United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 15, 2020*

Decided October 15, 2020 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1387 

LISA M. HARMON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

WISCONSIN REGIONAL TRAINING 

PARTNERSHIP, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 2:17-CV-1762 

Nancy Joseph, 

Magistrate Judge. 

O R D E R 

Lisa Harmon filed an employment-discrimination claim against her former 

employer. Not long after the parties negotiated an oral settlement agreement, Harmon 

changed course. She refused to sign a written agreement formalizing the terms and 

moved to revoke the oral settlement. The district court denied Harmon’s motion, 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-1387 Page 2 

granted the employer’s motion to enforce, and terminated the case. Because the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement, we affirm. 

Harmon’s operative pleading—her third amended complaint—alleged that her 

former employer, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (“WRTP”), violated her 

rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 She claimed that WRTP 

discriminated against her based on her race and terminated her employment in 

retaliation for filing an internal complaint. The parties consented under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c) to the jurisdiction of the assigned magistrate judge, David E. Jones, who in turn 

referred the case to Magistrate Judge William E. Callahan for a settlement conference. 

At the conference, Harmon was represented by her retained attorney, and the 

parties agreed to settle. On the record, Magistrate Judge Callahan recited the terms of 

the agreement, including: (1) WRTP’s promise to pay Harmon a sum of money; 

(2) Harmon’s promise to release all claims against WRTP; and (3) WRTP’s promise to 

modify Harmon’s employment records to reflect that she had resigned. Magistrate 

Judge Callahan also acknowledged that Harmon’s siblings, who attended the 

conference, agreed to sign a “side agreement” with Harmon that they would not reveal 

the terms of the settlement. Magistrate Judge Callahan then asked both parties if he had 

recited the terms accurately and, after clarifying that the settlement would not affect her 

lawsuit against her former union, Harmon responded, “yes.” A minute entry reflects 

that the mediation resulted in settlement and the case would be referred back to 

Magistrate Judge Jones for dismissal. 

A few days later, Harmon discharged her attorney, so WRTP emailed a proposed 

written settlement directly to her. The document incorporated the terms of the oral 

agreement and a few additional terms. One was a standard provision under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), giving Harmon twenty-one days to 

review the offer and seven days after acceptance to revoke. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(i), 

(f)(1)(G). Harmon refused to sign and emailed the district court to explain that “after 

further consideration” she “decided not to accept.” Harmon argued that the agreement 

should be revoked because she did not sign anything at the mediation, her siblings did 

not sign the side agreement, and her attorney had pressured her to settle. The court 

construed Harmon’s letter as a motion to revoke the oral settlement agreement. 

1 Harmon also sued her former union. See Harmon v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 

Aerospace Workers Dist. 10 AFL-CIO Union Lodge No. 66, No. 18-CV-74 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 

2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-1474 (7th Cir. 2020). 
No. 20-1387 Page 3 

Magistrate Judge Jones held a hearing and, after considering the settlement 

transcript and the parties’ arguments, ruled that the agreement was enforceable. He 

found that the record showed that Harmon unequivocally confirmed that Magistrate 

Judge Callahan set forth the terms accurately and agreed to the deal. And the record, he 

noted, did not support Harmon’s allegations about her attorney. Concluding that a 

change of heart cannot nullify a valid settlement agreement, the magistrate judge 

denied Harmon’s motion. She filed an interlocutory appeal, which we dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

Back in the district court, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of Magistrate 

Judge Nancy Joseph, who took over after Magistrate Judge Jones left the court. At a 

scheduling conference, the court heard and denied Harmon’s oral motion to reconsider 

the denial of her motion to revoke. WRTP then filed a motion to enforce the oral 

agreement. After briefing, the court granted the motion. It explained that Harmon and 

her attorney had confirmed on the record that the terms were accurate, and the minute 

order stated that a settlement was reached and the case would be dismissed once the 

appropriate documents were filed. Moreover, Harmon had not made her acceptance 

contingent on approval of a written agreement. Therefore, the court explained, 

Harmon’s issues with the proposed written agreement—that its terms differed from the 

oral agreement—were immaterial to the oral agreement’s enforceability. Finally, the 

court rejected Harmon’s attempt to rely on the ADEA revocation provision because she 

never signed the agreement. Satisfied that the parties had a meeting of the minds and 

that Harmon knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement, the court granted 

WRTP’s motion and terminated the case. 

On appeal, Harmon, now proceeding pro se, does not contest the existence of an 

oral settlement agreement under Wisconsin law, see WIS. STAT. § 807.05, but she argues 

that the district court should not have enforced it. We therefore review the court’s 

decision for abuse of discretion. Beverly v. Abbott Labs., 817 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 

Harmon first argues that she did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the 

contract because she felt pressure from her attorney to stay at the settlement conference. 

“An employee’s settlement of a Title VII claim must be knowing and voluntary,” and 

we review the district court’s factual finding on this point for clear error. Baptist v. City 

of Kankakee, 481 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). When a plaintiff is represented by chosen 

counsel during negotiations and settlement, we presume that the settlement was 

knowing and voluntary. Id. at 490–91. Arguments based on the attorney’s conduct or 
No. 20-1387 Page 4 

competence are “an improper factor in evaluating whether [the] settlement is knowing 

and voluntary,” and they “neither negate the presumption created by the 

representation of counsel nor demonstrate the kind of fraud or duress capable of 

rebutting the presumption.” Id. Here, Harmon expressed no reservations when she 

agreed to the settlement. And as Magistrate Judge Jones pointed out, when she sought 

to revoke the agreement, Harmon failed to provide evidence that her attorney 

pressured her, let alone evidence of fraud or duress. Thus, the district court did not 

clearly err in finding that she knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the settlement. 

Harmon next contends that the district court should not have enforced the oral 

agreement because one of its terms—WRTP’s promise to modify her employment 

records from “terminated” to “resigned”—is unlawful. Because Harmon applied for 

and collected unemployment insurance on the basis that she was fired, she explains, the 

modification will subject her to liability for fraud. See WIS. STAT. § 108.24. We agree with 

the district court that it is unlikely Harmon’s representation that she was fired, which 

was true when she made it, could subject her to liability for knowingly making a false 

statement to obtain benefits. Further, Harmon does not explain how this provision 

could void the entire contract. A court will not enforce a contractual provision when 

“performance is forbidden by civil or criminal statute or where a penalty is imposed for 

the action agreed to,” Abbott v. Marker, 722 N.W.2d 162, 164–65 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), but 

Harmon does not contend that modifying her personnel file—in her favor—is itself 

unlawful. In any case, Wisconsin law allows for the severance of unlawful provisions. 

See Baierl v. McTaggart, 629 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 2001). 

Harmon also argues that the district court should not have enforced the 

agreement because she has not signed anything and her siblings never signed the 

confidentiality agreement. Although a mediated settlement agreement is not 

enforceable if a party’s acceptance was expressly contingent on something that never 

happened, Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 620, 626–27, 631 

(Wis. 2006), neither Harmon nor WRTP attached any conditions precedent to their 

agreement. Instead, when Magistrate Judge Callahan stated that the parties reached a 

settlement and asked if he set forth the terms correctly, both parties responded, “yes.” 

The parties’ mere anticipation of a written document did not nullify their otherwise 

binding oral agreement. See Beverly, 817 F.3d at 334. Harmon further maintains that her 

attorney privately told her the settlement was contingent on her siblings signing the 

confidentiality agreement. Yet when Judge Callahan described it as a “side agreement” 

with Harmon, neither party objected. Moreover, Harmon’s siblings were not parties to 

the settlement. Harmon’s mistaken belief about the effect of her siblings’ promise of 
No. 20-1387 Page 5 

confidentiality is not a basis for voiding her agreement with WRTP. See Admiral Ins. Co. 

v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 811 N.W.2d 351, 362 (Wis. 2012). 

Harmon next argues that she had a right to revoke her oral acceptance under the 

ADEA, as the written settlement proposal provided. WRTP contends that Harmon 

cannot rely on the provision because she did not execute the agreement. But the right to 

revoke derives from the statute, not the parties’ contract: a former employee over the 

age of forty has the right to review any agreement releasing an age discrimination claim 

for twenty-one days and a right to revoke acceptance within seven days. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 626(f)(1)(F)(i), (f)(1)(G). The ADEA, however, does not support Harmon’s attempt to 

revoke her acceptance here. First, Harmon has never claimed (in this lawsuit or in an 

administrative charge) discrimination based on age, and at the time the settlement was 

reached, any prospective charge or lawsuit would have been untimely. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 626(d), (e). She therefore had no claim under the ADEA to release, notwithstanding 

the boilerplate provision in WRTP’s written proposal. In any event, that provision could 

not vitiate Harmon’s oral agreement. She accepted the oral settlement within the review 

period, and she did not notify WRTP or the court within seven days that she intended 

to revoke; instead, she sent her email eighteen days after the settlement conference. 

Lastly, Harmon argues that the written agreement is invalid because its terms are 

different from the oral agreement. But she is not bound by—nor can she enforce—terms 

of a written agreement that she never executed. Only the terms put on the record after 

the settlement conference are enforceable (unless the parties sign an agreement later). 

 We have considered Harmon’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED