SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

7 

KA 13-01456 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RYAN P. BRAHNEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

 

DAVID P. ELKOVITCH, AUBURN, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

RYAN P. BRAHNEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.

JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a resentence of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G.

Leone, J.), rendered December 3, 2012. Defendant was resentenced as a

second felony offender. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the resentence so appealed from is

affirmed.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment

convicting him following a bench trial of, inter alia, two counts each

of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1], [3]

[intentional and felony murder]), burglary in the first degree (§

140.30 [2], [3]), and criminal contempt in the first degree (§ 215.51

[b] [v], [vi]). In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals from a resentence

based upon County Court’s failure to sentence him as a second felony

offender (see generally CPL 400.21 [4]). According to the evidence

presented at trial, defendant unlawfully entered the home of his

former girlfriend and their three-year-old son, while they were

asleep, and stabbed his former girlfriend 38 times, causing her death.

Contrary to defendant’s contention in appeal No. 1, the verdict

of guilty of intentional murder is not against the weight of the

evidence inasmuch as he failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that he “acted under the influence of extreme emotional

distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the

reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a

person in [his] situation under the circumstances as [he] believed

them to be” (Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]; see § 25.00 [2]). The

evidence established that defendant was very angry when he observed a

man, who had recently been released from prison for a drug-related

conviction, at the home of his former girlfriend earlier in the
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KA 13-01456 

evening. Defendant returned to her home a few hours later, at which

time he broke a window, entered the apartment, and dragged the victim

downstairs and killed her. Following his arrest, defendant made

several statements justifying his behavior on the alleged ground that

his former girlfriend had exposed his son to drugs and to “drug

dealers.” 

Defendant presented the testimony of his expert psychologist who

opined that defendant had an underlying and undiagnosed condition of

bipolar disorder that was at the root of his inability to control his

rage with respect to his perception that the victim was exposing his

son to drug use. Defendant’s expert stated that defendant engaged in

a “frenzied attack” and that he had a “spotty” memory regarding the

attack. The People presented the testimony of their expert

psychiatrist who disagreed that defendant had bipolar disorder and

opined that defendant displayed the classic traits of antisocial

personality disorder. The People’s expert further testified that

defendant “is a violent man,” as evidenced by his criminal history of

violent crimes, and he opined that defendant’s concern for his son was

reasonable, but that his actions in response to that concern were not.

The People also presented evidence that defendant stated in a recorded

jail telephone call approximately three months prior to the murder

that he “was going to . . . murder her” and that he was going “take

[his] jack knife and carve her . . . neck out.” Defendant did not

mention that he was concerned about his son’s welfare during that

conversation. 

It is well established that “a brutal assault would not itself

suffice to demonstrate extreme emotional disturbance” (People v

McKenzie, 19 NY3d 463, 467; see People v Roche, 98 NY2d 70, 77-78;

People v Mohamud, 115 AD3d 1227, 1228-1229, lv denied 23 NY3d 965). 

Although the Legislature recognized that “some homicides are worthy of

mitigation because they ‘result from an understandable human response

deserving of mercy’ ” (Roche, 98 NY2d at 75; see People v Harris, 95

NY2d 316, 318; People v Casassa, 49 NY2d 668, 680-681, cert denied 449

US 842), that is not the case here. 

Defendant further contends in appeal No. 1 that the court failed

to comply with CPL 710.60 inasmuch as the court granted his pretrial

motion seeking a Huntley hearing but failed to conduct one. We

conclude that, by failing to object to the testimony of the arresting

officer and the three witnesses who heard defendant make inculpatory

statements during a standard suicide risk assessment during the

booking process, defendant waived his right to a Huntley hearing with

respect to those inculpatory statements (see People v Wilson, 90 AD3d

1155, 1155, lv denied 18 NY3d 963). Although defense counsel objected

to references in the prosecutor’s opening statement to inculpatory

statements made by defendant during recorded telephone calls with

family members, those statements are not subject to a CPL 710.30

notice or a Huntley hearing inasmuch as they were not made to a

“public servant” (CPL 710.30 [1]). We conclude that defendant did not

waive a Huntley hearing with respect to an inculpatory statement he

made to an officer while in a holding cell because he objected to the
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KA 13-01456 

testimony at trial, and the objection was overruled following an offthe-record discussion. We therefore conclude that the court erred in

permitting the testimony without conducting a Huntley hearing, or

stating on the record its determination of that part of defendant’s

motion seeking to suppress that statement (see CPL 710.60 [6]; see

generally People v Pallagi, 91 AD3d 1266, 1267-1268). We nevertheless

conclude that the error is harmless. We note that the record

establishes that the statement was spontaneous and not “ ‘the product

of an interrogation environment [or] the result of express questioning

or its functional equivalent’ ” (People v Sierra, 85 AD3d 1659, 1660,

lv denied 17 NY3d 905). The evidence of defendant’s guilt is

overwhelming, and we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility

that the error contributed to the conviction (see generally People v

Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention in

appeal No. 2 that the court punished him for exercising his right to a

trial by imposing a sentence more severe than that offered as part of

the plea agreement (see People v Brink, 78 AD3d 1483, 1485, lv denied

16 NY3d 742, reconsideration denied 16 NY3d 828). In any event, we

conclude that defendant’s contention is without merit. “[T]here is no

indication in the record before us that the sentencing court acted in

a vindictive manner based on defendant’s exercise of the right to a

trial” (id.). 

We reject defendant’s further contention in appeal No. 2 that the

court erred in directing that the sentences on the two counts of

burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [2], [3]), which run

concurrently with each other, shall run consecutively to the sentence

imposed on the count of intentional murder (§ 125.25 [1]). Defendant

was convicted of burglary for unlawfully entering the victim’s

dwelling, with the aggravating factors of causing physical injury to

the victim (§ 140.30 [2]), and using or threatening the immediate use

of a dangerous instrument (§ 140.30 [3]), i.e., a butcher knife. 

Defendant was charged with intentionally causing the victim’s death by

repeatedly stabbing her with a butcher knife. It is well established

that, in considering whether sentences must run concurrently under

Penal Law § 70.25 (2), “the court must determine whether the [actus

reus] element is, by definition, the same for both offenses (under the

first prong of the statute), or if the [actus reus] for one offense

is, by definition, a material element of the second offense (under the

second prong)” (People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 643). “[W]hen the

actus reus is a single inseparable act that violates more than one

statute, single punishment must be imposed” (People v Frazier, 16 NY3d

36, 41 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Parks, 95 NY2d

811, 814; Laureano, 87 NY2d at 645). Although the actus reus elements

of the burglary counts and the murder count overlap under the facts

presented here, we nevertheless conclude that the People

“establish[ed] the legality of consecutive sentencing by showing that

the ‘acts or omissions’ committed by defendant were separate and

distinct acts” (Laureano, 87 NY2d at 643). The evidence established

that, after defendant entered the apartment through a window that he

smashed with a cinder block, he dragged the victim from her bed and
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KA 13-01456 

down the stairs to the living room, where he killed her. 

We agree with our dissenting colleagues that the blood evidence

located on the wall of the upstairs hallway and on the stairs

establishes that defendant caused physical injury to the victim while

she was still upstairs. We note, however, that the photographic

evidence demonstrates that there was a small blood smear on the wall

of the upstairs hallway and drops of blood on the stairs. By

contrast, there was a tremendous amount of blood evidence in the

downstairs of the dwelling where the victim died. Furthermore, in a

recorded telephone conversation to his mother, defendant stated that

he “dragged [the victim] down the stairs and murdered her.” We

conclude that the location and amount of blood evidence in the

upstairs and in the downstairs of the dwelling confirm this statement. 

We therefore conclude that the People established that there were

separate offenses, i.e., that the burglary was completed while the

victim was still upstairs and that the murder occurred downstairs (see

People v Yong Yun Lee, 92 NY2d 987, 988-989; cf. People v Wright, 19

NY3d 359, 366-367; Laureano, 87 NY2d at 645). Thus, we conclude that

the burglary and the murder offenses were “committed through separate

acts, though they are part of a single transaction” (People v Brown,

80 NY2d 361, 364; see People v Brathwaite, 63 NY2d 839, 843; People v

Walker, 117 AD3d 886, 887, lv denied 24 NY3d 965). Also contrary to

defendant’s contention in appeal No. 2, the resentence is not unduly

harsh and severe.

Defendant contends in his pro se supplemental brief with respect

to appeal No. 1 that he was denied his right to due process because he

did not give a knowing and voluntary consent to the stipulation that

he caused the victim’s death; he was denied his right to be present at

sidebar conferences; he was not adequately advised of his right to

testify; and he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The

record establishes that defendant’s consent to the stipulation, which

he signed and which was reviewed on the record, was knowing and

voluntary. The record also establishes that the sidebar conferences

involved legal issues, and not “ ‘factual matters about which

defendant might have peculiar knowledge that would be useful in

advancing the defendant’s or countering the People’s position’ ”

(People v Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 596), and thus he did not have a

right to be present. Based upon remarks that defendant made during

the prosecutor’s summation, we conclude that he understood that he had

the right to testify. To the extent that defendant’s contention in

his pro se supplemental brief that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel involves matters that appear on the record, we conclude

that they are without merit and that defendant was afforded meaningful

representation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147). To

the extent that his contentions involve matters outside the record,

they must be raised by a motion pursuant to CPL article 440 (see

People v Washington, 122 AD3d 1406, 1406).

All concur except CENTRA and LINDLEY, JJ., who dissent and vote to

modify in accordance with the following memorandum: We respectfully

dissent inasmuch as we agree with defendant that County Court erred in

directing that the sentences on the two counts of burglary in the
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KA 13-01456 

first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [2], [3]), which run concurrently

with each other, shall run consecutively to the sentence imposed on

the count of intentional murder in the second degree (§ 125.25 [1]). 

In our view, the consecutive sentences are illegal under the facts of

this case. 

Pursuant to the two prongs set forth in Penal Law § 70.25 (2),

the court is required to impose concurrent sentences where a single

act constitutes two different offenses, or a single act constitutes

both one of the offenses charged and a material element of the other

(see People v Parks, 95 NY2d 811, 814-815; People v Laureano, 87 NY2d

640, 643). Where separate acts are committed in the course of a

criminal transaction, or where one act does not constitute a material

element of a charged crime, the court may, in its discretion, impose

consecutive sentences (see People v Bryant, 92 NY2d 216, 230-231;

People v Brown, 80 NY2d 361, 363-364). Whether a court has the

discretion to impose consecutive sentences thus depends on an analysis

of the statutory definition of the actus reus for each offense (see

Laureano, 87 NY2d at 643; People v Day, 73 NY2d 208, 211).

Here, the People failed to meet their burden of establishing that

the burglary and murder offenses were committed by separate and

distinct acts (see Laureano, 87 NY2d at 643; see generally People v

Rosas, 8 NY3d 493, 496). Defendant was convicted of murdering the

victim by stabbing her repeatedly with a knife (see Penal Law § 125.25

[1]), and was convicted of burglarizing the victim’s residence by

entering her dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein and

causing physical injury to her (§ 140.30 [2]) and using or threatening

the immediate use of a knife (§ 140.30 [3]). Contrary to the People’s

contention, the burglary was not complete as soon as defendant entered

the victim’s dwelling. This would be true if defendant had been

charged and convicted of burglary in the second degree (see § 140.25

[2]; People v Frazier, 16 NY3d 36, 41). Defendant, however, was

charged and convicted of two counts of burglary in the first degree,

which required the People to establish that, in addition to entering

and remaining unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit a

crime therein, defendant caused physical injury to the victim and used

or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous instrument (§ 140.30

[2], [3]).

To show that the burglary and murder offenses were committed

through separate and distinct acts, the People must point to

“identifiable facts” in the record (People v Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444,

451; see Laureano, 87 NY2d at 644). At trial, a recorded phone call

from defendant while he was in jail to his mother was played to the

court, in which defendant stated that he went inside the victim’s

residence, dragged her down the stairs and murdered her. A police

officer testified at trial that he found the victim with multiple stab

wounds in the downstairs of the residence. There were signs of a

struggle in the master bedroom upstairs, and the victim had defensive

wounds. There was blood “all over the place” downstairs, and there

was also some blood on the wall outside the master bedroom, on the

landing, on the wall next to the staircase, and on the stairs. The

parties stipulated that the forensic analysis showed that it was the
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KA 13-01456 

victim’s blood on the wall upstairs and on the staircase. The Medical

Examiner testified that the victim sustained 38 knife wounds. He did

not specify which of the wounds sustained by the victim was fatal, but

rather testified that she died as a result of multiple stab wounds to

the neck, chest, and back.

The majority concludes that the burglary was completed while the

victim was still upstairs, and that she was not murdered until after

she was dragged downstairs, and thus that the burglary and murder

offenses were committed through separate acts. In our view, we cannot

determine that the burglary and murder offenses were separate and

distinct because it is possible that the act of causing physical

injury to the victim and using the knife was also the act that caused

her death. Considering the fact that the victim’s blood was found

upstairs and on the staircase, it is apparent that defendant stabbed

the victim at least once while they were upstairs, which would

complete the burglary offenses. Unlike the majority, however, we

conclude that the murder offense may also have occurred through that

same act. In other words, the wound or wounds that the victim

sustained while upstairs may have ultimately caused her death. Where,

as here, the People failed to meet their burden, concurrent sentences

are required (see People v Amato, 1 AD3d 713, 716-717, lv denied 1

NY3d 594). We would therefore modify the resentence by directing that

the sentences imposed for the counts of burglary in the first degree

shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed for intentional

murder in the second degree. 

Entered: March 20, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court