ORDER 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 

AT SEATTLE 

PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL 

COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 

OF NORTH AMERICA, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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CASE NO. C09-420 RSM 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO TRANSFER 

I. INTRODUCTION

 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Transfer. (Dkt. #4). 

Defendants argue that this case should be transferred to the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Defendants indicate that this case 

arises out of an arbitration award that was issued in the District of Columbia, and that all 

parties to an agreement that controls in this case reside in that district. 

Plaintiff responds that it is neither bound to this agreement nor subject to the arbitration 

award Defendants rely upon to justify transfer. Therefore, they argue that the Court should 

uphold their choice of forum. Plaintiff also contends that the Court should stay the 

proceedings in light of a pending administrative hearing. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendants, and GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion to transfer. 
ORDER 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Background 

The instant lawsuit arises over a jurisdictional dispute between two labor unions over 

scaffolding work performed for Brand Energy Services, LLC (“Brand”), near Moses Lake, 

Washington.1 Defendant Laborers’ International Union of North America (“LIUNA”) 

challenged Brand’s assignment of work to members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters 

and Joiners of America (“Carpenters”). Specifically, LIUNA claimed that Carpenters’ 

regional affiliate, Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters (“PNRCC”) – the 

Plaintiff in this action – was improperly performing work within the jurisdiction of LIUNA. 

Notably, both LIUNA and Carpenters are national labor unions headquartered in Washington, 

D.C., while PNRCC has its offices and principal place of business in Kent, Washington. 

 LIUNA, Carpenters, and Brand are all bound by a collective bargaining agreement 

entitled the National Construction Agreement (“NCA”) and its corresponding Plan for 

Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry (“the Plan”). The NCA 

provides that National and International Unions are parties to the NCA, including “those local 

unions affiliated with such National and International Unions who accept the terms of this 

Agreement by virtue of accepting the benefits of the Agreements and/or referring employees 

to work on such jobs.” (Dkt. #5, Decl. of Davis, Ex. A, Preamble ¶ 1). 

 The Plan further provides that “[a] Union may become stipulated to the Plan by virtue 

of its affiliation with the Department or its National or International Union’s affiliation with 

the Department, a signed [] stipulation form setting forth that it is willing to be bound by the 

terms of the Plan or a provision in a collective bargaining agreement.” (Decl. of Davis, Ex. 

D. Art. II, § 1(a)).2

 

The Plan also outlines the procedures for resolving work jurisdictional disputes, 

including the proper procedure for binding arbitration. The Plan requires in relevant part that: 

 

1

 Brand is a nominal Defendant in this action. 

2

 The Plan defines “Department” as the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFLCIO, a national alliance of unions in the construction industry. 
ORDER 

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(1) arbitration hearings are to be held in Washington, D.C.; (2) an action to enforce an 

arbitration award must be brought in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia; and (3) all parties to the Plan are deemed to have consented to the District of 

Columbia’s jurisdiction. 

 In accordance with the Plan, LIUNA filed a dispute with the Plan Administrator over 

the jurisdiction of the scaffold tendering work awarded to Carpenters on March 9, 2009. 

LIUNA believed that it was entitled to perform the work for the Moses Lake project. After 

the parties were unable to resolve their dispute informally, the matter was submitted to 

binding arbitration pursuant to the Plan, and a hearing was held on March 20, 2009 in 

Washington, D.C. LIUNA and Carpenters were represented by their International Unions. 

Although PNRCC was not present at the arbitration hearing, a threshold issue raised 

by Brand during the hearing was whether PNRCC was bound to the NCA and the Plan. The 

Plan Arbitrator, J.J. Pierson, found in the affirmative. He held that “[b]ased on clear and 

convincing evidence, this arbitrator finds that both Brand and [Carpenters], including its 

affiliate [PNRCC], are stipulated to the Plan, and subject to the Procedures set forth in its 

Rules and Regulations.” (Decl. of Davis, Ex. G at 7). 

With respect to the substantive issues involved in the arbitration hearing, Arbitrator 

Pierson held in favor of LIUNA. He found that Brand had improperly assigned work for the 

Moses Lake project to Carpenters, and that Brand should have assigned the work to LIUNA. 

(Id. at 18). 

Dissatisfied, PNRCC filed the present action on March 30, 2009, seeking declaratory 

relief and asking this Court to vacate the March 23, 2009 Arbitration Award pursuant to § 301 

of the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. PNRCC alleges in its 

complaint that the Arbitration Award is unenforceable because it was not a party to the NCA 

or the Plan. PNRCC alleges that only the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has 

authority to resolve this jurisdictional dispute. 

Four days after PNRCC filed its complaint, LIUNA filed a petition under § 301 of the 

LMRA, and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-11, seeking enforcement of 
ORDER 

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the Arbitration Award in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

LIUNA filed the instant motion in this Court seven days thereafter, arguing that the 

procedures set forth in the Plan state that “[a]ll parties signatory or stipulated to this 

agreement consent to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia.” (Decl. of Davis, Ex. D, Art. VII, § 2(a)). 

Importantly, and prior to filing of this lawsuit by PNRCC, Brand requested a hearing 

with the NLRB to resolve the jurisdictional dispute in March of 2009 pursuant to § 10(k) of 

the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k). This statute provides that the NLRB “is empowered and 

directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have 

arisen[.]” Id. The NLRB originally scheduled its hearing on April 7, 2009 to resolve the 

jurisdictional dispute between the parties, but ordered the parties to show cause why the § 

10(k) hearing should not be quashed in light of the Arbitration Award. (Dkt. #12, Decl. of 

Shanley, Ex. F). PNRCC responded as directed, and the NLRB rescheduled the hearing to 

May 4, 2009. The hearing occurred as scheduled, but no decision has been rendered. 

B. Motions to Transfer 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 

where it might have been brought.” The purpose of this section is to “prevent the waste of 

time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary 

inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). The statute “displaces the common law doctrine of forum 

non conveniens” with respect to transfers between federal courts. See Decker Coal Co. v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Section 1404(a) is not, however, simply a codification of the common law doctrine. In 

passing § 1404(a), Congress “intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser 

showing of inconvenience” than was needed for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non 

conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). The decision to transfer an 
ORDER 

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action is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and must be determined on an 

individualized basis. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). 

The statute has two requirements on its face. First, the district to which defendants seek 

to have the action transferred must be one in which the action “might have been brought.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Second, the transfer must be for the “convenience of parties and 

witnesses,” and “in the interest of justice.” Id. 

Here, the Court finds that the action clearly could have been brought in District of 

Columbia. LIUNA is a labor organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The District of 

Columbia also has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this case, which require 

application of federal laws. Therefore the primary issue for the Court to resolve is whether 

the second requirement of § 1404(a) has been met. 

1. Section 1404(a) Factors

In determining whether a transfer is appropriate under this requirement, the Court must 

weigh numerous factors, including: (1) the location of where the relevant agreements or 

alleged events in the lawsuit took place; (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing 

law; (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, 

and the relation of those contacts to the plaintiff’s cause of action; (5) the difference in cost of 

litigation in the two forums; (6) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance 

of non-party witnesses; and (7) the ease of access to sources of proof. Jones v. GNC 

Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Other relevant considerations, drawn from the traditional forum non conveniens 

analysis, are: (8) the pendency of related litigation in the transferee forum; (9) the relative 

congestion of the two courts; and (10) the public interest in the local adjudication of local 

controversies. See Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. The burden is on the defendant to 

demonstrate that the transfer is warranted. Saleh, et al., v. Titan Corporation, et al., 361 

F.Supp.2d 1152, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2005). This Court has recognized that the above-mentioned 

factors cannot be mechanically applied. Amazon.com v. Cendant Corp., 404 F.Supp.2d 1256, 

1259 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
ORDER 

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2. The District of Columbia is the Proper Forum

In the instant case, the Court finds that this matter should be transferred to the District 

of Columbia. At the outset, the Court notes that the traditional statutory factors set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a) such as the convenience to the parties and the convenience to the witnesses 

apply with minimal force in this case. The only relief PNRCC seeks in this lawsuit is an order 

from the Court that PNRCC is not subject to the NCA or the Plan, thereby making the 

Arbitration Award unenforceable. Moreover, judicial review of the NCA and its Plan, as well 

as the Arbitration Award itself is purely a legal issue and does not contemplate evidentiary 

discovery. Any court reviewing this case must look primarily to the administrative record 

created at the arbitration hearing. Consequently, the majority of the factors mentioned above 

in the Jones case have little probative value to the Court. 

To the extent that any evidentiary discovery must be conducted in this case, the location 

of such evidence is located in the District of Columbia. LIUNA and Carpenters, PNRCC’s 

parent union, are headquartered in Washington, D.C. In addition, the Plan Administrator to 

the NCA is located in that district. The arbitration hearing also occurred in that district, and 

LIUNA and Carpenters through their International Unions were present at the hearing. As a 

result, those with knowledge regarding the interpretation of the Plan as well as the Arbitration 

Award are located in Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Mobile Video Servs., Ltd. v. Nat’l Ass’n of 

Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, 574 F.Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 

(finding that because “[a]ll the material occurrences which formed the factual basis for the 

arbitration award took place in Washington, D.C.,” the proper venue was the District of 

Columbia). 

Relatedly, PNRCC’s argument that the Court should honor its choice of forum is not 

compelling. The only connection this district has to this lawsuit is that PNRCC is located in 

this district. On the other hand, and as described above, the operative facts that give rise to 

enforcement of this Arbitration Award are located in Washington, D.C. See id. at 671 

(“While in general plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to considerable weight, that choice is 

accorded less weight when . . . the operative facts of the case have no material connection 
ORDER 

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with [plaintiff’s choice].”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Lou v. 

Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (“If the operative facts have not occurred within 

the forum . . . [the plaintiff’s choice] is entitled to only minimal consideration.”). 

Furthermore, the interests of justice support transfer to the District of Columbia. As 

mentioned above, there is currently a pending action in the District of Columbia wherein 

LIUNA is seeking enforcement of the Arbitration Award pursuant to NCA and the Plan. It 

would be inefficient and duplicative for this Court to engage in effectively the same analysis 

based on PNRCC’s requested relief. Indeed, PNRCC recognizes that its lawsuit is 

fundamentally related to LIUNA’s pending litigation as reflected by its statement that 

consolidation of this lawsuit with LIUNA’s lawsuit in the District of Columbia in this Court is 

the proper course of action. (See Dkt. #11 at 7-8). Notwithstanding PNRCC’s failure to cite 

any authority to justify such a request, this acknowledgment clearly reflects an understanding 

that a ruling from this Court would potentially be at odds with a ruling from the District of 

Columbia. Allowing PNRCC to proceed under such circumstances certainly does not serve 

the interests of justice or judicial economy. 

The Court also gives no weight to PNRCC’s argument that ruling on LIUNA’s motion 

to transfer amounts to ruling on the substantive issues raised by its lawsuit. PNRCC’s lawsuit 

arises out of an agreement entered into between Carpenters, LIUNA, and Brand. This 

agreement was entered into in Washington, D.C., and as mentioned above, the arbitration 

hearing interpreting these agreements also occurred there. Thus, irrespective of PNRCC’s 

attempts to claim it is not within the purview of the NCA, the starting point for any analysis 

requires examination of the original agreement between Carpenters, LIUNA, and Brand, as 

well as the Arbitration Award itself that PNRCC is challenging. 

The circular nature of PNRCC’s arguments is best evidenced by its contention that it is 

not a local union as contemplated by the Plan, but rather an intermediate union that falls 

outside the Plan. (Dkt. #11 at 3-4). Resolution of this argument undoubtedly requires a 

substantive analysis of the merits of this case; analysis PNRCC contends that this Court 

should not make in justifying transfer. Therefore just as LIUNA is arguing that PNRCC is 
ORDER 

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clearly subject to jurisdiction in the District of Columbia based on the language of the Plan, 

PNRCC likewise argues that it is not bound to that district based on the language of the Plan. 

In either circumstance, the analysis requires an examination of the Plan itself. 

Ultimately, LIUNA brought its lawsuit to enforce the underlying Arbitration Award 

based on the clear mandate of the Plan. Whether the Plan appropriately binds PNRCC is 

irrelevant for purposes of the § 1404(a) analysis. LIUNA has met its burden in justifying 

transfer, and the most appropriate forum to settle this dispute is the District of Columbia. 

C. Section 10(k) of the NLRA 

The Court also finds it worthwhile to address PNRCC’s contention that based on the 

pending § 10(k) hearing with the NLRB, the NLRB has proper jurisdiction to resolve this 

dispute. In support of this argument, PNRCC repeatedly states throughout its opposition that 

the NLRB “found that it was statutorily required under § 10(k) to serve as the final arbiter in 

the jurisdictional dispute between [LIUNA] and the PNRCC.” (Dkt. #11 at 5); (see also id. at 

7) (“In rejecting [LIUNA’s] argument, the NLRB determined that the PNRCC is not bound by 

the Plan award via the NCA and the NLRB is the proper forum to decide the jurisdictional 

dispute.”). 

However, PNRCC overstates the findings of the NLRB. The NLRB merely required 

PNRCC to show cause why its hearing should not be dismissed in light of the Arbitration 

Award. PNRCC responded as directed and PNRCC only rescheduled the original April 7, 

2009 hearing date to May, 4, 2009. In its order rescheduling the hearing date, the NLRB was 

completely silent as to the merits of the case. (See Decl. of Shanley, Ex. I). No statement or 

finding was made rejecting any of LIUNA’s specific arguments. Likewise, no statement or 

finding was made accepting PNRCC’s arguments. 

In any event, PNRCC fails to explain how the § 10(k) hearing effects LIUNA’s motion 

to transfer, other than mentioning in passing within a footnote that “the proper course of 

action is to stay this proceeding pending completion of the § 10(k) hearing before the 

[NLRB].” (Dkt. #11 at 8, n.1). Whether the NLRB has sole jurisdiction over this claim does 

not affect LIUNA’s motion to transfer. The narrow issue for the Court to determine at this 
ORDER 

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stage of the proceedings is whether the District of Columbia is the more appropriate forum. 

PNRCC is certainly free to raise any arguments related to the NLRB’s jurisdiction over its 

claims or otherwise file a motion to stay in the District of Columbia.

III. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the relevant pleadings, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, 

and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS: 

 (1) Defendants’ Motion to Transfer (Dkt. #4) is GRANTED. This case is hereby 

TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Clerk 

shall close this file and notify the Clerk of the Court in that district. 

 (2) The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 

 DATED this 5th day of June, 2009. 

A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE