IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0208

Filed February 10, 2016

IN RE THE DETENTION OF

BRUCE BAKER,

BRUCE BAKER,

Respondent-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J. 

Harris, Judge.

Bruce Baker appeals the district court’s order of commitment following a 

jury verdict finding him to be a sexually violent predator. AFFIRMED.

Thomas J. Gaul, Assistant Public Defender, Special Defense Unit, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik and Tyler J. Buller, 

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

Bruce Baker appeals the order of commitment entered by the district court 

following a jury verdict finding him to be a sexually violent predator, as defined by 

Iowa Code section 229A.2(11) (2013). Asserting there was insufficient evidence 

to prove he met the definition of a sexually violent predator, Baker argues the 

district court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1985, Baker pled guilty to burglary for breaking and entering a 

residence, then strangling and raping a fifteen-year-old girl. In 1992, Baker pled 

guilty to second-degree kidnapping and second-degree sexual abuse, arising out 

of an attack on a prostitute. Before he was due to be released from the 

Anamosa State Penitentiary in July 2014, the State filed a petition seeking to 

have Baker committed as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 

229A.

The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2015. Baker testified at trial 

and admitted to his prior offenses. The State offered the opinions of Dr. Amy 

Phenix, a clinical psychologist, in support of its case, while Baker countered with 

the opinions of Dr. Richard Wollert, a clinical and forensic psychologist, in his 

defense.

After the State rested, and again at the end of the trial, Baker made 

motions for a directed verdict.

1

 He asserted the State had failed to meet its 

 

1 Although Baker’s attorney stated at the close of the State’s evidence, “I would 

make a motion, however the court wants to call it, a directed verdict, a verdict of [Baker]

is not a sexually violent predator, for summary judgment; however the court wants to 

quote it,” and at the end of trial, “I would now renew my request for a summary 
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burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he fit the criteria of a sexually 

violent predator. Baker acknowledged the State proved that he had been 

convicted of a sexually violent offense, but asserted the State failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he suffers from a mental abnormality which 

makes him more likely than not to commit sexually violent offenses if not 

confined in a secure facility. The district court denied the motions and submitted 

the case to the jury, which found Baker to be a sexually violent predator. The 

district court committed Baker “to the custody of the Director of the Department of 

Human Services for control, care, and treatment until such time as his mental 

abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be placed in a transitional release 

program or discharged.”

Baker appeals, again asserting there was insufficient evidence that he 

suffers from a mental abnormality or that he is likely to reoffend. He asserts the 

testimony from the defense expert established that he had no diagnosis that fit 

the definition of mental abnormality under Iowa law and that he was not likely to 

reoffend if not confined in a secure facility.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

We review a district court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict for 

correction of errors at law. In re Det. of Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 

2008). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party 

and will find the evidence substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from 

 

judgment, directed verdict, judgment of acquittal; however the court deems fit to phrase 

it.” We construe the motion to be a motion for directed verdict. Kagin’s Numismatic 

Auctions, Inc. v. Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979) (stating Iowa courts “look to 

the substance of a motion and not to its name”).
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the evidence. See id. at 340. Furthermore, we affirm when the jury’s verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence. See In re Det. of Altman, 723 N.W.2d 181, 

186 (Iowa 2006).

III. Analysis.

A “sexually violent predator” is defined as “a person who has been 

convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 

mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts 

constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.” Iowa 

Code § 229A.2(11). A person is “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual 

violence” if “the person more likely than not will engage in acts of a sexually 

violent nature.” Id. § 229A.2(4).

This case essentially boils down to a battle of the experts. The State’s

expert, Dr. Phenix, testified Baker had four mental abnormalities: sexual sadism 

disorder, alcohol abuse disorder, marijuana abuse disorder, and other specified 

personality disorder with antisocial traits. Dr. Phenix found that Baker’s sexual 

sadism and personality disorders predisposed Baker to commit future sex 

offenses like the ones he committed in the past. She opined Baker’s mental 

abnormalities make him more likely than not to commit future sex offenses if he 

is not confined to a secure facility. In our review of the evidence, this is not one 

of the “obvious cases” where the district court should have disposed of this case 

via Baker’s motion at the close of the State’s evidence. The State presented 

evidence that Baker had been convicted of two sexually violent offenses, 

suffered from a mental abnormality, and the abnormality made Baker likely to 
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engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if not confined. 

See id. § 229A.2(4), (11).

On the other hand, Baker offered the opinions of Dr. Richard Wollert. Dr. 

Wollert did not believe Baker fit the definition of an Iowa sexually violent predator 

or that Baker was more likely than not to recommit a sexual offense if not 

confined. Dr. Wollert opined Baker “does not have a mental abnormality so he 

does not meet that criteria, and he is not more likely than not to commit sexually 

violent and predatory offense as a result of the mental abnormality, so he does 

not meet that criterion either.” In Dr. Woller’s opinion, Baker “meets neither 

criterion [under section 229A.2(4) and (11)].”

Clearly, the opposing camps of experts held conflicting opinions. It is not 

the court’s function here to determine the correctness of either the theory or 

testimony between experts. See Martin v. Bankers’ Life Co., 250 N.W. 220, 223 

(Iowa 1933). In ruling upon a motion for directed verdict, “[t]he function of the 

court is to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to make a case for the jury.” 

Id. Furthermore, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury: “The jury is free to 

believe or disbelieve any testimony as it chooses and to give weight to the 

evidence as in its judgment such evidence should receive.” State v. Thornton, 

498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993); see also State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 

685 (Iowa 2000) (“When conflicting psychiatric testimony is presented to the fact 

finder, the issue . . . is clearly for the fact finder to decide. The trier of fact is not 

obligated to accept opinion evidence, even from experts, as conclusive. When a 

case evolves into a battle of the experts, . . . the reviewing court . . . readily 

defer[s] to the [fact finder’s] judgment as [they are] in a better position to weigh 
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the credibility of the witnesses.” (Internal citations omitted.)). Moreover we must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(b).

Based upon the evidence at trial, including Dr. Phenix’s testimony that 

Baker’s mental abnormalities predisposed Baker to commit further acts of sexual 

violence and that he was more likely than not to commit another sexually violent 

act, as well as Baker’s two convictions for sexually violent offenses, we find there 

was sufficient evidence presented from which a reasonable jury could conclude

Baker is a sexually violent predator. While Baker’s expert, Dr. Wollert, offered 

opinions contrary to Dr. Phenix, it was up to the jury to decide which expert was 

more credible and whose opinion to accept. See Altman, 723 N.W.2d at 185.

We find no error in the district court’s denial of Baker’s motions for 

directed verdict and accordingly affirm the court’s order of commitment.

AFFIRMED.