## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Appli cation of the Cou nty Treasurer , 2012 IL App (1st) 101976

Appellate Court Caption In re APPL I CA T I ON OF THE COUNTY TREASURER AND ex Officio COUNTY COL L ECTOR OF COOK COUNTY, I L L I NOI S, for Orde r of J udgment and Sale Ag ainst Real Estate Returned Delinquent for the Nonpay ment of Gene ral taxes for the Yea r 2004 (CCPI
, L L C, PetitionerAppellee , v. MB F inancial B ank, Respondent- Appellant).

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-10-1976

Filed Rehea ringdenied Fe bruar y 17, 2012 April 5, 2012

Held (Not e: This syl lab us

con st i t ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action arising from the issuance of a tax deed to proper ty owned by responde nt, the trial court’s order dismiss ing responde nt’s motion to void the deed was reve rsed, since the tax deed wa s not rec orded within the time allowed by the s tatute due to an invalid attempt by th e as s i gnor of the tax lien to extend the rede mption period; there fore
, the tax deed was

v oid with no right to reimburse ment pursuant to section 22-85 of the Property Tax Code and the trial court’s dismiss al of responde nt’s motion
to voi d t h e deed was reve rsed and the cause was rema nded with direc tions to set the deed aside

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 08-COTD-1637; the Hon. Robert W. Be rtucc i, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded with dire ctions.Counsel on

Appea l Carter & Reiter, L t d

. , of Chicag o (Ter ry Carter
, Gre g ory Reiter, and Ly nnette L ockwitz, of counsel), f or appe llant.

Saly er L aw Offic es, L L C, o f Chicag o (Mindy S. Saly er, Amanda L

. Moressi, and B rittney

B. White, of counse l), for a ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE LAMPKI N delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presi d in g J ustice R. Gordon and J ustice Gar cia concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 After the trial court issued an order direc ting the issuance of a tax dee d t o p et i t ioner CCP I
, responde nt MB Financ ial Ba nk filed a motion to: (count I ) decla re the tax deed void, pursuant to section 22-85 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/22-85 (West 2008)); and (count I I ) vacate the order direc ting the issuance of the tax deed, pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of

Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/ 2-1401 (West 2008)). ¶ 2 There after, petit ioner filed a mot ion to dismiss counts I and I I of respondent’s motion, pursuant to se ctions 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code (735 I L CS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2010) ). The trial c ourt grante d petitioner’s motion to dismi ss. Respondent appea led. ¶ 3 On appea l, responde nt challeng es the trial court’s dismiss al of responde n t ’s motion to void the tax deed. Respondent contends p et i t i oner failed to timely rec ord the tax deed as require d by statute beca

use the filing of the first notice to extend the rede mption period was

a nullity and, thus, did not toll the deadline to rec ord the tax deed. Acc ording to responde nt, the first notice to extend was not valid beca use it was filed by the assig nor afte r the tax lien had alre ady been assig ned to another party

. Respondent contends that the assignor’s lack of

a statutory right to file the firs t notice to extend rende red that filing a nullity

. Respondent concludes t h at p et itioner’s tax deed was not rec orded within the require d statutory time period a nd, thus, is void. ¶ 4 Respondent also challeng es the trial co u rt ’s d i smissal of responde nt’s section 2-1401 petition to vaca

te t he order directing the i ssuance of t he tax deed. Specifica lly
, responde nt contends it s u ff

i ci ently pled a cause of action that the tax deed was procur ed by fra ud. Acc ording to responde nt, the fact that the as s i gn o r had filed the first extension notice was

conce aled from the tria l court whe n the assignee a pplied for the tax deed a

nd when the tax deed he aringwas he ld.
¶ 5 We hold that petitioner’s tax deed is void with no right to reimburse ment beca use it was
not rec orded within the time allowed by statute due to the invalid attempt by the assig nor of

-2-the tax lien to extend the rede mption period. Acc ording ly
, we reve rse the trial court’s

dismiss al of responde nt’s motion to void the tax deed and rema nd this cause with direc tions.

¶ 6 I . BA CKGROUND
¶ 7 In 2004, responde nt boug ht the proper ty at issue in t h i s d i s pute. Sometime therea fter responde nt constructe d a new commerc ial building on the proper ty and used it as one of its bank bra nches. ¶ 8 In J une 2006, the proper ty was sold to GJ Venture, L L C (GJ ), for $347.84, the amount of the second installment of the 2004 g ener al rea l estate taxes, at the Cook County annual tax sale. On the tax sale date, the proper ty was a vaca

nt lot. The orig inal rede mption expiration date f rom the tax sale date wa s J une 12, 2008. ¶ 9 On July 11, 2006
, GJ as s i gn ed t h e certificate of purcha se and all its right, title and interest in the proper

ty to the Sabre Group, L L C (Sabre ). On J uly 14, 2006, the county cler k issued a ce rtificateof purc hase to GJ.
¶ 10 On October 10, 2006, GJ delivere d a take notice to the county cler k for mailing to the last assessed taxpay er. The notice ad v i s ed that party that the proper ty was sold for delinquent taxes, the period of rede mption from the sale would expire on J une 12, 2008, and a petition for a tax deed to transfe r title would be filed.
¶ 11 On April 10, 2008, GJ filed a notice to extend the period of rede mption to J uly 25, 2008. That notice, which was in the form of an aff idavit, provided that aff

iant GJ
, “being first duly
sworn, deposes and say s that: [i t] is the attorney for the owner and holder” of the cer tificate of sale, who was extending the rede mption period. On J uly 1, 2008, attorney Heather Ottenfe ld aver

red that she was the attorney for the owner and holder of the cer tificate of sale, who was extending the rede mption period to Novemb er 2 6
, 2 0 08. Sabre’ s name did not appea r on either the April or J uly notice. Also on July 1, 2008, Sabre filed a petition for the issuance of a tax deed, which alleg ed that the proper ty had not be en rede emed from the tax sale a nd the per iod of extension would ex pire on Nove mber 26, 2008. ¶ 12 On J uly 18, 2008, responde nt was served by the county

sheriff with statutory notice of
t h e tax sale and final rede mption date at the proper ty ’s location. On J uly 22, 2 0 0 8
, responde nt was persona lly serve d statutory notice by the sheriff at responde nt’s downtown Chicag o location. ¶ 13 On October 6, 2008, the co u n ty cl erk sent responde nt an estimate of rede mption. The estimate stated that: the proper ty was sold to GJ for 2004 g ener al taxes on J une 12, 2006; the rede mption date was extended to November 26, 2008, and a g rand total o f $ 5
, 007.31 was

o we d i n taxes. The estimate stated, “Note: the g rand total is subject to incre as e. ” Fur thermore , a notation in the bottom, right c orner of the for m stated:

“Sale penalties incre ase ever y 6 months from the date of sale. Additional penalty of 0% amounting to $0 a dded af ter 12-12- 08.”

-3-¶ 14 Respondent issued a chec k, dated Dec ember 3, 2008, for $5,007.31 payable to the county

clerk to rede em the taxes. Howeve r, on Dec ember 9, 2008, the county cler k re tu rn ed
respo n d ent’s chec k with a letter explaining that the county cler k was “unable to acc ept [respondent’s] redemption pay ment beca

use the last day

to rede em has pa ssed.” ¶ 15 On J anuar

y 2, 2009, Sabre fi l ed i ts application for an order directing the clerk to issue

a tax deed. The appl ication identified GJ as the purcha ser and Sabre as the assig nee, and stated that the orig inal rede mption period expi red on June 12, 2008 but was e x tended a nd, thus, ex pired on Nove mber 26, 2008. ¶ 16 On J anuar

y 29, 2009, the tax deed h ea ring was held in this matter. Attorney Ottenfe ld
appea red on behalf of Sabre as the tax deed petitioner. Respondent was not prese nt at the hearing. Counsel for Sabre i nformed the court that the certificate of pu rchase is sued t o GJ had been assigned to Sabre, which was the curr ent holder of all rights, title and interest in the

cer tificate. Counsel stated that two notices to extend the rede mption period wer e filed in this matter; on e i n Ap ri l and another in J uly of 2008. Counsel, howeve r, was missing one extension notice and was unable to locate it in her file. Acc ording ly
, counsel asked for, and

rec eived, leave of court to submit either the orig inal extensions or a cer tifie d copy of the judgme nt book showing that timel y extensions wer e made. Then, counsel prese nted the testimony of Brian McMorris, an inspector. He testified that he had inspected the proper ty , which was a bank branc h, on J anuar y 26, 2008. He spoke to Ms. Waters at the bank and told her the nature of his visit. She responde d that the prope r party would have to be notified in writing

. McMorris inspected the proper ty ag ain on August 1, 2008, but had no contac t with
anyone ther e that day

. ¶ 17 On Fe bruar

y 4, 2009, Sabre assig ned the cer tificate of purcha se to petitioner CCP I

. On Fe bruar y 11, 2009, the trial court enter ed order s substitut ing CCP I as the tax deed petitioner and direc ting the cler

k to issue a tax deed to petitioner. Petitioner CCP I rec orded its tax deed on November

4, 2009. ¶ 18 In Dec ember 2009, responde nt filed a thre e-c ount motion t o decla re the tax deed void, pursuant to section 22-85 of t h e Property Tax Code, and vacate the Fe bruar y 2009 order direc ting the issuance of the tax deed, pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. In count I of the motion, responde nt alleg ed that the tax deed was void beca use petitioner failed to rec ord it within one year from J une 12, 2008, t he orig inal rede mption period expiration date. Respondent ar gued the de ed had to be rec orded by June 12, 2009, bec ause G J ’s attempt t o extend the rede mption period was invalid wher e it had previously assig ned awa y any rights to the proper

ty

. ¶ 19 In count I I of the motion, responde nt alleg ed that the tax deed was procur ed by fra ud and asked the court, under section 2-1401 o f t h e Code, to vacate the order issuing the deed. Specifica lly , responde nt alleg ed that Sabre failed to inf orm the trial court that GJ had filed the first notice of extension rathe r t han S abre
, counsel failed t o produce that first notice to the trial court, and the take notice was invalid beca use it was filed by GJ afte r it had assig ned

awa y any int er es t i n t h e proper ty to Sabre. Respondent also asser ted a claim for equitable rede mption, which alleg ed that responde nt rea sonably relied on incorre ct an d err oneous

-4-information from the c ounty cler k reg ardingthe re demption date.
¶ 20 Count I I I of the motion pled, in the alternative, that if responde nt w as not suc cessf ul in having the tax dee d order voided or vacated, the court should a war d responde nt a

n amount equal to the fair marke t value of the subject proper ty from the indemnity fund cre ated by the Property Tax Code because responde nt lost i ts property through no fault of its own. ¶ 21 Respondent attache d to its motion the Dec ember 4, 2009 affi d av i t o f re s p o n dent’s comptroller, Donna Ada m

. S h e aver red that she was employed by responde nt and its prede cessor s for 16 year s. She rec eived the take notice in J uly 2008. She had never seen such

a document befor e and asked Kathlee n Price, an in-offic e acc ounting office r, to investigate the ci rc umstances of the notice. In September 2008, Adam authorized responde nt’s $10 chec k pay ment to the county

cler k for the pur

pose of obtaining an esti mate of redemption. On or about November 21, 2008, Adam authorized responde nt’s $5,007.31 chec k pay ment to the county cler

k to rede em the subject proper ty from the tax sale. At t he end of August 2009, Adam lea

rned that the proper

ty was not re deeme d. ¶ 22 Respondent also at t ac h ed to its motion the Dec ember 7, 2009 aff idavit of ac counting office r Kathlee n Price. She aver red that she w a s e mp lo ye d by responde nt and its prede cessor s for 30 year s. After

she wa s prese nted with the take noticein J uly 2008, she telephone d the county cler

k’s office and rec eived information on how to obtain an estimate of rede mption. She rec eived the estimate on October 28, 2008 and had never seen such a document befor e. She revie wed the estimate and thought the rede mption amount wa s $5,007.31 with a final date of Dec ember 12, 2008 to pay the taxes befor e additional monies wer e due. Price stated that responde nt’s initial chec k for the pay ment, which was authorized on or about November 21, 2008, was voided beca use it was payable to the county cler k but listed an addre ss for the county notary depar

tment. When Price rec eived a new corr ectly addre ssed chec k, she mailed it the county cler

k, believing that the final date to pay was Dec ember 12, 2008. Howeve r, in Dec ember 2008, she rec eived a letter from the county cler k returning responde nt’s chec k and stating that the rede mption date had passed. She place d that letter aside, believing she could

reor der an estimate of rede mption to pay the taxes at a later date and responde nt would simply owe additional monies. She did not inform any other person at the bank of the county cler k’s letter. In August 2009, she noticed the county cler k’s le tt er and informed responde nt’s vice pr esident and a ssistant corporate counse l of the matter. ¶ 23 I n Fe b ru ary 2 0 1 0
, the Cook County trea surer filed a motion to stay co u n t I I I o f responde nt’s motion, pending de termination of counts I and I I of said motion by the cour t. The trial c ourt grante d the Cook County trea surer ’s motion.
¶ 24 There afte r, petitioner filed a motion to strike and dismiss counts I and I I of responde nt’s motion. Petitioner argued that responde nt’s motion should be dismiss ed pursuant to section 2-615 beca

use, inter alia
, the pleading s wer e defe ctive wher e t hey constituted an impermissible collater al attack on the tax deed, wer e fac tually inconsistent, fa iled to sufficie ntly plead a claim of fra ud, and established that responde nt failed to exercise the due diligenc e require d for section 2-1401 relief

. In the alternative, petitioner alleg ed that dismiss al was proper under section 2-619 beca use the aff

idavit submitt ed b y petitioner

-5-eliminated any issue contained in r espondent’s motion to void.
¶ 25 In support of its motion, petitioner submitt ed the aff idavit of Kevin Sierzeg a. He aver red that he was an employee of S.I

. Securities Manag ement, Inc., which was responsible fo r servicing the tax s ale cer tificates owned by GJ
, Sabre, and petitioner CCP I

. He was authorized to prepa

re and file notices of extension of rede mption periods and take notices on behalf of GJ
, Sabre, and petitioner CCP I

. He aver red that the October 10, 2006 take notice, and both the April and J uly 2008 notices to extend the rede mption period, wer e prepa red at his direc tion and with the full knowledg e and authority of both GJ , as the purc haser of t he

cer tificate of purcha se, and Sabr e, as the assig nee the reof

. ¶ 26 Followinga hea ring , the trial court grante d petitioner’s mot ion to dismiss counts Iand I I of responde nt’s motion to void the tax deed and vaca te the order direc ting the issuance of the tax deed. The trial court found that t h e ex t en sion notices wer e valid and there was no fra ud under the circ umstances. Responde nt appea led.

¶ 27 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 28 S ec t i o n 2 -619.1 of the Code (735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)) allows a movant to combi ne a section 2-615 motion to dismiss
, which challeng es the leg al sufficie ncy o f t h e nonmovant’s pleading s, with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss
, which adm i t s t h e l eg al sufficie n cy of the nonmovant’s pleading s but asser ts cer tain defe cts or defe nses. Kean v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc.
, 235 I ll. 2d 351, 361 (2009); Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson
, 338 I ll. App. 3d 156, 164 (2003). Under either section 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code, our standa

rd of r eview is de novo

. Kean , 235 I ll. 2d at 361. ¶ 29 Respondent argues the trial cou rt erre d in dismiss ing responde nt’s motion pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. Respondent contends the dismiss al was err or beca use the fac ts as pled supported responde nt’s claim that the tax deed either was void or was subject t o vacatur pursuant to section 2 -1 4 0 1 o f t he C ode. S pecif ically
, responde nt argues the tax deed was rec orded untimely and, thus, was void beca use GJ ’s assig nment of the tax sale lien to Sabre rende red the ext en s i o n notice filed by GJ a nullity

. Additionally
, responde nt argues the g rounds alleg ed in support of its section 2-1401 petition to vacate are leg ally sufficie nt as a matter

of law. ¶ 30 Petitioner claims responde n t fa i l s t o state a permissible cause of action to void the tax deed beca use responde nt, in a collater al proce eding
, is using section 21-385 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/21-385 (West 2008) ), conce rning the extension of the rede mption period by either the purcha ser or his assig nee of the tax sale lien, to direc tly attack the order direc ting the issuance of the tax deed. Acc ording to petitioner, responde nt forf eited its right
to any direc t attack on the tax deed proce eding and order for tax deed when responde nt failed
to respond to the notice of the tax sale it rec eived in J uly 2008. See 35 I L CS 200/22-45 (West 2008) (once a t ax d ee d has been issued under the Property Tax Code pursuant to a court order
, it is incontestable except by direc t appea l from the order direc ting the entry of that tax deed or by a sec tion 2-1401 petition).

-6-¶ 31 P et i t i o n er ’s d i rect attack/c ollatera l proce eding argument lacks m er i t

. C o u n t I o f

responde nt’s motion so u ght to void the t ax deed pursuant t o section 22-85 of the P roper ty Tax Code, which provides, inter alia
, that if the holder of the cer tificate purcha sed at any tax sale fails to rec ord the deed within one year from and afte r the time for rede mption expires, then the deed and the sale upon which it was based shall be absolutely void with no right to reimburse ment. 35 I L CS 200/22-85 (West 2008). Courts have a duty to vacate and expunge void order s from court rec ords. In re Application of the County Tre a s u r er & ex officio County Collect o r o

f Co o k County
, 333 I ll. App. 3d 355, 359 (2002). Moreove r, a void judgme nt may be attacke d at any time, either direc tly or collater ally

. In re Application of the County Collector
, 3 9 7 I l l

. App. 3d 535, 542 (2009) (her einaf ter, Dev on Bank

). Section 2- 1401, which essentially codified the common law means of collater ally attacking judgme nts, provides that “Nothing contained in this S ec t i o n aff ects any exis ting right to relief from a void order or judgme nt, or to employ any exis ting method to procur e that relief .” 735 I L CS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2008); see also Dev on Bank
, 397 I ll. App. 3d at 543. A section 2-1401(f ) petition alleg ing voidness is exempt from the g ener al require ments of section 2-1401 petitions, such as alleg ing a merit o ri o u s defe nse and due diligenc e. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education , 201 I ll. 2d 95, 104 (2002); Dev on Bank, 397 I ll. App. 3d at 543.
¶ 32 Turning to the merits of this appea l, responde nt argues that the deed issued to pe titioner i s void under the rele vant provisions of the Property Tax Code. Specifica lly
, respo n d en t

asser ts that the tax deed is void beca use it was not rec orded within one year from the orig inal J une 12, 2008 rede mption period expiration date. Although ce rtificate purcha ser GJ had attempted to extend the date to J uly 25, 2008, that filing–a ccor ding to responde nt–w as a nullity beca

use GJ lacke d any statutory authority to file an ext en s i o n wher e it had alre ady assig ned its right, interest and title in the cer tificate to Sabre. Respondent argues Sabre’ s J uly 2008 attempt to extend the expiration date to November 26, 2008 was also a nullity beca use the rede mption p eriod had alre ady expired. Respondent asser ts the orig inal rede mption expiration date of J une 12, 2008 rema ined eff ective and petitioner failed to rec o rd t h e tax deed w ithin one y ear

of that date , as re quired by section 22-85 of

the Property

Tax Code.
¶ 33 “[T] he primary purpose of the tax sales provisions of the Property Tax Code is to coer ce tax delinquent prope rt y o wners to pay their t axes, not to assist tax petitioners i n depriving the true owners of their property .” In re Application of the County Col lector , 295 I ll. App. 3d 703, 710 (1998). The key issue for responde nt is whether GJ ’s extension notice was valid under section 21-385 of the Property Tax Code. Section 21-385 provides, in pertinent part: “[The] purcha ser or his or her assig nee of proper ty sold for nonpay

ment of g ener al taxes *** may extend the period of rede mption at any time befor e the expiration of the orig inal period of rede mpt i o n, or there afte r prior to the expiration of any extended period of rede mption, for a period which will expire not later than 3 year s from the date of sale, by filing with the county cler k *** a written notice to that effect describing the proper ty , stating the date of the sale and specify ing the extended period of rede mption. *** I f the period of rede mption is extended, the purcha ser or his o r h er as s i gnee must g ive the notices provided for in Section 22-10 at the specifie d times prior to the expiration of the extended period of rede mption by causing a sheriff *** to serve the notices as provided

-7-in Section 22-15 and 22-20.” 35 I L CS 200/ 21-385 (West 2008).

¶ 34 Respondent argues a purcha ser cannot extend the re d em p t i o n p er i o d af t er i t has unconditionally assig ned awa y all of its rights to the tax lien. Respondent asser ts that when the rele vant provisions of the Property Tax Code are construed toge ther, the context rende rs p l ai n the meaning of the phrase “purc haser or his or her assig nee” in section 21-385. Specifica lly
, responde nt contends the leg islature clea rly intended that only the owner and holder of the cer

tificate of purcha se has the ri gh t t o ex tend the rede mption period under section 21-385; prior owner s and holders cannot extend the rede mption period beca use their statutory rights have be en tra

nsfer red to a new owne r and holde r. ¶ 35 Petitioner responds that section 21-385 expressly states that a “purc haser ” or “assignee”
may file the e x tension notice.
¶ 36 The primary objective in interpre ting a statute is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature. Solon v. Midwest Medic al Rec ords Ass’n
, 236 I ll. 2d 433, 440 (2010). The leg islature’s intent in enac ting a statute is best deter mined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory languag e. Id . “In deter mining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the s tatute i n its entirety
, the s ubject it addre s s es, and the apparent int ent of the l eg islature in enac ting it.” Solon , 236 I ll. 2d at 440.
¶ 37 When the languag e of the statute is clea r and unambiguous, the court must g ive it e ffe ct without resortingto other aids of c onstruction. Id . The statute is de emed ambiguous if it is
capa ble of being understood by rea sonably well-infor med persons in two or more differ ent way s. Id

. C o urts should construe statutes so as t o yield logic al and meaning ful results and
to avoid constructions that rende r sp ec i fi c l anguag e superf luous or meaning less. Roche lle Disposal Servic e, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board
, 266 I ll. App. 3d 192, 198 (1994). Courts do not depar

t from the plain statutory languag e by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. Solon
, 236 I ll. 2d at 441. Courts may also consider the conseque nces that would result from construing the statute one way or the other. Id

. ¶ 38 Statutes should be interpre ted as a whole, meaning differ ent sections of the same statute should be considered in ref ere nce to one another so that they are g iven harmonious eff ect. Michigan Ave nue National Bank v. County of Cook
, 191 I ll. 2d 493, 504 (2000). One section of a statute should not be interpre ted in a way that rende rs another section of the same statute irrele vant. Colli nsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees , 218 I ll. 2d 175, 185-86 (2006).
¶ 39 Section 21-350 of the Property Tax Code addre sses the period of rede mption for pr operty sold under the Property Tax Code. 35 I L CS 200/21-350 (West 2008). Gene rally
, the period of rede mption is two year s from the date of sale, but if cer tain exceptio n s apply
, then the rede mption period may be either leng thened or shortened. One such exception, located in section 21-350( c) pr ovides in pertinent par t: “§ 21-350. Period of Redemption. Property sold under this Code may be rede emed at any time before the expiration of 2 year s from the date of sale , except that:

-8-* * * (c) if the period of rede mption has been extended by the certificate h o lder as provided in Section 21-385
, the proper ty may be rede emed on or befor e the extended rede mption date.” (Empha sis added.) 35 I L CS 200/ 21-350 (West 2008).

This cross-r efe renc e to section 21-385
, which provides that the “purc haser or his or her assig nee of proper

ty sold for nonpay

ment of g ener al taxes” may extend the rede mption period by filing a written notice with the county cler k, is dispositi ve of the issue at hand. We
must construe section 21-385 harmoniously with section 21-350(c ). The leg islature’s use of the term “ce rtificate holder” in section 21-350(c ) establishes the clea r leg islative intent that the purcha ser or assig nee ref ere nced in section 21-385 must also be the cer tificate holder. See Colli nsville
, 218 I ll. 2d at 185-86 (The doctrine of in pari materia “is also applicable to differ ent sections of the same statute and is consonant with one of our fundame ntal rules of statutory construction–‘to viewall of the provisions of a statute as a whole.’ [Cit ation.]”). ¶ 40 Fur

ther suppo rt fo r t his construction is found i n section 21-260(e) of the P roper ty Tax Code, conce rning the proce dures t o obtain a tax deed for scave ng er sales. Specifica lly
, section 21-260( e) pr ovides in pertinent par t: “(e ) Procee ding to tax deed. The owner ofthe certificate of purchase shall g ive notice

as require d by Sections 22-5 through 22-30, and may exte nd the period of redem ption as provided by

Section 21-385 .” (Empha sis added.) 35 I L CS 200/ 21-260(e ) (West 2008).

Section 21 -260(e )’s cross-r efe renc e to section 21-385 further establishes the leg islature’s clea r intent that the purcha ser or assig nee ref ere nced in section 2 1 -385 must also be the

owner /holder of the c ertifica

te of purc hase. ¶ 41 Her e, GJ was not the cer tificate holder when it filed the extension n o t i ce pursuant to section 21-385. Specifica lly
, GJ had assig ned awa y its rights to the tax lien almost two year s befor e it filed the extension notice. See 35 I L CS 200/21-250 (West 2008) (“An assig nment shall vest in the assig nee *** all the right and title of the orig inal purcha ser.” ). Consequently
, the extension filed by GJ was a nullity
, and the orig inal rede mption expiration date of J une 12, 2008 rema ined in eff

ect. This meant that petitioner had to rec ord the tax deed by J une 12, 2009. Petitioner, howeve r, rec orded the tax deed on November 4, 2009, which was untimely and, thus
, absolutely void pursuant to section 22-85. The trial court, therefor e, erred when it dism issed responde nt’s motion to voi d the tax deed.
¶ 42 Petitioner asser ts that the section 2-619(a )(9) aff idavit by Kevin Sierzeg a eliminates any issue as to whether or not the extension notice was valid beca use Sierzeg a prepa

red and filed that noti ce with the full knowledg e and authority of GJ and Sabre. We do not agree

. Sierzeg a’s aff

idavit was not an aff

irmative matter that defe ated responde nt’s motion to void. That aff idavit mere ly indicated that a third-par ty g o-betwe en filed extension notices and take notices on behalf of GJ
, Sabre, and petitioner. The aff idavit in no way

ref uted the fa ct t hat neither GJ nor its authorized ag ent could file the nece ssary extension notice beca use GJ had assig ned away that and all other rights almosttwo year s prior. S ierzeg a’s affidavit and the April 2008 extension notice indicate that Sierzeg a was acting on behalf of GJ when the April

-9-2008 notice wa s fi led. M oreove r, petit ioner has neither argued nor shown that GJ had any

authority to act as Sabre’ s ag ent when GJ filed the April 2008 notice. In addition, petitioner has not a ddresse d, either on appea l or below, the validity of GJ’s April 2008 notice, which was in the for

m of an a ffidavit but was not signed by any office r or a g ent of GJ. ¶ 43 As a result of our construction of the re levant provisions of the Property Tax Code and

our conclusion that petitioner’s tax deed is void, we need not addre ss responde nt’s alternate argument that it suffic i en t l y pled a cause of action alleg ing the tax deed was procur ed by fra ud.

¶ 44 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 45 Pursuant to s ec t i o n 2 2 -85 of t he P roper ty Tax Code, the t ax deed at issue here and the sale on which it was based are void with no right to reimburse ment. Acc ording ly
, we reve rse the trial court’s judgme nt that dismiss ed responde nt’s motion to void. We rema nd this cause with direc tions for the trial court to set aside the tax deed under section 2-1401(f ) of the Code and sec tion 22-85 of the Proper ty Tax Code.

¶ 46 Reverse d and re manded with dire ctions.

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