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S. HRG. 111–492 

DEFAULT NATION: ARE 401(K) TARGET DATE 

FUNDS MISSING THE MARK? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

WASHINGTON, DC 

OCTOBER 28, 2009 

Serial No. 111–14 

Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin, Chairman 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

RICHARD SHELBY, Alabama 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

GEORGE LeMIEUX, FLORIDA 

ORRIN HATCH, Utah 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

DEBRA WHITMAN, Majority Staff Director 

MICHAEL BASSETT, Ranking Member Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening Statement of Senator Herb Kohl ............................................................. 1 

Opening Statement of Senator Bob Corker ........................................................... 2 

PANEL OF WITNESSES

Statement of Barbara Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce and Income 

Security, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC ................ 3 

Statement of Andrew J. Donohue, Director of Investment Management, U.S. 

Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC .................................. 26 

Statement of Phyllis C. Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC .... 39 

Statement of John Rekenthaler, CFA, Vice President of Research, 

Morningstar, Chicago, IL ..................................................................................... 53 

Statement of Ralph Derbyshire, Senior Vice President and Deputy General 

Counsel for FMR LLC, the Parent Company of Fidelity Investments, Marlborough, MA ......................................................................................................... 61 

Statement of Michael Case Smith, Senior Vice President, Institutional Strategies, Avatar Associates, New York, NY .............................................................. 73 

APPENDIX 

Statement of Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc. ................... 91 

Letter from Kevin Keller, CEO, Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc. with additional information ............................................................... 98 

Testimony submitted by Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration by Marilyn 

Capelli Dimitroff .................................................................................................. 104 

Statement from the Profit Sharing/401K Council of America (PSCA) ................ 110 

Statement from the National Association of Independent Retirement Plan 

Advisors (‘‘NAIRPA’’) ........................................................................................... 114 

Testimony submitted by Richard O. Michaud and Robert O. Michaud .............. 119 

Information from Investment Company Institute on Fees In Target Date 

Funds .................................................................................................................... 129 

(III) 

(1) 

DEFAULT NATION: ARE 401(K) TARGET DATE 

FUNDS MISSING THE MARK? 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 2:02 p.m., in room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Herb Kohl (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kohl, Bennet, Corker, and LeMieux. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERB KOHL, CHAIRMAN 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon and thank you all for being here. 

Today we will be talking about the promise and the reality of 

target date funds, which are an increasingly popular choice for people saving for retirement. Target date funds were developed for the 

average American worker who understands the importance of saving but may not understand the complexity of investing. Target 

date funds, which automatically adjust their investment portfolios 

to become more conservative as the participant gets close to retirement, come with the promise from financial firms that investors 

can simply indicate when they would like to retire, and the firm 

will handle the rest. 

Many Americans think target date funds sound like a great idea, 

and the U.S. Government agrees. In 2007, the Department of Labor 

qualified target date funds to be a default investment fund for millions of Americans who are automatically enrolled in 401(k) funds 

by their employer. As of March 2009, Fidelity reported that 96 percent of their plans with automatic enrollment used target date 

funds as their default option. Therefore, a conversation about target date funds is really a conversation about the future of America’s retire security. 

In February, our committee raised some concerns about the recent performance of target date funds. We found that the composition of these funds varied widely across the industry, and many 

contained an inappropriately high level of risk. Some workers in 

funds with a 2010 retirement date lost as much as 41 percent of 

their 401(k) savings in 2008. 

We discovered that there is no standard for what financial firms 

label and advertise as target date funds and no regulation of their 

composition. In response to our request, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Labor held a joint hearing in June on target date funds, and I am hopeful that we will 

2 

soon see greater oversight of this product that is on track to become the No. 1 savings vehicle in America. 

The Aging Committee has also continued with our investigation 

of target date funds, and the more we learn, the more concerns we 

have. This afternoon we will discuss three key problems. First, 

there is a lack of transparency and consistency in the design of target date funds. Second, many funds charge excessive fees, eroding 

the value of a worker’s assets over time. Third, fund managers 

have a conflict of interest in constructing target date funds and 

must resist the temptation to put their bottom line above the interests of the participants. Today the committee is releasing a report 

detailing each of these issues and their impact on retirement savings. 

This afternoon’s hearing is the third in a series we have held on 

strengthening the 401(k) system, which is steadily replacing defined contribution plans throughout our country. Previously we addressed the issue of hidden fees in 401(k) plans, which can have 

a big impact on retirement savings over several decades, and we 

have also examined the long-term effects of 401(k) loans and withdrawals on workers’ retirement savings. We have introduced legislation with Senator Harkin to require the disclosure of 401(k) fees 

and will soon introduce a bill to implement GAO’s recommendations to reduce the effects of loans and withdrawals. After all, in 

our efforts to encourage Americans to save for retirement, we must 

make sure that they are also able to save smartly. 

I would like to turn right now to the ranking member on this 

committee, Senator Corker. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB CORKER, RANKING MEMBER 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I apologize. I needed 

to introduce a panelist in another committee. 

I want to welcome each of you as witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. I think we obviously want to encourage Americans to save for the future. I think 

most of us are concerned about a calamity that is coming down the 

pike with people not saving as much as they should with retirement. At the same time, we want to make sure that people have 

the opportunity to invest in ways that are beneficial to them, and 

we do not want to discourage employers who are good actors, who 

are trying to encourage their employees to save, from doing so. So, 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for, again, having this hearing. 

I look forward to the panelists. Without further ado, I look forward to their testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Now we will be introducing our panel. 

Our first witness on the panel will be Barbara Bovbjerg of the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Ms. Bovbjerg is the Director of the Education, Workforce and Income Security team where 

she oversees studies on aging and retirement income policy. 

Next, we will be hearing from Andrew Donohue, the Director of 

the Division of Investment Management at the U.S. Securities and 

Exchange Commission. As Director, Mr. Donohue is responsible for 

developing regulatory policy and administering the Federal securities laws that apply to mutual funds and investment advisors. 

3 

Also joining us today is Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary of 

the Employee Benefits Security Administration at the Department 

of Labor where she oversees the administration, regulation, and enforcement of title I of ERISA. 

Next, we will be hearing from John Rekenthaler of Morningstar, 

one of the leading providers of independent investment research. 

Mr. Rekenthaler is Vice President of Research and New Product 

Development. 

The next witness will be Ralph Derbyshire, Senior Vice President 

and Deputy General Counsel for Fidelity Investments, the leading 

provider of target date funds. 

Finally, we will be hearing from Michael Case Smith of Avatar 

Associates, an independent investment manager based in New 

York. Mr. Smith is Senior Vice President of Institutional Strategies 

and Portfolio Manager of Target date funds for Avatar. 

Thank you all so much for being here. Ms. Bovbjerg, we will take 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF BARBARA BOVBJERG, DIRECTOR, EDUCATION, WORKFORCE AND INCOME SECURITY, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. BOVBJERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker. 

I am pleased to be here today to set the stage for the discussion 

of default investments in 401(k) savings plans. Although in the 

past, 401(k)’s were supplemental to defined benefit pension plans, 

401(k)’s are increasingly the primary source of workers’ pension income today. As such, these accounts will need to be sufficient to 

support workers through decades of retirement. 

My testimony today describes 401(k) saving and its challenges 

and measures that may improve such saving. My statement is 

based on reports we have issued over the last several years on 

401(k)’s, many of them for this committee. 

First, saving and its challenges. Only about half the workforce 

participates in a pension plan at all, and only about a third of 

workers save in defined contribution plans, of which 401(k)’s are 

the most common. Significantly, only about 8 percent of those in 

the lowest earnings quintile participate in one. The savings that result, of course, are insufficient. 

According to the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance, the median 

account balance for DC plans overall was about $23,000 for workers with a DC plan and not quite $28,000 for households. As you 

might expect, lower earners save much less. Their median account 

balance was $6,400. Workers nearing retirement age did better, but 

with median savings of about $40,000, and that is still not enough. 

These figures suggest that relatively few save, and even those 

who do save, save too little to ensure a secure retirement. These 

findings were developed from data collected before the market 

meltdown, by the way, so account size has likely fallen even lower 

today. 

Leakage from existing 401(k) savings partly explains the small 

account balances. Some 401(k) participants take actions that reduce savings they have already accumulated, such as borrowing 

from their account, taking hardship withdrawals, simply closing 

the account and taking the money when they change jobs. AlVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jun 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\55906.TXT SAG PsN: JOYCE
4 

though this so-called leakage affects a minority of 401(k) accounts, 

participants who take these actions can experience significant reductions of potential retirement income, both from the loss of compound interest, as well as from the financial penalties associated 

with the early withdrawals. 

In a recent report to this committee, we called for measures to 

improve the information participants receive about the disadvantages of early withdrawals and for statutory changes in hardship 

withdrawal rules. Reducing leakage, which is in fact self-inflicted 

savings reduction, would certainly help maintain what little savings workers accumulate. 

Fees can also reduce 401(k) savings, often without the account 

owner’s knowledge. We have reported that 401(k) participants can 

be unaware that they pay any fees for their accounts, and even 

when they know fees are being charged, few participants know how 

much they are. Even small fees can add up over a working lifetime 

and reduce retirement savings in a significant way. Hidden service 

provider arrangements may also drive fees higher than they need 

to be and thus cause plan participants and fiduciaries to unknowingly pay more than they should. 

We have called for improved disclosure of fees to help reduce excessive and unnecessary drains on 401(k) savings. I am pleased to 

note that Labor is taking regulatory actions and that, in fact, legislative remedies are also moving forward. 

So let me turn now to some good news. As we reported to you 

last week, provisions to encourage automatic enrollment appear to 

be raising 401(k) participation, which means the prospects for improved saving are rising. Plans using auto enrollment have increased from 1 percent in 2004 to about 16 percent in 2009, with 

higher rates of adoption among larger plan sponsors. Indeed, Fidelity Investments estimates that almost half of all 401(k) participants are in auto enroll plans and that participation rates have 

risen accordingly. This is good news, indeed. 

However, there are still some areas for concern. In our view, employers need to take action to increase saving, as well as participation, and this means higher default contribution rates and more 

adoption of automatic escalation. 

We also note that the default investments are increasingly target 

date funds, a focus of today’s hearing. Such funds can be advantageous to workers who do not want to rebalance their investments 

regularly, but the variation in these funds suggests that greater 

care should be given to their transparency and to their cost. 

In conclusion, American workers are increasingly being asked to 

save for their own retirements and they are not saving enough. 

Government action to enhance participation holds promise, but 

measures to discourage leakage and the charging of hidden fees 

must also receive priority. Also, it would be shameful if the very 

act of encouraging participation through automatic mechanisms 

also placed workers funds in default investments that do not serve 

their needs. As workers are faced with increasing responsibility for 

their own retirements, more must be done by Government and employers to help them. 

That concludes my statement. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bovbjerg follows:] 

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Donohue. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. DONOHUE, DIRECTOR OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. DONOHUE. Chairman Kohl, Ranking Member Corker, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Andrew Donohue and I am the Director of the Division of Investment 

Management at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and I 

am pleased to testify on behalf of the commission about target date 

funds. 

Today’s hearing occurs against the backdrop of recent turmoil in 

financial markets. 

Today workers are increasingly dependent on participant-directed vehicles such as 401(k) plans and responsible for managing 

their own retirement portfolios. 

Target date funds are designed to make it easier for investors to 

hold a diversified portfolio of assets that is rebalanced automatically among asset classes. Today assets of target date funds registered with the commission total approximately $227 billion. Target date funds have become more prevalent in 401(k) plans as a result of the designation of these funds as a qualified default investment alternative under the Department of Labor pursuant to the 

Pension Protection Act of 2006. 

On June 18, 2009, the commission and the Department of Labor 

held a joint hearing to explore issues relating to target date funds. 

While some of the hearings spoke of the benefits of target date 

funds, for example, as a means to permit investors to diversity 

their holdings and prepare for retirement, a number also raised 

concerns. 

One concern that has been raised is the degree to which communications to investors in target date funds have or have not resulted in a thorough understanding by investors of those funds and 

their associated risks. Losses in target date funds incurred in 2008 

raise questions about the extent to which investors understand the 

risk of target date funds. 

Recent variations in returns among target date funds with the 

same target date also have raised questions about the extent to 

which differences among target date funds have been effectively 

communicated to investors. 

Marketing materials for target date funds typically portray the 

funds as offering a simple solution for investors’ retirement needs. 

The marketing materials frequently are less nuanced than the disclosure found in the target date funds’ prospectuses. To the extent 

that an investor relies primarily on a fund’s marketing materials, 

the investor may develop unreasonable expectations regarding target date funds and their ability to provide for retirement. 

Often target date funds contain a year, such as 2010, in their 

name. These names provide a convenient mechanism by which an 

investor may identify a fund that appears to meet his or her retirement needs. However, investors may not understand from the 

name the significance of the target date in the fund’s management 

or the nature of the fund’s asset allocation to and after that date. 

27 

For example, investors may expect that at the target date most, if 

not all, of the fund’s assets will be invested conservatively to provide a pool of assets for retirement needs. 

At Chairman Schapiro’s request, the commission’s Division of Investment Management has undertaken a review of target date 

funds with a view to recommending steps that the commission may 

take to address concerns that have been raised. Because many individuals invest in target date funds through 401(k) plans and other 

defined contribution plans that are not regulated by the commission, we have been cooperating closely with our counterparts at the 

Department of Labor. 

The Division of Investment Management is focusing on two areas 

where enhanced regulation of target date funds may be appropriate: funds’ names and on funds’ sales material. 

Section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act makes it unlawful 

for any mutual fund to adopt, as part of its name, any word or 

words that the commission finds are materially deceptive or misleading. One approach that we are examining closely is whether 

there are circumstances where the use of a date in a fund’s name 

should be restricted in any way or prohibited. 

The division also is considering whether we should recommend 

that the commission amend its rules governing mutual funds sales 

materials to address issues raised by target date funds. 

The division is concerned that target date marketing messages 

be balanced and they not suggest uniformity or simplicity of target 

date funds where they are not present. 

Finally, together with the commission’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, the division is developing outreach efforts to 

investors that could help address potential misconceptions about 

target date funds. This is an area where we are hopeful that we 

can leverage our partnership with the Department of Labor to enhance the effectiveness of our efforts. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Special Committee, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donohue follows:] 

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Borzi. 

STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS C. BORZI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. BORZI. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Corker. Thank you so much for inviting me to discuss target date 

funds and the Department of Labor’s activities in connection with 

these funds and retirement plans. 

I am Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Employee Benefits Security Administration, also called EBSA. EBSA’s 

mission is to protect the security of retirement, health, and other 

employee benefit plans for America’s workers and to support the 

growth of employer-sponsored benefits. 

Mr. Chairman, as you have already noted, the growth of target 

date funds as an investment option in participant-directed individual account plans over the past few years has been really significant. At the end of 2008, an estimated 75 percent of 401(k) 

plans offered target date funds as an investment option. 

Target date funds are designed to simplify the burden that workers have in 401(k) plans to finance their own investments, their 

own retirements with little or no investment expertise. These 

funds, however, have been under scrutiny for the past few years for 

exposing investors and plan participants to unexpectedly large 

losses, particularly in 2008. Funds with the same target retirement 

date have investment allocations that differ significantly and thus 

produce different results. These differences in target date funds 

and the associated differences in their investment performance 

have prompted questions about whether plan fiduciaries and workers adequately understand these funds, how they operate and what 

their benefits, risks, and costs are. 

The Department shares the committee’s interest in examining 

whether target date funds provide workers with a secure retirement. As you know, in June we held a joint hearing with the SEC 

on target date funds. The hearing consisted of nine panels testifying on a variety of issues. Many panelists discussed the importance of disclosure and the challenges that exist with regard to 

clear communication about the sometimes complicated aspects of 

these funds. 

Since the June hearing, the Department has been reviewing the 

testimony, the additional submissions, and any other data that we 

have received on target date funds, and we have also been working 

with our colleagues at the SEC to explore what we can do together 

or what each individual agency can do to improve the understanding by both ERISA fiduciaries and participants of how target 

date funds operate. 

The remainder of my statement will focus on the Department’s 

outreach and oversight role related to target date funds. I want the 

committee to understand that these are an important priority of 

mine and a priority of the Secretary. We think the issues and concerns that you raised are very important and we take them very 

seriously and we are working diligently to carry out this investigation. 

40 

So let me tell you a little bit about the Department of Labor’s 

oversight. EBSA is responsible for administering and enforcing the 

fiduciary, reporting and disclosure provisions of title I of ERISA. 

ERISA protects participants and beneficiaries by holding plan fiduciaries accountable for prudently selecting the service providers 

and the plan investments. In carrying out this responsibility, plan 

fiduciaries must follow a prudent process, and they have to take 

into account all relevant information. But most importantly, they 

must act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. 

In 2006, Congress included in the Pension Protection Act provisions that were designed to promote the broader use of automatic 

enrollment in 401(k) plans. The new law provided statutory fiduciary relief for investments in certain types of default alternatives 

in the absence of participant direction. 

In 2007, the Department published a final regulation that described the types of investments that constituted qualified default 

investment alternatives, or QDIAs, and target date funds were included as a QDIA. Importantly, however, under the final regulation, even though target date funds are an acceptable form of 

QDIA, the fiduciary continues to have the obligation to prudently 

select, evaluate, and monitor any of these investment alternatives, 

including the target date funds. So the QDIA reg does not give the 

fiduciary a pass from the basic fiduciary responsibility to prudently 

select, evaluate, and monitor these funds. 

EBSA assists plan fiduciaries and others in understanding their 

obligations under ERISA through comprehensive education and 

outreach and our regulatory programs. Of course, we also provide 

oversight through our enforcement program. Under ERISA, plan fiduciaries are personally liable for losses if they acted imprudently 

in selecting and monitoring the investment choices they offer to 

their participants. So when EBSA investigators review the fiduciary selection of investments, rather than focus on how the asset 

performed, they are going to focus on the procedures used by the 

fiduciary to select and monitor the performance of the investment. 

To help educate plan fiduciaries about their obligations under 

ERISA, our education and outreach program provides information 

on specific topics such as selecting and monitoring service providers 

and investment options and automatic enrollment. We have numerous publications on our website, and we have also sponsored seminars and webcasts to help plan fiduciaries understand the law. 

Similarly, we have publications that help participants understand 

the choices that are offered through their plans. 

The Department is considering a number of additional initiatives 

to further assist plan fiduciaries and participants in understanding 

the benefits, the risks and the costs of plan investment options, including, of course, target date funds. One of our current regulatory 

initiatives involves transparency—improving disclosure to plan participants concerning their investment options and the fees that are 

charged. 

In addition, we are specifically considering what kind of disclosures need to specifically be made about target date funds. At the 

same time, we are evaluating our QDIA regulation to see whether 

41 

additional types of meaningful disclosure might be necessary when 

a target date fund is selected as a QDIA. 

We are also considering whether the Department can assist plan 

fiduciaries by providing more specific guidelines as to how they 

should go about selecting and monitoring target date funds for 

their plans regardless of whether the target date fund is a default 

investment or simply one of the investment options that are offered 

by the plan. 

Similarly, we have a regulatory initiative on investment advice. 

That was, as you probably remember, a pretty controversial regulation issued by the last administration. The Department intends to 

withdraw the final rule and the accompanying class exemption, and 

issue a new proposed rule that will support affordable and unbiased investment advice. This will help participants in choosing the 

investments, including target date funds. 

Finally, we do share the committee’s concern about the fee levels 

associated with some target date funds. As part of our regulatory 

project dealing with the disclosures of fees to plan sponsors and 

participants, we are working through the issues as they relate to 

target date funds and paying particular attention to them. I look 

forward to working with you on this and many other issues. 

Finally, thank you so much for the opportunity to testify at this 

important hearing. We remain committed to protecting plan participants and assuring the growth of retirement benefits and adequate security for America’s workers, retirees, and their families. 

I will be happy to answer any questions later on. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Borzi follows:] 

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rekenthaler. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN REKENTHALER, CFA, VICE PRESIDENT 

OF RESEARCH, MORNINGSTAR, CHICAGO, IL 

Mr. REKENTHALER. Hello. My name is John Rekenthaler. I am 

Vice President of Research for Morningstar. Thank you for inviting 

me to talk to the committee today. 

Morningstar is a leading provider of independent investment research and is the largest mutual fund research firm in the United 

States. 

I would like to state up front that Morningstar is generally supportive of target date funds. Throughout its history, Morningstar 

has frequently criticized entire categories of funds for being gimmicky or overpriced. We are considerably more positive about target date funds. We regard target date funds as being a sound invention that meets a true investor need. By offering broadly diversified portfolios that change over time, target date funds are a suitable choice for those who wish to delegate their investment decisions. They also are well suited for inactive owners who will not 

be making trades as they grow older and their situations change. 

That said, there are certain concerns, given the extraordinary position that target date funds now occupy as the default investment 

choice for America’s new retirement model. 

One concern lies with fees. Overall, annual expense ratios for 

target date funds mutual funds compare favorably with the expense ratios charged by other types of mutual funds. For example, 

on an asset-weighted basis—that is, with the larger funds counting 

proportionately more in the calculation than the smaller funds— 

target date funds have an average annual expense ratio of 0.69 

percent. This is lower than the 0.82 percent figure for so-called allocation funds, which are a competitor to target date funds that 

also invest in a broad mix of stocks and bonds. 

However, that average conceals a very wide range among the 48 

target date fund families we track. On the low end, one target date 

family has an expense ratio of only 0.19 percent. On the high end, 

another has an expense ratio of 1.82 percent, more than nine times 

higher than the first family. The issue of expenses is particularly 

important with target date funds because of their very long time 

horizons. Several fund families today offer funds with a 2055 date, 

46 years into the future. As the committee well knows, the power 

of compounding greatly magnifies small differences over such a 

long time period. 

For example, let us assume two target date funds that invest in 

identical underlying assets, returning 7 percent annually. One fund 

boasts the industry’s low expense ratio of 0.19 percent and, one, the 

industry’s high expense ratio of 1.82 percent. Over the 46-year time 

horizon mentioned above, an initial investment made in a low-expense fund would become worth more than twice as much as the 

one made in the high-expense fund. Few employees who are defaulted in target date funds through their 401(k) plans will be 

aware of either the expense differences or their powerful implications. 

54 

Another concern is the tendency of target date funds to invest 

solely in their company’s underlying funds. No reputable institutional investor would hand over his or her entire portfolio to a single asset management firm. Instead, the institutional investor sifts 

among many investment managers seeking to purchase the best 

and lowest-cost options for various slices of the portfolio. One firm 

gets a portion of the portfolio’s large-company stocks, another manages its short-term Treasuries, and so forth. The institutional investor would not expect a single firm to excel at all types of investing. Yet, that is implicitly the position taken by most fund families 

in running their target date funds. It is difficult to square such a 

practice as being the best outcome for an investor, although of 

course from a business perspective, it is understandable that a target date fund family would like to keep all of the assets collected 

in-house. 

Third, we are worried by the low level of conviction placed by the 

industry’s target date investment managers in the funds that they 

run. Morningstar tracks how much money a target date manager 

or any mutual fund manager invests in his or her own funds, as 

this is an item listed in each fund’s Statement of Additional Information. After all, target date funds would seem to be the ideal way 

for a fund manager to eat his own cooking or her own cooking, as 

they saying goes, given that target date funds are openly marketed 

as being suitable for every possible type of investor. Yet, only 2 out 

of 58 target date managers whom we track list $500,000 or more 

invested in their own funds. Even more strikingly, 33 of the managers, or 57 percent, show no investment at all. 

Overall in the fund industry, managers who invest heavily in 

their own funds tend to out-perform those who invest less. We 

would like to see target date fund managers embrace their funds 

more enthusiastically. 

In summary, target date funds are a useful and productive addition to the fund industry and a clear benefit to employees who own 

401(k) plans. They must improve, however, if they are to fully earn 

their position of being at the heart of America’s retirement future. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rekenthaler follows:] 

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Derbyshire. 

STATEMENT OF RALPH DERBYSHIRE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR FMR LLC, THE 

PARENT COMPANY OF FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, MARLBOROUGH, MA 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Chairman Kohl, Ranking Member Corker, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name 

is Ralph Derbyshire. I am Senior Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for Fidelity Investments. 

Since the advent of the 401(k) plan in the early 1980’s, Fidelity 

has been a leading provider of investment and administrative solutions for plan sponsors and participants. Today, Fidelity record 

keeps 19,000 workplace retirement plans with more than 14 million plan participants. We are also the leading provider of target 

date funds with more than $93 billion in target date assets. 

My testimony will focus on three areas: first, how target date 

funds help investors address improper asset allocation; second, how 

automatic enrollment plans and target date funds have helped increase retirement savings; and third, some suggested improvements to increase understanding of target date funds. 

Target date funds were created to address one of the biggest 

problems with defined contribution investing: improper asset allocation. Across all age groups, the majority of plan participants hold 

equity allocations that do not align with the amounts that most investment professionals recommend. You can see in figure 1—and 

these figures are in the appendix to my written testimony—that as 

participants approach retirement age, there is almost an even split, 

with approximately 40 percent invested too aggressively and 40 

percent invested too conservatively. That means that less than onequarter of the retirement age participants are in an appropriate allocation. 

In 1996, Fidelity introduced the Freedom Funds as one of the 

first mutual fund target date investment offerings to help address 

this asset allocation problem. As with most target date funds, Freedom Funds have an asset allocation mix that is more aggressive 

when the investor is younger and becomes more conservative as 

the investor grows older. The funds’ managers set the target asset 

allocation mix and achieve that mix by investing in as many as 24 

underlying Fidelity mutual funds. We employ a rigorous process of 

selecting those underlying funds based on an analysis of performance, risk, style consistency, and how well the funds complement 

each other. This provides sophisticated, long-term asset allocation 

in a simplified, straightforward investment vehicle for participants. 

It is also important to note that for the Freedom Funds the target date is the date when the individual plans to retire and not 

when they plan to liquidate their holdings in the fund. Our target 

date funds are designed to last well into an investor’s distribution 

phase, which for the typical investor will extend for at least 20 

years beyond retirement. Figure 2 shows the asset allocation or the 

‘‘glide path’’ of Freedom Funds over this entire life cycle. 

As has been noted, target date funds have increased in popularity in recent years, due in large part to changes made to the 

62 

automatic plan features in the Pension Protection Act of 2006. The 

percentage of plans at Fidelity that use a target date fund as the 

default option has increased from 38 percent before the effective 

date of PPA to 64 percent in 2009. Among plans at Fidelity that 

offer automatic enrollment, over 95 percent use a target date fund 

as the default option. 

Our data also shows that the PPA automatic programs have had 

a dramatic effect on employee participation in retirement plans, 

particularly among lower compensated and younger workers. Figure 3 demonstrates how automatic enrollment impacts employee 

behavior. Overall, 76 percent of eligible employees are automatically enrolled into the plan with an additional 19 percent of employees opting affirmatively to enroll in the plan. Counting those 

few who then opt out at a later date, the overall participation rate 

for these plans is 89 percent, which compares very favorably to participation rates of 50 to 60 percent in plans without automatic enrollment. So this combination of a large number of participants 

coming into plans with automatic enrollment, combined with a default into the target date fund has had a powerful impact on participant asset allocation. That is demonstrated in figure 4. 

There has been a lot of discussion about how target date funds 

have performed during last year’s market downturn, and in this 

difficult environment, many individuals take dramatic action with 

their portfolios, often selling at depressed levels only to buy back 

later at a higher price when the market rebounds. But if an investor stuck with their target date fund investments, they would be 

well on their way to recovering their losses from last year. 

For example, while the Fidelity Freedom 2010 fund was down 

about 25 percent for the 2008 calendar year, it is back up about 

22 percent year to date in 2009. While that is not a complete recovery, these funds are designed for investing throughout retirement, 

again an additional 20-plus years, and over the long term, the 2010 

fund has produced a greater than 6 percent average annual return 

since it was launched in 1996. 

While we feel that target date funds are an important and valuable investment tool, we agree that improvements can be made to 

help enhance investor understanding. The Investment Company Institute earlier this year released a set of principles aimed at improving the disclosure, communications, and education around target date funds. Among the suggested recommendations include the 

clear and concise disclosure of the relevance of the target date 

when it is used in a fund name, the funds’ assumptions about the 

investor’s withdrawal intentions, the targeted age group and an explanation of the funds’ glide path. These disclosures can enhance 

understanding by investors which will help assure that the funds 

are being used appropriately, and we fully support those recommendations. 

I thank you for the opportunity to address this important topic, 

and I would be pleased to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Derbyshire follows:] 

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CASE SMITH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES, AVATAR ASSOCIATES, 

NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon, Chairman Kohl, Ranking Member 

Corker. 

My name is Michael Case Smith and I am not a lawyer. I am 

a target date fund manager. I am with Avatar Associates. Avatar 

was founded in 1970. 

We have target date funds to 401(k) plans and profit sharing 

plans. Avatar willingly accepts and acknowledges it is a fiduciary 

for the allocation of the variable fee funds that we use to construct 

our target date funds. We can do this because we have limited the 

ability to self-deal and the conflicts of interest by constructing the 

target date funds with exchange-traded funds with which we have 

no economic interest. I will note that according to an article earlier 

this week, about 2 percent of the target date funds follow that nonconflicted model. 

I have been asked today to talk about conflicts of interest in target date funds, primarily proprietary target date funds. These are 

mutual funds that are constructed with shares of other mutual 

funds, typically mutual funds from the same company. We believe, 

our clients believe that target date funds allocated in this manner 

embed conflicts of interest. This is because the fund company determines its own mix of mutual funds. Since each underlying fund has 

its own fee structure, controlling their allocation may directly or indirectly affect the company’s compensation. 

Fund companies take the position that since target date allocations occur within the mutual fund, ERISA laws against self-dealing do not apply, and since ERISA does not apply, they are not fiduciaries. Since they are not fiduciaries, they are perfectly free to 

self-deal and put in their portfolio things like new funds that do 

not have long track records that would attract investment as a 

standalone option on the fund roster, poor-performing funds that, 

again, perhaps would not attract assets as a stand alone fund on 

a 401(k) roster or funds with a higher fee structure such as equities compared to bonds. 

But for the Department of Labor’s interpretation that shares of 

an underlying mutual fund do not constitute plan assets, such selfdealing within a target date fund would clearly constitute a prohibited transaction under ERISA. We do not believe that the exemption was meant to apply to proprietary asset allocation in mutual 

funds because such investment structures either did not exist at 

the time of the designing of ERISA or virtually unheard of, therefore certainly not contemplated by Congress. 

The committee is aware of Avatar’s request to the Department 

of Labor to answer a simple question: Should this exemption to 

rules against self-dealing apply to target date funds? If not, shares 

of the underlying proprietary funds and the target date fund of 

funds will be seen as what they are when they are offered as a 

stand alone option: plan assets under ERISA. If they are found to 

be plan assets under ERISA, fund companies would be prohibited 

74 

from self-dealing and have to put the interest of the participants 

and beneficiaries ahead of their own. This is something many plan 

sponsors and participants frankly would be surprised to learn that 

fund companies are not required now to do when they select, monitor, and allocate their own variable-fee funds. 

ERISA section 3(21) and 401(b) provide that under most scenarios assets underlying a mutual fund do not constitute plan assets. But these provisions carried qualifications back in 1974 such 

as ‘‘shall not by itself’’ or not ‘‘solely by reason of.’’ The wording of 

these statutory provisions shows us that the exception applicable 

to the underlying assets of a mutual fund—that is, the underlying 

fund of funds—is not absolute. 

An interesting piece of legislative history shows that the Department of Labor’s ERISA exemption on this matter was premised on 

the applicability of protections against self-dealing, self-interested 

transactions that are part of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investment Company Act. 

As Senator Long stated in a 1973 Committee on Finance 

report—and I will quote—‘‘Mutual funds are currently subject to 

substantial restrictions on transactions with affiliated persons 

under the Investment Company Act of 1940.’’ This would argue 

against the extension of the exemption to tiered asset allocation of 

mutual funds from ERISA rules against self-dealing. 

Now is the perfect time for Congress to clarify that such conflicts 

of interest are prohibited and in that way protect plan participants 

and our Nation’s private pension system. Once this conflict is eliminated, target date funds that have embedded conflicts of interest 

have a number of easy ways to comply. 

One way of doing so would be to simply adopt the protections for 

the exemption of investment advice, one-on-one advice, that Assistant Secretary Borzi spoke of that Congress already passed in the 

Pension Protection Act. I am glad to hear that she is looking to upgrade those protections and they will be unbiased and affordable. 

In that example, an algorithm would be used from a non-conflicted 

third party to review the in-house glide path and allocations of the 

fund company. 

Another way that a company can comply is turn over the allocation to an independent third party, something I would note that 

fund companies already do in their managed account options under 

Sun America Advisory. 

I would like to conclude by saying that Avatar’s goal in being 

here is to encourage and support a robust and equitable target date 

market by having asset allocation determined in a non-conflicted 

manner. Our goal to be here is to encourage Congress to clarify 

what respectfully probably seems like common sense to 435,000 

plan sponsors and 70 million Americans: Parties-in-interest should 

be prohibited from self-dealing in target date funds. 

Thank you for your time. I welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Questions from the panel? Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

courtesy of that, and I certainly appreciate all of your testimony. 

I find this to be a pretty fascinating hearing. 

I want to start by saying I hope that we will not get into the 

mode of trying to legislate returns. My guess is one of the main 

reasons we are having this hearing is we have had a downturn in 

the market, and all of a sudden, people’s expectations were not 

met. I doubt many of the people on this dias up here had their expectations met. I doubt many people in the country did. 

So I will just set the stage from my own point of view to say that 

I realize that there have been lots of tragedies, lots of disappointments, lots of people who reached retirement age who have not met 

their expectations. Again, I do not think we can legislate returns, 

and I am sure that is not what the Department of Labor is hoping 

to do. 

I would ask this question. Why would we not have as a default 

investment something like Treasury bonds or something like that 

and allow people to opt into more risky investments down the road 

if they choose to do that? The Labor Department. 

Ms. BORZI. Unfortunately, I was not around a couple of years ago 

when the qualified default investment regulation was passed, but 

I am sure that those kinds of safe investments were considered as 

part of the default investment approach. 

I think at the time people certainly thought that a target date 

fund was a relatively easy way for a participant to be able to get 

the diversification and not have to deal with the constant rebalancing in asset—— 

Senator CORKER. Well, that is what it is. 

Ms. BORZI. But I think your point is very well taken. 

Senator CORKER. But it is that. Right? 

Ms. BORZI. We are going to be looking back at the qualified default investment alternative regulation in the context of target date 

funds, and maybe that is an issue we need to look at. 

Senator CORKER. I am not necessarily in any way saying that is 

a good idea. I am just asking the question. 

John? 

Mr. REKENTHALER. Well, if I may, a few years back stable value 

funds I believe, which were a form of a cash fund and a more conservative investment, were the primary default—when defaults 

were used. They came under quite a bit of academic criticism from 

the academic community and others, the main point being that 

people who were defaulted into 401(k) plans through automatic enrollment plans tended not to move. They tended to be inactive and 

inert, and therefore, they were stuck in cash, the lowest-performing 

investment. Well, at least that was the theory, that cash was the 

lowest-performing investment a few years back. 

I mean, the main concern was that people who were defaulted 

into an overly conservative investment would miss participating in 

a market growth over the years and would not make the change 

because they tended to be the least active of investors. I think target date funds were intended as a middle ground. 

81 

Senator CORKER. Of course, that is what we have done with Social Security. Right? We put people in the lowest-performing asset 

for life. 

But, Mr. Derbyshire, let me ask you this. There is a whole lot 

being made of fees, and I am in some investments where we pay 

huge fees. They happen to be, by the way, the greatest returns 

also. I wonder if you would like to talk a little bit about the focus 

on fees. In essence, should we not be looking at the overall return 

of the portfolio in relation to other investments? Is there some concern that if we focus only on fees—I mean, the fact is you could 

have some very poor performers, people who really do not do much 

work who charge a very little fee, but in essence, their performance 

is not particularly good. I wonder if you might enlighten us in that 

regard. 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Well, I think at the end of the day, obviously, 

performance net of fees is the single most important criteria for 

evaluating whether a fund has performed well. 

In looking at target date funds, I think what Morningstar would 

tell you about fees is that there are some outliers, but for the most 

part, the fees within target date funds are actually well within the 

mainstream of mutual funds as a whole. So I am not sure that 

there is a particular problem overall with the level of fees in target 

date funds. After all, most of these funds are themselves made up 

of other mutual funds that have an existing fee structure in them. 

So I do not think for most target date funds there is a special issue 

regarding fees. 

Senator CORKER. Do you have any idea how your portfolio has 

performed as opposed to Mr. Smith’s which just invests in indexes? 

Has there been a marked difference? I mean, obviously, Mr. Smith 

is touting—and by the way, I think it is a very good point—not 

having a conflict of interest. Obviously, you think your funds are 

the very best funds there are, and that is why you invest in them. 

You all create them. Has there been a marked difference in return 

between the two? 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. I am not familiar with Mr. Smith’s product and 

its returns, so I really could not comment on that. 

Senator CORKER. But at the end of the day, I guess the question 

is we are trying to—I worry a little bit about the involvement that 

we are considering putting ourselves into here as it relates to what 

we are going to be telling people to invest in and not invest in. I 

understand the conflicts issue. But again, at the end of the day, 

what we are hoping to happen is that people will save and that 

they will invest in funds that give them the greatest return. Sometimes that can be done through the exchange route. Sometimes 

that is done proprietarily. I hope that we will not over-involve ourselves. 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Well, I would just comment I think Mr. Smith’s 

remarks were mostly directed at the conflict of interest issue as opposed to the aggregate, overall fee level. I would be happy to speak 

to the conflict issue, if that is your question. 

Senator CORKER. That would be great. 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Sure. 

So the point that is being made essentially involves two propositions. One is that because of the fee structure in these funds, the 

82 

fiduciaries that are managing these funds are going to make different and worse investment decisions. In other words, the managers will invest in higher-paying funds in order to pay more revenue to themselves or to prop up an under-performing fund with 

additional assets. The second proposition is that we should use 

ERISA rules to regulate that conduct. I would dispute both of those 

propositions. 

The first one about the investment advisor’s conduct, Mr. Smith 

said the investment advisor is not a fiduciary. Well, he is correct 

that it is not a fiduciary under ERISA, but it is a fiduciary under 

the Investment Advisors Act. So that fiduciary has to manage the 

fund in the best interests of the shareholders, and it would be a 

clear breach of that duty to invest in a fund solely to generate more 

revenue for the advisor itself. 

The second point I would make is that mutual funds, because of 

the Investment Company Act of 1940, are regulated by a board of 

directors and that board has to include independent directors. In 

fact, in the case of Fidelity’s Freedom Funds, 75 percent of the directors on the target date board are independent. The board provides oversight over the activities of the investment advisor, which 

is an additional protection. 

In terms of the second proposition about using ERISA’s fiduciary 

rules to provide some layer of additional protection, what I would 

say is it is not an accident of history that ERISA was not imposed 

on mutual fund managers and the mutual fund assets. It was a 

purposeful decision made by Congress in 1974, and it was precisely 

for the reasons I cited, which is that there are two securities laws 

enacted in the 1940’s that were specifically designed to govern mutual fund conduct. To introduce ERISA into that framework would 

result in both duplication and potential inconsistencies. 

An important point here is that mutual funds include many different investors. They are not all employee benefit plan investors. 

What is the rationale for imposing ERISA, which is an employee 

benefit plan statute, into an investment vehicle that includes nonretirement plan investors? 

So I think both of the propositions are false, and the evidence I 

think bears out that these funds are not being used in the way 

Mr. Smith would allege. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Senator Bennet. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much, all of you, for your testimony. I was 

watching it before I came over. I just wanted to ask a couple of 

questions, one along the lines of Senator Corker’s question about 

these two funds. 

Can somebody speak to the overall return in this downturn that 

we had of target date funds versus other kinds of mutual funds? 

I mean, was the performance the same, worse, better? 

Mr. REKENTHALER. I guess that is my job. 

Broadly speaking, target date funds performed as a somewhat 

more aggressive version of balanced funds. So, in other words, they 

performed somewhat better than pure stock funds, definitely a lot 

worse than conservative, fixed-income Treasury-type portfolios. The 

83 

prototypical balanced fund is 60 percent stock, 65 percent stock. A 

lot of the target date funds with the assets being in the longerdated funds were a little bit heavier in stock than that and did a 

little bit worse. Just as an example, the stock market was down 37 

percent, and I think the typical target date fund was down in the 

upper 20’s. It depended upon age, the longer-dated funds. But they 

certainly were mortal. No question about that. 

Senator BENNETT. Everything was. 

Mr. REKENTHALER. Yes. 

Senator BENNETT. One of the things that just was so striking to 

me when I was starting to have town hall meetings in January and 

February and March is that everyone was deeply concerned about 

where the economy was. I think the people most concerned about 

it in my view actually were young folks coming out of school who 

felt like they were going to be the last people hired into this economy. They still continue to worry about it. People in their 70’s who 

had seen, in many cases, half their net worth vanish at Dow 6500. 

It looks a little better at 10,000. 

I also agree with Senator Corker that we need to be very careful 

about how we legislate these kinds of things. We cannot legislate 

returns. 

I was really struck, as I read some of the written testimony and 

also heard some of the earlier testimony by Chairwoman Schapiro 

about how huge the variation was in balancing in these funds. I 

think some of the funds have 21 percent equities. Some have 79 

percent equities, and then there are a lot in between. If you were 

right on the cusp of your retirement and free to choose, obviously, 

to have 100 percent in equities, but if these funds are meant for 

retirement and people are not moving in or moving out of them 

very much, it just worried me to see that huge a distribution. I 

wonder if anybody has got thoughts about that. 

Mr. REKENTHALER. I would like to address that a little bit. One 

is that the variation among the target date funds is really pronounced in the near-dated funds near retirement. Actually the 

longer-dated funds all look, broadly speaking, the same. A 2040 

fund and a 2050 fund are pretty much—the 2040 funds range from 

80 percent stock to 95 percent stock. They are stock funds. They 

tend to perform similarly. The 2010 funds are where you have the 

range from 26 percent in equity on the low end to 72 percent in 

equity on the high end. 

There really is not an investment consensus—and I would say 

this is clearly an investment issue—among the fund families as to 

how you should be positioned. If you emphasize, as many do, that 

a 65-year-old married couple—you know, the odds are that somebody is going to live 25 years or so more, at least one party in the 

marriage—and you think about longevity risk and protection 

against inflation and so forth, you emphasize equities. There has 

been a whole lot of research done on that in financial planning 

journals and everything else saying that that is reasonable and 

sound and not—at least from published and reasonable journals 

saying that this is a fair approach. It is not somebody just inventing something. 

On the other hand, there are those who take a more conservative 

approach, concerned about market risk. A lot of it depends upon 

84 

the assumptions of the withdrawal rate of the investor which we 

do not know what the withdrawal rate of the investor is. 

So there are a lot of assumptions built into this, and it is tricky 

on the retirement age. I would say—I think we all feel—that this 

is about the top of the first inning almost in terms of thinking 

about how funds behave during retirement, and if you are going to 

take somebody through retirement in a target date fund or another 

kind of investment, how should that be structured. We are much 

later in the game in that than we are in the accumulation phase 

where there has been much more of a consensus. 

Senator CORKER. Phyllis. 

Ms. BORZI. I want to echo that, Senator. One of the things that 

we are so concerned about at the Department of Labor is that not 

only do participants not understand the choices in front of them 

when they have target date funds, but oftentimes it appears the fiduciaries do not understand, when they select these funds, the variation. 

Why is that? Well, I think in part it has to do with the fact that 

many of the employers who choose a target date fund as part of 

their investment platform do so because they think they are doing 

the right thing for their employees. They understand that one of 

the biggest mistakes that people make is in allocation, and that it 

is the most difficult decision that the participant has to make when 

faced with how to allocate his or her own portfolio. So the target 

date fund is an attractive option. 

One of the things that we are trying to do—and we are working 

with our colleagues at the SEC about this—is to try to figure out 

how we can structure better disclosure so that fiduciaries, particularly small- and medium-sized employers, have the information 

that they need to make more intelligent decisions. I have to commend my co-panelist from Fidelity. Many of the mutual fund companies themselves have been working very hard to try to focus on 

this disclosure issue. It is a concern that we all have. Unfortunately, one of the other things that we know is we can have the 

best disclosure in the world, but that will not make people read it. 

So I do not know how we are going to overcome that problem of 

participant understanding. 

But our first job is to educate the fiduciary so that as they select 

these funds, they are in a better position to be able to evaluate the 

relative risks and rewards and then try to help communicate these 

choices to the actual participants. 

Senator BENNETT. Do you have a view? 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Well, Ms. Borzi actually picked up on what I 

was going to say, which is that even if we cannot educate all the 

participants, we can certainly educate fiduciaries around the assumptions that go into building a target date fund. 

As Mr. Rekenthaler mentioned, I think the most critical assumption around these near-retirement date funds is the withdrawal assumption that goes into the funds. That probably accounts for most 

of the variation in the asset allocation. Part of the ICI’s recommendations are to make sure that that information is available 

to both plan sponsors and participants so they can make an appropriate decision around the funds. 

85 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. Thanks to the panel and thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Bennet. 

Ms. Borzi, some have suggested that the regulations be changed 

to require the investment manager of target date funds to assume 

fiduciary responsibility in order to qualify as a default investment. 

Do you think this is a good idea? Can it be done within the Department or we must we do it legislatively? 

Ms. BORZI. If you are specifically asking about the question that 

Mr. Smith raised as to whether or not the mutual funds need to 

take fiduciary responsibility for how they structure the underlying 

investment option, I think that is a difficult question to answer. As 

he pointed out and as Mr. Derbyshire pointed out, we are constrained by the statute. What we regulate is conflicts of interest 

and issues related to the fiduciaries, not the underlying investment 

asset. I know that a number of witnesses at our hearing suggested 

that we need to look into this question and maybe make some 

changes. 

I would just be cautious about this. I am not ruling it out or ruling it in. I am just saying at this point I think it is a little too early 

to make that decision. I think it has ramifications. It does involve 

our colleagues at the SEC who typically regulate the mutual fund 

itself. We regulate the fiduciaries. But I think that there are a lot 

of short-and long-term effects that have to be evaluated in order for 

me to answer that in a straightforward manner. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Mr. SMITH. If I may? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Derbyshire laid out an argument that as long as 

we are doing the allocation of shares that are recognized as plan 

assets, it is perfectly OK. It sort of begs two questions. No. 1, the 

fiduciary relief he points to was exactly the loophole I was speaking 

of, pointing to another area of fiduciary relief. The question it begs 

is, if it is perfectly OK to do it within the life cycle fund, why did 

they not do it for the previous 25 years when those shares of their 

mutual funds, which are plan assets, were standing alone on the 

investment roster? Did they not because it is against the rules for 

a party-in-interest to self-deal and take discretion over participant 

assets and skew them to portfolios of which they receive variable 

fees. 

But if it is the case, I would challenge Assistant Secretary Borzi. 

What is the point of upgrading the investment advice rules under 

the Pension Protection Act if those are meant to remove conflicts 

of interest from somebody giving advice to a participant in a oneon-one setting? Do not bother if it is OK in an embedded mutual 

fund. But those are two very different things. 

Ms. BORZI. They are two very different things. The point of the 

investment advice rule is to be sure that people get accurate, 

straightforward advice regarding their investment choices. Again, 

part of the problem here is that we have a statutory provision. Our 

regulation is supposed to be consistent with the statutory provision. 

As you probably know, this issue, the issue of what kind of investment advice could be given, was the last issue that Congress 

86 

addressed in the context of its discussion of the Pension Protection 

Act. There was a fundamental policy disagreement as to whether 

or not any form of conflicted advice was permissible or whether 

there were sufficient safeguards that could be crafted so that in a 

potential conflict-of-interest situation, participants can be protected. 

Unfortunately for the point of view that you are expressing, Congress made a different policy choice, and the policy choice Congress 

made was to craft an exemption from ERISA that allowed, under 

certain narrow circumstances, advice to be given by an entity that 

was already a service provider with respect to a plan. The reason 

that we are rethinking the investment advice regulation is because 

we want it to be much closer to the intent expressed by Congress 

to make sure that the safeguards are there. 

As I pointed out a minute ago, the underlying statutory authority 

for the Department is pretty clear. I think the statute is clear that 

we have the ability to regulate the fiduciaries but that we do not 

have the ability to regulate the mutual funds in creating these investment options. 

Congress could, of course, as the chairman pointed out before, always change the law, and all I am suggesting is I think that there 

are a lot of things you need to think about before we move forward 

in that direction. 

Mr. SMITH. My only point, and the last one, is the statutory language gives what we will call wiggle room, and they use words like 

‘‘not solely of’’ and what have you. 

Ms. BORZI. My lawyers disagree. While I am a lawyer myself, the 

one thing I learned in private law practice is that clients are better 

off listening to their lawyers than going off on their own. So that 

is the legal advice I am getting from my lawyer. 

Mr. SMITH. Fair enough. But on the one-on-one advice side, you 

pulled it from the previous administration. Let us assume it was 

to make it a higher level of safety for the plan sponsor. The words 

you use, Assistant Secretary, were ‘‘unbiased,’’ and that is all we 

are asking. That is all we are saying. If it is unbiased in oneon-one advice, it should be unbiased in the mutual fund—— 

Ms. BORZI. I am using ‘‘unbiased’’ in the context of the statutory 

provision that we are charged with interpreting. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Donohue. 

Mr. DONOHUE. I hesitate to jump in here but I will. 

I just would like to make the point that for investment companies, it is a comprehensive regulatory regime, that independent directors in particular put in place to help oversee conflicts that exist 

that advisors have in any number of areas, and this may be one. 

So boards have responsibilities. Investment advisors are fiduciaries 

to the fund. Board of directors are fiduciaries. They have responsibilities not just to the fund but also to the fund shareholders 

which would include investors and do include all investors into 

those funds. 

Among other things that the board will wind up approving, the 

board will wind up approving the overall fees that are being received by the manager for what they are performing. They have obligations to do that under section 15. The manager has obligations 

to provide to the board all information that has been requested or 

87 

is relevant to that determination of whether or not the fees are appropriate. Then there are remedies available under 36(b) for either 

the SEC or individual investors to sue where they think that the 

fees may be inappropriate. 

So if the concern is that there may be conflicts in terms of moving assets into certain underlying funds because of higher fees, 

there is a regulatory regime that is in place that should be overseeing that and should be doing that effectively. So I think that is 

one aspect of it. 

The second thing is having been set up as fund of funds, these 

funds hopefully are taking advantage of economies of scale that are 

occurring at the underlying funds. You could set up a target date 

fund where you invest directly in the underlying assets without 

going through another fund, and doing that in that manner would 

not raise any of the concerns that were raised by Mr. Smith because that is what mutual funds do. 

So in doing that, the statutory regime for fund of funds actually 

has a preference for in-house funds because of some of the conflicts 

that arose prior to 1940 where funds were investing in unaffiliated 

funds and could put a certain amount of pressure on the non-affiliated funds to do certain things for them. So there is a preference 

that is built into the statute, into the regulation for investing in 

underlying funds in excess of what would have been permitted otherwise under the 1940 act. 

So without getting into the issues relating to the application of 

ERISA, which I am not an expert in, I would say that I do think 

there is a comprehensive scheme that is in place. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Yes, sir, thank you. I think Mr. Derbyshire 

wanted to respond to your question. 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Well, I just wanted to add one final point about 

the overall notion that there is somehow a deep conflict in Fidelity 

or some other provider choosing its own funds, and that is the fact 

that when an investor chooses a Fidelity target date fund, they are 

asking us to manage their assets for them. It would almost be contrary to common sense to say, ‘‘Well, we should be required to invest in someone else’s funds.’’ As Mr. Donohue noted, we could 

manage these funds as a total pool of assets without having a fund 

of funds structure, and if they have asked us to do that, it should 

be OK for us to invest in our underlying funds if that in fact results in economies of scale and better investment results for the 

participants. 

Senator CORKER. Just to follow on that thinking, I suppose 

that—and I know this is not something that we in essence regulate, but you potentially feel a greater obligation to the people investing to ensure that your funds perform than you would if you 

were just getting a fee, if you will, for putting it in a fund you were 

unrelated to. I would assume that would be the case. 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Yes, well, I think that would be fair. We want 

to understand what we are buying and what we are investing in 

and we certainly would know more about our own funds than we 

would about anyone else’s. 

88 

Senator CORKER. Then if you want to give a counter point, Mr. 

Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I do. Here is what the industry has done on this 

point. They have said let us disclose this. The problem is we deal 

with small business owners and small businesses. Small businesses 

do not do a 401(k) plan based on the life cycle fund. They do it on 

the platform and the services and what have you. So the question 

for the small business owner is, if I do what the industry tells me 

to do, and I do my evaluation, and I say specifically, if I may, I am 

in a Fidelity plan and I say I want to fund X life cycle fund, I 

frankly do not have the choice. So we talk a lot about all the options out there, but when I am employee at a small business, which 

represents the vast number of the 401(k) plans out there, I do not 

have choice on my platform. Right? 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. I would say that we are an open-architecture 

shop where we will allow people to put whatever investments we 

can administratively operate on our platform. There may be economic consequences to that because, of course, we rely on the revenue from our funds to run our business. But we are an open shop 

and if plan aduciaries want to put different assets on our platform, 

we will do that if we can accommodate them. 

Senator CORKER. Go ahead, John. 

Mr. REKENTHALER. If I may speak to this without touching on 

any of the legal issues, if that is possible, because I am apparently 

the only non-lawyer here or there is a well-versed non-lawyer 

there. But I am definitely not a well-versed non-lawyer. 

I guess our view—and I discussed these proprietary funds. Just 

step back and looking from a high level is that when 401(k) plans 

began, they tended to be so-called closed architecture where the 

organization, the record keeper would bring in only its own funds, 

and the large plans fought against this and made them be open 

and unbundled. Those same large plans now are—you know, it is 

quite in vogue to create so-called custom target date funds where 

target date funds at a large plan are constructed for a low cost 

using a variety of funds from a variety of providers in an openarchitecture setting. 

So my view is large plans have generally led the way because 

they are large institutions that are well informed and have buying 

power and they have pushed for open architecture and they have 

pushed for low costs. It seems to me that is where the target date 

industry overall needs to be doing and not just for employees in 

large plans but for employees in companies across the country of 

all sizes. 

Senator CORKER. A response, Mr. Derbyshire? 

Mr. DERBYSHIRE. Well, I would certainly agree that large plans 

have led the way, and I think that is normally the case in most 

developments. There is nothing different about target date funds in 

this vein. Large plans have, obviously, more economic power to negotiate the deals that they want and they are very, very demanding 

at every level. What I would say is that the entire 401(k) industry, 

small and large employers as well, benefit from those developments. So the extent that these large employers are negotiating 

better arrangements for target date funds in their plans, those get 

89 

extended to the rest of the market as well. It takes time but I think 

everyone benefits. 

Senator CORKER. So, Mr. Chairman, I am going to be 100 percent 

honest and say that I do not know that I understand all the arcane 

issues of ERISA. I know our staff and I are going to talk more fully 

about this after the hearing. 

I think this has been, though, really enlightening, and it seems 

to me that what Labor has said is that we need to make sure that 

employers are far more educating employees. I absolutely agree. I 

know, having been an employer, making these decisions is excruciating, and you want to make sure that your employees 20 years 

later who have invested in these funds and you have invested 

funds for them have a retirement. I think there is a tremendous 

lack of education in that regard. I know that we had seminars each 

year to sort of let our employees know. But that needs to happen. 

It needs to happen a lot more. I applaud your efforts in trying to 

make sure that that occurs. 

I think from the standpoint of employers, I think some of them 

may decide to go with the funds that they feel like have no conflicts 

and they may, on the other hand, decide to go with funds that they 

just have faith in because of a track record. At the end of the day, 

you want to make sure that those returns are there. 

I think the other issue I would take from this or the other point 

is this target date fund—making sure people understand what that 

means. If they plan to withdraw all of the money when they are 

65, that means one thing, and if they plan to live off of it, they 

hope they have good genes and they are going to be around for another 20 years after that, that means something totally different. 

It seems to me that that is another piece. Obviously, the strategies 

vary widely in that case when you have to go on another generation versus ending at a date. 

So I think this has been a great hearing, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you raising this issue. I hope, on the other hand, we do not 

overreact to a tremendous downturn in the market and try to do 

some things that over time might hurt the very people that we 

would all like to see retire with greater savings in hand. 

So thank you all for your testimony, and I think each of you have 

provided a lot of information. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Senator LEMIEUX. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being a little 

delayed. I was at another committee meeting. I do not have a lot 

to add because I, unfortunately, did not get to hear the presentations. 

But certainly the 401(k) programs are tremendously important 

for the people of this country, and as Senator Corker just said, a 

lot of downturn in the economy has caused a lot of consternation 

among people who were about to retire specifically, people who 

were a few years away and thought that they were on a specific 

path and may not have had the information they needed to make 

sure that they were investing in more stable investments as they 

got to the end of their retirement. 

So I have read over the materials and the information about 

transparency and making sure there is enough information for peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jun 15, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\55906.TXT SAG PsN: JOYCE
90 

ple who are in these plans. Like Senator Corker, I too was an employer prior to coming to the Senate in charge of a law firm where 

we had about 300 employees, and these programs are tremendously 

important. We did our best every year to try to give information 

to all the folks so that they knew that they had in their options 

and knew the different plans. It is very difficult for the average 

employee, no matter how well educated, to go through these issues. 

They are very cumbersome. Usually someone comes into your board 

room and says, OK, here are three plans. This one does this. This 

one does that. You kind of check a box and maybe you go with it. 

So I just appreciate the chairman for having this meeting. I hope 

to listen and learn more about it. I thank all the witnesses for their 

testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. This has been a great 

hearing on a very important topic. Your coming here to bring your 

experience and your perspective has made this very informative. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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