UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

George T. Harris, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-10966 

Hon. Judith E. Levy 

Mag. Judge Stephanie Dawkins 

Davis 

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [18] 

Plaintiff George Harris brings this action pursuant to section 

205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his 

application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the Act. 

The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis, 

who on March 2, 2016, recommended that the matter be remanded to 

the Commissioner. (Dkt. 18.) 

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 Defendant timely filed objections to the Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Dkt. 19), and plaintiff filed a response. (Dkt. 

20.) For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and REMANDS this matter 

for further proceedings. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed a claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”) on 

April 10, 2012, alleging disability beginning that same date. (Record 

(“R”), Dkt. 9 et seq., at 168.) On August 13, 2012, plaintiff’s claim was 

initially denied. (Id. at 70-77.) Plaintiff requested a hearing and on 

January 2, 2013, plaintiff appeared with his attorney before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jerome B. Blum. (Id. at 49.) On 

January 22, 2013, the ALJ found plaintiff not to be disabled under the 

Act. (Id. at 79-89.) On February 25, 2013, plaintiff filed a request for 

review with the Appeals Council, and on April 22, 2013, the Appeals 

Council remanded the matter back to the ALJ to examine several issues 

and take additional evidence. (Id. at 93-96.) On October 30, 2013, the 

ALJ held a second hearing to address the flaws identified by the 

Appeals Council, (id. at 24-48), and on December 17, 2013, issued a 

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decision denying plaintiff SSI benefits. (Id. at 7-19.) Plaintiff again 

sought review of the ALJ’s determination, and on February 5, 2015, the 

Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, thus making the 

denial of benefits the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-5.) 

Plaintiff timely filed this action for judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision. (Dkt. 1.) 

The Court incorporates the facts as articulated in the Report and 

Recommendation. (See Dkt. 18.) The Court includes any specific facts 

upon which it relies in analyzing the parties’ arguments in its 

discussion of defendant’s objection. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In cases where a magistrate judge has submitted an R&R and a 

party has properly filed objections to it, the district court must conduct 

a de novo review of those parts of the R&R to which the party objects. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district “court may accept, reject, or modify, 

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate” judge. Id.    Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final 

decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s decision and whether the judge applied the correct 

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legal standards in reaching that decision. Elam v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 

273 (6th Cir. 1997)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined 

as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 

1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “If the 

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, [the 

Court] must defer to that decision ‘even if there is substantial evidence 

in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” 

Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Longworth v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 

2005)). 

When determining whether the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, the reviewing court must take into consideration 

the entire record, including “‘whatever in the record fairly detracts from 

its weight.’” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1986) 

(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1971)). 

However, the court may not review the evidence de novo, make 

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determinations of credibility, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec’y 

of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing 

Reynolds v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 707 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 

1983)). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendant objects to the R&R for two reasons. First, defendant 

challenges the recommendation to remand on the basis that substantial 

evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff could mentally 

do unskilled work. (Dkt. 19 at 2-5.) Second, defendant contests that 

the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the ALJ did not adequately 

explain the weight given to the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, 

Dr. Murskyj. (Id. at 6-10.) 

A. Commissioner’s Determination that Plaintiff 

Possessed the Mental Residual Functional Capacity 

for Unskilled Work is not Supported by Substantial 

Evidence 

The ALJ erred by making a determination regarding the severity 

of plaintiff’s mental health condition and his residual functional 

capacity without the opinion evidence of an acceptable medical source. 

Determinations of medical impairments and medical opinions must be 

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established by an acceptable medical source, which is defined as 

licensed physicians. SSR 06-03p. 

 The regulations governing SSI mandate a five-step sequential 

process to determine whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a). If the ALJ finds that a claimant is disabled at one step, 

then he makes his determination and does not go on to the next step. 

Id. If he cannot make that determination, he must proceed to the next 

step. Id. 

At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must consider 

whether a claimant has a severe impairment and whether the 

impairment meets the twelve month duration requirement in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.909. A “severe” impairment is defined as “any impairment or 

combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). 

Failure to find a severe impairment at step two is not reversible error, 

as long as the ALJ found at least one severe impairment, and, in the 

remaining steps, considers all of a claimant’s impairments. Fisk v. 

Astrue, 253 F. App’x. 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing Maziarz v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987)). 

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The Sixth Circuit has consistently followed the holding in Fisk. See, e.g.

Kirkland v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2013). 

In the present case, the ALJ did not address plaintiff’s mental 

impairments at step two. (R. 12.) However, at step three, the ALJ 

addressed plaintiff’s mental impairments as well as his headaches and 

lower back pain. (Id. at 12-14.) The ALJ found that plaintiff’s 

depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) “do not cause 

more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform 

basic mental work activities and are therefore nonsevere.” (Id. at 12-

13.) This finding relied upon records from Macomb County Community 

Mental Health (“MCCMH”), which documented plaintiff’s reports of 

“feeling depressed, isolating, and experiencing intermittent panic 

attacks,” as well as a mental status examination showing that plaintiff 

was “mildly guarded with constricted affect, but was cooperative and 

displayed intact insight and judgment.” (Id.) This finding was further 

supported by MCCMH documentation showing that plaintiff no-call/noshowed for multiple treatment sessions, and at the sessions he did 

attend, he reported that he was feeling better, performing community 

service, and attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. (Id.) 

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Additionally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff had not received treatment 

after late in 2012, which he found to undermine the credibility of the 

allegations regarding the severity of his psychiatric symptoms. (Id.) 

In making his determination, the ALJ gave no weight to the 

opinion of Dr. Prystash, the physician who performed a psychiatric 

evaluation of plaintiff on November 19, 2012, for the following reasons: 

1) Dr. Prystash only evaluated plaintiff on one occasion, and the report 

from that evaluation does not support the opinion he provided on 

plaintiff’s limitations, 2) Dr. Prsytash only checked off boxes on the 

opinion form and did not provide any substantive comments in support 

of the boxes he checked, and 3) plaintiff’s infrequent psychiatric 

treatment undermined the validity of Dr. Prystash’s opinion that he 

had slight limitations in understanding and memory, moderate 

limitations in sustained concentration and persistence, and marked 

limitations in the area of social interaction. (R. 13 (summarizing 

Medical Source Statement at id. 301-03).)1 

                                                            

1 The ALJ indicates that this examination took place in late October 2012 

(R.13), but the report is dated in the doctor’s handwriting as November 19, 2012. 

(Id. at 301-03.) 

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Despite having given no weight to Dr. Prystash’s opinion, the ALJ 

considered the Global Assessment Functioning score of 55 that Dr. 

Prystash assigned to plaintiff “as generally representative of moderate 

symptoms or moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning.” 

(R. 13.)2 The ALJ nonetheless gave this evaluation no weight, because 

it “represents a snapshot of [plaintiff’s] perceived abilities at a 

particular moment in time,” and is “merely a subjective opinion not 

based upon objective medical findings.” (Id.) The Sixth Circuit has 

stated that “while a GAF score may be of considerable help to the ALJ 

in formulating the RFC, it is not essential to the RFC’s accuracy,” and 

therefore, “the ALJ’s failure to reference the GAF score in the RFC . . . 

does not make the RFC inaccurate.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the Commissioner has 

not endorsed the use of the GAF in Social Security and SSI disability 

programs and has maintained that “[i]t does not have a direct 

correlation to the severity requirements” of the mental disorders 

listings. 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000). Accordingly, the 

                                                            

2 The Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF) is designed to measure a 

patient’s ability to function. A clinician rates the patient on a scale of 1 to 100. A 

score between 51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in 

social, occupational, or school functioning, while scores below 50 indicate serious 

impairments. 2 Attorneys Medical Deskbook § 18:10; DSM-IV, p. 34. 

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ALJ did not err by assigning no weight to the GAF score. See DeBoard 

v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 211 F. App’x 411, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(discussing cases & 65 Fed. Reg. at 50764-65). 

However, the ALJ committed an error necessitating remand when 

he first determined that Dr. Pryztash’s opinion should be given no 

weight, but then proceeded to evaluate plaintiff’s “paragraph B” 

criteria—that is, the four broad functional areas set out in the SSA 

regulations for examining mental disorders. 20 C.F.R., Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 14.) At this point in his evaluation, he had 

no acceptable medical-source evidence on which to base any further 

evaluation of plaintiff’s mental health status: he had assigned no weight 

to Dr. Prystash’s opinion and to the GAF score, and the treatment notes 

from the MCCMH limited license psychologist could not be used to 

establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment. SSR 

06-03p (defining sources who are not “acceptable medical sources” as 

social workers and therapists, and explaining only “acceptable medical 

sources” can establish a medically determinable impairment, provide 

medical opinions, and be considered “treating sources”). See also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 416.913(a), 416.927(a)(2), 416.927(d). 

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Rather, “the ALJ impermissibly substitute[d] his own judgment 

for that of a physician.” McCain v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. 

Programs, 58 F. App'x 184, 196 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ferguson v. 

Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985) (remanding to the SSA for 

payment of disability benefits)); Boulis-Gasche v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 

451 F. App’x 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2011). The Ferguson court determined 

the ALJ set “his own expertise against that of a physician” and failed to 

secure additional evidence from another physician if he found the 

existing evidence unsatisfactory. 765 F.2d at 37. See also Meece v. 

Barnhart, 192 F. App’x 456, 465 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that judges and 

ALJs in social security cases must resist the “temptation to play doctor” 

(quoting Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1990)). 

The ALJ had the responsibility to develop a complete medical 

history, and that responsibility includes contacting medical sources or 

arranging for consultative examinations when the evidence is 

inadequate to make a determination. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d)-(e); Deskin 

v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 605 F. Supp. 2d 908, 911 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 

Without acceptable medical evidence, the finding regarding plaintiff’s 

mental function is unsupported and remand is necessary. 

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B. The Commissioner Failed to Specify the Weight Given 

to the Opinion of Treating Physician Dr. Murskyj 

The ALJ failed to follow SSA regulations when he did not assign a 

weight to the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Murskyj. 

“An ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations ‘denotes a 

lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may 

be justified based upon the record.’” Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 

407 (6th Cir. 2009)). An ALJ is required to evaluate every medical 

opinion of record, and set forth a basis for rejecting any. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927. The ALJ must give a treating-source opinion “controlling 

weight” if (1) it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques” and (2) it “is not inconsistent with the 

other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied (May 2, 2013); 

20 C.F.R. 416.927; SSR 96-2p. “[A]n opinion from a medical source who 

has examined a claimant is given more weight than that from a source 

who has not performed an examination . . . , and an opinion from a 

medical source who regularly treats the claimant . . . is afforded more 

weight than that from a source who has examined the claimant but 

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does not have an ongoing treatment relationship. . . .” Id. at 375-76 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(2)). “ALJs must not succumb to the 

temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical 

findings.” Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App’x. 181, 194 (6th 

Cir. 2009) (citing Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

If the ALJ determines that a treating source's medical opinion is 

not to be given controlling weight, the ALJ must still determine the 

weight that it should be given. 20 C.F.R. 416.927; SSR 96-2p. And this 

determination must be based on a number of factors, including, the 

length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), as well as the “area of specialty and the degree 

to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is 

supported by relevant evidence.” Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376 (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)). In determining that a treating physician’s 

opinion should be given less than controlling weight, the ALJ must 

provide “good reasons” for the weight given to that opinion. Id. (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). “These reasons must be ‘supported by the 

evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make 

clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to 

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the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” 

Id. (internal citation omitted). This procedural requirement “ensures 

that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits 

meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule.” Wilson v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Dr. Murskyj is plainly plaintiff’s treating physician: he treated 

plaintiff first on October 4, 2011 (R. 244), and again on January 16, 

2012 (id. at 243), and May 8, 2012. (Id. at 282-84.) He referred him for 

neurology treatment between December 2011 and April 2012 (id. at 

248-54, 256-62) and again in August of 2012 (id. at 255), and between 

November 2012 and May 23, 2013. (Id. at 333-39.) The record 

demonstrates that Dr. Murskyj managed plaintiff’s physical care 

between October 4, 2011 and at least May 23, 2013, as the diagnostic 

reports from the neurologists referenced above were addressed to him. 

On May 8, 2012, he provided an RFC questionnaire based on his 

treatment of plaintiff from October 2011 to May 2012, and in that 

report he diagnosed cervicogenic headaches,3 lightheadedness, 

                                                            

3 A cervicogenic headache is a headache caused by a disorder of the cervical 

spine and its component bony disc and/or soft tissue elements, usually but not 

invariably accompanied by neck pain. International Headache Society, 

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dizziness, and paresthesia-that is, abnormal nerve sensations. (Id. at 

246.) He further indicated that plaintiff’s medications would lead to 

drowsiness. (Id.) Dr. Murskyj based his diagnosis on a September 2011 

CT scan of plaintiff’s cervical spine (id. at 241-42), a physical 

examination (id. at 243-44), and the neurology examinations and 

reports from physicians at Michigan Neurology Associates. (Id. at 248-

62.) 

The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Murskyj diagnosed plaintiff in 

October 2011 with “cervicogenic headaches,” but stated that the record 

lacked evidence that plaintiff received any further treatment for these 

headaches. (R. 12.) The ALJ further reasoned that the record did not 

reflect consistent complaints of headaches to any treatment providers, 

including a neurologist. (Id.) Later on in the decision, the ALJ 

evaluated Dr. Murskyj’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s RFC, but did not 

state what impact the apparent inconsistencies between this treating 

physician’s opinion and the other evidence in the record had on the 

weight he assigned to Dr. Murskyj’s opinion, nor did the ALJ state 

explicitly what, if any, weight he accorded to it. (Id. at 12-13, 17.) 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

International Classification of Headache Disorders, 3rd Edition (ICHD-III), Beta 

Version. 2013. 

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The ALJ made the following evaluation of Dr. Murskyj’s opinion 

regarding plaintiff’s physical restrictions on the amount of weight he 

could lift, his need for unscheduled work breaks, and the limitation on 

how long he could sit or stand/walk without rest: 

[T]his opinion is simply not supported by the remaining 

objective medical evidence, nor by Dr. Murskyj’s own routine 

and conservative treatment of the claimant. In fact, on the 

same date that this form was completed, Dr. Murskyj’s 

examination of the claimant revealed normal findings and he 

reported that the claimant only needed to return on an as 

needed basis or in one year (Exhibit 7F [284]). Dr. Murskyj 

also failed to report any significant objective findings that 

would support his conclusions. It appears that Dr. Murskyj 

relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and 

limitations provided by the claimant and seemed to 

uncritically accept as true most, if not all, of what the 

claimant reported. Yet, as explained throughout this 

decision, there exist good reasons for questioning the 

reliability of the claimant’s subjective complaints. 

(R. 17.) But the neurology examination reports—which were sent to Dr. 

Murskyj—confirm the diagnosis of myofascial pain syndrome,4 disc 

herniations, and a progressive need for increased dosages of pain 

medications, including Neurontin and Vicodin, and the desirability of 

trigger-point injection therapy or epidurals. (See, e.g., Id. at 248, 254, 

                                                            

4 Myofascial Pain Syndrome is a chronic pain disorder where pressure on 

sensitive points in your muscles causes pain in seemingly unrelated parts of your 

body. Myofascial Pain Syndrome, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/myofascial-pain-syndrome/basics/definition/con-20033195 (last visited 

April 26, 2016). 

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256.) The ALJ has not explained how this supporting evidence is not 

consistent with Dr. Murskyj’s opinion. 

 The good-reasons requirement involves a consideration of the 

factors found in 20 C.F.R. §§ 419.917(c)(2)-(6) to determine the weight 

given. These factors include the length and nature of the treatment 

relationship, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, how 

well the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings, 

the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, whether the 

opinion is provided by a specialist, and how familiar the treating 

physician is with the SSA’s disability programs. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

416.917(c)(2)-(6). The ALJ’s determination does not address these 

factors with adequate clarity. The ALJ noted the lack of objective 

findings to support the conclusions in Dr. Murskyj’s RFC questionnaire, 

and suggested that Dr. Murskyj appeared to have relied on plaintiff’s 

own report of his symptoms and limitations, which he found to lack 

credibility. 

It is apparent that the ALJ did not give Dr. Murskyj’s opinion 

controlling weight, but he did not explicitly state what weight he gave 

to this opinion. The RFC determination was for “unskilled sedentary 

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work,” which involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time, and the 

opportunity to alternate between sitting and standing as needed. (R. 14 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a)).) This determination departs 

significantly from Dr. Murskyj’s opinion in one key way. During the 

hearing, the vocation explained that “[i]f an individual is going to have 

consistent, unscheduled absences, they could miss one to two days per 

month but no more than 15 days a year or they would be unable to 

sustain competitive work.” (R. 41.) Since the ALJ found that there 

were competitive jobs in the economy for which plaintiff had the RFC, 

he had to have disregarded at least the portion of Dr. Murskyj’s opinion 

that plaintiff would need between three and four unscheduled days off a 

month. (See id. at 247.) This difference may indeed be material for the 

ultimate determination of whether plaintiff is disabled under the Act, 

and yet there is no meaningful way to review the Commissioner’s 

decision. 

Since the Court is left to speculate regarding what weight this 

treating physician’s opinion was given, the matter must be remanded to 

the Commissioner. “[A] failure to follow the procedural requirement of 

identifying the reasons for discounting the opinions and for explaining 

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precisely how those reasons affected the weight accorded the opinions 

denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the 

ALJ may be justified based upon the record.” Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544). 

As the Wilson Court explained: 

A court cannot excuse the denial of a mandatory procedural 

protection simply because . . . there is sufficient evidence in 

the record for the ALJ to discount the treating source's 

opinion and, thus, a different outcome on remand is unlikely. 

“[A] procedural error is not made harmless simply because 

[the aggrieved party] appears to have had little chance of 

success on the merits anyway.” Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 

F.2d 701, 719 n. 41 [(D.C. Cir. 1977)]; see also Ingalls 

Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. 

Programs, 102 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1996). To hold 

otherwise . . . would afford the Commissioner the ability to 

violate the regulation with impunity and render the 

protections promised therein illusory. The general 

administrative law rule, after all, is for a reviewing court, in 

addition to whatever substantive factual or legal review is 

appropriate, to “set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . 

without observance of procedure required by law.” 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (2001). 

378 F.3d at 546. 

 Because the Court cannot discern what weight the ALJ attributed 

to Dr. Murksyj’s opinion, this matter must be remanded to the 

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Commissioner for a determination made in accordance with the 

regulations of her agency. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons provided above, the Court adopts the Report and 

Recommendation and remands this matter for further consideration in 

accordance with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and the findings found 

herein. 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES the Commissioner’s 

objections and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 16, 2016 /s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court=s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 16, 2016. 

/s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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