1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Criminal Case No. 15-cr-20024 

v. Honorable Linda V. Parker 

GREGORY LAMAR CALHOUN, 

 Defendant.

________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR 

RETROACTIVE SENTENCE APPLICATION (ECF NO. 48) 

 

This matter presently is before the Court on Defendant Gregory Lamar 

Calhoun’s request for a reduction of his sentence, filed March 12, 2018. (ECF No. 

48.) 

On August 26, 2015, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of felon in 

possession of firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 30.) At the 

time of Defendant’s sentencing, Defendant was awaiting sentencing from the state 

court for a parole violation. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant requested that 

his federal sentence run concurrent to any sentence imposed by the state court. 

(ECF No. 44 at Pg ID 177.) This Court sentenced Defendant to 18 months of 

imprisonment and deferred the decision of whether Defendant would receive a 

concurrent sentence to the state. (Id. at Pg ID 191.) 
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 On January 11, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for ineffective assistance of 

counsel where he argued that his defense attorney failed to request that his federal 

sentence run concurrent to his undischarged state sentence. (ECF No. 37 at Pg ID 

145.) Defendant requested that this Court order that his federal sentence run 

concurrent with his state sentence. (Id.) This Court denied Defendant’s request on 

July 12, 2017. (ECF No. 47.) 

 More recently, Defendant filed a letter with the Court seeking the same 

relief. (ECF No. 48.) In a letter dated February 23, 2018, the Court’s case 

manager referred Defendant to the Designation and Sentencing Computation 

Center regarding his sentence. (ECF No. 48 at Pg ID 213.) On June 14, 2018, this 

Court received a letter from the Designation and Sentence Computation Center1

, 

inviting the Court to retroactively determine whether Defendant’s federal sentence 

should run concurrent or consecutive to his state sentence. (ECF No. 52.) 

Accordingly, on June 28, 2018, this Court entered an Amended Judgment and 

ordered Defendant’s 18-month sentence to run concurrent to the state sentence. 

(ECF No. 49.) 

 In response, on July 3, 2018, the government filed a motion to strike, 

arguing that the Court lacked authority to modify Defendant’s sentence. (ECF No. 

50.) Upon further review of the relevant law, the Court finds that the government 

 

1

 The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case was copied on the 

letter. 
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is correct. A district court is authorized to modify a defendant’s sentence once it 

has been imposed only in those instances where Congress expressly indicates. 

United States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 318 

(2009); see also United States v. Watkins, 655 F. App’x 478, 479 (6th Cir. July 21, 

2016 (umpublished). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) describes those limited circumstances as 

follows: (1) where the Bureau of Prisons has moved for the modification based 

upon extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a reduction or the 

fact that the defendant is at least seventy years of age, has served at least thirty 

years in prison and presents no danger to the safety of the community, see 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii); (2) where modification is permitted under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); (3) where 

the guideline range for the offense of conviction has been retroactively lowered, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); or (4) “to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by 

statute,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). 

Defendant’s request for a reduced sentence is not within the limited 

circumstances where this Court is authorized to act. Furthermore, pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3584(a), “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run 

consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.” In the 

instant case, both the federal and state court were silent as to how the sentences 

should run. Therefore, the default is for the sentences to run consecutively. 
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As to Defendant’s protestations that he did not receive credit to his federal 

sentence for the time he was in federal custody from February 17, 2015 through 

December 10, 2015, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) leaves the determination of sentencing 

credits to the Bureau of Prisons. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 

(1992) (“§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at 

sentencing.”) Although Defendant was in federal custody from February 17, 2015 

to December 10, 2015, the state had primary jurisdiction over Defendant because it 

arrested him first. See Buxon v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-2015, 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 124078, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2010). 

“If, while under the primary jurisdiction of one 

sovereign, a defendant is transferred to the other 

jurisdiction to face a charge, primary jurisdiction is not 

lost but rather the defendant is considered to be ‘on loan’ 

to the other sovereign.” United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 

894, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2005). “As between the state and 

federal sovereigns, primary jurisdiction over a person is 

generally determined by which one first obtains custody 

of, or arrests, the person.” Id. Issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not change a 

defendant’s custody status. Id. Therefore, petitioner’s 

removal from the state by federal writ did not relinquish 

primary custody of the state. Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 

795, 798 (8th Cir. 1994) (writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum does not alter prisoner’s custody status, 

but merely changes location of custody). The only 

function of such a writ is to cause the removal of a 

prisoner to the proper jurisdiction for prosecution. 28 

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5); United States v. Boyes, 305 F.2d 

160, 161 (6th Cir. 1962). A writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum is only a ‘loan’ of the prisoner to another 

jurisdiction for criminal proceedings in the receiving 
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jurisdiction. See Gipson v. Young, 786 F.2d 1164, 1986 

WL 16497, at *2 (6th Cir. 1986). 

Buxon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124078, at * 8-9. Furthermore, “[a] federal 

sentence does not begin to run . . . when a prisoner in state custody is produced for 

prosecution in federal court pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum.” United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 507 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 

2017) (quoting United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 1998)). 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s request (ECF No. 48) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be committed to the 

custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons until the completion of his federal 

sentence.

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 12, 2018 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, July 12, 2018, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ R. Loury 

 Case Manager