 10. In that 

report you talked about the shooting. You indicated that the person 

who was injured was transported to Kabul first and then was 

medevaced from there to Germany the following day. 

Your recommendations in that report were the following: that everybody on that team showed poor judgment by allowing unauthorized training to occur. Then in your conclusion, that Russell Cannon, who was the team leader, conducted unauthorized and unapproved training involved in this incident and there was no reason 

to have had the weapon in the position that it was. 

Did you send this report then to Mr. McCracken on December 

10? Is that the date of the report? 

Mr. WALKER. That is the date of the report, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. You were not at the incident. You interviewed the people who were and you told our staff—and correct me 

if I am wrong—that on the back of this vehicle, the team leader 

of Paravant, Russell Cannon, rode it like a stagecoach. It was a 

wild idea, you told our staff. While holding a loaded AK–47, the vehicle hit a bump. The weapon discharged, shooting another 

Paravant contractor in the head. Is that accurate? Is that what you 

told our staff you had determined? 

Mr. WALKER. Sir, I did not say I said he rode it like a stagecoach. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. What did you learn? 

Mr. WALKER. What did I learn? That he was on the back of the 

vehicle and the weapon went off. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. In your judgment, was this—— 

Mr. WALKER. I stated it was unauthorized training. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Were there any Afghans there? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you use the term it was a ‘‘wild idea’’ to 

do what they were doing? 

Mr. WALKER. It was unauthorized, yes, sir. They were up there 

to conduct vehicle training. 

Chairman LEVIN. They were supposed to be training the Afghans. Right? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. They were supposed to be training Afghans. 

That was their job. 

21 

Mr. WALKER. Not at that particular time. They were up there to 

change tires and learn how to take care of their vehicles. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Then why was it unauthorized? You 

said the training was unauthorized at the time. 

Mr. WALKER. They were not supposed to be using weapons at 

that time. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now, when you got this report, Mr. McCracken, from Mr. Walker 

saying that everybody showed poor judgment by allowing unauthorized training to occur and shared some fault, that Russell Cannon conducted unapproved, unauthorized training, there was no 

reason to have the weapon in the position that it was at the time. 

What did you do with your earlier report, Tab 4, which said that 

they were conducting routine training and that a normal training 

evolution was going on? Did you correct your report? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, Mr. Chairman. First of all, when I said it 

was routine training, it was not training for the Afghans. This was 

during one of the Eid holiday periods and we had no Afghan students. Mr. Walker, because of the different security situation that 

we found the Paravant employees in Afghanistan, organized training for the instructors to address certain contingencies that could 

occur over there. Such as, moving from one training site to another. 

Your vehicle breaks down, how do you safely get into the other vehicle? How do you change tires? That is what I meant by routine 

training. It was something we had not foreseen having to do, but 

once we had the men in place in Afghanistan, we found out that 

the reality was they would have to learn these types of skills. That 

is what I meant by routine and normal training, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. But the report that you sent to the Government, our Government, said that members of the team were conducting routine training. Those are your words. When they get that 

report, they assumed what happened was routine, but it was unauthorized. It was not routine. You got that report from Mr. Walker 

who talked to the people who specifically informed you that someone who was seriously injured had to be medevaced to Germany 

and that everyone showed poor judgment, it was unauthorized 

training. What did you do then to correct the impression in your 

report that would be obvious that they were not conducting routine 

training? That was not routine. It was unauthorized. 

Mr. WALKER. Actually, sir, if I could interrupt real quick. 

Chairman LEVIN. No. Let me ask this question of Mr. 

McCracken, if you do not mind. I am just asking about his report 

as to whether or not it was routine. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Sir, it was routine and authorized training. 

They were up there at Camp Dubs to practice contingency operations if their truck broke down and they had to get into another 

vehicle. 

Chairman LEVIN. What they were doing was unauthorized according to Mr. Walker’s report to you. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, sir. Jumping on the back of the vehicle 

was certainly unauthorized. I do not believe that anybody would 

condone that. 

Chairman LEVIN. But your report suggested, and this was sent 

to the Government, that this was routine training. They were conVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
22 

ducting routine training. I am just asking you. Did you ever correct 

that? That is my question. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Sir, I would not have corrected that. That was 

in fact routine training. It was not training Afghan soldiers. It was 

doing training for themselves. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was the activity they were carrying out when 

this gun was discharged and wounded somebody, was that routine 

or was that unauthorized? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The initial part of it was routine. 

Chairman LEVIN. No. The event. When they were up there with 

a gun on the back of the vehicle, was that authorized? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, sir. Nobody should have been on top of a 

vehicle that was going to move. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. When you were informed of that by Mr. 

Walker, did you then make it clear to the people who were getting 

this report in the Government that this event, the shooting was not 

during a routine procedure but during an unauthorized procedure? 

That is my question. Did you change this? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, sir. The training they were doing in general was routine and normal and ongoing. 

Chairman LEVIN. I am sure it was, but—— 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. But absolutely—I am sorry. 

Chairman LEVIN. When the gun went off, they were not engaged 

in a routine exercise. That was not normal for them to be on the 

back of a vehicle with an AK–47 not training anybody. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Mr. Cannon’s actions were not consistent with 

the training. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. They were not authorized. He was not engaged 

in an authorized act when that gun went off. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. He was not doing what he should have been 

doing, but the rest of the team was, in fact, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was he doing what he was authorized to do 

when that gun went off? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, Mr. Chairman. He should not have been on 

the back of the vehicle. 

Chairman LEVIN. So what he was doing was not routine, but was 

unauthorized. Is that correct? What he was doing when that gun 

went off was not authorized. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Therefore, it was not routine. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I would characterize it differently, Mr. Chairman. The team was doing training that we thought was very important and necessary. 

Chairman LEVIN. I am not talking about the team. I am talking 

about what Russell Cannon did when he shot someone and sent 

them, in serious condition, to a hospital. That is what I am asking 

you about. That is the event we care about. We do not care about 

changing the tires. We care about doing something he was not authorized to do, which resulted in seriously wounding somebody. 

That is what we are focusing on. Would you agree that the act that 

he committed was not routine or authorized? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would agree that what 

Mr. Cannon did was not routine or authorized. 

23 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Mr. Walker’s report to you said everybody showed poor judgment. Okay? You seem to think to the contrary, but the report you got said everybody on the team showed 

poor judgment. My question is after you sent this report, which 

went to our Government, PEO STRI, did you do anything to change 

the impression that this was a routine act? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I did not change the report, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. We are going to recess for 15 minutes. [Recess.] 

Our committee will come back to order. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

gentlemen, for being here today. 

Obviously, in a hearing of this type, it is always a question of 

what occurred and who was responsible or who was irresponsible 

with such occurrences. 

Obviously, training for the security protection of the Afghans is 

foremost in our minds because if the Afghans cannot provide for 

their own defense, it is going to be impossible for them to govern 

themselves as well. Without adequate security protection, the possibility of having any kind of democracy fades rapidly. So that is 

why what has happened and what will happen in the future is so 

critically important to the future of Afghanistan and the future of 

our and NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. 

Now, do we know what percentage of the ANP and the ANA are 

being trained by contractors and not the U.S. or NATO military 

members? What percentage? Does anyone know what percentage 

that might be? Colonel? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir, I do not. I would offer that within 

CSTC–A there was always Government involvement for the main 

programs of the ANA and ANP. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So it was established by the Government 

as opposed to established by the contractor. Is that fair? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, do we know who trains the 

trainers, the contracting trainers? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, of the contracts that I was familiar with for 

the training programs that I was familiar with, the company was 

responsible to train and certify each of its employees. As to standardized training, I would offer that that would be provided through 

the continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Center (CRC) 

training at Fort Benning which provides using CENTCOM standardized training for all personnel entering the theater. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So we had some reason to believe that the 

contract trainers had some basic plan to follow in terms of what 

training they might provide. Is that fair or is it not fair? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, if I may. The NATO weapons training statement of work (SOW) was modified several times to cover an evolution in training programs which we elected to use the Paravant 

contractors for. So as the training program matured, relative to the 

use of Paravant, in each maturation there was a training development piece which identified both training required for the trainers 

and then the development of the training provided for the ANA. 

24 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. McCracken or Mr. Walker, can you 

give us an idea from the company’s perspective on how the training 

of the trainers occurred? The use of the analogy of riding stagecoach gives cowboys a bad name and we do not want that to happen. These were not cowboys. These were just reckless individuals, 

not respecting safety, and yet safety training was part of their responsibility. Is that fair, Mr. McCracken? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, Senator Nelson, that is fair to say. The 

training which they received, especially this incident which happened on December 9, was from an evolving requirement. Colonel 

Wakefield alluded earlier that the training evolved while they were 

there. In fact, it still does to this day. 

The training they were doing on December 9 was the result of 

a difference in the reality in Afghanistan from what the Government and Paravant thought might actually be the case. For example, we did not anticipate that the Paravant trainers were going to 

have to leave the base to conduct training. As soon as they got 

there, they found out that they would have to leave at different 

times and attempt to go to different ranges and train. To address 

that contingency, that is why they were doing that training on December 9, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So for their own protection, given the fact 

that they now had a security situation of their own, they decided 

to arm themselves unilaterally. This did not come from the top 

down or did it come from the top down to the trainers? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. It did not come from the top down. We discussed this situation with the Army and the decision was made to 

get them weapons because it was a dangerous situation to be operating in Afghanistan outside the wires, outside of the protection of 

the confines of a base. It put people in a difficult situation. On the 

one hand, you do not want to have anybody at risk of some Afghans coming up out of nowhere and you not being armed. 

Also, quite honestly, you have up to 120 Afghan soldiers with 

NATO-issued M–16 rifles, and if you are not armed, it could be a 

somewhat risky situation, which nobody anticipated. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Were there any guidelines established by 

the company and the Army, the military, to deal with these individuals being armed as to what protocols might need to be in place 

for them for their own self-protection? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I discussed this issue with Colonel Wakefield 

and other military members in the fall of 2008, and we did decide 

we would try to find them some weapons they could have for protection on the range. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That deals with getting the protection, but 

it does not necessarily deal with the question of was there a protocol in place as to what they could do to protect themselves. Was 

it shoot first and ask questions later, I mean, that sort of a situation or something else? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Oh, absolutely not, sir. Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, all the instructors went through training at 

Blackwater’s offices in Moyock, NC, where they were introduced to 

rules such as that. Also Mr. Walker, the program manager, gave 

them advice and told them what the rules were and how best to 

avoid any confrontation if possible, that kind of thing. 

25 

Senator BEN NELSON. Colonel, were you satisfied at the time or 

are you satisfied now that the determination to provide weapons, 

the control of the weapons, and the use of the weapons were adequately discussed and agreed upon at the time, or has that happened subsequently if not at that time? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, if I may. The process that we were going 

through, prior to my departure in January 2009, was to propose allowing the Paravant contractors to wear sidearms while conducting 

training. 

Senator BEN NELSON. This was after the fact, while they were 

already doing it? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir. This was prior. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Prior. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Right. Yes, sir. 

The process was first brief and then gain approval by the Commanding General, CSTC–A, then General Formica, to propose and 

gain approval by Commander of CENTCOM. When I left in midJanuary 2009, that was a project which was passed to my successor, and I am not sure of the results or what efforts they took. 

But it was very clear in my mind that the Commander of 

CENTCOM owned at least the first piece in the decision process to 

allow the arming of contractors. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. McCracken and Mr. Walker, were you 

satisfied with the arrangement that the colonel is discussing? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. If I may, sir, I know that Colonel Wakefield 

was working diligently to get the authorizations in place, and on 

more than one occasion, he advised me what he was doing to work 

on it. I was sure that he was doing everything he could to get the 

authorizations in place. 

However, at that time, the Paravant employees did have weapons on their person while they were conducting training. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Those were different than the weapons 

that they got from the military subsequently or later? When you 

say they were armed, where did those arms come from? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Those arms were issued to the Paravant employees at the Blackwater armory in Kabul, and it is my understanding that those arms came from a place called Bunker 22. 

Senator BEN NELSON. For training purposes or for self-security 

purposes? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. For self-security purposes, sir. The Afghans 

had access to the NATO weapons which they were using for training. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I know my time is expired, but just to 

clear this point. So that was before Colonel Wakefield was working 

on a protocol or rules relating to the arming of the employees? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. It occurred concurrently, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Concurrent? I do not know what concurrent means either. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I am sorry. It happened at the same time, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I know that, but it sounds to me like it 

was not finished before the colonel left. So it happened subsequent 

to that. But you say that they were armed, but were they armed 

before that agreement was reached? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, Senator. 

26 

Senator BEN NELSON. That was what I was trying to get to. So 

that was pre-protocol. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, Senator. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Bottom line, they were carrying arms without 

the authority that they were seeking. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, Senator Burr? 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to stay on 

the same lines, if I can, because I think there is still some misunderstanding. 

In September 2008, Mr. McCracken, you traveled to Afghanistan, 

and what I want to know is, is it your understanding that you perceived a general agreement among Army personnel and Paravant 

trainers that they faced real danger while in the training range 

and should be armed for self-protection? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, Senator, that is my understanding. 

Senator BURR. Is it commonplace for range instructors to be 

armed, including in the United States? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, it is. 

Senator BURR. Colonel Wakefield, in or around November 2008, 

you were in charge of the CSTC–A in Kabul and gave verbal authorization for trainers to be armed and pledged to secure amended 

letters of authorization (LOAs) with weapons authorization. Is that 

an accurate statement? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir, it is not. 

Senator BURR. Tell me where it is inaccurate. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. Sir, I believe as described, the scope of 

my responsibilities was quite a bit less. I was the division leader 

for training and eduction as opposed to the—— 

Senator BURR. Okay. Was the second half of that correct? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

If I could give you the timeline. As the contract matured from 

our selection through the team’s arrival, Mr. McCracken and I corresponded quite frequently, both in person during his travels, telephonically, and by email. It was was a result of this coordination 

that I received a request from Mr. McCracken to gain permission 

for the Paravant contractors to carry weapons. 

Senator BURR. Did you give verbal authorization? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir. I explained to Brian at that time that 

it was the sole—— 

Senator BURR. Was that right? This was sometime in and around 

September 2008? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, I believe it was closer to November—— 

Senator BURR. Okay. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD.—because it was just prior to the lead elements 

arriving. 

Senator BURR. Colonel Nagasako replaced you. Is that right? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Senator BURR. He mentioned in a May 23, 2009, email—and I 

quote—‘‘The requirement to arm the Paravant instructors was 

based on them being on live-fire range with ANA soldiers.’’ So 

27 

clearly, there had been a decision made at that point to arm 

Paravant instructors. Correct? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, that was after—prior to my departure, there 

was no authority, and we had not asked—— 

Senator BURR. What did you convey to Colonel Nagasako when 

he came in? Did you convey anything about the conversations you 

and Mr. McCracken had had or your actions that you had taken? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes. 

Senator BURR. I think, Mr. Chairman, it should be noted that the 

subcontractor to Raytheon, Paravant, did not have the authority to 

interact directly with the contracting authority to obtain weapons. 

So this consulting process that we went through was the result of 

Paravant being a subcontractor. 

Let me move on. Mr. McCracken, were the weapons possessed by 

Paravant personnel for personal protection? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. That was the intent of the weapons, sir. 

Senator BURR. Were the Paravant personnel training the ANA at 

remote locations in Afghanistan? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, they were. 

Senator BURR. Did DOD provide protection at these remote locations, or were the Paravant personnel on their own until DOD 

could send troops to respond to a possible attack? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. At least in certain situations, they were in fact 

on the ground. In fact, in January, I went to Kandahar, which is 

arguably considered the most dangerous area in Afghanistan, and 

at the location there in the city of Kandahar, the Paravant instructors actually had to leave the base and go out on the side of a road 

and conduct the training there. While I was there one morning in 

January, at least two, possibly three different vehicles drove up 

with Afghan civilians in them. Drove right up to the range ostensibly to ask if they could pick up the brass shell casings and things 

like that. But we really did not know if they were there for that 

purpose or if they were trying to gather some intelligence and possibly do something later. It was a very tense situation, and we had 

hoped to have some coalition forces there to provide security. That 

never really materialized. 

Senator BURR. After the May 5, 2009, shooting, did Paravant 

take action to disarm and collect all weapons from Paravant personnel? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, they did. 

Senator BURR. Did Paravant and Blackwater take all action requested by you or Raytheon from the May 5 shooting? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. They did, in fact, do everything we asked them 

to. 

Senator BURR. I appreciate that. 

Colonel Wakefield, did Paravant make its personnel available to 

the Army investigation? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, that incident, the May incident, occurred 

after I redeployed, so I have no knowledge. 

Senator BURR. Did Paravant and Blackwater fully cooperate with 

the Army? Do you know? 

28 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Again, sir, I have no personal—— 

Senator BURR. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I am through with my questions, and I hope—if 

it is the chair’s intent to get to the bottom of this, then I think it 

is appropriate to figure out where the DOD oversight was to figure 

out what, in fact, were the instructions. It is only reasonable to believe that a subcontractor that goes into a live-fire range is going 

to want to be armed. If, in fact, there was supposed to be DOD security, where was it? If there was not, then we ought to all question how we get subcontractors to go in unarmed into a very dangerous situation. 

The truth is that our use of contractors means that our assets 

can be used in the fight, and I fear that we are headed on a road 

that tries to put every contract in a box that says this is not a wise 

use of our resources. I would only tell you that the contractor world 

in total—I question without it whether we could continue at the 

pace we currently are in theater in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I 

think we should require DOD to do the appropriate oversight, but 

I think we also should expect that when we put people in dangerous positions, we have to allow them to either have their own 

tools to supply their security or to make sure that we have the security supplied for them. 

I thank the chair. 

Chairman LEVIN. We do have witnesses on the oversight question. On the question of whether they should be allowed to carry 

arms or not, that is a question which is a DOD question. They were 

very clear. General Petraeus was very clear. CENTCOM was very 

clear. They had to seek authority and have authority to carry arms. 

They acknowledged that they did not. At the time of the December 

incident in 2008, they sought it. They were not given the authority 

to carry the AK–47s or sidearms. 

There is an additional issue. 

Now, whether they should is a different question, but they clearly had to have authority in order to carry weapons and they clearly 

did not have that authority. They had sought it. So that is a question of abiding by the rules. If the rules are not good rules, then 

you can argue they ought to be changed, but the rules were very 

clear they had to get authority from CENTCOM and they did not 

have that at the time. That part I think is clear and uncontested. 

There is another issue here in terms of oversight. The weapons 

that they did get out of Bunker 22 belonged to Afghanistan not to 

the contractors and not to us. If they were to be given arms, the 

arms should come not from the ANP that we were trying to equip, 

but from their own source, a different source. It is also clear that 

Bunker 22 was the place where the ANP’s arms were held. It was 

under our control. 

There are two issues there as well, but the oversight issue is an 

issue we will go into. 

Senator BURR. The chairman raises a couple of excellent points, 

and if I may just have one follow-up question of Mr. McCracken. 

I take for granted that Paravant trainers occasionally did have 

DOD personnel there. Am I correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. On occasion, they did, sir. 

Senator BURR. Did the DOD personnel ever ask them to disarm? 

29 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, they were never asked to disarm by the 

DOD personnel. 

Senator BURR. So there was likely an understanding from the 

DOD personnel there that it was okay, probably approved. I think 

the question is was there verbal approval or was there not. I cannot dispute what the chairman has said that there was not formal 

approval. 

Chairman LEVIN. There was not approval, period. They sought it 

and did not get it. As a matter of fact, they sought it just a few 

days before the December—let me stop because we have to go to 

other Senators. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thanks. 

Just following up on this, I want to make sure we make this 

clear. I have a copy of an email sent by you, Mr. McCracken on November 6, 2008, and I want to read it for the record and make sure 

that we are clear. On November 6, 2008, you said the following in 

writing: ‘‘I got sidearms for everyone, 9 millimeter Sigmas and holsters. We have not yet received formal permission from the Army 

to carry weapons yet, but I will take my chances. Pass the word. 

I will try to get out there in the morning with Bobby’’ [Tab 6]. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, I wrote that email, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did you not at one time tell Mr. Walker to 

disarm? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not recall that, but perhaps you could reference me to a document that would have that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I will come back to that. 

I am assuming that, Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, I know 

Colonel Wakefield—are you all veterans? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. We are, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay, and you, Mr.—I cannot pronounce 

your name. Help me. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Ograyensek. No, I am not a veteran. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

To the veterans on the panel, if you disagree with this statement, 

I would appreciate it if you would just speak up: ‘‘The superiority 

of our military has rested on many things, including a clear chain 

of command and accountability.’’ Would you all agree that that is 

an accurate statement? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Would any of you say that there was a clear 

chain of command and accountability as it related to the subcontractors or in this incident independent contractors who were 

carrying weapons without authority in Afghanistan? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I would say that there was, ma’am. It is my 

understanding that we had a verbal agreement with the Government that they would be armed. It was no secret. The military 

came out routinely and observed training. They knew that the 

Paravant instructors had weapons. Virtually everybody that is over 

in Afghanistan in the military carries a weapon with them all the 

time. Certainly people that are surrounded by Afghans that are 

armed would carry weapons. 

30 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me ask you this then. In December 

2008, we had at the time you were in charge of Paravant independent contractors. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Walker, were you on site in December 

2008 also? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. At that moment in time, we had Paravant 

personnel take AK–47s they were not entitled to, go out, and when 

they were supposed to be doing work on vehicles, one of those accidentally discharged and shot a guy in the head in 2008. Is that correct? In December 2008? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Who was fired over that? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The gentleman who discharged the weapon 

when he should not have been discharging the weapon, Mr. Cannon. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Was there an investigation by the military? 

Mr. WALKER. It happened on an Afghan base. 

Chairman LEVIN. Your mic. If you could turn that on, Mr. Walker. There is a button there. 

Mr. WALKER. It looks like it is on. 

Chairman LEVIN. Good. Talk right into the mic, if you would. 

Mr. WALKER. It happened on an Afghan base. We had an investigation by the ANA, and it was dismissed after that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Colonel Wakefield, was there an investigation of that by DOD, by 

anybody at CSTC–A or Certification and Training Assessment 

Group (CTAG) or TF Phoenix? Did any of the people that were supposed to be overseeing the training of either the ANA or the ANP 

conduct an investigation after that shooting incident? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Senator, I am unaware. I know that it was reported through the operations center and the CJ–3 was aware. I 

am not aware of what steps were taken. 

Senator MCCASKILL. When in this process did you tell Mr. Walker to disarm? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. That was in November. 

If I may. The initial team was on the ground, had just arrived 

that day into Kabul International Airport. I happened to be at 

Camp Phoenix for—I do not remember why I was there, but ran 

into them. I knew Johnnie by sight. He brought me over there and 

introduced me to several of the new arrivals. I noticed that some 

of them were carrying sidearms, and I told Johnnie that we did not 

have approval, that we would have to secure the weapons. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. After they were told to disarm, we 

had an incident with AK–47s where someone was shot in the head. 

Correct? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Was there anybody in the military that you 

would call accountable at this point? When I read the material and 

this diagram, I cannot tell who on here is the person—is it General 

Formica? Is it the one-stars at CTAG or TF Phoenix? Is it you? 

Who is it that should have, at that moment, when you realized that 

they are using AK–47s and someone has been shot in the head, 

31 

that we better get out there and figure out what kind of situation 

we have? Who is it in this diagram that should have taken responsibility at that point and did not? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, ma’am. I am not aware of the particular 

slide, but if I may, I believe this to be two separate issues. 

One was the request to arm their personnel, the Paravant personnel, while conducting range training operations. 

The December incident was tied to training of the Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK) which was an ANA battalion, 

the CNIK, which had the mission of securing the ANP poppy eradication force. So the training that was to be provided to the CNIK 

was on light infantry tactics, and we had a short-term requirement 

and a very short-notice requirement to train the CNIK. We elected 

to use one of the extra Paravant teams, and that is why that team 

happened to be at Camp Dubs conducting that training. 

While they were in support of the CNIK training, they were 

under the operational control of TF Phoenix, and I am unaware of 

what orders TF Phoenix issued which would have further delegated 

the responsibility for oversight of the contract personnel. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Was that kind of training in their work 

order, Mr. Ograyensek? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. I am sorry. Can you clarify—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Was that kind of training—was the training, in terms of the narcotics training—was that even in the work 

order? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. There was no training for narcotics, no. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me move on because I think that the 

point is that we had an incident that should have set off a red 

flashing light. It took another incident with all kinds of ramifications, in terms of who was involved in that incident, for people to 

get really ramped up about who was minding the store, as it related to this contract. 

Mr. Walker or Mr. McCracken, during this period of time, whose 

name was on your paycheck? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Blackwater’s name was on the paycheck, 

ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Walker, whose name was on your paycheck? 

Mr. WALKER. Direct deposit. I never saw it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you never saw it. Who did you think you 

were working for? 

Mr. WALKER. Blackwater. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Everybody was working for Blackwater. 

Right? 

So what was Paravant? It was just a name? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I think that would be an accurate statement, 

ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. They just put a name out there so there 

would not be the name Blackwater? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I was not involved in the formation of 

Paravant, so I would have to speculate about it if I were to answer 

that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

32 

In the beginning of this contract, I know you managed this contract from Florida, was it clear to the military that Raytheon was 

going to subcontract this work to Blackwater, and was it clear that 

they were then going to try to use what they called independent 

contractors to actually be the people on the ground doing the work? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. No, it was not clear at the initiation of this requirement that Raytheon was going to subcontract to any particular subcontractor. They selected Paravant through a competitive subcontracting process that was used by Raytheon’s purchasing system. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But Raytheon was allowed to subcontract? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Was there any thought of maybe including 

in the scope of the contract that certain requirements, as it related 

to subcontracting—so you knew that Raytheon was not going to do 

this work when you let the contract, that Raytheon was going to 

be a pass-through? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. When we awarded the contract, we were 

aware that Raytheon was going to subcontract this work to 

Paravant. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why not contract with Paravant? Why not 

just contract with Blackwater? What’s the point of putting 

Raytheon in the middle other than to make this chain of command 

and accountability a little less clear? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. We have the contract—the Warfighter FOCUS 

contract is for training services. It is with RTSC. They have the 

means to acquire other additional expertise through subcontracting 

if they cannot do the job themselves. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What is Raytheon doing in regards to training the ANP or the ANA? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. In this particular case, they were managing 

the subcontract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So this is just a classic middleman, that 

they are supposed to be managing but not providing any personnel 

to do the work. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Paravant also proposed management on the 

ground there to manage their own people. Raytheon also was in 

charge of managing the subcontract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Raytheon took a cut for just ostensibly providing management oversight to these guys who had been discharged from the Army for bad conduct and were on the ground 

shooting people? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Raytheon has subcontract agreements with 

many different subcontractors. We were using rates that were established in the basic contract, in the basic Warfighter FOCUS contract. We were using those rates. The only other costs that were 

added to this particular contract were other direct costs. So 

Raytheon received some material overhead, general and administrative, and some fee on top of that for this particular effort. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I am going 

to try to stick around if I can—I have another hearing—because I 

have more. But I think this is a great example of layers of contracts that do not have meaning but cost us money that we do not 

really get any value out of. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

33 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon or still good morning. Thanks for being here 

today. 

Colonel, I want to draw the lens back a little bit and ask you 

how we administer these contracts in general. Was it your responsibility for oversight of the contracts that we are talking about, or 

all of the contracts for folks who are working in Afghanistan? Are 

you responsible for overseeing those contracts? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir. My involvement was taking an identified requirement which could not be met through military sources, 

in this case, and writing the SOW which described what the Government expected the contractor to provide. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So who was responsible? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. For? 

Senator LEMIEUX. For overseeing all of the—my understanding 

is we have 33 percent more contractors in Afghanistan than we do 

troops. So we are talking about a huge number of people. Who is 

ultimately responsible at CENTCOM for overseeing these contractual arrangements? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, I do not know the answer to that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Who did you report to on these issues? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. To the Commanding General (CG) of CSTC–A. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Your focus of mission was only writing the 

SOW for this particular engagement? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir, to design and develop the training programs and policies to facilitate ANA and ANP training and development. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Did you have responsibility, once you wrote 

the SOW, to follow up to make sure that the contract was being 

performed as you had dictated? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Who had that responsibility? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. That was passed to TF Phoenix and to CTAG 

for the execution of the NATO weapons training. If I am answering 

your question correctly, Government supervision of the contractors 

I believe TF Phoenix had direct responsibility, ultimately—— 

Senator LEMIEUX. Who is in charge of TF Phoenix? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. That time, sir, it was a regular colonel from the 

State of New York. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Who is in charge of it now, do you know? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. I do not know, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I see the chairman is preparing something. I 

just want to make a point, Mr. Chairman. I think it would be useful to have a better understanding of who at CENTCOM or whoever in the chain of command is ultimately responsible for making 

sure that these contracts are performed in the way they are supposed to and that they are done efficiently and effectively. If there 

is 33 percent more contractors in Afghanistan than troops, by my 

rough math, that is 150,000 contractors because we have about 

100,000 troops. That is a statistic that I was given today. That is 

a lot of people performing a lot of important functions. 

I just have one final area. 

34 

Chairman LEVIN. We are in total agreement on that. A lot of confusion over the accountability and the responsibility for overseeing 

contractors. That is kind of laid out in the longer statement that 

I put in the record, but you are absolutely right. That confusion 

was huge and hopefully now there has been some improvement in 

it. But at this time—— 

Senator LEMIEUX. But whoever is in charge of it, Mr. Chairman, 

if that person at CENTCOM could come and speak to us to tell us 

how they administer these programs, what the accountability 

measures are, I think that would be helpful. 

In relation to this specific incident, Paravant was asking for the 

ability to carry weapons. Is that correct? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. When they were out doing this training operation and they did not yet have weapons, who was providing security for them? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, they were on a secured physical training 

area, Camp Dubs, that is guarded by the ANA and is the training 

location and billeting location for several coalition forces. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So they were with—inside of that facility? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. If they were at Camp Dubs, Darulaman, yes, 

sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. All of their purposes and all of their function 

would have been held within the confines of that camp? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. That was the initial intent. I am not sure if it 

was modified. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Mr. McCracken, you were saying about being 

outside of the wire. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, sir. At Camp Darulaman, otherwise 

known as Camp Dubs for the Americans, where that training was 

taking place, where they regularly trained the Afghans was actually outside the secure perimeter of the camp. Where the incident 

on December 9 happened, it happened at that very training site, 

which is outside the coverage area of Afghan security. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So I assume that the reason why you were requesting weapons is because you did not feel secure? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Having traveled over to Afghanistan, I can 

imagine that you would need to feel like you needed to have weapons, and it is a very dangerous place. I am not going to get into 

why the request was denied. Certainly this was a tragedy and this 

should not have happened, but it does not make sense to me that 

folks would not have the ability to protect themselves. Would you 

agree with that, Colonel? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, I would. Thank you. 

The initial concept in the development of this requirement was 

that the contractors could conceivably operate on their own without 

any coalition force. The reason why we went to contractors was the 

additional training requirement for the NATO weapons training 

and the uparmored HMMWVs was in excess of the current fielded 

force’s ability to manage the additional training, the reason why we 

went with the contractor. 

That being said, it was conceivable that other operational requirements could have taken away all of the coalition force covVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
35 

erage, leaving the contracted team on the range by themselves. So 

when Mr. McCracken—in what I seem to remember is November 

2008—requested permission to arm, I personally believed that that 

was a reasonable request and conveyed to him it would be processed through to get approval. 

Senator LEMIEUX. That is all the questions I have. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Begich? 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I apologize for 

being late. It sounds like it is a very interesting hearing, to say the 

least. 

First, I want to say I am trying to follow what Senator McCaskill 

was getting to, I do not think I heard the answer but I want to do 

two things, if I can. Mr. Chairman, if I can have just a little flexibility. We have a small group here. 

I just want to make sure I understood what Senator McCaskill 

was referring to on the chart because I was not clear on that chart 

and if she felt she got the answer because I will be very frank with 

you. I am looking at all four of you. I will use my words, and I 

came in midway here. But it just looked like a scam to continue 

to do the work for Blackwater under some other phony name in 

order to do the work. So I will just put that aside for a second. 

I just want to understand if Senator McCaskill can answer the 

question for me. I do not think I heard the answer of who was finally in charge, but I do not know what this chart was. So maybe, 

if I could, Mr. Chairman, just make sure I understand what was 

there that she was referring to. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think that is Senator McCaskill’s chart? 

Senator BEGICH. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is a committee chart but it basically lays 

out the fact that—where the training command is, which is now 

General Caldwell, and the two components of that, the ANA and 

the ANP, and that Paravant fed into TF Phoenix, which is the 

ANA training. But it is not clear from this chart—and frankly, I 

still do not think it is clear in the hearing who in the military 

takes responsibility for the lack of oversight in this instance. That 

was the issue. 

Senator BEGICH. That is what I was wondering if you—— 

Chairman LEVIN. If I could interrupt you, Senator Begich, because of something you said that I want to reinforce the point that 

Senator McCaskill also made. We interviewed Mr. McCracken, and 

this is what the interview said. This is the transcript of Ilona 

Cohen’s, committee counsel, interview with Mr. McCracken. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Ms. COHEN. Why was Paravant created? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. It was created, I believe, to be like a company that didn’t have 

any Blackwater on it, quite honestly, so they could go after some business that 

Raytheon was getting ready to hand out. So I think that’s why it was created. 

Ms. COHEN. What was the concern about having the Blackwater name? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Oh, the reputation. 

Ms. COHEN. Okay. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The baggage. 

36 

Chairman LEVIN. That is also in part the answer to Senator 

McCaskill’s question, that Mr. McCracken said he did not know 

about the structure, but his previous testimony to us in that interview was, in his judgment, it was because of the Blackwater name, 

the baggage that that carried. So they just created another name. 

Senator BEGICH. A shell. 

Chairman LEVIN. A shell. 

Senator BEGICH. A scam. Those are my words. 

I guess I want to get to a two-part question here. One is the hiring practices, one incident where Blackwater had an individual on 

a no-hire list, and then later this new scam company appears and 

hired the same person. I want to ask you, Mr. McCracken, in just 

a second. 

Also from the military end, I want to get clear on what I understand is that you were clearly aware that there was going to be a 

subcontract with this company, which I am assuming you did some 

research on to know that it was Blackwater, and if you did not, to 

be honest with you, why the hell did you not do that? 

I mean, at least as a former mayor, when we had subcontractors 

working for a major contractor, we knew who the heck they were 

because sometimes they do these scams and they try to have a 

company that is just a shell. It has no oversight, no responsibility 

of any kind or claims to be, and has multiple limited liability 

issues. So they do not have to worry about the subcontractors, and 

they hire workers that are not paid properly and the list goes on 

and on. 

First to Mr. McCracken, if I can understand—and I will use one 

incident, and if I get the name wrong, I apologize. Sebastian 

Kucharski worked for Blackwater in Iraq until he was terminated 

September 22, 2006, after being involved in an alcohol incident, 

and Blackwater put him on a ‘‘do not hire’’ list. Then he in the 

‘‘new company,’’ which really was not a new company, just a name 

that was put on stationery, was under contract for that new company. My understanding is, you were aware of that at some point, 

and then continued to keep him on the payroll. 

My issue is this process of hiring and who should be there, who 

should not be there. It was clear this person was not a desired employee from the original Blackwater, and Blackwater Lite, which is 

this other company, still kept him at a later date and hired him 

into a contract. How did that work? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I trusted the Blackwater recruiting arm who 

provides the people, and I asked about this Mr. Kucharski, and I 

was told that he was let go because of a personality conflict. That 

the charges were internal charges that were drummed up and that 

Kucharski was actually all right. That he had, like I said, a personality conflict with one of the supervisors on the big Blackwater contract. Given what I know about the big Blackwater contract in 

Iraq, which is I believe that is where he was, it did not surprise 

me that there may have been some vindictive charges brought up 

against somebody and maybe due process had not been followed in 

his case. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me ask you this. I am looking at an internal 

personnel record and I see his information here, but I do not see 

37 

any notation that indicates a change in that. I will share this with 

you at some point. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

Senator BEGICH. My point is there seems to be, at least from the 

review of some of the records that I have seen, an inconsistent effort in making sure that you have the right people working for you. 

We can argue first, I will do that in a second with the military 

folks, over the issue of the incident regarding who you hire and 

who you do not hire or who you keep on. Based on history, that 

was not only in Blackwater but Blackwater Lite. I am not going to 

give it the name that is in the record. It was really Blackwater 

Lite. 

So how do you respond to that? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Senator, I placed my trust in Blackwater’s recruiting division that they were providing us with people that they 

had vetted and that they had checked out. 

Senator BEGICH. You had no other way to double check these. 

You just trusted them and hoped it all worked out? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I did place my trust in them. I met Mr. 

Kucharski while he was in processing, and I did ask him about 

that incident and he gave me a solid story. I told him it was important that he never have something like that happen again. Whether there was, in fact, a personality conflict or not, there just was 

not any room for that. 

Senator BEGICH. I have another document and I will, again, be 

happy to share it. It is pretty clear on the recommendation of this 

individual regarding his immediate termination in 2006 [Tab 18]. 

You make it sound soft, that it was just all a misunderstanding. 

He had a little issue, and worked it all out. 

With the security issues, again, I know this from my own experience in managing a city of 3,000 employees with a significant police 

force. An incident like this, this person would not have been on the 

police force. He would not have been in our community officer program, which does not even carry a gun. They would not be part of 

the equation because of their past issues. 

I think there are a lot of issues around how you hire. I am going 

to hold you there for a second. 

I am still trying to figure out who is ultimately in charge when 

you were in operation. I will start with the subcontract first. Did 

you review who the subcontractor was going to be? Whoever wants 

to answer it because I do not know who is in charge of you two, 

so whoever is going to lay it out. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. The TO under which the—— 

Senator BEGICH. Is your mic on? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Yes, it is. 

Senator BEGICH. There it is, okay. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. If Raytheon could not perform those services, 

they were permitted to subcontract those particular—— 

Senator BEGICH. I understand that. Who reviewed that subcontractor from your group? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. That was a competitive subcontract. 

38 

Senator BEGICH. I understand that. You said it earlier. Who reviewed the contract once it was competitively awarded as 

Raytheon’s subcontract? Who made sure that a subcontractor 

would do the work that we wanted Raytheon to do? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Raytheon selected the subcontractor. 

Senator BEGICH. So no one in your operation reviewed that subcontractor? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. We did review the contract when it came in as 

the proposal. We reviewed the proposal as it was existing. There 

seemed to be no problems with it at all. 

Senator BEGICH. It did not raise any flags to you that this was 

really Blackwater Lite? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. There was no indication that they were part 

of Blackwater. 

Senator BEGICH. Zero indication from your perspective. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Zero indication. 

Senator BEGICH. In the performance of who was part of the organization, what did you see there in the sense of when you reviewed 

the proposal? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. What was proposed was a series of labor categories within the basic contract, within the basic Warfighter 

FOCUS contract. There were no names associated with those labor 

categories at the time of award. 

Senator BEGICH. I guess I want to ask you a little bit further 

then in that. So you see the proposal. You see no association of who 

might be part of this organization, but you have great faith in it 

that it will perform the job that Raytheon wanted. Had they performed any other security work? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. This is not a private security contract. This is 

a training services contract. 

Senator BEGICH. I understand that. I am sorry. I used the wrong 

word. The training work. Had they done other training work? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. There was other training work. They had a 

past performance volume in the subcontract proposal that we 

looked at. They did other training work for DOD and the Department of State (DOS), I believe, and for the Navy. 

Senator BEGICH. Was that work that they did or was it actually 

work that Blackwater had done, that they now claim as their credibility or their credit? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. The indication was that it was Paravant’s 

work. 

Senator BEGICH. Can you define what you mean by indication? 

Did you connect with those folks who had contracted with Paravant 

and check in with them and say who were these people that did 

this work? Did you do any of that? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. We did not call those references. 

Senator BEGICH. You did not call any of those references. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. It was the responsibility of Raytheon—— 

Senator BEGICH. You can dice the words, but ultimately it is our 

responsibility, when we are contracting out, to make sure those 

contractors are doing the service. My understanding is the work 

that was performed and was used in their proposal was work that 

Blackwater did that Paravant had now attached their names to as 

their references. But you checked none of those references. I want 

39 

to make sure I am right on this because if you did not check the 

references, how do you know they would perform the work that we 

wanted Raytheon to do, which they then subcontracted out? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. The subcontract proposals were reviewed by 

subject-matter experts in CSTC–A. CSTC–A was available to review each of those subcontract proposals. We relied on the subjectmatter expertise for CSTC–A to evaluate those proposals for us. 

When that proposal was selected by Raytheon and placed in our 

TO proposal, we found nothing wrong with that recommendation. 

Senator BEGICH. My time is up, I am learning a lot about the 

Federal Government and how they do their business and others 

that are associated with it. To be very frank with you, your excuse, 

what you have just given me, ‘‘your explanation’’—I will use that 

phrase more appropriately—would be clearly unsatisfactory for—it 

does not matter if it was a $10,000 contract we let in the city government to hundreds of millions of dollars contract to say, ‘‘well, 

we let it to a contractor. They did the work, and then we kind of 

looked at it. They brought us a competitively bid subcontractor. We 

felt comfortable with it and off we went to the races.’’ Maybe I am 

wrong about this. There was a lot of issues swirling around out 

there in the discussion of who provides the contractor work for the 

United States. 

I am disappointed, to say the least, and I am not satisfied with 

the response. At the end of the day, who was ultimately responsible 

to make these decisions? 

But I will leave it at that. My time has run out. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Ograyensek, did you just say that you were 

not aware of the fact that Paravant and Blackwater were one and 

the same? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Paravant had never done anything. They never 

had performed any training or any other function. Were you aware 

of that? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. No, I was not. 

Chairman LEVIN. They represented in their proposal that they 

have 2,000 personnel deployed overseas. They did not have anybody deployed overseas. Were you aware of that? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. I was not aware of that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do we check those things out? Do we ask for 

references? They make representations here which are wildly false. 

It is Blackwater. It is just a shell. It is just the name changed. Mr. 

McCracken knew and everybody knew in the field it was 

Blackwater trying to get rid of a negative name. But you were not 

aware of that. 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. No, sir. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I? 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. Is it in answer to that question? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Once the proposal had been approved through 

CENTCOM and through the regulatory part that I am not fully 

clear of, I received from PEO STRI, I believe it was, either four or 

five offers. It was each company’s proposal to meet the SOW reVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
40 

quirements. The company name was redacted. It was listed as offeror 1, offeror 2. So there was no names associated. 

As was mentioned, we conducted a subject-matter expert review 

of each of the proposals. When I came to the proposal of offeror 

number 3, as an example, there were biographical summaries listed in each of the offeror’s statements. One of the biographical summaries was that of the founder of Blackwater. I did not know the 

names of the companies that had provided offers, but knew that 

with his curriculum or with his biographical summary, I assumed 

that that was an offer from Blackwater. 

Chairman LEVIN. It turned out that that was the Paravant offer. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. As it turned out to be the Paravant offer. 

Chairman LEVIN. Everyone knew they were one and the same 

anyway. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. It may have been redacted, but you were aware 

of the fact that that was a Blackwater offer, in effect. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Correct. 

If I may, I believe I was aware of the incident in Iraq only as 

it was reported through CNN and the Stars and Stripes. So when 

I saw that, I knew of Blackwater’s reputation and I knew of the 

incident but did not have any indication or knowledge that they 

would not be able to provide the services which we required. So it 

did not raise a flag. I was not aware of the intricate details that 

perhaps the rest of the panel is of the incident in Iraq, but it was 

not a cause for concern. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Mr. McCracken, you indicated that you 

relied on Blackwater in terms of their personnel, but when it came 

to the hiring of Kucharski, you decided you were going to hire him 

despite Blackwater’s own records, which said do not hire this guy. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. After I consulted with Blackwater’s recruiting 

people, they initially presented him to me and I said, ‘‘well, it looks 

like he is a ‘do not use’,’’ and then they told me, ‘‘well, he is a ‘do 

not use,’ but it is just a personality thing.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. Oh, they told you. Blackwater told you to ignore their own document. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, they did, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I see. Their own document said that he was involved in an alcohol-related incident which resulted in a physical 

altercation between himself and another Blackwater independent 

contractor. His ‘‘actions and lack of prudent judgment in the consumption of alcohol resulted in an altercation not just between him 

and another independent contractor,’’ but also after the physical altercation, he attempted to ‘‘continue the confrontation and was 

once again stopped by guard force personnel.’’ He ‘‘then verbally 

threatened the other independent contractor and guard force personnel. His actions are an embarrassment to himself and 

Blackwater and there can be no other recommendation other than 

immediate termination’’ [Tab 18]. Blackwater told you just ignore 

that? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Sir, that is the first time I recall ever hearing 

that, what you have just read. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you check the record? 

41 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I was not privy to that record, sir. He worked 

for DOS—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Who at Blackwater told you to ignore that? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Nobody told me—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Who told you to ignore the fact that he was on 

the ‘‘do not use’’ list? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Some people in the recruiting department, but 

I have never seen that document before, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. When you say you were not privy to the 

record, you were head of recruiting at Blackwater, were you not? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I was, but that record would have been kept 

by what is called the Worldwide Personal Protective Services. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you ask to see the record before you decided to hire this guy despite being on the ‘‘do not use’’ list, particularly since you say you relied and trusted Blackwater? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I asked people from the DOS program, which 

is what I believe he was working on, what the situation was with 

him. I was told he was just wrapped up in a personality conflict, 

but I have never seen that document before, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you have access to it as a recruiter for 

Blackwater? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, I did not. They compartmentalized a lot of 

things. 

Chairman LEVIN. I see. 

Now, going back to the question of whether or not the folks working for Blackwater-Paravant had authority to have AK–47s or sidearms, Colonel, let me ask you this question. It was clear they did 

not have the authority. Whether it was reasonable that they sought 

it or not, they did not have authority to carry weapons. Is that correct? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, during my tenure, that is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. They sought authority repeatedly. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was not given to them? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. They knew they needed it? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. They knew they did not have it or they would 

not have sought it? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, is it reasonable that the Army, when 

there are contractors in the battlefield space that are going to be 

armed, would want to know who is carrying arms in their battlefield space? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. It is reasonable that there be such a requirement. Whether or not the request in this case was reasonable or 

not, we know it was not granted and argue whether it should have 

been. But we know it is reasonable that it is required and that they 

did not have authority to carry it. Is that true? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Mr. Ograyensek, let me ask you this 

question next. This incident report that Mr. McCracken wrote out 

42 

was forwarded to you or to your office according to this email message from Rhoda Shanick [Tab 4], who I believe was from 

Raytheon. She emailed a report to you that described the December 

9 incident. On this report, it checks certain things like operating 

equipment improperly, improper technique, policies not followed, 

and safety training not followed. 

When your office got that report, did you act on it? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. No, sir, I did not. I regret not acting on that 

memo. I was on temporary duty on another assignment when that 

memo came in. When I got back, I had over 287 messages that I 

had not read. For some reason, I did not notice the severity of that 

memo. It was not marked urgent. It was not marked with any particular emphasis. We missed it, and I regret missing it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did the Army investigate this matter? I want 

to go back to a question I think that Senator McCaskill raised. Do 

you know whether or not this shooting incident where a man was 

partially paralyzed through an unauthorized action was ever investigated by the Army? Do you know whether they did? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. I am not aware that they have investigated it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel, you are not aware of it either? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Sir, I am not. 

Chairman LEVIN. On December 3, 2008, before the December 

shooting, Raytheon actually requested PEO STRI project managers, 

Linda Comfort and Dave Christianson [Tab 26] authorization ‘‘for 

the Paravant employees to allow them to carry arms in Afghanistan.’’ Did they get that authorization, Mr. Ograyensek? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. No, sir, they did not. 

Chairman LEVIN. They were seeking it again, days before the 

event? 

Now, after the event—my time is up. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me make a point that Blackwater acting 

as Paravant was, in fact, removed from this contract as a subcontractor by Raytheon in the fall of last year. Correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, ma’am. I believe September 15 approximately. 

Senator MCCASKILL. At that point in time, MPRI took over as a 

subcontractor for Raytheon. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, ma’am. They continue to do the work to 

this day. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is true that they are not armed? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. They are not armed, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is it also true that a couple of dozen of the 

people that used to work for Paravant, also known as Blackwater, 

are now working for MPRI? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. I think that is an approximate number, 

but it is probably pretty accurate, about 24 or 20 of them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did they know, when they were going over 

to work for MPRI, that they were not going to be armed? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, they did, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yet, they still took that contract. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. These 20 or 24 decided to. There were several 

that decided not to continue to work in Afghanistan, but these ones 

have accepted that challenge. 

43 

Senator MCCASKILL. Having just come back from Afghanistan, I 

can certainly assume there are a lot of reasons you would not want 

to continue to work in Afghanistan. It is not exactly a vacation spot 

right now. 

Let me acknowledge that Blackwater provided security when I 

was over there, and let me acknowledge how many veterans are 

working for these companies that are doing great services, putting 

themselves in harm’s way, and helping us achieve a mission that, 

frankly, we could not achieve with the number of boots-on-theground we can get there in a fairly quick time period. I do not want 

to make this all about anybody who takes up one of these contracts 

is a bad guy. That is not the case. 

The difference is when I said in my first round of questioning, 

I bet you if I had people who worked for Blackwater, just bootson-the-ground for Blackwater, who are seen interchangeably as 

American soldiers in the roles they are doing, that they would 

admit that there is not the chain of command and accountability 

in terms of the rules that they have in the military. Would that be 

a fair statement? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. It is difficult for me to put words in somebody 

else’s mouth, but from my own experience, I think I would agree 

with that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So really what we have here is we have— 

where the hearts and minds of the Afghan people are incredibly 

important to this mission, we have two groups of people, both 

Americans, both being seen as a unified front in terms of what they 

are doing in this country. We have one group of people that if one 

of the Army had gone out there with an AK–47 they were not supposed to have on top of a moving vehicle and shot a guy in the 

head and paralyzed him, something would have happened in that 

chain of command. 

If they had kept somebody on the force that had been using cocaine, that had been drunk, that had been charged with larceny, 

that had done all these things these guys had done, that went out 

and killed Afghan people in the spring of 2009, something would 

have happened to them if they we’re in the military. Correct, Colonel? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I mean, this would have been a huge deal 

inside the military, that somebody wearing the uniform would be 

engaged in this kind of conduct. 

What is killing me about this problem with Blackwater is we 

have two sets of rules and one image. As long as we have two sets 

of rules and one image, we are in trouble on this mission. Until the 

contractors are held to the same standard as the men and women 

that are there in uniform, we are going to continue to come back 

at this. I do not care how many names they make up for 

Blackwater. I do not care how many different titles they put on the 

company. It is still going to be the same problem. Until the military gets that, until the military takes this problem more seriously 

in terms of what happens, whether it is you not following up on 

that memo or whether it is this question of who was responsible 

for the investigation after the incident in December, we are going 

to be back in this hearing room and we are going to continue to 

44 

be stalled on progress accomplishing this mission. I think it is really important that we get that. I am going to take it up with 

CENTCOM. I am going to take it up with General McChrystal. 

Who was the contracting representative (COR) on this contract 

within the unit, Colonel Wakefield? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Ma’am, during my tenure, I do not believe that 

there was a COR on ground. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I was just told by General Caldwell that 

they had made great progress on CORs. Here we have one of the 

key categories, training of the ANP and the ANA, being done by 

contractors, and you are telling me that when you were there, 

there was not a COR that was responsible for it? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. As I understand the term ‘‘contracting representative.’’ 

Senator MCCASKILL. A COR is what it is called, the acronym. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Right. I do not believe that there was. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Have you heard of that acronym? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Okay, that is good. If you had not 

heard of it, I was going to really panic. 

But it is not good that we have something that is so fundamental 

to this mission and they are telling me that the CORs are a lot better, that these CORs are now getting trained and they are really 

on the job in terms of contract oversight, and clearly this is a huge, 

gaping hole. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Ma’am, may I add something to your point? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. First of all, I agree with everything you said. 

I believe on this panel I am the only person who is in Afghanistan 

right now. I can tell you that since May of last year, PEO STRI 

has done a very good job, as has the Army, with providing oversight to the contractors, at least the ones that I deal with. I have 

had the opportunity to serve with two outstanding officers that 

served as CORs. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So it is better. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, ma’am. It is much better. I hope that PEO 

STRI and CENTCOM have an opportunity to demonstrate how 

much better it is, and I hope that next time you come over on a 

congressional delegation—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have to tell you, I was feeling better until 

I started digging into the documents on this hearing, and then all 

of a sudden, I panicked that maybe this was just a really good 

PowerPoint presentation, as the military can always do a great 

PowerPoint presentation, without the meat on the bone. I am glad 

to hear you say that, Mr. McCracken, that it is better, and I am 

going to continue to follow up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. 

I want to go back to the hiring practices and the vetting issue. 

The Paravant proposal for ANA training said that ‘‘each instructor 

must have on file a copy of the military service record,’’ which is 

a DD–214, if that instructor has prior military experience. 

Blackwater has told the committee that it does not have the DD– 

214 forms for Drotleff or Cannon. These were the two guys who 

45 

were indicted for the May 5, 2009, shooting in which two Afghan 

civilians were killed. 

Let me ask you, Mr. McCracken. Did you review the military 

records of Paravant contractors before they were hired? Was that 

your responsibility? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. It was not my responsibility, sir, and I did not 

review every single one of them, no. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know if anyone reviewed the records? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not know if anybody reviewed the records. 

I know they had a process in place to do so, however. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me just tell you about Mr. Drotleff’s military record. This is a guy who was hired, was involved in that May 

shooting 2009, and we know what the ramifications are—and they 

are still reverberating—of that shooting in terms of Afghan public 

distrust of so many of our activities there still. We have to overcome that. We gradually are. Our whole strategy is to protect the 

public, to show them that we are not there to dominate. We are not 

there to control. We are there to help them control their own country against the menace that they face. 

But his record, which apparently was ignored, included assault, 

failure to obey order or regulation, larceny, wrongful appropriation, 

and insubordinate conduct. That is the record that he had when he 

was hired by Blackwater. 

That is the problem, that kind of sloppy vetting puts us in a position where we are hiring people who, again, as I said in my opening statement and as others have said, are seen as representing 

America. This guy is seen as representing America. He does not 

and he never should be allowed to be put in a position where he 

is viewed that way. For him, Mr. Drotleff, with a record like that— 

and Justin Cannon, who was indicted for that May 2009 shooting, 

we are talking mainly about the December 9, 2008, shooting which 

should have been investigated but was not by the Army. But if that 

investigation had taken place, hopefully the May incident would 

not have happened. We would have taken action to change that 

whole environment. 

The other guy, Justin Cannon, was discharged from the military 

after he went AWOL and he tested positive for cocaine. 

I want to go back to one more thing about these weapons. It is 

important, and I think Colonel Wakefield told us this and others 

would agree, if you are going to have contractors armed, the Army 

better know about them. The Army needs to know who in their battle space is armed so in case they are called in, they can tell who 

are the bad guys and who are the good guys, if nothing else. That 

does not mean he is a bad guy. That means he could be a contractor. They have to have a plan for that. They have to be notified. 

They have to be informed. 

Let me ask you, Mr. McCracken, since you took responsibility for 

arming these folks, did you file plans with the military when they 

were moving about? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. It was Blackwater-Paravant’s policy to notify 

the military whenever they made a movement off the base. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did they? Were they notified about this movement that we are talking about in December? Do you know, Mr. 

Walker, if they were notified? 

46 

Mr. WALKER. They were still on the base at Camp Darulaman. 

They did not move off the base. 

Chairman LEVIN. I thought they were outside the wire. 

Mr. WALKER. Outside the wire, but still within the confines of 

Camp Darulaman. There is no fence around an Afghan base. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. So they did not move off the base. 

Mr. WALKER. They were up on a range north of Camp 

Darulaman. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was north of the camp. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So should they have notified the military, do 

you know? 

Mr. WALKER. No, I do not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Should they have notified under the special requirements that apply in war zones where contractors authorized 

to carry sidearms or AK–47s, that they notify military forces? Do 

you know whether that notice was given by Paravant? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not know, but in that case they would 

have not have notified the U.S. forces because they are working 

just off of an Afghan base, and they would have—they should have 

notified the Afghan range control that they are going to be on that 

particular range. 

Chairman LEVIN. You do not know whether, when they had 

arms, that they notified our military. They were supposed to, but 

do you know whether they did? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. In that case, I would be very surprised if they 

notified the American military because they were not leaving 

the—— 

Chairman LEVIN. But in other cases, do you know whether they 

formally used a notice that they were moving around if they were 

armed? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I know that Blackwater had a policy for them 

to do that. I do not know how often it was adhered to or if it was 

never adhered to. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does anybody here know whether or not they 

notified our military when they moved off base with arms? 

Mr. WALKER. We had a vehicle policy, vehicle movement policy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Not the vehicle moving. That they were armed. 

Do you know whether or not—— 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Pardon? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir, we did not inform the military that we 

were moving with ammunition or arms. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is a critical point because I think everyone would agree that there is a purpose to the requirement that 

they get authorization, and one of the purposes is so that the military then would know, hopefully. But the only way the military 

would know if an armed contractor is moving away from a base is 

if they are informed. There was not even a policy on the part of 

Paravant here. 

Mr. WALKER. But that would say that it was an American base. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. When they were moving away from 

the base, you are saying that they did not inform the military. Is 

that right? 

47 

Mr. WALKER. Exactly. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did we just hear you correctly? Did I just hear 

you correctly? 

Mr. WALKER. Let us go over it again. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did Paravant inform our military when they 

moved away from a base armed? 

Mr. WALKER. From a base? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. WALKER. American base? 

Chairman LEVIN. Either one, either one. 

Mr. WALKER. No, we did not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Mr. McCracken, you did take responsibility for providing arms to people who were not authorized to 

carry arms. Did you remind them at the time that they better notify our military when they are moving with arms? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Sir, I do not think I take responsibility for 

arming these—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you not say ‘‘go ahead and do it, I will take 

responsibility,’’ was that not the email? [Tab 6]. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I am not sure if those are my words, but I operated under the assumption that the military was allowing us to 

do that. As we understand, the military knew about them being 

armed, and it was not my decision solely. I do not have that kind 

of authority. The military had given us what we considered approval to have these weapons. 

Chairman LEVIN. You considered you had approval, and yet over 

and over again, you requested approval, including a few days before this December incident. Approval was requested and not given. 

So you can say that you assumed you had it, but the people who 

were there did not assume that they had it because they continually requested it. How many times did you request approval? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Very many times, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. So if you thought you had approval, 

you would not be requesting approval presumably. You wanted approval because you knew you needed it and did not get it, and you 

took responsibility in an email for—you said, ‘‘I got sidearms for everyone, 9 millimeter Sigmas and holsters. We have not yet received 

formal permission from the Army to carry weapons. I will take my 

chances’’ [Tab 6]. You were not just taking your chances. You were 

taking chances for others when you said that. ‘‘Pass the word.’’ 

It is the kind of lawlessness and failure to follow regulations and 

rules which gets us into trouble. Others can argue whether or not 

permission should have been granted. You can argue that and I am 

not here to argue it one way or another. Permission was needed for 

good reasons. The Army is in danger when we have people who are 

contractors representing America in the eyes of the Afghans, who 

are armed. The Army may have to come to rescue those folks, and 

they need to know who is armed. You took it on yourself, at least 

in that email, to say go ahead and do something which you knew 

was not authorized because you repeatedly sought that authority. 

It seems to me in doing so, you did not act responsibly. 

Just a couple more questions for this panel, and then we are 

going to go on to the next panel. 

48 

Let me just go back to you, Mr. Walker. After this December 

2008 incident, did you talk to Colonel Wakefield about it? 

Mr. WALKER. The incident was discussed, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. With Colonel Wakefield? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was orally? 

Mr. WALKER. Orally. 

Chairman LEVIN. In addition to your written message which 

went to Mr. McCracken, you had conversations about this with 

Colonel Wakefield. What did you tell him? 

Mr. WALKER. That we had had an incident on Camp Darulaman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Talk into the mic, if you would. 

Mr. WALKER. We had had an incident out on Camp Darulaman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was this during casual conversation or was 

this in his office or where was it? 

Mr. WALKER. This was in his office, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did he say he was going to take any action, or 

did you ask him to take any action? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir, I did not ask him to take any action. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. So why did you inform him? 

Mr. WALKER. He was in my chain of command and he needed to 

know. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. WALKER. However, there was an incident report that was 

written. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. That is the one we have talked about. 

Mr. WALKER. I am not sure it is the one that you have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there an additional incident report? Do you 

have it? 

Mr. WALKER. I am not sure I have it. I could find it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who wrote it? 

Mr. WALKER. I did. 

Chairman LEVIN. In addition to the one that we have referred 

that you sent to Mr. McCracken? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is the one we referred to which is at Tab 

3. [Pause.] 

Mr. Walker, take a look, if you would, at Tab 3. This is the memo 

that we have referred to where it came from you to Mr. McCracken 

where you talked about how they were engaged in unauthorized 

training, showed poor judgment, and no reason to have had that 

weapon in the position it was. Are you saying in addition to that, 

there was a memo that you wrote? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Would you have a copy of that memo 

somewhere? 

Mr. WALKER. I will give my best shot to look it up, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Thank you. 

Who is that to? 

Mr. WALKER. I would say it was just a report. It was not directed 

to anyone. It was an incident report. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was it handed to somebody, given to somebody, 

or sent to somebody? 

Mr. WALKER. I would have to look that up for you, sir. 

49 

Chairman LEVIN. It could have been a report you wrote for yourself. Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. It was not written for myself. I wrote it— 

it was an incident. It is standard procedure to write an incident report. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then who do you send that report to as a 

standard procedure? 

Mr. WALKER. I would say it was attached as a file in an email 

and sent back to Moyock. 

Chairman LEVIN. To whom? 

Mr. WALKER. Moyock, Blackwater. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sent to Blackwater, as far as you can remember. 

Mr. WALKER. It went to Moyock, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you check your files to see if you can come 

up with that report, which is, as you say, in addition to the December 10th report? Would you do that? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir, I will. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, Colonel Wakefield, do you remember discussing this incident with Mr. Walker? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that in your office? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. It was—I thought that it was outside, but it was 

on Camp Eggers and it was a day or 2 after the incident. I queried 

whether the report had been generated and then later confirmed 

that the CJ3, the operations center, had received the report. 

Chairman LEVIN. That report is Tab 3? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. No, sir. I do not know in what format the operations center—— 

Chairman LEVIN. But you had confirmed that they had received 

a report from Mr. Walker? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. They would have received and should have received the report through TF Phoenix. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would that have been Mr. Walker’s report? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Again, sir, that should have been a separate 

generated report from the TF Phoenix. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. I am not sure if it was sent telephonically or in 

writing or—— 

Chairman LEVIN. It could have been an oral report? 

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Yes, sir. The team, the Paravant team, should 

have been under the direct supervision of a TF Phoenix element 

while conducting preparatory training at Camp Dubs, or 

Darulaman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. McCracken, on November 25, the 

Blackwater country manager, Ricky Chambers, emailed you that 

Paravant should not approach the Bunker 22 issue with Wakefield. 

Do you remember that? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I have seen documents to that effect, sir. 

50 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you ask Ricky Chambers why he did not 

want to tell Colonel Wakefield about the Bunker 22 issue? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I am not sure if I did or not, sir. Maybe I did. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why would you know that the company would 

want to hide this issue from Colonel Wakefield? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not know why the company would want 

to hide from Colonel Wakefield. 

Chairman LEVIN. But you got an email saying do not talk to 

Colonel Wakefield about the Bunker 22 issue? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I am not sure why he would have said that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you ever talk to him? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Colonel Wakefield, sir? 

Chairman LEVIN. No. The person who wrote you, Ricky Chambers. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not recall asking Ricky about that, no. 

Chairman LEVIN. As to why he would ask you not to do that. Did 

you talk to Colonel Wakefield about the Bunker 22 issue? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I informed Colonel Wakefield that we were 

able to get weapons through Blackwater. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you say from Bunker 22? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not believe I told him from Bunker 22. To 

me they were just weapons from Blackwater. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. [Pause.] 

Mr. Walker, we are just looking for one document. 

The person who was the shooter at that December 2008 incident, 

I gathered he was fired. Was he also removed from the country or 

was he sent out of the country? 

Mr. WALKER. He was sent out of the country, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Whose decision was that? 

Mr. WALKER. I had recommended to Mr. McCracken that I relieve him of his duties and send him home right away. Mr. 

McCracken agreed with me. As soon as we were happy with the investigation, we got him on the next plane. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was there a policy to get people who were involved in incidents out of the country quickly because incidents 

would go away if that happened? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. You would be saying that we had incidents 

that we were trying to remove people from. When we had a problem with someone, I would recommend to Mr. McCracken that the 

person be relieved. He agreed with me and we got him an airplane 

ticket home. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was one of the reasons that incidents would 

tend to go away if people left the country? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. My staff says that you told them something different. Do you remember telling my staff that incidents would tend 

to go away if the people who were involved in the incidents left the 

country? Do you remember telling my staff that? 

Mr. WALKER. That would have been under the May issue—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember telling my staff that for either incident? 

Mr. WALKER. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

51 

Gentlemen, thank you. We appreciate your coming here today, 

and you are excused. 

We will now go to panel 2. [Pause.] 

Our second panel is the following: Fred Roitz. Am I pronouncing 

your name correctly, Mr. Roitz? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Fred Roitz, former Blackwater Vice 

President for Contracts and Compliance and the current Xe Services Executive Vice President of Contracts and Chief Sales Officer; 

and Dr. James Blake, who is the Program Executive Officer and 

head of contracting at PEO STRI. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. 

Mr. Roitz, I gather that you signed the Paravant contract, is that 

correct, with Raytheon? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, thank you for reminding me. Did either of 

you have an opening statement? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. I am sorry I jumped 

over that. 

Mr. Roitz. 

STATEMENT OF FRED ROITZ, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

CONTRACTS AND COMPLIANCE, BLACKWATER; CURRENT 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF CONTRACTS AND CHIEF 

SALES OFFICER, XE SERVICES, LLC 

Mr. ROITZ. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, Senators, 

my name is Fred Roitz. I am the Executive Vice President and 

Chief Sales Officer of Xe Services LLC. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you hear my comment about a 5-minute 

opening statement? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROITZ. Xe Services is the parent company of Paravant LLC. 

Before joining the company, I was in the U.S. Army. I retired as 

a lieutenant colonel after 20 years of service with my last assignment as the Commander of the Northern Region Contracting Center. 

I have personally seen the transformations at Xe Services under 

our new President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Joe Yorio. I 

am an executive of the old company, and I have witnessed the company moving forward from an entrepreneurial business to a company with a world-class corporate governance philosophy. 

At the outset, I want to express for myself and Xe Services our 

most profound condolences and deep sadness for the terrible loss of 

life and injury on May 5, 2009. The independent contractors’ actions that night clearly violated company policies against the use 

of alcohol, unauthorized use of vehicles, and taking weapons outside the training area. Those contractors are being held accountable by the law, as they should be. 

Xe Services will continue to provide security for U.S. diplomats, 

civil servants, congressional delegations, and other official visitors. 

Our work has been highly commended, most recently in 2009 by 

52 

the Inspector General of DOS who said our personnel security specialists are well-trained and highly professional. 

But the heart of the company is providing training, training for 

the U.S. domestic police forces, for the U.S. military forces, as well 

as the Afghan forces. In 2009 alone, we trained more than 38,000 

troops in the ANA which is critical to the success of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. 

Blackwater was an entrepreneurial company that experienced 

significant growth in a short period of time, largely in connection 

with supporting critical U.S. diplomatic and military missions in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of that work occurred in a high tempo, 

dangerous environment. Unfortunately, there were times when 

some members of the old company supported those missions at the 

expense of complying with important administrative and regulatory 

requirements. 

Today Xe is a reformed company with a different approach. 

While we are just as focused as before on the success of the mission, we have strengthened our focus on corporate governance and 

accountability. Immediately after taking charge in 2009, Mr. Yorio 

and the new management team engaged in an intensive top-to-bottom review of all company contracts. They identified the company’s 

operational performance was exceptional and well-received by our 

customers. However, they identified gaps in the performance of regulatory and administrative functions. As a result of that review, 

which continues, 9 vice presidents, more than half of the total, and 

16 directors have left the company. 

Xe is developing and implementing new compliance guidelines 

and training, including the new anticorruption policy. The company 

has instituted a new anonymous whistleblower hotline operated in 

multiple languages by a well-respected and independent third 

party. 

Finally, the company has instituted a new corporate governance 

structure that will include a board of directors with a majority of 

independent directors, including the chairman of the board. 

I would like to turn my attention now to the Raytheon/Paravant 

contract. I want to stress our personnel operated in a high-threat 

environment where the training locations were unsecure and the 

Afghan troops were fully armed. We should not minimize the risk 

of the Paravant personnel and the environment. This is particularly a concern to a company that has lost 37 individuals in support of our country’s overseas mission. 

In my detailed written statement, I have been very candid about 

the lessons we have learned and the changes we have implemented 

in working toward the goal of ensuring those mistakes never happen again. To summarize, policies and procedures were not followed because of Paravant’s prior management. Paravant’s leadership ultimately reported to me, and I accept my share of responsibility. That leadership and the company director failed to keep me 

adequately informed that well-established basic policies and practices were not followed. These include a training requirement for 

independent contractors before they are sent to Afghanistan, incomplete vetting of independent contractors, and permitting independent contractors to possess weapons without the proper authorization. Although Raytheon and the military were aware of the 

53 

weapons and were in the process of obtaining those authorizations, 

the contractor should not have possessed those weapons without 

the proper regulatory authorization. 

I can assure the committee that this new Xe Services would act 

differently today. We simply will not send our personnel overseas 

without the proper authorization for a weapon, where needed, and 

without full compliance with all requirements. We have put in 

place new leadership and procedures to help ensure this commitment is met. 

Let me close with an important point about the tragic May 5, 

2009, event. The project manager, team leader, and assistant team 

leader were relieved of their responsibilities shortly before that incident. The individuals involved in that incident violated expressed, 

existing, and clear company policies not to use alcohol, not to take 

a company vehicle for unauthorized use, and not to take weapons 

outside the training range. 

Xe Services will continue to serve the U.S. Government and all 

our customers with professionalism the new management demands. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roitz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY FRED ROITZ

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, Senators. My name is Fred Roitz and 

I am an Executive Vice President and the Chief Sales Officer of Xe Services LLC. 

Xe Services is the parent of Paravant LLC. Before joining the company I was in the 

U.S. Army. I retired as a lieutenant colonel following service as commander of the 

Northern Region Contracting Center for the Army Contracting Agency and the commander of Defense Contract Management Agency Raytheon Fort Wayne. 

Before I begin, let me express my condolences for the May 5, 2009, incident. I am, 

personally, deeply saddened by the terrible loss of life and injury. The independent 

contractors’ actions that night were in clear violation of many company policies, 

such as alcohol use, unofficial vehicle use, and weapons policies. Those independent 

contractors are being held accountable by the law, as they should be. Mr. Chairman 

and Senators, I express my personal condolences—and condolences on behalf of Xe 

Services—for that terrible and regrettable loss of life and injury. 

On behalf of Xe Services and its new management team, I thank the committee 

for the opportunity to appear today and to assist the committee in its factfinding 

mission. For the last 7 months, Xe Services has been cooperating with the committee’s investigation of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The company will 

continue to support the committee’s work. 

While providing testimony today is consistent with the company’s support of the 

committee’s work, the company was initially informed weeks ago that the committee 

was not seeking testimony from a company executive. Other witnesses were asked 

to appear as early as February 1, 2010, but I received the committee’s letter on February 17, 2010. We regret that, for whatever reason, we did not have the same opportunity to prepare for this hearing as others. We also regret that the committee 

did not allow my colleague, Mrs. Danielle Esposito, the company’s new Executive 

Vice President and Chief Operating Officer to appear alongside me. To the extent 

the committee makes inquiries regarding the operational changes implemented by 

the company’s new management team, including personnel actions and reforms 

taken in connection with Paravant LLC, Mrs. Esposito would be able to provide the 

most comprehensive responses. 

Having said that, I will do my best to answer the committee’s questions. If I am 

unable to answer any particular question, my colleagues and I will work to find the 

answer and report to the committee as soon as we are able. 

I would like to touch briefly on three topics. First, I would like to discuss the significant reforms that have occurred at Xe Services, which is, in many significant 

ways, a new company when compared to the old Blackwater. Second, I would like 

to describe the nature of the work that Xe Services performs in support of critical 

U.S. Government missions around the world, including the work Paravant was performing under its subcontract with Raytheon. Finally, I would like to address the 

54 

Paravant program generally, including the company’s lessons learned, as well as the 

May 5, 2009, incident in Kabul, which is one of the subjects of this hearing. 

XE SERVICES IS A REFORMED COMPANY

Blackwater was an entrepreneurial company that experienced significant growth 

in a short period of time. The great majority of that growth occurred in connection 

with supporting critical U.S. diplomatic and military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of that work occurred in high-tempo and dangerous environments. Unfortunately, there were times when the first priority of some members of the former 

leadership of the company was supporting those missions, even at the expense of 

complying with administrative and regulatory requirements. That will not happen 

under the company’s new leadership team, which emphasizes core values of honesty, 

integrity, reliability, and accountability. At Xe Services, our leaders, employees, and 

independent contractors remain just as focused on the success of the mission as before—that is, on providing the best possible service to the U.S. Government—but 

only with full compliance and accountability. 

This focus has been instilled by our President and Chief Executive Officer, Joe 

Yorio, who joined the company in March of last year. Mr. Yorio brings to Xe Services 

more than 9 years of U.S. Army Special Forces experience, as well as 18 years in 

senior leadership roles in multinational companies like Unisource Worldwide, Corporate Express, and DHL, where he gained the reputation of a leader who fixes 

problems. In addition to his focus on responsibility and accountability, he is working 

to rationalize and professionalize all aspects of the company’s business. He is a 

hands-on leader, who travels frequently to Afghanistan and the other countries 

where the company operates to supervise and oversee its employees and independent contractors, as well as to ensure that the company is meeting the requirements of our U.S. Government customers. 

Also appointed to the company’s senior management in March 2009 was Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Danielle Esposito. Mrs. Esposito, 

who has been with the company for 10 years, has been one of the key managers 

historically pushing for reforms inside the company. In recognition of her efforts, 

unique knowledge, and skills, Mrs. Esposito has overall responsibility for leading 

the company’s operations in training and security, among other areas. 

Immediately after taking charge in March 2009, Mr. Yorio and Mrs. Esposito have 

engaged in an intensive top-to-bottom review of all company programs and leadership with a focus on performance, accountability, and responsibility for administrative and regulatory compliance. They identified that the company’s operational performance was exceptional and well-received by its customers. However, they identified some gaps in performance of regulatory and administrative functions. As a consequence of this review, which continues, 9 vice presidents (more than half of the 

total) and 16 directors have left the company. 

To give the committee some idea of the scope of the task facing the new management team in early March 2009, the company had an estimated 700 employees in 

North Carolina, 1,200 independent contractors performing personal protective services in Iraq and Afghanistan, 100 independent contractors providing aviation services in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 200 independent contractors training the Afghan 

Border Police (ABP) and Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU). Paravant’s training of 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) represented an additional 72 independent contractors in Afghanistan and 3 employees at the company headquarters in North Carolina. Senior management’s review was intensive and their reforms were rapid. 

Recognizing that compliance must be a cornerstone of the new company and its 

new culture, Mr. Yorio and Mrs. Esposito quickly restructured Xe’s legal department, first by retaining a partner from Crowell & Moring, a law firm with a toptier government contracts practice, as its Acting General Counsel, and then by recruiting and hiring a new General Counsel, Christian Bonat, who most recently 

served as Senior Counsel to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense 

(DOD) during the Obama administration and previously as the Deputy General 

Counsel, Legal Counsel, of DOD in the Bush administration. 

The company has adopted a new anticorruption policy, and it is in the process 

of developing and implementing comprehensive compliance guidelines and training, 

to help to ensure that all personnel are responsive to the requirements of U.S. law. 

The company also is responding to recent public allegations of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. While the company believes that there is no basis to 

these allegations—the funds referenced in the allegations were intended to be and 

actually were used to make condolence payments to Iraqi families with the authorization and encouragement of the Department of State (DOS)—it nonetheless is takVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
55 

ing them seriously and is fully cooperating with the subsequent Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation. 

The company’s commitment to accountability is further reflected in the hiring of 

Karen Jones, Vice President for Export Compliance, who reports to me. In previous 

years, the company’s export compliance program was inadequate to address the regulatory requirements for exports of defense articles and services in support of U.S. 

Government missions. The company has taken responsibility for those shortcomings 

by fully cooperating with DOS and its investigation, and by instituting a comprehensive compliance program under Ms. Jones’ leadership and the oversight of an 

independent Export Compliance Committee, consisting of a former Congressman 

and a former Federal judge. The company dedicates substantial resources to what 

is now a world-class export compliance program. 

The company has instituted a new anonymous hotline program operated by a 

well-respected and independent third party vendor, Ethical Advocate. Under the 

new web-based hotline program, anyone may file an anonymous complaint or allegation. The complaint or allegation is first screened for any conflict of interest, and 

then reviewed, investigated (using outside legal counsel where warranted), and formally closed out with appropriate action also where warranted. The Web-based hotline includes a reporting tool that informs the anonymous filer of the status of the 

complaint and its outcome. The third party vendor is capable of receiving complaints 

in multiple languages and dialects, which will soon include the ability to translate 

a number of Afghan dialects. The company wants to ensure that non-English speaking individuals are not inhibited or prevented from using the reporting mechanism. 

In addition to these changes in leadership and policy, the company’s maturation 

is reflected in ongoing changes to Xe Services’ ownership and corporate governance. 

I mentioned that the company has approximately 700 employees based for the most 

part in Moyock, NC. The vast majority of these employees are engaged in typical 

corporate functions, including human resources, information technology, accounting 

and finance, quality assurance, legal and compliance, food services, maintenance, 

janitorial, and other services. Approximately one-third are involved in operational 

and operational support roles. The company and our employees are good corporate 

citizens, supporting numerous charitable and civic organizations in the region, including the Special Olympics, the United Service Organization, the Boy Scouts, and 

local nonprofit food service organizations. 

In recognition of the importance of our employees to the company’s overall success 

in supporting critical U.S. Government missions, the company is in the process of 

creating an Employee Stock Ownership Plan under which the company’s employees 

will own approximately 30 percent of its equity. Employees will be represented by 

Employee Stock Ownership Plan trustees, and the company’s management will owe 

fiduciary duties to its employee-owners. 

With new ownership, the company also will institute new corporate governance 

in the form of a board of directors that will include a majority of independent directors with backgrounds that will bring the highest integrity to the governance of our 

new company. The Chairman of the Board will be an independent director. 

These changes in personnel, attitude, focus, policy and practice, ownership, and 

governance represent a break from the past. The new Xe Services remains committed to our Nation’s critical missions. We are equally committed, however, to a 

culture of compliance that in all circumstances reflects a responsible U.S. Government contractor. 

XE SERVICES SUPPORTS CRITICAL U.S. GOVERNMENT MISSIONS

Many people believe that the company got its start after September 11, 2001, and 

that it began by providing personal protective services. But this is not the case. In 

fact, the company was awarded its first significant government contract after the 

attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, under which it trained U.S. Navy sailors to protect their ships against similar attacks in the future. 

While Xe Services will continue to provide security and expand into other areas 

of service, the company remains—at its heart—a training company. That is one of 

our core competencies, it is how we are currently supporting the U.S. military’s mission in Afghanistan, and it is how we hope to continue to support the U.S. mission 

in Afghanistan in the future. The need for training of Afghan troops and police is 

critical. Recent press coverage of the Marja offensive has highlighted the importance 

of quality training of Afghan troops. Such training of the ANA is critical to the success of the U.S. mission there. We are dedicated to supporting this mission. In 2009, 

we trained 38,657 ANA troops, through the Paravant program. We performed this 

training in a high-threat environment where the training locations were unsecured. 

56 

Xe Services also trained and graduated 3,700 ABP personnel and 5,708 NIU personnel in 2009. This training is done in hazardous and often remote environments. 

We not only have trained foreign military and police personnel at the behest of 

the U.S. Government overseas, we also trained approximately 20,000 military, State 

and local law enforcement, and civilian personnel, at our three U.S. training facilities in 2009. 

Xe Services, through its subsidiary Presidential Airways, provides aviation support and medical evacuation services to DOD personnel in Africa. Just last week, 

our personnel evacuated a congressman from Niger during civil unrest. 

The company continues to protect the lives of U.S. diplomats and other government personnel in Afghanistan, including congressional delegations. According to an 

August 2009 Performance Audit by DOS Inspector General (IG), we have ‘‘met each 

of [the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s] security goals’’ in fulfillment of our DOS security contract in Afghanistan. The Office of the IG further reports that our personal security specialists are well-trained and highly-professional, and that our customers—the U.S. personnel the company protects—state that our personnel are professional, make them feel secure, and are respectful to both officials under chief of 

mission authority and their Afghan counterparts. Through more than 4 years of personal protective work in Afghanistan, no one under our protection has been killed, 

and the company work under DOS contract has never experienced a lethal escalation of the use of force. For reference, we performed 2,730 personal protective missions in Afghanistan during 2008 alone. 

In the process of carrying out our work for the U.S. Government in incredibly 

challenging environments, we have lost 37 of our colleagues, who have sacrificed 

their lives in support of our country’s missions. 

The thread that runs through all of these services is that our company and its 

subsidiaries, provide mission-critical services to the U.S. Government both at home 

and in the world’s most challenging operational environment. Our performance is 

highly regarded by those we train, transport, and protect. Indeed, we seek to exceed 

minimum standards of conduct, for example, by implementing General Stanley 

McChrystal’s Counterinsurgency Guidance for all our deployed personnel in Afghanistan. That document, which is binding on NATO forces but not necessarily on contractors, directs personnel to be conscious of the need to protect Afghan nationals 

in all circumstances, as well as constantly to be aware of the need to win their 

hearts and minds. Xe personnel are directed to follow this guidance in performing 

our missions in Afghanistan. The new Xe Services is focused on adding to our record 

of performance the accountability and responsibility demanded by the company’s 

new management. 

RAYTHEON-PARAVANT CONTRACT

I will discuss the Raytheon-Paravant contract in general terms first, including the 

company’s lessons learned, before addressing the May 5, 2009, incident. 

The new management team’s review of all company programs included a thorough 

review of the Paravant program. Almost immediately after Mr. Yorio and Mrs. 

Esposito’s arrival at Xe, a number of issues requiring further investigation were 

identified, including, for example, the absence of Letters of Authorization (LOAs) 

that approved the possession and use of weapons by Paravant’s independent contractors before being deployed to Afghanistan. Xe Services was working to understand and address such issues when the May 5 incident occurred. Indeed, the company’s new management understood, and the documents provided to the committee 

support, that Raytheon’s leadership and CSTC–A and PEO STRI were not only 

aware of the weapons possessed by Paravant personnel, but they were actively seeking to amend the LOAs to approve their use. 

As a wholly-owned subsidiary of Xe Services, Paravant had required polices, procedures, and practices. It is clear in retrospect, however, that these rules were not 

always followed. In my view, the failure to commence this program following wellestablished policy was a failure of Paravant’s former leadership and the company 

director overseeing that program. That leadership and company director reported to 

me at the time, and I accept my share of the responsibility. That leadership and 

company director failed to keep me adequately informed that well-established basic 

policies and practices were not being followed. I believe they were concerned with 

performing the mission—which we have been told by the U.S. military that 

Paravant performed superbly—but there clearly was a failure to take other important steps, which I will describe. 

I can commit to this committee that the new Xe Services would not act in the 

same way today. Deploying personnel overseas with the assumption that problems 

will be resolved after deployment is not the way this company operates today. 

57 

It is important for the committee to understand how the contracting and subcontracting process worked with respect to this contract. For example, Paravant as a 

subcontractor did not have the authority to interact directly with the contracting authority (PEO STRI) to obtain weapons authorization. It was up to the prime contractor, Raytheon, to work with PEO STRI to obtain such authorization. 

I will now discuss each of the Paravant issues our new management identified 

and discuss the lessons the company has learned. 

CRC TRAINING

The policy of the company—both during the performance of the RaytheonParavant subcontract and today—is not to deploy independent contractors without 

any required CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) training. CRC training is a 1-week 

course that includes, among other things, medical, dental, and vision exams; a physical fitness test; and cultural sensitivity training. Quite simply, the company’s policy 

was largely ignored by the Paravant leadership, although Mr. McCracken was working to obtain a waiver that would have allowed CRC training to be provided to independent contractors at our facility in North Carolina, as was approved with respect 

to other company contracts. The company today is authorized to provide CRC training for all U.S. Government programs and personnel, including for individuals affiliated with other contractors. While the documents sent to the committee indicate 

that Raytheon and the military were aware that Paravant had deployed personnel 

without CRC training, that is no excuse. 

Today, our company would not permit deployment of independent contractors 

without CRC training if required by the contract. Moreover, the current culture encourages program leadership to elevate any potential noncompliance, and additional 

and vigorous oversight, primarily in the operational side of the company, ensures 

that the policy is followed. A program manager or any individual who violates this 

policy will be disciplined, up to and including prompt termination. 

VETTING OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

New management also identified failures in the Paravant program related to the 

vetting of independent contractor candidates. It is company policy to verify the military record, including discharge status, of all prospective independent contractors 

who are veterans. This is done by requiring that the individual submit a Form DD– 

214, which is a form listing the vital data of an individual’s military career, including training, assignments, deployments, and discharge status. It appears that 

Paravant required prospective independent contractors to sign written statements 

attesting to this information. With respect to the two independent contractors involved in the May 5, 2009, incident, each signed a statement indicating that he had 

been honorably discharged from military service. Apparently, Mr. McCracken did 

not always verify these statements by requiring submission of Form DD–214. The 

documents submitted to the committee indicate that the company had a written policy to obtain Form DD–214s in November 2008 and that Mr. McCracken at least 

started requiring DD–214s on new recruits as of December 17, 2008. To the extent 

that the Paravant program failed to obtain such forms, it was a violation of company policy then, and it would be a violation of company policy today. 

The company has taken a number of steps to ensure proper vetting of independent contractor candidates. First, immediately following the May 5, 2009, incident, the company revetted all Paravant personnel. Second, the company under new 

management has an ongoing process of periodically revetting all Xe Services independent contractors worldwide. Third, immediately following the May 5, 2009, incident, the new management restructured company’s centralized recruiting office and 

made it part of the human resources division to ensure adherence to standard operating procedures. Finally, the head of human resources has been elevated to a vice 

presidential position and reports directly to the CEO. This reflects the company’s 

commitment to appropriate vetting, and ensures that human resources policies, procedures, and practices are respected. 

WEAPONS AUTHORIZATIONS

It has been and remains company policy that employees and independent contractors deployed overseas may not possess firearms unless they hold appropriate authorizations for the relevant theater and contract. In the case of a DOD contract 

in Afghanistan, it is necessary to have an LOA that includes a weapons authorization, as well as an arming agreement issued by CENTCOM. This policy was not followed by the then-Paravant leadership, which elected to direct the issuance of weapons to Paravant independent contractors despite the absence of proper authorization. As previously mentioned, however, the company’s new management was in the 

58 

process of trying to understand the current status of weapons authorization given 

that both Raytheon and CSTC–A were well aware of the Paravant weapons and 

were seeking to revise the LOA to formally authorize the use of such weapons. Indeed, it is the responsibility of the prime contractor to seek this authorization from 

the contracting authority if it is necessary for performance of the contract. We are 

not aware of an instance where Raytheon or the U.S. military told Paravant independent contractors not to carry weapons. Moreover, the documents submitted to 

the committee support that after an incident involving unapproved use of weapons 

at a firing range in December 2008 (resulting in the termination of a team leader), 

Paravant’s leadership directed the limited use of such weapons while formal approval was being sought by Raytheon and CSTC–A from PEO–STRI, including that 

they were not to be used outside of the forward operating base and locked up when 

not being used on the range. However, this is not an excuse for failure to comply 

with applicable U.S. Government requirements. 

Today, in a situation where the company believed that possession of weapons for 

personal protection was necessary to the safety of our independent contractors, and 

LOAs with weapons authorization had not been issued, we simply would not deploy 

our independent contractors to theater without appropriate weapons authorizations. 

In addition, we would work harder with the prime contractor, in this case Raytheon, 

to have the contracting authority amend our independent contractors’ LOAs. Similarly, should the company determine that the safety of any personnel deployed without a weapons authorization is in jeopardy, the company would order its personnel 

to stay in their forward operating bases until authorization was given, and if it were 

not given, we would request a termination for convenience. 

Other policy changes make it highly unlikely that individuals lacking appropriate 

authorization would obtain weapons from the company’s secure weapons facility in 

Afghanistan. Current weapons policies do not permit issuance of weapons to individuals without appropriate written authorization. Additionally, regular inventories are 

performed to confirm the location of weapons in the company’s custody. Our management team is vigorously enforcing our new weapons policies. 

BUNKER 22 WEAPONS

It is my understanding that there is nothing inherently wrong with Xe Services 

or other contractors receiving weapons from Bunker 22 for use in U.S. Government 

contracts. Bunker 22 is a weapons facility under the control of the ANA and the 

mentorship of the U.S. Army. With the assistance of the U.S. military mentor assigned to Bunker 22, the company obtained weapons in bulk for use on a number 

of U.S. Government contracts. The use of the Bunker 22 weapons was not limited 

to Paravant, and included other company programs where the LOAs authorized the 

personnel to possess a weapon. However, the manner in which Bunker 22 weapons 

were provided to the company lacked appropriate controls and oversight. 

Today, if after authorization by appropriate military officials, the company were 

issued weapons from Bunker 22, our new weapons policies and controls would 

apply. That is, they would be accounted for in our quarterly inventories, and no 

weapon would be issued without appropriate written authorization, which, for a 

DOD contract, includes an LOA with weapons authorization and a CENTCOM 

issued Arming Agreement. 

The company has voluntarily returned many of the firearms it obtained from 

Bunker 22 to the Afghan Government under the supervision of the Disbandment of 

Illegal Armed Groups. The remainder have been or will be either: (a) turned over 

to the U.S. Army for destruction; or (b) turned in to Bunker 22 under the supervision of CSTC–A. For independent contractors performing other contracts for which 

weapons authorization has been obtained, replacement weapons were purchased by 

the company in the United States and were exported to Afghanistan with a valid 

export license. We understand from the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups that 

Xe Services is the only contractor that obtained weapons from Bunker 22 that has 

returned such weapons. Paravant independent contractors were never rearmed. 

THE MAY 5, 2009, INCIDENT

Xe Services’ actions in the days surrounding the tragic May 5, 2009, incident reflect our company’s new approach and focus. From mid-February to mid-March 

2009, Mr. McCracken was transitioning from his role as head of Paravant to 

Raytheon’s in-country manager. As a result of the company’s new management reviewing the Paravant program, the new Director of Paravant, Mr. Hugh Middleton, 

traveled to Afghanistan on April 28, 2009, for the purpose of relieving the in-country 

program manager, evaluating other personnel, and instructing Paravant personnel 

regarding certain company policies and procedures. 

59 

Mr. Middleton delivered a briefing on May 1, 2009, to all Paravant team leaders, 

the substance of which was to be passed down to all independent contractors. 

Among other things, the briefing expressly restated a number of crucial company 

polices, several of which were subsequently violated by the off-duty independent 

contractors involved in the May 5 incident. He reiterated the company’s no alcohol 

policy, a policy that each independent contractor signed before starting performance. 

He also instructed the Paravant personnel that weapons could not be carried away 

from the training range. Finally, he directed that vehicles were to be used for company business only. My understanding is that the four off-duty independent contractors involved in the incident drank alcohol, carried weapons off the training range, 

and utilized a company vehicle for an unauthorized purpose unrelated to contract 

performance. 

After reviewing Paravant’s leadership on the ground, Mr. Middleton informed 

Raytheon that it was relieving Paravant’s in-country program manager, Mr. Walker. 

Mr. McCracken, in his new capacity with Raytheon, opposed Paravant’s replacement 

of Mr. Walker, whom he had selected while working for Paravant. Mr. Middleton, 

several days later, terminated a team leader and an assistant team leader for performance reasons. These terminations occurred on May 5, 2009. 

The company recognized the potential consequences that this tragic incident may 

have on the U.S. military’s counter-insurgency efforts and strategy in Afghanistan. 

To that end, the company promptly notified and met with ANP and Ministry of Interior officials, and fully cooperated with all U.S. and Afghan law enforcement officials. At company initiative, and with the encouragement and facilitation of U.S. 

Army counter-insurgency personnel, the company’s in-country program management 

met with families of the victims shortly after the incident and provided compensation for their losses. The company’s new President and CEO also traveled to Kabul 

to meet with the families and express, personally and on behalf of the company, his 

deepest condolences for their loss. 

The morning after the incident, the company’s management took the initiative 

and ordered the immediate collection of all weapons from Paravant personnel. A 

vice president and a director of U.S. Training Center, another Xe Services subsidiary, traveled to Afghanistan the day after the incident to ensure that weapons 

were collected and that all personnel were cooperating with the military and Afghan 

investigations. The company also promptly terminated the four off-duty independent 

contractors involved in the incident. 

I, and my colleagues at Xe Services, regret that the efforts of the new management team to address and correct legacy issues at Paravant had not been fully completed prior to the tragic loss of life and injury to Afghan civilians on May 5, 2009. 

However, it is important to point out that it is an unfortunate reality that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent tragedy when a number of individuals consciously choose to violate strong policies. The four off-duty independent contractors 

involved in the incident chose to breach a number of key company policies—they 

drank alcohol in contravention of the strict no alcohol policy; they left the forward 

operating base late at night and without authorization; they used a company vehicle 

for a unofficial purpose; and they carried weapons off-duty and away from the training range. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Blake. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES T. BLAKE, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER AND HEAD OF CONTRACTING ACTIVITY, U.S. ARMY 

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR SIMULATION, TRAINING, 

AND INSTRUMENTATION 

Dr. BLAKE. Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony 

today on the important issue of oversight of RTSC and their subcontractor, Paravant LLC, under the Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

I serve as the Program Executive Officer and Head of Contracting Activity, U.S. Army PEO STRI. I am responsible for providing material solutions and services and modeling, simulation, 

training, and test instrumentation to support our soldiers. The PEO STRI executes a $3 billion program annually. More 

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60 

tractors perform this important mission. In addition, the PEO 

STRI’s FMS program supports more than 40 countries. 

Warfighter FOCUS, a contract for training services, was awarded 

on June 6, 2007, to a team led by RTSC, the prime contractor. The 

contract does not provide private security contractors. 

The ANA weapons training program was awarded to Raytheon 

under the Warfighter FOCUS contract on September 5, 2008. 

There was a shooting incident in Kabul on May 5, 2009, and on 

May 7, 2009, Raytheon informed PEO STRI of this tragic event. I 

deeply regret the loss of life suffered by the two Afghan citizens 

and the sorrow this has brought to their families. 

On July 17, 2009, in response to PEO STRI’s letter of concern, 

Raytheon informed PEO STRI that they would not renew the 

Paravant subcontract. Effective September 15, 2009, Paravant LLC 

was no longer performing under the Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today 

and for the support Congress and the members of this committee 

have provided our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I am 

happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Blake. 

Now, Mr. Roitz, first, in your statement to the committee that 

you had previously made, you said that CENTCOM rules relating 

to arming contractors were not followed by the then-Paravant leadership which elected to direct the issuance of weapons to Paravant 

independent contractors despite the absence of proper authorization. 

Were you personally aware that Paravant trainers were armed? 

Mr. ROITZ. I became aware, I believe, based on my recollection, 

Mr. Chairman, that they were armed in the December timeframe 

based on the incident that occurred on the training range. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you know that they were armed without 

authorization before that? 

Mr. ROITZ. No, Mr. Chairman. In fact, my assumption even in 

December would have been that they were armed with proper authorization because that procedure to become armed under a DOD 

contract is a very standard procedure. You have an LOA and you 

have the letter that is eventually signed by CENTCOM to allow the 

personnel to carry weapons. 

Chairman LEVIN. So you were not aware that there was a repeated request to CENTCOM which was rejected to arm those contractors. 

Mr. ROITZ. No, Chairman, I do not believe I was aware. 

Chairman LEVIN. When do you think you first became aware? 

Mr. ROITZ. I first became aware when Mr. McCracken was 

transitioning out. I believe that was the February-March timeframe. During the transition, Mr. LaDelfa was put in charge of 

Paravant. At that point, Mr. Yorio was also doing a bottoms-up review with our new chief operating officer, Ms. Esposito, and that 

concern was raised by Mr. LaDelfa to the new management team. 

The information that I received was through Ms. Esposito. 

Right after that, Ms. Esposito directed that they get to the bottom of the issues: are we authorized to be carrying weapons or not 

and are there issues with the arming agreements? 

61 

Mr. LaDelfa went down to Raytheon shortly thereafter, discussed 

this, and dispatched one of his personnel over to Afghanistan to 

meet with the people on the ground to ascertain whether there was 

any type of waiver or other authority granting them carrying the 

weapons. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the former Vice President for International Training and Operations, Jeff Gibson, told the committee 

that he made the decision to arm Paravant personnel without 

CENTCOM authority. Everyone knew about his decision and he 

definitely spoke with you about that decision. Is that true? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not recall any type of conversation of that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you deny that it happened? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not recall the conversation, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Paravant’s contract with the military’s arming 

regulations requires that armed contractors file a plan that spells 

out how contractors will coordinate with military authorities and 

request assistance in the event that they are attacked. Mr. Walker 

said that Paravant did not coordinate movements of its personnel 

with the military. He repeated that today. 

Do you know if that plan was ever filed by Paravant? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not know. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you ever check to see if it was filed? 

Mr. ROITZ. No, and I believe that that really would fall under the 

operational control of the leaders of Paravant, as well as Mr. Gibson in his role in operations. 

Chairman LEVIN. Blackwater acquired hundreds of AK–47s from 

Bunker 22 for its own personnel to use. General Petraeus has written us saying there is no policy or directive or order or instruction 

that allows U.S. military contractors or subcontractors to use weapons stored at 22 Bunker. That is what General Petraeus has told 

us [Tab 8]. 

Were you aware that Blackwater acquired weapons from Bunker 

22 for its own contractor use? 

Mr. ROITZ. Mr. Chairman, I believe the first I became aware of 

the Bunker 22—or the term Bunker 22 was during an inventory directed for export compliance in the April-May timeframe. It was an 

inventory for all defense-related articles overseas. When we received the list from Afghanistan, there was a significant amount of 

weapons on there that, from an export compliance point of view, we 

could not ascertain where they were sent. That caused a significant 

review by Ms. Esposito on the Bunker 22 issue, as well as our acting general counsel, Mr. Hammond. 

Chairman LEVIN. When did you first find out about that? 

Mr. ROITZ. The investigation, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. No. When did you first find out that Paravant 

and Blackwater were getting AK–47s from Bunker 22 for their own 

personnel? 

Mr. ROITZ. I believe the first I had heard of Bunker 22 weapons 

was, with Paravant, after the incident in May. 

Chairman LEVIN. Incident in May. 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. You were not aware of that fact before that? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. 

62 

Chairman LEVIN. When was the first time you found out that 

those weapons from Bunker 22 were going, or had been taken by 

Blackwater? 

Mr. ROITZ. I believe, Mr. Chairman, it would still fall under the 

auspices of when we inventoried those weapons in the April-May 

timeframe. 

Chairman LEVIN. That would be May 2009. 

Mr. ROITZ. April-May, correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in February of this year, we got a letter 

from your lawyer, which is Tab 15. It says that Blackwater is still 

using 53 weapons. Are you familiar with that letter? 

Mr. ROITZ. I am familiar that a letter was sent. I am not familiar 

with its contents. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that accurate? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not know, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. You are responsible, are you not, for Xe’s contract compliance? 

Mr. ROITZ. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. The contract requires you to abide by all of the 

rules of CENTCOM? 

Mr. ROITZ. We have multiple contracts, some deal with 

CENTCOM and DOD, others with DOS and obviously other agencies. 

Chairman LEVIN. It includes contracts that require you to comply 

with the CENTCOM rules and regulations? 

Mr. ROITZ. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. You are aware that there is a rule that you 

may not use weapons without authority and that you have no authority to use weapons from Bunker 22. You are aware of that? 

Mr. ROITZ. I am not aware of the authority surrounding the 

Bunker 22 weapons. I am aware that arming agreements and information have to be provided by CENTCOM, and those rules are 

very strictly followed. 

Chairman LEVIN. The 53 weapons that you still have, do you 

know how many of those came from Bunker 22? 

Mr. ROITZ. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know that if you have such weapons, 

it is not permitted? 

Mr. ROITZ. Mr. Chairman, I do not know if weapons from Bunker 

22 are permitted or not. I was not aware of the General Petraeus 

email or the message. 

Chairman LEVIN. I thought you said you became aware after this 

May or April time period that Bunker 22 weapons are for the Afghan forces, not for our contractors. 

Mr. ROITZ. No, Mr. Chairman. I think maybe I need to clarify. 

I became aware that Bunker 22 weapons were being used in the 

April-May timeframe. What they were authorized or not authorized 

for I was not aware. 

Chairman LEVIN. So until today, you have not been aware of the 

fact that those weapons are not for contractor use. They are for the 

ANSF. 

Mr. ROITZ. Until General Petraeus’ message was articulated, I 

was under the—— 

63 

Chairman LEVIN. Which was today, right, the first time you 

heard it? 

Mr. ROITZ. I was under the impression that they were authorized 

for use for some of our operations in Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is a problem. 

Chairman LEVIN. It is more than a problem. You are the compliance officer, right? 

Mr. ROITZ. For contracts compliance. We have all—— 

Chairman LEVIN. The contracts include statements that you have 

to comply with CENTCOM rules. Right? 

Mr. ROITZ. It is compliance with certain regulations regarding 

CENTCOM. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, and one of those rules is, and Petraeus 

made it clear in this letter, something that you say you never 

heard of before, that those weapons in that bunker are for Afghan 

forces. We are trying to equip those forces so they can take responsibility for their own security. You are saying until today you were 

not aware of the fact that those weapons were not for use by contractors but were intended for ANSF. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, but also I believe that 

the coordination, the paperwork withdrawing those weapons from 

Bunker 22, was not adequate or sufficient in its documentation. I 

believe the U.S. military was a part of the transfer of Bunker 22 

weapons with their knowledge or with their consent in country in 

Afghanistan when they went to Blackwater. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, what you are saying is, if you got weapons, 

it was with the consent of the U.S. military and you were not 

aware, until today, that you were not supposed to get those weapons. Is that what you are telling us? 

I mean, look, you signed the contract. The contract says specifically that you have to comply with applicable law, treaties, and directives, including specifically CENTCOM’s. What you are saying is 

you were not aware of that CENTCOM rule until today. That is 

what you are telling us. 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is what I am telling you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

When I say it is a problem, it is not just a Blackwater problem, 

it is also a military problem that we have one thing coming from 

the top and the impression, I think, that not just you, Mr. Roitz, 

but Mr. McCracken and Mr. Walker were giving in the previous 

panel was that maybe you were not supposed to have the guns and 

maybe you were not supposed to be getting access to the guns and 

maybe you were not supposed to be carrying the guns, but you 

were doing this under the watchful eye of military that was around 

in the vicinity and no one was saying, ‘‘what are you doing getting 

anything out of Bunker 22.’’ Is that correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. I think there are two issues, Senator. The first issue 

is the arming of the personnel. As I articulated earlier in my oral 

statement and in my written statement, the personnel should not 

have been armed without the appropriate approval in their LOAs 

and CENTCOM LOA or to carry those weapons. That is a separate 

64 

issue and that should not have happened, and it would not happen 

today. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Let us talk a little bit about Paravant and how it came about. 

Based on the public documents of last year, it says that Paravant 

had $80,000 in income. Is that accurate? 

Mr. ROITZ. Last year being 2009? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Mr. ROITZ. I could not see how that would be accurate. It would 

be more than that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is part of the problem here. Are there 

other cover corporations besides Paravant out there where you are 

putting a name on something so that people, like the previous witness, that was looking at these contracts, he said in the hearing 

today that he had no idea that Paravant was Blackwater. But yet, 

the people that were working for you in the theater said, ‘‘well, 

yeah, we worked for Blackwater. Everybody knew we worked for 

Blackwater. Our paychecks came from Blackwater. We were 

Blackwater.’’ Blackwater, Blackwater, Blackwater, Blackwater. 

Paravant just appears to be a classic example of a cover corporation in order for the people who were doing the contract not to 

know who they were really contracting with. 

Mr. ROITZ. Senator, that is a very good question. I think that 

there was, as you discussed earlier, multiple layers of Raytheon 

and then the U.S. Government. Raytheon, from my understanding, 

requested that a company name be other than Blackwater. It was 

at Raytheon’s request. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. So now we are getting to the meat of 

the matter. You are saying on the record that Raytheon requested 

that Blackwater make up a name for a company so they could 

enter into a contract with Raytheon. 

Mr. ROITZ. I am saying, Senator, that my understanding is that 

request for a company other than Blackwater, did come from 

Raytheon. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Something is really rotten in Denmark. The 

fact that the military was allowing this kind of cover corporation, 

if Blackwater is a problem, then we either have to admit that we 

are going to continue to contract with Blackwater and fix it or we 

cannot contract with them anymore. The American people have the 

right to be outraged that we are playing this kind of game with 

contracting. It is wrong. It is flat wrong. 

Now, I read your testimony that Xe has turned over a brand new 

leaf. Let us talk about background checks. Was Xe in existence in 

May 2009? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So this brand new leaf, let me see if I get 

this straight. We had one guy—and I am going to put this in the 

record because I think it is important. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[See Tab 38.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. We had Chris Drotleff that was hired. His 

military record included assault, insubordinate conduct, absence 

without leave, failure to obey an order, larceny, and wrongful apVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
65 

propriation. His criminal record, following his discharge from the 

Army, included convictions for reckless driving, disturbing the 

peace, assault and battery, driving while intoxicated, resisting arrest, and trespassing. Now, that is one of the people that you hired 

with this new leaf, Xe. It is one of the people you hired that shot 

innocent Afghan people. 

The other one, Justin Cannon, a trainer for Paravant, which we 

now know is nothing other than a made-up name on behalf of 

Blackwater, indicted also in the shooting. He was discharged from 

the U.S. military after he was absent without leave and tested 

positive for cocaine. 

It says in the contract that the company maintained a copy of 

military service records for the people it hired, but your company 

has informed the committee that it does not have the records of 

these two individuals in their files. 

Did you or did you not have the records when you hired these 

people to go over, who then allegedly inappropriately, and in a 

criminal fashion, have been indicted for killing innocent civilians in 

a country where we are trying to win the hearts and minds as one 

of our very top military priorities. 

Mr. ROITZ. Senator, there are multiple issues, and I would like 

to address each one. 

First, I believe the two individuals that you have cited were 

hired as independent contractors in the November-December timeframe of 2008. That would have been prior to Mr. Yorio’s arrival, 

as well as Ms. Esposito’s taking over the chief operating officer position. The vetting of those personnel was not in accordance with 

the policies that were established then or the policies of today to 

vet the independent contractor personnel. 

Since Mr. Yorio took over, we moved the recruiting division underneath the human resources department and elevated that position and charged that to a vice president from a commercial organization that reports directly to Mr. Yorio to, one, highlight the importance of the recruiting and vetting process and, two, to give the 

direct line to the CEO to prevent issues that occurred back in the 

past. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is every single person who is working for 

Blackwater now had the kind of background check that these two 

yahoos did not have? 

Mr. ROITZ. Ma’am, we went back and rescreened all personnel. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you have military records for all of 

them? 

Mr. ROITZ. I believe we do, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you have military records for these two 

individuals who killed people? 

Mr. ROITZ. We do not have those military records, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. 

At the time that this happened, you were vice president of training and contracts. Right? 

Mr. ROITZ. Contracts and compliance, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, okay. 

Now, let us talk about independent contractors. It keeps being 

referenced as independent contractors. That is fascinating to me 

that you would call these men—I am assuming maybe there are 

66 

some women in the group—independent contractors, especially in 

light of the fact that there was a strict prohibition of your using 

independent contractors in the contract with Raytheon. 

Now, my legal background tells me that when you have somebody who is an independent contractor, it is usually because you 

want to avoid liability. Why in the world were you all using these 

people as independent contractors instead of employees? 

Mr. ROITZ. Senator, the use of independent contractors precedes 

my work with Blackwater. I think the chairman asked a question 

about our Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filings, which we are 

fully cooperating with, and it has been going on for a number of 

years. We issue 1099s to the individuals. The actual rationale for 

it today, of why we use independent contractors, is a legacy item 

that goes back many years. 

Senator MCCASKILL. This letter in June 2009, after this occurred, 

your company or the pretend company, Paravant, took the legal position after these yahoos shot innocent people—you took the position that you had no responsibility for these folks because they 

were independent contractors. Is that true? [Tab 21]. 

Mr. ROITZ. I am not familiar with the document you are referring 

to. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am now reading a letter that was written 

to the director of contracts at Paravant, which is your company. 

Right? [Tab 22]. 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. This is from the manager of subcontracts at 

Raytheon. The letter says and especially troubling is Paravant’s 

legal position, regarding the limits of its contractual responsibility 

for its trainers, grounded on the assertion that they are independent contractors. 

So you have to be aware that you all asserted a defense in terms 

of any liability under what happened, the negligence in not vetting 

these guys, putting them in theater without even checking their 

background, and not having their military files with the kind of 

backgrounds they have. You used the legal representation that 

they were independent contractors to say, ‘‘not us, not our fault, we 

have no responsibility.’’ Is that not a fair statement? 

Mr. ROITZ. Senator, I would like to review those documents and 

get back to the committee on them [Tab 37]. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it is important that we get to this 

independent contractor thing, and I think it is something that we 

need to follow up with in terms of people in your position, Dr. 

Blake. If we are actually going to be putting on the battlefield, for 

training purposes, people who are working for private companies 

and going to be seen as our soldiers in terms of what they do and 

their actions are going to be held to the United States of America 

for accountability, it is very important that the company that hires 

them has a clear line of responsibility for what they do. 

We have already had this problem in Iraq where we have a contractor that killed one of our soldiers through their negligence and 

now is running around, even though they are still getting contracts 

from our Government. If you are going to get the contracts, Mr. 

Roitz—is that how you say your name? 

Mr. ROITZ. Roitz. 

67 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Roitz, if you are going to get the contracts and make the money, you have to take the responsibility for 

what these guys do. I think Raytheon was correct when they said 

you had no right to call them independent contractors under the 

subcontract, and I want to make sure going forward that that is 

clear. 

Are there any other corporations that have new names that are 

actually Blackwater besides Xe and Paravant? Are there any others 

we should know about so we can identify them for what they are? 

Mr. ROITZ. Senator, the corporate structure of what was formerly 

EP Investments, also known as Blackwater Worldwide, underwent 

a rebranding that the U.S. Training Center provides significant 

training services and security services to the U.S. Government. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just want a list of all the names. If there 

are more names, I just want a list of all the names. 

Mr. ROITZ. I think better, so I do not forget any, Senator, would 

be to provide the committee with an organizational chart with all 

the names on it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay, that is great. Are there more than 

five? Are there 10, 20? Can you give me a ballpark number of how 

many different names there are under the umbrella? 

Mr. ROITZ. We have many names from the different components. 

We have, for example, Aviation Worldwide Services, which provides 

aviation services to Transportation Command. We have Presidential Airways. We have Greystone. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Let us get the list. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[See Tab 37.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know my time is expired. I just have one 

other question. 

Have you gotten any award fees for your work in Afghanistan as 

it relates to training? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not believe we have any award fee contracts, 

ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. The contract which was submitted to Raytheon 

was signed by you. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was submitted in June 2008. Right? It is 

June 8 from Paravant. You signed it. 

Now, that proposal which went to Raytheon, when did Paravant 

come into existence? 

Mr. ROITZ. It was shortly before that timeframe, I believe. 

Chairman LEVIN. I just want to drive home this point, Senator 

McCaskill, about just how fake this was. I know Senator McCaskill 

is going to be interested as well to hear this. 

This is a contract that was submitted by Paravant, which is a 

shell company, to Raytheon on June 8, 2008. It says in the proposal 

the following: ‘‘Paravant has many years of experience in identifying and selecting top candidates for training.’’ As a matter of fact, 

Paravant did not even exist for many years. Is that not right, Mr. 

Roitz? 

68 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROITZ. I believe what that statement was attributing to was 

the recruiting and vetting functions that service all of the companies. 

Chairman LEVIN. Paravant came into existence in 2008. Right? 

Mr. ROITZ. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. It could not have many years of experience at 

anything. That is your contract proposal. How can you possibly 

suggest in writing, other than the fact that Raytheon was very well 

aware of the fact that Paravant came into existence exactly so that 

they would not have to have a letterhead that came from 

Blackwater. Instead, you got a letterhead coming from Paravant. 

I am just asking you the question. Your proposal says something 

which is not true. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. I believe, Mr. Chairman, if you reference the past performance sections of the proposal, it does reference Blackwater contracts. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. But this document—Paravant has 

many years of experience—is not accurate. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. It could have been much better worded. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can your answer be much better worded right 

now? Your answer could be much more direct, frankly. It could not 

be true that Paravant had many years of experience if they did not 

come into existence until the same year. Is that not true? 

Mr. ROITZ. That is true. 

Chairman LEVIN. We are looking for transparency here, and we 

had an effort to cover up who is really doing the contracting. It 

may have been at the request of Raytheon, and Raytheon will have 

to answer to that. There is clearly an effort to cover up that 

Blackwater was the real contractor here, and in terms of holding 

folks accountable, there is an effort made here to create an impression that some company named Paravant for years had been doing 

something which it had not been doing. 

You look at another reference in this contract. It says here that 

Paravant, there are two pages straight, ‘‘We have over 2,000 personnel deployed overseas.’’ Then the next page, ‘‘Many years of experience.’’ 

Now, you were working there as the contracting and compliance 

officer, did this trouble you at all that you were making statements 

that were not accurate in order to cover up the fact that it was a 

Blackwater operation here instead of something else? Were you 

troubled by that? 

Mr. ROITZ. I am troubled today as I read it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you troubled then? 

Mr. ROITZ. No, because I think my understanding was Raytheon 

specifically knew who exactly they were contracting with. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why they were asking for a different name. 

You knew why. They did not want the name Blackwater. 

Mr. ROITZ. They did not want the name Blackwater, as I understood it. 

Chairman LEVIN. By the way, who was it at Raytheon who told 

you they did not want to deal with Blackwater? 

69 

Mr. ROITZ. We will have to get that for the committee [Tab 37]. 

Chairman LEVIN. You do not know. 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not know. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was it your responsibility to screen the trainers which were hired? 

Mr. ROITZ. No. That would have been what we term as the operational support unit, which Mr. McCracken ran prior to his taking 

over. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. So that if the military record of Mr. 

Drotleff was not reviewed and you do not have that military record, 

that is something you were not involved in. 

Mr. ROITZ. No. It was an error or it was unacceptable that we 

did not receive the DD–214s. There was a policy in place that they 

were to get the DD–214s. 

Chairman LEVIN. But it did not happen in that case? 

Mr. ROITZ. It did not happen in that case. 

Chairman LEVIN. What about Mr. Kucharski? Are you familiar 

with that issue? 

Mr. ROITZ. He was the one referenced—— 

Chairman LEVIN. He was on the ‘‘do not use’’ list. 

Mr. ROITZ. That policy is very clear within the company that if 

they are a ‘‘do not use’’ person, they are not to be used. Mr. 

McCracken, based on his testimony this morning, I am not surprised, but clearly he violated the intent of that policy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you familiar with a letter which came from 

General Formica which said that the Army investigation which occurred after the May event, there was none after the December 

event, and if there had been one, as there should have been, there 

maybe never would have been a May event. But in any event, General Formica said in his June 2009 letter that the Army’s investigation ‘‘has raised serious issues concerning an apparent lack of contractor oversight’’ [Tab 1]. Are you familiar with that letter? 

Mr. ROITZ. I am not familiar with that specific letter, I do not 

believe. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know a Jim Sierawski? 

Mr. ROITZ. Sierawski? 

Chairman LEVIN. Sierawski. 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senior Vice President of Blackwater. 

There were some talking points which he used in a May 11 meeting shortly after the May event which said the following, that 

Paravant management in Afghanistan created an environment 

with ‘‘no regard for policies, rules, or adherence to regulations in 

country’’ [Tab 2]. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. ROITZ. Based on my review in preparation for the hearing, 

I would agree. 

Chairman LEVIN. You would agree? All right. 

In terms of this independent contractor issue, which Senator 

McCaskill has raised, it is a very, very critical issue. Those of us 

who are lawyers would not blink an eyelash in saying that these 

are not independent contractors. There is no way that these folks 

are independent contractors. You can call them whatever you want 

and you did it, I think, to limit your own liability and for a number 

of other reasons. But there is no way that they can be called indeVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
70 

pendent contractors when they have a continuing relationship or 

the workers work for long and fixed hours. They are under the supervision and control of the company. They have to comply with instructions, rules, and regulations. Just looking through what the 

criteria are for independent contractors, I do not think that these 

folks could be characterized as that. I understand there is an inquiry that is being made into that issue. 

When you filed a worker’s compensation claim with the Department of Labor’s Office of Worker’s Compensation, Blackwater told 

the Department of Labor that the injury occurred, you are talking 

about the December 9, 2008, event during usual work. Do you remember that? Are you familiar with that? [Tab 31]. 

Mr. ROITZ. I am not familiar with that report. I am familiar with 

the incident. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me quickly ask Dr. Blake some questions. 

By the way, you made reference to the independent contractor as 

a legacy issue. Is there a plan at Xe to end this practice or to review this practice, do you know? 

Mr. ROITZ. We are reviewing it currently. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you believe that Blackwater has an obligation to supervise its personnel operating in Afghanistan? 

Mr. ROITZ. Is that my question, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. I made a mistake. I said I was going to 

ask Dr. Blake, which I intend to do, but this is for you, Mr. Roitz. 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, I believe that there is a responsibility to supervise the personnel in Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Blackwater wrote Raytheon—this is Tab 

21—saying that if Raytheon believes that Paravant has an obligation to supervise all subcontractor personnel at all times, it is going 

to increase the cost. You are going to charge them for that. 

Mr. ROITZ. There are really two components of that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. ROITZ. The first component is staffing. Was there adequate 

staffing with the proper management in place to—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Under your contract, do you believe you had 

the obligation to supervise subcontractor personnel? 

Mr. ROITZ. Correct. I think there was adequate staffing in place 

for, I believe, it is 72 personnel. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then you said that you are going to need more 

money if you are going to do that. 

Mr. ROITZ. I believe that what this is referring to in that document is the alluding to Raytheon wanting personnel to supervise 

them 24/7 when they are not working under performance of the 

contract. You have the terms of the contract happening and then 

you have outside the scope of the contract. What we believed that 

they were asking for was outside the scope of the contract. 

Chairman LEVIN. That they do not have to supervise their personnel when they are not performing contract functions? 

Mr. ROITZ. There is an expectation that they have general supervision of those personnel, but what we believe Raytheon was asking for was greater than that. We have policies—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you clarify that? Did you ever clarify that 

with Raytheon? Did you ever get an answer back? 

71 

Mr. ROITZ. Our legal department was working with Raytheon’s 

legal department on that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. This might be my final question. We will turn 

it back to Senator McCaskill. 

Xe does not withhold income tax from these contractors, does not 

pay Social Security for these so-called contractor employees, but we 

will call them personnel, and does not pay Medicare taxes, does not 

pay unemployment tax on payments that are made. So Uncle Sam 

is out all of that revenue, the withholding, the Social Security, the 

Medicare taxes. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not believe so. 

Chairman LEVIN. You believe it is not correct? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not believe so. I am not a lawyer, and I would 

have to have a little assistance from my legal staff. But we will 

issue them a 1099 which my understanding is—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you withhold income tax? 

Mr. ROITZ. No, we do not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you pay Social Security tax? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not believe so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you pay Medicare tax? 

Mr. ROITZ. I do not believe so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. That is what I was asking. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I assume that the point you were trying to 

make, Mr. Roitz, is that it is their obligation to pay that based on 

their 1099. 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is one of the reasons the IRS takes a 

hard look at independent contractors, and it is very hard in terms 

of resources to stay on top of how many of those folks actually pay 

all the money they are obligated to pay. 

Once again, you have American soldiers in uniform training the 

ANA and the ANP, and then you have Blackwater folks looking the 

same, doing the same job. Out of every paycheck that military person has, their pay is docked for the same kind of things that most 

of us have our pay docked for. The question is whether or not we 

have that same level of accountability. 

How many independent contractors did you have in Afghanistan 

working on these contracts? 

Mr. ROITZ. On the Paravant contract? I believe it was approximately 70. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Seventy? So it was not an overwhelming 

number in terms of checking up on them. 

Mr. ROITZ. No, ma’am. We had quite a significant role in the Afghan Border Patrol training, the Narcotics Interdiction Unit training in Afghanistan, as well as performing services for DOS, which 

you referenced earlier in your statement. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many personnel do you have on the 

ground in Afghanistan right now through all the various named 

companies? 

Mr. ROITZ. We would have to get back to the committee on that 

[Tab 37]. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ballpark. You have to know ballpark. Is it 

hundreds? Is it thousands? 

72 

Mr. ROITZ. It is in the hundreds, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is in the hundreds? Okay. 

Dr. Blake, we have been showing an awful lot of attention to Mr. 

Roitz. I am going to ask you some tough questions now. 

This is essentially with Raytheon. We now know from this hearing that Raytheon requested Blackwater change their name to 

cover the fact that they were really hiring Blackwater, which 

should be a problem, obviously, because Raytheon is a major defense contractor. That is very troubling that their company would 

do that and we have to sort that out. I want Raytheon to be able 

to defend themselves. But according to the testimony that we have 

received, the people at Blackwater said they changed their name 

and made representations in the contract about how long they have 

worked because Raytheon knew they were really Blackwater. This 

was just putting another name in the contract to pretend like they 

were Blackwater so they could say they had all this experience, 

they had trained all these people, and they had this really good 

vetting process because Raytheon knew that it was not really 

Paravant, because it was Blackwater. 

Here is my question to you. This was essentially a pass-through 

contract with Raytheon. The only function Raytheon had, as it related to the work of Blackwater, that we have talked about in this 

hearing, was oversight. Is that correct? 

You need to put your microphone on, Dr. Blake. 

Dr. BLAKE. Excuse me. Raytheon served as the prime contractor. 

This was one TO of many, many TOs. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Dr. BLAKE. The subcontractor on that team was Paravant. So the 

responsibility for subcontractor management, which was in the solicitation and the award, rested with Raytheon. They were responsible for managing the activities of the sub. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So as I say, as it relates to this part of their 

work, their only responsibility was oversight. I know they had a lot 

of other TOs under the $11 billion contract, but for this part of the 

contract, they did not put anybody in the field to do training. This 

was all about a subcontract that they had with Paravant at the 

time, that they now have with the other company I referenced earlier, MPRI. 

Dr. BLAKE. That is my understanding. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Knowing that their only job was oversight 

and knowing what occurred during this period of time, whether it 

is them getting guns they were not authorized to get, an accidental 

discharge that paralyzed somebody because of being shot in the 

head, people that have criminal records that have been discharged 

from the Army that obviously have huge problems in their background, or being indicted criminally for killing innocent citizens 

during this period of time. Raytheon got not only an award fee for 

the performance, they got an increase in their award fee. Is that 

not correct? 

Dr. BLAKE. The performance of Raytheon under the contract and 

the performance of Paravant was not included. This TO was not 

part of the award fee consideration. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So they did not get any award fee for this 

part. 

73 

Dr. BLAKE. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How is that delineated? How would we be 

able to track that? 

Dr. BLAKE. The award fee plans are put together in advance, and 

we decide on what particular activities that are of sufficient concern to us that we want to track or have improvements made. That 

is normally done on the firm fixed price core work that we do and 

select customer work. Normally if there is an award fee associated 

with it, the customer would contribute to that pool, the award fee 

pool. In this particular case, that did not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That was confusing to me. I think this is 

important because in this committee hearing room we have gone 

through a lot of testimony about award fees. We had bad things 

happen in Iraq about award fees. There was really subperformance 

on many, many contracts, and these contracts all got award fees, 

which really are supposed to act like bonuses for good work. What 

we found out is that everybody just got them. It did not matter 

what kind of work they had done. They just got them. 

What I am trying to figure out now, clearly Raytheon failed in 

overseeing this contract. I think anybody I went up to and talked 

to at my grocery store, if I told them the story we have heard in 

this hearing, they would say Raytheon failed during that period of 

time in overseeing this contract. 

Did they suffer one penny because of that failure? 

Dr. BLAKE. The contract with Raytheon continued on. The work 

that Paravant was contracted to do with this particular TO was 

performed. The training was conducted for the ANA. There were no 

penalties, if that is the question that you are asking, associated 

with that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Should there be? Should there be penalties 

for this kind of failure of oversight, that the subcontractor had not 

even bothered to vet the people? 

Dr. BLAKE. This is a question we will have to look into. That was 

not in the contract at the time. This issue was not envisioned. 

I would like to make one clarification on the earlier statement. 

The responsibility for the prime contractor to monitor what was 

going on with the subcontract also included all of the information 

associated with managing that, to ensure that all the rules and 

regulations were complied with, that they were properly vetted and 

properly supervised. I do not view it as a pass-through, as you described it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. I guess that is my point. Either it is 

a pass-through and the fact that they failed in oversight is irrelevant, or they had responsibility for oversight and they failed because in either way there is a problem here. That is what I am getting at. The fact, Dr. Blake, if you just step back from it and look 

at it from a distance, they received an increase in their performance fee during this period of time. That dog don’t hunt where I 

come from. 

Dr. BLAKE. As a clarification, the award fee again was not based 

on the work being down in southwest Asia. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you did not take into account their failure on one part of the contract as you decided whether or not they 

should get award fees for the other parts of the contract? 

74 

Dr. BLAKE. It was not built into the award fee plan. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why would that be? Why would you not 

want to hold these guys accountable through the only mechanism 

we have, which is money? What would be the reasoning for that, 

do you know? 

Dr. BLAKE. No, I do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Does it make sense to you? 

Dr. BLAKE. The award fee plan is done in advance. We are looking backward into this activity that happened. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let us look forward. Going forward, would 

it make sense to you that you would have a contractor fail in their 

oversight capacity which they were being paid to do, good money, 

serious money to oversee and they did not have anybody on the 

ground in Afghanistan. These guys went into the field, they had 

not even been vetted and they were getting weapons they were not 

even supposed to have their hands on, and they were accidentally 

discharging them and shooting people. 

What I am trying to get at here is, we are trying to fix something 

here. This is not just about beating up on Blackwater, although it 

probably feels like it to Mr. Roitz. This is about fixing things. What 

I need to hear from you is, we have to fix this. We cannot be giving 

bonuses to companies who have failed in this part of it. We did 

okay over here. We go ahead and give them a lot of money and 

they do not suffer anything for failing over here. You follow my 

train of thought here? 

Dr. BLAKE. I do and it is an issue that we should look at. We 

agree that they should not be rewarded for poor behavior. We do 

have a subcontracting performance plan in place with them, and 

that would be a subject of how we would do the ratings for the performance of Raytheon. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We have two kinds of organizations that are 

performing the same functions. One responds to money and the 

other responds to duty. If we are going to hold these contractors 

accountable, we better get busy with making sure it hurts when 

they do things like this and fail to do things like this, if we do not 

respond that there are consequences. Let me close with this because I think I have certainly had an opportunity to ask a lot of 

questions, and I have learned a lot. I think we can follow up with 

some of this with the subcommittee on contracting. 

It is not so simple, Mr. Roitz, as changing your name. If it could 

be so simple. There are a lot of people who have been through this 

building who made big mistakes who would have liked to just 

change their name and make it all better. The way you restore 

your reputation is not by changing your name. The way you restore 

your reputation is by changing the way you do business. This is a 

good example of while the name had changed, the underbelly of the 

beast had not significantly changed because you did not even do 

the basics of checking whether or not you had people who had no 

business over there in positions of responsibility. 

I think you are wasting a lot of money on lawyers changing 

names. I think you could invest that money in quality control and 

accountability and probably do much better for your company than 

just thinking you can do it by changing a name. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

75 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Mr. ROITZ. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. ROITZ. Can I address that, please? 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure, if you can do it quickly. 

Mr. ROITZ. I will do it quickly. 

The change to Xe, while it is a name change, Senator—I do not 

believe that is—that is true that we have changed our name. But 

I have seen the old company, and I discussed it both in my written 

testimony and my oral testimony. The company of 2008 is not the 

company of today. There is much more structure in the compliance. 

There is a philosophy of compliance. An example of that is I 

stopped defense-related training on a major program in Afghanistan much to the angst of the customers because we identified we 

were out of compliance on an export control matter. That probably 

would not have happened in 2008, and that happened in 2009. 

Unfortunately, the new management that came in March 2009 

did not have enough time to do the top-to-bottom review before 

that May 5 incident, we truly regret that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I appreciate that. As time goes on, I am just 

telling you nobody around here is going to be convinced by new 

names. So as time goes on, it is how you perform and whether or 

not these problems are cleared up and whether or not you are willing to call these people employees instead of independent contractors because there is no reason you call them that for any other 

reason than avoiding liability for their actions. 

Mr. ROITZ. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee invited J.D. Stratton to testify 

today about his role in acquiring and distributing weapons to 

Blackwater personnel. He invoked the Fifth Amendment, which he 

had a right to do. Is Mr. Stratton still employed by your company? 

Mr. ROITZ. I was informed he is. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does that mean yes? 

Mr. ROITZ. Yes. I understand he is. 

Chairman LEVIN. You were doing the same thing back a couple 

years ago as you are doing now? 

Mr. ROITZ. No. My role has really changed. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. But you were employed then and you 

are still employed by the same company. So you are one employee 

at least they did not change. 

Mr. ROITZ. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Stratton is another employee they did not 

change. 

Now, a few months before, this goes to you, Dr. Blake, PEO STRI 

approved that Raytheon could subcontract with Paravant, and DOS 

evaluated Blackwater’s performance in Iraq. Are you familiar with 

that evaluation? 

Dr. BLAKE. No, Senator, I am not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the evaluation by DOS, which is again 

before your office approved this subcontractor Paravant, that DOS 

evaluation said that actions by Blackwater personnel during the 

late summer and fall of 2007 had led DOS—and these are DOS’s 

words ‘‘to lose confidence in Blackwater’s credibility and management ability’’ [Tab 29]. 

76 

Should that not have been taken into consideration by you, an 

Army contracting office, before you or your office approved this subcontract with Blackwater? 

Dr. BLAKE. I believe, as Mr. Ograyensek testified earlier, he was 

not aware that the firm that won the bid was a Blackwater-affiliated firm. I certainly was not either. I was not aware of this contract until after the shooting incident. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. So here we have a situation where 

the change of the name is deceptive, and I think we all ought to 

understand what we are talking about here. It resulted in a DOS 

assessment about a firm not being brought to the attention of our 

contracting people because the name had changed. 

This is some very serious business we are talking about here. I 

do not now what exactly we can do except to put in every application, that goes in here for a proposal for a contract or asking for 

approval of a subcontractor, a question whether or not that subcontractor has changed its name or was operating under a different 

name. 

This is deception here. This gets into a very serious issue because people in our Government who have the responsibility of approving a subcontract or not were not informed that another agency of our Government said they have no longer any credibility. DOS 

says they have no credibility in Blackwater in 2007. DOD approves 

a subcontract for Blackwater’s new shell corporation Paravant in 

2008. That is serious business. 

I just want to let you know that, Mr. Roitz, because then it is 

a misrepresentation to the Government in order to get a contract. 

It is not a technical issue. It is a very serious, substantive issue 

that needs to be addressed by DOD and it needs to be looked at 

by DOJ. We will refer that matter to DOJ, as well as ask DOD to 

take steps to make sure that that can never happen again. 

I want to go to your ratings issue. When you said this award fee 

was approved, it did not include this TO, is that what you said Dr. 

Blake? 

Dr. BLAKE. The award fee pool did not include that TO. 

Chairman LEVIN. But it has as a criteria here, it is a whole period. It is May 2008 to October 2008 for period 2, and then it is 

period 3, November 2008 to April 2009. So that includes the period 

of that December shooting. Where does it say what is excluded 

from here? Would a TO be included in here but not specifically 

identified, or it is just not included? 

Dr. BLAKE. Only selected tasks are included in that evaluation 

plan. You have a summary. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does it say that in here somewhere? 

Dr. BLAKE. In the development of the plan and the award fee 

pool, it would be, sir. I believe you are looking at a summary. 

Chairman LEVIN. Somewhere in there you could show us a document which would show that this particular TO was not included 

for consideration in that award fee. 

Dr. BLAKE. I would show you a document on what items were included in the determination. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Dr. Blake did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

77 

Chairman LEVIN. What were, okay. 

My last question goes to Mr. Roitz. 

Mr. Roitz, you were the contracts compliance officer for 

Blackwater back in December 2008, which was the first shooting 

which we focused on here today. In an email chain on that day, you 

indicated that you had been briefed on the shooting. Is that correct? 

As the contracts compliance officer, did you direct any kind of investigation to determine whether or not firing AK–47s off the top 

of a moving vehicle had anything at all to do with training the 

ANA in the proper use of weapons? Did you take any steps? 

Mr. ROITZ. Mr. Chairman, when I was briefed, I was briefed that 

it was not approved training. At that point, it was already decided 

that it was not approved and should not have happened. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you direct any kind of investigation? 

Mr. ROITZ. There was an incident report and I believe Mr. Gibson conducted some form of remedial action. I think there was a 

safety stand-down day. One person was fired. I am not sure of all 

the actions taken. 

Chairman LEVIN. You said it was approved training? 

Mr. ROITZ. No. It was not approved training. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was not approved, nor was it routine. 

Mr. ROITZ. No. 

Mr. Chairman, I do have one—my counsel has pointed out that 

I apparently misunderstood one of your earlier questions regarding 

General Petraeus. I misunderstood you to say that there was new 

guidance today which bars contractors from using Bunker 22 weapons. It is my understanding that Bunker 22 weapons may be an 

appropriate source of weapons. That does not undercut, in the case 

of Paravant, they should not have weapons without authorization. 

I wanted to be sure I did not leave a misinterpretation. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Thank you for that clarification. 

Documents that are in this binder will be made part of the 

record. The correspondence with witnesses who advised us that 

they would take the Fifth Amendment will be made part of the 

record and, as I said before, the entire lengthy opening statement 

which I summarized here. 

We again thank our witnesses for being here. We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INADEQUATE VETTING OF PARAVANT PERSONNEL

1. Senator LEVIN. Mr. McCracken, Sebastian Kucharski was fired from 

Blackwater in September 2006 for his involvement in an alcohol-fueled fight with 

another Blackwater independent contractor and was placed on Blackwater’s own 

‘‘Do Not Use’’ list at that time. You told the committee that Blackwater’s recruiting 

department presented him to you during in-processing for the Paravant contract. 

You stated that you were told that he had been fired from Blackwater for a ‘‘personality thing.’’ With whom did you discuss Mr. Kucharski at the time of his in-processing? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The ‘‘Do Not Use’’ classification was very arbitrary, in my experience. I was told that Mr. Kucharski was a program ‘‘Do Not Use,’’ in other words 

he could not go back to that particular program, in this case the Blackwater Worldwide Personal Protective Service program. When I asked Blackwater about this, I 

was told that Mr. Kucharski was a ‘‘Program Do Not Use’’ based upon a personality 

78 

conflict with another individual. I do not recall the name of the Blackwater individual, however. 

2. Senator LEVIN. Mr. McCracken, you testified to the committee that you did not 

have access to Mr. Kucharski’s records, showing the reasons he was added to the 

‘‘Do Not Use’’ list. Those records also show that on November 20, 2008, after Mr. 

Kucharski was hired by Paravant, his status on the ‘‘Do Not Use’’ list was changed 

by ‘‘asmith’’ or Alexis Smith, the only other Paravant employee at the time. 

a. Were you aware that Ms. Smith changed Mr. Kucharski’s status? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. No, I do not recall being aware of that change. 

b. Senator LEVIN. What was the purpose of the change? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not recall being aware of the change. 

c. Senator LEVIN. Did you discuss changing Mr. Kucharski’s status with Ms. 

Smith? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I do not recall discussing Mr. Kucharski’s status with Ms. 

Smith. 

3. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Roitz, Blackwater’s proposal for the Paravant contract describes a recruitment process to identify and vet candidates, whose key attributes 

are ‘‘character, integrity, reliability, and professionalism.’’ The proposal says that 

candidates will be selected by the Vice President of Contracts and others. 

a. Were you the Vice President of Contracts at that time? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Mr. Roitz was Blackwater USA’s Vice President of Contracts and Compliance at 

the time of the Paravant proposal. The reference ‘‘Compliance’’ in the title was intended to reflect contract compliance. 

b. Did you participate in the selection of personnel for Paravant? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Mr. Roitz has no recollection of participating in the ‘‘Instructor Section Panel’’ referenced in the Paravant proposal. The proposal was not incorporated into the 

Paravant subcontract. 

c. The proposal says that ‘‘each instructor must have on file a copy of DD214 (a 

servicemember’s military record) if that instructor has prior military experience.’’ In 

your written testimony, you said that ‘‘Apparently, Mr. McCracken did not always 

verify these statements by requiring submission of a Form DD214.’’ If you were the 

Vice President of Contracts at the time, what steps, if any, did you take to ensure 

that the Form DD214 was considered as part of the recruitment and hiring process? 

Mr. ROITZ. As a contractual matter, the Paravant subcontract did not require 

DD214s. However, the company’s November 2008 recruiting policy included an express requirement to request a copy of a DD214 from each selected candidate with 

military service. As the former head of Blackwater USA’s Operational Support Unit, 

which recruits and vets candidates under that policy, Mr. McCracken would have 

had direct knowledge of this policy. As the original Program Manger of the Paravant 

program when candidates were selected, Mr. McCracken would also know that the 

requirement for DD214s applied to his program. The program is also responsible for 

ensuring that files contain DD214s (See Senate Armed Services Committee 

(SASC))–034029—retained in committee files.) (Mr. McCracken, in his role as the 

management official in charge of Paravant, instructed Paravant’s Program Manager 

assistant to obtain DD214 before Mr. McCracken ‘‘give[s] the go-ahead to place them 

in CRC’’). 

BLACKWATER’S PAST PERFORMANCE

4. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Ograyensek, on July 1, 2008, just a few months before the 

Army approved Blackwater-Paravant to perform the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

training contract, the Department of State (DOS) reviewed Blackwater’s performance in Iraq and concluded that they had lost ‘‘confidence in [Blackwater’s] credibility and management ability.’’ 

a. Are contractor performance evaluations produced by the DOS available to you? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. Past performance evaluations produced by the DOS are not provided directly to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Contractor Performance AsVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
79 

1The dates are based on a translation of an Arabic document. 

sessment Reporting System (CAPRS) is the system primarily used by DOD. Effective July 1, 2009, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) required agencies to 

post all contractor performance evaluations in the Federal-wide Past Performance 

Information Retrieval System contractor performance evaluations that comply with 

the current FAR requirement are available to the Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (PEO STRI). 

b. In evaluating contract proposals do you consider performance evaluations conducted by other U.S. Government agencies? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. PEO STRI contracting officers may consider past performance 

information from any source as long as the performance being evaluated is recent 

and relevant to the services being acquired. 

COMPANIES OPERATING AS BLACKWATER

5. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Roitz, you testified that Raytheon requested that 

Blackwater perform the ANA training contract under a separate name. 

a. Who at Raytheon made the request that Blackwater operate under a separate 

name? 

b. To whom was that request made? 

c. Who at Raytheon and/or Blackwater participated in discussions about that 

issue? 

d. When did those discussion(s) occur? 

e. Who at Blackwater approved the decision to use the Paravant name in submitting its proposal for this government contract? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Please see Mr. Roitz’s letter to Chairman Levin of March 10, 2010, addressing 

these issues [Tab 37.] 

6. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Roitz, of the following companies currently operating as 

subsidiaries of the Prince Group LLC or Xe Services LLC (formerly known as 

Blackwater Worldwide), please identify when Blackwater began conducting business 

under the name of each subsidiary and the date(s) on which any proposal was submitted for a government contract or subcontract under each name. 

a. Apex Management Solutions LLC (10/21/05) 

b. Aviation Worldwide Services LLC (11/16/00) and its subsidiaries (Air Quest 

Inc., (10/23/00), Presidential Airways Inc., (6/10/98), Guardian Flight Systems LLC 

(1/6/06) (now a subsidiary of X3), STI Aviation Inc.) (3/19/02) 

c. Backup Training LLC (8/9/07) 

d. Blackwater Proshop LLC (11/21/05) (6/2/06) 

e. BWT Services LLC (6/2/06) 

f. E & J Holdings LLC (1/1/97) 

g. E & J Leasing LLC (9/25/98) 

h. EP Aviation LLC (11/15/01) 

i. EP Management Services LLC (11/16/06) 

j. GSD Manufacturing LLC (10/16/00) 

k. Pelagian Maritime LLC (2/2/07) 

l. Raven Development Group LLC (9/3/04-cancelled 8/12/09) 

m. Samurus Co. LTD (10/12/06) and its subsidiaries Greystone LTD (5/13/04), 

Greystone SRL (9/3/07), Salamis Aviation LLC (8/27/04), Al-Zulama Company) (5/2/ 

06) 1

n. Total Intelligence Solutions (11/28/06) 

o. Technical Defense, Inc. (11/29/00) 

p. Terrorism Research Center, Inc. (1/30/97) 

q. U.S. Training Center, Inc. (12/26/96) and its subsidiaries Blackwater West LLC 

(5/15/06), and Blackwater Security Consulting LLC) (1/22/02) 

r. XPG LLC (5/28/08) 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The dates of incorporation of the above entities are identified in the above parenthetical. The company previously produced in response to the chairman’s June 18, 

2009, letter request: (1) a chart (SASC–014705–014711—retained in committee files) 

identifying all contracts and subcontract to perform private security functions in AfVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
80 

ghanistan, including the period of performance; (2) copies of those contracts; and (3) 

copies of proposals for those contracts. 

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BLACKWATER’S ARMORER

7. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Roitz, you testified to the committee that Mr. Jerry D. 

Stratton, Jr. is still employed by Xe Services. Lawyers for Xe Services informed committee staff that as of July 2009, however, Mr. Stratton no longer had responsibilities as the company’s armorer. However, in his February 19, 2010, written responses to the committee’s questions, Chief Warrant Officer Gregory Sailer informed 

the committee that he was ‘‘approached by Mr. Stratton on 16 February 2010 asking 

how [Mr. Stratton] could turn in weapons that he claimed belonged to Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A).’’ 

a. What responsibilities did Mr. Stratton have since July 2009, including responsibilities relating to weapons? 

b. Why did Mr. Stratton attempt to contact Chief Warrant Officer Sailer on February 16, 2010? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Beginning in or around July 2009, Mr. Stratton was no longer responsible for the 

company’s central weapons storage facility in Afghanistan. He was transferred to 

the Quality Control team for the Afghanistan Border Patrol (ABP) program and is 

now primarily responsible for the collection of biometric data for Afghan students. 

We have been unable to interview Mr. Stratton regarding whether he contacted 

Chief Warrant Officer Sailer on February 16, 2010. In declining to provide additional information to the company on this and other issues, Mr. Stratton has raised 

through his counsel concerns that his cooperation with the company investigation 

may be considered a waiver of any applicable privileges or rights. In order to address that concern and obtain the information that the committee has requested, the 

company on behalf of Mr. Stratton’s counsel has asked committee staff to provide 

written assurance that information provided by individuals to company counsel 

would not be relied upon in any subsequent claim of waiver. No such assurances 

have been provided as of the date of this letter. 

PAYMENT TO MRS. DROTLEFF

8. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Roitz, after the May 5, 2009, shooting involving Blackwater/ 

Paravant personnel, Justin Cannon and Christopher Drotleff, Blackwater acknowledged in a May 27, 2009, letter to Mr. Drotleff’s wife that it had a ‘‘legal obligation’’ 

and was under direct orders from DOD not to take any action to facilitate Mr. 

Drotleff’s departure from Afghanistan. In its May 27th letter to Mrs. Drotleff, the 

company advised her, however, that Mr. Drotleff could leave Afghanistan ‘‘using his 

own resources.’’ At that time, Blackwater also sent Mrs. Drotleff a check for $4,850. 

Mr. Drotleff left the country the next day. [Retained in committee files.] 

a. Why was that money sent? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The May 27, 2009, letter states the purpose of the payment: ‘‘This payment to you 

was based on the company’s recognition of your family’s short-term needs and to 

recognize that your husband has shouldered more burden associated with this cooperation with the government’s investigation tha[n] the other three individuals involved in the incident, two of which left the company’s facility at night without any 

notice or assistance from the company and against its instructions.’’ 

The company terminated Mr. Drotleff and withheld all payments due him under 

his contract as a result of his breach of contract. The company’s actions left Mrs. 

Drotleff and her children without any financial support. Mr. Drotleff repeatedly expressed concern that by agreeing to return to Afghanistan, he remained unable to 

earn any income and had no way to financially support his family, which increased 

his flight risk. As indicated in the May 27, 2009, letter, the payment, made payable 

only to Mrs. Drotleff, was strictly humanitarian-based to allow Mrs. Drotleff to support her children and the family’s domestic financial obligations during extended deliberations among the U.S. Army, DOS, and the Afghan Ministries of Interior and 

Justice on whether to grant permission for Mr. Drotleff to leave Afghanistan. In 

making the payment, there was no intent for the funds paid to Mrs. Drotleff to be 

used for any other purpose. 

The funds were sent to Mrs. Drotleff on May 27, 2009, by overnight mail to arrive 

on May 28, 2009. Given the time zone differences, the company understands that 

81 

Mr. Drotleff left the company’s facility in Kabul on his own accord well before Mrs. 

Drotleff received the overnight package, with the May 27, 2009, letter and the 

check. The company does not know how Mr. Drotleff was able to depart the country. 

If the company wanted Mr. Drotleff to depart Afghanistan, it would never have 

escorted him back to Afghanistan to cooperate with the investigation. Mr. Drotleff 

was never reinterviewed by any U.S. or Afghan law enforcement personnel after returning to Afghanistan. 

b. Did the company advise DOD personnel of that payment at the time? If so, who 

did the company advise and when? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company did not advise DOD personnel of the payment and is not aware of 

any obligation to do so. The company was advising DOD and DOS of the company’s 

concern over Mr. Drotleff’s increasing despondency and restlessness while he waited 

for permission to depart Afghanistan. 

PARAVANT’S PERFORMANCE ON THE CONTRACT

9. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Blake, please advise the committee whether PEO STRI was 

aware of each of the following performance-related issues on the Raytheon-Paravant 

contract: 

a. In mid-April 2009, concerns were raised to CSTC–A and to newly arrived 

Raytheon country manager, Brian McCracken, about a shortage of Paravant personnel at a training site and whether the Paravant personnel were performing up 

to U.S. Army standards; 

Dr. BLAKE. My staff has advised me that CSTC–A CJ7 did not inform us of any 

personnel shortages. Raytheon Technical Services Company (RTSC) did not report 

any issues with their subcontractor performing to standard. 

b. On May 4, 2009, a Paravant Team Leader and an assistant Team Leader were 

thrown off the contract by the U.S. Army, after the Team Leader attempted to pull 

rank on an U.S. Army lieutenant. The newly appointed Paravant program manager, 

Tom Adams, reported of the entire Paravant team that they all are so average and 

the U.S. Army can’t stand any of them; 

Dr. BLAKE. After inquiring throughout my organization, I have found no one in 

my organization who reports that they were aware of this incident. I found no indication that either the CSTC–A CJ7 or RTSC ever reported the incident to PEO 

STRI. 

c. On May 5, 2009, military personnel in Gardez reported concerns to Raytheon 

about the maturity level and experience level of some of the Paravant personnel; 

Dr. BLAKE. I received no reports of concerns regarding the maturity level or experience of Paravant personnel. My staff reports that no concerns regarding qualifications of Paravant personnel specifically at Gardez were identified from either 

CSTC–A CJ7 or RTSC. One of the Technical Oversight Representatives (TORs) from 

a unit of CSTC–A, Major Van Westen, in June 2009 reported that some Paravant 

employees were ‘‘young ex-marines’’ and ‘‘little experience.’’ PEO STRI immediately 

addressed this concern and the issue was resolved. PEO STRI received no other report concerning qualifications of Paravant personnel from either CSTC–A CJ7 or 

RTSC. During this period, my staff had almost daily contact via telephone and 

email with CSTC–A CJ7 and RTSC, and the qualifications of Paravant employees 

was not raised as an issue. 

d. In May 2009, Paravant reported to Raytheon that they were having ‘‘a low 

qualification rate in almost every class;’’ 

Dr. BLAKE. It was not reported to me, and my staff indicates PEO STRI received 

no reports from RTSC regarding any problems or deficiencies in ANA qualifications. 

In contrast, RTSC reported to CSTC–A (with Paravant present) during the April 

2009 Program Management Review (PMR) that over 12,000 Afghanistan National 

Army (ANA) soldiers had been trained to date and that the ANA units had achieved 

passing rates of over 90 percent. The CSTC–A CJ7 never reported low qualification 

rates to the on-site PEO STRI Alternate Contracting Officer Representative (ACOR) 

or the PEO STRI management team. 

e. In mid-May 2009, concerns were raised to CSTC–A and to Raytheon country 

manager, Brian McCracken, about the effectiveness of the Paravant personnel and 

82 

their ‘‘capabilities to teach the ANA the proper methods and standards according 

to Army standards;’’ 

Dr. BLAKE. I was not personally aware of this and my staff reports receiving no 

information from either CSTC–A CJ7 or RTSC regarding a lack of effectiveness of 

Paravant personnel in contract performance. 

f. On June 15, 2009, Major Marco Van Westen reported that in the ‘‘last 8 months 

[Paravant] trainers were young ex-marines with little experience;’’ 

Dr. BLAKE. Yes, the PEO STRI on-site ACOR reported Major Van Westen’s comments to the COR located in Orlando, FL. However, clarification of Major Van 

Westen’s comments revealed that he was not commenting on the former-Marines’ 

lack of experience with weapons training, but their lack of Army experience. The 

lack of personnel with Army experience was immediately corrected as noted in the 

same report of Major Van Westen’s comments. Paravant assigned a former senior 

Army NCO as the team leader to provide the needed Army experience. Excerpt from 

report: ‘‘The last week’s significant changes have been made and now trainings are 

at standard.’’ 

g. In August 2009, because of export control violations, Paravant was forced to 

stop performance of their training of the ANA. 

Dr. BLAKE. Yes, on August 1, 2009, the PEO STRI on-site ACOR reported that 

Paravant stopped training due to concerns regarding export control violations. 

Paravant had been working under the assumption that Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) cases do not require export licenses. However, since this effort was funded 

with Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) appropriations it did require export 

licenses. Paravant was ordered to stop performance on the training of the ANA on 

August 1, 2009. Paravant remained on the stop work order until the license was 

received, which occurred on August 5, 2009. During August 1–5, 2009, trained ANA 

soldiers/cadre, supervised by U.S. Military personnel, conducted the training of ANA 

trainees. The CSTC–A CJ7 reported in an August 4, 2009, conference call that 

CSTC–A was satisfied with the interim solution and that the lack of an export control license did not result in any negative impact to training. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

10. Senator MCCAIN. Colonel Wakefield, based on your experience, can the CSTC– 

A train the ANA adequately and rapidly without relying on contractors? 

Despite repeated requests, Colonel Wakefield did not respond in time for printing. 

When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

PARAVANT’S PERFORMANCE ON THE CONTRACT

11. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did you receive any feedback from the military as to how well Paravant performed on the contract? 

Despite repeated requests, Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When 

received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. 

12. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, what kind of feedback did 

you get? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I received frequent feedback that the military was pleased with 

Paravant’s performance on the contract. While I cannot recall any specific comments, it was my understanding that the military was satisfied. 

13. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, how many ANA soldiers 

did Paravant train over the course of the contract and to what standard? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Over the course of the contract, Paravant trained approximately 

38,600 ANA soldiers to be zeroed and qualified with their weapons. 

83 

14. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did the military ask you 

to expand the training program beyond the basic North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rifles? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. The military requested that Paravant train the ANA soldiers in small infantry tactics, mortars, and artillery and to conduct noncommissioned officer training. 

15. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did Paravant continue to 

train ANA soldiers even after the May 5, 2009, shooting incident, and if so, how 

many? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. After the May 5, 2009, incident, as I understand it, 

Paravant trained approximately 21,800 ANA soldiers, which is over 50 percent of 

the soldiers trained by Paravant throughout the Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support (FOCUS) contract. 

DANGEROUS OPERATING CONDITIONS

16. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, before you went to Afghanistan on the Paravant contract, did you believe that the U.S. military would provide 

you force protection on the training ranges? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. 

17. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, who did, in fact, provide 

force protection on the training ranges? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. On certain training ranges, Paravant had to provide its own 

force protection. For example, in January 2009, I witnessed Paravant providing its 

own force protection at the training center in Kandahar because there was no coalition military available to provide it for them. I was informed that this was a common occurrence. 

18. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did you believe that you 

would be living and working on a U.S. military facility in Afghanistan? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, I initially believed that the Paravant instructors would be 

living and working on U.S. military facilities in Afghanistan and that I would be 

living and working under the same conditions during my visits to Afghanistan in 

the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, where did you, in fact, live 

and work? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The Paravant instructors lived on U.S. military bases under 

U.S. protection, but worked on Afghan bases, often with little or no protection by 

U.S. military. From April 2009 to the present, I have lived off base in an apartment 

near Camp Eggers in Kabul, Afghanistan. I work at Camp Eggers and travel 

throughout the region to oversee the Warfighter FOCUS contract. 

20. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, were the training ranges 

enclosed by a perimeter fence? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. At least two training ranges (in Kandahar and Darulaman) 

were not enclosed by a perimeter fence. In addition, the training rages at Kabul 

Military Training Center (KMTC) and Black Horse could also be accessed freely by 

Afghans. 

84 

21. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, were those ranges on the 

base or outside the base fence? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The training ranges in Kandahar and Darulaman were outside 

the base fence. The other training ranges were inside the base fence; however, local 

Afghans were able to travel through the training areas. 

22. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, could unauthorized personnel easily access those training ranges? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. Unauthorized personnel could easily access the Kandahar 

and Darulaman training ranges. I witnessed unauthorized personnel do so repeatedly during my visits to Kandahar and Darulaman. At KMTC and Black Horse, Afghans frequently drove through the training ranges. In fact, an Afghan civilian was 

killed by an improvised explosive device inside the Black Horse training range. 

23. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, how many Afghan trainees 

would be on the range in a given instruction group? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. An average of approximately 100 Afghan trainees would be on 

the range in a given instruction group, and in some instances approximately 800 

Afghan trainees per group. 

24. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, how many American or coalition instructors were there for the number of Afghan trainees? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. There were approximately 8 to 12 Paravant instructors for each 

group of Afghan trainees. 

25. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did the trainees have access to weapons and live ammunition? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. The trainees had access to both weapons and live ammunition. Paravant attempted to control access to live ammunition by only distributing 

magazines containing 12 rounds to the Afghan trainees immediately prior to a 

shooting exercise. 

26. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, are you familiar with any 

incident where an Afghan trainee threatened or attacked an American or coalition 

instructor? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, I am aware of a number of such incidents. In Gardeyz, in 

January 2009, an Afghan trainee pointed his weapon at a coalition instructor. At 

KMTC, in May 2009, an Afghan trainee pointed his weapon at a U.S. soldier during 

the course of a training session. Moreover, in March 2009, in Mazar-I–Sharif, three 

U.S. soldiers were shot while they were jogging past ANA soldiers. Similarly, in November 2009, five British instructors were shot inside a checkpoint by an ANA soldier, who thereafter fled. 

27. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did all Paravant employees 

go through some kind of Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Center 

(CRC) training? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes. All Paravant employees received Central Command 

(CENTCOM)-certified CRC training at Blackwater’s facility in Moyock, NC. 

28. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, did all Paravant employees 

receive training on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for military personnel, the Rules 

on the Use of Force (RUF) for contractor personnel, and the difference between the 

two? 

85 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Yes, the ROE for military personnel and the RUF for contractor 

personnel are part of the CRC curriculum at Moyock, NC. 

29. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker and Mr. McCracken, was this training on RUF 

adequate? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Blackwater’s training on RUF has been certified by CENTCOM 

and is, in my view, adequate. Although I did not personally attend the RUF training 

session for each Paravant instructor, it is my understanding that the instructors received RUF training in accordance with the curriculum standards. 

PARAVANT PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS

30. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, at the hearing, you mentioned that roughly 

24 independent contractors who had previously worked for Paravant on the NATO 

Weapons Training contract had transitioned to MPRI to continue the same work. 

Do you or anyone at Raytheon know whether any of these independent contractors 

had previously separated from the military with a discharge that was not characterized as an honorable discharge (i.e. whether any of these independent contractors 

had received a general, other-than-honorable, bad conduct, or dishonorable discharge)? If so, how many and what kind of a discharge did that person receive? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I am not personally aware of any former Paravant independent 

contractors (who thereafter transitioned to MPRI) who separated from the military 

with a less than honorable discharge. 

31. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, do you or anyone at Raytheon know whether any of these independent contractors had previously been convicted at a courtmartial during any period of prior military service? If so, how many? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Not to my knowledge. 

32. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, what was that person convicted for and 

what type of court-martial was it (i.e. Summary, Special, or General)? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. N/A. 

33. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, do you or anyone at Raytheon know whether any of these independent contractors had previously been convicted at State or 

Federal civilian criminal trial? If so, how many? What was that person convicted 

for? In what type of court (State or Federal)? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. During the course of my work at Raytheon, I learned that an 

MPRI instructor (who had transitioned from Paravant) had been convicted of driving under the influence in the State of Ohio at some time after the conclusion of 

his military service but before his Paravant employment commenced. 

34. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, do you or anyone at Raytheon know whether any of these independent contractors had previously received any form of nonjudicial punishment (e.g. an Article 15 in the Army) during any period of prior military service? If so, how many? For what offense(s) was that person punished for? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I am not aware of any such nonjudicial punishment. 

35. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, if any former Paravant IC had a poor disciplinary record—to include conviction at a court-martial, conviction at a State or 

Federal civilian criminal trial, or record of non-judicial punishment—why did MPRI 

continue to allow that person to work on the NATO Weapons Training contract? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. My understanding is that MPRI continued the employment because the individual has been doing very good work. I have verified this myself as 

recently as last week. 

36. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, did you or anyone at Raytheon have any 

input into MPRI’s decision? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I did not have such input. 

37. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, generally speaking, how have these 24 or 

so former Paravant independent contractors performed for MPRI? 

86 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. As I understand it, all of the former Paravant independent contractors have performed very well for MPRI. 

38. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, have there been any discipline problems 

from them? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Not to my knowledge. 

39. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, have any of them been fired by MPRI, and, 

if so, for what reason? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. None has been fired to my knowledge. 

40. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, are these former Paravant independent contractors also working as independent contractors for MPRI or are they MPRI employees? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. As I understand it, they are MPRI employees, not independent 

contractors. 

41. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, did you or anyone at Raytheon have any 

input as to whether they would be hired by MPRI as employees or independent contractors? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I did not have input on that issue. 

42. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, what lessons learned from your experience 

with Paravant have you incorporated into your oversight of MPRI’s performance on 

the NATO Weapons Training contract? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. I have incorporated a variety of new oversight methods as a result of my experience with Paravant. For example, all of the MPRI instructors have 

been disarmed and I have made it clear to all personnel that they are permitted 

to refuse to do any act that they regard as too dangerous. I make regular and unannounced safety inspections at the training sites and another Raytheon employee (a 

retired U.S. Army first sergeant) will soon be joining me in this effort. I solicit input 

directly from the Afghans on the quality of the training. Finally, at every training 

location, the U.S. military has designated and trained oversight representatives who 

are required to provide periodic reports to the government. 

43. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. McCracken, what lessons learned from your experience 

with Paravant have you incorporated into your oversight of other contractors you 

oversee in Afghanistan? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. All of the contractors that I oversee in Afghanistan are supervised to the same standards. 

OVERSIGHT OF THE PARAVANT CONTRACT

44. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, what are your responsibilities at PEO STRI? 

Dr. BLAKE. I am the Program Executive Officer and Head of Contracting Activity, 

U.S. Army PEO STRI. My organization is responsible for providing material solutions and services in modeling, simulation, training, and test/instrumentation to 

support our soldiers. The PEO STRI executes approximately $3 billion in programs 

annually. I am responsible for managing more than 1,230 military, government, civilian, and service support contractors. I am also responsible for FMS programs that 

support more than 40 countries. 

As the PEO, I am the responsible management official to provide overall direction 

and guidance regarding the programs in my portfolio. I directly control assigned 

program managers. On an annual basis, the PEO STRI portfolio contains several 

hundred individual programs and their associated acquisition actions. 

As the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA), I am responsible to ensure all 

purchases subject to provisions of the FAR, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation, 

and Army Federal Acquisition Regulation are made in accordance with the appropriate regulations and policies. 

As part of this HCA responsibility, I have appointed a Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). The PARC serves as the senior staff official for contracting functions and reports directly to the HCA. The PARC has direct access to 

the personnel and other essential resources necessary to perform all the functions 

assigned by me. As part of his responsibilities, he has established an organization 

that is composed of five contracting divisions and multiple supporting activities 

within the PARC office that include a Policy Team, Systems Team, and Cost and 

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Pricing Teams. The Acquisition Center executes several thousand contract actions 

annually. 

45. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, did you have any direct supervisory or oversight 

responsibilities for the Paravant contract? If not, who in your organization does? 

Dr. BLAKE. I did not have direct supervisory or oversight responsibilities of the 

Paravant contract. 

Within PEO STRI, government management and oversight is assigned to the Program Manager, Field Operations (PM Field OPS). PM Field OPS manages approximately $1 billion of training services worldwide. Within PM Field OPS, a team of 

individuals, lead by the Project Director for Southwest Asia, executed the programmatic management and oversight of this specific portion of the Warfighter 

FOCUS contract. This team worked in close coordination with the requiring activity, 

CSTC–A. The program management team had almost daily communications via 

telephone and email with CSTC–A, conducted regular PMRs, and conducted numerous site visits to observe various portions of the contract performance. 

The Warfighter FOCUS prime contractor is RTSC. They subcontracted the CSTC– 

A ANA Weapons Training effort to Paravant. The day-to-day oversight and direct 

supervision of this subcontracted effort is the responsibility of RTSC. RTSC was responsible for the performance of their subcontractor, Paravant. The Warfighter 

FOCUS Contracting Officer and the Contracting Officers Representative (COR) provide oversight from our offices in Orlando, FL. The ACORs and the TORs provide 

contractual oversight in-country. The COR monitors and reports contractor performance and makes recommendations to the Contracting Officer (PCO) on issues concerning scope of work. The COR also maintains standard processes, ensures the 

structure of the contract can support traceability of funds, appoints and oversees 

TORs, and ensures timely payment of invoices for work accomplished. The ACOR 

serves as a liaison between the user and PM Field OPS, monitors and documents 

the performance of the contractor on-site, ensures the contractor is compliant with 

the reporting process, ensures the TORs are submitting the Monthly Contractor Observation Reports, and notifies and recommends any corrective actions required to 

the COR. 

46. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, did you ever visit the sites in Afghanistan where 

Paravant employees were performing on the contract? If not you, did someone else 

visit from your organization? Who? How often? 

Dr. BLAKE. No, I did not personally visit the specific training sites of the ANA. 

However, multiple members of my organization did visit Afghanistan from the start 

of this contract. The following personnel visited Afghanistan: 

Mr. Dave Christensen, Assistant Program Manager - September 2008. 

Conducted Site Survey. 

Ms. Linda Comfort, Life Cycle Project Director - September 2008 and 

February/March 2009. Conducted Site Survey and PMR. Ms. Comfort had 

scheduled another on-site PMR in January 2009, but due to the threat conditions in theater at that time CSTC–A CJ7 requested we conduct that 

PMR via teleconference. 

LTC Rick Stroyan, On-site ACOR - May 2009 through November 2009. 

Mr. Russ McBride, Program Manager Field Operations - June 2009. Met 

with CSTC–A Deputy Commanding General, observed RTSC and Paravant 

executing the mission, and followed-up with assigned PEO STRI ACOR on 

contractor oversight and reporting. 

47. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, I understand now that PEO STRI has one ACOR 

in Afghanistan on a permanent basis. Given what happened with Paravant, do you 

believe that this is adequate? 

Dr. BLAKE. PEO STRI has 2 ACORs and 12 TORs in Afghanistan providing oversight of contract performance under the Warfighter FOCUS contract. Both ACORs 

are in Afghanistan, one at Bagram Air Force Base and one in Kabul. The TORs are 

designated in conjunction with CSTC–A and other using units, and are military officers assigned to units throughout Afghanistan. This structure of contract oversight 

is consistent with generally used practices, and compliant with directives from 

CSTC–A established in July 2009. PEO STRI continuously assesses proper contract 

oversight as any work is added to a contract. In light of the performance of 

Paravant under this contract and in compliance with a recent directive of the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army, I directed my PARC to review the direct oversight of 

contract performance in theater. 

88 

48. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, does PEO STRI need a more forward deployed 

presence to effectively oversee these contracts? 

Dr. BLAKE. PEO STRI has 2 ACORs and 12 TORs in Afghanistan providing oversight of contract performance under the Warfighter FOCUS contract. The TORs are 

designated in conjunction with CSTC–A and are military officers assigned to units 

throughout Afghanistan. Proper contract oversight is always considered as any new 

work is added to a contract. In light of the performance of Paravant under this contract and in compliance with a recent directive of the Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army, I directed my PARC to review the direct oversight of contract performance 

in theater. 

49. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, did you have any direct interaction with anyone 

from Raytheon Technical Services Corporation (i.e., the prime contractor), Paravant 

(i.e., the subcontractor), or CSTC–A (i.e., the customer)? 

Dr. BLAKE. I had high-level quarterly discussions with executives from RTSC on 

the execution of the Warfighter FOCUS contract. To the best of my knowledge, I 

had no direct interactions with Paravant or CSTC–A regarding this task order. 

50. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, where did you or your organization get information on what the Paravant contractors were doing and how they were performing? 

Dr. BLAKE. In executing our responsibility for contract oversight, my staff required regular PMRs to be conducted by the prime contractor, Raytheon Technical 

Service Company (RTSC). As the requiring activity, representatives from the CSTC– 

A CJ7 participated in these reviews. RTSC was required to provide reviews on their 

performance, including that of their subcontractors. My staff communicated almost 

daily via conference calls and email traffic in addition to the PMRs. After the arrival 

of the PEO STRI ACOR, he had almost daily interactions with the CSTC–A CJ7 

TORs. Contractor observation reports were submitted on a monthly basis. The 

ACOR made routine contract oversight visits and met with site personnel to assess 

training effectiveness and contractor performance. 

51. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, how good of a job did Paravant instructors do on 

training up the Afghan soldiers? 

Dr. BLAKE. This particular work effort provided basic weapons training to ANA 

soldiers and trained them as trainers for other ANA soldiers. My staff received feedback from the CSTC–A CJ7 on a number of occasions that indicated that the trainers were outstanding, flexible, and delivered a quality service. RTSC consistently reported in PMRs that Paravant’s efforts were achieving over a 90 percent qualification rate for the ANA soldiers. CSTC–A CJ7 officials were in attendance at these 

PMRs. 

52. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, did you receive any complaints or praise about 

the Paravant instructors’ performance? 

Dr. BLAKE. My staff reports that feedback received in regular communication and 

PMRs, concerning the Paravant instructors’ performance was generally positive. The 

only comment received that could be considered a complaint was a comment by 

Major Van Westen, CSTC–A, indicating a general lack of Army experience of the 

Paravant instructors. This concern was addressed immediately by adding an instructor with extensive Army experience. 

53. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, what was the required manning under the 

Paravant contract and was that manning level ever achieved and sustained? 

Dr. BLAKE. The initial CSTC–A requirement was to establish 6 teams of 12 personnel each. This staffing requirement was not achieved. However, no training days 

or events were missed due to the shortage of personnel as reported to PEO STRI 

by CSTC–A. 

54. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, did the failure to reach the required manning 

level under the Paravant contract affect performance on the contract? 

Dr. BLAKE. My staff has advised me that CSTC–A CJ7 never reported any impact 

to the contract performance as a result of personnel shortages. 

55. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, were you aware that Paravant employees had 

raised concerns about their security on the training ranges in Afghanistan and were 

these concerns ever adequately addressed? 

Dr. BLAKE. Although no concerns were reported to me, my staff was made aware 

of the security concerns raised by Paravant employees. Upon receiving reports of the 

security concerns, PEO STRI requested weapons authorizations from CSTC–A to adVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
89 

dress employee security. Eventually, the weapons authorization request was not approved. At no time did PEO STRI provide any weapons authorization to RTSC or 

Paravant. The Statement of Work required that the contractor employees would 

work and live under the coalition forces protection umbrella and suitable work areas 

were to be provided by CSTC–A. CSTC–A CJ7 never reported that the command 

could not meet the security needs of the contract employees. 

DECEMBER SHOOTING INCIDENT

56. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, I understand that there was an accidental discharge incident in December 2009 where one Paravant instructor accidentally shot 

another Paravant instructor on a training range in Afghanistan. Were you or someone in your organization notified of this incident at the time? 

Dr. BLAKE. I believe you are referring to an accidental shooting that occurred in 

December 2008. The incident was not reported to me at that time, but RTSC did 

report the incident via email to two PEO STRI Contracting Officers, Mr. Steve 

Ograyensek and Ms. Frances Purser. 

57. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, who provided notification to PEO STRI, how, and 

when? 

Dr. BLAKE. Ms. Rhoda J. Schanick, RTSC, provided the notification by email on 

December 9 and 10, 2008. 

58. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, what did your organization do at the time you 

received that notification? 

Dr. BLAKE. The two PEO STRI employees who received the email notification took 

no timely action. Mr. Ograyensek testified that he was on temporary duty on another assignment when that email notification came in and that upon his return he 

failed to open this particular email because of the volume of email in his inbox. Mr. 

Ograyensek reported that he had approximately 300 emails in his inbox upon his 

return, this email was not marked as urgent, and the subject did not raise a level 

of attention. Ms. Purser reports that she does not recall receiving or acting upon 

the email. Corrective action has been taken to ensure timely action on future incident reports. 

59. Dr. Blake, since the Paravant contractors did not have U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) authorization to carry the weapons involved in the accidental discharge, did someone from PEO STRI investigate? 

Dr. BLAKE. No. Although RTSC reported the shooting via email to the two PEO 

STRI Contracting Officers, both individuals report not reading that email and therefore no action was taken. We received no further report about the accidental shooting until the SASC staffers visited PEO STRI in October 2009. 

However, on December 3, 2008, in response to a query from RTSC, PEO STRI reiterated to RTSC that they had no authorization for Paravant employees to carry 

weapons. Between December 2008 and January 2009, PEO STRI communicated 

with CSTC–A to confirm that the combatant commander, in accordance with theater 

policy, had not approved weapons authorizations. As a result of this communication, 

on January 7, 2009, PEO STRI formally informed RTSC that weapons authorization 

was not forthcoming, and no Letters of Authorization (LOAs) would reflect weapons 

authorized. 

OVERSIGHT OF THE PARAVANT CONTRACT BY BLACKWATER/XE

60. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, what were or are your responsibilities at 

Blackwater/Xe Services? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Since March 2009, Mr. Roitz has served as Executive Vice President and Chief 

Sales Officer of Xe Services LLC. In that capacity, he is the executive with overall 

responsibility for preparing contract bids and proposals, negotiating contracts, and 

ensuring compliance with contract terms for Xe Services and its subsidiaries with 

the exception of Xe’s aviation entities under Aviation Worldwide Services LLC, including Presidential Airways, Inc., which maintains its own contracts department 

with a reporting chain to the President of Presidential Airways, Inc. Starting in December 2008, the Vice President, Export Control has reported to Mr. Roitz. Also currently reporting to Mr. Roitz are the following departments or functions: Contracts, 

90 

Sales (Commercial), Firearms Compliance, Small Business Liaison Officer, and Capture (Government Sales). 

Prior to his current position and starting in September 2004, Mr. Roitz served as 

Vice President for Contracts and Compliance of Blackwater Worldwide (which was 

renamed Xe Services LLC in January 2009). Mr. Roitz’s responsibilities were the 

same as described above relating to contracts, bids/proposals, and contract compliance. From approximately October 2008 to March 2009, Mr. Roitz effectively acted 

as a temporary Chief Operating Officer due to that position being open until it was 

filled by Mrs. Danielle Esposito in March 2009. 

61. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, did you have any direct supervisory or oversight 

responsibilities for the Paravant contract? If not, who in your organization does? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Paravant LLC is a separate legal entity and a wholly owned subsidiary of Xe 

Services LLC. Starting in the fall of 2008, Brian McCracken began using the title 

Vice President of Paravant LLC. The company’s personnel records indicate that he 

was made the Director of Paravant in December 2008. Mr. McCracken left Paravant 

for Raytheon in March 2009. While in charge of Paravant, Mr. McCracken reported 

to Jeff Gibson, Vice President, International Training and Operations, Blackwater 

Worldwide, who in turn reported to Mr. Roitz. 

When Mr. McCracken left for Raytheon he was replaced by John LaDelfa for a 

period of approximately 2 weeks after which Mr. LaDelfa was promoted to Vice 

President of Training and Operations, U.S. Training Center, Inc., as part of management reorganization by Xe’s new leadership. Under the reorganization, Hugh 

Middleton became the Director of Paravant and reported to Mr. LaDelfa, who in 

turn reported to Mr. James Sierawski, Senior Vice President of Training and Operations/General Manager, U.S. Training Center, Inc. 

Mr. Gibson left the company in March 2009 after Xe’s new leadership arrived. As 

part of the new leadership’s reorganization, Mr. Gibson’s responsibilities were transferred to Mr. Sierawski. 

As a limited liability company, there is a ‘‘manager’’ of Paravant. The individuals 

serving in the role of managers and the relevant dates are listed below. 

Name Title Dates 

Gary Jackson Manager 5/28/08–9/30/08 

Bill Mathews Manager 5/28/08–9/30/08 

Brian McCracken Manager 10/1/08–3/8/09 

John LaDelfa Manager 3/9/09–4/12/09 

Hugh Middleton Manager 4/13/09–Present 

Mr. Middleton continues to be the Manager of Paravant, although Paravant is no 

longer in active operation. The Paravant subcontract with Raytheon was not renewed by Raytheon, consequently no one has had responsibility for that program 

since performance ended in September 2009. 

62. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, did you ever visit the sites in Afghanistan where 

Paravant independent contractors were performing on the contract? If not you, did 

someone else visit from your organization? Who? How often? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

While Mr. Roitz has traveled to Afghanistan to review company operations there, 

he did not visit during performance of the Paravant subcontract with Raytheon. 

Several executives of Paravant and Blackwater/Xe Services traveled to Afghanistan 

in relation to the Paravant subcontract. 

Based on outside counsel’s review of Paravant travel records, from October 2008 

to March 2009, Brian McCracken traveled to Afghanistan four times between October and March 2008, typically staying there for 10–14 days per visit. 

Hugh Middleton, who became the Director of Paravant shortly after Mr. 

McCracken departed for Raytheon, traveled to Afghanistan to make leadership 

changes among the in-country program management from April 27 through May 5, 

2009. Mr. Middleton was accompanied by John LaDelfa, the Vice President of Training and Operations for U.S. Training Center, Inc. 

Additionally, Blackwater/Xe Services senior management routinely traveled to Afghanistan to review performance of the company’s contracts there, including the 

Paravant subcontract with Raytheon. This includes trips by Mr. Yorio in late May 

2009 and early August 2009, and by Mrs. Esposito in June 2009. 

91 

63. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, did other Blackwater employees or independent 

contractors conducting training in Afghanistan receive CENTCOM approval to carry 

weapons for their own protection? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company understands that CENTCOM approval for DOD contractors and 

subcontractors to carry weapons typically does not identify a particular use for such 

weapons, rather possession of weapons is either authorized or unauthorized for an 

individual. Employees and independent contractors of Blackwater/Xe Services and 

its affiliates have been authorized to carry weapons by CENTCOM at various times 

in furtherance of various U.S. Government contracts. In addition, authorization of 

weapons possession by employees and independent contractors performing non-DOD 

contracts is subject to a different authorization process, in which CENTCOM may 

or may not be involved. The company previously provided the committee with charts 

identifying the relevant affiliate’s personnel and the source of their authorization to 

possess a weapon (SASC–015971–15973, SASC–015590–15596, SASC–015991– 

16002) in response to the chairman’s June 18, 2009, letter request [retained in committee files]. 

64. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, why didn’t Blackwater seek approval for the 

Paravant independent contractors to carry weapons from the beginning? 

Mr. ROITZ. The company understands that, consistent with documents submitted 

to the committee, Brian McCracken, as the management official in charge of 

Paravant, requested authorization for Paravant personnel to possess weapons from 

the earliest days of performance of the subcontract (i.e., before independent contractors were deployed to Afghanistan on or about November 3, 2009) and that officials 

of Raytheon (the prime contractor) and CSTC–A (the U.S. military customer) were 

supportive of those requests. See e.g., SASC–032765 (‘‘I have attached three documents that our parent company had to have signed by the Army in order to carry 

weapons legally in Afghanistan in support of the CNPTO contract. If your command 

and the KO agree that we should be able to carry weapons, these documents may 

allow you to avoid having to reinvent the wheel.’’ Email from Brian McCracken 

(Paravant) to Bill Rebarick (Raytheon), Lt. Col. Pat Chiak (CSTC–A), John Walker 

(Paravant), and Col. Bradley Wakefield (CSTC–A), dated October 16, 2008; SASC– 

032766 (Mr. Chiak responds to Mr. McCracken). ‘‘Brian, do I need to take these enclosures and put in our letter head with the appropriate information and send them 

back to you? I am not really clear on the process for this.’’ To which Mr. McCracken 

replies, ‘‘Yes, please do. I will then give them to the KO for Raytheon and get him 

to sign off on letting our guys carry weapons while they are in country.’’) In addition, Colonel Wakefield testified at the February 24, 2010 hearing, ‘‘And so when 

Mr. McCracken in what I seem to remember as November 2008 requested permission to arm, I personally believe that was a reasonable request and conveyed to him 

that we should process through to get approval.’’ [Retained in committee files.] 

Furthermore, Colonel Wakefield’s testimony at the February 24, 2010, hearing appears to acknowledge that the October 2008 efforts to obtain authority for Paravant 

instructors to wear side arms occurred prior to the instructors being armed: 

Senator BEN NELSON. Colonel, were you satisfied at the time, or are you 

satisfied now that the determination to provide weapons and the control of 

weapons and the use of weapons were adequately discussed and agreed 

upon at the time? Or has that happened subsequently if not at that time? 

Colonel WAKEFIELD. Sir, if I may, the process that we were going through 

prior to my departure in January 2009 was to propose allowing the 

Paravant contractors to wear side arms while conducting—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. But this was after the fact, while they were already doing it? 

Colonel WAKEFIELD. No, sir, this was prior. 

65. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, once the Paravant contractors got to Afghanistan, 

did they raise concerns to you or someone in Blackwater about their security? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Mr. Roitz does not recall hearing such concerns expressed by Paravant personnel. 

This concern would have been more likely to be raised through the operational chain 

than the contracting chain. As indicated in the response to question 64 above, Brian 

McCracken (Paravant), Bill Rebarick (Raytheon), Lt. Col. Pat Cihak (CSTC–A), 

John Walker (Paravant), and Col. Bradley Wakefield (CSTC–A), were working to obtain formal authority for the Paravant instructors to possess weapons. Seeking such 

authority would not be necessary unless those involved recognized that weapons 

92 

were needed for personal protection. Again, Colonel Wakefield testified at the February 24, 2010, hearing, ‘‘And so when Mr. McCracken in what I seem to remember 

as November 2008 requested permission to arm, I personally believe that was a reasonable request and conveyed to him that we should process through to get approval.’’ 

66. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, did you or someone at Blackwater ever request 

that CSTC–A or other U.S. military organizations provide force protection for the 

Paravant contractors until the weapons authorization issue could be resolved? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Mr. Roitz does not recall hearing such a request. Brian McCracken and personnel 

at CSTC–A may be in the best position to answer this question. 

67. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, did you or someone at Blackwater ever consider 

stopping performance on the Paravant contract until the weapons authorization 

issue could be resolved? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As Mr. Roitz stated in his testimony, he became aware that Paravant Independent Contractors possessed weapons without proper authorization after the May 

5, 2009, incident. At that time, Xe Services new leadership had already ordered the 

disarming of all Paravant personnel. After the instructors were disarmed, the new 

Paravant In-Country Manager held a meeting with the Paravant Team Leaders who 

were verbally instructed to stop work and refuse to perform if they had any safety 

concern. 

68. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, were you aware that these Paravant independent 

contractors had procured weapons for themselves from the Afghan National Police 

(ANP) depot called 22 Bunkers? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As Mr. Roitz stated during the February 24, 2010, SASC hearing, he first became 

aware of the term Bunker 22 during an export control compliance-related inventory 

of all defense-related articles held by the company and its affiliates overseas, which 

took place in April or May 2009. Mr. Roitz became specifically aware that Paravant 

Independent Contractors had weapons from Bunker 22 after the May 5, 2009, shooting incident in Kabul. 

69. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, do you consider drawing weapons in this fashion 

to be an acceptable way for your company to do business? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As Mr. Roitz stated in his written testimony, it is his understanding that there 

was nothing inherently wrong at the time with Xe Services or other contractors receiving weapons from Bunker 22 with the knowledge and, indeed, assistance of U.S. 

military mentors at Bunker 22 for use in furtherance of U.S. Government contracts. 

However, the manner in which Bunker 22 weapons were provided to the company 

lacked appropriate controls and oversight, as Mr. Roitz discussed in his testimony, 

and today Xe Services would act differently. 

70. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, where are the weapons drawn from Bunker 22 

now? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As set forth in detail by the company’s February 20, 2010, response to the committee, all of the weapons that have been identified as being obtained from Bunker 

22 have either been turned in or demilitarized in coordination with the Afghan Government and/or CSTC–A. 

However, as also described by the February 20 response [Tab 15], it isn’t clear 

where the 53 AMD–65s and 32 9MM Smith & Wesson pistols currently possessed 

by the company, and on the company’s Afghan Private Security License, originated. 

The company understands from former employees that sometime between 2006 and 

2008 CSTC–A issued AMDs and Smith & Wessons to the company for use by Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU) students and that in 2006 CSTC–A directed the company to pick up the same types from Bunker 22 for distribution to students at ABP 

sites for training. Again, based on discussions with former employees, it does not 

appear the company ever received any paperwork associated with these transVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:03 Aug 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\57827.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
93 

actions. Also, it is unclear whether the company retained any of these weapons after 

the students’ training was complete or, if so, how many. 

The company is in the process of shipping replacement weapons from the United 

States for the remaining weapons obtained in Afghanistan. Once these arrive incountry, the company will coordinate the turn-in with CSTC–A. 

71. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, how many total Paravant employees or independent contractors served on the NATO weapons contract from the time the task 

order was awarded until the time Raytheon replaced Paravant as the subcontractor? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company previously produced to the committee a chart that provides the 

number of Paravant employees and independent contractors by month (SASC– 

032748–032748) [retained in committee files]. 

72. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, of this total number of Paravant employees and 

independent contractors, how many of those Paravant personnel (other than Justin 

Cannon and Chris Drotleff) had been convicted, prior to their employment by 

Paravant, at a criminal trial in either a State court, Federal civilian court, or a military court-martial? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company’s records indicate no other criminal convictions except for two individuals both with driving while intoxicated convictions and one with a reckless driving to endanger conviction. 

73. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, had any Paravant employees or independent contractors received a discharge from the military for any prior period of service that 

was not an honorable discharge? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Of the DD214s in the company’s possession, all were honorably discharged with 

the exception of one individual that received a ‘‘General Under Honorable Conditions’’ (SASC–032693) discharge and three DD214 forms (for two sergeants and one 

corporal) that do not contain a standard Box 24 identifying the ‘‘Character of Service’’ (SASC–032686–87, SASC–032693, and SASC–032713) [retained in committee 

files]. However, the decorations, medals, et cetera, listed the DD214 for the last 

three individuals do not suggest anything less than an honorable discharge. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, did any Paravant employees or independent contractors have a record of receiving some sort of non-judicial punishment (e.g. an 

Army Article 15) from the military for any prior period of service? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company does not have this information and understands that nonjudicial 

punishment is generally not reported on a DD214. 

75. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, other than Sebastian Kucharski, how many 

Paravant employees or independent contractors had previously been on Blackwater’s 

‘‘Do Not Use’’ list? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company is not aware of any. 

OTHER XE SERVICES CONTRACTS

76. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, how many contracts does Xe Services or its subsidiaries currently have to train the ANP and ANA and how much are these contracts worth? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As requested in the chairman’s June 18, 2009, letter request, the company provided the committee with a chart of its contracts and subcontracts to perform private security functions in Afghanistan that identifies the monetary value of those 

contracts (SASC–014705–014711) [retained in committee files]. The contracts and 

subcontracts for training can be identified in the column titled ‘‘Brief Description 

of Services/Scope.’’ 

94 

77. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, have you received feedback from the customers 

on these other contracts as to how well your employees have trained the Afghans 

and if so, what has that feedback been? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company is not aware of any past performance evaluation in the CPARS in 

connection with any training contract in Afghanistan. 

However, the company, then called Blackwater Worldwide, received a ‘‘2006 Star 

Partner Award’’ from Lockheed Martin in connection with its NIU support contract. 

The award letter, sent by Judith Burk, Vice President, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 

Quantity Solutions, Lockheed Martin Systems Management, to Fred Roitz states in 

part: 

‘‘Our customer, Robert Vierkant, CIV, OSD–Policy, in an email to Doug 

Ochsenknecht and Melissa Lederer of the DOD Counter-Narcoterrorism 

Technology Program Office expresses his overall satisfaction of Blackwaters’ 

[sic] performance. ‘They have done and are doing a great job in country. 

Please contact your contracting officer and have him express our appreciation to Blackwater for the hard work and the continuity they bring to the 

table. One of the most important aspects that the Blackwater support provides is the experienced personnel on the NIU support contract and the longevity they provide in country. Many of the Blackwater personnel have remained working with the NIU for a long period of time, building confidence 

and trust with the NIU. It is the continuity that Blackwater trainers bring 

to the table.’ 

In closing, I wish to extend my own personal appreciation, as well as that 

of the entire Lockheed Martin Systems Management team on a superb ‘job 

well done.’ We commend Blackwater on its stellar history of providing experienced personnel and customer satisfaction, and we look forward to a long 

and successful partnership.’’ 

78. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, have you had any similar problems on these other 

contracts? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company is unsure of the committee’s intended meaning of ‘‘similar problems.’’ In response to Request No. 4 in the chairman’s June 18, 2009, letter request, 

the company produced to the committee incident reports prepared under its contracts or subcontracts to perform private security functions in Afghanistan [retained 

in committee files]. 

79. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, what change have you made to these other contracts to ensure that nothing else like this Paravant example happens again? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Mr. Roitz’s written testimony contains significant details on changes to Xe’s business practices. In general, since Joe Yorio joined the company in March 2009 as Xe 

Services’ President and CEO, the new management team has made numerous 

changes in response to problems identified during his top-to-bottom review of all 

company contracts and programs, including the Paravant program. Further details 

on these efforts are contained in Mr. Roitz’s written testimony. 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PARAVANT CONTRACT

80. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, just prior to the May 5th shooting incident, 

Paravant lost many of its key on-site managers. The program manager, the deputy 

program manager, and several senior team leaders either quit or were fired. Do you 

believe this absence of key leaders on the ground contributed to a breakdown in discipline and loss of control? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As part of the top-to-bottom review conducted by Xe’s new management, which 

started in March 2009 and continued through the spring, a number of in-country 

Paravant leaders were removed from their positions of responsibility shortly before 

the May 5 incident. The incident regrettably occurred because four off-duty independent contractors consciously chose to violate four key company policies: they 

drank alcohol in contravention of the strict no alcohol policy; they left the forward 

operating base late at night and without authorization; they used a company vehicle 

95 

for an unofficial purpose; and they carried weapons off-duty and away from the 

training range. Rather than an absence of leadership, the removal of the Paravant 

in-country managers demonstrates new management’s efforts to assert leadership. 

81. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, how would you avoid creating such a situation 

in the future? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

At the time of the May 5, 2009, incident, Xe Services’ new management was acting aggressively to review all company contracts and programs, including Paravant, 

in an effort to identify and address any performance issues. As Mr. Roitz stated in 

his written testimony, he and his colleagues at Xe Services regret that the efforts 

of the new management team to address and correct these issues at Paravant had 

not been fully completed prior to the tragic loss of life and injury to Afghan civilians 

on May 5, 2009. 

82. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, are you planning to review the company’s policies 

on the ‘‘Do Not Use’’ list? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As Mr. Roitz indicated in his responses to questions during the hearing, the company has a written ‘‘Do Not Use’’ policy (SASC–023889–23892) [retained in committee files]. To clarify, however, the company does not maintain a ‘‘Do Not Use’’ 

list. Instead, a ‘‘Do Not Use’’ or ‘‘DNU’’ designation may be added to an individual’s 

computerized personnel record in the company’s personnel database. The personnel 

database contains other relevant information, including the individual’s name, employment history, personal identifying information, medical information, and other 

information. 

As described in Mr. Roitz’s written testimony, the company has made changes to 

the human resources function to ensure that policies relating to a ‘‘Do Not Use’’ designation are followed. 

83. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, what changes do you plan to make to the criteria 

for nominating, maintaining, and moving names to that list? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

As part of the new management’s ongoing review, revision, and updating of written policies, the company is in the process of establishing new implementing procedures for its ‘‘Do Not Use’’ policy. As part of that process, the company is reviewing 

the criteria for nominating and maintaining individual’s ‘‘Do Not Use’’ status. 

84. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, do you plan to make that list more accurate, upto-date, and available for Xe Services’ future personnel screening efforts? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Xe Services is committed to providing the highest quality service. As described in 

Mr. Roitz’s written testimony, the company has made changes to the human resources function to ensure that policies relating to a ‘‘Do Not Use’’ designation are 

followed. 

85. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, at the hearing, you mentioned that you are reviewing whether to continue the practice of hiring new personnel as independent 

contractors as opposed to full employees. When do you expect to complete that review and would you be willing to share the results of that review with the committee? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The classification of personnel as independent contractors is currently the subject 

of an administrative appeal at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The company 

hopes to complete its evaluation regarding its classification of independent contractors after the IRS issues its determination. The company notes that the U.S. Government uses independent contractors in a variety of circumstances and for legitimate reasons. See e.g., Creel v. United States, No. 07–60703, 2010 WL 685615 (5th 

Cir. March 1, 2010) (reversing the lower court’s finding that a doctor performing 

surgery at a Veterans Administration Medical Center was an employee of the Federal Government at the time of the alleged negligence, finding the doctor was an 

independent contractor of the VA, and remanding with instructions to grant the 

96 

2Procuring Contracting Officers identified in the contract, the Program Manager, Deputy Program Manager, and Contracting Officer Representative 

Government’s motion to dismiss the U.S. Government from a tort action brought 

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act). 

86. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, at the hearing, you mentioned that Xe Services 

does business with DOD and other government agencies through a number of subsidiary corporations. Going forward, will those subsidiary corporations make it clear, 

in writing, on future proposals for DOD contracts that the subsidiary corporation 

is owned by Xe Services? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

The company agrees that future proposals will more clearly identify when enterprise-wide resources, knowledge, or experience are being imputed to an affiliate. 

However, it is not unusual or improper for subsidiaries to submit proposals in its 

name alone or for a corporate parent to submit a proposal and not refer to one or 

more legally separate, operating subsidiaries that will be performing work under the 

general corporate umbrella. 

The Paravant proposal contained information that identified Paravant’s affiliation 

with Blackwater. Colonel Wakefield testified at the February 24, 2010, hearing that, 

notwithstanding redaction of the offeror’s names, he believed that it was a 

Blackwater offer in connection with his expert review of the subcontract proposal. 

In addition, government contracting personnel have other resources, such as the 

Central Contractor Registration database, which requires any subsidiary to identify 

its parent organization in its Online Representations and Certification Application. 

Paravant LLC complied with this requirement. 

87. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roitz, what other changes to the company’s business 

practices have you made in light of Xe’s experience with Paravant? 

XE SERVICES. Mr. Roitz did not respond to the committee’s questions for the 

record, but Xe Services LLC submitted responses on his behalf. 

Mr. Roitz’s written testimony contains significant details on changes to Xe’s business practices. In general, Xe Services’ President and CEO, Joe Yorio, and his new 

management team have made numerous changes since Mr. Yorio joined the company in March 2009 in response to problems identified during his top-to-bottom review of all company contracts and programs, including the Paravant program. Further details on these efforts are contained in Mr. Roitz’s written testimony. 

88. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Blake, what changes to the PEO STRI’s business practices have you made in light of your experience with Paravant? 

Dr. BLAKE. We have taken four actions in light of this experience. 

First, I directed changes to my internal review and approval processes to require 

program manager or deputy program manager approval prior to contracting for 

services to be provided within an operational theater. This raises both the visibility 

and approval level of this type of contracting service. 

Second, I directed the PARC to review the structure and location of government 

oversight of contract services provided in operational theaters. Although all oversight to date has been compliant with all known requirements, I directed that the 

review look more closely to determine if a greater oversight structure is warranted. 

Third, upon being informed of the lack of timely action on the report of the accidental shooting, I immediately directed implementation of new reporting requirements for accidents and serious incidents. I also directed implementation of procedures to track the resolution of these incidents to completion. These reporting and 

follow-up directives are in place now, and I have directed that the process be documented in organizational Standard Operating Procedures. 

Lastly, we modified the Warfighter FOCUS contract to require notification of any 

accident or serious incident within 24 hours. The contractor is required to notify 

local authorities (such as unit leadership) and the contract management team.2 The 

contractor must also establish a record in their Management Information System 

within 72 hours of the incident. In instances involving severe injury or loss of life, 

the contractor shall provide a telephonic notification to at least one of the recipients 

identified above ensuring a positive contact is made along with a written notification. 

89. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Walker, Mr. McCracken, and Colonel Wakefield, since 

we will have to rely on contractors to accomplish our mission in Afghanistan for the 

97 

foreseeable future, what can the military do to better employ and manage contract 

trainers on the ground? 

Mr. Walker did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files. 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. The improvements the military put into place following the May 

5, 2009, incident have been very effective, in my view. Raytheon and all of its subcontractors, including MPRI, have passed every government inspection in Afghanistan, and we are working cooperatively with PEO–STRI and the U.S. military. 

Colonel Wakefield did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer 

will be retained in committee files. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

WARFIGHTER FOCUS CONTRACT

90. Senator COLLINS. Mr. McCracken, Raytheon won the large Warfighter FOCUS 

contract, worth approximately $11.5 billion over 10 years, based partly on its Warrior Training Alliance which consists of several training companies, of which 

Paravant was one. Raytheon held a competition for a $20 million task order that 

Paravant won, and thus, Paravant became an official subcontractor of Raytheon. 

This Alliance was designed, according to Raytheon’s web site, ‘‘ . . . to ensure training continuity and provide a smooth contract transition.’’ If this Alliance was comprised of qualified potential subcontractors and, according to today’s testimony, 

Paravant was demonstrating a series of failures prior to the May 2009 shooting, 

why didn’t Raytheon terminate its subcontract with Paravant and chose another 

member of its Alliance? 

Mr. MCCRACKEN. Prior to the May 5, 2009, incident, I understood that Paravant 

was performing well and that the Army was satisfied with its performance. Following the May 5, 2009, incident, as I understand it, Raytheon decided not to renew 

Paravant’s contract and entered into discussions regarding a smooth transition to 

MPRI. In the intervening time period, Raytheon disarmed Paravant instructors and 

had full-time, on-the-ground oversight. During this period, I made regular and unannounced site visits at each of the training locations to ensure that Paravant was 

adhering to all applicable rules. Following the May 5, 2009, incident, Paravant 

trained more Afghan soldiers than ever before and did so without incident. 

ELECTRONIC SUBCONTRACTING REPORTING SYSTEM

91. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Ograyensek, the Electronic Subcontracting Reporting 

System (eSRS) is the system for prime contractors to report accomplishments towards subcontracting goals required by their contract. It collects information down 

to multiple levels of subcontracting and captures both contract level and commercial 

plans. If eSRS had been available and populated by Raytheon, would you have been 

able to discern that Paravant was largely a front for Blackwater/Xe? 

Mr. OGRAYENSEK. No, the eSRS system tracks subcontracting goals and achievements against those goals expressed as a percentage of total subcontracted Small 

Business, Woman Owned Business, and other socioeconomic groups (e.g., a goal of 

‘‘x percent’’ Small Business versus the actual percentage achieved). eSRS does not 

provide the names of the subcontractors. 

98 

[Tabs 1 through 38 follow:] 

TAB 1 


224FUL1.eps
99 

TAB 2 


224FUL2.eps
100 


224FUL3.eps
101 


224FUL4.eps
102 


224FUL5.eps
103 

TAB 3 


224FUL6.eps
104 


224FUL7.eps
105 

TAB 4 


224FUL8.eps
106 


224FUL9.eps
107 


224FUL10.eps
108 

TAB 5 


224FUL11.eps
109 


224FUL12.eps
110 

TAB 6 


224FUL13.eps
111 

TAB 7 


224FUL14.eps
112 


224FUL15.eps
113 


224FUL16.eps
114 


224FUL17.eps
115 

TAB 8 


224FUL18.eps
116 


224FUL19.eps
117 


224FUL20.eps
118 


224FUL21.eps
119 


224FUL22.eps
120 


224FUL23.eps
121 

TAB 9 


224FUL24.eps
122 


224FUL25.eps
123 


224FUL26.eps
124 


224FUL27.eps
125 

TAB 10 


224FUL28.eps
126 


224FUL29.eps
127 


224FUL30.eps
128 


224FUL31.eps
129 

TAB 11 


224FUL32.eps
130 

TAB 12 


224FUL33.eps
131 


224FUL34.eps
132 


224FUL35.eps
133 

TAB 13 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

134 

TAB 14 


224FUL36.eps
135 


224FUL37.eps
136 

TAB 15 


224FUL38.eps
137 


224FUL39.eps
138 


224FUL40.eps
139 


224FUL41.eps
140 


224FUL42.eps
141 


224FUL43.eps
142 


224FUL44.eps
143 


224FUL45.eps
144 


224FUL46.eps
145 

TAB 16 


224FUL47.eps
146 


224FUL48.eps
147 


224FUL49.eps
148 


224FUL50.eps
149 


224FUL51.eps
150 


224FUL52.eps
151 

TAB 17 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

152 

TAB 18 


224FUL53.eps
153 


224FUL54.eps
154 

TAB 19 


224FUL55.eps
155 

TAB 20 


224FUL56.eps
156 


224FUL57.eps
157 


224FUL58.eps
158 

TAB 21 


224FUL59.eps
159 


224FUL60.eps
160 


224FUL61.eps
161 


224FUL62.eps
162 


224FUL63.eps
163 


224FUL64.eps
164 


224FUL65.eps
165 


224FUL66.eps
166 


224FUL67.eps
167 


224FUL68.eps
168 

TAB 22 


224FUL69.eps
169 


224FUL70.eps
170 

TAB 23 


224FUL71.eps
171 

TAB 24 


224FUL72.eps
172 

TAB 25 


224FUL73.eps
173 


224FUL74.eps
174 

TAB 26 


224FUL75.eps
175 

TAB 27 


224FUL76.eps
176 


224FUL77.eps
177 


224FUL78.eps
178 


224FUL79.eps
179 


224FUL80.eps
180 

TAB 28 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

181 

TAB 29 


224FUL81.eps
182 


224FUL82.eps
183 

TAB 30 


224FUL83.eps
184 


224FUL84.eps
185 

TAB 31 


224FUL85.eps
186 


224FUL86.eps
187 

TAB 32 

[Information retained in committee files.] 

188 

TAB 33 


224FUL87.eps
189 

TAB 34 


224FUL88.eps
190 


224FUL89.eps
191 


224FUL90.eps
192 


224FUL91.eps
193 


224FUL92.eps
194 


224FUL93.eps
195 


224FUL94.eps
196 

TAB 35 


224FUL95.eps
197 


224FUL96.eps
198 


224FUL97.eps
199 


224FUL98.eps
200 


224FUL99.eps
201 


224FU100.eps
202 


224FU101.eps
203 


224FU102.eps
204 


224FU103.eps
205 


224FU104.eps
206 


224FU105.eps
207 


224FU106.eps
208 


224FU107.eps
209 

TAB 36 


224FU108.eps
210 


224FU109.eps
211 


224FU110.eps
212 

TAB 37 


224FU111.eps
213 


224FU112.eps
214 


224FU113.eps
215 


224FU114.eps
216 


224FU115.eps
217 

TAB 38 


224FU116.eps
218 


224FU117.eps
219 


224FU118.eps
220 


224FU119.eps
221 


224FU120.eps
222 


224FU121.eps
223 


224FU122.eps
224 


224FU123.eps
225 


224FU124.eps
226 


224FU125.eps
227 


224FU126.eps
228 

[Whereupon, at 1:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ 


224FU127.eps