UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Eric Santifer, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Inergy Automotive Systems, LLC 

and Jim Rebbeck, 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-11486 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti 

ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [48], ADOPTING IN PART REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [47], AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [29] 

 On April 24, 2015, pro se plaintiff Eric Santifer filed a complaint 

against defendants Inergy Automotive Systems, LLC and Jim Rebbeck, 

arguing they wrongfully terminated him on the basis of race. (Dkt. 1.) 

Defendants moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. 29.) On August 12, 

2016, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation 

granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 47.) On 

August 31, 2016, plaintiff filed objections to the report and 

recommendation. (Dkt. 48.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s 

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objections are denied, the report and recommendation is adopted in 

part, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 

I. Background 

The factual background that led plaintiff to file his complaint has 

been set forth in detail in the report and recommendation and it will not 

be repeated here. (See Dkt. 47 at 4–7.) 

In the report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge 

recommended granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

the following grounds. First, plaintiff’s claim is time barred, even if 

considered under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Dkt. 47 at 9–13.) 

Second, plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination. 

(Id. at 14–15.) Third, even if plaintiff stated a prima facie case, he 

failed to rebut defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

terminating his employment. (Id. at 16–19.) Fourth, as a matter of 

law, defendant Rebbeck cannot be held liable because he was not 

plaintiff’s supervisor. (Id. at 19.) 

Plaintiff objects to each of the recommendations in the report and 

recommendation. (Dkt. 48.) 

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II. Legal Standard 

A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is made 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]his recommendation has no 

presumptive weight,” and the district judge “has the responsibility of 

making the final determination.” Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1-

21, 286 F.R.D. 319, 320 (E.D. Mich. 2012). If a party objects to part or 

all of the report and recommendation, the district judge must review de 

novo those parts to which the party has objected. Lardie v. Birkett, 221 

F. Supp. 2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De 

novo review “entails at least a review of the evidence that faced the 

Magistrate Judge.” Lardie, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 

After reviewing a report and recommendation, a court may 

“accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations.” Id. If the 

report and recommendation is adopted after de novo review, the court 

“need not state with specificity what it reviewed; it is sufficient for the 

[c]ourt to say that it has engaged in a de novo review.” Id. 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff objects to each of the reasons for granting defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment that the Magistrate Judge set forth in 

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the report and recommendation. (See generally Dkt. 48.) Plaintiff first 

objects on the ground that January 15, 2015 cannot serve as the “official 

notification date” that would trigger the ninety-day statute of 

limitations. 

A plaintiff alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., must file an administrative action 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before 

filing a complaint in federal court. Once the EEOC makes a final 

decision, it will issue to the plaintiff a notice of his or her right to sue 

(“RTS”), and the plaintiff must file a civil suit in federal court within 

ninety days of receiving the RTS. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). 

In this case, plaintiff argues he filed his complaint with this Court 

within ninety days of receiving the RTS. On January 14, 2015, the 

EEOC made a final determination in plaintiff’s case, finding it was 

“unable to conclude that the information obtained [during its 

investigation of plaintiff’s complaint] establishes violations of” Title VII. 

(Dkt. 1 at 5.) That same day, the EEOC issued the RTS and 

communicated with plaintiff that the RTS would be mailed on January 

15, 2015. (Dkt. 48 at 1.) The EEOC mailed the RTS, dated January 14, 

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2015, to the address on record for plaintiff, which was a P.O. Box that 

plaintiff “regularly checked . . . on Saturdays.” (Dkt. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff 

claims he checked the box on January 17, 2017, but had not received 

the RTS, and did not check the box again until January 25, 2015, at 

which point he received the notice. (Id.) 

To support his argument that he filed his complaint with the 

Court within the statute of limitations, plaintiff first argues that he was 

not told about “reply times and deadlines” by the EEOC. He also 

argues that because he is a pro se litigant, he cannot be held to have 

prior knowledge of the five-day notification rule that states the ninetyday statute of limitations begins to run five days after the RTS notice 

has been mailed. Finally, plaintiff argues that he had “compelling 

personal responsibilities to secure housing and employment prior to 

starting to work on” his complaint. (Dkt. 48 at 1–4.) 

Although plaintiff was not told by the EEOC that the mailing of 

the RTS would trigger the statute of limitations, he admits in his 

objections that he was informed by the EEOC on January 14, 2015 that 

the RTS would be mailed on January 15, 2015. (Dkt. 48 at 1.) Thus, 

because plaintiff knew the letter would be mailed on January 15, 2015, 

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and has not offered evidence to suggest it was not mailed on that day, 

plaintiff is presumed to have constructively received the RTS 

notification on January 15, 2015, the day the letter was mailed to 

plaintiff. Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 

209 F.3d 552, 558–59 (6th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff constructively received 

RTS on the date it was mailed). The statute of limitations period began 

to run on January 20, 2015, and plaintiff was required to file his 

lawsuit by April 20, 2015. 

The rule may seem harsh, but the Sixth Circuit is clear that 

“notice is given and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins 

running, on the fifth day following the EEOC’s mailing of an RTS 

notification . . . by virtue of a presumption of actual delivery and receipt 

within that five-day duration, unless the plaintiff rebuts that 

presumption with proof that he or she did not receive notification within 

that period.” Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 557 (emphasis in 

original). And this Court cannot alter this rule even for a pro se

plaintiff, as “[t]he federal courts have strictly enforced Title VII’s 

ninety-day statutory limit.” Id. 

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Plaintiff also argues in his objections that he was delayed in filing 

his lawsuit because he was attempting to secure employment and 

housing. But he admits he began working on the complaint in late 

February (see Dkt. 48 at 3), which indicates he had at least seven weeks 

left in which to file the complaint before the deadline. Thus, after 

concluding a de novo review of the report and recommendation with 

regards to the statute of limitations issue, the Court concludes the 

magistrate judge accurately applied the law to the facts, and denies 

plaintiff’s objection on this ground. 

Because the Court finds plaintiff’s claims are time barred, the 

Court need not address plaintiff’s remaining objections. Accordingly, 

the Court adopts only the part of the report and recommendation about 

the statute of limitations issue, and defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is granted. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s objections are DENIED. 

(Dkt. 48.) The report and recommendation (Dkt. 47) is ADOPTED IN 

PART as to the statute of limitations issue and defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. 29.) 

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 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 1, 2017 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 1, 2017. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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