@f~'·_\ . 

ATTORNEY 

~ GENERAL OF TEXAS 

The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield 

Hunt County Attorney 

Post Office Box 1097 

Greenville, Texas 75403-1097 

Dear Mr. Littlefield: 

GREG ABBOTT 

December 8, 2011 

Opinion No. GA-0895 

Re: Authority of a county bail bond board to enact 

a rule that restricts a bail bond licensee from 

employing a person who is currently on probation 

or parole, or who is the defendant in a pending 

criminal case (RQ-0976-GA) 

You ask about the authority of a county bail bond board to enact a rule that restricts a bail 

bond licensee from employing an individual who is currently on probation or parole, or who is the 

defendant in a pending criminal case.! You specifically inquire about Rule 9.1 (g), adopted by the 

Hunt County Bail Bond Board (the "Board"). See Request Letter at 2.2 

Rule 9.1 defines "employee" as "any person hired by a Licensed Surety who performs" 

certain duties. Board Rule 9.1. The rule further provides that the employee 

(f) must not have been convicted of a misdemeanor 

involving moral turpitude or a felony in the past ten (10) years and 

(g) is not currently on probation, parole or has a 

misdemeanor or felony case pending. 

[d. Subsection (f) of the Board's rule closely tracks the language of a 2001 statute: 

A person may not accept or receive from a license holder 

money, property, or any other thing of value as payment for 

employment with a bonding business if, within the preceding 10 

I Letter from Honorable Joel D. Littlefield, Hunt County Attorney, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General 

of Texas (June 13, 2011), https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opin/index_rq.shtml ("Request Letter"). 

2See id. at Exhibit A (Rules and Regulations of the Hunt County Bail Bond Board at 15 (Sept. 16,2010» 

("Board Rule 9.1 "). 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 2 (GA-0895) 

years, the person has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving 

moral turpitude or of a felony. 

TEX. Oee. CODE ANN. § 1704.302(c) (West 2004).3 Subsection (g) of the Board's rule, however, 

imposes additional requirements that exceed the prohibitions established by the Legislature when 

it enacted section 1704.302, specifically that the Board would prohibit a licensee from employing 

an individual who is currently on probation or parole, or who is the subject of a pending felony or 

misdemeanor prosecution. See Board Rule 9.1 (g). You suggest that, by virtue of the broad authority 

conferred upon a bail bond board, the promulgation of subsection (g) is within the power of the 

Board in question.4 

Pursuant to chapter 1704 of the Occupations Code, a bail bond board is authorized, in 

relevant part, to 

(1) exercise powers incidental or necessary to the 

administration of this chapter; 

(3) supervise and regulate each phase of the bonding 

business in the county; 

(4) adopt and post rules necessary to implement this chapter; 

TEX. Oee. CODE ANN. § 1704.101 (West 2004). Your brief relies on an appellate decision from 

1989 that declared that this "broad rule-making power impliedly authorizes the [Dallas County Bail 

Bond] Board to supervise and regulate employees of bondsmen to the extent that such employees 

perform meaningful duties in the bonding business." Dallas Cnty. Bail Bond Bd. v. Stein, 771 

S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); see County Attorney's Brief at 1-2. 

However, the Stein opinion was issued before the Legislature had "expressly set forth eligibility 

requirements for employees of licensees." Ste in, 771 S. W .2d at 580. As the opinion noted, however, 

"an agency's rules must be consistent with the laws of this state." [d. Moreover, the Texas Supreme 

Court has observed that, "[i]n deciding whether a particular administrative agency has exceeded its 

rule-making powers, the determinative factor is whether the rule's provisions are 'in harmony with 

the general objectives of the Act involved.'" Pruettv. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd. , 249 S.W.3d447, 

452 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Gerstv. Oak CliffSavs. &LoanAss'n., 432 S.W.2d 702,706 (Tex. 1968)). 

3Act of May 27,2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1262, § 12,2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2996, 3000. 

4See Request Letter at Exhibit B (Brief from Joel D. Littlefield at 1-2) ("County Attorney's Brief'). 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 3 (GA-0895) 

As noted above, in 20.0 1 the Legislature placed specific restrictions on a bail bond business's 

employees. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704.302(c) (West 2004).5 Under subsection (g) of Rule 

9.1, the Hunt County Bail Bond Board imposes additional restrictions beyond those prescribed by 

the Legislature by denying employment to any person who is currently on probation or parole 

without regard to whether the individual was convicted within the past ten years. See Board Rule 

9.1 (g). The rule further denies employment to any person who is the subject of a pending felony 

or misdemeanor. See id. In 1984, an appellate court considered whether a bail bond board was 

permi tted to promulgate a rule that required a licensee to furnish a $100,000 securi ty deposit in order 

to do business in the county. See Tex. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 684 S.W.2d 

177 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court said that, because the 

relevant statute imposes a security deposit of not less than $5,000, but is otherwise determined by 

the applicant, the local rule establishing a flat $100,000 deposit "is a minimum in direct conflict 

with the statutory authority." Tex. Fire & Cas. Co., 684 S.W.2d at 179. "The local rules thus 

impermissibly impose additional and conflicting burdens on bail bond applicants and consequently 

must fail." [d.; see also Bexar Cnty. Bail Bond Bd. v. Deckard, 604 S.W.2d 214,217 (Tex. Civ. 

App.-S an Antonio 1980, no writ) ("The function of the bail bond board is to administer the statute, 

not to amend it, at least in the absence of statutory language indicating a legislative intent that the 

board should have the power to add to the qualifications enumerated by the [L]egislature.,,).6 

Like the rules established by the bail bond boards in the Harris and Bexar County cases, 

Board Rule 9.1 (g) prescrib'es requirements for employees of bail bond licensees that "impermissibly 

impose additional and conflicting burdens" on those licensees and their employees. Tex. Fire & 

Cas. Co., 684 S.W.2d at 179. As a result, we conclude that Rule 9.1(g) exceeds the authority of the 

Board. 

5Act of May 27,2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1262, § 12,2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2996, 3000. 

(,The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Pruett is not to the contrary. In that case, a county bail bond board 

suspended the license of a bail bondsman for violating two rules governing solicitation. Pruett, 249 S.W.3d at 451. The 

rules prohibited a licensee from soliciting within twenty-four hours after the execution of an arrest warrant and during 

certain "non-business hours. " Id. at 451 n.3. Although the court emphasized that the board's "explicit power is 

unambiguously broad" and noted that "no part of the Occupations Code ... would appear to single out solicitation as 

an impermissible area of agency rule-making," the court also observed that "courts have held bail bond boards may not 

add to licensing requirements in light of the extremely detailed licensing regime that the Legislature established." Id. 

at 453-54. The court distinguished the solicitation rules from the kind of additional licensing requirements at issue in 

Texas Fire & Casualty Co. by noting that "a board's attempt to alter or add to licensing requirements specified in the 

Bail Bond Act is not the same as a board's regulation of bondsmen once they are licensed." [d. at 454. In the situation 

you pose, the Hunt County Bail Bond Board has attempted to impose on both bail bondsmen and their employees 

burdens that are additional to and in conflict with those established by the Legislature. Compare Board Rule 9.1 (g), with 

TEX. Dcc. CODE ANN. § 1704.302(c) (West 2004). 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 4 (GA-0895) 

SUMMARY 

A rule of the Hunt County Bail Bond Board that restricts a 

bail bond licensee from employing an individual who is currently on 

probation or parole, or is the defendant in a pending criminal case, 

impermissibly imposes burdens on those employees that are 

additional to and in conflict with section 1704.302 of the Texas 

Occupations Code. The rule thus exceeds the authority of the Board. 

DANIEL T. HODGE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DAVID J. SCHENCK 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

JASON BOATRIGHT 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Rick Gilpin 

Very truly yours, 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee