UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM E. POWELL, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

INTERNAL REVENUE 

SERVICE, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 2:15-cv-11033 

District Judge Paul D. Borman 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANT IRS’S 

JANUARY 20, 2016 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 45) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant Defendant IRS’s January 

20, 2016 motion for summary judgment (DE 45). 

II. REPORT: 

A. Background 

 This lawsuit is one of three Plaintiff William E. Powell has filed against the 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in this Court.1

 On March 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed 

the instant lawsuit pro se, seeking to compel Defendant to comply with his 

                                                            

1 See Powell v. IRS, Case No. 2:14-cv-12626-SFC-MJH (E.D. Mich.) (judgment 

entered Sept. 9, 2015), and Powell v. IRS, Case No. 2:15-cv-11616-PDB-APP 

(E.D. Mich.) (IRS’s February 17, 2016 dispositive motion pending). 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 1 of 29 Pg ID 733
2

December 4, 2014 request for certain tax documents under the Freedom of 

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. (DE 1 at 2-3 ¶¶ 1-4.) 

By way of this Court’s April 28, 2015 opinion and order granting Plaintiff’s 

April 21, 2015 motion for leave to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff’s 

proposed first amended complaint (DE 9-1) became the operative complaint. (See

DEs 9, 10.) In addition to Plaintiff’s December 4, 2014 request, the first amended 

complaint concerns requests dated February 26, 2015, March 2, 2015, and April 

10, 2015. (DE 9-1 at 2-8.) Plaintiff’s entire case concerns alleged violations of 

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (DE 9-1 at 8-9.) 

B. Instant Motion 

Judge Borman has referred this case to me for pretrial matters. (DE 29.) 

Currently before the Court is Defendant IRS’s January 20, 2016 motion for 

summary judgment. (DE 45.) Therein, Defendant IRS argues: 

(1) [P]laintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with 

respect to any of his denied requested Items; 

(2) [P]laintiff did not follow the Service’s FOIA regulations for 

some of his requested Items; 

(3) with respect to some of [P]laintiff’s proper FOIA requested 

Items, the Service conducted a reasonable search but did not 

locate any responsive records, or 

(4) if responsive records were located (and were not exempt from 

disclosure under the FOIA) the Service properly released those 

records to [P]laintiff. 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 2 of 29 Pg ID 734
3

(DE 45 at 9.) 

Plaintiff filed a timely response on February 10, 2015, the due date. (DEs 

47, 48.) However, five days later, Plaintiff filed a motion to substitute pleading, 

representing to the Court that, “Plaintiff will not make any changes from [sic] any 

physical documents from the pleading filed on Wednesday, February 20 [sic], 

2016,” except for the redaction of personal information, including a social security 

number, taxpayer identification number, birth date, account information and the 

initials of a minor. (DE 49 at 1.) One day thereafter, Plaintiff filed a new 

response, which apparently deleted the personal information about which Plaintiff 

had expressed concern (see, i.e., DE 50-4 at 3, DE 50-9 at 1), but which was 

clearly not otherwise identical to the previous one, as it was missing nine pages of 

exhibits (Compare DE 48-1 through DE 48-45 [145 pages], DE 50-1 through 50-

42 [136 pages].) Accordingly, on February 17, 2016, this Court entered an order 

(DE 51) granting Plaintiff’s motion to substitute (DE 49) and directing the Clerk of 

the Court to strike each of Plaintiff’s responses (DEs 48, 50). At the same time, 

the Court’s order directed Plaintiff to file a substituted response, “identical to the 

pleading filed on February 10, 2016, but differing only by the redactions proposed” 

in the motion to file a substituted pleading, no later than Thursday, February 18, 

2016. (DE 51 at 2.) It is noted that Plaintiff is an e-filer, and thus should have 

been immediately aware of the Court’s re-briefing directive. 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 3 of 29 Pg ID 735
4

To date, no substituted response has been filed. 2 Accordingly, this motion is 

technically unopposed, see E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(c)(1). 3 To be sure, given the nature 

of this motion – which is primarily based on a record of correspondence between 

the parties that speaks for itself, as well as the statutory and regulatory law which 

governs FOIA actions – it is highly unlikely that an accredited response would 

change the outcome. Moreover, “a district court cannot grant summary judgment 

in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not responded. The 

court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant's motion for summary 

judgment to ensure that he has discharged that burden.” Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 

451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, notwithstanding the unopposed status of this 

motion, the Court will carefully consider the merits of Defendant IRS’s 

arguments, in light of the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s operative pleadings, to 

ensure that Defendant has discharged its burden. 

C. Standard 

Defendant IRS brings its motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). (DE 45 

at 1.) Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant 

                                                            

2 “A respondent opposing a motion must file a response, including a brief and 

supporting documents then available.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(c)(1). 

3 To complicate matters, on April 13, 2016, nearly two months after the date of my 

order, Plaintiff filed a “response to resubmit redacted summary judgment,” in 

which he seemingly attempts an extension of time within which to respond. (DE 

53.) The Court has addressed and denied this motion by an order entered this date.

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 4 of 29 Pg ID 736
5

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under 

governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The 

Court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from 

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. 

v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations 

omitted). 

“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists . . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 

(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e)(2) 

(providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of 

fact,” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the 

motion.”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC 

v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving 

party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat 

the motion.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 5 of 29 Pg ID 737
6

2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]here must be evidence 

upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving 

party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence favoring the nonmoving 

party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. City Management Corp. 

v. United States Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 254 (6th Cir. 1994). In other words, 

summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary judgment is 

properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a 

showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case. . . .” Stansberry, 

651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). 

D. Discussion 

1. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Generally 

Government agencies are required to make certain information available to 

the public. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2). “Except with respect to the records made 

available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, and except as provided in 

subparagraph (E), each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably 

describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating 

the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 6 of 29 Pg ID 738
7

promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). “In 

response to a FOIA request, an agency must make a good faith effort to conduct a 

search for the requested records using methods reasonably expected to produce the 

requested information.” Rugiero v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 247 F.3d 534, 547 (6th

Cir. 2001) (citing Campbell v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). “The FOIA requires a reasonable search tailored to the nature 

of the request.” Id. (citing Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28 (emphasis added)). 

“On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which 

the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the 

agency records are situated . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from 

withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records 

improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The statute 

further provides: 

In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may 

examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine 

whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any 

of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the 

burden is on the agency to sustain its action. In addition to any other 

matters to which a court accords substantial weight, a court shall 

accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning the 

agency's determination as to technical feasibility under paragraph 

(2)(C) and subsection (b) and reproducibility under paragraph (3)(B). 

Id. (emphases added). In other words, “[u]nder 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) federal 

jurisdiction is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) ‘improperly’; (2) 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 7 of 29 Pg ID 739
8

‘withheld’; (3) ‘agency records.’” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 

the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980). 

2. Exhaustion under FOIA and Its Effect on the Court’s 

Jurisdiction 

 Before coming to Court with a FOIA claim, a plaintiff must exhaust his 

administrative remedies by first appealing the adverse decision within the agency. 

“Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) 

of this subsection, shall-- 

(i) determine within 20 days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and 

legal public holidays) after the receipt of any such request 

whether to comply with such request and shall immediately 

notify the person making such request of such determination 

and the reasons therefor, and of the right of such person to 

appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination; and 

(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty 

days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) 

after the receipt of such appeal. If on appeal the denial of the 

request for records is in whole or in part upheld, the agency 

shall notify the person making such request of the provisions 

for judicial review of that determination under paragraph (4) of 

this subsection. 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i),(ii). However, the statute further provides that, “[a]ny 

person making a request to any agency for records under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) 

of this subsection shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies 

with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the applicable time 

limit provisions of this paragraph.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 8 of 29 Pg ID 740
9

 “Where no attempt to comply fully with agency procedures has been made, 

the courts will assert their lack of jurisdiction under the exhaustion doctrine.” In re 

Steele, 799 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hedley v. United States, 594 F.2d 

1043, 1044 (5th Cir. 1979)). In other words, a Plaintiff’s failure to administratively 

exhaust his or her document requests under the FOIA deprives the district court of 

jurisdiction. See Reisman v. Bullard, 14 F. App'x 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(plaintiffs “failed to show that they exhausted their FOIA remedies by requesting 

specific information in accordance with published administrative procedures and 

having their request improperly refused before they brought their district court 

action.”) (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) and In re Steele, 799 F.2d at 465-466). 

3. Defendant IRS is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s claims regarding his December 4, 2014 FOIA 

request, as the Court does not have jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s challenge to Defendant’s January 15, 2015 

interim response. 

Plaintiff’s December 3, 2014 FOIA request is comprised of thirteen (13) 

bullet point items. (DE 45 at 45-46.)4

 In a December 18, 2014 letter, William J. 

White, IV, an IRS Disclosure Specialist, explained that he needed additional time 

to “[s]earch for and collect the requested records from other locations[,]” and 

                                                            

4 The fax cover sheet to Plaintiff's December 2014 FOIA request is dated December 

3, 2014 (DE 45 at 44); however, Plaintiff consistently concedes that it was not sent 

to (or apparently received by) the IRS until December 4, 2014 (DE 1 at 2 ¶¶ 1-2; 

DE 9-1 at 2 ¶ 1.) It is, therefore, referenced by the latter date throughout this 

report. 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 9 of 29 Pg ID 741
10

extended the statutory response date to January 21, 2015. (DE 1 at 6, DE 45 at 48-

49.) On January 15, 2015, Bruce Hayes, an IRS Disclosure Manager, responded as 

to ten (10) items, enclosing 36 pages but withholding 13 pages as the tax 

information of other taxpayers. In addition, Plaintiff was notified of appeal rights 

by the enclosure of a Notice 393. (DE 45 at 51-53, 55-56.) By another letter dated 

January 15, 2015, this one from Disclosure Specialist White, the IRS extended the 

response date to February 12, 2015. (DE 45 at 58-59.)5

 

As noted above, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dated April 21, 2015. 

Therein, Plaintiff seems to challenge Defendant IRS’s response as to several of the 

thirteen (13) requests, regarding which Hayes responded on January 15, 2015 as 

follows: 

 The Individual Master File (“IMF”) Transcript for MFT 30 for 

William A. Powell for tax years 1988 to 1993: I researched our 

records and found that there are no documents specifically 

responsive to your request.

 The BMF Transcript for MFT 34 for the Powell Printing 

Company for tax years 1988 to 1994: I researched our records 

and found that there are no documents specifically responsive 

to your request.

                                                            

5 Moreover, on January 28, 2015, Disclosure Manager Hayes stated: “You asked 

for copies of Master File Specific transcripts for tax years 1989, 1992, and 1993 

under your personal account. At this time I am unable to retrieve the requested 

documents. If you still need Disclosure to provide these documents, please resubmit your request in thirty to sixty days to allow the system time to retrieve the 

documents from retention.” (DE 45 at 61.)

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 10 of 29 Pg ID 742
11

 The BMF Transcript for MFT 05 for the Estate of William A. 

Powell for tax years 1988 to 2014:6

 I researched our records 

and found that there are no documents specifically responsive 

to your request. 

 A copy of the tax year 1990 Form 2553 (Small Business 

Election) [and attached Tax Return] under the Document 

Locator Number (“DLN”) 17953-494-00101-0 for the Powell 

Printing Company: I researched our records and am unable to 

locate the document at this time. Please attempt to re-submit 

your request in 60 to 90 days to allow the re-filing of the form 

with the Federal Records Center.

 The BMF Transcript for MFT 02 for tax years 1989 to 1993 

and MFT 01 and MFT 10 for years 1988 to 1993 for Powell 

Printing Company:7

 I am enclosing 20 pages specifically 

responsive to your request. 

(DE 9-1 at 2-3 ¶ 3, DE 45 at 45-46, 51-53.) Plaintiff takes the position that 

Defendant IRS has not complied with any of the bulleted items. (DE 9-1 at 8 ¶ 4.) 

The Court should conclude that Defendant IRS is entitled to summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims which concern his December 4, 2014 FOIA 

request. Plaintiff’s amended complaint appears to contest only Defendant IRS’s 

January 15, 2015 interim response (DE 45 at 51-53) and not the same-day deferred 

                                                            

6 The phrase appearing in Plaintiff’s April 21, 2015 amended complaint appears to 

be a combination of two items (for MFT 05 Estate of William A. Powell) from 

Plaintiff’s December 4, 2014 FOIA request and is consistent with wording from 

the IRS’s January 15, 2015 letter. (Compare DE 9-1 at 2 ¶ 3, DE 45 at 45-46, DE 

45 at 51.) 

7 Here, too, the phrase in the amended complaint appears to be a combination of 

three items from Plaintiff’s FOIA request and is consistent with wording from the 

IRS’s letter. (Compare DE 9-1 at 3 ¶ 3, DE 45 at 45-46, DE 45 at 51.)

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 11 of 29 Pg ID 743
12

response (DE 45 at 58-59). (See DE 9-1 at 2-3 ¶ 3, DE 9-1 at 8 ¶ 4.) To the extent 

Plaintiff’s April 21, 2015 first amended complaint takes issue with the content of 

Defendant IRS’s January 15, 2015 interim response (DE 45 at 51-53), his 

complaint is prematurely filed. Plaintiff is required to give Defendant IRS the first 

bite at the apple regarding the adequacy of its response. See Am. Civil Liberties 

Union of Michigan v. F.B.I., No. 11-13154, 2012 WL 4513626, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 

Sept. 30, 2012) aff'd, 734 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiff's Appeal made no 

mention of § 552(a)(3)(C). If Plaintiff never notified Defendants of its objection to 

their search, then Plaintiff did not appeal this specific issue and thus could not have 

administratively exhausted this claim. Therefore, the Court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's search claim.”). Here, White has declared that, to his 

knowledge, Plaintiff has never filed an administrative appeal regarding the 

December 4, 2014 FOIA request. (See DE 45 at 41-42 ¶¶ 29-32.) No 

contradicting affidavit or declaration has been filed with the Court, nor is there a 

verified complaint.8

 Therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s December 4, 2014 FOIA claim, which appears to be limited to a 

                                                            

8 Neither of the two stricken responses (DE 48 and 50) is signed under penalty of 

perjury, nor are they accompanied by an affidavit or declaration from Plaintiff. 

(See DE 48 at 34, DE 50 at 34.) Indeed, the only attached affidavit is the July 13, 

2015 adverse Declaration of IRS attorney Joy E. Gerdy Zogby. (See DE 48-1, DE 

48-37, DE 50-1 & DE 50-36.) 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 12 of 29 Pg ID 744
13

challenge to the substance of Defendant’s January 15, 2015 interim response (DE 

45 at 51-53). 

4. Defendant IRS is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s claim(s) concerning his February 26, 2015 FOIA 

request, as it appears he has either received relief or 

Defendant does not possess any further, responsive 

documents. 

Plaintiff submitted four FOIA requests dated February 26, 2016, each of 

which concerns the Powell Printing Co., Employer Identification Number (“EIN”) 

38-2901076. (DE 9-3, DE 45 at 75-96.) By way of three letters dated March 10, 

2015 – as to Forms 990 (“the Forms 990 request”) (DE 9-3 at 3), DLN 38904-747-

00785-09 (“the Form SS-4 request”) (DE 9-3 at 1-2), and the 1990 Form 2553 

(“the Form 2553 photocopy request”) (DE 9-3 at 4) - Senior Disclosure Specialist 

Brinda L. Brown informed Plaintiff that he needed to “[p]rovide proof of [his] 

right to access the requested records.” (DE 45 at 106-107, 109-110, 112-113; see 

also Brown Decl. (DE 45 at 63-64 ¶¶ 4, 6-7).)9

 By way of a fourth letter – as to 

DLN 17953-494-00101-0 for 1989 and 1990 (“the Form 2553 inspection request”) 

(DE 9-3 at 5), Brown explained that Plaintiff could access Document 6209 online. 

(DE 45 at 118; see also Brown Decl. (DE 45 at 63 ¶ 5).) 

By a letter dated March 16, 2015, Plaintiff purportedly submitted several 

documents to illustrate that he was the authorized individual for Powell Printing 

                                                            

9 Plaintiff claims he did so on March 11 or March 12. (DE 9-1 at 8-9 ¶ 5.)    

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 13 of 29 Pg ID 745
14

Co. (DE 9-2, DE 45 at 120-121.)10 Thus, Plaintiff appears to contend that 

Defendant IRS’s time to respond expired 20 days later, which would have been 

April 10, 2015. Plaintiff claims he has not received “any correspondence to date of 

this Amended Complaint.” (See DE 9-1 at 8-9 ¶ 5.) By Brown’s own declaration, 

it seems that Defendant IRS did not timely act in response to Plaintiff’s March 16, 

2015 facsimile. (DE 45 at 66-67 ¶¶ 13-16.) Thus, assuming Plaintiff’s March 16, 

2015 letter related to each of the four February 26, 2015 requests, Plaintiff is 

deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies as to challenges to the same 

on the basis that Defendant failed to comply with the applicable time limit. 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 

Nonetheless, the Court should conclude that Defendant IRS is entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s February 26, 2015 FOIA claims which are the 

subject of the amended complaint at bar. First, it appears that Plaintiff has already 

received relief on his February 26, 2015 requests to (a) photocopy and inspect the 

original 1990 Form 2553 and (b) inspect the original 1989/1990 tax return. (DE 9-

3 at 4-5.) Citing this Court’s July 31, 2015 opinion and order (DE 39) and 

September 9, 2015 supplemental order (DE 45) in Case No. 2:14-cv-12626-SFC-

                                                            

10 Plaintiff’s March 20, 2015 FOIA request appears to have included copies of a 

First Amendment to William A. Powell Agreement of Trust, Plaintiff’s Social 

Security Card and Driver’s License, the Last Will and Testament of William A. 

Powell, and a program for the memorial service of William Andrew Powell. See 

Case No. 2:15-cv-11616-PDB-APP (DE 30-1 at 9-30.)

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 14 of 29 Pg ID 746
15

MJH, Defendant IRS argues Plaintiff “received full judicial relief” as to the 

photocopy request (DE 9-3 at 4) and that his inspection request (DE 9-3 at 5) is 

duplicative and moot based upon Plaintiff’s inspection at the September 3, 2015 

status conference before Judge Cox. (See DE 45 at 15-16; see also DE 45 at 24-

26, Brown Decl. (DE 45 at 67 ¶¶ 17-18).) In fact, in Case No. 2:14-cv-12626-

SFC-MJH, the Court’s September 9, 2015 order provides: “The parties appeared 

on September 3, 2015, and, in the presence of the Court, Plaintiff inspected the 

original Form 2553. Plaintiff was also provided with a certified copy of the 

document. Plaintiff has therefore obtained all relief he sought as to this 

document[,]” (DE 45 at 3). Therefore, assuming Plaintiff’s February 26, 2015 

request for the 1990 Form 2553 (Election by a Small Business Corporation) is the 

same as Plaintiff’s February 26, 2015 request for the 1989/1990 tax return with the 

DLN 17953-494-00101 (compare DE 9-3 at 4, DE 9-3 at 5), Plaintiff has received 

relief on his Form 2553 request.11 

Second, it appears that Defendant does not possess documents responsive to 

Plaintiff’s February 26, 2015 request for a Form SS-4 (“Application for Employer 

Identification Number”). (DE 9-3 at 1-2.) At the outset, I note that, while this 

                                                            

11 To the extent these requests are not the same, I note that Brown’s March 10, 2015 

letter explains: “You asked for a copy of the document identified by [DLN] 

17953-494-00101-0, for the tax year 1989 and 1990[,]” and continues, “You may 

access Document 6209 at the following URL . . . .” (DE 9-3 at 5, DE 45 at 118.) 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 15 of 29 Pg ID 747
16

specific request does not list a taxable year, Brown’s declaration assumes a Form 

SS-4 processed in 1989. (DE 45 at 67 n.3.) Brown declares that Defendant IRS 

“does not maintain records of Forms SS-4 for years prior to 1998[,]” ultimately 

explaining, “[b]ecause the Service does not maintain Forms SS-4 from 1989, there 

are no records responsive to Mr. Powell’s request and I am unable to provide Mr. 

Powell with the Form SS-4 he has requested. Mr. Powell would need to request 

this document from the SSA.” (DE 45 at 67-69 ¶¶ 19-23.) In addition, White 

declared that, having searched for a Form SS-4 with respect to a previous request 

by Plaintiff, he (White) “did not locate a copy of the Form SS-4 because it was 

processed in 1989, and the Service had destroyed the record pursuant to standard 

record retention policies[,]” and “ha[s] previously advised Mr. Powell that if he 

wished to obtain a copy of that Form SS-4, he could request it from the Social 

Security Administration.” (DE 45 at 42 ¶¶ 33-35.)12 Thus, in addition to the 

absence of a response from Plaintiff, the Court has no reason to doubt Defendant 

IRS’s assertion that “[t]he Service does not retain SS-4s for years prior to 1998 and 

                                                            

12 Moreover, referencing the Zogby Declaration (DE 35 ¶¶ 4, 7-15) and this Court’s 

July 31, 2015 opinion and order (DE 39) in Case No. 2:14-cv-12626-SFC-MJH, 

Defendant IRS claims the SS-4 request “is precluded by res judicata.” (DE 45 at 

16.)

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 16 of 29 Pg ID 748
17

therefore the Service has no responsive documents to this request.” (DE 45 at 

27.)13

Third, there do not appear to be any documents responsive to Plaintiff’s 

February 26, 2015 request for certain MFTs and several Forms 990 (“Return of 

Organization Exempt From Income Tax”). (DE 9-3 at 3.) Here, Defendant IRS 

contends that “Plaintiff appears to mistakenly believe that the Powell Printing Co. 

‘is under a 527 POL (Political Organization), which would have to file one of the 

990 series.’” (DE 45 at 14; see also Brown Decl. (DE 45 at 69 ¶¶ 24, 31).) 

Brown’s declaration explains this position, ultimately stating, “the transcript 

actually indicates that the Powell Printing company was not a 527 political 

organization[,]” and “[i]n my review of the Powell Company Printing transcripts I 

have not seen any indication that it was a tax exempt organization.” (DE 45 at ¶¶ 

32-37.) Also, as Brown points out, Plaintiff also requested information on MFT 67 

for 1988 to 1994 during December 2014, and White responded, “I researched our 

records and found that there are no documents specifically responsive to your 

request.” (DE 45 at 46, DE 45 at 51 ¶ 7, DE 45 at 70 ¶ 25, DE 45 at 77.) 

Moreover, Brown explains that Forms 990 are tax returns which need to be 

requested using a Form 4506 as set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d). (DE 45 at 70 ¶ 

                                                            

13Based on this conclusion, the Court need not consider Defendant IRS’s assertion 

in this case that Plaintiff’s February 26, 2015 SS-4 request is duplicative of a 

request he made in Case No. 2:14-cv-12626-SFC-MJH. (DE 45 at 26.)

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 17 of 29 Pg ID 749
18

26.) In any event, Brown describes the search performed and declares: “In 

searching for the Form 990 transcripts Mr. Powell requested, I found no responsive 

documents for the Powell Printing Company for the years Mr. Powell requested.” 

(Brown Decl. (DE 45 at 70-71 ¶¶ 27-30).) Given Brown’s declarations, and the 

absence of a response from Plaintiff, the Court has no reason to doubt Defendant 

IRS’s assertion that “no records responsive to this Item have ever existed.” (DE 45 

at 14.) 

In sum, as Judge Cox noted in his September 9, 2015 order in Case No. 

2:14-cv-12626-SFC-MJH (DE 45 at 4), “[a]gency possession of the requested 

documents is ‘an indispensable prerequisite to liability in a suit under the FOIA.’” 

Vonderheide v. I.R.S., No. 98-4277, 1999 WL 1000875, *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) 

(quoting Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 155). Here, too, “[t]he IRS provided evidence in 

the form of affidavits that it had conducted a good faith search and that it did not 

possess the requested documents.” Vonderheide, 1999 WL 1000875 at *1. 

5. Defendant IRS is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s claim(s) concerning his March 2, 2015 FOIA 

request, as it appears that (a) transcript requests are not 

processed through FOIA, (b) this is a duplicate request 

and/or (c) there are no responsive documents. 

Plaintiff’s FOIA request dated March 2, 2015 seeks the Business Master 

File, specifically lien information, for 1989-1993 for Powell Printing Co./Inc., EIN 

38-2901076. (DE 9-4, DE 45 at 98-100.) Plaintiff’s request was received on 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 18 of 29 Pg ID 750
19

March 3, 2015. A March 10, 2015 letter from Senior Disclosure Specialist Brinda 

L. Brown indicates that Plaintiff needed to “[p]rovide proof of [his] right to access 

the requested records.” (DE 45 at 115-116.) Here, too, it seems that no timely 

action was taken in response to Plaintiff’s March 16, 2015 facsimile. See Brown 

Decl. (DE 45 at 66-67 ¶¶ 13-16.)14 Thus, assuming Plaintiff’s March 16, 2015 

letter also related to the March 2, 2015 request, Plaintiff is deemed to have 

exhausted his administrative remedies as to a challenge to the same on the basis 

that Defendant failed to comply with the applicable time limit. 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(6)(C)(i). 

Nonetheless, the Court should conclude that Defendant IRS is entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s March 2, 2015 FOIA claims which are the 

subject of the amended complaint at bar. First, as to Plaintiff’s request for “a 

PHOTOCOPY of the Business Master File . . . in regards to LIEN Information 

(who put the lien on the business or on the return) ‘Specific’ for the years of 1989 

to 1993 for the Powell Printing Co/Inc . . .[,]” (DE 45 at 98), Brown declares that 

“[t]ranscripts may be obtained through routine procedures and are not processed 

through the FOIA.” (DE 45 at 72-73 ¶ 38.) Second, Brown also attests that “the 

lien information request appears to be a duplicate request[,]” citing Plaintiff’s April 

                                                            

14 In his unverified first amended complaint, Plaintiff claims he did so on March 16, 

2015. (DE 9-1 at 5.) Twenty (20) business days would have expired on April 10, 

2015. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 19 of 29 Pg ID 751
20

26, 2014 request (F14122-0081). (DE 45 at 73 ¶ 39-40.) Third, even if the Court 

has jurisdiction to enjoin withholding or order production under 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(4)(B), it does not appear that there are any responsive documents. After 

discussing the response to the 2014 request, Brown further declared: 

Nonetheless, in order to attempt once again to obtain records for Mr. 

Powell, I contacted the Service’s Centralized Lien Operations Field 

Office Resource Team (‘Lien Team’) and asked them to find any 

records related to liens filed on the Powell Printing Company’s 

account between 1988 and 1994. 

I received an email in response to my request for records from a 

member of the Lien Team, which stated: “I cannot locate any liens in 

the Automated Lien System for the taxpayer listed below at this time.” 

I have been unable to locate any other responsive records to Mr. 

Powell’s lien information request. 

(DE 45 at 74 ¶¶ 41-43.) Given this representation and the absence of a response by 

Plaintiff, the Court has no reason to question the reasonableness of the agency’s 

search under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C). Therefore, Defendant IRS is entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims regarding his March 2, 2015 FOIA 

request. 

6. Defendant IRS is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s claim(s) concerning his April 10, 2015 FOIA 

request, because the requests at issue do not comply with § 

552(a)(3)(A) and/or the documents sought do not exist. 

Plaintiff’s FOIA request dated April 10, 2015 seeks seven (7) items 

concerning William A. Powell, Andrew Powell or Powell Printing Co./Inc., among 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 20 of 29 Pg ID 752
21

which are four (4) Business Master File Transcripts (MFTs), two (2) Formal 

Closing Agreement Letters, as well as a request for Forms 8871 and 8872 for 

Powell Printing Co./Inc. (DE 9-5, DE 45 at 129-130.) By a letter dated April 14, 

2015, Disclosure Specialist Jennifer J. Perez explained that “Disclosure offices will 

no longer process requests for transcripts[,]” and provided Plaintiff with the 

procedures for requesting transcripts. (DE 45 at 132-134.) Perez’s April 14, 2015 

letter explains that “Treasury Regulation 26 CFR 601.702(d) provides that 

request[s] for records processed in accordance with routine agency procedures are 

specifically excluded from the processing requirements of the FOIA.” (DE 45 at 

132.) 

a. Plaintiff was not required to appeal Defendant IRS’s 

April 14, 2015 response, as the agency did not comply 

with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 

This Court does appear to have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 

challenge to the content of Defendant IRS’s April 14, 2015 response. As an initial 

matter, this response was timely under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). (DE 45 at 128-

130, 132-134.) Moreover, Perez declares that she has not had interaction with 

Plaintiff since she sent her response letter on April 14, 2015. (DE 45 at 125 ¶ 14, 

DE 45 at 132.) Furthermore, Perez declares that, to her knowledge, “Mr. Powell 

has never filed an administrative appeal regarding his FOIA request [she] received 

on April 10, 2015 . . . .” (See DE 45 at 125 ¶¶ 15-18.) 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 21 of 29 Pg ID 753
22

However, even though, as noted above, a plaintiff must exhaust his 

administrative remedies before coming to the Court by first appealing the adverse 

decision within the agency, Plaintiff’s amended complaint takes issue with the fact 

that the IRS had “not explained any appeal rights for the requests filed on April 10, 

2015, which is required by FOIA.” (DE 9-1 at 7, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).) The 

veracity of this allegation is confirmed, and thus made undisputed, by Defendant’s 

submission from the IRS’s own records. (DE 45 at 132.) This undermines 

Defendant IRS’s argument that Plaintiff’s failure to appeal the April 14, 2015 

response renders his claim unexhausted. (DE 45 at 20; see also Oglesby v. U.S. 

Dep't of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“State's letter to appellant, 

however, merely informed him that he could call the agency for further 

information: ‘If you have any questions, please contact the Information and 

Privacy Staff.’ This did not qualify as notice to appellant of his right to appeal the 

negative reference to his inquiry[,]” and “was insufficient under the FOIA to 

trigger the exhaustion requirement . . . .”)). Here, as in Oglesby, Defendant IRS’s 

April 14, 2015 letter advised Plaintiff to call or write if he had any questions, but 

did not otherwise notify Plaintiff of his right to appeal. (DE 45 at 132.) Therefore, 

the Court should address the merits of Plaintiff’s claim as to the content of 

Defendant IRS’s April 14, 2015 response. 

b. Plaintiff’s April 10, 2015 FOIA request was not 

appropriate as contemplated by 552(a)(3)(A). 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 22 of 29 Pg ID 754
23

With respect to the merits of Plaintiff’s April 10, 2015 FOIA request, his 

amended complaint takes issue with the content of Defendant IRS’s April 14, 2015 

response. (See DE 9-1 at 6-7.) For example, Plaintiff contends that “FOIA has 

DENIED Plaintiff’s Requests for the Business Master File Transcripts for William 

A. Powell and Andrew Powell . . . .” (DE 9-1 at 6.) Furthermore, claiming that 

previous, similar requests were processed under FOIA, Plaintiff suspects this 

abrupt change of procedure following his April 10, 2015 FOIA request is because 

it will reveal alleged fraudulent activity, data breach, identity theft and tax refund 

fraud that was not detected until Plaintiff “brought the suspicious activity to the 

IRS on or after 2012.” (DE 9-1 at 6-7.) In addition, Plaintiff contends that 

Defendant IRS’s April 14 correspondence “did not acknowledge whether or not the 

other Requests in the correspondence were going to be processed, but focused on 

the BMF Transcripts only.” (DE 9-1 at 7.) In other words, he seems to challenge 

the April 14, 2015 response’s failure to address the two (2) requests for Formal 

Closing Agreement Letters and the one (1) request for Forms 8872 and 8871 for 

Powell Printing Co./Inc. 

i. Plaintiff’s BMF Transcript requests 

Plaintiff claims that FOIA is the appropriate vehicle by which to request the 

documents listed in his April 10, 2015 request. (DE 9-1 at 7.) However, at least as 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 23 of 29 Pg ID 755
24

to the requests for tax transcripts, the Court should disagree. In this regard, as 

Defendant IRS points out, Plaintiff’s request “does not follow the Service’s FOIA 

regulations and[,] therefore[,] cannot state a valid FOIA claim.” (See DE 45 at 19-

20 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)).) Defendant IRS’s April 14, 2015 letter cited 

26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d) in explaining that “[d]isclosure offices will no longer 

process requests for transcripts[,]” and attached “Procedures for Requesting 

Transcripts,” among which is listed “Tax Return Transcripts.” 15 (DE 45 at 132-

134.) Importantly, with respect to “[i]nspection of tax returns and attachments or 

transcripts[,]” Section 602.702(d) provides: 

The inspection of returns and attachments is governed by the 

provisions of the internal revenue laws and regulations thereunder 

promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. See section 6103 and 

the regulations thereunder. Written requests for a copy of a tax return 

and attachments or a transcript of a tax return shall be made using 

IRS form 4506, “Request for Copy or Transcript of Tax Form.” A 

reasonable fee, as the Commissioner may from time to time establish, 

may be charged for such copies. 

26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s 

April 10, 2015 written requests sought a copy of a tax return and attachments or a 

transcript of a tax return, he was required to use IRS Form 4506.16 It follows that 

                                                            

15 The directions list several methods for requesting transcripts, one of which is 

“[c]omplete and mail Form 4506-T . . . to the IRS.” (DE 45 at 132, 133-134.)    

16 The IRS has a few iterations of Form 4506 (“Request for Copy of Tax Return”), 

including Form 4506-A (“Request for Public Inspection or Copy of Exempt or 

Political Organization IRS Form”), Form 4506-T (“Request for Transcript of Tax 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 24 of 29 Pg ID 756
25

Plaintiff’s pursuit of such records without using IRS Form 4506 would not have 

been in accordance with IRS regulation 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d)(1), and, therefore, 

would not have complied with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(ii). 

ii. Formal Closing Agreement Letters 

The Court must also consider the propriety of Plaintiff’s FOIA requests for: 

(a) the “Formal Closing Agreement Letter for the Federal Estate Tax Return (706)” 

of William A. Powell for 1992 through 1996, (b) the “Formal Closing Agreement 

Letter for the Federal Estate Tax Return (706)” of Andrew Powell between 1987 

through 1998, and (c) the Forms 8872 and 8871. (See DE 9-5, DE 45 at 129-130.) 

It seems that Defendant IRS treats these requests in the same way it did the four (4) 

requests for BMF Transcripts – as a “tax return and attachments” or a “transcript of 

a tax return,” 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d)(1). (See DE 45 at 18-20, Perez Decl. (DE 45 

at 123 ¶¶ 4-5.)) If the formal closing letters and Forms 8871 and 8872 so qualify, 

then these requests meet the same fate as those requesting the BMF transcripts; 

they should be made in accordance with 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d)(1) and, by 

extension, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(ii). If not, further consideration as to their 

propriety is in order. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

Return”) and Form 4506T-EZ (“Short Form Request for Individual Tax Return 

Transcript”). See www.irs.gov. 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 25 of 29 Pg ID 757
26

With respect to the formal closing agreement letters, Perez declares that, to 

her knowledge, Plaintiff “has not established his right to access records for Andrew 

Powell[,]” but “has established his right to access records belonging to William A. 

Powell.” (DE 45 at 123 ¶¶ 7-8.) However, Perez further declares: “It is not clear 

from Mr. Powell’s request what he means by, ‘Formal Closing Agreement Letter,’ 

so I assumed that he was referring to an attachment to a tax return.” (DE 45 at 124 

¶ 9.)17 Although not an argument expressly presented by Defendant IRS (see DE 

45 at 18-20), this purported lack of clarity raises the question of whether Plaintiff’s 

two requests for the “Formal Closing Agreement Letters” even comply with 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(i)’s requirement of a reasonable description. Moreover, 

Perez’s declaration essentially challenges Plaintiff’s entitlement to access the 

records of Andrew Powell (see DE 45 at 123 ¶ 7), presumably Plaintiff’s 

grandfather (see DE 45 at 18; see also DE 48 at 24); in other words, questioning 

whether Plaintiff is “properly authorized to make such a request.” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(3)(A)(ii), 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(c)(5) (“Reasonable description of records; 

identity and right of the requester.”), Subsection (C). Therefore, in the absence of 

a response from Plaintiff, and in consideration of the explanations offered by 

Defendant IRS through Perez’s declaration, the Court should conclude that 

                                                            

17Relatedly, she declares that, while preparing her declaration, she did some further 

checking, which revealed, “[t]here was no examination of William A. Powell’s 

estate tax return during the years Mr. Powell specified.” (DE 45 at 124 n.1.)   

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 26 of 29 Pg ID 758
27

Plaintiff’s two requests for “Formal Closing Agreement Letters” do not comply 

with Section 552(a)(3)(A). 

iii. Forms 8871 and 8872 

Finally, there remain Plaintiff’s April 10, 2015 requests for Form 8871 

(“Political Organization Notice of Section 527 Status”) and Form 8872 (“Political 

Organization Report of Contributions and Expenditures”). See DE 9-5, 

www.irs.gov. Perez has declared that Forms 8871 and 8872 are “returns filed by 

tax-exempt organizations.” (DE 45 at 123 ¶ 6.) Moreover, as noted above, Brown 

has declared that “the transcript actually indicates that the Powell Printing 

Company was not a 527 political organization[,]” and “[i]n my review of the 

Powell Company Printing transcripts[,] I have not seen any indication that it was a 

tax exempt organization.” (DE 45 at 72 ¶¶ 36-37, DE 9-3 at 3.) Given Defendant 

IRS’s assertion that Plaintiff appears to be “mistaken” in his belief that Powell 

Printing Co. is a Section 527 political organization (DE 45 at 14-15, 25), the Perez 

and Brown declarations in this regard, and the absence of evidence to the contrary 

from Plaintiff, it appears that no such documents exist. 

Additionally, the Instructions for Form 8871 note that “[t]he IRS is required 

to make publicly available on the internet and at its offices a list of the 

organizations that file Form 8871 . . . .” See https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i8871.pdf (Rev. February 2011). Written requests for such documents should 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 27 of 29 Pg ID 759
28

be made by Form 4506-A. See 26 C.F.R. 601.702(d)(3) (“Public inspection of 

certain information returns, notices, and reports furnished by certain tax-exempt 

organizations and certain trusts.”). Thus, the Court should conclude that 

Defendant IRS is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint concerns his April 10, 2015 request for Forms 8871 and 8872, either 

because it appears that no such documents exist or because the request does not 

comply with 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(d)(3) and, by extension, 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(3)(A)(ii). 

7. Conclusion 

The sole cause of action delineated in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is 

an alleged violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552, based upon his FOIA requests to Defendant 

IRS dated: December 4, 2014, February 26, 2015, March 2, 2015, and April 10, 

2015. These claims are the limit of the Undersigned’s report and recommendation. 

For the reasons stated above, Defendant IRS is entitled to summary judgment with 

respect to all four FOIA requests. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). Failure to 

file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 28 of 29 Pg ID 760
29

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 

505 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others 

with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 

390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 

1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections 

must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

 s/Anthony P. Patti _________________________ 

Anthony P. Patti 

Dated: April 20, 2016 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

2:15-cv-11033-PDB-APP Doc # 55 Filed 04/20/16 Pg 29 of 29 Pg ID 761