UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAROLYN PURDY,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

Case No. 15-10949

Linda V. Parker

United States District Judge

Stephanie Dawkins Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 15, 16)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Proceedings in this Court

On March 12, 2015, plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of

the Commissioner’s decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(C) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), District Judge Linda V.

Parker referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk for the

purpose of reviewing the Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff’s claims. 

(Dkt. 4). On January 5, 2016, the case was reassigned by Text-Only Order to the

undersigned pursuant to Administrative Order. (See Text-Only Order entered

January 5, 2016). On July 16, 2015, plaintiff filed her motion for summary

judgment. (Dkt. 15). On August 17, 2015, the Commissioner filed its motion for

1

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 1 of 29 Pg ID 501
summary judgment (Dkt. 16), and on August 24, 2015 plaintiff replied (Dkt. 17). 

The matter is now ready for report and recommendation. 

B. Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and

disability insurance benefits on April 3, 2012. The same day, plaintiff filed a Title

XVI application for supplemental security income. In both applications, plaintiff

alleged a disability beginning April 3, 2012. (Dkt. 11-5, Pg ID 206-213). The

Commissioner initially denied plaintiff’s applications on June 8, 2012. (Dkt. 11-4,

Pg ID 131-139). Thereafter, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and on

October 17, 2013, she appeared with counsel before Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Ryan Johannes, who considered her case de novo. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 73-

102). In an October 20, 2013 decision, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 57-67). 

Plaintiff requested a review of this decision, and the ALJ’s decision became the

final decision of the Commissioner when, after the review of additional exhibits,

1

 In this circuit, where the Appeals Council considers additional evidence but denies a 1

request to review the ALJ’s decision, since it has been held that the record is closed at the

administrative law judge level, those “AC” exhibits submitted to the Appeals Council are not

part of the record for purposes of judicial review. See Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696 (6th

Cir. 1993); Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996). Therefore, since

district court review of the administrative record is limited to the ALJ’s decision, which is the

final decision of the Commissioner, the court can consider only that evidence presented to the

ALJ. In other words, Appeals Council evidence may not be considered for the purpose of

substantial evidence review.

2

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 2 of 29 Pg ID 502
the Appeals Council on January 21, 2015, denied plaintiff’s request for review. 

(Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 40-45); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44

(6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff filed this suit on March 12, 2015. (Dkt. 1).

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s

motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the findings of the Commissioner

be REVERSED, and this matter be REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this Report and Recommendation under Sentence Four.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claim for disability is based on her claims of depression, anxiety

and hypertension. (Dkt. 11-2 Pg ID 62). At the time of her initial hearing, she was

47 years. She had previously worked as an assembler at factories. However, she

quit her most recent job because of her anxiety and emotional disturbance. (Dkt.

11-2 Pg ID 63, 80-82). 

A. ALJ Findings

 The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to plaintiff’s claims and

found at step one that plaintiff did not engage in any substantial gainful activity

since April 3, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 59). At step two,

the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major

depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and a personality disorder. (Id.) At step

3

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 3 of 29 Pg ID 503
three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. (Id. at 60). 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to perform:

a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

following nonexertional limitations: she can understand,

remember, and carry out simple repetitive tasks and

make simple work-related decisions; can relate to others

on a superficial basis with no work requiring interaction

with the general public and only occasional interaction

with coworkers or supervisors; and work should not be

fast paced or have strict time or quota demands and in a

routine work setting with only occasionally changes in

the work routine.

(Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID at 62). At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not

capable of performing any past relevant work. (Dkt 11-2, Pg ID 65). At step five,

the ALJ concluded that based on plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and

RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that

plaintiff can perform, and that plaintiff has not been under a disability from April

3, 2012, through the date of the decision. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 65-66).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims of Error

Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to

her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Leon Quinn. (Dkt. 15, Pg ID 462-465). Plaintiff says

that the ALJ failed to show why Dr. Quinn’s opinion was not entitled to

4

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 4 of 29 Pg ID 504
controlling weight. Here, the ALJ discredited Dr. Quinn’s opinion because “it

[was] not supported by the claimant’s medical record as a whole and is

contradicted by Dr. Quinn’s own findings and records.” (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64). 

However, plaintiff argues that Dr. Quinn was the only psychiatrist to consistently

treat plaintiff and the only other medical opinion in the record (state agency

examiner Thomas Horner, Ph.D.), was consistent with Dr. Quinn’s opinion. Both

physicians assigned plaintiff a GAF score within two points of one another: 54

versus 56. Also, Dr. Horner’s opinion (to which the ALJ assigned significant

weight) concluded that plaintiff had many of the same limitations as determined by

Dr. Quinn. (Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 371). Further, plaintiff argues that contrary to the

ALJ’s conclusion, Dr. Quinn never made a finding that she met Listing 12.04 (a

determination reserved for the Commissioner), rather he only opined that plaintiff

exhibited symptoms such as such as anhedonia, appetite disturbance with weight

change, sleep disturbance, psychomotor retardation, decreased energy and feelings

of guilt or worthlessness. (Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 392). Plaintiff argues that Dr.

Quinn’s statements are medical conclusions, not legal conclusions. Finally,

plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly discounted Dr. Quinn’s opinion

concluding that plaintiff could not live outside of a “highly supportive living

situation.” (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64; Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 396). According to plaintiff,

under Listing 12.00(F), such “highly supportive living” environments are ones that

5

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 5 of 29 Pg ID 505
“greatly reduce the mental demands” placed on the claimant, and can include the

claimant’s home. Given that Dr. Quinn stated that plaintiff’s “anxiety prevents her

from leaving home often” and that plaintiff lives with her mother, plaintiff says

that it is not implausible to define her living arrangement as “highly supportive”

under 12.00(F). (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 78; Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 394).

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ committed reversible error when he based

his opinion almost entirely on the opinion of state consulting examiner, Dr.

Thomas Horner, who actually determined that plaintiff was not capable of

functioning in the workplace. (Dkt. 15, Pg ID 465-467). According to plaintiff,

the ALJ used the opinion of Dr. Horner as the foundation for discrediting

plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and ultimately finding plaintiff not disabled. 

However, after evaluating plaintiff, Dr. Horner opined:

Plaintiff’s ability to relate positively, reciprocally, and

effectively with others ... is essentially intact from the

standpoint of a simple social skill, but impaired by her

constant depression and proclivity to break into tears

when employed. She brings a positive set of interactive

and communication ability to work situations – it’s just

that currently she is so beset by low self-esteem and

strong currents of guilt, shame, and embarrassment that

she cannot function well or easily with others. Her ability

to understand, remember and carry out familiar or

customary tasks is essentially intact. However, her ability

to focus and sustain attention to relevant and customary

occupational tasks is interfered with significantly by her

depressive dynamics. Plaintiff’s ability to withstand or

otherwise cope with the stresses of ordinary or

6

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 6 of 29 Pg ID 506
customary occupational activity is therefore impaired at

this time, and likely to remain so indefinitely.

(Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 371) (emphasis added). Plaintiff contends that because Dr.

Horner indicated that her symptoms are so severe that she is unable to cope with

the stress of ordinary or customary occupational activity now and indefinitely, his

opinion cannot provide the basis for determining that she can function in a normal

work environment. As a result, the ALJ’s decision is without evidentiary support

and is not based on substantial evidence. Plaintiff says that it would also be

improper to base the ALJ’s decision on the opinion of the non-examining state

agency consultant, Ruqiya Tareen, M.D. (Dkt. 11-3, Pg ID 109). Dr. Tareen

rendered her opinion without having examined plaintiff and also did not have the

benefit of reviewing the medical records from Dr. Quinn. (Id. at 105-107). Under

these circumstances, Dr. Tareen’s opinion cannot support the ALJ’s decision in

this case.

Plaintiff asks this court to remand for the entry of an award. That relief is

appropriate where “the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is

overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is

lacking.” Faucher v. Sec’y of H.H.S., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). 

Importantly, both of the acceptable medical sources that personally examined

plaintiff (Drs. Quinn and Horner) opined that she was disabled. And, according to

7

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 7 of 29 Pg ID 507
plaintiff, given the magnitude of the error, this matter should be remanded for

entry of an award, not for further proceedings.

C. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Commissioner first argues that plaintiff does not challenge the

adequacy of the vocational evidence at step five, other than challenging the RFC

finding as presented in the hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert. 

(Dkt. 16, Pg ID 483-484). 

Next, the Commissioner argues that plaintiff’s mental work capacity is

consistent with the medical opinions in the record. The Commissioner says that

the ALJ took into account the opinion of reviewing psychiatrist, Dr. Tareen, and

consultative examiner, Dr. Horner. The ALJ noted that plaintiff’s GAF scores

consistently showed no more than a mild to moderate degree of functional

limitation due to mental impairments. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 63-64; Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID

317, 339, 371, 380, 391, 414, 415). The Commissioner indicates that the ALJ

rightly relied on Dr. Tareen’s opinion insofar as it was consistent with the totality

of the medical evidence in the record. Ealy v. Commissioner of Social Security,

594 F.3d 504, 514-515 (6th Cir. 2010). The Commissioner says that the ALJ

rightly discounted Dr. Quinn’s opinion that plaintiff could not do any work due to

her mental limitations because first, Dr. Quinn never assigned plaintiff a GAF

score lower than 53, suggesting at most moderate (or even mild) functional

8

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 8 of 29 Pg ID 508
limitations, and also because Dr. Quinn made no accompanying observations

suggesting that plaintiff displayed symptoms that could render her unable to

function. (Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 389, 414-415, 418, 420). The Commissioner also

indicates that therapist notes from the same period also do not document an

inability to function. (Id. at 427-448). The Commissioner argues that the ALJ

may properly discount a psychiatrist’s opinion on a plaintiff’s functional

limitations where, as here, such an opinion is inconsistent with GAF scores in the

record. Curler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-1721, 561 Fed. Appx. 464, 472 (6th

Cir. 2014); Gribbins v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 01-5752, 37 Fed. Appx. 777, 779

(6th Cir. 2002).

In addition, the Commissioner argues that Dr. Horner’s opinion, upon which

the ALJ relied, supports a claim that plaintiff is not limited beyond what the ALJ

determined. First, Dr. Horner assigned plaintiff a GAF score of “56” which

indicates no more than a moderate degree of mental functional impairment. (Dkt.

11-7, Pg ID 371). The Commissioner notes that while plaintiff exhibited “sad

mood” this did not interfere with Dr. Horner’s ability to interview her. In

addition, Dr. Tareen, who reviewed Dr. Horner’s report, along with other evidence

available to him, did not rule out plaintiff’s ability to do simple work. (Dkt. 11-3,

Pg ID 112-113). The Commissioner also notes that the ALJ placed additional

limitations on plaintiff’s work capacity beyond those suggested by Dr. Tareen,

9

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 9 of 29 Pg ID 509
such as no more than superficial contact with others, low work stresses (in terms

of pacing) and only occasional changes in the work routine. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID

62). For these reasons, the Commissioner submits that the ALJ’s decision that

plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In enacting the social security system, Congress created a two-tiered system

in which the administrative agency handles claims, and the judiciary merely

reviews the agency determination for exceeding statutory authority or for being

arbitrary and capricious. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). The

administrative process itself is multifaceted in that a state agency makes an initial

determination that can be appealed first to the agency itself, then to an ALJ, and

finally to the Appeals Council. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). If relief is

not found during this administrative review process, the claimant may file an

action in federal district court. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir.

1986).

This Court has original jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this

statute is limited in that the court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions

absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal

10

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 10 of 29 Pg ID 510
standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the

record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005);

Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s decision, “we do not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or

decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.

2007); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). “It is of course for

the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses,

including that of the claimant.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247

(6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003)

(an “ALJ is not required to accept a claimant’s subjective complaints and may . . .

consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability.”);

Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (the “ALJ’s

credibility determinations about the claimant are to be given great weight,

particularly since the ALJ is charged with observing the claimant’s demeanor and

credibility.”) (quotation marks omitted); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (“Discounting

credibility to a certain degree is appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions

among medical reports, claimant’s testimony, and other evidence.”). “However,

the ALJ is not free to make credibility determinations based solely upon an

‘intangible or intuitive notion about an individual’s credibility.’” Rogers, 486

F.3d at 247, quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *4.

11

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 11 of 29 Pg ID 511
 If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings of fact

are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Therefore, this Court may not reverse the

Commissioner’s decision merely because it disagrees or because “there exists in

the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.” McClanahan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Mullen v. Bowen, 800

F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Substantial evidence is “more than a

scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers, 486

F.3d at 241; Jones, 336 F.3d at 475. “The substantial evidence standard

presupposes that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Commissioner may

proceed without interference from the courts.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027,

1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), citing, Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545. 

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to an examination of the record

only. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir.

2001). When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial

evidence, a reviewing court must consider the evidence in the record as a whole,

including that evidence which might subtract from its weight. Wyatt v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). “Both the court of

appeals and the district court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of

whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council.” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc.

12

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 12 of 29 Pg ID 512
Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). There is no requirement, however, that

either the ALJ or the reviewing court must discuss every piece of evidence in the

administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 508

(6th Cir. 2006) (“[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly

addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.”)

(internal citation marks omitted); see also Van Der Maas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

198 Fed. Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006).

B. Governing Law

The “[c]laimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits.” 

Boyes v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994);

accord, Bartyzel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 74 Fed. Appx. 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2003). 

There are several benefits programs under the Act, including the Disability

Insurance Benefits Program (DIB) of Title II (42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.) and the

Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) of Title XVI (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et

seq.). Title II benefits are available to qualifying wage earners who become

disabled prior to the expiration of their insured status; Title XVI benefits are

available to poverty stricken adults and children who become disabled. F. Bloch,

Federal Disability Law and Practice § 1.1 (1984). While the two programs have

different eligibility requirements, “DIB and SSI are available only for those who

have a ‘disability.’” Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). 

13

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 13 of 29 Pg ID 513
“Disability” means:

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (DIB); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a)

(SSI).

The Commissioner’s regulations provide that disability is to be determined

through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:

Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in

substantial gainful activity, benefits are denied without

further analysis.

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, that

“significantly limits ... physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities,” benefits are denied without

further analysis.

Step Three: If plaintiff is not performing substantial

gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected

to last for at least twelve months, and the severe

impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed

in the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed

to be disabled regardless of age, education or work

experience. 

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her

past relevant work, benefits are denied without further

analysis.

Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his

or her past relevant work, if other work exists in the

national economy that plaintiff can perform, in view of

14

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 14 of 29 Pg ID 514
his or her age, education, and work experience, benefits

are denied.

Carpenter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 4793424 (E.D. Mich. 2008), citing,

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Heston, 245 F.3d at 534. “If the Commissioner

makes a dispositive finding at any point in the five-step process, the review

terminates.” Colvin, 475 F.3d at 730. 

“Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence

and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is

precluded from performing her past relevant work.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 474, cited

with approval in Cruse, 502 F.3d at 540. If the analysis reaches the fifth step

without a finding that the claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the

Commissioner. Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). 

At the fifth step, the Commissioner is required to show that “other jobs in

significant numbers exist in the national economy that [claimant] could perform

given [his] RFC and considering relevant vocational factors.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at

241; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g).

If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the

decision must be affirmed even if the court would have decided the matter

differently and even where substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 

McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545. In other words, where

15

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 15 of 29 Pg ID 515
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, it must be upheld.

C. Analysis

1. Treating Physician Rule

Plaintiff first challenges the “little” weight the ALJ gave to her treating

psychiatrist Dr. Leon Quinn’s opinions and conclusions. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 63-64). 

The ALJ’s full analysis of Dr. Quinn’s opinions is reproduced here:

Although many of the treatment records from Catholic

Social Services are illegible, the records that can be read

indicate that she was primarily being treated for a

depressive disorder. (Ex. 12F). In July 2013, Dr. Quinn

provided several opinions as to the claimant’s mental

functioning. In one opinion, he provided limitations that

would qualify the claimant to meet listing 12.04 such as

having marked limitations regarding restrictions of

activities of daily living; extreme difficulties in

maintaining social functioning; and marked difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and three

extended episodes of decompensation. He added that the

claimant also requires a highly supportive living

arrangement. (Ex. 10F). In another opinion he stated that

the claimant’s impairments cause her such severe

limitations that she is unable to meet competitive work

standards. (Ex. 8F/4). Dr. Quinn also provided a letter he

gave to the court system to have the claimant excused from

jury duty. In the letter, Dr. Quinn stated that, because of the

claimant’s disabling psychiatric symptoms, “[she] feels

unable to respond to the request to serve on a jury.” He

continued, “Her anxiety prevents her from leaving her

home often, she feels unable to focus or concentrate for any

extended period of time and her depressive symptoms

contribute to her having no energy or motivation.” (Ex.

9F/1). The undersigned has given little weight to these

opinions and conclusions as they are not supported by the

16

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 16 of 29 Pg ID 516
claimant’s medical record as a whole and are contradicted

by Dr. Quinn’s own findings and records. For example,

despite claiming that the claimant meets a disability listing,

he also stated that she has a GAF score of 54, which

indicatesthat the claimant’s functioning is only moderately

impaired. (Ex. 8F/2). Additionally, Dr. Quinn’s conclusion

that the claimant meets a listing is also given little weight

since it is a determination left to the Commissioner and

cannot be abdicated. Furthermore, there is no indication in

the record that the claimant requires a highly supportive

living arrangement as Dr. Quinn has suggested.

(Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 63-64). 

An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion complete deference if it is

supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and it is not inconsistent

with the other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),

416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ determines that a treating source’s medical opinion

is not controlling, he must determine how much weight to assign to that opinion in

light of several factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and the frequency

of examination; (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3)

supportability of the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a

whole; (5) specialization of the treating source; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6).

 There is no per se rule that requires an articulation of each of the six regulatory

factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-CV-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich.

17

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 17 of 29 Pg ID 517
Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 394 Fed. Appx. 216, 222 (6th

Cir. 2010)). An ALJ’s failure to discuss the requisite factors may constitute

harmless error (1) if “a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the

Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the

opinion of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or

(3) “where the Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of

the procedural safeguard of reasons—even though she has not complied with the

terms of the regulation.” Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed. Appx. 462, 470

(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th

Cir. 2004)).

 The Commissioner requires its ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their]

notice of determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s

opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Those good reasons must

be “supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific

to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the

treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Wilson, 378

F.3d at 544 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The district

court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed to identify

the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for

that weight. See Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court

18

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 18 of 29 Pg ID 518
has made clear that ‘[w]e do not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has

not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion

and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions from ALJ’s that do

not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating

physician's opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir.

2009)).

The undesigned finds that the ALJ did not offer sufficient reasons for

discounting Dr. Quinn’s opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 

First, the ALJ indicates that he gave “little” weight to Dr. Quinn’s “opinions and

conclusions as they are not supported by the claimant’s medical record as a whole

and are contradicted by Dr. Quinn’s own findings and records.” Specifically, the

ALJ indicated that Dr. Quinn’s assigned GAF score of 54 contradicted his opinion

that plaintiff met a disability listing. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64). As discussed below,

the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s own selective interpretation of plaintiff’s

GAF scores does not constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the deference

owed to Dr. Quinn’s opinion.

“Global Assessment of Functioning represents the examiner’s judgment of

the individual’s overall level of psychological functioning.” Doud v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 314 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting American

Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th

19

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 19 of 29 Pg ID 519
ed. 2000)). The GAF score is a subjective determination that represents the

clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning. It ranges

from 100 (superior functioning) to 1 (persistent danger of severely hurting self or

others, persistent inability to maintain minimal personal hygiene, or serious

suicidal act with clear expectation of death). A GAF rating of 51 to 60 signals the

existence of moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning. White v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 2009). “A GAF score may help

an ALJ assess mental RFC, but it is not raw medical data. Rather, it allows a

mental health professional to turn medical signs and symptoms into a general

assessment, understandable by a lay person, of an individual’s mental

functioning.” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 502 n.7 (6th

Cir. 2006). Moreover, GAF assessments are “isolated to a relatively brief period

of time, rather than being significantly probative of a person’s ability to perform

mental work activities on a full-time basis.” White v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2813310,

at *10 (S.D. Ohio, June 23, 2014 ), adopted by 2014 WL 3510298 (S.D. Ohio July

14, 2014). 

 Contrary to the Commissioner’s suggestion, courts in this district do not

accord controlling weight to GAF scores. Bryce v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL

1328277 *9 (E.D. Mich. 2014). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s

failure to refer to a GAF score does not make his or her RFC analysis unreliable.

20

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 20 of 29 Pg ID 520
Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002) (“While a GAF

score may be of considerable help to the ALJ in formulating the RFC, it is not

essential to the RFC’s accuracy. Thus, the ALJ’s failure to reference the GAF

score in the RFC, standing alone, does not make the RFC inaccurate.”); see also

White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a

GAF score is a subjective determination); Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167

Fed. Appx. 496, 511 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that low GAF scores failed to

show that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, because,

in part, the court was not “aware of any statutory, regulatory, or other authority

requiring the ALJ to put stock in a GAF score in the first place”). 

Of particular importance here, courts in this Circuit have concluded that an

ALJ errs when he or she disregards the opinion of a treating psychiatrist and

instead relies on his or her own interpretation of a plaintiff’s GAF score(s).

Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 61 Fed. Appx. 191, 201 (6th Cir. 2003); Vock v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-12753, 2014 WL 4206885, *17 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22,

2014). The Martin Court specifically noted that no physician or medical expert of

record indicated that GAF scores, by themselves, provided a sound basis for

diagnosis. Further, the Sixth Circuit found that claimant’s treating psychiatrist

based his opinion on a variety of factors, only one of which was the GAF scoring. 

Finally, no medical expert opined that the GAF scores provided a basis for

21

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 21 of 29 Pg ID 521
discrediting the opinion of the treating physician. 

The Commissioner cites two cases for the proposition that it is appropriate

for an ALJ to discount a treating psychiatrist’s opinion where, as here, such an

opinion is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s assigned GAF scores. However, both

opinions are inapposite. First, in Curler v. Comm’r v. Soc. Sec., No. 13-1721, 561

Fed. Appx. 464 (6th Cir. 2014), the Sixth Circuit supported a rejection of a

claimant’s treating psychiatrist, but only after the Court noted that the

psychiatrist’s notes were inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 

Specifically, the Court said that the ALJ did not err in discounting the treating

psychiatrist’s opinion because he analyzed evidence that several therapists and

doctors documented that the claimant exhibited at most only “mild or moderate”

mental impairments in certain limited areas of functioning, assigned GAF scores

above 50, and found no incidents of decompensation. Id. at 472. Similarly, in

Gribbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 01-5752, 37 Fed. Appx. 777 (6th Cir. 2002),

the Sixth Circuit concluded that an ALJ properly discounted the opinion of a

treating psychiatrist because it was contradicted by other substantial medical

evidence, including another treating physician’s GAF score, and evidence of relief

that the claimant had obtained from an anti-anxiety medication, which was

unknown to the treating psychiatrist at the time of the opinion. Id. at 779. 

Contrary to the ALJs in Curler and Gribbins, the ALJ here did not identify

22

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 22 of 29 Pg ID 522
substantial medical evidence that contradicted Dr. Quinn’s opinion. Rather, the

only two pieces of evidence identified to contradict Dr. Quinn’s opinion were

plaintiff’s GAF score, which the ALJ alleged did not comport with Dr. Quinn’s

functional capacity assessment and the suggestion that there was no evidence in

the record for Dr. Quinn’s conclusion that plaintiff required a highly supportive

living arrangement. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64, 352). The undesigned has addressed

the ALJ’s mistreatment of plaintiff’s GAF score above. 

With respect to Dr. Quinn’s opinion that plaintiff required a highly

supportive living arrangement, Dr. Quinn noted that plaintiff has a medically

documented history of affective disorder that has lasted for at least two years and

has caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do any basic work activity,

with symptoms or signs currently attenuated by medication or psychological

support, and a “current history of 1 or more years’ inability to function outside a

highly supportive living arrangement with an indication of continued need for

such an arrangement.” (Dkt. 11-7, Pg ID 396). Dr. Quinn’s opinion that

plaintiff’s “anxiety prevents her from leaving home often” coupled with the fact

that plaintiff lives with her mother supports his conclusion under Listing 12.00(F). 

The Commissioner does not appear to dispute this evidence. 

As to the remaining justifications offered by the Commissioner in support of

her argument that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Quinn’s opinions, the

23

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 23 of 29 Pg ID 523
undersigned notes that “the courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc

rationalizations for agency action. It is well-established that an agency’s action

must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” Berryhill v.

Shalala, 4 F.3d 993, 1993 WL 361792, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 1993) (quoting

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50, 103

(1983)). “Courts are not at liberty to speculate on the basis of an administrative

agency’s order.... The court is not free to accept ‘appellate counsel’s post hoc

rationalization for agency action in lieu of reasons and findings enunciated by the

Board.’” Hyatt Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 939 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, the

Commissioner’s post hoc rationalizations are not an acceptable substitute for the

ALJ’s lack of rationale concerning his treatment of the opinions of plaintiff’s

treating psychiatrist.

Although the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff was not disabled ultimately may be

justified, if an ALJ fails to explain why he rejected or discounted the opinions of

the claimant’s treating physician, and how those reasons affected the weight

accorded the opinions, the Court must find that substantial evidence is lacking,

“even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.”

Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted); see also Cole, 661 F.3d at 939. This matter should be remanded for the

24

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 24 of 29 Pg ID 524
ALJ to further explain the weight given to Dr. Quinn’s opinion.

2

2. Other Medical Opinions

 Relatedly, plaintiff also claims that the ALJ impermissibly based his

opinion almost exclusively on the opinion of state agency non-examining,

psychological consultant Dr. Thomas Horner who, contrary to the ALJ’s decision,

found that plaintiff was incapable of functioning in the workplace. 

An ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion of record, and set

forth a valid basis for rejecting any. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; see Shelman v.

Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987). The Commissioner may not disregard

opinions of a consulting physician which are favorable to a claimant. See Lashley

v. Sec’y, 708 F.2d 1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983). Moreover, “in weighing medical

evidence, ‘ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their

own independent medical findings.’” Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL

5676254, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013) (citing Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 344 Fed. Appx. 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009)). An ALJ may not substitute his [or

her] own medical judgment for that of a treating or examining doctor where the

 To the extent that Dr. Quinn’s treatment notes are “illegible,” (Dkt.. 11-2, Pg ID 63) it 2

is the responsibility of the ALJ to contact Dr. Quinn to have those notes clarified on remand. See

Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-5p, Titles II and XVI: Medical Source Opinions on Issues

Reserved to the Commissioner, 61 FR 34471-01 (Because treating source evidence (including

opinion evidence) is important, if the evidence does not support a treating source’s opinion on

any issue reserved to the Commissioner and the adjudicator cannot ascertain the basis of the

opinion from the case record, the adjudicator must make “every reasonable effort” to recontact

the source for clarification of the reasons for the opinion.).

25

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 25 of 29 Pg ID 525
opinion of that doctor is supported by the medical evidence. See Simpson, 344

Fed. Appx. at 194; see also Bledsoe v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 2011 WL 549861,

at *7 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“An ALJ is not permitted to substitute her own medical

judgment for that of a treating physician and may not make her own independent

medical findings.”). This is so even though the final responsibility for the RFC

determination is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. Allen, 2013 WL

5676254, at *15. Further, an ALJ must “explain how any material inconsistencies

or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and resolved,”

discuss “why reported symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can

or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other

evidence,” “consider and address medical source opinions,” and “[i]f the RFC

assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, ... explain why the

opinion was not adopted.” SSR 96-8p. 

While the ALJ here gave Dr. Horner’s opinion “significant weight,” the

undersigned concludes that the ALJ failed to offer an explanation as required by

96-8p regarding Dr. Horner’s opinion that plaintiff’s ability to withstand or

otherwise cope with the stresses of ordinary or customary occupational activity

was impaired, and was likely to remain so indefinitely. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64,

371). The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Horner’s opinion, yet this portion of

the opinion that was favorable to plaintiff and which supports a finding of

26

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 26 of 29 Pg ID 526
disability, was not explained by the ALJ. This is error.

Moreover, the ALJ indicated that he gave “partial weight” to state agency

psychological consultant Dr. Ruqiya Tareen’s opinions because those opinions did

not take into account the full effect of plaintiff’s depression and anxiety on her

social functioning as suggested by Dr. Horner. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64-65). As

noted by plaintiff, however, Dr. Tareen did not have the benefit of reviewing the

notes of plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist when rendering her opinions. As

concluded in Blakley v. Comm’r v. Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2009),

the decision to accord greater weight to state agency physicians over a claimant’s

treating sources is not, by itself, reversible error. “In appropriate circumstances,

opinions from State agency medical ... consultants ... may be entitled to greater

weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.”• Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-

6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 2, 1996). The Court provided that one such

circumstance may occur, for example, when the “State agency medical ...

consultant’s opinion is based on a review of a complete case record that ...

provides more detailed and comprehensive information than what was available to

the individual's treating source.” Id. Here, however, the agency’s non-examining

source did not have an opportunity to review any of Dr. Quinn’s opinions. And,

because there was no “indication that the ALJ at least considered these facts

before giving greater weight to an opinion that is not ‘based on a review of a

27

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 27 of 29 Pg ID 527
complete case record,” it would be improper for the ALJ to base his decision on

Dr. Tareen’s opinions. 

Given the above conclusions, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ must

re-assess the weight given to all of the medical opinions in the record and reevaluate plaintiff’s RFC finding.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s

motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the findings of the Commissioner

be REVERSED, and this matter be REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this Report and Recommendation under Sentence Four.

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service,

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and E.D. Mich. Local

Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further

right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health

and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health

and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of

28

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 28 of 29 Pg ID 528
Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,”

etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the

objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. Local

Rule 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the

objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,”

“Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections

are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.

Date: August 19, 2016 s/Stephanie Dawkins Davis

Stephanie Dawkins Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 19, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing paper

with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send electronic

notification to all counsel of record.

s/Tammy Hallwood 

Case Manager

(810) 341-7887

tammy_hallwood@mied.uscourts.gov

29

4:15-cv-10949-LVP-SDD Doc # 19 Filed 08/19/16 Pg 29 of 29 Pg ID 529