UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KAYLEE A. CASTLE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 15-11021

 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 

Defendant. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [R. 14, 16]

Plaintiff Kaylee Castle appeals a final decision of Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application 

for disabled child’s insurance benefits (“CIB”) and child supplemental 

security income benefits (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”).

Both parties have filed summary judgment motions, referred to this Court 

for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

The Court finds that the decision by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) is 

supported by substantial evidence, and thus RECOMMENDS that:

• the Commissioner’s motion [R. 16] be GRANTED; 

• Castle’s motion [R. 14] be DENIED; and,

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• the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED, pursuant to sentence 

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Castle’s Background and Claimed Disabilities

Born in July 1994, Castle was eighteen when she applied for 

disability benefits in 2012. She dropped out of high school in the 10th 

grade, and has been working toward completing her credits for graduation 

online. Castle has alleged an onset date is December 14, 2010, and that 

she was disabled by anxiety, bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder (ADHD), mood disorder, depression and anger issues. [R. 11-6, 

Tr. 118, 163]. 

B. Procedural Background

Castle’s claim was denied initially on October 2, 2102, and she filed a 

timely request for an administrative hearing. [R. 11-4, Tr. 56-59, 63-65]. 

The ALJ held a hearing on September 10, 2013, during with Castle and a 

vocational expert (VE) testified. [R. 11-2, Tr. 28-44]. In a November 15, 

2013 written decision, the ALJ found Castle to be not disabled. [Id., Tr. 14-

37]. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Commissioner. [Id., Tr. 1-3]. Castle timely filed for 

judicial review. [R. 1]. 

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C. The ALJ’s Application of the Disability Framework Analysis

A “disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The Commissioner determines whether a

child is disabled by analyzing three sequential steps, assessing: (1) 

whether the child is engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the 

child has a “severe” impairment;1 and (3) whether the child’s impairment 

meets, medically equals, or functionally equals an impairment listed in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). See 20 C.F.R. 

§416.924(a). 

Applying this framework, the ALJ concluded that Castle was not 

disabled. She first found that Castle had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since her application date. [R. 11-2, Tr. 13]. The ALJ determined

that Castle had the severe impairments of ADHD, affective disorder, 

anxiety disorder and learning disorder. [Id.]. Next, the ALJ concluded that 

none of Castle’s impairments, either alone or in combination, met or 

medically equaled the severity of the listed impairments. [Id., Tr. 14-15]. 

1 A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 1520(c); 920(c).

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The ALJ then found that Castle had the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) 

to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with 

the following non-exertional limitations: She can perform 

simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with minimal changes in 

routine work setting and no production rate pace work; and she 

can occasionally interact with supervisors, but she should have 

no more than minimal, superficial interaction with co-workers or 

the general public. 

[Id., Tr. 15].

After considering Castle’s age, education, work experience, RFC and 

the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that she was not disabled. 

[Id., Tr. 20]. 

II. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and was made in conformity with proper legal standards. Gentry v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the 

evidence in the record below may be considered when determining 

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whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bass v. 

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Castle argues that the ALJ erred by failing to give controlling weight 

to an opinion from her treating psychiatrist, that the ALJ’s conclusions are 

inconsistent with evidence in the record, and that the RFC should have 

indicated that her workday and workweek would necessarily be interrupted 

by symptoms from her mental illnesses. The Court disagrees and 

recommends that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed. 

A. Treating Physician Rule

The “treating physician rule” requires an ALJ to give controlling 

weight to a treating physician’s opinions regarding the nature and severity 

of a claimant’s condition when those opinions are well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic evidence, and not inconsistent 

with other substantial evidence. Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723, 727-29; Rogers, 

486 F.3d at 242-43. If an ALJ gives less than controlling weight to a 

treating source’s opinion, she must provide “good reasons” for doing so 

that are “supported by the evidence in the case record, and ... sufficiently 

specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons 

for that weight.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th 

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Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96–2p, 1996 WL 

374188, at *5 (July 2, 1996)). 

Here, treating psychiatrist C.A.N. Rao, M.D., cosigned an opinion on 

July 9, 2013 indicating that, among other limitations, Castle’s ADHD, 

bipolar disorder and oppositional defiant disorder rendered her markedly 

limited in her ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular 

attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances.

2

 [R. 11-9, Tr. 

518-20]. The ALJ gave this opinion little weight, finding it to be 

“inconsistent with the evidence of record as a whole, including Dr. Rao’s 

own treatment reports.” [R. 11-2, Tr. 18]. Castle accuses the ALJ of using 

a “shotgun” approach of reporting only reports in which she was doing 

better. The Court disagrees.

The ALJ accurately described Dr. Rao’s treatment reports as “most 

recently indicat[ing] no abnormal findings on mental status examination and 

not[ing] her report that her mood was better, everything was going ‘all right’, 

and denying any symptoms of depression as she was still working toward 

her high school diploma.” [Id.]. Dr. Rao began treating Castle in December 

2012, at a time in which she had been off of the previously prescribed 

Abilify, Prozac and Strattera for six months. [R. 11-9, Tr. 442-43]. He 

2 The Court is not discussing the other limitations imposed by Dr. Rao 

because this is the only one at issue. [R. 14, PgID 578].

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reported Castle’s mental status exam (MSE) as revealing problems with 

moodiness, irritability and poor concentration, a labile affect, feelings of 

anxiousness and being uptight. [Id., Tr. 443]. Dr. Rao diagnosed Castle 

with ADHD with anxiety, and restarted her on her previous medications. 

[Id.]. During the five subsequent medication reviews, Dr. Rao described 

Castle as doing better, being friendly, talkative and “free of acute 

psychiatric symptoms,” denying depression, and being goal oriented as she 

worked toward achieving her high school diploma online. [Id., Tr. 444-45, 

507-11, 514-15]. Although Castle had previously discussed trouble with 

controlling her mood, she reported in April and May, 2013 that she was 

gaining insight, not having acute mood swings and was getting along with 

her grandmother, with whom she lived since March. [Id., Tr. 444-45, 511].

Castle’s good mood while living with her grandmother and 

talkativeness during therapy are noteworthy because, in August 2012, 

Castle and her mother described her as having a difficult time adjusting to 

change, needing company for showering and shaving, and rarely talking 

during therapy. [R. 11-6, Tr. 125-40]. The ALJ accurately points out that 

these August 2012 reports were written during a time period in which 

Castle was receiving no mental health treatment, and that the medical 

records show her improving significantly once she resumed treatment in 

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December 2012. [R. 11-2, Tr. 18-19].

The Court further notes that Dr. Rao never diagnosed Castle with 

bipolar disorder or oppositional defiant disorder, [see R. 11-9, Tr. 442-45, 

511, 514-15], so it is unclear why he imposed restrictions based in part on 

those diagnoses. 

B. Substantial Evidence in the Record for the ALJ’s Decision

Castle argues that Dr. Rao’s opinion was consistent with evidence is 

the record that she cites, and that the ALJ’s decision was inconsistent with 

that evidence. [R. 14, PgID 584-589]. Nonetheless, the ALJ’s conclusions, 

including that Dr. Rao’s opinion was deserving of little weight, is supported 

by other substantial evidence. 

Specifically, reports from Castle’s therapist (a social worker) and then 

treating psychiatrist for the period of February through September 2011 

generally described her as doing better and often having a bright mood, 

with no reports of depression or suicidal ideation despite the trauma 

associated with her father’s recent diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. 

[See R. 11-9, Tr. 371 (doing well except for anxiety in group situations); Id.,

Tr. 370 (doing well except for mood fluctuations); R. 11-7, Tr. 225 (doing 

well behaviorally, but mood fluctuated and was having poor sleep); R. 11-9, 

Tr. 369 (doing well taking medications, no major concerns, mood better, 

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affect appropriate, speech better, fair judgment, mood euthymic, not 

suicidal, no hallucinations, insight fair); R. 11-7, Tr. 219 (mood fairly bright); 

Id., Tr. 238-47 (no current suicidal ideation); Id., Tr. 268 (doing better with 

mood and behaviors, and Castle thought that less therapy was 

appropriate); Id., Tr. 266 (reported doing well); Id., Tr. 262 (dealing with 

father’s schizophrenia, but functioning better, mood bright); R. 11-9, Tr. 

368 (affect appropriate, speech spontaneous, no delusions, fair judgment, 

mood euthymic, not suicidal, no hallucinations, memory intact, insight fair); 

R. 11-7, Tr. 260 (mood bright, doing well); Id., Tr. 258 (feeling well, doing 

well with completing school credits and helping around house, not anxious 

or depressed); Id., Tr. 256 (still doing well with school and otherwise)].

However, Castle stopped taking her medication as directed and her 

then psychiatrist noted in October 2011 and February 2012 that she was 

not doing well as a result. [R. 11-9, Tr. 366-67]. After Castle resumed her 

medications, her mother reported in April 2012 that she was doing well. [R. 

11-9, Tr. 365]. By June, her therapist described Castle as having a bright 

mood, regular sleep and no major issues. [R. 11-8, Tr. 356, 358]. That 

must have been around the time that Castle stopped taking her

medications, as she reported in December 2012 that she had not been 

taking any for six months. [R. 11-9, Tr. 442-43]. It was during the period of 

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being unmedicated that Castle tried working at Meijers, but quit due to high 

anxiety while interacting with customers and coworkers. [Id., Tr. 375]. As 

previously described, Castle’s condition improved when she began treating 

with Dr. Rao and resumed her medication regimen. Castle then was noted 

to have gone bowling, and to be often shopping and socializing with friends 

in public. [Id., Tr. 507-11, 515].

Moreover, the ALJ did not disregard the evidence that Castle cites; 

she significantly accounted for Castle’s non-exertional limitations by 

requiring her RFC only simple and routine work, minimal changes in routine 

work setting, no more than minimal interaction with the public or coworkers, and only occasional interaction with supervisors. [R. 11-2, Tr. 15].

For these reasons, even though Castle cites evidence that might 

support a contrary conclusion, there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support the ALJ’s decisions and it should be affirmed. “If the 

[Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be 

affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and 

even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip 

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)

(internal citations omitted). 

C. Workday and Workweek Interruptions

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Castle complains that the ALJ did not include the requirement that 

she have interrupted workdays and workweeks in her RFC. She alleges 

that, even though the ALJ claimed to give significant weight to the opinion 

of State agency psychologist Barbara Jean Smith, Ph.D., [R. 11-2, Tr. 18], 

she failed to adopt Dr. Smith’s conclusion that she was moderately limited 

in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions, and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable 

number and length of rest periods. [R. 14, PgID 586; R. 11-3, Tr. 50-51]. 

However, the ALJ did not give Dr. Smith’s opinion controlling weight, and 

the regulations would not support such deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(e). The final responsibility for assessing Castle’s RFC was 

reserved for the Commissioner. § 404.1527(d)(2); Edwards v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 97 F. App’x 567, 569 (6th Cir.2004) (“[The RFC] determination is 

expressly reserved for the Commissioner.”). Further, as Castle admits, Dr. 

Smith’s September 2012 opinion did not benefit from Dr. Rao’s later 

records, which showed Castle improving once she resumed taking her 

medications. 

Consequently, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by issuing a 

RFC that did not anticipate necessary interruptions in her workday or 

workweek. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Castle’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 14] be DENIED, the 

Commissioner’s Motion [R. 16] be GRANTED and this case be 

AFFIRMED.

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: January 19, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

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Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 19, 2016.

s/ Karri Sandusky for 

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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