Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia,

Committee on Government Reform,

House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Friday, May 11, 2001 D.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM

Better Coordination

Needed Among

Participating Agencies

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Justice Issues

GAO-01-708T
Page 1 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our recent report on the District

of Columbia (D.C.) criminal justice system.1

 The D.C. criminal justice

system has a unique structure consisting of D.C., federal, and federally

funded D.C. agencies. In addition, over 30 law enforcement agencies other

than the Metropolitan Police Department (MPDC) have a presence in D.C.

To maximize their effectiveness, these agencies need to coordinate their

efforts. However, we found that because of the different sources of

funding, reporting structures, and organizational perspectives of the

various agencies involved in the D.C. criminal justice system, it has been

difficult to take a coordinated approach to identifying and addressing

problem areas that balances competing institutional interests. One reason

for this is that the costs of coordinating activities and taking corrective

actions may fall on one or more federally funded agencies, while any

savings may accrue to one or more D.C. funded agencies, or vice versa. In

the absence of a single hierarchy and funding structure, agencies have

generally acted in their own interests rather than in the interest of the

system as a whole.

The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council for the District of Columbia

(CJCC) is the primary venue in which D.C. criminal justice agencies can

identify and address interagency coordination issues. CJCC was created in

1998 by the agreement of its members2

 and was funded by the D.C. Control

 1

D.C. Criminal Justice System: Better Coordination Needed Among Participating Agencies

(GAO-01-187, Mar. 30, 2001).

2

Members include the D.C. Mayor; Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice; Chairman,

D.C. Council; Chairman, Committee on Judiciary, D.C. Council; Corrections Trustee;

Corporation Counsel; Chief Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Superior

Court); U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; Chief, MPDC; Chairman plus a member

of the D.C. Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (commonly

called the D.C. Control Board); Director, D.C. Youth Services Administration; Director,

District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (Pretrial Services); Director, Public Defender

Service for the District of Columbia (Defender Service); Director, D.C. Department of

Corrections (DOC); Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP); Chairman, U.S. Parole

Commission; and the Acting Director, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for

the District of Columbia (Court Services).
Page 2 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

Board. The D.C. Control Board3 did not fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001, and

CJCC’s sole remaining staff member is funded by a grant. CJCC has had

some success in improving agency coordination, mostly in areas such as

data sharing among agency automated data systems where all participants

stood to gain from a coordinated approach to a problem. In problem areas

where a solution would help one agency possibly at the expense of

another, CJCC has been less successful mainly because it lacked the

authority to compel agencies to address the issues. However, on balance

CJCC has provided a valuable independent forum for discussions of issues

affecting multiple agencies.

Our report recommended that Congress fund an independent Criminal

Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) that, among other things, would

assist criminal justice agencies in coordinating initiatives to improve the

system’s operations. In addition, we recommended that CJCC report

annually to Congress, the Attorney General, and the D.C. Mayor on its

activities, achievements, and issues not yet resolved and why.

The criminal justice process—from arrest through correctional

supervision4

—in any jurisdiction is generally complex and typically

involves a number of participants, including police, prosecutors, defense

attorneys, courts, and corrections agencies. Because of the large number

of agencies involved, coordination among agencies is necessary for the

process to function as efficiently as possible within the requirements of

due process. That is, all involved agencies need to work together to ensure

proper and efficient system operations, identify any problems that emerge,

and decide how best to balance competing interests in resolving these

problems. The unique structure and funding of D.C.’s criminal justice

system, in which federal and D.C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are

blended, creates additional coordination challenges. As shown in table 1,

 3

Under the statutory terms of its creation, D.C. Control Board activities are to be

suspended after the certification of certain specified preconditions. For example, one such

requirement is that the Authority certifies that the District has recorded 4 consecutive

years of balanced budgets. In fiscal year 2000, D.C. was expected to record its fourth

consecutive year of balanced budgets or budget surpluses. On the basis of a projected

fourth consecutive year of D.C. budget surpluses, Congress reduced the Control Board’s

fiscal year 2001 budget, anticipating that the Board would be phasing out its operations in

2001. The Board subsequently decided not to fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001.

4

Correctional supervision refers to criminal justice system supervision for convicted

defendants, including probation, incarceration, and postprison parole or supervised

release.

Background
Page 3 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

the D.C. criminal justice system consists of four D.C. agencies principally

funded through local D.C. funds, six federal agencies, and three D.C.

agencies principally funded through federal appropriations.

Table 1: D.C. Criminal Justice System Agencies and Their Principal Source of Funding

D.C. agencies, D.C. funded Federal agencies, federally funded D.C. agencies, federally funded

Metropolitan Police Department Office of U.S. Attorney for D.C. Superior Court

Office of Corporation Counsel Bureau of Prisons Public Defender Service

Department of Corrections U.S. Marshals Service Office of the Corrections Trustee

Office of the Chief Medical Examiner U.S. Parole Commission

Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for D.C.

D.C. Pretrial Services Agency

Source: GAO analysis.

According to most officials we interviewed and our own analyses, an

overarching problem within the D.C. criminal justice system has been the

lack of coordination among all participating agencies. Typically, federal

and nonfederal criminal justice systems include the following stages: (1)

arrest and booking, (2) charging, (3) initial court appearance, (4) release

decision, (5) preliminary hearing, (6) indictment, (7) arraignment, (8) trial,

(9) sentencing, and (10) correctional supervision. Most stages require the

participation of several agencies that need to coordinate their activities for

the system to operate efficiently while also meeting the requirements of

due process. That is, all involved agencies need to work together to ensure

that their roles and operations mesh well with those of other agencies and

to identify any problems that emerge and decide how best to resolve them.

Table 2 shows the stages in D.C.’s criminal justice system and the agencies

that participate in each stage. As shown in the table, 7 of the 10 stages

typically involve multiple agencies with different sources of funding,

which results in different reporting structures and different oversight

entities. For example, as many as six agencies—one D.C. (MPDC), three

federal (the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO),

U.S. Marshals Service, and D.C. Pretrial Services Agency), and two

federally funded D.C. agencies (Superior Court and Public Defender

Service (Defender Service)—need to coordinate their activities before the

D.C.’s Unique

Structure Presents

Additional

Coordination

Challenges
Page 4 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

arrestee’s initial court appearance for a felony offense can occur.5 At the

latter stages of the system, an offender’s sentencing and correctional

supervision may require the participation of as many as eight agencies—

one D.C.-funded agency (the Department of Corrections (DOC), five

federal agencies (USAO, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), U.S. Marshals

Service, U.S. Parole Commission, and the Court Services and Offender

Supervision Agency (Court Services)), and two federally funded D.C.

agencies (Superior Court and Defender Service). At any stage, the

participation of other agencies might also be required.6

 In addition, the

reporting and funding structure for these participating agencies often

differs. For example, USAO, the U.S. Marshals Service, BOP, and the U.S.

Parole Commission ultimately report to the U.S. Attorney General and are

funded by the appropriations subcommittee that funds the Department of

Justice;7

 MPDC and the Office of the Corporation Counsel (Corporation

Counsel) ultimately report to the D.C. Mayor; and Superior Court,

Defender Service, Pretrial Services, and Court Services are independent of

both D.C and the U.S. Department of Justice, submit their budgets to

Congress, and are funded by the appropriations subcommittee for D.C.

 5

USAO prosecutes felony and serious misdemeanor violations committed by adults in D.C.

Corporation Counsel would typically not be involved in prosecutions of adult felony

offenses.

6

For example, the D.C. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner may potentially be used for

such purposes as linking a particular suspect to a crime or court testimony regarding

autopsy results or toxicological tests.

7

 Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and

Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations. The House and Senate have

subcommittees with identical jurisdictions.
Page 5 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

Table 2: D.C. Criminal Justice Agencies Involved In Processing a “Typical” Case Through the Stages of the Criminal Justice

System

Stages of the criminal justice process (from left to right)

Type of

agency/

funding

Arrest

& booking Charging

Initial court

appearance

Release

decision

Prelim.

Hearing Indictment

Arraignment TrialSentencing

Correctional

supervision

D.C./

D.C.

MPDC MPDC

OCC

OCC DOC MPDC

OCC

MPDC MPDC

OCC

DOC

Federal/

federal

USAO USAO

USMS

PSA

USMS

PSA

USMS

USAO

PSA

USMS

USAO

PSA

USMS

USAO

PSA

USMS

USAO

PSA

USMS

USAO

CSOSA

USMS

BOP

USPC

CSOSA

D.C/

federal

Sup.Ct Sup.Ct

PDS

Sup.Ct

PDS

Sup.Ct

PDS

Sup.Ct

PDS

Sup.Ct

PDS

Sup.Ct

PDS

Sup.Ct

PDS

Legend: MPDC = Metropolitan Police, D.C.; OCC = Office of Corporation Counsel; USAO = U.S.

Attorney’s Office; USMS = U.S. Marshals Service; Sup. Ct = D.C. Superior Court; PDS = Public

Defender Service; PSA = Pretrial Services Agency; DOC = Department of Corrections; BOP =

Federal Bureau of Prisons; USPC = U.S. Parole Commission; CSOSA = Court Services and Offender

Supervision Agency.

Note 1: Any specific case is prosecuted by either Corporation Counsel or USAO, not both. However,

in specific circumstances, a case may be referred at some point in the process from one office to the

other for prosecution.

Note 2: Defendants who are eligible for a court-appointed attorney may, depending upon several

factors, be provided a PDS attorney, or a private attorney. D.C. courts’ budget funds private, courtappointed attorneys for criminal defendants.

Note 3: Information from the D.C. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner may potentially be used at

any stage in the process from arrest through trial. In addition, forensic evidence and testimony may

also be provided by federal agencies that perform certain forensic analyses for D.C., such as the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration, or Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms.

Source: GAO analysis of D.C. criminal justice agencies’ funding and responsibilities.

According to most officials we interviewed and our analyses, an

overarching problem within the D.C. criminal justice system has been the

lack of coordination among all participating agencies. Agency officials

pointed to several major problem areas, each the subject of recent studies

that have identified coordination issues. The areas included

• scheduling of court cases, which has resulted in the inefficient use of

officer, attorney, and court personnel time;

• information technology, which uses more than 70 different systems that

are not linked to facilitate the sharing of information;

Lack of Coordination

Among Agencies
Page 6 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

• correctional supervision, in which poor communication among agencies

has led to monitoring lapses with tragic consequences; and

• forensics, in which the sharing of responsibilities among agencies

increases the possibility of evidentiary mishaps resulting from lapses in

coordination.

The scheduling of court cases has had adverse affects on several criminal

justice agencies involved in case processing. As shown in table 2, MPDC,

prosecutors, Defender Service, U.S. Marshals Service, Pretrial Services,

Court Services, and Superior Court could be involved in the court-related

processing of a case from the preliminary hearing to the trial and

subsequent sentencing. Representatives from several of these agencies are

typically required to be present at court trials and hearings. Because

specific court times are not established, individuals who are expected to

appear in court are required to be present when the court first convenes in

the morning. These individuals might be required to wait at the courthouse

for some period of time for the case to be called, if (1) more trials or

hearings are scheduled than can be conducted, (2) any one of the involved

individuals is not present or prepared, or (3) the case is continued for any

number of reasons. MPDC recorded that during calendar year 1999 its

officers spent 118 full-time staff years in court-related activities such as

preliminary hearings and trials. While MPDC officials stated that officers

often spent many hours at court waiting for cases to be called, data were

not available on the proportion of the 118 full-time staff years that were

attributable to actual court time compared to the time spent waiting for

cases to be called, including cases that were rescheduled.

CJCC selected the Council for Court Excellence and the Justice

Management Institute8

 to conduct a detailed study of criminal justice

resource management issues, with particular emphasis on court case

processing and the utilization of police resources. In its March 2001 report,

the Council for Court Excellence and the Justice Management Institute

concluded that major changes were needed in the D.C. criminal justice

caseflow system to improve the system’s efficiency. Among other things,

the report found inefficiencies and counterproductive policies at every

stage in case processing. The report also concluded that little use was

 8

The Council for Court Excellence and the Justice Management Institute are not-for-profit

research organizations that, among other things, evaluate court-related programs and

functions.

Court Case Scheduling
Page 7 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

being made of modern technology in the arrest, booking, papering,9 and

court process that could improve system operations.

The Council for Court Excellence and the Justice Management Institute

identified priority areas for system improvements, such as redesigning

court procedures in misdemeanor cases, improving the methods used to

process cases from arrest through initial court appearance by automating

the involved processes, and improving the systems used to notify police

officers about court dates. Congress provided $1 million for fiscal year

2001 to implement some of the recommended case management

initiatives, such as a differentiated case management system for

misdemeanors and traffic offenses, the papering pilot project between

MPDC and Corporation Counsel, and a mental health pilot treatment

project for appropriate, nonviolent pretrial release defendants in

coordination with the D.C. Commission on Mental Health Services.

D.C.’s criminal justice system is complex, with more than 70 different

information systems in use among the various participating agencies.

These systems are not linked in a manner that permits timely and useful

information sharing among disparate agencies. For example, it is very

difficult to obtain data to determine the annual amount of time MPDC

officers spend meeting with prosecutors about cases in which prosecutors

eventually decide not to file charges against the arrestee. We determined

that such an analysis would require data about: (1) MPDC arrests, (2)

MPDC officer time and attendance, (3) charges filed by USAO or

Corporation Counsel, and (4) Superior Court case dispositions. Such data

are currently maintained in separate systems with no reliable tracking

number that could be used to link the information in each system for a

specific case and no systematic exchange of information. This lack of

shared information diminishes the effectiveness of the entire criminal

justice system. For example, according to a CJCC official, there is no

immediate way for an arresting officer to determine whether an arrestee is

on parole or for an arrestee’s community supervision officer to know that

the parolee had been arrested. Such information could affect both the

charging decision and the decision whether or not to release an arrestee

from an MPDC holding cell.

 9

Papering refers to the face-to-face meeting between an officer knowledgeable about an

arrest and a Corporation Counsel or USAO attorney to determine whether or not to

prosecute a case.

Criminal Justice Information

Systems
Page 8 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

In 1999, CJCC attempted to address problems with D.C. criminal justice

information systems by preparing, among other things, an Information

Technology Interagency Agreement that was adopted by CJCC members.

The agreement recognized the need for immediate improvement of

information technology in the D.C. criminal justice system and established

the Information Technology Advisory Committee (ITAC) to serve as the

governing body for justice information system development. ITAC

recognized that it was difficult for a single agency involved in the criminal

justice system to access information systems maintained by other

agencies, and pursued developing a system that would allow an agency to

share information with all other criminal justice agencies, while

maintaining control over its own system. ITAC devised a District of

Columbia Justice Information System (JUSTIS).

In July 2000, CJCC partnered with the D.C. Office of the Chief Technology

Officer in contracting with a consulting firm to design JUSTIS based on

modern dedicated intranet and Web browser technology. When

completed, JUSTIS is to allow each agency to maintain its current

information system, while allowing the agency to access selected data

from other criminal justice agencies.

Effective correctional supervision, which includes probation,

incarceration, and post-prison parole or supervised released for convicted

defendants, requires effective coordination among participating agencies.

In D.C., the stage of the criminal justice system referred to as correctional

supervision involves several agencies, including: (1) Superior Court, which

sentences convicted defendants and determines whether to revoke a

person’s release on community supervision; (2) Court Services, which

monitors offenders on community supervision; (3) DOC, which primarily

supervises misdemeanants sentenced to D.C. Jail or one of several halfway

houses in D.C.;10 (4) BOP, which supervises felons incarcerated in federal

prisons; (5) the U.S. Parole Commission, which determines the prison

 10DOC still has control over three prison facilities within the Lorton Correctional Complex,

which is to be closed by December 31, 2001, under the terms of the D.C. Revitalization Act.

Correctional Supervision
Page 9 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

release date and conditions of release for D.C. inmates eligible for parole;11

and (6) the U.S. Marshals Service, which transports prisoners.

Gaps in coordination among agencies may lead to tragic consequences,

such as those that occurred in the case of Leo Gonzales Wright, who

committed two violent offenses while under the supervision of D.C.’s

criminal justice system. Wright, who was paroled in 1993 after serving

nearly 17 years of a 15-to-60 year sentence for armed robbery and second

degree murder, was arrested in May 1995 for automobile theft charges,

which were later dismissed. In June 1995, Wright was arrested for

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. However, he was released

pending trial for the drug arrest, due in part to miscommunication among

agencies. Wright subsequently committed two carjackings, murdering one

of his victims. He was convicted in U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia and is currently serving a life without parole sentence in federal

prison at Leavenworth, KS.

The outcry over the Wright case resulted in two studies, including a

comprehensive review of the processing of Wright’s case prepared for the

U.S. Attorney General by the Corrections Trustee in October 1999. The

report included 24 recommendations to help ensure that instances similar

to the Wright case do not occur. In July 2000, the Corrections Trustee

issued a progress report on the implementation of recommendations from

the October 1999 report. According to the Corrections Trustee, while not

all recommendations in the October 1999 report have been fully

implemented, progress has been made in addressing several of them. For

example, with funds provided by the Corrections Trustee, DOC has

purchased a new jail-management information system for tracking inmates

and implemented a new policy on escorted inmate trips. In addition, in

January 2000, the Corrections Trustee began convening monthly meetings

of an Interagency Detention Work Group, whose membership largely

parallels that of CJCC. The group and its six subcommittees have focused

on such issues as the convicted felon designation and transfer process,

and parole and halfway house processing.

 11Inmates convicted in Superior Court prior to the implementation of the new D.C.

sentencing guidelines were generally sentenced to a range of years, such as 10 to 20 years.

Such inmates could be eligible for parole after serving a specified minimum number of

years. Under the terms of the D.C. Revitalization Act, the U.S. Parole Commission is now

responsible for determining the parole, or prison release, date for such inmates (Public

Law 105-33, Sec. 11231). Under the new sentencing guidelines, which abolished parole,

inmates will have to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence before being eligible for

release.
Page 10 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

In addition to the studies and the actions of the Corrections Trustee, CJCC

and Court Services are addressing the monitoring and supervision of

offenders. CJCC has begun to address the issues of halfway house

management and programs that monitor offenders. Court Services is

developing a system in which sanctions are imposed whenever individuals

violate conditions of probation or parole.

Forensics is another area where lack of coordination can have adverse

effects.12 D.C. does not have a comprehensive forensic laboratory to

complete forensic analysis for use by police and prosecutors. Instead,

MPDC currently uses other organizations such as the FBI, the Drug

Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms, and a private laboratory to conduct much of its forensic work.

MPDC performs some forensic functions such as crime scene response,

firearms testing, and latent print analysis. The Office of the Chief Medical

Examiner, a D.C. agency, performs autopsies and certain toxicological

tests, such as the testing for the presence of drugs in the body.

Coordination among agencies is particularly important because several

organizations may be involved in handling and analyzing a piece of

evidence. For example, if MPDC finds a gun with a bloody latent

fingerprint at a crime scene, the gun would typically need to be examined

by both MPDC and the FBI. In order to complete the analysis, multiple

forensic disciplines (e.g., DNA or firearm examiners) would need to

examine the gun. If the various forensic tests were coordinated in a

multidisciplinary approach, forensic examiners would be able to obtain

the maximum information from the evidence without the possibility of

contaminating it. Such contamination could adversely affect the

adjudication and successful resolution of a criminal investigation.

In April 2000, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) issued a report on the

D.C. criminal justice system’s forensic capabilities. The report concluded

that D.C. had limited forensic capacity and that limitations in MPDC

prevented the effective collection, storage, and processing of crime scene

evidence, which ultimately compromised the potential for successful

resolution of cases. NIJ-identified deficiencies included, among other

things:

 12Forensics involves a number of disciplines, such as latent prints, firearms/toolmarks,

forensic biology (including DNA), toxicology, drug analysis, questioned documents, and

trace evidence.

Forensic Capacity and

Coordination
Page 11 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

• out-of-date technology;

• lengthy delays in processing evidence;

• ineffective communications in the collection, processing, and tracking of

evidence from the crime scene; and

• ineffective communications between forensic case examiners and

prosecutors.

The NIJ report supported the development of a centralized forensic

laboratory that would be shared by MPDC and the D.C. Office of the Chief

Medical Examiner. The report did not examine the costs to build a

comprehensive forensic laboratory. In his fiscal year 2002 proposed

budget, the Mayor has allocated $7.5 million for the development of a

forensics laboratory that is designed to be a state-of-the-art, full-service

crime laboratory, medical examiner/morgue facility, and public health

laboratory that meets all applicable National Lab Standards. We did not

independently evaluate the costs and benefits of a comprehensive forensic

laboratory. However, such a facility could potentially improve

coordination by housing all forensic functions in one location, eliminating

the need to transport evidence among multiple, dispersed locations.

A principal area where D.C.’s unique structure has led to coordination

problems is case processing that occurs from the time of arrest through

initial court appearance. As shown in table 2, as many as six agencies need

to coordinate before an arrested person’s initial court appearance for a

felony offense can occur.13 However, we identified several aspects of the

current process where a lack of coordination posed problems. For

example, unlike many other major metropolitan jurisdictions, prosecutors

in D.C. require an officer who is knowledgeable about the facts of the

arrest to meet personally with them before they determine whether to

formally charge an arrestee with a felony or misdemeanor crime.14 This

process is called papering. During calendar year 1999, papering required

the equivalent of 23 full-time officers devoted solely to these appearances,

ultimately reducing the number of officers available for patrol duty by an

 13The USAO prosecutes felony and serious misdemeanor violations committed by adults in

D.C. Corporation Counsel would typically not be involved in prosecutions of adult felony

offenses.

14Corporation Counsel and MPDC have agreed to participate in a pilot project in which

officers will not be required to meet face to face with prosecutors to charge 17 minor

offenses.

A Coordination Case

Study: The Initial Stages of

Case Processing
Page 12 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

equal amount. Efforts in 1998 and 1999 to revise the papering process

failed in part because the costs and benefits of the changes under

consideration were perceived by one or more participating agencies to be

unevenly distributed. We focused our review on offenses prosecuted by

the USAO because during 1999 they accounted for over 85 percent of

MPDC officer hours expended on papering.

USAO’s requirement that MPDC officers personally meet with prosecutors

in order to make a charging decision appears to be unusual, particularly

for misdemeanors. A 1997 Booz-Allen and Hamilton survey found that in

30 of 38 responding jurisdictions (51 were surveyed), police officers were

not required to meet with prosecutors until court (i.e., trial), and in 3 cities

officers were not required to appear in person until the preliminary

hearing. In addition, we reviewed the charging processes in Philadelphia

and Boston. Neither of these cities required face-to-face meetings with

prosecutors for processing most cases. According to USAO officials, the

current papering process is critical for USAO to make an initial charging

decision correctly. Both USAO and MPDC officials said that the

paperwork submitted to USAO for charging decisions has been of uneven

quality.15

In the past decade, several attempts have been made to change the initial

stages of case processing in D.C. These efforts—which were made by

MPDC, Corporation Counsel, and USAO, in conjunction with consulting

firms—involved projects in the areas of night papering, night court, and

officerless papering. However, the involved agencies never reached

agreement on all components of the projects, and each of the projects was

ultimately suspended. The Chief of MPDC has publicly advocated the

establishment of some type of arrangement for making charging decisions

during the evening and/or night police shifts.

Night Papering and Night Court

Currently, both USAO and Corporation Counsel are only open to paper

cases during typical workday hours, that is, generally from about 8:00 a.m.

to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. Night papering could permit

officers on evening and night shifts to generally present their paperwork to

prosecutors during their shifts. Night court refers to conducting certain

 15There were no data to determine whether the quality of the paperwork was generally

better for misdemeanors than for felonies.

Attempts Have Been Made to

Change Initial Stages of Case

Processing in D.C.
Page 13 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

court proceedings, such as initial court appearance, during a late evening

or night shift. Night papering would require USAO and Corporation

Counsel charging attorneys to work evening hours, and night court would

involve a much broader commitment of D.C. Superior Court resources as

well as the participation of other agencies.

 Officerless Papering

Officerless papering would not require an officer to appear in person

before the prosecutor, and provisions could be made for the prosecutor to

contact the officer to clarify issues, as needed. In March 2001, MPDC and

Corporation Counsel began an officerless papering pilot program for 17

minor offenses prosecuted by Corporation Counsel.

In the absence of an automated system for completing and transmitting

the forms required for documenting arrests and making charging

decisions, simple entry errors resulting from entering the same

information multiple times can hamper the initial stages of case

processing. USAO has cited such problems as one reason that officers

should be required to meet face to face with prosecutors for papering

decisions. To the extent that the police do not have a reliable process for

reviewing and ensuring the completeness and accuracy of the paperwork

submitted to prosecutors, USAO is likely to continue to resist efforts to

institute officerless papering.

Even if these issues were to be successfully addressed, the distribution of

costs among the participants in any revised system would still likely pose

an obstacle to change. The costs of the current system of processing cases

from arrest through initial court appearance are borne principally by

MPDC—primarily a locally funded D.C. agency—not USAO or D.C.

Superior Court, both of which are federally funded. On the other hand,

instituting night papering would likely reduce MPDC’s costs, while

increasing the costs borne by USAO, Corporation Counsel, and/or D.C.

Superior Court, depending upon the approach taken.

CJCC is the primary venue in which D.C. criminal justice agencies can

identify and address interagency coordination issues. Its funding and

staffing have been modest—about $300,000 annually with four staff. CJCC

has functioned as an independent entity whose members represent the

major organizations within the D.C. criminal justice system. According to

many criminal justice officials we spoke with, during its nearly 3-year

existence, CJCC has had some success in improving agency coordination,

Obstacles to Changing Initial

Case Processing Stages

CJCC Has Had Some

Success as a

Coordinating

Mechanism
Page 14 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

mostly in areas where all participants stood to gain from a coordinated

approach to a problem. In problem areas where a solution would help one

agency possibly at the expense of another, CJCC has been less successful

mainly because it lacked the authority to compel agencies to address the

issues. However, on balance, CJCC has provided a valuable independent

forum for discussions of issues affecting multiple agencies.

The D.C. Control Board16 did not fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001, and

CJCC’s sole remaining staff member is funded by a grant. It is not known

whether CJCC will continue to formally exist, and if it exists, how it will

be funded, whether it will have staff, and whether it will remain

independent or under the umbrella of another organization, such as the

D.C. Mayor’s office. Recently, the Mayor included $169,000 in his fiscal

year 2002 proposed budget to fund CJCC. While we welcome the Mayor’s

support for CJCC, we believe that for CJCC to be most successful it must

be viewed as independent by participating agencies.

CJCC has not been required to formally report on its activities, including

areas of focus, successes, and areas of continuing discussion and

disagreement. The transparency provided by an annual report would help

to spotlight areas of accomplishment and continuing disagreement and

could assist with oversight by those responsible for funding individual

CJCC members.

As of November 2000, CJCC and other agencies involved in the D.C.

criminal justice system reported 93 initiatives for improving the operation

of the system. Most of these initiatives were ongoing; consequently, their

impact had not yet been evaluated. However, we found numerous

instances where participating agencies did not agree on an initiative’s

goals, status, starting date, participating agencies, or results to date. This

lack of agreement underscores a lack of coordination among the

participating agencies that could reduce the effectiveness of these

initiatives.

 16Under the statutory terms of its creation, D.C. Control Board activities are to be

suspended after the certification of certain specified preconditions. For example, one such

requirement is that the D.C. Control Board certifies that the District has recorded 4

consecutive years of balanced budgets. In fiscal year 2000, D.C. was expected to record its

fourth consecutive year of balanced budgets or budget surpluses. On the basis of a

projected fourth consecutive year of D.C. budget surpluses, Congress reduced the Control

Board’s fiscal year 2001 budget, anticipating that the Board would be phasing out its

operations in 2001. The Board subsequently decided not to fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001.

Initiatives to Improve

the D.C. Criminal

Justice System
Page 15 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

Every criminal justice system faces coordination challenges. However, the

unique structure and funding of the D.C. criminal justice system, in which

federal and D.C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are blended, creates

additional challenges.

CJCC has played a useful role in addressing such coordination challenges,

especially in areas where agencies perceived a common interest. However,

CJCC’s uncertain future could leave D.C. without benefit of an

independent entity for coordinating the activities of its unique criminal

justice system. Funding CJCC through any participating agency diminishes

its stature as an independent entity in the eyes of a number of CJCC’s

member agencies, reducing their willingness to participate. Without a

requirement to report successes and areas of continuing discussion and

disagreement to each agency’s funding source, CJCC’s activities,

achievements, and areas of disagreement have generally been known only

to its participating agencies. This has created little incentive to coordinate

for the common good, and all too often agencies have simply “agreed to

disagree” without taking action. Furthermore, without a meaningful role in

cataloging multiagency initiatives, CJCC has been unable to ensure that

criminal justice initiatives are coordinated among all affected agencies to

help eliminate duplicative efforts and maximize their effectiveness.

In our March 30, 2001, report,17 we recommended that Congress consider:

• Funding an independent CJCC—with its own director and staff—to help

coordinate the operations of the D.C. criminal justice system.

Congressional funding ensures that CJCC will retain its identity as an

independent body with no formal organizational or funding link to any of

its participating members.

• Requiring CJCC to report annually to Congress, the Attorney General, and

the D.C. Mayor on its activities, achievements, and issues not yet resolved

and why.

• Requiring that all D.C. criminal justice agencies report multiagency

initiatives to CJCC, which would serve as a clearinghouse for criminal

justice initiatives and highlight for CJCC members those initiatives that

warrant further discussion and coordination. This reporting requirement

 17D.C. Criminal Justice System: Better Coordination Needed Among Participating Agencies

(GAO-01-187, Mar. 30, 2001).

Conclusions

Matters For

Congressional

Consideration
Page 16 GAO-01-708T D.C. Criminal Justice System

could help improve interagency coordination, promote the adoption of

common goals, and help reduce redundant efforts.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be

pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the

Subcommittee may have.

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard

Stana or William Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key

contributions to this testimony included Mark Tremba and Geoffrey

Hamilton.

Contacts and

Acknowledgment