DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama, Chairman 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Dicks, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

BEN NICHOLSON, JEFF ASHFORD, KRIS MALLARD, 

KATHY KRANINGER, and MILES TAYLOR, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 3 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement ........................... 1 

Transportation Security Administration .......................... 195 

Southwest Border Enforcement .......................................... 439 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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TSA 

ICE 

SW Border 


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012 


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama, Chairman 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Dicks, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

BEN NICHOLSON, JEFF ASHFORD, KRIS MALLARD, 

KATHY KRANINGER, and MILES TAYLOR, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 3 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement ........................... 1 

Transportation Security Administration .......................... 195 

Southwest Border Enforcement .......................................... 439 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

67–979 WASHINGTON : 2011 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 1

JERRY LEWIS, California 1

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNY REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

TOM GRAVES, Georgia 

KEVIN YODER, Kansas 

STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas 

ALAN NUNNELEE, Mississippi 

————— 

1 Chairman Emeritus 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

WILLIAM B. INGLEE, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012 

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 2011. 

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

WITNESS 

JOHN MORTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

OPENING STATEMENT: CHAIRMAN ADERHOLT

Mr. ADERHOLT. Good morning. The hearing is called to order. 

This morning we would like to welcome John Morton, who is the 

Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, better 

known as ICE, as we consider the President’s FY12 budget request. 

This is the Nation’s second largest Federal investigative agency. 

Director Morton, we thank you for being here this morning; and we 

look forward to hearing your testimony before the Subcommittee. 

Let me take just a moment to express this Subcommittee’s condolences for the loss of Special Agent Zapata. Our thoughts and our 

prayers go out to his family and friends, his colleagues, and all 

those who knew him. His death is a stark reminder of the risks law 

enforcement officers face in the line of duty each and every day. I 

want to thank the men and women of ICE for their service, in recognition that it comes with great personal sacrifice. 

Turning to today’s hearing, we want answers to three main questions: 

Number one, how does the FY12 request stabilize ICE’s budget 

in terms of eliminating waste and improving efficiencies; two, how 

does the budget match resources to operational needs; and, three, 

how does ICE demonstrate real results in terms of the best possible 

security at the lowest possible cost? 

ICE has come a long way in its relatively short history. Eight 

years ago, field offices were rationing vehicle use due to shortfalls 

in equipment and other accounts. ICE’s mission expanded and contracted multiple times, as the Office of Air & Marine, the Federal 

Air Marshal Service, and the Federal Protective Service were 

transferred in and then out of ICE. As a new agency, ICE has had 

to distinguish itself among other law enforcement agencies to carve 

out its mission space. 

To see the progress ICE has made, one only has to look at the 

news over the past few weeks. On March 1st, ICE led 173 Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement partners in 168 U.S. cities in 

Project Southern Tempest, resulting in 678 gang-related arrests. 

447 were charged with criminal offenses, 231 were administrative 


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arrests, 322 had violent criminal histories, and 421 were foreign 

nationals. 

On February 24, an ICE-led investigation in Virginia resulted in 

indictments against 22 individuals involved in one of the largest 

document fraud rings in United States history. In 2 years, the 

criminal organization sold 15,000 fraudulent drivers’ licenses, social security cards, and other IDs, the proceeds of which were wired 

to Mexican drug cartels, and that was more than $1 million. 

Also on February 24th, a joint ICE–FBI investigation led to the 

arrest of a 20-year-old Saudi student in Texas who was amassing 

chemicals for a WMD attack. 

These cases demonstrate the breadth of ICE’s authority and why 

the agency must use all available tools, including administrative 

arrests on immigration violations, to disrupt illegal and dangerous 

activity. 

Congress has consistently provided robust resources to meet 

ICE’s mission needs and support its personnel. Today we are challenged not only to meet our national security needs, but to do so 

in a way that is responsible and disciplined with respect to our Nation’s mounting debt. 

Director Morton, in a time of fiscal crisis, the American people 

are demanding responsible budgets that demonstrate accountability for every dollar that is spent, and that means this Subcommittee will do its part to prevent waste or misuse of funds. In 

light of these priorities—national security and fiscal responsibility—the House passed H.R. 1. It provides an increase to ICE operations above the current levels of $57.8 million. H.R. 1 fully 

funds ICE agents and the minimum 33,400 detention beds that 

Congress expects ICE to maintain this fiscal year. This Subcommittee has always put a priority on operations and the needs 

of frontline personnel, and H.R. 1 continues to uphold that commitment. 

Turning to the FY12 request, I am pleased that your budget 

pledges to fully fund agents and the authorized minimum detention 

beds. However, as ICE continues to mature, we need to see that resources are responsibly applied to meet operational needs and deliver real results for security. 

The FY12 priorities raise longer-term issues about bed space utilization. The focus on criminal alien removal means longer average 

stays, and expansion of Secure Communities will put pressure on 

detention space. We need to understand the right resource level 

within this fiscally constrained environment to adequately support 

custody operations. 

The FY12 request also includes reductions that cause some concerns. I will be asking about the nearly $100 million in undefined 

professional services and administrative savings across operational 

accounts, as well as the $114.6 million cut from information technology that reduces modernization efforts by 85 percent. These socalled savings and reductions will likely reverse some of the 

progress ICE has made as an organization as well as impact operations. 

Director Morton, the American public demands straightforward 

answers on Immigration and Custom Enforcement efforts. Truth in 

budgeting, discipline, and transparency with respect to operational 


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needs are essential in this fiscal climate, and this Subcommittee 

will demand no less. 

I do appreciate you appearing before the Subcommittee. I appreciate your candor in helping understand ICE’s budget request for 

FY12. 

At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Price, who is the distinguished Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, for his opening 

remarks. Mr. Price. 

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OPENING REMARKS: RANKING MEMBER PRICE

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today, I am happy to join you in welcoming back Assistant Secretary John Morton from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, to discuss his agency’s $5.51 billion budget request for fiscal 2012. This is basically a ‘‘current services’’ budget, 

with a 1.4 percent increase from 2010, generally permitting the 

agency to operate at the same level from 2010 through 2012. But, 

Mr. Assistant Secretary, as with the rest of DHS, you have been 

asked to tighten your belt with regard to a number of your agency’s 

programs. 

Since you have taken the leadership at ICE, I have enjoyed our 

good working relationship. I am pleased that we share the goal of 

focusing ICE’s investigative and removal resources on the individuals who pose the greatest danger to our communities—gang members, drug traffickers, weapons smugglers, and other serious criminals. 

It was 4 years ago when this Subcommittee first brought attention to the large population of criminally convicted aliens who were 

being ignored by the previous administration in favor of low-level 

offenders. We enacted statutory language in ICE appropriations requiring ICE to devote a large portion of its enforcement budget to 

criminals. The results have been significant. ICE removals of criminal aliens rose by 12 percent in 2008, by 24 percent in 2009, and 

by 37 percent in 2010. 

Part of ICE’s response to our directive was to establish the Secure Communities program. I have been impressed with the results 

of the rapid build-out of Secure Communities and support your request to increase the program’s funding in 2012. The shift in removals from mostly non-criminals before your time to mostly criminals now has, in large part, been a result of this effort. Nonetheless, your implementation of the program can always improve, including the sharpness of your focus on the criminal population and 

your interaction with local authorities. I look forward to exploring 

that with you today. 

For years we have also pushed ICE to expand its Alternatives to 

Detention program, which allows ICE to keep track of low-risk individuals in the immigration court removal process. It is more humane, it is more cost-effective than penal detention for individuals 

who pose no danger to society. So I am pleased to see an increase 

in alternative to detention, however modest, which would allow 

thousands more individuals to be enrolled in this program. And 

while this does not have 2012 monetary implications, I am pleased 

that ICE has implemented the detainee locater system, making it 

easier for people to locate someone detained or released from ICE 

custody. 

While these are areas I applaud, I have a number of concerns. 

First, despite some recent remarkable seizures of both bulk cash, 

narcotics, and weapons that ICE should be proud of, the power of 

the Mexican cartels is not significantly degraded. I am concerned 

that the budget does not request any new funds to dismantle drug 

trafficking and human smuggling operations along the Southwest 

border. I will reserve further comments and questions on this issue 


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until the hearing we have next week specifically devoted to Southwest border enforcement. 

The budget also greatly reduces ICE automation programs by 85 

percent and eliminates funding for many critical activities such as 

the electronic health records and financial systems modernization. 

The 2012 budget eliminates all funding for construction activities 

and rescinds previously appropriated construction funds, leaving 

only a small amount of funds for emergency maintenance needs. If 

this means that we are deferring construction now only to accrue 

greater costs down the road, this course would be penny wise and 

pound foolish. 

Finally, the budget has no funding to expand the visa security 

units overseas, even though ICE is only operating in 40 percent of 

the countries we have defined as high risk. As we learned from the 

Christmas Day bombing attempt 15 months ago, it is better to 

deny a visa overseas based on derogatory information than to have 

to stop an attack while it is occurring. So, Mr. Secretary, we will 

need to discuss this further, both to understand the pace at which 

ICE is expanding this program and what is delaying the establishment of the visa security units in more countries. 

Mr. Morton, we value the work ICE does day in and day out. 

Many of your personnel operate in very dangerous areas, as seen 

most recently when ICE Agent Zapata lost his life and another 

agent was seriously wounded at the hands of the drug cartels in 

Mexico. It is a tough job. I am glad we have a tough prosecutor like 

yourself at the agency’s helm. 

We look forward to continuing to work with you to help you fulfill its mission, beginning with this review of your proposed budget. 

Thank you. 

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Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Price. 

Again, Director Morton, we welcome you today. We turn it over 

now for your testimony for the FY 12 budget request. 

OPENING REMARKS: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MORTON

Mr. MORTON. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Aderholt, 

Ranking Member Price, members of the committee. 

I obviously appear before you today to talk about the President’s 

proposed budget for fiscal year 2012. 

Let me start by recognizing and thanking you for the kind words 

about our special agents. As everyone here knows, two of them 

were stopped on a highway in San Luis Potosi in Mexico while 

driving between Monterey and Mexico City. Two cars of armed men 

forced them off the road and fired into their vehicle, killing Jaime 

Zapata and wounding Victor Avila. Our thoughts and prayers remain with Mr. Zapata’s family and with Victor, who I am happy 

to report is making a remarkably speedy recovery, notwithstanding 

having been shot twice. 

While the investigation is ongoing, I note that Mexican law enforcement officials have arrested several individuals that they feel 

were involved in the shooting. This is welcome news; and I can tell 

you we will continue to work very, very closely with the Mexicans 

to see that justice in this particular case is swift and firm. 

Let me also note my condolences for the families who lost loved 

ones in Japan as a result of the earthquake and tsunami. We have 

searched the records both in Japan and in Hawaii; and all of our 

people are safe and accounted for, thankfully. 

Turning to the budget, let me note first how much I appreciate 

the bipartisan and consistent support we have had from the Subcommittee. Our enforcement efforts have steadily grown over the 

past few years, notwithstanding the fact that we are a relatively 

young agency, and this simply would not have been possible without the important appropriations we have received from the Congress. 

As the Chairman noted, we have become the second-largest 

criminal investigative agency in the entire Federal Government. 

We are the principal investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, and I look forward to working with the Committee 

to solidify these gains, and I commit myself and my staff to a relationship marked by professionalism and candor. The President has proposed an appropriated budget of $5.5 billion, which is roughly an increase of slightly over 1.3 percent, or 

$155 million, over our enacted 2010 budget. 

The emphasis of the budget is very simple. First, we seek to 

maintain full enforcement operations; second, we seek to fully fund 

our detention program at the levels previously directed by Congress; and, third, we seek to continue the expansion of Secure Communities so that we reach over 3,000 jurisdictions by the end of the 

fiscal year, which will roughly be 96 percent of all the eligible jurisdictions in the United States. 

The main enhancements are $157 million for increased detention 

funding and $64 million for the expansion to Secure Communities. 

We are also seeking modest enhancements for data center consolidation and 2,500 more Alternatives to Detention positions. 


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Recognizing the top-line fiscal constraints, our budget does recommend delaying facility consolidation plans, it does significantly 

reduce the scope of many of our automation initiatives, it eliminates construction projects and expenses to address only emergency 

health and safety requirements, and it identifies additional efficiencies of $100 million in management and administration costs. 

I know these are of concern to the Committee, and I look forward 

to discussing them with you. They are just hard but necessary 

causes. We seek to maintain enforcement operations and results 

while observing some fiscal restraint. 

So what are our enforcement priorities going to be for the coming 

fiscal year? The same as now: aggressive investigation of national 

security threats and cross-border crime, and smart, effective immigration enforcement. 

Let me just deal with each very quickly, starting with criminal 

investigations. 

We have become a very, very large investigative agency. We have 

7,000 special agents posted in every single State of the Union and 

47 foreign countries, including Mexico, where we will be increasing 

our staff to 40, making it by far the largest overseas office we have 

in the world. 

Through our agents, we investigate a wide variety of crimes. I 

think most people and the public have no idea how broad ICE’s 

reach is, everything from the illegal smuggling of drugs and guns, 

money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, human smuggling and 

trafficking, child pornography, child sex tours and child labor, illegal exports of sensitive weaponry and technology, counterfeiting 

and piracy, and, of course, immigration visa and document frauds. 

We are going to stay focused on those things. 

With regard to immigration enforcement, we have over 6,000 officers and 900 attorneys dedicated to the removal process. You will 

see a continued use of these resources to maintain our key priorities and keep focus on strong overall enforcement. 

To that end, I would note that we have removed more people in 

the last 2 years than in any similar period in our history. We also 

prosecuted more people for illegal reentry. We put more people on 

the border. We audited more companies than we ever have before. 

And I note that just last month we reached an important milestone 

of our 20,000th gang member or associate arrest. We will stay focused on the removal of criminal offenders and national security 

threats. 

Mr. Price is entirely correct. The agency through this Committee 

had its attention sharpened and focused on criminal offenders. It 

was the right thing to do, and we are going to continue to do that 

through the Secure Communities program. 

We are going to continue to focus on the removal of border violators. Our support of CBP and the Border Patrol in particular along 

the border is strong and increasing. And we are going to focus on 

people who game the system. If you come back here after being 

previously deported, you are a fugitive in the face of a final order, 

or you obtain your status by fraud, we are going to focus on you. 

Finally, we will continue our strong emphasis on work, site enforcement, focused on employer compliance. 


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With that, let me thank you again for your support and welcome 

any questions that you may have. I will do the best to answer them 

with transparency and candor; and if I don’t know something or 

need a detail to get back to you, I will tell you so. 

Thank you. 

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Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Director. 

Before we start the questioning, let me say there is a chance that 

we could have votes this morning during the hearing, so we will 

move as quickly as possible through the first round of questions 

and then hope to get through a second one after that. 

COST SAVINGS

While the FY 12 request prioritizes agents and bed space needs, 

we still lack truth in budgeting. We need a responsible request 

from the Administration for operations with clear results and impacts. I know you have concerns about the reductions proposed: the 

approximately $100 million in undefined savings, cuts in information technology of $114 million, and other reductions. Can you tell 

us, the Subcommittee, today how you plan to identify these savings 

and, given the reductions, how you will continue to provide your 

agents and officers with the tools they need to do the job? 

Mr. MORTON. Mr. Chairman, we are going to do it primarily 

through two ways, our professional services contracts and our administrative activities, travel, supplies, conferences, with roughly 

about the same amount of money for each, $45 million for the professional services and $54 million for the administrative activities. 

We are going to go down program by program. We have a number of contracts where private contractors provide us administrative support. If we can do that more cost-effectively with Federal 

employees, either existing or new, we will do that. If there are 

some of these contracts that ultimately in the grand scheme of 

things are not critical, we will eliminate them. 

Then with regard to the administrative activities, we are just 

going to do some good old-fashioned belt tightening on travel, copying, conferences, printing, and the like. We have already done a 

fair amount of that this year. We have drastically reduced the 

number of conferences that we hold. We will look at video teleconferencing instead of in-person meetings. 

I don’t want to suggest that this is easy. It is not. I appreciate 

the fact that these are very difficult budget times. These are hard 

calls. I know the Committee has concerns about them. I am more 

than willing to continue to work through them as the budget process unfolds. And all I can say is we are going to do the very best 

we can to identify the savings so we can maintain an emphasis on 

operations and detention budgeting. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. One thing that the Subcommittee would like to 

see is a detailed list of proposed reductions compared against what 

ICE currently spends on these activities to help us better understand where these savings would come from. 

Mr. MORTON. Again, I think we can actually provide that for you, 

Mr. Chairman. Why don’t I commit to doing so here, actually by 

program, the amount by program within the agency. We will give 

you a full list of what we are looking in each program to save and 

how we plan on saving it. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

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DETENTION BED SPACE: COST

Mr. ADERHOLT. Congress has provided every request that ICE 

has made for detention bed space. It is a significant investment, accounting for nearly $1.4 billion, or a quarter of ICE’s total budget. 

As we discussed last week, ICE will meet the minimum authorized 

level of 33,400 beds in FY 11 if provided additional funds in H.R. 

1. 

Fiscal year 2012 priorities raise longer-term issues about bed 

space utilization. The continued emphasis on criminal alien removal means longer stays, and expansion of Secure Communities 

will also put pressure on detention space. Let me say that we cannot go back to the days of catch and release. The gains that have 

been made in terms of border control and the integrity of the immigration system would be completely lost if we did. 

That brings me to your FY 12 request for bed space. Dollars are 

scarce in Washington these days, budgets are being cut, but I am 

proud to say that this budget request does not cut funds for illegal 

immigrant detention space. As Chairman of this Subcommittee, I 

pledge to you that we will fund every dollar needed to house and 

detain illegal immigrants in order to keep them off the streets. 

However, we can’t do a penny more. It is incumbent on you, Director Morton, to ensure that these dollars are used wisely and that 

we get the most out of each and every dollar. 

I would ask you, what steps are being made to ensure that we 

are indeed getting the best possible security at the best possible 

cost? How are we going to get the most out of every bed space dollar while also meeting mission needs? 

Mr. MORTON. Mr. Chairman, you have identified a very important management issue for us that we spent a lot of time on in the 

last 2 years. The truth of the matter is, we spend a lot of money 

on detaining people. It is an expensive prospect, and we operate an 

extraordinarily large system. 

One of the things we are trying to do in this budget is to fully 

meet what Congress has required us to do in the past and we have 

not met for a full fiscal year to date. Part of the problem was our 

original estimates that we provided to the Committee many years 

ago were not accurate, and that was the agency’s fault. It cost us 

far more money to actually detain people than we were estimating 

at the time. 

So one of the first things that I did when I came into office, that 

we needed to have, to use your phrase, was truth in budgeting, and 

we figured out what does it really cost? So that has meant that we 

have identified a significant gap year after year in trying to meet 

our mandate of 33,400, and for the first time in this budget we tell 

you up front this is what it costs. 

Now, that said, we are always looking to save money, and there 

are a couple of ways we have been doing it and we can do it in the 

future. 

One, in past years, the agency entered into some contracts that, 

let me say, I don’t think were the most sharply negotiated, and we 

have been steadily trying to get out of those contracts as they come 

up for renewal to get something that is a better value for the taxpayer. In many instances, we can find and use detention facilities 


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that are not only an improvement over the facility we are using but 

we can do it at less cost. So that is an important part, and we are 

going to continue to do that as all of our various contracts turn 

over. 

The other thing that we can do is to be as efficient as we can 

in cycling people through the beds. The more we can reduce the 

length of stay in our beds, it is, in effect, an increase in the number 

of beds that we have available to us. So we can increase our bed 

space by either going out and getting more, or we can be more efficient with the bed space that we have. 

We are focused on that, trying to use the full authorities that we 

have under the statute to move people quickly where an administrative process is permissible, working on getting better travel documents. We have had a sustained problem with a number of foreign countries who are what we call recalcitrant countries, they 

don’t take their citizens back in a timely manner, and that means 

that we have to detain people longer. We are working hard with 

the State Department to really start to push some of these countries who have been dragging their feet on giving us travel documents. Because it is a requirement, it is an international obligation 

for people to take their citizens back, and we shouldn’t have to fuss 

around for 2 or 3 months to get a travel document. And that really 

affects the amount of time that we spend in detention. 

Then we have a small but hard core number of people that we 

cannot remove that are so violent and so dangerous that we can’t 

release them, and that is just—we are between a rock and a hard 

place on them. But that is a relatively small number. 

I completely agree with your sentiments. It is a work in progress. 

We are going to stay at it, and wherever we can identify inefficiencies so the taxpayer doesn’t have to spend one more dollar but we 

can increase our enforcement operations, we will do it. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Mr. Price. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

CRIMINAL ALIENS

Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the question of identifying and removing criminal aliens. We have recalled how, over the 

past 4 years, this Subcommittee has pressed for as an emphasis for 

ICE the identification and removal of criminal aliens, and part of 

the response has been, the Secure Communities program, which we 

fully supported. Since 2008, resources have consistently grown for 

ICE to make progress in finding aliens in penal custody and removing them at the completion of their criminal sentence. I am pleased 

you are requesting these funds for growth, an additional $64 million. The program got off to something of a slow start, but you appear to be on track now for nationwide deployment by 2013. So 

there is much to tout, but I do have some concerns, and I would 

like to focus on these briefly today. 

I am sure you are well aware of the recent case of the suspected 

gang member who had been previously deported and was recently 

arrested then in Loudoun County, Virginia. But he wasn’t flagged 

through the Secure Communities program. He was allowed back 

into the community, only to commit a heinous crime in neighboring 


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Fairfax County. Secure Communities should have flagged him as 

someone who had been deported, and he should have remained 

jailed. However, fingerprints of many of the deportees that were obtained before 2005 were not taken electronically, as I understand, 

and therefore are not in the database. What is it going to take to 

fix this deficiency? 

Mr. MORTON. You are exactly right in that particular case. And 

the challenge for us is that the recent fingerprints are all digital, 

but going back we have fingerprints, but they are not digitized. So 

what we have to do is steadily and aggressively go back and 

digitize all of the older print cards that have the fingerprints and 

get those into Secure Communities. Otherwise, you risk missing 

the identification. 

The other thing we have to do is work with our State and local 

partners to make sure they understand and we support clearly 

those instances in which there is what is called a no-match, so that 

even where the fingerprints aren’t a perfect match, if there is evidence of foreign birth or an unclear status, that they call us and 

we do a manual search to figure out what is going on. That didn’t 

happen in this case and, as a result, the person fell through the 

cracks and, as you noted, went out and committed a serious crime. 

That case also highlights why it is important that Secure Communities identify all offenders. We need to have an emphasis on 

identifying and removing the serious offenders. But many people, 

as in this instance, come into the criminal justice system for a 

lower level offense and ultimately commit a more serious offense. 

We need to make sure that we are identifying all of the offenders 

and then using our resources appropriately in, as the committee 

has required, a thoughtful, ranked way. 

Mr. PRICE. What can you tell us about the pace of this 

digitization program and is that affected by the low-balling of your 

automation budget? 

Mr. MORTON. I don’t know the answer to that, so let me find out 

the answer and get back to the Committee with how many of the 

old records we go through each year and whether our present budget is sufficient to allow that or it hurts it in any way. I will let you 

know that. 

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SECURE COMMUNITIES

Mr. PRICE. Now let me turn to another issue regarding Secure 

Communities. Advocates of targeted immigration enforcement have 

raised concerns, as you well know, in some cases that the goal of 

Secure Communities to identify and remove serious criminals, has 

not always resulted in the prioritization of serious criminals. ICE’s 

own data shows that 27 percent of the individuals removed after 

being identified through Secure Communities in fiscal 2010 had 

never been convicted of a crime, and in certain individual jurisdictions a majority of the people apprehended under the program had 

no criminal record. 

What can you tell us about your efforts to more effectively target 

enforcement where it really needs to be targeted, on the most dangerous people? What kind of management and oversight are in 

place to ensure that program outcomes are in line with the program’s stated objectives? 

Mr. MORTON. All right, let me address those in turn. 

First of all, we do prioritize by seriousness of offense, and we just 

last year reclassified the Secure Communities level. So Level 1 are 

aggravated felonies as defined by the Congress, Level 2 are all 

other felonies, and Level 3 are misdemeanors. 

The challenge for us is that we do identify and prioritize serious 

offenders. The question becomes what do we do with lesser offenders who are identified, and our position is, obviously, Federal law 

requires us to remove individuals, provided that resources permit 

it. So Secure Communities has allowed us to identify and remove 

more serious offenders than we ever have before in the history of 

the country, and that is going to continue as Secure Communities 

rolls out to more and more places. 

It has also identified a large number of lesser offenders, and that 

is because the single largest class of individuals convicted in the 

United States is, obviously, misdemeanors. That is the biggest pool 

that you would expect to be identified by a fingerprint program. So 

we do very much prioritize our efforts, but we also don’t look away 

on other people who are referred to us. That is true with non-criminals. That is why we do in fact remove non-criminals through the 

Secure Communities program. 

But it is important to remember, first of all, you don’t get into 

Secure Communities unless you are arrested for a criminal offense, 

and many of these people had a prior immigration history. For example, they had been previously deported, they had an outstanding 

deportation order, multiple criminal arrests. So we will receive and 

process for removal those individuals. We don’t detain everybody, 

but we will focus on removal. 

Mr. PRICE. If I could interrupt you, my time is about to expire 

here, and I want to make sure that we address the question of local 

variation. It is troubling when the numbers we see in terms of 

these various categories vary a whole lot from community to community. Are you really making an adequate effort, do you think, to 

make sure that this program is executed in accordance with guidelines in local jurisdictions? 

Mr. MORTON. You are absolutely right that that is something 

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yond the initial implementation where we were in 80 or 90 jurisdictions to where by the end of this fiscal year we are going to be in 

1,500 jurisdictions, half the jurisdictions of the United States. And 

we are very cognizant of the possibilities of local variation, whether 

benign or more sinister, and we feel that we have a responsibility 

to proactively look for variances that don’t make sense. 

So what we are doing is we are going to run every quarter statistical analyses of all of the people who are identified and removed. 

We are going to work with civil rights and civil liberties—as a matter of fact, we are right now—to develop a program where we look 

at the results. If we need to go drill down to a case-by-case approach, we are going to do that. We are going to work with the 

Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice so that we can 

be assured as we go out and roll this program out nationwide that 

the necessary oversight is in place. So we are working on that. 

I would be happy to lay out the specifics for you and your staff, 

if you would like. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I note your Scotch roots. 

Mr. MORTON. Thank you. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I have some, shall we say, Mexico-centric 

questions, and let me preface the questions by saying Mexico is a 

great ally. It is among our largest trading partners. 

I would like you to tell the Committee more about our largest 

overseas office there. There certainly are parts of Mexico which 

seem to be in a fairly chaotic state with drug cartels dominating 

the landscape. 

U.S.-MEXICO COOPERATION

I would like to hear from you how you interact with your counterparts in Mexico. I am not unfamiliar with programs like Operation Phalanx, but, given all the things that we hear about drug 

mules, gunrunning, and human trafficking, how do you interact 

with your Mexican counterparts? And since this is the Appropriations Committee, you obviously are concentrating more resources 

into Mexico. That must be done at perhaps the expense of other 

things. 

Mr. MORTON. It is without question a challenging environment 

from a law enforcement perspective, and there is a strong correlation between the organized crime cases we investigate along the 

Southwest border and what is going on in Mexico. In practice, most 

of our investigations along the Southwest border have a Mexican 

component to them. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me just say for the record, too, we obviously have a number of U.S. citizens who are very proud of their 

Mexican heritage and, obviously, a reputation for hard work. So I 

am sure everybody watches what happens with a state of alarm. 

Mr. MORTON. So we have agents, special agents, assigned to 

Mexico. What they are there to do is to coordinate with Mexican 

law enforcement, in particular the Federal police, the Federal Attorney General’s office, and the Customs officials, to pursue criminal investigations, to help Mexican authorities with criminal invesVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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tigations in Mexico and then to assist us with some on our side and 

increasingly to explore doing joint investigations. We also work a 

lot on capacity building and training. 

It is a work in progress. The one thing that has changed dramatically is our ability to talk frankly with our Mexican counterparts. Even our conversations of 5 years ago were very, very different. You have seen a level of candor in Mexico on corruption 

issues, on the need to build up their capacities and experience. So 

we are trying very hard to do that. 

I don’t want to suggest that the light is at the end of the tunnel. 

It is a tough row to hoe. But we are making significant progress 

in particularly going after a number of the cartel leaders. We have 

helped Mexico to bring their first human trafficking cases ever, and 

ICE did that with them. We showed them how to do that, provided 

some investigative support. 

We are going to start working with the Mexicans to identify the 

international smuggling organizations that bring people not just 

from Mexico but from many other places through Mexico to the 

United States. The more we can do to apprehend and intercept and 

disrupt in Mexico means far fewer people for the Border Patrol to 

have to try to catch at the border. So we are working hard on that. 

We are doubling down in Mexico. We are going to go from 20 people to 40 people, as I mentioned. It will be by far our largest office. 

And working very closely with DEA, we are just going to keep 

going after it hammer and tong. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Lastly, you share resources with the DEA, 

FBI, and other Department of Justice agencies, so it is not just you. 

It is a combined effort of a lot of different agencies. 

VETTING OF COUNTERPARTS

Mr. MORTON. Very much so. The DEA has a significant presence. 

ICE is the next largest. FBI is there. CBP is there. The one thing 

about ICE is our jurisdiction is so broad that we end up partnering 

with just about all of the law enforcement agencies down there. So 

we are doing drug work, we are doing money work, we are doing 

JTTF work. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Lastly, since my time is almost up, there 

is a vetting issue. Can you talk about that? We can’t assume always that our counterparts, your counterparts are who they are. 

Mr. MORTON. That is right. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There are some investigations? 

Mr. MORTON. That is right. So we typically operate, and we do 

in Mexico, through what are called vetted units. So we work with 

Mexican officials to establish trusted units of Mexican law enforcement authorities that we work with. We do the same in Colombia 

and Ecuador and many of the other Central American countries. 

We have eight vetted units, and we are going to try to add four 

more. Panama. They are very successful. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. Olver. 

Mr. OLVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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DETENTION BED SPACE: SPECIFICS

Director Morton, this is the first time I have had the opportunity 

to serve on this Committee, so my questions will probably be very 

rudimentary but also some impressions. 

I have been a bit surprised by the sense of body counts as very 

important in the comments that have been made by members of 

the Subcommittee and by you in your testimony. On the detention 

beds, this budget is fully funded for 2012 for 33,400 beds? 

Mr. MORTON. Per day, on an average, per day. 

Mr. OLVER. How many are funded in 2011? How much of an increase is that for 2012? 

Mr. MORTON. The way it works is that the Committee for the last 

few years has directed the agency to maintain a minimum level of 

33,400 beds. For a whole host of reasons, which good people can 

agree and disagree on, the agency has been unable to actually meet 

that figure. 

Mr. OLVER. What is it this year? 

Mr. MORTON. This year, for the first time, we are meeting 

through the first two quarters the detention mandate. Last year, 

we only maintained an average of a little over 30,000. 

Mr. OLVER. Last year it was 30,000. 

Mr. MORTON. That is right. 

Mr. OLVER. So there is no increase in the proposed budget. 

Mr. MORTON. We are trying to meet our obligation. 

Mr. OLVER. That answers something. I was thinking to myself, 

are these owned or are these contracted, and are they 1-year or 

long-term contracts or what? 

Mr. MORTON. It is a mix. We have over 250 different facilities 

that we use. They fall into three categories. There are governmentowned facilities, a very small number; there are contract facilities 

run by private contractors; and then there are facilities that are 

run by State and local authorities, and we rent space in those. 

The challenge for us is our population is very diverse, so we have 

to detain everybody from women, non-criminals, to very, very serious violent offenders like a penal institution. So we need a wide variety of facilities, and obviously we have a national reach. We have 

to be able to detain people throughout the United States. We are 

trying to reduce the number. We have taken it from over 300 to 

250. But we still run a very large system. 

Mr. OLVER. You have already told me you are not funding any 

more, but you were below, even though this was your sort of mandated capacities earlier. I was going to say, if you are opening 

more, filling—any more are included, then next year the question 

is likely to be, well, why didn’t you fill them all? Maybe that is a 

question that it was thought to be funded for that full number earlier. Maybe you have already suffered from that kind of a problem. 

REMOVAL OPERATIONS

Let me go on to a slightly different thing then. Your testimony 

points out that the two major core operational programs are enforcement and removal operations, and ‘‘removal’’ strikes me as a 

wonderful euphemism for deportation, which you have no problem 

using. And in all of your testimony you use deportation. It seems 


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like deportation is the word. Other euphemisms might be termination or re-termination or something like that. I don’t know. Or 

extermination, you know. 

The two programs—I note that the two core programs, enforcement and removal operations and the Homeland Security investigations, I was puzzled, the Homeland Security investigations in 

its body count arrests 55,000 individuals, including 34,000 criminal 

arrests, and then 20,000 administrative arrests, 21,000 administrative arrests. Now, are both of these core functions using these detention facilities, or is it only the removal operations that are using 

the detention facilities? 

Mr. MORTON. They both use them. Our detention power is limited to the administrative arrests. So all of the ERO arrests that 

are administrative—— 

Mr. OLVER. Your detention power is limited? 

Mr. MORTON. Limited. We only have civil detention power. We do 

not have penal power. So, unlike the Bureau of Prisons, we don’t 

incarcerate people. We detain them. 

Mr. OLVER. Are criminal arrests then housed in the Bureau of 

Prisons? 

Mr. MORTON. In the Bureau of Prisons or the Marshals Service. 

That is right. 

Mr. OLVER. So what about the administrative arrests? Are those 

civil? 

Mr. MORTON. They are all civil. 

Mr. OLVER. They would be involved in the detentions? 

Mr. MORTON. So we do all of the civil detentions. So we run a 

uniquely civil detention system. Now, we house a lot of people with 

criminal records in them, but the reason they are in the detention 

bed is because we are trying to remove them from the United 

States, which is a civil not a criminal process. 

Mr. OLVER. So what happens to the criminal arrests? So those 

are not in your budget? Those are in Federal prison’s budget? 

Mr. MORTON. The arresting piece. But the budget, no, that is either the Marshals Service for the pretrial detention or the Bureau 

of Prisons for incarceration. 

Mr. OLVER. Is my time up? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Yes, it is. 

Mr. OLVER. I have only started, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Carter. 

AGENTS KILLED

Mr. OLVER. Because I don’t know very much. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The two agents that were killed, that made the paper, one killed 

and one seriously injured in San Luis Potosi—first, I would note 

that San Luis Potosi is not a border town. San Luis Potosi is probably closer to Mexico City than it is to the border. They were both 

unarmed by order of the Mexican Government. I am very familiar 

with how harsh the Mexicans are on bringing guns into their country and I understand that is their policy. 

But it concerns me. You have just told us that you have added 

substantially more unarmed agents into the Mexico City office 

working with the folks down there. I can understand Mexico’s govVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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ernment, their gun policies, because they date back to the revolution. But the reality is you are putting people in a serious harm’s 

way unarmed who come from a country where they are trained to 

do the appropriate response when attacked. 

And San Luis Potosi is out of the war zone—and I am going to 

call the border the war zone—out of the war zone substantially, 

and yet the war is continuing south and no telling where it is going 

to stop. We all know that. We can see it moving in that direction, 

and we are just praying to God in Texas that it doesn’t move north. 

So shouldn’t you make a risk assessment where you would be 

able to argue that agents should be armed and try to negotiate 

arms for them? Are other agents of the Federal Government, like 

the FBI and the DEA, going into Mexico unarmed? That is my 

question. 

Then, finally, a story told to me by my friend Mr. Culberson, who 

normally sits right next to me, was that there was an ambush. 

This may be a Border Patrol question; it may not be an ICE operation. There was an ambush in Arizona where they issued shotguns with beanbags in them to the agents. Of course, the ambush 

was effective. The officer raised up with his beanbag gun and fired 

a round, and all of a sudden all hell broke loose and the guy shot 

back with real guns and the result was that two men were killed. 

Now, that seems like a really strange policy to me; and I would 

like you to address that policy. 

Mr. MORTON. Let me start with the last question. That was a 

CBP case, not an ICE case. That was Border Patrol Agent Terry 

who was killed. I don’t know all of the details of that particular 

case, but I do know that the Border Patrol’s policy on the use of 

force is the same as ours, and they were carrying guns and were 

authorized to use their firearms if they felt their lives are in danger. They can skip the beanbags. 

But to give you a deeper answer, I would refer you to the Border 

Patrol on that one. 

On the other one, let me say this, on the question of security and 

the doubling of our agents. We have been doing a very in-depth security assessment. We are very cognizant of the fact that we are 

sending people into a place that is dangerous, and we are taking 

a number of security steps. 

What I would ask, Mr. Carter, is maybe if I could come and talk 

to you outside of the hearing room on some of what we are doing 

and thinking. 

Mr. CARTER. I would be glad to. 

RE-ENTRIES

If I have still got time, the question about the Virginia case, do 

you have any concept of how many re-entries by violent criminals 

you are experiencing after they are deported, resulting in things 

like the Virginia case? We are a long way from the border here. We 

are a lot closer where I live. 

Mr. MORTON. I don’t. Let me see if we can get some hard numbers for you. 

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Mr. MORTON. I will tell you, it is a real problem. Re-entry is a 

big problem, not just with people that we deport with no criminal 

records but, obviously, criminal offenders that we deport and come 

back. And given the rate of recidivism in this country, which is 

about 60 to 70 percent, you can do the math, and we are talking 

about more crimes in communities. 

We prosecuted over 7,000 people last year for re-entry, which is 

the largest number we have ever done, and the vast majority of 

those are criminals. All I can say on it is it is a big problem. I 

share your concern on it. We do everything we can to identify 

them. And it is why, again, in some instances, we will learn of 

somebody who doesn’t have a criminal record. But if they are here 

after having previously been deported, the law is very clear on 

that, that you reinstate the removal order. You don’t get another 

hearing. You are removed. That is our obligation, and we are going 

to do that. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Chairman, and good morning, Director 

Morton. 

A couple things. In your written testimony, you said that ICE 

has increased the average daily detention population by 40 percent 

while increasing annual criminal arrest also by 1,200. Again, I applaud you and your officers for their diligence. 

SANCTUARY CITIES

My main concern is about this issue of sanctuary cities. Last 

year during a hearing with the Committee on Homeland Security 

on which I served at the time, I had a dialogue with an ICE official 

on this topic. Mr. James Dinkins acknowledged that the lack of cooperation by sanctuary cities can be challenging for Federal agencies and does come at a cost when ICE experiences difficulties 

building a criminal case against an alien. Sir, is it fair to say that 

there are a variety of metropolitan areas across the United States 

that can be labeled sanctuary cities? 

Mr. MORTON. First of all, on sanctuary cities, obviously, I don’t 

support the idea. I will say that there is a wide variety of cities 

that are known to have or said to have sanctuary policies. There 

is a wide range. There are some that have official laws or ordinances on the books that restrict communication with ICE or cooperation with ICE and others it is more in the area of policy. It 

can be challenging for us in some jurisdictions. 

I will say that as we have increasingly focused on our criminal 

investigative efforts and gang work, we have generally been able 

to work through it. But it is something we deal with. 

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT

Mr. DENT. I guess I get particularly disturbed by this because, 

on the one hand, the Justice Department is suing the State of Arizona for assisting with the enforcement of Federal immigration law 

and, on the other hand, we have communities out there that are 

discouraging or dissuading local law enforcement from cooperating. 

And that would have to be a real challenge to your men and 


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women who are trying to enforce the law. You need their help, do 

you not? 

Mr. MORTON. We very much look to State and local coordination 

and cooperation as a critical part of what we do. We don’t demand 

or require of any State and local law enforcement agency that they 

actually enforce Federal immigration law. If they want to work 

with us, that is welcome and we try to do that wherever we can. 

What we don’t want is to have actual interference. 

Mr. DENT. You have a 287(g) program where you will train people. 

Mr. MORTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DENT. I just think it is very disturbing to me, though, as you 

are trying to do your job, your men and women, you are not getting 

the collaboration and cooperation you need from some communities. 

On the issue of removal, the last time I checked, there were 

about eight countries that are causing us some problems with deportation. I think we have valid deportation orders against, the last 

I checked, over 150,000 people, but their home countries will not 

repatriate their citizens. I think those countries are China, India, 

Vietnam, Iran, Somalia, Jamaica, Eritrea, and I am probably forgetting one. 

Have we made any progress with these countries in terms of repatriating their citizens who have been through due process, it is 

time for them to go home? 

Mr. MORTON. We have made some progress. I don’t think I would 

call it complete progress. So we have reduced the delays in some 

of those instances, but they are still far too long, from my perspective. 

What I can tell you on that is we are really working hard with 

the State Department. We have seen demarches to some of those 

countries. I am going to be starting to get in the car and going to 

visit the ambassadors from those countries here in the United 

States, and we are just going to keep ratcheting the pressure. It 

is a real challenge. It has afflicted the system for decades. 

Mr. DENT. The only thing that is going to get their attention is 

you hold up visas from those countries. That will help settle it. 

That is where I think you have to apply the pressure point, and 

I have legislation on that subject. 

Also, the Federal prison population, what percentage of our Federal prison population today is criminal aliens? It was a very high 

percentage, again last time I checked. 

Mr. MORTON. I don’t know the exact percentage, but there are 

about—we estimate there is about 2 million criminal offenders in 

the United States who are removable, either because—— 

Mr. DENT. Is that Federal and State? 

Mr. MORTON. That is the entire population, yes, sir. I could try 

to break it out for you by Federal and State, but that is the entire. 

Mr. DENT. I had seen numbers as high as 20 percent in some 

cases of our State and Federal prison population being criminal 

aliens. I am not saying they are all here illegally. But where do 

they rank in the pecking order in terms of removal? I suspect they 

are near the top. 

Mr. MORTON. Very high, very high. And it depends on the State, 

and it depends on the jurisdiction, the percentage in a given—you 


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know, California, for example, the percentage will be much higher 

than if you are, say, in North Dakota. But we have that information if you are interested and are happy to give it to you. 

Mr. DENT. My time is expired. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I apologize for being late, but I have another hearing going 

on at the same time. 

INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

Mr. Morton, two recent reports by the DHS Office of the Inspector General have actually validated concerns raised by myself and 

the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and immigration advocates 

about the 287(g) program. The IG report found that the program 

lacks transparency, effective management controls, and proper 

oversight. 

The first report in March of 2010 was highly critical of the program and offered 33 recommendations to improve it. The October 

report provided an additional 16 recommendations and indicated 

that 28 of the original 33 still have not been implemented. 

What is preventing the agency from implementing the 28 original 

recommendations that remain and the 16 subsequent recommendations? And also if you could answer as part of your question, given 

the seriousness of the IG finding, shouldn’t you refrain from signing new agreements until these recommendations are implemented 

and these safeguards put in place, especially the proper oversight? 

Mr. MORTON. You are right. The Inspector General issued two reports that were critical of our oversight and management of our 

287(g) agreements. Many of the ‘‘open’’ recommendations from the 

Inspector General actually were agreed on, and it is just a matter 

of closing them out, just a few things that we need to do with the 

Inspector General. 

And so I think if you were to check with the Inspector General, 

we are down to about 10 truly outstanding issues that we are 

working through, and I don’t anticipate those to remain open for 

long either. We have accepted many of—in fact, all of the recommendations. We have created an advisory board. Civil rights 

and civil liberties is on our advisory board now for 287(g). 

Training, we have a much stronger oversight program, as you 

know. The Secretary directed that the program have a narrower 

focus for the task force. We have gone to a uniform memorandum 

of agreement with all of the 287(g) partners, and we had them all 

sign again. All of this has been done since the Inspector General 

report as an ongoing effort to improve our training. Our 287(g) 

agreements have remained stable, and we have had about 70 the 

entire time. There hasn’t been an increase since then. 

ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. After years of raising concerns, I was very 

pleased that your agency is moving forward to reform our immigration detention system. However, I remain concerned that you have 

made limited progress in implementing the alternatives to detention, which is a proven supervision and monitoring program for 


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vulnerable immigrants, such as pregnant women, the elderly and 

the sick. As your budget request acknowledges, alternatives to detention is also cost-effective relative to traditional detention. What 

is the timeline for instituting your planned detention reforms, and 

what factors have prevented ICE from implementing alternatives 

to detention nationwide for these vulnerable detainees, who pose no 

threat to society? 

Mr. MORTON. So our detention reforms are ongoing, and lots of 

things have been done. Many of the things that were in your bill, 

as a matter of fact, we have been able to address administratively. 

We have the online detainee locator system. We have begun a full 

overhaul of the medical care that we provide. We are moving to a 

new medical record system. We have two working groups for the 

advocacy communities. We have detention monitors in all of our 

major facilities, and you are just going to see a steady march to a 

design that is much more reflective of the diverse population that 

we have. There are some challenges that remain. 

Our reforms are subject to negotiation with our union, and the 

union has expressed some objections to the new standards and procedures that we want to implement. And so that is a matter that 

we need to negotiate with the union, and we are trying to do that. 

And with regard to ATD, as you can see, we are requesting that 

the Congress allow us to increase that by another 2,500 spots, so 

that would bring us to 19,500 per day, which is quite a large number. 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

The real challenge for us on ATD is that it is cost-effective on 

a daily basis. But because the Executive Office for Immigration Review does not have an expedited docket right now for ATD, they 

treat it as if they were a nondetained case. The cases take a long, 

long time, and it actually ends up being cheaper when people are 

in detention because they will move much more quickly. We have 

two pilot programs, one in Baltimore and one in Miami, with 

EOIR. 

I think if we can prove that that works and expand it, you will 

see ATD really work the way I think we all intend it to. We are 

not quite there, but we are getting there. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. This Subcommittee recognizes that court dockets 

and availability of judges to hear cases can slow deportation proceedings in progress. Does the Administration’s fiscal year 2012 request provide for enough immigration law judges to hear the case, 

the cases ICE is bringing forward? 

Mr. MORTON. I do not know the specifics of EOIR’s 2012 budget 

request. There are 270 immigration judges on average. You are 

right that EOIR resources is a critical factor on how quickly we can 

hear cases and remove them. 

I would need to go back, Mr. Chairman, and see what it includes. 

I am a strong supporter of additional resources for EOIR. But as 

you have just noted, it is one of the most central factors in whether 

or not we can move cases quickly. The nondetained docket in particular has an enormous number of cases on it for a very few number of judges to handle. It has been a problem for many, many decVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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ades. But I can’t comment on the specifics yet because I just don’t 

know them. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Do you know, and this is I think just as equally 

important, do you coordinate your operations with the Department 

of Justice to prevent these blockages in the systems? 

Mr. MORTON. We work very closely with EOIR. They are very 

supportive of a number of our efforts. We have done much better 

in the last 2 years with them than we had traditionally done. We 

have encouraged them to place a greater focus on the detained 

docket, which is the one docket that does move quite quickly. And 

they have agreed to work with us on that. They do do video teleconferencing with us. We have explored stipulated removals in having quicker dockets for cases that really aren’t contested. The nondetained docket remains a challenge. It is just the sheer volume of 

cases in the system is enormous. And then when you couple that 

with people who can appeal their case all the way to the Supreme 

Court, the nondetained docket can take many years for an individual case to become final. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. So there would be some indication there probably 

could be some more administrative law judges, but you are going 

to get with us on that and get the information to us. 

Mr. MORTON. Yes. Let me see how many the Department of Justice is requesting. 

[The information follows:] 

Response. In FY 2012, DOJ is requesting $11,039,000 for EOIR to support DHS 

enforcement programs, most notably a high priority enforcement initiative currently 

expanding nationwide by ICE/DHS: Secure Communities. EOIR’s 125-position increase includes 21 immigration judges, 10 BIA staff attorneys and related immigration court and BIA legal support staff. 

ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS AND REMOVAL

Mr. ADERHOLT. The administration has very publicly asserted its 

immigration enforcement focus on criminal alien identification and 

removal. I strongly support this priority, but of course, many members of this Committee and many Americans, including myself, 

have concerns about ignored administrative violations. 

My understanding, the past 2 years, administrative arrests associated with just worksite enforcement have dropped by 80 percent. 

In a worksite enforcement context, processing illegal aliens has uncovered fraudulent document rings and organized crime. 

And we cannot forget that several of the 9/11 hijackers were visa 

overstays, which were, of course, merely administrative violations. 

Finally, these individuals are taking jobs and breaking the law. 

How does letting them go impact the morale of immigration enforcement personnel and Americans in search of jobs in this current economy? 

Mr. MORTON. A couple of things on that, Mr. Chairman. 

We don’t let people go, and we did remove over 1,200 people that 

we encountered in worksite enforcement operations. What you have 

seen there is we did have a shift from the very large worksite enforcement operations that were focused on identifying and removing unauthorized workers at say large meat-packing plants to a 

focus on our part to really trying to create a culture of compliance 

in the employer community, and it is just a different approach. 


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With regard to the overall or to the question of whether or not 

we are removing noncriminals, we are. We have, last year, removed 

197,000 noncriminals. And while we have increased the percentage 

of criminals and our emphasis on criminals, we continue to remove 

noncriminals. We are, and as the numbers suggest, at quite a significant rate. The Committee for the last few years, and I completely support this, has directed that, you know, in the context of 

limited resources that we focus first and foremost on criminal offenders. 

I like to look at it this way, we are appropriated enough resources to remove about 380,000 people, and the question for all of 

us is, who are those people going to be in a world of limited resources? And so we start with criminal offenders, border cases that 

CBP brings us and people who game the system. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Well, I think we agree that when employers violate the law, they need to be held accountable, but employees, I 

think, need to be held accountable as well. And I think the Subcommittee believes it is very important and would like to see a 

focus on that. 

Mr. Price. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I apologize for having to run back and forth between two hearings this morning, but I understand in my absence 

you began to get into the subject of alternatives to detention, and 

I want to probe that further. We know it is a very economical and 

effective alternative to holding a low-risk individual in detention. 

The absconder rate is quite low, and the per-day costs are as low 

as $7 a day, compared to $122 a day in detention. 

Now, I understand that you have begun to explain how the 

courts treat these cases, are more likely to delay these cases, so 

those cost differences are somewhat obscure, but nonetheless, that 

is a very striking difference. 

ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

I wonder if alternatives to detention is being used optimally. I 

know you are proposing 2,500 new participants; that is good. But 

there may be another issue at play here. Beginning in 2010, Congress included statutory language in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act requiring ICE to maintain an average daily detention 

capacity of at least 33,400 beds. Now, I have never been a big proponent of this provision. And in an environment of fiscal restraint, 

I wonder more and more if we should be telling a Federal agency 

that they are not permitted to spend less than a certain amount. 

In this case, we are talking about $2 billion annually for immigration detention beds. That is a third of your budget. Your budget assumes continuing this level of detention. So I am wondering if in 

blindly adhering to keeping over 33,000 people daily in costly penal 

detention, whether we are missing a real opportunity to make 

wider use of alternatives to detention, to save some money, to engage in better enforcement practice. After all, of the 197,000 noncriminals deported by ICE in 2010, only 8.6 percent were placed in 

alternatives to detention. That is 17,000 people out of 197,000. 

Does that figure suggest we are fully utilizing alternatives to deVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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tention among noncriminal aliens? That is what we are talking 

about. 

It just stands to reason, I think, that more than the 8.6 percent 

of noncriminals in custody would be eligible based on ICE’s own 

criteria for alternatives to detention. How would you respond to 

that and also how do you feel about this statutory provision. Is it 

really wise to maintain a statute requiring you to keep 33,400 beds 

in play? 

Mr. MORTON. On alternatives to detention, I will tell you that I 

don’t think the agency has met the full promise of ATD for a variety of reasons, many of them are out of the control of the agency. 

But just to start by saying, I agree with you that there is a promise 

of ATD that has yet to be fully realized. A couple of challenges. In 

the past, we were using ATD not unreasonably to monitor some serious offenders who weren’t otherwise removable. 

And that was a reasonable, but not the originally, intended use 

of ATD in many instances, and so we have shifted that to the original intent. The big challenge we face with ATD is that, as you note, 

it is cost effective on a per-day basis, and in many instances, it 

leads to a high rate of compliance. And again, we are talking noncriminals. It doesn’t help with the public safety issue, but it does 

help with the risk of flight issue. 

The challenge for us is that right now, those cases go on the nondetained docket, and over time, the cost greatly exceeds. And we 

have two pilots, as I mentioned earlier, in Miami and in Baltimore, 

where EOIR is going to treat the ATD docket on an expedited 

basis, similar to the detained docket. If we can move to that model 

more nationally, I think we will start to see the savings that you 

recognize, the promise of ATD being realized in full. 

As you can tell from this budget, we are not waiting on that; we 

are asking for $2,500 more, and this is, you know, we are $19,500 

per day. This is, again, not for the year. So we are moving in the 

right direction. There is no question that we can do more and make 

it more efficient. It holds great promise. We are going to do that. 

With regard to the detention mandate, of course, I never want 

to quibble with the wisdom of the Appropriations Committees in 

past years, and there has been generous appropriation. We are not 

in a situation where obviously the Committee has appropriated 

more money to us in the detention world than we can spend. For 

reasons that we mentioned before, the agency didn’t provide the 

Committee with a particularly honest assessment of what it cost. 

You know, our focus here this year is just trying to meet, once 

and for all, in an honest way, the mandate that the Committee has 

put on us, and that is what we are trying to do. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Carter. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

RE-ENTRIES

Director Morton, I really appreciate your job. I have a bunch of 

questions, but I will ask as fast as I can. On the situation of the 

Virginia scripture we had from Mr. Price, where a convicted offender, who had been deported from our country, reentered our 

country and committed another offense. Would you support enVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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hanced punishment for those convicted offenders who reenter and 

commit another crime? As a former prosecutor at the Federal level, 

if they commit a Federal crime, would potential punishment be enhanced with the second conviction? 

Mr. MORTON. I would certainly support, both in terms of repeat 

offenders, that the guidelines, the sentencing guidelines, recognizing that if you are back again and committing crimes, it is time 

for a more serious sentence. 

Federal law does provide for a separate offense now, Federal offense, that is independent of the second crime of illegal reentry. 

And that is why we are really trying to prosecute those aggressively with regard to criminal offenders that we remove and come 

back. And gang members is a big problem. We have a lot of gang 

members that we remove, they come back, and they don’t go to a 

life of pursuing further education and honest work, but back to a 

life of crime, and so we really try to focus on them. And you know, 

my view is, if you are back again and you are committing more 

felonies, it is time for a little more serious sentence. 

INTENSIVE SUPERVISION APPEARANCE PROGRAM

Mr. CARTER. With regard to the discussion of the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program that you have given, from my experience, I support the use of monitors and so forth. I think it is a 

good use of money, and the appropriate people have been placed on 

those things as appropriate. I would argue it may not be appropriate for a violent offender. I think that should be a decision that 

should be made by a judge or somebody that makes those decisions. 

JURISDICTION

And that brings up another question. I was visiting with a Federal judge down on the border down at Del Rio about the issue that 

some courts are so overwhelmed and other courts actually have 

space to do these things. I tried to write a venue law, but she explained to me it is not a venue law, but rather a jurisdictional 

issue. It is not a jurisdictional issue; it is a venue issue, because 

being in the United States is not against the law, being in the 

United States without papers is not against the law, but crossing 

the border is against the law. So unless you catch them crossing, 

it is not a crime. And once you catch them inside the country, they 

are locked into that venue. And we would have to—that would 

have to become a crime in order to change venues. 

Do you have any comment on that particular issue to meet what 

the chairman was talking about, the fact that we have overloaded 

courts in one place and have other courts that could help? 

Mr. MORTON. I think you have accurately identified the problem. 

The way the illegal entry and crime is written, you know, oftentimes the government has to bring the case in the place where the 

illegal entry occurred, which of course is going to be over and over 

again four States along the Southwest border. And those states—— 

Mr. CARTER. And a smart criminal defendant can say, ‘‘oh, I 

crossed in Laredo, knowing that that court is so backlogged’’ that 

it could be literally years and years before he ever gets reached. 

Mr. MORTON. Or even in the instance where there is no evidence 

of how the person, where they came in, and the government—you 


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know, I came in the country illegally. Well, where? And the government has to try to figure out where to cross the border and where 

to bring the case. It is a challenge. 

Mr. CARTER. I would like to work on that. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Olver. 

Mr. OLVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am still stuck on page 1 of your testimony. I am still thinking 

about the 34,000 criminal arrests. Is my understanding now from 

what has been said earlier and then from what Mr. Dent talked 

with you about correct, that these criminal arrests must be detained in your operations until there is a conviction, I take it, and 

a sentencing? Or do they immediately go into some sort of holding 

pattern that is under the Department of Justice under the Federal 

prisons arrangement? 

Mr. MORTON. It is very complicated. So the first thing I would 

say is I would be happy to come by and help you better understand 

who we are, what we do and how we do it and what the law is, 

because the Immigration and Nationality Act is a little bit like the 

Tax Code. 

Mr. OLVER. All right. I will accept that. The end of that question 

was, I was wondering whether those people who go through Federal prisons end up being disproportionately the people who some 

of these countries that don’t want to take back their citizens, do 

they fall into that category? 

Mr. MORTON. So for the people that go through Federal prison 

for a Federal offense, first, they are detained by the Marshals. 

Mr. OLVER. They have to go back to you for deportation? 

Mr. MORTON. Absolutely right. And so they come back. 

Mr. OLVER. But when you are trying to deport them, the country 

of origin knows that they were criminally detained? 

Mr. MORTON. Sometimes they know, sometimes they don’t. It is 

more a problem of just general recalcitrants to take their people 

back. And there are a number of countries that just drag their feet 

with regard to taking their people back. 

REMOVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. OLVER. Okay. Well, let me just go to another question. I 

think I still have about 3 minutes. I have three offices, and I have 

case workers in each of those offices. And I have more than a handful, there are probably fewer than 500 handfuls, or 100 handfuls, 

500 cases each year, of families who have been caught up in the 

so-called removal process. And it often involves a man or a woman 

with a U.S. citizen who is a spouse and maybe some children who 

are U.S. citizens in the process, maybe not, where the U.S. citizen 

is trying to adjust for the spouse. And I get cases where it is very 

easy that that gets arranged and then, at the other end, where 

there is an almost summary deportation. And it ultimately often 

leads then to a divorce because they can’t get back together again 

easily, particularly if there are some children involved. 

Could you give me some idea why it is that there is such a disparity? This is an anecdotal finding. I would have to go through all 

my cases and actually total up this sort of situation, what it is that 

makes some of them get that adjustment easily and some become 

a summary deportation. 


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Mr. MORTON. The answer is it is going to depend on the person’s 

background and the relationship that they are seeking to use to adjust their status, whether it is an employment-based, a familybased relationship. 

Mr. OLVER. I have defined all persons who are married to an 

American U.S. spouse. 

Mr. MORTON. If they are immediate relatives, then it really is, 

do they have a criminal [record] or not, those kind of things; are 

there going to be any adverse factors? If your question is really 

about whether or not—because the actual adjustment is handled either by the immigration courts or the citizenship and immigration 

services. We don’t do benefits. We are the enforcement arm. We do 

grant deferred action on a case-by-case basis. And it may be that 

some of the cases you are referring to we deferred action on; we 

agreed to exercise administrative grace. And others, based on the 

circumstances, we proceeded to removal. 

Mr. OLVER. Do you have to wait, for instance, after a wedding, 

a marriage, if there are no children involved, yes, there may already be, but do you have to wait some particular period before the 

U.S. citizen can then vouch for the spouse for a green card that 

leads to citizenship? 

Mr. MORTON. No. If you are married, you apply for the benefit. 

And I will say, we have a policy, and I should follow up with you 

and your staff. Our policy is if you are in removal proceedings and 

you have a pending application for which you are eligible, you will 

ultimately receive adjustment. We terminate proceedings in those 

cases. 

Mr. OLVER. There is really one case where we had documentation 

for the application for the green card, and they were summarily departed. 

Mr. MORTON. If you have cases like that, I would like to follow 

up with you on them. Because our policy is if you are going to be 

granted a benefit and you are going to become a lawful permanent 

resident, we terminate proceedings. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. I just want to point out, I have had similar 

concerns. 

SECURE COMMUNITIES: PROFILING

Mr. Morton, I understand that Secure Communities, which is the 

program intended to identify and report felons and dangerous individuals in our country illegally, has been addressed earlier in a 

question. But I do want to highlight one concern, and that is that 

there are many who are concerned about the fact that the program 

is resulting in racial profiling and contributing to individuals not 

reporting crimes or helping law enforcement. And I know that that 

is a big concern of the Los Angeles Police Department and other 

departments in my area. 

But I want to give one example of victims of crimes not reporting 

these crimes because of this program. It is my understanding that 

Safe Horizons, which is New York’s largest provider of services to 

battered women, has begun advising its undocumented clients not 

to report abuse to police for fear that they will be deported through 

the Secure Communities program. Because sometimes—there was 


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one instance where a woman called because she was being beaten, 

and because they needed her to help translate, they took them both 

in. And they booked both the victim and the person who was committing the crime. 

So my question is, what are you doing or what can be done to 

address the concern, not only about racial profiling but with regards to victims that are afraid to report crimes, particularly those 

who are victims of domestic violence? 

Mr. MORTON. So, two things, and I will reiterate a few things 

that I said before. I totally recognize the concern on racial profiling. 

We are instituting a whole series of analytical steps working with 

the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the CRCL at DHS, 

inviting them to literally be part of the analysis with us so that we 

can root out and identify any jurisdictions that are misusing Secure 

Communities. 

With regard to the DV issue, it is again a concern we are very 

much aware of. I will in the coming weeks be working on a policy 

to address exactly this issue, particularly in those States that do 

what is called dual arrest; they arrest everybody first without trying to identify who is the victim and who is the perpetrator, and 

so they both come in to our custody. And we are going to try to address that specifically with a policy to make sure that we are not 

scooping up victims inappropriately. The challenge for us is, obviously, we have got to be careful not to ignore the perpetrators, because often, if they are let go, very bad things happen, as you 

know, in some of these domestic violence cases, serious violent 

crimes, even death. 

We have a fine line to walk there, but we have zero interest obviously in a victim who reports a crime suddenly getting scooped up 

because the local police just say, well, we will arrest both people 

and figure it out later. It is a problem, and we are going to have 

a specific policy on it. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. I look forward to that. Thank you. 

BIOMETRIC EXIT

Mr. ADERHOLT. As you are aware, the fiscal year 2012 request 

proposes to rescind $25 million that had been for biometric exit. 

The remaining $25 million is proposed to reduce the analysis backlog of potential overstays so more cases can be referred to ICE. Is 

this something you support? 

Mr. MORTON. The biometric exit function is not at ICE, although 

we depend on the references from it. I need to look, I think it must 

be in the US–VISIT part of the budget that that happens. I will 

tell you right now I don’t think that, as I understand it, the rescission would be for the future vision of having mandatory exit control. I don’t think if that were rescinded, it would affect our immediate operations. We would continue to get referrals from US– 

VISIT based on the passenger data from the airlines as to who is 

not showing up for their return flight. It, obviously, would have 

some, will have an effect on whether or not we have entry and exit 

controls in this country. 

Again, it is not my particular area of expertise, so I will just say 

that the creation of a full exit program for every port of entry, including the land borders, is obviously a very challenging one, and 


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it is not easy. But let me—I don’t know enough about the specific 

rescission at US–VISIT to answer that properly, and I don’t want 

to steer you wrong. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Well, it would leave no money to actually do biometric exit, and that is the point I want to make. Let me quickly, 

we have got a vote on the floor, but let me go ahead and call on 

Mr. Price. 

VISA SECURITY UNITS

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will be quick, and you may want to elaborate for the record, but 

I signaled in my opening statement that I do want to talk with you 

about visa security units. They are located at U.S. consulates overseas. They vet the background of people applying for U.S. Visas. 

ICE/VSUs use a broader range of databases than the State Department uses or perhaps can use to review the backgrounds of visa applicants. 

Currently, there are 19 of the 46 high-risk countries with VSUs. 

This figure increased by four after the attempted Christmas Day 

bombing a year ago. But there is no additional funding in the 2012 

budget request for more VSUs. The $30 million requested only 

funds those that are already established. 

You also, I am sure, recall that in the past, ICE has had difficulty in establishing additional VSUs at some embassies. For example, London told ICE that DHS already had ‘‘too many people 

at the embassy to justify a VSU there.’’ We remember that episode 

with some puzzlement. 

So, Mr. Secretary, in the time we have here, can you just summarize the value added by these visa security units that State Department employees cannot provide? I am not sure I understand 

that precisely. What is it that these units are adding that the State 

Department cannot provide? And then given this edge, aren’t you 

concerned that we have these units only in 40 percent of the countries that your own agency has labeled high risk? 

Mr. MORTON. So I am a big supporter of the VSU program. That 

there isn’t additional money in this budget is simply a reflection of 

the hard calls we had to make, and so it shouldn’t be taken as any 

indication of a lack of support on my part for the basic concept. 

The reason they are effective, as you note, Mr. Price, we have access to certain databases that the State Department doesn’t have 

access, so we are able to do a much fuller run. Plus, a lot of these 

cases really dig down, it is not just a question of running the computer, you have got to get out of the office and go down to the local 

courthouse in these foreign countries and see, is this person really 

married? Does this relationship really exist? Or we send an agent 

out to—they are going to go and claim that they are going to visit 

this particular address in the United States that doesn’t seem to 

exist. You know, send an agent out and check on that place; take 

a picture. We are able to do that in a way that obviously the consular officers are not. They are under a lot of pressure to move, for 

very good reason, the visa process along and not have unnecessary 

delays in getting lawful visitors to the United States. So that is 

where I am. I would love to see, as future budgets allow, continued 

expansion. I think it is a good program. 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Price. 

Director Morton, thank you for your attendance here today and 

for discussing the fiscal year 2012 request. We look forward to 

working with you and look forward to you getting back with us on 

some of the requests that we mentioned in the questioning this 

morning. Thank you. 

Mr. MORTON. I thank you very much. I will just say a big thank 

you to your staff. You know, I deal with lots of committees. The 

professionalism and just sort of straight shooting that we have had 

from the staff over the years has been great; not to say that you 

always agree with us and don’t beat up on us sometimes, but that 

is part of the process. 

And I also want to note that when Mr. Price was the Chairman, 

he was an absolute gentleman with us. Again, not that he didn’t 

disagree sometimes with what we were doing. 

And you know, Mr. Aderholt, you seem to be very much in the 

same vein and so I appreciate that. 

We will try to be open and direct with you. If you have concerns, 

please let us know earlier on rather than later. We want to try to 

get this right. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you very much. 


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(195) 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011. 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

WITNESS 

JOHN PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

OPENING STATEMENT: CHAIRMAN ADERHOLT

Mr. ADERHOLT. Good morning. Today we welcome John Pistole, 

Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, for 

his first appearance before this Subcommittee. 

Today we will examine the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget to 

fund TSA in its mission to protect our transportation systems from 

threat, sabotage, and other acts of violence, and help ensure the 

free flow of travelers and commerce. Mr. Administrator, we thank 

you for being here today, and we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

This year, TSA will observe its tenth anniversary, a decade 

marked by rapid change, a measure of success, and a few false 

starts. Additionally, driven by the need to close gaps in aviation security following the 9/11 attacks, TSA grew rapidly into an organization of over 60,000 personnel, most of them performing screening 

at airport security checkpoints, previously a job for airports and 

airlines. 

Today, TSA’s large and diverse workforce includes inspectors and 

Federal Air Marshals, who travel extensively to ensure security of 

flights and aviation and the aviation systems, and specialists dedicated to surface transportation security. I know TSA’s workforce 

strives to be conscientious and enterprising, and we acknowledge 

their hard work and commitment to keeping traveling safe and secure. 

However, the other side of the workforce is to ensure the right 

mix of staff and technology at checkpoints and throughout the travel environment. TSA must restrain its appetite for solving problems by adding personnel and increasing operation cost. Instead, 

TSA’s challenge in the foreseeable future is to recognize the highest 

degree of security at the lowest possible cost. It is a duty each Federal agency, even those with vital security missions, must embrace. 

New security threats from overseas pushed TSA and its sister 

agencies into the headlines last year to include explosives concealed in a traveler’s underwear and in printer cartridges intended 

to blow up an aircraft over Chicago. Regrettably, TSA’s progress in 

addressing these daunting challenges is undercut by budgetary 

sleight of hand of the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request. Once again, TSA is proposing a hypothetical offset, $590 million, 

through a proposed, but not enacted, increase in passenger fees 

that the authorizing committee has unequivocally rejected. 


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We are eager to hear you explain how TSA can keep programs 

whole, let alone take on new initiatives with such a large budgetary albatross, over 10 percent of your budget. 

Administrator Pistole, in this time of fiscal crisis, the first thing 

we need from the Administration is truth in budgeting. Budget 

gimmicks do not cut it. In addition to discussing your options under 

this budgetary handicap, we expect to learn about the progress in 

TSA’s major efforts to streamline and reinvent the security process 

for aviation security in the wake of new threats. 

You shared with the American Bar Association recently your vision of a more risk-based approach to screening passengers rather 

than the current one-size-fits-all. As TSA, like all other government 

agencies, faces leaner times, should reinventing the passenger security model be given more immediate consideration? 

Your major acquisition of a passenger screening system depends 

on having automated target recognition technology in place, which 

in turn will affect the size and mix of TSA’s screening workforce. 

But this technology is still undergoing testing. 

Mr. Administrator, we expect to hear today how your investment 

plan will get results. We need to know how to make TSA systems 

more efficient and more reliable, with a better mix of technology 

and manpower. I look forward to a productive relationship as we 

work together to get the balance right, to have the right number 

of transportation security professionals, the right tools and technology, helping to keep Americans and all others who use our system safe and secure. 

Your written statement will be placed in the record, so I would 

ask you to take five minutes or so and just summarize your comments to the subcommittee. But before we go to you, I would like 

to recognize Mr. Price, who is the distinguished ranking member 

of this subcommittee, for any opening comments he would like to 

make. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT: RANKING MEMBER PRICE

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Administrator 

Pistole, to your first appearance before this Subcommittee to 

present your budget request for fiscal year 2012. You have been 

serving as Administrator now for about nine months, at a time 

when the aviation sector continues to be a prize target for Al 

Qaeda and other extremists. 

The Christmas Day 2009 and Times Square attempted bombings 

occurred before you were head of TSA, but you had recently taken 

the helm when the attempted bombings of cargo aircraft occurred 

last October. So I know you had felt firsthand the pressure of these 

ever-evolving threats. Your agency is the last line of defense for our 

aviation sector, and while significant improvements have been 

made, the high threat environment we face makes very plain the 

need to close any critical gaps that remain. 

I know you share the view that effective security is smart security, and that we should be in the business of managing risk rather 

than trying to do the impossible by seeking to eliminate risk or 

holding out the illusion that we can do so. Our aviation security 

model has improved over the years, but it remains very cumbersome, and in the view of many, rather invasive. There are few 

signs of that system changing based on the 2012 budget, but I am 

encouraged by the willingness you have expressed on numerous occasions to consider ways to reform the system to be more riskbased in the future. 

The 2012 request, which totals $8.1 billion overall, includes $460 

million above the fiscal year 2010 level to secure our nation’s airports and flights and to protect other modes of transportation. This 

request continues activities that were ramped up after the Christmas Day bombing attempt. 

I am pleased to see additional funding to detect non-metallic 

threats with advanced imaging technology machines, which we anticipate will include a new feature to automatically recognize 

threats instead of relying on screeners to look at a person’s body 

outline. This should enhance privacy and hopefully speed up the 

time passengers spend at the checkpoint. 

I am also pleased to note additional funding for other technologies at the checkpoint, such as portable explosive trace machines, so that we can more rapidly detect potential threats. The 

budget request also includes funds to expand watch list vetting to 

make sure that we are catching persons who may want to do us 

harm before they board an airplane. 

And finally, I am pleased to note an expansion of the visible 

intermodal protection and response systems called VIPR, which 

supplement security on local passenger rail and mass transit systems, and also support special events. 

I also want to register some concerns about your request. For example, funding for air cargo security declines in 2012, even though 

TSA has been asked to take on greater responsibilities after the attempted air cargo bombing plot out of Yemen last fall, and indeed 

to expedite the deadline by two years for screening all international 

cargo carried on passenger aircraft. And I understand you intend 


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to do just that, to move that deadline ahead two years. Where is 

the budget match-up for that? We need to understand that. 

The budget request also appears to rehash a substantial request 

first proposed in 2011 for additional behavior detection officers. 

Until we can understand what changes you have made to address 

critical vulnerabilities raised by the National Academy of Sciences 

and the GAO about the behavior detection program, it may be premature to grow this program by roughly 10 percent. 

And finally, while the budget request increases funding for the 

Federal Air Marshals, your agency has still not addressed questions this Subcommittee posed almost 18 months ago about what 

the appropriate staffing levels are. What is the rationale for this 

or that staffing level? We received a report on this mandate, but 

it was simply inadequate. 

Mr. Administrator, I want to thank you for your service to the 

country. We look forward to continuing to work with you to ensure 

our transportation security professionals are equipped with the resources they need to keep the American people safe. As we begin 

to more closely examine your fiscal year 2012 budget, it is important to note that no program or account will be off limits to scrutiny. Our obligation is to take a balanced, realistic approach, to 

weigh risks carefully, and to make prudent investments. I know 

you share that point of view, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Price. At this time, Administrator Pistole, we look forward to your comments before the subcommittee. 

OPENING STATEMENT: ADMINISTRATOR PISTOLE

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Chairman Aderholt and Ranking 

Member Price, and distinguished members of the committee. There 

have been a couple of references made to the threats that we are 

dealing with, and I would just like to start my opening statement 

with a context for that threat environment, given my background 

in the FBI and now at TSA. 

I start every day with a threat briefing and intelligence briefing 

as to what foreign intelligence and law enforcement services are 

collecting in terms of information and intelligence that may be actionable for us here in the U.S. or for all those last points of departure for passengers or cargo coming to the U.S. So it is within that 

context that I present this Fiscal Year 2012 budget request. 

A couple of references have been made to the Christmas Day attack, the Yemen cargo plot. The one I would add is the assassination attempt against Muhammad bin Nayef, the Saudi Minister of 

Interior, Deputy Minister of Interior, basically the equivalent of the 

Homeland Security Secretary and FBI Director in one. 

The common theme is the same bomb maker in each of these 

three instances, as you know from your classified briefs. What we 

are facing is a determined, creative, innovative enemy who is always trying to come up with the next type of improvised explosive 

device that will defeat our current security measures because we 

have not forecast or done enough in that regard to try to identify 

what those threats are. 

Obviously, the Yemen cargo plot was one of the best examples I 

have ever seen in terms of intelligence that is tactical, not just 

strategic. The strategic intelligence we know is that Al Qaeda, particularly in the Arabian peninsula, wants to hurt us. But when we 

have tactical intelligence, where we have tracking numbers of 

packages identified, that is exactly the type of information we are 

looking for as one part of the U.S. Government’s continuum of national security. 

So again, that is the context that we are looking at. So our Fiscal Year 2012 budget request is for $8.1 billion, and it is, as you mentioned, some $460 million above our 2010 enacted level. Of that increase, $301 million supports critical security enhancements that 

we intend to implement this year, which enjoyed bipartisan support of the subcommittee and our Senate Approps Subcommittee 

last year. And I want to thank the committee for your strong support, for giving us the opportunity to pursue those initiatives, 

which include expanding our AIT passenger screening capability, 

100 additional canine teams for screening passengers for explosives, build greater international security program and intelligence 

sharing, and sustaining our FAMS international and domestic 

flight coverage. So new initiatives in Fiscal Year 2012 total $166 million, and 

these new initiatives basically allow us to continue to build upon 

the existing programs by adding capacity or new capabilities. I also 

ask for your support for our $82 million request for the addition of 


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275 AIT, advanced imaging technology, units. This will continue to 

add to our capability to screen passengers with those non-metallic 

devices, as we saw on 12/25. I believe the AIT has been proven 

safe, and that the steps we are taking now with automated target 

recognition completely address the privacy issues that have been 

raised. 

Our request also includes a requested increase of $21.9 million 

to add 350 behavior detection officers to improve the coverage of 

our tech points as we try to expand to more of a risk-based intelligence-driven process. And to improve our visible intermodal prevention response program, we are asking for an additional $26.8 

million to add 12 new teams to operate across the transportation 

systems and increase our partnership efforts. 

Our secure flight program has been successfully implemented 

and forms part of the daily intel brief that I receive, helping inform 

judgments and operational decisions as to what we need to be 

doing with flights that are departing from our 453 airports, and 

particularly as it relates to FAM coverage on those flights. 

I am also requesting an additional $12.3 million to sustain our 

expanded enhanced terrorist watch list vetting, which also figures 

in to the newer risk-based intelligence driven processes that I mentioned. These new enhancements represent a modest increase in 

the resources we have programmed for our mission, and I am looking to apply the resources we have to best achieve that mission, 

recognizing the budget constraints and issues that we all are dealing with, particularly in these weeks right now. 

So we need to protect against the tactics that the terrorists have 

used in the past, but shame on us if we do not do some forecasting, 

some intelligence predictions about what types of devices the terrorists may use in the future. And so that is why we are working 

with our partners throughout the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities, both here in the U.S. and overseas to try to make 

sure we have the latest intelligence, that we can inform our judgments as we take steps to mitigate risk. And that word mitigate 

is important because, as has been mentioned, we are not in the 

process or the business of eliminating risk. We will never eliminate 

risk unless we stop air travel or train travel, just like we do not 

eliminate car accidents unless you stop driving. 

So we are in the risk mitigation business, and I think we can do 

a number of things that are even budget neutral, even this year, 

that will advance that risk-based intelligence driven process of 

mitigating risk. So we are always looking for ways to improve, and 

I appreciate the subcommittee’s support for what we have done 

thus far and as we move forward. 

Let me just touch briefly, before I close then, on things that we 

will look at doing in terms of this risk-based approach. One is we 

have a great number of passengers who would be willing to share 

additional information about themselves in exchange for the possibility of streamlined screening. And so just as we have done with 

pilots who we do more of an identity-based screening for them now, 

because they are in charge of the aircraft, that type of approach I 

believe can also apply to those very frequent travelers who we 

know a lot about. 


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And so there are a number of iterations of this, but I would refer 

to it as a known traveler program, people who are willing to share 

information with us so that we can make a better assessment of 

what type of risk they may pose. And so benefits they may receive 

as a result of that sharing of information may result in streamlined 

processing and screening, such as not having to take shoes off. 

Maybe you do not have to take your jacket off. Maybe you do not 

have to take your laptop off. 

Additional information that we can use also using information 

we already have about what the aircraft is, the type of aircraft, the 

wide body, the regional jet. Do we have FAM coverage? All those 

things can go into an assessment of what type of screening we 

should do. And that is on the passenger side. 

We are also working very closely with our international partners 

and domestically here on the whole cargo issue, particularly following the Yemen cargo plot. So with the support of this committee 

between 2005 and 2010, we have been able to field new security 

technology, introduce new procedures of protocols, and eliminate 

over 7,000 people from mechanical checkpoint operations, and invested in behavior detection, violent appraisal officers, document 

checkers, and targeted security operations. 

So I would like to take that type of thinking along with the riskbased intelligence thinking that I outlined to work with the committee as we move forward. So with that, thank you. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The information follows:] 


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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. Again, we appreciate you are willing to come today and to speak before our subcommittee. I am going to go out of order. Ms. Lowey, I understand, 

has a subcommittee hearing shortly. So I am willing to take her 

out of order. So, Ms. Lowey, let me call on you for the first round 

of questions. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member for your indulgence, and thank you, Mr. Administrator. I am 

sorry. There are three hearings at the same time this morning. 

First, I want to commend you for recognizing the benefits of giving the TSA workforce a seat at the table by providing limited collective bargaining rights for transportation security officers. With 

your 26-year record with the FBI, I think anyone who opposes this 

decision will be hard pressed to question you on the grounds of security, given your credentials. 

I would also ask for unanimous consent to enter into the record 

a statement from NTEU regarding workplace rights at TSA. 

Mrs. LOWEY. What are the security benefits, Mr. Administrator, 

associated with collective bargaining rights at TSA? Do you believe 

travelers will encounter a more professional workforce as a result? 

And when do you expect to implement this initiative? 

Mr. PISTOLE. To answer your first question, Madame, the decision that I made, the determination on collective bargaining, the 

vote on that started last week and runs through April 19th. And, 

of course, it is simply giving them the option, the ability to vote on 

whether they want collective bargaining. So some of the benefits I 

see from that are because the enabling legislation, the Aviation 2nd 

Transportation Security Act, gave the Administrator broad discretion as to those issues that would be subject to collective bargaining—you are right in describing this as a limited type—it focuses primarily on those workplace issues that I have heard frustration from TSOs, transportation security officers, around the 

country, things like bidding on shifts and uniform issues, and some 

inconsistency across the country in those regards. 

And so what I want to see is not being distracted by those issues, 

but being able to focus on the security issue that the TSA was created for. And so by doing that, if the security officers vote to have 

a collective bargaining unit, just at the national level, not all the 

different local units and things, I believe we can achieve some 

greater professionalism and greater consistency in how we go about 

doing our jobs. 

SECURE FLIGHT

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you. And your testimony discusses Secure Flight program, which since Fiscal Year 2002 has cost taxpayers more than $437 million. With Secure Flight now operational, are you confident that both CBP and TSA are in a position 

to prevent another Abdul Mutallab-like incident, in which a flagged 

individual was successful in boarding a U.S. bound flight? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So one of the keys to the Secure Flight construct 

is that somebody is nominated to be on the terrorist watch list. 

And, of course, with Abdulmutallab, even though there are difVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00213 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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ferent pieces of information, he was not nominated until after the 

fact. And so even though CBP was planning to interview him when 

he landed in Detroit, it was an after-the-fact approach. 

So under Secure Flight, if somebody has been identified by an intelligence or law enforcement agency, is nominated and put on the 

watch list properly, then Secure Flight will definitely address that 

issue, as long as there is a positive identification made. And because it requires name, date of birth, and gender, there should be 

a positive identification made, assuming the person is not traveling 

under a false name, documents, and that has not been identified. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. And lastly, I just want to say I strongly 

support TSA’s increased deployment of advanced imaging technology machines, and frankly think the Administration needed to 

be more publicly supportive of your efforts in the last part of 2010. 

And your testimony discusses providing AIT machines at more 

than half the checkpoints nationwide. 

While high-volume airports such as Kennedy, Laguardia, and 

National have AIT machines, they are not at every checkpoint, or 

in the case of Kennedy at every terminal. So I hope during this 

hearing, although unfortunately I have to go, you could share with 

us your progress to ensure that every terminal, if not every checkpoint, at our most-traveled airports operate with the latest technology. I think I have about 30 seconds, if you can answer quickly. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. [Laughter]. 

Mrs. LOWEY. That is so generous. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I was looking for a clock. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. You have still got 40 seconds. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Forty seconds? Okay. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So obviously, the goal is to use AIT in those most 

heavily trafficked areas that can identify those who would pose a 

risk, either those who are here and going home, or those who are 

here and just traveling, but those who may pose a threat. So the 

goal is to put it in the category X, the largest airports, and then 

those that have the configuration and the space available without 

significant cost of reconfiguring. So it is a risk-based approach. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you very much for your leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

AVIATION SECURITY FEES

Mr. ADERHOLT. Your budget request: same proposal, new passenger fees. I alluded to that in my opening remarks. Of course, 

that has been rejected by previous Congresses, Republican, Democrat alike. Enactment of these fees is in the jurisdiction of authorizing subcommittees and committees. And Homeland Security Committee Chairman King from New York has publicly stated he opposes the fee. 

How will TSA make up for the $590 million fee revenue gap if 

it is not enacted? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, we are hopeful that it will be, and I know the Secretary is engaged with the 

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ognizing that there has not been a fee increase since 2002. And as 

part of the budget issues that Congress is dealing with now and 

the American people, it makes sense from my perspective to have 

those using the service help pay for the benefits of that. 

So using that as a starting point, I think it is an important objective to try to pursue. And again, I am very hopeful. 

Now, to your question, obviously, if that is not enacted, then it 

will be a significant challenge for TSA, if it all came from TSA, to 

do many of the things that I think the American people hope and 

expect us to do in terms of providing the best possible security on 

a daily basis for those who are traveling, particularly by air. I 

think there would be a broader discussion, obviously within the department and probably within the Administration, as to where 

those funds should come from to address what are the highest priorities. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY

Mr. ADERHOLT. Your budget proposes $76 million for 510 new 

TSA screens and 200 additional AIT systems that Mrs. Lowey referred to with automated targeting recognition. But just one system 

is now being tested. These will put you on track to cut in half the 

number of screeners needed to operate AIT. Will TSA certify and 

deploy these new AIT systems this year, and will this reduce the 

number of TSOs required for checkpoint screening? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So we have either completed or are nearing completion of three tests in airports in Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Reagan 

National for the automatic target recognition software that is being 

used. The hope and belief is that given the success of those trials 

that we have seen thus far, that we would convert all the existing 

AIT machines under that construct to the ATR still this year. 

That being said, we would also hope that the other manufacturer—and I believe the other manufacturer of the AIT, which has 

not yet finished their conversion, and we have not yet lab tested 

or field tested, that that would also happen for deployment next 

year as we go into 2012. 

So as it gets to your question, we would still need the TSOs to 

address what we believe will be the conversion this year, and the 

additional 500 AITs that we would hope to still obtain this year, 

and the additional 275 that we would look for in the fiscal year 

2012 budget. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Given the current tight budget assumptions, and 

going back again to that $590 million in proposed fee revenues, will 

you have to delay the acquisition and deployment of these new 

screening systems, and will this reduce your ability to meet savings 

and performance targeting expected in the automated screening 

process? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So again we would hope to still not only convert the 

existing 240 or so AITs that would have the ATR capability this 

year, but also acquire some of the additional AITs as soon as possible, and then at the end of the fiscal year to acquire the additional ones that we would deploy then in 2012. 


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TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAM

Mr. ADERHOLT. You had mentioned in your opening statement, 

and also you have made public statements, to talk a little bit about 

more of a risk-based approach. In one interview, and then you referred to it this morning, that ideally you could set up three different lanes for travelers at checkpoints by risk categories, ranging 

from trusted travelers, frequent travelers, and infrequent travelers. 

Talk a little bit about that design process and how you are including and blending human technology in the process elements all 

together. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Okay. So there are really two aspects. One is using 

information already available to us, such as Secure Flight, or information that frequent travelers—I like to refer to them as known 

travelers, those who would be willing to share additional information about themselves, perhaps what is in their frequent flyer account, if they are willing to share that with us. That gives us a 

much better understanding of who the traveler is. And the more we 

know about the traveler, the better judgment and assessment we 

can make as to whether they pose a high, medium, low, or almost 

no risk to that particular flight. 

That coupled with information we know about the aircraft, 

whether it is a wide body, a regional jet, is there Federal Air Marshal coverage, a number of things like that—are there people on 

the terrorist watch list who are selectees on those flights? Those 

are all things that we can use to help make better judgments as 

to what type of screening each individual should receive. 

That being said, it becomes a question then of if there are, for 

example, the three lanes that you mentioned, that becomes the implementation phase, if you will. So we may have a lot of information about a person. Depending on what airport that person is traveling through, there may or may not be an option for that, just 

based on the physical layout of the checkpoints and the real estate 

available that the airport has to provide. So the smaller the airport, the more of a challenge that becomes. 

So we are looking at several different options in that regard. But 

the bottom line is, it would not necessarily be a fee-based program. 

In fact, it would likely not be a fee-based program in its final 

iteration. There are programs such as Global Entry that Customs 

and Border Protection uses to facilitate people reentering the U.S., 

and that can be a baseline that could be used. They have already 

shared information with the U.S. Government. They want some 

benefit. But under this construct, it would not be a right that 

would be afforded an individual. It would be a likelihood, perhaps 

even a high likelihood, that they would receive some type of 

streamlined processing screening at a checkpoint. 

So whether there is a dedicated lane or not would really depend 

on the airport configuration. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY: SAFETY

Mr. ADERHOLT. Before I go on to Mr. Price, let me just ask you 

about the safety of the AIT screening technology and confirm to the 

subcommittee about that, there is no threat that these pose. And 

could you talk a little bit about that? 


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Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. There have been a number of issues raised 

with the advanced imaging technology, in particular the type that 

is called the backscatter machine, because it does emit radiation. 

There have been a number of tests that have been done and studies done over the years, whether it is the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the 

Johns Hopkins School of Applied Physics, just to name three, that 

have done assessments that have found the AIT to be not only safe, 

but very safe, and even the equivalent of traveling for approximately 3 minutes at altitude on a commercial aircraft. 

And so they have said that—different analogies, but you would 

have to travel thousands of times in a year just to meet the minimum dosage that these different studies assess as being of any 

concern. So not even pilots travel that much, thousands of times in 

a year’s time. 

That being said, I am concerned by what I have learned recently 

within TSA in terms of our handling of reports that were done by 

the contractor, the manufacturer, in terms of their assessments. 

And what I have found is that we did not handle those—the paperwork from those properly, that we did not immediately review and 

assess and verify that those documents were done properly. And so 

what we have found, and we have posted most of these, all of them 

that we have reviewed, to our Web site, and we will continue to 

do that as we go through these thousands and thousands of reports, is that there were some errors made in these reports. There 

were math calculations done wrong. One was done that said that 

the radiation was 10 times what it actually was. That was not the 

case, but that is the way the technician filled out the report and 

said that. 

So there was some sloppy paperwork. On the one side, there was 

a failure, frankly, on our part to review that, as opposed to filing 

away in a file cabinet and not doing follow-up. So we have changed 

the procedures on how we review. We have re-engaged with the 

manufacturer. They have gone back out to do additional studies. 

We are engaging two other entities, the U.S. Army Public Health 

Command, which has done a number of studies also, and then the 

NIOSH, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, 

NIOSH, to further assess. And they have done some prior assessment, but to update that. 

And then lastly, I am going to commission a new independent 

study beyond all these things that have already been done, just to 

reassure the American people that these machines are safe, that 

there are no issues with them, and given the highest level of confidence that not only are they traveling securely because of proper 

screening, but safely because of the equipment. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. I know there have been some members of Congress that have voiced concerns about that, and, of 

course, I know that you have probably gotten feedback as well from 

travelers as well. But at this point, Mr. Price. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY: PROCUREMENTS

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Administrator, you 

have addressed already your plans with regard to the advanced imaging technology units. I want to ask a follow-up on that then I 


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will turn to the question of air cargo and particularly the screening 

of air cargo on passenger flights. 

Now, on the AIT units, you plan to have 1,000 of these units procured. To date, 500 have been purchased, as I understand, and installed. The remaining 500 are to be procured once the final appropriation for fiscal year 2011 is resolved. They may not be installed 

until next year. 

Meanwhile, you are testing this automated target recognition 

software. It has been relatively successful, as I understand, the 

testing with regard to the millimeter wave machines; less so with 

the backscatter machines. But in any case, that testing is continuing. 

So it is clearly your intention to augment the technique of the 

AIT equipment with this ATR capability. And the reasons for that 

being desirable, I think, are pretty clear. I wonder, though, to what 

extent it is a condition, or you see it as a condition, for putting 

these additional units in place. Is it your intention not to procure 

any further AITs without ATR capability? What if the tests do not 

move forward on all of these machines? 

You are testing one vendor’s ATR capabilities right now. You are 

going to test two others, assuming they move along, later this 

month possibly, and then on into the spring and summer. So how 

do you weigh the benefits of ensuring that this capability is present 

on all machines versus the possible sacrifice of some competition in 

these procurements? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Congressman Price. The goal is to deploy the AIT with ATR capabilities from here out. And that being 

said, if the manufacturer for the backscatter does not develop in 

such a way that we believe they will at this point, we have every 

confidence that they will be able to not only develop and manufacture, but will be able to test this summer and deploy in the fall. 

That is the plan. 

So your question, if they do not—or if they are not successful in 

that, it is problematic because the goal is to do ATR, automatic target recognition. It is not an issue of security because we are getting, we believe, the same level of security. It is just an improved 

process, particularly as it relates to privacy. If they are not able to 

do that, then we will have to make some hard choices, which I cannot say today what those would be because there are so many variables involved. But we would obviously want to work with the committee to look at the best options. 

We believe that competition is important to keep driving private 

enterprise to the best technology at the best price and the best deployment on the best timetable. So we do not want to be in the situation of having only one vendor providing that, if we can avoid 

that. 

That being said, we do want to move forward with the ATR, as 

it is being proven successful. 

Mr. PRICE. And you do intend eventually to retrofit the alreadyprocured machines. Is that right? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Mr. PRICE. Whatever the technology—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. That they utilize. 


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Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

AIR CARGO SECURITY

Mr. PRICE. All right. Thank you. That is helpful. Now, to the air 

cargo requirement. The 9/11 Act required DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of air cargo on passenger flights by August of 2010. TSA met this requirement by the established deadline 

for domestic air cargo, but testified last year that it would not be 

able to screen 100 percent of international air cargo until 2013. 

After the attempted bombing of an all-cargo aircraft occurred, 

TSA expedited the deadline for industry to screen 100 percent of 

air cargo on international inbound passenger aircraft to December 

31, 2011, two years earlier than previously anticipated. 

So I congratulate you on that. I want to know exactly how you 

did it. At this point, what is your estimate for how much of this 

international air cargo we are screening now, and how are you 

going to get to 100 percent by the end of the year? And then I want 

to know about the budget implications. 

After the Yemen incident, TSA, along with CBF, briefed this 

Subcommittee multiple times on the efforts it was undertaking to 

enhance air cargo security. For example, TSA has been working 

with Yemen and other countries to enhance their airport and air 

cargo security measures and has enhanced its own vetting capabilities. Yet your fiscal year 2012 budget request decreases the amount 

of funding you request for air cargo from $122.9 million in 2010 to 

$114.7 million in 2012. 

So that raises an obvious question. Does your budget request 

fully encompass your air cargo needs? And how is this budget going 

to grow your abilities to know what is flying into and through our 

country? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Congressman. So a couple of points. 

And thank you for your support for what we have done domestically. We did achieve that milestone last summer. That 100 percent 

of all cargo on U.S. passenger planes is being screened, and we 

have done that primarily through a partnership with private industry where we have over 1,160 certified cargo screening facilities, 

entities that do the screening pursuant to our standards, away 

from the airports so it does not create a choke on the airport. 

And that accounts for about half of all the cargo that is issued 

to our passenger planes in the U.S. And it is through that partnership with private industry that we are able to do that. 

Looking internationally, it becomes much more of a challenge. 

Last year, there were, as I recall, almost 9—between 8 and 9 billion pounds of cargo coming into the U.S., and it breaks down 

roughly one-third on passenger flights, so almost 3 billion pounds, 

versus two-thirds on all-cargo flights. 

Because we at TSA do not do the screening overseas, we had to 

work with our partners both in civil aviation, law enforcement, depending on what country you are in; and as you mentioned in 

Yemen, worked with the entire government. I was in Yemen five 

days after the cargo plot was identified to assess what was going 

on there and what we could do to assist. 

So it is really through a partnership with the host governments 

and the carriers that are in the business of transporting cargo. And 


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I could get into more detail if you would like on that. So it is that 

same type of partnership we use domestically that we are hoping 

to replicate overseas. And as we have found, all, most all, of the 

cargo carriers have a strong interest in doing additional security, 

perhaps even beyond what we would require for any cargo coming 

from the last point of departure to the U.S. 

So we set a standard, and many carriers, such as the two biggest 

here in the U.S., the cargo carriers and freight carriers, take steps 

beyond that. They do their own risk modeling. They do their own 

assessment of whether they want to pick up what they assess as 

being a high-risk piece of cargo. So if somebody in Sana’a, Yemen, 

walks in and is not known to the person there at the freight forwarder they will not accept that, if it is destined for the U.S. 

So the situation that we had in Yemen for the two toner cartridge packages would not be picked up now. So it is through that 

partnership. It is also through a partnership with the governments 

to establish a national cargo security program. So we have just recognized France as the first to come in with a program that we assess as being consistent with U.S. standards. And so what the 

French government then actually certifies is their cargo carriers. 

We have eight or nine other countries that we are working with 

that do the same thing. 

So it is through that partnership. It is leveraging those things as 

opposed to us footing the bill for it, is the reason we have had a 

slight decrease in 2012. But the other part is the comments that 

we asked for from industry about updating the mandate to the end 

of 2011, that was simply requesting their comments, and we are 

not there. So is there a vote we need to talk about? 

So the issue becomes are they capable of complying with 100 percent, and the bottom line is probably not, not by the end of this 

year. So we will be looking for additional funds in 2013 to help 

augment that because it gets down to trust, but verify. So a cargo 

carrier or a foreign government carrier, passenger or otherwise, can 

say they are doing all these things. But if we cannot verify that 

independently, then we do not have a very high level of confidence, 

unless we know a lot about the carrier, and just some places we 

do not have that level of confidence. 

So we will not—in my estimation, we will probably not be at that 

100 percent by the end of this year, but more into 2012. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY: TRAINING & REQUIREMENTS

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Administrator, great 

to see you again. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Nice to see you, sir. 

Mr. DENT. I am excited about the 100-percent screening capabilities. I think that screening certainly represents a deterrent effect 

on our adversaries. I sometimes worry about our detection capabilities. I am not really here to talk today about so much the technology of, say, AIT. I am more concerned about the TSO training 

and personnel. 

You know, can you describe for us the training regimen for the 

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nology is good, but I am not sure that all of our TSOs always understand what they are viewing. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. So every TSO goes 

through the basic TSO training, just on what their job involves, regardless of their position. Before they would have any type of responsibility for using the AIT, they go through additional training, 

both on the job and then obviously separate training without passengers around. 

So they go through this training. But to your point, I think we 

can always improve upon that. We can do additional training. For 

example, what we found in Las Vegas with the automatic target 

recognition is that somebody with a ponytail, when they went 

through the ATR, the ponytail would show up as an anomaly. So 

it is through some basic retraining to say, okay, even though that 

is showing up on this generic outline of a person as an anomaly, 

with a quick physical inspection, just looking at it, you can probably assess whether there is any type of explosives or anything in 

that ponytail. 

So that is where we try to do immediate retraining and just say, 

look, take a quick look and do that. So I can give you the specifics, 

if you would like, in terms of all of the training. 

Mr. DENT. How many second chances does a TSO receive? How 

many second chances would they receive in the event that they 

keep misidentifying? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, so they go—every TSO has an annual requirement of being tested and passing that test. So if you are talking 

about that, that is one, and if they do not pass that test, they are 

given another opportunity. If they do not pass, then they are fired 

or let go. 

But if it is something on the job, if they miss something, it would 

be difficult to know that it has been missed unless it was an inspector general or a government accountability office testing our 

own TSA office and inspection testing, and so they are given feedback. And that factors into whether they keep their jobs or not. 

TRANSIT SECURITY GRANTS

Mr. DENT. If I could just quickly change subjects. Since Fiscal 

Year 2006, I think there is about 1.5 billion in transit security 

grants that have been appropriated and awarded, obligated, I 

guess, but only about 122 million has been drawn down. So that 

is about 92 percent of funds, I think, that remain unspent. 

So it is not much of an improvement from last year. What are 

we doing to help unclog this pipeline? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So there are two aspects of that. One is the processing time it has taken between TSA and FEMA, and that has 

been problematic in the past, but it is improving. So I can give you 

the specific figures, but it has gone from months and months of 

delays down to weeks or perhaps a month in general terms. 

That is one aspect. On the budget side of it, what we have found 

is that most of these grants, they have actually—the funds have actually been expended and the projects completed, but they have not 

invoiced those back to TSA and FEMA. And so it is simply a matter of them doing that within the five-year period to make sure 

that those funds are accounted for properly. 


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So the 92-percent figure is a little bit misleading from the standpoint that many of those projects have either been started, or some 

have actually been completed. 

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Mr. DENT. And one other quick question. Earlier this year, you 

announced that the TSOs are going to have the opportunity to vote 

for or against union representation. I understand the authority is 

pursuant to the Aviation Transportation Security Act. That was the 

basis of the decision, I guess. 

Can you describe what led you to this final decision and this assessment? 

Mr. PISTOLE. As you mentioned, ATSA, the Aviation Transportation Security Act, gave the Administrator the authority and discretion to decide whether the security officers should be afforded 

the right to vote on whether they want collective bargaining or not. 

In the course of doing town hall meetings around the country 

with TSOs, and then mid-level management, and then executives, 

there are a couple common themes. One was low pay that the TSOs 

were receiving. The second was a frustration over some of the midmanagement practices that seemed inconsistent, contrary to what 

I would want to see as a national program. And I learned that 

13,000 of the security officers were already paying union dues without collective bargaining. So there was a lot of frustration about 

just some of these issues. 

Under ATSA, because of the broad discretions that it gave me, 

I was allowed to say what I would include in collective bargaining 

or not, if I went that way. So, for example, just like going through 

a cafeteria, I would say, okay, this could be subject to collective 

bargaining. But because this relates to security, I am not going to 

allow anything involving security to be subject to collective bargaining. Only at the national level, so we would not have local bargaining units, to have a streamlined process that could perhaps address some of the issues over frustration of what is the uniform of 

the day. What shifts can I bid on? Things like that. 

Mr. DENT. Is election going to take place this spring? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The election started last Wednesday and runs 

through April 19th. And that is the good point. The Federal Labor 

Relations Authority ordered an election be held this spring. 

Mr. DENT. Secret ballots, too? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, secret ballots, sure, electronic, yes. So they ordered an election be held. So my determination was simply a matter of informing them of what they would be voting on. So it is not 

a traditional collective bargaining agreement by any means. And it 

is unique within the Federal government, if not labor-management 

relations. 

Mr. DENT. I yield back then. I think my time has expired. 

TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAM: EXPEDITED SCREENING

Mr. ADERHOLT. Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. You said that expedited screening at checkpoints makes sense because it is select security and it is an efficient use of our resources. And you are going to be introducing this 

new expedited screening system for commercial pilots. 


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The 9/11 Commission recommended that both pilots and flight 

attendants have equal access to expedited screening. Now, flight 

attendants, as I understand it, go through the same background 

checks as pilots. And there are many more flight attendants that 

are going through the airport than there are pilots. So if efficiency 

is one of the criteria, my question is why were they not included, 

and when will they be? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So I wanted to make sure that the system for the 

more identity-based screening for pilots was working well before we 

extended that to the flight attendants, recognizing the critical role 

the flight attendants play. But it really came down to the two factors of the pilots being in charge of the aircraft and being the ones 

with the ability to cause most harm if they chose to do that, as we 

saw in the Egypt Air 990 crash off the coast of Rhode Island on 

Halloween night, 1999, when the copilot put the aircraft down. 

So I want to make sure it is working well with the pilots group. 

We have met with the Flight Attendants Association and heard 

their views, and looking at that as part of this risk-based approach. 

So it is a matter of getting it right for the pilots, and then assuming we can work through some of those issues, I am considering extending that to the flight attendants. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. So once you get it right, then it will be extended? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I have not made that final decision. There are a lot 

of other issues involved there. But I can see the benefits in that. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Well, maybe we do not have the time now, 

but find out what those issues are—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD [continuing]. Again given the fact that they 

go through the same background checks, and if there is some kind 

of an attack, they are the first line of defense on the plane. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. So it really does not make any sense, at 

least from my perspective. There seems to be this double standard. 

I know that right after 9/11, pilots were given certain types of 

training. We had to fight to get flight attendants training in those 

kinds of incidents. 

So I would like to follow up with you on this. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Just to have a better understanding of 

what is going on there. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Okay. 

PRIVATE SCREENING: PERSONNEL

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. There are an increasing number of U.S. airports considering switching from TSA screening to private contractors. And as I understand it, already 16 U.S. airports, including 

San Francisco and Kansas City International, use private screening personnel. 

However, according to The Washington Post, some experts have 

raised concerns about this arrangement, arguing that a uniform 

government system makes more sense. Federal officials also say 

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cials say the switch to a network of privately run screeners could 

hinder much of the government’s progress since the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attack. 

Do you agree with the statements that have been made? And 

what criteria does TSA use to evaluate contractors and their employees? And do they have to meet the same level of training as 

TSA employees do? And do you also make sure that those employees go through the same kind of security background checks, and 

what kind of oversight procedures do you have in place to ensure 

that these companies are operating as they should? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So there are the 16 privatized airports, and there 

have been for several years. ATSA was passed, and there was an 

option given to private airports to come in and apply for private 

screening. And the 16 and a handful of others have applied. I announced the decision in January that I was not planning to expand 

the program, absent some compelling reason to do so. 

Fundamentally, I believe that the security officers for baggage, 

for passengers, should be a federalized work force. I see TSA as one 

component of the U.S. Government’s national security mission and 

counter-terrorism focus. 

So that being said, I am also open to those who can provide either the same level of security, because as you correctly noted, they 

have to follow all the TSA rules and mandates for how they are 

screened, whether it is using AIT or pat-downs or whatever it is, 

with TSA oversight, management, and follow-up. 

But if an airport authority has a business model, a security 

model that is new, innovative, more cost-efficient, then I am open 

to reviewing that. We have one pending right now that I have not 

made a decision on, but some of the options were to terminate the 

16. I did not feel like that was appropriate, because I think there 

can be some innovation and best practices that can come from 

those. And perhaps another one that we have not seen. 

I am also changing the process, the application process, because 

basically a one-page form saying yes, we are interested in being 

considered; I want to give airports the opportunity to demonstrate 

in their proposal or the application what new and innovative issues 

they may have. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Carter. 

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Administrator, I appreciate you 

being here. And I have questions about the collective bargaining 

rights that are being voted on right now. 

I am curious. I hear you say that the collective bargaining would 

include their uniform and their scheduling. Would it also include 

their salary? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Mr. CARTER. Would they be able to collective-bargain for instance 

on the issue of private security. Can they bargain against that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Mr. CARTER. What tools do they have if the things they ask for 

are refused? Can they strike? Slowdown? 


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Mr. PISTOLE. No, absolutely not. Yes, it is like all Federal employees. They would not be able to strike or slowdown. If they did 

that, they would be let go. 

Mr. CARTER. On the issue of scheduling, and how we schedule. 

My brother-in-law was a pilot. Pilots schedule by seniority. Senior 

people get the first choice and so forth. Quite honestly, they always 

choose to avoid having to work on the holidays, if they can help it. 

I would expect if you do that same system, that would be the 

same system. But then, I would also argue with my brother-in-law 

that that means if I am flying on Christmas, I am flying with the 

least-experienced pilot, which does not make me rest well. 

But more importantly, I am what you call a frequent flyer, not 

by choice, but by the occupation I have chosen. And I can tell you 

that I have experienced, on multiple occasions, more than I can 

count on both hands, a situation where you are training a person 

to operate the screen as the belt goes by. And they, by definition, 

are slow. They are calling over their people to check, double-check 

their work all the time. 

And if they are making the choices as to who works on the holidays, is that not going to be of great inconvenience to the traveler? 

But more importantly, our enemies seem to have, at least recently, 

chosen those crowded holiday times to try to get their weapons on 

board. I am talking about the underwear bomber and some of those 

others, so that they can do damage at a prime time. 

How does this collective bargaining enhance the safety, in light 

of the fact that you are probably going to be collective bargaining 

for the least experienced to be working on the most crowded days? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So a lot of that comes down to individual situations 

and preferences. Because some want to work the holidays, nights, 

weekends, for the differential on pay. Because we do have that 

built in. 

So with seniority, some, I believe, would choose to work those 

times simply for the additional pay, because they are not the bestpaid employees in the Federal Government to start with. So that 

is one issue. 

On the terrorist side, even though the Christmas Day bomber, 

Abdulmutallab, flew on Christmas Day, it was not designed as a 

Christmas Day attack. It was more his convenience of coming here, 

as you are aware. Of course, all the controversy over Thanksgiving; 

there was no specific plot. 

To your point, when we do have holidays, we actually have a significant surge capability, which will continue whether there is collective bargaining or not. And that is one of the things I was talking about. As it relates to security, my determination was that 

there would be no negotiating, no bargaining over security issues. 

So that means that if we need people working on Thanksgiving, 

then that is when they will work. 

And as you saw hopefully if you were traveling over Thanksgiving, you found limited wait times. And I think that over two 

million people traveled each day around the Thanksgiving holidays, 

and there are very few wait times over 30 minutes around all 453 

airports around the country. So that is because we had that surge 

capability. 


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So what I see the collective-bargaining doing is being able to address some of these underlying issues internal to TSA administrative issues, if you will, as to work conditions, uniforms, things like 

that, shifts. We have got almost 25 percent of our employees are 

part time, before cost efficiencies. Because as in rush hours in most 

major cities, we have, in most airports we have a morning rush and 

an afternoon rush. So during the middle of the day, we do not need 

all those people there. 

So again, almost 25 percent of our employees are part-time, from 

a cost efficiency standpoint. Some of them do a split shift, where 

they work in the morning 4 hours, and then be off for 2 or 3 hours. 

For those we try to afford training or additional educational opportunities. We have community colleges come in and do classes, and 

some people working toward Associate’s degrees, and then they will 

go back to their second shift. 

So the whole construct is to provide the best security at the best 

price, if you will, in the most efficient way. And keep it going so 

people do get through. 

Mr. CARTER. The fact that you are using part-time would not be 

something that the union could collective-bargain about? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So no, as it relates to which shift they would be 

working on, that would be subject to it. But not whether they are 

part-time or full-time, or things like that. 

And again, that is one of the unique authorities under ATSA. If 

it was a traditional collective bargaining agreement, there would 

have been a whole different discussion and decision. 

Mr. CARTER. Do you feel confident that you can assure us that 

the most qualified people will be in the place? I am looking at this 

GAO report, where the guy got through Houston security—which 

is important to me since I fly through there with a loaded handgun. And that does not build the confidence in the people that fly 

on that airplane. I learned the hard way when I first came up here 

that even having a broken-apart handgun and three bags is not allowed in baggage storage. I am still trying to figure out how I 

would be able to use that gun. 

Anyway, but this guy gets through with a loaded handgun. I am 

worried about the most experienced people being there, especially 

at the most heavily traveled times in America. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I appreciate your concern. 

Mr. CARTER. If you can assure me that is going to happen. 

Mr. PISTOLE. It has, obviously. We have been successful over the 

time since 9/11. 

Mr. CARTER. Collective bargaining will not interfere with that in 

any way? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Will not interfere with that. No, sir. 

PASSENGER SCREENING: IDENTIFYING HIGH-RISK TRAVELERS

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. Mr. Culberson. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Administrator, 

I wanted to ask initially about the, on a cargo screening, as I recall 

from our discussion last year I think, and the TSA has implemented procedures and policies after the Yemeni bombing, the attempted bombing, using toner cartridges on a printer. And look at 

the way the GAO described your cargo screening. 


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You require additional screening for high-risk cargo. And as I recall, one of the obvious ways you identify high-risk cargo is country 

of origin; if it has got characteristics of not only from the country 

of origin, if it is a country with a history of either they do not have 

adequate security for screening their own cargo that is coming to 

the U.S., or they have got a history of harboring terrorists, right? 

So you have objective criteria for identifying high-risk cargo 

based on those characteristics. Yet I also discovered—I am delighted to have Chairman Mica here, and I appreciate very much 

Chairman Aderholt letting Mr. Mica sit in on this—you have no 

such criteria for passengers. 

I discovered the reason that the U.S. Army, that terrible tragedy 

occurred at Fort Hood, is because the Army can spot, had policies 

in place to spot Communists, they had policies in place to spot 

white supremacists, like Aryan Nation or other, you know, psychos. 

But they had no policy in place to spot Muslim radical extremists. 

And similarly, last year I asked your predecessor to identify for 

me, tell me the statute, show me the policy, show me the statutory 

prohibition that prevents the TSA from using objective commonsense law enforcement criteria to provide additional screening to 

the individuals who, you know, you have got young Middle Eastern 

males that are responsible for 100 percent of the terrorist attacks 

in the United States. We know that they are pounding on airport 

security. I think the Navy or the Pentagon told me they have got 

millions of cyber-attacks every day on the Pentagon. 

These guys are obsessed with getting on another aircraft. I mean, 

this is their top priority. So we know they are pounding on us. And 

we know who is doing it: It is young Muslim men. Obviously extremists, psycho criminals. But they are all 100 percent young 

Muslim males. 

Yet you have a policy that prohibits your employees from providing additional screening to individuals that meet that objective 

criteria. Yet you inspect cargo. You give additional inspection to a 

box that meets those criteria, but you will not provide additional 

screening to an individual that meets those objective criteria. 

Do you see the inconsistency and the danger that you expose the 

country to by refusing to give additional screening to individuals 

who clearly fall within the category of potentially posing a threat 

to airport security? The inconsistency there is extremely dangerous. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, so a number of issues. During my two and a 

half decades with the FBI, I saw a number of non-Muslims commit 

terrorist actions in the U.S., whether it was Timothy McVeigh in 

Oklahoma City; Eric Rudolph, the Atlanta bomber; Ted Kaczynski, 

the Unabomber. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Sure, right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So one of the things we try to do is not just look 

for who the person may be, but what are they, what do we know 

about them from an intelligence standpoint. 

Every last point of departure to the U.S. from overseas, we do 

have enhanced screening for everybody. So they actually go beyond 

what their own requirements are, for example, within the European Union. So we do have that higher level of screening. 

Mr. CULBERSON. For everybody. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 


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PASSENGER SCREENING: PROFILING

Mr. CULBERSON. But my point is you have a policy that prohibits 

singling out any individual based on their race or ethnicity, and 

based on—I mean, these are just common-sense law enforcement 

techniques. 

If you have got 100 percent of these attacks that have been made 

on the United States by terrorists since 9/11, and even before that, 

have been conducted by—I mean, if you are in the FBI, the FBI, 

I mean, this is just common-sense law enforcement. It has nothing 

to do with racial profiling; this is just common-sense law enforcement. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And that is what we did in the Bureau, and that 

is what we do in TSA, in terms of trying to identify who may be 

a threat based on the intelligence. Not because of their religion, 

their ethnicity, their age. There have been two 64-year-old grandparents, one woman, one man, who blew themselves up in the last 

10 years, one in Tunisia, one in the West Bank. 

So people say well, why do you screen grandmothers? Well, because we do not know who is going to be a threat. 

Mr. CULBERSON. In wheelchairs and other things, you know they 

are going to try to hide things in? 

Mr. PISTOLE. A 77-year-old woman in a wheelchair who would 

not give up her bag at screening. And she was blind, supposedly. 

And finally they said look, you have got to have the bag go through 

screening. She took her handbag and got up and ran away. So it 

turned out yes, she was a 77-year-old grandmother, but she did not 

need a wheelchair and she was not blind. She was smuggling 

drugs. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Sure, and I understand that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So that is the difficulty of profiling, if you will, because we do not know who the terrorists will be. And like I say, 

McVeigh, Kaczynski, Rudolph. Who is not to say the next person 

to get on a flight may be a white male born and bred here, born 

and raised here? 

Mr. CULBERSON. But my concern is you have got a policy like the 

U.S. Army did, where you have got a deliberate blind spot where 

you will not give additional screening to individuals who meet 

these objective, absolutely objective criteria, where 100 percent of 

these folks fall within. 

You have got, for example, this new spot program you are implementing, where you are focusing on behaviors and appearances 

that deviate from an established base line. What I am trying to understand is, why do you have a policy in place that prohibits you 

from providing additional screening to young Muslim males? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I guess I will use Abdulmutallab as an example. 

Here he was, he is the son of a very wealthy Nigerian banker who 

used to be the head of their, basically the Treasury Secretary. 

Multi-millionaire. Yes, he was Muslim, but he is African. He would 

not necessarily have met that profile that you are describing as a 

Middle Eastern male. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Young Muslim males. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Okay. So then if we start doing additional screening for all Muslims, I do not think that is a proper approach to use. 


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So we just fundamentally disagree on how we should be going 

about doing it. 

I am looking for a person who poses a problem, regardless of the 

ethnicity, race, sex, or age. So I am looking for the person who is 

going to be a putative terrorist because of what is in their head, 

and I am trying to use intelligence in an informed fashion to do 

more identity-based screening before the person ever gets to the 

airport. So that is part of this risk-based approach I am trying to 

use, in a way that does not profile because the person is a certain 

fill-in-the-blank, but because of who they are, and their background, and what the intelligence community and law enforcement 

community tells us about the person. 

Mr. CULBERSON. I understand, and that is fine. What I am trying 

to get at is what policy, what statute or policy prohibits you from 

profiling? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would not cite a specific statute, just based on the 

U.S. Government’s approach for particular U.S. persons, many of 

whom, as you say, are here, regardless of ethnicity. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Time has expired. We are honored to have the 

Chairman of the full Committee of Transportation before us today. 

And he has joined us. And we have unanimous consent for him to 

join us in this first round of questioning. 

So Mr. Mica, we would turn to you. 

TSO SALARIES

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you. And I had planned to sit quietly by 

the side and observe, but I appreciate your hospitality. I would extend the same courtesy to members of our committee, but appreciate the fine work you are doing, and the important responsibility 

you have in properly funding our transportation security activities. 

As I walked in, I heard the TSA Administrator talking. I guess 

the question must have been around granting some of the, oh, collective bargaining rights. And I think he spoke to low TSO salaries. 

What is the beginning salary for a TSO officer, Mr. Administrator? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So the average for a full-time security officer is 

around $28,000. 

Mr. MICA. Twenty-eight thousand, okay. And we have how many 

TSO officers? Now, I see there are approximately 58,000 non-headquarters personnel to total in the sixty thousand-something range. 

How many of those are TSOs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are approximately 47,000 who are security 

officers, out of the approximately—the Federal Air Marshall figure, 

as you know, is classified, so I will not reveal that. 

Mr. MICA. But those are TSOs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The TSOs who may be behavior protection officers, 

bomb appraisal, document checkers, and things like that. 

Mr. MICA. I raise that because the information I had is 3,770, 

personnel in Washington, D.C., making an average of $105,000 a 

year. 

So then in addition we have—and the committee should look into 

that, if they would verify those figures. Then we have another 

9,300 administrative personnel out in the field. 

Now, having set this system up, as the Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, we started out with 


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16,500 private screeners. Never in my wildest imagination would 

we get to 60,000, and that number of bureaucrats. 

Now, to give you a better idea, we have how many commercial 

airports, about 430? 

Mr. PISTOLE. 453, some seasonal, maybe 457. 

Mr. MICA. And for the committee’s edification, 29 airports handle 

75 percent of the passengers. So most of the rest of the airports are 

relatively small. 

If you take 13,000 people, including 9,337 odd administrative 

personnel, that is an average about 30 administrators for every airport out there. Administrative personnel. 

I met with the administrator, and I asked him, and I will ask 

him again. He needs to get someone who knows how to manage 

people, some sort of efficiency study. There should not be more 

than 1,000 administrative personnel in Washington, D.C., and 

there should be a dramatically reduced number out in the field. 

I would urge the committee to look at what is going on. I challenge any of you to talk to a couple of administrative personnel 

who work at any airport. Get their card. And you do not have to 

get their name, but their position, and see how much they are making. There are countless positions that were never anticipated. 

PRIVATE SCREENING

But I would also ask the Administrator for information on the 16 

private screening operations. We received some of that information. 

I would love to put in the record what we received as the number 

of personnel. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. MICA. For example, here is Kansas City. I asked for how 

many TSA personnel over and above the private screening personnel they had. In Kansas City they gave me 26. We found a total 

of 51 personnel. I asked them to recalculate that, and they came 

back with 43. We have a list of the positions that they have at that 

airport. Totally unnecessary. 

And what I maintain, Mr. Administrator, if this is done, GAO 

uncovered part of this, is that TSA is cooking the books to make 

it look like the private screening, under Federal supervision, costs 

more. 

GAO’s initial response, after I had them look at it, said that 

there was a 3 percent cost differential as opposed to 17 percent. 

And I submit for the record, here is Rochester and we have other 

airports, I would request your committee, since they have been reluctant in giving us the accurate information, on getting that information to see the mass of unneeded positions, particularly at these 

private screening airports. 

BEHAVIOR DETECTION PROGRAM

I do not have much time, but if this committee funds the SPOT 

program for 350 more positions, you all need to have some serious 

counseling. Go back and look at the GAO review of this program. 

I helped initiate the SPOT-type program. And I can tell you that 

it was not implemented in the fashion it should be implemented in. 

The person that gets the ticket is the person who should be asking 

a question, if necessary. They have people standing around at a 

distance in a distorted version of any type of a behavior protection 

program. And asking for more, it is almost an insult. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY

If you look at the advanced imaging technology, to deploy that 

equipment in the manner in which it is deployed, in the way it is 

used, is an absolute joke. Any of you can defy that system. I defy 

it every time, because I try to refuse to go through their equipment. 

And if you have not had a briefing on the results of the testing 

of the equipment, which I had done in December—everyone should 

be required, who is a Member of Congress, to see the results of that 

advanced imaging detection. The results are classified. But it is not 

acceptable. 

And to give them more personnel to operate equipment which 

was not properly vetted before it was deployed in the first place, 

and then the deployment of it. It could be used. But you see the 

performance of it. 

The deployment is a joke. You can thwart it nationally, you can 

thwart it at Orlando, any airport. Just pick your lane, because even 

with the equipment that they have bought, it is not properly deployed to be used as secondary screening, or even primary screening for that matter. 

So this is all about the budget. We have not gotten into, and we 

do not have time to get into, personnel and attrition rates. They 

have trained probably a total of what, 120,000 personnel? They 

have twice as many people that they have trained than they have 


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working. They spent a billion dollars in that training. So they come 

back and say all we need is more training. 

I am telling you, this agency cries out for some oversight from 

this committee. I do not have legislative jurisdiction. And then the 

3,700 people that are in Washington, D.C., spend their time providing information to the Administrator, to allow him to make him 

decisions. Which I do not think, if he had all the facts, he would 

make in that fashion. 

BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION

So that is just the opening. I did not get into the ID fiasco. Not 

having a biometric ID, which we have ordered in Congress at least 

four times for a pilot 6 years ago. They spent $10 million on that. 

Now the FAA blames TSA, and TSA blames Homeland Security. 

Incidentally, I met with the Coast Guard the other day. They 

have, they showed it to me, an ID, with a biometric measure. They 

use it to access any of their computers, from any place. 

Here we have, after asking for a durable ID with a pilot’s picture 

on it, with a biometric measure, a card that is a joke. When I tell 

people the only pilot photo on the ID produced is Wilbur and 

Orville Wright, they think I am kidding, but that is the truth. This 

biometric measure does not work. 

So there is a lot of staff work here. I challenge the staff to work 

with our staff. I thank you for giving me a couple minutes. But we 

have a serious situation on our hands, and it demands your attention. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Well, thank you, Chairman Mica. I think you 

raise some issues that certainly we want to look at, that we need 

to look at, and will look into. And our staff here on the Subcommittee of Appropriations on Homeland Security will be happy 

to work with your staff on transportation to try to work on some 

of these issues. 

And if you have got a segment that you want to enter into the 

record, I would ask unanimous consent that it would be put into 

the record. 

So again, thank you for being here. 

Mr. MICA. No, sir. I might say, those are just some of the conflicting statistics on personnel that we received from TSA, and that 

we actually have in place. We will give you more if you like. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Again, we thank you for being here, and 

we will definitely work with you on this to see how we can make— 

I think our goal for everyone here would be that TSA, whether it 

be the subcommittee or the Congress in general, is to make TSA 

more effective and more cost-effective. And we want to work together to make sure that happens on all accounts. 

So we, again, thank you for your presence here this morning. 

VIPR TEAMS

Let me switch gears just a minute, and talk about the VIPR, the 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams. Your budget 

proposes $26.8 million for 12 new Visible Intermodal Prevention 

and Response teams, and I will refer to it as VIPR after this, which 

will bring the total number of teams to 37 nationwide. 


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I understand you plan to assign these to new locations based on 

an assessment of the impact on terrorist risk reduction. While 

there is clearly a need for the skills that VIPR teams have, it is 

also true that there are similar capabilities in State, local, and 

Transportation Authority agencies. 

Could you talk a minute, a little bit about the unique value offered by the VIPR approach to prevention and response, rather 

than relying on other agencies? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And obviously, we work 

in partnership with State and local law enforcement agencies in 

terms of trying to do something that would be a deterrent to terrorists, that may be a way of being both unpredictable, because of a 

show of force, but also something that is cost-effective from the 

standpoint of using State and local law enforcement officers as part 

of these VIPRs, or ‘‘vipers,’’ as we call them. 

Using two case studies as an example, the July 7 bombers in the 

London subway, the tube there. We know that they had the 

backpacks on, they are going into the subway, or the one got on 

the bus. And one of them even looked at the closed-circuit television camera as he was going in, because he knew in 10 minutes 

he would be dead, and as many people with him could be. 

But from de-briefings of people who have cooperated with the 

U.S. Government, we have learned that there are several things 

that are a deterrent. One is the CCTV, as long as you are not a 

suicide bomber. But the other two key ones are uniformed officers 

or K–9s. 

So what we try to do with the VIPR teams is be random and unpredictable. We break them into surface and then multimodal, so 

there may be opportunities at airports. And we did about 7,500 last 

year almost equally between surface and aviation multimodal. 

So for example, Union Station here in Washington. We may have 

a VIPR team that is there Tuesday at 10:00 as a visible presence 

of police, armed police, and K–9s. And so if we have an individual, 

such as Abdul mutallah, with a bomb on his person, well concealed, 

if he sees that presence, there is a good possibility that he may return and try it another time. And hopefully he would be picked up 

through intelligence or otherwise before he has another attempt. 

The recent Moscow Airport bombing is another type of terrorist 

activity, where they do not get on the aircraft, but the individual 

goes in with luggage and blows up himself in the luggage retrieval 

area. 

So the VIPR teams would also be effective from that type of visible preventive response, or prevention. To say if an individual like 

that walks into an airport or a train station and sees this visible 

presence, that the hope is, and the whole theory behind this is, 

that any time we can push away a possible terrorist to make him 

come back another day, you get this multiple, more opportunities 

to identify and intercept that person. 

So we augment what we do with the State and local law enforcement. We do some grants, in terms of training. We are also very 

excited by Vapor Wake dogs, those that are trained in the detection 

of explosives after they have gone past. 

So for example, the individuals in London on July 7, 2005, they 

walk past, they are walking to the subway, to the tube. And they 


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have got their backpacks with explosives. A dog would not necessarily have to hit on that bag or identify that bag at the point 

where most bomb-sniffing dogs are, but would be able to pick up 

on the vapor wake left behind by the explosives, and then be able 

to follow that. 

And we have tested that here in Union Station with good results. 

So Auburn University does that, that type of training. And so that 

is why we are interested in doing more training in that regard. 

And that is why we are looking to try to work with State and 

locals, recognizing their budget limitations in most instances, 

across the country this year, to try to be a force multiplier in partnership with them. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. It is my understanding in 2010, that TSA funded 

some cooperative agreements with State and with local law enforcement to partially reimburse airports for cost of security at checkpoints. 

Is this funding allocated according to risk? And how much State 

and local support meshes with TSA operations? 

Mr. PISTOLE. And just for context, is this within the Transportation Grant Program? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. With the VIPR. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Oh, with the VIPRs? So I am not quite sure what 

you are asking, with the VIPRs. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. I understand back, like I say, in 2010, that there 

were several cooperative agreements with State and local law enforcements to partially reimburse airports in this regard, at the 

checkpoints. 

Is the funding allocated according to risk? And how much does 

the State and local support mesh with TSA? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Okay. So the funding is, I mean, the whole deployment is using a risk-based approach. So there is a risk assessment 

that has been conducted of the transportation security, TSSRA, 

Transportation Sector Security, Risk Assessment, which identifies 

higher risk areas and things. So that is one part of it. 

And if it is particularly related to K–9s, we have two parts, one 

that we provide the, we train the dogs and provide those to State 

and local law enforcement. And I would have to go back and look 

at whether that was 9 or 10 that we actually provided additional 

incidental costs with that, which we do not have in the 2012 budget, I do not believe. So I would have to get more information to be 

more precise in the answer. If I could follow up on that. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Yes, sure, you can submit that for the record. 

That would be great. 

[The information follows:] 


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SCREENING OPERATIONS

Mr. ADERHOLT. Before I go on to Mr. Price, let me follow up on 

one issue that was mentioned earlier. In your opening testimony 

you talked about it, and we discussed the fact that there would be 

different categories and different, as the, I think, frequent travelers, infrequent travelers. 

Is there a timetable to try to move forward with these changes? 

Or what is your, give us some idea of what you expect in that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had several groups within TSA working on different risk-based and intelligence-driven strategies. And my hope is that we will be able to 

pilot some of these still this year, in cooperation with airlines and 

airports, and travelers obviously. So I do not want to commit too 

much more beyond that, because there are some details that we 

have to take care of. 

But clearly, the intent is to move in that direction with deliberate speed, and to make sure that the American people are open 

to it and willing to do that in a risk-based fashion. 

So some time this year, and I would be glad to follow up with 

the committee later on as things develop. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. This calendar year, you expect it. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is my hope, yes. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Mr. Price. 

AIR CARGO SECURITY

Mr. PRICE. I want to first go back briefly to your earlier answer 

on the 100 percent air cargo screening. That is, with respect to 

cargo stowed in passenger aircraft. 

You gave a rather detailed account of the challenges of this internationally, and some of the cooperative work you have underway. 

But I want to make sure that we do understand the budgetary implications of this. And you may want to furnish some further information for the record along those lines. 

As I understand it, you are still saying that three months into 

Fiscal Year 2012—namely, by December 31 of this year—you do 

anticipate having that 100 percent capacity in place. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is clearly the goal. But I do want to manage 

expectations. 

There are two aspects to it, and I apologize if I was confusing 

earlier. The air carriers could self-certify that they are at 100 percent. We do not have a way of verifying or validating that by the 

end of this year. So it would be an assertion, a statement by the 

carriers around the world to say yes, anything coming into the U.S. 

has been properly screened. But we do not have a way of independently validating that by the end of this year. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, it is very important, obviously, to have that capacity to validate. Well then, the question about what kind of actual timeframe we are looking at here is relevant. Do you expect 

100 percent of those carriers to make that claim, or express that 

intent by December 31? And then what about the follow-on effort 

at validation? What are we realistically looking at? And obviously 

there is a question about the money and personnel this will require, particularly with that validation aspect. 


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Mr. PISTOLE. Right. And you are right on point, Congressman. So 

the issue for us becomes how can we work with foreign governments and carriers, such as through this National Cargo Security 

Program that I mentioned, that France has been accepted as meeting the same standards. 

So we recognize we cannot be all things, all places, all people, all 

times. And so as we can leverage those relationships, that is the 

way that I believe we will get to 100 percent. 

To answer your question about by the end of the year, I think 

the carriers would say they would be close, and that they would be 

at 100 percent for all, what has been referred to as high-risk cargo, 

on passenger planes. The challenge becomes, and we are actually 

changing the language a little bit, going from high-risk to known 

shippers and known shipments. 

And so as the carriers focus more on the customer relationship 

and the actual cargo freight packages that they are picking up, 

they will do a lot beyond what we could verify, simply because it 

is good business practice. 

The bottom line is, in discussions with industry, nobody wants a 

plane to blow up. So what steps are they taking beyond what we 

can validate or verify? And we have very good success in that regard. 

But I want to be realistic. I do not think that December 31, 2011, 

is a date that we can say with the highest level of confidence that 

there will be 100 percent of cargo screening coming into the U.S. 

Mr. PRICE. We obviously need to stay abreast of this, and to understand exactly what we are talking about when we receive assurances that this screening will be comprehensive. In our discussions 

with you and last week regarding the Container Security Initiative 

overseas, what it takes to validate that system are complicated 

matters. These agreements with overseas partners clearly require 

a high level of continuing scrutiny. And they almost become diplomatic efforts sometimes. So I am not satisfied that this budget fully 

incorporates what this program is going to require. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Congressman, both for your support 

and your appreciation for some of the complexities and subtleties 

and nuances. Because you are right; there is a lot of diplomacy involved in these discussions. 

And we have the strong support of the State Department in 

doing those with host governments. Because there is a cost, obviously, involved on their end, and not everybody is willing to take 

on additional costs voluntarily. So that is why we have to work 

through the host governments to either enhance capacity—I will 

just use Yemen as an example. 

So when I went there in early November last year to assess what 

was needed, they have their cargo facility in their main airport. 

And so now they had one X-ray machine to screen small pieces of 

cargo, nothing big. You know, freight or anything like that. They 

had no explosive trace detection, they had no K-9. They are lacking 

a lot of things that we would say are basics here. 

So we actually sent a team in and trained almost 300 of their 

officers in enhanced physical inspection. And we loaned them some 

explosive trace detection equipment, handheld devices, and proVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00250 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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vided two additional, two State Department additional X-ray machines. 

Mr. PRICE. All right, so the State Department is the critical 

phrase there. Insofar as there is equipment offered, it is through 

the State Department. 

However, your budget should reflect training, oversight, what 

you regard as validation, properly speaking. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, the State paid for a good part of that. But you 

are absolutely right; we will be looking for that, I believe, in 2013. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Carter. 

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to go back to trying to figure this out. I am from Texas; I am from a right-to-work 

state. I do not have a lot of experience with unions and collective 

bargaining. 

You made a statement that there are how many members of the 

TSA that have already joined the union? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are 13,000 security officers who are paying 

union dues, without collective bargaining. 

Mr. CARTER. First, I do not understand why somebody would do 

that. Just because they like unions? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So if they have—— 

Mr. CARTER. You give money to them, but they do not give any 

services? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, so yes, they could be represented, in a disciplinary proceeding, for example, individually. But there is no collective bargaining for the union. 

Mr. CARTER. That kind of leads to my question. Let us assume 

that some of what Chairman Mica had to say has validity; that you 

are a little bit heavy in the employment area. You have maybe 

some dead-weight people in the TSA. 

Let us assume that you did your own investigation, and you discovered what Chairman Mica said had a lot of truth to it. And as 

a good manager, you decide that you need to lay off, pick a number, 

13,000 people from the TSA. Would you have to negotiate with the 

union and collective bargaining to do that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely not, no. And that is one of the beauties 

of this, this hybrid, if you will, because that would not be subject 

to. 

So the number of employees, their pay, benefits, anything related 

to security would not be implicated in that. 

And if I may, even though I did not hear Chairman Mica actually 

ask a question, the one thing—— 

Mr. CARTER. That is true. 

Mr. PISTOLE. The one suggestion he made, I am taking him up 

on that, in terms of doing an efficiency review of headquarters, of 

TSA headquarters. 

So the best number I have, as opposed to the 4,000 that he mentioned at one point, and another number at a different point, is 

around 2,700 for the whole D.C. area. But that includes more than 

just our headquarters. There other parts of that. 


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And just doing a quick comparison of ratios of other Federal 

agencies, we are much below some other Federal agencies. Not to 

say we are efficient, but just in comparison. 

So as my dad, who was a preacher and a seminary professor, he 

would say text without context is pretext. So I think something 

could be pulled out of context, and you can prove about anything 

you want. You know, I practiced law a couple years and was able 

to do that a few times. 

But my point being, I agree an efficiency review should be done, 

and I am planning to do that. And if I find inefficiencies, then absolutely, I want to move forward with that to make us the leanest, 

the best agency we can be. So I am completely committed to that. 

Mr. CARTER. That would be commendable. If they have paid 

union dues, then on disciplinary matters the union would intervene 

on their behalf and be able to negotiate for them. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So they could, on an individual basis, yes. 

Mr. CARTER. The fact that they are getting laid off because we 

do not need the job any more—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is not subject. 

Mr. CARTER [continuing]. You could not negotiate on those 

things. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right, right. 

SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM

Mr. CARTER. One last question, if I have time. Right now you 

have an established TRIP program to process appeals for people 

that have been, oh, if it is a no-fly list, or if they have been 

misidentified for some reason as people who cannot fly. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Mr. CARTER. How successful have you found the TSA TRIP program to be? Were there lessons learned from the first few years of 

the program? And does the fiscal year 2012 budget provide for 

these lessons learned and continued improvement in this program? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So the Redress program has had fits and starts, 

and I guess I would say it is on the improvement trajectory overall. 

That being said, the implementation of secure flight last year has 

reduced the number of misidentifications, because now we have the 

name, date of birth, and gender. Which if any one of those three— 

you would hope gender would not be off—but if those would be off, 

that has led to a number of misidentifications. And some of the 

horror stories we have heard from the years since implementation 

of Secure Flight, I do not have the numbers off the top of my head, 

but I will get those, in terms of those misidentifications, how those 

have significantly decreased. 

[The information follows:] 

Mr. CARTER. Please provide the budget for DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) for FY 2012 as compared to FY 2011, and the number of redresses for 

both years. 

Response: The budget for DHS TRIP, which provides redress services for inaccurate matches against the Watchlists, for FY 2011 is $1.157 million. The Administration’s budget request for FY 2012 anticipates operating the program at the same 

level as the previous year. 

In FY 2010, the total number of redress inquiries received was 41,344; the average monthly volume was 3,445. In the first 6 months of FY 2011, the total number 

of redress inquiries received was 15,925; with an average monthly volume of 2,654. 


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Secure Flight was fully implemented by the end of Calendar Year 2010. 

is the first episode. 

There should be fewer people needing redress through TRIP at 

the outset, so that is the good news. And I will have to get back 

to you on the, for the 2012 budget in terms of what we have for 

that, in terms of whether it is sufficient or not. I believe it is, I just 

do not know the figure off the top of my head. 

Mr. CARTER. I know you hear all kinds of horror stories. But our 

District Attorney was informed that he was on a no-flight list on 

dozens of occasions. And finally he called our office, and said can 

you do anything to help us out. And we worked with your office 

and got that fixed. 

And you know, he was an expert witness that flew up here to 

deal with the FBI on multiple things. He is a pretty good criminologist. And it was very embarrassing for him to be pulled out and 

said he was on a no-flight list. So you fixed it. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Glad to hear that. 

Mr. CARTER. But I think we have to be able to get an accurate 

list there, because it really—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Agreed. 

Mr. CARTER [continuing]. Offends some people. It offended John 

Bradley pretty badly. 

Mr. PISTOLE. You are absolutely right, Congressman, and that is 

our goal, to have no misidentifications. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, thank you. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Well, thank you, Mr. Administrator. And as I 

made in my opening remarks, I know TSA’s work force strives to 

be conscientious and enterprising. And we acknowledge the hard 

work of your agency, and the commitment to keeping travel safe 

and secure in this country. 

On the other side of the work force issue, is to ensure there is 

the right mix between technology at checkpoints, and make sure 

that the staffing levels are appropriate. 

So we look forward to working with you and making sure that 

TSA does not have a continued appetite of adding more personnel 

and increasing operating costs. But like I say, I know that is the 

goal of all of us. 

We look forward to working with you in the days to come, as we 

work on the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request as it goes through 

this Subcommittee. And again, we thank you for your presence 

here today. And we wish you all the best at TSA. 

The Subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(439) 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2011. 

SOUTHWEST BORDER ENFORCEMENT 

WITNESSES 

MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL 

THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF 

FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 

JAMES A. DINKINS, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. ZUKUNFT, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR 

MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP, U.S. COAST GUARD 

OPENING STATEMENT: CHAIRMAN ADERHOLT

Mr. ADERHOLT. The hearing is called to order. 

Good morning. 

This morning, we welcome witnesses from the Department of 

Homeland Security to talk about our progress in securing the 

Southwest border. They are Chief Michael Fisher, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol; Assistant Commissioner Thomas Winkowski, CBP, Office of Field Operations; Associate Director Jim Dinkins, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations; and Rear Admiral 

Paul Zukunft, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security 

and Stewardship of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for being here today, and thank you 

for your service. Each of you represents officers and agents who 

risk their lives every day in the interest of our Nation’s safety and 

security. And all of your agencies have experienced losses in the 

line of duty over the past year. And let me express our condolences 

to you for the lives you have lost in your particular agencies and 

our sincere gratitude for all of you who carry on. 

With the 5,500 miles of border with Canada, the 1,993 miles of 

border with Mexico, and the 2,627 miles of shoreline, securing the 

borders of the United States is a daunting task. 

Since its inception, this Subcommittee has closely examined security efforts and conditions along our borders, particularly along the 

Southwest border. Our focus today is not merely to recite where we 

have been. We know well the significant resources and dramatic 

strides that have been made since 2003. Rather, we want to talk 

about the goals for border security. 

We want to hear three things directly from you, the officers and 

agents who work on the front lines. Number one, what is the current assessment of border security? Number two, when will the 

border be secure? What does that mean? What resources are needed? And, number three, how do we measure progress toward a secure and economically vibrant border? 

Let me elaborate on each of these points. 


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First, what is the current assessment of border security? After 

investing billions of dollars in Southwest border security efforts in 

the past 8 years, where are we in relation to where we need to go? 

On the U.S. side of the border, we have invested in Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement personnel and capabilities. We 

have built 649 miles of physical fencing and tactical infrastructure 

to enhance detection and deterrence, and deployed and tested a variety of technologies. We have also invested in bringing the fight 

to the cartels, stepping up interdiction efforts away from the border, using air and maritime assets to support investigations in 

Latin America and in Mexico. 

At the same time, despite our efforts, conditions in Mexico remain dire. Drug production is up and meeting demand, and drugrelated violence has resulted in 35,000 deaths since the year 2005. 

With President Calderon’s term coming to an end in just a year, 

how much progress do we expect to make? 

Second, the most important, how much further do we have to go? 

What are the end goals, and how much will it cost to reach them? 

Commissioner Bersin gave us some insight before this Subcommittee into what he thinks the end goals are, in his appearance 

last week, the standard being that, if you try to come in illegally, 

you will be detected and you will be arrested. It means reducing 

the flow of illegal traffic in the United States from Mexico to a 

point that both assures public safety and is perceived by the people 

who live on the border and the people who live in Arizona as being 

safe and secure. 

I want to dig into the Commissioner’s comments. How will we 

achieve the level of detection and interdiction? What resources will 

it take? How long will it take? 

Last, we do need to measure progress. How do we measure 

progress along the way? The Administration has touted the decrease in apprehensions along the Southwest border as an indication of fewer illegal crossings and, therefore, successful deterrence. 

How do we really know that is the case? 

For our entire history, this so-called denominator has been evasive. We know how many we detect and interdict. The core question is, how many illegal aliens actually successfully cross into the 

United States and with what volume of contraband and drugs? 

How are we seeking to measure that? 

Director Morton and Admiral Papp indicated that their roles, in 

part, were to interdict individuals and drugs away from the land 

border to reduce the pressure on our borders. How has that contribution been measured? 

This is truly a daunting task, as I mentioned. And you face significant challenges every day in meeting our Nation’s border security needs. I appreciate you appearing before us today, and thank 

you in advance for your candor and your insight on the Southwest 

border security operations. 

At this point, I would like to recognize the Ranking member of 

this Subcommittee, Mr. Price from North Carolina. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT: RANKING MEMBER PRICE

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want first to join the Chairman in welcoming this multiagency panel here today and thanking all of you for your service 

and the guidance you afford to those who are working in your 

agencies. 

Mexico and the United States are friends and allies of long 

standing, with deep historical and cultural and political ties. Consider, also, the economic ties. The United States is Mexico’s largest 

trading partner. We buy 85 percent of Mexican exports. Mexico also 

buys large quantities of U.S. goods and services, surpassed only by 

Canada and China. So it behooves each of our countries to facilitate commerce across the Southwest border—commerce that is responsible for many American and Mexican jobs. 

However, this same border also experiences a substantial amount 

of illegal trade crossing between the two countries, with narcotics 

and illegal immigrants coming north and money and weapons 

headed south. Mexican drug cartels now dominate the wholesale illicit drug market in the United States, earning from $13.6 billion 

to $48.4 billion annually. 

Since President Calderon took office in 2006 and began directly 

confronting the drug cartels, Mexico and its border regions have 

been wracked by violence. The cartels control large swaths of Mexican territory and dozens of municipalities, and they are waging violent turf battles over control of key smuggling corridors from Nuevo 

Laredo to San Diego. Over the past 4 years, the death toll in Mexico exceeded 35,000, with each year setting a record higher than 

the previous one. 

The United States has been aggressively working with Mexico to 

stop this violence, because what happens south of the border is 

more than just Mexico’s problem. Recognizing our shared responsibility has led to enhanced cooperation between our governments. 

The DHS agencies before us today have had unprecedented cooperation with Mexican law enforcement and the military on information-sharing, joint training, cross-border communications, and 

the exchange personnel. You have also implemented unprecedented 

initiatives to interdict illicit shipments flowing north and south 

across the border. We are going hear today about those efforts and 

the funding for the Southwest Border Initiative. 

But as we take stock of the challenges we face related to the 

Mexican cartels, it is also important for us to step back and consider all of the forces at play in the drug trade. I have often 

thought and said that the strength and security of our country are 

not just about the budget accounts explicitly labeled ‘‘Homeland Security’’ and ‘‘Defense.’’ Success or failure in the war on cartels is 

no different. We can’t expect to solve our drug problems if we put 

more and more resources into interdiction at the border while 

doing very little to curtail the demand for drugs on our own streets, 

or, even worse, if we actually diminish our demand-side efforts. But 

I am afraid that is exactly what we are confronting in this currentyear budget discussion. 

The House majority’s funding bill for the remainder of fiscal year 

2011, H.R. 1, takes a serious bite out of our efforts to prevent and 


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treat drug abuse and, thereby, reduce demand for the cartels’ poisonous commodities. H.R. 1 would implement a massive $581 million cut to State and local law enforcement assistance funds, which 

include a variety of programs linked to drug-abuse treatment like 

Byrne grants, the residential substance abuse treatment program, 

drug courts, and Second Chance re-entry programs for ex-offenders. H.R. 1 also takes $191 million from Juvenile Justice Grants, 

which are also used to treat drug abuse among youth in our communities. H.R. 1 takes an indiscriminate $229 million cut from the 

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration at 

the Department of HHS. It cuts the Office of National Drug Control Policy by nearly $70 million and completely eliminates an initiative to get ex-offenders into the legitimate workforce. 

To put it simply, H.R. 1 would set our national drug-control efforts back by over a billion dollars. It would rob Peter to pay Paul. 

Cutting programs that reduce the demand for drugs, while maintaining those targeted at the supply of drugs—that simply does not 

make sense. 

Now, I realize that none of our witnesses here today can address 

the programs that fall outside the Department of Homeland Security, and I am not going to ask you do so. But I think it is extremely important to raise this issue because the work we do on 

this Subcommittee does not occur in a vacuum, and neither does 

the work that your agencies do along our borders and coastlines 

occur in a vacuum. Your agencies’ objectives are significantly affected by forces related to the drug trade that are outside your direct control. 

So I believe it is important for all of us with responsibilities in 

this area to bear in mind the full scope of the problem and the full 

scope of the likely remedies as we continue to grapple with our fiscal challenges, trying to preserve the strength and security of our 

country. 

So, gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony here today and 

to a frank discussion. The men and women under your leadership 

should be commended for all their hard work, their record seizures 

to date, the great sacrifices they make on behalf of the safety and 

security of the American people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Price. 

And let me just say that, certainly, the demand aspect needs to 

be considered, and we should never overlook that as a country. But 

the supply side of drugs coming into this Nation is really what our 

focus is today. And the individuals before us can help us assess 

that. 

Thank you for your opening comments. 

What I would like to do at this point is to start with the panel 

and your opening statements before I start into my questions. I will 

recognize Chief Fisher, and then we will go on down the table with 

Assistant Commissioner Winkowski, Associate Director Dinkins, 

and rear Admiral Zukunft. 

So, Chief Fisher. 

OPENING STATEMENT: CHIEF FISHER

Chief FISHER. Thank you, Chairman Aderholt and Ranking Member Price, distinguished members of the Committee. 

It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to share 

with you the efforts being undertaken by U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection to secure our borders generally and, in particular, the 

Southwest border. I also look forward to the opportunity to discuss 

our current assessment of the border, and the timelines of our security efforts and resources dedicated to that, and certainly metrics 

and measures and the extent to which we are going to measure 

that throughout the next few years. 

By way of current status, we are on pace to hire, train, and deploy 21,370 Border Patrol agents by September of this year. We 

have completed more than 649 of the 650 miles of fencing and 

added significantly more technology, including infrared and seismic 

sensors, video surveillance and mobile systems. We have added 

aerial platforms, to include unmanned aerial systems, which complement our ground effort. 

Furthermore, we have gained a greater appreciation for the differentiation between mere collaboration and operational integration 

with our Federal, State, local, tribal, and international partners, 

moving forward and realizing the strength of joint planning and 

implementation in a targeted and focused manner. 

As we have realized increased capacity and capability over the 

last few years, attributed in large part to the increase in resources, 

we have seen a transformation along our southern border. Activity 

levels are down to historic levels across the Southwest. Staffing levels at our high-risk sectors are up. And we are becoming more proficient with technology to respond to all threats. 

But, in similar cases, when law enforcement agencies learn to 

prioritize and focus their efforts and mitigate crime, the criminal 

element also learns and adjusts. As we are currently witnessing, 

transnational criminal organizations change their techniques, tactics, and procedures. They no longer try to overwhelm our agents 

in the urban environments, choosing instead to operate predominantly in extremely remote locations. 

In some cases, violence against our agents has increased, as the 

transnational criminal organizations try to intimidate our agents 

and attempt to influence our forward deployments away from areas 

previously exploited. And, in most cases, the cost of doing business 


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for the transnational criminal organizations continues to increase, 

shrinking the organizations’ profits. 

Over the past year, we have reviewed our strategy in light of the 

changing border environment. Our way forward and the strategy 

that will be applied will be risk-based. Accordingly, we will increasingly depend on information and intelligence to describe the intent 

and capability of our adversaries, thus defining the threat while 

continuously assessing our border vulnerabilities. And, in doing so, 

we must be more mobile, agile, and flexible than our adversaries. 

Finally, we will define the doctrine through nontraditional and 

unconventional approaches heretofore unexplored. 

I witnessed the evolution of the border over the past 24 years as 

a Border Patrol agent, both in terms of additional resources applied 

against the threat as well as the change in the adversaries’ ability 

to exploit border vulnerabilities. Although we have seen positive indicators of a secure border, our work continues and will not end as 

long as there are those who seek to enter this country illegally. 

In closing, I want to again thank you for this opportunity to testify today. I remain committed to the mission and confident in our 

collective ability to secure our borders, due in large part to the 

brave men and women of CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection], who each and every day provide a level of security to our citizens, who deserve no less. I am proud of our agents’ and officers’ 

dedication to duty and commitment to excellence. I also want to acknowledge and thank all of you on the committee for your support. 

As you are well aware, the border is a dynamic environment, and 

we will continue to strive to meet the demands of today as well as 

the challenges of tomorrow. 

I thank you again and look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Chief Fisher. 

Assistant Commissioner Winkowski? 

OPENING STATEMENT: ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER WINKOWSKI

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Price, and members of the Subcommittee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today and continue our ongoing dialogue regarding border enforcement on the 

Southwest border. Without your full support and partnership, we 

would not have been able to accomplish the many successes that 

we have had, to date. However, we still have many, many challenges. 

I want to assure the Subcommittee that we work closely with everybody on this panel—Chief Fisher, being my counterpart in Customs and Border Protection, and working between the ports of 

entry and Field Operations at the ports of entry. We have integrated and knitted, I think, a great strategic plan from the standpoint of bringing the skill sets that our Customs and Border Protection Officers [CBPOs] bring as well as the Border Patrol agents. 

Certainly, from the standpoint of ICE [Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement], our investigative arm, the executive director, James 

Dinkins, here to my left, there is a true partnership of taking seizures, taking arrests, and having a seamless transition from field 

operations over to the investigators. And, certainly, Rear Admiral 

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curity enterprise on our borders, particularly in the area of small 

boats and things of that nature. 

Given the limited time that I have, I thought I would just take 

a few minutes to talk about some of the work that we have been 

able to do. 

In the area of outbound operations, at the direction of Secretary 

Napolitano and Commissioner Bersin, CBP has reengaged in outbound operations over the past 2 years and has had success. We 

have seen an increase in our currency seizures across the Southwest border when you look at fiscal years 2009 and 2010. We have 

implemented 100-percent rail inspection along the eight crossings 

on the Southwest border, using our technology that you all have 

supported for us over the years. 

And, by the end of the year, we are going to have handheld License Plate Reader capability at the 111 outbound lanes along the 

Southwest border, with the plan of putting fixed-site License Plate 

Readers in the outbound lanes in the out-years. 

And, furthermore, as we create new facilities, we are keenly 

aware of the need to ensure the capability of outbound inspections 

in our design and construction. Many of our facilities are old, either 

don’t have a footprint for outbound inspections or have a very limited footprint. 

Another important initiative has been the Alliance to Combat 

Transnational Threats, or what we call ACTT, in Arizona. Since 

ACTT began on September 5th, 2009, we have made significant enforcement actions at our Arizona ports of entry, seized more than 

$13 million in outbound currency and over 129,000 pounds of marijuana and 3,600 pounds of cocaine. 

Our success can be measured in many ways. Raw numbers tell 

us something about the smugglers’ reactions and help validate our 

activities. And since we have increased our efforts and continue to 

evolve our methods, the cartels continue to move to more unique 

and deeper concealment methods, which makes it much more difficult for our CBP officers to detect, ranging from in transmissions, 

manifolds of automobiles, and gas tanks; the use of commercial 

buses; commingling drugs in legitimate produce. 

You know, critically important to our mission and related to the 

violence seen on the Mexican side of the border is our effort to give 

our officers the training and resources they need to ensure the security of the ports. We have conducted very, very comprehensive 

infrastructure surveys to improve the physical security of our ports. 

We have surveyed every single port and have made security enhancements in order to harden our ports of entry. 

We continue to deploy our tactical enforcement officers on our 

Southwest border, at our ports of entry. These are specially trained 

officers that have the long guns and the correct body armor. We 

also continue to enhance our Special Response Team program. 

I would also like to mention the much-needed infrastructure 

projects that we have undertaken and continue to pursue on the 

Southwest border. You know, over the past year, we have opened 

two new ports of entry in Texas: Anzalduas and Donna. And I have 

had the opportunity to go to each one of those ports. And those 

ports, the designs of those ports have taken into consideration the 

situation that we have down on the Southwest border from the 


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standpoint of making sure that our ports are hardened and have 

a comprehensive outbound footprint for our officers to conduct outbound inspections. 

Just recently, I was in San Ysidro and had the opportunity to 

break ground on the new facility in San Ysidro. And that facility 

also, at a cost of $600 million, not only enhances our inbound capability, going from 24 lanes to 63 lanes inbound, but also has an outbound footprint. And there are enhancements that we are making 

in San Luis, you know, with the help of this committee, the GSA 

[General Services Administration], and other partnerships. These 

are just a few examples of needed facility improvements that will 

require additional resources. 

Also, as you know, our fiscal year 2012 budget request contains 

money for 300 CBPOs for new and existing infrastructure. And I 

look forward to working with the committee to ensure that we have 

the essential personnel and resources going forward, not to mention the 250 officers that we received last year in the supplemental 

for the Southwest border; those officers are coming on board. 

So I wanted to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Associate Director Dinkins, thank you for being here today. 

OPENING STATEMENT: ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR DINKINS

Mr. DINKINS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Price and members of the subcommittee. I appear before you 

today to discuss ICE’s role in securing our Southwest border and 

specifically the efforts that we have made in recent years. 

I would like to begin by thanking you for noting the recent 

unprovoked attack against our special agents in Mexico. Our prayers remain with the Zapata family for their loss and for Special 

Agent Avila’s speedy recovery. 

Out of this tragedy, I am reminded, first and foremost, of the 

great courage our special agents and Federal law enforcement partners demonstrate each and every day, combating the activities of 

transnational criminal organizations and the challenges we face 

along the Southwest border. 

As the second-largest investigative agency in the Federal Government, ICE special agents focus their investigative activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations 

and the illicit pathways they exploit in the unlawful movement of 

people, contraband, weapons, and money across our international 

borders. This reoccurring global cycle of criminal activity, known as 

the criminal continuum, is a threat to our security, not only at the 

border but in our communities. 

This investigative effort of ICE’s nearly 7,000 special agents aims 

to attack the entire continuum. First, there are ICE attache located 

in 46 countries. We work with our foreign law enforcement partners to push our borders out and address the threats before they 

arrive in the U.S. 

Second, at the border we work, in partnership with CBP and the 

Coast Guard, to detect narcotics and contraband, prevent the unlawful entry of individuals into the country, and deter the illegal 

exportation of weapons and currency from the United States. 


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And, third, with 200 offices located throughout the U.S., ICE engages in proactive investigations with our Federal, State, local, and 

tribal law enforcement partners to investigate transnational criminal organizations operating and residing within our communities. 

Here, these individuals often engage in the most profitable stage 

of transnational crime—notably, the distribution and sale of illegal 

narcotics and the trafficking of aliens and contraband. In turn, 

these criminal organizations generate huge profits that are then 

smuggled out of the U.S. to fuel their ongoing criminal enterprises. 

I can assure you, combating these criminal organizations and attacking their financial infrastructure is a priority for ICE as well 

as the Department. We have taken significant steps to do so. And, 

as we move forward, we must continue to push our borders out and 

address the greatest national security and public safety threats before they arrive in the U.S. 

When they do arrive, we must be prepared to interdict, investigate, and prosecute the criminals for their actions. And, finally, 

if we are going to be successful, we have to continue to pursue the 

transnational criminal organization members who reside in big and 

small cities throughout the United States. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here today and discuss this very important issue with you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Admiral Zukunft. 

OPENING STATEMENT: ADMIRAL ZUKUNFT

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Good morning, Chairman Aderholt and Ranking Member Price. It is my pleasure to be here before the distinguished committee as a member of the Coast Guard. And I will just 

say, I am the Assistant Commandant for Maritime Security, Safety, and Stewardship here in Washington, D.C. And, certainly, the 

Southwest border is very first and foremost on my mind. 

As the lead U.S. agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard 

employs a three-layered maritime approach to the Southwest border. And that begins at the departure and transit zones well south 

of Mexico. It then reaches into the approaches of Mexico, and finally culminates in our customs waters, along our U.S.-Mexico 

maritime border. 

To complement the strategy, the Coast Guard leverages its role 

within the national intelligence community to bolster situational 

awareness as well as our inter-service, interagency, and international partnerships to advance the interdiction continuum 

against drug-trafficking organizations. That is, intelligence drives 

interdictions, the follow-on forensics and prosecutions and then, 

working through the interagency process, such as Panama Express, 

leads to more interdictions. And then it just perpetuates that intelligence-interdiction cycle. But we do it internationally and, certainly, with our DHS partners here at the table. 

Our unambiguous goal is to meet these threats far from the U.S. 

border. And the first layer of attack is in these transit and source 

zones, where transnational criminal organizations are most vulnerable. To this end, our Coast Guard area commanders work with 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM and with the Joint Interagency 

Task Force-South to detect, monitor, and interdict and apprehend 


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threats well beyond our U.S. waters, both in the Caribbean and in 

the Eastern Pacific. 

Coast Guard cutters and aircraft provide the necessary range, 

speed, command and control, and authorities to effect success in 

this transit zone. And, in addition to that, our Coast Guard law enforcement detachments that are employed on allied ships and our 

U.S. naval platforms are able to leverage our 37 bilateral agreements with signatory nations from these source and transit zone 

countries that have had a marked impact on drug-trafficking destined for the United States. 

During 2010, the Coast Guard removed over 200,000 pounds of 

cocaine and over 36,000 pounds of marijuana bound for the U.S. 

This represents 45 percent of the National Drug Control Strategy’s 

annual target for 2010, which is a 30-percent removal rate and 

equates to 445,000 pounds of cocaine. 

Our second layer of attack is the approach to Mexican coastal 

waters, where the Coast Guard works with the Mexican Navy and 

other interagency partners from Mexico. And through our North 

American Maritime Security Initiative, or NAMSI, we have established tactical-operations-center-to-operations-center agreements 

and information-sharing with SEMAR [the Mexican Navy] in Mexico that has also had a marked effect on trafficking. 

Since this inception of NAMSI in 2008, we have had 21 cases, totaling 47,000 pounds of contraband seized as a result of this relationship, fairly nascent at that, with our counterparts in Mexico. 

The final and third layer of our attack is in the U.S. customs 

waters, to include our maritime border with Mexico. And, to that 

end, we work very closely with CBP, ICE, our State and local partners. 

And you need not look any further than our Joint Harbor Operations Command, which is an interagency operations center in San 

Diego, where we have 20 representative agencies, including DOD 

[the Department of Defense], that monitor, at the tactical level, activity approaching our Southwest border. And since the stand-up of 

this center, we have interdicted, just in the last year alone, over 

800 migrants at sea. And that is twice the number that we have 

seen in previous years. So we are seeing an increasing trend in migrant trafficking by sea via the Southwest border. 

Finally, I will mention, we do surge operation on Falcon Lake 

and Lake Amistad. Even though it is not seawater, it is maritime 

border with Mexico, and certainly events in the last year have 

drawn increased attention to that particular threat. So we do 

transport, on a quarterly basis, forces that do interdiction operations there, as well. It is more of a presence right now that will 

hopefully deter further activity in that region. 


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Chairman Aderholt, Ranking Member Price, we are proud to 

take great strides with the Department to enhance security on our 

Southwest border. The United States Coast Guard has a clear 

strategy of layered attack that leverages joint services, interagency, 

and international partnerships. We are actively pursuing acquisition strategies that will deliver more capable and operational assets and systems for the Coast Guard in the years to come. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am pleased 

to entertain your questions. Thank you. 

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BORDER SECURITY: MEASURES OF PROGRESS

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Admiral. 

The Administration has noted time and again that the border is 

as secure as it has ever been. The question today is, how do we 

measure the level of security we have achieved? 

Let me walk you through the measures we have frequently 

heard. Border Patrol apprehensions of illegal aliens are down 36 

percent in the past 2 years and are less than one-third of what 

they were at their peak. Is a decrease in apprehensions truly an 

indication that fewer illegals are crossing, or there are fewer job 

seekers or fewer drug mules or both? 

The year 2010 saw more than 15,000 drug-related deaths in Mexico. Is an increase in violence an indication of greater pressure on 

the cartels or just more examples of their brazen and brutal tactics? 

While seizures of drugs, bulk cash, and other contraband are up, 

that can probably be attributed largely to having more officers and 

agents on the front lines. What aren’t we catching? Have our efforts actually squeezed and reduced the flow northbound into the 

United States or southbound in Mexico? Have drug use, availability, purity, and street value been affected at all as a result of 

our investments? 

And, lastly, I would like each of you to tell the Subcommittee, 

from your agency’s perspective, what are the best measures of the 

effectiveness of the Southwest border operations? Where are we 

today? Where do we need to go? And what tools and resources are 

needed to get there? 

And I will start with you, Chief Fisher. 

Chief FISHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think in posing those series of questions, interestingly enough, 

myself and the staff and others within CBP have been looking at 

this really heartily over the last few years. And, in particular, over 

this last year, what we realized as part of our strategy and the 

method by which we had recently been reporting out, in terms of 

levels of security, really were, in fact, what we would describe as 

operational control levels, really for the deployments of those resources over the years and how we would measure those; how we 

would ask the field commanders, ‘‘To what extent has that level of 

resources been a benefit, added value to your operations, and, from 

a cost standpoint, did that actually work?’’ 

And as we have been having these discussions with the field 

commanders, it became clear to a lot of us that levels of operational 

control measured in a linear fashion do not translate into border 

security, because border security is much broader than linear miles 

of operational control even under our own limited definitions. 

For instance, we started looking a year ago at not just the line 

in the sand, if you will, the juridical line that separates the jurisdictions between the United States and Mexico; we have been looking at the border in terms of corridors. And those corridors—as we 

start looking along, for instance, the Southwest border, what is it 

that the criminal organizations, smuggling organizations, 

transnational criminal organizations, anybody seeking entry into 

this country, what do they require to do that? 


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And so, when I mentioned earlier about the information and intelligence being a key indicator to identify the intent and capability 

defining the threat, that is exactly what we are trying to do. 

Just because we have an area along the Southwest border, for instance, that is extremely remote, absent any fence, absent periodic 

deployments of Border Patrol agents, that area may be, in and of 

itself, vulnerable because of the lack of those resources. It doesn’t 

necessarily indicate that that is an area of high risk. 

And we will give you a quick example. Some of the areas in the 

Big Bend National Park, for instance, vast expanse, don’t have a 

lot of resources there. But in those particular areas, criminal organizations, in order to bring narcotics and people through, need the 

same things that local populations need to be able to bring it 

through a country into another country and immediately into the 

interior of the United States. That requires infrastructure in terms 

of road systems, transportation systems, to easily do that. 

Now, in some of the other remote areas where they do operate, 

where it takes them 2 to 3 days, they do that at a higher risk, not 

necessarily because of the terrain, but because their exposure to 

our detection and interdiction efforts are higher. And so, when we 

look at the border and we want to focus those resources in those 

areas, we want to do it in a smart fashion. 

In the absence of infrastructure and technology in some of those 

extremely remote areas, what we are moving toward is identifying 

other technologies. And I will give you a quick example: the Intelligence Community and our UAS [unmanned aerial systems], for 

instance. We don’t want to just automatically assume because the 

infrastructure does not exist that the risk will always be low. The 

risk is going to be dependent, again, on the threat and if they decide to move for whatever reason. And we want to be able to know 

about it, have that situational awareness, and be able to detect, 

identify, and classify that threat: Are they just people? Are they 

people coming in with narcotics? Are they armed? Are they not 

armed? 

We also have the requirement to then be able to respond to it, 

either on the ground or in the air, and ultimately be able to make 

and effect the arrest. We had mentioned the denominator. What we 

need to be able to do—in a broad definition of border security, it 

is not just the apprehensions, and I would agree with you. More 

importantly, it is the proportion of individuals that we arrest subsequent to the detected entry. 

And so, then the question is, well, in those areas where we don’t 

have persistent detection capability, ‘‘What is the answer?’’ There 

are a few things. We would use the UAS and other national resources to be able to do periodic flyovers and utilizing change-detection capability to then go back and periodically check and see if, 

in fact, there is any change to the terrain. 

If, in fact, we identify and the analysts dictate that something is 

moving through there, we would send reconnaissance patrols out 

there, and we would identify what is coming through that area. If 

it is determined to be individuals, we can then start putting sensor 

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trenched in some of these places that we have seen across the 

Southwest border. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Thank you, Chief. 

And just because there are four witnesses, what we will do is try 

to keep answers just as brief as possible, but, of course, take the 

time that you need to answer the questions, but we will try to keep 

mindful of the time. I know the other Members here want to ask 

questions, as well. 

So, Assistant Commissioner Winkowski. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to kind of build off of what the Chief just testified to, in the 

area of ports of entry, unlike between the ports of entry, we have 

this dual responsibility. You know, we have a responsibility to 

make sure that dangerous people and dangerous things don’t come 

into the country, but we also have a responsibility to make sure 

that we are doing everything possible to facilitate the legitimate 

trade and travel. So we have this dual mission that is very, very 

complicated, that is very, very time-sensitive. 

We have been fortunate, in many respects, from the standpoint 

of support from this committee in putting out detection equipment, 

what we call Non-Intrusive Inspection equipment, that we have 

throughout the Southwest border. And that has given us the ability 

to focus in and target high-risk shipments, for example, and do 

quick inspections and make a determination and find contraband 

or to actually release the freight. 

So our measures are a number of things. Certainly, one measure 

is the activity, the illegal activity that we have coming through the 

ports. And, for example, inadmissible aliens, when you look at percentage change from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010, we are up 

4 percent; false claims up 15 percent; and fraudulent documents up 

11 percent. 

So the question starts becoming what the Chief and I talk about 

oftentimes as the Border Patrol continues to harden between the 

ports of entry, with technology and fence, the impact on the ports 

of entry—so if you can’t come through, if it is more difficult to come 

through between the ports of entry, the next, I think, natural point 

is at our ports of entry. And we have seen some increase in that 

rate, in that regard. 

The other measure we have is applying consequences. You know, 

we have gotten away from just doing simple voluntary returns, 

from the standpoint of someone comes in, doesn’t have the proper 

documents, fraudulent, at times we would give a voluntary return. 

Today, we give larger consequences, coming in as well as going out. 

And I think that is an important point here. I testified about our 

outbound strategy, and I talked a little bit about currency. But as 

we focus in on the outbound side (the number of illegal, undocumented aliens going back into Mexico), we didn’t focus in on that 

over the years. And we have focused in on it and have been able 

to apply consequences. 

So you have individuals, particularly in the pedestrian lane, 

walking into Mexico. And part of our outbound CONOPS [Concept 

of Operations] is detecting those individuals and applying consequences. So, you know, recidivism rates are something that we 

measure. 


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I agree that just finding more drugs day-in and day-out is not 

the only measure. It is how you are changing behavior, how will 

you—you know, we see in Arizona, with ACTT [the Alliance to 

Combat Transnational Threats] putting in 163 TDY [temporary 

duty] officers, an increase in enforcement activities. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Mr. Dinkins. 

Mr. DINKINS. Just to carry on, some of the indicators and specific 

things that we have noticed that really are indicators that we are 

making a difference with our collective efforts here—and I will 

keep it short—are the number of stash houses, for example, in Arizona, that we are finding with illegal aliens is fewer. The number 

of aliens in those stash houses are down. As well as the number 

of hostage situations where they have taken hostages of the illegal 

aliens and are demanding higher fees, those are also down from 

last year. 

And I think that we have seen a shift in the pressure that we 

are putting on these organizations, from alien smuggling fees going 

up, specifically in Arizona, over the last year, as well as we are seeing that, because they can’t get through the ports of entry as easily 

and they can’t make it between the ports of entry, they are forced 

to resort to more sophisticated, costly measures—dig tunnels, 

which could take months. And we have seen the number of tunnels 

that we have been able to interdict going up over the last 2 years 

drastically from previous years. 

So I think it really has changed. We have changed our pattern, 

and we are forcing them to do things differently, more costly. And 

it is making a difference. 

Now, as far as the investigations go, one of the key measures 

that we are using, which will start in fiscal year 2012, which really 

has changed the way that we focus away from just specifically arrests, indictments, and convictions and the number of seizers, is 

the disruptions and dismantlements of transnational criminal organizations. 

Because when you disrupt them, you are, you know, setting them 

back more than just necessarily taking their drugs or money away 

from them. And when you actually disrupt them and dismantle 

them, now you are actually eliminating the threat that that organization posed to the ongoing criminal and smuggling activity that 

they are involved in. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I will probably start a little more strategic. 

When I look at my current assessment, it really first starts with 

the relationships, then it is awareness, and then it is authorities. 

I have been in this business for 34 years, chasing drugs. I have 

commanded three ships, I have directed a joint interagency task 

force, and also dealt with this border problem when I was commander of the 11th Coast Guard District. Our relationships on an 

international scale are paramount. The United States cannot do 

this alone. 

Within our interagency relationships, we do not have GoldwaterNichols. Our Department of Homeland Security, we are 8 years old, 

but I am here to say, you know, the law enforcement officers that 


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join me here at the table, this is a one team, one fight. And it is 

very focused, and it is strategic. So the relationships, both internationally, interagency, and joint, are better than I have seen at 

any point in my career. 

When you look at awareness, this really comes down to information. Eighty percent of our interdictions were driven by intelligence. So when we have that information, there is a good likelihood at sea we are going to interdict. Now, as we are getting better 

systems for awareness, it is also imperative that we have the platforms to go out and do the interdictions. So those two really need 

to be held in balance. 

But we did see a net reduction last year of about 40 percent of 

cocaine moving by sea. At the same time, we are seeing different 

modes of conveyance. First, it was semi-submersible vessels, and 

now we are seeing fully submersible vessels. And then in the gofast, the vessels transiting cocaine, they are breaking these loads 

down into smaller volumes. In the past, our average interdiction 

was about five metric tons; now we are looking at just about under 

a metric ton. So the bad guys are spreading the risk. 

And the fact that they have not returned fire against our interdiction forces tells me that this is a risk that they can take, a business expense they can write off because there is still more coming. 

So that would be my assessment there, at least on the awareness 

piece. 

And then, finally, it is the authorities. We do have a number of 

bilateral agreements. And then our relationships with Mexico—I 

have been down to meet with the commander of the Second Naval 

Zone. We initially would talk about oil pollution protocols, and we 

said, ‘‘Let’s look at the real threat; you know, it is the violence on 

the border.’’ And we were able to take that where now, if we see 

an event off Mexico, our operations center in Alameda calls theirs 

immediately. And we have actually done exercises and interdictions 

with Mexico, which was really—would have been unheard of 10 

years ago. 

So I see the trend in our relationships, awareness, and our authorities all moving in the right direction. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Admiral. 

STOPGAP FUNDING, IMPACT OF

Mr. Price. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would also like to address a question to the entire panel to respond, as you perceive relevance in what I am asking, which has 

to do with the effects of not having, at this moment, long-term 

funding in place for Southwest border and drug-interdiction activities. 

Yesterday, the House passed yet another short-term continuing 

resolution, this one to keep the government operating for 3 weeks, 

until April 8th. I have said repeatedly, and many others have as 

well, this is no way to run a government. We need, once and for 

all, to finish funding what remains of fiscal year 2011. I think that 

was quite evident in December. It certainly is evident now. 

Now, I recognize the CRs have given you some flexibility. They 

have given some of your agencies the ability to shift money around 


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to cover 2011 needs not funded in 2010. H.R. 1, for that matter, 

provided additional resources specifically for Southwest border and 

drug-interdiction activities. However, we are almost halfway 

through the fiscal year, and I question whether these flexibilities 

alone will cover your needs. 

And, in any case, I want to ask the question. I would like for 

each of you to highlight what have been the impacts of living under 

short-term CRs for an extended period of time, the impact specifically on Southwest border and drug-interdiction activities. When 

does this type of funding stream truly affect your ability to operate 

effectively in these areas? And then, finally, what kind of adjustments are you going to need as we finally, hopefully, pass a fullyear CR and/or the 2012 bill? What kind of adjustments are going 

to be required by virtue of the funding arrangement under which 

you have lived thus far? 

Chief FISHER. Mr. Price, one specific area that is impacted is our 

inability to project and continue deployments in high-risk areas, 

not knowing what the allocation is going to be so that we can fiscally and—— 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Chief, if you could pull the mike a little closer? 

It is not picking up real well. 

Chief FISHER. I am sorry. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. That is better. 

Chief FISHER. Is the current deployments that we have right now 

in high-risk areas, in particular, Tucson, Arizona. Our inability to 

know between now and the end of fiscal year what the appropriation, what that dollar amount would be, to be able to scale that, 

either surge it up and move it into that area, because of the CR 

right now, that is probably the first and foremost operational impact that we are seeing. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. From a field operations standpoint, you know, 

37 percent of my staff, of the CBPOs, of which I have 22,000, 37 

percent are funded by user fees. So we have a little different situation there. 

But from the standpoint of staffing the ports of entry and paying 

the bills, we have not seen an impact in that regard. As a matter 

of fact, we are hiring the 250 officers that were approved in the 

supplemental as well as some additional officers. 

You know, to your point, Mr. Price, I mean, it does make it difficult from the standpoint of that long-term planning, but, nevertheless, not to the point that we have had to step back from our 

responsibilities of protecting the homeland, whether it is the Southwest border or northern border or airports or seaports. 

BORDER SECURITY: BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND CBP OFFICERS

Mr. PRICE. Well, this anticipates something I want to talk about 

later this morning. But, as to the new positions, I understand that, 

as of February 1st, none of these new Border Patrol agents are on 

board, and only 46 of the new CBP officers are on board that were 

funded through the supplemental. Now, that seems slow, to put it 

bluntly. And that may or may not be related to the uncertainties 

connected with stopgap funding. Do you have any quick observation on that? I do want to return to it in more detail. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. 


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I don’t know specifically about the supplemental funding as it relates to the authorized levels for Border Patrol agents. We have 

currently, right now, over 20,000 Border Patrol agents. And we are 

on pace—we have been hiring Border Patrol agents since October 

1st, the beginning of the fiscal year—both in terms of getting us 

to that 21,370 level at the end, which includes the 1,000 additional 

Border Patrol agents included in the summer supplemental, and it 

also includes attrition to keep us at that current level. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. And from the standpoint of the CBPOs, it was— 

we have our academy dates. We have two classes down there now 

that are bringing on board the 250. And we have other classes 

scheduled. 

STOPGAP FUNDING, IMPACT OF

Mr. PRICE. So, quickly, if we could move to other agencies on the 

stopgap funding question. 

Mr. DINKINS. Yes, sir. I mean, it is a challenge from management 

perspective. Fortunately, it has been at a level which we have been 

able to continue on with our hiring as needed. It is the long-term 

effects, if we don’t actually get annualization of the funding for the 

people that we are bringing on, which will—the out-years will have 

the challenge. Versus, right now we are carrying on and doing our 

hiring. We have classes running continuously to bring on the special agents that we need to do the job and that have been funded. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. For the Coast Guard, we are on life support. 

We can maintain the status quo, but we don’t operate in a statusquo requirement. 

I was the Federal on-scene coordinator for the BP oil spill, where 

we surged 3,000 people, 22 cutters from as far away as Alaska and 

Hawaii. So, God forbid, we have a disaster of that magnitude. But 

where that really hits us is if we have that requirement to surge. 

In addition, we are keeping a watchful eye on the price of fuel, 

which is the one discretionary item we have in our budget. But, as 

those dollars go up, you know, when the final budget comes in, that 

may be an area we have to reconcile by diminishing operations. We 

are not there yet, but I will say it does put us on life support. 

Mr. PRICE. That is a pretty alarming term, Admiral. Let me just, 

in the time I have remaining, ask you to elaborate. 

Are we talking here about the impact of the mere fact of stopgap 

funding and the uncertainty that that carries with it? Or are we 

talking about some adjustments, that whatever the full-year CR 

eventually looks like, and maybe even what the 2012 bill looks like, 

some adjustments that are going to be required to get the Coast 

Guard where it needs to be? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yeah, well, certainly, in the past, we have 

looked at supplemental measures to offset some of our surge requirements. But, certainly, we would like that to be more predictive. Because, you know, we looked at last year, we had Haiti, 

and we also had the BP oil spill. We are entering into what could 

be a devastating hurricane season; it is still unknown. 

But it really becomes more of a readiness issue. And the posture 

of the Coast Guard is to be always ready. And so, maybe it is a 

little bit melodramatic to say ‘‘life support,’’ but it is not the posVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00481 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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ture where the Coast Guard normally stands squarely on its two 

feet. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Let me just add that I think the question you 

asked is important. And on resources, we need to maintain operations. This Subcommittee has made operations a priority, both in 

H.R. 1 and under the short-term CRs. And supplemental funds are 

available to continue hiring, as needed. So I just want to make that 

point. 

And I will turn to Mr. Carter. 

BORDER SECURITY: TUCSON SECTOR

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have an awful lot of questions, but, first, I would like to point 

out the failure of the Democratic Party to create a budget last year 

and the failure to appropriate any money last year. We have had 

a 4-month CR, created by the Democrats, and two 5-week CRs by 

the Republicans. And it is time for all us to come to the table and 

start getting this thing done. 

I have some questions that I am very concerned about, and I 

think you have before you something Mr. Culberson prepared. I am 

going to start with this. Looking at that document you have there, 

and I look at 2007, it has gotten better in the Tucson sector, but 

the Tucson sector looks like, to me, a superhighway. 

It starts at 800,000 in 2007 and comes down to 200-and-something thousand today. I believe that there is a reason for that, and 

that is that the Border Patrol is prevented from going on several 

government lands, U.S. Government lands, that happen to dominate the Tucson sector. And it is my understanding, from talking 

to Members—Rob Bishop on the Resources Committee that many 

of the vehicle barricades that we created with some of the money 

we did on the Southwest border were to keep the Border Patrol out 

of certain areas, of conservation land and other things that are on 

the border. 

Is it a major factor that the Tucson corridor, with all of its public 

lands that border on Mexico, that prevents you from using vehicles 

to chase down these people inside U.S. lands? 

And there is a House bill that is being proposed, of which I am 

a cosponsor, H.R. 5016, which would resolve that matter and allow 

the Border Patrol to pursue those areas. Would that be something 

that would help you? 

Chief FISHER. Well, sir, my understanding—and I actually had 

an opportunity, about a month or so ago, to go down into the Tucson area, along with representatives from the Department of Interior and others. We currently have, and have had for the last few 

years, a memorandum of understanding [MOU] that allows us to 

go onto public lands in situations where we have to effect an arrest. 

So, to my knowledge, and even in that particular area, the Organ 

Pipe, where those vehicle barriers were put up over the years, Department of Interior told me at the time it has drastically reduced 

the amount of vehicle entries that were coming through there. 


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There are a whole host of factors that we believe contributed to 

the high numbers in Arizona over the last 10 years or so, and I 

would be more than welcome to talk about those in particular. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, I am going to take the worst-case scenario 

here. In 2007, 800,000 crossed in the Tucson sector, and the next 

highest is 152,000 in San Diego. They turned loose 98.6 percent of 

the people that were apprehended, of the 800,000 apprehended. 

So, there is something pretty badly wrong in Tucson, in the Tucson sector, as it compares to the rest of the Southwest border. It 

is like the 800-pound gorilla in the room. If it is not the fact that 

it is public land, if we are wrong on that, then I would like to know 

what it is. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. And, again, there are many factors. One 

thing, in particular, with our strategy—matter of fact, the Commissioner talks about Tucson in particular, that sector and that State 

as being the last stand for the smugglers. 

It is so because, since 1993, when we started in El Paso, we saw 

the majority of traffic there in El Paso. And then we moved it over 

to San Diego back in the 1990s, where they were seeing an increase of over 500,000 apprehensions during that time. And it 

moved over, hit a little bit in south Texas, but it stayed in Arizona 

for the last 10 years. 

When I was there, at the high-water mark, for instance, of the 

1.6 million apprehensions the United States Border Patrol agents 

made that year, 616,000 were in that sector. Last year, it was 

212,000. 

There are two factors, predominantly, why they are still there. 

One is because there are very few other areas with that legitimate 

infrastructure I talked about that they can go back to. They can’t 

go back to San Diego. They tried in 2007 and 2008. They tried 

going back in El Paso in small numbers. 

The other thing is, because of what is happening in Mexico, the 

lateral movement in Mexico between these smuggling organizations 

is not what it used to be. It used to be they could move across in 

Mexico, pay the plaza, get their people and the narcotics through, 

and do business that way. Until that settles, a lot of times they are 

not able to move out of those areas. 

Mr. CARTER. So you are saying to me that a bill that would open 

up those public lands would be of no benefit to you at all? 

Chief FISHER. I think when we look at our current MOU, some 

of the changes that we are working with Department of the Interior would include positioning mobile technology, not permanently, 

necessarily, but in areas. Because the current MOU right now suggests that we are able to go in in what is called ‘‘hot pursuit.’’ 

When we make a detection and we are trying to go through public 

lands, to include wilderness area, that allows for us to be able to 

do that. 

What the current MOU does not, at this point, allow for is for 

us to go in and move, for instance, a mobile surveillance system. 

And we are currently working that with DOI [Department of Interior] in specific areas to be able to do so. 


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BORDER SECURITY: BORDER PATROL AGENT DEATH IN ARIZONA

Mr. CARTER. I think I have time for one more question. It is reported to me that, in Arizona, an ambush was set up. I don’t know 

what sector it was in—in the Tucson sector, I have been told, and 

that one of our agents was armed with a weapon that fires beanbags. When the fighting started, he was shooting beanbags and 

they were shooting live ammunition, AK–47s, and he got killed. 

Now, what in the world are we sending a Border Patrolman out 

for an ambush with a beanbag gun? It was a SWAT team, I am 

told by Mr. Culberson. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir, I believe you are referring to the incident 

back in mid-December that involved the tragic death of Agent 

Brian Terry, who was a member of the Border Patrol Tactical Unit. 

That occurred in the mountains west of Nogales, Arizona. 

What I can tell you, sir, because it is still an ongoing investigation, all of the Border Patrol agents that were deployed in there 

had deadly force. 

Mr. CARTER. Except him? 

Chief FISHER. No, sir. He did have deadly force. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, the report is the gun was loaded with beanbags. That is not deadly force, is it? 

Chief FISHER. Well, the team deployed with a variety of weapons, 

sir. And I—— 

Mr. CARTER. So he just grabbed the wrong gun? 

Chief FISHER [continuing]. No, sir, that is not the case. 

Mr. CARTER. You are investigating that? 

Chief FISHER. Actually, the FBI is the lead investigative agency. 

And the United States Attorney’s Office in Arizona is still working 

that case, sir, so I can’t go into further levels of detail. I think you 

would understand that. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, I will let you ask that question. Am I through? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Yes, forgive me. Time is up. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Dent. 

BORDER SECURITY: UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a few quick questions. Chief Fisher and Commissioner 

Winkowski, we understand that CBP has been establishing a unified command structure for the Southwest border, similar to efforts 

undertaken by the Coast Guard. In addition, we know DHS has 

been looking at a more unified interagency approach to border security, looking to models such as the Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth. They combat narcotics, as you know, from South America 

and the Caribbean. 

What progress has been made in implementing this unified approach at CBP? And what difference is it making, if any at all? 

Chief FISHER. Sir, I can tell you, at the beginning of December, 

in Arizona, CBP stood up what is called the Joint Field Command. 

And we are just starting to set here in Washington, D.C., the Joint 

Operations Directorate. 

As most joint commands go, it was an area, one, as the lines to 

combat transnational threats started up in September of 2009. As 


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that matured, we started with a unified effort, we moved toward 

unified command, and now we are matured to a joint command 

construct. 

It is still relatively early to ascertain the extent to which it has 

increased, but I can tell you—and I will certainly ask Mr. 

Winkowski to comment, as well, if he so chooses—we have one person that speaks for the commissioner from a strategic level in the 

field, being able to look at Border Patrol operations, look at field 

operations—because they aren’t separate, as Mr. Winkowski indicated, at and between the ports of entry. And we have currently 

invested over 6,000 Border Patrol agents and officers in that State. 

Having a joint command helps us set a construct to be able to 

make sure that the implementation of that strategy is reaching the 

objectives and goals as previously stipulated. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Congressman Dent, the only thing I would add 

is, you know, prior to the creation of DHS, down in, for example, 

at a port of entry, you had, really, three government agencies running the port of entry. You know, you had the Customs Service, 

where I came from, under the Treasury Department; you had the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service under the Justice Department; and you had USDA under the Department of Agriculture. 

We made it work. 

The creation of DHS and CBP, 8 years ago this month, brought 

a whole new level of one agency, one department owning the borders, us being, you know, CBP owning the ports of entry, between 

the ports of entry, and the air-marine side. 

And we have matured in 8 years. And I think we have matured 

to a point where we needed to look at, ‘‘Is there a better way from 

the standpoint of managing our mission?’’ And we did a lot of research on this and took a lot of pieces from the Department of Defense with Goldwater-Nichols. 

I have had the opportunity, as Chief Fisher has, to spend a lot 

of time down in Tucson. And having one commander that is responsible for what is happening in that particular sector, to me, makes 

a great deal of sense. And what that means for my position for that 

particular area, as we continue to grow in there, is that I am going 

to organize, train, and equip, versus the operational side because 

the commander is responsible for the operational side. 

So, as the chief indicated, we have a ways to go. It is maturing. 

You know, we have, in this particular case, a Border Patrol agent 

that is in charge of the joint command. But, as the deputy, the 

joint commander is a field operations leader. 

So I think it is a good thing. I think it is innovative. I think we 

have matured to a point where we need to begin the process of relooking at how we manage the borders. 

Mr. DENT. What are your results and goals of the joint unified 

efforts, and what are the cost savings? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. From the standpoint of the Joint Field Command? 

Mr. DENT. Uh-huh. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. We are not there yet. I could not sit here and 

give you a dollar savings. From the standpoint of streamlining the 

process, I think, again, having one individual in charge of that particular sector, which includes ports of entry and between the ports 


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of entry, certainly streamlines the management reporting, because 

the commander reports directly to the Deputy Commissioner of 

CBP. 

Mr. DENT. Through a consolidation, do you see a better use of existing resources? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yeah, I believe so. And, again, time will tell 

here, but that commander has the full authority of shuffling resources. So if that particular commander wanted to take positions 

from the Customs and Border Protection officer position and place 

them someplace else in that particular AOR [area of responsibility], 

he has the full authority to do that. 

Typically, what would happen is, in order to do things like that, 

there is, you know, a reporting process that the director would 

have to come through and the headquarters. And we have streamlined that. 

So, for example, we see on the Southwest border with our outbound operations at the ports of entry; we see Border Patrol agents 

at the ports of entry working outbound operations with our border 

protection officers. We see border protection officers up at checkpoints, which traditionally was just handled by Border Patrol. 

So, you know, we are seeing this knitting; we are seeing this integration of personnel. And, as I mentioned in my oral reply, we 

all bring different skill sets to the table, Field Operations and Border Patrol. Now it is time—we have done a great job merging. Now 

it is time to really integrate. 

AIR INTERDICTION

Mr. DENT. And if I can just quickly go to the Admiral, just to 

talk about your aviation assets and capabilities for a moment. The 

Coast Guard has experienced a number of aviation casualties over 

the past few years, as you know. 

Do you have a plan to replace the two C–130Hs and two of the 

HH–60s that were recently lost? It appears that you have no plan 

under way to replace the two HH–65s that were also lost in mishaps. How are you mitigating the gap created by the absence of 

these aircraft, and what is your plan and timeline to replace these 

assets? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yeah, for the H–65 gap in particular, we are 

able to cover that with the remainder of our fleet. And these are 

short-range helicopters. They, you know, do the lion’s share of our 

coastal search and rescue, and then they also embark at sea. They 

are the same helicopters that carry our HITRON. These are our 

precision marksmen that shoot outboards of go-fast vessels. 

So we are not missing any opportunities to send cutters doing 

counter-drug missions that don’t have a helicopter. So we are able 

to work within our mix. Clearly, the critical pieces are the C–130s 

that provide that long-range surveillance, and the H–60s provide a 

longer-range capability, as well. 

Mr. DENT. What is your best tool for air interdiction? Helicopters? Fixed-wing? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Helicopter, by far. 

Mr. DENT. Is that true for the rest of you on interdiction? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir, the helicopter. Either the UH–60 or the— 

the Black Hawk or the Huey. 


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Mr. DENT. Okay. Thanks. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Culberson. 

BORDER SECURITY: APPREHENSIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We deeply appreciate the work that you do and are really committed to help you in any way that we can. 

Chief Winkowski, you really zeroed in on it, and that is the key, 

as all of you know as law enforcement officers, is to impose consequences and change behavior, and what do we do as a country, 

what do you all do as law enforcement officers to change behavior. 

And the key is imposing consequences. Criminal consequences is 

the most successful. 

And, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask if I could enter 

into the record, if I could, Mr. Chairman, without—without objection, can I enter this into the record? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Absolutely. So ordered. 

[The information follows:] 


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emcdonald on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 604 here 67979a.399
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Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you. 

I gave everybody a copy of this. This is numbers that I collected 

with you all’s help, Chief Fisher. And I really, really appreciate you 

all’s help in putting this together. 

This is the first time that I have ever been able to see these 

numbers all put together. And I have gave it to each one of the 

members of the committee. 

Because you can pretty quickly see what the problem is in Tucson. And noticed, when I first started bringing this to the Subcommittee’s attention, as Mr. Carter says, in the Tucson sector in 

fiscal year 2007, if you were picked up by the Border Patrol, you 

had a 98.6 percent chance of being home in time for dinner. And 

you were basically out about 3 hours in the lode, which is just, you 

know, terrible. And, as a result, they are just pouring through in 

Tucson. In 2008, you had a 99.6 percent chance of never being 

prosecuted. 

And I can’t get numbers—Chief, could you help me get numbers 

for 2009? I am not sure why we couldn’t get good numbers for 

2009. 

[The information follows:] 

Representative CULBERSON: And I can’t get numbers—Chief, could you help me 

get the numbers for 2009: I am not sure why we couldn’t get good numbers for 2009. 

Response: In Fiscal Year 2009, CBP’s Border Patrol apprehended 556,041 aliens 

between the Ports of Entry nationwide, 540,865 of those on the Southwest border. 

During the same time period, CBP’s Border Patrol had 60,603 Accepted Prosecutions nationwide, 60,064 of those on the Southwest border. 

Additional information regarding this question has been provided separtely to the 

Committees since it is for Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive. 

But notice in 2010, I mean, after a result—and you all have put 

in a lot of hard work, and this committee has put in the resources—deeply appreciate Chairman Price’s and Chairman 

Aderholt’s commitment to this. And, Chairman Price, in the time 

you worked on this, sir, you were able to put resources into the 

Southwest border, and it has made a big difference. 

In those sectors, Chief Fisher, where there are consequences 

being imposed and the—kind of the gold standard, in my opinion— 

and I have looked at this carefully and worked on it for many 

years, as everybody knows on the Committee. And you all know 

this has been near and dear to my heart, something I have worked 

on for many years. The gold standard is Judge Alia Ludlum in the 

Del Rio sector. 

Your sector chief there, sir, tells me that they have the lowest 

level of crossings they have ever seen, that things are very quiet. 

You know, you can hear the crickets chirping in Del Rio. The 

streets are safe. The community is thrilled. There is strong support 

among the local community, which is 96 percent Hispanic, for enforcing existing law, with primarily existing resources, with the 

close cooperation of the Border Patrol or the marshals or the judges 

or the prosecutors or the sheriffs, of CBP and ICE. There is a great 

cooperative relationship there, and that is sort of where Streamline 

started. And Judge Ludlum has had great success with it. 

I believe, Chief Randy Hill who was in El Paso, was just moved 

to Tucson. God bless him, you sent him under Niagara Falls. He 

is out there standing under Niagara Falls. 


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And if I could, Members, bring your attention to what happened 

in El Paso. Chief Randy Hill was the chief in Del Rio, working with 

Judge Ludlum. And that is why you see, Members, the prosecution 

rate in Del Rio is so high in 2007, in 2008. And we are going to 

get numbers for 2009. And it is still high, but you moved Randy 

to El Paso, I guess, over the last 2 years, Chief? And he is just 

doing a magnificent job. And because of the problems there in 

Nogales—excuse me, in Juarez and his work with the local folks, 

he got the prosecution rate in El Paso up to 65 percent. 

And I just want to confirm for the record, gentlemen, that this 

is the key. If we enforce existing law, impose real consequences— 

and the existing law is up to 6 months in jail. It is a criminal prosecution. And the consequence they are imposing, I want to make 

clear for the record, Members, is—for example, Judge Ludlum has 

given them a week, 2 weeks, a month, a couple of months, depending on the circumstances. 

Obviously, if it is an aggravated offense, if the individual has assaulted the officer, if they are carrying drugs, if they are carrying 

a weapon, they are in a special category, and they get zapped with 

a really serious criminal penalty. But if they are an economic migrant, if they are crossing, they have no other aggravating circumstances, that is what we are looking at here. They are being 

given a few weeks, a few days, a month maybe if they aggravate 

the judge, you know, bad attitude, fail the attitude test. 

And, as a result, they are just not crossing. You don’t see them 

crossing in Del Rio. The crossings in El Paso are down. In Yuma, 

where you have the Streamline program in effect, the illegal crossings are down. The local community supports this. 

Enforcing existing law with largely existing resources truly 

works. Is that all an accurate summation of what we see with 

these numbers and the work that is being done in these sectors 

where the law is being enforced? 

Chief FISHER. Mr. Culberson, there are two areas where I first 

want to start; I do want to agree that consequences, and, in particular, prosecution, is a key. I don’t necessarily think it is the key, 

and let me explain why. 

One, when you look at comparing and contrasting data like 

this—and this is something we were taking a hard look at over this 

past year—there are a lot of other variables to take into consideration. Places like Del Rio and others, when they instituted the Operation Streamline, the levels of activity and apprehensions were 

much lower than they were in Arizona. So you are looking at different judicial districts. You are looking at the capacity with jurisprudence to do that. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Sure. 

Chief FISHER. But there is another critical piece here that we are 

looking at, as well. We have taken a look at about a dozen different 

consequences that we have at our disposal subsequent to an arrest. 

And instead of looking at each of those programs and trying to figure out, well, which one has the best recidivism rate, which one 

has the best re-apprehension rate, what we decided to do is come 

up with what is called a ‘‘consequence delivery system.’’ 

And what that does, very quickly, is it takes all, in a particular 

area, all the consequences that are available to CBP, and then we 


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do an analysis of alternatives where we take a look at schedule, 

performance, and cost and try to figure out what we are trying to 

effect. 

And, in all consequences, there are two primary things we want 

to effect: One are the individuals, and two are the criminal organizations. And, in doing so, Streamline may be a key that we would 

want to, in specific populations, go forward to the U.S. attorney for 

prosecutions. But, in other cases, we may not because of the outcomes that we are trying to achieve. 

Mr. CULBERSON. What other consequences are available to you? 

I mean, the immigration court is a civil proceeding. 

Chief FISHER. Right. 

Mr. CULBERSON. So the only real consequence—and I have 

looked at this closely—that really has an impact is the criminal 

prosecution. Then you have these guys 10-printed. If they come 

back, it is up to 2 years. They don’t come back, you don’t get repeat 

customers, if it is a criminal prosecution. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. But, again, not all Streamline cases and 

dispositions are the same. In other words, in Arizona, for instance, 

the sentencing under their Streamline cases—and they are doing 

70 cases per day in Arizona, but the time served is 3 to 4 days. 

So when you really look at the consequence, it is not the program, 

it is what is happening as a result of that consequence. 

So, one in particular would be the Operations Against Smugglers 

Initiative for Safety and Security, also known as OASISS, where 

we take the case, we take the principal, we take the material witnesses, and we develop the case for prosecution of smuggling in 

Mexico, and we turn over that case and the principals to PGR [the 

General Prosecutor] in Mexico. We have seen very low recidivism 

rates when we do that. 

So, again, it is based on the outcome and what we are trying to 

effect, not just putting people into programs for the sake of the program. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

OFFICER CONDUCT AND INTEGRITY ASSURANCE

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Fisher, I have been deeply troubled by 

the long and growing list of Border Patrol misconduct cases. According to the LA Times, over the past 2 years at least five Border 

Patrol agents have been accused or convicted of sex crimes, including one individual who assaulted an immigrant mother while her 

children sat in a nearby car. 

Last May, an immigrant detainee died after being beaten and 

shocked with a Taser four times. In June, an agent admitted to assaulting an immigrant at a processing center, while later that 

month an unarmed 15-year-old boy was shot and killed in El Paso 

by Border Patrol personnel. And, in September, an agent went on 

trial for torturing a 16-year-old suspected drug smuggler. 

My question is, what steps is the Border Patrol taking to correct 

this pattern of wrongdoing? For example, what changes are being 


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made in regards to the training and the supervision of the Border 

Patrol so that these things don’t happen? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, ma’am. And we take every allegation very seriously, as you well imagine. And, certainly, we turn those cases, 

when they are brought to our attention—which, a vast majority of 

those cases come to our attention first, and we turn those over either to the Office of Inspector General, to ICE’s OPR, or to our own 

Internal Affairs. 

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The specific things that we have put into place over this last year 

include, but are not limited to, the following: One is recognizing 

that even our CBP Internal Affairs Office, you know, we have backlogs in terms of background investigations and reinvestigations for 

current Border Patrol agents. So we are looking to get that backlog 

down. 

And we have also instituted over the years polygraphing employees. And we are also going to be hiring more polygraph examiners 

to be able to ensure that integrity, first and foremost, stays within 

our organization that we are very proud of. 

We are also looking at areas where we—when we had doubled 

the size of the organization are taking a look at supervisory ratios 

in specific locations and making those supervisory ratio adjustments, where appropriate. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. Well, that brings me to the second 

question, and I think, in part, that you answered it. Because one 

of the concerns that was raised—and this was by Senator Mark 

Pryor of Arkansas—was that, initially, in the rush to hire Border 

Patrol agents, that hiring standards were lowered and that barely 

15 percent of Customs and Border Protection applicants undergo 

polygraph tests, and, of those, 60 percent were rejected by the 

agency because they failed the polygraph or were not qualified for 

the job. 

So are you saying, then, that you are now improving your hiring 

standards and the rate of the polygraph tests and background investigations, everything that needs to be done in order to ensure 

that those who are working at the border meet the standards that 

we all want is, in fact, now going to be implemented? 

Chief FISHER. Well, the standards to increase, again, the background investigations and the reinvestigations, that is accurate. 

We are looking to increase that, to be able to reduce the backlog, 

and, also, to do more polygraphs than we have done in the past. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. And about existing Border Patrol, in 

that same Washington Post story, it says that the number of CBP 

corruption investigations opened by the inspector general climbed 

from 245 in 2006 to more than 770 this year, and that corruption 

cases at its sister agency, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, rose from 66 to more than 220 over that same period. 

So is something also being done to prevent those kinds of things 

from happening, not only in terms of the initial hiring and the 

background checks, but also in terms of the supervision and whatever else—you would know better than me—needs to take place in 

order to ensure that these kinds of things don’t happen once folks 

are hired? 


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Chief FISHER. Yes. And, in particular, CBP, with ICE and the Office of Inspector General, have worked this year. You know, the 

first of it is to try to, you know, broaden out and try to define the 

problem. You know, how many of the allegations, for instance, that 

may be contained in a lot of those numbers, how many of those 

were legitimate allegations? What happened with the investigation? 

So, as we get more information and share that information between DHS and the Inspector General, I think we are going to be 

able to make better judgments and informed decisions in terms of 

what we can do to minimize those numbers in the future. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. 

Mr. Winkowski, did you want to—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Thank you. The only thing I would add is, in 

my office, Field Operations, we have done a number of things. I 

think the most important issue that we have done is we have 

begun a process, what we call AMSCO, which is an office that has 

highly specialized officers in it in headquarters, that looks at the 

data. 

So, for example, in Field Operations, everything we do in Field 

Operations, we leave some type of electronic fingerprint. So, whether we are processing you on the land border, fingerprinting you, or 

making seizures, we are leaving fingerprints. 

And what we are doing and one of the things that has enabled 

us to move forward is the vehicle primary client, which was part 

of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative implementation, taking that data and asking questions: Why did that officer take only 

5 seconds to process an automobile? I mean, typically, it is 45 seconds. Why didn’t they run names? We are being more proactive 

and going in there and looking at these things and then raising 

those issues up to Internal Affairs and the IG. So, we are being 

more proactive, rather than sitting back and having others come in 

and say we have a problem. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. Well, you know, we really appreciate 

what a difficult job you have, and so, any way that you feel that 

the committee can be helpful—I am speaking for myself, but I am 

sure that is true of the other Members—we really would appreciate 

that kind of input from you. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Thank you. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Thank you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

DRUG INTERDICTION: DETECTION OF SUBMERSIBLES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank you individually and collectively for what you do. 

I hope to have a greater appreciation for what you do. 

I know you focused on interceptions of surface vessels, aircraft 

that are involved in drug smuggling. What about, Admiral, the use 

of submersibles, or submarines? 

I have read about it—we have all read about it for the last couple 

of years. I assume they are cartel-owned submersibles. What are 

we doing to interdict them? How many are there out there? What 


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are the loads—what sort of loads are they bringing in? And how 

do you prosecute them? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Congressman, I will take that, and it is several areas. One, clearly, the challenge is vexing once it is on the 

high seas. You know, both Coast Guard and our DOD partners 

have a significant resource challenge tracking, first detecting, then 

monitoring movement of a fully submersible. 

So, as I said earlier, it really starts with the relationships. And 

so our relationships with Colombia, with the Colombian National 

Police, detecting these as they are being assembled, detecting these 

at the launch point, the most critical point, is to get them at 

the—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. With all due respect, with all of the assets 

we have at our disposal? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. These will operate over literally several million square miles. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yeah, but—— 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes, sir. And—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I assume they have signatures. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Well, the challenges is, when they are fully 

submersible and they are not emitting any electromagnetic signature, it becomes—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how many have we intercepted? Maybe 

you can—— 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. We have been able to—I don’t have the exact 

numbers of the semi-submersibles that we have detected. We do 

have legislation in place where just moving one of these, in itself, 

is a violation of U.S. law. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you are telling me that the Colombians, 

from what I can gather, have intercepted some of these 

submersibles, right? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That is correct. There was one—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But we are, to some extent, beholden to 

their goodwill? Colombia has been, actually, a very good partner in 

that regard. So we are beholden to the goodwill of countries that 

are home to these cartels? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yeah, again, when these exist in the sovereign shores—and these are in largely what I would call 

ungoverned territories. These are in the jungles in the eastern Pacific—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What ever happened to the Monroe Doctrine? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. They will carry upwards of 10 metric tons of 

cocaine. And that is what we have seen—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, give us some good news on the Committee—if that is allowable, Mr. Chairman—how much would you 

characterize we have seized through the utilization of these types 

of vessels? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I can get back to you with those exact numbers. I know, when I was commanding the 11th District just more 

than a year and a half ago, we seized five of these and more than 

40 metric—— 

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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Five out of what, 505 or—— 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Out of the ones we detected. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN [continuing]. Well, have we made any estimates as to how many of these—— 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. We have not. And we had a recent interdiction, as I said, about 2 months ago of one before it was able to 

launch. 

OFFICER FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just a last question. Throughout your 

workforce—and we give you credit for having a tough job, a dangerous job—linguists, a bilingual workforce, do you have a full complement of the people you need? Generally speaking, can you provide a brief response? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No lacking of people who can immediately 

identify—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. No, we have, as a matter of fact, a program in 

place that, depending on the level of their ability to speak a foreign 

language, we can pay up to a 5 percent award for that. So, the vast 

majority are Spanish speakers, but we also have a whole cadre of 

individuals that speak Asian languages and Middle Eastern languages, and oftentimes we use those officers to help out our investigators and others. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So, no lack of information or the ability of 

people to download it and understand it because of linguistic 

issues? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Right. No. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all. 

BORDER SECURITY: RESOURCES AND RESULTS

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Let me shift now to a little bit different topic in one regard, but 

still keeping within the overall theme, the operational control and 

resources. 

Let me direct this to you, Chief Fisher. I know you are at the 

front of the table, and it seems like you get directed most of the 

questions, but this question would probably be more aptly asked 

going toward you. 

The Border Patrol has dramatically grown in the past few years. 

At the same time, we have not achieved operational control of the 

border. 

Let’s talk about resources more specifically. What is the right 

mix of technology, infrastructure, and people to achieve operational 

control? And how many agents will you need? 

Chief FISHER. Mr. Chairman, over the last year or so, one of the 

things that I had asked the field commanders to assess was just 

that. 

As of the last few years, we have been in what is called a gain 

mode. We needed the resources. We had no idea what the numbers 

would be, in terms of miles of fence, for instance. We didn’t know 

what the technology could bring to us, and we don’t know how 


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many Border Patrol agents we needed. We just knew we needed 

more. 

And so what we are doing, now that we have the fence and we 

have seen what that has been able to do to us, predominantly in 

the urban areas, we are getting more and more technology, and 

more mobile technology, which is really going to be critical. 

And now that we have a workforce of 21,000—I had mentioned 

earlier about our doctrine approach. What we want to be able to 

assess is not whether we need more Border Patrol agents across 

some linear line in some astronomical number because that, in and 

of itself, is not going to achieve, whether by our definition, operational control nor any levels of operational security. 

And so what we are doing now is trying to figure out, with those 

deployments, what have we seen as a result of those deployments? 

And, in particular, how can we use and deploy those assets differently to achieve the same end state? 

As a quick example, when I was a Border Patrol agent many 

years ago, a sensor would go off, I had no idea if that was a cow, 

if that was people, if it was backpackers. And so, what I did, on 

my own, I would have to get out of a vehicle with a flashlight, kind 

of run through the mesquite trees, catch some sign, track it. And 

then, all of a sudden, I would come upon a group. Maybe there was 

dope; maybe there wasn’t. 

And so, what we are doing now is—that doctrine is a lot different 

than we are training Border Patrol agents. Now we have the ability 

not only to detect but also to identify and classify that threat. So 

instead of sending the Border Patrol agent in there, what is our 

concept of operations for deploying a UAS, for instance, to make 

that identification and classification? And instead of having Mike 

Fisher with his flashlight go out there, how about we have a sixman team in an air-mobile concept going out there and effectively 

making that arrest? Increased certainty of apprehension in a consistent manner gives us a higher level of border security and helps 

us even within our own operational control definitions. 

Those numbers that you had asked for specifically in terms of 

Border Patrol agents, I don’t have that information for you right 

now. But that is our attempt right now as we are looking at the 

strategy and how we redeploy those resources to get that level of 

operational control and border security that everybody expects. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Of course, you know this Subcommittee wants to 

get you the resources you need to do your job. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. But, of course, throwing money at the border 

without a clear understanding of how that funding buys you capability and makes the border secure is something different. 

Very simply, we have been asking for nearly 4 years for the Border Patrol’s mission requirements and how the technology infrastructure proposed meets those needs. 

With the Secretary’s announcement on the new Arizona border 

technology plan, we again have requested the basis for this change. 

How does your plan specifically meet your mission requirements? 

Chief FISHER. Very succinctly, sir, I will say that part of the 

analysis of alternatives in the Secretary’s assessment, we were part 

of that, within the Border Patrol and, certainly, CBP. And what we 


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are looking at doing is taking commercial, off-the-shelf technology 

and using that, specific to the terrain, specific to the threats and 

vulnerabilities that we see on the border. And our field commanders help assess that for us. 

So, as we start rolling out mobile surveillance systems with 

radar capabilities, daytime/nighttime cameras, seismic sensors, increased detection and identification and classification systems, 

those levels and those deployments are different than, for instance, 

building the Block 1 systems that we have seen under SBInet in 

Tucson and Ajo. 

Those systems are currently working for us, in terms of giving 

us a broader situational awareness. But the assessment piece also 

wanted to take into consideration, to what extent did we want to 

build all of that across the 2,000 miles of border? And so, what we 

came in—and based on the field commander’s recommendations 

and, certainly, my concurrence in looking at the border, is having 

more of a mobile capability so that we can respond to those threats, 

should they materialize. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Well, again, we want to support you, but we need 

your help. I would like your assurance to this Subcommittee that 

we will promptly receive thorough justifications for the hundreds of 

millions of dollars’ investment you have requested? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. And, in particular, how the technology proposed 

provides the best possible security at the lowest possible cost to 

meet Border Patrol needs. 

Chief FISHER. I will take that back as an action item, Mr. Chairman, and provide you what I am able to. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

[The information follows:] 

Chairman ADERHOLT: . . . in particular, how that technology proposed provides 

the best possible security at the lowest possible cost to meet Border Patrol needs. 

Chief FISHER: I will take that back as an action item, Mr. Chairman, and provide 

you what I am able to. 

Response: The overarching operational requirement is the need to achieve awareness of border activity through surveillance and detection to facilitate apprehension. 

By addressing this operational requirement, the Alternative Southwest Border Technology Plan seeks to enhance mission needs/mission criteria: to Detect, Identify, 

Classify, Track, and Respond/Resolve threats. 

With the DHS Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) as supporting evidence, CBP’s Office 

of Border Patrol (OBP) convened a panel of field operational subject matter experts 

from the Tucson and Yuma sectors. These experts were tasked to determine what 

technologies were required to achieve the field awareness and the probability of apprehension needed in each of their areas. 

OBP wanted to ensure that the field operational perspective and expertise from 

each area were leveraged to provide the most viable solution. These solutions are 

designed to fill the mission needs in their respective operational environments. 

The Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, who conducted the DHS 

AoA, briefed these field experts on the results of the AoA. The OBP panel of subject 

matter experts, informed by the results of the AoA and their detailed knowledge of 

the border areas and the threats to those areas, conducted a mission analysis and 

subsequently developed a detailed technology deployment plan for Arizona. 

Mr. Price. 

OFFICER CONDUCT AND INTEGRITY ASSURANCE: POLYGRAPHS

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I want to develop a couple of previous lines of questioning further with Chief Fisher and Assistant Commissioner Winkowski, if 

I might, the first having to do with the important efforts to ensure 

the integrity of the CBP forces; and then, secondly, some further 

questions about the hiring, using supplemental funds and hiring in 

general. 

CBP testified last year that the Mexican drug cartels had had 

some success in infiltrating Federal law enforcement agencies 

along the border. There had been cases of CBP officers assisting 

drug cartels, letting vehicles pass. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard raised earlier the rather alarming 60 percent 

polygraph rejection rate that you are seeing with current job applicants. That, of course, raises questions about who might have been 

hired when you weren’t regularly applying polygraph screening. So 

how big a problem is this, in general? 

There are some cases that are troubling, the case of Border Patrol Agent Marcos Manzano, who was illegally harboring a previously deported felon who was distributing narcotics from the 

agent’s home. It took 15 months from the time FBI received the allegations until that agent was arrested. 

Now, we need to tie this, I think, to your plans for the coming 

year and to your budget request. Your 2012 budget request includes an additional $26 million for CBP integrity programs—polygraphs, background investigations, periodic reinvestigations—the 

idea being to progress toward the requirements of the Anti-Border 

Corruption Act. 

Now, in the past, CBP has not been able to polygraph all its new 

applicants. In fiscal year 2008, only 5 percent received a polygraph. 

I understand that figure has now grown to around 25 percent. It 

seems clear to me that polygraphs and background investigations 

are critical to make sure that you have reliable employees. What will that $26 million buy? If that increase in your budget 

is enacted, will you be able to polygraph all CBP applicants before 

they come on board? And then, other than increasing funding for 

integrity programs, what actions have you taken and do you plan 

to take to rout out unreliable personnel? 

Chief FISHER. Sir, our intent is to polygraph as many applicants 

as we can prior to bringing them on board and training them as 

Border Patrol agents. 

And I will also tell you that, beyond just the polygraph and the 

background investigations that we had mentioned, the other thing 

within our organization—— 

Mr. PRICE. Well, excuse me, but I caught the ambiguity in that 

answer to Ms. Roybal-Allard, and that is why I asked it more precisely. What does ‘‘as many as you can’’ mean? What kind of assurances can you give? 

And there had to be some basis for that $26 million request. No 

doubt it is not just about polygraphs. But what kind of assurances 

can you give that we are really going to move to much higher and 

more reliable rates of screening? 

Chief FISHER. Well, sir, for clarification, it is my understanding 

that we are building capacity to be able to do polygraphs up to 100 

percent, with the increase in the examiners and with the money 

that was appropriated. 


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Mr. PRICE. Yes, sir. Would either of you want to elaborate on further measures, either those that are indicated in this budget or efforts that are otherwise under way? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Several thoughts, Congressman Price. 

I think the polygraph program, as proposed and in law now, is 

a step in the right direction. I really believe that the CBP officers, 

the Border Patrol agents, the ICE agents, Coast Guard, we are national security positions, and we have to be treated as such. 

And I think polygraph is good. It is a good start, from the standpoint of all new—my understanding and Commissioner Bersin’s 

goal, as I understand it, is that every new applicant, whether Border Patrol or a CBP officer, would be polygraphed, and that would 

be part of that $26 million. 

I think the other thing, and I mentioned it earlier, was that we 

need to take, I think, a more proactive, a more aggressive approach 

from the standpoint of using the data that we have out there. You 

know, there is a lot of opportunity there, and I think we have to 

keep in mind that we have this small group. We have, you know, 

60,000 employees in CBP, and we are talking about this very, very 

small group. And we have fallen short. There is no doubt about 

that. And one corruption case is one too many. 

But I think, as an office, we need to be more proactive, more forward-leaning from the standpoint, at least in the field operations 

area, of using the data, using the processing data from the standpoint of data integrity and from the standpoint of looking at how 

those data are used, how that process is taking place real-time out 

on the line, and asking questions about it. As I mentioned earlier, 

why did three cars just go by and nobody was queried? 

We have that capability now. And we have an office that has 

been established in which that is part of its function. But I think 

we need to be much more forward-leaning. 

And I personally believe that, you know, polygraphing all new 

applicants is important. And I think it is also important that we 

institute some type of a random system from the standpoint of 

polygraph, if we are going to look at ourselves as national security 

positions. 

BORDER SECURITY: OFFICER HIRINGS

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Let me move quickly to this question of hiring, using the supplemental funds. You both gave partial answers to that earlier and 

helped us understand what seems, on the face of it, certainly, 

seems to be a slow pace of hiring. 

I wonder, Chief, if you can elaborate and let us know of those 

thousand Border Patrol agents, what portion will be on board by 

the end of the fiscal year. I am talking specifically here, of course, 

of the ones funded in the 2010 supplemental appropriation. 

And Commissioner, the same for the 250 CBP officers. 

Finally, let me just raise an issue, and you may need to respond 

in more detail for the record. There are questions, again, on the 

face of it anyway, about the allocation of these officers. The plan 

that you have submitted, the expenditure plan, indicated 500 new 

Border Patrol hires would be deployed in the Tucson sector. The remaining 500 will be part of a mobile team disbursed into the largVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:30 Sep 13, 2011 Jkt 067979 PO 00000 Frm 00501 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\67979P2.XXX 67979P2

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est Border Patrol sectors—El Paso, San Diego, and the Rio Grande 

Valley—and will be used to rapidly respond to threats and intelligence-driven operations. 

How is that determined? How is the deployment of these mobile 

response team members determined? 

El Paso has a very low apprehension rate, yet you are deploying 

up to 187 additional agents there. Rio Grande is getting none, although your expenditure plan had indicated it would receive some. 

El Centro sector, which has the second-highest percent of apprehensions, receives none. 

It just, on the face of it, doesn’t seem to add up, or at least there 

is kind of a gap in terms of the rationale. Could you say what you 

can say orally here and then perhaps elaborate for the record? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Yeah, if you could briefly answer that, and then 

we are going to go on to Mr. Carter. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. The 500 of the 1,000 that are earmarked 

for the mobile response teams [MRTs] along those four corridors 

that you identified—although they would be stationed, because we 

have to put the billets somewhere—are going to be on those four 

locations. The intent is to have that capability to be able to move 

them either within that sector or within the corridors to broaden 

their resource capability outside of that location. 

For instance, El Centro, if El Centro has a requirement, increased threat or activity or hotspot, the MRTs in San Diego could 

be moved over there up to whatever level of additional requirements they would need a lot cheaper than me assigning agents 

from across the Southwest border over to El Centro. So I am putting them across the Southwest border and for the primary corridors on the basis of threat. They also can be redeployed outside 

of those corridors if need be. 

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Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask, before you turn to Mr. 

Carter, for a quick answer to my main question, which had to do 

with where we could expect these hiring levels to be at the end of 

this year? From each of you, if you don’t mind. 

Chief FISHER. Sir, we are on track by September of this year to 

have 21,370 Border Patrol agents. That does include the 1,000 additional based on the supplemental funds. 

Mr. PRICE. Does or does not? 

Mr. FISHER. It does, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. It does include. 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. And we will have the 250 on, by the end of the 

fiscal year. 

Mr. PRICE. By the end of the fiscal year. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Carter. 

MARITIME SECURITY: COAST GUARD PRESENCE IN TEXAS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I’d better start off by saying I may have come off a little 

harsh last time. I am an old trial judge, and some of you, at least, 

have dealt with judges in the past. But I want you to know that 

I am a friend of every agency you represent. I am a huge supporter 

of the Coast Guard. I have sat on the border with the Border Patrol 

in the dark. I have worked with all of your agencies and highly appreciate you, and I am on your side. I think you have a tough job, 

and I think you can do the job. And I asked the questions in a spirit of trying to get the job done. 

Now, to shift to a couple of questions. Admiral, I got a call last 

week from Texas State Senator Ogden on behalf of my Governor, 

Governor Rick Perry, asking if the Coast Guard would consider 

putting a permanent presence on our two lakes on the Rio Grande. 

And, even better, they would love to see you have a presence at 

least from the mouth of the Brownsville all the way up to the dam. 

If we can provide the resources and any authorization language 

to do so, would that be a mission that the Coast Guard could accomplish? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Well, certainly, we are seeing what impact 

our surge operations have. Again, about each quarter, we send 

teams to each lake for about a 1-week period to see what impacts 

that has. You know, is this a transitory threat or is this one that 

is going to be there for perpetuity? 

And you did hear Admiral Papp say that, in order to source that 

within our base right now, we would have to rob from one mission 

set to do another. So, if this is clearly the will of our Nation, it 

would take a permanent presence, to include the infrastructure, to 

operate—— 

Mr. CARTER. I would hope it is the will of our Nation, but I can 

guarantee it is the will of the State of Texas, okay? And those folks 

count on me. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes, sir. 


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BORDER SECURITY: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Mr. CARTER. So I will be in touch with the Coast Guard and 

work with you on getting the additional resources and authorization language, if anything. 

Gentlemen, Texas cattle ranchers are the largest cattle-producing State in the Union. We had 14 percent of the U.S. Beef cattle production in 2010. Mexico is a huge beef producer, and they 

purchase a whole lot of our beef. We swap cattle with Mexico, 

about 1.2 million head of cattle a year. And this is the normal commerce that goes on. 

In addition, our Rio Grande Valley is one of the highest crop-production areas for truck-farming-type crops in the entire country, 

outside of California. 

We are getting reports from our farmers and our ranchers that 

they are frightened and scared. Many of the ranchers are reporting 

that the Border Patrol has pulled back a mile from the river, in 

some instances, leaving them where they feel like they are out in 

‘‘no man’s land’’. 

Our Texas ag commissioner has just produced data. It came up 

yesterday, in fact—a Web site called 

www.protectyourtexasborder.com. I would recommend you go look 

at that. They show some of these ranchers and then, with nightvision, showing you the invasion of their ranches. 

The irrigation farmers are saying they can’t turn the water on 

at night in the Rio Grande Valley because they have been warned 

that if they flood the fields when they are coming across, they are 

going to kill them and their families. 

They are frightened on the border. And, you know, agriculture is 

the number-two employer and number-two part of the economy of 

Texas, oil being number one. And we desperately need something 

to protect those folks. 

And we are perfectly willing to give you more resources, we are 

perfectly willing to give the border sheriffs more resources, and 

local law enforcement more resources, whatever you think will help 

allow the citizens of Texas to live safely on that border. 

And I will tell you, from having this year visited the State of Arizona, God bless the people of Arizona. They don’t even have a river. 

And I don’t know how they are surviving. But I am right now talking about things that have been asked of me by my fellow Texans. 

Any place we can give resources to other law enforcement or to 

you, I am willing to do my very best to get that. And I need you 

to tell me how the cooperation is with locals. If it is enhancing border sheriffs and deputies from California to the Gulf of Mexico, we 

are willing to do it. You tell me what you need. 

So, do you have any suggestions? How about local law enforcement? More deputies backing you up, does that help? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. Not only does it help, it is critical to our 

mission to be able to do that. As a matter of fact, with Operation 

Stonegarden grants that the Department hands out, that helps 

them to be able to augment the missions. 

And, again, it is not, you know, having them stand side-by-side 

along the river, for instance; it is recognizing, beyond sharing of 

the information, deploying in high-risk areas, for them to be able 


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to use their jurisdictional authority to have the same impact and 

help us in our ability to disrupt and dismantle those organizations. 

Mr. CARTER. Stonegarden is for overtime pay, as I understand it. 

And some of these are really small—and I visited with some of 

them in Arizona, and I visited with them in Texas. Some of them 

are really small departments with big counties, as I know you are 

all aware of. And they need to hire more deputies, as well as to 

give overtime. Some of those guys are working a lot of overtime. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. So I am working on getting something to help them 

hire new deputies, as well as this great program, Stonegarden, 

which I thoroughly approve of. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Congressman Carter, don’t forget the ports of 

entry, from the standpoint of what the deputies do down there for 

us also. They are working outbound operations. We partake in the 

Stonegarden. If you go down to Hidalgo—I just met with the chief 

of police down there—they have a strong presence. They are helping us make millions of dollars in seizures every year. So let’s not 

forget the ports of entry also. 

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AGENTS: SECURITY

POSTURE IN MEXICO

Mr. CARTER. Well, we think that they are a good backup to a 

great program that you are working diligently. And I will testify 

before any court under oath that the work that the Border Patrolman was doing in the dark when I was out there with him that 

night, you can’t pay people enough to do that job. It is a terrible 

job. 

And, by the way, I have another question real quickly. ICE 

agents are getting killed in Mexico, and they are unarmed. And I 

asked this of the head of the Department, and I didn’t get an answer. I might not get an answer today. 

Are you the only unarmed American agents that go into Mexico? 

Are the other agencies also unarmed, like the FBI, the Drug Enforcement people and others? Are you the only ones that are unarmed, or is everybody unarmed when they go into Mexico? 

Mr. DINKINS. Sir, that is a great question. And rather than discuss our security posture overseas in an open forum, I would love 

to sit down and we could brief you. 

Mr. CARTER. That is the answer I got last time. 

Mr. DINKINS. I was wondering what answer—— 

Mr. CARTER. Yeah, that is exactly the same answer your boss 

gave. Okay, well, let’s discuss it because—— 

Mr. DINKINS [continuing]. Absolutely. 

Mr. CARTER [continuing]. I don’t like the idea—because San Luis 

Port of Sea is not the border. San Luis Port of Sea is deep in Mexico. And for those guys to get ambushed deep in Mexico and all 

they can fight them with is a smile, it is not a good place to be. 

Thank you, all of you. God bless you. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Carter. 

And thank each of you for appearing before the Subcommittee 

today and providing your insights on the Southwest border and the 

operations there. 


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As I mentioned in my opening remarks and I have said, we have 

always made operational needs a priority in this Subcommittee. 

And we take that very seriously, as I know all of you do, as well. 

The safety of the men and women who stand on the front lines are 

a great concern to us. 

Before we close today, I want to hear from each of you, is there 

anything that you need, issues or resources that we need to address, to do everything possible to keep your people safe in the 

field? 

Chief FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to respond to that question. 

And I don’t have anything right off the bat to respond to, other 

than, thank you and your staff for their responsiveness in helping 

us understand what the requirements are and what the end state 

looks like, in terms of a secure border. Your staff has been very 

good, so thank you, sir. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. The only thing I would add is just a couple of 

issues. You know, we received quite a bit of money under the 

ARRA, with $100 million for our NII equipment that is out there 

at the ports of entry, as well as over $700 million for improvements 

on ports of entry on the Northern border as well as Southern border. 

I do think that we need to keep our eye on the ball. We have had 

growth in Field Operations. But, again, we are a unique animal, 

in that we have this dual mission of facilitating legitimate trade 

and travel and also making sure that dangerous people and dangerous things don’t come in this country. 

And, as we continue to open up new ports of entry—I mentioned 

Donna and Anzalduas in Texas—we need to make sure that the resources come with that. Oftentimes, they don’t. And we have to 

keep our eye on that, as well as a place like San Ysidro. We are 

going to go from 24 booths to 63, and we have to staff those. 

You know, there is a big economic engine, and you all are mentioning that today, that happens at that port of entry. And I think 

we need to continue to give you the right matrix, we need to continue to give you the right data, we need to continue to, I think, 

present our case in that regard. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. And our staff will follow up with 

that. 

Mr. DINKINS. And, sir, I would just like to follow up. I want to 

thank you, as well. I mean, I think ICE has really come into its 

own. What I asked for and we have been working with the committee on is really to ensure that we maintain that momentum in 

moving forward into the next future budget years. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. And, Chairman, I am just thankful to the 

Committee. You know, on Friday, we decommissioned a 67-year-old 

cutter in Ketchikan, Alaska, the ACUSHNET. Unfortunately, there 

is another 67-year-old cutter that now owns the distinction of being 

the oldest cutter in our fleet. And it is the crews of those ships that 

are keeping us ready. And so, when I say we are on life support, 

that is, you know, it is really on the backs of our people right now 

that are keeping us ready for today and tomorrow. 


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But the fact that you have supported our recapitalization of our 

fleet, that will better posture us as we look at the Southwest border, not just today, but tomorrow as well. So, to the committee, I 

am thankful for your support. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Thank each of you for your candor this 

morning. 

And the hearing is adjourned. 


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I N D E X 

Page 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ............................................. 1 

Administrative Violations and Removal ................................................................ 50 

Agents Killed ............................................................................................................ 41 

Alternatives to Detention ........................................................................................ 48, 51 

Biography: Morton, John ......................................................................................... 27 

Biometric Exit .......................................................................................................... 56 

Cost Savings ............................................................................................................. 28 

Criminal Aliens ........................................................................................................ 33 

Detention Bed Space: 

Cost .................................................................................................................... 32 

Specifics ............................................................................................................. 40 

Executive Office for Immigration Review .............................................................. 49 

Federal Immigration Law: Enforcement ................................................................ 46 

Inspector General Report ........................................................................................ 48 

Intensive Supervision Appearance Program ......................................................... 53 

Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................... 53 

Opening Statement: 

Assistant Secretary Morton ............................................................................. 12 

Chairman Aderholt ........................................................................................... 1 

Ranking Member Price .................................................................................... 9 

Sanctuary Cities ...................................................................................................... 46 

Secure Communities ................................................................................................ 37 

Profiling ............................................................................................................. 55 

U.S.-Mexico Cooperation ......................................................................................... 38 

Vetting of Counterparts .......................................................................................... 39 

Visa Security Units ................................................................................................. 57 

Re-Entries................................................................................................................. 42, 52 

Removal Operations................................................................................................. 40, 54 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ........................................... 195 

Advanced Imaging Technology.................................................................... 214, 215, 234 

Procurements .................................................................................................... 217 

Safety ................................................................................................................. 216 

Training Requirements .................................................................................... 220 

Air Cargo Security ............................................................................................... 219, 249 

Aviation Security Fees ............................................................................................ 214 

Behavior Detection Program ................................................................................... 234 

Biography: Pistole, John ......................................................................................... 212 

Biometric Identification ........................................................................................... 235 

Collective Bargaining .......................................................................... 213, 222, 224, 251 

Opening Statement: 

Administrator Pistole ....................................................................................... 205 

Chairman Aderholt ........................................................................................... 195 

Ranking Member Price .................................................................................... 201 


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iv 

Passenger Screening: 

Identifying High-Risk Travelers ...................................................................... 226 

Profiling ............................................................................................................. 228 

Private Screening ..................................................................................................... 230 

Personnel ........................................................................................................... 223 

Secure Flight Program......................................................................................... 213, 252 

Screening Operations .............................................................................................. 249 

Transit Security Grants .......................................................................................... 221 

Trusted Traveler Program ...................................................................................... 216 

Expedited Screening ......................................................................................... 222 

Transportation Security Officer Salaries ............................................................... 229 

VIPR Teams ............................................................................................................. 235 

Southwest Border Enforcement ....................................................................... 439 

Air Interdiction ........................................................................................................ 486 

Border Security: 

Apprehensions and Prosecutions ..................................................................... 487 

Border Patrol Agent Death in Arizona ........................................................... 484 

Border Patrol Agents & CBP Officers ............................................................. 480 

Local Law Enforcement ................................................................................... 506 

Measures of Progress ....................................................................................... 475 

Officer Hirings .................................................................................................. 501 

Resources & Results ......................................................................................... 497 

Tucson Sector .................................................................................................... 482 

Unified Command Structure ........................................................................... 484 

Drug Interdiction: 

Detection of Submersibles ................................................................................ 493 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents: Security Posture in Mexico ... 507 

Maritime Security: 

Coast Guard Presence in Texas ...................................................................... 505 

Office of Professional Responsibility ............................................................... 492 

Officer Conduct & Integrity Assurance .................................................................. 491 

Polygraph .......................................................................................................... 499 

Officer Foreign Language Skills ............................................................................. 497 

Opening Statement: 

Admiral Zukunft ............................................................................................... 454 

Assistant Commissioner Winkowski ............................................................... 451 

Associate Director Dinkins .............................................................................. 453 

Chairman Aderholt ........................................................................................... 439 

Chief Fisher ...................................................................................................... 450 

Ranking Member Price .................................................................................... 446 

Stopgap Funding, Impact of ................................................................................ 479, 481 

Witness Biographies ................................................................................................ 469 

Æ 


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