UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ABDULLAH LAND, 

 Petitioner, CASE NO. 14-CV-11683 

v. 

 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

LLOYD RAPELJE, 

 

 Respondent. 

___________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND 

GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 

 Abdullah Land (“Petitioner”), presently confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in 

Freeland, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

In his pro se application, Petitioner challenges his conviction and sentence for first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b. For the reasons stated below, the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus is summarily denied. 

 Petitioner was convicted of the above-referenced offense following a jury trial in the 

Wayne County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the 

Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a 

State court shall be presumed to be correct.”); see also Wagner v. Smith, 581 F. 3d 410, 413 (6th 

Cir. 2009) (referring, verbatim, to the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of 

Appeals and presuming the facts to be correct). According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, 

[d]efendant was convicted by a jury of one count of first-degree criminal 

sexual conduct (CSC–I), MCL 750.520b, for an act of cunnilingus 

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involving the daughter of his girlfriend. The victim was eleven years old at 

the time. Defendant, the victim, defendant’s girlfriend, and two of 

defendant’s girlfriend’s sons all lived in the same house. The victim also 

asserted that defendant had touched her inappropriately on several 

occasions, but defendant was only charged for the act of cunnilingus. The 

trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory minimum of 25 years’ 

imprisonment to a maximum of 38 years’ imprisonment, with credit for 48 

days served. Defendant appeals his conviction and his sentence. We 

affirm. 

People v. Land, No. 306597, 2013 WL 163618, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013). 

 Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Land, 832 N.W.2d 240 (Mich. 

2013). 

 Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds: 

I. The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for 

acquittal/new trial. The verdict was against the great weight of the 

evidence. 

II. The statutorily required 25 year punishment violates both Article 1, 

Section 16 of the Michigan Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution. 

Pet. at 2 (Dkt. 1). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), imposes the 

following standard of review for habeas cases: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect 

to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 

unless the adjudication of the claim– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

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 A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). With respect to the 

“unreasonable application” standard, a federal habeas court “should ask whether the state 

court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-411.

The Supreme Court has explained that a “federal court’s collateral review of a state-court 

decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The “AEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential standard 

for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of 

the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “[A] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

 Additionally, federal courts are empowered to dismiss any habeas petition that appears 

legally insufficient on its face. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A federal district 

court is authorized to summarily dismiss a habeas corpus petition, if it plainly appears from the 

face of the petition or the exhibits that are attached to it that the petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief. Carson v. Burke, 178 F. 3d 434, 436-437 (6th Cir. 1999); Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

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 After screening the petition, the Court concludes that, for the reasons stated below, 

Petitioner’s claims do not entitle him to habeas relief and his petition must be summarily 

denied. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. Petitioner’s claim regarding the great weight of the evidence 

Petitioner first alleges that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and 

the trial court erred in declining to grant a new trial on that basis. Although acknowledging that 

the victim’s testimony was sufficient to establish the elements of the crime of first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct, Petitioner nonetheless argues that the verdict went against the great 

weight of the evidence because the victim’s testimony was incredible in light of the other 

evidence presented in this case, as well as the fact that there was evidence which suggested that 

the victim had a motive to falsely accuse Petitioner of sexually assaulting her. Pet. at 6, Pet. Br. 

at 15-21 (Dkt. 1-1).1

 A federal habeas court has no power to grant habeas relief on the ground that a state 

conviction is against the great weight of the evidence. Cukaj v. Warren, 305 F. Supp. 2d 789, 

796 (E.D. Mich. 2004); see also McKinnon v. Superintendent, 422 F. App’x 69, 75 (2d Cir. 

2011) (holding that an “argument that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence states a 

claim under state law, which is not cognizable on habeas corpus”); Artis v. Collins, 14 F. App’x 

387, 387-388 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to grant certificate of appealability to habeas petitioner 

on claim that jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence). A claim that a 

verdict went against the great weight of the evidence does not have a constitutional dimension 

— for habeas corpus purposes — unless the record is so devoid of evidentiary support that a 

due process issue is raised. Cukaj, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 796. The test for habeas relief is not 

 

1

 In his habeas petition, Petitioner incorporates by reference the arguments raised in his brief to 

the Michigan Court of Appeals. Pet. at 6.

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whether the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, but whether there was any 

evidence to support it. Dell v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 648 (E.D. Mich. 2002). As long as 

there is sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of this crime, the fact that the verdict may have 

gone against the great weight of the evidence would not entitle him to habeas relief. Id. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s contention concerning the weight of the evidence fails to state a 

cognizable federal claim. Walker v. Curtin, No. 1:10–cv–1267; 2011 WL 285152, at *3 (W.D. 

Mich. Jan. 5, 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never recognized a prisoner’s constitutional 

right to a new trial because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.”).2

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his first claim. 

B. Petitioner’s claim regarding his sentence 

Petitioner next argues that the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years is grossly 

disproportionate to the severity of his crime and violates both the Michigan and Federal 

constitutions’ prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Pet. at 7; Pet. Br. at 22-31. 

 This Court initially notes that Petitioner’s sentence was within the statutory limits under 

Michigan law for the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 

750.520b(2)(b). State courts are the final arbiters of state law. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 

74, 76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court's interpretation of state law, including 

one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in 

habeas corpus.”). Therefore, claims which arise out of a state trial court’s sentencing decision 

are not normally cognizable on federal habeas review, unless the habeas petitioner can show 

that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory limits or is wholly unauthorized by law. Vliet 

 

2

 Moreover, attacks on witness credibility are simply challenges to the quality of the 

prosecution’s evidence, and not to the sufficiency of the evidence. Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F. 3d 

594, 618 (6th Cir. 2002). An assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the 

scope of federal habeas review of sufficiency of evidence claims. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

330 (1995); see also Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F. 3d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that arguments 

resting on an allegation involving witness credibility are the province of the jury and not a 

federal habeas court).

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v. Renico, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1014 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Thus, a sentence imposed within the 

statutory limits is not generally subject to habeas review. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 

741 (1948); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 

 Petitioner fails to state a claim for federal habeas relief. The United States Constitution 

does not require that sentences be proportionate. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 

(1991), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment 

does not contain a requirement of strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence. 

The Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the 

crime. Id. at 1001. And a sentence within the statutory maximum set by statute does not 

normally constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Austin v. Jackson, 213 F. 3d 298, 302 (6th 

Cir. 2000). Moreover, federal courts generally do not engage in a proportionality analysis, 

except where the sentence imposed is death or life imprisonment without parole. United States 

v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995). Therefore, successful challenges to the 

proportionality of a particular sentence in non-capital cases are “exceedingly rare.” Rummel v. 

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). 

 Petitioner’s minimum sentence of twenty five years for first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct was not disproportionate to the offense or to the offender. See, e.g., Stadler v. Curtin, 

682 F. Supp. 2d 807, 829-830 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“The Michigan courts’ determination that a 

sentence of twenty-five to forty years for first degree criminal sexual conduct was not 

disproportionate is not an unreasonable application of this Supreme Court precedent.”). The 

fact that Michigan’s criminal sexual conduct statutes calls for a mandatory minimum sentence 

of 25 years and no longer gives any discretion to the sentencing judge does not alter the Court’s 

analysis of Petitioner’s claim. Indeed, “Harmelin squarely establishes that the mandatory nature 

of a non-capital penalty is irrelevant for proportionality purposes.” United States v. Farley, 607 

F.3d 1294, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010). As Harmelin upheld a mandatory nonparolable life sentence 

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for the offense of possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, it “precludes the conclusion that 

[Petitioner’s] much shorter mandatory minimum sentence” was “cruel and unusual.” United 

States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his second claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Before Petitioner may appeal this Court’s dispositive decision, a certificate of 

appealability must issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of 

appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court rejects a habeas claim on the 

merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In 

applying that standard, a district court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its 

examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the petitioner’s claims. Id. at 

336-337. 

 Having considered the matter, the Court concludes that petitioner has failed to make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability is not warranted in this case. 

 Although this Court will deny a certificate of appealability to petitioner, the standard for 

granting an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is a lower standard than 

the standard for certificates of appealability. Foster v. Ludwick, 208 F. Supp. 2d 750, 764 (E.D. 

Mich. 2002) (citing United States v. Youngblood, 116 F. 3d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

Whereas a certificate of appealability may only be granted if a petitioner makes a substantial 

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showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a court may grant IFP status if it finds that an 

appeal is being taken in good faith. Id. at 764-765; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. 24(a). 

“Good faith” requires a showing that the issues raised are not frivolous; it does not require a 

showing of probable success on the merits. Foster, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 765. Although jurists of 

reason would not debate this Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim, the issue is not frivolous; 

therefore, an appeal could be taken in good faith and Petitioner may proceed IFP on appeal. 

 Accordingly, the Court (i) summarily denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus, (ii) 

denies issuing a certificate of appealability, and (iii) grants Petitioner leave to appeal IFP. 

 SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 19, 2014 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Flint, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First 

Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 11, 2014. 

 s/Deborah J. Goltz 

 DEBORAH J. GOLTZ 

 Case Manager 

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