UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

DEBORAH A. BETTY, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-cv-10734 

 v. DISTRICT JUDGE ROBERT H. CLELAND 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

______________________________/ 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Deborah A. Betty seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security’s determination that she is not entitled to social security benefits for her physical and 

mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 13) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 16). Plaintiff has also filed a response to Defendant’s Motion. (Docket no. 17.) The 

motions have been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 3.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a 

hearing pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and 

Recommendation. 

I. RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 13) be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket 

no. 16) be GRANTED. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income with a protective filing date of July 6, 2012, alleging that she has 

been disabled since September 1, 2010, due to diabetes, high blood pressure, depression, sleep 

apnea, and arthritis in her right hand. (TR 109-16, 140-41, 145.) The Social Security 

Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims on October 5, 2012, and Plaintiff requested a de novo

hearing. (TR 47-62, 73-74.) On November 14, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a representative 

and testified at the hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Henry Perez, Jr. (TR 26-46.) 

In a December 23, 2013 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits 

because she did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. (TR 12-21.) The 

Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (TR 1-6), and Plaintiff commenced this 

action for judicial review. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment, which are 

currently before the Court. 

III. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff (docket no. 13 at 6-9), Defendant (docket no. 16 at 4-7), and the ALJ (TR 16-21) 

each set out a detailed, factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing 

testimony. Having conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s medical record and the 

hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that there are no material inconsistencies among these 

recitations of the record. Therefore, the undersigned will incorporate the factual recitations by 

reference. Additionally, the undersigned will include comments and citations to the record as 

necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date of September 1, 2010, and that Plaintiff had the following medically 

determinable impairments: depression, diabetes mellitus, arthritis of the right hand, obstructive 

sleep apnea, and hypertension. (TR 14-15.) Nevertheless, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited (or was expected to 

significantly limit) her ability to perform basic work-related activities for twelve consecutive 

months, and, therefore, she did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. 

(TR 15-21.) Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social 

Security Act at any time from September 1, 2010, through the date of the decision. (TR 12, 21.) 

V. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

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 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting 

that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

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“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in 

response to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the 

claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter 

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 

WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed and/or remanded under sentence four 

because “(1) the ALJ made an improper Step 2 Determination and erred in finding Plaintiff’s 

multiple impairments are non-severe impairments; (2) the ALJ failed to give proper deference to 

the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician; (3) the ALJ made a flawed credibility finding; (4) 

the ALJ erred in not considering the effect of Plaintiff’s impairment on her ability to work; and 

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(5) the ALJ failed to establish that there is other work in the national economy that Plaintiff can 

perform.” (Docket no. 13 at 10.) 

1. The ALJ’s Step-Two Determination 

First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made an improper determination at Step Two of the 

sequential evaluation process by finding that Plaintiff’s impairments were non-severe. (Docket 

no. 13 at 11-14.) At Step Two of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff was required to 

show that she suffered from a severe impairment. A severe impairment or combination of 

impairments is one that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform 

basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Basic work activities, defined as 

the physical or mental abilities and aptitudes necessary to perform most jobs, includes the ability 

to walk; stand; sit; lift; push; pull; reach; carry; handle; see; hear; speak; understand, carry out, 

and remember simple instructions; use judgment; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations; and deal with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1521, 416.921. 

The Sixth Circuit court has determined that the step-two requirement serves as a “de 

minimus” threshold hurdle in the disability process. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862-63 (6th 

Cir. 1988). The inquiry at step two functions as an “administrative convenience to screen out 

claims that are totally groundless” from a medical perspective. Id. at 863 (citation omitted). An 

impairment will be considered non-severe only if it is a “slight abnormality which has such a 

minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s 

ability to work, irrespective of age, education and work experience.” Farris v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). “Under this standard, the 

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question . . . is whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's finding 

that [the plaintiff] has only a ‘slight’ impairment that does not affect her ability to work.” Id. 

In making his Step-Two determination, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff has the 

medically determinable impairments of depression, diabetes mellitus, arthritis of the right hand, 

obstructive sleep apnea, and hypertension. (TR 15.) Then, after considering Plaintiff’s medical 

record, written statements, and hearing testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments were not severe on the grounds that Plaintiff’s statements regarding 

her symptoms were not entirely credible and the objective medical evidence did not reveal workrelated limitations. (TR 16-21.) With regard to Plaintiff’s physical impairments, the ALJ 

explained: 

Claimant’s physical impairments are [] found to be nonsevere based on the fact 

that they do not cause more than minimal limitation in functioning related to work 

activity for at least 12 months. Claimant has OSA and a CPAP had been 

described, but that diagnosis has also been described as only “mild”, having 

approximately 90% efficiency on most sleep studies. She also reports great 

fatigue and very little sleep, but her reports range from 1 hour of sleep per night to 

over 6 hours on her actual sleep studies. Moreover, her admitted activities during 

the day . . . are not consistent with someone who is exhausted and napping much 

of the day. Her hypertension also does not seem to be symptomatic, and her 

diabetes has not caused any significant problems other than rare occasions of high 

glucose. Her notes indicate that she is compliant with medication and that those 

conditions are stable. Lastly, regarding her arthritis, there is no actual x-ray or 

other exam in evidence to confirm such a diagnosis and no significant limitations 

in functioning from that disorder are indicated by the objective medical evidence 

of record. Specifically on one exam of her arm she was noted to have “some” 

decreased sensation in the ulnar and median nerve distribution of the right hand, 

however as she was also found to have full grip strength and no other functional 

limitations from that finding, her arm pain/osteoarthritis is also found to be 

nonsevere. 

 

(TR 20.) With regard to Plaintiff’s depression, the ALJ evaluated it under section 12.00C of the 

Listing of Impairments and found that it only mildly affected Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, 

social functioning, and ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. (TR 20-21.) The 

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ALJ also evaluated the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, who opined that Plaintiff’s 

depression resulted in marked limitations and a low GAF score, and accorded them little weight. 

(TR 18-20.) 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s findings with respect to her sleep apnea and depression. 

Plaintiff’s arguments in this respect are inextricably intertwined with her arguments regarding 

the ALJ’s assessment of her treating psychiatrist’s opinions and the ALJ’s credibility finding, 

which will be addressed in turn. 

 a. The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Dosyng Yoon, M.D.’s Opinion 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Yoon’s opinions that Plaintiff 

cannot work due to depression. (Docket no. 13 at 14-16.) It is well settled that the opinions of 

treating physicians are generally accorded substantial deference. In fact, the ALJ must give a 

treating physician’s opinion complete deference if it is supported by clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic evidence and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ determines that a treating source’s 

medical opinion is not controlling, he must determine how much weight to assign that opinion in 

light of several factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of 

examination; (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) supportability of the opinion; 

(4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) specialization of the treating 

source; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). 

 There is no per se rule that requires an articulation of each of the six regulatory factors 

listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

11-CV-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010)). An ALJ’s failure to discuss the requisite 

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factors may constitute harmless error (1) if “a treating source's opinion is so patently deficient 

that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the opinion 

of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or (3) “where the 

Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of 

reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.” Nelson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 

F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

 The Commissioner requires its ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their] notice of 

determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Those good reasons must be “supported by the evidence in 

the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the 

weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that 

weight.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The 

district court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed to identify the 

weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for that weight. See 

Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has made clear that ‘[w]e do not 

hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given 

to a treating physician's opinion and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions 

from ALJ's that do not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating 

physician's opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

 Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff began treating with Dr. Yoon in July 2012 and that 

Plaintiff treated with him about every two months through August 2013. (TR 18.) The ALJ then 

addressed Dr. Yoon’s treatment notes, diagnosis, and the GAF score he assigned to Plaintiff. He 

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began with a discussion of Dr. Yoon’s initial July 2012 psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff. (TR 

18 (citing TR 249-52).) In doing so, the ALJ recited Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the 

results of Dr. Yoon’s ensuing mental status exam, in which Dr. Yoon found that Plaintiff 

presented with average grooming/hygiene, cooperative attitude/behavior, anxious and depressed 

mood, auditory hallucinations, adequate impulse control, and adequate judgment. (TR 18 (citing 

TR 249-51).) Additionally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Yoon also found Plaintiff’s affect, 

psychomotor activity, speech, thought process, and attention/concentration to be within normal 

limits. (TR 18 (citing TR 250-51).) The ALJ further noted that Dr. Yoon diagnosed Plaintiff 

with major depressive disorder, single, severe with psychosis and assigned her a GAF score of 

45.1

 (TR 18 (citing TR 252).) The ALJ then discussed the results of Plaintiff’s subsequent 

mental status exams performed by Dr. Yoon in August and October 2012 and noted that they 

were substantially similar to the one in July – essentially normal with the exceptions of 

depressed mood and auditory hallucinations; the ALJ also pointed out that the results of 

Plaintiff’s December 2012 mental status exam were completely normal. (TR 18-19 (citing TR 

255-56, 329-30, 340).) The ALJ further pointed out that Dr. Yoon continued to assess Plaintiff’s 

GAF score at 45 through January 2013. (TR 19 (citing 322).) 

 The ALJ then acknowledged that Plaintiff may suffer from depression as a non-severe 

impairment, but he found that the low GAF score assessed by Dr. Yoon was inconsistent with his 

treatment notes, and he assigned Dr. Yoon’s opinion little weight. (TR 18, 19.) Specifically, the 

ALJ reasoned that while Plaintiff reported hallucinations and presented to Dr. Yoon with 

depressed mood, Dr. Yoon’s assessment of Plaintiff’s GAF score did not account for Plaintiff’s 

 

1

 A GAF score is a subjective determination based on a scale of 1-100 of “the clinician’s judgment of the 

individual’s overall level of functioning.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders, 32-34 (Text Revision 4th ed. 2000) (“DSM-IV”). A GAF rating of 41 to 50 signals the existence 

of serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. Id. 

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higher degree of functioning with regard to her judgment, impulse control, 

attention/concentration, grooming/hygiene, thought process, attitude/behavior, speech, 

psychomotor activity, affect, and orientation, as supported by the results of her mental status 

exams. (TR 18, 19.) The ALJ also asserted that Plaintiff’s December 2012 “wholly 

unremarkable mental status exam” could not support a GAF score of 45. (TR 19.) The ALJ 

further reasoned that other than the mental status exams, Dr. Yoon’s treatment notes were 

nonspecific and lacked the detail necessary to support his opinion regarding the severity of 

Plaintiff’s mental functioning. (TR 19.) Lastly, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Yoon’s assessment of 

Plaintiff’s GAF score was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reported daily activities and abilities to 

live alone, work part-time, attend church, shop, do chores, and prepare meals. (TR 19.) 

 Next, the ALJ considered and discussed the Medical Questionnaire form and the Medical 

Assessment of Ability to do Work Related Activities (Mental) form, both completed by Dr. 

Yoon on October 23, 2012: 

In addition, Dr. Yoon prepared two statements on October 23, 2012 indicating 

that Claimant had major depressive disorder with very low mood, helplessness, 

insomnia, and hallucination (Id. at 2). It was noted that she was fatigued and 

lacked concentration due to racing thoughts (Id.) It was also noted that she had 

side effects from her medication such as insomnia, shakiness, nausea, and 

agitation (Id. at 3). Dr. Yoon found that her age and unemployment status in a 

city with very high unemployment exacerbated her major depressive disorder 

(Id.). Those opinions are given little weight as they are not consistent with the 

mental exams and reports of Claimant noted above that do not indicate any side 

effects of medication, shakiness, nausea, or agitation, nor any frequent, repeated, 

or lasting indication of any lapse in concentration. Moreover, his other 

statements, such as those regarding hallucination and insomnia, are based on 

Claimant’s subjective statements and are not supported upon exam. Racing 

thoughts and shakiness are also not indicated by her exams, as they instead 

indicate normal thought process and normal psychomotor activity. For these 

same reasons, Dr. Yoon’s other statement of opinions, which indicates a GAF of 

45 and has several marked limitations in understanding and memory and social 

interaction are given little weight (Exhibit 9F). Notably, in that statement Dr. 

Yoon notes that Claimant does not do much, does not like being around others, is 

tired during the day with little energy, and stays at home[, which] is inconsistent 

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with his other statement that she has a friend that she talks to, and other 

statements noted above as admitted by Claimant or listed in her treating notes that 

indicate she does go out to shop, church, therapy, work, and is able to do some 

chores, handle personal care, cook, handle money, and do other activities that are 

not consistent with these opinions and so low of a GAF score. 

(TR 19-20 (citing 268-73).) 

 In her brief, Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Yoon’s opinions 

as inconsistent with his exams and reports are erroneous; (2) the ALJ failed to articulate good 

reasons for rejecting the GAF score assessed by Dr. Yoon; (3) the ALJ misinterpreted the GAF 

score because he did not consider it in conjunction with the other evidence of record; (4) the ALJ 

cherry-picked the treatment notes; and (5) the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Yoon’s opinion be 

disregarded is ambiguous because the ALJ does not identify the record evidence that is 

inconsistent with Dr. Yoon’s opinion. (Docket no. 13 at 14-16.) In her response brief, Plaintiff 

asserts that (1) the ALJ completely rejected the ALJ’s opinion; (2) the ALJ failed to find obvious 

inconsistencies between Dr. Yoon’s opinion and the medical record; and (3) the ALJ failed to 

specify what lesser weight should be given to Dr. Yoon’s opinion after consideration of the 

regulatory factors. (Docket no. 17 at 3-4.) Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ was not entitled 

to consider and rely upon the results of Plaintiff’s mental status exams because Dr. Yoon 

recorded the results through the use of check boxes. (Id. at 4.) Interestingly, though, Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ should have credited and relied upon Dr. Yoon’s October 23, 2012 opinion, 

in which Dr. Yoon uses check boxes to assess Plaintiff with marked limitations in several 

functional categories. (See TR 272-73.) 

Plaintiff’s arguments are conclusory and undeveloped. Plaintiff does not explain why the 

ALJ’s reasons are erroneous or describe what treatment notes the ALJ failed to consider. 

Moreover, many of Plaintiff’s arguments are incorrect and are directly invalidated by the ALJ’s 

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decision, discussed above. For instance, the ALJ did not completely reject Dr. Yoon’s opinions 

or fail to specify the weight he assigned to them. The ALJ explicitly assigned little weight to Dr. 

Yoon’s opinions, and in doing so, he considered the length of Plaintiff’s treatment relationship 

with Dr. Yoon, the frequency of examination, the consistency of Dr. Yoon’s opinions with the 

record, and the supportability of his opinions. Moreover, the ALJ supported his lengthy, wellreasoned assessment of Dr. Yoon’s opinions by citing numerous specific examples of their 

inconsistency with Dr. Yoon’s own treatment notes and Plaintiff’s reported symptoms and daily 

activities. The ALJ did provide good reasons for discounting Dr. Yoon’s opinion; his assessment 

of Dr. Yoon’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence and should not be disturbed. 

 b. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to explain why he found Plaintiff to be 

not entirely credible. (Docket no. 13 at 16-17.) “[A]n ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of 

the applicant are to be accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged 

with the duty of observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Comm’r, 127 F.3d 

525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But credibility assessments are not insulated from judicial review. 

Despite the deference that is due, such a determination must nevertheless be supported by 

substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s credibility determination must contain “specific reasons . . . 

supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to 

the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the 

individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” SSR 96–7p. “It is not sufficient to make 

a conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the 

allegations are (or are not) credible.’” Id. “[T]he adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of 

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an individual’s allegations to be credible” and may also find the statements credible to a certain 

degree. Id.

 Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated 

by the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will 

not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or 

about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available 

objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 

416.929(c)(2). The ALJ will consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, 

duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, (3) precipitating and 

aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken 

to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) treatment, other than medication, for symptom relief, (6) 

any measures used to relieve the symptoms, and (7) functional limitations and restrictions due to 

the pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); see also Felisky v. 

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and written statements and found 

them to be not entirely credible. (TR 16.) In support of this determination, the ALJ reasoned 

that Plaintiff’s part-time work as a bus monitor was inconsistent with her reports of being 

isolative and having auditory hallucinations. (TR 16.) The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s 

testimony that her right hand locks up, but he noted that Plaintiff had not undergone any related 

testing. (TR 16.) Similarly, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s September 2010 complaints of 

vision issues, but he noted that the results of the ensuing vision exam were negative for any 

vision defects or eye disease. (TR 16.) 

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The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s complaints with regard to her sleep apnea and 

explicitly found them to be incredible. The ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s statements about 

sleeping only one hour per night were inconsistent with the results of her sleep studies and her 

reports to Dr. Ali K. Najar, M.D., a physician at the St. Joseph Mercy Sleep Disorders Center. 

(TR 18 (citing TR 217-39).) The ALJ also reasoned that Plaintiff’s “Epworth Sleepiness Scale 

was 4 out of 24, which did not imply daytime sleepiness, and is damaging to [Plaintiff’s] 

credibility, particularly in light of treating records from July, 2013, . . . which indicate that she 

denied fatigue.” (TR 17 (citing TR 233 and 346).) Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s 

reports of great fatigue and very little sleep, but noted that that her reports range from one hour 

of sleep per night to over six hours of sleep during her sleep studies. (TR 20.) The ALJ further 

reasoned that Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities were inconsistent with someone who was 

exhausted and napping most of the day. (TR 20.) 

The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s daily activities as follows: 

Specifically, while Claimant has reported being fatigued with poor sleep and 

napping during the day, she lives alone (See Exhibit 11F, p. 7) and is able to do 

some chores, work part-time, and go out three times per week, including going to 

church and to therapy. She also alleges poor concentration, although the vast 

majority of her exams reveal intact concentration/attention, and she also reports 

that she can handle money, prepare meals, shop, and watch television and sit 

through church services. She alleges that she does not like to wash her hair or 

bathe, but her treating notes indicate good grooming and hygiene. She reported 

being isolative, but goes to therapy, work, church, and the store, going out about 

three times per week. The foregoing all support a nonsevere mental impairment. 

 

(TR 19.) Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s statements regarding her sleep quality, 

crying, napping, and other symptoms were inconsistent throughout the record. (TR 19.) Finally, 

the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Yoon’s treatment notes, which reflected essentially normal mental 

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status examinations on most occasions, were not fully supportive of Plaintiff’s allegations. (TR 

19.) 

 In her response to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ cherry-picked the 

evidence that he relied upon in his credibility determination, particularly with regard to 

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. Plaintiff then cites her function report, in which she stated 

that she was too afraid to go out alone, that she couldn’t sweep due to pain in her right arm, and 

that she didn’t drive because she was on too much medicine. (Docket no. 17 at 2 (citing TR 

185).) But the ALJ did explicitly consider those particular statements in his decision, when he 

discussed Plaintiff’s function report. (TR 16.) Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ omitted from 

his analysis, and thus mischaracterized, a portion of Plaintiff’s statement regarding how often she 

goes outside. (Docket no. 17 at 2.) The full statement reads, “3 days out of the week depends on 

how I feel.” (TR 185.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff went out “about three times per week.” (TR 

19.) The difference between these two statements is a matter of semantics, which the Court 

declines to address. 

The immediate discussion demonstrates that the ALJ set forth numerous legitimate 

reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and written statements in his decision, 

many of which apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3). 

Moreover, the ALJ supported his finding that the severity of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 

was not supported by the objective medical evidence by explicitly discussing and citing to 

several examples of inconsistency between Plaintiff’s complaints and the medical record. Thus, 

the ALJ’s decision is sufficiently specific to make clear to Plaintiff and to the Court the weight 

that he gave to Plaintiff’s statements and the reasons for that weight. The ALJ’s assessment of 

Plaintiff’s credibility is supported by substantial evidence. 

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As discussed supra, the ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Yoon’s opinions 

regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s depression is supported by substantial evidence. 

Furthermore, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including her statements 

regarding the severity of her sleep apnea, were not entirely credible is also supported by 

substantial evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Plaintiff failed to 

demonstrate that her depression, sleep apnea, or other physical impairments interfered with her 

ability to perform basic work activities. The ALJ’s Step-Two determination that Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable impairments were not severe is supported by substantial evidence, and 

Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied. 

 2. Plaintiff’s Other Arguments

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by not considering the effect of Plaintiff’s 

impairments when he developed Plaintiff’s RFC and the hypothetical questions to the VE, and 

by failing to establish that there is other work in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. 

(Docket no. 13 at 17-19.) The alleged errors committed by the ALJ, however, relate to the 

requirements of the sequential evaluation process beyond Step Two. Here, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff not disabled at Step Two, and where an ALJ finds that a plaintiff is not disabled at a step 

of the evaluation process, he need not proceed beyond that step. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s RFC and Step-Five arguments fail. 

VI. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court should DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 13) and GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 

16). 

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REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided 

for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with 

specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

 Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the 

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length 

unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address 

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections. 

Dated: February 17, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

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PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon counsel 

of record on this date. 

 

Dated: February 17, 2016 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager

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