United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1997 UNITED NATIONS

Status of Internal

Oversight Services

GAO/NSIAD-98-9

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278082 

November 19, 1997

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Rod Grams

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

In July 1994, the General Assembly passed a resolution creating the Office

of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) within the United Nations’

Secretariat.1

 The office was formally established on September 7, 1994,2 to

promote effective program management by identifying, reporting on, and

proposing remedies for problems of waste, fraud, abuse, and

mismanagement within the United Nations.

An independent oversight office has been the centerpiece of U.S. efforts to

improve U.N. management and its accountability to the member states. In

1994, to emphasize the importance of establishing such an office,

legislation was enacted that required certain funds to be withheld from the

United Nations until the President certified that it had an independent

office to conduct and supervise objective audits, investigations, and

inspections relating to the programs and operations of the United Nations.

Over concerns that OIOS may have been unable to carry out its mandate

due to resource and other constraints, the Congress required a similar

certification for fiscal year 1997.3

This report responds to your request concerning the operations of OIOS.

Specifically, our objectives were to determine whether OIOS (1) is

operationally independent; (2) has the necessary resources to carry out its

mission; and (3) has written policies and procedures in place for

conducting its work, following up on its recommendations, and providing

confidentiality to informants and protecting whistleblowers from possible

reprisal. OIOS’ functions and responsibilities are similar in some respects to

U.S. inspector general offices and, where appropriate, we provide

1

OIOS’ mandate is described in General Assembly Resolution 48/218B, July 29, 1994.

2

Secretary General’s Bulletin ST/SGB/273, September 7, 1994.

3

In accordance with P.L. 104-208 and section 401(b) of P.L. 103-236. Pending legislation contains a

similar provision for fiscal year 1998. See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997 (S. 903, sec. 2101).

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information on U.S. inspectors general for comparison. However, these

comparisons are not intended as criteria for assessing OIOS’ operations.

Because we are an agency of the United States, we do not have direct

audit authority to review the operations of international organizations,

including the United Nations.4

 This lack of direct audit authority resulted

in certain limitations being placed on the scope of our work and restricted

our ability to fully address our review objectives. Although U.N. officials

consented to our study and OIOS and other Secretariat staff were helpful

and forthcoming in interviews, OIOS declined to provide us access to

completed reports that had not been forwarded to the Secretary General

and General Assembly; its working papers supporting any of its reports;

and other records and files related to specific audits, investigations, or

inspections. These restrictions prevented us from (1) testing whether OIOS

was exercising its authority in an independent manner and (2) determining

whether OIOS was adhering to its stated policies and procedures and its

analyses were adequate to support its reported findings and

recommendations.

Background Effective oversight is a key management tool. The United Nations has both

internal and external accountability and oversight mechanisms. Internal

oversight units usually report directly to the executive heads of

organizations, while external oversight mechanisms generally report to the

governing bodies of organizations. Appendix I provides an overview of the

external oversight mechanisms in the U.N. system.

Until 1993, the major internal oversight functions of the Secretariat were

carried out by units within the Department of Administration and

Management, but they were not considered very effective because they

lacked independence and were often disregarded by managers. In August

1993, the Secretary General formed the Office for Inspections and

Investigations under an Assistant Secretary General. This office was not

part of the Department of Administration and Management and carried

more authority than the individual units because it reported to the

Secretary General. In July 1994, the General Assembly created an oversight

body with even more independence and authority—OIOS—to supersede the

Office for Inspections and Investigations.

4

Pending legislation contains a provision calling for the United Nations to provide us access to U.N.

financial data for nationally mandated reviews. See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997 (S. 903, 

sec. 2231(b)(6)).

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OIOS is considered by the United Nations and its member states to be an

internal oversight office and, therefore, part of the executive function of

the United Nations. OIOS is mandated to exercise its oversight functions

throughout the U.N. Secretariat, which covers the staff and resources of

the Secretariat, including peacekeeping missions. For 1996-97, OIOS had

oversight authority over $7 billion.5

 In addition, OIOS has been asked to

provide audit coverage for some independent entities, such as the U.N.

Joint Staff Pension Fund.

For the current biennium (1996-97), OIOS has 123 authorized positions and

a $21.6 million budget, of which $15 million comes from the regular U.N.

budget and $6.6 million comes from extrabudgetary resources.6

 Of the 123

positions, 10 are vacant, 36 are funded by extrabudgetary contributions,

and 6 are resident auditors with U.N. peacekeeping missions.7 OIOS also

has one staff member on nonreimbursable loan from a member state. It

has 88 staff in New York, 21 in Geneva, and 8 in Nairobi.

OIOS has four operational units—the Audit and Management Consulting

Division, the Investigations Section, the Central Monitoring and Inspection

Unit, and the Central Evaluation Unit. Investigation was a new oversight

activity introduced in February 1994, and inspections were also a new

function assigned to the Office for Inspections and Investigations. The

functions of the other units had been performed within the Department of

Administration and Management for years. The Under Secretary General

(USG) for Internal Oversight Services provides overall management of OIOS’

activities and monitors the status of implementation of OIOS

recommendations. Appendix II provides an organization chart of OIOS and

a description of each unit’s functions, budget, and staffing.

OIOS’ oversight does not extend to U.N. specialized agencies, such as the

World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the

Food and Agriculture Organization, or the International Atomic Energy

Agency. Specialized agencies are not under the authority of the Secretary

5

The United Nations budgets for 2-year cycles, or bienniums. The budget figures presented in this

report are for 2-year periods beginning January 1 of even-numbered years and ending December 31 of

odd-numbered years.

6

In addition to its regular budget, OIOS receives payments from various departments and organizations

not funded through the regular U.N. budget for specific oversight services. These funds are considered

“extrabudgetary,” and OIOS has used them primarily to pay for personnel.

7

These budget numbers and authorized positions do not include audit coverage for organizations that

have their own internal audit units, such as the U.N. Development Program, but they do include audit

coverage for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, which receives audit and other services from

OIOS.

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General or funded through the regular U.N. budget; rather, they are

autonomous bodies with their own governing boards, resources, and

oversight mechanisms. According to OIOS officials, they regularly exchange

views with the agencies’ oversight offices in order to coordinate and

strengthen oversight on a U.N.-wide basis.

Results in Brief OIOS is the internal oversight mechanism for the U.N. Secretary General.

Although OIOS had some start-up and early operational problems, many of

these seem to have been resolved. This was difficult to do in an

organizational environment that operated without effective internal

oversight mechanisms for almost half a century. In less than 3 years, OIOS

has assimilated four preexisting, internal oversight units from the Office

for Inspections and Investigations and, for the first time, hired professional

investigators and provided other resources for an investigations unit in the

United Nations.

OIOS’ mandate, the Secretary General’s Bulletin establishing OIOS, and OIOS’

implementing procedures provide the framework for an operationally

independent, internal oversight mechanism for the U.N. Secretariat.

However, without access to all its audit, inspection, and investigation

reports; working papers; and other records and files related to OIOS’ work,

we could not test whether OIOS exercised its authority and implemented its

procedures in an independent manner. One issue that may affect the

appearance of OIOS’ independence involves how it has implemented its

reporting mechanism. OIOS’ mandate calls for it to submit reports that

“provide insight into the effective utilization and management of resources

and the protection of assets” to the Secretary General and General

Assembly. Yet, OIOS had provided only 39 of its 162 various reports to the

Secretary General and the General Assembly or its committees.

Initial concerns about inadequate budget and staff levels have been

addressed. Since its establishment, OIOS’ regular U.N. budget has increased

from $12 million to $18.6 million (proposed for 1998-99), and its authorized

positions have increased by 18, to a total of 123. According to OIOS, it will

have sufficient resources to carry out its mandate if the proposed 1998-99

budget is approved.

OIOS’ audit division and the Investigations Section have developed written

auditing and investigative policies and procedures. These are detailed in

audit and investigations manuals, respectively. However, the Central

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Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation Unit do not

have comparable manuals.

Each OIOS unit tracks its recommendations and is responsible for

determining when they should be closed out. This information is

maintained in a central, automated database in the Office of the USG for

Internal Oversight Services. In its 1995 and 1996 annual reports, the USG for

Internal Oversight Services estimated OIOS had identified $35.5 million in

potential recoveries and realized $19.8 million in savings and recoveries.

OIOS’ Investigations Section has established procedures and developed

guidance, which it has publicized throughout the United Nations, for

ensuring informants’ confidentiality and protecting whistleblowers from

reprisal.

In discussions with the USG for Internal Oversight Services, we suggested

several ways to enhance OIOS’ future operations. In response, he said he is

considering certain changes in OIOS policies and procedures, but stated

that he does not plan to change his criteria for submitting reports to the

Secretary General and the General Assembly.

OIOS’ Mandate

Provides a

Framework for

Operational

Independence

To judge an organization’s operational independence, one must determine

whether (1) the organization’s mandate and procedures establish

conditions under which it can be operationally independent and (2) the

organization exercises its authority and prerogatives in an independent

manner. While our examination of the U.N. resolution creating OIOS, the

Secretary General’s Bulletin establishing OIOS, and OIOS’ operating

procedures showed that OIOS is in a position to be operationally

independent,8

 we could not test whether OIOS exercised its authority and

implemented its procedures in an independent manner because OIOS would

not provide us access to certain audit and investigation reports and its

working papers. Unrestricted access to OIOS’ records and files and such

reviews and tests that we could have conducted would have served as

indicators of how OIOS was exercising its independence.

OIOS’ U.N. Framework A primary characteristic of an effective internal oversight office is its

operational independence; however, the term is not easily defined and

even harder to measure in practice. Operational independence is a concept

8

In 1994, 1996, and 1997, the Secretary of State certified on behalf of the President of the United States

that, among other things, OIOS is set up as an independent office and has access to necessary records

and officials.

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rather than a discrete set of factors that can be tracked over time. Among

other things, operational independence includes insulating the unit head

from arbitrary removal from office; organizationally separating the unit

from the programs it examines; and ensuring the unit has full and free

access to relevant records, the authority to carry out work it sees fit, and

the ability to report its findings without interference from the executive or

the legislature. It is also important that the oversight unit’s mandate and

independent status be well understood among the community it oversees.9

OIOS has many of these characteristics, as noted below.

• The USG for Internal Oversight Services is appointed by the Secretary

General, following consultations with member states, for a fixed 5-year

term but must be approved by the General Assembly and may be removed

by the Secretary General only for cause and with the General Assembly’s

approval.

• OIOS recently established an administrative unit within the USG’s office. As

a result, OIOS no longer has to rely on the Department of Administration

and Management for basic administrative services.

• OIOS’ staffing administration is handled by the Office of Human Resources

Management. OIOS is subject to U.N. geographical and gender diversity

requirements and, in some cases, special language requirements. However,

the USG for Internal Oversight Services is authorized to appoint, promote,

and terminate staff—powers similar to those delegated by the Secretary

General to the heads of separately administered U.N. funds and programs

but not to other USGs.

• Like other departments, OIOS’ budget is a separate line item in the overall

U.N. Secretariat’s budget. Unlike other departments within the Secretariat,

the USG for Internal Oversight Services may directly inform the General

Assembly about the adequacy of OIOS’ budget and staffing levels.10

• OIOS’ mandate provides the authority to initiate, carry out, and report on

any action that it considers necessary to fulfill its mandate and

responsibilities. OIOS may not be prohibited or hindered from carrying out

any action within the purview of its mandate by the Secretary General or

any other party.

OIOS’ Oversight of U.N. Funds

and Programs

Although the Secretary General’s Bulletin states that the responsibilities of

OIOS extend to the “separately administered organs,” OIOS’ role in providing

9

Independence for supreme audit institutions is described in Auditing Standards, Auditing Standards

Committee, International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (June 1992), pp. 24-30.

10Pending legislation contains a provision calling for the United Nations to established procedures that

require the USG for Internal Oversight Services to report directly to the Secretary General on the

adequacy of OIOS’ resources. See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997 (S. 903, 

sec. 2101(c)(2)(A)(ii)).

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internal oversight services for separately administered U.N. funds and

programs has been questioned by a few member states.11 Funds and

programs are funded either completely or in part by voluntary

contributions and have their own executive boards or governing bodies.

According to OIOS officials, OIOS has provided oversight services primarily

for those areas for which the funds and programs do not provide their own

oversight coverage. For example, the U.N. Development Program has its

own internal audit, but OIOS provides investigative services. For the U.N.

High Commissioner for Refugees, which does not have an internal audit

unit, OIOS provides both audit and some investigative services.

However, in recent sessions of the U.N. Committee on Administration and

Budget—commonly known as the Fifth Committee12—certain member

states have made it clear that they do not accept the authority of the

Secretary General to implement OIOS recommendations in the funds and

programs without explicit direction from the executive boards of these

entities. If OIOS is required to seek the concurrence of the various funds

and programs executive boards before cognizant program officials can

implement its recommendations, OIOS’ operational independence would be

compromised. According to State officials, the United States and several

other delegations have made this point clear. They have emphasized that

OIOS is an internal oversight mechanism and part of the U.N. Secretariat

and, therefore, its recommendations are not subject to the review or

approval of the General Assembly or the respective executive boards of

the separately administered funds and programs.

As noted in its comments on this report, the State Department has

consistently taken the position that OIOS’ jurisdiction extends to the

separately administered funds and programs. State emphasized that the

U.N. Legal Advisor confirmed this understanding of the relationship in

July 1994. Additionally, at the request of the USG for Internal Oversight

Services, the U.N. Legal Counsel specifically ruled in October 1997 that

OIOS can make recommendations to program managers within the U.N.

Secretariat, including the funds and programs, without the endorsement or

approval of the General Assembly. While this decision did not explicitly

refer to the funds and programs executive boards, the situation is

analogous.

11Pending legislation contains a provision calling for OIOS to clarify its authority to audit every

program, project, or activity funded by the United Nations. See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997

(S. 903 sec. 2101(c)(2)(B)).

12The General Assembly has six committees. The Fifth Committee comprises all 185 member states

and, as its more formal name implies, deals with administrative and budgetary affairs.

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At the time of this report, OIOS was continuing to provide internal oversight

services to the funds and programs and reporting to the cognizant officials

without seeking the approval of the respective executive boards. However,

although U.S. State Department officials and the USG for Internal Oversight

Services are confident that OIOS’ position will prevail, the issue of OIOS’

relationship to funds and programs will likely come before the Fifth

Committee again.

Availability of OIOS Reports An area of concern is how OIOS has implemented its reporting mechanism.

OIOS can provide its reports without interference to the Secretary General

and General Assembly. Its mandate states that OIOS “shall submit to the

Secretary General reports that provide insight into the effective utilization

and management of resources and the protection of assets” and that “all

such reports are made available to the General Assembly as submitted by

the Office.” The USG for Internal Oversight Services determines which

reports are provided to the Secretary General, and we noted that OIOS has

provided seven of eight inspection reports to the Secretary General and

the General Assembly and that all six in-depth evaluation reports it has

done were provided to the Committee for Programme and

Coordination—a committee of the General Assembly. However, we also

noted that, as of September 1997, only 13 of 107 audit reports13 and 5 of 33

investigation reports were provided to the Secretary General and,

subsequently, the General Assembly.14 This raises two questions:

• If only 18 of 140 audit and investigation reports met the mandate’s criteria

for being provided to the Secretary General, are OIOS’ resources directed at

those areas that would provide insight into the operations of the United

Nations?

• On the other hand, if more OIOS reports actually provide the insight into

U.N. operations intended in the mandate, why were they not provided to

the Secretary General and the General Assembly?

We were not permitted to review the reports that had not been provided to

the Secretary General. Consequently, we could not address these

questions. In contrast, we note that all U.S. inspector general reports are

provided to the head of the respective inspector general’s department or

agency and many are also provided to the U.S. Congress.

13All audit reports are provided to the U.N. Board of Auditors, which is one of several U.N. external

oversight mechanisms, but OIOS’ reports are not available to anyone else unless the USG for Internal

Oversight Services provides them to the Secretary General.

14OIOS had also issued two annual reports, four special evaluation reports, one program performance

report, and one special report for the Secretary General on funds and programs. The total number of

OIOS products provided to the General Assembly or its committees is 39.

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The USG for Internal Oversight Services acknowledged that few audit and

investigation reports had been forwarded to the Secretary General and the

General Assembly. He told us that if he is satisfied with the program

officials’ response to the report and is confident that appropriate actions

are being taken, he does not send the report to the Secretary General. He

also noted that sending all OIOS reports would place an additional

paperwork burden on the General Assembly and that producing enough

reports for each member state would be expensive. The USG for Internal

Oversight Services said that beginning with the OIOS annual report due to

be published in October 1997, he will list all OIOS reports and if a member

state is interested in a particular one, OIOS will brief its representatives.15

He also said that previous annual reports have referred to the conclusions

and findings in many of OIOS’ reports and he has been willing to brief

member states on the topics addressed.

Informing U.N. Staff of OIOS’

Independence

OIOS and the Department of Administration and Management have made

efforts to communicate the scope of OIOS’ operational independence to

U.N. staff.

• In January 1995, the USG for Administration and Management issued to all

U.N. staff an administrative instruction providing guidance on the

personnel arrangements for OIOS. The instruction outlined the

administrative arrangements and the authority of the USG for Internal

Oversight Services in personnel matters.

• In February 1996, the U.N. Department of Public Information distributed a

U.N. publication describing OIOS’ role and purpose.16

• In April 1996, the USG for Administration and Management issued a note

reminding Secretariat department heads that the General Assembly’s

resolution establishing OIOS makes it clear that OIOS shall have the

authority necessary to carry out its functions. The note provided detailed

information regarding the procedures to be followed to ensure that OIOS is

given immediate access to all files and records required to perform its

important functions.

• In early 1997, the Investigations Section published an investigations

manual that is available to all U.N. staff. This manual contains information

on the jurisdiction of the Investigations Section; hot-line procedures;

investigative access to staff, records, sites, and materials of the United

15Some reports, especially reports of investigations, may be too sensitive to list, but this will be

decided on a case-by-case basis.

16The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations: Its Genesis, Its Mission, Its Working

Methods, Its Impact, the U.N. Department of Public Information (New York: Feb. 1996).

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Nations; rights of persons subject to investigation; and protection for

whistleblowers. The manual is also on the U.N. Secretariat’s intranet.

Comparisons to U.S.

Inspectors General

Although OIOS is similar to U.S. inspector general offices, including the way

it emphasizes operational independence and access to relevant records

and cognizant officials, it is different in many respects. For example, most

U.S. inspectors general are not appointed for a fixed term and can be

removed without approval of the Congress. Also, while U.S. inspector

general offices have the audit and investigation functions specifically

mandated like OIOS, the inspections, monitoring, and evaluation roles are

not. See appendix III for a more complete comparison of OIOS with U.S.

inspector general offices.

OIOS’ Budget and

Staffing Levels Have

Increased Since Its

Inception

In February 1997, the USG for Internal Oversight Services stated in a

memorandum to the USG for Administration and Management that OIOS will

have sufficient resources to carry out its functions if the proposed 1998-99

budget is approved. The head of each OIOS unit, including the

Investigations Section, which had been singled out by OIOS officials as

particularly hampered by the lack of trained staff, concurred with this

assessment. Since the establishment of OIOS, its regular U.N. budget has

increased by 55 percent and its authorized positions have increased by 18.17

However, this did not happen without some difficulty.

When OIOS was established in September 1994, it inherited the resources

budgeted for the units whose functions it absorbed. In early

December 1994, the USG for Internal Oversight Services described his

vision for OIOS and the resource requirements necessary before the U.N.

Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and

Budgetary Questions.18 He stated that he could not measurably enhance

the internal control mechanisms in the United Nations without more

resources. In particular, he pointed to the need to intensify the audit

coverage and strengthen the new investigation function.

The General Assembly reacted favorably, and OIOS, which had a total of

102 positions, was authorized 5 additional professional and 3 more general

17Since its inception, OIOS has had staff position increases totaling 20, but 3 positions were

“redeployed” to the U.N. Office of Human Resources Management, and 1 position was “redeployed” to

OIOS from the Department of Administration and Management, for a net increase of 18 positions.

18The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has 16 “experts” from member

states and reports to the Fifth Committee; it reviews the proposed U.N. budget and addresses financial

questions.

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service positions against the revised budget estimates for 1995, bringing

OIOS’ total number of positions to 110, including extrabudgetary positions.

Nevertheless, in early 1996, only 42 of 53 professional positions within

OIOS’ audit division were filled—a vacancy rate of almost 21 percent. OIOS

also noted that the accumulated and new cases in the Investigations

Section constituted a workload that was too large for the unit to clear.

Moreover, with the establishment of OIOS, the Central Monitoring and

Inspection Unit’s responsibilities expanded to address concerns of

member states regarding the qualitative nature of program performance

reporting and the need to enhance program management capability.

At the beginning of the 1996-97 biennium and at the urging of some

member states, particularly the United States, cuts in the overall U.N.

budget were mandated by the General Assembly. While the OIOS 1996-97

budget included partial funding for an additional 12 positions, including 

5 investigators, the USG for Administration and Management instructed

OIOS to stay within its regular U.N. budget of $15 million, although OIOS had

estimated it would need $15.725 million to fully fund its approved

positions. (This did not directly affect extrabudgetary resources.) We were

told by OIOS officials, and the USG for Internal Oversight Services noted in

OIOS’ 1996 annual report, that OIOS should not be totally exempt from

overall U.N. reductions. The USG for Internal Oversight Services said he

took this position because it would be “politically unwise” to suggest that

OIOS be treated differently than the rest of the organization.

According to OIOS officials, because OIOS had to stay within its $15 million

budget, it had to cut $725,000. To do this, OIOS did not fill its vacant

positions for the first year of the biennium. This action saved about

$603,000. The office also cut back expenditures for nonstaffing items for

an additional savings of about $122,000.

In January 1996, the General Assembly instituted a hiring freeze for the

entire U.N. Secretariat. In March 1996, OIOS was granted a waiver as long as

it followed through with its budget reductions. In February 1997, after the

budgetary reductions had been achieved, OIOS began announcing its

vacancies, and the recruitment and hiring process began.

As part of U.N. efforts to maintain a flat, no-growth budget, the 1998-99

budget outline set OIOS’ regular budget at $15.1 million—about the same as

the previous biennium. With that budget, OIOS could not have filled its

vacancies. But after negotiations with the USG for Administration and

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Management, OIOS was granted an additional $3.5 million, including

$1 million for exchange rate fluctuations and inflation, increasing OIOS’

regular budget to $18.6 million.19 According to OIOS, this increase will fully

fund the 12 new positions approved by the General Assembly in 1995, a

$127,300 (or 83 percent) increase in general operating expenses, and a

$236,500 (or 43 percent) increase for travel expenses.20 In addition, the

Department for Administration and Management “redeployed” one of its

positions to OIOS to perform administrative support functions. The General

Assembly still must approve the 1998-99 budget before it becomes final.

For a comparison of OIOS’ budget and staffing with other U.N. Secretariat

functions, see appendix IV.

Two of the Four OIOS

Reporting Units Have

Procedural Manuals

Internal oversight offices must ensure that the information developed in its

audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations is complete, relevant,

and accurate. Clear guidelines or procedures can help ensure that the

information presented, the conclusions reached, and the

recommendations made can be relied upon as accurate, fair, and balanced.

International auditing standards acknowledge that audit organizations

often carry out activities that, by strict definition, do not qualify as audits.

According to these standards, such organizations should establish a policy

on which specific standards should be followed in carrying out nonaudit

work.21 Although OIOS’ mandate does not require its reporting units to

adhere to any particular quality assurance standards or, for that matter, to

develop procedural manuals, OIOS’ audit division and the Investigations

Section have developed them.

Before OIOS’ audit division became part of OIOS, it developed “Standards for

the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing” based on the auditing

standards established by the Institute of Internal Auditors.22 These

19During this period, various congressional members expressed serious concerns about the adequacy

of OIOS’ budget. According to officials at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Assistant

Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs intervened with the USG for

Administration and Management on behalf of OIOS to emphasize the importance of adequate funding

for OIOS. We could not ascertain the bearing of this intervention on the proposed funding decision.

20To make more funds available for travel expenses, the U.N. Controller was asked to develop a plan

for reimbursing OIOS for travel costs associated with work at organizations outside of the U.N.

Secretariat proper, such as for funds and programs. One proposal was that a revolving fund of about

$300,000 could be established for this purpose. However, this matter had not been resolved at the time

we completed our study.

21Auditing Standards, pp. 12-13.

22Various auditing standards have been promulgated for use by audit organizations. The Institute of

Internal Auditors has issued Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Altamonte

Springs, Fla.: 1978 (revised July 1997)). U.S. inspectors general are required to conduct their audits in

conformance with GAO’s Government Auditing Standards: 1994 Revision (GAO/OCG-94-4, June 1994).

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standards provide guidelines for maintaining independence, planning and

conducting audits, and reporting audit findings and are incorporated into

the audit division’s internal audit manual. This manual is being updated to

reflect certain changes made since OIOS’ establishment. In addition, most

of the audit division’s staff have advanced degrees and many are

accountants. The staff have been trained in auditing techniques and take

continued education courses, including those sponsored by the Institute of

Internal Auditors and U.S. government agencies, including GAO.

After OIOS was established and the Investigations Section head had been

appointed, the section began developing an investigations manual, which

includes standards for conducting its work. This manual is similar in many

respects to those used by U.S. law enforcement agencies. According to a

former Department of State employee who helped develop OIOS’

investigation’s manual, about a dozen manuals from other organizations,

including some U.S. law enforcement agencies, were used to develop the

manual. In addition, most of the investigation staff are trained in

investigative techniques. The head of the unit and the senior investigator

also have law degrees.

The Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation

Unit do not have comparable manuals. The head of the Central Monitoring

and Inspection Unit told us that the unit does not have written standards

for conducting its work but employs a variety of quality control processes.

These include requiring documentary evidence for factual information in

inspection reports and using a newly implemented review process by OIOS

unit heads to evaluate all draft inspection reports before they are finalized.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services told us, however, that he recently

directed that an inspections manual be developed. As currently planned, it

would be completed in the spring of 1998.

According to the head of the Central Evaluation Unit, the unit (1) conducts

in-depth evaluations of U.N. programs as directed by a U.N.

intergovernmental committee—the Committee for Programme and

Coordination—and (2) provides methodological guidance for other

departments to conduct self-evaluations. For the in-depth evaluations, he

said the methodology is well known and each evaluation is conducted

according to generally accepted evaluation methods and social science

research techniques understood by the intergovernmental committee. In

addition, he said, staff working in the unit are trained in evaluation

methods. Regarding department self-assessments, he said his unit is in the

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

process of updating a manual to help guide these evaluations, but he did

not provide an estimate of when this effort would be completed.23

The lack of written guidance for conducting inspections may have led

several U.N. officials to raise questions about two recent inspections

reports. Specifically, they questioned certain facts and were concerned

that comments prepared by the inspected organizations were not

considered in preparing the final products. These officials alleged that

both reports contained factual errors that OIOS neither acknowledged nor

corrected. We could not validate these assertions because we did not have

access to the necessary working papers and related documents and files;

however, OIOS officials told us the comments provided did not address the

facts and were just a different point of view.

OIOS has no requirement to acknowledge that comments were received or

considered in finalizing its inspection reports. OIOS officials also noted that,

because of U.N. page limitations on published materials, it would have

been difficult to respond in detail to all the comments, much less

reproduce them in the report. Nevertheless, in an attempt to address these

concerns, the USG for Internal Oversight Services told us that for reports he

sends to the Secretary General he now requires program officials’

comments and OIOS’ response to be sent to the Secretary General for his

consideration. While this may help, systematically acknowledging in OIOS’

reports that comments were received, summarizing the sense of them or

reproducing them as part of the report, and describing how they were

addressed by OIOS would, in our opinion, provide a further basis for the

reader to judge the relevancy of the issues addressed and the

recommendations made.

In June 1997, OIOS compiled a document summarizing the quality assurance

process used in OIOS for each of its reporting units.24 While the sections for

audit and investigations largely draw on their respective manuals, quality

assurance procedures for the other two units were, for the first time,

delineated. However, we were not permitted access to OIOS’ documents to

determine whether the procedures in the audit and investigations manuals

or the June 1997 document were being followed.

23Pending legislation contains a provision calling for OIOS to develop a standardized methodology for

evaluating U.N. programs, including specific criteria for determining the continuing relevance and

effectiveness of the programs. See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997 (S. 903, 

sec. 2231(b)(4)(B)(i)).

24Quality Assurance and Client Consultation in Internal Oversight, OIOS (New York: June 1997).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

OIOS Has Procedures

for Following Up on

Recommendations

Since 1994, OIOS has made more than 3,000 recommendations.25 The Office

of the USG for Internal Oversight Services maintains a central, automated

database that includes a summary of each recommendation, the

department responsible for implementing the recommendation, the OIOS

staff member assigned to follow up on recommendations, and the status of

implementation. In addition to the centralized database, each unit

maintains a separate database to monitor compliance with all of its

recommendations.

In February 1995, OIOS issued guidance that outlines steps to be taken by

OIOS staff and program managers from the completion of fieldwork to

implementation of recommendations. According to OIOS officials, the units’

staff are responsible for tracking corrective actions managers take in

response to recommendations and for determining when they have fully

implemented recommendations. Program managers are responsible for

implementing recommendations and reporting to OIOS on a regular basis

on the status of implementation.

OIOS’ mandate requires it to report semiannually to the Secretary General

on the status of its recommendations in audit, investigation, and

inspection reports. OIOS also reports annually26 to the Secretary General

and the General Assembly on its significant audit, investigation,

inspection, and evaluation recommendations for corrective action and on

instances where program managers have failed to implement such

recommendations. In December 1996, OIOS reported that managers had

fully implemented about 68 percent of the audit recommendations the

office has issued since October 1994.

According to OIOS officials, in some cases, the office’s ability to monitor

implementation of recommendations has been limited because some

recommendations did not clearly state the cause of the problem or the

action required. Our study of the few reports available to us bears this out.

For example, a recommendation in one OIOS inspection report stated that

“compliance with audit recommendations should be given the priority they

deserve.” While OIOS officials said that the office does not want to be so

prescriptive that program officials do not have flexibility in implementing

25The number of recommendations is as of September 1997. Also, because we did not have access to

most of OIOS’ reports or its working papers and related files, we cannot judge whether this is an

appropriate number of recommendations for the amount of work done nor can we comment on the

substance of the recommendations.

26OIOS is required to submit to the Secretary General for transmittal to the General Assembly an

annual analytical and summary report on its activities. As of September 1997, it had submitted two

such reports.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

the recommendations, more guidance is often needed. OIOS officials said

the office has begun to focus on developing recommendations that are

more specific to facilitate the monitoring of their implementation. In some

cases, when recommendations were unclear, OIOS has established

benchmarks to help program managers and OIOS staff assess progress

toward achieving implementation.

The Investigations

Section Has

Procedures to Protect

Confidentiality and

Whistleblowers

OIOS has established systems and special controls for providing

confidentiality to whistleblowers27 and other informants who make reports

in good faith to the Investigations Section. Such individuals may provide

valuable information about potential areas of wrongdoing, but if they feel

threatened by reprisals, they may not come forward. In OIOS, they are

protected whether or not an investigation subsequently substantiates the

report.28 The Investigations Section’s manual, which is available to all U.N.

staff, provides information and guidance on specific requirements and

procedures for protecting the identity of staff members and others making

reports or suggestions and for safeguarding reports from accidental,

negligent, or willful disclosure. For example, the manual states that the

investigator assigned to the case is responsible and accountable for taking

all appropriate measures for the protection of the identity of the

complainant, and the section has established strict internal office

procedures to avoid the disclosure of the complainant’s identity.

In September 1994, the section began operating a “hotline” reporting

facility, which provides direct, confidential access for those making

complaints or suggestions by telephone, facsimile, or mail. The telephone

hotline operates on a 24-hour, confidential basis. Through April 1997, 85

complaints and suggestions had been received through the hotline

reporting facility. This amounted to about 15 percent of the reports to the

Investigations Section. The hotline reporting facility accepts anonymous

reports. However, according to the section chief, the majority of those

making complaints or suggestions identify themselves. If the information

received through the hotline proves to be accurate, the section uses it in

such a way that the source cannot be identified, except with permission,

according to the section’s manual.

27OIOS defines a whistleblower as a U.N. staff member or other individual who reports an alleged

wrongdoing in good faith and may be retaliated against as a direct result of the report.

28According to the OIOS’ mandate and the Investigations Section’s manual, individuals who report false

or malicious allegations, with knowledge of their falsity, will be considered guilty of misconduct and

dealt with in accordance with the Staff Regulations of the United Nations and Staff Rules 100.1 to 112.8

(New York: June 1, 1995).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

OIOS has also established mechanisms to protect individuals against

possible reprisal for making reports, providing information, or otherwise

cooperating with the office. The investigations manual states the section

will pay prompt and careful attention to cases involving potential reprisals

and will take interim steps, if necessary, to protect the whistleblower. The

manual also notes that disciplinary proceedings will be initiated and

disciplinary action taken against a staff member who is proven to have

retaliated against an individual providing information to the section.29

Since 1994, U.N. staff members and others have provided more than 500

tips or leads to the Investigations Section. These reports included

allegations of serious crimes and noncriminal violations, suggestions for

improvements, cases involving personnel matters or other grievances, and

requests for investigations by officials. Only a few leads specifically

categorized by OIOS as coming from a whistleblower have resulted in

investigative reports. (OIOS would not permit us to divulge how many.)

OIOS officials told us it has followed up in a number of instances where

reprisal was suspected but has taken disciplinary action in only one

instance to protect whistleblowers from reprisal. According to OIOS’

second annual report, the section had initiated an investigation based on

allegations by staff, who publicly identified themselves, that two senior

staff were interfering with the decision-making process of the local

committee on contracts. A senior staff member retaliated against the staff

by accusing them of falsifying bid documents and recommending that

charges be brought against them. The Investigations Section investigated

the senior staff member’s allegations and found them to be false. OIOS then

instituted charges against the senior staff member under the provision in

the office’s mandate to provide for protection of those supplying

information.

Conclusions and

Observations

OIOS has established itself as the internal oversight mechanism for the U.N.

Secretary General. It is in position to be operationally independent, has

overcome certain start-up problems, and has developed policies and

procedures for much of its work. However, it can do more to help ensure

that the information it presents, the conclusions it reaches, and the

recommendations it makes can be relied upon as accurate, fair, and

balanced. To this end, we discussed with the USG for Internal Oversight

Services several ways to enhance OIOS’ future operations.

29Disciplinary proceedings refer to the internal U.N. disciplinary process.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

First, we suggested that the USG for Internal Oversight Services clarify the

criteria for providing OIOS reports to the Secretary General and the General

Assembly. In response, he said he will begin publishing a listing of OIOS

reports in his annual report and provide briefings to member states on

request. While this will help publicize OIOS reports, it may not satisfy OIOS’

mandate to make reports available to the Secretary General and the

General Assembly that “provide insight into the effective utilization and

management of resources and the protection of assets.”

Second, we suggested that the USG for Internal Oversight Services develop

more formal written procedural guidance for the Central Monitoring and

Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation Unit. He agreed that an

inspections manual and evaluation manual for U.N. department

self-evaluations would be helpful and has taken initial steps to begin

developing them. However, he disagreed that additional guidance is

needed for the in-depth evaluations OIOS conducts at the direction of the

Committee for Programme and Coordination.

Third, we suggested that the USG for Internal Oversight Services develop

formal procedures for addressing program officials’ comments in each OIOS

report. The USG for Internal Oversight Services said he is beginning to send

program officials’ comments and OIOS’ analysis of them to the Secretary

General for reports forwarded to the Secretary General and the General

Assembly. While this is a step in the right direction, systematically

addressing program officials’ comments in all OIOS reports would help the

reader judge the relevancy of the issues discussed and the

recommendations made and lend credibility to the reports.

Recommendation Although OIOS has made considerable progress in resolving some initial

operational problems, the USG for Internal Oversight Services can do more

to help maintain OIOS’ independence and establish the office as the

authoritative internal oversight mechanism the General Assembly intended

OIOS to be. As previously noted, we suggested some actions that could be

taken by the USG for Internal Oversight Services in this regard. To help

focus attention on these matters, we recommend that the Secretary of

State encourage the USG for Internal Oversight Services to address the

noted suggestions.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

State and OIOS

Comments

The Department of State and OIOS commented on a draft of this report.

Their comments are reproduced in their entirety in appendixes V and VI,

respectively. Both generally agreed with our overall conclusions and

observations about OIOS’ first 3 years of operations.

State also said it generally concurred with our suggestions to the USG for

Internal Oversight Services. It noted that it has a vested interest in

implementing steps to ensure that OIOS functions effectively through the

provision of adequate resources and the maintenance of a highly skilled

and competent professional staff. State reiterated its position that effective

oversight of U.N. programs is of primary importance to the United States

and looks forward to building on the significant progress that OIOS has

made in this area.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services said that, while OIOS has become an

important and effective component of the U.N. management culture, its

operations can be fine-tuned. However, he disagreed with our suggestions

that OIOS revisit its criteria for sending reports to the Secretary General

and the General Assembly and that OIOS should treat program officials’

comments more formally in its reports.

With respect to OIOS report distribution, the USG for Internal Oversight

Services reiterated that OIOS only provides its reports to the Secretary

General and the General Assembly when the program officials disagree

with the recommendations. As already stated, this criteria does not seem

to satisfy a strict reading of the mandate. We also believe such limited

report distribution is counter to one of OIOS’ intended purposes, which is to

provide more visibility over management’s use of U.N. resources. In its

publication on OIOS, the U.N. Department of Public Information states that,

OIOS supports the need “for a more transparent assignment of

responsibility and accountability.” It goes on to say that “OIOS puts great

emphasis on transparency of procedures and full consultation with

management.”30 Making more reports available to the member states

would help enhance the desired transparency by publicizing reported

problem areas, the steps taken to resolve them, and who is accountable.

Such publicity, in turn, may also help prevent similar problems from

recurring.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services also said that providing more

reports would only overload the General Assembly’s agenda and be an

expensive burden. We believe the General Assembly should be allowed to

30The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations, pp. 1 and 18.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

judge for itself whether receiving a larger number of audit and

investigative reports would be too burdensome. We also believe that the

costs of reproducing copies of reports can be kept to a minimum by

publicly announcing their availability, but only providing copies to those

member states that request them or by making reports obtainable through

the U.N. intranet.

With respect to the treatment of program officials’ comments on OIOS

reports, the USG for Internal Oversight Services said that these comments

are transmitted to the Secretary General, but to reproduce dissenting

views that the Secretary General does not endorse would be inappropriate.

We disagree. We believe that treating program officials’ comments more

openly and formally provides OIOS the opportunity to demonstrate that it is

fair and evenhanded and that its conclusions and recommendations are

appropriate. To do less leads to speculation and, perhaps, unwarranted

criticism that program officials’ comments were not adequately considered

and addressed in the final report.

Both State and OIOS provided technical comments that have been

incorporated in the report as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine whether OIOS is in position to be operationally independent,

we reviewed its mandate and procedures and related U.N. documents and

met with the USG for Internal Oversight Services and other OIOS officials to

determine how OIOS has implemented these provisions. We also

interviewed several U.S. officials who helped draft the resolution creating

OIOS and the USG for Administration and Management, who was involved in

helping establish OIOS and providing it with administrative services. To

compare OIOS operations with those of U.S. inspectors general, we

reviewed the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. To help provide

a frame of reference for judging operational independence, we also

reviewed the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions’

Auditing Standards. However, without access to OIOS’ reports that had not

been provided to the Secretary General and the General Assembly and its

working papers, we could not take the additional step of testing whether

OIOS had exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an

independent manner.

To determine whether OIOS has the necessary resources to carry out its

mission, we reviewed the overall U.N. budget, budget and staffing

documents for the Office for Inspections and Investigations and OIOS, and

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

OIOS annual reports. We interviewed the USG for Internal Oversight

Services, his special assistant, and OIOS unit chiefs. We also met with the

USG for Administration and Management and officials in the U.N. Program,

Planning, and Budgeting Division and the U.N. Office of Human Resources

Management to discuss their roles in providing resources to OIOS.

To determine whether OIOS had written policies and procedures in place

for conducting its work, following up on its recommendations, and

providing confidentiality to informants and protecting whistleblowers

from possible reprisal, we reviewed the audit and investigations manuals

and other written guidance made available to us. We discussed OIOS

procedures and policies with the USG for Internal Oversight Services and

the OIOS unit chiefs. However, as previously noted, we were not provided

access to OIOS working papers or other records and files related to specific

audits, investigations, or inspections. This restriction prevented us from

determining whether (1) OIOS was adhering to its stated policies and

procedures and (2) its analyses were adequate to support its reported

findings and recommendations.

We also met with representatives of the U.N. Board of Auditors, the U.S.

Mission to the United Nations, and the U.S. State Department Bureau of

International Organization Affairs. We discussed with them the origins of

OIOS and their perceptions of its operations.

We conducted our study from March to October 1997 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you requested, we plan no further distribution of this report until 

15 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other

appropriate congressional committees, the U.N. USGs for Internal

Oversight Services and Administration and Management, and the Secretary

of State. Copies will also be made available to other interested parties

upon request.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
B-278082 

This report was prepared under the direction of Benjamin F. Nelson,

Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may be reached

on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

United Nations’

External Oversight

Mechanisms

26

Appendix II 

OIOS Organization

and Unit Functions,

Budget, and Staffing

28

Appendix III 

Comparison of U.S.

Inspector General

Offices and OIOS

31

Appendix IV 

Comparison of OIOS

Resources With Other

U.N. Secretariat

Functions

35

Appendix V 

Comments From the

U.S. Department of

State

37

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Contents

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

U.N. Office of Internal

Oversight Services

41

Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

43

Tables Table I.1: Overview of U.N. External Oversight Mechanisms 27

Table II.1: Overview of OIOS Functions, Budget, and Staff 30

Table III.1: Comparison of U.S. Offices of Inspectors General and

OIOS

32

Table IV.1: OIOS’ and Other U.N. Secretariat Functions’ Budgets 35

Table IV.2: OIOS’ and Other U.N. Secretariat Functions’ Regular

Budget Positions, by Function

36

Figure Figure II.1: OIOS Organization Chart 29

Abbreviations

IG Inspector General

OIOS Office of Oversight Services

USG Under Secretary General

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix I 

United Nations’ External Oversight

Mechanisms

This appendix provides a brief description of external oversight bodies for

the U.N. system. These bodies are considered external oversight

mechanisms because they generally report to the governing bodies of

organizations.1

 Unlike the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),

which is an internal oversight body and has authority over the operations

of the U.N. Secretariat and separately administered funds and programs,

U.N. systemwide external bodies have oversight extending to all U.N.

operations and the specialized agencies. The U.N. external oversight

bodies have varying mandates, extremely broad areas to cover, and

modest resources. The U.N. external oversight bodies are the General

Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary

Questions, the Board of Auditors, the Panel of External Auditors, the

General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council’s Committee for

Programme and Coordination, the International Civil Service Commission,

and the Joint Inspection Unit. (See table I.1 for an overview of the U.N.

external oversight mechanisms.)

Each specialized agency, as well as the International Atomic Energy

Agency, has its own external auditor that is responsible for auditing the

finances of the organization and reporting to the governing bodies. The

external auditors are selected from among member states’ supreme audit

institutions and are members of the U.N. Panel of External Auditors. For

example, the external auditor for the International Labor Organization is

the Auditor General of the United Kingdom.

1

The organizations we describe here were identified as external oversight mechanisms by the Joint

Inspection Unit in its report entitled Accountability, Management Improvement, and Oversight in the

United Nations System (Geneva: Nov. 1995).

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix I 

United Nations’ External Oversight

Mechanisms

Table I.1: Overview of U.N. External Oversight Mechanisms

Organization

Year

established Function

Advisory Committee on

Administrative and Budgetary

Questions

1946 The Committee, with 16 members chosen by the General Assembly on the basis

of broad geographical representation, personal qualifications, and expertise,

advises and reports to the General Assembly. The Chairman serves fulltime. The

Committee examines the proposed U.N. program budget; administrative and

budgetary matters referred to it, including the financing of peacekeeping

operations and extrabudgetary activities; and the auditors’ reports on the United

Nations. The Committee meets extensively throughout the year and is assisted

by a small secretariat in New York.

Board of Auditors 1946 The Board, consisting of three auditors general of member states, provides

external audit oversight functions for the United Nations and separately

administered funds and programs. Other auditors general serve as individual

external auditors for each of the specialized agencies and the International

Atomic Energy Agency.

Panel of External Auditors 1959 The Panel comprises the above appointed auditors currently from the United

Kingdom, Ghana, India, Germany, France, Switzerland, South Africa, and

Canada. It meets at least annually to promote best accounting and auditing

practices in the U.N. system and undertakes certain related initiatives that are

communicated to governing bodies through the Advisory Committee on

Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to administrations through the

Administrative Committee on Coordination.

Committee for Programme

and Coordination

1962 The Committee is the main subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council

and the General Assembly for planning, programming, and coordinating. It

reviews U.N. programs and assists the Economic and Social Council in its

coordination functions, including considering the activities and programs of

agencies of the United Nations and the U.N. system, systemwide coherence

and coordination, and the implementation of important legislative decisions. Its

conclusions and recommendations play a role in the adoption of the U.N.

program budget by the General Assembly. The Committee has 34 elected

members, is based in New York, and meets for 4 to 6 weeks per year.

International Civil Service

Commission

1974 The Commission comprises 15 independent experts appointed in their personal

capacities by the General Assembly. The Chairman and Vice Chairman serve

full time. The Commission makes recommendations to the General Assembly for

the regulation and coordination of conditions of service within the U.N. common

system and has certain decision-making functions regarding salaries,

allowances, and job classification standards. It meets twice yearly for about 

3 weeks each time and is serviced by a secretariat in New York.

Joint Inspection Unit 1968 The Unit comprises 11 inspectors from different member states who serve in

their personal capacities. They are chosen by the General Assembly on the

basis of membership in national supervision or inspection bodies or similar

competence. They review matters bearing on the efficiency of the services and

proper use of funds and seek to improve management, methods, and

coordination through inspection and evaluation. The Unit provides reports with

recommendations to the United Nations and its funds and programs and

specialized agencies.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix II 

OIOS Organization and Unit Functions,

Budget, and Staffing

OIOS consists of four operational units—the Audit and Management

Consulting Division, the Investigations Section, the Central Monitoring and

Inspection Unit, and the Central Evaluation Unit. It also has an office of

the Under Secretary General (USG) for Internal Oversight Services. The

Audit and Management Consulting Division is headed by a Director and a

Deputy Director. The other three OIOS units are headed by section or unit

chiefs who, like the Director of the audit division, report directly to the USG

for Internal Oversight Services. Figure II.1 shows the organizational

structure for OIOS. Table II.1 provides an overview of each unit’s function,

its budget, and staffing.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix II 

OIOS Organization and Unit Functions,

Budget, and Staffing

Figure II.1: OIOS Organization Chart

Headquarters

Section

Field

Section

Peacekeeping

Section

Electronic

Data

Processing

Section

Special

Assignments

Unit

Management

Consulting

Section

European

Section

(Geneva)

African

Section

(Nairobi)

Office

of the

USG

Central

Evaluation

Unit

Central

Monitoring and

Inspection Unit

Investigations

Section

UNHCR

Section

(Geneva)

Audit and Management

Consulting

USG for Internal Oversight Services

Secretary General

Source: The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations, page 4.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix II 

OIOS Organization and Unit Functions,

Budget, and Staffing

Table II.1: Overview of OIOS Functions, Budget, and Staff

1996-97 biennium

Dollars in millions

OIOS unit Functions Budgeta Staffb

Office of the Under

Secretary General

The Office provides overall direction, supervision, and

management of the activities of OIOS. It is also responsible for

the planning and monitoring of the work program of OIOS as

well as for providing administrative support.

$1.5 3 professional

4 support

Audit and Management

Consulting Division

The Division provides comprehensive audit services for all

U.N. activities for which the Secretary General has

administrative responsibility. These audits should promote

reliability of information; compliance with policies, regulations,

rules, and procedures; the safeguarding of assets; the

economical, efficient, and effective use of resources (value for

money); and the accomplishment of established objectives

and goals for operations and programs.

$7.8 29 professional

11 support

Investigations Section The Section investigates reports of violations of U.N.

regulations, rules, and pertinent administrative issuances and

transmits to the Secretary General the results of such

investigations, together with appropriate recommendations, to

guide the Secretary General in deciding on jurisdictional or

disciplinary action to be taken.

$2.6 12 professional

3 support

Central Monitoring and

Inspection Unit

The Unit’s role is to (1) enhance and strengthen the

management of programs and ensure that monitoring and

self-evaluation functions in each organizational unit of the

Secretariat are viewed as an integral part of management

oversight responsibility for the efficiency and effectiveness of

program performance; (2) provide support to managers in

establishing a proper system of program monitoring, including

the development of performance indicators and the analytical

assessment of performance; (3) provide necessary analytical

and transparent information on actual program performance to

intergovernmental bodies; and (4) undertake quick analyses

for the identification of problems affecting the efficient

implementation of programmed activities and recommend

corrective measures as appropriate.

$1.4 6 professional

3 support

Central Evaluation Unit The Unit determines, as systematically and objectively as

possible, the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact

of U.N. activities in relation to their objectives, to enable the

Secretariat and member states to make informed decisions

about the continuation of these activities.

$1.7 6 professional

4 support

Total $15.0 56 professional

25 support

aExcludes $6.6 million in extrabudgetary resources provided by other departments or

organizations for the audit division.

bExcludes 36 extrabudgetary positions and 6 resident auditors for the audit division and 1 staff

member on nonreimbursable loan.

Sources: The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations, the proposed U.N.

budget for 1998-99, and OIOS officials.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix III 

Comparison of U.S. Inspector General

Offices and OIOS

Prior to the creation of OIOS in July 1994, the United States and other

member states, as well as the U.S. Congress and GAO, had expressed

concern about the way the United Nations managed its resources and

criticized the inadequacies of preexisting internal oversight mechanisms.

In response to these concerns, the Secretary General established the

Office for Inspections and Investigations in August 1993 under the

leadership of an Assistant Secretary General. However, member

states—primarily the United States—wanted a more autonomous

oversight body with more authority.

In November 1993, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United

Nations proposed the establishment of an “Office of the Inspector

General” to the General Assembly. According to the proposal, the office

would support member states and the Secretary General by providing

independent advice based on an examination of all activities carried out at

all U.N. headquarters and field locations financed from the regular budget,

peacekeeping budgets, and voluntary contributions. At the same time, the

new office would have external reporting responsibilities. The office

would be headed by an “Inspector General” (IG) who, although an integral

part of the Secretariat, would carry out his/her responsibilities entirely

independent of the Secretariat and all U.N. governing bodies.

In April 1994, Congress enacted Public Law 103-236 (sec. 401(b)) which,

among other things, emphasized the importance of establishing such an

office. The legislation required certain funds to be withheld from the

United Nations until the President certified that it had established an

independent office to conduct and supervise objective audits,

investigations, and inspections relating to the programs and operations of

the United Nations. The legislation stated that the office should have

(1) access to all records and documents; (2) procedures to ensure

compliance with recommendations of the office; and (3) procedures to

protect the identity of, and to prevent reprisals against, any staff members

making a complaint or disclosing information, or cooperating in any

investigation or inspection by the office.

After a series of negotiations among member states, including the United

States, a compromise was reached, and the General Assembly, in

July 1994, approved a resolution creating OIOS within the U.N. Secretariat.

OIOS’ mandate reflects many of the characteristics of U.S. inspector general

offices. Table III.1 provides a comparison of U.S. offices of inspectors

general and OIOS.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix III 

Comparison of U.S. Inspector General

Offices and OIOS

Table III.1: Comparison of U.S. Offices of Inspectors General and OIOS

Subject U.S. offices of inspectors general U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services

Purpose Provide a means for keeping the head of the

agency and the Congress fully and currently

informed about problems and deficiencies in

programs and operations.

Assist the Secretary General in fulfilling his internal

oversight responsibilities relating to resources and

staff of the organization, including separately

administered organizations of the United Nations.

Authority Neither the head of the agency nor the officer next

in rank below the head shall prevent or prohibit the

IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any

audit or investigation.

Exercise operational independence to initiate,

carry out, and report on any action that OIOS

considers necessary to fulfill its responsibilities.

OIOS may not be prohibited or hindered from

carrying out any action within the purview of its

mandate.

Each IG is authorized to have access to all

records, reports, audits, reviews, documents,

papers, recommendations, or other material that

relate to programs and operations.

OIOS staff have the right of access to all persons,

records, documents, or other material assets and

premises and to obtain such information and

explanations they consider necessary to fulfill their

responsibilities.

Office head IGs, who report to and are under the general

supervision of the agency head.

USG for Internal Oversight Services, who is under

the authority of the Secretary General.

Appointment IGs are appointed solely on the basis of integrity

and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing,

financial analysis, law, management analysis,

public administration, or investigations.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services shall be

an expert in the fields of accounting, auditing,

financial analysis and investigations, management,

law, or public administration.

The President appoints 27 IGs with the advice and

consent of the Senate. Agency heads appoint 30

IGs.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services shall be

appointed by the Secretary General, following

consultations with member states, and approved

by the General Assembly.

IGs are appointed without regard to political

affiliation.

The Secretary General shall appoint the USG for

Internal Oversight Services with due regard for

geographic rotation.

Most IGs have no fixed term of service. The USG for Internal Oversight Services shall serve

for one fixed term of 5 years without possibility of

renewal.

Removal An IG appointed by the President and confirmed

by the Senate may be removed from office by the

President. Likewise, the agency heads who

appoint IGs may also remove them. However, for

all IGs, the reasons for such removal shall be

communicated to the Congress.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services may be

removed by the Secretary General only for cause

and with the approval of the General Assembly.

Budget IGs appointed by the President have separate line

item accounts in their agencies’ budgets.

Agency-appointed IGs’ offices are financed with

funds that are available for other agency activities.

OIOS budget proposals are submitted to the

Secretary General, who submits proposals to the

General Assembly for its consideration and

approval, taking into account the office’s

independence in the exercise of its functions.

OIOS is a separate line item in the U.N.

Secretariat’s budget.

(continued)

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix III 

Comparison of U.S. Inspector General

Offices and OIOS

Subject U.S. offices of inspectors general U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services

Coordination Each IG gives particular regard to the activities of

the Comptroller General, with a view toward

avoiding duplication and ensuring effective

coordination and cooperation.

OIOS shall coordinate its activities and provide the

Board of Auditors and the Joint Inspection Unit with

OIOS reports that have been submitted to the

Secretary General and the comments of the

Secretary General on them.

Standards Each IG shall comply with audit standards

established by the Comptroller General. Also, the

IGs have established quality standards for

investigations and inspections.

There is no requirement that OIOS establish

guidelines and standards appropriate to the United

Nations for any of its functions.

Function

Audit Create independent and objective units to conduct

and supervise audits and promote economy,

efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and

operations.

Examine, review, and appraise the use of financial

resources. Ascertain compliance of program

managers with financial and administrative

regulations and rules. Undertake management

audits, reviews, and surveys. Monitor the

effectiveness of internal control systems.

Investigation Create independent and objective units to conduct

and supervise investigations of programs and

operations. Prevent and detect fraud and abuse in

programs and operations.

Investigate reports of violations of U.N. regulations,

rules, and administrative documents. Assess the

potential within program areas for fraud and other

violations through the analysis of systems of control.

Inspection While inspection is not specifically mandated by

law, many IGs perform a similar function.

Conduct inspections of organizational units

whenever there are indications that programs are

not adequately managed or executed and that

resources are not being efficiently used.

Monitoring While monitoring is not specifically mandated by

law, many IGs perform a similar function.

Monitor program implementation and ensure that

monitoring is viewed as managerial responsibility.

Evaluation While evaluation is not specifically mandated by

law, many IGs perform a similar function.

Conduct evaluations of U.N. programs to assess

the efficiency and effectiveness of the

implementation of programs and legislative

mandates. Encourage self-evaluation by program

managers and provide them with methodological

support.

Reporting

Reports on programs,

operations, or utilization of

resources

Each IG is required to keep the head of the agency

and the Congress fully and currently informed by

means of reports and otherwise. Written reports

communicate the results of audits to officials at all

levels of government and, unless restricted by law

or regulation, copies should be made available for

public inspection.

OIOS shall submit reports that provide insight into

the effective use and management of resources

and the protection of assets to the Secretary

General, who shall ensure that all such reports are

made available to the General Assembly as

presented, together with any separate comments

the Secretary General may deem appropriate.

Reports on activities of the

office

Each IG shall prepare semiannual reports

summarizing the activities of the IG’s office during

the preceding 6-month period. These reports are

furnished to the agency head for transmittal to the

Congress, together with a report by the agency

head.

OIOS shall submit an annual analytical and

summary report on OIOS activities to the Secretary

General, who shall ensure that such reports are

made available to the General Assembly as

presented, together with any separate comments

the Secretary General may deem appropriate.

(continued)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix III 

Comparison of U.S. Inspector General

Offices and OIOS

Subject U.S. offices of inspectors general U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services

Reports on

recommendation status

IGs prepare semiannual reports that include

information on the status of audit

recommendations. These reports are submitted to

agency heads for transmittal to the Congress.

OIOS shall report to the Secretary General as

necessary, but at least twice yearly, on the

implementation of recommendations.

Recommendation follow-up Agency heads are responsible for designating a

top management official to oversee audit follow-up,

including resolution and corrective action.

The Secretary General shall facilitate the prompt

and effective implementation of OIOS

recommendations and inform the General

Assembly of actions taken in response to

recommendations.

IGs are responsible for reviewing responses to

audit reports and reporting significant

disagreements to the audit follow-up official.

The USG for Internal Oversight Services shall

report to the Secretary General for a final decision

on recommendations with which the program

managers concerned do not agree.

Referrals Each IG shall report expeditiously to the Attorney

General whenever the IG has reasonable grounds

to believe a federal criminal law has been violated.

Disciplinary and/or jurisdictional proceedings are

initiated without undue delay in cases where the

Secretary General considers it justified.

Protection for complainants Unless the IG determines disclosure is

unavoidable, the IG shall not disclose the identity

of employees who report possible violations of law,

gross waste of funds, and abuse of authority

without consent. Also, employees are to be

protected from reprisal for making a complaint to

the IG.

The Secretary General is to ensure that procedures

are in place to provide for direct confidential

access of staff members to OIOS, provide

protection against repercussions for staff members

who provide information, and protect the anonymity

of staff members.

Additional authorities The “Inspectors General Vision Statement” states

that IGs will work with agency heads and the

Congress to improve program management and to

build relationships with program managers based

on a shared commitment to improving program

operations and effectiveness.

OIOS may advise program managers on the

effective discharge of their responsibilities, provide

assistance to program managers in implementing

recommendations, ascertain that program

managers are given methodological support, and

encourage self-evaluation.

Each IG is authorized to select, appoint, and

employ such officers and employees as may be

necessary

The USG for Internal Oversight Services shall

exercise the degree of latitude and control over

OIOS personnel and resources that is necessary to

achieve the objectives of the office.

Sources of information on U.S. offices of inspectors general: Inspector General Act of 1978, as

amended; Quality Standards for Investigations, President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency,

(Washington, D.C.: 1985); Office of Management and Budget Circular A-50, “Audit Follow-up,”

revised (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1992); Quality Standards for Inspections, President’s Council

on Integrity and Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1993); Action Needed to Strengthen OIGs at

Designated Federal Entities (GAO/AIMD-94-39, Nov. 30, 1993); Inspectors General Vision

Statement (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1994); Government Auditing Standards: 1994 Revision

(GAO/OCG-94-4, June 1994).

Sources of Information on the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services: U.N. General Assembly

Resolution 48/218B, July 29, 1994; U.N. Secretary General’s Bulletin ST/SGB/273, September 7,

1994.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix IV 

Comparison of OIOS Resources With Other

U.N. Secretariat Functions

While the overall regular budget for the U.N. Secretariat has decreased

since the 1994-95 biennium, OIOS’ budget increased by 55 percent. Five of

the 12 other functions had budget decreases over the period. Concerning

staffing, while several U.N. Secretariat functions had staffing increases

from the 1994-95 to the 1996-97 biennium, all except OIOS experienced staff

decreases in the proposed 1998-99 biennium budget. Tables IV.1 and IV.2

provide a comparison of OIOS’ budget and staffing levels with other U.N.

Secretariat functions, respectively.

Table IV.1: OIOS’ and Other U.N.

Secretariat Functions’ Budgets Dollars in millions

U.N. Secretariat function

1994-95

Adjusted

1996-97

Appropriated

1998-99

Proposed

Overall policy-making, direction, and

coordination $37.2 $35.9 $38.6

Political affairs 198.3 199.4 164.9

International justice and law 50.7 50.2 55.5

International cooperation for development 301.0 294.3 302.3

Regional cooperation for development 339.3 351.8 399.4

Human rights and humanitarian affairs 132.7 134.3 138.6

Public information 131.4 134.3 140.3

Common support services 903.0 938.2 904.2

Office of Internal Oversight Services 12.0 15.0 18.6

Special expenses 60.1 68.8 60.0

Capital expenditures 83.8 28.6 35.9

Staff assessment 357.8 348.3 324.6

International Seabed Authority 0.8 4.0 0

Total $2,608.1 $2,603.1 $2,582.9

Source: U.N. budget documents.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix IV 

Comparison of OIOS Resources With Other

U.N. Secretariat Functions

Table IV.2: OIOS’ and Other U.N.

Secretariat Functions’ Regular Budget

Positions, by Function U.N. Secretariat function

1994-1995

Adjusted

1996-1997

Appropriated

1998-1999

Proposed

Overall policy-making, direction and

coordination 120 122 117

Political affairs 767 729 641

International justice and law 205 202 199

International cooperation for development 1,329 1,324 1,209

Regional cooperation for development 2,157 2,165 1,982

Human rights and humanitarian affairs 566 570 522

Public information 837 822 740

Common support services 3,997 3,933 3,347

Office of Internal Oversight Services 72a 81 82

Special expenses 65 64 0

Capital expendituresb 0 0 0

Staff assessmentb 0 0 0

International Seabed Authorityb 0 0 0

Total 10,115 10,012 8,839

aOIOS absorbed 64 positions from the Office for Inspections and Investigations and was granted

8 new positions during the 1994-95 biennium.

bThese functions do not have designated staff.

Source: U.N. budget documents.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

State

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

State

Now on pp. 4 and 5.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

State

Now on pp. 17 and 18.

Now on pp. 6 and 7.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the U.S. Department of

State

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix VI 

Comments From the U.N. Office of Internal

Oversight Services

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix VI 

Comments From the U.N. Office of Internal

Oversight Services

Now on pp. 5 and 18.

Now on pp. 8 and 9.

Now on p. 14.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Harold J. Johnson, Jr.

A.H. Huntington, III

Zina D. Merritt

Sandra D. Gove

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

Jackson W. Hufnagle

Office of Special

Investigations

Norman M. Burrell

Office of the General

Counsel

Mark C. Speight

(711257) Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-98-9 United Nations
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