Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES THOMAS

PRICE II, KARI MOORE, KAY PRICE,

WILLIAM W. KNOWLES FIRST FRIENDS CHURCH, and

JENNIFER WINNETT DENNISTON EARLHAM COLLEGE:

Knowles & Associates, P.C.

Carmel, Indiana CURTIS E. SHIRLEY

Indianapolis, Indiana

ROBERT M. OAKLEY

Dilley & Oakley, P.C. PHILIP C. THRASHER

Carmel, Indiana Thrasher Buschmann & Voelkel, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

DAVID J. BURTON

Richmond, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

BARBARA MONAHAN:

BRADLEY J. DOUGHERTY

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DEMARIS SNYDER WEHR, TIMOTHY JOHN )

SNYDER, TERENCE GLEN SNYDER, and )

DANIEL OWEN SNYDER, )

)

Appellants-Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) No. 89A04-1202-PL-76

)

THOMAS PRICE II, individually and as the named )

executor of the estate of Nilah Snyder, THOMAS )

PRICE II, as trustee of the Nilah Snyder Trust, )

BARBARA MONAHAN, KARI MOORE, )

THOMAS PRICE II, KAY PRICE, FIRST )

FRIENDS CHURCH, and EARLHAM COLLEGE, )

)

Appellees-Defendants. )
2

APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Judge

Cause No. 89D02-1102-PL-10

December 31, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge

Case Summary

Orval Snyder and his wife Nilah signed reciprocal wills that left the residuary estate of 

the first spouse to die to the surviving spouse, with the surviving spouse’s residuary estate to 

be distributed equally among their seven children from prior marriages. Orval died first, and 

his residuary estate was distributed to Nilah. After Orval’s death, Nilah transferred assets to 

a trust for which she had named her three children and First Friends Church and Earlham 

College as beneficiaries. When Nilah died, her probate estate had no assets. Orval’s four 

children sued the trust beneficiaries for breach of contract and tortious interference with an 

inheritance. The beneficiaries filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court 

granted the motion, concluding that the beneficiaries had not breached any contract or 

tortiously interfered with any inheritance.

On appeal, Orval’s children assert that the trial court erred in granting the 

beneficiaries’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Finding no error, we affirm.
3

Facts and Procedural History

The relevant facts are undisputed.1 Orval and Nilah were married in 1973. They had 

no children together. Orval had four children from a prior marriage: Demaris Snyder Wehr, 

Timothy Snyder, Terence Snyder, and Daniel Snyder (collectively, “Appellants”). Nilah had 

three children from a prior marriage: Thomas Price II, Barbara Monahan, and Philip Price, 

who is deceased.

In January 1985, Orval and Nilah signed reciprocal wills, which provide that when the 

first spouse dies, the residue of the estate is to be distributed to the surviving spouse. After 

the death of the surviving spouse, the residue of that spouse’s estate is to be distributed 

equally among the seven children and stepchildren. The wills also contain a provision stating 

that the testator and the testator’s spouse had “made Wills containing certain mutual 

provisions in favor of each other and in favor of [their] respective children with the 

understanding and upon the condition that neither of [them] will revoke such provisions nor 

make any changes therein without the written consent of the other.” Appellees’ App. at 26, 

29. Orval’s will names Nilah as the executrix, and Nilah’s will names Thomas Price II as the 

executor.

Orval died in April 1993, and his will was probated. The residuary estate was 

distributed to Nilah pursuant to the terms of the will. After Orval’s death, Nilah transferred 

assetsto the Nilah Snyder Trust, which had been created on the same date that the wills were 

signed. Thomas Price II is the trustee of Nilah’s trust. Nilah died in September 2010. Her

 

1

 Our factual recitation is based primarily on the trial court’s excellent findings.
4

will was probated, but no estate was ever opened and no personal representative was ever 

appointed. Nilah’s probate estate had no assets after expenses. 

On February 23, 2011, Appellants filed a complaint against Thomas Price II 

(individually and as the named executor of Nilah’s estate and the trustee of Nilah’s trust),

Barbara Monahan, Kay Price (Philip’s widow), Kari Moore (Philip’s adopted daughter), First 

Friends Church, and Earlham College (collectively, “Appellees”). Appellees are the named 

beneficiaries of Nilah’s trust. On March 7, 2011, Appellants filed a two-count amended 

complaint, to which they attached Orval’s and Nilah’s wills. The first count is entitled 

“BREACH OF CONTRACT” and reads in pertinent part as follows:

6. Nilah Snyder was contractually bound to comply with the plan for the 

distribution of assets set forth in her reciprocal Will.

7. Following the death of Orval Snyder, Nilah Snyder transferred property 

to the Nilah Snyder Trust, thereby altering the plan for the distribution 

of assets at her death and breaching her obligation to Orval to dispose 

of the property in the manner set forth in her reciprocal Will dated 

January 29th, 1985.

8. Nilah Snyder’s action with respect to said property defeated the 

contractual plan for the distribution of assets which constitutes a breach 

of the contract not to change the plan for the distribution of assets, 

between Nilah Snyder and her late husband, Orval Snyder.

9. The Plaintiffs herein, as third party beneficiaries of the contract 

between Nilah Snyder and Orval Snyder, have been damaged by Nilah 

Snyder’s Breach in that they have been denied their respective share of 

the assets which were the subject of said contract.

Appellees’ App. at 16, 17.2

 

2

 In its order, the trial court noted that Appellants had received $520,040 of non-probate property after 

Orval’s death. Appellants’ App. at 18 (finding 9).
5

The second count is entitled “TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 

INHERITANCE” and reads in pertinent part as follows:

1. An expectancy of Inheritance was created when the Plaintiffs were 

named as beneficiaries of the Last Will and Testaments of Nilah and 

Orval Snyder dated January 29th, 1985.

2. As a result of the intentional transfer of property into the Nilah Snyder 

Trust, the Plaintiffs were prevented from receiving their expected 

inheritance.

3. The intentional transfer of assets to the Nilah Snyder Trust constitutes 

tortious conduct because:

a) Nilah Snyder, as executrix of the Orval Snyder Estate, had a 

fiduciary duty to the Plaintiffs, who were named beneficiaries of 

Orval and Nilah Snyder’s reciprocal Wills.

b) Nilah Snyder received assets at the death of Orval Snyder, 

which she subsequently transferred to the Nilah Snyder Trust, as 

a result of her confidential relationship with her husband, Orval 

Snyder.

c) The transfer of assets to the trustee of the Nilah Snyder Trust 

constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty and an abuse of a 

confidential relationship.

4. The aforementioned tortious conduct caused the loss of the Plaintiffs’ 

expected inheritance.

Id. at 18.

Appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 

12(C), and Appellants filed a response. After a hearing, on January 23, 2012, the trial court 

issued an order granting Appellees’ motion that contains extensive findings and conclusions, 

including the following trenchant observation:
6

Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the named Defendants breached 

any contract, tortiously interfered with any inheritance, or breached any 

fiduciary duty. If, as Plaintiffs contend, Plaintiffs were damaged by Nilah 

accepting an inheritance from Orval and, then, transferring that inheritance to 

her trust, the complaint should have been timely filed as a claim in Nilah’s 

estate. Instead, Plaintiffs have chosen to file suit against a group of 

Defendants who have performed no wrongful acts.

Appellants’ App. at 22 (conclusion 18). This appeal ensued.3

Discussion and Decision

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. It is well settled that

a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(C) attacks the 

legal sufficiency of the pleadings. The test to be applied when ruling on a 

Rule 12(C) motion is whether, in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and with every intendment regarded in his favor, the complaint is 

sufficient to constitute any valid claim. In applying this test, we may look only 

at the pleadings, with all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint 

taken as admitted, supplemented by any facts of which the court will take 

judicial notice. The standard of review is de novo, and we will affirm the trial 

court’s grant of a Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings when it is 

clear from the face of the pleadings that one of the parties cannot in any way 

succeed under the operative facts and allegations made therein.

Fox Dev., Inc. v. England, 837 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).

At the outset, we must express our frustration with Appellants’ failure to include in 

their appendix a copy of either the pleadings or the filings related to Appellees’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A). See Ind. Appellate 

 

3

 In a footnote in their brief, Appellees state that they “moved to dismiss the appeal for multiple 

reasons, which the motions panel denied. We here incorporate our motion to dismiss and ask the Court to 

reconsider the motions panel decision and dismiss the appeal.” Appellees’ Br. at 2 n.2. We decline Appellees’ 

request because, as we have said before, a party “may not incorporate argument from another source by 

reference.” Dave’s Excavating, Inc. v. City of New Castle, 959 N.E.2d 369, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 

Oxley v. Lenn, 819 N.E.2d 851, 856 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied.
7

Rule 50(A)(2)(f) (stating that an appellant’s appendix “shall contain ... pleadings and other 

documents from the Clerk’s Record in chronological order that are necessary for resolution 

of the issues raised on appeal”) (emphasis added). If Appellees had not included these 

documents in their appendix, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 

review Appellants’ claims of error regarding the trial court’s ruling on the legal sufficiency 

of their pleadings.4

Regarding the breach of contract claim, Appellants correctly observe that “an intended 

third-party beneficiary may directly enforce a contract.” Appellants’ Br. at 6 (citing, inter 

alia, Mogensen v. Martz, 441 N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)). That said, Appellants cite 

no authority for the proposition that a third-party beneficiary may enforce a contract against 

anyone other than a party or a privy to the contract. Cf. Guraly v. Tenta, 125 Ind. App. 527, 

533, 132 N.E.2d 725, 727 (1956) (“Specific performance can not be enforced against one 

who is neither a party nor privy to the contract and on whom it is not binding, or by whom no 

duty under the contract has been assumed.”), trans. denied; Alexander v. Dowell, 669 N.E.2d 

436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Guraly). Appellees are neither parties nor privies to 

any contract between Orval and Nilah, but merely fellow third-party beneficiaries. 

Moreover, Nilah complied with her agreement not to revoke her will, and to the extent her

transfer of assets to her trust may have been contrary to the intent of the reciprocal wills, 

Appellees are simply not the proper parties to answer for it.

 

4

 We note that Appellees’ appendix contains a copy of the transcript of the hearing on their motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 50(F). See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(F) 

(“Because the Transcript is transmitted to the Court on Appeal pursuant to Rule 12(B), parties should not 

reproduce any portion of the Transcript in the Appendix.”).
8

As for the tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty claims, Appellants make 

no cognizable arguments in their initial brief. Consequently, any issues regarding these 

claims are waived. See Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 857 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 

(“[A]ny argument an appellant fails to raise in his initial brief is waived for appeal.”), trans. 

denied.

5

 In sum, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.

 

5

 Appellants also make some vague references to fraud, but their complaint contains no specific 

averments of fraud, as is required by Indiana Trial Rule 9(B).