General Peter Pace, United States Marine Corps

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

 General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army and later Secretary of 

Defense, said during World War II, “We are determined that before the sun sets on this 

terrible struggle, our fl ag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom 

on the one hand and overwhelming force on the other.” The Nation was at war in Europe 

and Japan, and although the struggle was very different from the one in which we are 

currently engaged, the themes that defi ne our profession of arms and guide the actions of 

our offi cers apply today just as they did over 60 years ago.

 The uncertainties of today’s world and the nature of our adversaries increase 

the importance of these ideas. They provide a foundation upon which you should build 

as you prepare to meet tomorrow’s objectives. The time and effort spent developing this 

groundwork will pay dividends as you confront new and unique challenges in the years 

ahead.

 I encourage you to refl ect on the timeless themes outlined in this book and 

consider what honor, integrity, selfl essness, commitment, and the greater good mean 

to you. They defi ne the ethos of our profession of arms, a philosophy that has moral 

leadership at its core. Vice Admiral James Stockdale, Vietnam POW and Medal of Honor 

recipient, once said, “... even in the most detached duty, we warriors must keep foremost 

in our minds that there are boundaries to the prerogatives of leadership, moral boundaries.” 

As you read these pages and think about their meaning, do so expecting to be called upon to 

apply moral leadership in situations where your life, the lives of your troops, and the safety 

and security of the United States hang in the balance.

 Your commission and oath of offi ce are reminders of your higher calling to 

our great Nation and Constitution. As you embark on your military career, I ask you to 

dedicate your study to the men and women you will one day have the privilege to lead and 

command.

PETER PACE

General, United States Marine Corps

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO)

I am continually impressed with the members of the Armed Forces, impressed and grateful for all they 

do. The same goes for their families who endure long months of separation and danger of loss. Each time I think 

we can ask no more of them, they fi nd another way to surprise me. Their resilience is amazing, and the nation is 

grateful.

 This new edition, written while the nation is at war, is a successor to a classic series written the fi rst time 

in 1950 by journalist-historian S. L. A. Marshall at the behest of General George C. Marshall, America’s greatest 

soldier-statesman of the last century. George Marshall never led troops in battle, but he spent much of his long and 

distinguished military career educating and training offi cers for war. He formed the great citizen-army that won the 

global mid-century wars against Nazi tyranny and Japanese imperial designs. George Marshall was a pioneer of 

service unity, what we call “jointness,” and unity of command in operational forces. S. L. A. Marshall, explaining 

the purpose of his book, attributed it to Marshall’s belief that offi cers of all services founded their professional commitment on a common moral-ethical grounding, a grounding the author of that fi rst volume set out to explain.

 This new edition takes up George Marshall’s inspirational premise and S. L. A. Marshall’s example 

and carries them into the new century. The book aims to educate commissioned offi cers of all services, as well as 

interested outsiders, about the basic moral-ethical requirements of being a commissioned offi cer in the Armed Forces 

of the United States. Understanding the common foundation of commissioned leadership and command of American 

military forces is essential if we are to achieve true excellence in joint operations; it unites the offi cers of the separate 

services in a common calling of supporting, defending, and bearing true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, and 

in providing good and faithful service in performance of the military offi cer’s duty. 

 The book begins emphasizing the offi cer’s oath and commission, observing the implications of the 

Constitutional division of military authority between the state and federal governments and of constitutional authority and responsibility for civil control of federal forces between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 

These divisions are sometimes diffi cult to negotiate, but they are the foundation of American liberty. The nation is 

ill-served when the leadership of the armed forces is inadequately attentive to the different roles and responsibilities 

of the separate branches. The nation is stronger when the American people fully understand them and demand their 

respect.

 This book is intended to be the fi rst volume in the professional library of newly commissioned offi cers, 

the fi rst brick in a lifetime of professional military education, supported by institutional periods of quality collective instruction and inquiry, expanded by progressive operational experience, but ultimately shaped by habitual 

individual study and refl ection throughout the military career. Broad continuous education -- technical, conceptual, 

and moral-ethical -- is the hallmark of a professional offi cer. The armed forces offi cer’s career must be designed to 

encourage and support a lifetime quest for knowledge and understanding of all aspects of the offi cer’s vocation.

 The American armed forces are amazing institutions. I have watched them at peace and war longer than 

most men and women in uniform. These brave and creative Americans have never failed to meet the challenges set 

before them and they have more than a few facing them today. The indomitable spirit of the thousands of wounded, 

men and women, regulars and reservists, fi ghting to remain on active duty in spite of their wounds, is ample evidence 

of the well-being of the institutional soul of today’s armed forces, its men and women of all ranks. It is into the hands 

of armed forces offi cers that the leadership of these men and women are entrusted by the American people, through 

their elected representatives and government. This book is a modest effort to explain the nature of that trust and the 

obligations and expectations it entails. 

Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO)

Ranking Member, House Armed Service Committee

 

CONTENTS

Introduction: The Meaning of the Commission .................................... i

1. The Citizen-Soldier—An American Tradition of Military Service...........1

2. The Profession of Arms ...............................................................11

3. Member of a Profession ............................................................21

4. Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation......................33

5. Character: Nobility of Life and Action...........................................41

6. Leadership ..........................................................................49

7. Responsibility, Accountability and Discipline .................................59

8. Service Identity and Joint Warfi ghting ...........................................73

9. An Ancient and Honorable Calling ......................................................93

Appendix 1: Founding Documents ...................................................99

 Declaration of Independence

 Constitution of the United States

Appendix 2: Authorizing Statutes for The Armed Forces ......................135

Appendix 3: Service Values ........................................................143

Appendix 4: Code of Conduct ......................................................147

Appendix 5: Keeping Your House in Order .....................................151

Appendix 6: “The Meaning of Your Commission:” 

 from the 1950 edition of The Armed Forces Offi ce.................161

Foundations of An Offi cer’s Professional Library ..........................173

Acknowledgements .................................................................................175

Instructions for Comment and Reproduction ......................................... 177
6

As an offi cer in the Armed Forces of the United States, you are a citizen

soldier, a warrior in the profession of arms, a member of a skilled profession, an 

unwavering defender of the Constitution and a servant of the nation. A leader of 

character, you accept unmitigated personal responsibility and accountability to 

duty, for your actions and those of your subordinates. You lead your service and 

defend the nation in seamless union with offi cers of all services. In so doing, 

you willingly take your place in an ancient and honorable calling, obligated 

equally to those who have gone before you, those you walk among, and those 

who will follow.
i

The Meaning of the Commission

 As an offi cer in the Armed Forces of the United States, you are a 

citizen-soldier, a warrior in the profession of arms, a member of a skilled 

profession, an unwavering defender of the Constitution and a servant of the 

nation. A leader of character, you accept unmitigated personal responsibility 

and accountability to duty, for your actions and those of your subordinates. You 

lead your service and defend the nation in seamless union with offi cers of all 

services. In so doing, you willingly take your place in an ancient and honorable 

calling, obligated equally to those who have gone before you, those you walk 

among, and those who will follow.

 “There is no greater demonstration of the trust of the Republic than in 

its expression and bestowal of an offi cer’s commission.”1

 This trust involves 

the majesty of the nation’s authority in matters involving the lives and deaths 

of its citizens. That this particular trust most often is fi rst directed on men and 

women of no particular experience in life, leadership, or war, elevates the act to 

a supreme occasion of faith as well. Accepting an offi cer’s commission in the 

armed forces is a weighty matter, carrying a corresponding burden of practical 

and moral responsibility. The offi cer must live up to this responsibility each day 

he or she serves.

 In 1950, the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense published a small 

handbook with a dark blue cover titled simply, The Armed Forces Offi cer.

2

 

Journalist-historian Brigadier General (Army Reserve) S. L. A. Marshall was the 

author. According to an introduction written by Marshall for a later edition, the 

Secretary of Defense, General George C. Marshall,

 “inspired the undertaking due to his personal conviction that American military 

offi cers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and 

morally.”3

 Defi ning that common ground, then, became Brigadier General 

Marshall’s goal.

 The 1950 edition of The Armed Forces Offi cer is considered something 

of a classic by many and still deserves close reading. For many years it was 

presented to new offi cers on their commissioning. Brigadier General Marshall 

revised the book several times, through 1975.4

 Following S.L.A. Marshall’s 

death in 1979, Brian P. McMahon, Sr. and John Causten Currey drafted a 1988 

edition with advice from an advisory board of retired fl ag offi cers. 5

 The world 

has changed dramatically since 1988, politically, technologically, and, therefore, 

militarily. It is time for another edition of this classic work.

 In fall 2002, at a conference on character development and education 

organized by the U.S. Naval Academy’s Center for the Study of Professional 
ii

discussion addressed the possibility of initiating an effort uniting all the service 

academies to defi ne what it means to be a commissioned offi cer in the twentyfi rst century. Within days, the Army Forces Command Commander, General 

Larry Ellis, suggested to the Commandant of Cadets at West Point that it was 

time for the Military Academy to take a hand in revising Marshall’s old book, 

which, said Ellis, he still kept on his desk and referred to frequently. With that 

coincidence of events, the effort to write a new edition of The Armed Forces 

Offi cer was taken in hand. Three academy superintendents agreed to a joint 

effort and the Joint Staff J7 agreed to provide sponsorship for what was intended 

to be a true joint service venture. The Marine Corps University and Coast Guard 

Academy subsequently came aboard.

 This book is written while our nation is at war. It is composed with 

the belief that the obligations of offi cership in the armed forces remain timeless 

and that nothing seen in the war on terrorism, or the campaigns in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, have indicated otherwise. Indeed, the highly publicized instances of 

soldier misconduct such as the disgraceful incidents of prisoner abuse at Abu 

Ghraib prison and elsewhere have tended to underscore the importance of active, 

competent and highly moral-ethical commissioned leadership, precisely by its 

absence. 

 The decision was made early in the drafting process to write a new 

book for the new century while retaining the original title and motivation. 

The intent is to draft a handbook aimed at new offi cers and those who aspire 

to become offi cers. There is an added ambition that the volume will be 

suffi ciently useful so that it will be retained throughout a career and, like 

Marshall’s original, referred to periodically by senior offi cers who want to seek 

renewed inspiration or professional centering. It is the authors’ purpose to write 

the book in the spirit of George C. Marshall’s goal: to defi ne the common ethical 

core of all offi cers while acknowledging that the military services retain cultural 

differences that are not only useful to their separate functions but necessary 

to their common success. Like the nation, the American military forces gain 

strength from their diversity. E pluribus unum, “From Many, One,” could be the 

motto of the Department of Defense as well as the United States.

 All armed forces offi cers begin their careers taking a common oath and 

receiving from their constitutional commander in chief a common commission. 

This oath and the commission, which constitute an individual moral 

commitment and common executive instruction, are the basis of the common 

ethic of commissioned leadership that binds the American military into the most 

effective and loyal fi ghting force in service to a democracy anywhere. Together 

they provide the common ethical grounding in which George C. Marshall 

believed. According to the Air Force Academy Superintendent, service as an 

offi cer is a privilege—“a privilege, founded on integrity, that brings with it great 
iii

 An oath is a moral undertaking, “a pledge to perform an act faithfully 

and truthfully.”7

 It commits the oath-taker to do certain things: to tell the truth 

in criminal trials and to provide disciplined service in the case of military 

enlistment. According to Admiral Arleigh Burke:

When an offi cer swears to “support and defend the Constitution of 

the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic”—he [or 

she] is assuming the most formidable obligation he [or she] will ever 

encounter in his life. Thousands upon thousands of men and women 

have died to preserve for him the opportunity to take such an oath. 

What he [or she] is actually doing is pledging his [or her] means, his [or 

her] talent, his [or her] very life to his country.8

 The offi cer’s oath has its origin in the constitutional requirement that 

“all executive and judicial offi cers both of the United States and of the several 

States, shall be bound by oath or affi rmation, to support this Constitution. ...”9

 

The current form of the oath dates from the end of the period of Reconstruction 

(May 1884) when former Confederate offi cials were readmitted to federal 

service.10 All commissioned offi cers of all military services subscribe to the 

same oath of offi ce as do other government offi cials (the president excepted)11 in 

a form prescribed under Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Tendered a commission, they 

swear:

that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 

against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith 

and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without 

any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and 

faithfully discharge the duties of the offi ce on which I am about to 

enter. So help me God.

 The oath is simple and deliberately unconditional. It is to the 

Constitution, the legal compact that created our current system of government, 

designating the president as commander in chief of the Army and Navy12 (and 

by extension Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard), while reserving to the 

Congress the power (and initiative) to raise and support Armies, to provide and 

maintain a Navy and to make rules for the government of the land and naval 

forces.13 Notably, the Constitution explicitly took for granted the existence 

of state militias that might be called into federal service and thus fall under 

federal authority. Militias were established, governed, trained, and equipped 

by the several states. The oath thus acknowledges that the Constitution divides 

authority over military forces between the federal government and the states, 

and among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal 
iv

and thus the rule of law, not on any person or offi ce. 

 The new offi cer swears, then, “to well and faithfully discharge the 

duties of his or her offi ce.” To well and faithfully discharge depends not simply 

on complying with the technical and legal requirements of the offi ce, but also 

on being consistent with the nation’s ideals, fundamental notions of respect 

for human dignity that are laid down in the Declaration of Independence, the 

Constitution, and other historic national documents. Offi cers’ understanding 

of their obligations must extend beyond the letter of the law to the spirit that 

inspires it.

 Having sworn allegiance and loyalty to the Constitution, and good 

and faithful service, the offi cer receives a commission from the president of the 

United States. In contrast to the oath, which has changed several times, the form 

of the commission is largely unchanged since the Revolutionary War. 14 

The commission defi nes the station of the offi cer.

To all who shall see these presents greeting: Know ye that, reposing 

special trust and confi dence in the patriotism, valor, fi delity and 

abilities of__________________, I do appoint him a _____(rank)___

_____________ in the (United States Army/Navy/Marine Corps/Air 

Force/Coast Guard) to rank as such from the __ day of__. This offi cer 

will therefore carefully and diligently discharge the duties of the offi ce 

to which appointed by doing and performing all manner of things 

thereunto belonging. And I do strictly charge and require those offi cers 

and other personnel of lesser rank to render such obedience as is due 

an offi cer of this grade and position. And this offi cer is to observe and 

follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as may be given 

by the President of the United States of America, or other superior 

offi cers acting in accordance with the laws of the United States of 

America. This commission is to continue in force during the pleasure 

of the President of the United States of America under the provisions of 

those public laws relating to offi cers of the Armed Forces of the United 
v

is made.

 The commission is both a letter of instruction and a grant of authority 

from the president, as commander in chief, to every offi cer. Offi cers are 

commissioned in their individual service, but each commission is otherwise the 

same. The commission begins by declaring that the offi cer possesses the special 

trust and confi dence of the president in the appointee’s patriotism, valor, fi delity, 

and abilities— his or her love of country, moral and physical courage under 

threat, faithfulness in thought and action, and professional competence. 

 Where the Oath of Offi ce requires the offi cer to swear that he or she 

will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the offi ce, the commission 

commands the new offi cer “to carefully and diligently discharge the duties 

of the offi ce to which appointed. ...” The president charges subordinates to 

obey the orders of the offi cer, and the offi cer to comply with the instructions 

and directives of the president and superior offi cers, notably limiting this 

responsibility to those offi cials “acting in accordance with the laws of the 

United States of America.” Even presidential orders, then, are no defense for 

American offi cers acting outside the law. Finally, the commission makes it clear 

that the offi cer, like all offi cials of the executive branch of government, serves at 

the pleasure of the president.

 Everything in this book about the nature of the offi cer can be said to 

derive from the Oath of Offi ce, the commission, the military provisions of the 

Constitution, its enabling legislation, and the inherent nature of the military 

calling.

 Chapter 1 reminds us that American armed forces offi cers are citizensoldiers, recounting sublime moments of self-sacrifi ce for the nation, which 

mark what journalist William Pfaff referred to as “the honorable absurdity of 

the soldier’s role ... an undertaking to offer one’s life, and to assume the right 

to take the lives of others.”15 Chapter 2 describes the profession of arms and the 

central role the warrior-leader will continue to play even as the practical nature 

of warfare undergoes rapid change. The warrior ethos remains at the center of 

a twenty-fi rst century offi cer’s calling. Chapter 3 is a consideration of a key 

contextual factor of an offi cer’s service that all American offi cers are expected 

to perform as leader-members of honored professions, their individual services, 

and, as joint service offi cers, as members of smoothly functioning, integrated, 

multiservice teams. 

 Chapter 4 addresses the requirement, central to every Soldier’s, 

Sailor’s, Airman’s, Coast Guardsman’s, or Marine’s oath, to defend the 

Constitution, and the role of every armed forces offi cer to be a servant of the 

nation. Chapter 5 examines the moral requirement that every offi cer be a leader 
vi

expectations and make the offi cer an inspirational leader for others to follow. 

Chapter 6 discusses leadership for new offi cers. Chapter 7, “Responsibility, 

Accountability and Discipline,” addresses that which most distinguishes 

commissioned offi cers from other categories of military leader—what S. L. 

A. Marshall referred to as their exceptional and unremitting responsibility.

16 

Chapter 8, “Joint War-fi ghting and Service Identity,” seeks to establish a balance 

between the twin goods of the unique service cultures and the imperative for 

all services to come together as one cohesive, unifi ed force on the battlefi eld. 

Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes what it means to be a member in an ancient and 

honorable calling, the commissioned leadership of the profession of arms, in the 

twenty-fi rst century. 

 There are several appendices. These contain the nation’s founding 

documents; the sections of Title 10, U.S. Code that establish the several services; 

a compendium of service values; The Code of Conduct; and a discussion of 

those things new offi cers should be aware of titled: “Keeping Your House in 

Order.”17 The fi rst chapter of S.L.A. Marshall’s fi rst edition is included as the 

fi nal appendix. Marshall’s language is a bit dated, but the chapter retains its 

original ability to inspire offi cers of all generations alike. The fi nal element of 

the book is a list, compiled by the authors of this book, of recommended books 

that might provide the foundations of an armed forces offi cer’s professional 

library.

 Offi cers and civilian faculty members from each of the service 

academies drafted this book.18 In the spirit of E pluribus unum, only modest 

efforts have been made to smooth the individual voices and styles. We adopt 

the current convention of capitalizing the titles of members of the armed forces: 

Soldier, Sailor, Marine, Airman, and Coast Guardsman. Where we have not, 

as in the fi rst chapter, the word “Soldier” is taken to comprehend members of 

all services. Our use of quotations is based on the value and authority of the 

argument put forward. For purposes of inclusion, we have introduced into some 

the feminine pronouns in brackets, excepting only those, as in the reverse of the 

title page, where it would have done excessive violence to the text. Both men 

and women serve as equals in the armed forces today. Both pay the inevitable 

costs of war in risk of life and limb. We believe our text should refl ect an 

equivalent equality of respect.
vii

, , p, , 

Intent,” 19 December 2002.

 2. U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Offi cer (Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi ce, 1950). The identity of the author was not given in the original 

edition.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Offi cer (Washington, DC: Armed 

Forces Information Service, 1975), ii. S. L. A. Marshall contributed a signed Introduction to the 1975 edition explaining how he happened to write the book.

4 . The 1950 edition was reprinted in 1956 as Department of the Army Pamphlet 660-2. 

It was revised in 1960 as DoD Pam 1-20/DA Pam 600-2/NAVPERS 15923A/AFP 190-

1-12/NAVMC 2563 and again in 1975 as DOD GEN-36/ DA Pam 600-2/NAVEDTRA 

46905/AFP 190-13/NAVMC-2563 (Rev 75).

 5. Available from the Secretary of the Army’s Public Affairs Offi ce at: http://www.usapa.

army.mil/pdffi les/p600_2.pdf, on-line, Internet, 18 May 2004. 

 6. Lieutenant General John W. Rosa, Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy, preface to 

U.S. Air Force Academy, Offi cer Development System, January 2004, 1.

 7. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Reese, “An Offi cer’s Oath,” Military Law Review, 25 (1 

July 1964): 3.

 8. Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.), quoted in ibid., 39.

 9. Article VI. The offi cer’s oath is found in Government Organization and Employees 

(Title V) U.S. Code, Section 3331.

10. To be precise, the current form was adopted in 1862 in response to the loss of a large 

number of army offi cers to the Confederacy. The oath was streamlined to its current form 

in 1884. Reese, “An Offi cer’s Oath,” 9-10. See also, Edward M. Coffman, “The Army 

Offi cer and the Constitution,” Parameters, 17, no. 3 (September 1987): 2-12. Another 

account of the history of the offi cer’s oath is Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Keskel, USAF, 

“The Oath of Offi ce: A Historical Guide to Moral Leadership,” Air & Space Power Journal 16, no. 4 (Winter 2002), on-line, Internet, 18 May 2004, available from http://www.

airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/win02/keskel.html.

 11. The president’s Oath alone is given in the Constitution, Article II, Section 1. The 

president swears to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.”

 12 Article II, Section 2.

 13. Article I, Section 8.

 14. See the form used in the Revolutionary War in the George Washington Papers at 

the Library of Congress, 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence, 1677-1799, 

Continental Congress, 1777, Printed Commission Form, Image 676 of 1269, on-line, Internet, 18 May 2004, available from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mgw:11:./

temp/~ammem_pZij. One major change, of course, is the presence of the president as 

commander in chief under the constitutional system. During the Revolution, Congress 

granted commissions.

15. William Pfaff, “The Honorable Absurdity of the Soldier’s Role,” The International 

Herald Tribune Online (March 25, 2003), on-line, Internet, 25 March 2003, available 

from http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=90840&owner=(IHT)&date=200303261632

23.

16. The Armed Forces Offi cer, (1950), 2.

 17. S. L. A. Marshall always included such a chapter in his versions of the book.

18. A list of the authors and their organizational affi liations while they worked on it is 

included at the end of this book.
viii

As an offi cer in the Armed Forces of the United States, you are a citizensoldier, a warrior in the profession of arms, a member of a skilled profession, an 

unwavering defender of the Constitution and a servant of the nation. A leader of 

character, you accept unmitigated personal responsibility and accountability to 

duty, for your actions and those of your subordinates. You lead your service and 

defend the nation in seamless union with offi cers of all services. In so doing, 

you willingly take your place in an ancient and honorable calling, obligated 

equally to those who have gone before you, those you walk among, and those 

who will follow.
1

The Citizen-Soldier—An American Tradition of Military Service

 From the birth of democracy in ancient Greece, the idea of the citizensoldier has been the single most important factor to shape the Western way 

of war. In a democracy, combatants bear arms as equals, fi ghting to defend 

their ideals and way of life. They are citizens with a stake in the society they 

have vowed to defend. They do not fi ght as mercenaries, nor are they guided 

by coercion or allegiance to the whims of a dictatorial leader. Rather, their 

motivation stems from a selfl ess commitment to an idea that far exceeds the 

interests of any individual member of the society.1

 For the armed forces offi cer 

of the United States, this ethos began with the militiamen who defended their 

homes, secured the frontier, and won a war of independence against the most 

formidable military power of that era. The American military tradition has 

since been governed by a strict adherence to the primacy of civilian control and, 

within that framework, has continued to champion the role of the citizen-soldier 

as the defender of the nation’s ideals. 

 In Congress, 4 July 1776, the founders of our nation outlined what they 

described as “self-evident” truths—universal principles concerning the proper 

relationship between citizens and government. Human rights, quantifi ed as 

“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” were their foremost concern, and 

government’s primary purpose was to defend those rights for all citizens. This 

defi nition of government radically transformed the role of the military in society. 

As the Declaration of Independence insisted, kings could no longer regard their 

armies as “independent of” or “superior to” civilian interests. From now on, 

rulers and military offi cers themselves would be subject to the will of the people. 

The priority of human rights, endowed by the Creator, would serve as the new 

focal point of allegiance for all citizens, whether civilian or military. From the 

outset, the American vision required military offi cers to serve fi rst and foremost 

as citizens of the nation, embodying the very ideals they swore to defend. 

The American Civil War tested the resolve of the American 

citizen-soldier like no other crisis in our nation’s history. Christmas 1860 

revealed an increasingly diffi cult period for the Corps of Cadets at West Point. 

Divided over the looming national crisis, most Southern cadets had already 

submitted their resignations, and more were sure to follow. With the Christmas 

season in view, the cadets of West Point gathered in the chapel and sang a hymn 

usually reserved for the last chapel service before graduation, “When Shall We 

Meet Again.” In December 1860, the words of the hymn suddenly alerted the 

cadets to what serving the nation might truly entail.
2

Meet ne’er to sever?

When will Peace wreath her chain

Round us forever?

Our hearts will ne’er repose

Safe from each blast that blows

In this dark vale of woes, —

Never—no, never.2

 Over the next four years, former cadet roommates, now serving as 

commissioned offi cers in blue and gray, would face the impossible challenge of 

fi ghting one another on opposing sides to determine the destiny of the United 

States of America. The aftermath would reaffi rm the resolve of federal principles established in the Constitution of 1789 and redefi ne the very oath of the 

armed forces offi cer. No longer pledging to bear allegiance only to the United 

States, offi cers after 1862 would take an oath to support and defend the Constitution.3

 In this fashion, the oath unmistakably underscored “We the People” as 

the highest authority in the military chain of command. 

 As soldier and citizen, today’s armed forces offi cer is a champion of 

both the nation’s defense and the principles upon which the nation was founded. 

Taking an oath to support and defend the Constitution means swearing to uphold 

the core values that defi ne the essence of American citizenship; the armed forces 

offi cer is fi rst and foremost a citizen who has embraced the ideals of the nation—only then can he or she defend those principles with true conviction. 

 It was an unswerving sense of civic responsibility that ultimately led 

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain to Gettysburg in 1863. During that battle, Chamberlain, a professor of modern languages from Bowdoin College, led his 20th 

Maine Volunteers in a courageous stand against Confederate assault and secured 

the southern end of the Union line at Little Round Top.4

 Colonel Chamberlain 

epitomized the ideal of the citizen-soldier, not only for his decisive leadership in 

battle, but for his commitment to the principles for which he felt called to join 

the defense of the Union. In his view, right action left the North no other option 

than to preserve the Union. As a professor watching the young men from his 

classes enlist in the army, Chamberlain was burdened with a sense of duty and 

responsibility yet unfulfi lled. Despite opposition from his wife and colleagues, 

the 33-year-old professor made the decision that would redefi ne his life’s mission. In response to the personal request of the governor of Maine to accept the 

leadership of a new regiment, Chamberlain wrote, “I feel it to be my duty to 

serve my Country. Your call to a post of honorable service fi nds me as a good 

citizen to come forward without delay & without excuse... I can make no other 

decision.”5

 
3

the ideas of the Constitution or even be willing to give one’s life in their defense. 

As the nation’s trusted professionals trained in the art and application of war, 

we are held to a higher standard—we are required to embody the values we 

have taken an oath to defend. At the end of the Civil War, Joshua Chamberlain, 

having been promoted to brigadier general, demonstrated that commitment 

during the surrender of Robert E. Lee’s forces at Appomattox Court House. 

Having given much thought to how he should lead his men to respond to the 

weary ranks of Confederate Soldiers, Chamberlain resolved to show respect 

to the defeated enemy by having his men present a salute of arms. Although 

he anticipated harsh criticism from his superiors for this gesture of respect, 

Chamberlain stated that “nothing of that kind could move me in the least. ... 

Before us in proud humiliation stood the embodiment of manhood ... thin, 

worn, and famished, but erect, and with eyes looking level into ours, waking 

memories that bound us together as no other bond—was not such manhood 

to be welcomed back into a Union so tested and assured?”6

 Sixty years later, 

a Virginian who had been among the Confederates that day asserted that the 

healing of the nation “began with that order to present arms.”7

 Given the choice 

between exacting revenge and upholding justice, Chamberlain followed a path 

guided by principle, even when bitterness and war-weariness urged otherwise. 

In so doing, he paid tribute to the more than 600,000 that made the ultimate 

sacrifi ce during the war, but more importantly, Chamberlain refl ected the very 

ideals for which those thousands had shed their blood. 

 As military offi cers, we have taken an oath of service above and 

beyond the ordinary parameters of noble citizenship. Our role in “promoting 

the general welfare” ultimately requires an unfl inching commitment to service 

before self. In some cases, we may be required to sacrifi ce our very lives. 

Countless numbers of American citizen-soldiers have had to make this choice, 

and as the next generation of armed forces offi cers, we have volunteered to 

inherit that legacy and selfl essly perform our service to the nation. In this 

light, courage is not a matter of heroism or extraordinary strength, but of inner 

conviction and faith—the decision to do the right thing for the right reason, no 

matter the cost. 

 During the opening stages of the Battle of Midway, 4 June 1942, 

Lieutenant Commander John Waldron and his squadron of 15 TBD-1 

“Devastators” had just taken off from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet at 0806.8

 

They were headed southeast over the Pacifi c in search of the Japanese fl eet. 

Originally from Pierre, South Dakota, Lieutenant Commander Waldron, “the 

Skipper,” was described by his fellow naval offi cers as “a regular guy” who 

was “loyal and thoughtful, and tough.”9

 The night before, Waldron had written 

a letter to his wife that stated, “I believe that we will be in battle very soon. I 

wish we were there today. But, as we are up to the very eve of serious business, 
4

I could not be happy otherwise ... if I do not come back, well, you and the 

little girls can know that this squadron struck for the highest objective in Naval 

warfare—to sink the enemy.”10 

 As a commander, Waldron’s character, sense of urgency, and concern 

for his men inspired the 15 junior pilots and 15 radio-gunners of Torpedo 

Squadron Eight to prepare for battle with courage and conviction. Most of 

the Airmen were green, and all except Waldron were novices when it came 

to the mission—even up until the Midway battle, none of the pilots had the 

chance to practice taking off with a torpedo, let alone dropping one in the 

water.11 Handling aircraft, machine guns, and radios as profi ciently as he did 

his acclaimed six-shooter, Waldron did his best to train Torpedo Eight in every 

facet of the mission: “Someday, you’ll be out there in the Pacifi c, and you’ll 

be all alone, and there won’t be any gals to cheer you on ... your nerve won’t 

pull you out then. By golly, you are going to know what to do. ... I’ve been in 

that sort of jam and it’s that sort of sixth sense that saved my life.”12 Waldron’s 

defi nition of heroism hinged on the principle that ordinary men could prepare to 

meet the enemy in extraordinary fashion. His pilots knew him fi rst and foremost 

as a patriot who loved his country—courage and sacrifi ce were, in his view, the 

highest expressions of citizenship. 

 With an uncanny intuition for the enemy’s next move, Waldron led 

his torpedomen straight to the pride of Admiral Nagumo’s carrier task force — 

Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu. At 0918, the carriers had just fi nished landing 

airplanes returning from their initial strikes on Midway Island.13 Waldron gave 

the signal for the torpedo bombers to line up for an attack on the largest carrier. 

However, the Japanese had already been alerted to the presence of the U.S. 

carriers, and the Zeros were airborne, ready to head off Waldron’s Devastators. 

With no fi ghter support to divert the Zeros, the torpedo bombers were fl ying into 

a trap, alone and vastly outnumbered. There was nowhere to run.14 Recognizing 

the opportunity to disrupt the landing and regeneration of further Japanese 

aircraft, Waldron broke radio silence and stated fi rmly, “WE WILL GO IN. WE 

WON’T TURN BACK. FORMER STRATEGY CANNOT BE USED. WE 

WILL ATTACK. GOOD LUCK!”15 As machine-gun bullets began to rip into 

the formation, the torpedo bombers held their descent and lined up on their 

targets to get their “fi sh” in the water. After a few of the torpedo bombers had 

been hit, Waldron’s plane burst into fl ames. In an effort to escape the blazing 

heat, his wingman saw Waldron place his right leg outside the cockpit just 

before his aircraft plunged into the water and disappeared.16 

 At the end of the hour, every plane from Torpedo Squadron Eight had 

been lost, and only one of 30 valiant crewmembers lived to tell the story. Not 

a single torpedo that splashed into the water ever hit a target, but Waldron’s 

squadron did manage to disrupt Japanese preparations long enough to give 
5

Kaga, and Soryu within the next few hours.17 

 According to pilot George Gay, the sole survivor of Torpedo Eight, 

the key to understanding John Waldron “is not what happened, but why he did 

what he did that day.” Before departing Hornet, Waldron had told his crews 

he expected the Battle of Midway would be the “biggest of the war, and may 

well be the turning point.” In the ready room, Waldron carefully prepared a 

mimeographed statement which he had each of his men read silently: “MY 

GREATEST HOPE IS THAT WE ENCOUNTER A FAVORABLE TACTICAL 

SITUATION, BUT IF WE DON’T AND WORST COMES TO WORST, I 

WANT EACH OF US TO DO HIS UTMOST TO DESTROY OUR ENEMIES. 

IF THERE IS ONLY ONE PLANE LEFT TO MAKE FINAL RUN-IN, I WANT 

THAT MAN TO GO IN AND GET A HIT.”18 Waldron’s focus was more than 

mission execution. Armed with an uncommon sense of conviction and patriotic 

zeal, he was committed to the principle of doing the right thing for the right 

reason. He embodied the Constitutional ideal of self-sacrifi ce, fi nding the 

resolve to lay his life on the line to promote the welfare of the nation. Waldron 

demonstrated that for citizen-soldiers, heroism is a function of our faith and 

conviction to give all we have for something we believe in. 

 An offi cer is granted an enormous responsibility to make decisions 

and lead others into combat. The values we have sworn to protect and defend 

represent a distinct perspective, faith, and conviction that require commitment 

beyond mere mental assent. Service to the nation requires us to embody selfsacrifi ce in every facet of our character and conduct, and it provides the essential 

reference point for how we execute our mission. As citizen-soldiers, we have 

not only committed ourselves to safeguard a set of ideals, we have accepted 

the higher responsibility of serving as their chief promoters, both at home and 

abroad. If necessary, we are willing to lay down our lives in their defense.

 In the 1950s, like many boys from small Midwestern towns, Lance 

Peter Sijan was a Boy Scout who sang in the church choir, earned his own 

spending money, and used his model airplanes to dream of future adventures 

in the sky. In his Milwaukee high school, he excelled in academics, lettered in 

football, and carried a reputation for honesty and genuine commitment to others 

that followed him through his offi cer training at the Air Force Academy where 

he graduated as a second lieutenant in 1965.

 On the evening of 9 November 1967, 25-year-old Lieutenant Sijan 

was on his 53rd combat mission in Vietnam. He was the back-seater in an F-4 

scheduled for another bomb run on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Not unlike 

other pilots fl ying out of South Vietnam, Lance wrestled with the frustration 

of targeting the same ambiguous patch of jungle, using the same call sign and 

time-on-target as in previous night missions. These fl ights seemingly exposed 
6

roommates recalled that “Lance had discussed these tactical shortcomings, 

necessitated by the wider policy considerations of limited war. But he still wore 

his uniform with pride every day, and refused to denigrate the national policy.”19 

 As orange tracer fi re ruptured the night sky, Sijan pressed the button 

to jettison his bomb load. An electronic malfunction detonated the bombs upon 

release, suddenly engulfi ng his Phantom in fl ames. Sijan ejected and drifted into 

the densely forested jungle below. His was the only chute known to emerge from 

the fi reball.20

 Sijan regained consciousness the next day, suffering from acute 

lacerations, a crushed right hand, a compound fracture in his left leg, and head 

injuries. A fl ight of F-4s intercepted Sijan’s beeper and a search and rescue 

effort commenced. However, just as the Jolly Green chopper arrived at the 

pickup point, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) gunners entered the area. Sijan’s 

voice came over the radio, “The enemy is too close... stay where you are—I’ll 

crawl to the penetrator.”21 Unable to move his injured body fast enough through 

the jungle foliage, darkness and weakened radio batteries prevented further 

rescue coordination. Able only to inch himself along the ground on his back, 

Sijan evaded capture for 45 days. His strength severely depleted, he managed to 

move some three miles from his starting position before the North Vietnamese 

discovered his unconscious, skeletal form in the middle of the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail.22 After awakening in an NVA road camp, Sijan mustered enough strength 

to overpower one of his guards and crawl into the jungle. However, he was 

recaptured after several hours, beaten severely, and taken along with two other 

U.S. pilots to the Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi. 

 Lance Sijan would never have considered himself to be a hero. 

However, his commitment as a citizen-soldier to the Constitutional principles he 

vowed to defend led him to conduct himself in an extraordinarily heroic manner. 

“He was dedicated to being a good pilot, a true professional, he had the selfdiscipline to recognize the hard duty he had as a downed pilot ... to escape and 

evade.”41 For Sijan, freedom was more than the anticipated hope of returning 

home—it was an idea that Sijan had sworn as an offi cer to fi ght for, even to lay 

his life down for. “He knew exactly what he was doing and why.”24

 Throughout his captivity, Sijan continuously resisted torture and 

refused to provide any military information to his captors. While enduring the 

chill of his damp prison cell, Sijan contracted pneumonia. With an iron will that 

refused to accept defeat, he instructed his cellmates to prop him up such that he 

might exercise his arms to condition himself for an escape attempt. A fi ghter 

until the end, Sijan died in prison on 22 January 1968.
7

because he took an oath to defend them, but because he believed in them. They 

were at the core of his very being. In his drive to evade capture and resist the 

enemy, Sijan demonstrated his unwavering commitment to the principle of 

freedom. He never anticipated on that fateful evening of November 1967 that 

his crippled F-4 would suddenly place him in the direst of survival situations. 

But Lance acted with honor because his convictions made it impossible for him 

to do otherwise. Glenn Nordin was the Jolly Green chopper pilot who heard 

Sijan’s last transmission during the failed rescue attempt. According to Nordin, 

“Sijan was in control of himself under the worst possible conditions. He had 

not only been courageous during his long struggle, he had been imaginative, 

cunning. ... The ability to make hard but necessary decisions under diffi cult 

conditions, then to show the strength of character to implement those decisions, 

despite hardship, despite resistance, both in combat and times of peace.”25

 The pride of our nation’s armed services stands on the shoulders 

of countless young men and women from all walks of life who have sworn 

to support and defend the ideals that defi ne the essence of our American 

citizenship. In the same way Japanese aircraft over Pearl Harbor in 1941 

galvanized the resolve of a nation, the September 11th terrorist attacks on 

the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 reminded us of the diffi cult 

sacrifi ces required to sustain our Constitutional freedoms. The global war on 

terrorism ushered the U. S. military into groundbreaking expeditionary efforts 

and prolonged stability operations designed to replace rogue regimes with 

representative governments while winning the hearts and minds of civilian 

populations harassed by insurgents. In this arena, armed forces offi cers stood 

on the front lines of both a military and an ideological battlefi eld, serving as 

ambassadors of democracy and the Constitutional principles embodied in 

their service as citizen-soldiers. Global commitments especially underscored 

the extent to which Reserve Components, serving alongside their active duty 

counterparts, were essential in sustaining our military capabilities. Extended 

tours and subsequent rotations into and out of the combat zones called for 

uncommon courage and perseverance in the face of asymmetric warfare in 

urban environments and prolonged separations from families back home. In the 

twenty-fi rst century, more than ever, the ideal of the citizen-soldier remains at 

the core of the American military service tradition.

 Unlike those who made the ultimate sacrifi ce in a singular act of 

military heroism, Captain Bill Jacobsen was killed when a suicide bomber 

entered his mess tent in Mosul on 21 December 2004. He was 31 years old, 

and the fateful attack occurred on his ninth wedding anniversary, taking his life 

along with fi ve of the light-armored Stryker Brigade troops he commanded in 

Iraq. 

 From his youth, Jacobsen had always planned to serve in the Army; 
8

Young University with an ROTC commission in 1998. He was a marathon 

runner who also enjoyed scuba diving and mountain biking. The devoted father 

of four decorated the tiny space he called home in Iraq with the pictures of his 

wife and children. Deployed less than three months in Mosul, the 184 men he 

commanded trusted his leadership in urban warfare, witnessed his diplomatic 

skill in working with the local population, and observed how he prayed before 

each meal in the mess tent. He built a strong rapport with his troops and 

instilled a sense of confi dence through his conviction in the democratic ideals 

he believed would prevail against even the most bitter Sunni neighborhoods; “It 

was the small details—the signs of respect, the signals that soldiers view fi ghting 

as a last option—that would help make the difference.”26

 Jacobsen’s father, a retired lieutenant colonel and Vietnam veteran, 

described his son as an offi cer who fully embraced the mission in Iraq; “He 

felt we are blessed in this country with the freedoms that we have ... this was 

something he believed in. ... He felt like he had a responsibility to help people 

gain freedom and democracy.”27 Like many countless citizen-soldiers before 

him, Captain Jacobsen served because he knew freedom never comes without 

a price. His seeming random death at the hand of a suicide bomber reminds us 

that heroism is not defi ned so much in the capacity someone serves, but by the 

convictions that compel someone to place themselves in harm’s way. Captain 

Jacobsen gave his life not only for his country, but for the principles he had 

embraced and deemed worthy of the ultimate sacrifi ce.28

 The United States Constitution calls all citizens to “establish Justice, 

insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 

general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 

Posterity.” As citizen-soldiers, the armed forces of the United States have the 

privilege of defending those ideals against enemies foreign and domestic—in the 

process, we are the standard bearers for those very principles. As exemplifi ed 

by Joshua Chamberlain, John Waldron, Lance Sijan, and Bill Jacobsen, offi cers 

are advocates of justice, self-sacrifi ce, and freedom. Proudly, we represent a 

cross-section of American society from all walks of life. We achieve promotions 

and leadership positions based on merit and proven ability to lead. Our strength 

is our common commitment to a democratic ideal that requires us to view 

one another as equals. When we serve together in combat, this democratic 

faith enables us to depend on each other for our very lives, and even more 

importantly, for the defense of our nation and the principles it represents.
9

1 Victor Davis Hanson, Courage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western 

Power (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 3-8

2 Ibid.

3 Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, “The Oath of Offi ce: A Historical Guide to Moral Leadership,” 

16 Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2002): 50

4 Edward Longarce, Joshua Chanberlain: The Soldier and the Man (Conshohocken, PA: 

Combined Publisjers, 1999). 

5 Mark Nesbitt, Through Blood and Fires: Selected Civil War Papers of Major General 

Joshua Chamberlain (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), 14

6Longarce, Joshua Chamberlain, 246.

7 Ibid., 247 

8 Walter Lord, Incredible Victory (New York: Harper Row, 1967), 140-141.

9George Gay, Sole Suvivior: The Battle of Midway and its Effects on his Life (Naples, FL: 

Midway Publishers, 1980), 305,308.

10 Ibid., 109.

11 Ibid., 117.

12 Ibid., 95-96.

13 Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York: Mc-Graw Hill, 1982), 232-246..

14 Gay, Sole Suvivior, 119.

15 Ibid., 119.

16 Ibid., 121.

17 Edward Jablonski, Airwar:An Illustrated History of Air Power in the Second World 

War I (New York: Doubleday, 1979), 92-95.

18 Ibid., 108.

19 Malcolm McConnel, Into the Mouth of the Cat: The Story of Lance Sijan, Hero of 

Vietnam (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), 228. 

20 John L. Frisbee, “Lance Sihan’s Incredible Journey,” Air Force Magazine, December 

1986, 116.

21 McConnell, 234.

22 Frisbee, “Sijan’s Incredible Journey,” 116.

23 Ibid.

24 McConnell, 231.

25 Ibid., 234.

26 Richard A. Oppel Jr., “A Faith in Quiet Diplomacy, Giving Respect, to the end, “ The 

New York Times, 2 January 2005.

27 Sam Skolnik, “Capt William W, Jacobsen Jr.: Captain has a strong belief in 

democracy,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, 25 December 2004.

28 Lauren Graf et al., “At Least 6 Fort Lewis soldiers are among Mosul dead,” The 

Seattle Times, 24 December 2004.
10
11

The Profession of Arms

 Humans fi ght as individuals and as groups. Some fi ght primarily for 

money, some for love of fi ghting, and some for lack of alternative opportunities. 

“From the beginning of ... recorded history physical force, or the threat of it, 

has always been freely applied to the resolution of social problems.”1 Human 

societies—from tribes and city-states to empires, organized religions, and 

nation-states—have regularly established and relied on groups of specialists 

who, willingly or unwillingly, assumed the burden of fi ghting, killing, and dying 

for the larger group. Whatever their formal name or title, theirs is the profession 

of arms.

 It is a basic premise of civilized societies, especially democratic ones, 

that the military serves the state (and by extension, the people), not the other 

way around. The profession of arms exists to serve the larger community, 

to help accomplish its purposes and objectives, and to protect its way of life. 

“The justifi cation for the maintenance and employment of military force [or 

military forces, for that matter] is the political ends of the state.”2

 In wartime 

or in peacetime, at home or abroad, the armed forces serve the larger society 

and perform the tasks their government assigns them. “The function of the 

profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a 

social or political problem.”3

 The essential task of its members is to fi ght, 

individually and collectively; of its offi cers, to direct and lead those who apply 

the instruments of destruction to achieve assigned ends. With rare exceptions, 

a society’s government identifi es the problems to be resolved with force, and 

it then turns to and relies on the professionals to handle the always diffi cult, 

usually dangerous, often bloody details in a manner acceptable to the citizens 

and supportive of their goals. 

 The most basic task of the profession of arms is the armed defense of 

the society, its territory, population, and vital interests. In its most elemental 

sense, the profession of arms is all about fi ghting and all about war. As the 

nineteenth-century Prussian strategist and student of war Carl von Clausewitz 

observed, “for as long as they practice this activity, soldiers will think of 

themselves as members of a kind of guild, in whose regulations, laws, and 

customs the spirit of war is given pride of place.”4

 The defi ning mission of 

the armed forces is the preparation for and the conduct of war, which includes 

securing the military victory until peace is restored politically. It is the warfi ghting mission that determines how they are organized, equipped, and trained.

 However, defense of self and of others does not exhaust the tasks 

societies give their organized warriors. Because they are disciplined and 

armed organizations with a wide range of skills and capabilities, military forces 
12

the state such as maintaining civil order at home and abroad and providing 

disparate forms of civil relief in times of crisis. In the United States, the Army, 

in particular, has been used at various times for internal development, as well 

as to promote exploration, to maintain order, to enforce federal law, and even 

to run Civilian Conservation Corps camps during the Great Depression of the 

1930s. The U.S. Coast Guard’s principal roles involve maintaining the security 

and safety of the nation’s ports and waterways and enforcing federal laws and 

treaties on the high seas. It is important not to confuse the primary mission for 

which armed forces are created, trained, and equipped, with a limitation on the 

range of missions society may give them. They are expected to bring great skill 

and enthusiasm to all assignments.

 Whatever its particular forms, the unique and specialized service to 

the nation gives the military profession its own nature and distinctive status, as 

well as privileges and responsibilities denied or spared the rest of the society. 

Because those responsibilities include the potential wholesale taking and losing 

of life, the military profession stands alone, in its own eyes and in the eyes of 

those it serves. Its members must always be conscious of their commitment: 

to be prepared to give, in Lincoln’s words, “the last full measure of devotion.”5

 

They serve at frequent cost to their convenience, their comfort, the stability of 

their families, and often their limbs and lives. It is ultimately because of their 

willingness to endure hardship, and risk life and limb on behalf of the nation, 

not the willingness to kill and destroy in the nation’s name, that members of all 

armed forces enjoy the respect and gratitude of the American people. Theirs is a 

higher loyalty and purpose, or rather a hierarchy of loyalties, which puts nation 

above service, service above their comrades in arms, and comrades above self. 

Soldiers serve the nation; they fi ght and die for each other.

 The commitment to the nation is a two-way street—between the 

individual military member and the larger society. Society invests much—its 

safety and security, its hopes and ideals, much of its treasure, and the best of 

its men and women—in the armed forces. For the member of the profession of 

arms, fulfi lling the society’s demands and expectations means investing one’s 

best as a professional and as a person. Sir John Hackett observed, “Service 

under arms has been seen at times and in some places as a calling resembling 

that of the priesthood in its dedication.”6

 Like the priesthood, the profession of 

arms is a higher calling, to serve others, to sacrifi ce self, to be about something 

larger than one’s own ambitions and desires, something grander than one’s own 

contributions and even one’s own life. As S.L.A. Marshall wrote, “... service 

to country is no longer a beautiful abstraction; it is the sternly concrete and 

unremitting obligation of service to the regiment, the squadron, or the ship’s 

company.”7
13

States Armed Forces. In the Air Force it is “service before self.” In the Navy it 

is “ship-shipmate-self.” The Army defi nes the value of loyalty as a hierarchy 

of responsibilities to Constitution, service, unit, and other Soldiers.8

 The basic 

idea is that there is always something larger, more important than the individual. 

Service in the armed forces is not primarily about self, but rather about others—

fellow citizens and fellow military members. “The military ethic is corporative 

in spirit.”9

 

 The loyalty to fellow military members has its roots and its rationale 

in the ultimate activity of the armed forces—combat and war. What Lieutenant 

General (Ret.) Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway wrote in the prologue 

to their memorable book about Vietnam could have been said by warriors of any 

nation about any war: “We discovered in that depressing, hellish place, where 

death was our constant companion, that we loved each other. We killed for 

each other, we died for each other, and we wept for each other.”10 The classic 

statement of this perennial and honorable theme is in Shakespeare’s Henry V:

We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;

For he today that sheds his blood with me

Shall be my brother.

Given the stakes, it is no wonder that the profession of arms invokes and 

requires, in the words of the U.S. military offi cer’s commission, “special trust 

and confi dence.” 

 The profession of arms has two major components within which almost 

everything else that is important is subsumed. There is a functional component, 

what the armed forces do, and there is a moral component, what they owe the 

nation. The two are intimately joined.

 The functional component fl ows from the missions and tasks that 

a society assigns its armed forces. All professions require competence and 

mastery of the technical details and techniques essential to and unique to 

them. The higher the stakes, the greater are the demands and expectations 

for competence. In matters of life and death, in medicine and the military, 

for example, the stakes and the standards are especially high. Every military 

professional learns quickly how complex and demanding this fi eld of endeavor 

is, in its technological and its human dimensions. Military affairs are about both 

things and people. The sheer quantity and sophistication of technical details in 

most military specialties would leave the average civilian awestruck. Almost 

nothing about the profession of arms is easy—or forgiving. How well the 

individual practitioner, especially the offi cer, masters this panoply of skills can 

determine who lives and who dies—and it often does.
14

 The functional component has two dimensions—individual and 

organizational. Not only must the offi cer hone his or her own skills to the 

sharpest edge, but offi cership, especially command, which is offi cership’s 

most essential function, carries the additional burden of responsibility for the 

collective skills of the organization—as a unit. “It is worth remembering from 

the start that military practice is group practice. The military art is deeply 

concerned with the performance of the human group under stress.”11 

 While the technical competencies vary greatly from specialty to 

specialty, even within a warfare specialty or branch, the requirements of the 

second component—the moral component—are common across the profession 

of arms and central to it. Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, Medal of Honor 

recipient for his service under the arduous conditions of long incarceration and 

torture as a prisoner of war, a timeless exemplar of moral military leadership, 

summed it up well: “Morality lurks in all the shadows surrounding our 

profession. To not only ignore it but fail to embrace it will ultimately ensure

your failure in the ... service.”12 Great though the powers of the offi cer are, 

especially in command, Stockdale cautioned an audience of future offi cers, “...

even in the most detached duty, we warriors must keep foremost in our minds 

that there are boundaries to the prerogatives of leadership, moral boundaries.”13 

Values limit acceptable actions in peace and war. There are things we do not do.

 One way to capture the range of requirements in the moral component 

is to think about three categories of ethical issues. The fi rst could be called The 

Individual in the Profession, the second The Profession at Work, and the third 

The Profession and the Society. The Individual in the Profession consists of 

those characteristics or virtues required of all military professionals. This is the 

realm, for example, of Duty, Honor, Country. It is accepted that “[T]he military 

establishment requires a sense of duty and honor to accomplish its objectives,”14

and so too do all its members to accomplish theirs. All members of the 

profession of arms, but most especially offi cers, must nurture and cultivate this 

broad set of virtues in order to carry out all their responsibilities successfully 

and consistently. The profession itself, and the individual service in which one 

serves, must assume some of the burden of education and support for character 

formation. At its core, this remains an integral part of the individual’s personal 

obligation and responsibility to well and faithfully execute the duties of the 

offi ce.

 The Profession at Work treats the most important, indeed defi ning, 

work of the profession of arms: the conduct of war. The ethics of war are 

incorporated and embodied in what has been called “The Warrior’s Honor.”15 
15

cultures, and their common features are among the oldest artifacts of 

human morality. ... As ethical systems, they were primarily concerned 

with establishing the rules of combat and defi ning the system of moral 

etiquette by which warriors judged themselves to be worthy of mutual 

respect.16

The basic notion of the warrior’s honor is nearly universal, transcending 

historical periods and cultures. It serves more than one purpose: distinguishing 

between those who fi ght honorably and those who do not, regulating acceptable 

weapons and practices, defi ning acceptable treatment of prisoners and the 

wounded. 17 Men and women who fi ght under such codes are members of an 

honorable profession. They are soldiers and warriors, and can proudly call 

themselves such. But those who fi ght outside or without such codes are not 

members of an honorable profession. With no code to bind and inspire them, 

they are, instead, barbarians or criminals. “For war, unconstrained by honor and 

high moral principle, is quickly reduced to murder, mayhem, and all the basest 

tendencies of mankind.”18

 For sons and daughters of the Western heritage, the primary ethical 

code governing the conduct of war is called the Just War Tradition. This moral 

tradition has roots in philosophy, theology, law, the practice of statecraft, and 

military codes such as chivalry. It has two aspects, usually identifi ed by their 

Latin names: jus ad bellum, which informs and guides the decision to go to war, 

and jus in bello, which informs and guides the conduct of war.19 Members of the 

armed forces are interested principally in the jus in bello, for they are the ones 

who conduct war. 

 According to jus in bello, for a war to be conducted justly it must meet 

two basic criteria – discrimination and proportionality. The principle underlying 

discrimination is noncombatant immunity: noncombatants may never be the 

object of an intentional direct attack. Noncombatants include not only civilians 

caught up in the maelstrom of war, but unresisting enemy soldiers who are 

wounded and out of the fi ght and those who have surrendered and been taken 

prisoner. Combatants include not only most military personnel but also civilians 

actively engaged in the war effort (e.g., delivering ammunition to the front lines 

or taking up weapons themselves). Proportionality says that the harm done in 

any military operation should not outweigh the good likely to be accomplished; 

that is, it must not be disproportionate to the legitimate gains achieved by a 

military operation.

 These principles are so widely accepted that they form the basis of the 

Law of Armed Confl ict. Formalized in international law, ratifi ed in treaties, 

these principles provide a common ground for distinguishing warriors from 

barbarians, and honorable soldiers from war criminals. Acts that violate this 
16

profession of arms and the American psyche. General of the Army Douglas 

MacArthur stated, “The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the 

protection of the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason of his 

being ... [a] sacred trust.”20 Moral soldiers do not harm prisoners, and they 

accept additional risk to safeguard the helpless. As S.L.A. Marshall wrote in 

the original version of this book, “The barbarian who kills for killing’s sake 

and who scorns the laws of war at any point is repugnant to the instincts of our 

people, under whatever fl ag he fi ghts.”21 

 The challenge and the moral danger for the Soldier who fi ghts under 

such a code is that in the heat and fury of combat, there are powerful forces, the 

“forces of moral gravity,” which tend to drag the Soldier down to the enemy’s 

level. The moral and legal codes that should govern the conduct of American 

military professionals are those they brought with them to the war, and they 

must not let themselves be dragged down to the level of an unscrupulous enemy, 

no matter how strong the temptation. It is particularly the offi cer’s duty to see 

that service members are not compromised by unworthy actions, even in the heat 

of battle.

 The third category of ethical issues, The Profession and the Society, has 

two dimensions, both of which have to do with civil-military relations. One is 

vertical—how the military relates to civilian political leadership. The other is 

horizontal—how the military relates to the population at large.

 The vertical dimension concerns civilian control of the military, a 

notion fi rmly established in the U.S. Constitution that gives all the important 

powers related to the armed forces to civilian offi cials, in particular to the 

president as commander in chief and to the Congress to form, organize, and 

regulate the armed forces in federal service. The actions of both, and those of 

the Armed Forces, are subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court. 

 A hierarchy in which political leaders trump military commanders is 

not unique to the U.S. constitutional setting. As General Sir John Hackett told 

an Air Force Academy audience, paraphrasing Thomas Hobbes, “Government 

... requires an effective military instrument bound to the service of the state 

in a fi rm obligation.”22 Subordination of military activities to the needs of 

government policy was a central concept for Clausewitz, writing almost two 

hundred years ago in Prussia: 

Subordinating the political point of view to the military would 

be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding 

intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other 

possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to 

the political.23
17

concerns how the military fi ts in with the larger civilian society it is sworn to 

serve. This zone of values presents a conundrum. For all the reasons given 

above, the military must maintain a set of values that are critical to its ability 

to perform the services the state requires of it. Yet, at some times, those very 

military values might not coexist well with the values of the larger civilian 

society the armed forces serve. The most salient example is the willing 

subordination to hierarchy that is the foundation of military discipline, compared 

to the broad individualism characteristic of the liberal democratic society.24

 Few theorists or practitioners, military or civilian, hold that the values 

of the armed forces must always be congruent with those of the larger society. 

Indeed, there seems to be strong recurrent evidence that members of the larger 

society harbor an expectation of higher standards of ethical conduct by military 

professionals than they hold for themselves. Yet, most would argue that when 

the civil and military values diverge too much, all is not well and dangers lurk 

for democratic societies. It is not in the interests of either the armed forces or 

the society for the two to drift apart on important values and attitudes. Members 

of the armed forces must not disparage the values they have sworn to defend, 

not least the free expression of views by citizens in free political discourse. 

Managing this balance is the business of all—military member, political leader, 

and citizen alike.

 The functional and the moral components of the profession of arms 

elaborated in the last several pages each place enormous demands on the 

military offi cer. What integrates them is the concept of the warrior leader. The 

technical and the ethical dimensions come together in this dual notion of what 

the armed forces offi cer must be. The offi cer must have the fi ghting spirit, 

the will to persevere to victory, no matter his or her specialty. “The martial 

spirit,” wrote Morris Janowitz, “continues to give the military profession its 

distinctive outlook and to mold even its military managers.”25 It remains the 

unique responsibility of the armed forces offi cer to ask other people’s children 

to do very dangerous things. These traditions, those of the warrior, must be 

inculcated, nurtured, and embodied in all offi cers, so that the armed forces 

never lose their essential reason for being—the ability to achieve just victory in 

combat. 

 Winning in battle is not an individual endeavor: This is a calling 

which regularly obliges them to order subordinates to kill other human beings. 

Technical skills and individual profi ciency are necessary but not suffi cient for 

the offi cer to carry out the duties of the offi ce to earn the “special trust and 

confi dence” that are the basis of the commission. Organizing, mobilizing, 

motivating, justifying, indeed inspiring others are essential talents for the offi cer 

in the profession of arms.
18

combat. “War,” Clausewitz says, “is the realm of danger; therefore, courage is 

the soldier’s fi rst requirement.” But courage, he adds, “is of two kinds: courage 

in the face of danger, and courage to accept responsibility.”20 The former is 

physical courage; the latter, moral courage. “The highest kind of courage is a 

compound of both.”27

 Another way to capture these qualities is to identify the positive 

character traits of a professional leader we refer to as a leader of character. 

The demands of war, and even of peacetime service, dictate that the offi cer 

must have strength of character—“the ability to keep one’s head at times 

of exceptional stress and violent emotion.”28 This requires, according to 

Clausewitz, “... fi rst, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some 

glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to 

follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”29 S.L.A. Marshall would agree. 

“What is the main test of human character?” he asks. “Probably it is this: that 

a [person] will know how to be patient in the midst of hard circumstance, 

and can continue to be personally effective while living through whatever 

discouragements beset him [or her].”30 

 Where stands the profession of arms in the United States in the opening 

years of the twenty-fi rst century, a time rich in opportunities and challenges? 

Contemporary American military power and prowess are unprecedented in 

history, dazzling to friend, foe, and mere observer alike. Technology undreamed 

of by warriors past is the stuff of everyday life for the American Soldier, 

Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Coastguardsman. This technology, combined 

with sophisticated training and grounding in sound moral and legal principles, 

enables American warriors to fi ght effectively, while maintaining the highest 

standards of professional ethics. Americans achieve victory and are expected 

to do so in the right way. The legitimacy of military action is always subject to 

public review.

 This new century has other challenges. The same technology that 

yields unparalleled success on the battlefi eld can also detach the warrior from 

the traditional ethos of the profession by insulating him or her from many of the 

human realities of war. Unconsidered, this can blind or desensitize the warrior 

to the true nature of his or her actions, indeed to war itself. New threats have 

thrust new missions and new types of combat on our armed forces. Reserve 

components have been called upon for sustained reinforcement of the active 

force in duration not seen since the Korean War. They have responded with 

patience and fortitude at great personal sacrifi ce. Since 11 September 2001, 

homeland defense has taken on new meaning and greater urgency. The fi ghting 

by Americans may take place not just “over there,” but, for the fi rst time 

since the Civil War, at home as well. Closing with and defeating not just the 

organized, uniformed armed forces of other nation-states, but the often-elusive 
19

 Fighting wars of indefi nite duration, with shadowy enemies and 

ambiguous transition points between war and peace, places additional burdens 

on the armed forces and on the society they fi ght to protect. In American 

military history, victory has usually been diffi cult and costly, and sometimes 

elusive, but where lies victory in such a world as this? This century’s wars 

seem to require investment of more effort and blood in building functioning 

civil societies and ensuring a successful peace than they do in terminating 

military resistance by conventional foes. The security and prosperity of whole 

nations are in the hands of our armed forces. Opportunities and challenges 

abound for the American warrior in the years ahead. These will be exciting, but 

demanding, years for the offi cers who lead our armed forces. Selfl ess service, 

subordination of individual interests to the wider good, and acknowledgement 

of the supremacy of civilian government over military requirements will remain 

defi ning virtues. The American people will need—and insist on having—the 

very best men and women to serve as offi cers. Technically and morally 

competent offi cers will have to give their individual and collective best if we are 

to succeed and prevail over the challenges that face us. We can and we will.

1 General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms (The Macmillan 

Company, 1983), 9.

2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 

Civil-Military Relations (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 

65.

3 Ibid.

4 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 187.

5 Abraham Lincoln, “Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at 

Gettysburg, 19 November 1863,” in Abraham Lincoln Great Speeches (Dover 

Publications, Inc., 1991), 104. 

6 Hackett, 9.

7 U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Offi cer (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Offi ce 1950), 158. Hereinafter, The Armed Forces Offi cer, 

(1950). 

8 “Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, 

your Unit and Other Soldiers” from “The Army Values,” FM 22-100 (August 

1999), Army Leadership, 2-3. 

9 Huntington, 64.

10 Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were 

Soldiers Once ... and Young (Harper Perennial, 1993), xviii.

11 Ibid, 215.
20

Academy, class of 1994, 29 March 1994,” in Thoughts of a Philosophical 

Fighter Pilot (Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 204.

13 Ibid, 203.

14 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait 

(The Free Press, 1971), 35.

15 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor (Henry Holt and Company, 1997).

16 Ibid., 116-117.

17 Ibid., 117.

18 Colonel John R. Allen, Commandant’s Intent, 19 February 2002 version 

(unpublished document) p. 3.

19 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Second Edition (Basic Books, 1992), 

21.

20 As quoted in ibid, 317. 

21 The Armed Forces Offi cer (1950), 15. 

22 General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, “The Military in the Service of the 

State,” United States Air Force, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military 

History, 1959-1987 (Washington, DC: Offi ce of Air Force History, 1988), 509.

23 Clausewitz, 607.

24 Peter Mazlowski, “Army Values and American Values,” Military Review

(April 1990), 10-23.

25 Janowitz, 36.

26 Clausewitz, 101.

27 Ibid.

28 Clausewitz, 105.

29 Ibid., 102.

30 The Armed Forces Offi cer (1950), 16.
21

Member of a Profession 

There is in armies a tendency to set up an offi cer group with an otherness, as 

a step towards, or if necessary ... a replacement of, the betterness you require. 

The offi cer is set apart, clothed differently and given distinguishing marks. 

His greater responsibilities are rewarded with greater privileges. There is 

some insistence on a show of respect. He is removed from that intimate contact with the men under his command which can throw such a strain upon the 

relationship of subordinates.1

 —General Sir John W. Hackett

 Offi cers are set apart as a group within the wider profession of arms: 

in uniform, insignia, responsibility, formal respect required, and limitations on 

appropriate interaction with other members. In the Armed Forces of the United 

States, commissioned offi cers subscribe to a different oath than other ranks. 

They receive a commission from the president of the United States and serve 

at his pleasure. The institutional requirement for formal respect is refl ected not 

only in the commission document but in the severity of punishment for offenses 

against commissioned offi cers in execution of their offi ce.2

 Indicative of 

differences in responsibility, there are offenses in the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice that only an offi cer can commit, most notably Article 88, “Contempt 

toward offi cials,” and Article 133, “Conduct unbecoming an offi cer and a 

gentleman.”

Formal institutional authority and magnitude of responsibility distinguish 

commissioned offi cers. The Supreme Court of the United States has observed: 

“An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that 

of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right of command in the 

offi cer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier.”3 What distinguishes the offi cer, 

S. L. A. Marshall wrote, is “exceptional and unremitting responsibility.”4

In the second chapter, the word profession was used in a general sense to 

indicate membership in a common vocation. Here it will be necessary to draw 

fi ner distinctions. An offi cer is a professional in two senses: individual and 

collective. Insisting on the distinction between the two senses is important to 

give emphasis to the fact of the offi cer’s ultimate individual responsibility to 

the obligations of the Oath of Offi ce, even when that confl icts with the apparent 

good of the professional body. 

 In the individual sense, the offi cer like the lawyer, clergyman, or 

medical doctor is a specialist, an individual practitioner, employed because of 

his unique learning, experience, and expertise, to perform a necessary service of 
22

exercise of professional judgment.”5

 The commissioning oath is an individual 

and highly personal bond with the nation—to well and faithfully discharge 

the duties of the offi ce—commissioned leadership of the profession of arms. 

Offi cers are fi rst and foremost leaders of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, 

and Coast Guardsmen. Offi cers earn the respect of society by success at arms; 

by faithful service in face of death, injury, and hardship; by living up to the 

high ethical standards required of those entrusted with the means of war; and by 

their willingness to direct and care for the men and women in their trust. The 

individual professional identifi es with his or her work and necessarily treats it as 

a high moral calling. This notion of willing self-identifi cation with the offi cer’s 

role may not be coincident with commissioning, but it marks the point at which 

the offi cer truly commits to the notion of being a professional. Until then, he 

or she remains an apprentice. In this sense, working as a professional involves 

responding to diverse and highly contextual problems requiring continued 

delivery of a quality service of a discretionary character. This contrasts 

sharply with the bureaucrat’s routine response by rule to generally similar 

tasks. Application of an educated discretionary judgment is the real skill of the 

professional. 

 This chapter emphasizes a second sense of the concept of a 

professional, the offi cer as a member of a profession, part of a self-conscious 

group of practitioners, pursuing a common calling and practicing under a 

collective compact with the nation and each other.6 The nation allows the 

membership of a profession a high degree of autonomy in recruitment, training, 

and performance. In return, the profession accepts, collectively, the obligation 

to assure the competence and ethical conduct of its practitioners, to advance the 

knowledge of their calling, to train and indoctrinate candidates for membership, 

and to develop their members throughout their careers. It is with the military 

services, organizations established in law, that the government, the constitutional 

client, establishes the jurisdiction of the profession(s) and the boundaries 

that govern individual practice.7

 For the offi cer, “the meaning of meritorious 

soldiering is determined by the practices and traditions of the professional 

community he joins.”8

 The wide discretion in the performance of professional 

duties granted the armed forces by the American people, through their elected 

representatives, underscores the trust placed in the membership to do what is 

right in all circumstances. When the profession is seen to fall short, the extent 

of its autonomy is generally reduced, or competitors assume its authority or 

jurisdiction.9

 For this reason, status as a professional and membership in a 

profession are both necessary perspectives on the nature of offi cership. The 

essence of being an armed forces offi cer cannot be understood without both 

concepts.

 The notion of the professional offi cer in the fi rst sense is an old one. 

George Washington insisted on professional conduct by his subordinates when 
23

man and later as commander in chief of the Continental army.10 American 

reference to the military as a learned profession, similar to medicine, law, or 

the clergy, can be found in the Atlantic Magazine as early as the 1820s.11 It is 

possible to see the notion of the professional offi cer at least as far back as the 

Roman centurions, long-service men selected for authority. Polybius says: 

Not so much ... the daring or fi reeating type, but rather men who are 

natural leaders and possess a stable and imperturbable temperament, 

not men who will open the battle and launch attacks, but those who will 

stand their ground even when worsted or hard-pressed, and will die in 

defence of their posts.12

 The specialized knowledge defi ning the offi cer changes over time, as 

do the circumstances in which it must be applied. The content of that knowledge 

involves the practical and abstract knowledge necessary for disciplined and 

purposeful direction and leadership of military forces and the management of 

violence, normally for political ends. Modern armed forces, of course, have 

many offi cers who do not engage the enemy directly, or at all. Because the 

consequences of institutional failure are so devastating to the nation, all armed 

forces offi cers subscribe to the war-fi ghting ethic of an indomitable will to 

succeed, even those whose specialty does not involve direct combat.

 

 Society’s respect for the professional offi cer is conditioned on reliable, 

ethical, and effective performance of duty. As General William T. Sherman 

warned offi cers attending the new School of Application for Infantry and 

Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth in October 1882:

No other profession holds out to the worthy so certain a reward for 

intelligence and fi delity, no people on earth so generously and willingly 

accord to the soldier the most exalted praise for heroic conduct in 

action, or for long and faithful service, as do the people of the United 

States; nor does any other people so overwhelmingly cast away those 

who fail at the critical moment, or who betray their trusts.13

 One need look no further than the public outcry to ethical crises at 

the nation’s service academies, or instances when offi cers are found to have 

betrayed the public trust or been derelict in their duties, to confi rm Sherman’s 

words. 

 Technical competence in the employment of force or the management 

of violence is the particular expectation of professional offi cers. Throughout 

a career, armed forces offi cers apply this specialized knowledge and skill 

creatively to solve unique practical problems, the resolutions of which are of 

importance to society. This requires development of leadership, as well as more 
24

A. Marshall wrote of two major roles of the armed forces offi cer—“as a leader 

of men, and as a logical, effi cient member of the Nation’s defense team.”14 

The fi rst is predicated on possessing individual skills of human motivation 

and direction, the ability to infl uence other men and women to cooperate 

in a common endeavor, even at risk of life. The second involves individual 

mastery of the progressively more complex technical and abstract skills of war 

fi ghting, as well as in the several departmental functions assigned to the service 

secretaries and listed in Title 10, U.S. Code—recruiting, organizing, supplying, 

equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and 

maintaining the nation’s armed forces.15 Most offi cers will spend a signifi cant 

part of their professional careers engaged in these strictly departmental 

functions, which place their own unique demands on the offi cer’s professional 

expertise. 

 For the military professional, like medical and legal peers, mastery 

of a special skill is both the basis of professional authority and the source of a 

continuing moral imperative. It is the basis of authority because, in exchange 

for reliable accomplishment in war fi ghting, society is willing to defer to the 

military offi cer’s professional expertise on many matters. This acknowledgment 

of an asymmetry of knowledge and ability between the layman and professional 

is the basis of the moral imperative for developing and maintaining excellence 

in technique. Failure to deliver quality in any professional service, be it in the 

provision of legal advice, medical care, or effective leadership in battle, infl icts 

a high cost on society. In the armed forces, failure involves the very security 

of the nation and the lives of the nation’s sons and daughters. These sons and 

daughters are placed in the care and direction of commissioned leaders in trust 

that their units will enter battle as prepared as humanly possible and that they 

will be employed in the wisest manner to achieve the nation’s purposes at least 

cost in blood and treasure. Development of the necessary knowledge and skills 

to live up to this trust requires a lifetime of individual study, training, and long 

practice by every offi cer. 

 The armed forces offi cer is presumed to have special skills essential to 

the successful conduct of battle, operations (purposeful sequences of battles), 

and campaigns. At the junior offi cer level, these tasks require the teaching skills 

to train subordinates, the executive skills to set performance standards and to 

evaluate their achievement, and the leadership skills to direct execution under 

combat conditions should the unit be committed to battle. A leader must have a 

fundamental knowledge of human nature and master the technical skills required 

to employ and maintain all tools assigned, practically as well as conceptually. 

At higher levels, offi cers are required to know the weapons and systems found 

in or available to their units, to organize training and direct employment of 

subordinate units, and to understand how their roles and missions contribute 

to the purposes of the whole. They are expected to understand and perform 
25

participating in joint operations. The constant fl ux in the conditions of 

professional service, the instruments of combat, and the purposes requiring their 

employment means that the professional is never free from the need to study and 

improve his technique or to develop imaginative problem-solving skills. The 

professional offi cer must be self-aware, self-refl ective, and self-critical to grow 

personally and professionally. 

 The traditional notion of the learned profession involved the possibility 

of a prolonged career. The military career has long since ceased to be a lifetime 

calling, though it remains a vocation that must be worth one’s life. Following 

the Second World War, to provide a younger force and avoid the promotion 

freezes that had followed earlier wars, the military services adopted “up or out” 

selection systems designed to cull the least successful offi cers at each promotion 

step allowing for a more pyramidal hierarchical structure for the services. 

This institutional practice insures a constant fl ow of promotion for those who 

remain and produces a highly competitive system in which everything an offi cer 

does weighs in seniors’ evaluation of his or her potential for future service as 

compared to peers. 

 A level of competition can be healthy for a profession to the extent 

it inspires individual members to perform at their highest capability. At the 

same time, competitive selection leads in some cases to egregious careerism 

and such behavior is sometimes rewarded. Offi cers must balance their desire 

for promotion with the needs of their service, their personal ambitions, and, of 

course, the welfare of their families. It is reasonable for offi cers to be savvy 

about the nature of the competition in which they are engaged. Not all postings 

are equal before selection boards and even the most selfl ess offi cer must be 

aware of the practical requirements of his or her chosen career path. Ethical 

offi cers will compete responsibly for the positions that enhance careers and they 

will keep in mind what the costs of climbing to the top of the tree are not worth.

 True professionals give their best effort to whatever task they are 

assigned and allow the future to take care of itself. The ideal of uniformed 

service is the collective striving toward a common goal by engaged individuals 

unencumbered by concerns of individual credit or reward. Those who share 

hardship and danger develop a rare sense of camaraderie, which often lasts a 

lifetime and mitigates much of the inconvenience of service. Most offi cers fi nd 

the shared nature of military service rewarding. Beyond individual reward or 

status, they value the engagement with similarly motivated peers, superiors, 

and subordinates in a common and challenging enterprise of great worth to 

the nation. Often those individuals with whom one serves become the most 

instructive teachers and most inspiring role models. 

 This ideal of collective striving, then, leads to the notion of offi cers 

not only as professionals but as members of an honored profession. Whereas 
26

abilities, and skills, professions are exclusive, self-conscious, functional 

collectivities or subcultures entrusted by society to perform or regulate 

performance of important functions.16 The Congress charters the armed forces 

to select, develop, and socialize their members and to certify their leadership. 

The services operate sophisticated educational institutions to develop new 

professional knowledge and to train and educate their leaders, particularly 

offi cers, progressively throughout their careers. As offi cers move through 

basic, intermediate, and senior level education, their professional horizons 

extend in breadth and depth to prepare them for the next level of institutional 

responsibility. As professionals, individual offi cers share the responsibility for 

their education with the institution and are expected to expand their expertise 

on the job and on their own through continuous self-study. Members of the 

profession apply their particular skills individually, according to standards 

enforced in some way by the group. Armed forces offi cers protect their status 

as members of an honored profession by refusing to tolerate practices by fellow 

members that violate the public trust or norms of the profession. 

 Professional standards extend beyond simple practice or direction of 

the common craft to maintenance of a high degree of personal integrity in all 

dealings, public and private. The enabling legislation of the three principal 

service departments contains an explicit requirement that: “All commanding 

offi cers and others in authority ... are required to show in themselves a good 

example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination. ....17 When members 

of the profession are seen to fail in their responsibility for self-policing, society 

withdraws its trust and the profession’s autonomy suffers. In addition to 

maintaining high standards of personal and professional conduct, the American 

armed forces accept a special public trust in caring for the service members 

under their charge, fi rst, because the young men and women they lead are 

the most valuable resource of the nation they serve, and second, because, 

individually, each service member is or will become a fellow citizen. 

 Members of the armed forces recognize each other as fellow 

professionals, according each other, on the basis of their common qualifi cations 

and good character, mutual respect and dignity. There are no second-class 

members in the profession of arms. All the brothers [and sisters] are brave.18 

Offi cers must be concerned, fair, and just to all service members. Professional 

offi cers do not engage in gossip or publicly disparage other offi cers, other 

units, and other service members. They must be particularly circumspect and 

self-disciplined in their treatment and attitude toward members of other races 

and gender. The armed forces are institutions founded on diversity. Combat 

readiness depends upon the full participation and contribution of every member, 

and every member has a right to expect fair and just treatment and reward. 

 Each service is to some extent a distinct profession framed largely by 

its unique history and distinct functions. Military action, involving employing 
27

signifi cant infl uence, shaping the several service cultures and affecting how the 

general obligations of military service are observed. The different technical 

requirements involved in each medium militate against complete unifi cation 

of the separate services. Still, in the late 1980s, the armed forces began to 

develop some paraphernalia of a distinct specialist profession for joint service 

offi cers, offi cers drawn from the various commissioning services to serve in 

joint headquarters and staff. Among these were joint doctrine, joint education 

facilities, and joint journals dedicated to extending professional knowledge of 

joint and combined operations. Offi cers in joint establishments must be able 

to draw on the individual capabilities of all the services to create innovative 

synergies, unique and responsive to each particular situation. Thorough 

knowledge of their parent service is essential, as is the concomitant obligation of 

their oath and commission to rise above departmental parochialism in service of 

the whole. This, of course, is equally an obligation of all offi cers.

 Membership in a profession does not mitigate the offi cer’s individual 

obligations and responsibilities. It does add responsibilities to maintain the 

standards by which the whole is judged by the client, the American people: to be 

alert to departures from the norms of professional conduct and to take positive 

action when they are observed; to participate in the creation and exchange of 

new knowledge in professional journals and in service and joint doctrine; and 

to play a role in the training and socialization of the successor generation. It is 

in the nature of professions that the entire body is often held accountable for the 

failings of the few.

 Legitimate behavior by members of the armed forces acting as a 

profession is conditioned by the primary individual loyalty of its membership 

to the Constitution and to the principle of civilian control. On the one hand, 

the professional is obliged to provide all leaders of government dispassionate 

expert advice on legitimate matters of professional expertise. On the other, the 

offi cer is bound to do so within the limits imposed by the Constitutional position 

of the president as commander in chief. Just as junior offi cers are expected 

to give their full support to seniors’ decisions once announced, offi cers, in the 

name of the profession, must not intrude on the prerogatives of the commander 

in chief, nor, simultaneously, on those of the Congress to decide on issues of 

organization and regulation. That rule holds, even when the decisions made 

confl ict with what offi cers consider professionally desirable, are contrary to the 

popular views of the moment, or, often and more painfully, when the leaders 

of the two branches of government differ and the military member fi nds him or 

herself in between. Having rendered their candid expert judgment, professionals 

are bound by their oath to execute legal civilian decisions as effectively as 

possible—even those with which they fundamentally disagree—or they must 

request relief from their duties, or leave the service entirely, either by resignation 

or retirement. Where this is not possible, the offi cer must fi nd his or her own 
28

the “little ... little, area ... where I must rule myself.”19 And they must be sure 

enough and honest enough, to live with the consequences for the rest of their 

lives.

 Professions gained prominence as corporate entities in the last half of 

the nineteenth century as part of the general process of industrial and societal 

rationalization. The seminal work on the nature of the American profession 

of arms is still Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, a book written 

in the mid-twentieth century.20 As late as the 1980s, Huntington’s depiction 

of the profession as a self-conscious collectivity, carrying out a special type 

of vocation, characterized by its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, 

seemed sound. The American military sustained a sense of corporate identity 

built around a unique body of knowledge, increasingly specialized and esoteric, 

not least attributable to the increased complexity of modern warfare. Practical 

experience and theoretical study in a system of professional schools run by 

experienced professionals, each with its various research and publishing arms, 

indoctrinated the leadership with a common way of viewing the military 

problem. The professions also created new knowledge and abandoned outdated 

concepts to keep the services in tune with changing requirements of national 

security. 

 By the late 1980s, the world was changing with the simultaneous 

breakdown of the Cold War political order and the breakup of the traditional 

civil-industrial model and its replacement by a new kind of industrial and 

professional structure. The coming of instant global communications, the 

Internet, a general trend to specialization and outsourcing in business, the 

attendant jettisoning of the notion of lifetime careers, and subordination of those 

with specialist knowledge to executives whose skills were limited to fi nancial 

management, marked the rise of postindustrial society. This development 

carried with it radical changes in the nature of those callings that heretofore had 

been considered the model professions, none more than the medical profession 

where the rise of managed health care and increased specialization displaced the 

independent physician as the professional ideal. Other claimants of professional 

status also had to adjust. 

 While this social evolution was under way, the strategic situation 

of the Cold War, which permitted a national focus on large-scale continental 

warfare capable of easy extrapolation from the increasingly distant wars of the 

early twentieth century, experienced its own revolutionary turn. International 

terrorism and the conditions that spawn it suddenly became the nation’s primary 

concern. Homeland defense and expeditionary warfare introduced new tasks 

to all armed forces. New means of command and control and new capabilities 

for precision standoff attack had to be accommodated. Functions, traditionally 

part of the service repertoire and upon which military success depends, to 
29

combat zones, on or near the battlefi eld, by civilians from other government 

agencies, and by civilian contractors, some of whom were former military 

members. Today very junior offi cers fi nd themselves required to infl uence 

actions by a variety of civilians not subject to their command and to perform 

even minor tactical tasks in full view of a judgmental global media. Service 

cultures and professional identities could not remain unaffected, and the scope 

of these fi nal changes has raised signifi cant legal, moral, and ethical issues 

society, government, and the international community will have to address. All 

these developments put new stress on the Huntingtonian model of the military 

profession.

 Still, the core task of the profession of arms—to win the nation’s battles 

and campaigns and to sustain the peace—remains unchanged. However the 

military profession reshapes itself to accommodate the changing conditions of 

the twenty-fi rst century, certain characteristics are likely to remain constant. 

Winning the nation’s battles and campaigns will remain the central professional 

preoccupation of all the offi cers in all the armed forces. The individual 

obligations of the commissioning oath and the commission are unchanged 

and are likely to remain so. Commissioned military service, for however 

long, continues to require a total commitment to serve and a formal and 

genuine subordination of self to the needs of the nation for the duration of the 

career. The nation, the members of the profession, and the military institution 

will continue to demand observation of the values of technical competence, 

excellence, respect, loyalty, duty, courage, and personal integrity because 

they remain essential to the accomplishment of the military mission. Offi cers 

will continue to be marked by the requirement to maintain and upgrade their 

special skills throughout their careers. They will be called upon to create new 

knowledge and new forms of practice as the world around them and the nature 

of the military problem continues to evolve. They will continue to provide 

effi cient service as members of the defense bureaucracy and effective service 

as armed professionals. When these two sets of values appear to be in confl ict, 

military professionals will seek balance in the best interests of the nation. 

Effi ciency and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive terms.

 In 1980, Herman Wouk refl ected on the nature of military service, 

trying to come to grips with the loss at sea of a Navy pilot he knew who died 

during a training fl ight. Wouk captured the timeless essence of professional 

military service.

But what did Butch Williams do with his death—this wonderful 

fi ghter, this fi rst class man who I believe would have been an important 

American leader, military and possibly more than military? What did 

he achieve with this accidental death in routine operations?
30

of the highest excellence submerged himself, his life, in this big 

destructive machine which is our solace and our protection, knowing 

full well that whether he fl ew combat missions or routine operations 

he was at risk. He gave up all the high-priced opportunities in this rich 

country ... and he served.21

1 General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan, 

1983), 220.

2 See Manual for Courts Martial, Article 90, Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior 

commissioned offi cer and compare it to Article 91, Insubordinate conduct toward warrant 

offi cer, noncommissioned offi cer or petty offi cer.

3 In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890). cited as precedent by Chief Justice Renquist 

in Parker, Warden, et al., v. Levy, 417 U.S., 733 (1974).

4 U. S. Department of Defense. The Armed Forces Offi cer (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Offi ce, 1950), 2. Hereinafter, The Armed Forces Offi cer, (1950). 

5 “A loss of respect,” The Spectator (17 April 2004), 7.

6 The profession in this sense is a sociological construct developed in the early twentieth 

century to address work patterns that did not conform to the industrial model. The 

seminal work on the military profession remains Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier 

and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1957). Allan R. Millett, a historian at Ohio State’s Mershon 

Center produced a fairly exhaustive overview of the literature on the concept of a 

military profession in Allan R. Millett, Military Professionalism and Offi cership in 

America, Mershon Center Briefi ng Paper, No. 2 ([Columbus, OH]: Ohio State University, 

1977). See also, Allan R. Millett, “Introduction,” The General: Robert L. Bullard and 

Offi cership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 

1975), 3-15.

7 Title 10, U.S. Code. Implements Congressional authority to raise and support armies 

and provide for a Navy.

8 Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline & the Law of War (New 

Brunswick, CT: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 17.

9 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor

(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

10 Don Higginbotham, “Washington and the Colonial Military Tradition,” in George 

Washington Reconsidered, Don Higginbotham, ed. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press 

of Virginia, 2001), 48. See also Glenn A. Phelps, “The Republican General,” in ibid., 

165-197.

11 “Lectures of Chancellor Kent,” Atlantic Magazine, 1 (June 1824): 148-149. 

Chancellor Kent was a legal commentator of the period.

12 Polybius, The Rise of The Roman Empire, Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. (Harmondsworth, 

UK: Penguin Books, 1979), 322.

13 General William T. Sherman, “Address To The Offi cers and Soldiers Composing the 

School of Application at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 25, 1882,” available at the 

Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

14 U.S. Department of Defense, “Foreword,” The Armed Forces Offi cer, reprint ed. 

([Washington, DC]: Offi ce of Armed Forces Information and Education, 1960), ii.
31

(Secretary of the Navy), and 8013 (Secretary of the Air Force). 

16 A summary of the literature defi ning the military as a profession in this sense can be 

found in Millett, Military Professionalism and Offi cership in America, 1977.

17 Title 10, Section 5947 (Navy); Section 3583 (Army); Section 8583 (Air Force).

18 Paraphrase: COL Leonard D. Holder, Commander, 2nd Army Cavalry Regiment, Gulf 

War (1991), quoted in Michael D. Krause, The Battle of 73 Easting; 26 February 1991: 

A Historical Introduction to a Simulation, Washington, DC: A Joint Project of The Center 

for Military History and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (18 June 1991), 

10.

19 Thomas More in Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons: A Play in Two Acts (New York: 

Random House, 1960), 59.

20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of CivilMilitary Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). 

21 Herman Wouk, “Sadness and Hope; Some Thoughts on Modern Warfare,” The Naval 

War College Review (Winter, 1998 – reprinted from September-October, 1980), on-line, 

Internet, 19 May 2004, available from http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/

winter/art13w98.htm.
32
33

Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation

By their oaths, members of the armed forces are defenders of the Constitution 

and servants of the nation. But theirs is a particular kind of Constitution and a 

unique kind of nation. The Constitution, with its Bill of Rights, is a compact of 

a self-governing people, providing for a framework of government by consent 

to complete work begun with an earlier statement of democratic principles, the 

Declaration of Independence. The Declaration’s assertion of unalienable rights 

established early on the spirit in which the rules of the Constitution would be 

administered: 

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 

that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 

that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. —That 

to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 

their just powers from the consent of the governed. 1

 The Constitution made implicit the principle of military subordination 

to civil authority, in recognition of the ultimate source of political sovereignty 

asserted in the Declaration of Independence. At the same time, it established 

the spirit that would govern the discipline of the American armed forces. 

General Washington emphasized military subordination to civil authority in 

his scrupulous deference to the Continental Congress in his role as military 

commander. The Declaration of Independence articulated the political 

expectations of the Soldiers Washington sought to turn into a disciplined regular 

force to serve the revolutionary effort. Both democratic expectations are as 

valid today as they were at the beginning of our nation.

 In a famous military anecdote, Major General Friedrich Baron von 

Steuben, the Prussian drill master who transformed the rag-tag Continental 

army into an organized, disciplined fi ghting force at Valley Forge, captured an 

important trait of American Soldiers in a letter to an old European comrade: “In 

the fi rst place, the genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with 

that of Prussians, Austrians, and French. You say to your soldier, ‘Do this, and 

he doeth it’; but I am obliged to say, This is the reason why you ought to do this 

and that: and then he does it.”2

 Like their revolutionary counterparts, today’s 

Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and Airmen, must understand 

not only what they must do, but why they must do it. With this in mind, the 

rest of this chapter explores the concepts behind the phrase, “Defender of the 

Constitution and Servant of the Nation.”

 The concept of being a “servant” is uncomfortable to most Americans. 

The word conjures an image of forced obedience, of slavery, or of menial 
34

makes a voluntary choice to serve the nation, to place the nation’s interests 

ahead of his or her personal desires. It is this voluntary commitment that forms 

the core of the oath of offi ce, the solemn pledge to support and defend the 

Constitution of the United States. American offi cers embrace the concept of 

“service before self.” 

 Offi cers in the United States armed forces swear to uphold the ideals 

and obligations embedded in our nation’s Constitution, laws, and elected 

representatives. With the oath of offi ce as an anchor, offi cers agree to serve the 

country by fulfi lling their duties to the best of their ability and to be loyal, not 

only to military superiors and branch of service, but to constitutionally elected 

and empowered leaders and, by implication, to the citizens of our great country. 

Offi cers view this concept of service with pride. Instead of menial domestics, 

they view themselves as “Servants of the Nation,” who commit their lives to 

serve a cause greater than themselves. They must trust willingly the judgment of 

elected offi cials and their fellow citizens. In this, offi cers pledge their abilities, 

their honor, and, when necessary, their lives. Offi cers subordinate themselves 

to civilian control, not as mere servants, but servant-leaders who set the 

example for their troops. Three historical examples further explain the chapter’s 

concepts: the actions of General George Washington at Newburgh in 1783, 

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War in 1950-1951, 

and Major John Key during the Civil War in 1862.

 Throughout his command of the Continental Army, Washington 

exhibited great deference to the position of the Continental Congress. No 

incident illustrated his stand better, however, than one that came at the end of 

the war, when victory had been assured. In 1783, two years after the victory at 

Yorktown, General Washington provided the defi ning example of a “Servant of 

the Nation.” 

 As the Continental army began to disband, many offi cers faced a 

bleak future. Various states rejected legislation to provide adequate pensions 

and many offi cers had lost their property and personal wealth during the long 

Revolutionary War. These disheartened, disgruntled offi cers approached General 

Washington to lead the army to rectify their grievances; in the words of one, to 

use bayonets “to procure justice to itself.”3

 Washington rejected the idea of a 

military coup in a letter and spoke in a surprise visit to his assembled offi cers 

at their fi nal encampment near Newburgh, New York. When his prepared 

words failed to quiet the gathering, Washington pulled a letter from his pocket 

to read in one last attempt. He stared at the letter in confusion and anxiety, and 

then pulled from his pocket something only a few had ever seen him use—a 

pair of glasses, stating, “Gentlemen, . . . you will permit me to put on my 

spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my 

country.”4

 This simple act broke the opposition. As old comrades wept, George 
35

closing remarks: 

And let me conjure you, in the name of our common Country, as you 

value your own sacred honor, as you respect the rights of humanity, 

and as you regard the Military and National character of America, to 

express your utmost horror and detestation of the Man who wishes, 

under any specious pretences, to overturn the liberties of our Country, 

and who wickedly attempts to open the fl ood Gates of Civil discord, 

and deluge our rising Empire in Blood.5 

In maintaining the subordination of the Army to civilian authority, Washington 

inspired generations of American offi cers as the classic example an offi cer as the 

“Servant of the Nation.”6

 Somewhat more than a century and a half later, at the end of World War 

II, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur appeared to most Americans as the 

ideal “Defender of the Constitution.” Renowned for his courageous defense of 

the Philippines, daring escape from Corregidor, and brilliant “island-hopping” 

campaign to outmaneuver and outfi ght the Japanese, MacArthur ranked as the 

second most popular man in America.104 Indeed, MacArthur’s signature corn 

cob pipe and crushed, bemedalled service cap created a legendary image, not 

unlike the heroic image of George Washington. Little did the public expect that 

within fi ve years, MacArthur would be embroiled in what some scholars called 

“the gravest and most emotional constitutional crisis” of the twentieth century.8

 According to John W. Spanier, “The issue at stake was no less than 

the continuation of civilian supremacy and of the President’s authority as 

Commander in Chief.”9 The Truman-MacArthur controversy shows that 

defending the Constitution means more than a willingness to risk your life 

in battle. It also entails that the offi cer must subordinate personal political, 

military, strategic, and social views to those of our nation’s elected leadership.

 Even before the Korean War, General MacArthur challenged President 

Harry S. Truman’s leadership. Following the euphoria of victory in World War 

II, the nation rode an emotional roller coaster as harsh realities of an emerging 

Cold War bucked the nation’s psyche. In light of the Iron Curtain, the Berlin 

crisis, the Communist victory in China, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, 

and other events demonstrating the end of the wartime alliance, some Americans 

considered President Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, a political hack, 

both unsuited and unqualifi ed for the awesome responsibilities of the offi ce. 

 In contrast, General Douglas MacArthur’s fl air, rhetorical skills, and 

proven battlefi eld leadership appeared worthy of a great president. MacArthur’s 

benevolent, enlightened rule of occupied Japan further enhanced his presidential 
36

primary ballots in Wisconsin and Nebraska, even while he served in uniform. 

Although MacArthur was never an offi cial candidate and poor primary showings 

proved disappointing, the general remained a popular fi gure and symbol of 

leadership.10 The apparent contrast of unequal personalities—the heroic, 

dazzling MacArthur and the pedestrian, drab Truman—underscored one of the 

major civil-military crises in American history. Like Washington’s behavior 

at Newburgh, the Truman-MacArthur controversy helps defi ne the concepts of 

“Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation.”

 When Communist North Korea launched a sudden, surprisingly 

effective invasion of South Korea in June 1950, Douglas MacArthur returned 

to the limelight as a battle leader. Although stung by early, humiliating defeats, 

American forces rallied, and MacArthur’s reputation soared with a spectacular 

amphibious assault at Inchon that turned the tide of the war. 

 Buoyed by success, General MacArthur made a series of public 

remarks critical of the Truman Administration’s conduct of the war. In a letter 

to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the general, whose strategic responsibilities 

included affairs in China and Taiwan, repudiated the President’s policy to limit 

war to the Korean peninsula and described government offi cials as advocating 

“appeasement and defeatism.”108 Hesitant of rebuking a national hero, the 

president and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) communicated their displeasure 

and attempted to restrain MacArthur’s policy statements in careful, guarded 

memoranda and messages. Apparently undeterred, or perhaps unsure of the 

president’s intent, General MacArthur continued harsh criticism of Truman’s 

strategic policies, in particular with regard to the administration’s attempt to 

fi ght a limited war.

 In October 1950, President Truman met with MacArthur at Wake Island 

to clarify strategic issues and affi rm his role as commander in chief. Skeptics 

thought the unpopular Truman was simply trying to cash in on MacArthur’s 

Inchon success. In their only meeting, MacArthur presented a wide range of 

strategic issues, apologized for his previous remarks, and assured the president 

that a United Nations advance into North Korea would not provoke the 

Communist Chinese into entering the war. After two days of talks, the president 

and his theater commander departed on good terms. President Truman remarked 

to reporters, “There was no disagreement between MacArthur and myself. It 

was a most successful conference.”12

 When a surprise Chinese onslaught smashed American and United 

Nations troops in November, MacArthur called for drastic measures to 

defeat the new enemy. Calling for air attacks against China and Manchuria, 

a naval blockade, the construction of air bases on Formosa, and the addition 

of Nationalist Chinese troops to Allied forces, MacArthur pressured Truman 
37

and a possible third world war. Despite the Wake Island meeting and formal 

guidance from the president and JCS prohibiting unapproved public policy 

statements, MacArthur sent a strong letter to House Minority Leader Joseph 

W. Martin denouncing the administration’s half-hearted conduct of the war.13 

Representative Martin entered the letter into public debate by reading it to 

Congress. General MacArthur’s text directly violated the president’s directives 

and challenged the administration’s policies of restraint with its famous cry that 

“there is no substitute for victory.”14 

 After ineffective attempts to rein in the celebrated general, President 

Truman relieved MacArthur from command on 11 April 1951, with the full 

support of his statutory military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his 

unexpected and unpopular announcement, President Truman stated, “I have, 

therefore, considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there 

would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy. . . 

. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause 

of world peace is more important that any individual.”15

 Although historians debate whether MacArthur intended for 

Representative Martin to publicize his letter, the distinguished Soldier violated 

specifi c orders and the spirit of the commander-in-chief’s guidance. MacArthur 

described his own ideas of what constituted loyalty to the Constitution in a 

speech to the Massachusetts legislature following his dismissal:

I fi nd its existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous 

concept, that the member of our armed forces owe primary allegiance 

or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the 

Executive Branch of the Government rather than to the country and its 

Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be 

more dangerous.16

 On the surface, this statement might seem consistent with “supporting 

and defending” the Constitution, but it is terribly fl awed. It presumes to give to 

the military leader the right or obligation to judge the decisions of his political 

masters. Offi cers do not have this right. Wiser words had been offered 50 years 

before by General John Schofi eld, who observed before Congress, “Nothing 

is more absolutely indispensable to a good soldier than perfect subordination 

and zealous service to him whom the national will may have made the offi cial 

superior for the time being.”17 (Emphasis added.) Distinguished British military 

thinker General Sir John Winthrop Hackett points out that MacArthur’s concept 

violates principles basic to any successful democracy:

That the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its 

expression through the institutions specifi cally established by it—
38

constitution—can be legitimate. 18 

 No individual offi cer, not even a theater commander, possesses the 

right to determine the legitimacy of the president’s positions on national 

policies. Armed forces offi cers must serve loyally all elected offi cials even 

though those offi cials might “temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive 

Branch.” The American offi cer must refrain from individual interpretations 

of the Constitution. To be a “Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the 

Nation,” offi cers must promptly and effectively obey the chain of command, 

regardless of political party or ideological bent. An offi cer’s duty must be to 

implement state policy and to execute without challenge the lawful orders of 

elected leadership, reserving advice for legitimate forums and restricting it to 

matters of professional competence. Offi cers must not publicly question the 

effectiveness or validity of national policy. 

 MacArthur, writes Professor John W. Spanier, “went beyond challenge 

by appealing over the heads of his civilian and military superiors to the 

opposition party in Congress and the American people themselves in an attempt 

to change that policy.”19 This act constituted the heart of a constitutional 

crisis that stands in striking contrast to Washington’s ending of the Newburgh 

conspiracy.

 Washington, of course, was commander in chief of the Continental 

army at the moment of the nation’s birth. MacArthur was a legendary 

commander who had been chief of staff of the Army 10 years before the Second 

World War. What does “Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the 

Nation” mean at less exalted levels of the armed forces? Professor Eliot Cohen 

tells a story of a Major John J. Key, aide-de-camp to General Henry Halleck in 

1862. President Abraham Lincoln cashiered Major Key for saying publicly that 

the object of military operations against the Confederacy intended no more than 

to draw out the war to the point where a compromise peace was possible. At the 

time, General George McClellan, many of his staff offi cers, and the opposition 

Democratic Party held these views. 

 Lincoln dismissed Key, observing: “It is wholly inadmissible for any 

gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such 

sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done.”20 Key’s disgrace, 

which Lincoln never reversed, was based on the president’s belief that Key 

represented some in the Army who were not fully committed to the defense of 

the Constitution and restoration of the sovereignty of the national government. 

By his action the president made clear that total commitment was expected.

 By accepting the commission and swearing the Constitutional oath, 

American offi cers embrace the concept of civilian control of the military and 
39

must strive to be nonpartisan in conduct, speech, and actions, so long as they 

wear the uniform. Toward the end of his life, MacArthur apparently recognized 

his previous errors when he reminded West Point cadets: 

Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, 

which divide men’s minds; but serene, calm, aloof, you stand as 

the nation’s war-guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides 

of international confl ict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle. . . . 

Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of 

government; whether our strength is being sapped by defi cit fi nancing, 

indulged in too long, by federal paternalism grown too mighty, by 

power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by 

crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown 

too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal 

liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. These great 

national problems are not for your professional participation or military 

solution.21

 Although this may be diffi cult advice to follow in today’s world of 

instant access to global communications and news media, it stands even more 

important. The American people trust their commissioned offi cers to carry out 

lawful orders energetically and implement public policies without hesitation. To 

be a “Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation” means that you 

not only protect and obey the laws of our nation, but also the ideals expressed by 

the Declaration of Independence. American offi cers must safeguard the public 

trust in impartial, nonpartisan armed forces through their willing subordination 

and enthusiastic obedience. 

1 “The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies,” on-line, Internet, 4 April 

2004, available from (http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html).

2 John McAuley Palmer, General Von Steuben (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1937), 157.

3 James Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable Man, (Boston: Little, Brown 

and Co., 1974), 171.

4 Ibid., 174.

5 George Washington, “Speech to the Offi cers of the Army,” Headquarters, Newburgh, 13 

March 1783, in George Washington, George Washington: Writings, John H. Rhodehamel, 

ed. (New York: Library of America, 1997), 496-499.

6 Flexner, 174.

7 Public opinion polls showed only fellow West Point graduate and former aide to 

MacArthur, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower more popular. Burton I. 

Kaufman, The Korean Confl ict (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 94.

8 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War 
40

9 Ibid. In fairness, noted historian Professor D. Clayton James argues against the notion 

of a civil-military crisis and instead focuses on failures of command and communication. 

See D. Clayton James, “Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War,” Harmon 

Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 24, United States Air Force Academy, 1982, 

and D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refi ghting the Last War: Command and 

Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993). 

10 Kaufman, Korean Confl ict, 94 and Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, MacArthur, and the 

Korean War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 9.

11 “General Douglas MacArthur’s Letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 17 August 

1950,” in Kaufman, Korean Confl ict, 136. 

12 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers 

(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991), 377; quoted in Wainstock, Truman, 

MacArthur, and the Korean War, 69.

13 On 6 December 1950, the President issued two directives: fi rst, all Americans abroad 

must clear public statement on foreign or military policy through the State Department or 

Defense Department, respectively; second, all personnel must exercise “extreme caution” 

in public statements and refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy 

with the media. James, Refi ghting the Last War, 204, and James, “Command Crisis,” 3.

14 “General Douglas MacArthur’s Letter to House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, 

20 March 1951” in Kaufman, Korean Confl ict, 150. See also, James, Refi ghting the Last 

War, 204-208; James, “Command Crisis,” 3; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur, 4-10; and 

Kaufman, Korean Confl ict, 95-96.

15 “Truman’s Speech Explaining his Decision to Relieve MacArthur of his Command, 11 

April 1951” in Kaufman, Korean Confl ict, 152. 

16 Douglas MacArthur, “War Cannot Be Controlled, It Must Be Abolished,” Vital 

Speeches 17 (15 August 1951), 633, quoted in General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, “The 

Military in Service to the State,” Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 13 

(United States Air Force Academy, CO, 1970), 13.

17 Although little known today, General Schofi eld served as a Civil War Corps 

commander, secretary of the Army, and fi nally Army commanding general. He addressed 

these words to Congress following his retirement. Lieutenant General John M. Schofi eld, 

quoted in Russell F. Weigley, Towards An American Army: Military Thought from 

Washington to Marshall (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974, Columbia University 

Press, 1962, 162.

18 Hackett, “The Military in Service to the State,” 13.

19 Spanier, Truman-MacArthur, 4.

20 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime 

(New York: Free Press, 2002), 39.

21 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, “Address to the Corps of Cadets Upon 

Acceptance of the Sylvanus Thayer Award,” United States Military Academy, West Point, 

New York, 12 May 1962.
41

Character: Nobility of Life and Action

You must know that it is no easy thing for a principle to become a 

man’s own, unless each day he maintain it and hear it maintained, as 

well as work it out in life.

 —Epictetus

 In February 1943, the troopship Dorchester was torpedoed off the coast 

of Greenland. The Coast Guard Cutter Escanaba rushed to the stricken vessel’s 

rescue. The fi rst volunteer swimmer over the side was Ensign Richard A. 

Arrighi, USCGR. Ensign Arrighi entered the frigid, dark, stormy sea repeatedly, 

rescuing countless Soldiers and merchant seamen, quitting only when his crude 

rubber suit became worn and fi lled with water, and he himself had to be hauled 

aboard nearly unconscious and treated for exposure. Ensign Arrighi received 

the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for these heroic efforts in August 1943—

posthumously. His ship, Escanaba, had exploded two months earlier in the 

waters between Labrador and Greenland, most likely from a torpedo attack, with 

the loss of all but two of her crew. Ensign Arrighi’s body was never recovered.

 The rich collective histories of the armed forces include many similar 

stories chronicling one Soldier’s or Sailor’s efforts to save another’s life. The 

unwritten code of “leave no man behind” has driven countless rescue operations, 

often more harrowing than the original mission itself. Many citations 

accompanying the Congressional Medal of Honor describe the fi nal chapter in 

the lives of the brave heroes who perished completing these rescue efforts. This 

warrior-saving-warrior ethos challenges the armed forces offi cer to live a noble 

life worthy of this ultimate measure of dedication.

 Previous chapters have articulated a special honor code required of the 

armed forces offi cer, which includes standards of conduct far more demanding 

than other professions. These lofty canons result in a character worthy of 

America’s trust to lead her sons and daughters into harm’s way and truly 

deserving of a comrade’s ultimate sacrifi ce.

 What is character? What is its role in the unique challenges and charges 

of offi cership? “Leadership,” writes General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “is a 

potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be without one, 

be without strategy.”1

 General Schwarzkopf’s words affi rm that character 

plays a primary role in defi ning good leadership. How, then, is character to be 

defi ned?

 Questions about the existence and development of individual character 
42

about the nature of character and did not always agree about the fundamental 

questions of whether an individual is born with an essential character, or if the 

choices made in daily life shape one’s character. Does character exist apart 

from the actions that manifest its properties? Aristotelian philosophy refl ects a 

common understanding that character, in essence, has no true value outside of 

character in practice: “Aristotle constantly reminds his readers that happiness or 

fulfi llment is activity: it is virtue in action, not virtue unused. And virtue as a 

state of the soul is of value only for the activity which it makes possible.”2

 “Character,” according to Aristotle, “is that which reveals choice, 

shows what sort of thing a man chooses or avoids in circumstances where the 

choice is not obvious, so those speeches convey no character in which there is 

nothing whatever which the speaker chooses or avoids.”3

 One can realize moral 

purpose only through the choices one makes; character in theory has limited 

signifi cance. The choices involved in daily living provide the abstractions with 

a meaningful shape.

 Individuals drawn to careers as offi cers in the armed forces may enter 

with similar foundations on which the services can build; these foundations 

arise from inherent attributes or upbringing. If the American philosopher 

Ralph Waldo Emerson asserts correctly that “No change in circumstance can 

repair a defect in character,” then the character foundation one brings to the 

service must have the strength and solidness essential to bear the weight of the 

responsibility the profession requires from its members.4

 Moral crisis can be 

avoided if the offi cer remains in constant and vigilant pursuit of the character 

ideals that successful military leaders must possess. Associated with excellence 

in character since ancient times, the Greek concept of Aretè provides useful 

insights when defi ning character. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defi nes 

Aretè as:

... excellence, i.e. a quality that the possession of which either 

constitutes the possessor as or causes it to be, a good instance of its 

kind. Thus sharpness is an Aretè of a knife, strength an Aretè of a 

boxer, etc. Since in order to be a good instance of its kind an object 

normally has to possess several excellences, the term may designate 

each of those excellences severally or the possession of them all 

together—overall or total excellence.5

 The ancient defi nition of Aretè retains its value today. Just as Homer’s 

Odysseus negotiated the treacherous terrain of his world by relying on character 

as much as strategy, offi cers must make the right choices and develop the 

necessary qualities to face the many temptations to compromise. The armed 

forces offi cer can look directly to the core values of each branch of the service to 

understand the qualities or virtues that all offi cers must possess to achieve Aretè. 
43

devotion to duty, service, loyalty, excellence, courage, and integrity. These 

qualities are like the sharpness of the offi cer’s sword; the offi cer must develop 

and maintain them to serve and lead effectively—and to remain worthy of the 

risks taken by comrades in arms. 

Honor: In its simplest and purest form, honor is a compelling moral 

motivation to do the right thing at the right time. Failure to adhere to one’s own 

sense of honor is the wellspring of guilt and the source of shame. An ancient 

virtue and the very soul of offi cership, honor involves a conscious concept of 

high ethical conduct, moral behavior, honesty, integrity, and trust. 

 Respect: Respect is the positive regard one person evidences for the 

shared humanity of another. “[I]n relation to those under his command, [the 

naval offi cer] should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, fi rmness, and charity.”6 

Respect is often the least discussed but most important value in leadership. 

Respect of the leader for the led inevitably earns a corresponding response. 

Like most concepts of character, respect is often diffi cult to defi ne; however, it 

is readily evident when it is observed. Its antithesis, “disrespect,” is even more 

recognizable. Mutual respect is the foundation of teamwork. The best guidance 

on respect remains the Golden Rule: Treat others as you would have them treat 

you.

 Duty: Duty is a moral obligation to place accomplishment of the 

assigned task or responsibility before all personal needs and apprehensions. At 

the extreme end of the spectrum of the tasks assigned are those missions that 

may require the ultimate level of devotion to duty: to lay down one’s life for his 

or her country.

 Service: The offi cer is the servant of the nation. Service implies 

subordination and selfl essness. Service entails dedicating one’s very life to 

something higher and more important than one’s own gratifi cation.

 Excellence: Excellence is a deep-seated personal passion for 

continuous improvement, innovation, and exemplary results in all endeavors. 

Excellence is fundamental to offi cership. Unwavering attention to detail and 

fervor for the extraordinary in every aspect of conduct and performance must be 

the integral fi ber that binds an offi cer’s character. 

 Courage: Courage is the will to act rightly in the face of physical, 

personal or professional danger, or adversity. Courage, physical and moral, is 

inseparably linked to the warrior ethos and the profession of arms. Selfl ess acts 

by brave men and women, using their tools and their wits to get the job done 

under very dangerous, sometimes deadly conditions are the very foundation of 

the military culture. While bravery, valor, or gallantry under fi re is the facet of 
44

to require moral courage than the willingness to face certain death in combat. 

The fortitude required to consistently do the right thing in spite of personal 

considerations is far more diffi cult than dramatic acts of heroism. Admiral 

James Stockdale, who has reason to know, writes, quoting Epictetus, “Refuse 

to want to fear, and you start acquiring a constancy of character that makes it 

impossible for another to do you wrong.”7

 Stockdale’s words refl ect the need 

to conquer the circumstances that by design or accident threaten to fracture 

the honor, integrity, and devotion to duty essential to an offi cer’s character and 

self-respect. Unchallenged maintenance of the lofty core values and concepts 

recorded on these pages is not effortless; courage is required when risk and 

personal harm stand in the way. 

 Commitment: Commitment is total dedication to success. “In 

whatever we do, we do the very best we can—every single time.” This 

unoffi cial motto of the Coast Guard captures the effort and focus demanded 

in an offi cer’s character. From the many extra hours necessary to maintain 

physical and mental fi tness, to the internal fortitude required to overcome 

what may appear to be insurmountable odds, offi cership demands unwavering 

determination, not only to succeed, but to excel! 

 

Loyalty: “Loyalty means a true, willing, and unfailing devotion to a 

cause. It is closely akin to unselfi shness. It entails the complete elimination of 

our own personal likes and dislikes, hopes, desires, and interests in order that 

the common cause may triumph.”8

 Loyalty is bearing true faith and allegiance 

to the Constitution. Loyalty is unfailing attachment or steadfastness not only 

to a cause but also to those who share engagement in its pursuit, subordinates, 

superiors, and peers. Like respect, loyalty is reciprocal. It is based on mutual 

trust and regard. Where it is found, it is returned.

Integrity: “Personal integrity also means moral integrity. Regardless 

of what appears to be some superfi cial ideas of present-day conduct, 

fundamentally, today as always, the [individual] who is genuinely respected 

is the [one] who keeps [his or her] moral integrity sound and is trustworthy 

in every respect.”9

 In 1946, General of the Air Force Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 

wrote these words in response to a request for advice. The general articulates 

a timeless and essential truth for every armed forces offi cer. Of the virtues and 

qualities drawn from the services’ core values, perhaps integrity best captures 

and summarizes the essence of offi cership. “Integrity is a character trait. It is 

willingness to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is the “moral 

compass”—the inner voice; the voice of self-control; the basis for the trust 

imperative in today’s military.”10 Integrity refers to holding oneself to a strict 

moral code in word and deed, a code that forms the foundation for all interaction 

with subordinates, peers, and superiors alike. It is also the place where 

the old adage, “lead by example,” reaches its zenith. “Walking the talk” is 
45

what one does. Any sign of hypocrisy will be swiftly, certainly, and harshly 

judged. The root of the word integrity is the Latin adjective integer, meaning 

whole. Integrity in a general sense means soundness, completeness, wholeness 

—all aspects of ones life fi t together, complementing one another without 

contradiction. When what we do matches what we think, how we believe, 

and what we say, the outcome is an integrated whole—that whole is integrity. 

Integrity is essential to the core of an offi cer’s character. 

 These positive values also instruct through opposition. Their negatives 

reveal the character fl aws that offi cers must never ignore or about which they 

must never grow complacent. Dishonor, disrespect, apathy, laziness, mediocrity, 

cowardice, and disloyalty in an offi cer have an insidious effect on the service 

and the nation, corrupting purpose and threatening security. Identifying, then 

mitigating character fl aws is an essential and continuous ritual. The armed 

forces offi cer serves as a national public fi gure representing the ethos of 

heroism in our times. “Service before self” echoes the guiding principle that 

true strength emerges from the transcendence of individual ego and in the 

incorporation of the spirit of the whole into one’s own character.

 The profession of arms demands constant self-awareness, selfrefl ection, and self- criticism of the times and places when better choices should 

have been made. Self-awareness plays a crucial role in character development. 

Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak states, 

“Sound morals and ethical behavior cannot be established or created in a 

day ... they must be institutionalized within our character over time.”11 By 

viewing character development as a lifetime pursuit, offi cers maintain their 

commitment to Aretè, or total excellence, even when faced with ever-changing 

environments, challenges, and risks. Chief Justice Earl Warren explained, “The 

man of character, sensitive to the meaning of what he is doing, will know how to 

discover the ethical paths in the maze of possible behaviors.”12 The maze may 

change, but the commitment to the ethical path must remain constant.

 If, as Thomas Paine asserts, “Character is much easier kept than 

recovered,”13 then it becomes essential for the armed forces offi cer to remain 

vigilant against threats to personal integrity. In his letter of instructions to the 

commanding offi cers of the revenue cutters, Alexander Hamilton describes the 

ideal qualities and conduct for offi cers in contrast with the potential weaknesses:

While I recommend in the strongest terms to the respective offi cers, 

activity, vigilance, and fi rmness, I feel no less solicitude, that their 

deportment may be marked with prudence, moderation, and good 

temper ... [a]lways keep in mind that [your] countrymen are free 

men, and as such, are impatient of everything that bears the least mark 

of a domineering spirit ... therefore, refrain, with the most guarded 
46

rudeness, or insult ... [e]ndeavor to overcome diffi culties, if any are 

experienced, by a cool and temperate perseverance in ... duty—by 

address and moderation, rather than by vehemence and violence.14

 Haughtiness, rudeness, and violence in temperament cannot be 

tolerated because these fl aws in behavior and attitude weaken character. 

In classical narrative, a hero has a character fl aw, which must be overcome. 

This struggle for self-mastery drives the plot forward and appeals to readers, 

who may not possess the same fl aw but identify with the universal struggle to 

master one’s weaknesses. In classical drama, the hero often falls because of 

excessive pride or hubris. Armed forces offi cers must be vigilant against the 

weaknesses to which those granted power and public trust become vulnerable. 

They must guard against feelings of entitlement and privilege. A commanding 

offi cer has absolute authority and responsibility for the command and its 

mission. The enticement to assume entitlement and privilege can easily become 

overwhelming—especially when one wields the power of life and death. 

 Demonstrating strength in character may involve making unpopular 

choices. Concerns about reputation cannot infl uence an offi cer’s decisions. 

Faith and moral courage allow an offi cer to pursue the path most consistent 

with the core values of the service. According to Roman philosopher Cicero, 

“Our character is not so much the product of race and heredity as of those 

circumstances by which nature forms our habits, by which we are nurtured and 

live.”15

 The spirit of Cicero’s words echo in the famous line from Dr. Martin 

Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech: “I have a dream that my four little 

children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color 

of their skin, but by the content of their character.”16 The twenty-fi rst century 

armed forces offi cer leads the most diverse crews and units in U.S. history. 

Men and women of different racial, ethnic, socio-economic, and religious 

backgrounds join together to serve and desire the opportunity to be judged “by 

the content of their character.” To lead effectively, armed forces offi cers must 

strive to understand and embrace diversity. They must strive to incorporate 

the essential respect into their own character development and root out the 

assumptions or biases that would impede their leadership capabilities.

 The nobility of life that actualizes good character is not always defi ned 

by actions that bring renown. When poet William Wordsworth refers to “the 

best portion of a good man’s life,/ His little, nameless, unremembered, acts/ 

Of kindness and of love,” he suggests the goodness or strength in character 

that one demonstrates through the small acts equal a well-lived life.17 Through 

these acts, the spirit nourishes itself and needs no further recognition. These 

acts remain “nameless” in that no one recognizes them, even the individual who 
47

character strengthens in its resolve and becomes better able to face the more 

formidable tests.

 The most formidable evidence of a leader’s character comes not from 

an offi cer’s own actions, but reveals itself through the brave, selfl ess acts of 

those Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Seamen, and Coast Guardsmen they lead: 

“The true test of a leader is whether his followers will adhere to his cause from 

their own volition, enduring the most arduous hardships without being forced to 

do so, and remaining steadfast in the moments of greatest peril.” (Xenophon).18

 At the dedication of the 5th Marine Division Cemetery on Iwo Jima, 

Chaplain (Rabbi) Roland B. Gittelsohn, USN, spoke these powerful words:

THIS DO WE MEMORIALIZE those who, having ceased living with 

us, now live within us. Thus do we consecrate ourselves, the living, to 

carry on the struggle they began. Too much blood has gone into this 

soil for us to let it lie barren. Too much pain and heartache have fertilized the earth on which we stand. We here solemnly swear: this shall 

not be in vain. Out of this, and from the suffering and sorrow of those 

who mourn this, will come—we promise—the birth of a new freedom 

for the sons of men everywhere. AMEN19

To develop one’s character diligently and passionately as an armed forces offi cer 

involves living a life that respects and redeems perpetually those brave men and 

women who have served before and who have paid the ultimate price for our 

freedom and the honor and dignity of your uniform.

1 General Norman Schwartzkopf, quoted in Quotes for the Air Force Logistician, Beth 

F. Scott et al., eds., (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Agency, 

September 2001), 46, on-line, Internet, 29 April 2004, available from http://www.afl ma.

hq.af.mil/lgj/Quotes%20for%20the%20Air%20Force%20Logistician.pdf. 

2 Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 57.

3 Aristotle, Poetics, on-line, Internet, 29 April 2004, available from Gregory R. Crane, 

ed., The Perseus Project, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Po

et.+1450b.

4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays and English Traits, vol. 5, The Harvard Classics (New 

York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14), 6, on-line, Internet, 29 April 2004, available from 

http://www.bartleby.com/5/111.html. 

5 Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1995), 47.

6 John Paul Jones, “Extract from a Letter from John Paul Jones to the Naval Committee 

of Congress, 14 September 1775,” quoted in Augustus C. Buell, “Paul Jones, the Founder 

of America’s Navy: a History,” in Naval Leadership (Annapolis, MD: United States 

Naval Institute, 1939), xv.
48

(United States Naval Academy, 2001), 18-19.

8 Buell, Naval Leadership, 9-10.

9 Gen H. H. Arnold to Lt Col Leroy L. Stephen, 5 Nov 1946, 7 Jan 1947, 2 quoted in Lt 

Col R. Joe Baldwin, “The Leadership Imperative in a Transforming Air Force,” Airpower 

Journal 7 (Fall 1993): 40; quoted in Capt Mark Williams, “Character and the Core Values 

of the USAF,” Air Force Offi cer Accessions and Training Schools (unpublished draft), 32. 

10 United States Air Force Core Values (n. p. : Department of the Air Force, 1997), 1.

11 General Charles Krulak, “Remarks at JSCOPE 2000,” 27 January 2000, on-line, 

Internet, 23 May 2004, available from http://www.geoffmetcalf.com/krulak_20001019.

html.

12 Earl Warren, Christian Science Monitor, 21 May 1964, quoted in Simpson 

Contemporary Quotations, James B. Simpson, ed. (New York: 

Houghton Miffl in, 1988), number 1650, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2004, available from 

http://www.bartleby.com/63/50/1650.html.

13 Thomas Paine, The American Crisis, no. 13 (April 19, 1783) in The Columbia World 

of Quotations, number 43524, on-line, Internet, April 2004, available from http://www.

bartleby.com/66/24/43524.html. 

14 Alexander Hamilton, “Letter of Instructions to the Commanding Offi cers of the 

Revenue Cutters, 4 June 1791,” quoted in U. S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime 

Guardian (Department of Transportation, 2002), 83. 

15 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Lege Agraria, II, 95 in The Columbia World of Quotations, 

number 12416, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2004, available from http://www.bartleby.

com/66/16/12416.html.

16 Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have a Dream,” Address at Lincoln Memorial during 

March on Washington 28 August 1963, in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of 

Quotations (1989), number 462, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2004, available from http://

www.bartleby.com/73/462.html.

17 William Wordsworth, “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abby, on 

Revisiting the Banks of the Wye During a Tour, 13 July 1798,” in The Complete Poetical 

Works (London: Macmillan, 1888), on-line, Internet, 29 April 2004, available from http://

www.bartleby.com/145/ww138.html. 

18 Xenophon, Memorbilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology, trans. E.C. Merchant 

and O.J. Todd Loeb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923), quoted in The 

Military Quotation Book, James Charlton,ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002), 

48.

19 Chaplain (Rabbi) Roland B. Gittlesohn, USN, “The Purest Democracy: Dedication of 

the 5th Marine Division Cemetery on Iowa Jima, 26 March 1945,” U.S. Marine Corps 

History and Museums Division, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2004, available from: http://

hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/HD/Historical/Docs_Speeches/Thepurestdemocracy.htm.
49

Leadership

 No aspect of an offi cer’s persona and performance is more important 

than leadership. While leaders exist at all levels within the armed forces, a 

special burden and a broader scope of leadership fall on those holding a commission. Leadership of other service members is the principal business of offi cers.

 Leadership, according to the Army Leadership Manual, is infl uencing

people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to 

accomplish the mission and improving the organization.1

 Leadership is not just 

ordering people around. Troops obey because they must; they follow because 

they want to. They obey superiors; they follow leaders.

 For military leaders, the primary goal is always to accomplish the 

mission, small or large, tactical or strategic, in peacetime or in war. The 

requirements of the ultimate mission of war, which is the underlying rationale 

for the existence of the Armed Forces of the United States (“to provide for the 

common defense”), set the bar for military leadership quite high. In that bloody 

crucible, offi cers must be prepared, competent, and willing to order their troops 

to take the lives of the enemy and to be ready to give up their lives themselves. 

 Given the ultimate mission, armed forces offi cers must build, maintain, 

and employ war-fi ghting capability. “Creating and sustaining superior fi ghting 

power requires the combination of the tangible activities of war—maneuver, 

fi repower, and protection—with the intangible elements of war—leadership, unit 

esprit, and individual courage.”2

 Combining those physical and mental qualities, 

and molding people into an effective fi ghting team, requires leadership.

 In order to accomplish the mission, whatever it is, the offi cer must take 

care of the troops. This is critical both because the offi cer is legally and morally 

responsible for their well being and care, and also because if the troops are not 

well taken care of, it will become diffi cult, if not impossible, to accomplish the 

mission. Yet, if the situation requires it, mission accomplishment trumps the 

welfare and personal safety of subordinates. Mission accomplishment comes 

fi rst.

 Taking care of the troops means attending to their personal needs—

physical, mental, and spiritual—and, to a great extent, to their families’ needs 

as well. It also means training and educating the troops for the demands and 

challenges of their individual jobs and unit missions. In its fullest sense, troop 

development means going beyond the immediate requirements of the job and 

the mission to helping them grow in their own careers, preparing them for 

higher rank, for greater responsibility, and most especially for current and future 
50

other leaders. 

 The legendary Commandant of the Marine Corps, General John A. 

Lejeune, put his own distinctive stamp on the quality of leadership he expected 

of Marine offi cers:

The relationship between offi cers and enlisted men [and women] 

should in no sense be that of superior and inferior nor that of master 

and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact, it should 

partake the nature of the relationship between [parent] and son [or 

daughter], to the extent that offi cers, especially commanding offi cers, 

are responsible for the physical, mental, and moral welfare, as well as 

the discipline and military training, of the young men [and women] 

under their command who are serving the nation in the Marine Corps.3

 Leadership is a bond of trust. Successful leaders in every fi eld, but 

especially in the military, all have an ability to gain and maintain the trust and 

confi dence of their superiors, their peers, and their subordinates. In military 

organizations, leadership is founded on a bond of trust between the leader and 

the led, trust engendered by the leader’s competence, presence, courage, and 

moral example—and by the military character of the subordinates. “The leader,” 

Sir John Hackett writes, “has something which the others want and which only 

he can provide. ... A capacity to help people in the overcoming of the diffi culty 

which face them in a joint enterprise. ... The function of leadership cannot be 

discharged on the one side without a requirement to be led on the other.”4

 Leadership starts with the led, the pride instilled in the individual 

Airman, Coast Guardsman, Marine, Sailor, or Soldier, pride in who and what 

they are. Offi cers must create the bond of trust with subordinates by establishing 

and maintaining standards, by setting the example, and by being fearless. 

 Leadership is refl ected in unit esprit. It is founded on the pride of the 

followers, the confi dence that they are by virtue of being in military service 

different and better than the run of the mill, part of something bigger than 

themselves, something heroic. They must trust that their offi cers will neither 

cause them to do anything that would detract from that self-image, nor allow 

them to fall below the highest standards of duty and performance. 

 As S. L. A. Marshall wrote, trust is built over time and serves for the 

long haul:

While men may be rallied for a short space by someone setting an 

example of great courage, they can be kept in line under conditions of 
51

upon a respect which the commander has won by consistently thoughtful regard for the welfare and rights of his men, and a correct measuring of his responsibility to them.5

 Military subordinates expect their leaders to be competent in their 

trade. They trust their lives and blood will not be wasted in meaningless actions. “Don’t worry, General. We trust you,” a 3rd Armored Division soldier 

told Lieutenant General Fred Franks, the VII Corps Commander, on the eve of 

the ground attack in Operation Desert Storm.6

 “Marines,” according to the Marine Corps leadership manual, Leading Marines, “have a reasonable expectation 

that their leaders will come up with plans that will accomplish the mission and 

give them the best possible chance of succeeding. They do not ask for certainty, 

just the best possible preparation and skills from their leaders.”7 Leaders, in 

turn, trust their subordinates to respond to direction with alacrity and to perform 

in accordance with the high standards of their service.

 Trust is a two-way street, a mutual relationship between leaders and 

those they lead. A leader builds and nurtures trust in an organization both 

by being trustworthy and by being trusting. Troops must be able to take the 

leader’s word at face value and have full confi dence in his or her technical competence and moral character. But the second face of trust is equally essential: 

troops must know that their leaders have confi dence in them and take their word 

at face value. The offi cer who continually second-guesses the troops or micromanages them will not be leading an organization distinguished by trust, and 

thus that offi cer will fail in a primary obligation. As Admiral William Crowe 

put it when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “You cannot run a unit 

just by giving orders and having the Uniform Code of Military Justice behind 

you.”8

 Leaders are expected both to interpret the orders of higher authority, 

translating them into meaningful tasks for accomplishment by their 

subordinates, and to buffer the troops from the storms that originate above. This 

latter can be easily misunderstood. Offi cers are not shop stewards. “Offi cers 

occupy the middle ground.”9

 Their function is to get the most out of the unit 

for which they are responsible, while protecting their charges from unnecessary 

burdens, but they understand that the fi nal determination of what is necessary 

will not be made by them. General Powell describes the expectations of 

Soldiers for their lieutenant:

They will look to you for inspiration, for a sense of purpose. They 

want to follow you, not be your buddy or your equal. You are their 

leader. They want someone in charge who they can trust—trust with 

their lives. They want someone they respect, someone they can be 

proud of. They want to be able to brag about their lieutenant.10
52

orders, not those of some higher authority. In the same vein, the responsibility 

is theirs, and they do not pass it on. Troops get the credit. Offi cers accept the 

blame. When an order appears to make no sense, subordinates expect it will be 

questioned and better alternatives offered if available. Superiors expect that the 

order will be executed with energy if it stands. 

 Leaders keep everyone focused on the mission and on winning. 

According to General Colin Powell, the troops “expect you to lead them to 

win, whether in battle or peacekeeping, to accomplish the mission given by the 

Nation.”11

Leaders set and enforce the standards. New offi cers often do not 

understand that failing to set high standards, and more important, failing to 

respond with disapproval when they are not met, undermines their authority. 

Lax standards are not what the troops need, want, and have a right to expect. 

John Baynes, a retired British infantry offi cer, has observed:

A strictly imposed discipline is not condescending. ... To allow a 

soldier to disobey orders is really to insult him. A good man, in any 

walk of life, knows what he can do, and what he should do. If he fails, 

he expects the just reward of failure. ... A man in authority who lets his 

subordinates get away with poor performance implies in doing so that 

they and their actions are of no signifi cance. ... Tolerance is not only 

disliked by the soldier for its implications that his efforts do not matter 

much, but also because it is to some extent an abnegation of duty by his 

superior.12

S. L. A. Marshall put it more simply: “The level of discipline is in large part 

what the offi cers in any unit choose to make it. ...To state what is required is 

only the beginning; to require what has been stated is the positive end.”13

 An American exemplar of military leadership (and of much else as 

well), General George Washington, gave this advice on discipline:

... be strict in your discipline; that is, to require nothing unreasonable 

of your offi cers and men, but see that whatever is required be 

punctually complied with. Reward and punish every man according 

to his merit, without partiality or prejudice; hear his complaints; if 

it is well founded, redress them; if otherwise, discourage them, in 

order to prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every shape, and 

impress upon the mind of every man, from the lowest to the highest, the 

importance of the cause, and what it is they are contending for.14
53

like,” demonstrating it by personal example, and being satisfi ed with nothing 

less from everyone in the unit, offi cers and enlisted alike. The Marines say, 

“Whenever two Marines are together ... one is in charge,” meaning that the 

“senior Marine present” is responsible for ensuring that both of them adhere 

to the standards of the Corps.15 In a similar vein, “Every soldier is a leader, 

responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank.”16 

Leaders must accept responsibility and accountability for everything that 

happens in their unit, even when they are not physically present. By setting 

demanding, but achievable, standards leaders develop sound and proud units. 

Leaders set the example. Commissioned leaders earn their authority 

by setting the example in their conduct both on-duty and off-duty. Offi cers are 

expected to model high moral standards, refl ecting virtue, honor, patriotism, and 

subordination of self. Leading Marines puts it succinctly: 

Commanders will impress upon all subordinate offi cers the fact that 

the presumption of integrity, good manners, sound judgment, and 

discretion, which is the basis for the special trust and confi dence 

reposed in each offi cer, is jeopardized by the slightest transgression 

on the part of any member of the offi cer corps. Any offense, however 

minor, will be dealt with promptly, and with suffi cient severity to 

impress on the offi cer at fault, and on the offi cer corps.17

 In fact, there are four aspects of military performance in which even 

the greenest offi cer can set the example for more experienced troops: discipline, 

military bearing, appearance, and physical fi tness. Discipline begins with selfdiscipline: “No man is fi t to command, who cannot command himself.”155 

Military bearing requires little more than carrying oneself confi dently and 

speaking in a clear and forthright manner. The uniform should fi t properly 

and be worn correctly, because what the offi cer does, immediately becomes 

the standard for the troops to follow. Physical fi tness is essential to proper 

performance of duty in any service. It provides for stamina, particularly in 

periods of stress. The new offi cer may have much to learn about how to operate 

complex military equipment, or direct tactical maneuvers under stress, but there 

is no reason he or she cannot fall-in for physical training and set a standard for 

subordinates to emulate. 

 To be effective, the new offi cer must master the techniques involved in 

the work of subordinates. He or she must be willing to ask intelligent questions 

and to learn quickly. In time, S.L.A. Marshall wrote, the ability “to do the work 

of any man serving under him ... so that his men begin to understand that he is 

thoroughly versed in the work problems that concern them ... is the real bedrock 

of command capacity.”156 Here, the time-honored practice of “management by 

walking around” can be quite helpful to the offi cer.
54

of danger and uncertainty, in which physical courage and moral courage are 

challenged on all sides. Sir John Hackett says the requirements for an offi cer at 

war are bravery, competence, tirelessness, and calm.20 Along the same lines, S. 

L. A. Marshall identifi es courage, creative intelligence, and physical fi tness.21 

 Physical courage in a leader is most often expressed in a willingness to 

act, even alone if necessary, in situations of danger and uncertainty. Marshall 

observes:

Among the commonest of experiences in war is to witness troops doing 

nothing, or worse, doing the wrong thing, without one commanding 

voice being raised to give them direction. In such circumstances, any 

man who has the nerve and presence to step forward and give them an 

intelligent order in a manner indicating that he expects to be obeyed, 

will be accepted as a leader and will be given their support.”22

 To give that order, the offi cer must be present: It is diffi cult, if not 

impossible, to lead from the rear. Here, too, the offi cer leads by example, and 

when it is most needed, that example can be inspiring. Leaders are obligated to 

overcome the natural fear, which affl icts them as well as their subordinates, and 

to continue to function and to lead, even in the face of great personal danger. 

That is what physical courage is all about.

 Leaders can prepare themselves and those they follow for moments 

of stress and danger by anticipating what they are likely to face and preparing 

themselves mentally to respond instinctively. Battle drills for small units, battle 

station drills on ships of war, and practice emergency procedures for aircrew 

are intended to hone instinctive and effective response to threats. As shown 

in Chapter 1, Lieutenant Commander John Waldron had prepared his unit and 

himself mentally for the deadly torpedo run at Midway. 

 Moral courage is different from physical courage, but it is just as 

necessary, and the demands it places on the offi cer are just as formidable. “The 

highest kind of courage is a compound of both.”23 Simply put, moral courage is 

the courage to do what is right, even when it is diffi cult or not in your immediate 

best interests. In war, where they might be horribly injured or even killed, 

offi cers bear the moral burden of ordering men and women they lead to perform 

tasks that would ordinarily be censured by society: to take others’ lives. It 

requires enormous moral strength to bear the burden of command for prolonged 

periods when one’s subordinates are wounded and killed, frequently because of 

decisions the offi cer makes under pressure of events. 

 Simultaneously with bearing the burden of ordering actions directly 

destructive of life and limb, the offi cer is responsible for protecting troops from 
55

their jobs might seem to involve. “Marines don’t do that,” a Marine lieutenant 

is said to have told a subordinate getting ready to destroy a Vietnamese farmer’s 

hut without cause. Taking care of the troops is professional and moral bedrock 

for the military, and offi cers who place their troops in moral or legal jeopardy 

are not taking care of them. The offi cer who does so violates something deeply 

imbedded in the DNA of the military profession.

 In wartime, and under stress, all eyes turn to the leader: “What do 

we do now, Lieutenant?” The physical and moral courage, the values, and the 

confi dence the offi cer retains in face of every trial are often what get the unit 

through their shared ordeal. 

The need for moral courage is not confi ned to the battlefi eld. If the troops see 

their offi cer cutting corners, evading responsibility, lying, or even shading the 

truth, in order to accomplish some goal, they will draw their own lessons about 

what is acceptable behavior and what is not. Every decision an offi cer makes, 

and every action he or she undertakes, becomes, wittingly or not, a potential 

precedent or model for the future behavior of the troops. They will pay as much 

attention, and perhaps even more, to what the offi cer does as to what the offi cer 

says.

 Leaders build and sustain morale. Leadership, by its very nature, 

is not a solitary activity, no matter how lonely it may feel at times. It always 

involves others, individually and as a unit. In his memoir of service with the 

British Army in the Middle East and Burma, John Masters relates a speech Field 

Marshall “Bill” Slim gave early in the war on the subject of morale:

In the end every important battle develops to a point where there is 

no real control by senior commanders. Each soldier feels himself 

to be alone. Discipline may have got him to the place where he is, 

and discipline may hold him there—for a time. Co-operation with 

other men in the same situation can help him to move forward. Selfpreservation will make him defend himself to the death, if there is no 

other way. But what makes him go on, alone, determined to break 

the will of the enemy opposite him is morale. Pride in himself as an 

independent thinking man, who knows why he’s there, and what he’s 

doing. Absolute confi dence that the best has been done for him, and 

that his fate is now in his own hands. The dominant feeling of the 

battlefi eld is loneliness, gentlemen, and morale, only morale, individual 

morale as a foundation under training and discipline will bring 

victory.24

 The collective equivalent of morale is unit esprit—a palpable sense 

of being part of something larger, something better, and the bonds that tie the 
56

well: “Esprit de corps, then, depends on good leadership primarily, but there are 

other factors. The term implies not only respect between offi cers and enlisted ... 

but also a feeling of confi dence and comradeship among Marines themselves.”25 

Esprit is the mental and emotional state of the entire unit, which then motivates 

the members to overcome what are at times seemingly insurmountable obstacles, 

to be willing to suffer, even to die, for each other.

 To return to the theme with which the chapter began, S.L.A. Marshall 

said of esprit, it “is the product of a thriving mutual confi dence between the 

leader and the led, founded on the faith that together they possess a superior 

quality and capability.”26 Leaders recognize the esprit in units, even in 

peacetime, by the pride they take in the little visible things like wear of the 

uniform, the sharp salute, a bit of swagger, and meticulous attention to detail. 

The snap of the guard at the gate speaks volumes of the heart of the organization.

 The opportunities and types of leadership differ among, and within, the 

armed forces according to the nature of their combat roles. For example, Army 

and Marine ground combat leaders, even as very junior offi cers, practice a very 

direct kind of leadership with large groups of enlisted personnel. In contrast, 

Air Force, Marine, and Navy pilots seldom get to practice unit leadership on a 

similar scale until they reach the middle grades of their profession. On the other 

hand, as a pilot, a junior offi cer may command a crew that includes more senior 

offi cers. Junior Coast Guard offi cers commanding isolated stations exercise an 

extraordinary degree of initiative. Division heads on ships practice a style of 

leadership unique to the sea services in its formality. Each example requires 

different, but equally important, leadership skills. Commissioned leaders depend 

upon the experience and maturity of noncommissioned deputies to complement 

their own knowledge and to support their authority and responsibility. 

 Despite occasional references to someone as “a born leader,” leadership 

in fact is an acquired skill, something learned, “an art mainly acquired by 

observation, experience, and emulation.”27 Leadership is as much a matter of 

the heart and soul as of knowledge. There is no simple formula that will guide 

all new commissioned leaders to complete success. Leading Marines lists 11 

requirements for leaders that are useful for offi cers of all services, of all pay 

grades, in all military occupational specialties:

 Be technically and tactically profi cient

 Know yourself and seek self-improvement

 Know your Marines and look out for their welfare

 Keep your Marines informed

 Set the example

 Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished

 Train your Marines as a team
57

 Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates

 Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities

 Seek responsibility, and take responsibility for your actions.28

1 Department of the Army, Leadership, FM 22-100 (31 August 1999), 1-4. 

2 Leading Marines FMFM 1-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, 1995) 81.

3 Leading Marines FMFM 1-0 (Washington, DC, Department of the Navy, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, 1995) 97.

4 General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan, 

1983), 216. 

5 U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Offi cer (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Offi ce 1950), 161. Hereinafter, The Armed Forces Offi cer, (1950). 

6 General Frederick M. Franks Jr., “Battle Command: A Commander’s Perspective,”

Military Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 3 (May-June 1996), 4.

7 Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, Leading Marines, MCWP 6-11 

(November 2002), 87.

8 Newsweek, April 18, 1988, as found in Peter G. Tsouras, Warriors Words – A Quotation 

Book (Arms and Armor Press, 1992), 302.

9 This formulation was shared with some of the authors of this book by VADM Rodney 

Rempt, Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, in September 2003 at the McCain 

Conference, an annual all-service academy meeting organized by the Center for the Study 

of Professional Military Ethics.

10 General Colin Powell, “1998 Sylvanus Thayer Award Speech,” Assembly (November/

December 1998), 79.

11 Powell, 79.

12 John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, (Garden Park, NY: Avery, 1988), 

186-187.

13 The Armed Forces Offi cer (1950), 141. 

14 Letter to William Woodford, 10 November 1775, The Writings of George Washington,

Vol. 4, 1931-1944, as found in Tsouras, Warrior Words, 139. 

15 Leading Marines, 33

16 Les Brownlee and Peter J. Schoomaker, “Serving the Nation at War: A Campaign 

Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,” Parameters, XXXIV, No. 2 

(Summer 2004), 13.

17 Quoted in Leading Marines, 94.

18 Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.), Dictionary of Military and Naval 

Quotations (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1966), 59.

19 The Armed forces Offi cer (1950), 170.

20 Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan Publishing 

Company, 1983), 216.

21 The Armed forces Offi cer (1950), 82.

22 The Armed forces Offi cer (1950), 111.

23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 101.

24 Field Marshall Sir William “Bill” Slim quoted in John Masters, The Road Past 

Mandalay; A Personal Narrative (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), 39-40
58

26 The Armed forces Offi cer (1950), 160.

27 Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.), The Marine Offi cers Guide, 4th edition 

(Naval Institute Press, 1977), 367.

28 Leading Marines, 91.
59

Responsibility, Accountability, and Discipline

The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force 

under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the 

man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will (or should be) a 

citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.1 

 

 —General Sir John W. Hackett

 Responsibility, accountability, and discipline are three independent, yet 

interrelated, core concepts of the military profession that separate you from your 

civilian contemporaries. Responsibility involves acknowledging your duties and 

acting accordingly. Accountability means “the buck stops here,” neither shifting 

blame to others nor taking credit for others’ work or success. Discipline entails 

following orderly, prescribed conduct, and punishing those who fail to meet their 

responsibilities or established standards. 

 In the 1950 edition of the Armed Forces Offi cer, S. L. A. Marshall notes 

the deference a nation gives to military offi cers because of the responsibility 

they accept when commissioned: 

They accept the principle that some unusual advantage should attend 

the exceptional and unremitting responsibility. Whatever path an 

American offi cer may walk, the offi cer enjoys prestige. Though little 

is known of the offi cer’s intrinsic merit, the offi cer will be given 

the respect of fellow citizens, unless that offi cer proves to be utterly 

undeserving.” [Emphasis added]2

 Responsibility, accountability, and discipline. These three common 

terms have spawned numerous interpretations and debates over the years. 

However, across the divergences, some important common truths become 

apparent.

Responsibility. General Curtis E. LeMay was once asked to 

provide a one-word defi nition of leadership. After some thought, he replied, 

“Responsibility.” As a military offi cer, you voluntarily commit to the associated 

duties and obligations of your commissioning oath: “I take this obligation 

freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” You maintain this 

responsibility to duties and obligations and to performing your unit’s mission 

until you leave the service. 

Accountability. Merriam-Webster defi nes accountability as “an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s actions” 
60

responsibilities (i.e., perform your unit’s mission), you are accountable for the 

consequences and face appropriate disciplinary action if appropriate. In short, 

accountability prevents carelessness. Otherwise we could feel free to make irresponsible decisions or forget to carry out our duties, unnecessarily [endangering] 

the safety of our [people or our resources].4

 

Discipline. In a July 1759 Letter of Instructions to the captains of 

the Virginia Regiment, which he commanded, George Washington observed, 

“Discipline is the soul of an [a]rmy. It makes small numbers formidable, 

procures success to the weak, and esteem to all.”5 A decade and a half later, 

after one look at the mob that the Continental Congress called an army, General 

Washington insisted that the Founding Fathers establish a system for meting 

out punishment. In response to his demands, Congress borrowed the English 

Articles of War and gave the commanding general a formalized system of 

military justice. Washington recognized that discipline, enforced by an evenhanded system and credible 

administration of justice, is the backbone of an effective fi ghting force.6

 Although responsibility, accountability, and discipline have only 

been discussed in simplistic terms thus far, consider how each factors into the 

following examples. 

 At 0210, 4 December 1989, a U.S. Coast Guard cutter went aground 

off Keweenaw Point in Lake Superior after completing buoy operations. It 

ultimately sank, after its entire crew was forced to abandon ship. Fortunately, 

no lives were lost but the World War II-era ship, valued at approximately $29 

million, was. What precipitated the grounding? At 0202, just several minutes 

prior to the grounding, the commanding offi cer left the bridge for his stateroom 

and the mess deck without looking at the chart of the area or verifying the 

vessel’s position. The offi cer of the deck also failed to verify the ship’s position 

in accordance with the commanding offi cer’s standing orders and made wrong 

assumptions about the commanding offi cer’s approval of the ship’s track. The 

board of investigation concluded that the proximate cause of the grounding was 

the failure of the offi cer of the deck and commanding offi cer to properly carry 

out and supervise the required standard practices of navigation in accordance 

with Coast Guard regulations and the commanding offi cer’s own standing 

orders, while maneuvering at night and in unfamiliar, restricted waters.7

 The commanding offi cer was issued a letter of reprimand for “his 

dereliction of duty and his negligence in the safe navigation of his vessel that 

resulted in the stranding and subsequent loss of his vessel.” The offi cer of the 

deck received a letter of reprimand for “her dereliction of duty and her failure to 

obey a lawful order as expressed in the Commanding Offi cer’s Night Orders.”8
61

offi cer of the deck were responsible for the safe operation of the vessel. How? 

The commanding offi cer was responsible for ensuring proper procedures 

were established to ensure safe operations, while the offi cer of the deck was 

responsible for ensuring those safe operations were carried out. Both individuals 

failed to uphold this responsibility, were held accountable for their actions, and 

subsequently disciplined in the form of punitive action for their failures.

 On 9 February 2001, USS Greeneville was operating south of Oahu, 

Hawaii, conducting a seven-hour Distinguished Visitor Cruise. At approximately 

1300 the executive offi cer informed the commanding offi cer that the ship 

needed to start afternoon ship demonstrations, including an emergency surfacing 

maneuver, for the civilian guests. At that particular time, Greeneville was 12-13 

miles away from its next scheduled point of location and more than 30 minutes 

behind the schedule posted in the Plan of the Day. 9 As it rose to the surface, 

Greeneville collided with Japanese motor vessel Ehime Maru, a “moving 

classroom” for high school students preparing for employment in the marine 

products industry. Ehime Maru sank in less than 10 minutes; of 35 Japanese 

crew, instructors, and students on board, 26 were rescued—the remaining nine 

members died. 10

 A subsequent Naval Court of Inquiry’s report of investigation 

determined there were two fundamental causes for the collision: (1) Greeneville

completed only an abbreviated sonar and periscope search that did not 

conform to standard operating procedures or the commanding offi cer’s own 

standing orders, and (2) the ship’s watch team failed to work together and pass 

information to each other about the surface contact picture. 

The reason for these two causes is quite clear. The Commanding 

Offi cer, USS Greeneville created an artifi cial sense of urgency in 

preparation for surfacing on 9 February when prudent seamanship, 

the safety of his submarine and good judgment dictated otherwise. 

In doing so, he marginalized key contact management and Control 

Room personnel, cut corners on prescribed operational procedures, and 

inhibited the proper development of the contact picture. 11

 In a Memorandum for the Record, dated 23 April 2001, Commander 

in Chief of the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet Admiral Thomas Fargo issued the following 

statements:

Commander X’s disregard of his own standing orders and guidance 

provided by Naval Warfare Publications was a cause of the collision.. 

operational standards on board USS Greeneville, starting with the 

Commanding Offi cer and permeating throughout the crew, were relaxed 

and casual. [Additionally] ... the collision was caused by Commander 
62

a late arrival at the entrance to Pearl Harbor.12

 The commanding offi cer was ordered to Admiral’s Mast and was 

found to have violated Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 

(Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) and Article 110, UCMJ (Negligent 

Hazarding of a Vessel). He was issued a punitive letter of reprimand, forfeited 

one-half of his pay for two months (with forfeitures suspended for six months), 

and removed “for cause” from his previous duties as commanding offi cer, USS 

Greeneville, actions which effectively terminated his career.13

 These cases clearly depict the relationship among responsibility, 

accountability, and discipline. Additionally, they highlight the critical point that 

responsibility and accountability are applicable not only in combat situations. In 

fact, most of your challenges in these arenas will develop during routine, dayto-day operations such as the Coast Guard or Navy incidents. Finally, the USS 

Greeneville incident clearly reveals how miscues can lead to tremendous loss of 

life and resources, both domestically and on the international front. A more indepth look at responsibility, accountability, and discipline, with accompanying 

case studies, will better defi ne the respective role each of these concepts plays in 

your career. 

Responsibility. Following the disastrous third day’s attack at 

Gettysburg, in a battlefi eld dialog with Major General Cadmus M. Wilcox, 

General Robert E. Lee fully personifi ed the concept of responsibility: “Never 

mind General,” he told his shaken subordinate, “all this has been my fault; it 

is I that have lost this fi ght, and you must help me out of it.”14 As both Lee’s 

comment and the Coast Guard cutter case study illustrate, the demands on 

you as a military offi cer are great, and the weight of this responsibility is 

individual and compounds with rank and position. This professional and moral 

responsibility is a total commitment. It runs the entire gamut—from maintaining 

standards of dress and appearance, to observation of customs and courtesies, 

to maintenance of proper human relations and professional relationships, to 

the utmost challenge—giving orders to your Airmen, Sailors, Soldiers, Coast 

Guardsmen, or Marines to kill other human beings or to risk being killed 

themselves. No other single profession demands this constant, far-reaching level 

of responsibility of its members, regardless of rank or rate.

 One of the unique distinctions of the offi cer profession is that you are 

responsible for all the personnel, equipment, and missions that you lead—24 

hours a day, seven days a week. Furthermore, you are responsible for your 

subordinates’ actions, even for an outcome you did not directly cause, as 

illustrated in the following case study involving a Marine lieutenant serving as a 

rifl e company commander at Twenty-nine Palms, California. 
63

a road guide during night maneuvers in the Mojave Desert, 200 yards away from 

his partner—in violation of standard procedure but by the order of his lieutenant. 

When the maneuvers ended, the lance corporal was overlooked by a truck 

convoy and accidentally left behind in the desert. The lieutenant’s subordinate, 

a Marine gunnery sergeant, was charged with accounting for all the Marines 

and erroneously reported 100 percent accountability. After nearly two days, 

the lance corporal was reported missing and a search ensued. Tragically, the 

lance corporal’s body was found, several hundred yards from where he was last 

seen; the desert heat was apparently responsible for his death. An investigation 

ensued and dereliction of duty charges were fi led against the lieutenant. The 

court-martial panel held the lieutenant responsible for the lance corporal’s death, 

convicted him, and sentenced him to four months in the brig and dismissal from 

the Marine Corps.15

 Why did the lieutenant pay the price for the death of the Marine, when 

he had assigned the responsibility of ensuring all were present to the gunnery 

sergeant? In assigning responsibility, the lieutenant did not relinquish his 

ultimate responsibility and accountability for the welfare of his troops. The 

gunnery sergeant was given the authority to act on behalf of the lieutenant 

and to share the responsibility. Delegation of authority never absolves you, 

the offi cer, of your inherent responsibility to see that obligations are met, even 

when accomplished by subordinates. You have absolute responsibility for 

everything and everyone under your care, particularly the safety and well being 

of your people.16 You cannot delegate responsibility. Your duty and obligation 

is to the mission of the unit. If anything under that command falls short, you 

are accountable for the shortcoming, regardless of its cause. The lieutenant 

was held accountable for the tragedy and paid the price for the failure of his 

subordinate to execute a duty. Succinctly put, being “held responsible” is 

synonymous with being “held accountable.” 

 Along with responsibility must go accountability. Without 

accountability, having to answer for what one has not done, either good or bad, 

one has no responsibilities. If an offi cer has no responsibilities for which he or 

she will be held accountable, followers will fi nd it diffi cult, if not impossible, to 

place their confi dence and trust in that leader.17

Accountability. In an August 1995 video message, Air Force 

Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman gave his views on Air Force standards and 

accountability. General Fogelman’s words on accountability apply to all service 

members everywhere: 

The principle that good order and discipline are essential to combat 

effectiveness has not changed throughout the years. Good order and 

discipline. At the very foundation of those concepts must be standards 
64

enforced. Our military standards are higher than those in our society 

at large because of what we do. We defend our nation. The tools of 

our trade are lethal. We are held to a higher standard by the public and 

we are held in high regard by the public because of the integrity we 

demonstrate by holding ourselves accountable and others accountable 

for their actions. ... [F]ailure to ensure accountability will destroy 

the trust of the American public—the very people living under the 

Constitution we swore to 

support and defend, and who look to us, the members of their nation’s 

Air Force, to embrace and live by the standards that are higher than 

those in the society we serve.”18 

 The tape was made following the 14 April 1994 Black Hawk incident 

when two F-15Cs of the 53d Fighter Squadron, enforcing the “no fl y” zone 

over northern Iraq, mistakenly shot down two Army Black Hawk helicopters 

engaged in United Nations’ humanitarian missions for the Kurds, killing all 

26 passengers: 15 Americans, fi ve Kurdish civilians, and British, French, and 

Turkish military offi cers. Investigations by the Air Force resulted in charges of 

dereliction of duty against a crew member, an Air Force captain, of the Airborne 

Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft controlling the airspace at the 

time, and charges of negligent homicide and dereliction of duty against one of 

the F-15 pilots and four other AWACS crew members. The AWACS captain 

was acquitted and charges against the others were dropped following Article 

32 investigations. Altogether, eight offi cers were reprimanded, counseled, or 

admonished, and one was punished nonjudicially.19 

 Following the captain’s court-martial, General Fogleman “was satisfi ed 

that the outcome was appropriate and just; no one was court-martialed who 

should not have been, or vice-versa, or issued letters of reprimand, Article 15s, 

and so forth. But I was appalled,” he said, “when I asked the question, ‘Let me 

see the evaluation reports on the people.’ I discovered that none of what they 

had done was in those reports.”20 So he personally issued letters of evaluation 

describing their failure that became a permanent part of each individual’s record. 

For the two F-15 pilots, three offi cers on the AWACS aircraft, and two generals 

in the chain of command, this action effectively ended their careers in the Air 

Force. General Fogleman also grounded the pilots and AWACS crew members, 

and disqualifi ed them from duties in fl ying operations for three years.21

 Accountability exempts no one. Enlisted members can also be held 

accountable for failure to perform their unit’s mission properly. In May 1995, 

two Air Force technical sergeants improperly installed and inspected an F15C fi ghter’s longitudinal and lateral fl ight control rods. The cross-connected 

controls caused the plane to roll to the left instead of going up when the stick 

was pulled back. When the stick was pulled right, instead of rolling right, the 
65

killing the pilot. Both noncommissioned offi cers (NCOs) were charged with 

negligent homicide in the death of the F-15C pilot, as well as four counts each 

of dereliction of duty for failure to “inspect their work and failure to complete 

the aircraft maintenance paperwork properly.” On the day of his court-martial, 

the fi rst NCO committed suicide. The second subsequently accepted a general 

discharge in exchange for dismissal of the charges against him.22 Accountability, 

as General Fogleman observed is central to the maintenance of good order and 

discipline.

Discipline. In his 1944 instructions to the Third Army corps and 

division commanders, General George S. Patton Jr. declared: “There is only 

one sort of discipline—perfect discipline. If you do not enforce and maintain 

discipline, you are potential murderers.”23

 As General Patton’s words convey, you face dire consequences 

if you ignore the issue of discipline. Discipline can be viewed within two 

frameworks—as an orderly or prescribed conduct or pattern of behavior, or as 

punishment for failure to meet responsibilities or established standards. Army 

Regulation 600-20 aptly captures both:

It [Discipline] is manifested in individuals and units by cohesion, 

bonding and a spirit of teamwork; by smartness of appearance and 

action; by cleanliness and maintenance of dress, equipment, and 

quarters; by deference to seniors and mutual respect between senior and 

subordinate personnel; by the prompt and willing execution of both the 

letter and the spirit of the legal orders of their lawful commanders; and 

by fairness, justice, and equality for all soldiers.24

 The fi rst framework—an orderly or prescribed conduct of pattern 

or behavior—begins with self-discipline. Self-discipline is that which, next 

to virtue, truly and essentially raises one [individual] above another.25 Selfdiscipline, which allows you to meet the highest standard without hesitation, is 

imperative for your success as a commissioned offi cer. Do what you are told 

and be where you are supposed to be, when you are supposed to be there, with 

what you need to accomplish the mission, ready to perform. That is what well 

and faithfully discharging the duties of the offi ce is all about. 

 As a military offi cer, you must act with confi dence and cannot indulge 

yourself in self-pity, discouragement, anger, frustration, or defeatism. You 

must exercise self-discipline to make decisions and to ensure your loyalties to 

relationships or personal gain do not supercede loyalty to the Constitution, your 

service, or the mission.26

 Self-discipline is displayed via crisp, collective obedience to duly 

constituted authority, a trait which distinguishes a military organization from 
66

demand that subordinates follow suit. To achieve compliance effectively, you 

must retain the separation essential to exercise supreme authority to order men 

and women into harm’s way if need be, with the expectation that you will be 

obeyed without question. You, in turn, must follow superior direction or rules 

unless faced with a clear operational, legal, or moral reason to refuse or deviate. 

At the same time, when necessary, you must be prepared to depart from the 

letter of instructions to achieve the commander’s purpose, justifying these 

choices to superiors as soon as possible. As always, you are accountable for the 

consequences of your decisions. 

 Military discipline is the leader’s most important management tool. It 

is the backbone of effi ciency and the essence of an organization.27 As Patton 

once remarked, “If you can’t get them to salute when they should salute and 

wear the clothes you tell them to wear, how are you going to get them to die 

for their country?”28 You lose your credibility if you fail to hold subordinates 

consistently accountable for digressing from established standards and 

policies. Likewise, you must ensure that enforcement of standards is swift, 

fair, consistent, and impartial if you hope to maintain the effectiveness of your 

standards and policies. 

 The second framework of discipline—punishment for failure to meet 

responsibilities or established standards—is rooted in the UCMJ and the Manual 

for Courts-Martial. 

The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in 

maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote 

effi ciency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby 

to strengthen the national security of the United States.29

 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974), 

“has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society 

separate from civilian society.”30 As such, this specialized society operates 

within a separate military justice system because rules and procedures that may 

be perfectly suited to the civilian community simply do not meet the needs 

of military forces who must deploy, live, work, and fi ght in close and often 

harsh and dangerous conditions. Furthermore, an armed force has unique legal 

requirements. There is no civilian legal counterpart to disobedience, absence 

without leave (AWOL), cowardice, or disrespect. 

 An offi cer is not only an administrator but a magistrate, and it 

is this dual role which makes his function so radically different than 

anything encountered in civilian life . . . [M]ilitary discipline ... is no 

different than the discipline of the university, a baseball league or a 

labor union. It makes specifi c requirements of the individual [and] it 
67

discipline in the military establishment and in any other free institution 

is this, that if the man objects, he still does not have the privilege of 

quitting tomorrow.31

 To be effective, the military justice system must be mobile, react to 

unique offenses, and be administered by those who understand the environment 

in which it functions.32 Dr. Douglas McGregor’s four-principled “Hot Stove 

Rule” analogy illustrates how a leader’s enforcement of standards and policies 

provides effective discipline and strengthens leadership’s credibility. First, 

the stove is swift in its message and relatively intense—gives off heat as a 

warning and “rewards” the offenders immediately. Second, the stove singles 

out precisely the errant behavior—offenders are not penalized for anything other 

than the specifi c deviations. Third, the stove burns all the time; it is consistent—

whether you touch it once, twice, or many times the results are the same. Fourth, 

and fi nal, the stove is impersonal and does not lose its temper—the stove burns 

indiscriminately anyone who touches it without getting angry or taking it 

personally.33

 As a military offi cer, you have a variety of disciplinary tools available 

to you, including oral and written counselings, admonitions and reprimands, 

administrative discharges, nonjudicial punishment, or trial by court-martial. 

Your base/post legal offi ce will advise you on the particular options pursuant 

to the respective case, recommend a course of action, and assist you with the 

appropriate paperwork. Regardless of the offense or desired punishment, 

you must remain objective, consider each case on its individual merits, and 

personalize the subsequent action so as to best correct the problem and prevent 

its recurrence, if possible. The more serious the offense, the heavier the 

penalty—thus the greater the importance of avoiding injustice by getting all the 

facts straight, and tempering blind justice with judgment.34

 The fi nal case study in this chapter captures all of the concepts 

previously presented, from responsibility, accountability, and lack of selfdiscipline to full implementation of the military justice system. However, this 

particular case adds a unique element not discussed in any of the other cases—

the impact of our individual actions on relationships with our international allies.

 On 3 February 1998, a crew of four Marine captains was aboard 

a Marine EA-6B, a four-seat electronic warfare aircraft, fl ying a low-level 

training mission in the Dolomite Mountains of Calvalese, Italy. On the last 

leg of the route, the pilot spotted a cable in front of him and saw a yellow fl ash 

to his right. The pilot went full-stick forward, negative G, and heard and felt 

a loud thud. Two cables supporting a ski gondola had sliced into the right 

wing, creating two large holes and taking off a portion of the vertical stabilizer. 

When the cables snapped, the gondola fell 370 feet to the ground, killing nine 
68

12 March 1998, a Command Investigation Board, headed by a Marine Corps 

major general, concluded that aircrew error was the cause of the mishap. The 

four aircrew members were charged with 20 counts of negligent homicide and 

several lesser offenses. The commanding offi cer, executive offi cer, operations 

offi cer, and director of Safety and Standardization faced nonjudicial punishment 

for systemic errors in the squadron, and the commanding offi cer was ultimately 

relieved of command.

 Approximately one week after the commanding offi cer was relieved, 

investigators discovered that a videotape of portions of the fl ight existed and 

had been destroyed by the front right-seater. This revelation came to light 

when one of the back-seaters was granted immunity and was ordered to testify. 

Consequently, additional charges of conduct unbecoming an offi cer were 

brought against the two front-seaters and were to be handled apart from the 

courts-martial hearing the negligent homicide charges.

 In February 1999, the pilot’s General Court-Martial for negligent 

homicide commenced; he was found not guilty. Subsequently, the charges 

of negligent homicide were dropped against the right-seater. These results 

created immense outrage among our Italian allies and the victims’ families 

and governments, who perceived our military justice system as inadequate. 

Signifi cant international discord within the American and Italian alliance ensued. 

 In March 1999, the right-seater’s General Court-Martial for conduct 

unbecoming an offi cer charges was convened to hear the case involving the 

videotape destruction. The right-seater pleaded guilty and was dismissed from 

the Marine Corps.35 When questioned about what he thought of his actions, his 

response was: “It was the wrong thing. It’s not right as a person. It’s not right 

as a Marine Corps [o]ffi cer. It’s not right as [his name]. It was wrong.”36 This 

Marine captain did the right thing, belatedly, in accepting responsibility for 

his actions; however, those actions had consequences beyond his own career. 

They refl ected poorly on his service and his country in a large international 

arena. The “conduct unbecoming an offi cer” trial for the pilot followed shortly 

thereafter. He pleaded not guilty. He was convicted and sentenced to six 

months’ confi nement and dismissal from the Marine Corps.37

 The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed the attack on 

9/11 have not been without examples of individual offi cers failing in their 

responsibilities for expected moral-ethical leadership. An internal investigation 

traced the scandalous misconduct of a small group of enlisted military police at 

the Abu Ghraib prison to egregious failures in leadership by the commissioned 

chain of command of the Army’s 800th Military Police Brigade. A number 

of other unrelated cases have resulted in administrative admonish-ment, 
69

mistreatment of enemy prisoners, or covering up mistreatment by subordinates, 

during the stability operations following the successful decapitation of the 

prewar governments. 

 

 Due to these extreme violations of the law and basic disrespect for 

the humanity of those in our custody, the damage suffered by the nation’s 

international standing is incalculable. “Sad to think,” retired Army Colonel 

James Lacey was quoted as saying, in regard to Abu Ghraib, “that all of this 

could have been avoided by one strong captain who had a basic education in 

the difference between right and wrong.” 38 What can be said with assurance is 

that the domestic and international reputations of the armed forces will greatly 

depend on public opinion—opinion regarding the adequacy of accountability 

imposed on those commissioned leaders who fail to “well and faithfully 

discharge” the duties of their offi ce. For those tough ethical decisions, the 

institutional leadership will ultimately be held accountable.

 What all of the aforementioned examples have in common is signifi cant 

cost to the nation in terms of prestige, national reputation, money, material, and 

lives suffered as a result of individual inattention, dereliction, or incompetence 

by relatively junior offi cers failing, through lack of discipline, to meet their 

individual and professional responsibilities for precise effective service. Where 

professionals fail to deliver effective and ethical service, they must expect 

to face accountability. Where the institution lacks the will to impose it, the 

profession, and interests of the nation as a whole, suffers. That is the core of 

General Fogleman’s briefi ng to the Air Force leaders following the judicial 

processes in the Black Hawk shoot-down. You must embrace responsibility, 

accountability, and discipline, which are defi ning elements of the offi cer’s 

profession and vital concepts in keeping with the moral obligations of the oath 

and the “special trust and confi dence” of the nation. 

You must not fail.
70

1 General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan, 

1983), 202.

2 U. S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Offi cer (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Offi ce, 1950), 2.

3 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition (Springfi eld, MA: MerriamWebster, Incorporated, 2001), 8. 

4 Tom O’Connor, Leadership and Accountability, 1, on-line, Internet, 18 June 2004, 

available from http://www.amdo.org/leuschnr.html.

5 Colonel Robert Debs Heinl Jr., USMC (Ret.), Dictionary of Military and Naval 

Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1988), 93. [Heinl errs in 

dating Washington’s letter 1759. Actual date is 29 July 1757.] 

6 Captain J. P. Porier, USAF, “Military Justice: History of Military Justice,” Legally 

Speaking (Holloman Air Force Base, NM, February 2000), 1.

7 Formal Board of Investigation: Grounding and Loss of USCGC MESQUITE WLB-305, 

(no date), 44. 

8 Ibid., 54.

9 “Collision Summary,” 1-2, on-line, Internet, 1 November 2004, available from http://

www.cpf.navy.mil/pages/legal/foia/Executive_Summary3.pdf.

10 “Court of Inquiry,” 8, on-line, Internet, 1 November 2004, available from http://www.

cpf.navy.mil/pages/legal/foia/GREENEVILLE_Combined_COI_Rpt.pdf. 

11 “Statement of ADM Tom Fargo, U.S. Pacifi c Fleet Commander,” 2, on-line, 

Internet, 1 November 2004, available from http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pages/legal/foia/

GREENEVILLE_Press_Statements_ADM_Fargo_23_Apr.pdf.

12 “Memorandum for the Record,” 3-4, on-line, Internet, 1 November 2004, available 

from http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pages/legal/foia/COI_Memo_For_the_Record.pdf.

13 “Statement of ADM Fargo,” 2-3.

14 Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 277.

15 “Offi cer Guilty in Death of Abandoned Marine,” (February 26, 1989), 1-2, on-line, 

Internet, available from http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=c3dc33b967c

4087c43274e2db3655dbb.

16 Lieutenant Colonel Gary E. Slyman, USMC, “Responsibility and Accountability,” 

(U.S. Naval Academy, April 14, 2004), 1-2.

17 Concepts for Air Force Leadership (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University 

Press, 2001), 61. 

18 General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, “Air Force Standards and Accountability,” 1, 

6, on-line, Internet, 24 April 2004, available from http://www.usafa.af.mil/corevalue/

accountability.html.

19 Dr. Richard H. Kohn, “The Early Retirement of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of 

Staff, United States Air Force,” Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 2001), 14, on-line, 

Internet, 24 May 2004, available from http://weblinks3.epnet.com/citation.asp?tb=&_ug=

sid+4DFDB61C%2D7EAE%2D46B6%2DB96F%2D46CBC37B3DBF%40sessionmgr2

+D214&_us=sm+ES+E6C7&_uso=db%5B0+%2Daph+hd+0+op%5B0+%2D+st%5B0+

%2DAN++4287548+tg%5B0+%2D+EEE7&.

20 Ibid., 4.

21 Ibid., 14.

22 Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Tillery, USAF, Accountability: Inconsistent, Situation 

Dependent and Subjective (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1997), 23-26. 

23 Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 94. 
71

Army, 13 June 2002), 15.

25 Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 91.

26 U.S. Air Force Academy, Offi cer Development System (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO, 

January 2004), 7.

27 Major T. A. Fleek, Lieutenant B. W. Endicott, and Master Sergeant A. R. Orlandella, 

Discipline in the Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Library, June 

1955), 8.

28 Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 94.

29 Manual for Courts-Martial United States, (Washington, DC: Joint Service Committee 

on Military Justice, 2000), I-1.

30 Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War

(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 164

31 The Armed Forces Offi cer (1950), 139, 143.

32 Porier, “Military Justice,”1-2. 

33 Major K. A. Caver, USAF, Major C. A. Franklin, USAF, Major P. H. Henson, 

USAF, Major S. E. Hirst, USAF, Lieutenant Commander J. C. Jenista, USN, Major S. 

M. Junkins, Jr., USAF, Lieutenant Commander M. D. McClure, USN, and Major I. S. 

Phatshwane, USAF, “Ten Propositions Regarding Leadership,” Maxwell Air Force Base, 

AL, on-line, Internet, 4 March 2000, available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/

projects/ay1996/acsc/96-079.pdf.

34 Major General A. Newman, USA, Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership

(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), 209.

35Lieutenant Colonel Gary E. Slyman, USMC, “Aviano EA-6B Gondola Mishap (Part 

A)” ([Annapolis, MD]:Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, U.S. Naval 

Academy, 25 April 2002), 2.

36Lieutenant Colonel Gary E. Slyman, USMC, “Aviano EA-6B Gondola Mishap (Part 

B)” ([Annapolis, MD]:Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, U.S. Naval 

Academy, 25 April 2002), 3.

37 Slyman, “Part A,” 2.

38 Josh White and Thomas E. Ricks, “Top Brass Won’t Be Charged Over Abuse: Army 

Finds Offi cers Responsible, but Not Culpable, in the Abu Ghraib Scandal,” Washington 

Post (27 August 2004), A 17.
72
73

Service Identity and Joint War Fighting

 The Armed Forces of the United States consist of fi ve military 

services—the Air Force, the Army, the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and 

the Navy. In the twenty-fi rst century, the days of any service operating as a 

truly independent actor are long since past. The fi ve services fi ght together as 

a team, which means they must plan and train as a team. That does not mean 

that all fi ve play equal parts in every battle or exercise. It does mean that the 

fi ve are partners in the overall business of defending the United States, its 

territory, population, and national interests, and, therefore, that the best each has 

to offer must be woven into every battle, exercise, and plan. There can be no 

“lone wolves” among our fi ve services, because our security cannot afford such 

free agentry. When the nation is threatened, the Navy doesn’t go to war, nor 

does the Army; the nation goes to war, using all its services’ capabilities in the 

combination that best suits the particular threat posed and the war plan designed 

to defeat it. 

 While “jointness” has become the short-hand description for this 

fi ve-service partnership, with its own “color”—purple—there is another way 

to characterize the relationship among the services, one with deep roots in 

American history and political culture—E pluribus unum—From many, one. 

Inscribed on the banner held in the beak of the eagle on the Great Seal of the 

United States, approved by Congress on 20 June 1782, those words convey 

the reality that out of the original 13 colonies, one nation emerged. The 13 

new states kept their own identities, as well as their own local customs, food 

preferences, accents, and so forth, but together they constituted one nation that 

was not just the sum of the 13, but greater than the total when combined. 

 So, too, from fi ve services comes the one entity—the Armed Forces of 

the United States—charged with the defense of the nation. 

Tradition and identity, including uniforms and customs, matter, as do the 

requirements generated by the distinctive roles the various services perform; the 

requirements involved in fi ghting on land, at sea, and in the air; and the different 

capabilities they bring to the battle. Thus, the services keep their separate 

traditions and identities, their distinctive uniforms and customs, but out of the 

fi ve of them emerges a single armed force that, because of the synergies among 

them, is greater, more fl exible, and more capable than the mere sum of the fi ve.

 This book is all about being an offi cer in the Armed Forces of the 

United States in the early years of the twenty-fi rst century. That involves being 

an offi cer in the Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy, while 
74

States. To be a fully effective offi cer, both in one service and in the armed 

forces, requires knowing one’s own service well, including its capabilities as 

well as its limitations, and knowing the other services well enough to appreciate 

their strengths and their weaknesses, what they bring to the fi ght, and how their 

capabilities can best mesh with those of the other services.

 Each service has its own uniforms, customs, and traditions. On a 

deeper level, each has its own culture. It is culture that defi nes and describes 

any organization best. It also best defi nes and describes what it means to be 

a member of that organization. Thus, part of this chapter’s contribution to 

understanding what it means to be an offi cer in the armed forces is to capture, 

albeit in snapshot style, the culture of each of the fi ve services. As used here, 

culture is taken to have two meanings—on the organizational level, how this 

service defi nes and sees itself; and on the individual level, what it means to be 

an Airman, a Soldier, a Coast Guardsman, a Marine, or a Sailor.

The Air Force. “Man’s fl ight through life is sustained by the power 

of his knowledge.” These words, written by Austin “Dusty” Miller and found 

on the Eagle and Fledglings statue at the U. S. Air Force Academy, introduce 

Air Force service culture. At the heart of this culture is the idea that aviation 

transformed both civil society and warfare. Aircraft revolutionized war by 

adding a third dimension to land and sea operations, along with unmatched 

speed, range, mobility, and fl exibility in both combat and support activities. In 

a like manner, evolving space technology transforms warfare on the earth’s 

surface. Space capabilities provide revolutionary strides in global presence; 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); communications; geolocation; navigation; weather; and precision weaponry. The airplane and 

spacecraft also dramatically changed society by opening new horizons of 

knowledge and shattering previous barriers of time and distance. They made the 

world smaller. The realities of technology’s impact fundamentally altered how 

we travel, how we view the world, and how we fi ght.

 Current Air Force culture emphasizes the term “Airman.” In the past, 

this word referred to pilots and navigators, but now Airman refers to anyone 

who understands and appreciates the full range of air and space capabilities and 

can employ or support some aspect of airpower and space power. The Air Force 

understands that not all Airmen wear a blue uniform; some wear green or khaki. 

Some fi ght from ships. Moreover, in today’s world, nonfl ying space operators, 

maintainers, intelligence personnel, supply troops, and other support functions 

prove vital to air and space superiority. They are Airmen and form the air and 

space team.

 The concept of independence formed the bedrock of Air Force identity 

in its early days. Pioneer Airmen believed that the air arm must achieve service 
75

minded focus to maximize airpower’s potential. At the core of that belief was 

their understanding, gained through theory and experience, of the strengths 

and weaknesses of airpower and space power. Early airpower theory stressed 

strategic airpower, the ability to destroy an enemy’s war-making capability by 

attacking vital centers of industrial or communications infrastructure.

 Although strategic attack remains an important operational function of 

air and space power, contemporary air and space doctrine emphasizes support to 

joint and multinational operations. It describes the contribution of air and space 

power to the joint war-fi ghting team through “the tenets of air and space power.” 

According to AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, airpower and space power:

· Should be centrally controlled and decentrally executed

· Is fl exible and versatile

· Produces synergistic effects

· Offers a unique form of persistence

· Must be prioritized

· Must be balanced

These tenets refl ect the specifi c lessons of air and space operations over history 

and require informed judgment in application.1

On the other hand, historically there were inherent limitations of airpower, and 

these too were recognized early in the airplane’s development:

· Technology and capital dependent—not every country has the 

industrial, scientifi c or fi nancial resources to build modern aircraft

· Transitory—aircraft cannot live in their medium as can surface forces; 

aircraft must land to refuel and rearm. ...

· Weather and night—the natural phenomena of rain, wind, clouds, and 

darkness of night present formidable barriers to fl ight

· Cannot hold ground—for surface advocates this is the most damning 

limitation; only troops can occupy and, therefore, control events on the ground2

Over the past century of fl ight, technology enhanced airpower’s strengths and 

diminished its traditional weaknesses. While space assets do not share the same 

limitations, scientifi c, technological, and budgetary obstacles pose challenges. 

Today’s Air Force emphasizes mastery of the capabilities and potential of 

airpower and space power, while understanding fully their limitations. Along 

the same lines, in order to appreciate Air Force service culture, an offi cer should 

comprehend the following ideas that mark the Air Force vision:

§ Unity of command and centralized control/decentralized execution. 

Airmen still believe that the Air Force is the service most oriented to think in 

strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions; to think globally; to appreciate 
76

Airman should work for the geographic combatant commander (theater 

commander) to maximize the capabilities of the joint service team.

§ Futureoriented and technology-focused. Advances in 

technology dominate both the offi cial and unoffi cial service culture 

of the Air Force. In one sense, Air Force personnel tend to identify 

with their plane, space system, or service specialty. Since it often 

takes years to master the technology and procedures involved, this 

cultural trait is natural, but today’s Air Force emphasizes a common 

mission and doctrine to minimize division. Additionally, since rapid 

technological advances dominate air war, Airmen believe in the words 

of one of the pioneers of airpower theory, Italian Air Marshal Giulio 

Douhet: “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the 

character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the 

changes occur.”3

§ Space—unlimited horizons. With scientifi c advances opening 

exciting vistas of space, Douhet’s remark captures Air Force thinking 

for the twenty-fi rst century. Today’s Airman appreciates the value 

of space as “the ultimate high-ground” and views American space 

supremacy as an imperative. Today’s Air Force is committed to 

developing tomorrow’s space capability in three vital areas: an 

unsurpassed military and civilian space cadre; a strong and consistently 

funded space industrial base; and a commitment to leading-edge space 

research and exploration.4 Thus, today’s Air Force considers itself a 

genuine air and space force. 

§ Adaptability and change. From the dawn of fl ight, Airmen 

understood the vital role of nonmilitary aviation. The founders of the 

U.S. Air Force consciously developed ties to civilian aerospace industry 

and the airlines, as well as to popular culture, in an attempt to develop 

“air mindedness” and public acceptance. Like civilian industry, the Air 

Force is based on adaptability and change; new ideas are encouraged; 

new management trends are often adopted. 

§ Expeditionary and forward deployed. For most of its fi rst 

50 years, the Air Force conducted global operations from fi xed bases 

within the Continental United States (CONUS) or overseas. With the 

end of the Cold War and a rise in overseas contingency operations, 

Air Force culture and operations shifted to an expeditionary, forwarddeployed reality. Concentrating on rapid, effective deployment, 

barebase operations, and crisis-response actions, the Air and Space 

Expeditionary Force represents not only a new organization and 

training focus, but a new attitude.5 
77

emphasis on change, the Air Force often struggles with service identity. At 

times, offi cers and enlisted personnel master their individual service specialties 

and become highly skilled, but overly specialized, and lose perspective on 

broader service concerns. Nevertheless, the Air Force prides itself on mission 

focus and accomplishment. Air Force culture looks to the future and attempts to 

lead technological trends. 

The Army. The Army exists to serve the Nation.6 Throughout its 

history, the U.S. Army mission has remained constant: to secure and defend 

our homeland and decisively defeat those enemies who strive to disrupt our 

freedoms. The birth of the U.S. Army preceded the birth of the Nation. One 

of the fi rst actions undertaken by the Continental Congress on 14 June 1775 

– before that gathering began even considering a Declaration of Independence 

– was to direct General George Washington to muster troops for a Continental 

Army. That army, along with colonial militias, defeated the British in the eightyear War of Independence.7

 Today, as part of the joint force, the Army continues 

to support and defend America’s Constitution and way of life. The Army 

protects national security interests, including forces, possessions, citizens, allies 

and friends. It prepares for and delivers decisive action in all operations. Above 

all, the Army provides combatant commanders with versatile land forces ready 

to fi ght and win the Nation’s wars.8

 The Army’s contribution to joint operations is landpower. Landpower

is the ability – by threat, force, or occupation – to promptly gain, sustain, and 

exploit control over land, resources, and people. Landpower includes the ability 

to:

· Impose the Nation’s will on adversaries – by force if necessary 

 – in diverse and complex terrain.

· Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the 

 conditions for a lasting peace.

· Address the consequences of catastrophic events – both natural 

 and man-made – to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic

 civil services.

· Support and provide a base from which forces can infl uence 

 and dominate the air and sea dimensions of the joint 

 operational area.9

 Ultimately, Army forces’ ability to control land, resources, and people 

through a sustained presence makes permanent the advantages gained by joint 

forces.10 Army forces provide combatant commanders the means to deter 

potential adversaries and shape the strategic environment.11

 
78

Army Forces relevant in any environment. Tough disciplined Soldiers and 

imaginative, adaptive leadership are essential. Rigorous and realistic training, 

sound doctrine, and modern equipment also contribute. The design and 

practices of Army institutional structures provide essential support. These 

same characteristics make Army forces important to establishing relationships 

with potential multinational partners. The versatile mix of Army organizations 

provides combatant commanders with the landpower necessary to achieve 

objectives across the range of military operations.12

 While the core Army mission has changed little over the years, the 

Army has adapted to the evolving nature and pace of confl ict. Current Army 

transformation efforts focus on requirements for fi ghting and winning the global 

war on terrorism and meeting other national security and defense missions, 

while simultaneously posturing the Army to sustain its full range of global 

commitments into the future.13 The future Army will embody several key 

attributes as it becomes a force that is more joint and expeditionary, adaptive and 

fl exible, lethal and survivable. 

Campaign Quality Army. Recent confl icts have demonstrated that the 

duration and nature of Army ‘boots on the ground’ is inherently unpredictable. 

The campaign quality of an Army thus is not only its ability to win decisive 

combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations as long as 

necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound 

changes in the context and character of the confl ict. The Army’s preeminent 

challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the 

staying power, durability, and adaptability to carry a confl ict to a victorious 

conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.14

Expeditionary Mindset. In this globalized world, our enemies shift 

resources and activities to areas least accessible to our armed forces. As elusive 

and adaptive enemies seek refuge in the far corners of the earth, the norm will 

be short-notice operations, at great distance, in extremely austere theaters of 

operations, with incomplete information available. These conditions defi ne 

expeditionary operations. Soldiers with an expeditionary mindset will be 

confi dent that they are organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in the 

world, at any time, in any environment, against any adversary, and accomplish 

the assigned mission.15

A Joint Mindset. Our collective future is irrefutably joint. To meet 

the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace 

the capabilities of its sister services right down to the tactical level. That will 

require development of operational concepts, capabilities and training programs 

that are joint from the outset.16 This in turn requires a new emphasis on 

individual leadership and values.
79

and will remain, the Army’s centerpiece – the basic building block of all 

Army organizations and operations. The Army’s greatness as an institution 

and its reputation around the world is derived from the values and actions of 

its Soldiers. Living the Warrior Ethos and inspired by the Army’s enduring 

traditions and heritage, Soldiers are the best citizens the nation has to offer. 

Warrior Ethos.18 As in the past, Soldiers serving the Nation today 

embody the Warrior Ethos:

· I will always place the mission fi rst

· I will never accept defeat

· I will never quit

· I will never leave a fallen comrade.

The Army seeks individuals ready and willing for warrior service. Bound to 

each other by integrity and trust, the young Americans welcomed into the Army 

learn that in the Army every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens 

in his or her presence regardless of rank. They value learning and adaptability, 

particularly as it contributes to initiative. They learn the Army’s culture is one 

of values, and that Soldiers adhere to the following seven core Army values: 

loyalty, duty, respect, selfl ess service, honor, integrity and personal courage. 

Soldier’s Creed.19 In addition to the seven core values, all Soldiers 

are expected to uphold a set of principles called the Soldier’s Creed. This 

guides every aspect of their Army lives, from their behavior and attitude to their 

training and the carrying out of duties and missions. The Warrior Ethos and the 

Soldier’s Creed form the moral and ethical content of America’s Army.20

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States 

and live the Army Values. I will always place the mission fi rst. I will never 

accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am 

disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and profi cient in my warrior 

tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself. I am 

an expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy 

the enemies of the United States of America in close combat. I am a guardian of 

freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.
80

In 1790, the First Congress of the United States established a 

small maritime law enforcement agency to assist in collecting the new 

nation’s customs duties. For the next eight years this Revenue Marine 

(later called the Revenue Cutter Service) was the nation’s only naval 

force and so was soon assigned military duties. Over time, the Revenue 

Cutter Service acquired new responsibilities ... the result is today’s U. 

S. Coast Guard–a unique force that carries out an array of civil and 

military responsibilities touching on almost every facet of the maritime 

environment. ...

... the Coast Guard’s legal historical core is as a military service, 

originated with unique law enforcement authority and leavened with 

a well-earned reputation for humanitarian service. These purposeful 

attributes enable us to meet a broad multimission mandate from our 

nation. Our core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty enable 

that mandate to be fulfi lled. As America’s Maritime Guardian, we are 

proud to be warriors and protectors at all times. 

 

 —Coast Guard Publication 1

 The Coast Guard’s Foundation Doctrine articulates the essence of the 

nation’s smallest branch of the armed forces. Two hundred plus years as the 

only armed service assigned a vast array of civil responsibilities and missions 

has caused the Coast Guard’s culture to be distinctly different from its four 

larger military cousins. The nation has long recognized that the Coast Guard 

requires military discipline and training to perform its national defense duties 

and its often dangerous maritime security and safety missions successfully. 

When Alexander Hamilton originally suggested forming the Revenue Marine, 

he insisted on organizing it along military lines and convinced President 

Washington to commission Revenue Marine offi cers. Thus began the formation 

of the military culture and history of this small, distinct naval service.

 To understand the Coast Guard’s unique service culture, one must 

recognize that it is the compilation of several interrelated histories and cultures. 

Formed in 1915 when its parent organization, the U. S. Revenue Cutter Service, 

combined with the U. S. Life Saving Service, the Coast Guard would later 

absorb the U. S. Lighthouse Service and the Bureau of Maritime Inspection and 

Navigation. The distinctive service that exists today includes attributes and core 

values from each organization, expanding and strengthening the Coast Guard’s 

maritime culture. Here are a few highlights of the things that form Coast Guard 

culture today:
81

same naval ceremonies, customs, and traditions as its larger sea service cousins. 

From the titles it attaches to its ranks and rates, to the nautical nomenclature 

used in everyday speech, the Coast Guard shares a common maritime history 

with sailors everywhere. Coast Guardsmen have a deep affection for the sea and 

its lore. Coast Guard cutters are U.S. warships. The cuttermen who sail in these 

ships continue a long and distinguished seagoing heritage. Having fought side 

by side at home and abroad in every confl ict in U. S. history, the Coast Guard is 

inspired by the history and tradition of the U. S. Navy as well as its own.

· All things maritime: The Coast Guard’s many roles and missions 

require it to possess a rare blend of humanitarian, law enforcement, regulatory, 

diplomatic, and military capabilities. The Coast Guard’s many broad regulatory 

mandates require it to monitor and understand all manner of activity on or near 

the water. This omnipresence provides a “cop on the beat” like familiarity with 

the waterfront and a deep understanding of the many occupations and enterprises 

that make their living on or around the sea. A long, distinguished history of 

enforcing international maritime treaties and successful joint naval operations 

extends this comprehensive knowledge and understanding of all things maritime 

far beyond the borders of the U. S. The Coast Guard and its unique military, 

multimission, maritime culture provide a model for naval services around the 

world.

· Face to face interaction with the citizens it serves: The Coast 

Guard’s many civil, peacetime missions require it to have far greater day-to-day 

interaction with the American public than the other branches of the armed forces. 

From rescuing a recreational boater in distress, to conducting an inspection 

on a large merchant ship, many citizens have reason to have routine contact 

with Coast Guard personnel. This frequent interaction presents extraordinary 

challenges for the organization and the individual Coast Guardsman. Coast 

Guard personnel must exercise their powers prudently and with restraint. In 

his 1791 Letter of Instruction to Revenue Cutter offi cers, Alexander Hamilton 

charged them to “overcome diffi culties by cool and temperate perseverance to 

[your] duty.” That standard remains integral to Coast Guard culture today.

· Small units in small places: The Coast Guard has very few large 

bases. It is an organization dominated by small boat stations, small cutters 

(ships), and small air stations—often in similarly small coastal communities 

far from other military facilities. These small units are integral parts of the 

community. Often operating far from higher command authority, junior Coast 

Guard leaders enjoy a clear mandate for on-scene initiative, but also bear 

immense responsibility for the well being and conduct of their crews.

· “You have to go out but you don’t have to come back”: Coast 

Guardsmen are taught to avoid or mitigate unnecessary risk, but this historic, 
82

heritage of selfl ess service to the nation. Be it combat, law enforcement, or 

search and rescue operations, the Coast Guard does dangerous work in hostile 

environments. Selfl ess acts by courageous men and women using their tools 

and their wits under dangerous conditions to get the job done are the foundation 

of Coast Guard culture. A lifeboat crashing through the surf or a helicopter in a 

low hover over a vessel in distress are the enduring images of the Coast Guard at 

work.

· Maritime Cop on the Beat: Maritime law enforcement and border 

control are the oldest of the Coast Guard’s many responsibilities and is the 

historic core of its existence. Stopping and boarding ships at sea provided the 

foundation upon which the Coast Guard’s broader and more complex presentday mission set is built. The burden of being the nation’s primary maritime law 

enforcement service is an essential and inescapable component of Coast Guard 

culture.

· Lifesaver, Guardian and Warrior: The sacred triad of the Coast 

Guardsman’s persona and psyche is that of lifesaver, guardian, and warrior.188 

Every Coast Guardsman must be all three at all times—they are not privileged 

to pick and choose. A law enforcement patrol can become a search and rescue 

sortie or emergent response to a security threat at a moments notice. The call 

to deploy the Coast Guard’s unique skills to a foreign shore may come at any 

time. Every Coast Guardsman must remain Semper Paratus—always ready—to 

answer the call.

 The Coast Guard’s relatively small size, assignment as a Tier One 

organization in the Department of Homeland Security, and civil responsibilities 

and missions make its culture unparalleled among the U.S. Armed Forces. 

What makes the Coast Guard unique is that in executing our diverse 

missions as America’s Maritime Guardian, we harmonize what seem to 

be contradictory mandates. We are charged at once to be policemen 

and sailors, warriors, humanitarians, regulators, stewards of the 

environment, diplomats, and guardians of the coast. Thus we are 

military, multimission, and maritime.

 —Coast Guard Publication 1

Marine Corps. There are no ex-Marines: “Once a Marine, Always a 

Marine.” Marines are different. They have their own air arm and deploy on 

land and at sea. They have the longest boot camp. They have a hymn, not a 

song. Marines are different because of their ethos. 

 Chapter 1 of Fleet Marine Force Manual-1-0 is titled “Our Ethos.” On 
83

... being a Marine comes from the eagle, globe, and anchor that is 

tattooed on the soul of every one of us who wears the Marine Corps 

uniform. ... Unlike physical or psychological scars, which over time, 

tend to heal and fade in intensity, the eagle, globe, and anchor only 

grow more defi ned–more intense–the longer you are a Marine. ‘Once a 

Marine, always a Marine.’22 

 That tattoo is a selfl ess spirit of being one of the few. Ask any member 

of the Marine Corps what he or she does, and the answer will be, “I’m a 

Marine.” What is most important to a Marine is being a Marine, not what rank 

or military occupational specialty he or she holds. It is the culture of the Marine 

Corps that makes the Corps different from society as a whole, as well as from 

the other services. Its deep appreciation for its rich history and traditions instills 

pride and responsibility in every Marine down to the lowest levels. Every 

Marine has celebrated the Marine Corps Birthday every year since becoming 

a Marine, whether in garrison or in combat. In garrison, it is celebrated every 

year everywhere in the world with the identical ceremony. Older Marines pass 

the traditions of the Corps to younger ones, ensuring they understand that the 

successes and sacrifi ces of the past set the path for the future. Since the fi rst two 

battalions of Marines were raised by an act of the Continental Congress in 1775, 

many of whom were recruited from Tun Tavern in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

the Corps has distinguished itself in every confl ict in our nation’s history.

“Every Marine is a Rifl eman”—In fact, every Marine offi cer or 

enlisted is trained fi rst to be a rifl eman before being trained in any other 

specialty. It is this bedrock premise of “every Marine a rifl eman” and the 

training that goes with it that set all Marines on a common foundation. Leaders 

are molded in the same training given those they will lead, building empathy and 

understanding unattainable in other services. Every facet of the Marine Corps 

exists to support the Marine rifl eman, and every Marine understands that.

“Soldiers of the Sea”—It is the culture of the Marine Corps that 

produces the Soldier of the Sea. The Marine Corps is determined to be 

different—in military appearance, obedience to orders, disciplined behavior, 

adherence to traditions, and most important, the unyielding conviction that the 

Corps exists to fi ght.23

 “Taking Care of Our Own”—The characteristic that best defi nes 

Marines is selfl essness: a spirit that places the self-interest of the individual after 

that of the institution and the team, all working toward a common goal. It is 

important that the unit succeed, not the individual. It is common to hear Marines 

speak of their leaders based on how well they take care of subordinates. “Take 

care of your people” and “Take care of each other” are imbued in Marines from 
84

know how their troops live in the barracks because they go there, and in the fi eld 

they never have more creature comforts than their troops do. The only privilege 

of rank is that of ensuring that your subordinates are cared for. This culture 

defi nes what the Marine Corps is and who Marines are—men and women who 

exhibit extraordinary leadership and courage, both physical and moral, shaped 

by their dedication to the institution and each other. 

“Combined Arms Expeditionary Forces in Readiness”—Operationally there 

are four generally accepted characteristics that defi ne and describe the Marine 

Corps. First, although capable of deploying and employing by various means, 

the specialty is amphibious: the Corps comes from the sea. Therefore, it focuses 

primarily on the coastal or littoral regions of the world. Second, the Marine 

Corps trains and operates as a Marine air-ground task force, a combined-arms, 

air-ground team, logistically self-sustainable. Third, as a force-in-readiness, the 

Marine Corps is a national “swing force”—forward deployed and expeditionary 

by nature—ready to respond rapidly to crises. Fourth, the Marine Corps 

considers itself a light-to-medium force, packing a quick and lethal punch. 

Although prepared to operate across the full confl ict spectrum, the Marine Corps 

is more at home and most effective as a light-to-medium force that can be onscene quickly with enough fi repower and sustainability to conduct operations as 

an “enabling force” until heavier units arrive.

The Marine Corps is small. In 2004, only 211,000 active and 

Reserve (171,286 active duty), of which more than 114,000 are in the operating 

forces and more than 35,000 are typically forward-deployed. As part of its 

expeditionary nature, the operating forces of the Marine Corps live on “camps,” 

not forts or bases, and maintain a high tooth-to-tail ratio, relying on the other 

services for a large portion of logistics, transportation, education, and combat 

service support. Many Marines receive specialized training at the other services’ 

schools. There are no Marine doctors, nurses, dentists, fi eld medical corpsmen, 

or chaplains (all of whom are provided by the Navy). The Air Force and the 

Navy get the Marines to the fi ght, with the Army assisting toward sustainment if 

Marines are forward-deployed beyond 90 days. 

 Seventy percent of active duty Marine forces are in the operating 

forces, with the bulk of those forces in the Fleet Marine Forces. These operating 

forces provide the combat power that is immediately available to the combatant 

commanders for employment. 

To Marines “expeditionary” means more than just getting 

there quickly. The Marines in the operating forces, most in a Spartan-like 

“temporary-residence” mindset when not deployed, are eager members of the 

combined-arms team. This team is tailored toward a maneuver warfare approach 
85

maximizing the combined effect of its resources at a critical seam of the enemy’s 

defense. 

 In 1957 the Commandant of the Marine Corps asked Lieutenant 

General Victor Krulak, “Why does the United States need a Marine Corps?” 

Five days later General Krulak replied:

Essentially, as a result of the unfailing conduct of our Corps over the years, they 

(our nation’s citizens) believe three things about Marines. First they believe 

when trouble comes to our country there will be Marines—somewhere—who, 

through hard work, have made and kept themselves ready to do some thing 

useful about it, and do it at once. ...

Second, they believe that when the Marines go to war they invariably 

turn in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful—

not most of the time, but always. Their faith and their convictions in 

this regard are almost mystical....

The third thing they believe about Marines is that our Corps is 

downright good for ... our country; that the Marines are masters of 

a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into 

proud, self-reliant stable citizens—citizens into whose hands the 

nation’s affairs may safely be entrusted. 24

Krulak went on to conclude: 

I believe the burden of all this can be summarized by saying that, while 

the functions which we discharge must always be done by someone, 

and while an organization such as ours is the correct one to do it, 

still, in terms of cold mechanical logic, the United States does not 

need a Marine Corps. However, for good reasons which completely 

transcend logic, the United States wants a Marine Corps. Those reasons 

are strong; they are honest, they are deep rooted and they are above 

question or criticism. So long as they exist—so long as the people are 

convinced that we can really do the three things I mentioned—we are 

going to have a Marine Corps. ... And, likewise, should the people 

ever lose that conviction—as a result of our failure to meet their 

high—almost spiritual standards—the Marine Corps will then quickly 

disappear. 25

 In 1935 Gunnery Sergeant Walter Holzworth was asked how the 

Marine Corps came by its reputation as one of the world’s greatest fi ghting 

formations. He replied, “Well, they started right out telling everybody how great 

they were. Pretty soon they got to believing it themselves. And they have been 
86

 The Navy. “The profound infl uence of sea commerce upon the wealth 

and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which 

governed its growth and prosperity were decided,” wrote Alfred Thayer Mahan 

on page 1 of his classic, The Infl uence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.27 

“Mahan’s studies convinced him that sea power, conceived on a broader scale, 

would constitute for the United States ... an instrument of policy serving to 

enhance the nation’s power and prestige.”28

 Like many other navies, the U.S. Navy has always seen itself as 

intimately tied to national power—protecting it, enhancing it, advancing it. 

From the seed of this idea has grown the rich heritage that has shaped the way 

the Navy has done business for centuries, on any of “the seven seas.” As a 

seagoing service, the Navy is built on combat ships and aircraft, supported 

by a seaborne logistics force, protecting U.S. interests at sea and on the land 

immediately adjacent to the sea. And the culture of the Navy is built on this 

idea, shaped by—and shaping—this rich heritage.

Those who go down to the sea in ships: The Navy and its Sailors go 

to sea. For Sailors, tours at sea and tours ashore are two different things entirely. 

The fi rst are “what it’s all about”; the latter are the interludes between cruises. 

Sailors often pride themselves, indeed brag about, how many months or years of 

their career they have spent at sea. The oceans are vast, and ships move slowly, 

so tours at sea are long, usually measured in months rather than weeks. The 

Navy culture is a deployment culture; deployments form the rhythm of Navy life 

for the Sailors and for their families. If “home is where the heart is,” then many, 

perhaps most, Sailors have two homes—the one with family and friends ashore 

and the other with shipmates on deployment.

 The Navy’s worldwide presence and availability “on the seven seas” 

are its hallmarks and make it usually the “fi rst on the scene” when trouble erupts 

affecting U.S. interests in any corner of the globe. To this day, the Navy says, 

and on some level believes, that when a crisis springs up, the fi rst question the 

president of the United States asks is, “Where are the carriers?”

Independence: The Navy has always been the most independent of the 

armed services. During the Navy’s formative years, when a ship went to sea, 

it cut nearly all its ties to its place of origin. The oftentimes harsh nature of the 

operating environment at sea forces the Navy to a culture of self-reliance. In the 

days before modern communications, when the captain of a ship at sea surveyed 

the horizons from the bridge, he was literally the master of all he surveyed. 

There was no one else, including superior offi cers, there.

Autonomy of command at sea: The captain, thus, was the sole word of 
87

Even after electronics created the ability to “talk to the boss” around the clock, 

anywhere in the world, the habit of autonomous operations continued to reside 

in the naval forces. “Command by Negation,” a concept unique to naval 

command and control, allows a subordinate commander the freedom to operate 

as he or she sees best, keeping authorities informed of decisions taken, until the 

senior overrides a decision. The Navy is the only service that uses the acronym 

UNODIR (UNless Otherwise DIRected) by which a commanding offi cer 

informs the boss of a proposed course of action, and only if the boss overrides 

it, will it not be taken. The subordinate is informing the boss, not asking 

permission.

Community subcultures: One other important element of the Navy 

culture does not have ancient roots, but is rather a function of the evolution 

of the Navy and, to a great extent, the evolution of technology and hardware. 

More so than members of the other services, the Sailor identifi es with a specifi c 

warfare specialty or community. The Army has its infantry, artillery, and 

armor offi cers, for example, but the centripetal force of the surface, submarine, 

aviation, and special warfare communities in the Navy exceeds anything their 

comrades in arms in other uniforms know. While some of this power comes 

from parochialism, there is a more substantial reason for it. No matter their 

branch, all Army offi cers operate on, or very near to, the ground. Land warfare 

is their specialty; they work on the ground. In contrast, some naval offi cers 

operate on the surface of the water, some underneath it, others fl y high above it, 

and still others use the water as the springboard for special operations on land: 

different warfare community, different medium in which they operate. They 

think differently because they have to—the varying mediums in which they 

operate demand it.

 Surface offi cers see themselves as the “backbone” of the naval service, 

involved in all facets of our nation’s defense from power projection ashore to 

maritime interdiction operations and law enforcement. Submariners take pride 

in being known as the “Silent Service,” referring not only to the stealthiness of 

their platform, but also to their culture of not discussing their specifi c operations 

with others. Since 1910 when the fi rst naval offi cer was ordered to fl ight 

training, naval aviators have assumed an increasingly important role in the 

Navy, and with it, a style in many ways more like those of their fellow aviators 

in other services than like those of their fellow Sailors in the surface, submarine, 

or special warfare communities. The SEALs (Sea, Air, Land) embody both a 

fl exibility beyond that of their fellow Sailors and a bond between offi cers and 

enlisted that is unique within the Navy; this latter is both the reason for and the 

product of the single Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) course that 

all SEAL offi cers and enlisted must complete.
88

has to do with its close linkage to the Marine Corps. With both branches united 

under the Department of the Navy, sharing one academy as a commissioning 

source, and bearing a history of partnership dating back to the eighteenth 

century, the Navy-Marine Corps team is able not only to infl uence events at sea, 

but also to project power ashore, defending and advancing U.S. interests around 

the world.

* * * * *

E pluribus unum. These fi ve, powerful services, diverse but complementary, 

constitute the armed forces. The challenge for the armed forces offi cer is to be 

simultaneously a master of his or her own service and a knowledgeable partner 

of the other four. Taking appropriate pride in one’s own service is in order, but 

that should never stray into arrogance regarding the other services. Different

does not mean inferior. It means different. The talented, professional offi ce —at 

any pay grade—must be ready, willing, and able to leverage the best of each of 

the services, as the mission requires. 

Joint war fi ghting is the employment of all the armed forces in a 

common effort to achieve a desired end. Joint war fi ghting is not new to the 

American armed forces. Washington’s victory at Yorktown depended on 

cooperation with naval forces (i.e., the French fl eet). Grant’s victories on 

the western rivers were built largely on Navy cooperation with Army forces 

onshore. The great amphibious landings of World War II could not have 

taken place without imaginative and detailed integration of the efforts and 

complementary capabilities of all the nation’s military forces. 

 What has changed in the twenty-fi rst century is the overlapping 

nature of individual service capabilities within a single area of operations. 

Essentially, the range of weapons and communication systems, combined with 

the ability to create and operate sophisticated information networks, promises 

to reduce the theater of war to a single battlefi eld on which effects created by 

forces of all services can be employed selectively and simultaneously throughout 

the area, much as Napoleon directed subordinate units around early nineteenthcentury battlefi elds. 

 As Napoleon’s cavalry, artillery, and infantry retained unique 

characters because of differences in capabilities, operating requirements, and 

skills, so today’s military services necessarily retain their unique identities, 

founded both on their histories and on the continuing differences in the 

functional requirements of operating in their respective mediums. Confl icting 

pressures—full operational integration of effects for greatest collective impact 

and organizational separation to maximize individual means—have required the 

development of new organizational concepts to guide the services in achieving 

the greatest possible operational integration, while maintaining their more or less 
89

 Central to twenty-fi rst century warfare by the U.S. Armed Forces is the 

concept of joint interdependence, broadly the notion that service capabilities 

provided to joint operational commanders are combined to achieve their full 

complementary effects, at the lowest possible level, to obtain the greatest 

possible collective effects.196 Achieving joint interdependence requires 

that junior offi cers understand the differing strengths and limitations of each 

service’s capabilities and know how to integrate those capabilities in their 

actions to speed mission accomplishment. Service rivalries have no place on the 

battlefi eld, where success, not credit, is the professional currency. 

 Because seamless cooperation at all levels is increasingly important, 

reciprocal respect of members of other services as fellow warriors and offi cers is 

vital. Operational integration begins with mutual understanding and respect, as 

well as shared adherence to the ethic born out of the common oath and commission which this book takes as its substantive starting point. Joint synergy, the 

ability to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts, begins with understanding the several service cultures: E pluribus unum.

1 AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 27. In a related explanation, 

contemporary airpower theorist retired Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger expressed airpower’s 

inherent strengths as Ubiquity—the ability to operate in the third dimension above the 

Earth, unconstrained by the limitations of terrain; Speed—an order of magnitude faster 

than their surface counterparts; Range—truly global; Potenc —while striking deeply in an 

enemy country, aircraft can deliver signifi cant ordinance; Flexibility — the combination 

of above factors that allow aircraft to perform a variety of missions, over a wide area, in 

a very short period of time, Philip S. Meilinger, Airwar: Theory and Practice (London, 

Frank Cass, 2003), 1-2.

2 Meilinger, Airwar, 1-2.

3 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: CowardMcCann, 1942; reprint, Washington, DC: Offi ce of Air Force History, 1983), 30.

4 Peter B. Teats, “The Road to Space Supremacy,” Address to Air Force Association Air 

and Space Conference 2004, 14 September 2004, Washington, DC, on-line, Internet, 13 

October 2004, available from http://www.afa.org/media/scripts/Supremacy_Conf.html.

5 General John P. Jumper, “Chief’s Sight Picture: The Culture of our Air and Space 

Expeditionary Force and the Value of Air Force Doctrine,” Air Force email distribution, 

5 July 2003; General John P. Jumper, “Chief’s Sight Picture: Adapting the AEF—Longer 

Deployments, More Forces,” Air Force email distribution, 4 June 2004.

6 At the request of the Army Staff, the discussion of The Army, which follows, is taken 

largely verbatim from FM 1, The Army, June 2005, and the 2004 Department of the 

Army Pamphlet, Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and 

Expeditionary Mindset

7 Profi le of the United States Army – a reference handbook 2005, Association of the 

Unites States Army, 13

8 FM 1, The Army, 1-1.
90

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid, 3-4.

12 Ibid, 1-1, 1-2.

13 Building the Future Force While Continuing to Fight The Global War on Terrorism,

Dr Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, article in October 2005 ‘Army’ magazine

14 Department of the Army White Paper, Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality 

Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, (28 April 2004), 7.

15 Ibid., 4, 5.

16 Ibid., 5-6.

17 FM 1, The Army, 1-1.

18 US Army homepage – www.army.mil

19 Ibid.

20 See Chapter 1, FM 1, The Army. 

21 Captain Bruce Stubbs, “We Are Lifesavers, Guardian, and Warriors,” Proceedings, U. 

S. Naval Institute (April 2002).

22 FMFM1-0, 7.

23 FMFM 1-0 Leading Marines, 8.

24 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the United States Marine Corps

(New York, Pocket Books, 1984), xix-xxi.

25 Ibid., xx-xxi.

26 Ibid., 1.

27 (New York: Dover Publications), 1987, 1. 

28 Margaret Tuttle Sprout, “Mahan: Evangelist of Seapower,” as reprinted in George 

Edward Thibault, editor, The Art and Practice of Military Strategy (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University), 1984, 114.

29 Adoption of any particular term in the highly fl uid transformation repertoire is 

risky. Joint interdependence seems to have the “legs” to last. Department of Defense 

DRAFT Working Paper, Major Combat Operations; Joint Operating Concept, version 

1.07 (24 March 2004). The discussion of the concept is taken from Department of the 

Army White Paper, Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and 

Expeditionary Capabilities, (28 April 2004). 
91

An Ancient and Honorable Calling

 “The choice of a line of work,” says Professor William Lee Miller, “can 

be one of the foremost ‘moral’ choices one makes.” It is, Miller continues, “a 

choice about what it is worthwhile to spend one’s life doing.”1

 Your decision 

to undertake a military career of whatever duration, to accept an offi cer’s 

commission, and to make the offi cer’s oath is particularly weighty. It requires 

no less than commitment of your life to the service of others, even unto death. 

In exchange, such service carries with it the benefi ts and burdens of life as a 

public offi cial in the world’s most successful democracy and membership in an 

ancient and honorable calling—the profession of arms. Speaking of his own 

commission, George Washington wrote to a British opponent:

I cannot conceive of any more honorable [source of offi cer’s rank], 

than that which fl ows from the uncorrupted Choice of a brave and free 

People–The purest Source & original Fountain of all Power.2

 As an armed forces offi cer, you accept responsibility both for faithful 

execution of your offi ce, to include a life of continuous study and application, 

and the maintenance of an exemplary personal life. This responsibility is owed 

to the nation, the service, fellow armed forces offi cers, all those who wear and 

have worn the nation’s uniform in any grade or capacity, as well as those who 

will come hereafter. The responsibility implies a dual obligation—to protect the 

Constitution and to pass on the honor of being an armed forces offi cer in no way 

diminished by the character of your service. 

 George Marshall was right: There is a common ground, ethically and 

morally binding all American military offi cers, of whatever service, to their 

particular branch and their fellow armed forces offi cers. This common ground 

originates with the common constitutional oath and commission. Indeed, 

it is the basis of the true professional jointness of the commissioned leaders 

of all the armed forces. Logically, it would be as true to say that all offi cers 

are commissioned into the Armed Forces of the United States, with service 

in a particular department, as it is to continue to follow the traditional form 

of commissioning them into the separate departments and binding them by a 

common oath and commission. In that sense, all offi cers are joint offi cers who 

happen to be on the establishment of their particular service. It is the common 

moral obligation that unites the separate service cultures into one fabric—E 

pluribus unum.

 As an offi cer, you must be a warrior, a leader of character, an 

unwavering defender of the Constitution, a servant of the nation, and an 

exemplar and champion of its ideals. 
92

in the face of all opposition and diffi culty. Great fl exibility and courage are 

required of very junior offi cers in today’s operating environment that the Marine 

Corps calls “the three block war” — subunits of the same formation performing 

humanitarian assistance, stability, and combat operations within three city 

blocks.3

 Likewise, great fl exibility is required of junior offi cers of the Coast 

Guard, commanding small patrol boats and isolated stations at home and abroad. 

Operating independently, far from command, they bear responsibility to enforce 

the laws and will of the nation. Endowed with a clear mandate for on-scene 

initiative, these men and women bear the responsibility for the success of their 

mission and well being and conduct of their crew. 

 It is the warrior spirit that will sustain you in times of hardship and 

discouragement; that will give you the evident confi dence and purpose to 

rally your troops for one more effort when all their will seems to be waning. 

According to Field Marshal Sir William Slim,

When you’re in command and things have gone wrong there always 

comes a pause when your men stop and–they look at you. They don’t 

say anything–they just look at you. It’s rather an awful moment for the 

commander because then he knows that their courage is ebbing, their 

will is fading, and he’s got to pull up out of himself the courage and the 

will power that will stiffen them again and make them go on.4

 The warrior ethos is Washington, almost single-handedly sustaining 

the Revolution by maintaining the will of the Continental army through his 

indomitable example; going over to the attack at Trenton and Princeton in the 

depths of the winter of 1776. It is Ulysses Grant at Fort Donelson, his line 

broken and troops driven back, riding to the front and telling his soldiers, “Fill 

your cartridge-boxes quick, and get into the line; the enemy is trying to escape, 

and he must not be permitted to do so.”5

 It is Captain Guy V. Henry, lying 

wounded on the battlefi eld of the Rose Bud, telling a friend, “It is nothing. For 

this are we soldiers.”6

 It is Admiral Chester Nimitz, ordering Admiral Raymond 

Spruance to be governed by the principle of calculated risk before the Battle 

of Midway, then sending him into battle against a superior Japanese fl eet.7

 It 

is the indomitable spirit of Admiral James Stockdale and Lieutenant Lance 

Sijan, continuing to resist the nation’s enemies in spite of injury, captivity and 

torture. And, it is the spirit that guided Captain Nathan Self and his platoon of 

Army Rangers, fi ghting their way to the top of a mountain called Takur Ghar 

in Afghanistan to recover a lost comrade, a Navy Seal, rather than leave him 

behind.204 Warriors will always place the mission fi rst, will never accept 

defeat, will never quit, and will never leave a fallen comrade behind. The Code 

of Conduct will be their guide and standard. “I am an American, fi ghting in 

the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give 

my life in their defense.”
93

are expected to win constrained by values important to the American people. 

This is increasingly important as the actions of Soldiers become immediately 

visible to the world through instantaneous communications. The application 

of national values has changed over time, depending, among other things, on 

the nature of the war and the value of its object to the American people. At a 

minimum, the American armed forces are expected to fi ght according to the 

principles of “Just War” enshrined in international conventions to which the 

nation is a party. Violation of these rules, however inconvenient or dangerous to 

one’s self or one’s unit, is contrary to the national laws of war and indicative of 

a failure of professional discipline as well as morality. When the armed forces 

are functioning properly, such violations can be expected to be prosecuted 

energetically.

 The offi cer owes his subordinates leadership. Captain Daniel Glade, 

seriously wounded in Iraq and hospitalized at the time at Walter Reed General 

Hospital, put it this way when asked what he would tell new lieutenants about 

the responsibilities of commanding troops in battle:

Tell them that they have to be the unit’s leader or commander. To do 

that you cannot be one of the troops. They do not need another buddy. 

They need a leader and expect you will step up to that. Be demanding 

on standards and tough minded in the way you decide and conduct 

yourself. Care for your troops but be a leader.9

The offi cer, as a leader of character, is responsible to protect his 

subordinates from the dehumanization that naturally follows descent into the 

maelstrom of war. The offi cer must stand above the chaos and travail and guard 

his or her people’s humanity when it is most sorely tried. To do that you must 

be very secure in the values you stand for and revere, in accordance with the 

special trust and confi dence the president and the nation have reposed in your 

patriotism, valor, fi delity, and abilities.

As an offi cer, you are expected to be a leader of character in peace 

as well as war. Offi cers are creatures of the law, acting under authority of 

the president as constitutional commander in chief, according to the laws and 

regulations laid down by Congress. As a public fi gure entrusted with the means 

of war and authority over the lives of fellow citizens, offi cers’ conduct must 

conform at all times to the highest standards of respect, honor, duty, service, 

integrity, excellence, courage, commitment, and loyalty. To do less undermines 

the credit of your service, as well as the professional standing of the corps of 

American armed forces offi cers as public trustees of the nation’s welfare and 

security.
94

while bearing to it, true faith and allegiance. This support and defense is 

provided by well and faithfully discharging the duties of the offi ce. Support and 

defense of the Constitution requires, fi rst of all, personal subordination to the 

civil offi cials established by the Constitution and the Congress to hold ultimate 

command on behalf of the American people. By their oaths, armed forces 

offi cers are co-opted for the duration of their commission to support, even with 

their lives, the legal decisions of their civilian leaders, even when they believe 

they are ill-founded or ill-advised. As Army Chief of Staff General Matthew 

Ridgway told his subordinates:

The professional military man has three primary responsibilities:

First, to give his honest, fearless, objective, professional, military 

opinion of what he needs to do the job given him.

Next, if what he is given is less than the minimum he regards as 

essential, to give his superiors an honest, fearless, objective opinion of 

the consequences.

Finally, he has the duty, whatever the fi nal decision, to do the utmost 

with whatever he is furnished.10

Whatever the historical record, it is diffi cult to see how true faith and allegiance 

to the Constitution permits the offi cer in uniform to lobby in opposition to 

policy decisions with which they are not in agreement. At the same time, 

it hardly permits of withholding honestly held professional views from 

constitutionally empowered authorities when called upon to provide them.

 The armed forces exist to serve the nation. Broadly speaking, the 

service we provide is national defense. This service demands unconditional 

commitment and unlimited liability. Armed forces offi cers stand in relation to 

the nation and its government not just as creatures of law but as members of a 

set of specialist professions, permitted substantial collective control over their 

own recruitment, training, and performance in exchange for reliability both in 

the quality of their conduct and effectiveness of their practice. This relationship 

imposes collective obligations to create new knowledge and to enforce high 

standards of conduct and performance on the membership of the armed forces 

and, particularly, on the established leadership—the offi cer corps.

 Armed forces offi cers must continuously assess their technical skills 

and upgrade them by study and practice. You must be imaginative, adaptive, 

and able to respond quickly to new circumstances and threats. You must be 

self-confi dent enough in your own skills and abilities to assume responsibility 
95

self-aware, self-refl ective, and self-critical. The American people entrust their 

sons and daughters to your care. Competence in every aspect of the profession 

of arms is a moral obligation.

 You will not always fi nd the conduct of your fellow professionals to be 

up to standard. As a member of a profession you will have an obligation to do 

something to address perceived failures, by questioning, by encouraging, and in 

egregious cases, by being willing to act. The standard is always what is good for 

the nation, not what is good in the short term for the profession. Narrow loyalty 

to the latter can lead to individual and collective deceptions that, in the end, are 

corrosive of the honor of the profession and all its members. What is good for 

America is always good for the armed forces.

 The armed forces offi cer carries on an enduring tradition of citizen 

service to the nation. Your conduct must honor the ideals and principles 

enshrined in the Declaration of Independence: that all men are created equal, 

that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 

among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. The offi cer’s 

demonstrated character, marked by integrity, courage, capability, and 

commitment, must be such that he or she is worth following into harm’s way 

even at risk of life and limb. The offi cer as a public fi gure must model values 

of a higher standard than those observed by the popular culture, and they must 

do so without succumbing to the conceit of believing they are better than their 

masters.

Only when the military articulates and lives up to its highest values can 

it retain the nobility of the profession of arms. Only when it retains a 

proper sense of its role in American democratic life does it retain the 

trust and respect [George C. Marshall] spoke of. Only a military that 

daily lives out its values and feels its connection to the citizens is a 

military that engenders the respect and loyalty of the nation and keeps 

it from being feared.1

1

 You have entered an ancient and honorable calling, a life of discipline, 

hardship, and danger. It is, therefore, a heroic life, for “one who truly lives 

under obedience is fully disposed to execute instantly and unhesitatingly 

whatever is enjoined him [or her], no matter whether it be very hard to do.”12 

At the end of your service, your reward will be the satisfaction of knowing that 

your character, competence, and leadership made a difference in your life and 

for the lives of your countrymen.

1 William Lee Miller, Lincoln’s Virtues (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 92.

2 George Washington to Thomas Gage, 19 August 1775, in George 

Washington, George Washington: Writings, John H. Rhodehamel, ed. (New 
96

3 The concept was fi rst articulated by General Charles Krulak before the 

National Press Club on 10 October 1997. Vital Speeches of the Day, 64, no. 5 

(15 December 1997): 139-142.

4 Field Marshal Sir William Slim, “Higher Command in War,” 1952 Kermit 

Roosevelt Lecture, audio tape, Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

5 Quoted in J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Bloomington, 

IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 88.

6 John F. Finerty, Warpath and Bivouac (Chicago: M. A. Donohue & Co., 

1890), 130.

7 Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. 

Spruance (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1974), 123-124. 

8 Bradley Graham, “Bravery and Breakdowns in a Ridgetop Battle: 7 

Americans Died in Rescue Effort That Revealed Mistakes and Determination,” 

Washington Post (24 May 2002), A1.

9 Notes provided by General (Ret) Frederick M. Franks Jr. to the students of MS 

497, Battle Command, at the United States Military Academy, West Point on 8 

March 2005.

10 Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway as Told to 

Harold H. Martin (New York: Harper, 1956), 346.

11 Martin L. Cook, “Moral Foundations of Military Service,” Parameters, 30, 

no. 1 (Spring, 2000): 117-129, on-line, Internet, 23 May 2004, available from: 

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00spring/cook.htm. 

12 Jules J. Toner, S. J., quoted in Chris Lowney, Heroic Leadership: Best 

Practices From a 450-year-old Company that Changed the World (Chicago: 

Loyola Press, 2003), 49.
97

Appendix 1: Founding Documents
98
99

www.archives.gov April 2, 2004 

The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription

IN CONGRESS, July 4, 1776.

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to 

dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to 

assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which 

the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the 

opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 

them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 

are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 

are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, 

Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 

consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes 

destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, 

and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 

organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect 

their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments 

long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and 

accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to 

suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the 

forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and 

usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce 

them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off 

such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such 

has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity 

which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The 

history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and 

usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny 

over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the 

public good.

He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing 

importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be 

obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
100

people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the 

Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. 

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, 

and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of 

fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. 

He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly 

fi rmness his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be 

elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have 

returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the 

mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions 

within.

He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose 

obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass 

others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new 

Appropriations of Lands.

He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws 

for establishing Judiciary powers.

He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offi ces, 

and the amount and payment of their salaries.

He has erected a multitude of New Offi ces, and sent hither swarms of Offi cers to 

harrass our people, and eat out their substance.

He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent 

of our legislatures.

He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil 

power.

He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our 

constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of 

pretended Legislation:

For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which 

they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:

For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:

For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent: 

For depriving us in many cases, of the benefi ts of Trial by Jury:

For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences

For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, 

establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so 

as to render it at once an example and fi t instrument for introducing the same 

absolute rule into these Colonies:

For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering 

fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:

For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with 

power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
101

waging War against us.

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed 

the lives of our people. 

He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat 

the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances 

of Cruelty & perfi dy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally 

unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.

He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear 

Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and 

Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. 

He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to 

bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose 

known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and 

conditions.

In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most 

humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated 

injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may defi ne a 

Tyrant, is unfi t to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have 

warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an 

unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances 

of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice 

and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common 

kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our 

connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice 

and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which 

denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, 

Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General 

Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the 

rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People 

of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies 

are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection 

between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; 

and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, 

conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts 

and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of 

this Declaration, with a fi rm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we 

mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.
102

Column 1

Georgia:

 Button Gwinnett

 Lyman Hall

 George Walton

Column 2

North Carolina:

 William Hooper

 Joseph Hewes

 John Penn

South Carolina:

 Edward Rutledge

 Thomas Heyward, Jr.

 Thomas Lynch, Jr.

 Arthur Middleton

Column 3

 Massachusetts:

 John Hancock 

 Maryland:

 Samuel Chase

 William Paca

 Thomas Stone

 Charles Carroll of Carrollton

Virginia:

 George Wythe

 Richard Henry Lee

 Thomas Jefferson

 Benjamin Harrison

 Thomas Nelson, Jr.

 Francis Lightfoot Lee

 Carter Braxton

Column 4

Pennsylvania:

 Robert Morris

 Benjamin Rush

 Benjamin Franklin

 John Morton

 George Clymer

 James Smith

 George Taylor
103

 George Ross

Delaware:

 Caesar Rodney

 George Read

 Thomas McKean

Column 5

New York:

 William Floyd

 Philip Livingston

 Francis Lewis

 Lewis Morris

New Jersey:

 Richard Stockton

 John Witherspoon

 Francis Hopkinson

 John Hart

 Abraham Clark

Column 6

New Hampshire:

 Josiah Bartlett

 William Whipple

Massachusetts:

 Samuel Adams

 

 John Adams

 Robert Treat Paine

 Elbridge Gerry

Rhode Island:

 Stephen Hopkins

 William Ellery

Connecticut:

 Roger Sherman

 Samuel Huntington

 William Williams

 Oliver Wolcott

New Hampshire:

 Matthew Thornton 
104

Page URL: 

http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/declaration_transcript.

html

U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20408 • 1-86-NARA-NARA • 

1-866-272-6272 
105

 www.archives.gov April 2, 2004 

The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription

Note: The following text is a transcription of the Constitution in its original 

form. 

Items that are underlined have since been amended or superseded.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 

establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, 

promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 

and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 

of America.

Article. I.

Section. 1.

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 

States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2.

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 

second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State 

shall have the Qualifi cations requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch 

of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age 

of twenty fi ve Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and 

who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be 

chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 

States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective 

Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free 

Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding 

Indians not taxed, three fi fths of all other Persons.The actual Enumeration shall 

be made within three Years after the fi rst Meeting of the Congress of the United 

States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they 

shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for 

every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; 
106

be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence 

Plantations one, Connecticut fi ve, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania 

eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina fi ve, South 

Carolina fi ve, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive 

Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fi ll such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Offi cers; and 

shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section. 3.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 

State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall 

have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the fi rst Election, 

they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the 

Senators of the fi rst Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, 

of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at 

the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second 

Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess 

of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary 

Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fi ll 

such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 

Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 

when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but 

shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Offi cers, and also a President pro tempore, 

in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Offi ce of 

President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for 

that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affi rmation. When the President of the 

United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be 

convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
107

or Profi t under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be 

liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to 

Law.

Section. 4.

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 

Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 

the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as 

to the Places of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting 

shall be on the fi rst Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a 

different Day.

Section. 5.

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifi cations of its 

own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; 

but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to 

compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such 

Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members 

for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a 

Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time 

publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require 

Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any 

question shall, at the Desire of one fi fth of those Present, be entered on the 

Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of 

the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in 

which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section. 6.

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their 

Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United 

States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the 

Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their 
108

Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 

Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, 

be appointed to any civil Offi ce under the Authority of the United States, which 

shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased 

during such time; and no Person holding any Offi ce under the United States, 

shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Offi ce.

Section. 7.

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but 

the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 

Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 

United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his 

Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the 

Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.If after such 

Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be 

sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise 

be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become 

a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by 

yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill 

shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not 

be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall 

have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had 

signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which 

Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate 

and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 

Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; 

and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being 

disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of 

Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case 

of a Bill.

Section. 8.

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 

Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 

Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be 

uniform throughout the United States;
109

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 

with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the 

subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fi x the 

Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin 

of the United States;

To establish Post Offi ces and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 

Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 

and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To defi ne and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 

Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 

concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall 

be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 

Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 

suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 

governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 

States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Offi cers, and 

the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by 

Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District 
110

the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United 

States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent 

of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of 

Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 

Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 

Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 

Offi cer thereof.

Section. 9.

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 

shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the 

Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed 

on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 

in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the 

Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to 

the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, 

one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 

Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 

Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 

time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person 

holding any Offi ce of Profi t or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of 

the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Offi ce, or Title, of any kind 

whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
111

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters 

of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but 

gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, 

ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any 

Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties 

on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing 

it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any 

State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United 

States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the 

Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep 

Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact 

with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually 

invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Article. II.

Section. 1.

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 

America. He shall hold his Offi ce during the Term of four Years, and, together 

with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 

Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives 

to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Offi ce of Trust or Profi t under the United States, 

shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two 

Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with 

themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the 

Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit 

sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the 

President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the 

Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certifi cates, and the Votes 

shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be 

the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors 

appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an 
112

chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, 

then from the fi ve highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse 

the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, 

the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this purpose 

shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a 

Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the 

Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the 

Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who 

have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on 

which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the 

United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at 

the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Offi ce of 

President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Offi ce who shall not have 

attained to the Age of thirty fi ve Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident 

within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Offi ce, or of his Death, 

Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Offi ce, 

the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law 

provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the 

President and Vice President, declaring what Offi cer shall then act as President, 

and such Offi cer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a 

President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, 

which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he 

shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other 

Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Offi ce, he shall take the following Oath 

or Affi rmation:--”I do solemnly swear (or affi rm) that I will faithfully execute 

the Offi ce of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, 

preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

Section. 2.

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 

United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 

actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of 

the principal Offi cer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject 
113

grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in 

Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 

make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall 

nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 

Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, 

and all other Offi cers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 

otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress 

may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Offi cers, as they think proper, 

in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fi ll up all Vacancies that may happen during 

the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End 

of their next Session.

Section. 3.

He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the 

Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge 

necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 

Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with 

Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he 

shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he 

shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all 

the Offi cers of the United States.

Section. 4.

The President, Vice President and all civil Offi cers of the United States, shall be 

removed from Offi ce on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, 

or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Article III.

Section. 1.

The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, 

and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 

and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 

their Offi ces during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for 

their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 

Continuance in Offi ce.
114

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 

this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 

shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 

other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 

Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to 

Controversies between two or more States;-- between a State and Citizens of 

another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the 

same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a 

State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and 

those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original 

Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 

have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 

under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; 

and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 

committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such 

Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section. 3.

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against 

them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person 

shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the 

same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no 

Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except 

during the Life of the Person attainted.

Article. IV.

Section. 1.

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 

and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general 

Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 

be proved, and the Effect thereof.
115

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 

Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who 

shall fl ee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the 

executive Authority of the State from which he fl ed, be delivered up, to be 

removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 

escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, 

be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim 

of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Section. 3.

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new 

State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor 

any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, 

without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the 

Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 

Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 

States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any 

Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section. 4.

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 

Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 

Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot 

be convened), against domestic Violence.

Article. V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 

shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 

Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 

proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents 

and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratifi ed by the Legislatures of 

three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, 

as the one or the other Mode of Ratifi cation may be proposed by the Congress; 
116

y p

thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the fi rst and fourth 

Clauses in the Ninth Section of the fi rst Article; and that no State, without its 

Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article. VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 

Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, 

as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the 

several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Offi cers, both of the 

United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affi rmation, 

to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a 

Qualifi cation to any Offi ce or public Trust under the United States.

Article. VII.

The Ratifi cation of the Conventions of nine States, shall be suffi cient for the 

Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

The Word, “the,” being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the 

fi rst Page, the Word “Thirty” being partly written on an Erazure in the fi fteenth 

Line of the fi rst Page, The Words “is tried” being interlined between the 

thirty second and thirty third Lines of the fi rst Page and the Word “the” being 

interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page. 

Attest William Jackson Secretary

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the 

Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven 

hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of 

America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our 

Names,

G°. Washington

Presidt and deputy from Virginia
117

Geo: Read

Gunning Bedford jun

John Dickinson

Richard Bassett

Jaco: Broom

Maryland

James McHenry

Dan of St Thos. Jenifer

Danl. Carroll

Virginia

John Blair

James Madison Jr.

North Carolina

Wm. Blount

Richd. Dobbs Spaight

Hu Williamson

South Carolina

J. Rutledge

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney

Charles Pinckney

Pierce Butler

Georgia

William Few

Abr Baldwin

New Hampshire

John Langdon

Nicholas Gilman

Massachusetts

Nathaniel Gorham

Rufus King

Connecticut

Wm. Saml. Johnson

Roger Sherman
118

Alexander Hamilton

New Jersey

Wil: Livingston

David Brearley

Wm. Paterson

Jona: Dayton

Pennsylvania

B Franklin

Thomas Miffl in

Robt. Morris

Geo. Clymer

Thos. FitzSimons

Jared Ingersoll

James Wilson

Gouv Morris

For biographies of the nonsigning delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 

see the Founding Fathers page. 

Page URL: 

http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/constitution_transcript.

html

U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20408 • 1-86-NARA-NARA • 

1-866-272-6272 
119

U.S. NATIONAL ACHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

 www.archives.gov August 13, 2004 

The Bill of Rights: A Transcription

Note: The following text is a transcription of the fi rst ten amendments to the 

Constitution in their original form. These amendments were ratifi ed December 

15, 1791, and form what is known as the “Bill of Rights.”

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 

the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 

Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 

of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 

of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affi rmation, 

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 

unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 

in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 

War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 

case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
120

without just compensation.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 

public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 

have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 

by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 

obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 

defence.

Amendment VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 

dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 

shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according 

to the rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fi nes imposed, nor cruel and 

unusual punishments infl icted.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 

deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 

prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 

people.

Note: The capitalization and punctuation in this version is from the enrolled 

original of the Joint Resolution of Congress proposing the Bill of Rights, which 

is on permanent display in the Rotunda of the National Archives Building, 

Washington, D.C. 
121

www.archives.gov August 13, 2004 

The Constitution: Amendments 11-27

Constitutional Amendments 1-10 make up what is known as The Bill of Rights.

Amendments 11-27 are listed below.

AMENDMENT XI 

Passed by Congress March 4, 1794. Ratifi ed February 7, 1795.

Note: Article III, section 2, of the Constitution was modifi ed by amendment 11.

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

AMENDMENT XII 

Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratifi ed June 15, 1804.

Note: A portion of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution was superseded by the 

12th amendment.

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President 

and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same 

state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as 

President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they 

shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons 

voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 

they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of 

the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; -- the President of the 

Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open 

all the certifi cates and the votes shall then be counted; -- The person having the 

greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number 

be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 

such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding 

three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives 

shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 

the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one 
122

two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to 

a choice. [And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President 

whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day 

of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in 

case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. --]* The 

person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the 

Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 

appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers 

on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose 

shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of 

the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally 

ineligible to the offi ce of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of 

the United States.

*Superseded by section 3 of the 20th amendment.

AMENDMENT XIII 

Passed by Congress January 31, 1865. Ratifi ed December 6, 1865.

Note: A portion of Article IV, section 2, of the Constitution was superseded by 

the 13th amendment.

Section 1.

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 

States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XIV 

Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratifi ed July 9, 1868.

Note: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modifi ed by section 2 of the 

14th amendment.
123

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2.

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 

their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 

excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for 

the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 

Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial offi cers of a State, or 

the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants 

of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, 

or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 

the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the 

number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 

twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3.

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 

President and Vice-President, or hold any offi ce, civil or military, under the 

United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 

member of Congress, or as an offi cer of the United States, or as a member of any 

State legislature, or as an executive or judicial offi cer of any State, to support the 

Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 

against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress 

may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 

debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 

insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 

nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 

insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 

emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 

held illegal and void.
124

The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 

provisions of this article.

*Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment.

AMENDMENT XV

Passed by Congress February 26, 1869. Ratifi ed February 3, 1870.

Section 1.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 

by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 

condition of servitude--

Section 2.

The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate 

legislation.

AMENDMENT XVI 

Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratifi ed February 3, 1913.

Note: Article I, section 9, of the Constitution was modifi ed by amendment 16.

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 

whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 

without regard to any census or enumeration.

AMENDMENT XVII 

Passed by Congress May 13, 1912. Ratifi ed April 8, 1913.

Note: Article I, section 3, of the Constitution was modifi ed by the 17th amendment.
125

State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have 

one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifi cations requisite for 

electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, 

the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fi ll such 

vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the 

executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fi ll the 

vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any 

Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

AMENDMENT XVIII

Passed by Congress December 18, 1917. Ratifi ed January 16, 1919. Repealed 

by amendment 21.

Section 1.

After one year from the ratifi cation of this article the manufacture, sale, or 

transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or 

the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the 

jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2.

The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this 

article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3.

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratifi ed as an 

amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as 

provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission 

hereof to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XIX 

Passed by Congress June 4, 1919. Ratifi ed August 18, 1920.
126

by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XX 

Passed by Congress March 2, 1932. Ratifi ed January 23, 1933.

Note: Article I, section 4, of the Constitution was modifi ed by section 2 of this 

amendment. In addition, a portion of the 12th amendment was superseded by 

section 3.

Section 1.

The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th 

day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d 

day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article 

had not been ratifi ed; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

Section 2.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting 

shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a 

different day.

Section 3.

If, at the time fi xed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President 

elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a 

President shall not have been chosen before the time fi xed for the beginning 

of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice 

President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualifi ed; 

and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President 

elect nor a Vice President shall have qualifi ed, declaring who shall then act 

as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and 

such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have 

qualifi ed.

Section 4.

The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons 

from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever 

the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death 
127

whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Section 5.

Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the 

ratifi cation of this article.

Section 6.

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratifi ed as an 

amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 

States within seven years from the date of its submission.

AMENDMENT XXI 

Passed by Congress February 20, 1933. Ratifi ed December 5, 1933.

Section 1.

The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is 

hereby repealed.

Section 2.

The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the 

United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of 

the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 3.

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratifi ed as an 

amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided 

in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to 

the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XXII 

Passed by Congress March 21, 1947. Ratifi ed February 27, 1951.

Section 1.

No person shall be elected to the offi ce of the President more than twice, and no 

person who has held the offi ce of President, or acted as President, for more than 
128

elected to the offi ce of President more than once. But this Article shall not apply 

to any person holding the offi ce of President when this Article was proposed 

by Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the offi ce 

of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article 

becomes operative from holding the offi ce of President or acting as President 

during the remainder of such term.

Section 2.

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratifi ed as an 

amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 

States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the 

Congress.

AMENDMENT XXIII 

Passed by Congress June 16, 1960. Ratifi ed March 29, 1961.

Section 1.

The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall 

appoint in such manner as Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number 

of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be 

entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; 

they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be 

considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to 

be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform 

such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

Section 2.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXIV 

Passed by Congress August 27, 1962. Ratifi ed January 23, 1964.

Section 1.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election 

for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or 
129

United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other tax.

Section 2.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXV 

Passed by Congress July 6, 1965. Ratifi ed February 10, 1967.

Note: Article II, section 1, of the Constitution was affected by the 25th 

amendment.

Section 1.

In case of the removal of the President from offi ce or of his death or resignation, 

the Vice President shall become President.

Section 2.

Whenever there is a vacancy in the offi ce of the Vice President, the President 

shall nominate a Vice President who shall take offi ce upon confi rmation by a 

majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section 3.

Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 

and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he 

is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his offi ce, and until he transmits 

to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be 

discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section 4.

Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal offi cers 

of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law 

provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 

of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is 

unable to discharge the powers and duties of his offi ce, the Vice President shall 

immediately assume the powers and duties of the offi ce as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the 

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration 
130

the Vice President and a majority of either the principal offi cers of the executive 

department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit 

within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 

of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is 

unable to discharge the powers and duties of his offi ce. Thereupon Congress 

shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if 

not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter 

written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days 

after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both 

Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 

his offi ce, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting 

President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his 

offi ce.

AMENDMENT XXVI 

Passed by Congress March 23, 1971. Ratifi ed July 1, 1971.

Note: Amendment 14, section 2, of the Constitution was modifi ed by section 1 

of the 26th amendment.

Section 1.

The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, 

to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 

account of age.

Section 2.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXVII 

Originally proposed Sept. 25, 1789. Ratifi ed May 7, 1992. 
131

tatives, shall take effect, until an election of representatives shall have intervened. 

Page URL: 

http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/charters/

constitution_amendments_11-27.html

U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20408 • 1-86-NARA-NARA • 

1-866-272-6272 
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Appendix 2: Authorizing Statutes for Armed Forces
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135

TITLE 10 , Subtitle D, PART I, CHAPTER 807 

Sec. 8062. - Policy; composition; aircraft authorization 

 (a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Air Force that is capable, in 

conjunction with the other armed forces, of - 

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of 

the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, 

and any areas occupied by the United States; 

(2) supporting the national policies; 

(3) implementing the national objectives; and 

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil 

the peace and security of the United States. 

(b) There is a United States Air Force within the Department of the Air Force. 

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and 

service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped 

primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It 

is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective 

prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with 

integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime 

components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war. 

(d) The Air Force consists of - 

(1) the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard of the United States, 

the Air National Guard while in the service of the United 

States, and the Air Force Reserve; 

(2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Air 

Force without component; and 

(3) all Air Force units and other Air Force organizations, with their 

installations and supporting and auxiliary combat, training, administrative, and logistic elements; and all members of the Air Force, including 

those not assigned to units; necessary to form the basis for a complete 

and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a 

national emergency. 
136

strength authorized by law pursuant to section 115 of this title, the authorized 

strength of the Air Force is 70 Regular Air Force groups and such separate 

Regular Air Force squadrons, reserve groups, and supporting and auxiliary 

regular and reserve units as required. 

(f) There are authorized for the Air Force 24,000 serviceable aircraft or 

225,000 airframe tons of serviceable aircraft, whichever the Secretary of the 

Air Force considers appropriate to carry out this section. This subsection does 

not apply to guided missiles 
137

TITLE 10, Subtitle B, PART I, CHAPTER 307. 

Sec. 3062. - Policy; composition; organized peace establishment 

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of - 

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of 

the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and 

any areas occupied by the United States; 

(2) supporting the national policies; 

(3) implementing the national objectives; and 

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil 

the peace and security of the United States. 

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land 

combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be 

organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for 

prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible 

for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of 

war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint 

mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the 

Army to meet the needs of war. 

(c) The Army consists of - 

(1) the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, 

the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States and 

the Army Reserve; and 

(2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Army 

without component. 

(d) The organized peace establishment of the Army consists of all - 

(1) military organizations of the Army with their installations and supporting and auxiliary elements, including combat, training, administrative, and logistic elements; and 

(2) members of the Army, including those not assigned to units; 

necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization 

for the national defense in the event of a national emergency 
138

TITLE 10, Subtitle C, PART I, CHAPTER 507. 

Sec. 5062. - United States Navy: composition; functions 

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval 

combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. 

The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt 

and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for 

the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of 

war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint 

mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the 

Navy to meet the needs of war. 

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof 

within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and 

service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air 

transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques 

involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder 

of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel 

necessary therefor. 

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, 

and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern 

as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, 

and the Navy 
139

TITLE 10, Subtitle C, PART I, CHAPTER 507. 

Sec. 5063. - United States Marine Corps: composition; functions 

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, 

and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic 

therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fl eet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fl eet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval 

bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the 

prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide 

detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall 

provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval 

stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may 

direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with 

the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. 

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the 

Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, 

technique, and equipment used by landing forces. 

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint 

mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine 

Corps to meet the needs of war 
140

TITLE 14, PART I, CHAPTER 1. 

Sec. 1. - Establishment of Coast Guard 

The Coast Guard as established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service 

and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times. The Coast 

Guard shall be a service in the Department of Homeland Security, except when 

operating as a service in the Navy 

Sec. 2. - Primary duties 

The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable 

Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the 

jurisdiction of the United States; shall engage in maritime air surveillance or 

interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United 

States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for 

the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and 

waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters 

not specifi cally delegated by law to some other executive department; shall 

develop, establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of 

national defense, aids to maritime navigation, ice-breaking facilities, and rescue 

facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters 

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; shall, pursuant to international 

agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities 

on, under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the 

jurisdiction of the United States; shall engage in oceanographic research of the 

high seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and shall 

maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy 

in time of war, including the fulfi llment of Maritime Defense Zone command 

responsibilities.. 
141

Appendix 3: Service Values
142
143

Service Values of the Armed Forces

Air Force Army Navy & Marine Corps

 Loyalty 

Integrity First Duty Honor

 Respect

Service Before Self Selfl ess Service Courage

 Honor

Excellence in All We Do Integrity Commitment

 Personal Courage

Coast Guard

 Honor

 Respect

 Devotion to Duty

 
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145

Appendix 4: Code of Conduct
146
147

Code of Conduct

for

Members of the United States Armed Forces 

I

I am an American, fi ghting in the forces which guard my country and our way of 

life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. 

II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender 

the members of my command while they still have the means to resist. 

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make 

every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor 

special favors from the enemy. 

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will 

give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my 

comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful 

orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way. 

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give 

name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further 

questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements 

disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. 

VI

I will never forget that I am an American, fi ghting for freedom, responsible for 

my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will 

trust in my God and in the United States of America. 

Executive Order 10631 (1955) as amended by EO 11382 (1967) and EO 12633 

(1988)
148
149

Appendix 5: Keeping Your House in Order
150
151

 Offi cers are expected to live balanced lives. They are expected to 

keep their professional and personal affairs, “their house,” in order, to practice 

self-discipline on and off-duty, and to treat all moral, legal, and fi nancial 

obligations responsibly. Offi cers anticipate deployment or periods of temporary 

duty with little or no advance notice. They must keep their fi nancial and legal 

affairs current at all times, anticipating they may be called away for extended 

periods with very little time to tie up loose ends. Because military service 

places many restrictions on the freedom of movement, domicile, and conduct of 

all service members, offi cers assume a degree of responsibility for the welfare 

of their subordinates that is not typical of civilian managers. Offi cers are not 

only responsible that their houses are in order, but they must ensure that those 

of their subordinates are taken care of as well. Congress has enshrined this 

responsibility in the sections of Title 10, U.S. Code that create the service 

departments:

All commanding offi cers and others in authority in the [Army, Naval 

Service, Air Force] are required ... to take all necessary and proper 

measures, under the laws, regulations and customs of the [Army, Naval 

Service, Air Force], to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical 

well being, and the general welfare of the offi cers and enlisted persons 

under their command and charge.1

 With that said, it is necessary to be clear about what offi cers owe their 

troops and crews. It honors your subordinates to remember they are Soldiers, 

Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Airmen; they are not your children or 

minor dependents. They are women and men who have voluntarily accepted the 

risks and necessary hardship that military service entails. All service members 

must accept primary responsibility for the character of their personal affairs, 

while their leaders must stand ready to provide general oversight, advice, 

counsel, and assistance. 

This chapter describes keeping your house in order under the heads of personal 

responsibility, property accountability, and the balanced life.

Personal Responsibility

 Offi cers are on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They are 

responsible for living a respectable public life and their private affairs must 

be such that should they become known, they meet the standards of moral and 

ethical rectitude demanded by the public and the standards of the profession. 

Any private act that casts doubt on an offi cer’s integrity, judgment, and 

reliability is grounds for negative evaluation of his or her career potential and, 

if serious enough, separation. Offi cers in sensitive situations will almost 
152

when other actions refl ect badly on their judgment or reliability. Offi cers must 

be temperate in their use of alcohol, avoid overtly sexual public conduct and 

situations, especially in the presence of subordinates, and abstain entirely from 

illegal drugs. There is no faster way to terminate an offi cer’s career than driving 

under the infl uence or showing up positive on a drug urinalysis.

 It is particularly important for new offi cers to maintain fi nancial 

stability. It goes without saying that offi cers are responsible for providing 

for the welfare of their dependents. They are also expected to settle all their 

just debts without fail. Most new offi cers have a daunting array of routine 

indebtedness: education loans, car payments, operating expenses, uniforms, and 

expenses related to setting up housekeeping. There are other routine expenses 

such as rent, utilities, eating, laundry and dry cleaning, and maintaining your 

appearance. The armed forces have a confusing and archaic pay system. 

Members draw different salaries depending on location, specialty, status, 

whether they are provided government quarters or live on the local economy, 

whether they are deployed or at home station, whether they receive rations 

in-kind, or buy their own. It is essential that they understand their eligibility 

for the various allowances that fl esh out the monthly paycheck and actively 

manage their credit and indebtedness so it does not become a matter requiring 

intervention of the chain of command to protect the reputation of the service. 

 It is important when establishing eligibility for an allowance that the 

offi cers understand the circumstances under which eligibility for allowances 

ends. Many supplementary payments require presentation of receipts, so offi cers 

must develop habits of requesting and keeping records of expenditure required 

in performance of duty. Receipts documenting most expenses other than rations 

must accompany claims for reimbursement for travel and temporary duty, and 

there are a host of restrictions governing routine temporary duty arrangements, 

particularly acceptable lodging arrangements, about which service members 

should check with their local travel and fi nance offi ces prior to undertaking any 

obligation for payment that may turn out to be nonreimbursable. It is a fact that 

while all services are governed by the same Joint Travel Regulations (JTRs), 

services and local authorities often interpret the requirements of the JTRs 

differently.

 The ease of establishing credit card accounts and running up excessive 

short-term indebtedness at a high interest rate is a genuine threat to new offi cers, 

new families, and enlisted subordinates. Offi cers must become experts on 

the Military Pay system, both to manage their own affairs and those of their 

subordinates. In addition, as a matter of personal survival, offi cers must practice 

self-discipline in managing their debt. It is essential to have a budget—one that 

provides for systematic savings against the likelihood of a rainy day. 
153

member’s loss of life. Some kinds of life insurance can serve both as a form of 

savings and provide an immediate estate in event of death. Even single offi cers 

should be aware that most life insurance policies are much less expensive when 

acquired early in a career. The government underwritten Serviceman’s Group 

Life Insurance (SGLI) provides a good foundation for a balanced insurance and 

savings program. Generally, service members will want to create a combination 

of immediately available savings, life insurance, and investment to prepare for 

their retirement, as well as provide for unanticipated fi nancial requirements and 

provide for their families.

 Besides managing their fi nances responsibly on a day-to-day basis, 

offi cers and all military members must remain mobile. An essential feature 

of mobility is ensuring rental contracts have a military clause that permits 

termination on short notice in the event of receipt of orders. Because most 

military personnel are paid by electronic deposit to a fi nancial institution of 

their choice, all offi cers must establish an account to receive deposits. It is 

convenient to set this up for longer durations, rather than a single assignment, 

with an institution that caters to military members and is familiar with the 

mobile life style. Married offi cers must ensure continuity of support to 

dependent family members. Consideration should be given to opening a joint 

bank account. Nevertheless, dependent spouses should know what arrangements 

are in place prior to a member’s deployment.

 Commissioned leaders are responsible for ensuring that their 

subordinates have robust plans for the welfare of their families should the 

service member(s) be deployed on short notice. Single parents and married 

service couples are required to have family care plans that provide for the 

safekeeping of children in case of deployment. Offi cers must ensure their 

subordinates’ plans are up to date and if they fall into one or the other of these 

categories that their own arrangements are current, foolproof, and that they 

have a plan B. Military families tend to live on-base or in communities close 

to home bases. It is traditional for military communities to take care of their 

own, particularly during periods of deployment. Each service’s traditions 

and standards are unique and have grown up to meet their particular rhythm 

of absences. Suffi ce to say, commanders at all levels realize that confi dence 

in the welfare of family members during absence is an element of combat 

power. Offi cers have a positive responsibility to ensure their own subordinates 

anticipate the needs of their families during absences and that family networks 

exist to help those who suffer loss or unexpected emergencies while the service 

member is absent.

 Offi cers should have a will. Personal property insurance is useful, 

particularly to cover losses of high-priced property like computers and other 
154

insurance to offset medical expenses for family care not covered by TRICARE, 

the Department of Defense-managed health care system. 

 Offi cers should build a personal fi le of copies of all important 

offi cial documents and orders and keep it up to date. A current inventory of 

household goods is also useful. Most offi cers should have powers of attorney 

that permit someone to act in their stead if they are deployed without notice. 

Apartments have to be secured or closed (a housing allowance usually stops 

upon deployment for single service members), cars secured, bills paid, and so 

on. Marital status alone does not automatically entitle a spouse to act in the 

member’s name. Because powers of attorney sign over great authority over 

one’s affairs to another, they should not be entered into without legal advice 

from the Staff Judge Advocate Offi ce. As a general rule, powers of attorney 

should be limited to performance of specifi c functions limiting the amount of 

harm that can be done if the trusted agent makes a mistake or breaks the trust 

implied in the instrument. 

Property Accountability

 There are few pitfalls that more often ensnare new offi cers than the 

responsibility to maintain accountability of government property in their care. 

Each service has its own regulations governing the detail of how accountability 

is to be maintained, however, in all services, the failure to maintain 

accountability and care for government property can lead to heavy personal 

fi nancial liability—even where the property is not in the responsible party’s 

immediate care. Some general rules are worth recounting. 

 First of all, offi cers must know what property they are accountable 

for. Ordinarily this is documented at unit level. However, many tool sets have 

separate components, identifi cation of which requires reference to other sources 

or technical documents. Normally a unit supply offi cer or noncommissioned 

offi cer can identify the proper documents and listings.

 Commanders are responsible for all the property assigned to their unit. 

They meet this responsibility by seeing to it that a chain of accountability is 

established from themselves to those who use the equipment to perform their 

duties. Where commanders fail to establish such formal accountability, they 

generally retain personal accountability as a matter of command. Even when the 

commander or subordinate leader has established user accountability by tying a 

particular user to a piece of equipment, the leader is responsible for ensuring that 

the property is maintained and present. Ordinarily the leader does this through 

a regular and systematic program of routine inspections and accountability 

inventories. Where equipment is found to be missing or damaged, the 
155

to establish fi nancial liability for the loss to the government. For complex 

military equipment, loss or careless or wanton damage can lead to huge fi nancial 

liabilities. Offi cers must know their responsibilities for property accountability 

and carry them out as a matter of the highest priority.

Balanced Life

 Finally, offi cers are expected to live balanced lives and do everything 

they can to see that their subordinates have the opportunity to do the same. 

Balanced lives involve the care in proportion of the physical, material, mental, 

and spiritual well being of each service member and of their family members. 

Physical well being involves both the maintenance of the service member’s 

physical condition and the provision of required medical care for members 

and their families. TRICARE is a regionally managed health care program for 

active duty and retired members of the military services, their families, and 

survivors. All active duty members are automatically enrolled in TRICARE 

and, for the most part, receive medical care at no cost through military medical 

facilities. Family members must be enrolled in one of a number of TRICARE 

programs, each differentiated by available services, provider choice, and out-ofpocket costs. Family members are not eligible for uniformed dental care, but 

supplemental insurance programs for dependent dental care are available at a 

minimal cost. Because TRICARE is a complex program, service members with 

families will want to inform themselves fully of the details of available covered 

services and services requiring out-of-pocket expense before selecting the 

particular program suitable for their needs. 

 Material well being for service members has to do with access to the 

best equipment available to accomplish their mission. Offi cers have a number 

of roles ensuring their subordinates receive and maintain the government 

equipment necessary for their mission. For family members, it has to do 

with the presence of shelter, food, and safety to members living in organized 

military communities. While the provision of these resources is beyond the 

purview of most offi cers, they do have the obligation to ensure that they and 

their subordinates are aware of the resources available to them and have access 

to them in accordance with existing service regulations. Offi cers also become 

involved when subordinates fail to maintain adequately the resources provided. 

 In addition to salary, service members receive housing or a housing 

allowance as part of their payment for service. Because the Department of 

Defense is engaged in the long-term process of outsourcing military housing, 

a number of different programs exist for management of housing resources. 

Where government housing is available, members can be required to live 

on-post to maintain facility usage or, where housing is scarce, they may have 

to live off-base and wait a long time before government housing becomes 
156

housing offi ce will normally assist members locating approved housing with 

costs commensurate with the available housing allowance. When on detached 

service, it is the member’s responsibility to know what the housing allowance 

will cover before overextending himself or herself on housing costs. Again, 

a military clause in all rental contracts is essential. When living off-base, it is 

always wise to inquire about monthly utility costs and to anticipate requirements 

for initial deposits equal to a month’s rent and utility costs. Housing allowances 

are supplemented in high-cost areas, but it cannot be assumed that the allowance 

and supplement will be fully adequate to fund the off-base housing the member 

fi nds desirable.

 Mental and spiritual needs are provided for by allowing members 

time off from the press of duty and encouraging and supporting their spiritual, 

professional, and intellectual development. All offi cers must take time off from 

their day-to-day concerns to refresh their batteries and reorient their thinking. 

There is little more important that an offi cer can do to help his subordinates 

balance their lives than to make their off-duty time reasonably predictable, while 

ensuring a command climate that encourages their personal development and 

well being, and one that guarantees family members will be properly cared for in 

their absences. Offi cers must continue to grow professionally and intellectually. 

They must plan for and take every opportunity to enhance their professional and 

civil education and encourage and support their subordinates to do the same. 

 Military service, with its shared dangers, hardships, and periods of 

separation from family and loved ones, produces both great personal stress 

within individual service members and strong bonds of attachment within units. 

Uncertainty, chaos, and fear pervade the battle space. Experience shows that 

forces whose members can best control their fear and channel it into cohesive 

action usually win the battle. Human losses are a regular part of battle, thus 

the requirement for military men’s and women’s spiritual comfort in the face 

of loss, to make sense of the irrational and horrifi c, is a part of providing for 

both member and unit well being. Those who face death together share a bond 

unique in human society. Grieving is a part of the collective esprit of any 

combat organization, just as it is for fi rst-responders at home. The welfare of 

the service member’s spirit, unique to each of them and their particular view of 

the world and life, is fostered too by membership in a unique culture with its 

own sense of moral community and feeling of accomplishment in service and 

sacrifi ce to a higher purpose—the preservation of the republic and its way of 

life. The shared uniforms, ceremonies, traditions, and values of our military 

services all reinforce the spiritual kinship of their members as a people set apart, 

performing an essential service for the wider society. 

 Even in peacetime, prolonged separation and concern for distant family 

members places heavy emotional stress on young Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 
157

and their view of the world and life according to a faith-based religion and fi nd 

emotional strength in religious observation and ceremony. Others fi nd their 

view of reality in nature, philosophy, or other human beings. Regardless of 

one’s world view, as offi cers of a secular republic with a constitution mandating 

religious neutrality, the leader must walk a careful line. He or she must be 

sensitive to the needs of all their subordinates, irrespective of their world 

views, ensuring access to whatever ministrations they fi nd of spiritual comfort 

without promoting or denigrating any or none. The same comfort and pride 

must be extended to member’s families who bear their own burdens in most 

cases without the strength drawn from direct membership and acknowledged 

participation. Family support groups, access to religious and other spiritual 

support, and public observations of respect and appreciation for the sacrifi ce of 

those lost or injured are an important part of military life.

 Members of today’s armed forces are largely married, sometimes to 

fellow service members. Married service members particularly feel the strain 

of balancing personal and professional responsibilities that are not diminished 

just because of parenthood. The services are demanding masters, expecting 

that duty for all members will take priority over the convenience and sometimes 

even the welfare of the family. Service families are expected to be largely selfreliant. The services provide a variety of community support agencies, often 

sustained largely by volunteer labor of family members that can help service 

members and their families deal with the vicissitudes of service life. Offi cers as 

leaders must know what these services are, encourage their support, and know 

how to gain access to them for their subordinates. It is a truism that services 

develop Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen and reenlist 

families. However, families are expected to do their part to sustain their quality 

of community life.
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Appendix 6: “The Meaning of Your Commission”
160
161

November 1950

C H A P T E R O N E

THE MEANING OF YOUR COMMISSION

 Upon being commissioned in the Armed Services of the United States, 

a man incurs a lasting obligation to cherish and protect his country and to develop within himself that capacity and reserve strength which will enable him to 

serve its arms and the welfare of his fellow Americans with increasing wisdom, 

diligence and patriotic conviction.

 This is the meaning of his commission. It is not modifi ed by any reason of assignment while in the service, nor is the obligation lessened in the day 

an offi cer puts the uniform aside and returns to civil life. Having been specially 

chosen by the United States to sustain the dignity and integrity of its sovereign 

power, an offi cer is expected so to maintain himself and so to exert his infl uence 

for so long as he may live, that he will be recognized as a worthy symbol of all 

that is best in the national character.

 In this sense the trust imposed in the highest military commander in the 

land is not more than what is encharged the newest ensign or second lieutenant. Nor is it less. It is the fact of commission which gives special distinction 

to the man and in turn requires that the measure of his devotion to the service of 

his country be distinctive, as compared with the charges laid upon the average 

citizen.

 In the beginning, a man takes an oath to uphold his country’s Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic, to bear true faith and allegiance, 

and to discharge well and faithfully the duties of offi ce. He does this without 

any mental reservation.

 Thereafter he is given a paper which says that because the President as 

a representative of the people of this country reposes “special trust and confi -

dence” in his patriotism, valor, fi delity, and abilities,” he is forthwith commissioned.

 By these tokens, the Nation also becomes a party to the contract, and 

will faithfully keep its bond with the man. While he continues to serve honorably, it will sustain him and will clothe him with its dignity. That it has vouched 

for him gives him a felicitous status in our society. The device he wears, his insignia, and even his garments identify him directly with the power of the United 

States. The living standards of himself and of his family are underwritten by 

Federal statue. Should he become ill, the Nation will care for him. Should he 

be disabled, it will stand as his guardian through life. Should he seek to advance 

himself through higher studies, it will open the way.

 Other than the offi cer corps, there is no group within our society toward 

which the obligation of the Nation is more fully expressed. Even so, other 

Americans regard this fact with pride, rather that with envy. They accept the 
162

responsibility. Whatever path an American offi cer may walk, he enjoys prestige. 

Though little is known of his intrinsic merit, he will be given the respect of his 

fellow citizens, unless he proves himself utterly undeserving.

 The national esteem for the corps is one of the priceless assets of 

American society. The services themselves so recognize it. That the place 

such strong emphasis upon the importance of personal honor among offi cers is 

because they know that the future of our arms and the well-being of our people 

depend upon a constant renewing and strengthening of public faith in the virtue 

of the corps. Were this to languish, the Nation would be loath to commit its sons 

to any military endeavor, no matter how grave the emergency.

 The works of goodwill by which those who lead the national military 

forces endeavor to win the undeserved trust of the American people is one of 

the chief preservatives of the American people is one of the American system of 

freedoms. The character of the corps is in a most direct sense of fi nal safeguard 

of the character of the Nation.

 To these thoughts any offi cer who is morally deserving of his commission would freely subscribe. He will look beyond the letter of his obligation and 

will accept in his own heart the total implications of his new responsibility.

 So doing, he still might see fi t to ask: “But to what do I turn my 

thoughts? How do I hold myself so that while following the line of duty, I will 

also exemplify those ideas which may inspire other men to make their best effort?”

 It is suggested that there is a one-word key to answer among four lofty 

qualities which are cited on every man’s commission.

 That word is Fidelity.

 As for patriotism, either a man loves his country or else he would not 

seek commission at its hands, unless he be completely the rascal, pretending to 

serve in order to destroy.

 Valor, on the other hand, can not be fully vouchsafed, since it is not 

given to any man to know the nature and depth of his personal courage.

 Abilities vary from man to man, and are partly what heredity and 

environment have made them. If nature had not imposed a ceiling, mere striving 

would make every man a genius.

 But fi delity is the derivative of personal decision. It is the jewel within 

reach of every man who has the will to possess it.

 Given an offi cer corps composed throughout of men who would make 

the eternal try toward bettering their professional capabilities and furthering 

the working effi ciency and harmony within all forces, the United States would 

become thrice armed though not producing one new weapon in its arsenals.

 Great faith, rightness of mind, infl uence over other men, and fi nally, 

personal success and satisfaction come of service to the ideals of the profession. 

Were these strengths refl ected throughout the offi cer body, it could well happen 

that because of the shining example, the American people would become more 

deeply conscious of the need to keep their own fi bers strong than has been their 
163

 Accepting these truths as valid, a man still must know where he stands 

before making a true reckoning of his line of advance. This entails some 

consideration of himself (a) as to the personal standard which is required if him 

because of his position in relation to all others (b) as to the reason in common 

sense which make this requirement, and (c) as to the principles and philosophy 

which will enable him to play his part well.

 The military offi cer is considered a gentleman, not because Congress 

wills it, nor because it has been the custom of people in all times to afford him 

that courtesy, but specifi cally because nothing less than a gentleman is truly 

suited for his particular set of responsibilities.

 This is not simply a bit of self-adulation; it is distinctly the American 

tradition in the matter. The Nation has never attempted to draw its offi cers from 

a particular class. During World War II, thousands if men were commissioned 

in our forces who enjoyed little opportunity in their earlier environments. They 

were sound by nature. They had courage. They could set a good example. 

They could rally other men around them. In the eyes of the services, these 

things count more that any man’s blood lines. We say with Voltaire, “Whoever 

serves his country well has no need of ancestors.”

 On the other hand, from the time of the Colonies, this country has despised press gangs, fl ogging, martinetism, and all of the other Old World military 

practices which demanded the rank and fi le. Its military system was founded 

on the dignity of man, just as was its Constitution. The system has sought ever 

since to advance itself by appealing to the higher nature of the individual. That 

is why its offi cers need to be gentlemen. To call forth great loyalty in other 

people and to harness it to any noble undertaking, one must fi rst be sensible of 

their fi nes instincts and feelings. Certainly these things at least are among the 

gentle qualities which are desired in every military offi cer of the United States:

 1. Strong belief in human rights.

 2. Respect for the dignity of every other person.

 3. The Golden Rule attitude toward one’s daily associates.

 4. An abiding interest in all aspects of human welfare.

 5. A willingness to deal with every man as considerately as if 

 he were a blood relative.

 These qualities are the epitome of strength, not of softness.

They mark the man who is capable of pursuing the great purpose consistently 

in spite of temptations. He who possesses them will all the more surely be 

regarded as a “man among men.” Take any crowd of new recruits! The greater 

number of them during their fi rst few days in service will use more profanity and 

obscenity, talk more about women and boast more about drinking than they have 

ever done in their lives, because of the mistaken idea that this is the quick way 

to get a reputation for being hard-boiled. But at the same time, the one or two 

men among them who stay decent, talk moderately and walk the line of duty will 

uniquely receive the infi nite respect of the others. It never fails to happen!

 There is the other matter about how a man should feel toward his own 
164

able calling because the book says so should not suffi ce one’s own interest in the 

matter, when a little personal refl ection will reveal wherein the honor resides.

 To every offi cer who has thought earnestly about the business, it is at 

once apparent that civilization, as men have known it since the time of the Greek 

City States, has rested as a pyramid upon a base if organized military power. 

Moreover, the general possibility of world culture progress in the foreseeable 

future has no other conceivable foundation. For any military man to deny, on 

any ground whatever, the role which his profession has played in the establishment of everything which is well-ordered in our society, shows only a faulty 

understanding of history. It made possible the birth of the American system of 

freedoms. Later, it gave the nation a new birth and vouchsafed a more perfect 

union.

 Likewise, we need to see the case in its present terms. One may abhor 

war fully, despise militarism absolutely, deplore all o the impulses in human 

nature which make armed force necessary, and still agree that for t he world as 

we know it, the main hope is that “peace –loving nations can be made obviously 

capable of defeating nations which are willing to wage aggressive war.” Those 

words, by the way were not said by a warrior, but by the eminent pacifi sts, Bertrand Russell. It does not make the military man any less the humanitarian that 

he accepts this reality, that he faces toward the chance forth-rightly, and that he 

believes that id all military power were stricken tomorrow, men would revert to 

a state of anarchy and there would ensue the total defeat of the forces which are 

trying to establish peace and brotherly love in our lives.

 The complete identity of American military force with the character 

of the people comes of this indivisibility of interest. To think of the military as 

a guardian class apart, like Lynches “born for vision, ordained for watching” 

rather than as a strong right arm, corporately joined to the body and sharing its 

every function, is historically false and politically inaccurate. It is not unusual, 

however, for those whose task it is to interpret the trend of opinion to take the 

line that “the military” are thinking one way and “the people” quite another on 

some particular issue, as if to imply that the two are quite separate and of different nature. This is usually false in detail, and always false in general. It not 

only discounts the objects of their unity but overlooks the truth of its origins.

 Maybe they should be invited to go to the root of the word. The true 

meaning of “populous,” from which we get the word “people,” was in the time 

of ancient Rome the “armed body.” The pure-blooded Roman in the days of 

the Republic could not conceive of a citizen who was not a warrior. It was the 

arms which Roman’s possession of land enabled him to get that qualifi ed him to 

participate in the affairs of state. He had no political rights until he had fought. 

He was not of the people; they were of him.

Nor is this concept alien to the ideals on which Founding Fathers built the 

American system, since they stated it as the right and duty of every able-bodied 

citizen to bear arms.

 These propositions should mean much to every American who has 
165

man does not renounce any part of his fundamental character as an American 

citizen. He has simply signed on for the post graduate course where one learns 

hoe to exercise authority un accordance with the spirit of liberty. The nature 

of his trusteeship has been subtly expressed by an Admiral in our service: “The 

American philosophy places the individual above the state. It distrusts personal 

power and coercion. It denies the existence of indispensable men. It asserts the 

supremacy of principle.”

 An understanding of American principles of life and growth, and 

personal zeal in upholding them, is the bedrock of sound leading in our services. 

Moral and emotional stability are expected of an American offi cer; he can usually satisfy his superiors if he attains to this equilibrium. But he is not likely 

to satisfy himself unless he can also achieve that maturity of character which 

expresses itself in the ability to make decisions in the detachment of spirit from 

that which is pleasant or unpleasant to him personally, in the desire to hold onto 

things not by grasping them but by understanding them and remembering them, 

and in learning to covet only that which may be rightfully possessed.

 An occasional man has become wealthy while in the services by making wise investments, through writings by skills at invention, or through some 

other means. But he is the exception. The majorities have no such prospect. 

Indeed, if love of money were the mainspring of all American actions, the offi cer corps long since would have disintegrated. But it is well said that the only 

truly happy people on earth are those who are indifferent to money because they 

have some positive purpose which forecloses it. Than the service, there is no 

other environment which is more conductive to the leading of the full life by 

the individual who is ready to accept the word of the philosopher that the only 

security on earth is the willingness to accept insecurity as an inevitable part of 

living. Once an offi cer has made this passage into maturity, and is at peace with 

himself because the service means more to him than all else, he will fi nd kinship 

with the great body of his brothers-in-arms. The highest possible consequences 

can develop from the feelings of men mutually inspired by some great endeavor 

and moving forward together according to the principle that only those who are 

willing to serve are fi t to lead. Completely immersed in action they have no time 

for smallness in speech, thought or deed. It is for these reasons that those who 

in times past have excelled in the leadership of American forces have invariably been great Americans fi rst and superior offers second. The rule applies 

at all levels. The lieutenant who is not moved at the thought that he is serving 

his country is unlikely to do an intelligent job of directing other men. He will 

come apart at the seams whenever the going grows tough. Until men accept this 

thought freely, and apply it to their personal action, it is not possible for them to 

go forward together strongly. In the words of Lionel Curtis: “The only force that 

unites men is conscience, a varying capacity in most of them to put the interests 

of other people before their own.”

 The services are accustomed to being hammered. Like other human 

institutions, they are imperfect. Therefore the criticisms are not always unjust. 
166

than any other organic part of our society and government.

 The service offi cer is charged only to take a lively interest in all such 

discussions. He has no more right to condemn the service unfairly then has any 

other American. On the other hand he is not expected to be an intellectual eunuch, oblivious to all of the faults in the institution to which he gives his loyalty. 

To the contrary, the nature of that loyalty requires that he will use his force toward the righting of those things which reason convinces him are going wrong, 

though making certain that his action will not do more damage than repair.

 His ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country, and not 

to his service or his superior. He owes it to his country to speak the truth as he 

sees it. This implies a steadying judgment as to when it should be spoken, and 

to whom it should be addressed. A truth need not only be well-rounded, but the 

utterance of it should be cognizant of the stresses and objectives of the hour. 

Truth becomes falsehood unless it has the strength of perspective. The presentation of facts is self-justifying only when the facts are developed in their true 

proportion.

 Where there is public criticism of the services, in matters both large and 

small, the service offi cer has the right and the duty of intervention only toward 

the end of making possible that all criticism of the services, in matters both large 

and small, the service offi cer has the right and the duty of intervention only 

toward the end of making possible that all criticism will be well-informed. That 

right can not be properly exercised when there is nothing behind it but a defense 

of professional pride. The duty can be well performed when the offi cer knows 

not only his subject – the mechanism itself – but the history and philosophy of 

the armed services in their relation to the development of the American system. 

Criticism from the outside is essential to service well-being, for as Confucius 

said, oftentimes men in the game are blind to what the lookers on see clearly.

 The value of any offi cer’s opinion of any military question can never be 

any greater than the extent and accuracy of his information. His ability to dispose public though favorably toward the service will depend upon the wisdom 

of his words rather than upon his military rank and other credentials. A false 

idea will come upon a bad fate even though it has the backing of the highest 

authority.

 Only men of informed mind and unprejudiced expression can strengthen the claim of the services on the affections of the American people.

 This is, of itself, a major objective for the offi cer corps, since our public 

has little studious interest in military affairs, tends ever to discount the vitality of 

the military role in the progress and prosperity of the nation and regards the security problem as one of the less pleasant and abnormal burdens on an otherwise 

orderly existence.

 It is an explicable contradiction of the American birthright that to some 

of our people the military establishment is at best a necessary evil, and military 

service is an extraordinary hardship rather than an inherent obligation. Yet these 

illusions are rooted deep in the American tradition, though it is a fact to be noted 
167

which followed the American Revolution, the new union of States tried to eliminate military forces altogether. There was vast confusion of thought as to what 

freedom required for its own survival. Thomas Jefferson, one of the great architects of democracy, an still renowned for his “isolationist” sentiments, wrote the 

warning: “We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make 

military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe 

until this is done.”

 None the less, the hour came when the standing Army was reduced to 

80 men. None the less, the quaint notion has survived that an enlightened interest in military affairs is somehow undemocratic. And none the less, recurring 

war has invariably found the United States inadequately prepared for the defense 

of its own territory.

 Because there has been a hold-over of these mistaken sentiments right 

down to the present, there persists in many military offi cers a defensive attitude 

toward their own profession, which has no practical relation to the strength of 

the ground on which they are enabled to stand. Toward any unfair and fl ippant criticism of the “military mind” they react with resentment, instead of 

with buoyant proof that their own minds are more plastic and more receptive to 

national ideals than those of any other profession. Where they should approach 

all problems of the national security with the zeal of the missionary, seeking and 

giving light, they treat this subject as if it were a private game preserve.

 It suffi ces to say of this minority that they are a barnacle on the hull of 

an otherwise staunch vessel. From such limited concepts of personal responsibility, there can not fail to develop a foreshortened view of the dignity of the task 

at hand. The note of apology is injected at the wrong time; the tone of belligerency is used when it serves no purpose. When someone arises within the halls 

of government to say that the military establishment of “uneconomic” because it 

cuts no bricks, bales no hay and is not unusual to hear some military men concur 

in this strange notion. That acquiescence is wholly unbecoming.

 The physician is not slurred as belonging to a nonproductive profession because he contributes only to the care and healing of the body, and though 

these things to the general well-being of society. Respect for formal education, 

organized religion and all of the enterprises built up around the dissemination of 

ideas is not the less because the resultant benefi t to society is not always tangible 

and saleable. Hence to say that that without which society could not endure in 

its present form is “uneconomic” is to make the word itself altogether meaningless.

 In that inner power of courage and conviction, which stems from the 

spiritual integrity of the individual, lies the strength of democracy. As to their 

ability to produce toward these ends, the military services can stand on the 

record. When shortly after World War II, a census was taken among the returned 

men, 60 percent said that they had been morally strengthened by their military 

service in the American uniform. About 30 percent had no opinion or felt that 
168

ity considered themselves damaged. This is an amazing testimony in light of the 

fact that only a small fraction of American youth is schooled to believe that any 

spiritual good can come of military service. As to what it signifi es, those who 

take a wholly materialistic view of the objects of the Republic are entitled to call 

the military establishment “uneconomic.” The services will continue to hold 

with the idea that strong nationhood comes not of the making of gadgets but of 

the building of character.

 Men beget goodwill in other men by giving it. They develop courage 

in their following mainly as a refl ection of the courage which they show in their 

own action. These two qualities of mind and heart are of the essence of sound 

offi cership. One is of little avail without the other, and either helps to sustain the 

other. As to which is the stronger force in its impact upon the masses of men, no 

truth is more certain than the words once written by William James: “Evident 

though the shortcomings of a man may be, if he is ready to give up his life for 

a cause, we forgive him everything. However inferior he ma be to ourselves in 

other respect, if we cling to live while he throws it away like a fl ower, we bow to 

his superiority.”

 Theodore Roosevelt once said that if he had a son who refrained from 

any worthwhile action because ot the fear of hurt to himself, he would disown 

him. Soon after his return to civilian life, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke 

of the worthwhileness of “living dangerously.” An offi cer of the United States 

armed forces can not go far wrong if he holds with these ideas. It is not the suitable profession for those who believe only in digging-in and nursing a soft snap 

until death comes at a ripe old age. Who risks nothing gains nothing.

 Nor should there be any room in it for professional smugness, small 

jealousies, and undue concern about privilege.

 The regular recognizes as peer and comrade the offi cer from any of 

the civilian components. That he is a professional does not give him an especial 

eminence, but simply a greater measure of responsibility for the success of the 

total establishment. Moreover, he can not afford to be patronizing, without risking self-embarrassment, such is the vast experience which many reservists have 

had on the active fi eld of war.

Toward services other than his own, any offi cer is expected to have 

both a comradely feeling and an imaginative interest. Any Army offi cer is a better man for having studied the works of Admiral Mahan and familiarized himself 

with the modern Navy from fi rst-hand experience. Those who lead sea-going 

forces can enlarge their own capacities by knowing more, rather than less, about 

the nature of the air and ground establishments. The submariner can always 

learn something useful to his own work by mingling with airmen; the airman 

becomes a better offi cer as he grows in qualifi ed knowledge of ground and sea 

fi ghting.

 But the fact remains that the services are not alike, that no wit of man 

can make them alike, and that the retention by each of its separate character, 
169

power. Unifi cation has not altered this basic proposition. The fi rst requirement of a unifi ed establishment is moral soundness in each of the integral parts, 

without which there can be no soundness at all. And on question of fundamental 

loyalty, the offi cer who loves every other service just as much as his own will 

have just as much active virtue as the man who loves other women as much as 

his wife.
170
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Acknowledgments

This book was written by a team of authors representing the superintendents of 

the Military, Naval, Air Force, and Coast Guard Academies, with participation 

and support of the Marine Corps University. The authors were serving and 

retired offi cers and civilian faculty members, both women and men. Because 

The Armed Forces Offi cer has traditionally been a Department of Defense 

publication, early sponsorship for the project was sought from the Joint Staff 

J-7. Congressman Ike Skelton, a longtime supporter of professional military 

education, agreed to provide a Foreword as did the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. The authors drafted the chapters individually and edited them 

collectively according to an organization, and with a concept of what it means 

to be an Armed Forces Offi cer, developed together at the beginning of the 

drafting process. The effort has been guided by the spirit of the United States 

of America: E Pluribus Unum. Contributing authors (their organizational 

affi liations when they worked on this project) were:

Colonel Michael F. Campbell, USMC, Deputy Director, Center for the Study of 

Professional Military Ethics, U.S. Naval Academy.

Captain Robert L. Desh, USCG, Director, Leadership Development Center, 

U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

Dr. John T. Farquhar, Lt Col, USAF, Ret., Associate Professor of Military 

Strategic Studies, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.

Dr. Jennifer Griffi ths, Leadership Development Center, U.S. Coast Guard 

Academy.

Colonel Jon Hull, USMC, Marine Corps University

Colonel Robyn M. King, PhD., USAF. U.S. Air Force Academy and Air 

University, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Major Daniel R. Moy, USAF, Assistant Professor Department of History, U.S. 

Air Force Academy.

Dr. Albert C. Pierce, Director, Center for the Study of Professional Military 

Ethics, U.S. Naval Academy.

LtCol Gary E. Slyman, USMC, Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, U.S. Naval Academy.

Dr. Richard Swain, William E. Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, 

U.S. Military Academy, West Point

Debbie Beck, Editor

Layout and design by Joint Staff Support Services Offi ce, Pentagon
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the Armed Forces Offi cer should be directed to:

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178