COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

PATRICIA HANSON, S/K/A 

 PATRICIA HANSON BAILEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2899-95-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 APRIL 1, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 

William W. Sweeney, Judge 

 Thomas S. Leebrick (Mosby & Leebrick, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 The circuit court convicted Patricia Hanson on two counts of 

contempt for violating two juvenile court orders and sentenced 

her to two concurrent ten-day jail terms. On appeal, Hanson 

contends that the circuit court erred by (1) using an abuse of 

discretion standard for review, rather than conducting a de novo

review, (2) admitting hearsay testimony of the juvenile court 

judge's order, (3) holding that the juvenile court had the 

jurisdiction over Hanson necessary to find her in contempt when 

she was not a named party to the proceeding, (4) holding that the 

juvenile court had jurisdiction to order Hanson's cooperation on 

her daughter's delinquency petition when Hanson was not a party 

to the action, no final order of delinquency was entered, and no 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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finding of delinquency was made, and (5) finding the evidence 

sufficient to support Hanson's contempt citations. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm Hanson's contempt citation for 

disobeying the juvenile court's September 1994 order, however, we 

reverse Hanson's contempt citation for disobeying the July 1994 

order. 

BACKGROUND

 On July 27, 1994, the Bedford County Juvenile and Domestic 

Relations District Court, after considering a CHINS1

 petition, 

found that Patricia Hanson's daughter was a child in need of 

supervision and ordered, among other things, that the appellant 

"have an evaluation of her need for alcohol treatment" and that 

she "enter and complete treatment if recommended." In September 

1994, a delinquency petition was brought against Hanson's 

daughter, charging her with violating a court order. On 

September 1, 1994, the court found that the evidence was 

sufficient to prove that Hanson's daughter was delinquent, but 

took the petition under advisement for twelve months. The 

juvenile judge ordered the child to be placed in the Presbyterian 

Home and ordered Hanson to immediately apply for Medicaid 

assistance for the child and that she cooperate with the court 

service unit in all matters relating to her daughter. 

 On December 20, 1994, the juvenile court issued a show cause 

summons against Hanson pursuant to Code § 18.2-456 charging her 

 

 1 Children in Need of Supervision. See Code § 16.1-278.5. 
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with contempt for failing to complete the ordered alcohol abuse 

counselling and failing to apply for Medicaid. On February 6, 

1995, the juvenile court issued a second show cause summons 

against Hanson pursuant to Code § 16.1-69.24 charging her with 

contempt for failing to cooperate with the court service unit by 

removing her daughter from the Presbyterian Home before the 

program was completed. 

 The juvenile court conducted a show cause hearing and found 

Hanson in contempt on both charges and sentenced her to ten days 

in jail for each contempt, to be served consecutively. Hanson 

appealed to the circuit court. 

 In the circuit court hearing, a court service unit probation 

officer testified that Hanson's daughter had reported problems 

with Hanson abusing alcohol in the home. The probation officer 

testified that as a result, the juvenile court judge ordered 

that Hanson be evaluated to determine her need for alcohol 

treatment in July of 1994. Hanson began but did not complete the 

alcohol assessment program. 

 As to the September 1994 delinquency order, the court 

service unit probation officer testified that it arose from an 

assault and battery charge which Hanson lodged against her 

daughter. The probation officer stated that Hanson was "very 

much a part of the decision to place [her daughter] at the 

Presbyterian Home. [Hanson] said that . . . she could no longer 

keep [the daughter] at home." The officer testified that Hanson 
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contacted him in January 1995 and wanted to withdraw her daughter 

from the Presbyterian Home. He informed Hanson that her daughter 

had been ordered to complete the program unless Hanson petitioned 

the juvenile court to amend the September 1994 order. However, 

Hanson removed her daughter from the Presbyterian Home program 

without petitioning to amend the order and before the daughter 

completed the program. 

 One of the case workers at the Presbyterian Home testified 

that Hanson was "sabotaging" their efforts to work with the 

daughter. The case worker stated that one of the daughter's 

problems was truancy, and when the daughter visited Hanson, 

Hanson did not make the daughter go to school and was 

consistently late in returning the daughter to the Home. While 

her daughter was still at the Home, Hanson took her, without 

informing the Home's staff, to see a psychiatrist who diagnosed 

her as being manic-depressive. However, the Home's case worker 

did not believe that the daughter was manic-depressive. The case 

worker further testified that she told Hanson that she would have 

to either petition the court to amend the order or revise the 

service plan to shorten the program to end on January 23, 1995 

before she could remove her daughter from the Home. Hanson opted 

to revise the service plan, but then signed a discharge statement 

removing her daughter from the Home on January 17, 1995, before 

the end of the revised program. The case worker testified that 

Hanson had not allowed her daughter to sign the discharge 
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statement because she did not want the daughter held accountable 

for the removal decision. 

 Hanson acknowledged that in July 1994 the juvenile court 

ordered that she be assessed for alcohol abuse. Hanson testified 

that she had difficulty attending her alcohol evaluation 

appointments because she did not drive and her husband, who could 

drive her, worked out of town during the week. ARISE, the 

alcohol assessment center, informed Hanson that her file was 

being closed because she had failed to keep her scheduled 

appointments. Hanson did eventually complete the alcohol 

assessment program, which determined that she did not have an 

alcohol problem. However, Hanson did not complete the alcohol 

evaluation program until October 1995, after she was convicted by 

the juvenile court of contempt, but before her circuit court show 

cause hearing. 

 As to Hanson's failure to obey the September 1994 order, she 

testified that she did not obtain a Medicaid card for her 

daughter as ordered because the court service unit never 

contacted her after her daughter entered the Presbyterian Home, 

so she assumed that they did not need the card. Hanson testified 

that she disagreed with the Home staff that her daughter suffered 

a bipolar or manic-depressive disorder. Hanson further testified 

that she knew that she could not withdraw her daughter from the 

Home without having the juvenile court amend its order or revise 

the service plan. Nevertheless, Hanson withdrew her daughter 
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from the Home on January 17, 1995 without the permission of the 

court or the court service unit. On cross-examination, Hanson 

admitted that she knew she violated the juvenile court's order 

when she removed her daughter from the Home. 

 The circuit court judge, in his letter opinion, found beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Hanson had willfully violated both 

juvenile court orders. Accordingly, the court found her in 

contempt and imposed two ten-day jail sentences to run 

concurrently. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Prior to the circuit court trial, the judge expressed his 

belief that the standard of review for contempt appeals from a 

court not of record is for abuse of discretion rather than de

novo. Defense counsel objected and argued that the evidence 

should be reviewed de novo. At the conclusion of the evidence, 

the judge issued a letter opinion stating, "I find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Patricia Hanson willfully violated both 

orders." 

 In Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368, 417 S.E.2d 891 

(1992), this Court held that appeals of contempt citations from 

district courts are reviewed de novo. 

 Code § 16.1-132 grants to any person 

convicted of an offense in the district court 

the right of appeal to the circuit court and 

Code § 16.1-136 provides that such appeal 

shall be heard de novo, as a new trial. 

The issue before the circuit court is not 

the disposition of the matter in the lower 

court, but the defendant's guilt or 

innocence. In this determination, the 
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judgment of the district court must be 

ignored. In the appeal of a contempt 

citation, however, those events which 

occurred in the district court comprise the 

evidence of the offense before the court of 

record. The occurrence, circumstances and 

perceptions of the district court judge are 

relevant and necessary direct evidence in the 

appellate proceeding, the admission of which 

does not effect the de novo nature of the 

trial. 

Id. at 373, 417 S.E.2d at 894 (citations omitted). Thus, the 

correct standard of review in the circuit court was a de novo

review of whether Hanson willfully violated the two court orders. 

 Although the trial judge initially stated his belief that 

the standard of review was an abuse of discretion, the judge's 

opinion letter found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hanson 

willfully violated the juvenile court orders. Thus, the trial 

judge applied the correct standard of review and considered the 

evidence de novo. 

HEARSAY EVIDENCE

 The appellant contends that the trial judge erred by 

admitting the hearsay testimony of the court service unit 

probation officer to prove what the juvenile court judge ordered 

the appellant to do in the July 27, 1994 and September 1, 1994 

orders. We disagree. 

 "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at trial, which is offered to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted." Clark v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. 

App. 1068, 1070, 421 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1992). "Unless it is offered 
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to show its truth, an out-of-court statement is not subject to 

the rule against hearsay and is admissible if relevant." Church 

v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208, 212, 335 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1985). 

 Here, Mr. Harper's testimony as to the contents of the 

juvenile judge's orders and what the judge ordered the appellant 

to do was not offered for the truth of its contents. The orders 

themselves were evidence in the case. The testimony of the 

probation officer was offered to prove that the trial judge told 

Hanson of the requirements of the order and proved that she had 

notice of the orders. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in 

admitting the evidence. 

JULY 1994 CHINS ORDER

 Because Hanson was not a named party to the July 1994 CHINS 

order entered by the court, she contends that the juvenile court 

did not have jurisdiction to order her to have an alcohol 

treatment evaluation and to enter a treatment program if 

indicated. More specifically, Hanson argues that the evidence 

was insufficient to prove that she was a contributing factor to 

her daughter's need for supervision as required under Code 

§ 16.1-241(F)(3). We find that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the trial court's finding that she contributed to the 

need for supervision and, therefore, the juvenile court had 

jurisdiction to order the alcohol evaluation. 

 Code § 16.1-241(F)(3) gives the juvenile court jurisdiction 

over 

 [a]ny parent, guardian, legal custodian or 
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other person standing in loco parentis of a 

child . . . [w]ho has been adjudicated in 

need of services, in need of supervision, or 

delinquent, if the court finds that such 

person has by overt act or omission, induced, 

caused, encouraged or contributed to the 

conduct of the child complained of in the 

petition. 

Furthermore, Code § 16.1-278.5(B)(3) gives the court the 

authority to "[o]rder the child and/or his parent to participate 

in such programs, cooperate in such treatment or be subject to 

such conditions and limitations as the court may order and as are 

designed for the rehabilitation of the child." 

 At trial, the court service unit probation officer testified 

that there were "problems within the household, fighting, staying 

out all night, truancy . . . that sort of thing." Prior to the 

July 1994 CHINS order, he stated that "there were suspicions that 

there were problems with alcohol abuse in the household . . . ." 

 Hanson's daughter also testified that, prior to the July 1994 

hearing, she told the probation officer that her mother had a 

problem with alcohol abuse. She later recanted that statement, 

but not until after the judge entered the order requiring Hanson 

to obtain the evaluation. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to 

support the juvenile court's factual finding that the mother had 

contributed to her daughter's need for supervision, giving the 

court jurisdiction to order the mother to be evaluated for 

alcohol abuse pursuant to Code § 16.1-241(F)(3). 

SEPTEMBER 1994 DELINQUENCY ORDER

 In the September 1994 delinquency order, the juvenile court 
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judge found the evidence sufficient to prove that the child was 

delinquent, but the court took the case under advisement for 

twelve months. Hanson contends that she cannot be held in 

contempt of the September 1994 order because it was under 

advisement and not a final order. The argument is without merit. 

 In general, an order finally disposing of a case must be 

entered by a trial court before it is final and may be appealed. 

Hairfield v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 649, 654, 376 S.E.2d 796, 

799 (1989). However, the issue was not whether the delinquency 

order was final and appealable. An interlocutory order which 

directs a party to perform or refrain from certain acts is 

enforceable and may be the subject of a contempt citation. So 

long as the September 1994 order was a valid court order, as we 

find that it is, a contempt charge may be brought for failure to 

obey the court's order. 

 As to Hanson's claim that the September 1994 delinquency 

order was not enforceable against her because she was not a named 

party, Code § 16.1-241(F)(3) confers juvenile court jurisdiction 

over the parent of a child who has been adjudicated delinquent. 

Furthermore, if the juvenile is found to be delinquent, Code 

§ 16.1-278.8(6) grants authority to the court to 

 [o]rder the parent of a juvenile with whom 

the juvenile does not reside to participate 

in such programs, cooperate in such treatment 

or be subject to such conditions and 

limitations as the court may order and as are 

designed for the rehabilitation of the 

juvenile where the court determines this 

participation to be in the best interest of 

the juvenile and other parties concerned and 
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where the court determines it reasonable to 

expect the parent to be able to comply with 

such order . . . . 

 In the September 1994 order, the juvenile court judge found 

the evidence was sufficient to prove that the child was 

delinquent. Taking the case under advisement did not void or 

negate the delinquency finding or defeat the court's jurisdiction 

to order the child's mother to be evaluated. Therefore, the 

juvenile court had jurisdiction to order that the mother be 

evaluated and to hold her in contempt for willfully disobeying 

the court's order. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 Code §§ 18.2-456 and 16.1-69.24 confer upon the juvenile 

court the power to punish for contempt in cases of 

"[d]isobedience or resistance of an officer of the court, juror, 

witness or other person to any lawful process, judgement, decree 

or order of the court." Code § 18.2-456(5). Willful or 

intentional disobedience is a necessary element in proving 

contempt. Carter v. Commonwealth. 2 Va. App. 392, 397, 345 

S.E.2d 5, 8 (1986) (citing 17 Am. Jur.2d Contempt § 8 (1964)). 

 At the time of the juvenile court contempt hearing, Hanson 

had attended but had not completed the alcohol evaluation 

program. However, when the case was heard de novo in the circuit 

court, the evidence proved that Hanson had completed the program 

on October 11, 1995, two weeks before the circuit court trial. 

The July 27, 1994 order did not provide a time limitation by 
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which the evaluation was to be completed. The evidence did not 

prove that time was of the essence. The purpose of the judge's 

order was to have Hanson evaluated to determine the need for 

alcohol abuse treatment to the extent her conduct may have 

contributed to her daughter's delinquency. At the time of the 

circuit court trial de novo, Hanson had completed the alcohol 

abuse treatment and was not shown to have willfully disobeyed the 

court's order. Thus, the evidence was insufficient for the 

circuit court to find that Hanson was in contempt of the juvenile 

court order. Accordingly, Hanson's contempt citation on this 

count is reversed and dismissed. 

 As to the September 1994 order, the evidence was sufficient 

to support the trial court's finding that Hanson willfully 

disobeyed that order. Hanson admitted at trial that she knew she 

was violating the order by removing her daughter from the 

Presbyterian Home before the end of the program. She argues, 

however, that she intended no disrespect to the court and, 

therefore, lacked the intent necessary to be in contempt of the 

order. 

 Hanson's argument has no merit. She intentionally disobeyed 

the court's order. She removed her daughter from the 

Presbyterian Home in violation of the order and after being told 

by the court service unit probation officer and the case worker 

that she could not do so unless she petitioned the juvenile court 

to amend its order. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support 
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Hanson's conviction on this count. 

 In summary, we hold that the trial court used the proper 

standard of review and that the juvenile court had jurisdiction 

over Hanson, the child's mother. The evidence was sufficient to 

sustain Hanson's contempt citation for violating the September 

1994 order. However, because Hanson completed the alcohol 

evaluation program, the circuit court erred in finding that she 

was in contempt on the July 1994 order. Accordingly, we affirm 

the appellant's conviction on the September 1994 order and 

reverse the conviction on the July 1994 order. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part.