UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SOUTHWEST METALS, INC., a Michigan

corporation, and JOSEPH FAWAZ, an

individual,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

CITY OF DETROIT, MICHAEL E.

DUGGAN, Mayor of Detroit, in his official

capacity, DETROIT POLICE

DEPARTMENT, JAMES CRAIG, Detroit

Police Chief, in his official capacity, SGT.

REBECCA McKAY, in her individual and

official capacities, KEVIN JONES, City of

Detroit Business License Center Manager,

in his official capacity, and CITY OF

DETROIT BUSINESS LICENSE CENTER,

jointly and severally,

Defendants.

_______________________ __________/

CASE NO. 2:15-cv-11080

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY 

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND STAYING ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

I. INTRODUCTION & FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction (Doc. 4) and their supplemental emergency

motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 9). Southwest Metals, Inc., (Southwest)

is an Arab-American-owned scrap yard located in the metro-Detroit area, purportedly

owned by Joseph Fawaz. Plaintiffs claim that in May 2013, Southwest unwittingly

purchased stolen copper wire from an individual identified as Mr. Richardson, thereby

becoming involved in a Detroit Police Department investigation. Plaintiffs cooperated

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with the police department’s Copper Theft Task Force throughout the investigation of

Mr. Richardson. After the case against Mr. Richardson had been investigated,

prosecuted, and closed, Plaintiffs claim that Sgt. Rebecca McKay initiated an “abusive”

and “harassing” investigation of Plaintiffs. For example, in May 2014, Sgt. McKay

obtained a search warrant with allegedly defective probable cause in order to search

Southwest’s premises for stolen copper wire. Plaintiffs assert that surveillance video

taken during the search shows Sgt. McKay unlawfully planting evidence. They further

maintain that Sgt. McKay’s actions were motivated by an unrelenting personal vendetta

against them, possibly attributable to race. Consequently, Plaintiffs filed a complaint

against Sgt. McKay with the police department’s Internal Affairs Department. In spite of

an ongoing Internal Affairs investigation, Plaintiffs assert that the harassment and abuse

continue in retaliation for their complaint. 

Currently, criminal misdemeanor proceedings are pending against Mr. Fawaz

and Southwest. Additionally, in light of the citations issued against Southwest, the City

of Detroit Business Licensing Center denied its application for renewal of its business

license on March 26, 2015. Because Southwest’s existing business license expired on

March 31, 2015, Southwest ceased operations on that date. At a hearing conducted

before this Court on April 8, 2015, however, Defendants indicated that in spite of the

expiration of the license, Southwest could continue operating until such time that an

administrative hearing on the matter could be conducted. A show cause hearing

regarding renewal of the business license is tentatively scheduled for April 15, 2015. 

Plaintiffs have filed an amended complaint advancing the following claims:

violation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on deprivation of

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property and liberty interests (Count I); violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 based on disparate treatment and racial discrimination (Count II); violation of the

First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on unlawful retaliation (Count III);

tortious interference with a business relationship (Count IV); intentional infliction of

emotional distress (Count V); and violation of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (Count VI). (Doc. 10.) In their present motions, Plaintiffs request the following

relief: (1) suspension of the prosecution of the May 2015 warrants issued against Mr.

Fawaz and Greg Aslinger; (2) a stay of any proceedings for any criminal charges,

citations, or violations issued against Plaintiffs; (3) a stay of administrative business

license proceedings; and (4) removal of Sgt. McKay from any investigation involving

Plaintiffs.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy

that should be granted only if the movant establishes that the circumstances clearly

demand it. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000). The same factors

are considered in determining whether to grant a request for either a temporary

restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543

F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008). In determining whether to grant a motion for preliminary

injunction, a court must consider four factors: (1) whether the movant has a strong

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable

injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause

substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by

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issuance of the injunction. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network v. Tenke Corp.,

511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

“Younger v. Harris and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against

federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary

circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.

423, 431(1982) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). That is, where a

state proceeding involving the same issues presented in a federal court suit is already

underway, the Younger doctrine directs the federal court to abstain until the conclusion

of the state proceeding. Abstention is appropriate when three criteria are met: "(1) there

must be on-going state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings must implicate

important state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state

proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555

(6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). If a federal court determines that

abstention is appropriate, its discretion generally “does not extend so far as to permit a

court to dismiss or remand, as opposed to stay, an action at law." James v. Hampton,

513 F. App’x 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gray v. Bush, 628 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir.

2010)).

The three-factor abstention test is satisfied in the present case. First, there are

ongoing state proceedings regarding both the criminal charges and the business license

renewal. The Younger doctrine is unquestionably applicable in cases involving criminal

prosecutions. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (“One [of] the basic doctrine[s] of equity

jurisprudence [is] that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to

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restrain a criminal prosecution . . . .”). Likewise, the Younger doctrine applies to

pending state administrative proceedings in which an important state interest is

involved. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627

n.2 (1986). Second, the pending state proceedings implicate important state interests. 

Certainly, the state’s ability to deter scrap metal theft through police investigation and

administrative licensing is an important state interest and one of particular concern to

the City of Detroit. Furthermore, as the state is in the best position to determine how

most effectively to implement its policies in order to safeguard this interest, it is not

appropriate for the federal court to interfere at this stage. Third, Plaintiffs will have an

adequate opportunity to raise their constitutional challenges during the course of the

state proceedings. Regarding the criminal proceedings, Plaintiffs will have the

opportunity to present their procedural and constitutional objections when the case is

heard, and may further avail themselves of the state appellate process. With respect to

the business license proceedings, Defendants have clarified that Southwest may

continue to operate until such time as a hearing is conducted. Therefore, the state

administrative proceedings also provide adequate opportunity to raise constitutional

challenges.

Plaintiffs maintain that the Court should decline to apply the Younger doctrine

pursuant to the exception for cases involving “bad faith, harassment, or flagrant

unconstitutionality.” See Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2006). The

Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that the exceptions to the Younger doctrine

apply, see id., and courts typically interpret these exceptions narrowly, Gorenc v. City of

Westland, 72 F. App’x 336, 339 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d

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199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986)). Indeed, the exceptions are rarely applied. See Tindall v.

Wayne County Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have found

no Supreme Court case that has ever authorized federal intervention under this

exception. Such cases thus are exceedingly rare, particularly where a plaintiff seeking

to defeat an abstention argument has failed to avail himself first of state appellate

processes before seeking relief in federal court.”). At this stage of the litigation, the

Court is not persuaded that the evidence presented by Plaintiffs meets this high burden. 

Plaintiffs’ evidence is equally susceptible to an inference of a good faith investigation

undertaken by the Detroit Police Department or to an inference of bad faith harassment

and malicious prosecution. When rebutted with Defendants’ evidence and assertions,

Plaintiff’s theories fail to meet their burden.

As discussed above, the exclusive remedy available when Younger abstention is

applied in a case involving monetary damages is a stay of the action, pending

conclusion of the state proceedings. See James, 513 F. App’x at 476. Although this

action may be an “empty formality,” leaving the district court "nothing [] to do but clear

the case number off of its docket once the state proceedings conclude," it avoids

entanglement with a statute of limitations defense should a plaintiff prevail on his claims

in the state proceedings. Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th

Cir. 1998). 

IV. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction. All proceedings in this Court are stayed

pending the outcome of the state court proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 16, 2015 s/Marianne O. Battani 

MARIANNE O. BATTANI

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Order was served upon counsel of record via the Court's ECF System to

their respective email addresses or First Class U.S. mail to the non-ECF participants on April 16, 2015.

s/ Kay Doaks 

Case Manager

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