Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 86 / Friday, May 4, 2007 / Notices 25337 

1Attachment 1 contains sensitive information 

and will not be released to the public. 

2 ‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal 

History Records Check Requirements for Access to 

Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately),’’ 

(EA–06–203) dated September 29, 2006, (71 FR 

59140, Oct. 6, 2006) (ML061510049). 

2.318, 2.1300, and 2.1319(a), notice is 

hereby given that a member of the 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

Panel is being designated as Presiding 

Officer in the following proceeding in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

directions in its Memorandum and 

Order dated April 26, 2007 

(CLI–07–18): 

Consumers Energy Company, Nuclear 

Management Company, LLC, Entergy 

Nuclear Palisades, LLC, and Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades 

Nuclear Power Plant) 

This proceeding, which will be 

conducted pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2 

Subpart M of the Commission’s 

Regulations, ‘‘Procedures for Hearings 

on License Transfer Applications,’’ 

concerns a Notice of Consideration of 

Approval of Transfer of Facility 

Operating License and Conforming 

Amendment and Opportunity for a 

Hearing published in the Federal 

Register at 71 FR 66,805 (Nov. 16, 

2006). The Commission is considering 

issuing an order approving the transfer 

of Facility Operating License No. DPR– 

20 for Palisades Nuclear Plant currently 

held by Consumers Energy Company 

and Nuclear Management Company, 

LLC to Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC 

and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. As 

relevant here, in CLI–07–18 (slip op. at 

4), the Commission determined that 

petitioners Van Buren County and 

Covert Township have standing in this 

proceeding. The Commission deferred 

ruling on the admissibility of the 

contentions proffered by the County and 

the Township, but it granted their 

request for access to proprietary 

information redacted by the applicants 

from the license transfer application (id. 

at 14). The Commission directed the 

applicants to provide the County and 

Township access to the unredacted 

version of the application pursuant to a 

confidentiality agreement (id. at 16–17). 

Unless and until directed otherwise by 

the Commission, the Presiding Officer’s 

responsibilities shall be limited to 

resolving any disputes regarding the 

County’s and Township’s access to 

proprietary information in the 

application (id. at 17, 18). 

The Presiding Officer is: 

Administrative Judge Michael C. Farrar, 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001. 

All correspondence, documents, and 

other materials relating to disputes 

regarding the County’s and Township’s 

access to proprietary information in the 

application shall be filed with the 

Presiding Officer in accordance with 10 

CFR 2.302. 

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th 

day of April 2007. 

E. Roy Hawkens, 

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety 

and Licensing Board Panel. 

[FR Doc. E7–8549 Filed 5–3–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[EA–07–074] 

In the Matter of All Research and Test 

Reactor Licensees Identified in 

Attachment 1; Order Imposing 

Fingerprinting and Criminal History 

Records Check Requirements for 

Unescorted Access to All Research 

and Test Reactor Licensees Identified 

in Attachment 1 (Effective Immediately) 

I 

The Licensees identified in 

Attachment 1 1 to this Order hold 

licenses as research and test reactors 

(RTRs) issued in accordance with the 

Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as 

amended, by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC or 

Commission). On August 8, 2005, the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) was 

enacted. Section 652 of the EPAct 

amended Section 149 of the AEA to 

require fingerprinting and a Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

identification and criminal history 

records check of any person who is 

permitted unescorted access to a 

utilization facility, which includes the 

RTRs listed in Attachment 1 to this 

Order. 

II 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the 

Commission established physical 

protection requirements applicable to 

RTRs, which included storing and using 

the special nuclear material in 

controlled access areas, monitoring the 

controlled access areas for unauthorized 

activities, and ensuring a response to all 

unauthorized activities. 

Subsequent to the terrorist events of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC took 

various actions to ensure the 

acceptability of individuals for 

unescorted access to RTRs. RTRs were 

advised to consider taking additional 

precautions including observation of 

activities within their facility, and 

licensee precautions were evaluated at 

specific RTR sites in the remainder of 

2001. From 2002 through 2004, RTRs 

implemented compensatory measures 

(CMs), which included site-specific 

background investigations or checks. 

Additionally, in January 2003, NRC sent 

the names of and information on all 

individuals with unescorted access at 

RTRs to U.S. intelligence agencies for 

review. This review found no issues. 

Individuals with unescorted access 

since January 2003 have undergone sitespecific background investigations or 

checks, which were implemented as 

part of CMs implemented at RTRs in 

response to NRC initiatives. 

The RTR site-specific background 

investigations and checks were 

established using a graded approach, 

considering the specific configuration, 

uses and radiological risk of each 

facility, to provide acceptable protection 

of the nuclear material and any 

associated radioactive materials. The 

background investigations and checks at 

a minimum verify identity, nationality, 

immigration status (if applicable), and 

determine whether the individual 

demonstrates a pattern of trustworthy 

and reliable behavior through facilityspecific verification of various aspects 

of a person’s background. These 

verifications include consideration of 

educational, military, employment and 

criminal histories. With regard to 

criminal history, some of the RTR 

facilities use FBI fingerprint-based 

criminal history records checks, while 

others use either State fingerprint-based 

criminal history records checks or 

criminal history records checks which 

do not include fingerprints. These 

background investigations or checks, 

through a combination of various 

elements, have provided additional 

assurance for the protection of the 

specific facility from potential 

radiological risk from insider threats. 

Further, RTRs are required by Orders 

dated September 29, 2006, to have FBI 

fingerprint-based identification and 

criminal history records checks for 

persons allowed access to Safeguards 

Information.2 These individuals are 

those who are allowed access to the 

details of security plans or procedures at 

the specific facility and, therefore, have 

actual knowledge and ability to affect 

the facility security. Therefore, those 

Orders provide additional assurance 

that security information and associated 

RTRs facilities are adequately protected. 

Previously, AEA Section 149 only 

required fingerprinting and criminal 

history records checks of persons 


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25338 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 86 / Friday, May 4, 2007 / Notices 

3AEA § 149.b. 

seeking unescorted access to facilities 

licensed under Sections 103 and 104b of 

the AEA, e.g., power reactors. Power 

reactors are required by 10 CFR 73.57 to 

have fingerprint-based criminal history 

records checks performed as part of 

granting unescorted access to the 

facility. RTRs have not been subject to 

this requirement, and have only been 

required to control access to authorized 

persons and screen those persons for 

access in accordance with their security 

plans or procedures. 

Congress left intact the Commission’s 

authority to relieve persons by rule from 

the fingerprinting, identification, and 

criminal history records check 

requirements of AEA Section 149 ‘‘if the 

Commission finds that such action is 

consistent with its obligations to 

promote the common defense and 

security and to protect the health and 

safety of the public.’’ 3 Currently, the 

NRC has no rule that would provide 

relief from or require the 

implementation of AEA section 149 for 

fingerprinting for unescorted access to 

RTRs. 

The NRC is planning a rulemaking to 

reexamine the extent of fingerprintbased criminal history records checks 

for unescorted access to RTRs that it 

finds to be necessary to ensure adequate 

protection of the public health and 

safety and common defense and 

security. In the interim, the NRC has 

decided to implement this requirement, 

in part, prior to the completion of the 

rulemaking to provide acceptable, 

additional assurance that an individual 

with unescorted access to a RTR facility 

will not adversely impact the common 

defense and security or the public 

health and safety. Therefore, in 

accordance with Section 149 of the 

AEA, as amended by the EPAct, the 

Commission is imposing the FBI 

criminal history records check 

requirements, as set forth in this Order, 

including Attachment 2 to this Order, 

on all Licensees identified in 

Attachment 1 to this Order. These 

requirements will remain in effect until 

the Commission determines otherwise. 

The AEA requires fingerprint-based 

criminal history records checks at 

utilization facilities. Section 11cc of The 

AEA defines utilization facility as 

(1) any equipment or device, except 

an atomic weapon, determined by rule 

of the Commission to be capable of 

making use of special nuclear material 

in such quantity as to be of significance 

to the common defense and security, or 

in such manner as to affect the health 

and safety of the public, or peculiarly 

adapted for making use of atomic energy 

in such quantity as to be of significance 

to the common defense and security, or 

in such manner as to affect the health 

and safety of the public; or 

(2) any important component part 

especially designed for such equipment 

or device as determined by the 

Commission. 

The Commission’s rules, in 10 CFR 

50.2, define a ‘‘[u]tilization facility’’ as 

‘‘any nuclear reactor other than one 

designed or used primarily for the 

formation of plutonium or U–233.’’ 

Further, ‘‘Nuclear reactor’’ is defined as 

‘‘an apparatus, other than an atomic 

weapon, designed or used to sustain 

nuclear fission in a self-supporting 

chain reaction.’’ These definitions 

include the RTRs listed in Attachment 

1. 

For purposes of this Order, an 

individual who is granted ‘‘unescorted 

access’’ could exercise physical control 

over the special nuclear material 

possessed by the licensee, which would 

be of significance to the common 

defense and security or would adversely 

affect the health and safety of the 

public, such that the special nuclear 

material could be used or removed in an 

unauthorized manner without detection, 

assessment, or response by systems or 

persons designated to detect, assess or 

respond to such unauthorized use or 

removal. At RTRs, such individuals 

include those with the capability and 

knowledge to use the special nuclear 

material in the utilization facility or 

remove the special nuclear material 

from the utilization facility in an 

unauthorized manner without detection, 

assessment and response by the 

physical protection system or related 

provisions or persons. 

In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, 

I find that in light of the common 

defense and security matters identified 

above, which warrant the issuance of 

this Order, the public health, safety, and 

interest require that this Order be 

effective immediately. 

III 

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53, 

104, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 186 

of the AEA of 1954, as amended, and 

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 

2.202, 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 

73, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THAT 

ALL LICENSEES IDENTIFIED IN 

ATTACHMENT 1 TO THIS ORDER 

SHALL COMPLY WITH THE 

REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN THIS 

ORDER. 

A. All licensees identified in 

Attachment 1 to this Order shall comply 

with the following requirements: 

1. The Licensee shall, within twenty 

(20) days of the date of this Order, 

establish and maintain a fingerprinting 

program for unescorted access that 

meets the requirements of Attachment 2 

to this Order. 

2. The Licensee shall, in writing, 

within twenty (20) days of the date of 

this Order, notify the Commission (1) of 

receipt and confirmation that 

compliance with the Order will be 

achieved or (2) if it is unable to comply 

with any of the requirements described 

in Attachment 2, or (3) if compliance 

with any of the requirements is 

unnecessary in its specific 

circumstances. The notification shall 

provide the Licensee’s justification for 

seeking relief from or variation of any 

specific requirement. 

B. In accordance with the NRC’s 

‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and 

Criminal History Records Check 

Requirements for Access to Safeguards 

Information (Effective Immediately)’’ 

(EA–06–203) issued on September 29, 

2006, (71 FR 59140, October 6, 2006), 

only the NRC-approved reviewing 

official shall review results from a FBI 

criminal history records check. In 

accordance with all other applicable 

requirements and the evaluation of the 

results of the FBI criminal history 

records check as specified in this Order, 

the reviewing official shall determine 

whether an individual may have, or 

continue to have, unescorted access. No 

person may have access to Safeguards 

Information or unescorted access to any 

utilization facility, or radioactive 

material or property subject to 

regulation by the NRC if the NRC has 

determined, in accordance with its 

administrative review process based on 

fingerprinting and an FBI identification 

and criminal history records check, 

either that the person may not have 

access to SGI or that the person may not 

have unescorted access to a utilization 

facility, or radioactive material or 

property subject to regulation by the 

NRC. 

C. Fingerprints shall be submitted and 

reviewed in accordance with the 

procedures described in Attachment 2 

to this Order. Individuals who have 

been fingerprinted and granted access to 

SGI by the NRC-approved reviewing 

official in accordance with EA–06–203 

(September 29, 2006), do not need to be 

fingerprinted again for purposes of 

authorizing unescorted access. In 

addition, individuals who have a 

favorably decided U.S. Government 

criminal history records check within 

the last five (5) years, or who have an 

active Federal security clearance have 

satisfied the EPAct fingerprinting 

requirement and need not be 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 86 / Friday, May 4, 2007 / Notices 25339 

fingerprinted again, provided in each 

case that the appropriate documentation 

is made available to the Licensee’s 

reviewing official. However, all other 

applicable requirements must be 

satisfied to allow any individual 

unescorted access to the facility. 

D. The Licensee may allow any 

individual who currently has 

unescorted access, in accordance with 

applicable requirements, to continue to 

have unescorted access, pending a 

decision by the reviewing official (based 

on fingerprinting and a FBI criminal 

history records check) that the 

individual may continue to have 

unescorted access. The licensee shall 

complete implementation of the 

requirements of Attachment 2 to this 

Order by July 30, 2007. 

Licensee responses to Condition A.2. 

shall be submitted to the Director, Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555. 

The Director, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, may, in writing, 

relax or rescind any of the above 

conditions upon demonstration of good 

cause by the Licensee. 

IV 

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the 

Licensee must, and any other person 

adversely affected by this Order may, 

submit an answer to this Order, and 

may request a hearing on this Order, 

within twenty (20) days of the date of 

this Order. Where good cause is shown, 

consideration will be given to extending 

the time to request a hearing. A request 

for extension of time in which to submit 

an answer or request a hearing must be 

made in writing to the Director, Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555, and include a 

statement of good cause for the 

extension. The answer may consent to 

this Order. Unless the answer consents 

to this Order, the answer shall, in 

writing and under oath or affirmation, 

specifically set forth the matters of fact 

and law on which the Licensee or other 

person adversely affected relies and the 

reasons as to why the Order should not 

have been issued. Any answer or 

request for a hearing shall be submitted 

to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications 

Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies 

also shall be sent to the Director, Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant 

General Counsel for Material Litigation 

and Enforcement at the same address, 

and to the Licensee if the answer or 

hearing request is by a person other than 

the Licensee. Because of possible delays 

in delivery of mail to United States 

Government offices, it is requested that 

answers and requests for hearing be 

transmitted to the Secretary of the 

Commission either by means of 

facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101 

or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov 

and also to the Office of the General 

Counsel either by means of facsimile 

transmission to 301–415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a 

person other than the Licensee requests 

a hearing, that person shall set forth 

with particularity the manner in which 

his/her interest is adversely affected by 

this Order and shall address the criteria 

set forth in 10 CFR 2.309. 

If a hearing is requested by the 

Licensee or a person whose interest is 

adversely affected, the Commission will 

issue an Order designating the time and 

place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, 

the issue to be considered at such 

hearing shall be whether this Order 

should be sustained. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the 

Licensee may, in addition to demanding 

a hearing, at the time the answer is filed 

or sooner, move the presiding officer to 

set aside the immediate effectiveness of 

the Order on the ground that the Order, 

including the need for immediate 

effectiveness, is not based on adequate 

evidence but on mere suspicion, 

unfounded allegations, or error. In the 

absence of any request for hearing, or 

written approval of an extension of time 

in which to request a hearing, the 

provisions as specified above in Section 

III shall be final twenty (20) days from 

the date of this Order without further 

Order or proceedings. 

If an extension of time for requesting 

a hearing has been approved, the 

provisions as specified above in Section 

III shall be final when the extension 

expires, if a hearing request has not 

been received. AN ANSWER OR A 

REQUEST FOR HEARING SHALL NOT 

STAY THE IMMEDIATE 

EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER. 

Dated this 30th day of April 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

James T. Wiggins, 

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 07–2207 Filed 5–3–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Report to Congress on Abnormal 

Occurrences Fiscal Year 2006; 

Dissemination of Information 

Section 208 of the Energy 

Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law 

93–438) defines an abnormal occurrence 

(AO) as an unscheduled incident or 

event which the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

determines to be significant from the 

standpoint of public health or safety. 

The Federal Reports Elimination and 

Sunset Act of 1995 (Public Law 104–66) 

requires that AOs be reported to 

Congress annually. During fiscal year 

2006, nine events that occurred at 

facilities licensed or otherwise regulated 

by the NRC and/or Agreements States 

were determined to be AOs. The report 

describes three events at facilities 

licensed by the NRC. The three AOs at 

NRC-licensed facilities included a spill 

of high-enriched uranium solution at a 

fuel fabrication facility, a medical event, 

and an unintended dose to an mbryo/ 

fetus. The report also addresses six AOs 

at facilities licensed by Agreement 

States. [Agreement States are those 

States that have entered into formal 

agreements with the NRC pursuant to 

Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act 

(AEA) to regulate certain quantities of 

AEA licensed material at facilities 

located within their borders.] Currently, 

there are 34 Agreement States. During 

Fiscal Year 2006, Agreement States 

reported six events that occurred at 

Agreement State-licensed facilities, 

including four medical events, one 

unintended dose to an embryo/fetus, 

and one industrial event. As required by 

Section 208, the discussion for each 

event includes the date and place, the 

nature and probable consequences, the 

cause or causes, and the action taken to 

prevent recurrence. Each event is also 

being described in NUREG–0090, Vol. 

29, ‘‘Report to Congress on Abnormal 

Occurrences, Fiscal Year 2006.’’ This 

report is available electronically at the 

NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/ 

. 

Nuclear Power Plants 

During this period, no events at U.S. 

nuclear power plants were significant 

enough to be reported as AOs. 

* * * * * 

Fuel Cycle Facilities 

(Other Than Nuclear Power Plants) 

During this reporting period, one 

event at an NRC-licensed fuel 

fabrication facility was significant 


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