If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

September 3, 2020

9:05 a.m.

v No. 347553

Kent Circuit Court

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,

LC No. 17-007661-NF

Defendant,

and

FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 348440

Kent Circuit Court

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,

LC No. 17-007661-NF

Defendant,

and

FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,

Defendant-Appellee.
-2-

Before: TUKEL, P.J., and MARKEY and GADOLA, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

In this dispute involving personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault 

act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company paid 80% of the 

charges billed by plaintiff Spectrum Health Hospitals but refused to pay the full amount on the 

basis that charges exceeding 80% of the total amount billed were “unreasonable.” Spectrum filed 

suit, seeking payment of the balance. The trial court denied Farm Bureau’s motion in limine 

regarding, primarily, the relevance of evidence pertaining to payments by third-party payers such 

as health insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid, concluding categorically that this evidence was not 

pertinent to the question whether Spectrum’s charges were reasonable within the meaning of the 

no-fault act. Thereafter, the parties entered into a consent judgment, preserving Farm Bureau’s 

right to challenge the trial court’s ruling on its motion in limine. Subsequently, the trial court 

entered an order denying Spectrum’s request for attorney fees under the attorney-fee penalty 

provision of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3148. In Docket No. 347553, Farm Bureau appeals by 

right, challenging the trial court’s earlier decision on the motion in limine. In Docket No. 348440, 

Spectrum appeals by right the denial of its request for attorney fees. The appeals have been 

consolidated by this Court.1 We reverse in Docket No. 347553, which also requires us to reverse 

in Docket No. 348440, and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 22, 2016, Brett Sabby suffered bodily injuries in a motor vehicle accident that 

occurred when the car in which he was a passenger left the road and struck a tree. As a result of 

the accident, Sabby received medical care and treatment at Spectrum. Many of the medical records 

available to us on appeal have been heavily redacted. But from the available information, it 

appears that, among other injuries, Sabby suffered a femur fracture, a complex open ankle fracture, 

broken ribs, a knee laceration, and a “Roy-Camille type III sacral U fracture.” From the redacted 

billing-related documents, it also appears that Sabby’s treatment included surgery, laboratory tests, 

x-rays, implants, physical therapy, “recovery room” services, and pharmacy services. For 

treatment and services provided between August 22, 2016, and September 2, 2016, Spectrum’s 

charges totaled $225,279.10. 

Farm Bureau was responsible for providing Sabby with PIP benefits under the no-fault act. 

Spectrum submitted Sabby’s bills to Farm Bureau for payment, but Farm Bureau only partially 

paid the bills. In total, Farm Bureau paid Spectrum $180,223.27, or 80% of the total requested, 

leaving an unpaid balance of $45,055.83. In denying full payment, Farm Bureau maintained that 

any charges in excess of 80% of Spectrum’s gross charges were unreasonable within the meaning 

of the no-fault act. Accordingly, Farm Bureau refused to pay any more than 80% of Spectrum’s 

total charges. In denial letters dated October 14, 2016, Farm Bureau more fully explained its 

reasons as follows:

 

1

Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, 

entered April 16, 2019 (Docket Nos. 347553 & 348440).
-3-

Based on recent court rulings, Farm Bureau understands that in cases not 

involving insurance your hospital customarily discounts gross charges by twenty 

percent if payment is made within ninety days of the date the charges are billed. In 

those cases, the courts have ruled that under MCL 500.3157, charges to no-fault 

insureds may not exceed eighty percent of gross charges if payment is made within 

ninety days. Farm Bureau is making payment within thirty one days of the date the 

charges have been billed. . . .

Furthermore, based on our own investigation, charges in excess of eighty 

percent of gross charges are charges in excess of reasonable charges. Because under 

MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and 3157 a hospital’s charge to a no-fault insured may not 

exceed a reasonable charge, this is an additional reason why no-fault benefits are 

not owed for charges in excess of eighty percent of gross charges.

On August 22, 2017, Spectrum filed the current lawsuit against Farm Bureau.2 Spectrum 

sought (1) payment of Sabby’s benefits under the no-fault act, (2) a declaratory judgment to the 

effect that Farm Bureau was liable for payment of Sabby’s no-fault benefits, (3) a declaratory 

judgment providing that Farm Bureau’s practice of unilaterally paying only 80% of a claim was 

unreasonable and violative of the no-fault act, and (4) an award of prefiling interest, costs, and 

attorney’s fees pursuant to MCL 500.3142, MCL 500.3148, MCL 600.6013, and MCR 2.625. In 

its answer to Spectrum’s complaint, Farm Bureau denied that it had any outstanding liability for 

no-fault benefits. According to Farm Bureau, Spectrum’s total charges were in “excess of 

reasonable charges;” therefore, Farm Bureau did not owe any additional amount. 

The parties’ arguments regarding the reasonableness of Spectrum’s charges and how 

reasonableness should generally be determined focus primarily on MCL 500.3157, MCL 

500.3158, and MCL 500.3159.3 Relevant to the parties’ arguments, MCL 500.3157 provided:

A physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution lawfully rendering 

treatment to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal 

protection insurance, and a person or institution providing rehabilitative 

occupational training following the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for 

the products, services and accommodations rendered. The charge shall not exceed 

 

2 Sabby was not a party to the case, but Spectrum obtained an assignment from Sabby. And the 

parties entered into a consent judgment, agreeing that Spectrum was an assignee on the basis of a 

“valid assignment” of rights. Given the valid assignment, there is no dispute on appeal that 

Spectrum was permitted to pursue Sabby’s no-fault benefits for medical services provided in 2016.

3 With the enactment of 2019 PA 21, the Legislature substantially amended portions of the nofault act, including MCL 500.3157, effective June 11, 2019. Spectrum, however, commenced the 

current case before the effective date of the amendment, meaning that this case is controlled by the 

former provisions of the no-fault act. See George v Allstate Ins Co, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d 

__ (2019); slip op at 3 n 3. Unless otherwise noted, references to the no-fault act are to the version 

in effect at the time this action was commenced. 
-4-

the amount the person or institution customarily charges for like products, services 

and accommodations in cases not involving insurance. [Emphasis added.]

MCL 500.3158(2) states:

A physician, hospital, clinic or other medical institution providing, before 

or after an accidental bodily injury upon which a claim for personal protection 

insurance benefits is based, any product, service or accommodation in relation to 

that or any other injury, or in relation to a condition claimed to be connected with 

that or any other injury, if requested to do so by the insurer against whom the claim 

has been made, (a) shall furnish forthwith a written report of the history, condition, 

treatment and dates and costs of treatment of the injured person and (b) shall 

produce forthwith and permit inspection and copying of its records regarding the 

history, condition, treatment and dates and costs of treatment.

And finally, MCL 500.3159 provides:

In a dispute regarding an insurer’s right to discovery of facts about an 

injured person’s earnings or about his history, condition, treatment and dates and 

costs of treatment, a court may enter an order for the discovery. The order may be 

made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to all persons having 

an interest, and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the 

discovery. A court, in order to protect against annoyance, embarrassment or 

oppression, as justice requires, may enter an order refusing discovery or specifying 

conditions of discovery and may order payments of costs and expenses of the 

proceeding, including reasonable fees for the appearance of attorneys at the 

proceedings, as justice requires. 

During discovery, Farm Bureau sought documents and information from Spectrum on 

matters that Farm Bureau asserted related to the reasonableness of Spectrum’s charges for Sabby’s 

care and treatment within the meaning of the no-fault act. Farm Bureau requested information 

concerning (1) the average annual increase in Spectrum’s charges and (2) whether charges for 

uninsured persons were the same as for individuals with no-fault insurance. With respect to 

Sabby’s charges more specifically, Farm Bureau sought information regarding (1) the amount 

generally billed for the same care for the same dates of service, (2) the 115% Medicare rate for

this care, and (3) the rates Priority Health and Blue Cross/Blue Shield each paid for such care. 

Farm Bureau also asked whether Spectrum compared its charges to other hospitals, and, if so, 

whether the charges were comparable. Additionally, Farm Bureau requested that Spectrum 

produce financial records for the 2015 to 2016 fiscal year, including (1) Spectrum’s federal 

Hospital and Hospital Health Care Complex Cost Reports, (2) Spectrum’s IRS Form 990, (3) 

Spectrum’s Audited Financial Statements, (4) Spectrum’s Financial Assistance Policy, and (5) 

various documents related to billing and collection. 

Spectrum objected to many, though not all, of these requests on the grounds that the 

information was “irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible 

evidence.” Briefly stated, Spectrum indicated that, to support its charges at issue in this case, 

Spectrum “anticipate[d] that it will rely on its billing and medical records related to the dates of 
-5-

service at issue . . . as well as its financial statements and comparative charge data for the years in 

dispute.”

Relevant to its claim that the charges were unreasonable, on the same date that Farm Bureau 

filed its answer in this case, Farm Bureau also filed an initial witness list, which included, among 

other witnesses, Mark A. Hall, who was identified as an expert witness. Farm Bureau then filed a 

motion in limine to qualify Hall as an expert in “health services research” specifically related to 

healthcare costs. In its motion in limine, Farm Bureau did not present Hall’s opinions on the 

charges related to Sabby in particular. Rather, Farm Bureau offered Hall’s general opinions on 

healthcare costs and the opinions he provided in unrelated cases. 

In moving to qualify Hall as an expert and in explaining the relevance of his testimony, 

Farm Bureau asserted that the no-fault act did not define the term “reasonableness,” and in the 

absence of a definition, the courts should look to the open market, just as courts look to the open 

market when deciding valuation questions in other contexts. But, on the basis of Hall’s opinions, 

Farm Bureau also maintained that open-market rates could not be determined by looking solely at 

gross charges or even gross charges customary in the industry. Instead, quoting Hall, Farm Bureau 

asserted:

“[T]he market for the prices in medical services is not an effective or 

functioning market unless patients are represented by an insurance company. If 

patients seek care outside of their insurance network or if they don’t have healthcare 

insurance, then they’re left to whatever doctors and hospitals want to charge and 

they’re not in an effective position to negotiate.

So if one is looking for sort of effective market or competition constraint 

prices, one needs to look in the part of the market in which insurance companies 

and government agencies negotiate over prices and not at the part of the market 

where patients are left to their own devices.”

In addition to the amounts paid on the open market, Farm Bureau also asserted that 

reasonableness should be determined by considering (1) costs to the hospital in providing 

treatment, including specifically the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio, and (2) “the amount generally 

billed”

4

for the services. Furthermore, Farm Bureau asserted that Hall should be qualified as an 

expert on healthcare costs and that he should be allowed to offer an opinion on the reasonableness 

of charges. In making this argument, Farm Bureau emphasized that, in an unrelated case, the 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court qualified Hall as an expert on these topics after conducting a Daubert5

hearing. Ultimately, Farm Bureau’s motion in limine asked the trial court:

 

4 The “amount generally billed” is a specific figure that hospitals must calculate for tax purposes.

5 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 

(1993).
-6-

1. For a ruling qualifying Defendants’ expert, Mark Hall.

2. For a ruling that the No-Fault Act does not define what is a 

reasonable charge and the normal rules of evidence apply.

3. For a ruling that what is paid on the open market is relevant to the 

reasonableness of the gross charge.

4. For a ruling that evidence of payment rates of payers other than nofault insurers are relevant to the reasonableness of Spectrum’s gross charges.

5. For a ruling that Spectrum’s ratio of costs to charges is relevant to 

the issue of the reasonableness of the gross charge.

6. For a ruling that the amount generally billed is relevant, 

discoverable, and admissible with regard to the reasonableness of the gross charge.

Spectrum filed a response to Farm Bureau’s motion. Spectrum indicated that it “did not 

object” to Hall’s qualifications, given his experience, to testify as an expert at trial. Spectrum 

noted, however, that Hall needed a foundation for his testimony as required by MRE 702 and MRE 

703, and Spectrum reserved the right to object to his specific testimony should it fail to meet these 

requirements. In particular, Spectrum reserved the right to object on the basis of the facts or data 

used to support Hall’s opinions.

Although not objecting to Hall’s qualifications as an expert, Spectrum did object to Farm 

Bureau’s requests for a ruling on what constituted relevant and admissible evidence regarding the 

reasonableness of Spectrum’s charges. Detailing the holdings in several opinions issued by this 

Court and the Michigan Supreme Court, Spectrum asserted that discovery and evidence relating 

to reasonableness were limited by the no-fault act. More specifically, citing decisions of this Court, 

Spectrum maintained that, because the focus of MCL 500.3157 is on “charges” and not “payment,”

the amount that others—such as insurance companies or Medicare—pay for services is not relevant 

to a determination of reasonableness under the no-fault act. For this reason, Spectrum asked the 

trial court to deny Farm Bureau’s request for a ruling that the amount others pay is relevant and 

admissible. 

Although disputing Farm Bureau’s assertion that the amount others pay is relevant, 

Spectrum did not expressly address Farm Bureau’s additional arguments regarding the relevance

of (1) a hospital’s cost-to-charges ratio or (2) the amount generally billed. At most, in a footnote, 

Spectrum asserted that in light of Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich 

191; 895 NW2d 490 (2017), the “costs of treatment” a healthcare provider must disclose under 

MCL 500.3158 were the costs to the injured person, “i.e., the provider’s charge,” as opposed to 

the provider’s costs. 

Farm Bureau filed a reply brief, reiterating Hall’s opinions regarding the open market and 

again asserting that payments for healthcare services on the open market were relevant to assessing 

reasonableness. In making this argument, Farm Bureau attempted to distinguish the cases from 

this Court discussing the irrelevance of “payments” by asserting that the issue in those cases related 

to whether a charge was “customary” rather than whether it was “reasonable” within the meaning 
-7-

of MCL 500.3157. Farm Bureau also more specifically responded to Spectrum’s “costs of 

treatment” argument under MCL 500.3158. Citing Bronson Methodist Hosp v Auto-Owners Ins 

Co, 295 Mich App 431; 814 NW2d 670 (2012), Farm Bureau maintained that this Court had 

already rejected the contention that a healthcare provider’s charge was the sole criterion for 

assessing reasonableness, a conclusion that Farm Bureau contended had not been altered by 

Covenant. 

On January 12, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Farm Bureau’s motion in limine. 

The parties relied on their briefs. Ruling from the bench, the trial court granted Farm Bureau’s 

motion in limine in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the trial court concluded:

I have read and reviewed this matter. It’s kind of an interesting argument 

brought by the defense here for their expert. But I am going to side with Spectrum 

Health with regards to this matter. I am going to adopt the law and argument as 

stated in their brief. I believe that their definition of what is reasonable is 

appropriate, pursuant to the law in the State of Michigan at this time. 

On February 2, 2018, the trial court entered its order, granting in part and denying in part 

Farm Bureau’s motion in limine. The trial court did specify that Hall could testify as an expert, 

subject to any objections by Spectrum under MRE 702 and MRE 703. But the trial court denied 

the remainder of Farm Bureau’s motion “for the reasons stated on the record.” 

Thereafter, on March 7, 2018, Farm Bureau moved to compel discovery. Farm Bureau 

interpreted the trial court’s partial denial of its motion in limine, along with the court’s acceptance 

of Spectrum’s legal position, as the court’s conclusion that the “only evidence relevant” to the 

reasonableness of Spectrum’s charges was evidence bearing on whether the “gross charges are 

within a reasonable range of gross charges customary in the industry.” Recounting the details of 

its previous discovery request, Farm Bureau asserted that Spectrum should be required to produce 

documents “consisting of the gross charges of comparable hospitals for the same treatment”

provided to Sabby. More specifically, Farm Bureau sought published, publicly-available “charge 

data” from a source such as “American Hospital Directory.com,”

6

as well as a comparison of 

Spectrum’s gross charges to comparable hospitals.7 

Subsequently, the trial court entered a stipulated order compelling discovery as follows:

 

6 American Hospital Directory, Your Best Source of Hospital Information and Custom Data 

Services, <http://www.ahd.com> (accessed February 24, 2020).

7 Farm Bureau asserted that these types of materials and comparisons had been provided by 

Spectrum in other cases. As an example, Farm Bureau attached an affidavit from a Spectrum 

financial director from another lawsuit between Spectrum and Farm Bureau. As set forth in his 

affidavit and supporting documents, the director conducted various analyses of Spectrum’s costs, 

including comparison of Spectrum’s charges for specific treatment codes to the costs of similarlysituated medical providers as reported on the American Hospital Directory website.
-8-

IT IS ORDERED THAT Plaintiff shall produce such published, publicly 

available comparative data printouts from ahd.com, clinical cost analyzer, showing 

comparative data, including comparative gross change data, from comparable 

hospitals as Plaintiff may rely on at trial in this case.[

8

]

 

Notably, in its motion to compel information about Spectrum’s gross charges, Farm Bureau 

conceded that if the data in question showed that Spectrum’s charges were in the reasonable range 

of gross charges customary in the industry, Farm Bureau would likely agree to a stipulated 

judgment in Spectrum’s favor. But it would do so only if it could preserve its right to challenge 

the trial court’s motion-in-limine order pertaining to Hall and the issue of identifying evidence 

relevant to determining reasonableness. Indeed, following some additional discovery, Farm 

Bureau moved for entry of judgment in Spectrum’s favor in the amount of $47,820.94. The request 

for judgment preserved Farm Bureau’s right to appeal the trial court’s motion-in-limine order and 

any subsequent award of postjudgment costs and attorney fees. Spectrum initially opposed the 

motion for entry of judgment, asserting that there was no basis for the judgment and that Farm 

Bureau simply intended to use this case to argue for a change in the law in the appellate courts. 

After moving for entry of judgment, Farm Bureau also filed what it characterized as an 

offer of proof relating to the trial court’s motion-in-limine order. In this offer of proof, Farm 

Bureau detailed Hall’s opinions about reasonableness in general and, more specifically, about the 

reasonableness of the charges in Sabby’s case. With regard to Sabby, Hall considered various 

documents related to Sabby’s treatment, and according to his report, he was prepared to offer

various opinions regarding the reasonableness of the charges for Sabby’s treatment.

9

 

 

8

In its motion to compel discovery, Farm Bureau also sought evidence of the amount customarily 

“charged” in cases not involving insurance, including information about any 20% discount 

Spectrum might provide to patients for prompt payment. The order did not mention any discount 

information, and Farm Bureau does not pursue this argument on appeal.

9 Those opinions were as follows:

2. Farm Bureau paid $180,223.27 on total gross charges of $225,278.92 for 

insured Brett Sabby for dates of service August 22, 2016 to September 13, 2016. 

The treatment provided was the medical service of orthopedic surgery. More 

specifically, the service was categorized as “Base MS-DRG 956-000-00,” which 

signifies “limb reattachment, hip and femur procedures for multiple significant 

trauma.” Spectrum’s charge, payment and cost data for these categories of

treatment is reported by American Hospital Directory. See attached Exhibit RE. 

Data regarding average net payment received is reported in Spectrum’s Medicare 

Cost Report and also by the American Hospital Directory.

3. It is my opinion that $180,223.27 reasonably compensates Spectrum for 

$225,278.92 of gross charges. This opinion is based on my general knowledge and 

extensive academic research about the extent to which hospitals typically mark-up 

charges over costs and the extent to which they discount their list prices when they 
-9-

 

negotiate market rates with third party payers that have some bargaining power. It 

is also based on the . . . information [in the paragraphs that follow.]

In fiscal year ending June 30, 2016 Spectrum reported to the federal 

government that, on average, it was paid 49% of its gross charges across all of its 

patients. The American Hospital Directory (AHD) reports similar or greater rates 

of charges to payments for the areas of clinical service involved in this case. My 

opinion is that these actual payment amounts are highly relevant to determining the 

reasonableness of hospitals’ non-discounted charges. Rates accepted from private 

health insurers are freely negotiated in actual market conditions, and thus are a true 

reflection of market rates. “List prices” that hospitals set in their “chargemasters” 

usually have no firm basis in market realities or conditions. Almost no patient or 

insurer pays these prices, so there are no significant market forces that deter 

hospitals from setting unreasonable and unrealistic list prices. Also, the markups in 

hospitals’ chargemasters are usually demonstrably unreasonable. Spectrum, like 

other hospitals, sets its undiscounted prices almost 3 times greater than its actual 

costs, which is much more than what they willingly accept from private insurers. 

When hospitals’ list prices are demonstrably unreasonable, an alternative basis for 

determining reasonableness is what a hospital actually agrees to accept from private 

insurers with whom they negotiate.

Hospitals have less choice over what they receive from public insurers, such 

as Medicare and Medicaid. Still, these insurers are under statutory legal obligation 

to pay prices that assure a reasonable level of access for patients. Thus, these 

government prices have some relationship to market-based reasonableness. 

Generally speaking, government prices can be thought of as marking a lower bound 

of reasonable prices, whereas prices from private insurers are closer to the upper 

range of reasonable prices. Therefore, knowing this actual range of prices from the 

predominant sources of hospital payment is highly relevant to knowing whether a 

hospital’s list prices exceed what is reasonable.

It is also instructive to compare Spectrum’s gross charges to its costs. In 

fiscal year ending June 30, 2016, Spectrum reported to the federal government that 

its cost to charge ratio was .350044, and AHD reports a similar ratio (0.3445). This 

means that Spectrum’s gross charges were about 290 percent more than its costs. 

More specific data reported by AHD shows similar cost to charge ratios (0.37 –

0.38) for the specific medical services relating to limb reattachments, which equates 

to a 260-270 percent markup.

[4.] Therefore, paying 80 percent of Spectrum’s gross charges equates to 

paying a mark up of more than double its actual costs. Farm Bureau’s payment also 

equates to paying in excess of 60 percent more than what other payers would pay, 

on average. In my opinion, this amount paid is reasonable for the services rendered. 
-10-

On August 17, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Farm Bureau’s motion for judgment. 

At the hearing, the parties indicated that they had reached the “same agreement” that they reached 

in another case a “few moments ago.” That agreement was not specified on the record in the 

current case. The other case was Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co (lower court 

docket no. 17-02224-NF). On the record in that case, the parties agreed that there was no issue 

left for a jury and that judgment should enter in the amount sought in the complaint. But the parties 

did not reach an agreement regarding penalty attorney fees. And they specified that “[e]verything 

will be preserved for an appeal.”

Following the hearing in the current case, the trial court entered a consent judgment. The 

judgment awarded Spectrum a total of $60,337.17, which consisted of $45,055.82 for unpaid 

medical charges, $12,271.05 for interest under MCL 500.3142, $375 for costs pursuant to MCR 

2.625, and $2,635.30 in prejudgment interest under MCL 600.6013. The consent judgment 

specified that Spectrum could file a postjudgment motion for attorney fees. The consent judgment 

also preserved Farm Bureau’s right to appeal the trial court’s motion-in-limine order.10 

Spectrum moved for attorney fees under MCL 500.3158, asserting that Farm Bureau’s 

partial denial of payment of Sabby’s medical bills was unreasonable for two reasons. First, 

Spectrum contended that the denial was unreasonable because it was based on the assumption that 

all hospital charges in excess of 80% of gross charges are per se unreasonable. Moreover, 

according to Spectrum, this general assumption was unreasonable and violative of Farm Bureau’s 

obligations under MCL 500.3157 to review “in each instance whether a charge is reasonable.” 

Second, Spectrum contended that the denial was unreasonable because it was based on Farm 

Bureau’s contention that reasonableness should be measured by amounts that other contractedpayers pay for services despite the fact that this contention had been consistently rejected by the 

appellate courts. In total, Spectrum sought attorney fees under MCL 500.3148 in the amount of 

$14,616.50. 

Farm Bureau opposed the motion for attorney fees, asserting that its denial of benefits was 

reasonable because there were legitimate questions of statutory construction and a bona fide factual 

controversy. First, in asserting that there was a legitimate legal question in this case, Farm Bureau 

reiterated its contentions that the no-fault act does not define reasonableness, that caselaw on the 

question of reasonableness was not binding because it constituted obiter dictum, and that the plain 

meaning of the no-fault act should control. Second, with regard to the facts, Farm Bureau 

maintained that publicly-available information proved there was a bona fide factual dispute as to 

the reasonableness of Spectrum’s charges.

On March 8, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Spectrum’s motion for attorney fees. 

The parties relied on their briefs. The trial court denied the request for attorney fees, explaining

as follows: “I think this is a question of a bona fide factual uncertainty. I’m going to adopt the law 

and argument in Farm Bureau’s brief . . . .” Thereafter, on March 25, 2019, the trial court entered 

an order denying Spectrum’s motion for attorney fees.

 

10 The consent judgment also dismissed defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 

Michigan with prejudice.
-11-

Both Farm Bureau and Spectrum now appeal to this Court. In Docket No. 347553, Farm 

Bureau appeals by right the consent judgment, challenging the trial court’s motion-in-limine order, 

which matter was preserved in the consent judgment. In Docket No. 348440, Spectrum appeals 

by right the trial court’s postjudgment denial of attorney fees and costs under MCL 500.3158. The 

appeals were consolidated.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decisions regarding the 

admission of evidence and discovery matters. Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants & Taverns 

LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 571; 918 NW2d 545 (2018); Mercy Mt Clemens Corp v Auto Club Ins 

Ass’n, 219 Mich App 46, 50-51; 555 NW2d 871 (1996). “A trial court abuses its discretion when 

its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Mueller, 323 Mich 

App at 571 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review de novo preliminary or underlying 

questions of law. Id. When a trial court makes a determination that is legally incorrect, the court 

necessarily commits an abuse of discretion. Id. This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory 

interpretation. Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390, 398; 919 NW2d 20 (2018). 

With respect to statutory construction, our goal “is to ascertain and give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent.” McNeill-Marks v MidMichigan Med Ctr-Gratiot, 316 Mich App 1, 21; 891 

NW2d 528 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[T]he Court must begin with the language of the statute, ascertaining the 

intent that may reasonably be inferred from its language. It is axiomatic that the 

words contained in the statute provide the most reliable evidence of the 

Legislature’s intent. The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it 

plainly expressed, and clear statutory language must be enforced as written. If the 

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither 

required nor permitted, and courts must apply the statute as written. Only if a statute 

is ambiguous is judicial construction permitted. [Bronson, 295 Mich App at 441-

442 (citations omitted).]

B. DISCUSSION

1. THE NO-FAULT ACT AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REASONABLE AND 

CUSTOMARY CHARGES

With the enactment of the no-fault act in 1972, the Legislature “eliminated the old 

automobile tort reparations system” and replaced it with a system of mandatory no-fault insurance 

under which “an injured insured was guaranteed what the Legislature considered to be a sufficient 

and expeditious recovery from his or her own insurer for all expenses for reasonably necessary 

medical care, recovery, and rehabilitation, as well as some incidental expenses.” Muci v State 

Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 478 Mich 178, 187; 732 NW2d 88 (2007). “The goal of the no-fault 

insurance system was to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, 

and prompt reparation,” Shavers v Kelley, 402 Mich 554, 578-579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), while 
-12-

minimizing “administrative delays and factual disputes,” Brown v Home-Owners Ins Co, 298 Mich 

App 678, 685-686; 828 NW2d 400 (2012).

But adequate and expeditious compensation were not the no-fault act’s only goals. “The 

no-fault act was as concerned with the rising cost of health care as it was with providing an efficient 

system of automobile insurance.” Dean v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 139 Mich App 266, 273; 362

NW2d 247 (1984). Indeed, “[i]t represents the policy of this state that the existence of no-fault 

insurance shall not increase the cost of health care.” Id. at 274. Furthermore, the no-fault act was 

intended to create an affordable system that would restrain insurance premiums. Stevenson v 

Reese, 239 Mich App 513, 519; 609 NW2d 195 (2000); see also Davey v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins 

Exch, 414 Mich 1, 10; 322 NW2d 541 (1982). In short, while the no-fault act sought to “provide 

individuals injured in motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate and prompt reparation for certain 

economic losses,” it was also intended to provide these benefits “at the lowest cost to the individual 

and the system.” Gooden v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 166 Mich App 793, 800; 420 

NW2d 877 (1988).

“The no-fault act provides a comprehensive scheme for payment, as well as recovery, of 

certain ‘no-fault’ benefits, including personal protection insurance benefits.” Citizens Ins Co of 

America v Buck, 216 Mich App 217, 223; 548 NW2d 680 (1996). “Under personal protection 

insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the 

ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” MCL 

500.3105(1). PIP benefits are payable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges

incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s 

care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a) (emphasis added). The amount that a 

healthcare provider can “charge” for products and services is further described in MCL 500.3157, 

which, again, provided as follows before the recent amendment of the no-fault act:

A physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution lawfully rendering 

treatment to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal 

protection insurance, and a person or institution providing rehabilitative 

occupational training following the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for 

the products, services and accommodations rendered. The charge shall not exceed 

the amount the person or institution customarily charges for like products, services 

and accommodations in cases not involving insurance. [Emphasis added.]

“When read in harmony, §§ 3107 and 3157 clearly indicate that an insurance carrier need 

pay no more than a reasonable charge and that a health care provider can charge no more than 

that.” McGill v Auto Ass’n of Mich, 207 Mich App 402, 406; 526 NW2d 12 (1994) (emphasis 

added). Under § 3157 it is also clear that a “no-fault insurer is not liable for the amount of any 

charge that exceeds the health-care provider’s customary charge for a like product, service, or 

accommodation in a case not involving insurance.” Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich 

App 55, 103; 535 NW2d 529 (1995) (emphasis added). A plaintiff seeking payment of no-fault 

benefits “bears the burden of proving both the reasonableness and the customariness” of the 

provider’s charges. Munson Med Ctr v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 218 Mich App 375, 385; 554 NW2d 

49 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Covenant, 500 Mich at 196.

Notably, the reasonable and customary provisions are two “separate and distinct limitations 

on the amount health-care providers may charge and what insurers must pay.” Advocacy Org for 
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Patients & Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 257 Mich App 365, 376; 670 NW2d 569 (2003) 

(AOPP), aff’d 472 Mich 91 (2005). With regard to the customary-charge limitation, “whether 

there has been an impermissible § 3157 overcharge is determined by looking to the provider’s 

customary charge in cases not involving insurance, meaning those situations where there is literally 

no insurance in the lay sense of the term—no Medicare, no Medicaid, no BCBSM, and so forth.” 

Munson, 218 Mich App at 389-390 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, a healthcare 

provider cannot charge a no-fault insurer—and a no-fault insurer is not liable for—an amount that 

exceeds the amount that the healthcare provider would customarily charge patients without 

insurance. See, e.g., Hofmann, 211 Mich App at 103-107.

Butsimply because a charge is “customary” in cases without insurance does not necessarily 

mean that the charge is also reasonable. See AOPP, 257 Mich App at 375-376. That is, a 

“customary” charge does not automatically equate to a “reasonable” charge. Id. at 376. The AOPP 

panel explained:

Rather than defining what is a “reasonable” charge, the clear and 

unambiguous language of the second sentence in MCL 500.3157 simply places a 

maximum on what health-care providers may charge in no-fault cases. The first 

sentence of § 3157 provides that a health-care provider may only charge a 

reasonable fee, while the second sentence unambiguously provides that a healthcare provider’s charge for products, services, or accommodations in cases covered 

by no-fault insurance shall not exceed the amount customarily charged in cases not 

involving insurance. [Id. at 375-376 (quotation marks, citations, ellipses, and 

alteration omitted).]

In other words, under § 3157, a provider’s “customary” charge functions as “the cap on what 

health-care providers can charge,” but it is “not, automatically, a ‘reasonable’ charge requiring full 

reimbursement under § 3107.” Id. at 377. “It may be that a health-care provider’s ‘customary’

charge is also reasonable given the services provided, while at other times the ‘customary’ charge 

may be too high, and thus unreasonable.[11] Either way, the trier of fact will ultimately determine 

whether a charge is reasonable.” AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379. See also Advocacy Org for Patients 

& Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 472 Mich 91, 95; 693 NW2d 358 (2005) (“[I]t is for the trier 

of fact to determine whether a medical charge, albeit ‘customary,’ is also reasonable.”).

Accordingly, while the “customary” limitation establishes a cap on charges, the statutory 

“reasonable amount” restriction on charges also functions as a distinct means of controlling 

healthcare costs in the context of the no-fault act. See AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379; Hofmann, 

211 Mich App at 113-114. In other words, while health and accident insurance carriers are 

generally free to contain healthcare costs by placing “dollar limits upon the amounts it will pay to 

doctors and hospitals for particular services,” a no-fault insurer may not do so. Hofmann, 211 

Mich App at 113-114 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, a no-fault insurer’s ability 

to control costs—indeed its obligation to police costs as contemplated by the no-fault act—

involves determining “in each instance whether a charge is reasonable in light of the service or 

 

11 But “a charge that is more than that charged to an uninsured person would, by necessity, be 

unreasonable because of the limitation in § 3157.” AOPP, 257 Mich App at 377 n 3.
-14-

product provided.” AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379. The requirement that no-fault insurance carriers 

pay no more than what is reasonable in relation to medical expenses evinces the Legislature’s 

intent to place a check on healthcare providers who are without incentive to keep medical bills at 

a minimum. McGill, 207 Mich App at 408. The Legislature clearly did not intend that no-fault 

insurers pay all submitted claims absent review of the claims for excessiveness or fraud. Id.

Although the no-fault act and this Court’s caselaw clearly provide that no-fault insurers 

have the right and obligation to pay only reasonable charges, the method of determining

reasonableness is unclear. As both this Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit have recognized, the no-fault act leaves “open the questions of (1) what constitutes a 

reasonable charge, (2) who decides what is a reasonable charge, and (3) what criteria may be used 

to determine what is reasonable.” AOPP, 257 Mich App at 374-375, citing Advocacy Org for 

Patients & Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 176 F3d 315, 320 (CA 6, 1999). This Court has 

provided some answers to these questions.

For instance, in terms of who decides what is a reasonable charge, this Court has explained 

that healthcare providers “necessarily make the initial determination of reasonableness by charging 

the insured for the services. Once [they] charge the insured, the insurer then makes its own 

determination regarding what is reasonable and pays that amount to plaintiffs.” AOPP, 257 Mich 

App at 379 n 4. If the no-fault insurer does not pay all of the charges, a healthcare provider may 

file suit to challenge the failure to fully pay the bills. It is the healthcare provider’s burden to 

establish the reasonableness of the charges by a preponderance of the evidence. Bronson, 295 

Mich App at 450. And “a hospital’s itemized bills and records do not, standing alone, satisfy the 

‘reasonableness’ requirement.” Id. at 452. Whether the amount charged is reasonable is ultimately 

a question of fact for a jury. AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379. 

Although it is clear who determines reasonableness, the answers to the questions (1) what 

constitutes a reasonable charge and (2) what criteria may be used to make this determination are 

somewhat less certain. See id. at 374-375. This Court has approved consideration of some specific 

factors when determining reasonableness. In AOPP, for example, the panel concluded that the nofault act did not prohibit consideration of charges by other healthcare providers for the same 

services for purposes of assessing reasonableness. Id. at 382. In Bronson, 295 Mich App at 449-

450, this Court later clarified that a comparison to the charges of other healthcare providers is not 

and should not be the only means of determining reasonableness. The Bronson panel concluded 

that the cost to a healthcare provider of durable medical supply products used in treating an insured

is an appropriate (and discoverable) consideration in determining whether the charge for those 

products was reasonable. Id. at 445-454 (case specifically focused on the actual cost of surgical 

implant products). Neither AOPP nor Bronson, however, purported to delineate all the permissible 

factors or evidence that would be relevant to a determination of reasonableness. See AOPP, 257 

Mich App at 379 (“We will not attempt to delineate the permissible factors for determining what 

is ‘reasonable,’ because it is not necessary to do so in resolving plaintiffs’ arguments.”); see also 

Bronson, 295 Mich App at 449-450.

Against this backdrop, the present case is yet another instance in which a no-fault insurer 

has denied full payment of charges on the basis that the charges—though apparently consistent 

with customary charges for patients without insurance—were not reasonable within the meaning 

of the no-fault act. The issue on appeal concerns the identification of the factors or criteria that 

may be considered when determining reasonableness. Specifically, Farm Bureau asserts (1) that 
-15-

reasonableness should be measured by the open market, including what others actually pay for 

services, (2) that a healthcare provider’s cost-to-charge ratio is a permissible factor to be 

considered when judging reasonableness, and (3) that the “amount generally billed” may also be 

considered when assessing reasonableness.

2. PAYMENTS TO HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS BY THIRD-PARTY PAYERS – THE 

CASELAW

Although Farm Bureau mentions various types of data allegedly relevant to an assessment 

of reasonableness, the primary focus of Farm Bureau’s appellate briefing is on the payments that 

healthcare providers accept for services from other payers, including health insurers and 

government programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. Before considering the merits of Farm 

Bureau’s arguments under the no-fault act regarding the relevance of this information to the 

reasonableness of a charge, the preliminary question before us is whether this Court’s caselaw has 

already foreclosed consideration of such data. As detailed below, this Court undoubtedly has held, 

and correctly so, that the amount that others, such as a health insurer or government program, 

actually pay to a healthcare provider has no bearing on the customary prong of § 3157. MCL 

500.3157 caps charges at the amount a healthcare provider “customarily charges for like products, 

services and accommodations in cases not involving insurance.” (Emphasis added.) But, as 

discussed earlier, this Court in AOPP acknowledged that customary charges do not necessarily 

equate to reasonable charges. In light of the significant distinction between customary and 

reasonable, we conclude that this Court’s caselaw precluding consideration of third-party 

payments in the context of the customary inquiry does not control whether those payment may be 

considered when determining reasonableness.

More specifically, as detailed by the parties, for many years no-fault insurers have sought

to limit their liability under the no-fault act to the amounts paid by third parties such as healthcare 

insurers, Medicaid, Medicare, and even worker’s compensation. This Court has repeatedly 

rejected these attempts, but in doing so, the focus has been on the “customary” prong of § 3157. 

This Court has refused to cap liability for no-fault insurers at the amounts customarily paid by 

third parties. But this Court has not squarely addressed whether the amounts actually paid by third 

parties for the same services might be relevant to the reasonableness of a charge.

To begin with, in Johnson v Mich Mut Ins Co, 180 Mich App 314, 320; 446 NW2d 899 

(1989), “the defendant insurer argue[d] that the trial court committed error requiring reversal in 

ordering payment of customary hospital charges instead of amounts which Medicaid would have 

paid had plaintiff not been injured by an automobile.” In presenting this argument, the defendantinsurer did not question the reasonableness of the charges or the necessity of the services. Id. at 

321. Instead, the defendant-insurer simply “sought to persuade the trial court that the hospital’s 

charges could only approximate those reimbursable by Medicaid.” Id. This Court found that 

assertion “untenable . . . in light of the unambiguous statutory language of MCL 500.3157, which 

clearly permits health care providers . . . to charge reasonable amounts not exceeding their 

customary charges for the products, services and accommodations they provide to other injured 

persons in cases not involving insurance.” Id. at 321-322. “[U]nder Johnson’s reasoning, the 

acceptance of discounted payments does not define a health care provider’s ‘customary’ charge.” 

Holland v Trinity Health Care Corp, 287 Mich App 524, 535; 791 NW2d 724 (2010). But Johnson 

did not answer, nor even address, whether acceptance of discounted payments for services would 

be relevant to a determination of a “reasonable charge.” See Johnson, 180 Mich App at 322.
-16-

Next, in Hofmann, 211 Mich App at 98, the relevant issue again concerned the “customary”

prong and, in particular, whether the healthcare providers in that case “violated MCL 500.3157 by 

charging more for products and services in cases involving no-fault insurance than they 

customarily charged in cases not involving insurance.” In resolving the dispute, the Hofmann 

panel recognized that “the relevant inquiry under § 3157 is not the amount that is customarily 

charged to other health insurers, but rather the amount that is customarily charged ‘in cases not 

involving insurance.’ ” Id. at 107. More specifically, pertinent to the instant case, the insurer in 

Hofmann argued that the amount Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) paid as a 

health insurer should be used to determine the healthcare provider’s “customary” charge because, 

among other reasons, at least 70% of the healthcare provider’s patients had BCBSM coverage for 

the charges in question. Id. at 112. In rejecting this argument, this Court reasoned:

[The insurer’s] reasoning is premised on the principle that BCBSM’s 

“payments” to plaintiffs for x-rays, as opposed to plaintiffs’ “charges” to BCBSM 

for those x-rays, are the proper criteria to be used in determining the plaintiffs’ 

“customary charge” for x-rays. This position is untenable, however, in light of the 

clear statutory language of § 3157, which states that a “charge” in a no-fault case 

“shall not exceed the amount [a] person or institution customarily charges for like 

products, services and accommodations in cases not involving insurance”

(emphasis added). Thus, [the insurer’s] reliance on the amount that was “paid” by 

BCBSM, as opposed to the amount that plaintiffs “charged,” is unwarranted.

Furthermore, [the insurer’s] position ignores the fact that the amounts that 

plaintiffs receive in payment from BCBSM are subject to contractual limitations, 

whereas the amounts that [the insurer] must pay for covered medical expenses are 

not limited contractually. Our Supreme Court discussed this distinction in Auto 

Club Ins Ass’n v New York Life Ins Co, 440 Mich 126, 139; 485 NW2d 695 (1992):

One way of containing [health care] costs is for an insurer to 

place dollar limits upon the amounts it will pay to doctors and 

hospitals for particular services. While health and accident carriers 

generally are free to establish such limits, a no-fault insurer is not. 

Only the statutory qualification of reasonableness limits the amount 

that must be paid by a no-fault carrier for covered medical expenses. 

[Emphasis added.]

The Court justified this distinction by noting that the obligation of a no-fault carrier 

is secondary to that of a health or accident insurer in situations where both types of 

coverage exist. Id.

In essence, [the insurer] is asking this Court to establish a rule that, in 

situations where other health or accident insurance coverage does not exist, the 

obligation of a no-fault carrier must be limited to what a health insurer would have 

had to pay if health insurance existed, notwithstanding that the health insurer’s 

obligation might be controlled by contract, whereas the no-fault carrier’s is not. 

This position does not find support in the no-fault act. [Hofmann, 211 Mich App 

at 113-114.]
-17-

In short, Hofmann, consistent with Johnson, rejected the assertion that “third-party 

contractual or statutory limitations [may be used] as a benchmark for determining the extent of a 

no-fault insurer’s liability for payment of a health-care provider’s customary charge.” Id. at 109 

(emphasis added). Notably, like Johnson, the Hofmann Court specified that the reasonableness of 

the charges under § 3157 was not at issue. Id. at 114. The Hofmann Court expressly qualified its 

ruling in this respect, stating:

We note that the absence of contractual limitations in no-fault situations 

does not give health-care providers liberty to charge no-fault insurers any amount. 

In addition to the “customary charge” limitation discussed above, §§ 3107 and 3157 

also impose a statutory qualification of reasonableness, such that a no-fault carrier 

is liable only for those medical expenses that constitute a reasonable charge for the 

product or service. In this case, however, [the insurer] has not challenged the 

reasonableness of the x-rays charges that comprise the basis of its § 3157 

counterclaim for reimbursement. [Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).]

Hofmann, in other words, recognized a potential distinction between reasonable charges and 

customary charges, and its holding regarding the irrelevance of payments by third-parties was 

specific to the customary-charge cap under § 3157.

The distinction between customary and reasonable charges was somewhat muddied by two 

decisions from this Court following Hofmann. First, in Munson, 218 Mich App at 378, the nofault insurer refused to pay the full amount billed and instead paid the healthcare provider 

according to the fee schedule in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq. 

In recounting the background and facts of the case, the Munson panel noted that the insurer 

contested the reasonableness of the charges in the trial court on the basis that it was unreasonable 

and unfair to charge no-fault insurers one amount for services while accepting lesser amounts from 

other sources—such as Medicaid, Medicare, BCBSM, and worker’s compensation—as payment 

for the same services. Munson, 218 Mich App at 379-381. Under a heading of “Reasonable and 

Customary Charges,” the Court turned to analysis of the no-fault act, including § 3157. Id. at 381. 

Importantly, while mentioning “reasonable” charges in the opinion, the Munson Court focused its 

analysis solely on customariness rather than reasonableness. Specifically, the Court stated:

Under th[e] statutory scheme, [the insurer] is required to pay the “customary 

charges” for services rendered by Munson. The critical issue in this case is what 

the statutory term “customary charges” means. Munson, of course, argues that 

“customary charges” means the standard amount it bills on behalf of every patient 

treated, regardless of the fact that Munson routinely accepts less than this amount 

in many cases (Medicare, Medicaid, and BCBSM insured cases). [The insurer] 

argues that “customary charges” means the lesser amount that Munson actually 

accepts in full satisfaction of the bill for the services rendered. [Munson, 218 Mich 

App at 382.]

After quoting extensively from Hofmann, the Munson panel then rejected the no-fault insurer’s 

attempt to limit its liability to the amount paid by third-party payers, holding:

In the instant case, [the insurer’s] proffered definition of “customary 

charges” is the same one that was rejected by Hofmann, although [the insurer’s] 
-18-

benchmark is broader here than it was in Hofmann. (Here, [the insurer] defines the 

benchmark as the amount that Munson received from Medicare, Medicaid, 

BCBSM, and arguably, worker’s compensation.) And, as in Hofmann, [the insurer] 

ignores the limitations placed upon Munson by the federal statutes governing 

Medicare and Medicaid, by the state statutes governing Medicaid and worker’s 

compensation, and by the contractual arrangement between Munson and BCBSM. 

Defendant’s argument therefore fails for the same reasons it did in Hofmann. 

[Munson, 218 Mich App at 385.]

In rejecting reliance on what others pay, after quoting from Hofmann, the Court in Munson 

recognized that the proper point of comparison for customariness under § 3157 is those patients 

without any insurance because “it is obvious that the phrase ‘in cases not involving insurance’

means those situations where there is literally no ‘insurance’ in the lay sense of the term—no 

Medicare, no Medicaid, no BCBSM, and so forth.” Id. at 390. Finally, in rejecting the insurer’s 

reliance on the worker’s compensation fee schedules, Munson determined that despite “a strong 

equitable argument” from the insurer, the worker’s compensation fee schedules could not simply 

be incorporated into the no-fault act, particularly when voter-referendum attempts to amend the

no-fault act to include fee schedules had failed. Id.

Unlike Hofmann and Johnson, Munson did not expressly limit its holding to the customary 

prong of § 3157, and indeed the Munson Court mentioned reasonableness, to some extent seeming 

to lump “reasonable and customary” together in its analysis. Id. at 381. But 

despite the reference to reasonableness, we conclude that Munson cannot be relied upon as having 

resolved the question presented in this case, i.e., whether payments by third parties are relevant to 

the reasonableness of a charge. While alluding to reasonableness, Munson stated that “[t]he critical 

issue in this case is what the statutory term ‘customary charges’ means.” Id. at 382. The Court 

proceeded to analyze the term “customary charge” without any analysis of what a reasonable 

charge entails. Id. at 382-385. For Munson to be read as having determined what a reasonable 

charge entails—and whether third-party payments are relevant to reasonableness—the Munson 

panel would have had to assume that reasonableness and customariness were coextensive. Such

an assumption, however, is not expressly stated anywhere in Munson, and in any event, “[i]t is a 

well-settled principle that a point assumed without consideration is of course not decided.” 2 

Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, 329 Mich App 22, 46; 941 NW2d 88 (2019) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). And, perhaps more importantly, the assumption that reasonableness 

and customariness are one and the same has absolutely no validity after AOPP. See AOPP, 257 

Mich App at 376-377.

Indeed, Munson’s failure to analyze reasonableness is particularly notable in light of 

AOPP. The foundational premise of Munson’s analysis was that the no-fault act requires the 

insurer “to pay the ‘customary charges’ for services rendered by” the healthcare provider. Munson, 

218 Mich App at 382. But of course, under AOPP and the plain language of the no-fault act, this 

is not an accurate statement. Rather, the customary inquiry is “separate and distinct” from the 

reasonableness determination. And while a provider’s “customary” charge functions as “the cap 

on what health-care providers can charge,” it is “not, automatically, a ‘reasonable’ charge requiring 

full reimbursement under § 3107.” AOPP, 257 Mich App at 376-377.

To the extent AOPP and Munson could be read to conflict insofar as Munson states that an 

insurer is required to pay customary charges, it bears emphasizing that the Michigan Supreme 
-19-

Court affirmed this Court’s decision in AOPP, agreeing that “it is for the trier of fact to determine 

whether a medical charge, albeit ‘customary,’ is also reasonable.” AOPP, 472 Mich at 95. By 

lumping reasonable and customary together and analyzing customariness while wholly failing to 

provide any analysis of reasonableness, the Munson panel failed to recognize the distinction 

between reasonable and customary. And it ultimately did not consider or decide the question 

whether evidence of third-party payments may be relevant to reasonableness. In short, reasonable 

and customary are separate questions. Rather than assume that Munson answered the 

reasonableness question presented in this case, we read the Munson decision as simply having 

resolved the customariness issue that it actually decided. Any incidental reference to “reasonable”

in Munson was nothing more than dictum. See People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 722; 299 NW2d 

304 (1980) (“While there are some cases containing language which may be construed as assuming 

the existence of such a rule in Michigan, the language is clearly dictum as the question was neither 

at issue nor expressly considered.”). Consequently, like Johnson and Hofmann, Munson does not 

provide the answer to the question in this case.

The issue of third-party payers arose again in Mercy Mt Clemens, 219 Mich App at 49, 

wherein the insurer asserted that a “ ‘charge’ means the amount customarily accepted by a plaintiff 

as payment in full.” (Quotation marks omitted.) On the basis of this interpretation, the insurer 

sought discovery of information about the amounts actually paid by “third-party payers such as 

Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross-Blue Shield . . ., worker’s compensation insurers, health 

maintenance organizations (HMOs), and preferred provider organizations (PPOs).” Id. at 48. The 

healthcare providers sought a protective order, arguing that information about third-party payers 

was irrelevant because “under § 3157 their charges could not exceed the amount customarily 

charged for such services ‘in cases not involving insurance.’ ” Id. at 49. The trial court agreed 

with the healthcare providers that amounts paid by third parties were not relevant and “were 

outside the parameters of discovery.” Id. at 50.

On appeal, the issue was framed as whether “reference to ‘insurance’ in § 3157 . . . should 

be read to refer to no-fault insurance only, rather than all types of insurance that provide payment 

for medical care.” Id. The Court answered this question in the negative, ruling that “[t]he words 

‘in cases not involving insurance’ in § 3157 should not be interpreted to mean ‘in cases not 

involving no-fault insurance.’ ” Id. at 51. The Mercy Mt Clemens panel held:

[R]eimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid, and worker’s compensation 

insurance is set by statutory and regulatory limitations. Reimbursement from Blue 

Cross, HMOs, and PPOs is set by contracts between those entities and health-care 

providers. Under Munson, Hofmann, Hicks, and Johnson, such information is not 

admissible to prove the customary charge that defendant must pay under § 3157. . 

. . In light of this precedent, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding 

that the information sought on discovery was not relevant to whether the amounts 

charged by plaintiffs met the requirements of §§ 3107 and 3157 of the no-fault act 

and that it was not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff’s 

requested protective order. [Mercy Mt Clemens, 219 Mich App at 54-55.]

This Court also noted that “[r]egardless of whether third-party health-coverage providers such as 

Medicare, Medicaid, worker’s compensation, Blue Cross, HMOs, and PPOs are technically 

insurance carriers, the amounts that plaintiffs accepted as payment in full from those entities cannot 
-20-

be used to prove the customary charge for those services under § 3157 of the no-fault act.” Id. at 

55.

Very much like Munson, the decision in Mercy Mt Clemens mentioned reasonable charges 

and acknowledged that charges must be reasonable. Id. at 52. But, like Munson, the analysis then 

focused solely on the question of customary charges and whether third-party payments were

relevant to determining a customary charge in cases not involving insurance. Id. at 52-55. Missing 

from Mercy Mt Clemens was a recognition that customary charges are not necessarily reasonable 

and that an insurer need not automatically pay a customary charge. Rather than assume Mercy Mt 

Clemens answered the reasonableness question presented in the instant case, we construe that 

decision as simply having resolved the customariness issue that it actually addressed and decided. 

And any incidental reference to “reasonable” in Mercy Mt Clemens was nothing more than dictum. 

See Aaron, 409 Mich at 722. Consequently, like the other cases cited by Spectrum, Mercy Mt 

Clemens does not provide the answer to the question in this case.

The first case to actually address the separate and distinct question of reasonableness was 

AOPP. As detailed earlier, the panel in AOPP, 257 Mich App at 376, determined that “the 

‘customary charge’ limitation in § 3157 and the ‘reasonableness’ language in § 3107 constitute 

separate and distinct limitations on the amount health-care providers may charge and what insurers 

must pay with respect to victims of automobile accidents who are covered by no-fault insurance.” 

Because they are separate inquiries, and an insurer only has to pay a reasonable charge (subject to 

a customary-charge cap), AOPP also determined that an insurer did not necessarily have to pay a 

charge simply because it represented a customary charge in cases not involving insurance. Id. at 

376-379.

While addressing reasonableness, AOPP did not involve a situation in which the insurer 

sought to have reasonableness determined on the basis of the amounts paid by third parties. Indeed, 

this Court in AOPP noted that the no-fault insurer did not attempt to use worker’s compensation 

fee schedules, nor did the insurer try to make comparisons to the amounts paid by health insurers, 

Medicaid, or Medicare. Id. at 381-382. Instead, AOPP entailed an insurer’s use of an 80th

percentile test that assessed reasonableness by comparison to the amounts charged by other 

healthcare providers rendering the same service. Id. More specifically, under the test, payment is 

recommended “of one hundred percent of the charges as long as the charge does not exceed the 

highest charge for the same procedure charged by eighty percent of other providers rendering the 

same service.” Id. The Court held that “the criterion . . . used [by the insurer] in determining 

whether a particular charge is reasonable is not precluded under the plain language of the statute 

or Michigan case law.” Id. at 381. As part of its analysis, the AOPP panel stated:

Indeed, the panels in Mercy Mt Clemens, Munson, and Hofmann each 

concluded that the data regarding payments made by third-party payers could not 

be used to determine the customary charge under § 3157. In contrast, this case 

involves defendants’ review of plaintiffs’ medical charges for reasonableness under 

§ 3107 by comparing plaintiffs’ charges to those of other providers for similar 

services. [AOPP, 257 Mich App at 382 (citation omitted).]

Spectrum asserts here that AOPP rejected comparisons to third-party payers because they are

irrelevant to the determination of reasonableness. But that question was simply not addressed in 

AOPP.
-21-

In sum, while there may be cases from this Court containing language that might be 

construed as precluding consideration of amounts paid by third parties when determining the 

reasonableness of an amount charged by a healthcare provider, a careful review of the caselaw 

shows that this specific question was neither at issue nor expressly considered in these decisions. 

In other words, there is, at most, obiter dictum on this question, which lacks the force of 

adjudication and is, therefore, not binding on this Court under the principle of stare decisis. Aaron, 

409 Mich at 722; 2 Crooked Creek, 329 Mich App at 46. 

3. REASONABLENESS AND THE RELEVANCE OF THIRD-PARTY PAYMENTS

The question, of course, becomes whether third-party payments are a permissible 

consideration under the no-fault act for purposes of assessing reasonableness. Again, under 

§ 3107(1)(a), an insurer is liable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges

incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s 

care, recovery, or rehabilitation. . . .” (Emphasis added.) And MCL 500.3157 provides additional 

details about what a healthcare provider can charge for its services. As commonly understood, “a 

‘charge’ is a ‘[p]ecuniary burden, cost’ or ‘[a] price required or demanded for service rendered or 

goods supplied.’ ” Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 267; 821 NW2d 472 (2012) (citation 

omitted; alterations in original). Generally speaking, absent a contractual limitation or some other 

restriction imposed by law, healthcare providers are “free to charge the public whatever they 

want[.]” Mich Ass’n of Psychotherapy Clinics v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich, 118 Mich App 

505, 528; 325 NW2d 471 (1982). In the no-fault context, however, healthcare providers are not

free to charge whatever they want. Rather, §§ 3107(1)(a) and 3157 limit a charge to a “reasonable”

amount, so long as it does not exceed the amount customarily charged.

Although “[t]he Legislature selected ‘reasonableness’ as the operative criterion for 

determining the amount of a charge for services,” Hardrick v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 

651, 671-672; 819 NW2d 28 (2011), the Legislature did not define the term “reasonable,” AOPP, 

257 Mich App at 379. Relying on dictionary definitions, the Michigan Supreme Court has 

generally defined the term “reasonable” as follows:

The term “reasonable” commonly refers to that which is “agreeable to or in 

accord with reason; logical,” or “not exceeding the limit prescribed by reason; not 

excessive[.]” The term “reasonable” has also been defined to mean “fair, proper, or 

moderate under the circumstances” and “[f]it and appropriate to the end in view.” 

[Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 159; 802 NW2d 281 (2011) 

(citations omitted; alterations in original).]

Pursuant to this common understanding of the term “reasonable,” we see that a healthcare 

provider’s charge must be fair, proper, or moderate, in accord with reason, and not excessive. A 

determination of reasonableness—while initially made by the healthcare provider and 

independently reviewed by the insurer—is ultimately a question for the fact-finder. See Bronson, 

295 Mich App at 448.

In this context, the issue in this case is simply whether amounts paid for the same services 

by health insurers and others, such as Medicaid and Medicare, may be considered by a fact-finder 

as a point of comparison for determining whether the amount a healthcare provider charged a nofault insurer was reasonable. We conclude that while it is certainly not dispositive of the 
-22-

reasonableness of a charge, the amount that third-parties pay is nevertheless evidence bearing on 

the reasonableness of a healthcare provider’s fees. Cf. Bronson, 295 Mich App at 454 

(“[P]laintiff’s actual cost for the surgical implant products is not dispositive on the issue whether 

its charges were reasonable; however, the actual cost of the durable medical equipment is certainly 

a piece of the overall ‘collage of factors affecting the reasonable rate’ of plaintiff’s charges.”). 

Simply put, third-party payments which are accepted by a healthcare provider as payment in full

during the pertinent timeframe for products and services are relevant to determining the 

reasonableness of charges for those very same products and services in the context of treatment 

covered by PIP benefits.

In Hardrick, 294 Mich App at 667-668, this Court discussed the characteristics of relevant 

evidence, explaining as follows: 

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence 

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401 (emphasis added). 

Relevance divides into two components: materiality and probative value. Material 

evidence relates to a fact of consequence to the action. A material fact need not be 

an element of a crime or cause of action or defense but it must, at least, be in issue 

in the sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy. Materiality 

looks to the relation between the propositions that the evidence is offered to prove 

and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition that 

is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. . . .

To be relevant, evidence must tend to make the existence of any fact that is 

of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence. . . . The threshold is minimal: any tendency 

is sufficient probative force. Evidence is relevant if it in some degree advances the 

inquiry, and is not objectionable simply because it fails to supply conclusive proof. 

No single item of evidence can be rejected upon the sole ground that it falls short 

of making a case; if it contributes to that end it must be received, and its sufficiency 

in connection with the other evidence must be determined on a review of the whole 

when the case is closed. [Quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted.]

In this case, the question is whether the charges for Sabby’s surgery and other medical 

treatments and services were reasonable. In this context, comparison of the amounts that Spectrum 

charged for the services Sabby received to the amounts that others actually paid for the same 

services during the same general timeframe—and that Spectrum accepted as payment in full for 

these services—tends to make it more or less likely that the amounts Spectrum charged were

reasonable or unreasonable. That is, what others actually pay can be used to measure the value of 

the medical services provided and can constitute a useful point of comparison for assessing the 

reasonableness of medical charges. This evidence, supplying one measure of the value of the 

services provided, “throws some light, however faint, on the reasonableness of a charge” and is 

therefore worthy of a jury’s consideration. See Bronson, 295 Mich App at 452 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Indeed, unlike the customary-charge cap, which is expressly limited to comparison of the 

charges to cases not involving insurance, the reasonableness prong does not contain any similar 
-23-

restriction. See MCL 500.3157. Rather, it is more broadly concerned with ensuring that a charge 

is fair and not excessive, and this concern invites comparison to amounts actually being paid on 

the open market. See, e.g., Douglas, 492 Mich at 275 (“The compensation actually paid to 

caregivers who provide similar services is necessarily relevant to the fact-finder’s determination 

of a reasonable charge for a family member’s provision of these services because it helps the factfinder to determine what the caregivers could receive on the open market.”). We agree with the 

following sentiments of the Georgia Supreme Court in Bowden v The Med Ctr, Inc, 297 Ga 285, 

292; 773 SE2d 692 (2015):

The amounts that TMC charged to (and agreed to accept as payment in full 

from) other patients treated at the same hospital for the same type of care during 

the same general time frame that Bowden was treated may not be dispositive of 

whether TMC’s charges for Bowden’s care were “reasonable” under OCGA § 44–

14–470(b), to the extent that the other patients were not similarly situated in other 

economically meaningful ways. But that does not mean that how much TMC 

charged those other patients is entirely irrelevant—particularly in the broad 

discovery sense—to the reasonableness of the charges for Bowden’s care. 

The fair and reasonable value of goods and services is often determined by 

considering what similar buyers and sellers have paid and received for the same 

product in the same market, with adjustments upward or downward made to 

account for pertinent differences, and we see no reason why the same cannot be 

true of health care. [Citation omitted.12]

A medical provider’s typical price cannot be deemed reasonable unless it reflects an 

amount that is actually being charged in the marketplace, and a realistic standard considers the 

amount insurers actually pay and the amount a medical provider is willing to accept. Nassau 

Anesthesia Assoc PC v Chin, 32 Misc3d 282, 286; 924 NYS2d 252 (2011). Quite simply, when 

determining reasonableness, the amount that others pay for the same goods or services is a 

pertinent factor to be considered when deciding whether a charge of those same goods or services 

is reasonable.13

 

12 Cases from other jurisdictions, while not binding, may be considered persuasive. Hiner v 

Mojica, 271 Mich App 604, 612; 722 NW2d 914 (2006).

13 Although we hold that the amount third parties pay for products and services may be relevant to 

a determination of reasonableness, the evidence needs to be specific to the particular charges at 

issue and cover the same general timeframe. See AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379 (a no-fault insurer 

need only pay a reasonable charge “for the particular product or service”). General information 

and broad statistics are irrelevant to the question whether the particular charges in a given case 

were reasonable. Thus, an insurer would not be justified in uniformly reducing the payment on all 

medical bills by a set percentage based on general statistics. Instead, each case and each expense 

needs to be considered and analyzed individually. Here, while Farm Bureau offered general 

information about the healthcare market and Hall’s general opinions on reasonableness, it also 

provided Hall’s opinions specifically with respect to Spectrum’s particular charges related to its 
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We emphasize that the amount third parties pay does not conclusively establish a 

reasonable amount. Instead, in ruling that third-party payments may be relevant, we are simply 

indicating that such evidence may be considered as a point of comparison to assist the trier of fact

in determining the amount of a reasonable charge for the services in question. See Bronson, 295 

Mich App at 451-454. The amount paid by others for the same services is just one measure—

among all the evidence the parties might wish to present—regarding the reasonableness of the 

charges. See id.

For instance, a healthcare provider would be free to present evidence and to argue that its 

charges were similar to those of other providers. And there are, of course, reasons why health

insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid pay less, including contractual and statutory limitations, see 

Mercy Mt Clemens, 219 Mich App at 54, and a healthcare provider could present these factors and 

distinctions to a jury. In view of these differences and any other evidence presented, the jury 

would be fee to give the evidence regarding third-party payers little or no weight and to instead 

conclude that the amount charged to uninsured individuals, or some other amount, is a better 

measure of reasonableness. But the fact that there are different measures and factors bearing on 

the assessment of reasonableness—and potential weaknesses in the evidence Farm Bureau wishes 

to present—does not render evidence of third-party payments irrelevant as a matter of law. See 

Bronson, 295 Mich App at 451-454. Instead, a jury should be presented with the complete picture 

of the range of charges and payments for medical services on the open market.

In sum, when assessing the reasonableness of a medical charge, relevant evidence includes

the full range of charges and payments falling within the pertinent timeframe for the particular 

services, products, and treatment at issue in the case. Among that evidence, the jury may consider 

the amounts paid by third parties because such evidence “ ‘throws some light on the reasonableness 

of the charges.’ ” Bronson, 295 Mich App at 452 (citation omitted).

In contrast to this conclusion, Spectrum relies heavily on Johnson, Munson, Mercy Mt

Clemens, Hofmann, and AOPP for the proposition that the amount third parties pay for medical 

services is not relevant to the assessment of reasonable charges under § 3157. As discussed, these 

cases did not actually resolve the question presented in this case—specifically, whether payments 

by third parties are relevant to the determination of reasonableness. Nevertheless, one additional 

point about these cases warrants discussion in light of Spectrum’s arguments on appeal. 

Specifically, in analyzing the customary prong, some of the cases addressed the significance of the 

use of the term “charges” in §§ 3107(1)(a) and 3157, noting that “payments” are not the same thing 

as “charges.” See, e.g., Hofmann, 211 Mich App at 113-114. Employing this reasoning, Spectrum 

contends that, whether considering customariness or reasonableness, payments are not relevant to 

an analysis of charges.

Certainly, “charges” and “payments” are different terms, and the amountsomeone typically 

charges for services may not be the same as the amount someone is actually paid for those services. 

See, e.g., Law v Griffith, 457 Mass 349, 357; 930 NE2d 126 (2010) (“The only patients actually 

paying the stated charges are the uninsured, a small fraction of medical bill payors.”). But the 

 

treatment of Sabby and the amount charged to Farm Bureau as compared to what others would 

pay. 
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significance of this basic distinction between a “charge” and a “payment” falls away when the 

inquiry becomes one of reasonableness. Under the customary prong of § 3157, the sole question 

concerns the amount the healthcare provider customarily charges in cases not involving insurance, 

and actual payments matter not at all in answering this question. But when the reasonableness of 

those charges is at issue, the charges alone—even if customary and even if comparable to the 

charges of other healthcare providers—cannot be absolutely dispositive of their reasonableness.

To limit assessing the reasonableness of provider charges solely to a 

comparison of such charges among similar providers would be to leave the 

determination of reasonableness solely in the hands of providers, as a collective 

group, and would abrogate the cost-policing function of no-fault insurers, contrary 

to the intention of the Legislature. [Bronson, 295 Mich App at 449-450.]

Instead, in the context of reasonableness, a difference between the amount paid by third 

parties when compared to no-fault insurers and the uninsured is clearly relevant to, though not 

dispositive of, an assessment of reasonableness. To conclude otherwise would be to require the 

jury to ignore the realities of the marketplace when, in actuality, “the market for a particular service 

bears on its reasonableness.” Hardrick, 294 Mich App at 671-672. And “the parameters of the 

relevant market present jury questions.” Id. at 672. When determining reasonableness, the jury 

cannot be limited to consideration of a healthcare provider’s “charges” for services but must be 

allowed to contemplate the value of the services on the market, including reflection on the amounts 

paid for such services by third parties.

Textually, in concluding that use of the word “charges” in § 3157 does not preclude 

consideration of “payments” when assessing reasonableness, we again emphasize that 

consideration of payments is simply one measure for the jury to ponder; it is certainly not 

dispositive. We do not suggest that “payments” necessarily establish the unreasonableness of a 

charge. The issue is simply whether evidence of payments by third parties may be considered by 

the fact-finder when gauging the reasonableness of charges. And we hold that nothing in the plain 

language of § 3107(1)(a) or § 3157 precludes consideration of third-party payments when 

determining a no-fault insurer’s liability for reasonable charges.

4. MCL 500.3158 AND MCL 500.3159

Even if relevant, Spectrum contends that the evidence Farm Bureau seeks to admit should 

be excluded because it is not discoverable under §§ 3158 and 3159. Spectrum more specifically 

contends that evidence relating to Spectrum’s costs is not relevant or discoverable because 

Covenant overruled this Court’s decision in Bronson, and as a result, only “costs to the injured 

person,” i.e., the provider’s charges, are relevant and discoverable. Contrary to these assertions, 

Covenant did not overrule Bronson. With regard to the specific evidence in question, Bronson 

appears to have limited applicability to the current case because Farm Bureau has not particularly 

sought discovery of a “standalone” item, the cost for which is easily quantifiable. Instead, the 

evidence Farm Bureau seeks to admit is based on publicly available data. While this information 

may not be obtainable directly from Spectrum under §§ 3158 and 3159, nothing in the no-fault act 

prevents Farm Bureau from introducing publicly available data with the proper foundation.

Generally, Michigan follows an open and broad approach to discovery, permitting 

discovery “for any relevant matter, unless privileged.” Bronson, 295 Mich App at 443. “However, 
-26-

a trial court should also protect the interests of the party opposing discovery so as not to subject 

that party to excessive, abusive, or irrelevant discovery requests.” Id. (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The no-fault act contains two provisions regarding discovery that are relevant to this 

case. First, § 3158(2) provides:

A physician, hospital, clinic or other medical institution providing, before 

or after an accidental bodily injury upon which a claim for personal protection 

insurance benefits is based, any product, service or accommodation in relation to 

that or any other injury, or in relation to a condition claimed to be connected with 

that or any other injury, if requested to do so by the insurer against whom the claim 

has been made, (a) shall furnish forthwith a written report of the history, condition, 

treatment and dates and costs of treatment of the injured person and (b) shall 

produce forthwith and permit inspection and copying of its records regarding the 

history, condition, treatment and dates and costs of treatment.

Additionally, § 3159 provides:

In a dispute regarding an insurer’s right to discovery of facts about an 

injured person’s earnings or about his history, condition, treatment and dates and 

costs of treatment, a court may enter an order for the discovery. The order may be 

made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to all persons having 

an interest, and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the 

discovery. A court, in order to protect against annoyance, embarrassment or 

oppression, as justice requires, may enter an order refusing discovery or specifying 

conditions of discovery and may order payments of costs and expenses of the 

proceeding, including reasonable fees for the appearance of attorneys at the 

proceedings, as justice requires. 

In this case, Spectrum asserts that these statutory provisions preclude discovery of the 

information Farm Bureau seeks and that because discovery is not allowed, it also follows that the 

information is not relevant or admissible. We disagree. The discovery devices specified in the 

no-fault act do not necessarily represent “the complete panoply of discovery tools that the 

Legislature intended to provide in connection with mandatory no-fault insurance coverage.” Cruz 

v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 598 n 14; 648 NW2d 591 (2002). Much, if not all, 

of the information Farm Bureau wants to rely upon regarding payments by third parties and 

average cost-to-payment ratios is publicly available and was obtained by Farm Bureau from 

various sources. Sections 3158 and 3159 of the no-fault act might not specifically require 

Spectrum to provide this information to Farm Bureau. But nothing in § 3158 or § 3159 precludes 

the consideration of publicly available data, so to craft such a limitation from the Legislature’s 

silence on publicly available data would unjustifiably hinder no-fault insurers in responsibly 

investigating claims. Cf. Cruz, 466 Mich at 598 n 14 (concluding no-fault discovery mechanisms 

were “not comprehensive”). Moreover, given that the information is publicly available, Farm 

Bureau’s accessing the information cannot plausibly run afoul of § 3159’s protections against 

annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression. Indeed, considering that the information is publicly 

available, the question is not really one of discovery, but admissibility. So provided that the data 

is relevant and otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, neither § 3158 nor § 3159 

precludes its admission.
-27-

On appeal, with regard to the costs of treatment, Spectrum also specifically argues that this 

Court’s decision in Bronson, permitting discovery of a healthcare provider’s costs (at least to the 

extent those costs may be easily quantified), was implicitly overruled by Covenant. In Bronson, 

295 Mich App at 450-451, this Court reasoned:

In keeping with the insurer’s obligation to determine the reasonableness of 

a provider’s charges, we believe that defendants were entitled to discover the 

wholesale cost of the surgical implant products for which the insureds were 

charged. The no-fault act, MCL 500.3158(2), permits defendants to discover 

plaintiff’s “costs of treatment of the injured person,” not the “costs of treatment to

the injured person,” which presumably are plaintiff’s customary charges. 

(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, defendants are permitted to consider the cost to 

plaintiff of providing that treatment and not merely the cost of treatment as billed 

by the provider to the injured person when evaluating the reasonableness of the 

charges submitted for payment. We recognize that permitting insurers access to a 

provider’s cost information could open the door to nearly unlimited inquiry into the 

business operations of a provider, including into such concerns as employee wages 

and benefits. However, we explicitly limit our ruling to the sort of durable medicalsupply products at issue here, which are billed separately and distinctly from other 

treatment services and which defendants represent (and plaintiff has not disputed) 

require little or no handling or storage by a provider. The surgical implant products 

here are standalone items that can be easily quantified. Plaintiff must come forward 

with evidence to convince a jury that the charges for the durable medical equipment 

were reasonable.

Bronson has limited application to the current facts. That is, at least on appeal, Farm Bureau has 

not identified a need for information about Spectrum’s costs for specific “durable medical-supply 

products.” Instead, Farm Bureau’s arguments focus on publicly available data regarding costs 

relative to charges, an issue which Bronson simply did not address. Although not the type of 

information at issue in Bronson, contemplation of this publicly available data is not precluded by

§ 3158 or § 3159, and because it is publicly available, it does not run afoul of Bronson’s concern 

about opening the door to unlimited discovery requests of a healthcare provider. In short, 

Bronson’s specific discovery holding seems to have little bearing on the present case.

Nevertheless, we address Spectrum’s assertion that Covenant implicitly overruled Bronson

because in making this argument, Spectrum purports to find support for its more general assertion 

that the reasonableness of medical charges is defined solely by comparison to charges among 

similar healthcare providers. In Bronson, this Court expressly rejected the contention that 

reasonableness could be determined solely by comparison of a provider’s charges to similar 

providers. The Bronson panel reasoned that such an approach “would be to leave the 

determination of reasonableness solely in the hands of providers, as a collective group, and would 

abrogate the cost-policing function of no-fault insurers, contrary to the intention of the 

Legislature.” Bronson, 295 Mich App at 449-450. In concluding that costs were also relevant, 

this Court noted that § 3158(2) permits discovery of the “ ‘costs of treatment of the injured person.’ 

” Id. at 450. In contrast to this conclusion, Spectrum now argues on appeal that § 3158(2) should 

be read to allow discovery only of the costs of treatment to the injured person, i.e., a provider’s 
-28-

charges, meaning that the sole point of comparison for determining reasonableness would be a 

comparison of charges. 

In analyzing the text of § 3158(2), Spectrum maintains that Bronson implicitly involved a 

misapplication of the last antecedent rule.

14

 That is, Spectrum contends that this Court erred by 

reading the phrase “of the injured person” to only modify “costs of treatment” when “of the injured 

person” should also be read to modify “history, condition, treatment and dates” as used in 

§ 3158(2). Read in this manner, Spectrum asserts that the Legislature chose “of” because one does 

not say, for example, “history to the injured person.” Spectrum also appears to believe that the 

Legislature chose “of” to denote a possessive relationship. In other words, according to Spectrum, 

the Legislature actually meant to say “injured person’s history, condition, treatment and dates and 

costs of treatment.”

Bronson clearly rejected this position.15 But Spectrum maintains that Bronson’s 

construction is no longer good law because Covenant held that the statutory cause of action for nofault benefits belongs to the injured person, not a healthcare provider. Spectrum notes that Bronson 

operated under the assumption that healthcare providers could file suit against an insurer. See 

Bronson, 295 Mich App at 450. And Spectrum emphasizes that the Covenant Court looked briefly 

at § 3158(2), noting that this provision “simply requires that a healthcare provider make the injured 

person’s medical records and certain treatment information available to the insurer.” Covenant, 

500 Mich at 205-206.

Contrary to Spectrum’s assertions that Covenant overruled Bronson, this Court has already 

recognized that Covenant did not affect the method for determining reasonableness as articulated 

in AOPP and Bronson. Auto-Owners Ins Co v Compass Healthcare PLC, 326 Mich App 595, 

609-610; 928 NW2d 726 (2018). The Compass Healthcare panel stated:

As the trial court concluded in its opinion and order on reconsideration, 

“[t]he only effect of Covenant was to place the dispute over the reasonableness of 

the charges between a provider and a patient-insured, rather than between a 

 

14 The last antecedent rule is a grammatical rule which “provides that a modifying or restrictive 

word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last 

antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Tuscola Co Bd of 

Comm’rs v Tuscola Co Apportionment Comm, 262 Mich App 421, 425; 686 NW2d 495 (2004) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no mention of this rule in Bronson.

15 Contrary to Spectrum’s arguments, Bronson did not purport to apply the last antecedent rule; 

and Bronson was also clearly correct in not rewriting § 3158(2) in the manner requested by 

Spectrum. Had the Legislature intended to say “the injured person’s history, condition, treatment 

and dates and costs of treatment,” it could have easily used this phrase. See Yaldo v North Pointe 

Ins Co, 457 Mich 341, 346; 578 NW2d 274 (1998). Instead, relevant to this case, the Legislature 

provided for discovery of the “costs of treatment of the injured person,” and Bronson properly 

concluded that the Legislature intended the meaning it clearly and unambiguously expressed. See 

Yaldo, 457 Mich at 346.
-29-

provider and an insurer.” It did not alter the method of disputing the reasonableness 

of the amount paid. [Id. at 610 (alteration in original).]

Indeed, there is nothing inconsistent between Bronson’s discovery ruling and Covenant. 

To the contrary, the crux of Covenant’s statutory analysis was that the “the no-fault act does not, 

in any provision, explicitly confer on healthcare providers a direct cause of action against insurers.” 

Covenant, 500 Mich at 204-205. And the Supreme Court also could not find any such cause of 

action in the no-fault provisions “that do not explicitly refer to healthcare providers.” Id. at 206-

218. In comparison, relevant to Bronson’s conclusion, the no-fault act expressly mentions 

healthcare providers in § 3158(2) and explicitly imposes a duty on healthcare providers to disclose 

the “costs of treatment of the injured person.” The fact that healthcare providers lack a statutory 

cause of action does not alter their express obligation to comply with § 3158(2). Even before 

Covenant, this obligation existed in cases brought by an injured person rather than a healthcare 

provider. In short, Covenant did not overrule Bronson, it did not alter the method of disputing 

reasonableness, and it did not otherwise change a healthcare provider’s obligation to comply with 

§ 3158(2). In sum, the discovery provisions in §§ 3158 and 3159 do not compel the conclusion 

that consideration of third-party payments is barred by the no-fault act.

5. APPLICATION

The trial court denied Farm Bureau’s motion in limine regarding the relevance and 

admissibility of evidence, agreeing with Spectrum’s assertion that this Court’s caselaw construing

§ 3157 categorically precluded the admission of evidence of third-party payments for similar 

services. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that evidence regarding third-party 

payments may be relevant and admissible for purposes of assessing reasonableness under 

§ 3107(1)(a) and § 3157. And the trial court’s blanket exclusion of this evidence constituted an 

error of law amounting to an abuse of discretion. See Mueller, 323 Mich App at 571. To be clear, 

we do not hold as a matter of law that the evidence offered by Farm Bureau is relevant and 

admissible; rather, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand the matter for the trial court to 

make the determination in the first instance under the proper legal framework. Cf. In re Kerr, 323 

Mich App 407, 412; 917 NW2d 408 (2018) (remanding for a new evidentiary ruling when trial 

court’s exclusion of evidence was based on an error of law). The trial court has not yet considered 

the relevance of the specific data in question to the particular healthcare charges at issue in this 

case that were billed in 2016, nor has the court addressed Hall’s particular methodologies in 

analyzing that data.16 The record must also be developed with respect to the precise cost 

information Farm Bureau seeks to discover and whether the cost information meets the standards 

in Bronson. 

 

16 For instance, on appeal, in a footnote, Spectrum asserts that Hall’s methodologies—based on 

“common sense”—do not meet the standards for admission of an expert opinion. This issue, raised 

for the first time on appeal, should also be addressed on remand in determining the admissibility 

of Farm Bureau’s evidence. 
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6. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER MCL 500.3148

Given our holding that evidence of third-party payments may be relevant, thereby requiring 

remand for additional proceedings, whether the trial court erred by denying Spectrum’s motion for 

attorney fees under MCL 500.3148 need not be considered because an award of attorney fees at 

this juncture would be premature.17

III. CONCLUSION

In Docket No. 347553, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of Spectrum regarding 

the balance on the charges billed by Spectrum for medical services rendered to Sabby. In Docket 

No. 348440, we reverse the order denying Spectrum’s motion for attorney fees. We remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Having prevailed 

in Docket No. 347553, Farm Bureau may tax costs under MCR 7.219 relative to that particular 

appeal. We decline to award taxable costs in Docket No. 348440.

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Jonathan Tukel 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

 

17 Although our ruling in favor of Farm Bureau with respect to the motion in limine lends some 

support to the denial of Spectrum’s request for attorney fees, the issue of attorney fees cannot be 

properly addressed until, at the earliest, it is determined what specific evidence is admissible and 

the impact of the evidence on the question concerning the reasonableness of Farm Bureau’s 

decision to only pay 80% of the amount billed. And, of course, the issue of liability is now 

reopened.