1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHRISTOPHER TESS, 

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-CV-10791 

vs. 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

___________________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [12] AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [15] 

Plaintiff Christopher Tess seeks judicial review of Defendant the Commissioner of Society 

Security’s determination that he is not entitled to Social Security benefits for his physical and 

mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 12) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 15). With consent of the Parties, this case has been referred to the undersigned for 

final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (Docket no. 14.) 

The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 

7.1(f)(2), and issues this Opinion and Order. 

I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security 

Income on March 18, 2013, alleging that he had been disabled since October 17, 2012, due to a 

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spinal impairment and affective and anxiety disorders.1

 (See TR 10, 13.) The Social Security 

Administration denied benefits. (See TR 157.) Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing, which was 

held on July 16, 2014, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John Dodson, who subsequently 

found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because he was capable of performing a significant 

number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 10-19.) The Appeals Council declined to review 

the ALJ’s decision, and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then 

filed their instant Motions. 

II. Plaintiff’s Testimony, Medical Evidence, and Vocational Expert Testimony

Plaintiff (docket no. 12 at 12-17), Defendant (docket no. 15 at 5-13), and the ALJ (TR 

14-17) each set out a detailed factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record, Plaintiff’s 

hearing testimony, and the VE’s testimony. Having conducted an independent review of 

Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that although the 

parties and the ALJ each focus on different statements and records, there are no material 

inconsistencies between their recitations of the record. Therefore, the Court will incorporate 

these factual recitations by reference and will include comments and citations as necessary 

throughout this Opinion and Order. 

III. Administrative Law Judge’s Determination

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the act through 

December 31, 2012; that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 17, 2012, 

his alleged onset date; and that he suffered from severe “degenerative disc disease and affective 

and anxiety disorders.” (TR 13.) The ALJ then found that his impairments did not meet or equal 

 

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 Plaintiff filed an earlier application for benefits, which was denied in a decision dated 

October 16, 2012, the day before his current alleged onset date. (TR 77-94.) 

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those listed in the Listing of Impairments. (TR 14-16.) 

Next, The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the extent of his symptoms were 

not wholly credible and that Plaintiff could perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: 

[H]e is limited to unskilled work which would avoid concentrated exposure to 

hazardous heights or dangerous machinery; he cannot climb ropes, ladders, or 

scaffolds but is capable of performing all other postural movements on an 

occasional basis; can engage in only occasional superficial interactions with the 

public and occasional interactions with co-workers and supervisors; cannot engage 

in production rate standards; and needs to be able to alternate between sitting and 

standing positions up to three times an hour.2

 

(TR 16-17.) The ALJ then determined, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing work as an office helper, assembler, or inspector/sorter. (TR 18-19.) 

Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act from 

October 17, 2012, through the date of his decision. (TR 19.) 

IV. Law and Analysis 

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

 

2

 In Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the Sixth Circuit held that social-security 

claimants and the Commissioner are barred by principles of res judicata from relitigating issues 

that have previously been determined. 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997). Where limitations have 

been found, the Commissioner is bound by the principles of res judicata to accept those limitations 

unless there is new and material evidence of changed circumstances. Id. at 842; SSAR 98-4(6). 

And where a claimant who has previously been adjudicated “not disabled” seeks to avoid 

application of res judicata, he must provide proof that his condition has worsened since the date of 

the prior decision to such a degree that he is no longer capable of engaging in substantial gainful 

activity. See Vesey v. Comm’r, No. 11-10967, 2012 WL 4475657, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 

2012). Noting his responsibility under Drummond, the ALJ found that Plaintiff presented new 

records and opinions with regard to both his physical and mental impairments. (TR 14-15.) 

Moreover, the ALJ determined a new RFC based on this new evidence. The ALJ’s analysis and 

determination of that new RFC is considered herein. 

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final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that 

the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the 

decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”). 

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a 

five-step sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

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(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 

relevant past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can perform.” 

Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding “supported by 

substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.” 

Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). This 

“substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in response to a 

hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] individual 

physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] (a 

sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter upon the 

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pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the decision of 

the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is reversal and 

a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 WL 

2292305, at *8 (E.D.Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). Plaintiff argues that this 

matter should be reversed or remanded because (1) the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s 

credibility due to (a) statements made in his prior application for benefits, (b) a minimal work 

record, and (c) a lack of mental-health treatment prior to November 2011; (2) the ALJ improperly 

weighed the medical opinions of record, including (a) Plaintiff’s six-month parking permit, and (b) 

check-sheets submitted by his treating physicians; and (3) the ALJ failed to pose complete and 

accurate hypothetical question to the VE where the ALJ failed to include any limitations related to 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (Docket no. 12.) 

1. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination

Plaintiff first takes issue with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s complaints were not 

fully credible. “An ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded 

great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a 

witness’s demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). 

But credibility assessments are not insulated from judicial review. Despite the deference that is 

due, such a determination must nevertheless be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s 

credibility determination must contain “specific reasons . . . supported by the evidence in the case 

record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent 

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that 

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weight.” SSR 96–7p. “It is not enough to make a conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s 

allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) credible.’” Id. “The 

adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations to be credible” and may 

also find the statements credible to a certain degree. See id.

Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated by 

the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will not 

reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about 

the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work . . . solely because the available objective 

medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). The ALJ 

must consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, duration, frequency, and 

intensity of claimant’s pain, (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, 

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) 

treatment, other than medication, for pain relief, (6) any measures used to relieve the pain, and (7) 

functional limitations and restrictions due to the pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3); see also 

Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entirely credible for the following reasons: 

 There is “no history of any mental health treatment prior to November 15, 2011,” 

which was “one month after the claimant had filed his previous applications for 

disability on October 17, 2011.” (TR 14-15.) The ALJ noted that this lack of 

treatment and a lack of any hospitalization “fail[ed] to support the marked and extreme 

level of impairment cited by the treating sources.” (TR 15.) 

 When Plaintiff filed his previous applications for benefits, Plaintiff had “ceased 

working with the state employment people because he wanted to concentrate on child 

care for his son” and that “his hobbies included playing hockey, working on the 

computer, and writing music.” (TR 15.) The ALJ found that “[t]hese records [were] 

suggestive of a possible secondary gain motive” and that “playing hockey is not 

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consistent with a total [in]ability to leave one’s house.” (TR 15.)3

 

 Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that his “pain had essentially resolved with [a] 

March 28, 2013 laminectomy surgery,” and he did not complain of any pain until July 

18, 2014, “which was actually after the administrative hearing.” (TR 17.) 

 “As noted previously by Judge Scallen, the claimant had indicated at the time of the 

prior hearing that he engaged in child care, cooking, housecleaning, laundry, shopping, 

reading, playing board games, watching ‘reality TV,’ working on his computer, and 

going to church.” (TR 17.) 

 “Judge Scallen also noted that there was a lack of objective documentation of any focal 

sensory, motor, or reflex deficits.” (TR 17.) 

Plaintiff contends that these findings are inappropriate as the relevant time period for a 

disability determination did not begin until October 17, 2012, after ALJ Scallen issued his 

determination. Defendant impliedly acknowledges that the ALJ may have erred if he had 

considered this information as substantive evidence regarding Plaintiff’s disability application, but 

Defendant argues that the ALJ was permitted to consider this evidence when determining 

Plaintiff’s credibility. (Docket no. 15 at 15-18.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant that the ALJ did not err by considering this information 

when determining Plaintiff’s credibility, and Plaintiff has not provided any legal argument 

suggesting otherwise. Nevertheless, the Court finds the ALJ’s credibility analysis insufficient. 

Nowhere in his decision did the ALJ consider Plaintiff’s current application or any of the 

credibility factors noted above. Instead, with the exception of discussing Plaintiff’s June 2013 

back surgery, the ALJ merely rehashes ALJ Scallen’s credibility finding and adopts it as his own. 

Although the ALJ acknowledged the receipt of new evidence and determined a new RFC, the ALJ 

 

3 The Court notes that this finding (and the previous finding) are discussed during the 

ALJ’s Step 3 determination with regard to whether Plaintiff’s impairments meet or equal any of 

the listed impairments. The ALJ indicates at Step 4 that these “elements of possibly secondary 

gain are again noted,” impliedly referring to his discussion at Step 3. 

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failed to discuss what effect this new evidence may have had on Plaintiff’s credibility. It belies 

logic to determine that Plaintiff’s RFC has changed since the prior decision and then find that his 

prior application for benefits impugns his credibility. Thus, without further analysis by the ALJ, 

the Court is unable to determine whether his credibility findings are supported by substantial 

evidence. Therefore, the Court will remand this matter for further discussion of Plaintiff’s 

credibility. 

2. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Opinions of Record 

Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by improperly weighing the opinions of Dr. Holly 

Gilmer (presented as evidence in the form of a disability parking permit) and Suzanne Johnson, 

LMSW, Dr. Philip MaharajPrasad, and Dr. Sarva Sarvananda (provided as three checklist forms). 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting these opinions and adopting the opinion of the 

state agency physician, Dr. Leonard Balunas. (Docket no. 12 at 21-25.) 

The ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion complete deference if it is supported by 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial 

evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). But it is equally well settled that the 

ultimate issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner and not the treating or examining 

physician. Kidd v. Comm’r, 283 Fed. Appx. 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, when a medical or 

non-medical source offers an opinion on “an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether 

the claimant is disabled, the ALJ need not accord that opinion controlling weight.” Id. (citing 

Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007)). The opinion of an examining source is 

generally accorded more weight than is the opinion of a source who did not examine the claimant. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). The opinion of a state agency medical or psychological consultant is 

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reviewed in the same manner as is the opinion of a nonexamining physician or psychologist. 20 

C.F.R. §404.1527(e). 

Additionally, the Commissioner requires its ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their] 

notice of determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Those good reasons must be “supported by the evidence in the case 

record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Wilson 

v. Comm’r, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-2p, 1996 

WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). If the opinion of a treating source is not afforded controlling weight, 

an ALJ must apply certain factors in determining what weight to give the opinion, including the 

length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 

treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as 

a whole, and the specialization of the treating source. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (citation omitted). 

Even then, a finding that a treating-source medical opinion is not well supported by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with the other 

substantial evidence in the case record means only that the opinion is not entitled to controlling 

weight, not that the opinion should be rejected. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-2p, 1996 WL 

374188, at *4. Notably, though, “it is not the Court’s job to conduct a de novo review of the 

evidence or to rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision. The Court must ensure both that the ALJ applied 

the correct legal standard and that his decision is supported by substantial evidence. See 

Christephore v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 11-13547, 2012 WL 2274328, *6 (E.D. Mich. 

June 18, 2012) (Roberts, J.) 

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Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit has upheld the decision of an ALJ which gave less than 

controlling weight to a treating physician without specifically analyzing the factors set forth in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) where the ALJ provided “good reason” for the decision. See Infantado v. 

Astrue, 263 Fed.Appx. 469, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2008). There is no per se rule that requires an 

articulation of each of the six regulatory factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). Norris 

v. Comm’r, No. 11-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. 

Comm’r, 394 Fed. Appx. 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, an ALJ’s failure to discuss the 

factors of § 1527(c)(2)-(6) may constitute harmless error (1) if “a treating source’s opinion is so 

patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner 

adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or (3) 

“where the Commissioner has met the goal of [Section 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural 

safeguard of reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.” 

Nelson v. Comm’r, 195 Fed. Appx. 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Wilson v. Comm’r, 378 F.3d 

541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

With regard to Dr. Gilmer’s provision of the parking permit for Plaintiff, the ALJ noted as 

follows: 

Holly Gilmer. M.D., did provide the claimant with a temporary disability parking 

permit on June 27, 2014, but this was clearly not an endorsement of long-term 

disability as it was for only six months. This opinion is given considerable weight 

but is not supportive of the claimant’s disability claim. 

(TR 17.) On the form itself, Dr. Gilmer noted that Plaintiff had “[a]n inability to walk more than 

200 feet without having to stop and rest.” (TR 454.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to 

consider that “Dr. Gilmer could renew the permit or extend the permit after the 6 month time 

period had lapsed,” but as Defendant notes, any such argument is speculation. Plaintiff bears the 

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burden of proof at Step 4, and Plaintiff provided no evidence to suggest that Dr. Gilmer intended to 

extend or renew information on the permit form. Thus, the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 

Dr. Gilmer’s opinion. 

 With regard to the opinions offered by Ms. Johnson and Drs. Prasad and Dr. Sarvananda, 

the ALJ and the parties noted that their opinions were substantially similar. The ALJ states that 

the forms “indicate that the claimant has marked deficiencies in activities of daily living, extreme 

social limitations, frequent deficiencies of concentration, persistence, and pace, repeated episodes 

of decompensation, and a complete inability to function outside of his house.” (TR 14.) the ALJ 

then affords these opinions “very little weight” because they are “inconsistent with the claimant’s 

abilities to attend his medical appointments or the actual treatment records from Macomb County 

Mental Health.” (TR 14.) Defendant points to the ALJ’s findings and argues that “there do not 

appear to be any clinical signs of disabling mental illness in the record during the relevant period.” 

(Docket no. 15 at 20.) But the ALJ made no such statement, and Defendant’s post-hoc 

rationalization is insufficient to support the ALJ’s decision. See Christephore v. Commissioner of 

Social Sec., No. 11-13547, 2012 WL 2274328, *6 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2012) (Roberts, J.) (“[I]t is 

not the Court’s job to conduct a de novo review of the evidence or to rubber stamp the ALJ’s 

decision. The Court must ensure both that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and that his 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, it is the ALJ’s rationale that is under 

review, not defense counsel’s.”) Plaintiff, however, contends that the ALJ’s reliance on 

Plaintiff’s ability to attend his medical appointments is not a valid reason to discount a medical 

opinion. (Docket no. 12 at 21.) The Court agrees. More importantly, though, while the ALJ’s 

ultimate determination regarding these opinions may not have been in error, his cursory discussion 

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of the treating physicians’ opinions is insufficient. Therefore, the Court will remand this matter 

for further consideration of the medical opinions of record. 

3. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Mental RFC with Regard to 

Concentration, Persistence, or Pace4

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in the development of his mental RFC when he 

failed to include any limitations with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. (Docket no. 

12 at 27.) When, as he did here, the ALJ makes a finding that a claimant has moderate limitations 

in concentration, persistence or pace, the ALJ must account for such limitations in the claimant’s 

RFC and in his hypothetical questions to the VE. See Tinker v. Astrue, No. 08-11675, 2009 WL 

3064780, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2009). Findings of moderate limitations in concentration, 

persistence, or pace do not necessarily preclude “simple, routine, unskilled work.” Lewicki v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-11844-BC, 2010 WL 3905375, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010) 

(citations omitted). Such limitations may, however, result in the claimant being unable to meet 

quotas, stay alert, or work at a consistent rate of speed. Edwards v. Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d 

920, 930 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 

 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s mental RFC as follows: 

[H]e is limited to unskilled work . . .; can engage in only occasional superficial 

interactions with the public and occasional interactions with co-workers and 

 

4 Although Plaintiff frames this argument in terms of the ALJ’s questions to the VE, as 

Defendant notes, and as this Court has discussed numerous times when presented with such an 

argument by Plaintiff’s counsel, an ALJ need only include in the hypothetical questions to the VE 

those limitations that the ALJ finds to be credible; that is, the ALJ need only ask the VE 

hypothetical questions related to limitations that the ALJ also includes in the plaintiff’s RFC. See 

Casey v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, the ALJ 

included all of the limitations that he found credible in Plaintiff’s RFC; and he included all of those 

same limitations in his hypothetical questions to the VE. Thus, in substance, Plaintiff’s argument 

is not a challenge to the ALJ’s questioning of the VE; it is, instead, a collateral challenge to the 

ALJ’s RFC finding. The Court will, therefore, consider it as such.

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supervisors; [and] cannot engage in production rate standards . . . . 

(TR 16.) As noted above, a limitation to non-production-rate work is a common and adequate 

limitation for those persons who suffer from moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or 

pace. See Edwards, supra. Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain what additional limitations the 

ALJ should have imposed. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument fails in this regard. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [12] is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and that Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment [15] is DENIED. The Court will remand this matter for further consideration as 

discussed herein. 

Dated: February 5, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of this Order was served upon Counsel of Record on this date. 

Dated: February 5, 2016 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager 

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