1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

GALE VERE, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-10745 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

CITY OF ADRIAN et al., 

 Defendants. 

_________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #30) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF #36)

 In this action, Plaintiff Gale W. Vere (“Vere”) claims that the City of Adrian 

(the “City”) and one of its employees, Heather Laskey (collectively, 

“Defendants”), violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteen Amendment 

when they refused to hire him because he resided outside of the City. The 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on that claim (see the “Motion for 

Summary Judgment,” ECF #30), and Vere has filed a motion to amend his 

Complaint (the “Motion to Amend,” ECF # 36). For the reasons explained below, 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Vere’s Motion to 

Amend is DENIED. 

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ESSENTIAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Vere lives in Adrian Township, Michigan. (See Compl. at ¶ 2, ECF #1 at 2, 

Pg. ID 2.) In April 2012, October 2012, and January 2014, he applied for 

employment with the City of Adrian, a municipality that is adjacent to Adrian 

Township. (See id. at ¶ 6, ECF #1 at 2, Pg. ID 2.) At the time of Vere’s 

applications, the City had a policy favoring its residents in the employment 

application process. The policy provided that “[i]f the qualifications of two 

applicants for new hires are equal, the applicant living within the city limits shall 

be given job preference” (hereinafter, the “Policy”). (See ECF #30-9 at 3, Pg. ID 

392.) 

The City did not interview Vere for any of three positions for which he 

applied and it ultimately hired other applicants. (See id. at ¶ 7, ECF #1 at 2, Pg. ID 

2.) The City filled two of the positions with residents and one with a non-resident. 

(See Mot. Summ. J., ECF #30 at 12-14, Pg. ID 219-21; Pl.’s Resp. Br., ECF #32 at 

9, Pg. ID 413.) 

In December 2013, Vere filed a complaint against the City with the United 

States Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (the “EEOC”). In that 

complaint, he alleged that the City discriminated against him based upon his age 

when it declined to hire him for the first two positions. The City responded that it 

had non-discriminatory reasons for its decision not to hire Vere. The City 

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explained, among other things, that it chose particularly well-qualified applicants 

for the positions, and it added that it “gave a preference to applicants that lived 

within city limits, as [the City] believes that employees residing within the city 

limits have a vested interest in city operations because they are directly affected.” 

(ECF #30-3 at 5, Pg. ID 272.) 

After reviewing the City’s response to his EEOC filing, Vere filed this 

action against the City and two of its employees: Heather Laskey and Dane 

Nelson.1

 (See Compl., ECF #1.) Vere alleged that the Defendants violated his right 

to equal protection of the laws when, pursuant to the Policy, it treated his nonresidency as a factor in their decision not to interview and/or hire him for the three 

positions. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 9-14, ECF #1 at 2-3, Pg. ID 2-3.) 

On May 22, 2015, the Court entered a scheduling order setting deadlines for, 

among other things, fact discovery cutoff, expert disclosures, and filing dispositive 

motions (the “Scheduling Order”). (See ECF #18.) The Scheduling Order directed 

the parties to complete fact discovery by December 31, 2015. (See id. at 1, Pg. ID 

67.) The Court later entered a stipulated order extending fact discovery through 

March 29, 2016. (See ECF #24.) On April 29, 2016, after the close of fact 

discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. (See ECF #30.) On 

 

1 Nelson was dismissed from this action on January 15, 2016. (1/15/2016 Dkt. 

Entry.) 

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June 24, 2016, the Court scheduled a hearing on that motion for July 13, 2016. 

(See Notice of Hearing, ECF #35.) 

 On June 29, 2016 – approximately three months after the already-extended 

fact-discovery cutoff, two months after the Defendants moved for summary 

judgment, and fourteen days before the scheduled hearing on that motion – Vere 

filed the Motion to Amend. (See ECF #36.) In that motion, Vere sought to add 

claims based, in part, upon alleged acts that occurred after the already-extended 

discovery cutoff and after the Defendants moved for summary judgment. More 

specifically, Vere’s proposed Amended Complaint seeks to add claims that the 

Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and 

Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq. (the 

“ELCRA”), in June of 2016 when they hired someone else to serve in the City’s 

Finance Department. (See Motion to Amend, ECF #36-1 at 5-6, Pg. ID 615-17.) 

The proposed Amended Complaint also adds a new Defendant, Cindy Prue. (See 

id. at 1, Pg. ID 612.) 

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

A. Governing Legal Standard 

A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact . . . .” SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc.,

712 F.3d 321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

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U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, “the 

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. “The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for 

[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment is not appropriate 

when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury.” Id. at 251-52. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . .” Id. at 255. 

B. Analysis 

 “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which 

either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats 

one differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the 

difference.” Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 

2011)). Non-residents of a municipality “do not constitute a suspect class” under 

the Equal Protection Clause. Hudson Cty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City 

of Jersey City, 960 F. Supp. 823, 832 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Baldwin v. Fish & 

Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 389 (1978)); see also Assoc. of Cleveland Fire 

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Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that a 

municipal employer’s residence requirement did not “make[] classifications along 

suspect lines.”). Thus, in order to establish that the Defendants violated the Equal 

Protection Clause, Vere must show that the consideration of his non-residency 

impermissibly burdened one of his fundamental rights or lacked a rational basis. 

He has failed to make either showing. 

A. The Policy Does Not Burden Vere’s Fundamental Rights 

 Vere has not established that the Defendants burdened any of his 

fundamental rights in any way. He contends that they infringed his fundamental 

right to travel when they counted his non-residency against him, but that argument 

cannot be squared with the controlling Supreme Court precedent. 

The Supreme Court “frequently has considered constitutional challenges to 

residence requirements,” and it “always has been careful to distinguish . . . 

durational residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements.” 

Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325 (1983). Durational residence requirements 

“condition receipt of a benefit on a minimum period of residence within a 

jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). These requirements burden “the constitutional 

right to travel from one statement to another” – a right that “occupies a position 

fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union” and which “has been firmly 

established and repeatedly recognized.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 

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(1969) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)), overruled 

on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 

In contrast, a bona fide residence requirement does not condition receipt of a 

benefit upon any minimum period of residency; it “simply requires that the person 

does establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted to 

residents.” Martinez, 461 U.S. at 329 (emphasis in original). Bona fide residence 

requirements, in general, do “not burden or penalize the constitutional right of 

interstate travel, for any person is free to move to a State and to establish residence 

there.” Id. And, more specifically, a bona fide residence requirement for public 

employment – i.e., a requirement that a public employee live within the employing 

jurisdiction, albeit not for any fixed period of time before commencing 

employment – does not “burden” an employee/applicant’s “right to travel.” Assoc. 

of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 502 F.3d at 549. 

Here, the Policy is plainly a bona fide residence requirement, not a 

durational one.2

 The Policy’s plain language – which provides that “[i]f the 

qualifications of two applicants for new hires are equal, the applicant living within 

the city limits shall be given job preference” – imposes no minimum period of City 

residency for the applicant to receive “job preference.” (ECF #30-9 at 3, Pg. ID 

392.) Indeed, an applicant who has lived in the City for a week (or even a day) 

 

2

 The court refers to the City’s Policy as a “residence requirement” for ease of 

reference. 

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would receive the same hiring preference as a person who has lived in the City for 

twenty years. Because the Policy “simply requires that [an applicant] does 

establish residence before” he is entitled to the hiring preference, it is a bona fide 

requirement. Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328. 

 Vere resists this conclusion. He insists that the Policy creates a durational 

residence requirement even though it says nothing about any minimum fixed 

period of residence. In support, Vere relies on two cases – Grace v. City of 

Detroit, 760 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Mich. 1991) and Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 

310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002) – but neither convinces the Court that the Policy 

imposes a durational residence requirement. 

In Grace, the plaintiffs challenged residence requirements established by a 

City of Detroit ordinance. That ordinance required that all applicants for positions 

“in the city service be residents at the time of the application.” Grace, 760 F. 

Supp. at 648. The record before the court established that, in “practical effect,” the 

ordinance imposed a durational residence requirement: 

The period of time between application and certification 

may be as long as three years, depending upon the nature 

of the job and the number of applicants for a position in 

city service. The period from application through the 

formulation of an eligibility list ranges from two months 

to a year depending upon the same criteria. The practical 

effect of these requirements is to impose a residency 

requirement of substantial duration, for the mere 

opportunity to compete without any certainty of ultimate 

success. 

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Id. at 649.3

 Unlike the plaintiffs in Grace, Vere did not identify (in his motion for 

summary judgment and supporting brief) any evidence that the City’s application 

process is so inordinately lengthy that, in “practical effect,” the Policy imposes a 

durational requirement. Thus, Grace is not on point. 

And even if the facts of this case were closer to Grace, the Court would 

respectfully decline to follow Grace. The Court is not aware of (and Vere has not 

identified) any other decision that has treated a residence requirement with no

expressly-stated minimum duration as a durational requirement. And the Court is 

concerned that the approach in Grace – treating a residence requirement for 

employment as durational merely because there is a time lag between application 

and decision – could erroneously transform almost every residence requirement for 

government employment into a durational one. Moreover, the majority of federal 

courts addressing residence requirements like the one at issue in Grace – ones with 

no expressly-stated duration – treat those requirements as bona fide, not durational. 

See, e.g., Andre v. Bd. of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48, 52-53 (7th 

Cir. 1977) (city ordinance establishing hiring preference for city residents without 

regard to length of residency was a bona fide residence requirement); Van Deelen 

v. City of Kansas City, 411 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1127 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (same). 

 

3

 The decision in Grace was issued on “cross motions for summary judgment.” 

Grace, 760 F.Supp. at 647. 

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Indeed, Vere has not cited any decision other than Grace that treats residence 

requirements with no stated time frame as durational. The Court will follow the 

majority approach to classifying residence requirements and will not follow Grace. 

In Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

considered the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that established so-called 

“drug-exclusion zones” – geographic areas that persons with certain drug-related 

criminal records could not enter for a period time. See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 487. 

The court held that the ordinance unconstitutionally burdened the fundamental 

right to intrastate travel. But Johnson does not support Vere’s argument that the 

Policy created a durational residence requirement because the court emphasized 

that the case did “not involve [any type of] continuing residency requirement.” Id.

at 494 (emphasis added). Instead, the case “involve[d] a constitutional challenge 

to an ordinance that excludes certain individuals from high crime areas of the city, 

and presents issues of access not raised in [an earlier decision involving a residence 

requirement].” Id. Simply put, Johnson says nothing about whether the Policy 

amounts to a durational residence requirement. The Court remains convinced that 

the Policy establishes a bona fide residence requirement that does not impose any 

burden on Vere’s fundamental right to travel. 

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B. The Policy Is Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest 

 Bona fide residence requirements like the Policy are subject to rational basis 

review. See Martinez, 461 U.S. at 329 n.7; Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ. of City 

School Dist. of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d 625, 628 (6th Cir. 1976). Rational basis 

review requires only that the residence requirement be “rationally related to a 

legitimate government purpose.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “The burden is upon the challenging party to negative 

‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for 

the classification.’” Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 

356, 367 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 

(1993)). The Policy easily passes the rational basis test. 

 As one federal court has explained, there are a number of legitimate reasons 

that a municipal employer may favor its own residents, including 

the recruitment and retention of employees who are 

highly motivated and deeply committed to the city in 

which they live in work, enhancement of the quality of 

employee performance due to the greater knowledge of 

City conditions and the greater personal stake in the 

City’s progress, reduction in absenteeism and tardiness 

due to the proximity of the employee’s work and home, 

the availability of employees trained to respond to 

emergency situations, and the general economic benefits 

flowing from local expenditure of employee’s salaries. 

Van Deelen, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 1127; see also Wardwell, 529 F.2d at 627-28 

(identifying many “rational bases” supporting a school district’s policy of requiring 

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its teachers to reside within the district). Given these legitimate interests, several 

federal courts have held that municipal/governmental employer residence 

requirements withstand rational basis review. See, e.g., Van Deelen, supra; Salem 

Blue Collar Workers Assoc. v. City of Salem, 33 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 1994) 

(applying rational basis test and upholding municipal employer’s residence 

requirement); Wardwell, supra. Here, the Policy may reasonably further the 

legitimate interests identified above, and it therefore survives rational basis review. 

 In sum, for all of the reasons above, the Court concludes that the Policy does 

not violate the Equal Protection Clause and that the Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on the equal protection claim in Vere’s Complaint. 

THE MOTION TO AMEND

As described above, in the proposed Amended Complaint, Vere seeks to add 

(1) new legal theories, (2) new factual allegations based on acts and omissions 

occurring after the close of discovery and completion of summary judgment 

briefing, (3) new claims, and (4) a new defendant. Even under the liberal standards 

for amendment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), the proposed 

amendments should not be allowed. 

The Sixth Circuit has identified the factors that a district court should 

consider when deciding whether to grant a party leave to amend its complaint: 

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Several elements may be considered in determining 

whether to permit an amendment. Undue delay in filing, 

lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the 

moving party, the repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party, and futility of amendment are all factors which 

may affect the decision. Delay by itself is not a sufficient 

reason to deny a motion to amend. Notice and 

substantial prejudice to the opposing party are [the] 

critical factors in determining whether an amendment 

should be granted.

Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 130 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (quotation 

omitted). Here, the “critical factors” of notice and prejudice weigh heavily against 

allowing Vere’s proposed amendment. 

 Most importantly, permitting Vere to amend his Complaint to add new 

factual allegations and new claims following the close of discovery, and after 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment, would cause Defendants 

substantial prejudice. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized “that allowing 

amendment after the close of discovery creates significant prejudice, and other 

Circuits agree.” Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(citations omitted); see also Miller v. Admin. Office of Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 898 

(6th Cir. 2006) (“Because the discovery deadline had already passed and the 

deadline for filing dispositive motions on the issue of immunity was imminent, the 

defendants would have been prejudiced if a further amendment had been permitted 

by the district court.”). Moreover, as the Second Circuit has explained, “a 

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proposed amendment” is “especially prejudicial” when discovery is complete and 

the defendant has “already filed a motion for summary judgment.” Krumme v. 

WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ansam Assoc. v. 

Cola Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442, 446 (2d Cir. 1985)). The prejudice under 

these circumstances arises because the proposed amendments “would require a 

new wave of discovery” and would substantially “delay the final disposition of the 

action.” Id. Simply put, the Defendants would suffer material and unfair prejudice 

if, at this extremely late stage in the proceedings, the Court allowed Vere’s 

amendment, re-opened discovery, and effectively “turned back the clock” in this 

action. 

In addition, at no point during discovery did Defendants have notice that 

they could potentially have to defend against Vere’s new proposed claims. Indeed, 

they could not have had such notice because some claims are based upon alleged 

acts and omissions that occurred after discovery closed. This lack of notice further 

weighs against allowing the proposed amendments. 

Vere argues that the Court should allow the proposed amendments because 

Rule 15(a) embodies a liberal policy in favor of allowing amendments, he did not 

delay in seeking to amend once he learned of the alleged facts underlying the 

proposed new claims, and the proposed amendments are not futile. (See Motion to 

Amend, ECF #36 at 4-5, Pg. ID 609-10.) On the facts of this case, these factors 

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are not sufficient to justify the addition of new claims and new factual allegations. 

If Vere wishes to pursue these new and additional claims, he may file a separate 

action against Defendants.4

 In short, the prejudice from the proposed amendments 

at this advanced stage and the lack of notice to Defendants outweigh the factors 

Vere identifies. The Court will not permit Vere to file his proposed Amended 

Complaint. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #30) is GRANTED and the Motion to 

Amend (ECF #36) is DENIED. 

 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 20, 2016 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties 

and/or counsel of record on July 20, 2016, by electronic means and/or ordinary 

mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113

 

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 The Court expresses no opinion as to whether Defendants may interpose the 

judgment here as a defense to any claims that Vere may attempt to assert in a 

future action. 

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