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i 

57–696 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–98] 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S RAPID 

ACQUISITION PROCESS: IS IT A MODEL 

FOR IMPROVING ACQUISITION? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PANEL ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 8, 2009 
(II) 

PANEL ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey, Chairman 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

ANDREW HUNTER, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

ALICIA HALEY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, October 8, 2009, The Department of Defense’s Rapid Acquisition 

Process: Is It a Model for Improving Acquisition? ............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, October 8, 2009 ...................................................................................... 27 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2009 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S RAPID ACQUISITION PROCESS: IS 

IT A MODEL FOR IMPROVING ACQUISITION? 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Andrews, Hon. Robert, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Panel 

on Defense Acquisition Reform ........................................................................... 1 

Conaway, Hon. K. Michael, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, 

Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform ................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael, USMC, Commander, Marine Corps Systems 

Command .............................................................................................................. 5 

Dee, Tom, Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ............................ 7 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 12 

Zakheim, Dr. Dov S., Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Member of the Defense Science Board ....................................................................... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Andrews, Hon. Robert ...................................................................................... 31 

Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael ............................................................................. 32 

Dee, Tom ........................................................................................................... 44 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 73 

Zakheim, Dr. Dov S. ......................................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 91 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S RAPID ACQUISITION 

PROCESS: IS IT A MODEL FOR IMPROVING ACQUISITION? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM PANEL, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 8, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 8:00 a.m., in room 2261, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Andrews (chairman of 

the panel) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON 

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

Mr. ANDREWS. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you 

for your attendance at this morning’s hearing of this panel. We feel 

very honored to have before us this morning a very distinguished 

group of gentlemen who have done much for our country and who, 

we know, will contribute much to our deliberations. 

The panel is continuing on its consideration of the core questions 

of whether the uniformed personnel of our country and taxpayers 

are getting full value for the money we spend on the procurement 

system; and there is a qualitative aspect to that and a quantitative 

aspect to that. We have gone through a series of hearings in which 

we have explored hypotheses as to the reasons why we are not getting that value. 

We have a slightly different twist on that approach this morning 

because we are looking at a case study that, by all accounts, is a 

success story where the public was able to achieve and the 

warfighters were able to achieve very high value, whether we 

measure that qualitatively or quantitatively or both. 

The issue before us is to look at this case study and to see whether there can be lessons learned from the case study. It would be 

instructive for the broader context of how we approach procurement here in the Department of Defense (DOD) for our country. 

The story is an impressive one. It became painfully and 

shockingly obvious to all those involved in the 2004–2005 cycle that 

something was terribly wrong in the way we were arming and 

equipping our warfighters to deal with a growing Improvised Explosive Device (IED) crisis in the two theaters in which we were 

operating at that time. 

I think it is very important the record note at this point the contribution of the former chairman of the full committee, Congressman Duncan Hunter, for whom the bill that did much of this work 
2 

was named, and many members of the Democratic side—certainly, 

Mr. Skelton was instrumental in many ways. Mr. Taylor, I remember, was instrumental in many ways. Any number of members of 

the full committee became personally and actively involved in a 

way that, I think, made a great difference. 

But—the most important difference makers were a series of people, certainly the troops in the field, who were ultimately responsible for the use of these new vehicles, but a lot of unsung heroes, 

as well, deserve credit: the engineers who did design, the planners 

who planned the industrial process, the procurement officials and 

staff who made the procurement happen, and logistical people who 

got the products delivered. There is a success story here that, I 

think, ‘‘deserves to have many fathers’’ as the saying goes. 

The facts here are compelling. We want to get beyond those facts 

and look at the reason. 

I think the most compelling fact is that this issue began to get 

serious currency in the discussions around these halls in early 

2005. You might date it to February 2005. What is impressive is 

that from those very urgent discussions in the winter of 2005 to the 

most recent report in July of 2009, a period of about 4 years and 

4 months, we went from urgent discussions to 13,848 vehicles being 

fielded. That is a substantial achievement, and I think the most 

important achievement is one, I would hope, the witnesses might 

address, which I think is implicit in the testimony, but needs to be 

made explicit. 

The impressive achievement here is not the speed at which this 

was accomplished or the quality of the product that came out of the 

process or, frankly, the relative cost-effectiveness, from what I can 

glean in looking at the economic statistics. The real measure of success is that there are Americans who are with their families today, 

who are leading lives, whether still in the uniformed service of the 

country or not, who would not be here were it not for this progress, 

for whom we would be commemorating their loss on Memorial Day 

were this not successful. 

So I think the true measure of success here is in lives saved, injuries prevented and lives that are now thriving and going on as 

a result of this. 

So we are going to hear this morning from four witnesses who 

will talk about how this story unfolded, who will talk, frankly, 

about the challenges that still exist. I don’t want the record to 

show that we think there is an unvarnished, unblemished story of 

success here. We can always learn from everything that we do, but 

we will have four witnesses who will talk to us this morning about 

how we went from an urgent discussion in the winter of 2005 to 

the present robust fielded capability, and lessons that we might 

then draw from that to improve our overall procurement system. 

I think that we have assembled four individuals who are eminently qualified to make these points, who have served in various 

departments and on various boards that we have created or directed to look at this issue, so we feel very fortunate to have you 

with us this morning. 

At this time, I would like to ask my friend, Mr. Conaway, for his 

opening statement. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Andrews can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, PANEL ON DEFENSE 

ACQUISITION REFORM 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning. I appreciate that. 

In the last couple of hearings, we have looked at DOD’s role in 

tackling the challenges facing the industrial base in a global market and another major component of the acquisition process, which 

is the purchase of commodities. As the chairman stated, today’s 

hearing specifically looks at rapid acquisition and whether or not 

some or all of the changes made in the rapid acquisition process 

to reduce timelines can also produce improved outcomes in the regular acquisition process. 

Certainly, the lessons learned from the unique strategy used to 

procure the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles 

offer a good example of what is possible in terms of quickly getting 

a needed capability to the warfighter, and I cannot think of a better group of witnesses to discuss this issue with us, particularly 

General Brogan, who has had multiple opportunities to excel in 

front of the House Armed Services Committee, not only in regards 

to MRAP, but many other subjects as well. 

I would add that in looking at our witnesses’ statements, one 

theme stood out. I believe it was Dr. Zakheim’s statement that 

said, ‘‘Any rapid response must be based on proven technology and 

robust manufacturing processes.’’ In other words, rapid acquisition 

is not a place for accelerating new technology development. I believe this is one of the reasons why the MRAP program was so successful, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Any panel that has got half of them named ‘‘Mike’’ and the—if 

we had had Coffman in here, it would have been a better comment, 

but if half of the committee is named ‘‘Mike,’’ we are going to get 

some work done this morning. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ANDREWS. We were hoping for some ‘‘Roberts’’ this morning, 

but it looks like we fell short in that category. 

Do we have any ‘‘Jims’’? 

Okay, thank you, Mike. 

You are all veterans of testimony here, so you know that your 

statements, without objection, will be entered into the record of the 

proceeding. I think the members have had a chance to read the 

statements. I have. We would ask you to give us a brief oral synopsis of your statements, about five minutes, so we can get to as 

much dialogue with the panel members as we can. 

I am going to take a few minutes and introduce each of the four 

witnesses. Then when I have finished the introductions, we will 

start with you, General, and we will roll through the oral testimony 

and get to the questions. 

General Michael M. Brogan is a native of Orrville, Ohio. He 

graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a Bachelor of 
4 

Science degree in chemical engineering, and was commissioned as 

a Second Lieutenant. 

He has had a distinguished career. I am just going to read some 

of the personal decorations he has won: the Meritorious Service 

Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Commendation Medal with Gold 

Star, the Navy Achievement Medal, and the Combat Action Ribbon. 

He reported to the 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton in June 

of 1999, and assumed command of the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion (AABn). In July of 2001, he transferred to the National Defense University at Fort McNair as a student in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). He graduated from ICAF in June 

of 2002 with a Master of Science in national resource strategy. He 

reported to the Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico and 

was assigned as the Product Group Director, Infantry Weapons 

Systems. 

In February of 2004, General Brogan reported to the Office of Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) Advanced Amphibious 

Assault (AAA) for duty as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program Manager, and he became in September 2006 the Commander 

of the Marine Corps Systems Command. 

General, thank you for your service to our country. We appreciate it very much. 

Thomas Dee is a native of New York City. He is probably celebrating the Yankees’ victory last night. He was appointed to the 

Senior Executive Service and assumed responsibilities as Director 

of Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell in March of this year. He is responsible for resolving immediate warfighter needs identified by the 

DOD’s combatant commanders. 

He served the United States Navy from March of 1980 until his 

retirement in January of 2007. He held a variety of worldwide leadership positions, spanning Operations Desert Storm, Stabilization 

Forces (SFOR) and Kosovo Forces (KFOR) in the Balkans and several others. 

He holds a Master of Science degree in national resource strategy 

from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National Defense University, a Master of Arts degree in international relations 

from the University of Southern California (USC), a Bachelor of 

Arts degree in history from New York University (NYU); and he 

lives in Great Falls, Virginia. 

Mr. Dee, thank you for your service and for being with us this 

morning. 

A true veteran of our committee, Dr. Dov Zakheim, has been 

here so often and has served us so well. He is now Senior Vice 

President of Booz Allen Hamilton. From April 2001 to 2004, he 

served as Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and as Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense. From 1987 to 2001, 

he was Corporate Vice President of System Planning Corporation. 

From 1985 until March 1987, he was Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Planning and Resources in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

He is a graduate of Columbia University; he graduated summa 

cum laude from there; the London School of Economics, he studied 

there. He studied economics and politics at St. Antony’s College, 

University of Oxford. 
5 

He is the author of a dozen books or monographs, numerous articles. He has, frankly, been a great resource to this committee, and 

has served our country well. 

It is great to have you back with us this morning. 

Finally, last but certainly not least, Mike Sullivan—another returnee. Mr. Sullivan serves as Director of Acquisition and Sourcing 

Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

He has been with the GAO for 23 years. 

He has his bachelor’s degree in political science from Indiana 

University, a master’s degree in public administration from the 

School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. 

Mr. Sullivan, we so much appreciate the dedication and excellence of you and your colleagues at GAO. We are happy you are 

with us here this morning. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So, General, we are going to ask you to begin. As 

I said, your written statement is already part of the record, and we 

would ask you to synopsize it. You are on. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL BROGAN, USMC, 

COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND 

General BROGAN. Good morning, sir. 

Chairman Andrews, Representative Conaway, distinguished 

members of the panel, thank you for the opportunity to appear this 

morning, and thank you for your continued support of our men and 

women in uniform. I also appreciate that you made the statement 

part of the record without having to ask. 

I recognize that the focus of today’s hearing is on the rapid acquisition of MRAP, but I would like to take just a couple of minutes 

and talk about overall rapid acquisition within the Marine Corps. 

Not only MRAP but all of the rapid acquisition that has been accomplished in the Marine Corps has been performed by our existing organizations, the Marine Corps Systems Command and the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, and since its establishment in February of 2007, the Program Executive Office Land Systems. 

While we did grow a new program management office to perform 

the MRAP function, we did not create any ad hoc organizations. We 

were able to do this because of our Marine Corps culture of mission 

accomplishment and because succeeding Commandants have made 

it very clear that the number one priority is supporting our men 

and women who are engaged in combat. 

We are a small, flexible, uniformed service, and we encourage innovation; and at Marine Corps Systems Command, I am fortunate 

to have all of the authority that is necessary to accomplish the mission. 

Certainly, the Marine Corps, during this conflict, has developed 

and refined the process that we use to respond to urgent universal 

needs statements. But we encourage rapid response, and the Acquisition Demonstration Project, the predecessor to today’s National 

Security Personnel System, allowed us to reward this type of behavior. 

Operating with a sense of urgency and exploiting speed are part 

of our culture. It is nested within the theory of maneuver warfare 

that is inculcated in every marine. It is the very foundation of how 

we operate as marines. Urgency drives how we plan to conduct op-
6 

erations in the operating forces, and it is codified in a rapid response planning process that is used to great extent by the Marine 

Expeditionary Units that forward deploy. Inherent in this is the 

willingness to accept risk, to make decisions and to operate without 

complete information. 

Turning now to MRAP, the foundation for its success was our 

mind-set to accomplish the mission and the focus on the only metric that mattered—how many trucks got in the hands of the 

warfighter. To be sure, we tracked many other things—how many 

were produced, how many were in transit in the United States, 

how many were being integrated at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), how many were being transported by 

United States Transportation Command—but the thing that we focused on was how many vehicles were actually fielded. 

It began for us in the fall of 2006 when the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) approved the requirement 

and when we issued the first sole-source award to Force Protection, 

Inc. That award was made on the 6th of November, coincident with 

the release of the full and open competition request for proposals. 

That same sense of urgency was fostered by Dr. Etter, former Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, as she chaired weekly synchronization meetings that 

were attended by senior members of the Department—Secretary 

Bolton, the Deputy Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 

and the Deputy Director of J–8. 

It was further demonstrated by folks like Colonel John Rooney 

at the Aberdeen Test Center, who made it his number one priority 

to test these vehicles. Captain ‘‘Red’’ Hoover, the commanding officer at SPAWAR in Charleston; folks from the Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA); unsung heroes like Sid Polk at the 

Office of Secretary of Defense Industrial Policy, who went out and 

looked for pinch points as we began to ramp up. Many others in 

the early days who are not well known contributed significantly to 

this effort. In the spring, Secretary Young was assigned to lead a 

task force to help remove barriers and accelerate the program. 

What has been well chronicled is, in May of 2007, Secretary 

Gates made MRAP the number one priority for the Department of 

Defense, and he approved the ‘‘DX’’ rating—the highest priority 

within the Defense Priorities & Allocations System. Certainly, that 

brought the formidable resources of the entire Department to bear 

and accelerated the program. 

The Program Manager, Paul Mann, frequently refers to MRAP as 

the ultimate team sport. In fact, it is. Throughout the Department 

and with our industrial partners, we have been able to ramp this 

up. Many individuals and organizations have contributed to its success. 

Finally, the entire program was accomplished within the existing 

acquisition regulations. All of the actions normally required of an 

Acquisition Category 1D program have been done by MRAP. They 

were not all done in the normal sequence. Many of them were tailored, but they have all been accomplished. The key was to view 

those regulations as permissive, not prohibitive, to see opportunities and not challenges, to look for possibilities and not obstacles; 
7 

and always the focus was on the 19-year old lance corporal that we 

are charged to support. 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ANDREWS. General, thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Brogan can be found in the 

Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Dee, welcome to the panel. 

STATEMENT OF TOM DEE, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. DEE. Thank you, Chairman, Representative Conaway and 

members of the panel. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. And I also thank you for entering my comments for 

the record so I can speak a little more extemporaneously and a little quicker probably, than reading through this whole thing. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Please take your time. 

Mr. DEE. So let me make a couple of key points on rapid acquisition within the Department. 

As you noted, the Department early on in Operation Iraqi Freedom, recognized the need to be able to respond to unanticipated urgent needs identified out in the battlefield inside of a current execution year and with a little bit more priority than—or with a little 

more urgency than would normally be provided through the normal 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) 

process. 

To that end, the JRAC, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, was established by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz back in 2004. Our charge 

is to track those Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) that are 

identified by the combatant commanders that fall outside of the 

services’ normal responsibility. 

JRAC does not oversee all of the rapid acquisition efforts within 

the Department. Under title 10, each of the services has established processes to facilitate a timely response to their service-identified need, and there have been lots of those. The Army alone has 

had over 7,000 operational needs statements and urgent operational needs statements that they have responded to. 

General Brogan very eloquently talked about the successes with 

the MRAP Task Force and the Joint MRAP Program Office. There 

have been other task forces established by the departments to include task forces or other organizations to include the Joint IED 

Defeat Organization, JIEDDO; the Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force; the Biometric Task Force. My organization itself was established to respond to these urgent requirements. All of those various bodies have responded to needs 

ranging from Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robots to ISR 

equipment, MRAPs, of course, and lots and lots of other sorts of capabilities. 

I need to point out, though, and to echo General Brogan, that the 

topic for today is rapid acquisition. But you cannot look at the acquisition process itself in isolation from the rest of the processes 

that lead to a capability. 
8 

In order to produce something, to get something out into the 

field, you begin by understanding and identifying what your requirements are—being able to assess what those needs are, rapidly 

assess what those needs are, and identify potential solutions. You 

need to provide adequately and timely resources inside of a current 

execution year in order to be able to respond to those proposed solutions. And then you need to initiate the acquisition process in 

order to actually produce and procure the selected solution and, of 

course, provide the life cycle support for that. 

So, as we look at what needs to be done in order to more rapidly 

provide capabilities into the field, you need to consider not just the 

acquisition process itself, but all of those elements which make up, 

essentially, the Department’s planning program and budgeting and 

execution system. 

Dr. Zakheim will talk more eloquently than I will about his task 

force, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force, on the fulfillment of urgent operational needs. It recognized the need for rapid 

and agile acquisition in a time of war, and it recommended two 

separate acquisition structures, one for deliberate and one for rapid 

acquisition. We are reviewing those recommendations still within 

the Department, but we recognize that there is a risk in accepting 

these two distinct structures. 

We need to accept that all acquisitions, whether in wartime or 

peacetime, need to become more agile and responsive in order to 

keep pace with accelerating development cycles—which are enabled 

through accelerated development cycles, especially in terms of information, technologies, communications technologies, et cetera. To 

echo Representative Conaway’s point, we need to have mature 

technology in the bank that can be rapidly fielded. 

To that end and under the leadership of the new Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and his Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), Mr. Zach Lemnios, 

the Department has restructured the Directorate of the Defense 

Research and Engineering to emphasize rapid development and the 

fielding of new technologies. 

The trick is being able to anticipate new threats and new requirements before they get to the point that they need to be urgent, 

and we are starting from scratch within an execution year. 

We believe that we have begun the process and have begun 

building the foundation for future science and technology efforts 

within this new organization with the rapid fielding office within 

DDR&E, and we believe that we are on the path to developing that 

technology that can be rapidly transitioned. 

I have to add one more thing, and that is the support that we 

have received from Congress. The MRAP Task Force and JIEDDO 

are two great examples of support that we have gotten primarily 

from the resource perspective—as I mentioned earlier, identify requirements, be able to do an assessment, provide ready resources 

in order to be able to provide something. 

It is difficult to find resources within a current execution year. 

We have submitted within our budget submission for fiscal year 

2010 a request for rapid acquisition funds. I understand, as of last 

night, that request was not approved, and we will continue to 
9 

struggle with finding resources in the current execution year for 

rapid acquisitions. 

So we appreciate the support that Congress has provided, and we 

appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. I believe that 

the Department has embraced the lessons learned from Iraqi Freedom, from Enduring Freedom, and that we are on the path to more 

responsive and agile acquisition. 

We look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, Mr. Dee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dee can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Zakheim, welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), MEMBER OF THE 

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is 

good to be back in front of the committee, and I am privileged to 

appear before this particular panel. 

I am really going to be discussing in telescoped form the findings 

of a rather thick task force report; and as you know, the task force 

was chaired by Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), who really is an expert in 

the field. 

The fundamental issue facing DOD after more than eight years 

of war is that it still really doesn’t have a coherent system for addressing urgent operational needs coming out of the battlefield. Put 

very simply, it is just not agile enough to enable commanders to 

respond quickly in the most effective way possible to the demands 

of countering systems such as IEDs, these technologies that our enemies are able to gather and put together and employ very quickly. 

You just heard that over 7,000 needs statements have already 

come to the Department over the course of the war just for the 

Army alone. Right now, the defense acquisition community has created over 20 different ad hoc organizations to deal with the problem. There is nothing that is permanent. The only permanent thing 

is the JRAC, that Mr. Dee heads up, and that has been around for 

a few years. 

We have to find a way for the Department of Defense to field 

militarily useful solutions more quickly. Because of the nature of 

the current threat environment, we need to have institutional 

changes in acquisition, in programming and in budgetary systems 

to account for this growing sophistication of flexibility on the part 

of the threat. 

In addition, the Department does not often employ operations research and systems analysis when it determines the best response 

for an urgent need that sometimes is couched in terms of a mission 

rather than a specific system or a specific item. We need to figure 

out what is the best choice. So let me run you through the findings 

very quickly. 

We believe that all of DOD’s needs cannot be met by the same 

acquisition process. We do need, in our view, to codify and institutionalize a separate set, a parallel set, of rapid acquisition proc-
10 

esses and practices that can be tailored to expedite the rapid delivery of capabilities that warfighters need. 

We found that because the notion of ‘‘rapid’’ is fundamentally 

countercultural to the way the bureaucracy thinks. And the bureaucracy—and this is quite right—their approach is to stick within the system, to stick to the rules, to cross every ‘‘T’’, to dot every 

‘‘I’’. The trouble is, if you dot every ‘‘I’’ and cross every ‘‘T’’, there 

are people getting killed out there in the meantime until all the 

‘‘Ts’’ got crossed. 

So the issue is, how do you create a system—how do you create 

a culture of dealing with creativity and work-arounds that goes totally counter to the T-crossing and I-dotting? Not simple. 

Another finding: Any rapid response has to be based on proven 

technology and robust manufacturing processes. Mr. Conaway mentioned that. It does not matter where it comes from. If it works, 

use it. 

Another finding: Current approaches to implement rapid responses to urgent needs are not sustainable. As I said, you cannot 

have a permanent approach to what looks like a very long-term 

challenge if everything is ad hoc. 

And we need an integrated triage process. Some of these requests 

can be met by logistics activities. They do not really need to gin up 

the acquisition community; but if you do not have a triage system, 

if you do not have an overlooking system that addresses these 

questions, you just do not know. You may be going to the wrong 

place. 

Then, whether there are personnel barriers, budget barriers or 

process barriers; these are huge inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition. 

What we need is an institutionalized capability to deliver joint 

capabilities rapidly and efficiently. We have got to be aware of the 

global marketplace. We have got to increase the use of all contracting authorities. We do not do that. 

We need a different workforce culture, and we need to incorporate good practices that do exist because, in these 20 ad hoc organizations, if you actually go through them, you will find some 

good practices, but they are not across the board. 

So what are our recommendations? 

First, a dual acquisition path, as I mentioned. The only way to 

really deal with this is to have a separate path with a separate culture, getting the people who are the best and the brightest. And 

we should have a standard definition for what we mean by an ‘‘urgent need.’’ You know, there are JUONs, there are ONs. I mean, 

there is an alphabet soup of different ways of dealing with these 

urgent needs, and the definition ought to be that an ‘‘urgent need’’ 

is one that if left unfulfilled, will seriously endanger personnel and/ 

or pose a major threat to ongoing or imminent operations, period. 

That is what should be an ‘‘urgent need.’’ 

Second recommendation: Both the executive and legislative 

branches have to create a fund, in our view, for rapid acquisition 

and fielding, something like the Small Business Innovative Research Fund, SBIR. We think it ought to be about 0.5 percent of 

the DOD budget, it should be replenished annually with a cap of 

about $3 billion, and the funding should not expire. 
11 

Now, you just heard a lot more modest request did not get 

through. We believe that, if you are really serious about rapid acquisition, over the long term and in an institutional way, this is 

what you have to do. This is a partnership between the executive 

branch and Congress. 

And we believe that the funding should be transparent. We discussed this at great length on the task force, and I think you remember that. We would issue quarterly reports for this. Congress 

could require additional notification. There would be an oversight 

group. The group would not only involve DOD personnel, cochaired 

by the Under Secretary for AT&L, right now Ash Carter, and the 

Vice Chairman, right now General Cartwright, but also representatives from the combatant commands, who are members, and Congressional appropriators could be invited as permanent observers. 

In other words, Congress would have a sense of hands-on oversight. 

The third recommendation—and this may be the most crucial: 

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) should create a Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA). It should be within the office of 

AT&L. It should look for what Mr. Gates himself called a 75 percent solution. It should be similar organizationally to the Defense 

Logistics Agency and to the National Security Agency, led by a 

three-star-level officer reporting directly to USD AT&L and dotted 

line to the Vice Chairman. 

The mission would be purely and simply to address combatant 

command needs rapidly with proven and emergent technologies 

within 2 to 24 months. If you cannot do it within 24 months, it is 

outside the bounds of what we mean by ‘‘rapid acquisition.’’ 

I list in my statement a whole list of requirements or things that 

RAFA would manage, and I can get back to those if you ask me 

to. It should not be a large workforce—the best and the brightest, 

both from the military and the civilian, with incentives for both the 

military and the civilian side to put the best and the brightest people in there, but small enough to be effective, large enough to carry 

out its tasks. And we would hope that there would also be parallel 

organizations within the services to work with this new RAFA unit. 

Fourth recommendation: Initial funding and billets for this new 

organization could be based on absorbing and integrating existing 

programs and organizations. You can imagine this will be the biggest bureaucratic fight of all. Taking people and money is not easy, 

let me tell you. I have been there. 

Fifth recommendation: DOD should establish a streamlined, integrated approach for rapid acquisition. This RAFA organization 

should deal with essentials only in terms of both what is required 

and how quickly it is fielded. Two to 24 months should be the fundamental guideline, and RAFA and the services should manage the 

actual process of getting into production. 

We believe it is imperative that the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service leaders begin to implement all 

five of these recommendations. In this regard, it is really gratifying 

that Under Secretary Ashton Carter has articulated concerns similar to those of the task force, as you just heard, and as he actually 

mentioned in a recent meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations 

in front of a very large audience. 
12 

So we know the Department’s heart is in the right place—there 

is no question about it—but existing urgent needs remain to be fulfilled. With increasingly limited resources available to fund them, 

the potential for new and more devastating capabilities from adversaries continues to enlarge; and we strongly believe—and we know 

everybody in this room agrees with us—that the men and women 

of the Armed Forces, who stand in harm’s way, deserve nothing 

less than the support of a new, streamlined system to meet their 

urgent battlefield needs. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Doctor, thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Sullivan, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 

back before the panel. I appeared a couple of months ago, discussing other matters. Today is about rapid acquisitions. 

Last year, we reviewed the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

rapid acquisition program to determine if it was able to deliver urgent capabilities to the field in a timely manner, and we found it 

to be very successful in doing that. I see four essential keys to that 

success that are germane to today’s discussion. 

First, the Department kept operational requirements to a minimum. Second, the program used only mature technologies and stable designs—something we have heard from everybody today. 

Third, the program was given the highest priority and a ‘‘DX’’ rating by the Secretary of Defense. And fourth, the Department ensured full and timely funding for the program. 

The question today is: Can this formula be applied to all of 

DOD’s acquisitions and the broader acquisition process? 

Certainly, the first two keys to success, doable requirements and 

known technologies, are possible under today’s process. In fact, due 

to recent acquisition reform legislation by the Congress and the Department’s own changes, the process has policies in place that encourage those things. In fact, there are a handful of acquisition programs, past and current, that have adhered to these principles and 

have succeeded or appear to be doing very well, such as the F–16 

and the F/18–E/F programs, the Joint Direct Attack Munition, the 

Shadow UAV, the small diameter bomb, and more recently, the P– 

8A and the SM–6 programs. However, this acquisition culture rarely accepts the 75 percent solution, which is very much what those 

programs represent. So they remain the exception and not the rule. 

On the other hand, the last two keys that I mentioned above are 

not possible across the broader acquisition process today. First, not 

every program can be the highest priority, and second, there are 

constraints that every program must accept when it comes to funding. Therefore, we see merit in the recommendations that Dr. 

Zakheim just went through from the Defense Science Board study 

on urgent needs that was issued, I think, this past July, which of-
13 

fered two separate acquisition processes, which he went through— 

a rapid process and a deliberate process. 

The study deals with the assignment of highest priority by suggesting a triage process that would characterize the urgency of the 

need and exhaust other nonmaterial solutions, as Dr. Zakheim 

talked about; and it also recommends the highly transparent rapid 

acquisition fund. I think you would put in kind of a half a percent 

of the DOD budget as a starting point for that to ease the availability of funding. 

These are ideas that would improve our rapid acquisition processes, and I think we agree with that. The report did not focus too 

much on the current process or the deliberate process in detail. 

That was not necessarily its objective. 

I would like to bring a new dimension to our discussion of acquisitions that has not received a lot of attention and which could, in 

our opinion, be another game-changer for the acquisition process. 

Mr. Dee referred to it a little bit. It has to do with science and 

technology. 

For over a decade, GAO has issued a broad body of work that examines best practices and underscores the need for all that we 

talked about—faster development times, more predictable costs and 

faster delivery to the field using best practices. As early as 1999, 

we reported that successful enterprises achieve this by separating 

technology development from product development. That means not 

allowing immature technologies into the acquisition process, and 

investing significant time and money in maintaining a vibrant and 

relevant technology base that can fuel acquisition programs with 

needed technologies more quickly. 

We have, for years, noted that, while the Department must often 

depend on beyond-the-state-of-the-art technologies to maintain our 

national security, it does not fund or organize its science and technology organizations and processes to bring those technologies to 

acquisition programs that require them. As a result, our current 

acquisition programs are continually faced with needing immature 

technologies to make great advances in weapons systems, something the MRAP did not have to do. 

We can do better than that with the current process, so I would 

like to submit an additional dimension for this panel to consider as 

it continues to work on improving acquisitions. 

I believe we can improve the chances of the current process by 

examining the best ways to organize, fund and coordinate the Department’s science and technology organizations. A more vibrant 

technology base would allow the Department to manage significant 

risk in its proper environment where the investments are less and 

where there is time for trial and error and discovery, if you will. 

Investing more up front and gaining knowledge and demonstrating technologies before they have to go on to acquisition programs seems appropriate for a national security mission that demands cutting-edge performance in concert with speedy delivery of 

critical capabilities to the warfighter; and we would do anything 

the panel or the committee would like to work with you on in trying to develop best practices in that area. 

With that, I will conclude, and I look forward to any questions. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, thank you Mr. Sullivan. 
14 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you to each member of the panel. You have 

completely met our high expectations this morning. We appreciate 

it very much. 

Mr. Sullivan, I will start with you. The conclusion of your testimony really spoke to this. 

One of the observations about the success of MRAP was the use 

of mature technologies. It is not hard, though, to imagine a situation where the next time there is an urgent need there will not be 

a mature technology there to meet it. 

I agree with you. In the absence of that mature technology, a 

rapid acquisition process does not make any sense at all. 

I think I heard you recommend that we create a sort of bullpen 

of technologies that perhaps have not been used yet, but would be 

on call for that kind of situation. Describe for me a little more 

about how we would define the mission of that organization that 

would develop those technologies. How would we derive the requirements, for example? 

Let’s say that we assembled a group of scientists and firms inside and outside the government and said, ‘‘We want you to start 

thinking about and developing technology that we think there is a 

high probability we are going to need in a hurry.’’ Who would set 

the requirements for that organization and how? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, the work that we have done in the past on 

that—and it has been a while to do that, but we tried to do a best 

practices look at that. So we looked at corporations as entities as 

you would, say, the Department of Defense. I think the critical 

thing that has to happen is that there has to be corporate leadership, and there has to be some unifying factor for that, that can 

break down the stovepipes. 

You know, for example, there are many companies that have different product lines—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. If I may, for whom in the DOD organization do 

you think this leader should work? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think, right now, under the Under Secretary for 

Acquisition Technology and Logistics, it would work fine because 

DDR&E and the Science and Technology (S&T) community would 

come under that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, this sort of segues into a point that Dr. 

Zakheim made about a legal definition of ‘‘urgency.’’ I think that 

you are on target with your definition. 

Who should be the adjudicator of that definition? In other words, 

who should make the decision that a particular proposal meets the 

definition of ‘‘urgency’’? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, that would be, in my view—and I think my 

colleagues on the task force would agree—it would be the Director 

of RAFA. 

Now, you get the needs coming in. If you had an organization 

that was dedicated to getting things out on the street—or actually 

on the battlefield—within 24 months, then that is the person who 

conducts, his staff or her staff conducts the triage and makes that 

definition. 
15 

Mr. ANDREWS. How do we avoid the inherent cultural problem 

around here that potential vendors of these products would have a 

huge incentive to define everything as ‘‘urgent’’? How do we get 

around that? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Because the requirement will not be generated by 

the vendors. The requirement is generated by the field. I think that 

is what Mike Brogan was talking about in terms of MRAP. 

General BROGAN. I would submit, sir, that certainly the adjudicator of whether or not it can be conducted in a rapid manner 

would be the organization that Dr. Zakheim described. But determining that a need is urgent and that it endangers U.S. personnel 

or mission accomplishment has to come from the commanders in 

the field, the Combatant Commander, the Joint Staff, and the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Committee. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Exactly. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I agree with that entirely. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I would, too. 

I think that the important second part of that clause, though, is 

‘‘come from the commanders in the field’’ to whom? 

Sadly, the case of the MRAP was obviously urgent. We had 

young men and women dying, and the urgency was painfully obvious. I think there are other urgencies that would not be so obvious 

because the immediate costs would not be so high; and I want to 

be sure that we are acutely tuned in to the reports from our commanders. 

Let me just ask a follow-up. 

Dr. Zakheim. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I think, maybe, the way to look at it is this: You 

get the requirements coming in, and they are defined as ‘‘urgent,’’ 

and there are multiple requirements; and that is, I think, what you 

are talking about. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. That is what the triage, to some extent, is about. 

That is why you need some operations research and systems analysis as well. 

But finally—I mean, for instance, if this three-star is getting 

calls from different four-stars, which could happen, that is why this 

person reports to the Under Secretary of AT&L with a dotted line 

relationship to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs so that for 

those really high-level decisions you have high-level support. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask you a question, Mr. Dee, about the 

233 JUONs that have been processed. There are 59 left unresolved. 

Are there data that would characterize the 174 that have been 

resolved? Have they each been resolved to the level of success that 

we have here? How would you generally characterize the performance of the resolved JUONs? 

Mr. DEE. To call a JUON ‘‘resolved’’ would mean that its capability is provided to the satisfaction of the combatant commander 

in dialogue with the component task forces. So all of the JUONs 

that have been closed and that are considered resolved have met 

the satisfaction of the combatant commander. 

Now, whether or not it met the performance criteria that was 

originally laid out in that original JUON may or may not be true. 

What happens is, after a JUON comes in, as has already been dis-
16 

cussed, a triage does go on, and there is a discussion and a dialogue back with the combatant commander. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Have we developed metrics that are external to 

the judgment of the commander in the field, the external data, objective data? 

Mr. DEE. No, sir, we have not. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think we should? 

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. Absolutely, we should. But there needs to be 

a recognition that the range of urgent requirements covers a very 

broad scope of technologies, of capabilities that recognize—and we 

are struggling to develop metrics for this. 

Mr. ANDREWS. There is a final point I will make—and then I 

want to yield to my colleagues—for any of the members of the 

panel to submit for the record. 

It is my understanding that the most important metric in the 

MRAP program, which I would express as the reduction in fatalities per attack and serious injuries per attack, is pretty compelling. 

If someone could submit that for the record, we would like to see 

it. In other words, translate this into lay people’s language so I can 

understand. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

Panel files.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. The odds of an IED attack killing the occupants 

of the vehicle dropped dramatically, and the odds of serious injury 

dropped dramatically as a result of the success of the program. 

That is what we care the most about, as you said, General, very, 

very well. So anything that would quantify that we would appreciate. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thanks, Chairman. 

Again, thanks, gentlemen, for being here. 

General, I will start with you. You mentioned that the MRAP 

met all of the existing requirements and processes that it went 

through, that you did not skip anything. 

In hindsight, are there things that were really more form than 

substance or additional things that we can do to eliminate barriers 

and just pencil-pushing that really did not protect the system from 

exploitation and did not get the gear to the people quicker? 

Can you give us any kind of recommendations to change things 

that you saw now that you have been through it once in a very successful way? 

General BROGAN. Sir, my sense is that we took a look at all of 

the documentation that is required for the acquisition Category 1 

program, because Secretary Krieg made it apparent early on that 

eventually it was going to rise to that level and be designated as 

such. 

We looked at which ones we needed in the program office to be 

able to do the job and accomplish the mission, which ones satisfied 

statutory requirements for reporting, which ones satisfied regulatory requirements. We decided we would do the ones that the 

program office needed done to accomplish the mission; we would 

tailor each of the rest of them and either provide an abbreviated 

version or push it until later in the process when we had more time 

and could, in a deliberate manner, lay it out. 
17 

One of the examples would be the systems engineering plan. Because we were buying designs that existed and were going to be integrating known command and control systems, situational awareness systems, jammers, things like that, weapons onto the platform, we did not need a long, drawn-out systems engineering plan 

that told us all the steps we would go through with initial design 

review and critical design review and things of that nature. 

So we tailored the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) early on, and 

have just, frankly, in the last couple of months, completed the fullblown version and delivered it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Why did you need to complete the fullblown version? I mean, somebody had to do that. Their attention 

could have been on something else besides, you know, documenting 

the file, so to speak. 

Was that essential to do that? Maybe we could get the GAO to 

come look at that system. 

It is things that you do just because it says you have to do them, 

but they do not contribute to protecting the taxpayer—well, getting 

the gear, first, and then protecting the taxpayer, second, which is 

what a lot of that stuff you are talking about does. If we do not 

need to do it, you simply did it just to pay for the file—— 

General BROGAN. Well, we did it, sir, because we did need to document the configuration management process. You know, we fielded these vehicles quickly. We have updated them and have added 

additional capability to them, as we have gone on. 

One of the ones particularly important right now is adding the 

independent suspension system. These vehicles were fielded with 

solid axles, leaf springs, not made to go off road. By upgrading that 

suspension, we can. 

And so configuration management is one of those systems engineering practices that does have value, but we did not need it early 

on. We do need it now. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

Doctor, you talk about a dual process, new silos, but you also 

used the word ‘‘culture.’’ Then help us distinguish between Recommendation 1 and 3 as to why that wasn’t just one recommendation. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, I think you have got to really focus quite specifically on the cultural side of things. If you create a separate organization and you have not really paid a lot of attention to the 

kinds of people you are bringing in, that organization will wind up 

looking like the original organization very, very quickly. They will 

find a way to cross every ‘‘T’’ and dot every ‘‘I’’. 

When Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols, it changed the entire 

power balance inside the Department of Defense. I mean, when I 

served in the 1980s, the Joint Staff was a place where people went 

prior to immediate retirement. It was a place, frankly, for deadenders. 

Goldwater-Nichols turned this on its head. It essentially says you 

cannot become a flag or a general officer unless you have got that 

Joint badge on your chest. All of a sudden, all the best people start 

coming, and the Joint Staff is exceedingly powerful. 

When Mike Brogan said a few minutes ago that, you know, the 

RAFA Director would not work on his or her own, that is abso-
18 

lutely right. In fact, the report specifically says it works with the 

Joint Staff. Why? Because the Joint Staff already has been making 

choices and doing triage. 

What we are saying in the report is, you need the same—and 

there are all sorts of programs. There is the Presidential Management Fellows Program. There is the Intergovernmental Personnel 

Act (IPA) program. There are a host of different programs that get 

best civilians in. We need to ensure that the best military people 

come in, because then you create a truly powerful organization that 

can make choices. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So how does Recommendation 3 not fulfill Recommendation 1? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Oh, it does. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So they are the same? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Again, the reason that they are separate, frankly, 

is that it is an implementer. You can have Recommendation 1, but 

without Recommendation 3, it ain’t going to work. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. The definition that you mentioned, ‘‘urgent,’’ shouldn’t it include specifically the 2-to-24-month thing? Because it is urgent that we develop a robot that takes the place of 

our soldiers. It would meet the other two definitions. 

It is not even remotely possible to get that in 24 months, because 

if you create this new organization, there will be competition for resources. There will be competition for work. There will be competition for people to the extent that RAFA is the premier organization 

you are trying to create that would attract the best and the brightest. 

So shouldn’t the 24-month thing really be codified as well? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, it could be. I mean, we discussed that quite 

a bit, and I think both of these gentlemen were there when some 

of this was discussed. 

The definition we gave was kind of an all-encompassing one. I 

think people could argue whether it is 2 months or 3 months, 24 

months or 26 months. We believe that this is what RAFA should 

be doing. 

There may be cases where you want to do something urgently, 

and it is outside the bounds. If you want to write it in, I personally 

would have no issue with it, frankly. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. You mentioned a triage system. There has 

got to be a triage system in place now, doesn’t there? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. There is. As you heard, what there is not is a systematic approach that includes, for instance, ORSA, the Operations 

Research and Systems Analysis. In other words—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Well, is that something that could be done 

separate and apart from any kind of legislative attention to it—the 

system, itself, Mr. Dee—or couldn’t you fine-tune the triage system 

on your own? 

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. DEE. There is a triage system and there is not a triage system. There are multiple triage systems depending on the category 

with which an urgent need comes in. Every service, again, has got 

a process that they review their needs, urgent or traditional needs, 
19 

as they come in the door, and they assign a priority to it and add 

resources. So that does go on. 

In the joint world, we do have a triage process that begins with 

the Joint Staff and their existing Functional Capabilities Board to 

be able to look at potential solutions for this and a proper provider. 

So we do have a triage process that goes on now. 

What we do need to do, quite honestly, is to be able to have that 

better dialogue with the requester and a recognition that these requirements, as they come in, need to be considered somewhat fungible based on the available technology that you have got—potential solutions, maturity, a balance of the operational risk and that 

programmatic risk. That needs to be a dialogue between the building folks and the folks in the field. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you report back to us on the progress that 

you are making on the things that you can do on your own, that 

you think are appropriate versus the things—because, as the chairman may say at the end of the process here, we are focused on the 

2011 Defense Authorization Act. And so we are looking for things 

to do legislatively, but we are also anxious to get things done that 

you can do on your own. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

Panel files.] 

Mr. DEE. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Conaway, I know the staff will appreciate 

that, as they have finally finished work on this year’s bill, we are 

giving them assignments immediately that next year’s bill has already begun. 

Mr. CONAWAY. No good deed goes unpunished. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Mr. Conaway, I would just point out that Recommendation 3, of course, goes beyond culture and goes though 

this whole RAFA organization. In theory, one could argue we will 

have a separate rapid acquisition approach without setting up an 

organization. Quite frankly—and you are fully aware of how the 

building works—that will be one of the arguments, Why do we 

need a new organization? 

So we believe, unless you have a champion that pushes, that is 

truly in charge, you could go with Recommendation 1, but it may 

not be fully implemented. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So the issue is to step back from the GoldwaterNichols because you are going from ‘‘all under one hat’’ back to separate silos. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Exactly. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. And the risks attendant with that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. The Chair recognizes Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you members 

of the panel. 

I am worried there is a little bit of an error of self-congratulation 

here about the relative success of acquisitions, particularly in regard to MRAPs. We mentioned three things that worry me. 

Number one, what we are talking about here is relative success 

in fielding weapons against a Third World force that used elemental technology like garage door openers and very cheap explosives. A lot of this was revealed in Secretary Rumsfeld’s original 
20 

2003 memo about the cost-benefit equation of this type of asymmetric warfare. 

How would we be faring against a sophisticated enemy? I shudder to even ask that question. 

General BROGAN. It wouldn’t even be close. We are very well capable of dealing with a sophisticated enemy. We have built the U.S. 

Armed Forces for that for years. We now have to adjust in order 

to deal with the asymmetric enemy, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, let’s talk about that adjustment, fielding 

MRAPs. 

In your testimony, General, you say the initial requirement was 

1,185 in November 2006, and now the requirement is 22,000. So 

far, with all of our success, 14,000 have been fielded in theater, and 

you said that delivery of trucks to the warfighter was the test. So 

we are still far short of the 22,000. 

The key is this: The current issue of the Joint Forces Quarterly 

says that probably 1,609 of our soldiers ended up being casualties 

due to slow fielding of MRAPs. Now, it is painful to ever quantify 

a shortcoming like that, but it is in the Joint Forces Quarterly. 

This is not some attack from the fringe. So, it is always impossible 

to be perfect, but I would suggest that by our own measures, we 

are not even coming close. 

General BROGAN. Sir, certainly it took us a while to make the decision to pursue MRAP. Once that decision was made, I think that 

is the topic of the success that was achieved. 

The requirement was 16,238 for a long time after we got to that 

plateau, and we have delivered all but a handful of those vehicles 

into the hands of the U.S. Government. Now, some of those have 

gone to home station training bases, some are being used for testing evaluation. We have fulfilled the requirement for all of the 

baseline MRAP vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. That has been 

satisfied. 

Just recently, in fact in June of this year, the MRAP all-terrain 

vehicle requirement went from 2,080 to 5,244, and then last month 

went up to 6,644. Those are the ones that are not yet fulfilled. 

We are in production in that vehicle. Oshkosh is the manufacturer. They were ahead of schedule in July, August and September. 

They are ramping up to be able to produce 1,000 of those vehicles 

per month in December and are on track to get there. 

Mr. COOPER. That, in itself, is a fascinating situation. Here we 

have a slump in the automobile industry in America and we have 

sole-sourced to one manufacturer that most people have never 

heard of, and it is kind of remarkable when, in World War II, a 

24-month requirement, the war was half over by then. 

General BROGAN. Respectfully, sir, we did not sole source. This 

was a full and open competition. Oshkosh has been building trucks 

for the U.S. military for more than 30 years. 

Mr. COOPER. But there is only one manufacturer. 

General BROGAN. There is one company in charge. They are 

using two production facilities. 

Mr. COOPER. But don’t we have other auto companies in America 

and truck companies that are looking for work? 

General BROGAN. Yes, sir, but fundamentally building large armored trucks is not quite the same as a passenger sedan. 
21 

Mr. COOPER. But in World War II, we didn’t devote our entire 

aircraft or ship to one company. 

It is kind of interesting how we approach this, again, dealing 

with a Third World enemy. And perhaps we are perfectly and immaculately equipped for the First World enemies that we may be 

facing, but I am just suggesting they don’t have too much high 

technology on their side. 

The third point is this, and here I am faulting Congress: The testimony says, ‘‘Currently there are no funds in the FY 10 base budget under consideration for a rapid acquisition fund, despite the administration request for $79 million.’’ 

So here I am faulting Congress. This is pretty amazing. If this 

is something to brag about and we zero fund it, and we require the 

Pentagon to beg, borrow and steal to get the monies from other accounts to put in, it is kind of embarrassing. 

Is this something worth bragging on, or not? Maybe Congress 

doesn’t get it. 

Meanwhile, our own military publications are saying 1,609 unnecessary casualties due to slow fielding of one type of weapon system that all our brilliant strategists and technicians somehow 

didn’t anticipate the need for until years—years, into these conflicts. This is amazing. 

Mr. Dee. 

Mr. DEE. Sir, if I may just make a couple of comments on your 

observations. 

The comment concerning the current nature of today’s war and 

preparations for future capabilities, I think when you are talking 

about and you are looking at our acquisition process, I think it is 

important to remember the way that Mr. Gates, Secretary Gates, 

is talking about future wars as hybrid wars. And there is not going 

to be a big distinction—there is going to be a mix of capabilities 

and a mix of adversaries and a mix of weapons and threats we are 

facing that range from the same things we are seeing today in 

terms of improvised explosive devices and other kinds of improvised weapons and easily commercially available weapons, and the 

high-end future missile systems, et cetera, et cetera; and you need 

to be able to do those all at once. 

Recognizing that the technology is moving so quickly these days, 

whatever we do for rapid acquisition needs to be applicable to the 

way we think about longer-term conventional warfare. We need a 

capability and we need a system that can be responsive. 

Regardless of what enemy we are talking about, we are always 

going to have unanticipated needs in war. We did in World War II, 

and we are going to have them in the future wars, as we have 

them today. 

On the funding thing, there is a lot of discussion, and Congress 

has been very supportive. And it is a difficult problem because the 

Department gets a lot of money, so why can’t the Department just 

move money where they need to move it? Just the reality is that 

there is a lot of competition in the Department for resources because of this conflict between building future capabilities and responding to urgent needs. 

So the ability to have a rapid acquisition fund, as Dr. Zakheim 

has pointed out and the Defense Science Board, and as the MRAP 
22 

task forces had and as JIEDDO has, if you want to do things quickly, you need quick, immediate access to resources. Without that, 

you are going to get stuck into the competition for resources within 

the building and the reprogramming actions, which all, in and of 

themselves, takes time to do. 

Mr. COOPER. If I could just inject, Dr. Zakheim’s proposal was for 

a $3 billion fund, and he points out in his testimony that JIEDDO 

is already at $10 billion, and with it a heavy bureaucracy and uncertain results. So sometimes when we do throw money at a problem, you don’t necessarily see the payback. 

I don’t want to interrupt you. 

Dr. Zakheim. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, obviously throwing money at a problem isn’t 

the best way to do it. 

One of the things that I found when I was Comptroller is that 

when you go and ask for something like a $3 billion fund that we 

propose, we actually censor ourselves in the Department, and the 

reason is that we keep hearing from the Hill, these kinds of funds 

are slush funds and you are not going to manage the money right. 

So, we are very hesitant to come up with these sorts of requests. 

One of the reasons the DSB Task Force recommended this kind 

of oversight group and the regular reporting on a quarterly basis, 

and even more frequently as needed, was to allay these congressional concerns. Because if you are talking about this kind of a 

fund, where there isn’t anything specific, then the competition inside the Department for those resources is tremendous; and one of 

the arguments made is, well, Congress isn’t going to give you the 

money anyway, so why are you throwing $3 billion out the door? 

That is why these requests don’t get made. 

We are suggesting a vehicle for assuring Congress that they have 

the transparency, that you have the visibility, that you have a say 

in things; so then it becomes a credible request, and then it is more 

likely that something along those lines may actually be put in the 

budget. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. If I could, just to add to that, talk about the funding, the only problem here is not just the immediate access to funding, but it is the way that—if we are talking about fixing the current process, the funding, the way that they program and fund programs today. In fact, GAO looked at, years ago, some kind of a systems engineering fund that could be established, that also didn’t 

really go anywhere because it would be thought of as kind of a 

slush fund. 

But there is a two-year wait for any program that starts up in 

the Department of Defense now that—if it is not urgent, there is 

basically a two-year lag time between trying to get your program 

going and receiving funding. That is an issue that is yet to be resolved, as well. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
23 

One of the issues that has been discussed in this committee is 

the difficulty with continually placing requirements, new requirements, on a project without, really, a deadline. 

I think, Dr. Zakheim, you mentioned the 75 percent solution. 

There is always a drive for a 100 percent solution. 

So in this process of rapid acquisition, would you envision a cutoff, and beyond that cutoff, that maybe new requirements would 

have to come to a higher threshold? I know it was mentioned, Dr. 

Zakheim, again, that you said, maybe have Congress involved in 

the process, at least as observers; that maybe beyond a certain 

deadline that a requirement change would have to go up a higher 

level to sort of discourage that. 

Any comments on that from anybody? 

Mr. DEE. Sir, I mentioned a little while ago that the requirements need to be viewed as fungible, and that is true. As a requirement comes in, it needs to be balanced against the available, the 

maturity of the technology, what can be done quickly in order to 

provide a capability to the field. But that dialogue needs to happen 

before the decision is made to produce something. 

So, as this triage develops, you need to have the dialogue with 

the field. You need to figure out what is good enough. You have to 

answer the question, what is good enough to mitigate your immediate capability for the gap that you have got. And them you reach 

your production decision, and then you need to lock that requirement so you can actually get on with it. 

Not to preclude future spirals or future improvements to the capability you delivered, but you need to spend more time on that upfront dialogue, figuring out what you need to have. And when you 

figure it out and you agree to it and you resource it, then you get 

on with it; and the next spiral is viewed as the next iteration of 

something. But you don’t interrupt the production line, you don’t 

interrupt your acquisition efforts to continually morph the capability. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I think Mr. Dee just put it very well. If you have 

got a desire to hit that 99 percent capability, that is part of a dialogue with the services and the Joint Staff; and that additional 25 

percent, as it were, the system that gets you that 25 percent, that 

goes back in your regular acquisition system. 

Now, one thing I think might be useful to clarify, the task force 

deliberated as to whether we should look beyond just rapid acquisition at this larger system. We decided that, A, it was a little bit 

out of scope from what we were being asked. But, more importantly, that is such a long-standing headache, as everyone knows, 

that we figured if we could lay out a process for rapid acquisition 

that made some sense and develop some best practices, those could 

then be imported into the larger acquisition system. 

Let’s face it. We are not doing ourselves any favors with an acquisition system that takes 15 years to get something out the door. 

Think about the fact that from the time Hitler took power, when 

the Germans were training with broomsticks, to the time he 

marched down the Champs-Elyses, was only 7 years, and technology now improves so much more quickly. 

We have to do something about the larger acquisition system, 

and we thought that perhaps if we can come up and the Depart-
24 

ment working with the Congress comes up with a viable rapid system, we could then extract some next best practices for that, for 

the kinds of things that Mr. Dee and you were just talking about, 

moving from that 75 percent solution to that 99 percent solution. 

General BROGAN. If I may, sir, with MRAP in particular, when 

the initial request came in, there was one requirement that we did 

not have the ability to immediately meet, the Explosively Formed 

Penetrator (EFP). And through a consultative process between the 

JRAC and U.S. Central Command, we locked down those requirements. 

Then Admiral Giambastiani, as the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs and Chairman of the JROC, made it very clear to everyone 

involved that he would control not only key performance parameters, which normally reside at that level, but the key system attributes of the vehicle as well, and that no one could change them 

without JROC approval. 

So that kept us from having to deal with requirements creep, 

with all the good ideas that people want to add later on, and allowed us to move forward very quickly. 

Then when we later got a solution to EFP, we had built in the 

ability to retrofit it into the vehicles, and we were able to go back 

and add that to vehicles that were previously fielded and include 

it in those that were yet to be produced. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. If I could just make a point, I agree with everything everyone is saying here. If you look at MRAP today, in fact 

as an urgent need, as a rapid acquisition, it actually has become 

the first increment of what will probably become a regular acquisition program that has block upgrades for years to come. 

So the tech base, what they did right was they kept those requirements to what they can do right now, get some breathing 

room, get our troops some equipment, and now they have an opportunity in the regular process if the tech base, if and when the tech 

base responds. I am sure there are all kinds of good things that 

come out of that. Open systems, I am sure, has been looked at in 

that regard, 

The programs that I mentioned in my oral statement were part 

of the regular acquisition process, and more or less they did that. 

If you go back and look at the F–16, it held the line on requirements, and all of those others that I mentioned held the line on requirements. 

One thing that we are looking at now, it is such an exception in 

the regular process to be able to start a program with doable requirements. We are trying to figure out how those programs were 

able to do that in this culture. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway, do you have any concluding remarks this morning? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Just one thing quickly. 

Mike, the transitioning in Afghanistan from the units that were 

originally bought for Iraq, you mentioned that. Walk us through a 

little bit of how quickly you were able to identify the fact you had 

to go off road in Afghanistan and how nimble the system was to 

meeting up a new version or new variant of the MRAP. 
25 

General BROGAN. Yes, sir, there are two pieces to that. The first 

is, we fielded some baseline MRAPs into Afghanistan, principally 

the RG–31s, because they were the smallest, had the tightest turning radius, which was one of the attributes that the warfighter 

there was looking for. 

Then he asked for a vehicle that had the off-road capability of 

a Humvee, but the survivability inherent in an MRAP, and that 

was really the genesis of the MRAP all-terrain vehicle. 

Particularly in my service, because we didn’t want to buy a 

whole additional fleet of vehicles, the Commandant was very interested in our ability to upgrade the suspension of those vehicles that 

we had already purchased and be able to employ them in that environment. 

We had also been receiving complaints from the field about how 

poor the ride quality was in the vehicle. It is a heavy truck, solid 

axle, leaf springs. It is painful if that vehicle leaves the road. 

We had started in the program office a search for an improvement for the suspension, and we did that through the Nevada 

Automotive Test Center. We down-selected to what turns out to be 

the same suspension that is on the Marine Corps’s seven-ton medium tactical vehicle replacement truck, built by Oshkosh, already 

in the system, all the repair parts are available; and we were able 

to put that onto our Cougars, both Category I and Category II. We 

are now looking at putting it on the RG–33s, and we are in the 

process of upgrading that suspension so we can make use of the vehicles already purchased by the taxpayer in an environment that 

is far more inhospitable from a terrain standpoint. 

So we have had those two tracks going on. One, an MRAP allterrain vehicle, is going to be much smaller than Cougar. Cougar 

is about 40,000 pounds, combat loaded at its lightest. MRAP allterrain is right at 30,000, combat loaded. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Give me a sense, Mike, of the time frame this all 

occurred in. 

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. We received the JUONs for MRAP allterrain in the fall of last year. We conducted the competition 

through the late winter. It was a full and open competition. We required the vendors to deliver trucks with their proposal. That kept 

all the PowerPoint guys away, folks who just had good ideas but 

no hardware. 

Then we whittled that down to five vendors who had actual, viable candidates. We gave each of them a contract with an initial delivery order for three more vehicles that we put through a rather 

rigorous test regime. We provided them the results of the test, gave 

them the chance to revise their proposals in what is called a fair 

opportunity revision. Then we graded those proposals, the test results and made our contract production award to Oshkosh. 

We had thought that we may need to use more than one vendor. 

We had also—I met personally with the leadership of all five of 

those companies—although one person represented two of them, 

because BAE had two entries in their two different divisions—and 

asked them before we made the production award decision, ‘‘Would 

you be willing to license your vehicle to someone else to produce 

if you are the winner and would you be willing to produce someone 

else’s vehicle if you are the loser?’’ And they all said, ‘‘Will you help 
26 

us with any monopoly issues, with teaming arrangements?’’ We 

agreed to do that. So we had that ability. 

Oshkosh is going to be producing 1,000 trucks a month in December. We can only absorb 500 vehicles a month in Afghanistan 

because of the throughput of other war materiel, because we have 

to take the soldiers off of the operating bases, train them on that 

vehicle, and then send them back out. 

So—we are going to be producing many more than we are capable of absorbing, so there was no need to really go to multiple vendors in order to accomplish and fulfill this requirement. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, that is it. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much. 

General, you have done a lot for your country, but figuring out 

a way to reduce PowerPoint presentations may be your greatest 

contribution, for which we are very grateful. 

I want to thank the panel for their excellent preparation and 

contribution this morning. As we proceed, we are going to examine 

two questions as we make a report and legislative recommendations to the full committee for next spring. One of them will be 

ways to further improve and fine tune the rapid acquisition process, whether it is to assure the tech base that is necessary, whether 

it is to tighten and explicitly define the definition of urgency, 

whether it is to sharpen the triage process. A lot of good ideas we 

have heard this morning will go into that consideration. 

The second area of inquiry will be the lessons learned area, the 

extent to which we can take this exceptional process and use its 

lessons learned in the rule, what is not urgent and not rapid. 

We would invite the continued contribution of each of our four 

witnesses to each of those two questions as we go forward. 

Mr. Sullivan, we would particularly welcome your thoughts about 

the way that this, what I characterize as a ‘‘tech bullpen,’’ could be 

created and funded in moving forward. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 91.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. We had high hopes for this morning’s hearing, 

and you gentlemen have exceeded those hopes. We appreciate that 

very much. Any information for the record should be submitted as 

we had asked. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:22 a.m., the panel was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 8, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 8, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 8, 2009 

(91) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The concept of a ‘‘tech bullpen’’—that is, having relevant and feasible technologies available to transition into product development on major weapon 

system acquisition programs is doable, but the department and the services would 

have to significantly change the way their current science & technology environment 

is structured, funded, and organized to meet the needs of the acquisition community 

and the warfighter. Stovepipes must be eliminated, funding should be shifted from 

acquisition to science and technology organizations for technology exploration and 

development, and much better communication between the acquisition programs 

and the technology base must be established. We have visited world class technology 

firms who have been able to put in place practices to ensure that the proper technologies are being nurtured to meet their customer requirements and that they are 

ready and mature enough to transition to product lines in order to meet the customer’s needs in a timely manner. We believe DOD could benefit from adopting 

some of these practices and adapting them to its own national security mission. 

Leading commercial companies use three key techniques for successfully developing and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that technologies 

must be mature before transitioning to the product line side. 

• Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic planning precedes technology development so managers can gauge market needs, identify the most desirable and relevant technologies, and prioritize resources. Strategic planning is 

considered a precursor to transition and allows managers to identify market 

needs so the company can quickly adapt its technology portfolios to meet those 

needs. 

• Gated management reviews: A rigorous process with meaningful metrics is used 

to ensure a technology’s relevancy and feasibility and enlist product line commitment to use the technologies once the labs are finished maturing them. 

• Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology transition agreements 

solidify and document specific cost, schedule, and performance metrics labs need 

to meet for transition to occur. Relationship managers address transition issues 

within the labs and product line teams and across both communities. Meaningful metrics gauge project progress and process effectiveness. 

Over the past several years, DOD has taken steps to improve its transition processes, but it lacks many of the techniques that are hallmarks of leading firms’ ability to transition technology smoothly onto new products. From a strategic perspective, the department lacks strong influence at the corporate level to guide the department’s technology investments. In addition, DOD does not use a gated process 

with criteria that would allow lab and program managers to know when a technology is ready to transition. Consequently, technologies are often not ready when 

needed and acquisition programs pull the technologies into their programs too early, 

leading to inefficiency during product development and cost and schedule increases. 

We’ve found that DOD has taken some positive steps to aid technology transition. 

They hold promise, but must be accepted, improved, and replicated significantly 

more than currently to have a positive impact. For example, each of the military 

services has established boards to select and oversee some of their technology 

projects and has elevated the importance of meaningful metrics. They are also using 

technology transition agreements. However, use of these agreements thus far has 

been low. With regard to improving communication, DARPA is using relationship 

managers to address transition issues. And the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

has initiated a number of new programs, including the Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstration program, which requires the S&T and acquisition communities to 

work more collaboratively earlier in the acquisition process. 

Despite different environments, we think the practices used by some of the world 

class firms we’ve visited can help DOD make better progress in transitioning technologies to weapon programs if adopted and adapted. Private companies operate in 

a competitive environment that demands speedy delivery of innovative, high-quality 

products to satisfy market needs or the company will go out of business. DOD has 

a variety of ‘‘customers’’ and complex relationships that often hinder the chief tech-
92 

nology officer at the corporate level from providing the type of strategic leadership 

found at successful companies. 

DOD puts pressure on itself to develop many new technologies. And because competition for funding is fierce, the technologies described with many superlatives for 

speed and lethality tend to get more attention than others do. We previously reported that to secure funding, DOD program managers frequently make overly optimistic promises to the warfighter about technologies’ cost, feasibility, risk, and delivery schedule. The challenge for DOD and congressional decision makers lies not only 

in the ‘‘how to’’ aspects of technology transition but also in creating stronger and 

more uniform incentives that encourage the S&T and acquisition communities to 

work together to deliver mature technologies to programs. [See page 26.] 

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