UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

TINA M. KING, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-cv-14330 

 v. DISTRICT JUDGE NANCY G. EDMUNDS 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

________________________/ 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Tina M. King seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security’s determination that she is not entitled to social security benefits for her physical and 

mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 14) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 16). Plaintiff has also filed a response to Defendant’s Motion. (Docket no. 17.) The 

motions have been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 4.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a 

hearing pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and 

Recommendation. 

I. RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 14) be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket 

no. 16) be GRANTED. 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 1 of 16 Pg ID 496
2

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income with protective filing dates of January 15, 2012 and January 9, 

2012, respectively, alleging that she has been disabled since June 8, 2006, due to asthma; the 

early stages of emphysema; diabetes; high blood pressure; chronic cough; numbness in her left 

thigh, the side of her right calf, and the big toe of her right foot; a fallen arch on her left foot; 

bouts of mild depression; and possibly sleep apnea and sciatica. (TR 79-80, 129-37, 152.) The 

Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims on May 3, 2012, and Plaintiff requested 

a de novo hearing. (TR 59-80, 93-94.) On May 23, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a 

representative and testified at the hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Lawrence E. 

Blatnik. (TR 26-58.) Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to June 2, 2008 at the hearing. 

(TR 30, 146.) In a June 6, 2013 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits 

because she was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. 

(TR 13-21.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (TR 1-6), and Plaintiff 

commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed cross motions for summary 

judgment, which are currently before the Court. 

III. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE

In her brief, Plaintiff set forth the procedural history of this matter and a brief summary 

of the medical evidence. (Docket no. 14 at 7-11.) Plaintiff also submitted a detailed outline of 

the medical evidence as an exhibit attached to her brief. (Docket no. 14-2.) The ALJ set out a 

detailed, factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record, Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, 

and the vocational expert’s (VE’s) testimony in his decision. (TR 15-21.) Defendant, in addition 

to adopting the ALJ’s recitation of the facts, also provided a summary of the medical evidence. 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 2 of 16 Pg ID 497
3

(Docket no. 16 at 4-9.) There are no material inconsistencies among the aforementioned 

accounts of the record; therefore, the undersigned will incorporate the factual recitations by 

reference. Additionally, the undersigned has conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s 

medical record and the hearing transcript and will include comments and citations as necessary 

throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

original alleged onset date of June 8, 2006, and that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe 

impairments: asthma; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); hypertension; 

gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD); diabetes; and obesity. (TR 15-17.) The ALJ also 

found that Plaintiff’s aortic aneurysm and mood disorder were non-severe impairments. (TR 17-

18.) Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the 

severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (TR 18.) The 

ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the following RFC: 

[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). She can lift and carry ten pounds 

occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; she can sit at least six hours, and 

stand and walk up to two hours, in an eight-hour work day; and she requires a 

sit/stand option that allows her to change position every 20 to 30 minutes. The 

claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally balance, 

stoop, crouch, crawl, squat, or climb ramps or stairs; must avoid concentrated 

exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, humidity, fumes, odors, dust, gases or 

respiratory irritants; cannot use air, pneumatic, power, torque or vibratory tools; 

and cannot work with dangerous or unprotected machinery or at unprotected 

heights. 

(TR 18-20.) Subsequently, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 20-21.) 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 3 of 16 Pg ID 498
4

Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act at any 

time from June 8, 2006, through the date of the decision. (TR 13, 21.) 

V. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 4 of 16 Pg ID 499
5

that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in 

response to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the 

claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 5 of 16 Pg ID 500
6

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter 

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 

WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed and remanded under sentence four 

because (1) the ALJ failed to properly apply Social Security Ruling (SSR) 02-1p in evaluating 

Plaintiff’s obesity; and (2) the substantial evidence of record does not support the ALJ’s RFC 

finding that Plaintiff can perform sustained work activities at a limited sedentary level. (Docket 

no. 14 at 18-27.) 

1. The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Obesity 

Plaintiff asserts that while the ALJ determined that she had a severe impairment of 

obesity, he did not properly consider the impact of Plaintiff’s obesity or explain how Plaintiff’s 

obesity affected her RFC in his decision. (Docket no. 14 at 18-22; docket no. 17 at 2-4.) In 

support of this contention, Plaintiff relies on SSR 02-1p, which discusses obesity as a risk factor 

for other impairments. (Id.) SSR 02-1p classifies individuals with regard to obesity by 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 6 of 16 Pg ID 501
7

considering their Body Mass Index (BMI). SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *2 (Sept. 12, 

2002). Individuals with a BMI greater than or equal to 30 are considered “obese,” with those at 

or above a BMI of 40 having the most “extreme” type of obesity with the greatest risk for 

developing obesity-related impairments. Id. In evaluating the effects of obesity, SSR 02-1p 

“does not mandate a particular mode of analysis,” but it does “direct[] an ALJ to consider the 

claimant’s obesity, in combination with other impairments, at all stages of the sequential 

evaluation.” Nejat v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F. App’x 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “Regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity, the 

Ruling provides: ‘As with any other impairment, we will explain how we reached our 

conclusions on whether obesity caused any physical or mental limitations.’” Sleight v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 896 F.Supp.2d 622, 631 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (Michelson, M.J.) (quoting SSR 02-1p, 

2002 WL 34686281, at *7). 

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was 5’5 1/2” tall and weighed 267 pounds. (TR 

33.) Those statistics, according to Plaintiff, depict a BMI of 44.1, or Level III obesity. (Docket 

no. 14 at 8.) At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

obesity was a severe impairment. (TR 15.) The ALJ then devoted a paragraph to Plaintiff’s 

obesity in his discussion of Plaintiff’s RFC: 

The claimant is somewhat obese, and I have considered how her weight affects 

her ability to perform routine movements and necessary physical activity within 

the work environment. I am aware that obesity often complicates existing 

medical problems, and that the consequences of this condition may not be readily 

apparent. The combined effects of obesity with other impairments may be greater 

than might be expected without the disorder. I examined any added and 

accumulative effects this condition played on her ability to function, and to 

perform routine movement and necessary physical activity within the work 

environment. In spite of her weight, clinicians observed the claimant ambulate 

well without an assistive device (she reported some periodic use of a cane) and to 

retain functional range of motion. The claimant’s neurological functions were 

intact, and her musculoskeletal and extremity reviews were free of deformity, 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 7 of 16 Pg ID 502
8

clubbing, cyanosis, edema, heat, discoloration, ulceration, diminished pulsation or 

atrophic changes. 

(TR 19.) 

Plaintiff asserts that this passage does not adequately comply with SSR 02-1p. 

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ recognized the duties imposed upon him by the 

Ruling, but he failed “to take into consideration the obvious limitations that obesity imposes on 

the claimant and instead cherry picked the [medical evidence of record] to retreat from his 

finding that obesity is a severe impairment.” (Docket no. 14 at 20.) As Defendant points out, 

however, Plaintiff does not cite to any portion of the medical record that the ALJ failed to, but 

should have, considered in evaluating Plaintiff’s obesity. (Docket no. 16 at 14.) Instead, 

Plaintiff invites the Court to conduct its own review of Plaintiff’s medical records to pinpoint the 

ALJ’s error. (Docket no. 17 at 4.) But the “‘court is under no obligation to scour the record for 

errors not identified by [the] claimant.’” Bush v. Astrue, No. 12-11790, 2013 WL 1747807, *14 

(E.D. Mich. Jan 25, 2013) (Grand, M.J.) (quoting Martinez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-

13700 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2011)). Additionally, it is not the Court’s function to reweigh or 

resolve conflicts in the evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument fails in this regard. 

Plaintiff’s argument also fails because the Sixth Circuit has found that an ALJ does not 

need to explicitly “mention [] obesity if he credits an expert’s report that considers obesity.” 

Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.App’x 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Bledsoe v. 

Barnhart, 165 F.App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2006)). Here, the ALJ accorded significant weight to 

the opinion of B.D. Choi, M.D., the non-examining state-agency physician, who conducted the 

initial disability determination. (TR 20.) On May 3, 2012, Dr. Choi acknowledged that Plaintiff 

had a BMI of 43 and was morbidly obese, but he found that Plaintiff was able to perform light 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 8 of 16 Pg ID 503
9

work. (TR 66, 76.) This credit alone would satisfy the Sixth Circuit’s precedent. For the 

reasons stated above, the undersigned finds that the ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s 

obesity in accordance with SSR 02-1p, Bledsoe, and Coldiron, and recommends that Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity be 

denied. 

2. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC 

Plaintiff also asserts that the substantial evidence of record does not support the ALJ’s 

RFC finding that Plaintiff can perform sustained work activities at a limited sedentary level. 

(Docket no. 14 at 23-27; docket no. 17 at 4-6.) Defendant counters that “[t]here was no error in 

the ALJ’s RFC determination where the medical evidence showed minimal impairment, no 

treating physician opined any functional limitations, and his RFC finding was even more limited 

than the state agency physician’s finding, the only opinion of functional limitations in the 

record.” (Docket no. 16 at 19-24.) 

The RFC assessment is the Commissioner’s ultimate finding about the claimant’s ability 

to perform work-related activities. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5. 

It is defined as the most, not the least, the claimant can do despite his impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The ALJ derives the RFC after considering the medical and other 

relevant evidence in the record. Id. He must support the RFC by including a narrative 

discussion describing how the evidence supports his conclusions and providing citations to 

specific medical facts and nonmedical evidence. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. In 

determining the RFC, the ALJ must discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work 

activities in an ordinary setting on a regular and continuing basis. Id. The ALJ may adopt an 

opinion of a medical or nonmedical source in whole or in part if he finds that it is supported by 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 9 of 16 Pg ID 504
10

and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. However, at all times the 

ultimate responsibility for fashioning the RFC rests with the ALJ, who has an obligation to 

determine the RFC based on the evidence he finds credible. 

First, Plaintiff argues that her need for a sit/stand option would preclude sedentary work. 

(Docket no. 14 at 23.) A sedentary job is defined as one that involves sitting, with an occasional 

amount of walking and standing required. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). “Alternating between 

sitting and standing, however, may not be within the definition of sedentary work.” Preston v. 

Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 854 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Here, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work but that she also required a sit/stand 

option that would allow her to change position every 20 to 30 minutes. (TR 18.) The ALJ 

presented those limitations to the VE in his hypothetical questions, and the VE testified that there 

are a significant number of jobs in the regional and national economy that an individual with 

those limitations could perform. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument fails in this regard. 

Next, Plaintiff argues that neither her testimony nor her symptoms “allow regular and 

continuing work” and that the medical records, read in their entirety, support her testimony. 

(Docket no. 14 at 23-27.) Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ ignored significant record 

evidence that supports Plaintiff’s complaints and only commented on non-issues in his 

discussion of Plaintiff’s ailments, forgetting her obesity, breathing problems, and fatigue. (Id. at 

26.) A contemporaneous review of Plaintiff’s argument with the ALJ’s decision, however, 

reveals that the ALJ did consider the evidence Plaintiff cites to in her brief. (Compare id. at 25-

26 with TR 15-17.) To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have explicitly 

discussed the exact same evidence that Plaintiff cites in her brief, her argument fails, as it is 

axiomatic that an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record. Kornecky v. 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 10 of 16 Pg ID 505
11

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Furthermore, as 

discussed above, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not “forget” about Plaintiff’s 

obesity. He also did not “forget” about Plaintiff’s alleged breathing problems and fatigue; the 

ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s complaints, and found them to be not entirely credible. (TR 18-

19.) 

“[A]n ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great 

weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s 

demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Comm’r, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But 

credibility assessments are not insulated from judicial review. Despite the deference that is due, 

such a determination must nevertheless be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s 

credibility determination must contain “specific reasons . . . supported by the evidence in the 

case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the 

reasons for that weight.” SSR 96–7p. “It is not sufficient to make a conclusory statement that 

‘the individual’s allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) 

credible.’” Id. “[T]he adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations 

to be credible” and may also find the statements credible to a certain degree. Id.

 Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated 

by the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will 

not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or 

about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available 

objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 

416.929(c)(2). The ALJ will consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 11 of 16 Pg ID 506
12

duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, (3) precipitating and 

aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken 

to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) treatment, other than medication, for symptom relief, (6) 

any measures used to relieve the symptoms, and (7) functional limitations and restrictions due to 

the pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); see also Felisky v. 

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

In reaching his credibility determination, the ALJ reasoned that no physician imposed 

any work-preclusive functional limitations on Plaintiff or opined that Plaintiff was completely 

disabled. Plaintiff argues that this line of reasoning is erroneous because Dr. Cathy Glick, M.D., 

a cardiologist who conducted a consultative examination of Plaintiff in April of 2013 stated that 

Plaintiff “cannot work because of her shortness of breath.” (Docket no. 14 at 20 (quoting TR 

310).) Defendant counters that what appears to be Dr. Glick’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s 

ability to work is, in all probability, Dr. Glick’s recitation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

(Docket no. 16 at 16.) Dr. Glick makes the statement at issue in the section of her report that 

summarizes Plaintiff’s medical history. And the statements that Dr. Glick makes before and 

after the statement at issue, that Plaintiff “evidently has significant problems with her back and 

her knees and is trying to be certified for disability” and Plaintiff “does not have any definite 

drug allergies,” support Defendant’s contention, as their context does not support such an 

opinion statement of disability. Moreover, in the sections of her report titled “Impression” and 

“Plan,” Dr. Glick provides no opinions regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations or her ability 

to work. Instead, she notes Plaintiff’s chest discomfort and risk factors, she sets forth her plans 

to start Plaintiff’s treatment by administering certain tests, and she advises that recommendations 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 12 of 16 Pg ID 507
13

will be forthcoming after the test results are in. Hence, Plaintiff’s argument regarding Dr. Glick 

and the ALJ’s line of reasoning here are unavailing. 

Even if the ALJ’s reasoning regarding the lack of a physician’s opinion on Plaintiff’s 

disability was erroneous, the ALJ set forth numerous legitimate reasons for discrediting 

Plaintiff’s testimony, and his assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility should not be disturbed. For 

example, the ALJ noted that the results of Plaintiff’s heart, lung, and other clinical examinations 

did not reveal debilitating results. (TR 19.) He pointed out that imaging studies of Plaintiff’s 

chest were commonly negative for infiltrates, effusions, or focal considerations; that Plaintiff’s 

breathing status did not necessitate hospitalization, emergent care, or oxygen supplementation; 

and that workups of Plaintiff’s heart did not reveal evidence of irregularities. The ALJ further 

reasoned that the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s claims of pain and 

fatigue, her alleged need to lie down for extended intervals of time with her legs elevated, or her 

alleged difficulty with handling and fingering functions. 

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily living: 

Within testimony or the written record, it was reported that the claimant 

performed self-care tasks, laundered clothing, washed dishes, swept and mopped 

floors, completed light household cleaning chores, shopped, attended to financial 

matters, planted flowers in the summer, walked on a treadmill, read, watched 

television, and spent time with family (Exhibits 4E, 13F p. 4 and testimony). 

(TR 19.) Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s statement above reads as if Plaintiff was able to perform 

these activities on a continuous and indiscriminate basis, which she claims is erroneous because 

she can only perform these activities on “good days.” (Docket no. 14 at 25.) Defendant 

responds that Plaintiff’s claim is speculative, as there is nothing in the ALJ’s findings that states 

as such. (Docket no. 16 at 23.) The undersigned agrees with Defendant. 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 13 of 16 Pg ID 508
14

As discussed above, the ALJ provided specific reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

credibility in his decision, some of which apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). 

Thus, the ALJ’s decision is sufficiently specific to make clear to Plaintiff and to the Court the 

weight that he gave to Plaintiff’s statements and the reasons for that weight. The ALJ’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility is supported by substantial evidence and should not be 

disturbed; Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied in this regard. 

Finally, Plaintiff, in her reply brief, claims that the ALJ did not properly assess Plaintiff’s 

RFC because he overlooked the findings and opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and examining 

physicians and did not even consider the opinions of Dr. Choi, the state-agency non-examining 

physician. (Docket no. 17 at 5.) Plaintiff, however, does not point to one finding or opinion 

regarding her functional limitations issued by a physician to support her contention, and the 

Court finds none. Moreover, with regard to Dr. Choi, Plaintiff is blatantly incorrect, as the ALJ 

discussed Dr. Choi’s opinion that Plaintiff was capable of performing light work, and he afforded 

it significant weight. (TR 20.) The ALJ then imposed further restrictions on Plaintiff’s ability to 

work than did Dr. Choi, a result more favorable to Plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, 

Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC lack merit, and her 

Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of an improper RFC should be denied. 

 3. Plaintiff’s Other Arguments

 Plaintiff seemingly finds fault with the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s alleged sleep 

apnea and aortic aneurysm. (Docket no. 14 at 21-22.) Plaintiff asserts that she “exhibited and 

testified to all the symptoms of [sleep apnea] and was being tested for the disease.” (Id. at 21.) 

But the record does not include the results of the alleged testing, and there is no evidence that 

Plaintiff received such a diagnosis. With regard to Plaintiff’s aortic aneurysm, the ALJ 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 14 of 16 Pg ID 509
15

acknowledged that Plaintiff was recently diagnosed, but he found that it was not a severe 

impairment. (TR 17.) Plaintiff does not explain why the ALJ’s findings (or non-findings) 

regarding Plaintiff’s aortic aneurysm or alleged sleep apnea are erroneous. The Court is not 

obligated to develop these arguments on Plaintiff’s behalf, and it declines to do so. See Bush v. 

Astrue, No. 12-11790, 2013 WL 1747807, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2013) (Grand, M.J.) 

(citation omitted). 

VI. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court should DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 14) and GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 

16). 

REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided 

for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with 

specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 15 of 16 Pg ID 510
16

 Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the 

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length 

unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address 

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections. 

Dated: December 3, 2015 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon counsel 

of record on this date. 

 

Dated: December 3, 2015 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager

2:14-cv-14330-NGE-MKM Doc # 18 Filed 12/03/15 Pg 16 of 16 Pg ID 511