North Ko

a country stu

Federal Research 

Library of C

E

Robert L
 

 

 

 

On the cover: Statues of a worker, a peasant, and a party intellec

front of Chuch’e Tower in P’yŏngyang 

Courtesy Pulmyŏl ŭi t’ap (Tower of Immortality), P’yŏngyang: M

Ch’ulpansa, 1985, 325 

Fifth Edition, First Printing, 2008. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

North Korea: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 

Congress; edited by Robert L. Worden. -- 5th ed. 

p. cm. -- (Area handbook series) (DA Pam ; 550-81) 

“Research completed October 2007.” 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

ISBN 978-0-8444-1188-0 

1. Korea (North). I. Worden, Robert L. II. Library of Congress. Fed

Research Division. 

DS932.N662 2008 

951.93--dc22 

2008028547 

Use of ISBN 

This is the Official U.S. Government edition 

publication and is herein identified to cert

authenticity. Use of the ISBN 978–0–8444–118

for U.S. Government Printing Office Official E

only. The Superintendent of Documents of th

Government Printing Office requests that any 

edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authenti

with a new ISBN. 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
 

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ISBN 978–0–8444–1188–0
 
Fore

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepar

Federal Research Divison of the Library of Congress under t

try Studies/Area Handbook Program, formerly sponsored 

Department of the Army and revived in FY 2004 with congre

mandated funding under the sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs 

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5). 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign 

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrela

of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical an

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of s

entists. The authors seek to provide a basic understandin

observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static p

Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up th

their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inte

the issues on which they are divided, the nature and exten

involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes tow

other and toward their social system and political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and shou

construed as an expression of an official U.S. government posi

icy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accep

dards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and su

for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future e

David L. Osborne 

Chief 

Federal Research Di

Library of Congress 

Washington, DC 205

E-mail: frds@loc.go

Acknowledg

This edition supercedes North Korea: A Country Study, p

in 1994. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portio

edition in the preparation of the current book. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Di

the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the boo

W. Meditz made many helpful suggestions during her revi

parts of the book and managed the editing, indexing, and pr

of the book. Catherine Schwartzstein edited the manuscri

many very useful suggestions, and helped clarify obscure po

also performed the final prepublication editorial review and 

the index. Sarah Ji-Young Kim provided valuable assistance 

ing facts, reviewing and revising maps and figures, collecting 

tions, and assisting with the preparation of the Country Pr

Bibliography. Margaret L. Park, a Library of Congress int

Rutgers University, prepared the preliminary drafts of the ma

book. Janie L. Gilchrist performed word processing. 

The authors also are grateful to other individuals in the L

Congress who contributed to the book. Foremost was Sonya 

Lee, Korea Reference Specialist in the Asian Division, w

important advice and clarified many points. She also helped 

illustrations from the Library of Congress collections to u

book. Paul Dukyong Park of the Asian Division assisted in 

and providing copies of North Korean publications. Youngs

of the African/Asian Acquisitions and Overseas Operations 

provided various sources and contact information for photogr

other information on North Korea. Sarah Byun, Elaine H

Kim, and Young-ki Lee of the Regional and Cooperative C

Division clarified points on the romanization of Korean-

words. Suk-Young Kim, a fellow in the John W. Kluge Cen

Library of Congress, on sabbatical from the University of C

Santa Barbara, read parts of the manuscript and made valuabl

tions both on the text and on North Korean propaganda po

could be used for illustrations. The extensive research assis

Chapter 4 by Lucia Selvaggi of Boston University must be 

edged as well. 

Christopher S. Robinson prepared the book’s maps and c

also performed the photocomposition and preparation of the f

tal manuscript for the printer. Both he and Katarina David of 
eral Research Division performed digital conversion of photog

and illustrations used in the study. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of individua

public and private organizations that allowed their photographs 

used in this study; they have been acknowledged in the illust

captions. Additionally, thanks goes to Boon-hee Jung and Ch

Lee of the Ministry of Unification of South Korea and to Jung

Lee of the Overseas Pan-Korean Center in Washington, DC, fo

viding recent photographs of North Korea. 

vi 
Con

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Country Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table B. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors . . . . 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bruce Cumings 

THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN NATION . . . . . . . . . . 

KOREA IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
 

THE RISE OF KOREAN NATIONALISM AND 
 

THE THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Paekche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Koguryŏ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Silla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Korea under Silla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

UNIFICATION BY KORYŎ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE CHOSŎN DYNASTY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Florescence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dynastic Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

WORLD ORDER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

JAPANESE COLONIALISM, 1910–45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

COMMUNISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NATIONAL DIVISION IN THE 1940s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tensions in the 1940s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

U.S. and Soviet Occupations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Arrival of Kim Il Sung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Establishment of the Democratic People’s 
 

Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950–53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE POSTWAR PERIOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Corporatism and the Chuch’e Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NORTH–SOUTH RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
 

CENTURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Helen-Louise Hunter 

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Topography and Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Environmental Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

POPULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Creating a New Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Cult of Kim Il Sung. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Class Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The New Socialist Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Work Unit as the Basic Social Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Thought-Controlled Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Elite Life in P’yŏngyang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Privileged Life Beyond Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Daily Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Society in Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Militarized Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Family Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Leisure Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Primary Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Middle School and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Higher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HEALTH CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 3. The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

David Kang 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1940s–90s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

viii 
The Economy after World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE SINCE THE 
 

AGRICULTURE, THE FAMINE OF 1995–98, AND 
 

North Korea’s Development Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

EARLY 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Comparisons with South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Energy and Power Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Forestry and Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Telecommunications and the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Government Budget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ECONOMIC CHANGES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Collapse in the 1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Causes of the Famine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Effects of the Famine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Post-Famine Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Reform of the Public Distribution System . . . . . . . . . 

Banking and Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Legal and Administrative Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Special Economic Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Top-Down Reform Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Assessment of the Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NORTH–SOUTH RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sunshine Policy and New Economic Development . . 

Kaesŏng Industrial Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE ECONOMY IN TRANSITION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Victor D. Cha and Balbina Y. Hwang 

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE GOVERNMENT, 
 

PARTY, AND MILITARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Local Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Role of Chuch’e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Origins of Chuch’e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Application of Chuch’e in the North Korean State . . . . 

PARTY LEADERSHIP AND ELITE RECRUITMENT . . . . 

Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Party Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Party Cadres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Ruling Elite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Leadership Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MASS ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE MEDIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Inter-Korean Affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

China and the Soviet Union/Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

PROSPECTS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REFORM. . . . . . . 

Chapter 5. National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

James M. Minnich 

MILITARY HERITAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National Defense Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National Security Policy Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED 
 

FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General Staff Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Strategic Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Officer Corps Professional Education and Training . . . 

Enlisted Conscription and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Military Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DOCTRINE, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

x 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

INTERNAL SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Punishment and the Penal System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Judicial and Prosecutorial Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ministry of People’s Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

State Security Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Guard Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Border Security Command and Coastal Security 
 

Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NATIONAL SECURITY PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Published Country Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of North Korea, 2007 . . . . . . 

2 Korea in the Fifth Century A.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 Population by Age and Sex, 2005, and Estimated 
 

11 Simplified National Military Command 
 

12 Deployment of Ground and Naval Forces and 
 

3 North Korea in Its Asian Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 Topography and Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

for 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 2005 . . . . . . . 

7 Primary Roads and Expressways, 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8 Primary Railroads, Ports, and Airports, 2006 . . . . . . . . 

9 Special Economic Zones, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10 Party, State, and Government Power, 2006. . . . . . . . . . 

Structure, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Wings, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

13 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

14 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

P

This edition of North Korea: A Country Study replaces the 

edition, published in 1994. Like its predecessor, this study at

review the history and treat in a concise manner the domina

political, economic, and military aspects of contempora

Korea. Sources of information included books, scholarly jour

eign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governm

international organizations, and numerous periodicals and W

on Korean and East Asian affairs. A word of caution is n

however. Even though more information is forthcoming f

about North Korea since it became a member of the United N

1991, the government of a closed society such as that of Nor

controls information for internal and external consumption

both the scope of coverage and its dissemination. 

A chronology of major historical events is provided at the 

the book (see table A). Chapter bibliographies appear at the e

book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable and 

sources recommended for further reading appear at the end 

chapter. A glossary also is included. 

Spellings of place-names in the book are in most cas

approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN); sp

some of the names, however, cannot be verified, as the BG

notes. Readers of this book are alerted that because the BG

nizes the Sea of Japan as the formal name of the body of wa

east of the Korean Peninsula, this book also uses that term. H

Koreans themselves call this body of water the East Sea; thus, 

also is given at each first use. Similarly, the Yellow Sea is ide

the West Sea. The generic parts appended to some geograph

have been dropped and their English equivalents substituted: f

ple, Mayang Island, not Mayang-do, Mount Paektu, not Pa

and South P’yŏngan Province, not P’yŏngan-namdo. In som

variant names have been introduced: for example, Amnok for 

as it is known in North Korea and Yalu as the same river is 

China. The name North Korea has been used where appro

place of the official name, Democratic People’s Republic of K

McCune–Reischauer system of transliteration has been e

except for the names of some prominent national and historica

Thus, Kim Il-sŏng is rendered as Kim Il Sung, and Kim Ch
rendered as Kim Jong Il. The names of Korean authors writing in 

lish are spelled as given in the original publication. 

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion 

(see table B) is provided to assist readers who are unfamiliar with 

ric measurements. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Aug

2007. Certain other parts of the text, however, have been update

Chronology and Introduction discuss significant events that 

occurred since the completion of research, and the Country Profi

portions of some chapters include updated information as availab

xiv 
Table A. Chronology of Important Events 

2333–ca. 194 B.C. Old Chosŏn kingdom.
 

2000 B.C. Pottery culture introduced.
 

Fourth century B.C. Walled-town states noted.
 

ca. 194–108 B.C. Wiman Chosŏn state; iron culture emerges.
 

A.D. 246–668 Three Kingdoms period.
 

246–660 Paekche kingdom.
 

312–671 Koguryŏ kingdom.
 

356–935 Silla kingdom.
 

384 Buddhism adopted as state religion in Paekche.
 

ca. 535 Buddhism adopted as state religion in Silla.
 

668 Korea unified under Silla, Koguryŏ pushed to the north.
 

698–926 Parhae state rises as successor to Koguryŏ.
 

751 Dharani Sutra, oldest example of woodblock printing in the w

892–935 Later Paekche kingdom.
 

918–1392 Koryŏ Dynasty.
 

1231 Koryŏ army defeated by invading Mongols.
 

1254 Second Mongol invasion.
 

1274 and 1281 Korean forces join Mongols in abortive invasions of Japan.
 

1392–1910 Chosŏn Dynasty.
 

1418–50 Reign of King Sejong, who introduces hangul (or chosŏn’gul

1592 and 1597 Armor-clad “turtle ships” under Yi Sun-sin defeat Japanese in

1627 and 1636 Manchu invasions of Korea.
 

August 1866 Koreans attack armed American ship, the General Sherman, i

River, destroying the ship and killing crew. 

1864–73 Yi Ha-ung introduces institutional reforms. 

1876 Unequal treaty imposed by Japan; China seeks to reassert trad

ence. 

1885 Chinese general Yuan Shikai blocks Korean reforms and natio

1894 Tonghak (Eastern Learning) rebellion. 

1894–95 Using pretext of Sino-Japanese War, Japan moves troops into 

1905–10 Japanese protectorate established over Korea. 

1910–45 Korea becomes a colony of Japan. 

April 15, 1912 Kim Il Sung born. 

1919 Nationwide protests demand independence from Japan. 

1925 Korean Communist Party established in Seoul. 

1931 Japan annexes Manchuria; Chinese and Korean joint resistanc

emerge; heavy industrialization in northern Korea follows. 

1937–45 World War II in East Asia; Koreans involved in both sides of 

February 16, 1941 Kim Jong Il born (but later his official birth date is proclaimed 

16, 1942). 

1943 Allied powers (United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet U

postwar period of tutelage for Korea. 

August 11, 1945 United States sets thirty-eighth parallel as dividing line betwe

and U.S. zones. 

September 1945 Kim Il Sung arrives in North Korea. 

October 10, 1945 North Korean Communist Party established. 
 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 

February 8, 1946 

August 28–30, 1946 

February 8, 1948 

March 27–30, 1948 

August 15, 1948 

September 2, 1948 

September 9, 1948 

December 26, 1948 

June 25, 1950 

October 25, 1950 

February 7, 1953 

July 27, 1953 

1954–56 

December 1955 

April 23–29, 1956 

August 27, 1957 

1957–61 

October 26, 1958 

September 6–18, 1961 

1961–67 

October 8, 1962 

1964 

October 5–12, 1966 

November 25, 1967 

January 23, 1968 

November 2–13, 1970 

July 4, 1972 

December 25, 1972 

August 25, 1975 

October 10–14, 1980 

February 28, 1982 

September 8, 1984 

December 12, 1985 

November 2, 1986 

March 13, 1987 

January 1989 

April 22, 1990 

September 1990 

September 17, 1991 

December 1991 

Interim People’s Committee, led by Kim Il Sung, becomes first No

Korean central government.
 

Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) founded, First KWP Congress held

Korean People’s Army (KPA) formally established.
 

Second KWP Congress.
 

Republic of Korea established in South Korea with its capital at Se

First Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) held.
 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established in No

Korea with its capital at P’yŏngyang; constitution adopted.
 

Soviet forces withdrawn from northern half of Korean Peninsula.
 

Korean War (“Fatherland Liberation War”) breaks out.
 

Chinese forces enter Korean War.
 

SPA gives Kim Il Sung title of marshal.
 

Armistice signed by United States (for the United Nations), North 

Soviet Union, and China (but not South Korea).
 

Three-Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan.
 

Kim Il Sung proclaims chuch’e political ideology of autonomy an

reliance.
 

Third KWP Congress.
 

Second SPA election.
 

Five-Year Plan.
 

Withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea completed.
 

Fourth KWP Congress.
 

First Seven-Year Plan.
 

Third SPA election.
 

Nuclear research facility established at Yŏngbyŏn.
 

Kim Il Sung elected KWP general secretary.
 

Fourth SPA election.
 

North Korean patrol boats capture U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo.
 

Fifth KWP Congress held.
 

High-level talks between North Korea and South Korea end with 

announcement that unification will be sought peacefully.
 

State constitution revised; Kim Il Sung elected president.
 

North Korea joins Nonaligned Movement.
 

Sixth KWP Congress held.
 

Seventh SPA election.
 

SPA adopts joint-venture law.
 

North Korea signs Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wea

Eighth SPA election.
 

North Korea becomes party to 1972 Biological Weapons Conventi

South Korea’s Hyundai founder tours North Korea, announces join

ture in tourism.
 

Ninth SPA election.
 

First of series of prime minister–level meetings between North Ko

and South Korean officials takes place in Seoul.
 

North Korea becomes member of the United Nations.
 

Kim Jong Il appointed KPA supreme commander.
 

xvi 
 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events (Continue

December 13, 1991 

January 20, 1992 

January 30, 1992 

April 1992 

January 1993 

March 12, 1993 

April 1993 

June 15, 1994 

July 8, 1994 

October 1994 

1995–98 

July 8, 1997 

October 8, 1997 

July 26, 1998 

September 1998 

June 13–15, 2000 

July 2000 

October 9–12, 2000 

October 23, 2000 

October 2002 

December 2002 

August 3, 2003 

August 27–29, 2003 

February 25–28, 2004 

June 23–25, 2004 

February 10, 2005 

July 26–August 7, 2005 

September 13–19, 2005 

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, an

tion (Basic Agreement) signed between North Korea and Sou

calls for reconciliation and nonaggression and establishes fou

missions; joint declaration on denuclearization initialed.
 

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Penin

both sides agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, po

deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reproc

uranium enrichment facilities”; agreement takes effect on Feb

1992.
 

P’yŏngyang signs full-scope Safeguards Agreement with the I

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), having pledged to do so in 1

State constitution amended, emphasizes chuch’e instead of M

Leninism.
 

North Korea refuses IAEA access to two suspected nuclear w

P’yŏngyang announces intent to withdraw from Treaty on the 

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
 

National Defense Commission chairmanship passes from Kim 

Kim Jong Il.
 

Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter visits P’yŏngyang.
 

Kim Il Sung dies unexpectedly.
 

Bilateral talks held with United States starting in June lead to 

Framework freezing North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
 

Devastating floods followed by famine.
 

The end of three years of mourning for Kim Il Sung.
 

Kim Jong Il appointed general secretary of KWP.
 

Tenth SPA election.
 

State constitution revised, Kim Jong Il’s power consolidated a

reconfirmed as chairman of the National Defense Commissio

est office of state.”
 

First inter-Korean summit, emanating from “Sunshine Policy” 

by South Korea in 1998, held in P’yŏngyang.
 

North Korea begins participating in the ASEAN Regional For

Vice Marshal Cho Myŏng-nok visits President William J. Clin

Washington, DC.
 

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright hosted in P’yŏngy

on North Korea’s missile program. 

North Korea admits developing nuclear weapons technology.

North Korea removes United Nations seals and cameras from 

nuclear facility, moves fresh fuel to reactor.
 

Eleventh SPA election.
 

Six-Party Talks initiated in Beijing, involving North Korea, S

the United States, China, Russia, and Japan.
 

In second round of Six-Party Talks, North Korea proposes it b

“compensation” in return for freezing its nuclear weapons pro

In third round of Six-Party Talks, U.S. proposal to resolve nu

discussed.
 

P’yŏngyang announces it has nuclear weapons and is suspend

ticipation in the Six-Party Talks.
 

First session of fourth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijin

In Joint Statement of Principles, at second session of fourth ro

Party Talks, all parties unanimously reaffirm goal of denuclea

the Korean Peninsula in a verifiable manner. 
 

 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 

November 9–11, 2005 

July 4–5, 2006 

October 9, 2006 

December 18–22, 2006 

February 8–13, 2007 

March 19–22, 2007 

June 25, 2007 

July 16, 2007 

July 18–20, 2007 

September 27–30, 2007 

October 2–4, 2007 

November 14–16, 2007 

December 11, 2007 

January 4, 2008 

February 26–27, 2008 

March 28, 2008 

May 16, 2008 

June 26, 2008 

June 27, 2008 

June 30, 2008 

August 11, 2008 

October 11, 2008 

At first session of fifth round, North Korea begins boycott of Six-P

Talks, citing the “U.S.’s hostile policy” and U.S. law enforcement 

that led in September to a freeze of North Korean accounts in Mac

Banco Delta Asia. 

North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles over Sea of Japan (E

Sea). 

North Korea announces that six days earlier it conducted an under

nuclear weapon test, with the statement that the test will “contribu

defending the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in t

around it.” 

Second session of fifth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing, w

parties reaffirming commitment to Joint Statement of September 19

but left deadlocked over financial dispute with the United States. 

Third session of fifth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing; join

ment on initial steps toward denuclearization of the Korean Penins

with a 60-day timetable for North Korea to shut down its main nuc

reactor, signed on February 13. 

First session of sixth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing. 

North Korea acknowledges transfer of funds frozen by United Stat

Banco Delta Asia in Macau, confirms it will take next step in impl

ing February 13, 2007, agreement. 

IAEA confirms Yŏngbyŏn nuclear reactor has been shut down. 

First session of sixth round of Six-Party Talks resumes in Beijing; 

communiqué signed on July 20 stating parties’ commitment to the 

tember 19, 2005, joint statement and the February 13, 2007, agree

and a tentative date for the next round of negotiations. 

Second session of sixth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing; i

mentation of February 13, 2007, agreement confirmed. 

Second North–South summit held in P’yŏngyang; Kim Jong Il and 

Korean president Roh Moo Hyun issue joint declaration on North–

cooperation to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to abide b

nonagression. 

North Korean prime minister Kim Yong-il holds talks in Seoul wit

Korean prime minister Han Duck-soo. 

Cross-border freight-train service reestablished for first time since 

War. 

North Korea declares it has disclosed all nuclear developments; U

States disagrees. 

New York Philharmonic Orchestra performs in P’yŏngyang. 

North Korea test fires missiles over the sea and warns that it migh

disabling its nuclear facilities. 

United States agrees to restart deliveries of food aid to North Kore

North Korea submits declaration of its nuclear inventory to China, 

of the Six-Party Talks. 

United States announces intent to remove North Korea from list of 

terrorism sponsors and to lift some trade sanctions. North Korea d

cooling tower at Yŏngbyŏn Scientific Research Center. 

First renewed U.S. food aid delivery arrives in North Korea. 

United States announces decision not to remove North Korea from 

sponsored terrorism list until P’yŏngyang allows independent veri

of its declared nuclear programs. 

United States formally removes North Korea from its list of state te

sponsors. 

xviii 
Table B. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factor

When you know Multiply by To find 

Millimeters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.04 inches 

Centimeters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 inches 

Meters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 feet 

Kilometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.62 miles 

Hectares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.98 long tons

 1.1 short tons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2,204 pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 degrees Fahr

and add 32 

Country Profile 

1,000 

2,000 

3,000 

N

autical Mi el s 

P’yongyang  ̆ 

ASIA 

Pittsburgh 

Washington 

Country 

Formal Name: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
 

(DPRK—Chosŏn Minjujuŭi Inmin Konghwaguk).
 

Short Form: North Korea (Chosŏn).
 

Term for Citizen(s): Korean(s).
 

Capital: P’yŏngyang.
 

Date of Independence: August 15, 1945, from Japan; Democratic
 

People’s Republic of Korea founded September 9, 1948.
 

xxi 
Geography 

Size: Total 120,410 square kilometers land area, 130 square kilometers water area. 

Topography: Approximately 80 percent mountain ranges separated 

by deep, narrow valleys; wide coastal plains on west coast, discontinuous coastal plains on east coast. The highest peak Mount Paektu, 2,744 

meters above sea level. Only 22.4 percent of land arable. Major rivers 

are Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) in north, Taedong in south. 

Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid summers. 

Society 

Population: 23,479,089 estimated in July 2008. In 2008, birthrate 

14.6 births per 1,000; death rate 7.3 per 1,000; sex ratio 0.95 male to 

each female as of 2008 estimate. Approximately 60 percent of population living in urban areas, about 14 percent in P’yŏngyang in 2005. In 

2008 estimated population density per square kilometer 194. 

Ethnic Groups: Almost all ethnic Koreans, a few Chinese and Japanese. 

Language: Korean, some dialects not mutually intelligible; written 

language uses phonetic-based hangul (or chosŏn’gul) alphabet. 

Religion: Traditionally Buddhist, now about 10,000 practicing; about 

10,000 Protestants, 4,000 Roman Catholics, indeterminate number of 

native Ch’ŏndogyo (Heavenly Way) adherents. Organized religious 

activity except officially supervised is strongly discouraged. Personality cult of Kim Il Sung promoted by state as sole appropriate belief. 

Health: Life expectancy estimated in 2008 at 69.4 years for males, 75 

for females. Infant mortality 21.9 per 1,000; one doctor for every 700 

inhabitants and one hospital bed for every 350 inhabitants. Estimated 

famine deaths in 1990s vary from 500,000 to 3 million people. In 1998 

an estimated 60 percent of children suffered malnutrition, 16 percent 

acutely malnourished. 

Education and Literacy: Eleven years free, compulsory, universal 

primary and secondary education. Higher education offered in 300 

colleges and universities. In 2000 primary and secondary education 

included: 27,017 nursery schools, 14,167 kindergartens, 4,886 fourxxii 
year primary schools, and 4,772 six-year secondary schools, enrolling 

5.9 million students. Nearly 1.9 million students attended postsecondary institutions. Literacy rate 99 percent. 

Economy 

Major Features: Traditionally socialized, centrally planned, and primarily industrialized command economy isolated from rest of world; 

prior to 1991 heavily dependent on Soviet aid. Since 2002 “economic 

improvement measures” practiced to create incentives, increase salaries, and improve flow of products to cash-paying consumers; 

increased economic cooperation with South Korea. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 2007 estimated at US$40 billion, 

possibly as low as US$10 billion; per capita income based on GDP 

(purchasing parity power) estimated in 2007 was $1,900. GDP by sector, based on 2002 estimates, is agriculture 30 percent, industry 34 percent, and services 36 percent. 

Agriculture: Principal crops include rice, potatoes, corn, cabbages, 

apples, soybeans, pulses, and sweet potatoes; other vegetables, fruits, 

and berries also important. Livestock includes pigs, poultry, rabbits, 

horses, cattle, sheep, and goats. Fishing provides important dietary 

supplement, including freshwater and saltwater fish, shellfish, and 

mollusks; about 63,700 tons produced using aquaculture in 2002. 

Industry and Manufacturing: Machine building, armaments, electric power, chemicals, metallurgy, textiles, and food processing. 

Natural Resources: Coal, iron ore, cement, nonferrous metals (copper, lead, and zinc), precious metals (gold and silver), also magnesite. 

Exports: Estimated US$1.4 billion free on board, 2006. Major commodities: minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including 

armaments), textiles, fishery products. South Korea, China, and Thailand are largest trading partners. 

Imports: Totaled US$2.8 billion cost, insurance, and freight, 2006. 

Major imports: petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, 

textiles, and grain. China, South Korea, Thailand, and Russia are main 

trading partners. 

Exchange Rate: Officially US$1=140.00 wŏn in late October 2008; 

internal black market rate 2,500–3,000 wŏn to US$1. 

xxiii 
Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Inland Waterways and Ports: 2,250 kilometers, most used only by 

small boats; Amnok (Yalu), Tuman (Tumen), and Taedong most 

important navigable rivers. Major port facilities—all ice-free—at 

Namp’o and Haeju on west coast and Najin, Ch’ŏngjin, Hŭngnam, 

and Wŏnsan on east coast; merchant fleet 171 ships of gross-registered 

tons or more in 2007. 

Roads: In 2006 total road network estimated at 25,554 kilometers; 

724 kilometers paved, 24,830 kilometers unpaved. Major expressway 

links Wŏnsan on east coast with P’yŏngyang inland and Namp’o on 

west coast. 

Railroads: In 2006 total rail network approximately 5,235 kilometers, 

although officially claimed to total 8,500 kilometers, 1.435-meter 

standard gauge roadbeds located primarily along east and west coasts; 

3,500 kilometers electrified. Rolling stock includes about 300 electric 

and numerous diesel locomotives; great majority of freight carried by 

rail. Subway system opened in P’yŏngyang in 1973. 

Civil Aviation: In 2007 estimated 77 usable airports, 36 with permanent-surface runways and 41 with unpaved runways. Sunan International Airport north of P’yŏngyang offers about 20 flights per week on 

North Korean, Chinese, and Russian carriers; other airports at 

Ch’ŏngjin, Hamhŭng, Najin, and Wŏnsan. State-run airline Air Koryo, 

uses 15 Soviet-made planes, provides domestic service to three airports and foreign service to eight cities in China, Thailand, Germany, 

and Russia. In 2001 only 5 tons per kilometer freight carried by air. 

Pipelines: 154 kilometers of oil pipelines in 2007. 

Telecommunications: 17 AM, 14 FM, and 14 shortwave government-controlled radio stations in 2006. Nearly all households have 

access to broadcasts from radios (4.7 million in 2001) or public loudspeakers. Four main television stations, 55 television sets per 1,000 

population; in 2005 estimate, 980,000 telephones in use; e-mail service introduced in 2001, but public Internet access restricted. 

Print Media: Twelve principal newspapers, 20 major periodicals; 

electronic and print media controlled by state. 

xxiv 
Government and Politics 

Party and Government: Communist state under one-man dynastic 

leadership. Party, state, and military structures consolidated under the 

leadership of Kim Jong Il; National Defense Commission, which he 

chairs, nation’s “highest administrative authority.” Position of president conferred posthumously on Kim Il Sung after his death in 1994. 

Premier and cabinet appointed by unicameral Supreme People’s 

Assembly (SPA), except minister of the People’s Armed Forces, who 

answers directly to Kim Jong Il. President of SPA Presidium is titular 

head of state. Constitution adopted in 1948, revised in 1972, 1992, and 

1998. Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) ruling party under general secretary Kim Jong Il. Last full party congress was 1980; Central Committee last met in 1994. With KWP, Chongu (Friends) Party and Korean 

Social Democratic Party provide nominal multiparty system. 

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces (do), two provincial-level 

municipalities (chikalsi or jikhalsi—P’yŏngyang and Najin–Sŏnbong), 

one special city (t’ukpyŏlsi)—Namp’o. The second level includes ordinary cities (si or shi), urban districts (kuyŏk), and counties (gun or kun). 

Third level made up of traditional villages (ri, or ni); cities subdivided 

into wards (gu); some cities and wards subdivided into neighborhoods 

(dong), the lowest level of urban government to have its own office and 

staff. 

Judicial System: Three-level judicial system patterned on Soviet 

model. Central Court highest court and accountable to Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA); also provincial courts at intermediate level and 

“people’s courts” at lowest level; special courts try cases involving 

armed forces personnel and crimes related to railroads and rail 

employees. 

Foreign Relations: Once heavily dependent on traditional close allies, 

Soviet Union and China; diplomatic relations expanded significantly 

since early 1990s. North Korea now has diplomatic relations with 150 

nations; maintains full embassies in 27 nations. Nuclear weapons proliferation and missile sales major issues shaping relations with neighbors and United States. Three-Party Talks (North Korea, United States, 

and China) in 2003 discussed nuclear weapons and economic aid 

issues; Six-Party Talks (United States, North Korea, South Korea, 

China, Japan, and Russia) held 2003–7. Improved relations with South 

Korea aimed at eventual peaceful reunification of Korean Peninsula. 

xxv 
National Security 

Armed Forces: Korean People’s Army—1,106,000 personnel in 

2005, world’s fourth largest after China, United States, and India. 

Army—approximately 950,000 (including at least 87,000 special 

operations troops); navy—46,000; air force—110,000. 

Military Budget: According to North Korea, US$1.8 billion, or 15.7 

percent of government budget (2003). External sources believe more 

likely around US$5 billion, or 44.4 percent of government budget. 

Military Units: Army—nine infantry, four mechanized, one tank, and 

one artillery corps; P’yŏngyang Defense Command; Border Security 

Command; Missile Guidance Bureau; and Light Infantry Training 

Bureau. Navy—two fleets, 19 naval bases. Air force—four air divisions, three air combat divisions stationed at 11 airbases. 

Military Equipment: Main battle tanks, light tanks, armored personnel carriers, towed artillery, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket 

launchers, mortars, surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, antitank 

guided weapons, recoilless launchers, and air defense guns; submarines, frigates, corvettes, missile craft, large patrol craft, fast torpedo 

craft, patrol force craft, amphibious ships, coastal defense missile batteries, hovercraft, minesweepers, depot ship, midget ships, and survey 

vessels; bombers, fighters and ground attack fighters, transports, transport helicopters and armed helicopters, training aircraft, unmanned air 

vehicle, and air-to-air missiles and surface-to-air missiles. 

Auxiliary Forces: Border guards and police under Ministry of People’s Security—189,000; reservists and paramilitaries—7.7 million. 

xxvi 

126 128 130 

130 

42 

40 

124 

40 

38 38 

Boundary representation 128

not necessarily authoritative 

Demarcation line and 

demilitarized zone 

®

o

o

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

9 8

12 

11 

10 

Yellow Sea 

(West Sea) 

Sea of 

Japan 

(East Sea) 

East 

Korea 

West Bay

Korea 

Bay 

Kanggye 

Hamhung 

Haeju 

Namp’o 

Hyesan 

Ch’ongjin 

Sinuiju 

Wonsan 

P’yongsong 

P’yongyang 

Sariwon 

Najin– 

Sonbong 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆  ̆ 

 ̆ 

CHINA 

RUSSIA 

SOUTH 

KOREA 

0 20 40 60 Kilometers 

0 20 40 60 Miles

 

®

o

International boundary 

Demarcation line and

 demilitarized zone 

Province boundary 

National capital 

Provincial-level municipality 

Administrative capital 

NOTE: Najin-Sonbong, Namp’o, 

and P’yongyang are designated 

as special cities treated as 

provinces 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

1. Nanjin–Sonbong 

2. North Hamgyong 

3. South Hamgyong 

4. Yanggang 

5. Chagang 

6. North P’yongan 

7. South P’yongan 

8. P’yongyang

 9. Namp’o 

10. North Hwanghae 

11. South Hwanghae 

12. Kangwon 

Provinces and Provincial-Level Municipalities 

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of North Korea, 2007 

xxviii
 
Introdu

AS A NATION, KOREA HAS a long history of cultural and 

development. Uniquely Korean characteristics have been in 

the peninsula for more than 4,000 years. As a divided nation

tory is much shorter. The Democratic People’s Republic 

(DPRK), or North Korea, with its capital in P’yŏngyang, has 

existed as a separate state only since September 9, 1948. The 

half of the peninsula is governed by the Republic of Kore

Korea), with its capital in Seoul, which came into being j

weeks earlier. Divided Korea is the legacy of Japanese co

(1910– 45), World War II (1937–45 in Asia, 1939–45 in Eur

Cold War between the United States and its allies and th

Soviet Union and its allies (1948–91), the Korean War (1950–

long-term intransigence between the two Koreas. 

Events that took place within China and the Sovie

P’yŏngyang’s staunchest supporters, in the late twentieth cen

significant effects on North Korea. Economic reforms in Ch

late 1970s and the demise of the Soviet Union and the co

Eastern bloc in the early 1990s resulted in market-based 

imports from these partners and lesser amounts of economi

moral support. These realities, plus improved relations betwe

Korea and Japan, coincided with the gradual improvement of 

between P’yŏngyang and Seoul, leading in 1991 to their join

sion to the United Nations and an agreement between the two 

reconciliation and nonaggression. Prospects appeared positiv

ther rapprochement between North and South and betwe

Korea and the United States until the unexpected death 

Korea’s paramount leader, Kim Il Sung (1912–94). 

The regime’s ability to manipulate international economic 

aid, following the disasters of floods in 1995 and famine 

1995 and 1998, and the determination of Kim’s successor, his 

Jong Il, to develop nuclear weapons capabilities further inhi

development of normal relations with other nations. The on-a

again Six-Party Talks—held in Beijing among North Kore

Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States—betw

and 2007 have produced many reassurances and moderate 

tions but few tangible results. 

The Korean Peninsula is strategically situated in the north

ner of the Asian landmass. The northern half of the peninsul
 

 

the People’s Republic of China and Russia to the north and 

Korea to the south. The Yellow Sea (or West Sea as preferred by 

ans) washes the western shore of the peninsula, and the Sea of 

(or East Sea as preferred by Koreans) is off the east coast. The p

sula is a salient pointing at Japan and has, for millennia, been a 

roads of cultural exchange and military invasions between ma

and insular Northeast Asia. Long an area of interest to imperial C

Korea has been fought over by all of its neighbors and, most rec

was the focal point of major conflict during the Korean War. 

decades since an armistice was signed in 1953, the peninsula—

north and south—has been transformed by internal and external 

cal, military, and economic forces, and the societies of the two h

of the peninsula have been continually reshaped. North Korea is 

ble for being largely mountainous—more than 80 percent of th

is mountain ranges, divided by deep, steep valleys relieved only 

west coast by wide plains and more sporadic plains on the east 

The climate can be harsh, bitterly cold in the winter and hot and h

in the summer. 

The origins of Korean civilization, like any ancient culture, e

from legends and myths, some of which are bolstered by archae

and historical analyses. Paleolithic and neolithic societies pop

the peninsula between 500,000 and 7,000 years ago, respectivel

it is the pottery culture that emerged around 2000 B.C. and the 

opment of walled-town states in the fourth century B.C. that hist

of Korea see as the origins of Korean culture. The northern adva

Korean culture and influence was met by a similar advance 

China and the establishment of a Chinese presence in what tod

North Korea and northern parts of South Korea. Temporarily bl

in the north, Korean—or Chosŏn—culture was concentrated 

south. Three kingdoms—Silla, Paekche, and Koguryŏ—deve

there during the third century to the seventh century A.D. 

Koguryŏ became ascendant for a time, it pushed its control dee

what is today northeastern China. Silla eventually became sup

and a centralized government emerged by the fifth century A.D

dhism was introduced from China by the fourth century, a lega

was established in the sixth century, and cultural borrowing from 

Dynasty (614–906) China, especially Confucianism, took hol

Silla declined, the new state of Koryŏ arose and established it

dynasty (924–1392) and flourishing culture until its demise in th

fourteenth century in the wake of invasions by the Mongols 

Inner Asia. 

The Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1910) followed Koryŏ, and 

enjoyed a long period of cultural development and relative p

Neo-Confucian doctrines introduced from China swept away old 

xxx 
 

tices, resulting in the emergence of a well-educated secular so

agrarian majority, and scholar-officials imbued with Neo-C

principles that prescribed the hierarchical position of every m

society. A Chosŏn king is credited with inventing the moder

hangul alphabet (which the North Koreans call chosŏn’gul)

printers were using movable metal type two centuries before 

peans. Korea’s deployment of the world’s first armor-clad s

called “turtle ships,” repulsed devastating invasions from Jap

late sixteenth century, but they were followed in the mid-sev

century by Manchu invasions from the north that debilitated C

Revival from foreign invasions engendered increasing 

and, by the nineteenth century, dynastic decline. The arriv

Western powers in East Asia brought new problems and 

degrees of success at modernization and reform by Kore

neighbors, China and Japan. Imperialist rivalries among Chin

and Russia resulted in direct interference in Korea’s affairs

attempts by reformers to strengthen Korea, Russian and 

competition over a disintegrating China spilled over into Ko

lowing the Russo–Japanese War (1904–5), Japan solidified i

over Korea by making it a protectorate, then a colony and p

Japanese Empire. 

Japanese rule over Korea differed from that imposed by ot

nial powers. Rather than just extract resources and labor fro

Japan allowed manufacturing to take root (primarily in the n

agriculture to flourish (primarily in the south). Korean e

growth sometimes outstripped that in Japan. Nonetheless, th

ence was humiliating for Koreans, and nationalism and politi

ism emerged. The North Koreans’ legacy of guerrilla warfar

Japan during World War II would later give legitimac

P’yŏngyang regime. The end of World War II brought indep

from Japan but also division of the peninsula into two parts a

tually a devastating war. 

North Korea’s contemporary society is under the regimen

one-party rule and controlled by the world’s first communist 

that of the Kim family. Despite claims of socialism by the le

society is as structured today as in premodern times. After 

new leadership began to build a rigid class structure that em

Confucian hierarchical values, the cult of Kim Il Sung, and a 

controlled, thoroughly militarized society. Members of th

Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and the military establishmen

eminent in society and favored with housing, food, educa

creature comforts. For others, life has been impoverished, wit

education, a poor health-care system, no open religious instit

spiritual teaching, and few basic human rights. 
 

The economy of North Korea has gone through tremendous c

since 1948. Before World War II, the northern half of the Korean 

insula was an industrial heartland supporting Japan. Rather tha

raw materials or semifinished products back to Japan, colonial 

preneurs built mines to exploit the raw materials and factories t

duce the finished products. As North Korea developed followin

destruction of the Korean War, it did quite well for a time. Withi

years, most parts of the economy had returned to 1949 levels o

duction. All sectors of the economy reportedly experienced 

growth rates. Central economic development plans were impose

competition to fulfill plan targets by various parts of the eco

caused imbalances between light and heavy industries and be

industry and agriculture. Nevertheless, until 1960 the North’s r

structed economy grew faster than that of the South. During the 1

in sharp contrast to the growth during the previous plans, the eco

experienced slowdowns and reverses. Despite a desire to mode

the regime’s 1955 declaration of national self-reliance (chuch’e

become a central focus of economic planning. Most trade wa

China and the Soviet Union, which provided North Korea with n

industrial, military, and technological assistance at bargain rates

the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union collapsed, China had refo

its economy and opened it to the world, and North Korea was le

state of shock. South Korea, which had not recovered as quickly 

the Korean War, had eventually surged past the North and bu

economy with vast international implications. Gradual rapproch

with the South led to joint economic ventures and infusions of i

ment and aid from the South. Flood and famine in the mid-1

however, caused grievous harm to the economy and between 50

and 3 million deaths. “Adjustments” to the economy were in 

and the regime cautiously allowed changes to the public distrib

system, adopted monetized economic transactions, and change

incentives for labor and companies in 2002. The centrally pl

economy was shelved, but the economy itself continues in tran

and is barely functional. 

The North Korean state is tightly controlled by a small gro

elites led by Kim Il Sung from 1948 to 1994 and, since 1994, 

son and successor, Kim Jong Il. The cult of personality and the 

tism of the Kim family are special features of North Korean po

Kim Il Sung’s wife, daughter, son-in-law, a cousin by marri

brother-in-law, and his son all held high-level positions in the r

during the elder Kim’s lifetime. Kim Jong Il was groomed as a su

sor well in advance of his father’s unexpected death in 1994. 

three years of official mourning, the younger Kim assumed con

the state, party, and military. And he set out to groom one of hi

xxxii 
sons to succeed him. The cult status built around the father 

retained and enhanced by the son. Whether it will pass on 

generation is yet to be seen. 

As the ubiquitous Kim cult is a beacon for society, the co

chuch’e is a guiding principle for politics. Marxism–Leninism

hallowed principle in North Korea, was not included when 

constitution was amended in 1992. By 1998, when the co

was revised again, the concept of private ownership was ad

technocrats and local light-industry managers were grant

autonomy from central party control. Nevertheless, chuch

words of this book’s authors, is “inextricably intertwined” 

cult of Kim, and the regime could be imperiled by further e

disasters. 

In the North Korean regime, the party, the state, and the 

also are inextricably intertwined, with the top leadership po

all three held by Kim Jong Il. However, the “military-first” 

policy, which was formalized in 1995, has meant a slippage in 

trol the party bureaucracy has over the state. To control the st

ical and moral suasion are insufficient for Kim; instead, he 

tight military control to fill this apparent gap. Constitution

highest military organ of state authority is the National Defen

mission, and Kim Jong Il is its chairman. The presidency is h

humously by Kim Il Sung, and the titular head of state is the 

of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, North 

nominal legislature. The National Defense Commission is acc

on paper to the Supreme People’s Assembly. But with Kim 

man of the commission, as well as supreme commander of th

People’s Army, chairman of the KWP’s Central Military Com

and general secretary of the KWP, there is no room for dou

who is in charge and which organ of state is predominant. T

has not held a national party congress since 1980, and the K

tral Committee, which is supposed to hold plenary sessions 

months, has not met since 1994. Nevertheless, the KWP con

play a critical role in supervising its own members and co

mass organizations, such as those for children, youth, wome

ers, loyal opposition parties, and even Koreans living overs

menting civilian society in general. 

Society also is controlled by the civilian bureaucracy. Thro

cials from the central government down to the ward level and 

control exercised over the media and all forms of communic

government plays an important part in the day-to-day regimen

society. Mirroring the Supreme People’s Assembly are provi

local people’s assemblies, which provide an appearance o
 

 

 

support and involvement, at least by local elites, in the governa

the country. 

Kim Jong Il also controls the all-powerful military establish

North Korea has, after China, the United States, and India, the 

largest combat force in the world. There are more than 1.2 millio

sonnel on active duty and an additional 7.7 million personnel in 

military and reserve forces. With a forward deployment of its 

near the demilitarized zone (DMZ—see Glossary) that divides 

and South, North Korea helps keep the Cold War legacy alive

deployment is bolstered by the world’s largest artillery force—

13,500 artillery pieces and rocket launchers. Members of the 

forces are among the best fed, housed, educated, and trained in 

Korean society. The intent is to keep them at a high state of rea

against the perceived threat from U.S. forces stationed in South 

and patrolling the adjacent seas and in the air in Northeast Asia. 

Korea has developed and tested long-range missiles and nuclear 

ons capabilities to counter the specter of a remilitarized Japan a

perennial fear of the United States. The Ministry of People’s A

Forces, which provides administrative direction to the military, 

subordinate to the cabinet but instead answers directly to the cha

of the National Defense Commission. 

North Korea’s military capabilities are designed to suppo

goals of the state and the party, namely to reunify and communi

peninsula. These goals influence military strategic planning, 

training, and force modernization. The Korean People’s Army 

three-part strategy of surprise attack; quick, decisive war; and 

tactics to carry out the nation’s defense policy. The tactics in

plans to launch massive conventional, chemical artillery, and m

attacks and simultaneous insertion of special operations forces

development of a nuclear weapons capability has been part 

overall strategy. So too is the long-term construction of North K

large defense industry, which also is closely managed by the Na

Defense Commission. The sŏngun policy ensures that defense, 

try, and the military establishment in general have all they ne

want. 

August 24, 2007 

* * * 

As the manuscript for this book was being completed, a num

significant events occurred in or concerning North Korea. 

Korea reported on October 9, 2006, that it had conducted it

xxxiv 
nuclear test—a “historic event that brought happiness to our 

and people,” according to the Korean Central News Agency

skepticism about the size and success of the test, independen

revealed that a low-yield (estimated between a half-kiloton 

kiloton) device had been detonated. As North Korea apparent

the world’s nuclear club, it received international condemnat

the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Nat

even from its close ally, China. Even as sanctions were dis

North Korean official suggested that his country could 

nuclear missile if the United States did not resume negotiatio

ever, Kim Jong Il himself reportedly apologized for the test 

there were no plans for additional tests. 

Despite the tensions caused by the North Korean test, on D

18, 2006, the Six-Party Talks resumed in Beijing among re

tives of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan

and China, After protracted negotiations, an agreement wa

signed on February 13, 2007, by which North Korea agree

down its main, Soviet-built nuclear reactor capable of produci

ons-grade plutonium and to allow inspections by the Inte

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the United States 

release US$25 million of North Korean (allegedly money-la

funds frozen in 2005 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank owned by the Delta Asia 

Group, and to provide economic aid and improve diplomatic 

P’yŏngyang did not shut down the aging nuclear reactor at Y

as promised by April 14 but gave assurances that it would do 

after the United States released the Banco Delta Asia funds via 

eral Reserve Bank in New York on June 25, 2007, to a Nort

account at a commercial bank in Russia near the border w

Korea. Just before the announcement, Assistant Secretary 

Christopher R. Hill made an unannounced two-day trip to P’y

on June 21–22. The trip was made despite there being no U.S

for concessions as a condition of the visit, which was requ

North Korea. Following Hill’s meetings with Ministry of 

Affairs officials, the Six-Party Talks resumed two days late

18–20 and continued on September 27–30 in Beijing. At the l

sion, the six parties agreed to implement the February 17, 200

ment. In subsequent months, the United States agreed on 

2008, to restart deliveries of food aid and in June 2008 to remo

Korea from its list of countries sponsoring terrorism. 

On June 27, 2008, North Korea submitted to the Chines

host nation of the Six-Party Talks, a 60-page declaration of it

inventory, including a list of its nuclear facilities, the amoun

duced and extracted plutonium and how it is used, and the v
 

 

its uranium stocks. The next day, Washington reciprocated wi

announcement that it would remove North Korea from its list of 

that sponsor terrorism, and North Korea dramatically destro

cooling tower at the Yŏngbyŏn facility. Despite these breakthro

the North Koreans rejected the U.S. suggestion of on-the-spot in

tions of their nuclear facilities and sampling of nuclear materia

Bush administration responded on August 11 by announcing 

would not remove North Korea from the state-sponsored terroris

until P’yŏngyang established a mechanism that allowed interna

inspectors to verify the claims of its June 27 nuclear declaration. 

Other momentous events included the April 11, 2007, appoin

of Kim Yong-il as North Korea’s premier, replacing Pak Pong-ju

had held the office since September 2003. Kim had been the long

deputy bureau director and minister of land and marine tra

before becoming premier. In May 2007, the railroad crossing the 

ern DMZ was reconnected between North Korea and South Kor

the first time since 1950. On May 17, two five-car passenger test 

ran between Kaesŏng in North Korea and Munson, in South K

across the DMZ and back. Freight service on the same 25-kilo

route was inaugurated on December 11, 2007. 

North Korea reportedly suffered its heaviest-ever rainfall in A

2007 and the worst since the devastating floods of 1995. About 1

cent, or 450,000 tons, of the country’s crops were destroyed 

August floods; hundreds of people died, and some 300,000 we

homeless. A summit conference planned for August 28–30 in P

yang between Kim Jong Il and South Korean president Roh Moo 

was postponed until October 2–4 because of the floods. At the c

sion of their cordial summit, Kim and Roh signed a joint declaratio

ing for permanent peace and economic prosperity on the K

Peninsula. Despite follow-up prime ministerial talks in Seoul in N

ber, political realities in South Korea compelled Roh to take a st

stance on North Korea, and inter-Korean relations, like the Six

Talks, continued to fluctuate. 

More serious developments occurred in September 2008. On 

tember 9, Kim Jong Il failed to appear at public celebrations f

sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. The condit

Kim’s health, as he recovered from a reported cerebral hemor

was subject to silence within North Korea and considerable sp

tion outside the country. Regional and more distant obs

expressed concern about the sustainability of the P’yŏngyang re

The nuclear dispute with the United States and other nations t

serious turn on September 24 when North Korea asked IAEA of

to remove their seals and surveillance equipment at the Yŏn

xxxvi 
 

nuclear reprocessing plant and then denied them access. P’y

sought more concessions—and removal from Washington

sponsored terrorism list—as it threatened to resume p

nuclear fuel. However, on October 11, the United States 

removed North Korea from its terrorism list, and the North 

resume its denuclearization procedures. 

Amidst ostensibly improved international relations betwe

Korea and other nations, bilateral ties between P’yŏngyang a

became more tense. The North objected to South Korea’s e

more conservative policies concerning nuclear, human rig

other issues. On October 7, North Korean units tested two shi

missiles in the Yellow Sea, which was seen as a provocatio

South. On October 17, P’yŏngyang threatened to cut off al

relations if the conservative policies of the South—which t

viewed as provocative—continued. In the meantime, the Nort

ued to deny reports concerning Kim Jong Il’s poor health, an

sources began to reveal new famine conditions emerging in 

parts of the DPRK. 

November 5, 2008 Robert L

Chapter 1. Historical S
Statue of Kim Il Sung as a young man preaching revolution, a part of 

Wangjae-san Grand Monument, Onsŏng, North Hamgyŏng Province 

Courtesy Pulmyŏl ŭi t’ap (Tower of Immortality), P’yŏngyang: Muny

Ch’ulpansa, 1985, 137 
 

 

THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SITUATION of th

cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea

atively stable and predictable from the end of the Korean 

1953 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The first-generat

lutionaries who built and directed the political system after 

held power as the 1990s began. Kim Il Sung, the founder of 

and the center of its politics, continued to hold ultimate po

the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the emergence o

crisis in relations with the United States in 1993 over North 

nuclear policy, and Kim’s unexpected death in 1994 put Nor

on a much less stable and predictable footing. A general co

its energy system and massive flooding followed in 1995, l

famine that claimed the lives of somewhere between 300

800,000 people annually through 1998. A new generation le

beholden to, Kim’s son—Kim Jong Il—took over at the hig

elons in the late 1990s and attempted to respond to the w

changes of the previous decade, on the Korean Peninsula a

world. 

North Korea responded to a dynamically shifting set of 

economic, and diplomatic opportunities and constraints wit

survival strategy and sporadic reform. The nation held far

negotiations with the United States that led in October 1994 t

sation of further development at its nuclear complex at Y

After former dissident Kim Dae Jung came to power in the 

of Korea (South Korea) in 1998, his policy of engagement l

first-ever summit meeting between the leaders of the two K

June 2000, and to a host of agreements on South Korean inv

trade, and tourism in or with the North. Kim Jong Il also b

the North’s diplomatic ties by opening relations with Austra

ada, and most countries in the European Union. The fate of 

North Korean system hinged on its success in adaptation to 

environment: whether the state survived as a separate entity, 

partner in some sort of federation with the South, or went th

many other communist systems and simply disappeared st

very open question in the early twenty-first century. 

However the new leaders respond, the legacies of the pa

heavily on them. More than most communist systems, Nor

has molded Marxism–Leninism to the requisites of an in

political culture and a continuous tradition going back to a

Furthermore, the deep-seated continuity of leadership and 
structure since the late 1940s means that North Korea contin

work within long-established foundations of politics, econo

and diplomacy. It is essential to grasp the evolution of North K

history in order to understand the developments since the mid-1

The DPRK originated with the national division in 1945 and 

midst of the post–World War II confrontation between the U

States and the Soviet Union. North Korea was, and in some way

is, a classic Cold War state, driven by reference to the long-ru

conflict with South Korea and the United States. It was founded 

heyday of Stalinism, which had particular influence on the N

heavy-industry-first economic program. The regime’s Korean o

traced to a harsh guerrilla struggle against Japan in the 1930s. He

state perhaps uniquely forged in warfare, in Manchuria (as Nor

China was then commonly known) against Japan, in a civil str

fought by unconventional means at the inception of the regim

through vicious fratricidal war while national structures were s

infancy. Out of that war came one of the world’s most remarkabl

rison states, with most of the adult population having military e

ence. All these influences combined to produce a hardened lead

that, whatever else one might think of it, knew how to hold 

power. But North Korea also accomplished a rare synthesis be

foreign models and domestic sources of politics; the political sys

deeply rooted in native soil, drawing upon Korea’s long history o

tary existence on a small peninsula surrounded by greater power

The Origins of the Korean Nation 

Koreans inhabit a mountainous peninsula protruding south

from Northeast Asia and surrounded on three sides by water (s

1; The Physical Environment, ch. 2). The peninsula, for most 

recorded history, was surrounded on three sides by other pe

Chinese to the west, Japanese to the east, and an assortment of 

barian” tribes, aggressive invaders, and, in the twentieth centu

expanding and deepening Russian presence to the north. Alth

Japan exercised decisive influence by the late sixteenth centu

ancient times the peoples and civilizations on the contiguous 

continent were far more important. 

The northern border between Korea and China formed b

Amnok (known as the Yalu in China) and Tuman (Tumen a

called in China) rivers has been recognized for centuries. Thes

ers did not always constitute Korea’s northern limits, as Ko

ranged far beyond this barrier well into Northeast China and Si

and neither Koreans nor the ancient tribes that occupied the pla

Manchuria regarded these riverine obstacles as sacrosanct bo

4 
 

The harsh winter climate also turned the rivers into frozen p

for many months, facilitating the back and forth migrat

which, over time, the Korean people were formed. 

Paleolithic excavations show that human beings inhab

Korean Peninsula 500,000 years ago, but most scholars ass

present-day Koreans are not descended ethnically from th

inhabitants. Neolithic humans were there 7,000 or 8,000 y

their presence affirmed by the ground and polished stone t

pottery they left to posterity. Around 2000 B.C., a new pot

ture spread into Korea from China, leaving evidence of p

painted designs. These neolithic people practiced agriculture 

tled communal life and were widely supposed to have had 

guineous clans as their basic social grouping. Korean hist

modern times sometimes assume that clan leadership syste

acterized by councils of nobles (hwabaek) that emerged in th

quent Silla period traced back to these neolithic peoples. Th

hard evidence, however, to support such imagined beginning

Korean people. 

A mythical figure, Tan’gun, is said to have founded the 

nation in 2333 B.C. (a date set by the South Korean gove

the year he built his royal palace near modern-day P’yŏngy

established the Old Chosŏn kingdom. Although his ori

obscure, the Tan’gun legend has existed since before the sec

tury A.D. and has had influence ever since. The North 

regime’s Foundation Day on October 3 relates to Tan’gun

government claimed in 1993 to have found and excavated 

near P’yŏngyang. 

By the fourth century B.C., a number of walled-town stat

peninsula had survived long enough to come to the atte

China. The most illustrious state was Old Chosŏn, which h

lished itself along the banks of the Liao and the Taedong 

southern Manchuria and northwestern Korea. Old Chosŏn p

into a civilization based on bronze culture and a political f

of many walled towns, which, judging from Chinese accou

formidable to the point of arrogance. Riding horses and usin

weapons, the Chosŏn people extended their influence to t

taking most of the Liaodong Basin. But the rising power of 

China state of Yan (also known as Eastern Zhou) checked 

growth and eventually pushed it back to territory sout

Ch’ŏngch’ŏn River, located midway between the Yalu and 

rivers. As Yan gave way in China to the Qin (221–207 B.C

Han (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) dynasties, Chosŏn declined, and 

populations migrated eastward. Out of this mileu emerged W

man who assumed the kingship of Chosŏn sometime betw
 

 

 

and 180 B.C. Wiman Chosŏn melded Chinese influence and th

Chosŏn federated structure; apparently reinvigorated under W

this state again expanded over hundreds of kilometers of territo

ambitions ran up against a Han invasion, however, and W

Chosŏn fell in 108 B.C. 

These developments coincided with the emergence of iro

ture, enabling a sophisticated agriculture based on implements 

as hoes, plowshares, and sickles. Cultivation of rice and other 

increased markedly, allowing the population to expand. Ther

an unquestioned continuity in agrarian society from this time 

the emergence of a unified Korean state many centuries later, e

the peoples of the peninsula could not be called Korean. 

Han Chinese built four commanderies to rule the peninsula 

south as the Han River, with a core area at Lolang (Nangna

Korean), near present-day P’yŏngyang. It is illustrative of the r

lessly different historiography practiced in North Korea and 

Korea, as well as both countries’ dubious projection backwa

Korean nationalism, that North Korean historians denied th

Lolang district was centered in Korea and placed it northwest 

peninsula, possibly near Beijing. Perhaps this was because Lolan

clearly a Chinese city, as demonstrated by the many burial o

showing the affluent lives of Chinese overlords and merchants. 

The Three Kingdoms Period 

Paekche 

For about four centuries, from the second century B.C. to th

ond century A.D., Lolang was a great center of Chinese statecra

industry (including the mining of iron ore), and commerce. Its 

ence was far-reaching, attracting immigrants from China and ex

tribute from several states south of the Han River, which pat

their civilization and government after Lolang. In the first three 

ries A.D., a large number of walled-town states in southern Kore

grouped into three federations known as Chinhan, Mahan

Pyŏnhan; rice agriculture had developed in the rich alluvial v

and plains to the point of establishing reservoirs for irrigation. 

Chinhan was situated in the middle part of the southern peni

Mahan in the southwest, and Pyŏnhan in the southeast. The st

Paekche, which soon came to exercise great influence on Korea

tory, emerged first in the Mahan area; it is not certain when thi

pened, but Paekche certainly existed by A.D. 246 because L

mounted a large attack on it in that year. That Paekche was a ce

ized, aristocratic state melding Chinese and indigenous influenc

6 
 

 

not in doubt, nor was its growing power: within a century, 

had demolished Mahan and continued expanding northw

what today is the core area of Korea, around Seoul. It is tho

the Korean custom of father-to-son royal succession began w

Kŭn Ch’ogo (reigned ca. 346–75) of Paekche. His grandson 

rated another long tradition by adopting Buddhism as the s

gion in 384. 

Koguryŏ

Meanwhile, two other powerful states had emerged nor

peninsula around the time of Christ—Puyŏ in the Sunga

Basin in Manchuria, and Koguryŏ, Puyŏ’s frequent enem

south, near the Yalu River. Koguryŏ, which also exercised 

influence on Korean history, developed in confrontation 

Chinese. Puyŏ was weaker and sought alliances with China 

ter Koguryŏ but eventually succumbed around A.D. 312. 

was expanding in all directions, in particular toward the Li

in the west and toward the Taedong River in the south. In 3

ryŏ occupied the territory of Lolang and came into conf

Paekche. 

Peninsular geography shaped the political space of Pae

Koguryŏ, and a third kingdom, Silla. In the central part of K

main mountain range, the T’aebaek, runs north to south along 

of the Sea of Japan (or, as Koreans prefer, the East Sea). 

mately three-quarters of the way down the peninsula, 

roughly at the thirty-seventh parallel, the mountain range ve

southwest, dividing the peninsula almost in the middle. Th

west extension, the Sŏbaek Range, shielded peoples to the 

from the Chinese-occupied portion of the peninsula but place

ous barrier in the way of expansion into or out of the sout

portion of the peninsula. This was Paekche’s historical territo

Koguryŏ, however, extended over a wild region of nort

Korea and eastern Manchuria subjected to extremes of tem

and structured by towering mountain ranges, broad plains, 

giving rivers. The highest peak, known as Paektu-san 

Paektu, or White Head Mountain), is situated on the conte

North Korea–China border and has a beautiful, crystal-pur

its summit. Kim Il Sung and his guerrilla band utilized ass

with this mountain as part of the founding myth of North K

as Kim Jong Il was said to have been born on the slopes of th

tain in 1942. Unsurprisingly, North Korea claimed the Kog

acy as the mainstream of Korean history. 
 

 

(JA

Ansisong 

P’yongyang 

Puyo 

Kyongju 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

Yellow 

Sea 

(West Sea) 

Sea of Japa

(East Sea) 

Liao 

Sungari 

Naktong 

Han 

Taedong 

Tuman (Tumen) 

Amnok 

(Yalu) 

Paektu-san 

2,744 

Shandong 

Peninsula 

Liaodong 

Peninsula 

KAYA 

SILLA 

PAEKCHE 

PUYO 

KOGURYO 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

100 Miles 

0 100 Kilometers

0 

50 

50 

Northern limit 

Populated place 

Spot elevation in meters 

Source: Based on information from Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, Seoul, 198

Republic of Korea, Government Information Agency, Korean Overseas Inform

Service, Facts About Korea, Seoul, 2006, 17; and Suh Cheong-Soo, ed., An E

pedia of Korean Culture, Seoul, 2004, 219.

Figure 2. Korea in the Fifth Century A.D. 

8 
 

Silla 

According to South Korean historiography, however, it 

glories of a third kingdom that were most important in foun

nation. Silla eventually became the repository of a rich and 

ruling elite, with its capital at Kyŏngju in the southeast, nor

modern port of Pusan. The military men who ruled Sout

either as dictators or elected leaders beginning in 1961, 

from this region, and most South Korean historians consid

historical lineage as predominant. It was the Paekche legacy 

fered in divided Korea, as Koreans of other regions and hist

both North Korea and South Korea discriminated against th

of the Chŏlla provinces in the southwest of the peninsula. B

together, the Three Kingdoms continued to infuence Korea

and political culture. Koreans often assumed that regional t

they liked or disliked went back to the Three Kingdoms per

Silla evolved from a walled town called Saro. Silla chron

said to have traced its origins to 57 B.C., but contemporary 

ans have regarded King Naemul (r. A.D. 356–402) as the r

first consolidated a large confederated kingdom and estab

hereditary monarchy. His domain was east of the Naktong 

today’s North Kyŏngsang Province. A small number 

located along the south-central tip of the peninsula facing t

Strait did not join either Silla or Paekche but instead forme

League, which maintained close ties with states in Japan. Si

tually absorbed the neighboring Kaya states in spite of an 

Wa forces from Japan on behalf of Kaya in A.D. 399, wh

repelled with help from Koguryŏ. Centralized government 

emerged in Silla in the second half of the fifth century, as th

became both an administrative and a marketing center (see f

the early sixth century, Silla’s leaders introduced plowing 

and built extensive irrigation facilities. Increased agricultur

presumably ensued, allowing further political and cultural 

ment, including an administrative code in 520, a heredit

structure known as the bone-rank system to regulate memb

the elite, and the adoption of Buddhism as the state religio

535. Status in Silla society was so much influenced by birth 

eage that the bone-rank system led each family and clan to 

extensive genealogical records with meticulous care. Beca

male offspring prolonged the family and clan lines and were 

names registered in the genealogical tables, the birth of a 

greeted with great felicitation. The elite, of course, was m

scious of family pedigree. 
 

Silla was weaker militarily than Koguryŏ, however, and sou

fend off its rival through an alliance with Paekche. By the begi

of the fifth century, Koguryŏ had achieved undisputed control 

of Manchuria east of the Liao River as well as the northern an

tral regions of the Korean Peninsula. At this time, Koguryŏ 

famous leader appropriately named King Kwanggaet’o (r. 391–

whose name translates as “wide open land.” Reigning from th

of 18, he conquered 65 walled towns and 1,400 villages, in ad

to assisting Silla when the Wa forces from Japan attacked. B

Koguryŏ’s domain increased, it confronted China’s Sui Dy

(589–618) in the west and Silla and Paekche to the south. 

Silla attacked Koguryŏ in 551 in concert with King Sŏ

523–54) of Paekche. After conquering the upper reaches of th

River, Silla then turned on Paekche forces and drove them out 

lower Han area. While a tattered Paekche kingdom nurs

wounds in the southwest, Silla allied with Chinese forces of th

and the successor Tang (618–906) dynasties in combined a

against Koguryŏ. The Sui emperor, Yang Di, launched an invas

Koguryŏ in 612, marshalling more than 1 million soldiers, only 

lured into a trap by the revered Koguryŏ commander, Ŭlchi Mu

who destroyed the Sui forces. Perhaps as few as 3,000 Sui so

survived their eclipse, thus contributing to the fall of the dyna

618. Tang emperor Tai Zong launched another huge invasion in 

but Koguryŏ forces won another striking victory in the siege 

Ansisŏng (An Si Fortress), forcing him to withdraw. 

Koreans have always viewed these victories as sterling examp

resistance to foreign aggression. Had Koguryŏ not beaten bac

invaders, all the states of the peninsula might have fallen under 

term Chinese domination. Thus commanders such as Ŭlchi M

became models for emulation thereafter, especially during the K

War (1950–53). Paekche could not hold out under combined Sil

Tang attack, however. The latter landed an invasion fleet in 66

Paekche quickly fell. Tang pressure also had weakened Ko

which, after eight successive years of battle, succumbed to a com

tion of external attack, internal strife, and several famines. Ko

retreated to the north, enabling Silla forces to advance and conso

their control up to the Taedong River, which flows through P’yŏng

Silla emerged victorious in 668. It is from this famous dat

South Korean historians speak of a unified Korea. The period 

Three Kingdoms thus ended, but not before all of them had 

under the long-term sway of Chinese civilization by introd

Chinese statecraft, Buddhist and Confucian philosophy, Conf

practices of educating the young, and the Chinese written lan

10 
(Koreans adapted the characters to their own language throu

tem known as idu). The Three Kingdoms also introduced Bu

the various rulers seeing, in a body of believers devoted to 

but serving one king, a valuable political device for unity

from Koguryŏ and Paekche perfected a mural art found on 

of tombs and took it to Japan where it deeply influenced 

temple and burial art. Indeed, many Korean historians have 

believe that the wall murals in royal tombs in Japan indic

the imperial house lineage may have Korean origins. 

Korea under Silla 

Silla and Paekche had sought to use Chinese power again

ryŏ, inaugurating another tradition of involving foreign p

Korean internal disputes. Silla’s reliance on Tang forces to co

its control had its price, however, because Silla had to resist e

ing Tang forces, which limited its sway to the area south of 

dong River. But Silla’s military force, bolstered by an ide

youthful warrior (hwarang), was formidable, and it seized 

territories by 671 and by 676 pushed Koguryŏ northward and 

commanderies off the peninsula, thereby guaranteeing that t

opment of the Korean people would take independent form. 

The broad territories of Koguryŏ were not conquered, 

and a Koguryŏ general named Tae Cho-yŏng established a s

state called Parhae that extended to both sides of the Am

Tuman rivers. Parhae forced Silla to build a northern wall in 

kept Silla forces below a line running from present-day P’y

to Wŏnsan. By the eighth century, Parhae controlled the 

part of Korea, all of northeastern Manchuria, and the Liaod

insula. Both Silla and Parhae continued to be influenced d

Tang civilization. 

There were many contacts between Silla and Tang China

numbers of students, officials, and monks traveled to C

study. In 682 Silla set up a national Confucian academy to t

officials and later instituted a civil-service examination syst

eled on that of the Tang. Parhae modeled its central governm

more directly on Tang systems than did Silla and sent many 

to Tang schools. Parhae culture melded indigenous and Ta

ences, and its level of civilization was high enough to merit 

nese designation as a “flourishing land in the East.” 

Silla in particular, however, developed a flourishing indigen

lization that was among the most advanced in the world. Its 

Kyŏngju was renowned as the “city of gold,” where the ar

pursued a high culture and extravagant pleasures. Tang histori
 

that elite officials possessed thousands of slaves, with like numb

horses, cattle, and pigs. The wives of such senior officials wor

tiaras and earrings of delicate and intricate filigree. Silla scholars 

ied the Confucian and Buddhist classics, advanced state administr

and developed sophisticated methods for astronomy and calen

science. The Dharani Sutra, recovered in Kyŏngju, dates as far b

751 and is the oldest example of woodblock printing yet found 

world. “Pure Land” Buddhism united the mass of common p

who could become adherents through the repetition of simple c

The crowning glories of this “city of gold” are the Pulguksa Tem

Kyŏngju and the nearby Sŏkkuram Grotto, both built around 75

home to some of the finest Buddhist sculpture in the world. The g

atop a coastal bluff near Kyŏngju, boasts a great stone Sakyamun

dha in the cave’s inner sanctum, poised such that the rising sun ov

sea strikes him in the middle of the forehead. 

Ethnic differences between Koguryŏ and the Malgal people na

Manchuria weakened Parhae by the early tenth century, howeve

as Silla’s power had begun to dissipate a century earlier when re

castle lords splintered central power and rebellions shook Silla’s 

dations. While Parhae came under severe pressure from Qid

Kitan) warriors from Inner Asia (the region west and north of 

proper), Silla’s decline encouraged a resurgent Paekche under a 

named Kyŏnhwŏn to found Later Paekche at Chŏnju in 892

another restorationist, named Kungye, to found Later Kogur

Kaesŏng in central Korea. Wang Kŏn, the son of Kungye, wh

ceeded to the throne in 918, shortened the name to Koryŏ and b

the founder of a new dynasty (918–1392) by that name, whence 

the modern term “Korea.” 

Unification by Koryŏ

Wang Kŏn’s army fought ceaselessly with Later Paekche f

next decade, with Silla in retreat. After a crushing victory over Pa

forces at present-day Andong in 930, Koryŏ received a formal s

der from Silla and proceeded to conquer Later Paekche by 935—

ingly, with troops led by the former Paekche king, Kyŏnhwŏn, w

son had treacherously cast him aside. After this accomplishment, 

Kŏn became a magnanimous unifier. Regarding himself as the p

successor to Koguryŏ, he embraced survivors of the Koguryŏ li

who were fleeing the dying Parhae state, which had been conque

Qidan warriors in 926. He then took a Silla princess as his wif

treated the Silla aristocracy with unexampled generosity. Wang 

established a regime embodying the last remnants of the Three 

doms and accomplished a true unification of the peninsula. 

12 
 

Pulguksa Temple, built between 751 and 774, is a masterp

golden age of Buddhist art in the Silla kingdom and is on the 

World Heritage List. The temple is in Kyŏngju, North Kyŏngsang 

Sou

Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, 

With its capital at Kaesŏng, the Koryŏ Dynasty’s compo

forged a tradition of aristocratic continuity that lasted dow

modern era. The elite combined aristocratic privilege and 

power through marriage alliances, control of land and centr

cal office, and making class position hereditary. This esta

pattern for Korea, in which landed gentry mingled with a Co

or Buddhist-educated stratum of scholar-officials; often sch

landlords were one and the same person, but in any cas

wealth and bureaucratic position were powerfully fused. Th

center a strong bureaucracy influenced by Confucian 

emerged, which thereafter sought to dominate local power 

tated against the Japanese or European feudal pattern of sm

sovereignty, castle domains, and military tradition. By the t

century, there were two dominant government groupings—

the civil officials and the military officials—known ther

yangban (the two orders—see Glossary). 

The Koryŏ elite admired the splendid civilization that 

during China’s Song Dynasty (960–1279). Official delegat

ordinary merchants brought Koryŏ gold, silver, and ginseng 

in exchange for Song silks, porcelains, and woodblock bo

treasured Song porcelains stimulated Koryŏ artisans to pr
 

 

 

even finer type of inlaid celadon porcelain. Unmatched in the 

before or since for the pristine clarity of its blue-green glaze an

delicate art of its inlaid portraits (usually of flowers or anim

Koryŏ celadon displayed the refined taste of aristocrats and lat

great influence on potters in Japan. 

Buddhism coexisted with Confucianism throughout the K

period, deeply influencing the daily life of society and pe

bequeathing to modern Korea its eclecticism of religious b

Koryŏ Buddhist priests systematized religious practice by rend

the Chinese version of the Buddhist canon into mammoth w

block print editions, known as the Tripitaka Koreana. The firs

tion was completed in 1087 after a lifetime of work but wa

another, completed in 1251 and still extant, was located at the 

Temple. Its accuracy, combined with the exquisite calligraphic 

ings, made it the finest of some 20 Tripitaka editions created in 

Asia. By 1234, if not earlier, Koryŏ had also invented movabl

type, two centuries before its use in Europe. 

This high point of Koryŏ culture coincided with internal di

and the rise of the Mongols, whose power swept most of the k

world during the thirteenth century. Koryŏ was no exceptio

Khubilai Khan’s forces invaded and demolished Koryŏ’s arm

1231, forcing the Koryŏ government to retreat to Kanghwa 

(off modern-day Inch’ŏn), a ploy that exploited the Mongol h

men’s fear of water. But after a more devastating invasion in 12

which countless people died and some 200,000 people were 

captives, Koryŏ succumbed to Mongol domination, and its 

married Mongol princesses. The Mongols then enlisted thousan

Koreans in ill-fated invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, 

Korean-made ships. The Kamakura shogunate (1185–1333) t

back both invasions with aid, as legend has it, from oppo

typhoons known as the “divine wind” or kamikaze. The last per

Mongol influence was marked by the appearance of a strong bu

cratic stratum of scholar-officials or literati (sadaebu in Ko

Many of them lived in exile outside the capital, and they used 

superior knowledge of the Confucian classics to condem

excesses of the ruling families, who were backed by Mongol p

The overthrow of the Mongols by the Ming Dynasty (1368–

in China gave an opportunity to a rising group of military 

steeled in battle against coastal pirates from Japan, to contest p

in Koryŏ. When the Ming claimed suzerainty over former M

domains in Korea, the Koryŏ court was divided between pro-M

and pro-Ming forces. Two generals marshaled their forces f

assault on Ming armies on the Liaodong Peninsula. One of the 

erals, Yi Sŏng-gye, was pro-Ming. When he reached the A

14 
One of the 81,200 wood printing blocks of the Tripitaka Koreana, 

in 1251 following the destruction of the originals 

Mongol 

Courtesy Korean Collection, Asian Division, Library of 

Washin

More than 6,500 volumes of the 

Tripitaka Koreana are housed at Haein 

Temple in South Kyŏngsang Province, 

South Korea. 

Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, 

New York 
River, he abruptly turned back and marched on the Koryŏ c

which he subdued quickly. He thus became the founder of K

longest-lasting dynasty, the Chosŏn (1392–1910). The new stat

named Chosŏn, harking back to Old Chosŏn 16 centuries earlie

its capital was built at Seoul. 

The Chosŏn Dynasty 

Florescence 

One of Yi Sŏng-gye’s first acts was to carry out a sweeping 

reform long advocated by literati reformers. After a national c

tral survey, all old land registers were destroyed. Except for e

doled out to loyalists called “merit subjects,” Yi declared all 

land to be owned by the state, thus undercutting Buddhist te

(which held sizable tracts of farmland) and locally pow

clans—both of which had exacted high rents from peasants, le

to social distress in the late Koryŏ period. These reforms also g

enhanced the taxation revenue of the central government. 

Buddhist influence in and complicity with the old system m

easier for the literati to urge an extirpation of Buddhist econom

political influence, and exile in the mountains for monks and 

disciples. Indeed, the literati accomplished a deep Confuciani

of Chosŏn society, which particularly affected the positi

women. Often prominent in Koryŏ society, they were relega

domestic chores of child rearing and housekeeping, as so-

“inside people.” 

As Neo-Confucian doctrines swept the old order away, 

effectively developed a secular society. Common people, how

retained attachments to folk religions, shamanism, geomancy

fortune-telling, influences condemned by Confucianism. 

Korean mass culture created remarkably lively and diver

forms: uniquely colorful and unpretentiously naturalistic folk 

ings of animals, popular novels in Korean vernacular, and char

such as the mudang (shamans who summon spirits and pe

exorcisms). In this way, women frequently found expressio

their artistic creativity. 

For more than a century after its founding, Chosŏn flourished 

exemplary agrarian bureaucracy deeply influenced by a cad

learned scholar-officials, steeped in the doctrines of Neo-Conf

ism. Like Koryŏ, the Chosŏn Dynasty did not manifest the typic

tures of a feudal society. Chosŏn possessed an elaborate procedu

entry to the civil service, which was highly developed, and a pr

of administering the country from the top down and from the c

16 
 

The system rested upon an agrarian base, making it differ

modern bureaucratic systems; the particular character of 

bureaucratic interaction also provided one of Korea’s departu

the typical Chinese experience. 

The leading Western historian of the Chosŏn Dynasty, 

Palais, has shown that conflict between bureaucrats seeking 

for government coffers and landowners hoping to control ten

harvests was a constant during the Chosŏn, and that in thi

over resources the landowners often won out. Despite theoret

land ownership, private landed power soon came to be stro

more persistent in Korea than in China. Korea had centralize

istration, to be sure, but the ostensibly strong center was mor

façade concealing the reality of aristocratic power. 

Thus Korea’s agrarian bureaucracy was superficially st

actually rather weak at the center. The state ostensibly domi

society, but in fact landed aristocratic families kept the sta

and perpetuated local power for centuries. This pattern persi

the late 1940s, when landed dominance was obliterated in a 

revolution and attenuated in southern land reform; since then 

ance has shifted toward strong central power and top-down 

tration of the whole country in both Koreas (see The New 

Society, ch. 2; The Economy after World War II, ch. 3). 

Confucianism began with the family and an ideal mode

tions between family members. It generalized this family 

the state, and to an international system—the Chinese wor

The principle was hierarchy within a reciprocal web of du

obligations: the son obeyed the father by following the di

filial piety; the father provided for and educated the son. D

obeyed mothers and mothers-in-law, younger siblings follow

siblings, wives were subordinate to husbands. The superior 

and privileges of older adults made longevity a prime virtue

of society viewed transgressors of these rules as unculture

not fit to be members of their community. When generalize

tics, a village followed the leadership of venerated elders, 

zens revered a king or emperor who was thought of as the 

the state. Generalized to international affairs, China’s emp

the big brother of the Korean king. 

The glue holding the system together was education, 

socialization into Confucian norms and virtues that began 

childhood with the reading of the Confucian classics. The m

ure was the so-called true gentleman, the virtuous and 

scholar-official who was equally adept at poetry or statecraf

tion started very early, as Korean students had to master t
 

ordinarily difficult classical Chinese language—tens of thousan

written characters and their many meanings; rote memorizatio

the typical method. Throughout the Chosŏn Dynasty, all o

records, all formal education, and most written discourse w

classical Chinese. With Chinese language and philosophy, of c

came a profound cultural penetration of Korea, such that 

Chosŏn arts and literature came to use Chinese models. 

The Korean written alphabet, hangul (see Glossary), was sy

atized in the fifteenth century under the greatest of Korean 

Sejong (r. 1418–50), who also greatly increased the use of 

moveable type for book publications of all sorts. Some scholar

sider Korean to be part of the Ural–Altaic group of languages, in

ing Turkish, Hungarian, Finnish, and Japanese; others believe i

be a language isolate. In spite of the long influence of written 

nese, Korean remains very different in lexicon, phonology, and 

mar. The hangul alphabet did not come into general use un

twentieth century, however; since 1948 the North Koreans have 

the Korean alphabet—which they call chosŏn’gul—exclus

while South Koreans retained usage of a mixed Sino–Korean 

until the 1990s, at which time Chinese characters became less u

Confucianism is often thought to be a conservative philos

stressing tradition, veneration of a past golden age, obedien

superiors, careful attention to the performance of ritual, disda

material things, commerce, the remaking of nature, and a prefe

for relatively frozen social hierarchies. Much commentary on 

temporary Korea focuses on the alleged authoritarian, antid

cratic character of this Confucian legacy. Yet a one-sided emp

on these aspects would never explain the extraordinary comm

bustle of South Korea, the materialism and conspicuous con

tion of new elites, or the determined struggles for democrati

put up by Korean workers and students. On the other han

assumption that North Korean communism broke completely 

the past would blind one to continuing Confucian legacies the

family-based politics, the succession to rule of the leader’s son

the extraordinary veneration of Kim Il Sung (see The Cult of K

Sung, ch. 2). 

The Chosŏn Dynasty had a traditional class structure that dep

from the Chinese Confucian example, providing an important l

for the modern period. Yangban was still the Korean term fo

aristocracy, but it no longer connoted simply two official orde

key features were its virtual monopoly on education and o

position, possession of land, and the requirement of hereditar

eage for entry to yangban status. Unlike in China, commoners 

18 
 

Korean movable-type specimens made of brass, iron, copper, and 

thirteenth century. Korea advanced the technology of printing by d

movable cast-metal type, from t

Courtesy Korean Collection, Asian Division, Library of 

Washin

King Sejong (r. 1418–50), the fourth king of the Chosŏn Dynasty, t

attributed the development of the Korean hangu

Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, 

not sit for state-run examinations leading to official positio

ans had to prove that they belonged to a yangban family, 

practice meant a forebear having sat for exams within the 

generations. In Korea, as in China, the majority of peasant 

could not spare a son to study for the exams, so that upwa

mobility was sharply limited. But in Korea the limit also wa

ically hereditary, leading to less mobility than in China and 

toward class distinction that often seemed indistinguisha

castes. A major study of all successful exam candidate

Chosŏn Dynasty (some 14,000) showed remarkable persi

those elite families producing students to sit for the exam

studies have documented the persistence of this pattern into 

twentieth century. Even in 1945, one could say that this ar

was substantially intact, although its effective demise ca

thereafter. 

Korea’s traditional class system also included a peasant 

and minorities of petty clerks, merchants, and so-called 
 

 

 

 

classes, caste-like hereditary groups (paekchŏng) such as but

leather tanners, and beggars. Although merchants ranked highe

low-born classes, Confucian elites frowned on commercial ac

and squelched it as much as possible right down to the twentiet

tury. Peasants ranked higher than merchants because they w

the life-giving land, but the life of the peasantry was almost a

difficult during the Chosŏn period, although more so in the late

turies. Most peasants were tenants, required to give up at least h

their crop to landlords as tax, and subject to various additional 

tions. The low-born classes were probably worse off, however, 

the very high rates of slavery for much of the Chosŏn period

source reported more than 200,000 government slaves in Seoul 

in 1462, and recent academic study has suggested that as much 

percent of Seoul’s population may have been slaves. In spite of 

ery being hereditary, rates of escape from slavery and manum

also were unusually high. Class and status hierarchies also are 

ent in the Korean language and have persisted into the contemp

period. The correct form of address to superiors and inferior

quite different, and elders could be addressed only using elab

honorifics. Even verb endings and conjugations differed acco

to station. 

Chosŏn-period Confucian doctrines did not stop at the na

boundary but also informed a foreign policy known as “servin

great” (sadae), meaning China. Chosŏn lived within China’s 

order, radiating outward from Zhongguo (the Middle Kingdo

associated states, of which Korea was the most important. I

China’s little brother, a model tributary state, and in many wa

most important of China’s allies. Koreans revered things Ch

and China responded by being for the most part a good neig

giving more than it took away. Exercising a light-handed suzer

China assumed that enlightened Koreans would follow it w

being forced. Absolutely convinced of its own superiority, 

indulged in a policy that might be called benign neglect of 

Korean, thereby allowing Korea substantive autonomy as a nat

This sophisticated world order was broken up and laid low b

Western impact in the late nineteenth century, but there were i

tant legacies for the twentieth century. As dwellers within a 

power, Koreans had to learn to be shrewd in foreign policy, an

had a good example of that in China. Koreans cultivated the s

ticated art of “low determines high” diplomacy, seeking to us

eign power for their own ends, wagging the dog with its tail. 

both South Korea and North Korea often struck foreign observ

rather dependent on big-power support, yet both not only cl

20 
but also strongly asserted their absolute autonomy and indep

as nation-states, and both were adept at manipulating their b

clients. Until the mid-1980s, North Korea was masterful, bo

ting big powers to fight its battles and in maneuvering bet

two communist giants, the Soviet Union and China, to get so

from each and to prevent either from dominating it. Much 

traditional period, P’yŏngyang’s heart was with China. 

The soft spot that Koreans had in their hearts for China 

however, the main characteristic of Korea’s traditional diplom

was isolationism, even what scholar Kim Key-hiuk has call

sionism (see Glossary). For three centuries after the Japan

sions of the 1590s, Korea isolated itself from Japan, dealt har

errant Westerners washing up on its shores, and kept the C

arm’s length. Thus Westerners called Korea the “hermit kingd

term expressing the pronounced streak of obstinate hostilit

foreign power and the deep desire for independence that mark

tional Korea. Ethnocentric and obnoxious to foreigners, a 

tained, autonomous Korea not besmirched by things for

remained an ideal for many Koreans. North Korea has ex

“hermit kingdom” option by remaining one of the more isola

in the world; it was really South Korea that, since 1960, wa

tionary in the Korean context by pursuing an open-door polic

world markets and seeking a multilateral, varied diplomacy. 

Dynastic Decline 

A combination of literati purges in the early sixteenth centu

nese invasions at the end of the century, and Manchu invasio

middle of the next century severely debilitated the Chosŏn sta

never again reached the heights of the fifteenth century. Th

also saw the Manchus sweep away the Ming Dynasty in Chin

a remarkable period when Korean society seemed to devel

with China, while making many independent innovations. 

The doctrinaire version of Confucianism that was domi

ing the Chosŏn made squabbles between elites particular

The literati were grounded in Neo-Confucian metaphysic

reached sublime heights virtually unmatched elsewhere in E

in the writings of Yi T’oegye, known as “Korea’s Zhu Xi” 

Chinese twelfth-century founder of the Neo-Confucian sch

many other scholar-officials, however, the doctrine rewar

scholasticism and obstinate orthodoxy. First, they had to 

their minds to one or another side of abstruse philosophica

and only then could the practical affairs of state be put in or

situation quickly led to so-called literati purges, a series of u
 

 

beginning in the mid-fifteenth century and lasting more tha

years, with the losers finding their persons, their property, their 

ilies, and even their graves at risk from victors determined to 

pate their influence—always in the name of a higher morality. 

in the dynasty, the concern with ideological correctness exacer

more mundane factional conflicts that debilitated central powe

such thinking also expressed the pronounced Korean concern 

the power of ideas, still visible in Kim Il Sung’s doctrine of ch

(see Glossary; Political Ideology, ch. 4), which has assumed tha

tification of the mind precedes correct action, even to the po

Marxist heresy in which ideas determine material reality. A

rate, by the end of the sixteenth century the ruling elite h

homogenized its ideology that there were few heterodox misc

left: all were presumably united in one idea. 

At the end of the sixteenth century, Korea suffered devas

foreign invasions. The first came shortly after Toyotomi Hide

ended Japan’s internal disorder and unified the islands. His ev

goal was to put China under his control, and he launched an inv

that put some 160,000 Japanese soldiers at Pusan in 1592. A

the Chosŏn court took flight to the Yalu River, infuriating ord

Koreans and leading slaves to revolt and burn the registries. 

nese forces marched through the peninsula at will. In the n

time, however, Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin built the world’

armor-clad ships, so-called “turtle ships” encased in thick p

with cannons sticking out at every point on their circular s

which destroyed Japanese fleets wherever they were found

Korean ships cut Japan’s supply routes, and, combined with th

patch of Ming forces and so-called “righteous armies” that rose 

guerrilla warfare (even Buddhist monks participated), cause

Japanese to retreat to a narrow redoubt near Pusan. 

After desultory negotiations and delay, Hideyoshi launched 

ond invasion in 1597. The Korean and Ming armies were read

time. Yi Sun-sin, with a mere dozen warships, demolished the 

nese forces in Yellow Sea battles near the port of Mokp’o

would-be conqueror Hideyoshi died, and Japanese forces with

to their home islands where they nursed an isolationist policy f

next 250 years. In spite of the Chosŏn victory, the peninsul

been devastated. Refugees wandered its length, famine and d

were rampant, and even the basic land relationships were overt

by the widespread destruction of the registers. Korea had paid a 

ble price for turning back invasions that otherwise would hav

stantially redirected East Asian history. 

Chosŏn had barely recovered when the Manchus invaded 

the north, fighting on all fronts to oust the Ming Dynasty. Inva

22 
 

Admiral Yi Sun-sin (1545–98), the Korean 

naval hero who is best known for his 

innovative armored “turtle ships” 

Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, 

New York 

in 1627 and 1636 established tributary relations between K

the Manchus’ Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), but they were les

rious than the Japanese invasions, except in the northwes

Manchu forces wreaked havoc. Thereafter, the Chosŏn Dyn

a period of revival, which, had it continued, might have le

much better prepared for its encounter with the West. 

The Confucian literati were particularly reinvigorated by 

lectual movement advocating that philosophy be geared to 

real problems of the society. Known as the Sirhak (Practic

ing) Movement, it produced some remarkable people, su

Hyŏng-wŏn (1622–73), who sat in a small farming village a

over the classics seeking reform solutions to social probl

developed a thorough, detailed critique of nearly all the ins

aspects of Chosŏn politics and society and a set of concrete 

to invigorate it. Chŏng Yag-yong (1762–1836), thought t

greatest of the Sirhak scholars, wrote several books that of

views on administration, justice, and the structure of poli

others, such as Yi Su-kwang (1563–1628), traveled to C

returned with the new Western learning then spreading in 

while Yi Ik (1681–1763) wrote a treatise entitled Record of 

for the Underprivileged. 
A new vernacular fiction also developed in the seventeent

eighteenth centuries, much of it taking the form of social crit

The best known example is Ch’unhyang chŏn (The Ta

Ch’unhyang), which argues for the common human qualities o

born, commoners, and yangban alike. Often rendered as a play, 

been a great favorite in both North Korea and South Korea. An 

poetic form, made up of short stanzas and called sijo, be

another vehicle for free expression of distaste for the caste-like 

uities of Korean society. Meanwhile, Pak Chi-wŏn (1737–

journeyed to Beijing in 1780 and wrote Jehol Diary, which 

pared Korean social conditions unfavorably with those he obs

in China. 

The economy was differentiating, as the transplanting of rice 

lings boosted harvests and some peasants became enterprising 

landlords. Commercial crops developed, including tobacco, gin

and cotton, and merchants proliferated at big markets, such as 

in Seoul at Dongdaemun (East Gate) and Namdaemun (South 

and at the way stops to China at Ŭiju, or Japan at Tongnae

Pusan. The use of coins for commerce and for paying wages be

more widespread, and handicraft production increased beyond 

ernment control. The old Koryŏ city of Kaesŏng became a 

center of merchant commerce and conspicuous wealth. F

throughout the seventeenth century Western learning filtered 

Korea, often through the auspices of a spreading Roman Ca

movement—which attracted commoners above all by its cre

equality. 

Korea in the Nineteenth-Century World Order 

Unfortunately for Korea, the early nineteenth century witne

period of sharp decline in which most of Chosŏn’s new dev

ments were extinguished. Harsh persecution of Catholics beg

1801, and agricultural production declined, resulting in an ag

state of rank poverty, with many peasants pursuing slash-and

agriculture in the mountains. Popular uprisings began in 181

occurred sporadically through the rest of the century, culminat

the Tonghak (Eastern Learning—see Glossary) Movement o

1860s, which led to a major peasant rebellion in the 1890s. 

Korean leaders were aware that China’s position had been 

formed by the arrival of powerful Western gunboats and trader

they reacted to the First Anglo-Chinese War, better known 

Opium War (1839–42), by reinforcing Korea’s isolation. When 

Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his “black ships” f

Japan to open its ports in the mid-1850s, stimulating drastic r

24 
of Japanese institutions—the Meiji Restoration of 1868—an

quent industrialization, Korean literati attributed this ch

Japan’s inferior grasp of Confucian doctrine. There were Fr

American attempts to “open” Korea, including an August 1

dent when an armed American-owned merchant ship, the 

Sherman (the former U.S. gunboat USS Princess Royal), ste

the Taedong River almost to P’yŏngyang, whereupon local

it and killed all its crew (an event in which Kim Il Sung cla

great-grandfather was involved). Korea’s success in rebuff

intrusions encouraged the regime to think it could hold ou

nitely against external pressure. 

Developments from 1864 to 1873 under a powerful lead

the Taewŏn’gun, or Grand Prince, Yi Ha-ung (1821–98) off

ther evidence of Korean resilience, because he was able t

the bureaucracy, bring in new talent, extract new taxes from 

yangban and commoners, and keep the foreign imperialist

Korea’s descent into the maelstrom of imperial rivalry w

after this time, however, as Japan succeeded in imposing a 

style unequal treaty in February 1876, giving its nationals e

torial rights and opening three Korean ports to Japanese co

China sought to reassert its traditional position in Korea by 

the imperial powers off against each other, leading to uneq

ties between Korea and the United States, Britain, Russia, I

other nations. The Chinese even gave the Koreans the desig

national flag during this period. These activities split the 

court into pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, pro-American, and 

sian factions, each of which influenced policy down to 

annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. Meanwhile, variou

reform movements, influenced either by Japanese or Amer

gressives, attempted to gain momentum. 

Although Korean historians have postulated an “enligh

movement,” this phase of sporadic Westernization cannot 

be compared to the Enlightenment in Europe and was c

thwarted by reactionary scholars and officials. A number of 

uals, including Kim Hong-jip, Kim Ok-kyun, Yun Ch’i-ho

Kil-chun, were very impressed by what they witnessed in 

the early 1880s, as that country industrialized quickly. Yun 

to become an influential modernizer in the twentieth century

became the first Korean to study in the United States—at th

nor Dummer Academy in Byfield, Massachusetts. Meanwh

Ok-kyun, impressed by the Meiji Restoration, sought to p

coup d’état in 1884 with a handful of progressives and a
 

 

Japanese Legation soldiers. Resident Chinese troops quickly 

pressed the coup, however, and Kim fled to Japan. 

For a decade thereafter, China reasserted a rare direct influ

when General Yuan Shikai established his residency in 188

momentarily made China first among the foreign powers then 

dent in Korea. A conservative reformer in China, he had no u

Korean reformers and instead blocked the slightest sign of K

nationalism. Japan put a definitive end to Chinese influence 

Sino–Japanese War (1894–95), seizing on the reinvigorated To

Movement, which led to widespread rebellion in 1894. Uniting 

ants against Western pressure, growing Japanese economic pe

tion, and Chosŏn’s corrupt and ineffectual government, the reb

spread from the southwest into the center of the peninsula

threatening Seoul. The hapless court invited China to send tro

put the rebellion down, whereupon Japan had the pretext it wan

send troops to Korea. After defeating Chinese forces, Japan de

Korea independent, thus breaking its long tributary relationship 

China. Thereafter, Japan pushed through epochal reforms that 

the old civil service exam system, abolished traditional class di

tions, ended slavery, and established modern fiscal and ju

mechanisms. 

Korean reformers influenced by the West, such as Phillip Ja

(Sŏ Chae-p’il, 1866–1948) who had studied in the United S

launched an Independence Club in 1896 to promote Westerni

and used the vernacular hangul in its newspaper, the Tongnip Si

(The Independent), alternating pages in Korean with English

club included many Koreans who had studied Western learn

Protestant missionary schools and, for a while, influenced no

young reformers but also elements of the Korean court. One 

reformers was Yi Sŭngman, otherwise known as Syngman 

(1875–1965), who became the first president of the Repub

Korea (South Korea) in 1948. The club was repressed and coll

after two years. 

In 1897 King Kojong (r. 1864–1907), when confronted with 

nese plots, fled to the Russian Legation, where he conducte

nation’s business for a year and shortly thereafter declared Ko

be the “Great Han (Korean) Empire,” from which came the 

name Taehan Min’guk, or Republic of Korea. It was the futi

gasp of the Chosŏn; the only question was which imperial p

would colonize Korea. Japan found a champion in U.S. pre

Theodore Roosevelt. In 1902 Britain established an alliance 

Japan, and both London and Washington gave Japan a free ha

Korea. 

26 
 

The widow Myong-su shows her faithfulness to her late husband by sp

unwanted suitor (upper left) and giving all her belongings to her servants to 

of her stepson (lower right). Woodcut from volume 3 of Oryun haengsilto (F

of Conduct), a 1775 Korean book on Confuc

Courtesy Korean Collection, Asian Division, 

Congress, Washin
To the north, Russia also was expanding into Manchuri

Korea and, in alliance with France and Germany, had forced Ja

return the Liaodong Peninsula, acquired from China as a result 

Japanese victory in 1895. Japan promptly leased the region 

China and continued to develop it. Shortly thereafter, in 1900, 

nese forces intervened with the other foreign powers to suppre

Boxer Uprising in China. Russia continued to develop the ra

system in Manchuria and to exploit forests and gold mines 

northern part of Korea. During this period, Americans, too, 

given concessions for railroad and streetcar lines, waterw

Seoul’s new telephone network, and mines. 

Russia and Japan sought to divide their interests in Korea, su

ing at one point that the thirty-eighth parallel be the dividin

between their spheres of influence. The rivalry devolved in

Russo–Japanese War (1904–5), however, when Japan launched 

cessful surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Dalian (Port Arth

Northeast China. Japan then electrified all of Asia by becoming th

nonwhite people to subdue one of the “great powers”; thereafter 

Asian progressives, Sun Yatsen of China and many young Ko

included, went to study in Japan. Under the peace treaty signed in 

brokered by Theodore Roosevelt in a conference at Portsmouth

Hampshire, Russia recognized Japan’s paramount rights in Korea

lomatic notes exchanged between the United States and 

acknowledged a trade-off between the Philippines and Korea. 

would not question American rights in its colony, and the United 

would not challenge Japan’s new protectorate, which it establis

1905. Japan thus controlled Korea’s foreign policy, installed a re

general, and, in 1907, deposed King Kojong. Kojong was succeed

his son Sunjong (r. 1907–10), the second and last emperor of K

Significant Korean resistance followed on this deposition, spre

through several provinces as local yangban organized militias for 

rilla warfare against Japan. In 1909 a Korean assassin name

Chung-gŭn killed Itō Hirobumi, the Japanese statesman who ha

cluded the protectorate agreement. An expatriate Korean in San 

cisco also gunned down Durham Stevens, a foreign affairs adv

the Japanese who had lauded their efforts in Korea. Such oppo

was too little and too late. In 1910 Japan turned Korea into its c

thus extinguishing Korea’s hard-fought independence, which ha

emerged with Silla and Koguryŏ resistance to Chinese pressures. 

The Chosŏn Dynasty faltered under the impact of Korea’s 

ing in 1876 and then collapsed in a few decades. Despite its ex

dinary five-century longevity, while the traditional system 

adaptable, even supple in the marginal adjustments and increm

28 
King Sunjong (1874–1926; 

r. 1907–10), second and last 

emperor of the Great Han 

(Korean) Empire, ca. 1907 

Courtesy George Grantham 

Bain Collection, 

LC–USZ62–72799, Lot 

11148, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of 

Congress, Washington, DC 

responses necessary to forestall or accommodate domestic 

nal conflict and change, it could not withstand the ful

onslaught of technically advanced imperial powers wit

armies. The old agrarian bureaucracy managed the interpla

ferent and competing interests by having a system of checks 

ances that tended over time to equilibrate the interests of 

parties. The king and the bureaucracy kept watch on each o

royal clans watched both, scholars could criticize or rem

from the moral position of Confucian doctrine, secret inspe

censors went around the country to watch for rebellion an

accurate reporting, landed aristocrats sent sons into the bur

to protect family interests, and local potentates influenced th

magistrates sent down from the central administration. The 

Dynasty was not a system that modern Koreans would 

restore or live under, but in its time it was a sophisticated 

apparatus, sufficiently adaptable and persistent to give unifie

Korea for half a millennium. 

Japanese Colonialism, 1910–45 

Korea did not escape the Japanese grip until 1945, when J

prostrate under the U.S. and Soviet onslaught that broug
 

 

War II to a close. The colonial experience that shaped postwar 

was intense and bitter. It brought development and underdev

ment, agrarian growth and an impoverished peasant tenancy, i

trialization and extraordinary dislocation, and political mobili

and deactivation. The colonial period also resulted in a new ro

the central state, new sets of Korean political leaders, comm

and nationalism, and armed resistance and treacherous collabor

Above all, it left deep fissures and conflicts that have gnawed 

Korean national identity ever since. 

Colonialism was often thought to have created new nations 

none existed before, to have drawn national boundaries, br

diverse tribes and peoples together, tutored the natives in self

ernment, and prepared for the day when the imperialist p

decided to grant independence; but all such advantages exis

Korea for centuries before 1910. Furthermore, by virtue of thei

tive proximity to China, Koreans had always felt superior to 

and blamed Japan’s devastating sixteenth-century invasions fo

dering Korean wealth and power in subsequent centuries. 

Thus the Japanese engaged not in creation, but in substi

after 1910: substituting a Japanese ruling elite for the Korean 

ban scholar-officials, colonial imperative coordination for th

central state administration, Japanese modern education for C

cian classics, Japanese capital and expertise for the budding K

versions, Japanese talent for Korean talent, and eventually ev

Japanese language for Korean. Koreans never thanked the Jap

for these substitutions, did not credit Japan with creations

instead saw Japan as snatching away the ancien régime, Korea’

ereignty and independence, its indigenous if incipient mode

tion, and above all its national dignity. Unlike some other co

peoples, therefore, Koreans never saw Japanese rule as anythin

illegitimate and humiliating. Furthermore, the very closeness 

two nations—in geography, in common Chinese cultural influ

and in levels of development until the nineteenth century—

Japanese dominance all the more galling to Koreans and g

peculiar intensity to the relationship, a dynamic that sugges

Koreans that “there but for accidents of history go we.” 

The Japanese built bureaucracies in Korea, all of which wer

tralized and all of them big by colonial standards. Unlike the 

tively small British colonial cadre in India, the Japanese ca

large numbers (700,000 by the 1940s), and the majority of co

ers worked in government service. For the first time in h

Korea had a national police, responsive to the center and poss

its own communications and transportation facilities. The hug

ental Development Company organized and funded industria

30 
One of 12 hand-colored maps in the manuscript atlas, Tae Chosŏn chi

Korean Map); the atlas, dating to ca. 1874, has individual maps of the pr

Korea, China, Japan, and 

Courtesy Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress, Washin

agricultural projects, and came to own more than 20 pe

Korea’s arable land; it employed an army of officials who fa

through the countryside to supervise agricultural product

official Bank of Korea performed central banking functions

regulating interest rates and providing credit to firms and 

neurs—almost all of them, of course, Japanese. Central judi

ies wrote new laws establishing an extensive, “legalized” s

racial discrimination against Koreans, making them second-

izens in their own country. Bureaucratic departments prolif

the Government General Headquarters in Seoul, turning it 

nerve center of the country. Semi-official companies and co

ates, including the big zaibatsu (business empires) such a
bishi and Mitsui, laid railroads, built ports, installed modern 

ries, and ultimately remade the face of old Korea. 

Japan held Korea tightly, watched it closely, and pursued an 

nized, architectonic colonialism in which the planner and adm

trator was the model, not the swashbuckling conqueror. The s

highly centralized colonial state mimicked the role that the Jap

state had come to play in Japan—intervening in the economy, 

ing markets, spawning new industries, and suppressing di

Politically, Koreans could barely breathe, but economically 

was significant—if unevenly distributed—growth. Agricultura

put rose substantially in the 1920s, and a hothouse industriali

took place in the 1930s. Growth rates in the Korean economy 

outstripped those in Japan itself; one estimate suggested an a

growth rate for Korea of nearly 3.6 percent in the 1911–38 p

compared to a rate of 3.4 percent for Japan itself. 

Koreans have always thought that the benefits of this growth 

entirely to Japan, and that Korea would have developed rapidly 

out Japanese help anyway. Nonetheless, the strong colonial sta

multiplicity of bureaucracies, the policy of administrative gui

of the economy, the use of the state to found new industries, an

repression of labor unions and dissidents that went with it prov

surreptitious model for both North and South Korea in the po

period. Japan showed them an early version of the “bureauc

authoritarian” path to industrialization, and it was a lesson 

seemed well learned by the 1970s. 

The Rise of Korean Nationalism and Commun

The colonial period brought forth an entirely new set of K

political leaders encouraged both by the resistance to, and the o

tunities of, Japanese colonialism. The emergence of nationali

communist groups dates back to the 1920s; it was in this perio

the left–right splits of postwar Korea began. The transformat

the yangban aristocracy also began at this time. In the 1930s

groups of armed resisters, bureaucrats, and, for the first time, 

tary leaders emerged. Both North Korea and South Korea have 

profoundly influenced by the political elites and the politica

flicts generated during colonial rule. 

One thing from the Chosŏn Dynasty that the Japanese were no

to destroy was the yangban aristocracy. Although the higher sc

officials were pensioned off and replaced by Japanese, landlords 

allowed to retain their holdings and encouraged to continue disc

ing peasants and extracting rice as in-kind tax payments from 

The traditional landholding system was put on a different 

32 
 

 

through new legal measures and a full property survey shortly 

Japanese took over, but tenancy continued and was syste

extended throughout the colonial period. By 1945 Korea had 

cultural tenancy system with few parallels in the world. M

tional landlords were content to sit back and let Japanese 

increase output; by 1945 such people were widely viewed as 

ous collaborators with the Japanese, and strong demands em

share out their land to the tenants. During the 1920s, however

trend began as landlords became entrepreneurs. 

In 1919 mass movements swept many colonial and sem

countries, including Korea. Drawing on U.S. president W

Wilson’s promises of self-determination, a group of 33 inte

on March 1, 1919, petitioned for independence from Ja

touched off nationwide mass protests that continued for mon

Japanese fiercely crushed these protests, causing many 

Koreans to become militant opponents of colonial rule. 

1919 was a watershed for the anti-imperialist movement i

The leaders of the movement were moderate intellectuals 

dents who sought independence through nonviolent means 

port from progressive elements in the West. Their co

witness and the nationwide demonstrations that they p

remained a touchstone of Korean nationalism. The movem

ceeded in provoking reforms in Japan’s administration, but i

to realize independence also stimulated radical forms of ant

resistance. 

Some Korean militants went into exile in China and th

Union and founded early communist and nationalist r

groups. The Korean Communist Party was established in 

1925. One of the organizers was Pak Hŏn-yŏng, who bec

leader of the Korean communist movement in southern Ko

1945. Various nationalist groups also emerged during thi

including the exiled Korean Provisional Government in S

which included Syngman Rhee and another famous nationa

Ku, among its members. 

Sharp police repression and internal factionalism made it 

ble to sustain radical groups over time. Many nationalist a

munist leaders were jailed in the early 1930s, only to ree

1945. When Japan invaded and then annexed Manchuria 

however, a strong guerrilla resistance embracing Chinese a

ans emerged. There were more than 200,000 guerrillas—al

connected, and including bandits and secret societies—fig

Japanese in the early 1930s. After murderous but effective 

insurgency campaigns, the numbers declined to a few tho

the mid-1930s. It was in this milieu that Kim Il Sung (o
 

 

named Kim Sŏng-ju, 1912–94; the name Il Sung means “becom

sun”) emerged. He was a significant guerrilla leader by the 

1930s, considered by the Japanese as one of the most effectiv

dangerous of guerrillas. The Japanese formed a special counter

gent unit to track Kim down and assigned Koreans to it as p

their divide-and-rule tactics. 

Both Koreas created myths about this guerrilla resistance: 

Korea claimed that Kim single-handedly defeated the Japanes

South Korea claimed that Kim was an imposter who stole the 

of a revered patriot. Nonetheless, this experience was importa

understanding postwar Korea: the resistance to the Japanese be

the main legitimating doctrine of North Korea; North Koreans 

the origin of the army, the leadership, and their ideology back t

founding moment. For the next five decades, the top North K

leadership was dominated by a core group that fought the Jap

in Manchuria. 

Japan went to war against China in 1937 and the United Sta

1941, and as World War II took on global dimensions, Koreans f

first time had military careers opened to them. Although most 

conscripted foot soldiers, a small number achieved officer status, 

few even attained high rank. Virtually the entire officer corps 

Republic of Korea army during the Rhee period (1948–61) was 

from Koreans with experience in the Japanese Imperial Army. A

in part, the Korean War (1950–53) became a matter of Japa

trained military officers fighting Japanese-spawned resistance le

Japan’s far-flung war effort also caused a labor shortage thr

out the empire, including Korea, where it meant that bureau

position was more available to Koreans than at any previous 

Thus, a substantial cadre of Koreans obtained administrative e

ence in government, local administration, police and judicial 

economic planning agencies, banks, and the like. That this dev

ment occurred in the last decade of colonialism created a di

legacy, however, for this also was the harshest period of Jap

rule, the time Koreans remember with greatest bitterness. K

culture was squashed, and Koreans were required to speak Jap

and to take Japanese names. The majority suffered badly at th

cise time that a minority was doing well. This minority acquir

taint of collaboration and never successfully shucked it off. 

from 1937 to 1945 was much like Vichy France in the early 1

Bitter experiences and memories of the period continue to d

people, even within the same family, and as they have been too 

ful to confront directly, they have become buried history. Non

less, the memory continues to play upon the national identity. 

34 
 

Perhaps the most important characteristic of Korea’s 

experience was the manner in which it ended: the last dec

four-decade imperium was a pressure cooker, building up 

that exploded in the postwar period. The colonial period b

crescendo, abruptly collapsed, and left the Korean people 

different great powers to deal with the results. There had be

fighting against Japan along the Korea–China border in 

1930s, including forays into Korea by Kim Il Sung’s forc

sustained armed resistance within Korea itself. 

In the mid-1930s, Japan entered a phase of heavy industr

that embraced all of Northeast Asia. Unlike most colonial 

Japan located heavy industry in its colonies and brought th

of production to the labor and raw materials. Manchuria an

ern Korea acquired steel mills, automotive plants, petro

complexes, and enormous hydroelectric facilities. The reg

held exclusively by Japan and tied into the home mark

degree that national boundaries became less important than 

transnational, integrated production. To facilitate this pr

Japan also built railroads, highways, cities, ports, and other 

transportation and communication facilities. By 1945 Kore

tionally had more kilometers of railroads than any other Asi

try except Japan, leaving only remote parts of the central e

and the wild Northeast China–Korea border region untou

modern means of conveyance. These changes were e

induced and served Japanese, not Korean, interests. Thus, 

resented a kind of overdevelopment. 

The same changes fostered underdevelopment in Korea

as a whole. Because the changes were exogenous, the Kore

and managerial classes did not blossom; instead, their deve

was retarded or ballooned suddenly at Japanese behest. Am

majority peasant class, change was considerable. Koreans 

the mobile human capital used to work the new factories in 

Korea and Manchuria, mines and other enterprises in Ja

urban factories in southern Korea. From 1935 to 1945, Kor

its industrial revolution, with many of the usual charac

uprooting of peasants from the land, the emergence of a 

class, urbanization, and population mobility. In Korea the 

was telescoped, giving rise to remarkable population mo

when considered comparatively. By 1945 about 11 perce

entire Korean population was living abroad (mostly in Ja

Manchuria), and fully 20 percent of all Koreans were eithe

or in a province other than that in which they were born (w

of the interprovincial movement being southern peasants 
Pacific Oce

East 

China 

Sea 

Yellow 

Sea 

(West Sea) 

Sea of Japan 

(East Sea) East 

Korea 

Bay 

Korea Strait 

West 

Korea 

Bay Hons

Ho

Kyushu 

Ryukyu Islands 

Shikoku 

CHINA 

RUSSIA 

TAIWAN 

MONGOLIA 

SOUTH 

KOREA 

PHILIPPINES 

J A P A N 

Boundary representation 

not necessarily authoritative 

120 

40 

30 

20 

120 130 

130 140 

0 300 Kilometers

0 

100 200

100 200 300 Miles

International bound

Cease-fire line of 1

38th parallel 

North Korea 

Figure 3. North Korea in Its Asian Setting 

into northern industry). This was, by and large, a forced or mob

movement; by 1942 it often meant drafted and conscripted 

Peasants lost land or rights to work land only to end up work

unfamiliar factory settings, doing the dirty work for a pittance. 

When the colonial system abruptly terminated in August 

millions of Koreans sought to return to their native villages 

these far-flung mobilization details. But they were no long

36 
 

 

 

same people: they had grievances against those who remaine

at home, they had suffered material and status losses, they o

come into contact with new ideologies, they all had seen a 

world beyond the villages. It was this intense final dec

loosed upon postwar Korea a mass of changed and disgrun

ple who greatly disrupted the early postwar period and the 

the United States and the Soviet Union. 

National Division in the1940s 

Tensions in the 1940s 

The crucible of the period of national division and opposi

in Korea was the decade from 1943 to 1953. The politics of 

porary Korea cannot be understood without comprehen

events of this decade. It was the breeding ground of the two 

of war, and of a reordering of international politics in North

(see fig. 3). 

From the time of the tsars, Korea was a concern of Russian 

The Russo–Japanese War was fought in part over the disposit

Korean Peninsula. It was often surmised that the Russians sa

as a gateway to the Pacific, and especially to warm-water p

thermore, Korea had one of Asia’s oldest communist mo

Thus, it would appear that postwar Korea was of great inter

Soviet Union; many have thought that its policy was a simp

of Sovietizing northern Korea, setting up a puppet state, and 

1950, directing Kim Il Sung to unify Korea by force. T

greater complexity than this in Soviet policy, however, as 

Andrei Lankov’s scholarship has demonstrated. The Soviet

get a warm-water port out of their involvement in Korea, and 

not have an effective relationship with Korean communists. 

nist Party of the Soviet Union general secretary Joseph 

purged and even shot many of the Koreans who had function

Comintern (see Glossary), and he did not help Kim Il Sung 

guerrillas in their struggle against the Japanese. 

The United States took the initiative in big-power deliber

Korea during World War II, suggesting a multilateral truste

postwar Korea to the British in March 1943, and to the Sovi

end of the same year. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, worr

the disposition of enemy-held colonial territories and aware 

nial demands for independence, sought a gradualist, tutelary 

preparing colonials (like the Koreans) for self-government a

pendence. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the 

the urging of the United States, declared that after Japan was 
Korea would become independent “in due course,” a phrase con

with Roosevelt’s ideas. At about the same time, planners in the 

Department of State drastically altered the traditional U.S. pol

noninvolvement toward Korea by defining the security of the p

sula as important to the security of the postwar Pacific, which w

turn, important to U.S. national security. 

At a midnight meeting in Washington on August 10–11, 1945

War Department officials, including John J. McCloy and Dean 

decided to make the thirty-eighth parallel—roughly the half-way 

between the northern and southern extremities of Korea—the div

line between Soviet and U.S. zones in Korea. Neither the Sovie

the Koreans were consulted. The day following Japan’s s

der—August 15, 1945—was designated as the date of Korean 

pendence from Japan. Then, when 25,000 U.S. soldiers occ

southern Korea in early September 1945, they found themselv

against a strong Korean impulse for independence and for tho

reform of colonial legacies. By and large, Koreans wished to 

their problems themselves and resented any implication that they 

not ready for self-government. 

During World War II, Stalin usually did not voice an opinion 

discussions with Roosevelt about Korea. From 1941 to 1945, K

Sung and other guerrillas were given sanctuary in Sino–Soviet b

towns near Khabarovsk, trained at a small school, and dispatch

agents into Japanese-held territory. Recent research by Japanese 

rian Wada Haruki suggests that Chinese communists controlle

border camps, not Russians. Although the U.S. Department of 

suspected that as many as 30,000 Koreans were being train

Soviet guerrilla agents, postwar North Korean documents, captu

forces led by General Douglas MacArthur, show that there cou

have been more than a few hundred guerrilla agents. When the S

occupied Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel in August 1945

brought these Koreans (often termed Soviet–Koreans, even t

most of them were not Soviet citizens) with them. Although this 

was not large, several of them became prominent in the regim

example Hŏ Ka-i, an experienced party organizer, and Nam Il, 

Americans came to know during the Korean War when he le

North Korean delegation in peace talks. The Soviets acquiesced 

thirty-eighth parallel decision without saying a word about it an

accepted the U.S. plan for a multilateral trusteeship at a foreign m

ters’ meeting in December 1945. Over the succeeding two yea

two powers held so-called joint commission meetings trying to re

their differences and establish a provisional government for Kor

38 
 

 

 

 

U.S. and Soviet Occupations 

The U.S. military command, along with emissaries di

from Washington, tended to interpret resistance to U.S. desi

South as radical and pro-Soviet. When Korean resistance le

up an interim “People’s Republic” and so-called “people’s 

tees” throughout southern Korea in September 1945, th

States saw this fundamentally indigenous movement as p

Soviet master plan to dominate all of Korea. Radical activity

the ousting of landlords and attacks on Koreans who had 

the colonial police, usually was a matter of settling scores 

from the colonial period, or of demands by Koreans to run t

affairs. But it immediately became wrapped up with U.S

rivalry, such that the Cold War arrived early in Korea—in 

months of 1945. Once the U.S. occupation chose to bolster t

quo and resist radical reform of colonial legacies, it immedi

into monumental opposition to its policies from the mass 

Koreans. 

Most of the first year of the occupation (1945–46) was gi

to suppression of the many people’s committees that had 

which provoked a massive rebellion that spread over four p

in the fall of 1946. After it was suppressed, radical activis

oped a significant guerrilla movement in 1948 and 1949. T

ignited a major rebellion at the port of Yŏsu in southern Sou

in October 1948. Much of this disorder stemmed from t

solved land problem, as conservative landed elements u

bureaucratic power to block redistribution of land to peasan

The North Koreans sought to take advantage of this discon

the best evidence shows that most of the dissidents and g

were southerners, upset about southern policies. Indeed, the 

of the left wing was in those provinces farthest from the thir

parallel, in the southwest, which historically had been rebell

Tonghaks came from there), and in the southeast, which ha

greatest impact from Japanese colonialism. 

By 1947 Washington was willing to acknowledge form

the Cold War had begun in Korea and abandoned attempts t

ate with the Soviets toward a unified, multilateral admin

The Soviets also had determined that the postwar world w

one of two blocs, and they exercised broad administrative c

North Korea. According to declassified documents, when P

Harry S. Truman announced the Truman Doctrine and the 

ment policy in the spring of 1947, Korea was very nearly 

along with Greece and Turkey as a key containment coun

Department of State planners foresaw a whopping US$600 
 

package of economic and military aid for southern Korea, ba

away only when the U.S. Congress and the War Department b

at such a huge sum. The decision was then made to seek U

Nations (UN) backing for U.S. policy in Korea, and to hold 

sponsored elections in all of Korea if the Soviets would go alo

southern Korea alone if they did not. The elections were held 

South in May 1948, and they resulted in the establishment 

Republic of Korea on August 15 that year. 

The Arrival of Kim Il Sung 

Kim Il Sung did not appear in North Korea until late Septe

1945. What he did in the weeks after the Japanese surrender 

known. The Soviets presented Kim to the Korean people as a 

rilla hero. From August 1945 to January 1946, the Soviets w

with a coalition of communists and nationalists, the latter head

a Protestant leader named Cho Man-sik. The coalition did not 

a central administration, nor did it establish an army. In retro

their policy was more tentative and reactive than U.S. pol

South Korea, which moved forward with plans for a separate a

istration and army. Soviet power in East Asia was flexibl

resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in 

1946. 

Whether in response to U.S. initiatives or because most Ko

despised the trusteeship agreement that had been negotiated 

end of 1945, separate institutions began to emerge in North Ko

early 1946. In February 1946, an Interim People’s Committee 

Kim Il Sung became the first central government in the North

next month, a revolutionary land reform ensued, dispossessing 

lords without compensation. In August 1946, a powerful po

party (called the Korean Workers’ Party—KWP) quickly fille

political vacuum and dominated politics; and in the fall, th

rudiments of a northern army appeared. Central agencies nat

ized major industries (previously mostly owned by the Japanes

began a two-year economic program based on the Soviet mo

central planning and the priority of heavy industry. Nationalis

Christian leaders were ousted from all but pro forma participat

politics, and Cho Man-sik was held under house arrest. Kim Il 

and his allies dominated all the political parties, ousting peopl

resisted them. 

Within a year of the liberation from Japan, North Korea had a 

erful political party, a growing economy, and a single leader n

Kim Il Sung. Although Kim had rivals, his emergence—and that 

Kim system—dated from mid-1946. By then he had placed close

allies at the heart of power. His prime assets were his backgroun

40 
 

 

 

skills at organization, and his ideology. Although Kim was 

years old when he came to power, few other Koreans who 

alive could match his record of resistance to the Japanese. He 

tunate to emerge in the last decade of a 40-year resistance 

killed off many leaders of the older generation. North Korea 

claimed that Kim was the leader of all Korean resisters, whe

there were many more besides him. But Kim was able to win 

port and firm loyalty of several hundred people like him: youn

nationalistic guerrillas who had fought in Manchuria. The prim

legitimacy in postwar Korea was one’s record under the hated 

regime, and so Kim and his core allies possessed nationalist cr

that were superior to those of the South Korean leadership

more, Kim’s backers had military force at their disposal and 

advantage against rivals with no military experience. 

Kim’s organizational skills probably came from his expe

the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Unlike tr

Korean leaders—and many more intellectual or theoretical 

nists, such as Pak Hŏn-yŏng—Kim pursued a style of mas

ship, using his considerable charisma and the practice of 

factories and farms for “on-the-spot guidance,” and he en

his allies to do the same. The North Koreans went again

orthodoxy by including masses of poor peasants in the KW

terming it a “mass” rather than a class or vanguard party. 

Since the 1940s, North Korea has enrolled 12 to 14 perce

population in the dominant party, compared to 1 to 3 percent 

communist parties. The vast majority of party members h

poor peasants with no previous political experience. Memb

the party gave them position, prestige, privileges, and a rud

form of political participation. Kim’s ideology tended to b

tionary-nationalist rather than communist. The chuch’e ideo

its beginnings in the late 1940s (although the term chuch’e 

used until 1955), a doctrine that stressed self-reliance and 

dence but also drew upon the Neo-Confucian emphasis on 

tion of the mind prior to action in the real world. Soon after K

power, virtually all North Koreans were required to parti

study groups and “re-education” meetings, where regime 

was inculcated. 

In the 1940s, Kim faced factional power struggles among 

(those guerrillas who operated in Manchuria), communists 

remained in Korea during the colonial period (the domestic 

Koreans associated with Chinese communism (the Yan’an 

and Koreans from or close to the Soviet Union (the Soviet fa

the aftermath of the Korean War, amid much false scapegoatin

disasters of the war, Kim purged the domestic faction, many 
leaders were from southern Korea; Pak Hŏn-yŏng and 12 of his 

ciates were pilloried in show trials under ridiculous charges tha

were American spies. Ten of them subsequently were executed. 

mid-1950s, Kim eliminated key leaders of the Soviet faction, in

ing Hŏ Ka-i, and overcame an apparent coup attempt by memb

the Yan’an faction—whereupon he purged many of them. Som

the guerrilla hero Mu Chŏng, reportedly escaped to China. 

power struggles ensued during only the first decade of the regim

were not repeated. There were of course conflicts within the l

ship later on, but they were relatively minor and did not succes

challenge Kim’s power. 

In the 1946–48 period, there was much evidence that the S

hoped to dominate North Korea. In particular, they sought to in

North Korea in a quasicolonial relationship in which Korean raw 

rials, such as tungsten and gold, were exchanged for Soviet ma

tures. Although the Soviets also sought to keep Chinese comm

influence out of Korea, in the late 1940s Maoism was quietly 

duced into Korean newspapers and books by a Yan’an-trained K

agent. Soviet influence was especially strong in the media, where 

organs were staffed by Koreans from the Soviet Union, and in the 

rity bureaus. Nonetheless, the Korean guerrillas who fought in 

churia were not easily molded and dominated. They were tough, h

nationalistic, and determined to have Korea for themselves. Th

especially so for the Korean People’s Army (KPA), which w

important base for Kim Il Sung and which was led by another Ma

rian guerrilla, Ch’oe Yŏng-gŏn, when it was founded on Febru

1948. At the founding ceremony, Kim urged his soldiers to carr

ward the tradition of the Manchurian guerrillas. 

The Establishment of the Democratic People’s Repub

of Korea 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was establish

September 9, 1948, three weeks after the Republic of Kore

formed in Seoul on August 15. Kim Il Sung was named premier, 

he retained until 1972, when, under a new constitution, he was n

president. At the end of 1948, the Soviets withdrew their occu

forces from North Korea. This decision contrasted strongly 

Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. Tens of thousands of Korea

diers who fought in the Chinese civil war (1946–49) also filtered 

into Korea. All through 1949, tough, crack troops with Chines

Soviet, experience returned to be integrated with the KPA; the 

of these Korean troops inevitably skewed North Korea toward C

It enhanced Kim’s bargaining power and enabled him to man

42 
 

 

between the two communist giants. The Soviets kept advise

Korean government and military, although far fewer than 

sands claimed by South Korean sources. There were probab

400 advisers assigned to North Korea, although many of th

experienced military and security people. Both countries con

trade, and the Soviets sold World War II–vintage weaponry 

Korea. 

In 1949 Kim Il Sung had himself named suryŏng (see Glo

old Koguryŏ term for “leader” that the Koreans always mo

the adjective “great” (as in Great Leader). The KPA was buil

recruiting campaigns for soldiers and bond drives to purcha

tanks; meanwhile, the tradition of the Manchurian guerrillas 

nished in the party newspaper, Nodong Shinmun (Workers

perhaps to offset the influence of powerful Korean officers wh

with the Chinese communists, such Mu Chŏng and Pang Ho-

The Korean War, 1950–53 

North Korea seemed almost to be on a war footing in ea

Kim’s New Year’s speech—analogous to a “state of th

address in spelling out guidelines—was bellicose and ex

South Korea as a puppet state. The army expanded rapidly

drilled in war maneuvers, and war-bond-purchasing drives c

for the purchase of Soviet weaponry. North Korea fort

thirty-eighth parallel, and soon border incidents began brea

Neither side recognized the parallel as a legitimate boun

Rhee regime also wanted to unify Korea under its rule, by 

necessary. Rhee often referred to a “northern expedition” to 

the lost territory,” and in the summer of 1949 his army prov

majority of the fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel (acc

declassified U.S. documents), fighting that sometimes took 

of lives. 

This belligerent attitude was a prime reason why the Unit

refused to supply tanks and airplanes to South Korea: it fe

they would be used to attack the North. When U.S. secretar

Dean Acheson made a speech in January 1950, in which he 

to place South Korea outside the U.S. defense perimeter in 

was mainly seeking to remind Rhee that he could not count 

matic U.S. backing, regardless of how he behaved. 

Although there remain murky aspects to the start of the 

War, it now seems that the opening of conventional war on 

1950 (thus, the term “6–25 War” that is used in South K

North refers to the war as the Fatherland Liberation W

mainly Kim’s decision, resisted by Stalin for many months 
 

acquiesced to in early 1950, and that the key enabling factor w

existence of as many as 100,000 troops with battle experien

China. When the Rhee regime, with help from U.S. military 

ers, severely reduced the guerrilla threat in the South in the win

1949–50, the civil war moved into a conventional phase. Kim c

sought backing from Stalin for his assault, but documents fro

Soviet and Chinese sides, which have appeared sporadically 

the 1990s, suggest that he got more backing from China. Th

meetings appear to have occurred in April 1950, when Kim 

secret trips, first to Moscow and then to Beijing. 

Had U.S. forces not entered the war, the northern regime w

have won easily; the southern army and state collapsed in 

days. As eventually occurred, however, it was Kim’s regime th

war nearly extinguished. The key year in which formal U.S. p

moved from multilateral internationalism to unilateral contain

in Korea was 1947. There were at this time severe global lim

U.S. power, and the Truman administration could not publicly 

mit arms and money to Korea on the same scale as to Greec

Turkey. But in secret U.S. congressional testimony in early 

Acheson said that the United States had drawn the line in Kore

he meant it. It was in pursuit of this basic containment polic

Acheson, by then secretary of state, urged Truman to commit 

tary forces to save South Korea in June 1950. But, as the fig

wore on in the summer of 1950, U.S. policy changed once 

Had the United States simply sought to contain the communist 

into the South, it would have restored the thirty-eighth parallel 

it crushed the North Korean army. Instead, UN forces led b

United States under General Douglas MacArthur marched into 

Korea and sought to destroy the northern regime and unify the 

insula under Syng-man Rhee’s rule. Again, declassified docum

tion now shows that this action reflected a change from contain

to a new policy called rollback: as policy planners described 

United States for the first time had the chance to displace and 

form some communist real estate. 

This thrust by UN forces in the fall of 1950, however, br

Chinese forces in on the northern side; these “volunteers” and a 

vigorated North Korean army pushed UN and South Korean 

out of the North within a month and caused a crisis in Am

domestic politics as backers of Truman fought with backers of 

Arthur over the administration’s unwillingness to carry the w

China. Although the war lasted another two years, until an arm

was signed on July 27, 1953, the outcome of early 1951 was d

tive: a stalemate and a U.S. commitment to containmen

44 
 

accepted the de facto reality of two Koreas—and that expl

U.S. troops remain in South Korea today. 

When the war finally ended, the North had been deva

three years of bombing attacks that hardly left a modern 

standing. Both Koreas had watched as a virtual holocaust 

their country and turned the vibrant expectations of 194

nightmare. Furthermore, when Kim’s regime was near

guished in the fall of 1950, the Soviets did very little to 

China picked up the pieces, which the North Koreans have n

gotten. From this moment on, it was clear that North Kore

its relationship with China, whereas it dealt with the Sovi

because it had to, not because it wanted to. And, in the en

Korea did not sign the armistice agreement as a sign of disag

over the decision not to pursue the war to the final defeat of 

munist forces in the North. 

The point to remember is that this was a civil war. The t

edy was not the war itself, for a civil conflict solely among 

might have resolved the extraordinary tensions generated 

nialism and national division. The tragedy was that the wa

nothing: only the status quo ante was restored. Today, the 

and the problems remain. 

The Postwar Period 

The Economy 

North Korea long had a socialist command economy wi

year plans (as much as seven to 10 years) and a bias towa

industry. It allowed only a sharply limited role for market al

mainly in the rural sector, where peasants sold produce fro

private plots. There was almost no small business. The N

sought a self-reliant, independent national economy; the

would seem to be a typical socialist system on the Stalinis

and certainly it was in the emphasis on heavy industry. 

The Three-Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan (1954–56

began after the Korean War, and the Five-Year Plan (1

which succeeded it, both stressed the reconstruction and 

ment of major industries, with consumer goods at the botto

orities (see North Korea’s Development Strategy, ch. 3). T

toward major industries, however, pushed the economy fo

world-beating growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s. Officia

put the average annual growth rate in industry at 41.7 perce

Three-Year Plan and 36.6 percent during the Five-Year P

First Seven-Year Plan (1961–67) projected an average rate o
cent, but stoppages of aid from the Soviet Union in the early 1

owing to North Korean support for China in the Sino–Soviet di

caused the plan to be extended for three years. 

By the early 1970s, North Korea clearly had exhausted ext

development of its industries based on its own, prewar Japan

new Soviet technologies, and it therefore turned to the West and 

to purchase advanced technology and turnkey plants. These inclu

French petrochemical complex in 1971, a cement plant in 1973

in 1977, a request that Japan sell an integrated steel mill (whic

denied). Even a complete pantyhose factory was imported, sugg

more attention to consumer items. Ultimately, these purchases c

North Korea to run into problems servicing its external debt, 

ran to US$2 billion and US$3 billion by the late 1970s. 

Later seven- and 10-year plans failed to reach projected g

rates; still, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study pub

in 1978 estimated that North Korea’s per capita gross national 

uct (GNP—see Glossary) was the same as South Korea’s as l

1976. In 1979 Kim Il Sung claimed a per capita income in the 

of US$1,900, and later North Korea put the figure at more 

US$2,500, but it is not known if the figure was accurate, or h

was derived. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has fallen 

behind South Korea as transportation bottlenecks and fuel res

problems have plagued the economy. Published CIA figures f

1980s and 1990s place North Korea at around US$1,000 in pe

ita GNP. The North did not do badly in producing goods of th

ond industrial revolution: steel, chemicals, hydroelectric p

internal combustion engines, locomotives, motorcycles, and v

sorts of machine-building items. But it lagged far behind 

“communications” technologies of the third industrial revol

electronics, computers, and semiconductor chips, for example. 

There were innovations, however, which suggested signi

North Korean differences from the Stalinist model of industri

tion. The delivery of goods and services was decentralized 

neighborhood or village level, and several provinces were claim

be self-reliant in food and consumer goods. Foreign visitors saw 

long lines at stores and restaurants, although resident dipl

found that little was available in the stores. Clearly the morale 

population was better than in the former Soviet Union until the 

1990s, as both the cities and the factories give an appearance o

ciency and hard work. 

North Korea had reasonably successful socialist agricultura

tems until the collapse of the economy in the mid-1990s (see 

lapse in the 1990s, ch. 3). Agriculture was collectivized aft

46 
 

 

Korean War, in stages that went from mutual aid teams to 

stage cooperatives but stopped short of building huge state 

in the Soviet Union or the communes of Maoist China. 

mostly on cooperative farms corresponding to the old na

lages rather than state farms, and using material incentives w

apparent ideological bias against them, North Korea pushed 

tural production ahead rapidly. World Health Organization 

who visited in 1980 reported that “miracle” strains of rice 

wide use, and the CIA reported in a published study in 1

grain production had grown more rapidly in the North th

South, that living standards in rural areas “have probably i

faster than in the South,” and that North Korean agricul

quite highly mechanized, fertilizer application was perhap

the highest in the world, and irrigation projects were extens

Up until the late 1980s, North Korea claimed to have th

per hectare rice output in the world; although that claim c

proved, experts did not question the North’s general agricult

cess, and published CIA figures put North Korea’s per cap

output among the highest in the world in around 1980. Subs

North Korea failed to reach projected targets, however, su

grand goal of producing 10 million tons of grain annually 

By the 1990s, South Korea’s rural population lived much be

its northern counterpart, and with accumulated disasters, by 

1990s the North was producing barely more than 4 millio

grain per year. 

North Korea became a significant participant in inte

arms trafficking, selling missiles, machine guns, artillery, lig

and other items to friendly countries such as Pakistan, S

Iran. North Korea traded weaponry for oil with Iran, accou

as much as 40 percent of Iranian arms imports during 

Iran–Iraq War (1980–88; see Defense Industry, ch. 5). 

Foreign observers discount North Korea’s claims of nea

plete self-reliance. Until the Soviet collapse in 1991, th

Union and China had provided petroleum, coking coal, a

other critical resources and competed for influence with 

technicians. (Now Russia and China compete to have econo

tions with South Korea.) North Korea has done well in usin

nous coal and hydroelectric resources to minimize oil use

percent of its energy regime is dependent on imported pe

The pursuit of self-reliance is, of course, primarily a matte

Western politics and foreign relations; it sacrifices efficie

scale and comparative advantage. 
 

Until the 1970s, North Korea’s foreign trade was almost w

with the socialist bloc, but then it diversified imports and ex

toward Japan, Western Europe, and various developing nation

the mid-1970s, some 40 percent of its trade was with noncomm

countries, and within the bloc only half was with the Soviet U

but, by the late 1980s, foreign exchange and other difficultie

North Korea once again dependent on trade with the Soviet U

and the Russian demand for payment in hard currency for o

other items drastically hurt North Korea’s economy in the 

1990s. Exporting has been a priority for several years, althoug

North in no sense has an export-led economy like the South

focus on exports is to garner foreign exchange to import adv

technologies needed for further industrial growth and to pa

imported oil; the exporting policy has not been particularly su

ful. (North Korea’s total trade with Russia and China was fa

than South Korea’s in the early 2000s.) 

In spite of these difficulties, American visitors to North Ko

the 1980s tended to come away impressed by what they saw. Cro

into North Korea from China made people think they had left a 

country for a moderately well-off one. The fields were deep gree

every meter of land was carefully tended; construction projec

round-the-clock shifts; people bustled through the streets to work 

hours; the cities suggested a clean, sparsely populated, diligen

efficient system. 

The country still has an isolated, antiquarian, even bucolic 

sphere, as if one were thrown back to the 1950s; at the same ti

has a few world-class facilities, such as the P’yŏngyang Mat

Hospital, which is replete with German and Hungarian techn

or the fleet of Mercedes put at the disposal of officialdom 

Health Care, ch. 2). Until the famine period of the mid- to late 1

the mass of the people were well fed and plainly dressed, with 

access to consumer goods beyond basic clothing and hous

items (see Effects of the Famine, ch. 3). 

Quite apart from the shocks it has received from abroad since 

North Korea faces its own set of structural problems in the eco

Its ponderous bureaucracy is impenetrable and exasperating to f

business executives—and to its own officials, who find it hard to 

municate with other bureaucracies. Its dogged desire for self-re

has alienated foreigners and placed many obstacles in the way of 

with the West, not least the relative lack of foreign exchange. Te

logical obsolescence means the North must import newer techno

if it ever hopes to compete with the South, and since 2000 it has 

to adopt the new policies necessary to gain access to such techn

for example, revaluing its currency, enacting new tax and profi

48 
 

for foreigners, and permitting limited space for market me

(see Legal and Administrative Reforms, ch. 3). As long 

Korea maintains its hostility toward the United States and its 

force commitments aligned against the South, it will not get 

and technology that it claims to want and certainly needs. 

Both Koreas are industrial and urbanized nations, but on 

different models of political economy. A unified Korea wo

be a formidable industrial state. What would permit this 

marriage of divergent systems? Perhaps the stress on edu

both Koreas, strong backing from big-power allies, effectiv

state intervention in promoting economic development, an

all, the simple fact that neither are “new” states but rather 

of an ancient and proud nation that began its modernizatio

tury ago, not just in the postwar period. 

Corporatism and the Chuch’e Idea 

Marxism presented no political model for achieving social

an opaque set of prescriptions. This political vacuum opened th

an assertion of indigenous political culture and could even b

demand it by virtue of the very paucity of political models. T

gest foreign influence on the North Korean leadership was the 

communist model, and so Kim Il Sung was very much a “m

leader like Mao Zedong, making frequent visits to factorie

countryside, sending cadres “down” to local levels to he

implementation and to solicit local opinion, requiring sm

political study and so-called “criticism and self-criticism,” u

odic campaigns to mobilize people for production or educa

encouraging soldiers also to engage in production in good 

army” fashion. The Ch’ŏllima (see Glossary) or “flying horse

ment inaugurated in the late 1950s was a typical example of a 

inspired strategy. North Korea, like China but unlike the Sovi

also maintained a “united front” policy toward noncommunis

so that in addition to the ruling KWP there were much sm

ties—the Korean Social Democratic Party and the native Ch

(see Glossary) religion’s Chongu (Friends) Party—with mai

bolic functions (see The Korean Workers’ Party, ch. 4). 

There are many differences from China and the Sovie

however, and many of them have been there from the beginn

symbol of the KWP, for example, is a hammer and sickle wi

ing brush superimposed, symbolizing the “three-class alli

workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Unlike Mao’s Chin

Korea has never excoriated intellectuals as a potential “new 

exploiters; instead, it has followed an inclusive policy towa
 

 

perhaps because postwar Korea was so short of intellectual

experts, and because so many left the North for the South 

1945–50 period. The term intellectual, of course, refers to e

and technocrats, not dissenters and critics, of which ther

exceedingly few in North Korea, even when compared to Chin

the former Soviet Union. The relatively sophisticated indu

structure that North Korea began in 1945 also required a highe

portion of experts and created labor shortages in agriculture, th

stimulating mechanization of farming, another difference 

China. In contrast to the typical Marxist–Leninist model, the K

less a tiny vanguard than a big “mass party,” as mentioned e

which then raises the question, what is the vanguard? It is wha

Il Sung called the “core” or “nucleus” at the commanding heig

the regime, consisting of himself and his closest associate

“good things” emanate in top-down fashion from this core, in 

departure from Maoist dicta about the source of good ideas bei

mass of peasants and workers. 

North Korea’s political system is therefore a mix of Marx

Leninism, Korean nationalism, and indigenous political cu

The term that perhaps best captures this system is socialist c

ratism. Although corporatism historically is associated with 

servative, even fascist regimes, since the 1920s there has b

particular strain of leftist corporatism, which argued that 

twentieth-century nation-state, conflict replaced class confl

the motive force of history. Romanian Marxists were amon

first to spell this out as a type of socialism particularly app

ate to colonial or less-developed countries, now usually c

developing nations. North Korea was the first example of po

lonial socialism; the colonial heritage of dependency and u

development deeply affected North Korean politics and still 

so today. If nation-state conflict is the point, then you w

emphasize masses rather than classes, that is, national 

rather than workers fighting bourgeois intellectuals; you w

have a mass party, not a class party of proletarians. North K

ideology has followed suit, burying Marxism–Leninism und

ubiquitous, always-trumpeted chuch’e idea. One cannot o

North Korean newspaper or listen to a single speech w

hearing about chuch’e. The term was first used in a 1955 s

in which Kim castigated some of his comrades for being too 

Soviet—thinking that if the Soviets eat fish on Monday, Ko

should, too, and so forth. But chuch’e really means keepin

foreigners at arm’s length, which resonates deeply with Ko

“hermit kingdom” past. 

50 
 

Chuch’e has no meaning for a Marxist, but much for East A

shares a first Chinese character with the ti-yong (essence and 

use) phrase popular in late nineteenth-century China and 

character with the Japanese kokutai (national polity) of the 19

ti-yong concept built on Chinese learning as the basis of the 

and Western learning or technology for its utility. Kokut

somewhat mystical term meant to distinguish all that was 

Japanese from all that was alien and foreign. Chuch’e comb

meanings, taking Korean ideas as central, foreign ideas as se

it also suggests putting Korean things first at all times, be

“subjective” where Korea is concerned. By the 1970s, chuch

umphed fundamentally over Marxism–Leninism as the basic 

of the regime, but the emphases have been there from the beg

Corporatist doctrine has always preferred an organic p

the liberal, pluralist conception: a corporeal body politic, no

diverse groups and interests. North Korea’s goal of tight 

home produced a remarkable organicism, unprecedented 

existing communist regime. Kim was not just the “iron-will

victorious commander,” the “respected and beloved Great 

he was also the “head and heart” of the body politic (e

supreme brain of the nation”). The flavor of this politics can 

realized through quotation from Korean Central News 

releases: 

Kim Il Sung ... is the great father of our people .... Lon

the history of the word father being used as a w

representing love and reverence ... expressing the unbreak

blood ties between the people and the leader. Father. 

familiar word represents our people’s single heart of bound

respect and loyalty .... The love shown by the Great Leade

our people is the love of kinship. Our respected and bel

Leader is the tender-hearted father of all the people .... Lov

paternity ... is the noblest ideological sentiment possessed 

by our people .... 

His heart is a traction power attracting the hearts o

people and a centripetal force uniting them as one .... Ki

Sung is the great sun and great man ... thanks to this, g

heart national independence is firmly guaranteed. 

This verbiage was especially strong when the succession 

son was publicly announced at the Sixth KWP Congress 

The KWP was often referred to as the “mother” party, the m

was said to provide “blood ties,” the leader was always “f

and the country was presumably one big “family.” Kim wa
be paternal, devoted, and benevolent, and the people were s

respond with loyalty, obedience, and mutual love. Unlike the 

ists, the regime has never tampered with the families of citize

se, and indeed the family is termed the core unit of society 

constitution, and the society is called a “great integrated entity

Family Life, ch. 2). 

North Korean socialism demonstrates an apparent volunte

something also redolent of corporate politics. North Korean p

gandists say that “everything is decided by idea,” directly contr

ing the materialism at the heart of Marxism. And, of cours

leader’s ideas are the best, compounded by his firm “will,” a

described as “iron-like,” or “steel-like.” Kim Il Sung inv

chuch’e, and all Koreans “must have chuch’e firm in min

spirit,” and only then can they be good “Kimilsungists,” and 

then can the revolution be successful. The more one seeks to u

stand chuch’e, the embodiment of Kim’s rule and will, the mo

meaning recedes. It is a state of mind, not an idea, and one t

unavailable to the non-Korean. It is the opaque core of North K

national solipsism (see Glossary). 

The North Korean system is not simply a hierarchical struct

party, military, and state bureaucracies, but also a hierarchy of 

widening concentric circles. At the center is Kim Jong Il. The 

circle is his family, followed by the now-elderly guerrillas 

fought with Kim Il Sung, and then the KWP elite. These indiv

form the core circle, which controls everything at the highest 

lon of the regime. Here politics is primarily personalistic, resti

something akin to oaths of fealty and obligation. The core mus

stantly be steeled and hardened, while moving outward and d

ward concentrically to encompass other elements of the popul

and to provide the glue holding the system together. As the pe

bra of workers and peasants is reached, trust gives way to cont

a bureaucratic basis, and to a mixture of normative and remune

incentives. Nonetheless, the family remains the model for so

organization. An outer circle marks off that which is Korean 

that which is foreign, a reflection of the extraordinary ethnic an

guistic unity of Koreans and the country’s history of exclusion

This corporate system is instinctively repellent to anyone who 

tifies with the modern liberal idea, or indeed with the modern M

idea. North Korea’s simple adherence to its corporatism would b

thing, but by trumpeting the system’s worth far and wide, it has e

widespread disbelief and ridicule. Nonetheless, the system is dif

In 1990, when many Marxist–Leninist regimes had collapse

North Koreans proudly stated that they were still hewing to their 

worn path, of “nation-first-ism,” placing the nation first in every

52 
Kim Jong Il with his parents

Courtesy Kŭmsukangsan (P’yŏngyang), Februa

The North Korean difference can be explained only by referen

tradition and the political culture from which it derives. It is 

of Confucian holdovers, Korean traditionalism, and socialist 

ism. 

The strength and stability of the system rest on marryi

tional forms of legitimacy to modern bureaucratic structures

peculiar charisma of Kim Il Sung providing the transition 

glue between the two. The weakness is that core politic

seems still to rest upon personalistic ties, with trust barely e

beyond the leader’s family and his long-time guerrilla as

This is the reason that Kim Jong Il was deeply involved in p

government activities for at least 25 years before he took po

an entire generation of party faithful and government bureau

rewarded over these same years for supporting his successio

father-to-son succession in any way alien to East Asian poli

ture: many huge South Korean firms are headed by the found

This look inside North Korea may or may not explain w

Korea is so reviled in the West. In any case, its external pol

quently give good reasons for abhorring it. In October 1983

blast in Rangoon, Burma, decimated South Korean presid

Doo Hwan’s cabinet and very nearly killed Chun himself. A 

court determined that North Korean terrorists carried out th

cable act. The North Koreans presumably acted on the as
 

that killing Chun would have an effect similar to the 1979 assa

tion of South Korean president Park Chung-hee: that is, the rem

of the maximum leader causes deep disorders to the political sy

they were probably right. In 1987 another terrorist blew a 

Korean airliner apart, an act also linked to North Korea. The m

for that act was more murky, perhaps intended to dissuade fore

from coming to the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. If so, it bespoke d

ation and a purely malicious and gratuitous terrorism emanating 

P’yŏngyang. The Olympics went off without widely predicted t

ist activity, however, and to date there has been no further evi

of North Korean terrorism. In the early twenty-first centur

North reportedly has trafficked in illegal narcotics and coun

currency. 

With its external reputation for worst-case socialism, in the 

most observers thought North Korea would go the way of the St

states of Eastern Europe and collapse. Some thought East Ger

would be the model, with North Korea folding up and embracing 

unity with the South. Others suggested the example of Romania, 

Nikolae Ceauşescu had modeled his dictatorial rule on Kim Il S

The “revolution of 1989” was so unexpected as to breed humilit

all observers of socialist states, but, so far, North Korea has no

lowed the East German path. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who rei

the military there; amid the widespread demonstrations against 

Honnecker’s regime, Gorbachev kept the 360,000 Soviet Army 

in their barracks. North Korea, however, has an independently 

trolled army estimated at 1.2 million strong, and most of the pr

the Soviets could exert had been applied (overall Soviet a

P’yŏngyang declined precipitously after Gorbachev took p

although military aid continued). 

Korea’s main difference from Eastern Europe is that it suff

terrible civil war, with some 4.5 million killed, in recent me

The North probably suffered nearly 2 million casualties. Ther

were 1 million Chinese casualties. It is very hard to believe tha

itary commanders who fought the South in a bloody civil war w

allow South Korea to overwhelm North Korea, by whatever m

If North Korea’s socialist system collapses under the intense in

tional pressures of our time, probably the apparatchiks will d

themselves to have been nationalists all along (with some meas

truth) and try to keep their hold on power. 

International Relations 

It is a mark of some kind of failure that, more than half a ce

after the Korean War ended, the two Koreas still face each 

54 
across the bleak Demilitarized Zone (DMZ—see Glossary), 

most of the time in unremitting hostility, punctuated by oc

brief thaws and increasing North–South exchanges. Huge ar

still poised to fight at a moment’s notice. This has been true 

Korean War, which really solved nothing, except to solidi

bulwarks of containment, to which the United States, Sout

and North Korea remain committed, even in the post–C

world. Both Koreas continue to be deeply deformed by the 

to maintain this unrelenting struggle. Yet, around the penins

has changed. 

Watershed changes in world politics in the 1970s altered 

War logic that had governed East Asia. With U.S. president 

M. Nixon’s opening to China in 1971–72, both North K

South Korea watched helplessly as their great-power be

cozied up to each other. With the conclusion of the Seco

china War (1954–75), obstacles to ending the Cold War th

Asia were even fewer. The new strategic logic of the 1970

immediate and beneficial impact on the Korean Penins

Nixon administration withdrew a division of U.S. troops 

heightening tension. The North Koreans responded by virtu

ing attempts at infiltration (compared to 1968, when more 

soldiers died along the DMZ and the spy ship USS Pue

seized) and by significantly reducing their defense budge

Kissinger revealed in his memoirs that Kim Il Sung was in 

during Kissinger’s famous “secret visit” in July 1971; altho

not known whether they talked, it is likely that Nixon and K

encouraged South Korea to talk with the North and indicat

North various benefits that might come their way if Nor

took a moderate path. In what seemed to be a miraculous 

ment, in early 1972 both Koreas held talks at a high level 

the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency an

Sung’s younger brother), culminating in a stunning July 

announcement that both would seek reunification peacefu

pendently of outside forces, and with common efforts towa

ing a “great national unity” that would transcend th

differences between the two systems. Within a year, this 

had effectively failed, but it was a reminder of what can b

plished through enlightened diplomacy and of the continuin

tance of the unification issue. 

Later on, the policies of the United States and China shift

if less dramatically. When the Carter administration announc

for a gradual but complete withdrawal of U.S. ground for

Korea (air and naval units would remain deployed in or nea
a prolonged period of North Korean courting of Americans beg

1977 Kim referred to President Jimmy Carter as “a man of jus

and the North Korean press momentarily dropped its calu

against the United States, including use of the term “U.S. imp

ism.” Kim gave interviews saying he was knocking on the Am

door, wanted diplomatic relations and trade, and would not int

with American business interests in the South once Korea was 

fied. The North Koreans also began using a term of opprobriu

Soviet imperialism, chibaejuŭi (“dominationism”), a term akin 

Chinese usage, “hegemonism.” By and large, P’yŏngyang s

close to China’s foreign policy line during the Carter years, 

taking care not to antagonize the Soviets needlessly. When Vi

invaded Cambodia in 1978, the North Koreans forcefully and 

licly condemned the act, while maintaining a studied silence 

China responded by invading Vietnam. 

Civil disorders in South Korea in 1979–80 and the emergenc

new Cold War atmosphere on a world scale froze the Korean 

tion for much of the 1980s. The Carter administration dropp

program of troop withdrawal in 1979. The Reagan administ

invited President Chun Doo Hwan to visit Washington as its fir

eign policy act, a move designed to bolster South Korean sta

The United States committed itself to a modest but significant 

up of force and equipment levels in the South. In the early 1980

United States added some 4,000 personnel to the 40,000 alrea

South Korea, sold Seoul advanced F–16 fighters, and with the 

mounted huge “Team Spirit” military exercises involving up

of 200,000 troops of the two nations toward the beginning of 

year. 

Sino–American relations warmed considerably in 1983, and f

first time China said publicly that it wished to play a role in red

tension on the Korean Peninsula; this announcement was follow

a major North Korean initiative in January 1984, which called f

first time for three-way talks among the United States, South K

and North Korea. Previously, North Korea had never been will

sit down with both nations at the same time. (The Carter admin

tion had made a similar proposal for three-way talks in 

Through most of the 1980s, China sought to sponsor talks be

Washington and P’yŏngyang (talks that occasionally took pla

Beijing between low-level diplomats) and encouraged Kim Il Su

take the path of diplomacy. By the early 1990s, China had a 

larger trade with South Korea than with North Korea, with frei

going back and forth directly across the Yellow Sea, and in 

China and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations. South 

56 
pursued an active diplomacy toward China, the Soviet Union 

Russia, and various East European countries, saying it wou

trade and diplomatic relations with “friendly” communist 

This policy bore fruit in 1988, when most communist 

attended the Seoul Olympics, with only Cuba honoring t

Korean “boycott.” The collapse of East European communis

ously damaged North Korean diplomacy, as Hungary, Polan

slavia, and other states opened diplomatic relations with Seou

North–South Relations in the Twenty-first C

The two Koreas made sporadic progress in relations w

other in the late 1980s. The founder of the Hyundai cong

toured North Korea in January 1989 and announced a join

in tourism, which was the seed of a program whereby tens 

sands of South Koreans tour the scenic Mount Kŭmgang 

Diamond) in the North (see Special Economic Zones, ch

1991 ended, a watershed breakthrough seemed to occur w

two prime ministers signed a nonaggression pact, which co

both sides to substituting a real peace for the Korean War a

reducing troops and mutual vilification, and engaging in w

ing exchanges. This progress was followed up at the end of 

an agreement to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. 

ticular agreement was facilitated by a key American de

1991 to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea. 

The 1994 Agreed Framework freezing North Korea’s 

facilities opened up eight years of wide-ranging diplomac

Korean Peninsula. Four-Power Talks (the two Koreas, th

States, and China) sought to bring a final conclusion to th

War. President Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” of eng

opened the way to many joint ventures with the North, inc

project in Kaesŏng that envisions operating hundreds of fac

which South Korean firms would employ North Korean la

reconnecting roads and railroad lines across the DMZ. In Ju

Kim Dae Jung traveled to P’yŏngyang for a summit to m

Jong Il, the first time that the two heads of state shook han

the country was divided in 1945. The administration of P

William J. Clinton exchanged high-level visits in late 20

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveling to P’yŏn

meet Kim Jong Il, coming very close to a major deal that i

would have bought out the North’s medium- and long-ra

siles. The administration of President George W. Bush did 

cur with that agreement, however, and its concerns about 

nuclear program involving highly enriched uranium der
 

substantial détente that had occurred in the previous decade. 

tions between Washington and P’yŏngyang deteriorated in a low

crisis that began in October 2002 and lasted into the second 

administration. Unfortunately, the Agreed Framework unra

ending the freeze on the North’s plutonium facilities and givin

North the fuel to build several nuclear weapons. North 

declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state on February 10, 

thus confirming a new and dangerous element in the balan

forces on the Korean Peninsula (see Strategic Weapons, ch. 5). 

* * * 

For additional reading on history prior to the twentieth centu

best sources are Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick 

Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner’s Korea Old and N

History; Han Woo-Keun’s The History of Korea; and James B

ais’s Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. For the Japanese p

Carter J. Eckert’s Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims an

Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism; Sang Chul Suh’s Grow

Structural Changes in the Korean Economy, 1910–1940; and M

Robinson’s Cultural Nationalism in Korea, 1920–25 provide 

information. The Politics of Korean Nationalism by Chong-Sik 

Communism in Korea by Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik 

The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948 by Dae-Sook Su

Suh’s Kim Il Sung: A Biography are good books on the orig

Korean nationalism and communism. The Korean War and its o

are covered in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War; 

mary Foote, The Wrong War; and Peter Lowe, The Origins 

Korean War. Communism in Korea by Scalapino and Chong-Sik 

Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh’s Socialist Korea: A Case Study 

Strategy of Economic Development, and a study of North K

agrarian socialism by Mun Woong Lee, Rural North Korea 

Communism: A Study in Sociocultural Chang, offer a tho

grounding in North Korean history. A survey of North Korea’s 

national relations and U.S. policy toward North Korea can be fou

Selig S. Harrison’s Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunificatio

U.S. Disengagement. (For further information and complete cita

see Bibliography.) 

58 
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environ
 

 

Bas-relief on P’yŏngyang’s Arch of Triumph. The inscription on the f

reads“The world’s one and only patriot. Long live Kim Il Sung.” 

Courtesy Pulmyŏl ŭi t’ap (Tower of Immortality), P’yŏngyang: Muny

Ch’ulpansa, 1985, 283 
BEFORE ITS DIVISION IN 1945, Korea had been cultu

linguistically distinct for more than 5,000 years and a s

nation-state under the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1910) for m

500 years. Traditional culture and social structure during 

period of independent rule were deeply influenced by Chine

zation, and high value was placed on Confucian ideals of so

mony, loyalty, orthodoxy, authority, and filial piety. 

The years of colonization by imperial Japan (1910–45) hu

Korea, depriving it of freedom and creating a skewed econ

left the country ethnically and culturally distinct and little 

socially. Much more damaging to the ancient culture and so

been the division in 1945 into North Korea and South Ko

independent nations with 10 million separated families 

hoped to reestablish a sovereign nation under traditional Ko

ues, beliefs, and behavior. The Democratic People’s Rep

Korea (North Korea), the larger of the two countries and hi

the more industrially developed, had a population of 9.1 m

1945, only slightly more than half that of the traditiona

agrarian Republic of Korea (South Korea), which had 16 

people in 1945. 

The two peoples that have emerged since 1945—the 

society in the North and the pluralistic society in the South

opposite ends of the spectrum of world societies. Prev

would have been almost unthinkable that two such different 

as the Koreas at the beginning of the twenty-first century co

emerged from the traditional Korean society that 100 yea

had remained mostly unchanged for more than a millennium

The Physical Environment 

North Korea is located in the northern half of the Korea

sula, which extends about l,000 kilometers southward from 

east Asia. The nation occupies about 55 percent of the total 

of the peninsula, or approximately 120,410 square kilome

water covers 130 square kilometers. 

North Korea lies between South Korea to the south, Chi

north and northwest, and Russia to the northeast. The north

ders with China and Russia extend for 1,435 kilometers, w

kilometers separating North Korea from the Chinese prov

Jilin and Liaoning and the remaining 19 kilometers sepa
126 128 130 

130 

124 

40 

42 

38 

128 Boundary representation 

not necessarily authoritative 

Demarcation line and 

demilitarized zone 

�

CHANGBAI RANGE

KANGNAM 

RANGE 

NANGNIM

RANGE 

T’AEBAEK RANGE 

CHAERYONG 

PLAIN 

P’YONGYANG 

PLAIN 

HAMGYONG RANGE 

Paektu-san 

2,744 

Kosong-san 

1,756 

Kumgang-san 

1,638 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

Yellow Sea 

(West Sea) 

Sea of 

Japan 

(East Sea) 

East 

Korea 

Bay West 

Korea 

Bay 

Yalu (Amnok) 

Yalu (Amnok) 

Tumen (Tuman) 

Taedong 

Changin 

Imjin

P’yongyang  ̆ 

CHINA 

SOUTH 

KOREA 

0 25 50 75 Kilometers

0 25 50 75 Miles

�

International boundary 

Demarcation line and

 demilitarized zone 

National capital 

Spot elevation 

Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 

from Russia’s Primorskiy Territory. This northern border is fo

by the Amnok (or Yalu, as it is known in China) and Tuman (Tu

as it is known in China) rivers, which have their sources 

region around Mount Paektu (Paektu-san or White Head Moun

an extinct volcano and Korea’s highest mountain (see fig. 4)

Amnok flows in a southwesterly direction into the Yellow S

West Sea as it is known to Koreans), and the Tuman flows in a 

easterly direction into the Sea of Japan (or East Sea as it is kno

Koreans). Part of the border with China near Mount Paektu h

62 
 

to be clearly demarcated. Koreans trace their origin to 

around Mount Paektu, and the mountain has special signific

contemporary North Koreans because of the legend that 

created that their leader, Kim Jong Il, son of founding lead

Sung, was born on Mount Paektu during World War II, w

father was attaining the status of a military hero as a longt

Japanese guerrilla fighter. 

Korea’s west coast is bordered by the Yellow Sea, which 

Korea from China. The east coast is bordered by the Sea 

The 8,460-kilometer seacoast of Korea is highly irregu

North Korea’s half of the peninsula having 2,495 kilom

coastline. Some 3,579 islands lie adjacent to the Korean P

most of them along the south coast. 

North Korea’s southern border with South Korea is at th

eighth parallel, an unnatural division of the Korean Penin

was roughly the point where the opposing armies in the Ko

(1950–53) faced one another at the time of the cease-fire an

of an armistice marking the end of the fighting on July 27, 1

a border that was hastily agreed upon at the end of World W

U.S. and Soviet leaders, with no particular reference to nat

features. 

Known since 1953 as the Demarcation Line (see Glossary)

der between North Korea and South Korea at the thirty-eight

is the most heavily guarded border in the world and the last f

of the Cold War. The so-called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ—

sary), a 4,000-meter-wide strip of land that straddles the Dem

Line, runs east and west for a distance of 238 kilometers over 

three kilometers over the sea. North Korea claims a 12-naut

territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautica

also has established a military boundary line of 50 nautical m

east coast and the exclusive economic zone on the west coast 

foreign ships and aircraft without permission from the Nort

government are officially banned. 

Topography and Drainage 

Approximately 80 percent of North Korea’s land area is 

of mountain ranges separated by deep, narrow valleys. A

tains on the Korean Peninsula higher than 2,000 meters a

level are in North Korea, the highest one being Mount Paek

northern border with China at 2,744 meters above sea lev

are wide coastal plains on the west coast, the most extensi

the P’yŏngyang and Chaeryŏng plains, each covering ab

square kilometers. Because the mountains on the east co
 

abruptly to the sea, the discontinuous coastal plains in the ea

much smaller than those on the west coast. The majority of the 

lation lives in the plains and lowlands, which constitute less th

percent of the country, providing North Korea only a small am

of arable land. 

The mountain ranges in the north and east form the watersh

most of the country’s rivers, which run in a westerly directio

empty into the Yellow Sea. The longest of these is the Amnok

kilometers in length and navigable for 678 kilometers. The s

largest river, the Tuman, which is navigable for only 81 of it

kilometers, is one of the few major rivers to flow into the S

Japan. The third longest river, the Taedong, which flows th

P’yŏngyang and is largely responsible for the natural beau

North Korea’s capital city, is navigable for 245 of its 397 kilom

There is no east–west waterway crossing the Korean Peni

Ships in eastern ports of North Korea can reach western ports on

going around the southern tip of South Korea. Outside observ

isolated and secretive North Korea were astonished when, in 199

captured intelligence ship USS Pueblo, which had been taken 

east coast port of Wŏnsan after its seizure by North Korea in Ja

1968, appeared in P’yŏngyang as a much-acclaimed tourist attra

Apparently, North Korea had disguised the ship, officially still a 

missioned vessel of the U.S. Navy, and sailed it around the peni

up the west coast and along the Taedong to P’yŏngyang. 

There are relatively few lakes in North Korea, and they tend 

small because of the lack of glacial activity and the stability 

earth’s crust in the region. Unlike neighboring Japan and C

North Korea has experienced few severe earthquakes. 

Climate 

North Korea has long, cold, dry winters and short, hot, humid 

mers. Temperatures range between –8° C in December and 27

August. Approximately 60 percent of the annual rainfall o

between June and September, the main rice-growing period. Aug

the wettest month of the year with an average rainfall of 317 mi

ters. Typhoons can be expected on an average of at least once 

summer. Since the mid-1990s, erratic weather conditions, partic

devastating floods in 1995 followed by a prolonged drought, 

contributed to a precipitous drop in agricultural production (caus

serious failures of government agricultural policies as well as 

weather, deforestation, and soil erosion) and led to one of the 

famines of the late twentieth century, resulting in the death of 

than 1 million North Koreans. 

64 
 

Peaks of the North Korean side of Mou

as seen from the Chinese side across La

Courtesy Sarah Ji-y

Environmental Factors 

After the Korean War, North Korea embarked on an amb

ill-fated program of industrialization. Industry used generally 

technology and outmoded equipment transferred from th

Union and China that in other communist-bloc nations eventu

duced air, water, and soil pollution. The passage of an envir

protection law by the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 1

gests that North Korea had a serious pollution problem, proba

particularly in the industrial cities of Namp’o, Hamhŭ

Ch’ŏngjin. 

Air pollution, alleviated somewhat by the absence of priv

mobiles and restrictions on the use of gasoline-powered 

because of the critical shortage of oil, has long been severe b

the heavy reliance on coal as the major source of energy. T

causes of pollution have been industrial boilers and kilns an

hold heating and cooking. According to a United Nations Env

Programme (UNEP) report published in 2003, data on air pol

very limited and confined mainly to P’yŏngyang, where there 

no industry and hydroelectric power rather than coal is m

monly used to meet energy demands, giving an atypical pict

quality throughout the rest of the country. However, in 1990 bo

industrial kilns in P’yŏngyang consumed nearly 3.4 million 
 

coal, and household consumption for heating and cooking amoun

another nearly 358,000 tons of coal. The government has given p

to the prevention of air pollution in P’yŏngyang, where the gover

elite live, and to other major cities, with policies aimed at reducin

consumption in the household sector, enhancing combustion effic

and employing gas purification devices on boilers and kilns. Fo

tainable management of air quality, however, the government wil

to introduce advanced technologies, such as clean coal techn

high-efficiency purification of exhaust gas, and renewable e

options for environmentally sound energy development. 

North Korea is richly endowed with forests, which are distri

throughout the country with highest cover in the northern area. 

ever, the majority of the forests are mountain forest cover, mor

70 percent of which stands on slopes greater than 20 degre

1945 the forested area of North Korea was estimated at 9.7 m

hectares. War and industrial use greatly depleted this resource

est stock per hectare increased from 53.6 cubic meters in 19

55.9 cubic meters in 1990, at which time afforested and refo

areas totaled 1.1 million hectares. Thereafter, however, soci

nomic and industrial development led to a decrease in forested 

to 986,000 hectares by 1996. This degradation in forest reso

which play an important role in economic development as w

human well-being, has continued. At least part of the decline 

result of the excessive use of firewood during the energy crisis 

late 1990s brought about by the cut-off of exports of petroleum 

Russia and the flooding of North Korea’s coal mines. Defores

for firewood occurred simultaneously with the destruction of 

areas of forests in the devastating floods and droughts that pl

North Korea in the 1995–97 period. Forest fires, landslides, and 

ious insect damage have further decreased forest area and s

This trend has been accentuated by conversion of forest into 

land since the mid-1990s, during the years of decreasing 

imports. The government has undertaken initiatives to restore f

damaged by the recent flooding, droughts, forest fires and i

deforestation, including the 1999 promulgation of the Law o

Forest, which established an annual Tree-Planting Day on Ma

and the inauguration of a 10-year plan for afforestation/refores

to restore and rehabilitate 2 million hectares of degraded forest

proposed measures, if successful, will restore only recent da

however, rather than augment traditional forest resources. 

North Korea is rich in water resources, including rainfall, r

and underground water, but there is wide fluctuation in precipi

across the country and a short outflow time of rainfall because 

steep slopes of catchments. There were severe shortages of 

66 
 

during the period of high temperatures and continued droug

mid-1990s. One of the world’s worst famines was a direct 

the shortage of water, the contamination of the water due to 

and drought, and the decrease in agricultural production d

natural disasters of those years (see Effects of the Famine

Discharges from some urban settlements and industries h

jected certain bodies of water to severe eutrophication, a

water-quality indices do not meet environmental standar

water contamination and lack of investment in disinfection

age reservoirs, water-borne diseases have led to numerou

including 300,000 to 800,000 annually during the drought 

ine in the mid-1990s. The government adopted the Law o

Resources in June 1997, amended in January 1999, estab

basis for water-resources protection and strengthening gov

control on effluents and sewage from factories, enterprises, 

fication plants. Television, radio, newspapers, and newslett

directed to inform the public frequently about the need f

conservation, which is now viewed as a critical issue in the 

Floods in the mid-1990s inflicted an estimated US$925 m

damage to North Korea’s arable land. Forest degradation in 

est areas adjacent to agricultural land contributed to land 

North Korea’s mountainous terrain means that its agric

heavily dependent on chemical fertilizers, and the acidifi

arable land by fertilizer application has brought about a d

both soil humus content and crop output. In order to pro

resources from acidification and to enhance fertility, treated 

and coal ash from urban centers are applied to the land

P’yŏngyang is given priority over other parts of the count

processing of municipal solid waste into fertilizer. There h

continuous efforts by the government to increase pubic a

about the importance of land quality as the basis of their li

and national prosperity. 

Population 

North Korea’s population, estimated in July 2007 

23,301,725, is slightly less than half that of South Ko

North’s 2007 estimated birthrate is 15.0 births per 1,000 

death rate 7.2 per 1,000. The country is highly urbanized. On

40 percent of its citizens live in rural areas, a low percent

less-developed country and a reflection of the mountainou

and limited arable land. Population density is estimated at 

sons per square kilometer. The inability of the rural popu

produce enough food to feed the urban society would norm
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80 and older 

80 and older 

AGE-GROUP 

MALES FEMALES 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 

2005 

0–4 

5–9 

10–14 

15–19 

20–24 

25–29 

30–34 

35–39 

40–44 

45–49 

50–54 

55–59 

60–64 

65–69 

70–74 

75–79 

0–4 

5–9 

10–14 

15–19 

20–24 

25–29 

30–34 

35–39 

40–44 

45–49 

50–54 

55–59 

60–64 

65–69 

70–74 

75–79 

AGE-GROUP 

MALES FEMALES 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 

2025 

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Commerce, Census 

International Programs Center, International Data Base Population Pyramids 

Korea), Washington, DC, 2007, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbpyr.html.

Figure 5. Population by Age and Sex, 2005, and Estimated for 2025 

68 
 

 

 

any government to finance necessary imports of food 

exports of industrial and mineral products, which is how the 

half of Korea traditionally survived. However, since the mi

when agricultural production began falling precipitously 

demands for imported food have risen dramatically, the re

not been able to increase exports of industrial products bec

simultaneous decline in industrial production (see Post-Fam

ation, ch. 3). 

With plausible policy adjustments, an earlier call for inte

assistance, and less interference with the humanitarian aid o

tions’ established norms for food distribution, North Kor

have averted the great famine of the mid- and late 1990s. A

the country suffered the worst famine in the late twentieth 

the only one in a country not at war, and one of the most de

famines of the last century, which left at least 1 million p

percent of North Korea’s population—dead. Most of the dea

among the young and the elderly who, as is typical in fami

cumbed to diseases such as tuberculosis before actually st

death. 

Since the famine, the population growth rate has slowe

cantly. The estimated annual growth of 0.9 percent (2002–

sents a dramatic decline from 2.7 percent in 1960, 3.6 p

1970, and even the 1.9 percent rate in 1975. Earlier estim

demographic experts that North Korea’s population would 

to 25.5 million by 2000 and to 28.5 million in 2010 have pro

off the mark because of the effects of the unexpected, de

famine. In 1990 life expectancy at birth was approximately 

for males and almost 73 for females. Despite the effects of 

ine, the 2007 estimate showed a slight increase in life ex

(69.2 years for males and 74.8 for females). There also wa

imbalance in the male:female sex ratio. According to 2

mates, there were 0.94 males for every female in the genera

tion and 0.98 males for every female in the 15 to 64 age-gr

fig. 5). The population is almost completely ethnic Korea

few Chinese and Japanese. 

The North Korean government seems to perceive its popu

too small in relation to that of South Korea. There is no offic

control policy, but falling growth rates are the result of l

riages (after a man’s compulsory military service), an e

population as a result of long hours of work and political stu

ilies’ limited resources and housing space, and, now more s

earlier years, the deterioration in health conditions be

chronic food shortages (see Family Life, this ch.). 
 

 

 

 

Social Structure and Values 

Creating a New Society 

In the relatively short span of 60 years, North Korea has d

oped a unique society that is, in the opinion of many observer

world’s most oppressive, heading the list of countries having 

cious human rights records. The society can best be describe

distinctively Korean version of socialism, mixing Marxist–Le

ideas with the rigid hierarchical social structure and authoritari

of Confucianism, enforced by an extreme totalitarian regim

rules with a mixture of terror and the world’s most intense per

ity cult. Despite mounting economic failures and horrific h

rights abuses, the leadership has remained firmly in contro

compliant society in a well-armed but impoverished nation. 

Perhaps more than can be said of any other country, North 

is the creation of one man—Kim Il Sung—one of the most intri

figures of the twentieth century, dominating his country durin

lifetime and afterward as few individuals in history have done. 

the late 1950s until his death in 1994, Kim’s power was n

unlimited, and he ruled his country longer than any other lea

the twentieth century. American political scientist Donald Ob

fer pointed out in The Two Koreas that when Kim died in July 

he had outlived Joseph Stalin for four decades and Mao Zedo

almost two decades and had remained in power during the ter

office of six South Korean presidents, nine U.S. presidents, a

Japanese prime ministers. No leader has ever had so free a ha

shaping the destiny of his country, and it is fair to say that non

had greater success in creating a national society of his own d

quite unlike any other society, communist or otherwise. It is re

able that such a man should have become the architect of a m

state and society almost single-handedly. He had only eight ye

formal education (the last two of which were in schools in Nor

China before he was expelled for revolutionary activities). Kim 

an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter who served for a decade in 

attached to the Chinese Communist Party’s guerrilla army, th

four years with a Soviet military unit during World War II, 

thereafter installed by the Soviets as the new leader of North 

in 1945. 

Kim Il Sung does not appear to have had a coherent philos

construct guiding his life or planning for North Korean socie

was not an intellectual and not well read. He was reported to 

known a lot of Confucianism and a smattering of Marx, Lenin

Hegel. Christian influences in Kim’s early life had not been 

70 
 

known until the serial publication in 1992–95 of his six

memoir With the Century. He was born in P’yŏngyang in 19

daughter of a Presbyterian elder and a father who had been 

at a missionary school in P’yŏngyang. He claimed, later in 

to have “been affected by religion” despite his youthful con

with the church but acknowledged that he “received a grea

humanitarian assistance from Christians.” But Kim Jong I

his father, has never had anything favorable to say about 

having had no personal familiarity with religious beliefs a

tices (see Religion, this ch.). 

Whereas South Korea’s society was shaped by myriad in

the North’s is Kim Il Sung’s creation. It reflects his genius 

tations, his restricted experience of the world and his dee

convictions and, perhaps most important of all, his national

trine of chuch’e (see Glossary), doing things his way, being 

dent, not following foreign example or advice but rather 

idea of what was best for North Korea (see Political Ideol

Role of Chuch’e, ch. 4). Just as he personally laid out the 

the rebuilt P’yŏngyang (his “dream city”) after the devastati

Korean War and decided which buildings would go where a

architects would design which buildings in which style (S

Korean), he planned and enforced the daily life of his peo

their waking up until their going to bed, from the cradle to t

His role in the everyday life of the people may have been s

exaggerated, especially in later years when the cult of Kim 

reached dazzling proportions, but there is abundant evidenc

other leader has ever had a greater hand in planning, direc

boasting about a society that he created. 

It is difficult to describe the mix of ideas and influences t

to bear on the creation of North Korea’s unique society. It 

class society emphasizing Confucian hierarchal values, a 

cult society extolling Kim Il Sung as a demigod, an O

thought-controlled society, a thoroughly militarized so

impoverished socialist economy with a limited education sy

woefully poor health-care system, no free religious instit

spiritual teaching, and few, if any, basic human rights (se

tion; Health Care, this ch.). 

The Cult of Kim Il Sung 

What matters most in North Korea is loyalty to th

Leader” Kim Il Sung and his teachings and, since 1994, th

pretation by his son and heir, the “Dear Leader,” Kim Jong I

immediately apparent upon one’s first meeting with a North 
 

whose every sentence is peppered with references to “the thou

Kim Il Sung,” “dedication to Kim Il Sung,” being a “Kim Il 

man,” or just “Kim Il Sung.” 

The Kim cult has flourished in the special conditions of a 

tively small country with a homogeneous population, a tradit

social harmony, authoritarian rule and loyalty of the people 

ruler, and, in this case, a charismatic leader with a unique st

leadership who ruled for an unusually long time. For nearly 50 

Kim Il Sung traveled around his country for more than 150 day

sometimes as many as 225 days a year. From 1954 to 196

reportedly made more than 1,300 on-the-spot inspections of c

tive farms, factories, mines, highways, housing complexes, chi

facilities, museums, and other public buildings. In the 30 years 

1950 to 1980, he reportedly traveled more than 513,000 kilom

averaging approximately 52 kilometers a day. He was perso

familiar with every town and village, every farm and factory, vi

many of them repeatedly. Over the years, most North Korean

him close at hand on one or another of his visits to their provin

While the relatively small size of North Korea made it easi

him to establish a personal relationship with his people than 

for Stalin or Mao, who were remote by comparison, Kim’s part

personality and skills in establishing personal rapport, espe

with children, cannot be denied. One of his effective leadership 

tices, for example, which won the hearts of both children and 

parents, was his custom on his endless visits to nursery and ele

tary schools of taking a Polaroid camera and having each child

ture taken with him. The children would then take the photog

home and hang them in their homes, where only images of Kim 

allowed to be displayed. For many years, North Koreans have 

and ended their day with a bow to Kim’s portrait in their home

From available evidence, it seems that the cult of persona

North Korea rests on a genuine belief of the vast majority of th

ple in the greatness and goodness of Kim Il Sung. Visitors to 

Korea often remark on the depth of the people’s feelings for 

Whatever criticism there is, it is rarely voiced, even in private

ple are afraid to criticize the regime, especially Kim. Some def

have admitted to having secret doubts about his infallibility, bu

would never have voiced these doubts in public or, for that mat

private. The most convincing reason for accepting the genuin

of the people’s love for Kim actually comes from defectors 

have absolutely no reason to exaggerate their true feelings fo

after having made the highly dangerous decision to defect and 

ing no fear of being returned to the dreadful existence from 

72 
 

 

Parade celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the North Korean C

Party (later the Korean Workers’ Party), P’yŏngyang, October 

Kim Il Sung is featured in the large circula

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), Novemb

they have so narrowly escaped. In spite of any reservations 

have about the excesses of the cult, they still express a certa

ence for Kim Il Sung as a person and as a leader. Their ad

seems deep-seated, genuine, and unshakeable. Studied at a 

as an abstraction, the cult may appear ludicrous, almost u

able, but, up close, its hold over the perception and thought 

of North Koreans is awe inspiring. 

When Kim Il Sung died suddenly and unexpectedly o

attack in July 1994 at the age of 82, the nation was shocked 

come with grief on a scale that few outsiders comprehend

time. Kim had been their leader during all or most of their 

the people had seen him at close range on many occasions. 

they had lost a father, as well as the “Great Leader,” who in 

officially proclaimed the “Eternal President” of North Kor

than that, they had lost a cult leader whom they revered as a d
 

It would be hard to exaggerate the mood of vulnerability, c

sion, and uncertainty, on top of grief, that engulfed the nat

1995, at the time when the first of a series of natural calam

floods, droughts, famines, and starvation, gripped the nation, 

ing it to near economic collapse (see Collapse in the 1990s, c

Many North Koreans attributed the severe problems then affl

the country to the loss of the “Great Leader,” as if there had 

some disastrous world reordering. 

The handling of Kim’s funeral reflected the country’s st

mind. No foreign dignitaries were invited to attend the funeral 

monies, despite the fact that a head of state for almost half a ce

was being honored. Kim’s chuch’e philosophy of national ind

dence may have played some role in the decision to ban outs

but the simple explanation seems to have been the people’s f

of a loss too personal and too private to share with others. Pe

the moral superiority and defiant aloofness that cult members 

cally feel toward nonbelievers militated against the inclusion o

siders at such a painful time. The limited glimpse that the o

world was afforded of the national outpouring of grief, with 

dreds of thousands of North Koreans weeping for days, bespo

honest desire to grieve in private, with no play for international 

pathy or support. There is no reason to think that their tears a

time were anything but genuine. 

After the funeral, at which the designated heir, Kim Jo

appeared but did not speak, he did not appear again in publ

many months. When asked why, he said simply that he wa

grieving for his father, an unusual admission for a head of 

Observers of the scene wondered why he had not moved 

quickly to assume the mantel of leadership. While there may 

have been overriding political considerations involving the ne

consolidate his own political position, there was a sense that h

was almost paralyzed by grief over his father’s death and sensit

the country’s need for time and space to absorb the loss (see L

ship Succession, ch. 4). His state of mind over his father’s de

often cited as a major reason for his slowness in responding 

natural disasters that befell North Korea in the mid-1990s. 

Since the elder Kim’s death, the cult has grown to even g

proportions. It continues to dominate every aspect of North K

life. In this regard, it should be emphasized that it still is—

always has been—the cult of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il succee

power as the son of Kim Il Sung in the tradition of the Chosŏn 

archy. One might assume that, as his son, Kim Jong Il would b

vated to the same godlike status. However, that does not seem 

74 
 

the case. He is more the apostle or high priest of his father’s 

a very zealous one at that. As the chief beneficiary of the cu

every reason to maintain and promote the cult to eve

excesses. For a period of time in his career, the younger Kim

responsibility in the Ministry of Culture actually seems to h

the promotion of the cult. He has proven expertise in t

Among Kim Il Sung’s children, Kim Jong Il “was the one 

his father’s trust. He supported Kim Il Sung’s deification,” a

to Hwang Jang-yop, Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) secr

ideology. The younger Kim is credited with coining the ter

sungism, with its specific connotation of one-man rule, an

the 1960s and 1970s he presided over the elevation of Kim 

from national hero and “Great Leader” to official deity. 

It would have been far riskier for Kim Jong Il to have 

replace his father in the people’s affections, which he is not 

have accomplished in any case, than to co-opt his father’s cu

own purposes. In this way, he has avoided any compariso

father in which he would inevitably be found wanting. At 

time, he has capitalized on the benefits of being the son 

demigod, a position that no one else can challenge and tha

patible with traditional Confucian thinking, which holds 

father-son relationship of the five personal connections (r

subject, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, 

and wife, and friend and friend) that contribute to the per

mony of society. 

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Kim 

political power is any less than his father’s because the youn

is not the object of a comparable cult of personality. He is 

ent-day leader of a cult society, with all the powers associa

being the leader, as distinct from the object of worship. It is 

that he could ever have created so intense and enduring a 

around his persona. He is not the charismatic man his father 

has inherited total political power, which he reinforces by 

rating the cult worship of his father, without himself having 

ure of his father as a demigod in what is essentially a 

religious state. 

Foreign visitors to North Korea are often stunned by th

presence of Kim Il Sung in the lives of North Koreans, no

their view all the time but constantly in their thoughts as we

are photographs of Kim hanging in people’s homes; giganti

of Kim hanging from the roofs of huge public buildings; sta

portraits of Kim in offices, classrooms, shops, public halls, 

hospitals, and other indoor locations, as well as on the front 
 

and the decks of ships; mosaics of Kim with his band of anti

nese guerrilla fighters on the walls of the elaborately deco

P’yŏngyang subway system; and statues and sculptures, som

them gold-plated, and the most impressive of all a huge, illum

white marble statue of Kim seated at one end of the magni

International Friendship Exhibition Hall in a pose reminisce

Abraham Lincoln’s statue in the Lincoln Memorial in Washin

DC. By one count, there were more than 500 life-size statues o

in 1980, and by the time of his death in 1994 that numbe

increased many times over. There are elaborately staged thea

productions of his life story, some of them reportedly produc

Kim Jong Il, who is known to have taken a personal interest an

in the development of North Korea’s movie and theater industr

Kim Il Sung’s birthplace at Man’gyŏngdae and his burial 

P’yŏngyang are shrines, and North Korean students and work

on annual pilgrimages to them from all over the country, often 

ing many kilometers to get there. On a typical day, Man’gyŏng

visited by some 10,000 people, including foreign visitors wh

taken there as a routine first stop on their tour of P’yŏngyang a

vicinity. There are raised plaques at spots in the middle of 

where Kim stopped to give on-the-spot guidance. Subway 

where he sat are roped off as memorials. There are signs ov

doors of factories and day-care nurseries marking the date tha

visited. Objects that he touched on these visits are covered with 

or draped with a veil and often set aside in a special room. 

Korea’s only four-year civilian university is named after him

the four-year military university (see Higher Education, thi

Officer Corps Professional Education and Training, ch. 5). 

birthday (April 15) is celebrated as the most important nationa

day of the year. There is a photograph of Kim on the identifi

card that hangs from the neck of every North Korean. People a

required to bow down to all his portraits in public location

North Koreans have been known to take out the picture of Kim 

they carry and bow to it, sometimes ostentatiously, as when a 

Korean diplomat returns home from an overseas assignment. K

Sung is literally everywhere in North Korea. In P’yŏngyang

cannot walk 100 meters without encountering his likeness. 

Kim Il Sung’s tomb is also an indicator of the level of cult d

opment. Reconstruction of the Kŭmsusan Assembly Ha

P’yŏngyang started in 1995 and reportedly cost US$8.9 b

Referred to by foreign media as a “tomb palace,” the nearly 35

square-meter, five-story memorial houses Kim’s embalmed 

and a typical larger-than life statue of the deceased president. 

76 
 

200,000 people can assemble on the square in front of the 

Male visitors to the hall where Kim lies in view are required 

suits, and women are required to wear hanbok (traditiona

dress). The tomb is connected to the P’yŏngyang subway 

people-mover walkways, escalators, air purification system

matic shoe cleaners, and granite and marble construction thr

If this were not suffocating enough, there is the more psy

cally stifling pressure of how much Kim Il Sung is constant

minds of the North Korean people, not just forever in th

Beginning in nursery school, children memorize poems abo

early life and make up their own poems and drawings in his 

In later years, they act out stories of his life, and in middle 

school they memorize long passages from his teachings. Far

recite his writings about agriculture from memory; worke

other passages from his treatises on industry; women mem

words about the family; foreign affairs students memorize 

tures on chuch’e and other international subjects; and 

learns what it means to be “a Kim Il Sung man.” Every morn

hear the regime’s political message for the day taken fro

writings, and at weekly political meetings and self-critic

sions, they study these writings in much greater detail, b

and ending with patriotic songs glorifying Kim. The only 

and theater productions that they see are variations on the 

Kim’s life. Whether working or relaxing, Kim Il Sung is a

the forefront. 

The most distinguishing feature about North Korean soci

is the intensity of the Kim cult, not just its more extreme 

manifestations, but the hold that it has over the people’s m

feelings. North Korea is, above all else, the world’s most 

cult society with all the trappings of a nation-state. 

As members of a cult society, North Koreans are traine

think but to follow. They may be rational on most issues, bu

sitive issues touching on the cult or Kim’s life and teachin

are totally intransigent. Their unshakable faith in the corre

Kim’s teachings and confidence in his way of doing things

ing to chuch’e doctrine, can make them closed to negotia

resistant to compromise, even at the sacrifice of their own b

ests. The strong belief in the rightness of their cause and the

better times to come, which true believers often have and t

from, can see them through difficulties that nonbelievers m

weather as well. Some analysts consider that North Korea 

able to survive the natural calamities and adverse internatio

sure since the mid-1990s—which forecasters predicted wou
 

the nation to the point of national collapse—only because 

internal strength of a people bound together in an irrational bu

fying national cult. 

A Class Society 

Two phrases are likely to dominate any conversation with a 

Korean, regardless of the subject under discussion, just as they 

inate every aspect of life in North Korea. They are Kim Il 

sanga (Kim Il Sung’s thoughts) and sŏngbun (see Glossary), m

ing socioeconomic or class background. 

In North Korea, a person’s sŏngbun is either good or bad

detailed records are kept by KWP cadre and government se

officials of the degree of goodness or badness of everyone’s sŏn

The records are continually updated. It is easy for one’s sŏngbun 

downgraded for lack of ideological fervor, laziness, incompeten

for more serious reasons, such as marrying someone with 

sŏngbun, committing a crime, or simply being related to som

who commits an offense. It is very difficult to improve 

sŏngbun, however, particularly if the stigma derives from the p

olutionary class status or behavior of one’s parents or relatives. 

In the early days of the regime, sŏngbun records were sk

and some people survived by concealing the fact that their f

uncle, or grandfather had owned land or was a physician, mer

or lawyer. However, in the late 1960s, the state made a major 

to conduct exhaustive secret investigations of the background 

North Koreans. Periodically after that, additional investigations 

carried out by the public security apparatus whenever Kim Il 

had reason to believe there was opposition to his rule in a c

area of the country, town, or factory. 

During the Chosŏn Dynasty, four distinct Confucian-based 

strata developed: the scholar-officials (or nobility), the “middl

ple” (technicians and administrators subordinate to the schola

cials), the commoners (a large group comprising about 75 perc

the total population, including farmers, craftsmen, and merch

and the “despised” or base people at the bottom of society. To e

stability, the government devised a system of personal tallies k

the scholar-officials to identify people according to their status

Kim Il Sung borrowed heavily from this Confucian syste

upset the social hierarchy in a radical remaking of society, m

keeping with communist teachings and his personal experienc

guerrilla fighter. Because the only “good” people in the pre

period, in Kim’s view, were factory workers, laborers, and far

they and their descendants were accorded privileged status

78 
 

highest distinction went to the anti-Japanese guerrillas 

fought with him in Northeast China (Manchuria) prior to an

World War II, and then to veterans of the Korean War 

descendants. Next came the descendants of the prerevo

working people and the poor, small farmers. 

The regime also recognized the essential roles of intellec

professional workers in society. The symbolism of this is se

KWP’s insignia, which depicts a pen in the middle of the tr

socialist hammer and sickle to emphasize the relationship am

physical labor of workers and farmers and intellectual act

the well educated. Kim realized that an educated popula

skilled technicians were needed to rebuild the industrial b

had been established in North Korea during the Japanese 

period and destroyed during the Korean War. However, th

edgeable people Kim favored were not the precommunist pe

rati but rather educated technologists who were u

reconstruction and who were completely trustworthy and loy

regime. Education in the new Korea was supposed to remov

tinctions between intellectuals and the working class 

according to Charles K. Armstrong, “the political conversi

former and the intellectual uplifting of the latter.” 

Ranked below the former guerrillas, working people and 

and intellectuals, in descending order were—and still are—

distinct groups. The only touch of humor in this otherwis

business of ranking people according to their sŏngbun is th

nology some defectors say refers to the chosen versus the n

“tomatoes” versus “apples” versus “grapes.” Tomatoes, w

red to the core, are worthy communists; “apples,” which are 

on the surface, need ideological improvement; and “gra

hopeless. 

Based on their sŏngbun ranking, North Korea’s populatio

divided into three main groups. The preferred class, cons

some 10 to 15 percent of the population, is given every ad

Its members receive better schooling, including the poss

attending Kim Il Sung University, better jobs (in foreign affa

or in the military), better housing, better clothing, better 

more of it, and better medical care. The middle 40 to 50 p

the population—ordinary people—can hope for a lucky bre

as a good assignment in the military that will bring them to t

tion of KWP cades and may get them a better job afterward

no hope, however, of a college education or a professiona

And finally, there is the bottom 40 percent of the populat

“undesirables”—to whom all doors to advancement are clos
 

can expect little except assignment to a collective farm or fa

just like their parents. This group includes a high percenta

women, who generally do not have the military as a way to imp

ment and are usually assigned immediately after middle schoo

farm or to a factory job in the neighborhood in which they gre

For them, travel to another town or region is out of the question

In this total reorganization of society that Kim Il Sung wr

with amazing success, and relatively little terror compared 

wholesale purges of Stalin and Mao, today’s privileged, edu

class are the children of the precommunist working class, 

those discriminated against are the former privileged and edu

class and their descendants. Thus, North Korean leaders of K

Sung’s generation were not likely to have been educated b

middle school, and their children—the leaders of today who 

received a privileged education through college and a few th

university—are a first-generation elite, schooled in Kimilsun

with no family history of intellectual or professional achieve

untraveled and inexperienced in the ways of the world, owing e

thing to Kim Il Sung and his social revolution. 

In this respect, the society that Kim created represents a si

cant break from traditional Korean society, where the priv

class, the scholar-officials, were a meritocratic elite who gained 

positions through educational achievement. Talent was a nece

although not always a sufficient, prerequisite for getting into th

elite. Influential family connections also helped to obtain high 

cial positions but not to the same extent as in contemporary 

Korea. 

The new social system has created a tight, cohesive leade

bound not only by an intense loyalty to Kim Il Sung and Kim J

but also by lifetime bonds to one another. In North Korea, one 

in housing provided by a father’s work unit, grows up with ch

of other fathers who work with one’s father, goes to schoo

those children, takes vacations with them, and eventually go

work with them in the same career for the rest of one’s life. So

gists who contend that the complexity of an individual’s perso

derives from the number of social groups to which an indiv

belongs could only conclude that the personality of most 

Koreans is not that complex. They know fewer people in thei

times than the average person does in most other countries, an

people they know all share basically the same life experience 

same collective farm or factory or, in the case of the elite, 

same military ranks or foreign service or administrative work. 

80 
 

 

Another limiting feature of a class society based on sŏng

effect on the morale of the people, both the privileged and un

ileged. One source, a defector interviewed by this author 

had been given every advantage in life, schooled in the fines

including Kim Il Sung University, trained for the Ministry o

Affairs, and given overseas assignments. This defector, 

was preoccupied with the unfairness of a system that allo

friends, sons of higher-ranking party officials like his f

escape volunteer labor, vacation at seaside resorts, and obta

assignments abroad despite their poorer grades and oftenti

of motivation and hard work. It would seem that the system 

discontent at all levels, except perhaps at the very highe

Competent people constantly “find themselves working fo

who are their inferiors in knowledge and intelligence. T

incompetent people, trusted by the party because of th

sŏngbun, getting ahead while the more competent are bloc

advancement on account of their sŏngbun. People may be 

admired for their own worth despite their lower status in 

being held in good repute by others is no substitute for being 

politically reliable by the party.” 

In the final analysis, the system hurts more than just th

themselves. As one North Korean defector noted: “worke

good family background neglect their work but are still p

while workers with a poor family background do not w

because there is no hope for promotion.” Thus, among its ot

the sŏngbun system is, by its very nature, antithetical to the 

alization process, which prospers when people are promote

basis of merit, rather than class background or ideology. T

widening economic disparity between North Korea and Sou

would seem to bear this out. The economic boom of Sout

where much less importance is attached to class backgro

more emphasis is given to education and ability, has left Nor

far behind. In the North, where loyalty to Kim and a goo

background are all that matter, ideological considerations h

ously interfered with good economic policy, and the resu

been disastrous. 

In short, Kim Il Sung managed nothing less than the 

remaking of the social structure without the terror associa

Stalin’s and Mao’s creation of communist societies in th

Union and China, respectively. Kim’s success in effectin

mental social change was much greater than that of other co

regimes as a result of both the much smaller, more homo

population of North Korea, and also his particular skills
 

 

 

standard, he must be judged to have accomplished one of the 

successful and intensely coercive social engineering feats of m

times. 

The New Socialist Society 

Kim Il Sung’s vision of a new socialist North Korean s

developed from ideas that influenced him during his 15 years 

China’s communists and later with Soviet military units in the 

and 1940s. The idea of centering life, including the provisi

social services, around an individual’s basic work or school un

a revolutionary break with traditional Confucian thinking, 

envisioned society as a great family living in perfect harmony

each individual family being the primary social unit. 

Many observers in the late 1940s and 1950s believed tha

and his cohorts were out to destroy family life. There is enoug

dence to convince some that the family is no longer the basic 

unit of North Korea, that it has been supplanted by the work 

which controls virtually every aspect of an individual’s life. 

ever, the family has proved remarkably resilient in North Kor

in China and the republics of the former Soviet Union. It may b

the family never really was as threatened as many Western obs

thought, because it is not at all clear that Kim intended to d

family ties in his remaking of society. He seems to have plann

reinforce the bonds of family while constructing a new so

command structure that would better ensure his control over 

aspect of the people’s lives, thinking perhaps that the two were 

conflict. The family remains strong in North Korea, despite the 

cal changes introduced by Kim Il Sung that limit the time that f

members spend together. 

The Work Unit as the Basic Social Unit 

In North Korea, everyone over the age of six is a member of 

sort of a unit outside the family. It can be the school one attend

factory, collective farm, or government office where one works; 

military unit to which one is assigned. The unit provides housi

well as food, clothing, and medical care. Normally, it is the fa

work unit that provides housing for his family. Thus, wives and 

dren do not usually live with the people they work with or go to s

with, although some students, mainly those in college or at K

Sung University, live on campus. With the exception of dom

chores, women and children perform all their daily tasks with 

work or school unit. 

82 
 

 

People apply to the unit for permission to travel, to stay a

town hotels, or to eat at public restaurants. It is the unit th

rizes vacation time and arranges for one’s stay at governmen

vacation retreats. The individual must apply to the unit for 

sion to see a doctor or have an operation. If a person h

enough money to buy a watch, bicycle, or other major c

good, he or she must first get the unit’s permission to make 

chase. He or she must also get its approval to marry. Fin

with fellow unit members that a person attends all party m

militia training, self-criticism sessions, morning and eveni

sessions, and cultural events, such as concerts and museu

and social events, such as movies and dances and day trips 

birthplace at Man’gyŏngdae or tourist sites in P’yŏngyang. 

that a person can be tied to the same unit for years, sometim

lifetime, suggests the importance of personal relationships 

ers in the unit. It is easy to imagine the frustrations and unh

that people endure when those relations are not good and th

hope of changing work units. The leader of the unit has 

hold over a person than his or her spouse or parent when it 

the everyday decisions discussed above, including some of 

important decisions of a lifetime, such as whom one will m

also easy to see how the regime can control nearly every as

person’s life through the leader of his or her work unit, the in

who makes almost every decision affecting the lives of the p

that unit. 

The totalitarian regime came into being with the divisio

population into these socialist work units, a feat that Kim 

accomplished soon after coming to power in 1946 with vir

resistance and no use of force. This charismatic leader, who 

traditional Confucian beliefs in filial piety, love of family, an

to the state, disarmed many people. They were not well 

about communist doctrine and social organization. 

The grouping of people into work units applies to all North 

from the age of six to 60 (for women) or 65 (for men), when 

retire. Thus, unless husbands and wives belong to the sa

unit—a common occurrence—they do not share many of th

ences that families in other countries normally share. Nor do 

as much with their children as parents in other countries. For 

children visit Kim’s birthplace and museums in P’yŏngyang 

ings arranged by their schools. They go to the theater and 

with their classmates. Meanwhile, their parents go to the

events, at different times, in the company of fellow member

work units. Tickets are distributed to members of a work 
 

 

group; they are not given separately to individuals or families at 

of their choosing. Thus, although family members may be expo

many of the same experiences, they do not share these exper

with their parents or siblings. 

Parents are much less directly involved than Western pare

other aspects of their children’s upbringing, such as their edu

and medical care. Family vacations are very rare. Children see 

sicians assigned to their school; parents consult physicians ass

to their work units. School authorities, working with local party 

cials, arrange the volunteer labor schedules of students during 

tion times, with little or no coordination with parents’ volu

labor schedules. Teachers accompany students to collective f

where they help with rice transplanting and rice harvesting; p

are likely to be assigned to different collective farms for the sa

different two-week stints of volunteer labor. 

The only time that parents and children are regularly tog

after 7:30 to 8:30 AM and before 10:00 or 10:30 PM is on Sunda

one family day in North Korea. Generally, families spend th

together at home, most often doing household chores or re

They may go for a walk in the park or visit an amusement cen

the zoo. Often one sees fathers out with their children on S

afternoons, while mothers are at home catching up on the w

laundry and cleaning. The more affluent might eat Sunday din

a local restaurant as a special treat, not a common occurrence, 

thing they would probably do no more than a few times each 

There is a simple joy in being at home together as a family. En

in work, study sessions, self-criticism sessions, militia training

other activities for most of their waking hours, six days a 

North Koreans long for leisure moments at home with their fam

Women, especially those in the cities, are reported to espe

resent the activities that keep them away from home in the eve

and separated from their children most of the week. 

There is much in this description of family life in North Ko

suggest that the family is no longer the basic social unit of so

that it has been supplanted by the work unit, which controls n

every aspect of an individual’s life. At the same time, one of th

tinguishing features about the North Korean leadership has be

strong familial aspects, including Kim Il Sung’s blatant nepoti

giving his relatives high party and government posts and his 

more extraordinary and eventually successful efforts in prom

his son as his successor, a Confucian rather than communist pra

Kim’s sense of family was always central to his life and leade

North Korean propaganda constantly stresses the importance 

84 
 

 

family. Concerned that separating babies of only a few m

age from their working mothers and putting them in daytim

ies—a practical solution to the pressing need to keep wom

workforce—might be interpreted as a move against the fam

cials have been at pains to deny any such intention. 

Some observers have suggested that the Kim cult, with K

father figure, was meant to substitute for a sense of family

all North Koreans belonging to one big family, an old C

idea. Both Kim regimes have placed similarly high value 

tional ideas of close familial bonds together with loyalty to 

In short, Kim Il Sung does not appear to have viewed 

unit and family as competing social units. As he envisag

work unit was the best way of providing equal services to t

lation and getting equal work from the people, a commun

that appealed to him. He probably did not see that goal as 

ing the strong Korean sense of family, even though in p

would mean much less time for the family to be together and 

loss in the family’s control over decision making. One can 

that family life and the prerogatives of the family have suf

the dismay of the people. But whatever discontent this ha

has certainly not lessened the people’s strong feelings of fa

may actually have fostered closer family ties as the one 

against the state’s total control over people’s lives. If the 

not the main social unit of current-day North Korean life, 

people’s primary love and refuge. 

A Thought-Controlled Society 

Childhood may be the only happy time in North Korea b

reality of life in a thought-controlled, totalitarian society 

The KWP’s control over every aspect of a person’s life ass

in gradual steps, starting with membership in the Young 

Corps, then the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League (see G

and finally, for those who pass the test, the Korean Worke

(see Mass Organizations, ch. 4). 

The one day that seems to stand out as the most excitin

childhood is the day a boy or girl becomes a Young Pioneer 

the ages of nine and 11. It marks the only gala celebrat

child’s life up to that point, because birthdays are not cele

any special way. Children receive the Young Pioneer red sca

buttons at a ceremony held at school and attended by their 

usually on a national holiday such as Kim Il Sung’s birthd

15), Army Day (April 25), or National Day (September 9). E

Young Pioneer receives presents from the family, such as a 
 

 

 

 

 

notebook, or school bag. These were the only gift-wrapped pr

that one North Korean defector ever remembered receiving. 

There are about 3 million Young Pioneers in North Korea. 

can be seen everywhere in P’yŏngyang and other cities marchin

by two in orderly fashion, usually singing, with the yellow ep

on their bright blue uniforms and red scarves tied around their n

They receive two hours of ideological training every day and 

full day of volunteer labor on Saturdays. These commitmen

nothing compared to later demands on their time, when they be

members of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League between th

of 14 and 16. 

The political pressures of the adult world begin to engulf te

ers when they are 14 to 16 years old. If any one event can be si

out as marking the end of childhood, it is entry into the Kim Il 

Socialist Youth League, which brings tremendous new pressu

conform, endless new requirements for work, study, self-crit

dedication, and service to the state. The symbolism involved i

ing up one’s bright red Young Pioneer scarf in exchange fo

much more somber league button seems to capture the mood ex

Entrance to the league is by examination, but it is not dif

and almost everyone eventually passes it by the time he or she 

years old. There is no family celebration when a child join

league, unlike entry into the Young Pioneer Corps. There is sim

meeting at school attended by the students and their teachers b

their families. Not knowing the changes that are in store for 

the new league members have no real sense of the significance 

event. Only when they look back, defectors say, can they appr

entry into the league as the watershed in life that it really is. 

Having by then completed primary school and moved on to 

dle school, most North Koreans have had a chance to observ

workings of sŏngbun in society. They have gained some insigh

their own standing in the rigidly class-conscious society. A

point, some begin a lifetime of adjustment to the unhappy f

having been born with bad sŏngbun and thereby deprived o

chance of great success in life, while others begin to relax 

comfortable feeling of having been lucky enough to be born 

good sŏngbun. 

Volunteer Labor 

Everyone in North Korea older than 16 years of age is requi

perform volunteer labor for the state. One of the criteria for 

membership is the amount of volunteer labor one has done 

member of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League. There is a

pressure—throughout life—to do more than is required. 

86 
 

The USS Pueblo, now a tourist attraction on the Taedong River in P

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), July 

Visitors to P’yŏngyang in the 1970s used to commen

amazing construction activity late at night. They described h

struction sites of several city blocks in size, swarming w

sands of workers, poorly dressed, laboring for long hours 

night, the whole scene illuminated by a series of light bulb

up above. They understandably, but incorrectly, assumed t

were regular construction workers on the night shift, thei

clothes and wan appearance suggesting their poor standard 

In fact, as defectors later revealed, these were middle-sc

college students, unused to hard labor and wearing the

clothes, performing their stint of volunteer labor. Apparen

was a certain excitement about this kind of nighttime con

project in P’yŏngyang. Students enjoyed seeing friends wh

had not met for awhile. There was a kind of camaraderie a

de corps. Girls and boys were both there, so there was som

a party atmosphere. Students got extra credit for night v

labor, which improved the chances of their being accepted 

party. The work was not strenuous and required no special s

Certain projects are known to have been constructed by 

rather than adult volunteers, who generally are recruited f

projects. For instance, students, bused in for construction w

ing school vacations, built a new highway between Kaes

Sinŭiju (see Special Economic Zones, ch. 3). It is more usua

dent volunteer laborers to do most of the road repairs or ex
 

 

for new roads in North Korea, as distinct from road construct

more technically complex work. Students played a major role 

construction of three national monuments dedicated to Kim Il 

on his seventieth birthday on April 15, 1982, and were repor

have been “inspired” by the thought of donating their labor to 

projects. 

Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League officials are responsib

organizing student volunteer labor. They are told the numb

laborers needed for each project, and they see to it that all stude

their jurisdiction are assigned on an equitable basis. 

Most volunteer labor is not as much fun as student proje

P’yŏngyang. People quickly tire of it, and after many years p

become jaded about it. One defector described the volunteer lab

performed as a student in P’yŏngyang. He helped move heavy e

ment on the roads, polished stone floors in newly constructed 

ings, cleaned up after renovations, helped with the constructio

swimming pool, and helped farmers transplant rice in the sprin

then harvest it in the late summer. 

Almost all North Korean students in upper-middle school

school, and college, as well as many adults, including memb

military units, help with the spring planting and fall har

Schools are essentially closed during these periods, as are 

offices and factories. People seem to dislike work on the farms 

of all. Volunteer laborers camp out on the front porch of far

homes in crowded conditions. They generally receive inade

food, certainly less than they are used to getting, and farmers 

difficult to put up with the people living temporarily in and a

their homes. Sometimes the tension escalates into skirmishes. 

Students are required to give 30 to 40 days of volunteer labo

ing the spring rice transplanting season, 15 to 20 days during th

vest, and an unspecified number of days during the monsoon s

to repair flood damage. Additionally, they must perform other 

of volunteer labor during their summer vacation, during winter 

in December, and on school afternoons, including Saturday. Th

easily add up to more than 150 days a year. In crises, su

droughts or floods, which were commonplace during North K

difficult years in the mid-1990s, students are mobilized for inde

periods, putting in more than the average 150 days of work per 

Young men, who normally participate in a 60-day military tra

program during the summer, are exempt from volunteer labor 

time, but female students do volunteer labor during their su

break. All this adds to an incredible amount of volunteer lab

student per year. None of it is paid for, of course, so it is probab

accurately reflected in state statistics on national income. 

88 
 

According to defectors, most students probably would n

to volunteer labor if they did not have to do so much of it, e

so much rice transplanting. They all say there is too much w

it takes too much time from studying. But they seem to acce

teer labor as part of life. They only resent being asked to 

much and the unending pressure to give more. While the w

may not be so bad, the pressure to do more is “unrelenting.” 

Political Study Sessions 

In addition to obligatory volunteer labor, North Korean 

and adults must participate in political study sessions thre

times a week and self-criticism meetings once a week. St

sions are separate from academic studies, although the la

include a strong ideological content. Generally, study sessio

on contemporary issues and events. They may be devoted t

est editorial in the party newspaper, Nodong Shinmun (

Daily), the party line on the current economic situation, ne

tives from Kim Jong Il, or distilled current events in Sou

and other countries. There is continual study of Kim Il Su

and teachings, much of it repeating what students are t

school. By the time they have graduated from college, most 

have read all of Kim’s works and have taken detailed notes 

Self-Criticism Meetings 

Some of the most difficult moments of a person’s life 

Korea are spent in self-criticism meetings, which begin wit

the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League and continue until l

In the 1960s, these meetings were held monthly, but in 

1970s Kim Jong Il is reported to have advised his father, 

his own experience as a student, to make these meeting

instead of monthly and of shorter duration and to sanction 

of less serious offenses, such as smoking and staying up to

as to lessen the pressure that built up between monthly m

Apparently, the pressure is somewhat less under the new 

although people dread these meetings. 

Each school and work unit sets aside a particular afte

evening every week for criticism meetings, which consis

self-criticism and criticism of others. According to a reliab

who endured many such sessions, it is a “terrifying thing to 

in front of others and be criticized” and almost as upsetti

under constant pressure to criticize others. People are encou

keep a notebook and write down all the things that they 
 

friends and neighbors have done wrong during the week. The

these notes as talking points in the criticism sessions. 

There is a knack to surviving these sessions with minimum 

ger and minimum psychological stress. The knack is to join 

with friends and agree ahead of time on whom to criticize th

and for what. That person is not surprised, then, by the critici

friends and is prepared to respond. The individual also learn

safer things to criticize and how to turn the discussion quic

Kim’s teachings on that subject. For instance, in criticizing o

or others for staying up late, it is important to explain that 

behavior not only makes one lazy and sleepy the next day but i

gestive of a bourgeois attitude. Then the wrongdoer can go on t

Kim’s warning against other kinds of bourgeois behavior, defl

the focus of the criticism from his or her own transgression 

broader discussion of bourgeois behavior. The trick is in m

oneself and others seem guilty but not dangerously so and, 

process, to score points by citing Kim Il Sung constantly. 

According to Kim Jong Il’s directives, everyone is suppo

speak at each meeting, either in self-criticism or in criticism o

ers, but this does not always happen owing to lack of time. The 

sure mounts for anyone left out to speak at the next me

Sometimes, self-criticism sessions can get very tense, especi

political subjects are discussed. One student remembered a 

who never again spoke to another student who criticized h

length for skipping a political class. 

By all accounts, criticism meetings are among the most dr

moments of the week. As a way of blocking out the fear, one st

said he never really listened during the meetings. His mind 

always on other things. “Nothing [he] heard would have ch

[his] mind about anyone anyway,” knowing it all to be so fake. 

So long as these sessions focus on basically unimportant beh

they are not in themselves threatening. What is important 

regime is the behavior that people are persuaded to avoid for f

being discovered and criticized. In this sense, criticism meetin

a very effective instrument of control. What keeps North Kore

line is the knowledge that they are always being watche

reported on by their friends and neighbors, as well as securit

sonnel. Criticism sessions establish that Orwellian climate o

stant watchfulness in conditioning North Koreans, even as y

students, to notice their fellow students and report on their beh

According to those who have lived in the system for years

cism meetings have the effect of encouraging some of the 

human traits: a disregard for others’ feelings, a willingness t

90 
 

 

others to further one’s own career, disloyalty, lying, moral 

ity, and a super-critical attitude toward others. Remembe

these sessions begin when a student is only 14 to 16 years 

can appreciate that young people are subjected to social and 

pressures far beyond their capacity to handle. The maturi

called for in walking the thin line between overzealous cri

others, with the risk of losing friends, and a lackadaisical 

with the threat of party censure, is beyond the skill of most p

this age. Small wonder that childhood in North Korea ends 

with league membership and consequent exposure to th

business of self-criticism sessions. 

The Elite Life in P’yŏngyang 

The inequality of life under the sŏngbun system coul

more dramatically illustrated than in Kim Il Sung’s bu

“dream city” for the privileged elite that is off-limits to the r

population. In no other country is there such a striking d

between living in one city and living anyplace else in t

country. 

P’yŏngyang was reduced to rubble during the Korean W

then it has been rebuilt according to a design personally app

Kim Il Sung. The streets, laid out in a north–south, east–w

give a well-ordered appearance, and its public buildings, whi

a grand scale, make it a monumental city. The elegant decor o

lic buildings features terraced landscaping, illuminated foun

statues, marble floors, high sculptured ceilings, mosaic wal

tions, plush red carpeting and oriental rugs, and exquisite 

crystal chandeliers. 

North Korea’s showcase capital of P’yŏngyang is not only 

of the rest of the county but atypical of East Asia in general. T

ral beauty of its parks and rivers, the grandeur of its public 

and its wide, tree-lined avenues—all sparkling clean—and th

control of the chosen few living there, creates an impression 

cious, uncrowded Asian city. P’yŏngyang has been describe

eign visitors as one of the most beautiful cities they have eve

winter, with snow on the ground, they have noted an eeri

beauty somewhat suggestive of a Siberian city with its Russ

architecture relieved by more modern buildings of gracefu

design. In the spring and summer, one’s impression is of flow

low trees, parkland, and rivers. Despite all this natural beauty, 

most foreigners as silent, remote, and unlike the vibrancy a

ness of most other Asian cities. Its grandeur and attractivene

accompanied by what one would most expect to find in the ca
 

 

country: a large population going about its business in a spontan

unprogrammed way. In P’yŏngyang everything is planned, 

spontaneous. Its chosen population consists of the super

leged—few in number and privileged beyond the ordinary 

Korean’s wildest imagination—who enjoy the “good life” by 

Korean standards but the worst life, in world opinion, in terms of 

human rights. 

A priority of Kim’s in designing his dream city was to lim

size of its population. According to defectors, everyone wants t

in P’yŏngyang. There would be a mass movement of people in

city, were it not for the tight controls, with guards at every entr

registration required of all residents. To maintain its orderly, u

tered appearance, bicycles and trucks are forbidden in major sec

There are no privately owned vehicles, so the only automobil

those belonging to the government for official use. People trav

bus, trolley, or subway (see Transportation, ch. 3). The mere 

tence of a subway in P’yŏngyang, much less one with elabora

mosaics and crystal chandeliers, seems surreal in a country 

most people walk to and from work and only the fortunate are 

to their factories. 

In most of North Korea, men and women go to bathhouses 

atively primitive design two or three times a month. In P’yŏng

the privileged go to the Health and Recreation Center, open 

days a week, featuring a showcase gym, huge indoor swim

pool, and elaborate sauna facilities. They have the most modern 

pital facilities, unheard of anywhere else in North Korea

P’yŏngyang Maternity Hospital has a closed-circuit television 

tem that allows visitors to talk with patients and see newborn b

in the nursery. A showcase nursery school, which caters to the 

and daughters of Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, has a h

swimming pool, a fancy merry-go-round, an electric train, and 

of expensive tricycles. None of the other 60,000 childcare an

dergarten facilities in the country are equipped in such a way. 

10,000 privileged children, ages eight to 16, go to the P’yŏn

Children’s Palace, a huge complex of four buildings containing 

than 500 rooms, with an assembly hall seating 1,200. The Chil

Palace offers courses in music, dance, martial arts, science, me

ics, gymnastics, painting, and sculpture, as well as an assortm

sports activities. One Westerner observed that the three grand p

in one room would have been “unavailable to any student 

country without a master’s degree in pianoforte.” Most foreign 

tors are genuinely impressed with the technical proficiency 

students studying ballet and violin. In the evening, these youn

92 
Propaganda poster showing 

representatives of the army, 

industry, women, and intellectuals. 

In the background is the national 

seal of the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea. The caption 

reads: “Let us sacrifice for our 

fatherland as a citizen armed with 

strong consciousness.” 

Courtesy Chosŏn Yaesul 

(P’yŏngyang), January 2003, 47 

put on musical shows for foreign visitors, such as the one U

retary of State Madeleine Albright attended in 2000. A p

staff of 500 full-time teachers and l,000 part-time teachers d

activities at the Children’s Palace. 

North Korea’s concept of an after-school center for extr

lar activities was modeled on an expanded version of th

experience. Kim Il Sung was especially proud of the Childr

ace. He used to visit it three or four times a year. He was the

opening of the first elevator installed in a North Korean bui

The North Koreans instituted a novel system for ensuring 

privileged always enjoy the most modern conveniences. P

constantly moved in and out of apartments in P’yŏngyang 

ones are built. Because apartment buildings are occupied b

working in the same office—in P’yŏngyang most likely a 

ment ministry—they can be moved as a group. There is n

tion of social ties, as one’s neighbors move on together int

higher-standard apartment building. 

For North Koreans who have seen P’yŏngyang rebuilt 

ashes of the Korean War, there is genuine pride in the glo

city. Kim Il Sung himself took great personal pride in P’y

He considered it his “own creation,” his “personal child.” 

well aware of the importance of morale in a war-torn countr

is reported to have designed it “to enhance the ego and mora
 

whole nation.” He loved the city and once said he would neve

its destruction. It is truly a dream city, in the sense that more th

percent of North Korea’s population can only dream of living 

city of 2.9 million. Only the very apex of North Korean s

enjoys its incomparable amenities. 

The Privileged Life Beyond Money 

In an effort to create the impression of a classless societ

North Korean government likes to cite statistics on income to 

port its contention of great equality. However, money is not a 

measure of privilege in North Korea, nor are the rationing syst

any of the established rules and regulations. The system of pri

operates outside the established system of wages and rations an

normal distribution of goods and services. 

Salary levels are particularly deceptive. The highest paid c

ministers, who earn around 250 wŏn (for value of the wŏn

Glossary) per month, and professors at Kim Il Sung Universit

top artists and musicians, who earn around 200 wŏn a mont

paid only three to four times the wage of the average North K

factory worker, who earns 60 to 90 wŏn per month. However, 

net ministers and other high-ranking officials receive many 

benefits. They are entitled to free high-quality cigarettes, w

clothes, and leather shoes. Ordinary citizens would not have a

to special shops where these and other items, such as beef, 

wine, liquor, candy, eggs, and anchovies, can be purchased a

count prices. There are different shops for different levels 

hierarchy so that people are not aware of what is available to o

On important national occasions, high-level officials are 

special gifts, such as imported color televisions, fountain pen

wristwatches. They go to private showings of Western movie

have access to Western magazines and books, banned for ord

North Koreans. They live in exclusive apartment buildings wit

vators (instead of long walk-up stairways on the outside of the 

ing) and have a living room, separate dining room, ki

bathroom, and two to four bedrooms. Their apartments are furn

with a color television, refrigerator, sewing machine, electri

and, in some cases, air conditioning, all of which are beyon

hope of the average citizen. Such officials are driven to wo

chauffeured limousines. 

The elite have other special services at their disposal, incl

prestigious medical facilities that dispense rare and expensive 

cines, all free of charge. Most North Koreans would not ev

aware of the existence of these medical clinics. There are s

94 
 

clubs for the elite that include bowling alleys and tennis co

nis being a game that most North Koreans have never seen

the luxurious government-owned retreats tucked away fro

view, there are resorts on the beach at Wŏnsan and hillside 

the mountains along the east coast that are sometimes used 

ing foreign dignitaries but otherwise are reserved for top p

government leaders. 

Unlike his father, who spent the first half of his life as a 

fighter in harsh conditions and who seemed to retain a tast

simpler life, Kim Jong Il has been raised amidst privilege, g

best available education, finest clothes, good food, luxury 

biles, lavish vacation homes with swimming pools, tennis, 

horseback riding, and Western movies, of which he is a con

In P’yŏngyang he presumably lives in the large presidential 

that was built for his father in the late l970s. The house is re

be a three-story building with a five-story presidential hall a

arate three-story conference and museum building. The com

a moat on two sides and formal gardens and lawns, is set b

the street, cordoned off from normal traffic, and obscured fr

lic view. No foreigner is known to have been taken there. 

The average North Korean has no idea how Kim and h

live. The rarified lifestyle and hidden wealth are known on

privileged few. The system has promoted an elitism that is 

antithesis of the communist notion of egalitarianism. 

There is one area in which the elite have no special p

political freedom. As a person rises through the ranks to the 

ership, more, rather than less, is expected in terms of politi

sance to the Kim cult. As the individual has more to lose 

from power, he or she is naturally disinclined to jeopardize 

by a less than fulsome show of fidelity. Thus, one finds 

exaggerated worship of the cult at the upper levels of the 

ment. The ambassador in an embassy is likely to be the mo

cal observer of the cult. Such fidelity may not be his true fee

it is the price of survival. He is likely to set the example in 

long hours of studying Kim’s teachings and participation in 

sessions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel are routinely 

home for a month’s political reindoctrination every two yea

privileged status brings them no respite from constant poli

veillance. No one escapes that. 

Daily Life 

Most North Koreans have no means of acquiring the pre

of privilege. They might have access to a television, refriger
 

 

sewing machine in communal rooms in their factories or coope

farms. A lucky few might have a wristwatch or a bicycle tha

won as a result of an economic competition within their facto

office. Whatever their income, they are unable to buy more 

their allotment of basic foodstuffs, such as rice, corn, and sug

of which are rationed. And, in contrast to the privileged, wh

their allotment of food grains in rice, ordinary citizens get a m

of rice and other grains. 

Certain benefits come without charge. Typical housing fo

ordinary North Korean family is provided free of charge by the 

unit. It consists of a living-dining room, one bedroom, a kitche

shared toilet facilities, regardless of the size of the family. Edu

and medical care also are free, but there is a significant diffe

between the medical and educational services provided for the 

leged and nonprivileged. Access to automobiles and vacation re

and exemption from volunteer labor are out of the question f

majority. Finally, and most importantly, the intangibles in life a

a matter of free choice. Ordinary citizens have no choice wher

live, what job they do, where they can travel, or what they mig

willing to give up to send their children to college. 

Wages are a particularly misleading measure of equality in 

Korea, appearing to indicate that the elite live only twice as w

ordinary North Korean working people and about three or four 

as well as the lowest-paid unskilled workers. There is a salary 

for each category of wage earners depending on the size and lo

of a factory, the nature of a person’s job within the factory, an

seniority of an individual worker. A work-team rating system f

adjusts wages on the basis of performance. Workers can be rew

or penalized for such things as the care they take of equipmen

quality of their work, their initiative in solving production prob

and their safety record. The wage structure is basically modeled 

that of the Soviet Union with a few adjustments. 

Wages have no bearing on food consumption, basic wor

school clothes, and other essential consumer goods that are disp

through the government distribution system. Nor do they dete

the level and kind of education and medical care, which are pro

free of charge by the work or school unit in keeping wit

sŏngbun system. Salaries can be thought of as something of a 

between wages as known in most of the world and children’s a

ances, which are given for extra expenditures above and b

basic housing, food, clothing, education, and medical care pro

by parents. North Koreans can spend their wages on extra 

clothing, cigarettes, haircuts, cosmetics, entertainment (dinne

96 
 

 

restaurant or the movies), or occasionally the purchase of 

item such as a wristwatch or bicycle, but only with permiss

the work unit. 

The limited role of money in the economy is reflected in 

tortion between wages and prices, especially the price of n

tial goods that the regime wants to limit. A nylon sweater 

pairs of nylon stockings, considered nonessential luxury it

priced at the average North Korean’s monthly salary. The 

daily wage of 2.5 wŏn would not cover the cost of one kil

peanuts, one meter of nylon cloth, one pair of nylon socks, 

of nylon stockings. It could buy one meter of cotton cloth

brush and toothpaste, one private bath in a bathhouse and 

soap, a haircut and styling, or a set of table tennis paddles a

There is simply no way that an average family could ever 

save enough to buy a refrigerator (selling for 300 to 400 w

black-and-white television (300 to 700 wŏn). 

Until the late 1990s, one of the distinguishing feature

North Korean economy was the uniformity of prices o

throughout the country, the similarity of goods and services 

in urban and rural areas, and the provision of similar shoppi

ties in different areas, in keeping with Kim Il Sung’s intentio

vide a basic equality in the system, with allowances for the 

the top but with enforced uniformity for all others. Kim used 

that “any item sold in a North Korean ‘daily necessity’ sto

be bought in the most remote area at the same price as in a

place.” Since the famine of the mid-1990s, the emergence 

regime’s blessing) of local free markets outside the gove

public distribution system has brought some disparity 

throughout the country determined by economic forces o

and demand in different locales. However, the regime con

assert control over the distribution of more goods, especially 

agricultural production had somewhat improved. 

Neighborhoods 

In building his new socialist society after the war, Kim w

enced by the Swedish experience of self-sufficient urban n

hoods. For every block of living quarters for 5,000 

inhabitants (administered as a unit called a dong), he cre

same array of shops, typically on the first floor of a high-ri

ment building, including a food store supplying rice, ve

fish, and other foodstuffs and a barbershop, beauty parlo

public bathhouse, shoe-repair shop, fuel-supply depot, bra

office, medical clinic, children’s nursery school, and libra
 

 

 

 

 

which are run by the dong administrative committee. In rural 

where there are fewer inhabitants, the same group of stores i

vided for each county, the population of which would also be 

5,000 to 6,000 people. Wherever one travels in North Korea, in

ing P’yŏngyang, one sees this same grouping of stores that Kim 

sidered essential to everyday living. 

The residents of each urban dong or each rural county (g

kun) are expected, indeed forced, to shop in their neighbo

stores. They are registered to shop there and no place else. The

not redeem their rice rations elsewhere. Each store can track th

chases of its registered customers; there is no need for coupon

family is going out to dinner at a restaurant, the neighborhood 

can authorize the restaurant’s purchase of so many grams of ric

deduct that amount from the family’s running account. 

Kim’s neighborhood concept contributes to the overwhe

sense of uniformity about the country. Just as every place h

same prefabricated dining halls at factories, schools, and m

installations, one sees the same group of stores, often in the 

layout. The people are all exposed to essentially the same sho

experience, although in the larger cities there also are books

photographic studios, flower shops, music stores, optical s

sports equipment stores, and even pet stores for those who can 

them. 

Consumer Goods and Services 

In organizing North Korean society on a self-sufficient neig

hood concept, Kim avoided some of the commuting problems en

tered by Soviet consumers who used to complain of having to 

long distances to shop. The difficulty associated with shopp

North Korea is occasioned by the fact that everyone shops at the 

times: on the way home from work or during the midday break. 

are no other times to shop because almost everyone is at wo

attending school. Visitors to North Korea all attest to the emptin

stores during the day except during these rush hours. North Ko

also must shop every day. Without refrigeration, most people ha

means of keeping food fresh, especially in summer. 

The regime has controlled the consumption of consumer 

and services through the rationing of basic foodstuffs, the dire

tribution of essential work and school clothes, and tight contro

the distribution of all other goods (including extra clothing and 

tional foods, basic necessities such as haircuts and bathing ser

and nonessential items such as wristwatches and bicycles) thro

system of artificially low wages and artificially high prices. 

98 
Newly built traditional-style rural houses, Chagang 

Courtesy Kŭmsukangsan (P’yŏngyang), Jun

the price of basic necessities such as haircuts, public baths

fares, school supplies, and home fuel (wood and coal) is r

low, luxury items such as wool, finished clothing, electric

ances, and imported items are priced exorbitantly, well a

reach of most workers. 

Diet 

The system has effectively limited food consumption an

process had a significant impact on the birthrate. Most peop

cannot afford to have more than two children, even with bot

working. The average number of children per family, acco

2007 estimates, is two, low for an Asian country. 

Kim envisaged the consumption of food based on th

required to do a job rather than the prestige of the job. Thu

son’s allotment of food grains does not necessarily parallel h

wages. Miners and ocean fishermen and others doing hea

including the military, are allotted more grain than governm

party officials engaged in less strenuous physical activitie

ever, the privileged among the latter receive their grain allo

rice rather than a combination of food grains and are pai

wages, enabling them to buy more food and other consum

shop at special stores with discounted prices for luxury i

available elsewhere, and receive a plethora of nonmonetary 

including better housing, better medical care, and higher ed
The kind of rice—polished or unpolished—a North Kore

allotted under this system also is very important. North Ko

have a definite preference for rice over corn, barley, or wheat. 

high government and party officials enjoy polished rice. A c

minister who receives 700 grams of grain in the form of po

rice is considered much more favored than a blast-furnace op

who receives 900 grams of grain per day as 50 percent unpo

rice, 40 percent corn, and 10 percent wheat flour. Rations for 

dren are considered generous compared to rations for adults. T

family consisting of adults only is generally less well off in ter

rationed food. It is a common occurrence for childless househo

be short of grain well before the end of the month. 

North Korean families receive grain rations only for members 

immediate family. When they have visiting guests or relatives or a 

ding or funeral, they must ask their guests to bring their own rice r

The basic diet for most North Koreans is rice and veget

three times a day, with fruit occasionally (when in season), ch

two or three times a month, and red meat five or six times a 

Heavy on carbohydrates, low in fats, proteins, vitamins, and m

als, it is not a balanced or varied diet. According to defector

monotony of the same meal, three times a day, for long period

major source of dissatisfaction. Moreover, chronic malnutritio

serious problem, as 27 percent of the population lives at or belo

absolute poverty level. 

After enjoying a steady improvement in their diet from th

1950s through the 1970s, North Korean consumers must have 

disappointed with the lack of progress in the 1980s through the 

1990s. A dramatic improvement in food supplies in the late 

had engendered high hopes for continued progress. Instead, 

were dashed by an actual decline in rice allotments, both in rur

urban areas, continued shortages of fresh fruits, meats (except 

try), fish, kimchi, cooking oils, cigarettes, and liquor. Accord

defectors, the decline in rice allotments was a major source of d

isfaction. However, the worst was yet to come. 

A Society in Crisis 

North Korea’s economy received a severe jolt with the colla

the Soviet Union in 1991 and the cut-off of Soviet exports of o

food at “friendship” (subsidized) prices. This shock led to the c

of factories and coal mines and resulted in power shortages. 

there was a decrease in Chinese exports of food, fertilizer, oi

coking coal because of China’s economic reforms. North Korea’

cultural production began to decline just as food imports also 

100 
declining. Because of its inhospitable environment for crop 

tion, the country had developed an agriculture that was high

dent on a range of industrial inputs, particularly chemical f

insecticides, and electrically powered irrigation systems. 

The government’s public distribution system was begi

fail as early as 1991; by 1994 it had totally collapsed in som

ties (see Reform of the Public Distribution System, ch. 3

problems were temporarily overshadowed in July 1994 by t

pected death of Kim Il Sung, which left an exhausted popul

tually paralyzed in a state of deep mourning. Then the cou

hit by devastating floods, droughts, and famine in the m

(see Causes of the Famine; Effects of the Famine, ch. 3). 

The famine took its greatest toll on such vulnerable group

dren and the elderly. Older people reportedly were choosing 

so that others in their family might survive. The entire facul

school, except for two professors, was reported to have 

Nineteen percent of one urban area reportedly died. The 

harsh response to the crisis was to perform triage in cities in 

and east and to let the general population fend for itself. Pr

ally high numbers of people died there. Starving North Kore

told to stay inside when foreign humanitarian workers were 

so that the outside world would not know the extent of the d

A major change in North Korean society can be trace

tragic events of the mid-1990s. People, already worn out an

ened, became seriously demoralized, traumatized by h

decide which children to feed over others, and depressed 

many deaths in a family and in the country at large. Regim

ganda was replaced by a new brutality over the population a

in the people’s minds with the ascent to power in 1994 of K

Il. The government distribution system continued to co

farmers’ markets, operating on their own, diverted food from 

channels in establishing the first glimmers of an unregula

mercial system. Out of necessity, households were forced to 

larger share of their food from the new outlets, either farm

kets or general markets in the cities or through inform

exchanges. As the market has come to supply a greater an

share of total consumption, a new divide has appeared in th

On one side are those who are able to augment their wages 

eign exchange (in areas close to the border with China, on 

coast where foreign seafarers call, and in P’yŏngyang where 

have contact with foreigners). On the other side are those 

on shrinking local currency wages with no access to 

exchange or other income-earning opportunities. The latter, 
about 30 percent of their income on government-distributed foo

another 30 percent on nonfood essentials, have only about 30 p

of their budgets to cover up to 50 percent or more of their c

needs. Surveys suggest that these households spend up to 80 p

of their income on food. Some have managed to survive only b

ing their possessions or establishing a sideline business, su

making and selling sweatshirts or selling homegrown vegetable

The rise of a free market outside the centrally planned eco

and the breakdown in the government food distribution system 

ated a new economic competition in the population that did no

when the government had tight control over the dispersal 

goods. It lessened the people’s dependence on the regime, incr

opportunities for individual initiative, and lessened the cult-lik

on the people’s thinking that all good things come from K

seems all but inevitable that the trauma and dislocations sinc

mid-1990s have increased dissatisfaction with the regime, wh

admitted or not. 

In the short space of seven years (1991–97), the country e

enced more destabilizing change in its economy, political sy

and society than since the Korean War. It was the worst econ

decline in the twentieth century of a country not experiencing 

decline that altered the nature of society and brought a response 

the government that has included a new element of fear and ind

ence from a previously less draconian totalitarian regime. 

As the famine intensified, thousands of people left home in s

of food. Some took the much riskier step of fleeing across the b

into China. The flood of refugees into China created a serious 

lem for the North Korean government in its relations with C

which has long tried to limit the influx of illegal North Korean

Northeast China. Beijing periodically has cracked down with a

and the forced repatriation of some 200,000 to 300,000 of the 

Korean refugees who had sought refuge in China since the 

1990s. Faced with the loss of control over starving people wand

away from home in search of food, the North Korean govern

responded by establishing a network of ad hoc prison-labor c

detention centers characterized by extreme deprivation and to

in which those caught fleeing to or returning from China were 

cerated for periods of up to six months (see Punishment an

Penal System, ch. 5). 

A Militarized Society 

North Korea is the world’s most militarized society. For 

than 50 years, the regime has allocated between 25 and 33 perc

102 
its gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) to the milit

porting the 1.2 million-strong armed forces and reserve and 

itary forces of 7.7 million (see Organization and Equipme

Armed Forces, ch. 5). For most men and some women, mil

vice follows middle school as a matter of course. Of the p

fit, only the privileged few (Kim Jong Il being one of the el

who went from middle school to Kim Il Sung University 

ever serving in the military) and those at the other extrem

very bad sŏngbun—are exempt from military service. Mo

men are anxious to join the military, if only to avoid the sti

is attached to those who do not. For most, it offers the prom

better future. At a minimum, it improves the chances of 

better job after discharge. A sailor trained as a radio ope

example, later might be assigned as the radio operator on a 

fishing boat. Although one’s career is essentially determ

one’s sŏngbun, a young man’s performance in the military 

can alter the direction of his career within certain prescribed 

In a country that has traditionally placed people in precis

ries or rankings within the society, the military ranks high 

Korea. Parents are proud to have their sons in the army, and 

diers there is the psychic boost of being a member of a p

group. Practically every family has at least one member o

duty, in the reserves, or retired from the military. There i

association between the population and the defense estab

because of the military’s constant assistance to the civilian 

tion in nonmilitary ways, such as road construction, indust

struction, civil engineering projects, and rice planting and h

(see Reserve Forces, ch. 5). A major drawback of military s

the long separation of sons from their families. Most young 

not see their parents during their entire enlistment. Mos

granted leave, even in times of family crisis, such as the d

parent. This prolonged absence is a major source of discont

military ranks and a major sorrow for parents. 

From a sociological viewpoint, the importance of the m

extensive interaction with the civilian economy, especially 

ing activities, is its reinforcement of the sameness of life. S

the military is not an escape from an otherwise inevitable 

rural drudgery. For some who grew up in cities, it is an 

tion—more than they might want—to life on a collective fa

tary service offers no escape from political study, either. If a

soldiers are subjected to more intensive political indoctrina

civilians. They attend classes at least three days a week and 

icism sessions at least once a week. Political meetings held 
 

 

major campaigns have been known to last 24 hours and to de

unit readiness as a result of sleep deprivation. Foreigners have 

how tired North Korean troops appear. 

In years of economic collapse, the government distributed 

national food aid mainly to the military and the elite cla

P’yŏngyang. Thus, the political and military elite have had a v

of channels for acquiring food not available to the general po

tion. These include the “first draw” on the domestic harvest, a

to grains and other foods sold on the domestic market through 

leged access to foreign exchange, and direct access to imports 

China and South Korea and other international food aid that the 

ernment distributes through what is left of the centralized food 

bution system. Compared to the rest of society, which was l

fend for itself at the height of the famine, the military has fare

in terrible times. 

Family Life 

With most able-bodied young men in the military, except f

elite few in college, it is not surprising that foreigners inev

remark on the conspicuous absence of young men in the work

Farmers are either women or old men. Most of the workers at 

ries, especially textile factories, also are women. According to 

Korean statistics, women account for more than 50 percent 

total workforce but probably as much as 90 percent of the ci

labor force between the ages of 16 and 30. This statistic repr

nothing less than a social revolution in an Asian country 

fewer than 5 percent of industrial workers were women in 

tional, precommunist times. The role of women changed dra

cally and quickly in the early 1950s from the traditional role o

time housewife and mother to full-time worker, in addition to 

and mother. 

Another major change has been the increase in women’s e

tion. Women may well account for almost two-thirds of colleg

dents. Graduates of teachers’ colleges and medical schoo

almost all women; most men of the same age are in the military

reliance on women in the workplace is a necessity in a nation 

20 percent of its male population and almost all its young 

between the ages of ages 17 to 30 serving in the military. 

Although they compete favorably with men at the low and m

levels, few women have risen to top management positions in 

other than teaching and medicine (except for women athlete

artists). Women dominate the KWP in terms of overall memb

and offices held at lower levels but are poorly represented at h

104 
 

 

levels. For instance, women hold the majority of party co

jobs at the factory and neighborhood levels but hold a far lo

portion of party jobs at the city and county levels and ev

posts at the provincial and national levels. The same is 

women in government. Whereas they are very active at low

such as on election committees, women hold relatively few 

level government posts. 

In traditional times, women married in their late teens a

twenties; often their bridegrooms were even younger. To

prohibit marriage of women younger than 27 and men youn

30. Were it not for these laws, which are strictly enforc

would be a large age differential between husbands and w

result of young men’s long service in the military. 

Kim Il Sung held fast to traditional ideas of courtship 

riage. Arranged marriages are still very much accepted 

Korea and apparently preferred. As in traditional times, yo

and women have little or no dating or courtship experience 

marriage. Western notions of courtship and marriage now 

in South Korea, China, and other Asian nations would be v

most North Koreans as a corruption of traditional values ra

a release from outmoded strictures. 

It is not arranged marriages or the limitations on premari

life that are so much hated as the laws against early marria

young women have finished middle school and started to 

the time they are 16; they have to wait another 11 years be

can marry. Young men are a decade older by the time they 

ished military service. The enforcement of late marriages ha

effect of controlling the birthrate, whether or not that was t

reason for the state’s ban on early marriages. 

In the changed social times of today, males and females 

coeducational schools at all levels (including college and 

Sung University) and work together in factories and office

the farms. There are inevitable pressures on young peopl

together in everyday life but prohibited from marrying until 

in their late twenties. There is little information about ho

people cope with these pressures. According to defectors, i

subject that North Koreans discuss even with their closest f

would seem that they simply accept traditional values reinf

the regime’s need for a large military. 

Foreigners who have visited both North Korea and C

invariably struck by the contrast between the familiar scene 

of young couples strolling together in parks and the absenc

such sight in North Korea. Occasionally, pairs of young w
 

young men can be seen walking alone but never a male-femal

ple. Usually, young people are seen in groups of three or more. 

do not get closer to each other than an arm’s length. The mos

would do is sit down for a few moments to talk confidentially

even married couples walk arm in arm; there are no public di

of affection. Unmarried men and women would never dare to 

hands in public. 

At school, young men and women have friendships, even ro

tic friendships, but sexual relations are taboo. Both the man an

woman would be risking the standing of their family as well a

own future and career. Special friendships are acknowledged 

exchange of notes or love letters, but private meetings are rare. 

sex is a serious offense, and strict punishment is meted out

grounds for dismissal from school, expulsion from political o

zations, and sometimes discharge from the military. If a w

becomes pregnant out of wedlock, an abortion can be perform

to five months. Illegitimate children are very rare. When such a 

is born, it falls under the care of the state. The mother must surr

the child to the authorities, who are given full responsibil

deciding what is best for the child. This is in keeping with the 

attitude toward the custody of children in divorce cases, where 

the authorities give little weight to parental rights compared to 

view of the best interests of the children. 

In short, there is simply no place for young couples seekin

vate moments together, except possibly at the movies. This situ

explains why some people still go to the movies despite the te

nature of the regime-scripted stories. There are no bars, dance 

discos, or coffeehouses. What is left for those who establish ro

tic friendships at school are a few shared private moments tog

after class, after criticism sessions, or during volunteer labor 

Even a walk together in the park or in the countryside is acco

nied by risk and requires great care. Students are constantly on 

guard, knowing full well that their behavior with members 

opposite sex is a prime topic for self-criticism sessions. 

behavior in this and other areas is self-regulated through the c

mechanism of endless self-criticism sessions. 

Whatever secret friendships they may make, young people 

that eventually they will marry someone with a similar backg

selected by their parents and approved by the KWP. The tradit

arranged marriages has served the regime’s purposes well for 

ous reasons, but the overwhelming criterion has always 

sŏngbun. The system tends to preserve the purity of the priv

class, keeping it free of less desirable elements. Those wit

sŏngbun have no choice but to marry others of the same backgr

106 
Women tilling the soil, Jan

Courtesy Kathi Zellweger, Caritas–H

Whereas in precommunist days, a go-between oversaw the 

tions between the two families, today the party acts as 

between. Personal records, kept by the KWP secretary of 

tory, collective farm, or government agency, provide the n

information to match couples of similar background. Pe

from the party is absolutely required. Because the husb

wife’s place of work has to provide accommodations, a cou

not live together without the party’s approval. 

People can ask for the party’s permission to marry, or 

leave the choice of a marriage partner to the KWP entirely. 

ingly, the better a person’s sŏngbun, the more likely he or 

rely on the party. It is easier to accept the party’s verdict 

thereby assured of a good career. At the lower end of the soc

trum, collective-farm workers, miners, and unskilled facto

ers, whose careers are not likely to be significantly affected 

choice of a spouse, seem to play a greater role in the sel

their marriage partners. The regime is mindful of this natu

tion process in assigning young men, newly discharged from 

itary, to collective farms and factories where there are ext

women. Apparently, some are temporarily assigned to text

ries, where most of the workers are women, where they 

single women. Later, after they have married, they are trans

other jobs. 
 

 

 

The society is still characterized by the traditional tenden

families to remain in the same general area where their anc

lived for generations. Marriages between people from differen

graphical areas are discouraged. Marriages between urban male

rural females are particularly discouraged as a means of lim

migration into the cities. Children of collective farmers have 

chance of moving out of the countryside into the cities, unles

truly excel in school and are given the rare opportunity of a h

education, with the possibility of a job in the city. 

The state’s downplaying of the wedding ceremony has bee

of the most obvious social changes in North Korea, considerin

elaborate weddings that traditionally involved costly cerem

feasts, and gift exchanges between the two families. The regim

outlawed all such costly, showy weddings, primarily for econ

reasons but perhaps also because of the tradition of simple wed

that Kim Il Sung and his anti-Japanese guerrillas established. 

cally, the ceremony is held at home, with a small reception afte

at home or at a restaurant. Most weddings are held on Sunda

holidays because those are the only times that people are not 

ing. The wedding ceremony itself is rather perfunctory. The 

and groom simply bow to a picture of Kim, in a communist u

of the traditional bow to the bride’s and groom’s parents. Then 

kiss each other briefly, a North Korean couple’s only public 

The presiding official—a work-unit or party functionary—g

congratulatory speech. There is no exchange of wedding rin

other jewelry. The bride keeps her maiden name. Children take 

father’s name. 

Although simple by traditional standards, wedding receptio

nonetheless joyous occasions for North Koreans, offering, a

do, one of the few opportunities to indulge in eating, drinking

singing. Only for a wedding can North Koreans buy special q

ties of wine, rice cookies, and cakes. The major constraint o

number of guests is the amount of food and liquor that can b

vided. Usually relatives living nearby and a few close friends 

bride and groom, including their supervisors, will be invited. A 

ple is authorized a skirt and jacket for the bride, a new suit f

groom, and a set of bedclothes. A special touch at weddings 

taking of pictures. This is probably the only occasion when ord

North Koreans are photographed, but many families are not a

afford the services of a photographer. 

Honeymoons are out of the question. A newlywed couple typ

takes three or four days off from work on paid vacation. They 

not be able to live together for several months, perhaps even 

year or more. They must wait to be assigned housing by the husb

108 
place of work, although they might live at one or the other’s 

home in the interim. 

Defectors have reported many unhappy marriages in Nort

Whether this is because they were arranged marriages or n

marriages reflect the stress and strain of a life where both 

leave home early in the morning, return home late at night

per, and go to bed. They have very little time together and a

time for leisurely activities. There is minimal prospect of 

and almost no chance for extramarital romance. Adulterous 

ships are dangerous. If discovered, they result in job demo

expulsion from the party. Only the elite are thought to be 

from the party’s swift and inexorable punishment, and e

must be careful. According to one defector: “Everyon

together and knows where everyone else should be. Pe

missed at once if they do not go home after work. Besides, t

ing hours are so long that there is no time or energy left ove

The stability of the family is reinforced by attitude

divorce. As in traditional times, marriage in North Kore

viewed as an alliance between families, suggesting somethi

more permanent than the union of two people. Marriage as 

tution has been idealized by the regime, and divorce is c

Divorce is another area in which the regime’s attitude has re

traditional values. In actual practice, it is very difficult 

divorce. For one thing, it is difficult to get permission to 

order to institute legal proceedings; divorce application 

high; and one has to get the party’s approval to seek a 

Divorce is harmful to one’s career, so most people in high 

are deterred from seeking a divorce. At a minimum, it would 

chances for advancement; more likely, it would result in a d

The fear of losing one’s children is another serious det

divorce. For all these reasons, divorce is a rare occurrence. 

Women continue to work after they marry as a matter o

Almost all able-bodied women work until retirement at 

Under the banner of full equality between the sexes, the re

forced a totally new lifestyle on North Korean women, who 

absolutely no choice in the matter. Social equality with 

meant only a more difficult life for women, with man

devoted to hard work on the job and additional hours de

political study and volunteer labor, plus all the traditional 

bilities of home and children. 

Women may be the most dissatisfied people in the socie

major complaints are reported to be the lack of help at hom

tle time with their children, and too much time in politic

There are also feelings of job discrimination in the assign
 

women to the more menial jobs after a limited education. Wom

not spared from heavy work, either. Almost half of the steve

observed at the port of Namp’o appear to be women; other w

have worked as rock drillers and workers in fish-processing pla

temperatures well below freezing. The long years that men h

spend in the military have forced women into these phys

demanding and dangerous jobs. 

Women, as well as men, are enormously overworked. For w

the day begins earlier and ends later than it does for men. In 

areas and urban areas without indoor plumbing, working wive

mothers rise early to fetch water from a centralized location. 

like men, must be at work by 8:00 AM. Morning exercise 

blares over loudspeakers, and participation in morning ex

drills, although voluntary, is encouraged. Young childre

dropped off at nurseries or kindergartens on the way to wor

across North Korea, from 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning workers 

political study meetings under the direction of a party official

is the time set aside for study of the day’s editorial in Nodong 

mun and for new party and government policies and decisions 

relayed to the people. Toward the end of the hour, office dir

and plant managers lead a discussion of work plans for the 

Work starts at 9:00 AM and continues until 1:00 PM, with a 

break for exercises. After a long midday rest period, during 

many people take a nap, work continues until around 8:00 in th

ning, after which study sessions and self-criticism meetings ar

ducted until 10:00 PM. On the way home, mothers pick up 

children at the nurseries and then stop at the central kitchen in 

neighborhood or on their collective farm to pick up cooked ri

dinner. Older children are at home waiting, usually sleeping or 

their homework or housework. There is an unchanging regu

about people’s lives, six days a week, 52 weeks a year. 

Children 

The time North Koreans spend with their families may be lim

but that time is treasured and engenders feelings that are in

From all available evidence, parents dote on their children n

than parents anywhere else in the world. In fact, if anything

seem to live for their children, perhaps because their own lives 

little but hope for a better future for their children. Parents mak

rifices gladly, saving as much as they can all during their liv

secure the best for their children. 

Just as in traditional times, North Koreans grow up today w

strong sense of loyalty to both their parents and the state. Ch

110 
 

 

 

are taught to love and respect their parents in the tradition

way. The regime does nothing to distort those natural family 

Its concern has been to incorporate such feelings into a bro

for Kim Il Sung and the state. 

Kim is portrayed in official regime propaganda not o

fatherly figure but also as a model son. A 1980 article entit

Il Sung Termed Model for Revering Elders” tells how he wa

mother’s cold hands with his own breath after she return

work each day in the winter and gave up the pleasure of play

swing because it tore his pants, which his mother then had 

“When his parents or elders called him,” said the article, “

from his spot at once no matter how much fun he had been 

answered ‘yes’ and then ran to them, bowed his head and w

what they were going to say.” According to Kim himself, “

nists love their parents, wives, children, and their fellow c

respect the elderly, live frugal lives and always maintain a 

mien.” Kim Jong Il is also described as a filial son. When 

five years old, a propagandist wrote, he insisted on personal

ing his father from evil imperialists with a little wooden rifl

Love of children has become a national dogma, follo

example set by Kim Il Sung, who easily surpassed even 

consummate Western politicians in his seemingly endles

kissing babies and hugging young children. He visited state 

constantly. He referred to the children of North Korea as th

and queens” of the country, the “hope of the future.” He seem

uinely to delight in young children. It was part of his person

appeal, and it captured the North Korean spirit and attitude p

Children in North Korea are showered with material thin

as toys and games, to the limit of their parents’ and the state

to provide them. An example of this is the fancy equipmen

ground equipment, sports equipment, and musical instrum

which state nurseries spend an inordinate amount of money

North Korean children attend nursery school from the ag

months, if not earlier. There are day nurseries in every villa

cooperative farm, or major workshop, where the children 

every evening with their parents. There are three-day nurser

county level, where the children go home on Wednesday 

and again on Saturday through Sunday. And there are week

ing nurseries in P’yŏngyang and other big cities, where the 

either go home on weekends or live permanently while thei

are serving abroad. The equipment, routine, and teaching a

schools are supposedly standardized, although this is do

practice. All nurseries provide the same comprehensive care
ing medical checkups by physicians or nurses and regular ha

and shampoos by barbers. Thus, parents are freed from many 

routine child-care chores that would otherwise keep a mother 

work. 

Children are taught discipline and love for the state and the

ents from the earliest age. They are taught that Kim is the sou

everything good and that they should love, honor, and obey 

They are taught respect for their elders, which is expressed in th

ditional custom of children bowing to their parents, teacher

others in authority. Informed observers of societies in both 

and North Korea have noted that authority relationships be

children and adults in North Korea are, if anything, even more 

tured than in China. The good manners and discipline learned 

early age tend to become reflex action that North Korean def

actually find difficult to abandon later, in adjusting to life in an

country. Classroom discipline is very tight, and the role o

teacher is supreme. Spanking children, as a form of discipli

teachers, is forbidden. Violations of school discipline, such a

paying attention in class or leaving the school grounds, are qu

addressed. First, the school notifies the parents. If the studen

not quickly improve, his or her ration is cut. At this poin

sŏngbun of both the student and the parents has slipped s

notches. 

Despite their disciplined behavior learned early on, there 

lively, high-spirited, self-confident attitude in North Korean ch

that foreigners immediately notice. It is possible that this is 

the result of the regime’s constant reiteration of Kim Il S

chuch’e philosophy, basically a mind-over-matter view of the 

in which all things are possible if people work hard enou

achieve them, in which slogans such as “We have nothing to en

the world,” do have a positive, reassuring effect. 

North Korean children spend relatively few hours at home 

their families; however, children are with other children at a yo

age and for longer periods of time than in most contemporary s

ies. Presumably, they are more used to a group environment th

average American child of the same age. They are taught a vari

skills at a very early age—singing, dancing, athletics, and instru

tal music—which may rank as one of the regime’s major 

accomplishments. Foreigners are often amazed at the musica

gymnastic abilities of young North Korean children who perfo

these areas with great poise, self-confidence, and maturity

“happy smiling faces” of children seem to be in stark contrast 

“grim, unsmiling expression” on the face of North Korean 

112 
Chuch’e Tower, built in 1982 on the bank of the Taedong River, comm

Kim Il Sung’s seventieth birthday; the design is attributed to Ki

Courtesy Kathi Zellweger, Caritas–H

with whom foreign visitors come in contact. Compared to 

childhood is a happy time. 

Leisure Activities 

With their days filled with work or school, volunteer labo

cal study, and self-criticism meetings, North Koreans have 

little time to spend by themselves, with their friends, or at ho

family. Essentially, they have Saturday evenings and Sund

The regime, which advocates that people ought to “do away 

slightest indolence and relaxation in life and work and live 

olutionary morale,” provides little in the way of recreation

ties, except for movie theaters, city parks, some amusemen

and sports events. Public restaurants are generally beyond a 

budget, and there are no coffeehouses, bars, or cabarets. Yo

ple might have ice skates or simple fishing equipment. O

their only recreational equipment is likely to be a soccer bal

ball, volleyball, or table tennis paddles. Table tennis is p

concrete tables permanently installed throughout North 

public places such as school playgrounds and city parks. 
 

 

North Koreans are sports minded, almost to the point of o

sion. Students are required to participate in after-school sports 

extension of their normal school day. Most schools offer soccer

ketball, volleyball, handball, table tennis, boxing, gymnastic

track. Kim Jong Il is reported to enjoy tennis and horseback r

both sports unavailable to the general population. 

There is great interest in the national competition among 

Korea’s professional sports teams, especially the men’s s

teams. Often, the games are televised. Popular interest in spe

sports is one of the main escapes from the political pressures o

Movies are inexpensive but are not popular because all are 

Korean–made films with a predictable propaganda theme. A t

story line involves a Korean family split apart by the Korean 

some family members in the North having a bright and happy 

tence and those living in the South having tormented lives. A

end, the family is always reunited at the glorious day of reun

tion, and the movie ends with homage to Kim Il Sung. P

quickly tire of the story line and go to see only those movies tha

ture their favorite movie stars. 

The circus is a popular recreation. A resident circus in P’yŏn

performs year-round, featuring acrobatic acts and magic tricks. 

ing foreigners are uniformly impressed with the skills of the per

ers. Students in other parts of the country are bused to P’yŏngy

see the circus, as well as museums and other national institu

Field trips to P’yŏngyang are part of every North Korean’s educ

An amusement of young people the world over—pets—are 

part of North Korean lifestyle. Dogs and cats are thought of 

pets but as food. They are not kept inside as house pets and a

allowed in cities, including P’yŏngyang. The only pets in citi

birds and aquarium fish, both of which can be bought at loc

stores. They are quite popular but expensive. Only the privilege

afford to buy birds, usually canaries. 

The major recreation at home and at school seems to be card 

ing, traditionally a favorite pastime. There are no organized d

or concerts for students, and they appear to spend little time re

for pleasure. Outside of Kim Il Sung’s collected works, schoo

books, and official propaganda, no other books are available. 

ally no works of Western origin have been printed in the countr

few appear to have been smuggled into the country until rec

The only news of the outside world getting into North Korea a

occasional books smuggled in from China and illicit radio b

casts received by the few radios brought in from China. No li

underground has developed as it did in the Soviet Union, and 

114 
 

are no well-known underground dissident writers. The in

lighting in homes and schools effectively rules out reading a

Reports of North Koreans huddled around radios smu

from China listening to British Broadcasting Corporation a

of America broadcasts offer the first hint of news of the 

world reaching North Korean citizens. Videos of taboo 

movies, which also have been smuggled in from China, ap

have reached a limited number of people who put them

great risk in watching them. These first glimmers of an und

secret society represent the first sign of a crack—a very s

indeed—in the regime’s hitherto successful block of al

news. Although North Korea launched its first e-mail s

2001, Internet access is severely restricted. 

Religion 

Article 68 of the constitution grants freedom of religio

and guarantees the right to construct buildings for religious 

religious ceremonies (see The Constitutional Framework

Although it may nominally provide for freedom of religiou

in practice the government not only prohibits organized 

activity but also persecutes religious believers. Many o

agree that the official religion is the cult of Kim. The cult p

religious fervor in an atheist state that in reality outlaws all 

beliefs and practices. Semireligious aspects of the cult inc

making of Kim Il Sung’s birthplace into a shrine for wo

Kim. The religious mystique of his life includes an associa

Mount Paektu, the “holy mountain of revolution,” where 

Sung lived in hiding during the war years and where his 

Jong Il is supposed to have been born, according to legend (

a mountain that has always been revered as the mystical pla

gin of the Korean people. In North Korean embassies ab

most factories and homes, and in many schools, there are litt

set aside as chapels for worshiping Kim. Kim Il Sung’s pictu

beside lighted candles. Most North Koreans begin and end 

with a bow to Kim’s portrait. These semireligious devoti

national leader who has assumed the status of a demigod c

the official and only “religion” allowed in North Korea. 

In the early 1900s, P’yŏngyang was the center of a ve

Protestant missionary effort in Korea. Kim Il Sung’s par

grandfather were Christians who went to church regularly w

lived in P’yŏngyang and later when they moved to Manchur

ever, the missionaries’ efforts are not visible now. Ther

openly professed Christians in North Korea today—such a
 

sion could be reason for imprisonment—and Christian mission 

ters have long since disappeared. Officials claim that U.S. b

destroyed every single Christian church during the Korean Wa

customs based on both Eastern and Western religious beliefs p

such as dressing the dead in new clothing and placing them i

fins for burial. However, religious believers, such as the famil

people who defected to South Korea after the war and the old 

class, are regarded as members of the “disloyal” class, “enem

the state” who can be imprisoned for that reason alone. Church

regarded as symbols of imperialist oppression. Defectors repo

even in the privacy of the family, North Koreans are afraid to p

a belief in God. 

A 1992 defector, a North Korean table tennis champion w

age 18, was the youngest political prisoner at the prison camp 

he was imprisoned for walking across a frozen river into Chi

the spur of the moment “out of curiosity” after skiing down M

Paektu at a ski resort used by the sons and daughters of high 

cials, was emphatic on the subject: 

When Billy Graham visited North Korea, he sai

Christianity is reviving. I’ll tell you the real story o

religious life in North Korea. There’s absolutely no religio

in North Korea. I saw so many people in camp who came i

because of religious belief. Even secretly praying is enoug

to get you sent to camp. Probably everyone in North Kore

who is a religious believer is sent to a camp. I want to writ

a letter to Billy Graham: ‘If you really want to know 

religion in North Korea, go to a prison camp.’ When Bill

Graham went to a church service, he should have aske

people in the congregation to recite Bible verses.

The people who attended the staged religious services for 

Graham and other visiting dignitaries are presumed to have bee

ing out their roles as devout worshipers. They do not attend c

regularly, only when the regime has foreign dignitaries to impr

Only those born before 1950 would have any recollection 

old religious beliefs and practices. As Lee Sang-tae, a member 

Central Committee of the General League of Writers, expl

when asked if the use of gigantic choirs in Song of Paradis

other North Korean “revolutionary” musical extravaganzas 

back to church music brought in by Western missionaries: “

lutely not. We have had no such influence from the missionarie

developed our songs based on our traditional heritage. Before l

tion, we had religions—Buddhism, Christianity—but after libe

116 
 

the influence of these disappeared.” Lee spoke for the new 

tion, Kim Jong Il’s generation, to whom the religious belief

parents have clearly not been passed on. Therein lies a si

difference between Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Whereas 

elder could remember attending church and even playing t

at church services and would have had a clear memory of 

ents’ and grandparents’ religious devotions, Kim Jong Il ha

heritage. He knew his father as a man who had by then re

Christian doctrine, who claimed that he was “not affected 

gion” despite his youthful connections with the church, 

founded an atheist state with his self-worship substituted fo

A December 1980 editorial in Nodong Shinmun expli

vated the cult to a national religion, inviting foreigners to j

direct challenge to the Christian faith, which reportedly h

14,000 adherents, and a brazen attempt to replace the fath

the Christian trinity with the Kim father/son deity, the edito

claimed: “People of the world, if you are looking for miracl

to Korea! Christians, do not go to Jerusalem. Come rather t

Do not believe in God. Believe in the great man.” 

Former Buddhist temples, which apparently survived 

because of their remote location in mountainous areas, are 

ered cultural relics rather than active places of worship a

been taken over by the state and converted to secular use. 

Mount Kŭmgang and Mount Mohyang, for example, are co

national treasures and have been preserved and restored. T

features an academy for Buddhist studies. Some 10,000 p

Buddhists reportedly exist in North Korea. Two churches, 

estant Pongsu Church and Catholic Changchung Cathedr

opened in P’yŏngyang in 1988, just in time for the World F

Youth and Students the following year and obviously to pro

illusion of freedom of religion to foreigners attending the fe

the Pongsu Church on a Sunday during the festival, worship

“Jesus Loves Me” in Korean. According to Bradley K. M

American journalist and author of Under the Loving Ca

Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, who w

“many of them appeared to know (the hymn) by heart.” Mar

that a pastor prayed “in the name of Jesus Christ” for the su

the festival, preached on a political theme—the need for re

nuclear weapons from the peninsula, and prayed for Korean 

cation. Martin also reported that church members and cle

not KWP members and that they removed their Kim Il Sun

while in church. He was told that Protestants who did not a

Pongsu Church worshipped at home but that it was rare, 

instance, to see anyone under the age of 40. 
 

 

Another American correspondent in P’yŏngyang to atten

youth festival visited the newly opened Catholic church and n

churchgoers depositing their Kim Il Sung badges in a bowl a

entered. The priest, as it turned out, drove a Mercedes and 

more money than the highest-ranking party member the jour

had been allowed to meet, a sure sign that he was acting the pa

priest for the benefit of the foreign visitors. When the jour

asked his young North Korean interpreter “Who is more import

you, Kim Il Sung or God?” the interpreter is reported to have l

thoroughly confused for the first time in the interview. “W

God?” he asked. Again, all of this, including the churchgoers’ a

ent familiarity with the hymns, could have been staged. 

As others have concluded, this attempt by the regime to sh

tolerant attitude toward Christianity at the youth festiva

intended to improve P’yŏngyang’s standing in the West at a 

when Kim Il Sung was trying to drive a wedge between Seou

Washington. In March–April 1992, American evangelist Billy 

ham was invited to North Korea for the same reason and 

attended services at the Protestant Pongsu Church. Kim Il 

appears to have backed away from the direct challenge to estab

religions exemplified in the 1980 Nodong Shinmun editorial. 

Kim’s death in 1994, foreigners have noticed no activity 

church on many subsequent visits. Kim Il Sung may have bee

sonally impressed with Mr. Graham and may have built th

Christian churches in P’yŏngyang to impress Western visitors

interestingly, Kim Jong Il has not made a similar pretense o

gious services in P’yŏngyang since he took power two years aft

Graham visit. He has accorded the Graham family VIP treatme

their subsequent visits to North Korea but no open show of fak

gious services. When Billy Graham’s son Franklin visited in 

he was not allowed to preach. 

In view of Kim Jong Il’s lack of pretense in recent years abo

absence of religious observances in North Korea, the announc

in July 2006 that California’s megachurch pastor the Reverend 

Warren, author of the book The Purpose-Driven Life, which is 

lar in South Korea, had accepted an invitation to preach in 

Korea in a 15,000-seat stadium at an outdoor evangelistic crus

March 2007, the first such event in the officially atheist state 

years, came as quite a surprise to most observers of North K

The visit was to mark the 100th anniversary of the 1907 P’yŏn

Revival, one of the most important events in the spread of Chri

ity to Korea. The event was being arranged by a group of 

Korean businessmen, not North Korean officials, but the latte

118 
 

 

 

dently agreed so as to give the appearance of religious free

tolerance after the worldwide condemnation North Ko

received for its July 4, 2006, launch of seven missiles ca

bearing nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Il’s surprising reversal 

ing a Potemkin-like evangelistic crusade, after 10 years’ op

gard of the world’s criticism of his country’s lack of 

freedom, suggests a desperate need to counter world oppro

future visit by Billy and Franklin Graham also was under d

with North Korean officials in August 2006. 

As Hwang Jang-yop, the former chief ideologue who ar

North Korea’s chuch’e philosophy and is the highest-lev

Korean official to have defected, has said, the chu

P’yŏngyang “are fake churches built for show,” and the mon

in the Buddhist temples “are of course fake monks.” Genuin

ers in North Korea cannot profess their faith, said Hwang, “o

believers are allowed to do so.” 

A woman defector from North Korea revealed her secret 

Christian before she fled in 1999. Her parents were Chris

she carried on the family tradition. She said that religious 

“have been captured and gunned to death, and their familie

jails for political criminals.... Believers are forced to go und

because of the harsh oppression. Nobody could freely talk a

gion during the 1960s and 1970s.” However, the defector fo

despite the suppression, religious beliefs were hard to eradi

underground church members stayed in contact through m

People who owned short-wave radios listened to South 

Christian broadcasts and then shared what they had heard w

coreligionists. Meetings took place at friends’ homes whe

“home services” were held. 

In so many ways, but especially in religious beliefs and p

have North and South Korea diverged since the Korean W

only one, but a most important, difference between the two 

that will loom large in the eventual reunification of Korea. 

cial religion in North Korea as it is practiced today—the cu

Il Sung—would seemingly be incompatible with any re

religious belief in the world today. 

As an apparent sign of opening to Russia, construction o

sian Orthodox church began in P’yŏngyang in 2003, fol

visit to the Russian Far East by Kim Jong Il in 2002, and it 

secrated in August 2006. The North Korean government 

construction of the church, and the Russian Orthodox Chu

vided the icons, sacred vessels, and bells. A Russian-train

Korean priest was put in charge. 
 

 

 

An indigenous monotheistic religion—Ch’ŏndogyo (Hea

Way)—an outgrowth of the nineteenth-century Tonghak Mov

(see Glossary), also perseveres. Ch’ŏndogyo stresses the eq

and unity of man with the universe and was traditionally po

among the rural population. Its teachings draw from Budd

Confucianism, Daoism, and Catholicism. Ch’ŏndogyo has a

2.7 million adherents who have a KWP-controlled political voi

the Chongu (Friends) Party. 

Education 

The North Korean leadership takes great pride in its free e

tion system. When the communists came to power in 1946, illi

was widespread, and fewer than 20 percent of all Koreans had 

beyond elementary school. Now 99 percent of the population is 

ate. To accomplish this end, the country dispensed with com

Chinese characters in favor of sole reliance on the indigenous

ple, and phonetically precise chosŏn’gul (Korean script; kno

South Korea as hangul) writing system. Against its advantag

being a relatively easy language with a nationalistic appeal, re

on chosŏn’gul has had the disadvantage of further isolating 

Korea from other countries of East Asia where knowledge o

nese characters remains the “linguistic glue” binding China, 

Korea, and Japan together. Ignorance of Chinese characters has 

a major drawback for North Korea in its efforts to expand trad

other foreign contacts and an embarrassment in terms of it

demic and scholarly standards. 

Having lost most of the intellectuals and skilled technicians 

in the North in the mass exodus to the South after the Korean 

the regime felt a great sense of urgency to develop a new cl

skilled technicians to rebuild the country. By 1956 it had estab

a program of universal compulsory primary education of six 

including kindergarten, that was extended to the junior-m

school level by 1958, providing students with a total of seven 

of free education. Emphasis also was placed on adult education 

effort to make the whole population literate through a night pro

for farmers that operated during the winter months. A major e

sion of technical schools also was undertaken, with speci

courses in mining, engineering, mechanics, communications, e

fishing, medicine, law, music, and art. North Korea’s only fou

university, Kim Il Sung University in P’yŏngyang, was estab

in 1946. 

The shortage of teachers and funds delayed the regime’s 

ambitious goal of establishing a free, compulsory nine-year e

120 
Second-grade students shar

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), Jun

tion system until 1967. It was the first such program in E

both China and Japan then having only six-year compulsory 

with tuition partially free. The current 11-year compulsory, 

cation program, involving two years of kindergarten, four 

primary school, and five years of middle school, was estab

the mid-1970s. According to North Korean official stat

2000, there were 1.5 million children in 27,017 nursery 

748,416 children in 14,167 kindergartens, 1.6 million stu

4,886 four-year primary schools, and 2.1 million students 

middle schools. Nearly 1.9 million students attended more 

colleges and two-year universities. In 2005 there were an e

2.5 million students in primary schools, another 2.5 million 

in middle school, and about 1 million students in high sch

another source cites a total of 8 million enrolled in educati

nursery school through elementary and middle school, hig

college, and university, including correspondence courses 

cational courses for workers at their job sites (so-called fac

leges). It is impossible to confirm these statistics that th

releases, but they give some idea of the emphasis on e

although one must make allowance for the significant amou

unteer labor that students above the age of 11, and particular

the age of 14, give to economic projects throughout the ye

cially at rice planting and harvesting time and all during the 

The country’s elaborate, state-financed system of nurse
 

“children’s palaces” for prekindergarten children is not includ

the 11-year compulsory education program. 

Primary Education 

Beginning in primary school, the education system is intend

Kim’s own words, to train North Koreans to “serve the ex

social system.” Even in primary school, children commit passa

Kim’s speeches to memory and recite them at the front of the 

at other times sitting in perfect silence and upright attention. A

can imagine, there are reportedly few behavior problems

teacher explained: “We are educating them in communist mo

We are educating them in a unitary idea—thinking in the sam

and acting in the same way.” 

There are typically one primary school in each village an

middle school in each district made up of two or three villages

mally, a middle school in a city accommodates about l,000 stu

and a rural middle school about 500 or 600 students. Defector

mate the size of an average class to be about 30 students. Beca

limited classroom facilities, many schools operate in two shifts

an afternoon overlap accommodating non-classroom activities 

as physical education, militia training, and study hall. 

Middle School and Beyond 

Boys and girls receive essentially the same education in coe

tional institutions through middle school. On completion of th

year compulsory program, which ends around the age of 15 

most young women go to work, either on farms or in local fact

and most males begin their obligatory military service. Ap

mately 30 percent of all male students, usually the sons of high

ing government and military officials, are exempted from m

service to continue their education through high school and c

or, possibly, university. Kim Jong Il, for instance, never served 

army but went straight from middle school to high school to K

Sung University. After completing their military duty, about 

cent of former military draftees enter a one-year preparatory 

school) course for college or university. High schools are “sp

ized” schools, as are colleges, which may be engineering, indu

agricultural, medical, foreign languages, music, fine arts, dram

letic, teacher-training, or KWP colleges. Admission to colle

university (all of which are two-year universities except for the 

year Kim Il Sung University) is somewhat easier after service 

military than directly from middle school. The military decide

will go on to college and who will be assigned to manual labor

122 
 

Beyond middle school, North Korea has devoted its maj

toward increasing the supply of technically and scientifica

cient personnel by expanding the enrollment at and reso

technological colleges, vocational schools (usually two-yea

divided into agricultural and mechanical programs), and fac

leges, and by sending selected groups of students abroad, p

to Russia and Eastern Europe, for scientific and technical e

Kim Jong Il appears to have been the driving force in the 

gram to send North Korean students abroad for training. 

1998, he spoke favorably of Deng Xiaoping’s “great feat in 

2,000 or so students abroad annually” from China and expr

hope that North Korea could emulate China on this point. 

There has been an improvement in mass education at t

grades and impressive training of technicians for the workfo

the late twentieth century. However, Western technicians w

supervised the construction and early production processes 

imported from the West have despaired of North Korean eng

incompetence, disregard for safety procedures, careless mai

and repair procedures, and stubborn refusal to accept advice

Higher Education 

The absence of true higher education and an educated, in

class is the most serious deficiency of the system. Sixty ye

its founding, Kim Il Sung University remains the sole civil

year university. Its graduates, numbering about 3,000 a yea

total student body of 12,000, who constitute the educationa

the country, represent less than 0.01 percent of the popula

university, like every other educational institution and perh

than others, subordinates education to unrelenting political 

nation. Students in the social sciences spend almost 50 p

their time in ideological study. Students in the science dep

devote about 20 percent of their time to Kim study. Mo

books in the university’s library are various editions of K

lected works, bound in leather. A separate catalog, which 

one room, indexes all of his speeches. As students becom

educated and advance to higher levels in school, and at Kim 

University, they actually have to spend more time studyin

teachings and expend more energy in public observance of 

cult. In a system that puts a premium on political loyalty, t

and ambitious cultivate their political skills and worry le

academic proficiency. 

From all reports, there is dissatisfaction with the limited 

nities for higher education. Many students who want to go o
school or college and are qualified to do so are barred, either be

of sŏngbun or because of the limited number of schools of h

learning. Only about 30 or 40 percent of middle-school gradua

directly to high school, and another 5 percent attend high s

after completing military service; fewer than 10 percent of 

school graduates go on to college or university. 

Imbalances in the curriculum constitute another serious 

ciency. The study of science predominates, while the social sci

are all but neglected, except for the study of Marxism–Leninism 

the communist revolution in Korea. According to one forme

dent, more than three out of four classrooms at Kim Il Sung U

sity consist of laboratories for the study of biology, chem

geology, and related subjects. Foreign visitors have been sing

unimpressed with the laboratories at the university, the bes

North Korea has to offer. 

There are indications that Kim Jong Il realizes the dire ne

economists and financial experts as North Korea struggles to re

from its economic collapse in the late 1990s, expand trade with 

countries, and promote foreign investment in North Korea, at le

the extent that it can do so without allowing unwanted foreign 

ences to seep into the country. The dilemma for the regime is th

ficulty in learning economics without exposure to the benefit

free-market system. 

Outside of science, music, drama, and certain technical skil

education system is unimpressive, most notably in the socia

ences and foreign-language departments. Because of the li

number of trained linguists, North Korea has been unable to 

several international conferences at the same time or even 

large ones at any given time. An international table tennis mee

in P’yŏngyang in 1979 dramatized the acute need for translat

many different languages. Shortly thereafter, the School of Fo

Languages broke away from Kim Il Sung University to beco

separate institution. Around that same time, Kim Il Sung mad

study of English compulsory in upper-level middle schools. Pr

that, students in middle school were required to study Russian

1978, both English and Russian were mandatory. At the same 

in a crash program to train English-speaking technicians and 

and government officials, North Koreans were sent to specia

guage-training programs in Japan, Guyana, Yugoslavia, and Ira

North Korea’s kidnapping of foreign nationals to teach the

guages to its diplomatic corps and kidnapping of foreign actor

actresses to spearhead its movie industry between 1977 and 19

now well known. Kim Jong Il’s hand can be seen in these cri

124 
 

acts, which may have accomplished his immediate purpose 

ter of culture in jump-starting a nonexistent foreign-langu

gram but at the cost, some years later, of a disastrous se

international relations with the countries involved. The natio

tions with Japan, in particular, have been affected signific

North Korea’s surprising admission in 2003 that it did in fa

Japanese citizens off the beach in Japan, as Japan had long 

and North Korea had adamantly denied, for the purpose of 

Japanese to its foreign diplomats. 

The basic problem that affects the quality of a North 

education is the conflict between reality and the state’s insis

its own brand of the “truth.” The quality of North Korean e

can never be any better, or any closer to the truth, than th

party line. North Koreans are taught, for instance, and hav

son to question such basic untruths as: Russia, not the Unit

or Britain, was primarily responsible for the defeat of Japan 

many in World War II. A good idea of the level of studie

observed from the caliber of what is called original researc

are only 10 to 15 journals in the fields of chemistry, physics

phy, other physical sciences, linguistics, history, and arc

that could be considered remotely scholarly, and Western 

have found no original ideas or research techniques of any re

None of these journals are available in translation outside 

Korea. There has been some good archaeological work a

research on Korean dialects, but there are no North Korean 

with international standing in any field. Science may be the 

in which a North Korean can get a fairly good education wi

tively small component of ideological indoctrination. Som

rising economic stars have been trained in the sciences, be

both the superiority of a scientific education and the absen

economics program. 

In short, the regime has educated a whole generation 

Koreans in Kim Il Sung’s image, more sophisticated than 

technical and scientific areas but essentially practical-minde

interested in solving immediate issues at hand. The curren

tion of North Koreans has had little in the way of intellectua

lenging experience, and the members of the older genera

might have retained some of the earmarks of a traditional e

have passed from the scene. The loss of a highly educated e

the loss of traditional religious beliefs, has long-term imp

for North Korea’s eventual reentry onto the world scene af

than 60 years of political, social, and cultural isolation. Co

to the education system would require years to show results
 

Health Care 

To the extent the state can make it available, medical care i

vided free of charge. In assuming full responsibility for the hea

its people, the regime has given priority to preventive medicin

physical exercise is seen as the first line of defense against il

Children and adults are expected to participate in physical ex

during work breaks and school recesses. They also are encoura

take part in recreational sports, such as running, gymnastics, v

ball, ice skating, and traditional Korean games. Mass gymnasti

plays, involving tens of thousands of uniformed participants, 

regular feature of major holidays and visits of important fore

to P’yŏngyang. 

The government has instituted nationwide regular medical c

ups. It is this feature of North Korea’s health program, plus the 

tice of cleanliness, that most impresses foreigners. Checkup

provided on a routine basis at every school, factory, coope

farm, office, and military unit. People are given a complete a

checkup and in addition are required to have monthly checku

the treatment of minor conditions, such as colds. In some p

physicians go to schools and factories; otherwise people visit 

clinics. In either case, because health care is organized around 

ple’s place of work or school, members of the same family d

see the same physician. There is no choice of physician. Indiv

are required to follow the orders of their assigned physician an

not refuse treatment. There is continuity in medical records; 

son’s lifetime “health card” is automatically forwarded to th

health clinic if he or she moves. 

The regime has been very aggressive in attacking epidemi

eases, including typhus, smallpox, cholera, and encephalit

instituting a nationwide inoculation program, which, howeve

fers from a chronic shortage of serums. Physicians oversee th

tine spraying of public places such as trains, buses, restaurant

hotels with DDT and other insecticides. Foreigners report 

spraying of trains after every stop. 

The prevalence of tuberculosis is generally blamed on malnu

and hard work. At one time, it was the leading cause of death in 

Korea. In 2005 it ranked farther down on the list behind cancer

disease, strokes, and digestive and respiratory ailments. Howeve

ing the late 1990s, when famine claimed the lives of 1 million or 

North Koreans, the immune systems of the vulnerable, main

elderly and the young, weakened as caloric intake fell, and many 

ple succumbed to diseases such as tuberculosis before actually 

ing to death. As of 2005, no cases of human immunodeficiency 

126 
Research staff of the Acupuncture and Moxibustion Division, Koryŏ I

Medical Science, P

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), Jun

acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) had b

cially reported. 

As one of its first priorities after the war, the regime s

train more physicians at long-established medical col

P’yŏngyang, Hamhŭng, Ch’ŏngjin, and Sariwŏn, plus new

lished medical junior colleges located in each province. In 

the number of physicians and hospitals per capita, North Ko

high in the world today, although it is unclear just how we

these physicians are. In the past, North Korea reportedly 

doctor for every 700 inhabitants and one hospital bed for e

inhabitants. Health expenditures in 2001 represented 2.5 p

gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary). Despite thes

ditures, the country is thought to be some 15 to 20 years b

medical research. 

Medicine is not a prestigious profession in North Korea. 

doctors, lawyers, professors, and other intellectuals of prere

ary days were denounced as enemies of the state and relegat

lower classes. Many young men choose not to go to medica

more than 75 percent of North Korea’s physicians are wome

are no nursing colleges; women with a high-school educatio

serve as nurses. 

There is a significant variation in the quality of med

throughout the country. Central hospitals in P’yŏngyang, su
 

Red Cross Hospital and the P’yŏngyang Medical College Ho

have the most modern equipment and hundreds of cancer and 

disease specialists. City and provincial hospitals, such a

P’yŏngyang Hospital and Haeju Hospital, are reserved for ser

ill patients. There also are county and ward hospitals, factory h

tals for factories with 7,000 or more employees, and rural healt

ters. On a smaller scale, clinics that have no beds and essen

give first-aid treatment are run by nurses or midwives, not tr

medical doctors. 

All eye surgery reportedly is done in the central hospit

P’yŏngyang. Foreign visitors who have observed the modern o

ing rooms and equipment in these hospitals see not only the 

but, in some cases, the only facilities for certain kinds of oper

or cancer treatment. Cataract surgery is not available to the av

North Korean, a situation that may confine him or her to life w

reading after a certain age. The P’yŏngyang Maternity Ho

another showcase hospital, has become a regular stop on th

tour of P’yŏngyang since its opening in late 1980. 

The epitome in medical care is provided to top party and go

ment officials at the Government Hospital in P’yŏngyang 

known as the Ponghwa Clinic). Dr. Ch’oe Ung-sam, the first di

of the clinic and Kim Il Sung’s longtime chief personal phys

graduated from a Japanese medical school and later served as 

of Ch’ŏngjin Medical College. In addition to the clinic, he oper

special medical service providing 24-hour medical care for both 

Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, plus special services for cabinet min

and top KWP officials. Unlike other hospitals, the Ponghwa 

has central heating and, in each patient’s room, air condition

sofa, two armchairs, and a coffee table. Its elite patients loo

over a floral, terraced courtyard. Most North Koreans are not 

of the existence of the Ponghwa Clinic, but anyone going n

would notice the government cars parked in front. Foreign v

are not taken to the Ponghwa Clinic, despite North Korean inte

showing off the nation’s other premier facilities. 

Except for a few pediatric hospitals, tuberculosis sanator

and the central hospitals in P’yŏngyang, most hospitals are g

hospitals. A typical one would have about 100 to 150 beds

most rooms accommodating from 10 to 15 patients each. The m

ity of the patients are there for surgery; the most common oper

are for appendicitis, tonsillitis, boils, and abscesses. Only the 

modern hospitals have beds with mattresses; most others 

wooden-board beds; patients bring their own bedding. Visito

not allowed in patients’ rooms. The rules isolating hospital pa

128 
 

 

 

from other people are strictly enforced throughout the 

Patients are not allowed to leave their rooms, and they 

allowed to smoke. While they are in the hospital, they mu

their food ration card and eat only meals provided by the 

Even by North Korean standards, the food is poor. Going to 

pital is not a comfortable experience. 

North Koreans’ major complaints about medical care 

shortage and extremely high cost of medicines, especially 

ics, which are in great demand. Pharmaceutical imports fro

Russia, and China are reserved for the elite. Antibiotics ava

the general public are produced domestically. Control ov

supplies is exerted by physicians who are authorized to 

only those medicines that are available, in amounts that can 

Most modern drugs are not sold on the open market; foreign 

always note the absence of pharmacies selling medicines. O

tional medicines produced domestically are available a

drugstores. Black-market sale of medicines has long been p

The regime has claimed a dramatic improvement in the h

longevity of its population. According to North Korean stati

average life expectancy was a little more than 38 year

1936–40 period; in 2007 life expectancy was estimated at 6

for men and 74.8 years for women. Other projections a

lower for both men and women. Life expectancy is not exp

improve as the first decade of the twenty-first century proce

Prior to the famine of the mid-1990s with its horrific d

North Koreans reportedly were pleased with the advances 

medicine, especially in the fight against traditional epidemic 

and the improvement in surgical care. Free medical care 

considered one of the regime’s most impressive accompli

However, the people know nothing about the advances made 

countries. They know only what the state has told them, 

have been told—and apparently believe—that medical care 

Korea and the West is a luxury that only the rich can affo

must be much more cynical now, however, after watching a m

more of their loved ones die in one of the great famines of th

eth century. Estimates of the death toll vary from the gove

quasi-official figure of 220,000 to the estimate of 3.5 millio

South Korean nongovernmental organization Good Friends

of a famine, most deaths were due to disease, not starvation. 

gling of drinking water with sewage in the flooding in 19

gastrointestinal diseases, which led to dehydration, especiall

dren. With their immune systems already weakened as a 

poor nutrition, they were vulnerable to a number of illnesses
 

 

 

 

 

There also have been serious long-term health effects of the 

ine, some irreversible, which will erase many of the m

advances of past years. According to a 2004 UN survey, ther

been serious stunting (low height for age) and wasting (low w

for height) of children under six, as a result of chronic malnut

The rate of stunting was found to be 37 percent; 23 percent 

underweight (weight for age); and 7 percent showed signs of 

ing. Not surprisingly, given the regime’s handling of scarce 

supplies, the survey revealed considerable regional variation

stunting rate in P’yŏngyang was found to be half that in cities 

north and east that are geographically removed from rural area

ies where the government was unable or unwilling to tran

scarce foodstuffs. According to a 2004 UN Food and Agric

Organization report, North Korea’s population is one of the 

undernourished in the world, in the company of the very p

nations such as Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Haiti. Despite the fl

international aid since the mid-1990s, there has been no signi

improvement in nutritional levels since 1995. 

With the loss of at least 5 percent of its population during the 

ine in the mid-1990s, and a lower birthrate and higher mortalit

since then, North Korea has seen a drop in its population and a 

rioration in the health of the people that would normally be seen 

in wartime. Estimates in 2007 indicate a birthrate of nearly 

births per 1,000 population, a death rate of just over 7.2 death

1,000, and an infant mortality rate of 22.5 per 1,000 live birth

total fertility rate for 2007 has been estimated at two childre

woman. 

The long-term health effects of a famine that ranks as one 

worst of the twentieth century, coupled with chronic food sho

that continue into a second decade and promise only more ma

ished North Korean children, will plague North Korea for ye

come. Its hopes for steady growth in its population, to compet

South Korea’s much larger population, have been soundly da

Meanwhile, the smaller, sicker population that remains after so 

deaths will likely need greater expenditures on health—and 

food for better nutrition—than the regime can afford without c

ued international aid or a drop in military expenditures. 

* * * 

Much of this chapter is based on the author’s 1999 book, K

song’s North Korea. The book is a declassified Central Intelli

Agency study originally prepared in the early 1980s and based 

130 
 

the sources available to the U.S. Government at that time, i

interviews with North Korean defectors, foreign diploma

stationed in P’yŏngyang or traveling to North Korea, East E

technicians working at North Korean industrial sites, and o

tors to the country. 

Bradley K. Martin’s Under the Loving Care of the 

Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty is the best s

information on the society published since 2003. Other 

studies that provide a more specific focus on a particular f

North Korean society are David R. Hawk’s report The 

Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps; Stephan 

and Marcus Noland’s Hunger and Human Rights: The P

Famine in North Korea; and The Great North Korean Fami

ine, Politics, and Foreign Policy by Andrew S. Natsios. 

Since the famine of the mid-1990s and the flood of Nort

refugees into China seeking to escape the deteriorating foo

tions and the tightening totalitarian controls, defector repo

provided a better and better understanding of North Korean 

These defector reports have been featured in newspaper an

zine articles, as well as academic journals and conferences

early twenty-first-century videos of a public execution 

Korea of people who have helped the refugees along the Chi

der have provided new sources of up-to-date, irrefutable info

Foreign visitors to North Korea, all carefully screene

regime beforehand, continue to write feature articles about 

its to P’yŏngyang. They are usually not allowed to trave

P’yŏngyang, however, the one exception to this having 

international humanitarian aid officials who have been al

many areas but not, for instance, in the northeast provinces. 

ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

Chapter 3. The Eco
The lead statuary of the Monument for Socialism, Revolution, and

Construction of Socialism, Mansudae Square, P’yŏngyang, complete

in April 1972. The handle on the torch is inscribed “chuch’e,” while

the book says “Selected Works of Kim Il Sung.” 

Courtesy Pulmyŏl ŭi t’ap (Tower of Immortality), P’yŏngyang: Muny

Ch’ulpansa, 1985, 63 
 

 

 

THE ECONOMY of the Democratic People’s Republic 

(DPRK), or North Korea, has undergone tremendous chan

the 1990s began. Compared to its neighbors—the Republic 

(South Korea), China, Russia, and Japan—North Korea is b

poorest and most backward country in Northeast Asia. The 

that North Korea’s economy underwent in the 1990s under th

ship of Kim Jong Il led many observers to expect that it wo

implode. That the North Korean regime has survived far lon

most expected and continues to function, and even reform 

omy, is an intriguing puzzle. However, although North Korea 

vived, its economy is in shambles and has contracted steepl

late 1990s, these pressures finally had forced the North Korea

ship to begin undertaking economic reforms, essentially ab

the Soviet-style centrally planned—or command—economy 

it had clung since the late 1940s under the leadership of Kim 

Whether those reforms can have their intended effect is a que

will only be answered in the future. 

North Korea has been—and remains—one of the most clo

eties in the world. Reliable information about the state and 

of its economy, as well as information about its economic 

tion, is exceedingly scarce. North Korea has made comparati

stantial strides toward openness since the 1990s, especially 

June 2000 summit between South Korea’s president Kim D

and Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) general secretary Kim Jon

increasingly deepened interactions between the two Kore

greater openness has led to better information than was p

available, although the quality and quantity of information ab

economic functions, such as gross domestic product (GDP—

sary), growth rates, and industrial production, remain superf

suspect at best. 

Economic Development, 1940s–90s 

The Economy after World War II 

North Korea has been one of the most closed, autarkic, 

tralized economies in the world since the late 1940s. Altho

situation began to change in the early twenty-first century, t

omy remains one of the most obscure and recondite. For dec

economy was organized around the doctrine of chuch’e (s

sary). Although in reality North Korea was heavily depende
 

and technology transfers from the Soviet Union and Chin

attempt to be virtually autarkic was a main aspect of its eco

until the late 1990s. 

At the end of the era of Japanese colonization of the Korean 

insula (1910–45), North Korea inherited the basic infrastructur

modern economy and achieved considerable success because 

ability of the communist regime to marshal underused resource

idle labor and to impose a low rate of consumption. The Jap

had developed extensive heavy industry, particularly in the m

lurgy and chemical industries, hydroelectric power, and min

the northern half of Korea, where they introduced modern m

methods. The southern half of the peninsula produced most 

rice and the majority of textiles. The hydroelectric and che

plants were said to be second to none in Asia at that time in ter

both their scale and technology. The same applied to the railroa

communication networks. 

There were, however, serious defects in the industrial stru

and their location. The Korean economy, geared primarily to b

the Japanese homeland, was made dependent on Japan. H

industry was limited to the production of mainly raw mat

semifinished goods, and war supplies, which were then shipp

Japan for final processing, consumption, or deployment. Japa

not allow Korea to develop a machine-tool industry. Most indu

sectors were strategically located on the eastern or western 

near ports so as to connect them efficiently with Japan. Railroa

works ran mainly along the north–south axis, facilitating Ja

access to the Asian mainland. Because the Japanese held alm

key government positions and owned and controlled the indu

and financial enterprises, only a few Koreans acquired the 

skills essential for modernization. Moreover, the Japanes

behind an agrarian structure—land tenure system, size of land 

ings and farm operations, and pattern of land use and 

income—that needed much reform. 

The sudden termination of the Japanese occupation at the e

World War II, in August 1945, and the subsequent partition 

nation brought economic chaos (see National Division in the 1

ch. 1). Severance of the complementary “agricultural” South 

the “industrial” North and from Japan meant that North Korea

ditional market for raw materials and semifinished goods as w

its sources of food and manufactured goods were cut off. Fu

more, the withdrawal of the entrepreneurial and engineering 

supplied mainly by Japanese personnel affected the economic 

Thus, the task facing the communist regime in the North w

136 
develop a viable economy, which it reoriented mainly tow

communist-run nations, while at the same time rectifying t

formation” in the colonial industrial structure. The problem 

ther compounded by the devastation of the industrial base d

Korean War (see The Korean War, 1950–53, ch. 1). North 

economic development did not begin in earnest until 

Korean War. 

North Korea’s Development Strategy 

During what North Korea called its “peaceful cons

period before the Korean War, the fundamental task of the 

was to overtake the level of output and efficiency attained to

end of the Japanese occupation. This effort included rest

and developing a viable economy oriented toward the com

bloc nations and beginning the process of socializing the e

Nationalization of key industrial enterprises and land reform

which were carried out in 1946, laid the groundwork for tw

sive one-year plans in 1947 and 1948, respectively, and for 

Year Plan (1949–50). During this period, a piece-rate wag

and an independent accounting system began to be applied

commercial network increasingly came under state and coo

ownership. 

The basic goal of the Three-Year Postwar Reconstruct

(1954–56) was to reconstruct an economy devastated by th

War. The plan stressed more than merely regaining the prew

levels. China, the Soviet Union, and East European count

vided reconstruction assistance. The highest priority was de

heavy industry, but an earnest effort to collectivize farm

began. At the end of 1957, output of most industrial comm

except for a few items, such as chemical fertilizers, carb

sulfuric acid, where the recovery took longer, had returned 

levels. 

Having basically completed the task of reconstruction, 

planned to lay a solid foundation for industrialization while 

ing the socialization process and solving the basic problem

and shelter during the Five-Year Plan (1957–61). The soci

process was completed by 1958 in all sectors of the econo

the Ch’ŏllima Work Team Movement (see Glossary) was int

Although growth rates reportedly were high, there were 

imbalances among different economic sectors. Because 

went to individuals and enterprises that met production quo

tic efforts to fulfill plan targets in competition with other en

and industries caused efforts to be disproportionate between 
 

 

 

enterprises, between industry and agriculture, and between ligh

heavy industries. Because resources were limited and the trans

tion system suffered bottlenecks, supplies went primarily to 

cally well-connected enterprises or those whose man

complained the loudest. An enterprise or industry that perfo

better than others often did so at the expense of others. 

Until 1960 North Korea’s economy grew faster than that 

South. During the reconstruction period after the Korean War, 

were opportunities for extensive economic growth. This genera

tern of initially high growth resulting in a strong rate of capita

mation was mirrored in the other Soviet-style economies. To

the end of the 1950s, as reconstruction work was completed an

capacity began to diminish, the economy had to shift from the e

sive to the intensive stage, where the simple discipline of marsh

underused resources became less effective. In the new stage, 

ciency arising from emerging bottlenecks led to diminishing re

Further growth could be attained only by increasing efficienc

technological progress (see The Economy, ch. 1). 

Beginning in the early 1960s, a series of pervasive and s

bottlenecks began to impede development. Blockages gen

were created by the lack of arable land, skilled labor, energy

transportation and by deficiencies in the extraction industries. M

over, both land and marine transportation lacked modern equip

and infrastructure. The inability of the energy and mining secto

well as of the transportation network, to supply power and raw 

rials as rapidly as the manufacturing plants could absorb them 

to slow industrial growth. The Five-Year Plan targets were m

completed by 1959, and the year 1960 was officially categorize

“buffer year” before the next plan started in 1961. 

The First Seven-Year Plan (1961–67) built on the groundw

the previous plans but changed the focus of industrialization. H

industry, with the machine-tool industry as its linchpin, gained 

tinuing priority. During the plan, however, and because of the 

drawal of Soviet aid during the Sino–Soviet dispute, the eco

experienced widespread slowdowns and reverses for the first tim

sharp contrast to the rapid and uninterrupted growth during th

vious plans. Poor performance forced the regime to extend th

for three additional years, to 1970. During the last part of t

facto 10-year plan, emphasis shifted to pursuing parallel dev

ment of the economy and of defense capabilities. 

The Six-Year Plan (1971–76) followed immediately after the 

ous plan, but in the aftermath of the poor performance of the pre

plan, growth targets of the Six-Year Plan were scaled down su

138 
 

 

 

tially. Because some of the proposed targets in the First Se

Plan had not been attained even by 1970, the Six-Year Pla

deviate much from its predecessor in basic goals. The Six-Y

placed more emphasis on technological advance, self-suffi

industrial raw materials, improving product quality, correctin

ances among different sectors, and developing the power an

tive industries; the last of these had been deemed largely re

for slowdowns during the First Seven-Year Plan. The plan c

attaining a self-sufficiency rate of 60 to 70 percent in all indus

tors by substituting domestic raw materials wherever possib

organizing and renovating technical processes to make such 

tion feasible. Improving transport capacity became one of th

tasks in accelerating economic development—understandably 

it was one of the major bottlenecks threatening the Six-Year P

By the end of August 1975, North Korea claimed to have 

the Six-Year Plan 16 months ahead of schedule. Under the 

stances, it was expected that the next plan would start witho

in 1976, a year early. However, it was not until nearly 30 

later that the plan was unveiled; 1976 and 1977 became 

years. 

The inability of the planners to formulate and institute e

plans continuously reveals as much about the inefficacy of 

itself as about the extent of the economic difficulties and ad

tive disruptions facing North Korea. Targets for successive p

example, had to be based on the accomplishments of p

plans. If these targets were underfulfilled, all targets of the n

had to be reformulated and adjusted. 

The basic thrust of the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978–84

achieve the three-pronged goals of self-reliance, moderniza

“scientification.” Although the emphasis on self-reliance was 

it had not previously been the explicit focus of an economic p

ing the 1970s, North Korea was not nearly as closed off to th

tional community as it became during and after the 1980s. A

trade accounted for a relatively small proportion of the count

economy during the Cold War, North Korea still traded w

countries. And, while most of the trade was conducted with C

the Soviet Union, a surprisingly large proportion of trade occu

side the communist bloc. For example, during the 1970s, abou

cent of North Korea’s trade was with Japan, and more than 1

was with nations belonging to the Organisation for Econo

Operation and Development (OECD—see Glossary). 

This new emphasis on self-reliance might have been a re

the mounting foreign debt originating from large-scale im
Western machinery and equipment in the mid-1970s. Through 

ernization North Korea hoped to increase mechanization and 

mation in all sectors of the economy through the proce

scientification, the adoption of up-to-date production and ma

ment techniques. The specific objectives of the economic plan 

to strengthen the fuel, energy, and resource bases of industry th

priority development of the energy and extractive industries; to 

ernize industry; to substitute domestic resources for certain imp

raw materials; to expand freight-carrying capacity; and to acce

a technical revolution in agriculture. 

All indications are that the Second Seven-Year Plan was no

cessful. North Korea generally downplayed the accomplishme

the plan, and no other plan received less official fanfare. It wa

cially claimed that the economy had grown at an annual rate 

percent during the plan, somewhat below the planned rate of 9.

cent. The reliability of this aggregate measure, however, is h

questionable. By official admission, the targets of only six com

ities were attained (cereals and grains among them). After the 

concluded, there was no new economic plan for two years, an in

tion of both the plan’s failure and the severity of the econom

planning problems confronting the economy in the mid-1980s. 

The main targets of the Third Seven-Year Plan (1987–93) w

achieve the “Ten Long-Range Major Goals of the 1980s for the 

struction of the Socialist Economy.” These goals included the 

previous policy goals of self-reliance, modernization, and sci

cation. Furthermore, the plan gave more attention to developin

eign trade and joint ventures. Because of the collapse of the so

bloc in the late 1980s, the plan never had a serious chance o

ceeding, and in 1993 North Korea admitted it was not successfu

December 8, 1993, Premier Kang Song-san said that, “Due 

collapse of socialist countries and the socialist market, our cou

economic cooperation and trade have faced setbacks. Thi

brought serious damage to our economic construction, and the

our Third Seven-Year Plan has had a hard time achieving its g

After 1993, North Korea did not promulgate plans. 

The end of the Cold War (1945–89) severely shook North K

During the Cold War, North Korea had been able to rely on exte

Soviet and Chinese military, technological, and economic aid

aid had been large in absolute terms, and, more importantly, ha

vided North Korea access to more advanced technology than it 

otherwise have obtained on its own. Beginning in 1989, the 

Korean economy underwent a series of shock waves. The limi

centrally planned economy had already begun to be reached d

140 
 

A streetcar in downtown P’yŏngyang, J

Courtesy Overseas Pan-Korean Center, Washin

the 1980s, and to compound these problems, the Soviet U

China abandoned North Korea and stopped providing aid a

rials at “friendship prices.” Both the Soviet Union and Ch

normalized relations with South Korea. From US$260 milli

to the North in 1980, by 1987 North Korea was actually r

deficit with the Soviet Union, and by 1990 all aid from Mos

ceased. In 1992 China also decided to make North Korea pa

prices for goods previously sold at friendship prices, thu

aggravating North Korea’s problems. As a result, North 

imports of oil and grain from China dropped dramatical

early 1990s. For example, while North Korea had imported 

lion tons of coal from China in 1988, by 1996 that am

dropped precipitously, to only 100,000 tons. 

The severe problems inherent in a centrally planned econ

fully manifested themselves by the mid-1980s, and the econ

started its decline even before the Soviet Union and Chi

doned aid to the North. By 1990 North Korea’s economy h

to contract, experiencing negative GDP growth rates from 

1998. Only in 1999 did that growth actually turn positive fo

time in a decade. By 2003, South Korea’s Ministry of Un

estimated gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) per 

North Korea at US$762, and a total GNP of US$17 billio

industrial capacity was half what it had been in 1989. 
Economic Infrastructure Since the Early 1990

Comparisons with South Korea 

Although North Korea recovered more quickly from the K

War than the South, by the mid-1960s, South Korea had beg

economic development, and its economy was growing rapid

the 1980s, South Korea had caught and surpassed the North in 

absolute GDP and per capita income. North Korea recovered ra

from the war of 1950–53, in large measure as a result of exte

aid from the Soviet Union and China. At its peak in 1960, 

Korea’s absolute GNP was almost 80 percent that of South Ko

However, as the South began its development under Presiden

Chung-hee in the 1960s, the North rapidly fell behind. Wi

decade, North Korea’s economy was half the absolute size of 

Korea’s, and by 1990 it was only 10 percent of the South’s. By 

most estimates put the South’s economy at 33 times larger th

North’s. The South has a population roughly twice that of the N

and although per capita incomes were roughly similar until a

1975, the South’s continued economic dynamism meant that by 

South Korean per capita income was roughly US$6,000, whil

in the North was about US$1,000. By 2003, the per capita in

gap between the two countries had again expanded dramat

North Korea’s GNP per capita was then roughly US$762, whil

in the South was 10 times more, at US$17,800. 

Organization 

North Korea historically was organized on lines similar to 

centrally planned economies. Property rights belonged largely 

state, resources were allocated through plans and not through 

kets, and prices and money were not the central features of the 

omy. Up until 1998, the state constitution recognized two g

economic categories: state-owned enterprises and worker coo

tives (see The Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). From the late 

to the late 1980s, North Korea had one of the most complete so

economies in the world. 

The KWP is the supreme power in North Korea, and it ha

control over the government and state organs. The constitu

revisions of September 1998 retained the stipulations that the “

ocratic People’s Republic of Korea shall conduct all activities 

the leadership of the Workers’ Party.” No decision can be 

without the approval of the party, and the party retains full c

over economic enterprises, factories, and the cooperative farms

142 
The system of party control over the economy was form

the Taean Work System (see Glossary), which Kim Il Sung an

on a visit he made to the Taean County Electrical Appliance 

December 1961. The Taean Work System continued for 4

Under this system, factory party committees’ collective le

oversaw production activities, and these factory party co

were under the direct control of the provincial KWP chapters

tory party committee was responsible not only for business an

cal aspects of the factory, but also for political and moral asp

secretary of the factory, a member of the provincial party cha

sided over the factory party committee, organized produc

management goals, and was responsible for ensuring that p

political directives were followed in the factory. This role 

secretary tremendous control, despite the appearance of a co

decision-making organization, and some party chiefs abu

power by making unilateral decisions without regard to the m

of the factory. North Korea abandoned the Taean Work Syste

2002 and introduced a new economic management system (s

and Administrative Reforms, this ch.). 

Forced collectivization of the North Korean agricultura

occurred between 1945 and 1958. More than 1 million farm 

holds were turned into collectivized farms, with a smaller n

designated “state farms.” North Korea achieved this change 

massive loss of life or disruption, and this relatively succes

lectivization stands in contrast to the Chinese and Sovie

ences, where forced collectivization led to mass famine an

life in the millions. By the late 1990s, there were appro

3,000 cooperatives, 300 state farms, and 240 other farms. D

1950s, Kim Il Sung announced in a series of speeches t

framework of collectivization for agricultural development 

sufficiency in North Korea. These speeches included four ba

ciples: mechanization, chemicalization, irrigation, and el

tion. This framework came to be known as the Ch’ŏngsan-n

(see Glossary) of agriculture, taking its name from a smal

tural collective near P’yŏngyang, where, in 1960, Kim h

time talking with farmers and reportedly providing “on

guidance.” The KWP Central Committee formally adopted 

principles and the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method on February 25, 

with the Taean Work System, the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method 

ceased to function by the early 2000s. 

The Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method was essentially unchanged unti

stitutional revisions of September 1998 formally permitte

ownership of assets, as well as instituting the Cabinet of M
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tion Service,” Seoul, 2005, http://kores.net/; and John C. Wu, “The Mineral In

of North Korea” in United States Geological Survey, Mineral Year Book, 3, A

Reports: International, Washington, DC, 2005, http://minerals.usgs.gov/miner

pubs/country/2005/knmyb05.pdf.

Figure 6. Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 2005 

144 
 

 

composed mainly of the heads of ministries (see The Executiv

Concurrently, the government administrative reform of S

1998 aimed to cut expenditures and increase efficiency 

greater centralization of functionally related bureaucracies at 

ter, and through delegation of responsibilities to local uni

actions had the result of decreasing central control over local 

trative authorities. 

Most notably, North Korea’s industrial structure profile is 

relatively industrialized country. In 2003 agriculture made 

27.2 percent of the economy, mining 7.8 percent, manu

18.5 percent, and services 32.8 percent. This is the profile o

try that has managed to begin moving beyond abject poverty

North Korea’s growth rates have varied significantly by 

Although growth was slow from 2001 to 2003, there was e

across all major sectors. Mining and power generation sho

most growth (3.2 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively), but 

manufacturing, and agriculture also all reveal positive grow

lowing the 1990 drop-off in oil imports and the floods and f

the mid- to late 1990s, although the overall economy contr

almost 25 percent, trade volume has increased. Agricultur

has rebounded from a low in 1997, but production of most i

and mining goods remains reduced. mostly as a result of th

energy and demand. 

Natural Resources 

North Korea’s major natural resources include coal, copp

spar, gold, graphite, iron ore, lead, magnesite, pyrites, salt, 

and zinc (see fig. 6). The country also has uranium ore 

which often have been cited in the international crisis ov

Korea’s nuclear weapons program that may include a 

enrichment program in addition to its known plutonium repr

program (see The United States, ch. 4). 

Some 22.4 percent—about 27,000 square kilometers—

Korea’s land is arable. Of this area, about 8 percent is in p

crops. Because of adverse weather conditions, agriculture i

dependent on insecticides, chemical fertilizers, and el

driven irrigation systems. The latter require energy resou

North Korea desperately lacks since the cut-off of Ru

imports in the early 1990s and shortages of hydroelectr

since the prolonged drought in the mid-1990s. For all these 

the North never has been and is not likely ever to be self-suf

food (see Agriculture, the Famine of 1995–98, and E

Changes; Foreign Economic Relations, this ch.). 
 

Energy and Power Generation 

A major problem for the North Korean economy lies in its e

sector. A stable energy supply is fundamental to a sustainable 

omy, and North Korea’s outdated and crumbling energy gri

drag on the entire economy. Energy shortages began in 1990 

the Soviet Union and China severely reduced their fuel expo

North Korea. The reduction in imports resulted in part from c

ued Western economic sanctions against the North and in part 

North Korea’s inability to pay for energy imports with hard cur

Much of the energy infrastructure is outdated, poorly maint

and based on obsolete technology. Because the power grid is 

and dilapidated, even if supply constraints were eased by incr

imports, the actual transmission of energy, especially elect

would remain problematic. Outdated distribution facilities and 

ficient management also lead to a major loss of power during 

mission itself. The system has been driven to collapse because 

lack of investment in the energy infrastructure, and because 

Korea faces limitations on both the technology and the c

needed to improve energy efficiency, rehabilitate its transm

grid, and develop reliable power plants. According to South K

Ministry of Unification, 70 percent of North Korea’s power fac

have either been abandoned or are in urgent need of repair. 

Since 1990 North Korea’s energy use has declined, m

mainly by a drastic drop in oil imports. For example, North K

crude oil imports in 2002 were 23 percent of those of 1990, and 

has been no rise in refining capacity since 1975. 

The decline in oil imports has had a negative impact sinc

early 1990s. North Korea’s total volume of power-generation c

ity in 1998 was 7.1 million kilowatts, and by 2003 it had only 

to 7.7 million kilowatts. Whereas in 1990 North Korea pro

27.7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, in 2002 it produced on

billion kilowatt-hours, or 6 percent of South Korea’s produ

Night-time satellite photography showing electric light usage re

North Korea, except for P’yŏngyang, as a “black hole” in Nor

Asia. 

A light-water nuclear-reactor project in Kŭmho, on the e

coast in South Hamgyŏng Province, opened in December 199

cooperative undertaking between North Korea and the Korean 

insula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multil

consortium composed initially of representatives from the Eur

Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Kŭmh

a relative success story until work stopped on the reactors in 20

a result of tension between North Korea and the United State

146 
 

suspected North Korean infringements of the 1994 Agreed 

work (see Glossary; The United States, ch. 4). This project 

intended for widespread economic use but was designed 

workers from Japan, South Korea, and the United States 

building site. Because foreign workers actually lived at 

North Korean and foreign officials had to reach a number 

ments covering such issues as currency exchange, mail and 

nications exchange, and travel and housing. 

Although the North is attempting to develop renewable s

energy, such as hydroelectric power and wind power, these 

still do not meet primary-energy demand. Hydroelectric po

stituted 17 percent of North Korea’s energy use in 2002, 

remained the mainstay of energy production, accounting fo

cent of primary-energy use. Until major renovations in th

sector can be implemented, the entire North Korean econ

remain severely impeded. Because North Korea lacks the tec

and the capital with which to upgrade transmission and g

facilities, the task of renovation will be a long process, if it 

all. 

Transportation 

Railroad, highway, air, and water transportation all are 

North Korea. Railroads are the most important mode of tr

tion, linking all major cities and accounting for about 86 p

freight and about 80 percent of passenger traffic. Roads, on 

hand, support only 12 percent of the freight-transporting 

and rivers and the sea, only 2 percent. Transportation by 

than for military purposes within North Korea, is negligible 

7; fig. 8). 

Railroads and Rapid Transit 

In 2002 North Korea had 5,214 kilometers of railroads, s

percent of the South’s total. Even though the North has more 

ters of railroads than the South, 80 percent of these railroads 

trified, and thus operations frequently are suspended beca

lack of power in the grid. It is believed that North Korea h

300 electric and numerous diesel locomotives. About 35 mil

senger journeys occur each year. The great majority of North 

freight is carried by rail in the interior, amounting to about 

lion tons annually. 

Two major railroad lines run north–south in the interior, 

each along the east and west coasts. Two east–west lines 

Wŏnsan and P’yŏngyang by a central and a southerly rou
 

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Figure 7. Primary Roads and Expressways, 2005 

part of a third link line constructed in the 1980s connects provin

the mountainous far north near the border with China. The ra

system is linked with the railroads of China and Russia, alth

gauge inconsistencies necessitate some dual gauging with Russ

North Korea and South Korea continue to reconnect rail 

between the two countries, there has also been a need to stren

the carrying capacity of the northern railroads, which have de

rated as a result of the lack of infrastructure maintenance sin

1980s. 

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Figure 8. Primary Railroads, Ports, and Airports, 2006 

A subway system opened in P’yŏngyang in 1973 with 

another line was added in 1978. The system has an estima

kilometers of track and 17 stations. 

Roads 

North Korea’s road network was estimated at 31,200 ki

in 1999. Of this total, only 1,997 kilometers were paved, 

only 682 kilometers were multilane highways. By 2005 exp
 

 

linked P’yŏngyang with Hŭich’ŏn to the north, with Wŏnsan 

east, Namp’o to the west, and Kaesŏng to the south near the w

section of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ—see Glossary). Wŏ

on the east coast, is linked by expressway to Kosŏng near the e

section of the DMZ. However, 29,203 kilometers (93.6 perc

the 1999 total) of North Korea’s roads had gravel, crushed sto

dirt surfaces, and maintenance on many roads was poor. Most 

paved roads are less than two lanes wide. 

Maritime Capabilities 

North Korea has a harbor loading capacity of 35.5 million t

percent of the capacity of South Korea. The major port facilitie

ice free—are at Namp’o and Haeju on the west coast and Najin 

referred to in the media as Rajin), Ch’ŏngjin, Hŭngnam, and W

on the east coast. United Nations (UN) statistics for 2002 repo

North Korea had ships totaling 870,000 gross registered tons. In 

the merchant fleet itself was composed of 232 ships of 1,000 

registered tons or more. These ships included, by type, the follo

176 cargo carriers, 14 bulk carriers, four container ships, three 

stock carriers, five dual-purpose passenger/cargo ships, 17 petr

tankers, three refrigerated-cargo ships, eight roll-on/roll-off 

one chemical tanker, and one vehicle carrier ship. 

Civil Aviation 

In 2003 North Korea had an estimated 78 usable airports, 

which had permanent-surface runways and 43, unpaved run

North Korea’s Sunan International Airport is located 20 kilom

northeast of P’yŏngyang and offers about 20 flights per we

North Korean, Chinese, and Russian carriers. Other major ai

are located at Ch’ŏngjin, Hamhŭng, Najin, and Wŏnsan. The

also 19 heliports. The state-run airline, which uses a fleet 

Soviet-made planes, is Air Koryo. It provides domestic serv

three airports and foreign service to eight cities in China, Tha

Germany, and Russia. North Korean aircraft seldom are use

transporting cargo. In 2001, according to UN statistics, only 

per kilometer were carried by air, as compared with South K

11,503 tons per kilometer. 

Forestry and Fishing 

Because of oil shortages, most forestry products are used fo

with only small amounts of timber (roundwood) going for con

tion and manufacturing. In 2002, according to an estimate by the 

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, North Korea 

150 
duced 7.1 million meters of roundwood. Fishing provides a

tant supplement to the diet and for export. The catch in 200

200,000 tons of wild-caught freshwater and saltwater fish, 

and mollusks and about 63,700 tons produced using aquacult

Telecommunications and the Internet 

North Korea’s telecommunications and Internet netw

largely on obsolete Soviet- and Chinese-made equipmen

from the 1950s and 1960s. The sector is deprived of any n

ernment financing and is faced with unreliable electricity su

severe deficits in modern equipment, spare parts, elementary 

nents, and raw materials. As a result, the networks are high

able and inefficient, cost-insensitive, labor extensive, and s

frequent breakdowns. 

Despite these problems, one-third of North Korean villag

access to prepaid cell phones and other telephones that allow 

make long-distance calls both domestically and internati

some personal risk. North Korea also has several dozen mod

communications facilities and academic research institu

sophisticated telecommunications equipment, allowing the

to and use of modern telecommunications technologies, i

wireless radio and telephone, satellite communications, 

Internet. Only a few privileged North Koreans have such ac

public Internet use is restricted by the state. 

The North Korean Ministry of Posts and Telecommun

working with the International Telecommunication Union 

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has la

optic cable lines throughout North Korea. By 2000 a na

communication network using fiber-optic cables had been se

by 2003 some 938,000 telephones were in use. The P’y

Informatics Center has begun developing software, focusin

commercial markets. The center’s products include a secure 

gram that is being marketed through a Japanese company. A

to political scientist Alexandre Mansurov, several North 

computer institutes are equipped with between 200 and 3

Pentium IV desktop computers hooked up to multiple Sun M

tem servers running Microsoft Windows platforms with p

such as Microsoft Office, Adobe Photoshop, and other word

ing and desktop-publishing software. In May 2002, the fir

Internet café opened in P’yŏngyang, equipped with six perso

puters and charging US$3 per hour (roughly one-sixth the 

salary of an average worker). By 2005 there were six or sev

net cafés in P’yŏngyang, one equipped with 100 compu
 

 

 

North Korean government operates five official Web sites in 

and one in China, and its diplomats around the world commu

with P’yŏngyang through e-mail. North Korea is said to have 

oped extensive “intranets,” including the Kwangmyong-net r

edly used by more than 2 million subscribers, and the Hoon-net

mainly by foreigners. 

Chinese telecommunication companies are aggressively ex

ing their reach into North Korea. In 2003 Chinese cell-phone co

nies started building relay stations along the North Korean b

and as many as 20,000 North Koreans have access to Chines

phones, despite government attempts to ban their use. High-ra

Korean People’s Army (KPA) and KWP cadres do have acc

Global Standard for Mobile (GSM) communications-based m

phones in P’yŏngyang. Foreign government delegations vi

P’yŏngyang, especially from the South, use satellite phones for 

munication with their respective capitals. The first GSM ce

telephone network for 5,000 subscribers was established i

Najin–Sŏnbong area in early 2002, and a mobile-telephone ne

for foreign subscribers was launched in P’yŏngyang at the e

2002. 

Government Budget 

The Ministry of Finance controls all aspects of the governm

budget. The state budget is a major government instrument in 

ing out the country's economic goals. Expenditures repres

about 75 percent of GNP in the mid-1980s—the allocation of 

reflected the priorities assigned to different economic sectors. 

were abolished in 1974 as “remnants of an antiquated society.” 

action, however, did not have any significant effect on state re

because the overwhelming proportion of government fund

average of 98.1 percent during 1961–70—was from turnover (

taxes, deductions from profits paid by state enterprises, and v

user fees on machinery and equipment, irrigation facilities, t

sion sets, and water. 

In order to provide a certain degree of local autonomy as w

to lessen the financial burden of the central government, a 

budget system” was introduced in 1973. Under this system, p

cial authorities are responsible for the operating costs of instit

and enterprises not under direct central government control, su

schools, hospitals, shops, and local consumer-goods producti

return, they are expected to organize as many profitable ventu

possible and to turn over profits to the central government. 

Around November each year, the state budget for the follo

fiscal year (see Glossary) is drafted, subject to revision a

152 
March. Typically, total revenues exceed expenditures by 

margin, with the surplus carried over to the following year. 

ing to these broad statistics, North Korea’s central gov

expenditures for 2002 were US$10 billion, or 58 percent 

GDP. The largest share of the budget, nearly US$4.2 billi

percent), was devoted to the national economy, while US

lion, or 14.4 percent, went to the military. A total of 38.8 p

the government budget was devoted to “People’s Policy

included public welfare, science, health, and education. 

spending as a share of total expenditures traditionally has co

a major part of the government budget (see Defense Industr

The Ministry of Finance also controls government 

including banks. North Korea nationalized banks in Aug

and, on December 6, 1947, established the Central Bank of t

ocratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Foreign Trade Ba

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was founded in 195

duct international business for the Central Bank. Since 19

have been a number of joint-venture banks and also four i

companies. 

The Central Bank issues currency, regulates the money 

sets official foreign-exchange rates, deals with the purchase 

of gold and foreign exchange, and handles foreign loans. 

eign Trade Bank, under the supervision of the Central Bank

transactions and letters of credit related to foreign trade and 

the foreign-exchange payments of foreign-trade organizat

other enterprises. The Kŭmgang Bank is a specialized bank 

dles transactions of foreign-trade organizations dealing with 

and imports of machinery, metals, mineral products, and 

products. The Daesong Bank handles transactions of the 

Trading Company and other trading organizations. 

Agriculture, the Famine of 1995–98, and Eco

Changes 

Collapse in the 1990s 

The agricultural system in North Korea essentially col

the 1990s, with severe economic and social repercussions 

out the country. Under the best weather conditions, the c

North Korea allows only one growing season, from June to 

and some experts estimate that even in normal times, Nor

would have a 12 percent shortfall in the grain production re

feed its people. Before the division of the peninsula, the 

half imported food from the more-fertile South. With the di

the peninsula, North Korea attempted to be self-sufficien
 

production, a largely unattainable goal. That North Korea is u

to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture is not surprising—mos

trally planned economies have inherent limitations because 

structure of land ownership and use, as well as the collect

nature of the organization and management of agricultural pr

tion. In the case of North Korea, the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method em

sized mass mobilization and political conditioning, to the detr

of efficient agricultural practices. 

During the 1995–97 period, North Korea experienced a ser

ecological shocks—drought and flooding—that devastated 

already weakened agricultural sector and resulted in a natio

famine. It is highly unusual for an industrialized country with a 

tively advanced standard of living to experience famine. Famin

floods since the mid-1990s have devastated the agricultural s

and reports of starvation and undernourishment are common

Indeed, some scholars have estimated that from a peak around 

North Korea’s agricultural production contracted by up to 50 pe

When North Korea collectivized agriculture and centralized 

sion making in the 1950s, with the goal of food self-sufficien

achieved large quantitative increases in output. These increases 

mainly the result of even-larger quantitative increases in inputs

as fertilizers, and clearing land not normally suitable for agricu

Between 1961 and 1988, grain production expanded by 2.8 p

per year. 

However, while these increases in fertilizer use, irrigation, and 

trification explain the past success of North Korean agriculture

also explain the subsequent decline in the 1990s. Pursuit of food 

sufficiency led to a heavy reliance on chemicals and fertilizer. Ov

of the arable land led to acidification and erosion of the soil. M

ally productive areas increasingly were converted to farmland

this practice led to flooding as the topsoil eroded and defores

occurred (see The Physical Environment, ch. 2). According t

agronomists, the soil deposition into the river system raised rive

toms to such a degree that the rivers are no longer capable of ab

ing the water from heavy rains or spring thaw. The annual flo

that occurs thus has become increasingly severe. Furthermore, 

izer use dropped dramatically in the 1990s as the North lost the 

to import fertilizers at friendship prices from China and the f

Soviet Union. For example, although North Korea had used 319 

grams of nitrogenous fertilizers per hectare in 1990, that amoun

dropped to 35 kilograms per hectare by 1996. 

As a result of these problems, by the early 1990s the agricu

system was even less able to produce enough grains and other 

stuffs to feed the population. For example, in 1992 grain de

154 
 

Red Cross food aid at Haeju Port, South Hwanghae Province, Jan

Courtesy Ministry of Unificat

exceeded supply by more than 1 million tons. Initially, Nor

drew down stockpiles and attempted other short-term measu

as exhorting the citizens to eat only two meals a day. Howe

before the ecological disruptions of the mid-1990s, the sy

begun to collapse. 

Causes of the Famine 

The famine in the mid-1990s was a result of both syste

proximate causes. By the early 1990s, there was clear evid

severe decline across the entire North Korean economy. Ha

the Soviet Union and China as major subsidy providers, t

omy began to falter. In particular, the loss of agricultural 

and fertilizer and energy imports from the Soviet Union an

had an immediate impact on agricultural output. 

The failure of collective farming was also a factor in the co

agricultural production. The main systemic problem in coll

farming—as in all centralized economies—is the disparity 
 

 

effort and reward. In North Korea, farmers were paid on the ba

points for workdays, as well as political loyalty to the state. How

monitoring effort is difficult in dispersed agricultural setting

often workers physically would be in the fields but make no s

effort at work. As long as the system was able to receive large am

of inputs in the form of cheap fertilizer and capital equipment fr

socialist allies, output could generally increase, even though th

ductivity of the individual workers was not improving and, in 

probably decreasing. When the inputs began to decline in the 

1990s, the system was unable to adjust accordingly. 

The proximate cause of the famine itself began with massive 

mer floods in 1995 that destroyed that year’s harvest. Floods i

and August that year inundated 400,000 hectares of arable land

placed 500,000 people, and reduced grain production by 1.9 m

tons, which was about 30 percent of the annual grain supply. S

flooding continued in 1996 and was followed abruptly in 1997 

severe drought. In 1997 North Korea’s Central News A

reported that large reservoirs were 10 to 20 percent below no

and almost 620 smaller reservoirs were close to empty. Prol

drought and light snowfall in the winter of 1997–98 led to an

grain shortfall of 1.9 million tons. A chronic shortage of e

resources further compounded the situation. 

Effects of the Famine 

North Korea underwent a severe economic, environmenta

demographic crisis in the mid-1990s. However, the extent of th

sis is still unknown, because outside observers have not had 

access to the most-affected areas in North Korea. In particular, 

is considerable scholarly dispute over the actual number of d

that occurred as a result of the famine. A bipartisan team o

congressional staff members visited North Korea in August 

and concluded that famine-related deaths amounted to 300,0

800,000 annually. The famine was so severe that North Kore

forced to ask for international aid, for the first time allowing of

of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the 

World Food Programme into every province in North Korea. 

Post-Famine Situation 

North Korea had its best harvest in a decade in 2004. Even s

harvest was not enough to feed its people. A report by the 

World Food Programme projected domestic cereals availabil

2004–5 at 4.24 million tons, a 2.4 percent increase from the pre

year. The 2004 rice paddy harvest was estimated at 2.4 million 

156 
while corn output was unchanged at 1.7 million tons. The 

need for the year 2004–5 was estimated at 5.1 million tons, 

gap of 900,000 tons. 

After the devastating famine of the mid-1990s, the ag

sector began to stabilize in the early twenty-first century. 

cally, however, North Korea will never be able to attain f

sufficiency. Indeed, even South Korea has never been in t

tion. Under the best of conditions, self-sufficiency in agric

impossible for North Korea, and the current conditions are 

ideal. Although the agricultural sector has been partially pr

the overuse of fertilizer and subsequent deforestation of ar

have ruined much of the potentially arable land for a gene

come. Furthermore, lacking a fully free market and access t

and technology, the system has not come anywhere near e

and there is little potential for reform in the near future. 

Economic Reforms 

By the 1980s, the inherent limitations of North Korea’s 

planned economy had begun to be reached, as demonstrate

failure of the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978–84). Compoun

situation, the end of the Cold War and the loss of support fro

and the Soviet Union in close succession, as well as the f

the mid-1990s, combined to devastate the North Korean eco

response, North Korea cautiously began to move toward 

called economic adjustments (the term reform would have s

there had been something wrong with the state’s economic 

but the leadership allowed that adjustments could be 

Although North Korea initially made mostly empty pronoun

about economic reform, more dramatic changes occurred in 

On July 1, 2002, North Korea significantly adjusted the p

tribution system that had been a major element of the 

planned economy. North Korea adopted monetized economic 

tions and changed the incentives for labor and companies. T

also adopted a number of policies and strategies designed to 

foreign investment and trade. However, although the refor

centrally planned and administered, they were not comprehe

a result, a multilayered and partly decentralized economy 

where prices were allowed to float and private ownership and 

were permitted, but the state still owned most of the major en

and still controlled workers in many other ways. The governm

mulgated new laws that covered central planning, agriculture

resources, and industrial sectors. Concurrently, there were n

on stock, joint-stock companies, joint ventures with foreign f
 

a number of other decrees that opened the economy to more f

participation. Administrative and managerial responsibilities wer

egated from KWP officials to industrial and commercial man

Assets in oil refining, mining, manufacturing, textiles, and foo

cessing became subject to corporate ownership. 

The changes of 2002 were categorically different from 

announced earlier. In July 2003, the former U.S. ambassad

South Korea, James Laney, and Jason Shaplen, a former advi

KEDO, noted that, “In the two months prior to the October 

HEU [highly enriched uranium] revelation, North Korea had

remarkable speed, undertaken an important series of positive 

tives that seemed the polar opposite of its posturing on the n

issue ... [representing] the most promising signs of change o

peninsula in decades.” 

These reforms affected the entire society, whereas previous r

efforts were partial, segmented, and largely restricted to peri

sectors of the economy. The earlier reform efforts extended o

areas easily controlled by the regime, such as foreign direct i

ment or special economic zones that could be cordoned off from 

Korean society at large. The implication of wider reforms was th

regime was taking a much larger step—and having a greater imp

society—than before. It also meant that the regime was making 

ger gamble, because the effects of the changes would be diffic

control. Although the partial reform efforts of 2002 may be too li

to bring about economic recovery, the effect on society is increa

irreversible. Yet with much control remaining within the govern

economic reform is still partial. North Korea is no longer a cen

planned economy, but the new institutions for “market socialism

either nascent or nonexistent. 

There is considerable skepticism among foreign analysts 

whether these changes are genuine or simply a minimalist attem

the regime to “muddle through.” There is also skepticism 

whether any reform measures can actually make a differen

North Korea’s economy. Some experts have argued that only 

plete and thorough political and economic change can generat

tainable economy activity. Others see more potential for succ

the set of “China-style” reforms that North Korea has b

Although the ultimate assessment of the reforms will only oc

the future, it is possible to conclude that they are significant, an

egorically different from the adjustments of the past. At the 

time, because these developments are continuing to occur in the 

2000s, a comprehensive description of the reforms is also dif

because government institutions, laws, and policies are cha

rapidly. 

158 
Farmers at work in the rice paddy; the sign exhorts them to 

together to the rice-plantin

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), May 

Reform of the Public Distribution System 

The most significant of the July 2002 central governme

economic reforms was the introduction of a pricing system 

the market sets most prices. Except for crops, rationing w

ished, and goods are now traded using currency. Althoug

continue to be administered, “by fiat, state prices are broug

with prices observed in the markets.” In addition, work

given a one-time salary raise, with salaries increasing 10 to 

depending on occupation, and prices surged 40 to 80 times. 

previously had been paid regardless of performance. Under 

system, however, they earn according to how much they w

those who do not work are not eligible for some services pro

the government. 

Rationing under the old public distribution system ha

collapsed in the mid-1990s as the economy went throug

shocks. The main feature of the system was food rationin

applied to almost two-thirds of the citizenry. Industrial 

received the major portion of public distributions; state-f

collective-farm workers received smaller distributions from 

tem, making up the difference from their own agricultural 

tion. Although originally designed to provide each citi

sufficient food rations, as the economy and in particular ag
 

production contracted, the rations were reduced initially from 6

800 grams per day, depending on the type of labor involved, t

or 450 grams per day by late 1999. Many people could not aff

buy enough extra food. 

In response to the breakdown of the public distribution sy

small-scale markets began sprouting up all over North Korea. Alt

in 2000 the private sector was estimated to constitute less than 

cent of the entire economy, the expansion of private markets was 

Experts suggest that the private markets generated as much as 2

cent of the food supply in 2004. Farmers’ markets, long grud

accepted, became much more important to the entire economy. 

many of the acts undertaken by the central government in 2002 

actually merely an official sanction of events and changes that 

already underway. 

At the same time, the government decentralized much of th

nomic decision-making authority to local representatives. Mea

included cutting government subsidies, allowing farmers’ mark

operate, and transferring managerial decisions for industry and 

culture from the party and the central government (through fa

party committees) into the hands of local production units. In th

enterprises were required to cover their own costs, managers 

forced to meet hard budget constraints, and evaluation of wo

was no longer based on the number of days they showed u

rather on productivity and profit. To what extent this reform ha

realized in practice is not clear, although there were reports in 

and 2005 that the system was beginning to function as exp

State-owned enterprises were allowed to trade part of their pr

tion and materials in a new “socialist goods trading marke

export their products themselves, and to earn the capital nece

for their operation to function. State-owned enterprises also 

allowed to restructure their operations as they saw fit. Farmers 

given the right to make decisions on how to cultivate their land

the government retaining ownership of the land. 

In order to participate in the private sector, households beg

keep foreign currency. In 2000 the Bank of Korea in Seoul esti

that North Korean households held approximately US$964 m

in total foreign currency, with the average household holdin

equivalent of US$186. This practice not only put the North K

households firmly in the marketplace but also took money 

from private savings accounts denominated in wŏn (for value 

wŏn—see Glossary), thus affecting the central government’s a

to direct lending and projects. Of the foreign currency, more th

percent was in U.S. dollars, with the remainder in Chinese ren

or Japanese yen. North Koreans’ need for foreign currency in

160 
was largely a result of the breakdown of rationing that occu

1995, which forced citizens to move into the black market 

of food and other goods. Black-market operators refused 

North Korean wŏn and demanded hard currency. 

Information about the pace and extent of the market re

sketchy, because North Korea has not opened its econom

international participation or scrutiny. However, anecdotal 

abounds that notable change has taken place. A micro

opened in P’yŏngyang’s Yanggakdo Hotel in 2002, 11 re

selling goat delicacies had opened in P’yŏngyang by 2004

capital has a “food street” lined with restaurants that cat

well-off and to foreigners. Visitors to P’yŏngyang in 2004 

that more than 35 distinct markets were in operation, the be

being the Tongil Market in the downtown area. These mark

tions are not privately owned—usually they are run by 

unit—but they are profit generating, according to Nichola

of Koryo Tours, a company that specializes in travel tours 

Korea. Estimates suggest that there might be as many as 400 

throughout in the country. 

It seems increasingly clear that the centrally planned econ

to be abandoned—that the decision was less one of choic

necessity. Chosun Ilbo reported from Seoul on December 

that the North Korean regime was forced to lift a ban on priv

nesses because “popular disaffection was about to explode.

World Bank economist Bradley Babson notes that “small fam

nesses of 3–5 workers are expanding with official recognit

ducing a variety of hand-made products for sale in local mar

Since July 2002, North Korea has continued to modify 

and price structures. In March 2003, the government allow

chants to sell not only farm products but also manufactur

and other commodities and permitted manufacturers to sel

to the market. On November 23, 2003, the regime charged i

conglomerates with responsibility for investments in their o

ities. In the past, all facility investments had been made by 

This change means that manufacturers are now respon

replacing their own facilities. 

In 2004 the central government reduced the minimum wag

employees of foreign companies from US$80 or US$90 per 

US$38 per month. Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Kim Yong

that “We have recently drastically reduced the minimum wa

Euros [US$38] ... in the past, we only allowed foreign co

entry into specialized economic zones, but now we will allow 

set up in other places around the North. If [a company] wish

ticipate in the development of the mineral industry in the N
can grant rights, and the same goes for establishing a bank. We ar

ing a series of steps to lessen investment restrictions in each indu

Although the enterprises remain under the control of the stat

although salaries in many sectors are still dictated by the go

ment, it is clear that the introduction of limited supply and de

has generated an increase in market activity in North Korea. 

Banking and Finance 

The financial system of North Korea remained almost en

state controlled in 2002; however, the government began to i

ment change in this sector, as well. In the past, some foreign 

had been allowed to form businesses in North Korea. For exa

in 1995 the Dutch bank ING signed a joint-venture agreemen

the North Korean Foreign Insurance Company, establishin

investment bank in North Korea that was 70 percent owned by 

This was the first Western bank in North Korea, although ING 

pulled out. In the wake of the 2002 reforms, Daesong Bank of 

Korea announced a relationship with Sberbank of Russia in No

ber 2004, designed to increase the ease with which customers o

banks could transfer foreign currency and make payments. Add

ally, in July 2004 North Korea began, with an Australian firm, a 

venture called Korea Maranatha Enterprise Development Lim

The venture was owned equally by North Korea’s Minist

Finance and the Maranatha Trust of Australia, with the goal of 

ing small amounts of money to North Korean enterprises in a 

develop the country’s small and medium-sized businesses. Of

of Korea Maranatha described the operation as a pilot program

that the entity began operations with two clients, and hop

increase its operations if the venture proved successful. 

Beginning in February 2002, North Korea also devalued th

relative to the dollar. During the 1990s, North Korea had main

an obviously overvalued rate of 2.15 wŏn to the U.S. dollar. In 

ruary 2003, the black-market rate went from 200 wŏn per do

400 wŏn per dollar, and by November 2003 the wŏn was excha

at 1,000 wŏn per dollar. In September 2004, the official exc

rate was 160 wŏn to the euro (the currency adopted by North 

in December 2002 for foreign-exchange transactions). Howev

black-market exchange rate was 10 times that amount (see A

ment of the Economic Reforms, this ch.). 

Another aspect of the new financial changes was the issue o

lic bonds to North Korea’s citizens. In 2003 the North Korean 

ernment floated bonds for the first time since the start of the K

War in 1950. On March 26, 2003, the minister of finance anno

162 
 

 

The P’yŏngyang Silk Mill, P

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), Janua

that P’yŏngyang would borrow money from the public by 

bonds. The bonds, floated on May 1, 2003, had a maturity 

April 30, 2013, in denominations of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 w

bonds carried no interest rate and were redeemable in ins

starting in December 2008, but if their holders drew lucky 

in lotteries to be held once every six months, they would re

unspecified “prize.” 

Some observers believe that the bond program is a positiv

a fiscal policy improvement measure that brings North Kore

into the modern world. Others believe it will only add to the 

of workers and laborers and was designed by the govern

increase its budget by using surplus money that currently r

the hands of citizens. 

Although there has been some reform in the financial sec

first years of the century, on the whole the financial system 

tightly controlled. The government has made little effort to 

a viable financial capital market, and, as of 2007, there were 

pendent financial institutions and no appreciable bond mar

than the unusual system P’yŏngyang had set up. 

Legal and Administrative Reforms 

In addition to changes to the centrally planned economy 

government changed a number of laws and amended the con
 

 

 

to provide a legal framework for domestic economic reform a

increase foreign trade and investment. A major element of 

legal changes were the constitutional revisions of September 

which formally permitted private ownership of assets, provi

more clearly delineated basis for foreign investment and trad

established the Cabinet of Ministers, composed mainly of the 

of economic ministries. Concurrently, the administrative refo

September 1998 aimed to reduce government expenditure

increase government efficiency through greater consolidati

functionally related bureaucracies at the center, and through d

tion of responsibilities to local units. This reform had the res

decreasing central control over local administrative authorities

Although there has been foreign investment in North Korea 

the 1970s, a relatively major effort to open the North to the in

tional economy has occurred only since the mid-1990s. There 

11 constitutional amendments relating to foreign investment in 

alone. In 1999 the government amended joint-production and 

venture laws to allow for projects outside the Najin–Sŏnbong 

national Trade Zone. Until that time, 100 percent foreign-o

investment enterprises were allowed to set up businesses only 

Najin–Sŏnbong zone. The government continues to establis

legal foundations that permit and regulate international invest

The Processing Trade Law, Lock Gate Law, and Copyright 

came into effect in April 2001 to expand the scope of foreign 

These measures regulate which sectors are open to foreign i

ment and in which sectors foreign firms may own 100 percent 

capital, with protection from nationalization and guarantees 

right to lease and use land for up to 50 years and of tax and 

preferences. 

As part of the July 1, 2002, reforms, the KWP formally aban

the Taean Work System and introduced a new economic-manag

system. The new system turned over to the manager responsibil

running a factory and reduced the political and economic role 

factory party secretary. It tasked the manager with running the f

on a self-accounting system and changed the wage system. In th

system, salaries for workers were raised, and merit pay was 

duced to reward those who work harder or more efficiently. How

the factory party committee is still the formal leadership of th

tory, and the party secretary retains the chairmanship of the co

tee, which continues to provide the secretary with the opportun

wield power in the factory. Thus, although nominally the pow

the KWP was reduced and the actual manager’s power was incr

it is not clear how dramatic this shift is in practice. 

164 
North Korea set up the External Economic Legal Advice 

June 1999 in order to settle legal issues with regard to inte

investment and trade relations. In August 2004, the North also 

the establishment of the country’s first private law firm, as p

efforts to attract international investors. Hay, Kalb Associate

ish-owned firm, opened a joint-venture company employing 

local lawyers with offices on Kim Il Sung Square on August 

In a revision of its criminal law on April 29, 2004, Nor

changed and strengthened legal measures to protect private 

while stiffening penalties for antistate crimes. The revision

since 1950, reflects P’yŏngyang’s ambition to achieve two 

the same time: safeguarding its regime and boosting its 

ished economy. The law introduced lengthy new provision

ing the principle of legality and classified in detail pr

obscure provisions regarding private ownership. The numbe

cles dealing with economic crimes increased from 18 to 7

articles cover such issues as provisions punishing foreign 

for tax evasion, infringement of trademark rights, illegal com

transactions, and violation of import and export orders. 

In December 2004, North Korea announced a real estate 

gave individuals some rights to sell their houses at will in 

half of 2005. Because the number of illegal house trades am

viduals increased after the “economic adjustment policy” 

2002, regulating the trade gave the government some con

such activities. 

Many of the legal and administrative changes since 19

designed to clarify and further strengthen the rights and resp

ties of foreign firms in North Korea. Other changes cov

organization and control of domestic economic activity. Be

many of the laws have been enacted relatively recently, it i

how they will operate in practice and how vigorously the 

ment will enforce and implement them. 

Special Economic Zones 

A major element of North Korea’s reform was the develo

special economic zones. These zones vary in their particular

were established with special tax and tariff incentives for fo

with the aim of attracting investment and foreign exchange, 

employment, and boosting the local development of improv

nologies and infrastructure through greater interaction with 

firms. North Korea has established four such zones. The 

these areas was the Najin–Sŏnbong International Trade Zon

lished in 1991 and located in territory carved out of the 
 

Boundary representation 

not necessarily authoritative International boundary 

Demarcation line and

Demarcation line and 

demilitarized zone 

®

�

P’yongyang 

Sinuiju 

Najin 

Kaesong 

Kumgang 

Sonbong  ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

Yellow Sea 

(West Sea) 

Sea of 

Japan 

(East Sea) 

MOUNT KUMGANG 

TOURIST ZONE 

KAESONG SPECIAL 

INDUSTRIAL ZONE 

SINUIJU SPECIAL 

ADMINISTRATIVE 

REGION 

NAJIN–SO

INTERNA

TRADE 

CHINA 

SOUTH 

KOREA 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

60 Miles 

0 60 Kilometers

0 

20 

20 

40 

40 

®

 demilitarized zone 

National capital 

Populated place 

Figure 9. Special Economic Zones, 2006 

province of North Hamgyŏng, near the border with Russia. B

early twenty-first century, three more regions had been adde

Sinŭiju Special Administrative Region, in North P’yŏngan Pro

along the border with China on the Yellow Sea (or, as Korean

fer, the West Sea) was established in 2001; the Mount Kŭm

Tourist Zone, in Kangwŏn Province, in the southeast coasta

along the DMZ, was established in 1998; and the Kaesŏng S

Industrial Zone, in the city of Kaesŏng (formerly Kaesŏng 

ince), within sight of the DMZ near P’anmunjŏm, was establish

2002 (see fig. 9). 

166 
 

 

 

Like most other policies undertaken by the North Korean 

the zones show slow and halting progress. The Najin–Sŏnb

has had a mixed history: by the end of 1999, total foreign in

was estimated at US$125 million, almost half of which ca

the Emperor Group of Hong Kong for its construction of a h

casino. However, with help from the United Nations Dev

Programme (UNDP), in late 1998 North Korea opened its o

ness school in the zone, the Najin Business Institute, alon

business information center. 

In January 2001, the government announced the establis

a large special economic zone in the city of Sinŭiju, locate

Amnok River (known as the Yalu in China) border with C

intended to encompass 128 square kilometers. As plan

Sinŭiju region would allow foreign currencies to be used 

designed to take advantage of the restored railroad link 

North Korea and South Korea. Sinŭiju reportedly was given 

of independent authority in almost all political and e

aspects, including legislation, administration, and judicia

P’yŏngyang claimed that it would not interfere except t

diplomacy and national defense issues. Sinŭiju was even to 

the right to issue visas independently. A Chinese businessm

Bin, originally was put in charge of the zone, although Yan

complications with the Chinese government over unrelated 

activities in China sidetracked his appointment. Sinŭiju has 

tle progress, in large part as a result of difficulties over its 

tration and leadership. However, it is important to note that i

Chinese who held up progress, not North Korean mismanag

Since its opening in 1998, the Mount Kŭmgang Tourism 

shown more success. In accordance with an agreemen

between the Hyundai Group in South Korea and the North 

government, the Mount Kŭmgang zone allows South Korea

ship passengers to take tours of Mount Kŭmgang, one of 

most famous and beautiful mountains. Hyundai Asan st

three-day packages to Mount Kŭmgang in 1998 using a s

and an overland route has been available since September 2

July 3, 2004, a one-day trip to the mountain became possib

two Koreas agreed to extend the hours during which visi

pass through the DMZ. The total number of visitors to th

Kŭmgang zone reached 800,000 by the start of 2005. 

A fourth zone, in Kaesŏng, a historical capital of Ko

established in 2002 and began operations in 2004; it has be

successful. The Kaesŏng Special Industrial Zone is mainly 

Korean–South Korean joint venture (see Kaesŏng Industrial 

this ch.). 
168
 
Mount Kŭmgang Tourist Z

Courtesy Munhwasarangbang Compa
Top-Down Reform Measures 

In assessing the reforms, an important point to be made 

North Korea’s economic policy is that the reform measures 

centrally planned and top-down, and thus the measures enjoy

support of the highest political levels in North Korea. For exa

Kim Jong Il himself was quoted as saying, “Things are not wha

used to be in the 1960s. So no one should follow the way p

used to do things in the past.... We should make constant effo

renew the landscape and replace the one which was formed 

past, to meet the requirements of a new era.” This reform init

was a gamble for Kim because it also meant that he risked bein

sonally connected to its failure. 

An article in the semi-official English-language People’s Ko

2002 reflected this attitude. It said, “these measures, effective J

are intended to comprehensively improve the people’s living sta

based on the new economic policy mapped out by General Sec

Kim Jong Il to build an economically powerful nation.” The 

continued, “the recent series of economic measures came in lin

General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s new economic policy, whose es

is that the basic method of socialist economic management is t

maximum profits while adhering to socialist principles.” 

In addition, the regime emphasized that the reforms were a 

ual and long-term process, writing that: “it was in the year 200

this new economic policy of Kim Jong Il began to be put into 

tice in earnest on a national scale. It contained the strengthen

the cabinet’s role as the headquarters of the national econom

transfer of authority of economic planning to each leading econ

organ at all levels, the rational reorganization of factories and 

prises and the improvement of their management; and the diffe

ation and specialization of production.” Choe Hong-kyu, a b

director in the State Planning Commission, was quoted in Pe

Korea as saying: “Kim Jong Il stresses that all the outworn and 

matic ‘Soviet-type’ patterns and customs should be renounced 

fields of economic planning, financing, and labor management 

also points to the fact that foreign trade should be conduc

accordance with the mechanism and principles of capitalism.” 

These official pronouncements by the leadership echoe

increasingly open admission that society was changing in res

to the economic difficulties that North Korea was experiencin

August 1, 2002, Supreme People’s Assembly president Kim 

nam said: “We are directing our whole efforts to restructure ou

nomic base to be in line with the information technology revo

... we are reforming the economic system on the principle of p

ability.” 

170 
 

 

There is further evidence of the explicit consent of the to

ship. The 2003 New Year’s Day editorials in Nodong 

(Workers’ Daily) cited “new measures for economic mana

and noted that “it is urgent to improve economic managem

rapidly develop science and technology: we should man

operate the economy in such a way as to ensure the largest p

ity while firmly adhering to socialist principles.” Minister of 

Mun Il-bong gave a speech on March 26, 2003, saying th

institutions and enterprises a system of calculation based o

will have to be correctly installed, production and financial 

ing systems be strengthened, production and management 

be carried out thoroughly by calculating the actual profits.” 

government has attempted to retain control of the system, 

the same time recognizing the need to make changes in its e

practices. 

Assessment of the Economic Reforms 

Since the formal abrogation of the centrally planned eco

July 2002, most anecdotal reports indicate that the marke

experiencing an initial and significant surge in prices—hav

ued to function relatively normally. There was no widesprea

farmers’ markets moved to fill the void in supplies caused b

ing, and the population appeared to have adjusted to the 

circumstances. The economic reforms tested the governme

ity to deal with inflation, troubled enterprises, and the ur

created by the monetization of the economy. Low supply 

output have led to massive increases in prices and further 

tion of the wŏn. 

The FAO’s World Food Programme estimated that the pri

and corn rationed through the public distribution system 

low and stable, 44 wŏn and 24 wŏn per kilogram, respecti

prices at the private markets were much higher. The nomina

rice increased 550 percent, and perhaps even more. In N

2004, the price of rice was 600 wŏn per kilogram, almost 3

of a typical monthly wage. Corn was 320 wŏn per kilogram

months following the introduction of price reforms, there w

inflation. 

By comparison, in 1979 China’s initial price reforms dro

price of rice by 25 percent. In North Korea, prices have go

at least 600 percent, and the wŏn has depreciated from th

exchange rate of 150 wŏn to US$1 in 2002 to at least 1,0

with some estimating the black-market values at between 2

3,000 wŏn to the dollar in 2006. The reforms probably enab

Jong Il to gain some measure of control of the economy by 
those black marketeers who held large amounts of wŏn befo

currency devaluation, because the value of their wŏn holdings 

meted with the devaluation against the dollar. However, 

income workers also were badly affected by the rise in pric

addition, many workers were laid off by companies forced 

costs. Finally, fragmentary evidence suggests that even those s

of the labor force favored with the largest wage hikes (6,000 

were discontented. Defectors crossing into China complaine

the promise of higher wages had not been kept, with workers r

ing only an additional 800 wŏn and then nothing extra after Oc

2003. This failure may have created a new class of urban poo

could be difficult to control in the future, although there is onl

ited evidence of any unrest. 

The regime has made major changes in the way in whic

economy functions. Undoubtedly these changes have been des

by Kim Jong Il and the ruling regime to retain control while d

with the undeniable economic problems in the country. Howev

changes have created confusion and perhaps even chaos. While 

is considerable disagreement among observers as to what the 

motivations of the regime are, and also skepticism as to wheth

reforms can work, the point remains that the changes affect the 

society and are thus politically consequential. 

The evidence points to the conclusion that North Korea’s 

nomic reforms are cautious and tentative, not wholesale. The

are clumsy. Inflation is rampant, but production has not been fr

respond accordingly. A North Korean opening up will not fost

kind of immediate wholesale rhetorical and practical change

the United States apparently expects. Examining the reforms, e

mist Marcus Noland wrote in 2003: “It is not at all clear that th

rent leadership is willing to countenance the erosion of state c

that would accompany the degree of marketization necessary to 

talize the economy.” 

Indeed, it is unclear whether any reform measures can ac

make much of a difference in North Korea’s economy. Neverth

these reforms are significant, and, more importantly, they w

extremely difficult to reverse. It is one thing to declare a specia

nomic zone in the northeastern region of Najin–Sŏnbong an

more significant to affect the daily lives of every citizen by intr

ing market reforms. Willingly or unwillingly, the Kim Jong Il r

has started down a path that is difficult to reverse and also hol

potential to spark real change in North Korea. 

172 
 

 

Foreign Economic Relations 

In addition to domestic economic reforms that began 

North Korea has become increasingly open to a foreign p

The legal and constitutional changes that the regime has m

1998 provide a more clearly delineated framework for fore

and investment in North Korea. By 2005 overall levels of t

surpassed those of 1991 (when trade was US$2.5 billion

upward trend continued from a nadir in 1998 (when trade d

to US$1.4 billion). Total foreign trade for 2005 was arou

billion, or around 10 percent of GDP. 

The regime also began to take small and tentative steps 

exposing North Korean bureaucrats to how market capitali

tions in practice. Because government bureaucrats have bee

entirely in a system of central planning, they lack the basi

edge about how markets function and how to operate in 

environment. Beginning in 2001, former military offic

assigned as directors of factories and enterprises, in an 

attempt to transform them from military elites into econom

There is skepticism on this point, with some observers se

action as an attempt by the military to increase its control 

economy. Even if this assumption were true, however, the 

that the military itself is becoming more involved in the da

tioning of economic matters. 

Political scientist Park Kyung-ae notes that nongove

contacts between North Korea and various foreign nations i

significantly in the late 1990s. For example, two North Kor

ical and energy delegations visited the United States in 1

other visits to the United States in 1998 included economi

tions that focused on poultry, academic exchanges, and e

2001 more than 480 North Koreans visited Australia, Chi

and Sweden for training programs in finance, trade, and acc

Other groups of officials have studied in Canada, Mexico, th

pines, Singapore, and Thailand. By far, the most delegati

traveled to China, although industrial management training 

occurred in India and Malaysia. In Europe, North Kore

studied medical techniques in Switzerland, and agricultural 

tural groups have visited Austria, Denmark, Hungary, I

Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 

In the wake of the agricultural and economic trouble

1990s, North Korea also has depended heavily on foreign a

1995 to 2000, North Korea received more than US$2 billi

from other nations and international organizations. The bu

aid was from South Korea and covered projects such as th
 

 

 

Kŭmgang zone, the 1994 Agreed Framework, and food and m

aid for famine victims. 

Despite political troubles with the North, the United State

has been a major donor to North Korea for humanitarian re

Between 1995 and 2003, the United States contributed US$61

lion in food aid and US$5 million in medical assistance. The 

contribution to KEDO amounted to more than US$400 m

before all work on the KEDO project was stopped in 2004. 

Although North Korea remains a very closed and isolated co

there has been considerable opening in foreign economic p

since the late 1990s. Mostly because of economic stagnation e

in the decade, the North also has been far more open to interna

aid donors. As a result of this opening, foreign firms had ach

more penetration into North Korea in the early twenty-first ce

than at any time since the Korean War. 

North–South Relations 

Sunshine Policy and New Economic Development 

South Korea is clearly the country that has most vigorously 

sued attempts to engage North Korea economically. In 1998 

Korean president Kim Dae Jung developed the Sunshine P

whereby South Korea abandoned its long-standing policy of ho

to the North and instead began to follow a path designed to e

the North through economic and cultural contacts. The chan

strategy has proved popular in the South. Roh Moo Hyun wo

2002 presidential election by a resounding 49 percent to 40 p

over competitor Lee Hoi Chang, based largely on Roh’s cam

promise to continue the Sunshine Policy. 

Following the shift to the Sunshine Policy, South Korea ra

increased its contacts with the North: North–South mercha

trade increased 50 percent from 2001 to 2002, to US$641.7 m

The following year, trade between North Korea and South 

rose 13 percent, to US$724.2 million. 

South Korean conglomerates rapidly expanded their activit

the North with the official approval of both South Korean and 

Korean governments. In 2002 permission was granted to 39 

Korean firms to establish cooperative partnership arrangement

North Korea. In 2005 Samsung successfully negotiated wit

North Korean government to place its logo in P’yŏngyang an

begun exporting consumer electronics from its electronic indu

complex of more than 1.6 million square meters in factories 

North. LG Corporation has been manufacturing televisions in 

174 
The port of Namp’o, South P’yŏngan 

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), Januar

Korea since 1996. By 2004, there were more than 1,000 Sou

ans living and working in North Korea, and the port of Nam

180 South Korean companies. 

By the end of 2004, more than 400 South Korean compa

set up offices in Yanji, a city in the Yanbian Korean Aut

Prefecture in China’s Jilin Province, close to its border wi

Korea. These firms have invested a total of US$161.8 mi

greatest amount of all the foreign investors. Indications are 

South Korean investments will keep growing. Of these co

about 40 already have moved into North Korea’s Sŏnbong a

development districts, establishing food, cigarette, and garm

tories. The garment factories alone were employing 20,00

Koreans in 2005. In addition, many other companies are 

joint ventures in transportation, wood processing, cultiv

marine products, agricultural development, restaurants, tr

tourism. 

Cooperation also increased rapidly between the two Kor

ernments in the early 2000s. In November 2004, th

Resources Corporation, a quasigovernmental organization 

Korea, announced that it would open a liaison office in Nort

Park Yang-soo, president of the corporation, said that in 

cooperate on economic development between South Ko

North Korea, our state-run corporation plans to set up a liais
 

 

 

or branch office for raw materials in P’yŏngyang next year.” 

Korea had never had a liaison office in the North, and at the ti

Park’s announcement, South Korea and North Korea techn

were still at war. The goal of the liaison office is to exploit m

deposits in the North, beginning with an annual goal of exp

10,000 to12,000 tons of graphite to the South. As of late 200

opening of the office was on hold. 

More than 200,000 South Koreans visited North Korea in 20

The number of South Korean visitors to the North, excluding 

Korean tourists to the Mount Kŭmgang resort, has experi

yearly increases of 20 percent since 2000. 

Another governmental project was the plan to reconnec

Kyŏngŭi Railroad—a connection between North Korea and 

Korea through the DMZ, which had been severed since the K

War. This railroad will connect the entire Korean Peninsula to Ch

and Russian railroad networks that, in turn, connect to cities in 

and European Russia. The economic and political implications 

railroad reconnection are potentially fairly large, because it 

allow shipment of goods from Japan and South Korea to Euro

North Korea. It also could be a conduit for further trade and i

ment in the region. The Korea Transport Institute estimates that 

ings could be significant within three years of completion o

railroad, perhaps up to US$149 million in fees annually. 

The Kyŏngŭi Railroad also is significant in political terms. 

during the 2002 United States–North Korea standoff, North 

and South Korea continued to work toward reconnectin

Kyŏngŭi Railroad. The railroad has required clearing a section 

DMZ of land mines. In order to actually clear the DMZ, m

meetings were required, and the fact that both militaries were a

agree is a significant step in the reduction of tension on the p

sula. Work on the line continued throughout the crisis of 2002

land mines were cleared by December 2002, and the laying o

road track was completed. Construction work was complet

2006. 

Kaesŏng Industrial Venture 

The major venture between North and South is the establish

of a special economic zone and industrial district just north 

DMZ in the ancient capital city of Kaesŏng. Planned to use 

Korean capital and North Korean labor, the zone includes a ra

and a highway that connect North and South through the 

Hyundai Asan of South Korea and the Asia–Pacific Peace Comm

of the North struck a deal in August 2000 to develop an ind

176 
Workers sorting and weighing new prescription 

Sariwŏn pharmaceutical factory, North Hwanghae 

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), December 

park. The Land Corporation, a South Korean state-invested 

tion, contracted with the North for a 50-year lease of the area

North provided South Korean businesses favorable tax rates 

rency-exchange conditions in return. The two Koreas brok

on the first phase of development on June 30, 2003, a cere

mark the inauguration of the Kaesŏng Special Industrial Zo

agement Committee and start the construction of enterprises 

ate in the zone was held in Kaesŏng in October 2004, and t

park was expected to be completed by 2007. When finished

will cover 66 square kilometers and might eventually 

100,000 North Koreans and 150,000 South Koreans. The 

value of products produced in Kaesŏng could reach US$21 b

year, according to the Federation of Korean Industries. 

On December 1, 2004, the highway through the DMZ to 

was officially opened. After completion of the 4.2 kilom

highway crossing the Demarcation Line (see Glossary) tha

the DMZ up to the Tongil Tower and connecting the two Ko

road officially opened as the Main East Sea Road. The railr

necting Kaesŏng to the South was also completed in June 2

months after beginning work clearing land mines in the 

December 2004, the North and the South also reached an ag

on the supply of electric power to the Kaesŏng Special I

Zone, according to the Korea Electric Power Corporation. U
 

 

 

agreement, the South began transferring electric power to the 

in January 2005, marking the first time electricity has been 

ferred across the DMZ since the Korean War broke out in 1950

South Korean government said it would seek provisions in 

free-trade talks that will permit preferential duties for products 

the Kaesŏng zone so that they will be treated as if they had bee

duced in the South. 

North Korean-made iron kitchen pots began to appear in d

ment stores in Seoul in December 2004, as the first products 

inter-Korean joint economic project to become available i

South. The South Korean manufacturing company, LivingArt, 

of 15 companies from South Korea that have begun to produ

Kaesŏng’s pilot area of nearly 100,000 square meters. Such w

excitement in South Korea that the first set of 1,000 pots sold 

the first day. Woori Bank, South Korea's second-largest l

opened a branch in Kaesŏng in December 2004. 

The Economy in Transition 

North Korea’s economy is in transition. The old, cen

planned economy has essentially been abandoned, but a full em

of market capitalism has not yet occurred. Some 15 years aft

fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea continues to survive, 

bling along with an economy that is barely functional. The Nor

endured far longer than most observers expected, and althoug

tempting to predict that the regime—and the economy—wil

lapse in the near future, prudence cautions against any predi

about prospects. Market signals are beginning to pervade the 

omy, and more information from the outside world is beginn

penetrate the country. Ultimately, this development will have a 

formative effect in North Korea. How soon this transformatio

occur is far less certain. 

* * * 

The economy of North Korea is in tremendous flux, and 

sources of information are constantly appearing. The South K

Ministry of Unification has an excellent English-language We

(http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/), and both the Korean and E

sites have detailed and comprehensive information that is consis

the most up-to-date available. The Nautilus Institute of Berkeley

fornia, has an informative Web site (http://www.nautilus.org/

includes briefings, policy papers, and data on all aspects of 

178 
 

Korea, including extensive discussion of the economic reform

Korea’s Naewoe Press publishes a monthly review of Nor

called Vantage Point that incorporates the best English- and 

language information available. The Economist Intellige

offers reliable economic data on North Korea through its 

Country Report: North Korea. 

The Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) of the DPR

Web site that contains its current and past news release

www.kcna.co.jp/). Among other North Korean sources tha

tently contain economic topics are Chosŏn chungang 

(Korean Central Yearbook), an annual with sections on the 

and other related topics; Kŭlloja (The Worker), a monthly j

the KWP Central Committee; Nodong Shinmun (Workers

the KWP’s daily newspaper; and Foreign Trade of the De

People’s Republic of Korea and Korea Today, monthly Eng

guage periodicals. 

Other South Korean research institutes that have extensi

arly publications on North Korea are the Korea Institute of 

Unification (www.kinu.or.kr), the Sejong Institute (www.sej

and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (ww

go.kr). The most useful Japanese source is Kita Chōsen no 

bōeki no tenbō (North Korean Economic and Trade Prosp

annual published by the Japan External Trade Organization 

that contains up-to-date surveys of the economy and statistica

trade. Another informative Japanese source is the monthly p

Kita Chōsen kenkyū (Studies on North Korea). 

Other valuable sources in English are the January–Febru

of Asian Survey, which carries the annual survey on North K

United Nations’ International Trade Statistics Yearbook; t

national Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics Y

and the U.S. Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign B

Information Service) translations of North Korean broadca

able via the U.S. National Technical Information Service

News Connection (http://wnc.fedworld.gov/). (For further 

tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

Chapter 4. Government and P
Three strong arms—from top: the farmer, the party intellectual, and t

worker—grasping the pole of the Korean Workers’ Party flag with th

three-part symbol of the hammer, writing brush, and sickle. The capti

the bottom reads: “Party’s leadership means our life”; the inscriptio

top reads: “Victory if protected, death if abandoned.” 

Courtesy Chosŏn Yaesul (P’yŏngyang), January 1996, 66 
 

 

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 

or North Korea, was founded on September 9, 1948. Its claim 

ereignty was facilitated by the World War II Allied powers’ 

imperial Japan in 1945, ending Japan’s 35-year occupatio

Korean Peninsula, and was the direct result of failed attempt

eeship models and later of failed United Nations (UN)–adm

elections in 1948 to unify the two occupation zones. The N

under the sway of the Soviet Union while the South was un

control. UN-administered elections—impeded by the Sovie

North—were held only in the South on May 10, 1948, leadi

establishment in August of that year of the Republic of Kore

Korea). 

North Korea is one of modern history’s few truly Orwe

nepotistic systems. The first leader of North Korea, Kim 

was born in 1912. He served as an officer in the Soviet army 

an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter in Manchuria in the 1930

returning to North Korea in September 1945, whereupo

authorities anointed him as leader. Kim had taken a po

power in 1946, soon holding absolute, solipsistic control a

secretary of the North’s communist Korean Workers’ Party 

and president of the state until July 8, 1994, when his sudd

led to the ascension of his son Kim Jong Il as the next lead

on February 16, 1941 (although, since 1982 his official birth 

been February 16, 1942, to match it symbolically with Kim 

birthday, which was April 15, 1912), and groomed since 

1970s as the heir apparent, Kim Jong Il was given pos

increasing importance in the KWP hierarchy throughout th

At the KWP’s Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, Kim 

succession was consolidated with his phased assumption o

over the civil administration, followed by his designation as 

commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in Decemb

His assumption of rule was formalized in September 1998, 

ably after the official period of mourning for Kim Il Sung ha

Kim Jong Il rules the country as supreme commander of the 

and as chairman of the National Defense Commission. Th

position of president remains held posthumously by his fath

The cult of personality and the nepotism of the Kim famil

tute unique features of North Korean politics. In the past, f

ple, Kim Il Sung’s wife, Kim Song-ae, was a member of t

Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committe
 

Supreme People’s Assembly, a deputy to the assembly, and 

woman of the Korean Democratic Women’s Union Central Co

tee. Kim Il Sung’s daughter, Kim Kyong-hui, was a member 

KWP Central Committee and deputy to the Supreme Pe

Assembly, and his son-in-law, Chang Song-taek, was premier, 

nate member of the KWP Central Committee, and deputy 

Supreme People’s Assembly. Kang Song-san, Kim Il Sung’s c

by marriage, was premier and a member of the KWP Central 

mittee and its Political Bureau, deputy to the Supreme Pe

Assembly, and member of the state Central People’s Committe

Tam, who died in 1991, was Kim Il Sung’s brother-in-law, a me

of the KWP Central Committee and Political Bureau, chairm

the Supreme People’s Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, d

to the Supreme People’s Assembly, and chairman of the Comm

for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. In 2005 Kim J

appeared to be grooming one of his sons, Kim Jong Chul, to su

him. His eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, was another possibility fo

cession, but he appeared to have lost standing in the family hier

as a result of his arrest and detainment at Japan’s Narita Interna

Airport in 2001 while traveling on a forged passport. 

Although the Korean Communist Party dated from the 1

North Korea claims that the KWP was founded by Kim Il Su

1945. Since that time, despite the existence of other small po

organizations, North Korea has been under the one-party rule 

KWP (see Mass Organizations, this ch.). Throughout Kim Il S

reign, the party remained the most politically significant enti

preeminence in all spheres of society placed it beyond the rea

dissent or disagreement. Party membership is composed o

“advanced fighters” among North Korea’s working people: wo

peasants, and working intellectuals who are said to struggle d

edly for the success of the socialist and communist cause. The 

claims a membership of 3 million. The ruling elite considers 

members the major mobilizing and developmental cadres, or 

(see Glossary). In principle, every worker, peasant, soldier, and 

lutionary element can join the party. 

What distinguishes Kim Jong Il’s rule from his father’s has 

the relative decline in influence of the KWP and the rise of the 

tary as the predominant organ of government and society. “Mi

first” (sŏngun) politics is reflected not only in the leadership 

tions held formally by Kim Jong Il (chairman of the Na

Defense Commission) but also in the relative elimination of 

major KWP functions (for example, plenary meetings). The 

powerful government institution under Kim Il Sung was the Po

Bureau of the KWP Central Committee. The National Defense 

184 
The national flag has three horizontal bands of blue (top), 

width), and blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side 

band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star. The official sea

large hydraulic power plant under Mount Paektu and the ligh

pointed red star with ears of rice forming an oval frame bound 

ribbon inscribed: “Democratic People’s Republic o

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), August 1994, fr
 

mission has effectively displaced the Political Bureau as the pre

inant decision-making authority. The privileging of the m

undeniably is related to Kim Jong Il’s moves to consolidate 

power and legitimacy in the shadow of his father’s military cr

tials and uncontested rule. 

The political system is guided by the concept of chuch’e 

Glossary)—“national self-reliance” in all activities. The essen

chuch’e is to apply creatively the general principles of Marxism 

Leninism in the North Korean way. As historian Dae-Sook Su

noted, chuch’e is “not the philosophical exposition of an ab

idea; rather, it is firmly rooted in the North Korean people and 

Il Sung.” In April 1992, North Korea promulgated an amended 

constitution that deleted Marxism and Leninism as principal na

ideas and instead emphasized chuch’e. Reinforcing this trend

stitutional amendments in 1998 recognized the concept of p

ownership for the first time and granted some autonomy to te

crats and local light industry from central party control. The re

moreover, now admits flaws in the socialist-style economy 

source of the problems rather than blaming its economic wo

outside forces, as it traditionally has done. A Nodong Shi

(Workers’ Daily) editorial on November 21, 2001, thus declare

the socialist economic management method is still immature an

perfect .... If we stick to this hackneyed and outdated method, 

is not applicable to the realities of today, then we will be una

develop our economy.” Wide-ranging economic reforms anno

in July 2002 represented further steps away from the Marxi

socialist models (see Prospects: The Significance of Reform

ch.). But in spite of these changes, the regime clings firmly 

chuch’e ideology. 

This apparent contradiction, in large part, is because the ideol

inextricably intertwined with the glorification, bordering on d

tion, of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s authority and cult of per

ity. Kim and his father used the ideology, party, military

government to consolidate power. The two Kims have been add

by many honorary titles, including “great leader (father),” “dear 

(son),” and suryŏng (see Glossary), which can be taken to me

son of the nation, national hero, liberator, and fatherly leader. Ac

ing to the party, there can be no greater honor or duty than being 

to one or the other of the two Kims “absolutely and uncondition

Executive power is not checked by any constitutional provision

government structures’ principal purpose is to ensure strict p

compliance with the policies of Kim Jong Il; such comp

implants an appearance of institutional imprimatur on Kim’s h

186 
 

 

personalized and absolute rule. Although the internal wor

North Korean politics are extremely opaque, politics as a fu

competition for power by aspiring groups and promotion of 

ests of special groups appears to be less germane to the Nort

setting. 

The most significant twenty-first-century political event 

Korea relates to the July 2002 market-liberalization refo

Economic Reforms, ch. 3). These are generally associated w

measures: basic monetization of the economy and the legali

makeshift markets; currency depreciation; transplanting m

decisions for industry and agriculture from the central gov

(factory party committees) into the hands of local producti

and pressing forward with special administrative and i

zones to induce foreign investment. These measures repre

the North’s best attempt at serious reform and its most d

gamble in terms of regime resiliency. If major change is th

tive, the reforms are the clearest expression of P’yŏngyang’s 

intentions to move away from a command-style economy to 

might enable the regime to reach some modicum of econom

ity, which, in turn, could mean that the North is serious abou

away its nuclear threat for the aid necessary to push forw

these reforms. If the liberalization is a gamble, the North 

pursuing the reforms despite its nuclear ambitions, with the 

it can achieve both goals (that is, hard currency inflows and 

of some nuclear capabilities). The reality may lie between th

But there is no denying that these reforms also make th

more vulnerable to basic supply and demand and price press

way never encountered before in North Korea. 

Relationships Among the Government, Par

and Military 

From the founding of the DPRK in 1948 through the ear

the KWP held a commanding position vis-à-vis the govern

definitive shift toward “military-first,” or sŏngun, politics to

with the 1994 death of Kim Il Sung and the succession to 

Kim Jong Il. The significance of this shift meant the prom

the military as the central organ of government at the expen

KWP. 

Also, from 1948 to the early 1990s, government organs were 

as executors of the general line and policies of the KWP. Go

was expected to implement the policies and directives of the 

mobilizing the masses. All government officials or functiona
 

exhorted to behave as servants of the people, rather than as overb

“bureaucrats.” The persistence in party literature of admonitions a

formalism strongly suggests that authoritarian bureaucratic be

remains a major source of concern to the party leadership. This co

may explain in part the party’s intensified efforts, beginning in the 

1970s, to wage an ideological struggle against the bureaucratic 

style of officials. The general trend was toward tightened party c

and supervision of all organs of administrative and economic 

implementation. 

In January 1990, Kim Jong Il introduced the slogan “to ser

people” and directed party functionaries to mingle with the p

and to work devotedly as their faithful servants. Kim stated th

collapse of socialism in some countries was a stern lesson to 

Korea and was related to failures in party building and party ac

He stressed the importance of reinforcing the party’s ideol

unity and cohesion and elucidated tasks that would strengthen 

cation in the principle of chuch’e, revolutionary traditional e

tion, and socialist and patriotic education. 

The KWP continues to be the formulator of national purpos

orities, and administrative hierarchy. It is the central coordina

administrative and economic activities at the national and loca

els. Through its own organizational channels, which permea

government and economic agencies, the party continues to ov

administrative operations and enforce state discipline. W

exception, key government positions are filled by party loy

most of whom are trained in the North Korean system, 

emphasizes ideology and practical expertise. 

The shift to “military-first” politics is generally associated 

Kim Jong Il’s formal assumption of the National Defense Com

sion chairmanship after the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994

1991 plenary session of the KWP Sixth Party Congress, Kim Il 

made his son the supreme commander of the KPA. A few m

later, the elder Kim named the younger Kim marshal (wŏnsu) 

DPRK, effectively putting operational control of the military 

his son. Kim Il Sung held the National Defense Commission 

manship until April 1993, when he turned this position over 

son, who assumed full duties only upon the death of his father. 

The National Defense Commission constitutionally is the h

institution within the military establishment only, but in pra

under Kim Jong Il, the National Defense Commission has be

the dominant decision-making body of the state (see fig. 10). 

believe this shift is the manifestation of the younger Kim’s co

dation of power and legitimacy after the death of his father

188 
Jong Il possessed none of the credentials of his father, eith

party or in the military. The younger Kim thus sought to c

military by elevating its position within North Korea relati

party as the primary means of legitimizing his own rule. 

speculation that Minister of People’s Armed Forces O Chin-

fidant of Kim Il Sung, was a key figure in assuring the m

obedience and acceptance of Kim Jong Il, despite the youn

lack of any military credentials such as his father had posses

only other possible leadership candidate, Premier Kim Il 

tion), had been removed from his post in 1976. 

Military-first politics was formalized in about 1995. It w

time that the concept was introduced as “a revolutionary 

attaching great importance to the army” and “politics emphas

perfect unity and the single-hearted unity of the Party, Army 

ple, and the role of the army as the vanguards.” Phrases suc

sŏngun revolutionary idea,” “sŏngun revolutionary leadersh

“sŏngun politics” also have been employed since 1998. The b

cept of sŏngun is to rely on the military as the primary leg of 

olution,” economic reconstruction, and North Korean–style s

Implicit in this principle is the prioritization of the military’s n

key component of the state’s national objectives. 

One of the justifications for military-first politics is ach

of the national objective of kangsong taeguk (rich nation an

army), a concept introduced in 1999 by Kim Jong Il. As 

inseparable link between North Korean patriotism and su

Kim’s grip on the military has been established, explaining 

majority of Kim’s public appearances have been with the K

The National Defense Commission’s rise as the hegemoni

tion within the North Korean government began in April 1992

constitutional revision separated the National Defense Com

chairmanship from the presidency, establishing the commiss

independent body. The 1992 state constitutional revisions al

long-held practices in which the president was supreme comm

the armed forces and chairman of the National Defense Com

shifting power instead to the Supreme People’s Assembly 

National Defense Commission. The key significance of th

sions is that the president (a position that only two years later 

held posthumously by Kim Il Sung) was made the nomina

state, but with the power to appoint the National Defense Com

chairman. The first session of the 10-term Supreme People’

bly on September 5, 1998, reinforced the National Defense 

sion’s grip by empowering it with authority over all milita

and defense projects. The National Defense Commission, 
 

 

KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY 

NATIONAL 

DEFENSE 

COMMISSION 

MINISTRY OF 

PEOPLE’S 

ARMED 

FORCES 

COUNTY 

PROCURATORS’ 

OFFICE 

SPECIAL 

PROCURATORS’ 

OFFICE 

CENTRAL 

PROCURATORS’ 

OFFICE 

PROVINCIALLEVEL 

PROCURATORS’ 

OFFICE 

PROVINCIALLEVEL 

PEOPLE’S 

COMMITTEE 

PROVINCIALLEVEL 

PEOPLE’S 

ASSEMBLY 

PROVINCIALLEVEL 

PARTY 

COMMITTEE 

PROVINCIALLEVEL 

COURT 

COUNTY 

PEOPLE’S 

COURT 

SPECIAL 

COURT 

CENTRAL 

COURT 

CABINET 

MINISTRIES (30), 

COMMISSIONS (2), 

AND OTHER 

CABINET-LEVEL 

ORGANIZATIONS (3) 

COUNTY 

PEOPLE’S 

ASSEMBLY 

COUNTY 

PARTY 

COMMITTEE 

CENTRAL 

COMMITTEE 

POLITICAL 

BUREAU 

AND ITS 

STANDING 

COMMITTEE 

CENTRAL 

AUDITING 

COMMITTEE 

SUPREME 

PEOPLE’S 

ASSEMBLY 

SUPREME PEOPLE’S 

ASSEMBLY PRESIDIUM 

COUNTY 

PEOPLE’S 

COMMITTEE 

Political control 

General line of con

Elected 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, Inform

Center on North Korea, “Power Structure of North Korea,” 2006, http://unibo

unikorea.go.kr/dataroom/images/table_d_01.gif; and U.S. Central Intelligence 

Agency, “North Korea,” Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Gov

ments, June 28, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/chiefs94.htm

Figure 10. Party, State, and Government Power, 2006 

190 
 

nominally under the Supreme People’s Assembly, essentiall

tutes the highest executive body, headed by its chairman, Kim 

The primary military organ in the KWP is the Military Affair

ment, also run by Kim Jong Il through his position as party 

secretary (see National Defense Organizations, ch. 5). 

In 2007 the National Defense Commission consisted of 

man (Kim Jong Il); first vice chairman (Cho Myŏng-nok); 

chairmen (Kim Yŏng-chun and Yi Yong-mu); and three 

(Kim Il-ch’ŏl, Chŏn Pyŏng-ho, and Kim Yang-gŏn), each w

year terms. The National Defense Commission has the p

direct all activities of the armed forces and national defense 

establish and disband central defense institutions, appoint 

miss senior military officers, confer military titles and grant 

top commanders, and declare a state of war and issue mob

orders in an emergency. 

The Korean Workers’ Party 

The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), according to the pre

the party constitution, is the “vanguard organization of the 

class,” and the “highest type of revolutionary body among a

zations of the working masses.” The National Party Congr

supreme party organ and approves reports of other party 

adopts basic party policies and tactics, and elects membe

KWP Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commi

elections, however, are perfunctory because the members 

bodies are actually chosen by Kim Jong Il and his few tru

leagues. When the National Party Congress is not in ses

Central Committee acts as the official agent of the party. Th

Committee is supposed to meet at least once every six mo

has the responsibility of electing the party general secreta

Jong Il), members of the Political Bureau, and its Standing 

tee (or Presidium, the highest operational party organizati

Central Committee also elects members of the KWP S

(which implements administrative decisions, personnel 

ment, and other important party matters) and members of th

Military Commission (which formulates the party’s military 

action plans, and defense industry development. The comm

last known chairman was Kim Il Sung; it should not be 

with the similarly named Military Affairs Department. Th

Committee additionally elects the members of the Central In

Committee, which maintains party discipline, reviews petit

appeals from provincial and directly governed city party o

tions, and investigates members violating party policies o
 

 

 

 

with the top leadership. A party congress is supposed to be con

every five years, but as of 2007, one had not been held sinc

Sixth Party Congress in 1980. Party congresses are attended by 

gates elected by the members of provincial-level party assemb

the ratio of one delegate for every 1,000 party members. 

Until his death in July 1994, Kim Il Sung held all key party 

tions, including being KWP general secretary, member of the Sta

Committee of the Political Bureau, and chairman of the Central 

tary Commission. Kim Jong Il was not appointed general sec

until October 8, 1997. Although technically open to mass me

ship, access to the KWP is denied to those without a “reliable” 

background. The KWP operates as the core of the North Korea

ity, with more than 3 million members. The party carries the id

of a class-based and individual-leadership organization. The KW

two alliance parties, the Korean Social Democratic Party an

Chongu (Friends) Party, supportive of the Ch’ŏndogyo religio

Religion, ch. 2). Kim Jong Il has formally led the KWP since 

although informally the party has been under his control since 

Kim Jong Il’s accession was followed by a round of purges 

KWP, in which some of his father’s old followers were removed 

office. 

The Sixth Party Congress, convened October 10–14, 1980

attended by 3,220 party delegates (3,062 full members and 158 

nate members) and 177 foreign delegates from 118 countries. A

dance significantly increased from the approximately 1,800 del

who attended the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. The 

congress was convened by the KWP Central Committee to re

discuss, and endorse reports by the Central Committee, the C

Auditing Committee, and other central organs covering the act

of these bodies since the previous congress 10 years earlier. The 

Party Congress also elected a new Central Committee. 

In his report to the congress, Kim Il Sung outlined a set of goa

policies for the 1980s. He proposed the establishment of a Demo

Confederal Republic of Koryŏ as a reasonable way to achiev

independent and peaceful reunification of the country. He also 

fied a new 10-point policy for the unified state and stressed that 

Korea and South Korea should recognize and tolerate each o

ideas and social systems, that the unified central government s

be represented by P’yŏngyang and Seoul on an equal footing, an

both sides should exercise regional autonomy with equal righ

duties. Specifically, the unified government should respect the 

systems and the wishes of administrative organizations and of 

party, every group, and every sector of people in the North an

South, and the central government should prevent one side 

imposing its will on the other. 

192 
Kim Il Sung also emphasized the Three Revolutions (s

sary), which are aimed at hastening the process of political a

logical transformation based on chuch’e ideology, impro

material and technical standards of the economy, and de

socialist national culture. According to Kim, these revoluti

the responsibility of the Three Revolutions Team Movem

Glossary)—“a new method of guiding the revolution,” wh

bined political and ideological guidance with scientific and 

guidance. This approach enabled superior authorities to 

lower levels and rouse masses of the working people to a

the Three Revolutions. The teams performed their guidance 

sending their members to factories, enterprises, and coo

farms. Their members are party cadres, including those 

KWP Central Committee, reliable officials of the governm

sons from economic and mass organizations, scientists an

cians, and young intellectuals. Kim Il Sung left no question 

Three Revolutions Team Movement had succeeded the C

Movement (see Glossary) and would remain the principa

through which the party pursued its political and econom

tives in the 1980s. 

The linkage between party and economic work also was a

by Kim Il Sung. In acknowledging the urgent task of econo

struction, he stated that party work should be geared toward 

economic construction and that success in party work should 

sured by success in economic construction. Accordingly, part

zations were told to “push forward economic work activ

prominence to economic officials, and help them well.” Party 

also were advised to watch out for signs of independence on 

of technocrats. The membership and organization of the K

specified in the party rules. 

There are two kinds of party members: regular and prob

Membership is open to those 18 years of age and older but i

only to those who have demonstrated their qualifications; 

tions are submitted to a cell along with a proper endorsem

two party members with at least two years in good stan

application is acted on by the plenary session of a cell; an af

decision is subject to ratification by a county-level party co

After approving an application, a one-year probationary 

mandatory, but it may be waived under certain unspecified 

circumstances,” allowing the candidate to become a full 

Recruitment is under the direction of the Organization and G

Department and its local branches. 
The Constitutional Framework 

The state constitutions of North Korea have been patterned 

those of other communist states. The constitutional framework 

eates a highly centralized governmental system and the relatio

between the people and the state. The constitution was adop

1948, completely revised in December 1972, revised again in 

1992, and then amended and supplemented in September 

Innovations of the 1972 constitution included the establishm

the positions of president and vice presidents and a superc

called the Central People’s Committee. 

The revised 1998 state constitution has 166 articles (15 fewe

the 1992 constitution) in seven chapters. As with the 1992 rev

the 1998 constitution continues to uphold chuch’e at the expe

Marxism–Leninism and includes articles encouraging joint ve

within special economic zones, guaranteeing the “legal right

interests of foreigners,” and establishing a framework for exp

ties with capitalist countries. The 1992 revision had provided a 

framework for the 1991 appointment of Kim Jong Il as sup

commander of the armed forces by removing the military fro

command of the president and by placing the military under th

trol of the National Defense Commission, of which he is chai

The 1998 constitution confirms this power. 

The 18 articles of chapter 1 of the 1998 constitution deal with 

tics. Article 1 defines North Korea as an independent socialis

representing the interests of all the Korean people. Article 15 

that the DPRK defends the democratic, national rights of Ko

overseas and their rights as recognized under international law. S

eignty emanates from four expressly mentioned social groups: “

ers, peasants, working intellectuals, and all other working pe

State organs are organized and operate on the principle of demo

centralism. Article 9 declares that “the complete victory of soc

in the northern half of Korea” will be accomplished through th

cution of the three revolutions of ideology, technology, and cu

while struggling to realize unification of the fatherland by foll

the principles of independence, peaceful unification, and 

national unity. In the 1972 constitution, socialism was to have 

accomplished by driving out foreign forces on a countrywide 

and by reunifying the nation peacefully on a democratic basis. 

articles in this chapter of the 1998 constitution refer to the main 

line, the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method (see Glossary) and spirit, and the 

Revolutions Team Movement. The constitution states that foreig

icy and foreign activities are based on the principles of independ

peace, and solidarity. Diplomatic, political, economic, and cu

194 
relations are to be established with all friendly countries bas

principles of complete equality, independence, mutual respec

terference in each other’s internal affairs, and mutual benefit. 

Economic affairs were codified in chapter 2. The co

declares that the means of production are owned by state a

cooperative organizations. Article 22 reiterates that natural r

railroads, airports, transportation, communication organs, ma

ries, enterprises, ports, and banks are state owned. Article 2

personal property as that “meeting the simple and individual

the citizen.” Benefits derived from supplementary pursuits, su

small garden plots of collectivized farmers, are considered 

property; such benefits were protected by the state as private 

and are guaranteed by law as a right of inheritance. Accordin

cle 33, the planned, national economy is directed and 

through the now largely abandoned Taean Work System (s

sary; Organization, ch. 3). 

Culture, education, and public health are covered in c

Article 45 stipulates that the state develop a mandatory 11-y

cation system, including two years of compulsory preschoo

tion (see Education, ch. 2). Article 47 says that education is 

at no cost and that the state grants allowances to students en

universities and colleges. Article 56 notes that medical s

universal and free (see Health Care, ch. 2). (Medical care 

right to education are also covered in articles 72 and 73 in ch

Article 57 places environmental protection measures before 

tion; this emphasis is in line with recent attention given to pr

the natural environment and creating a hygienic living and 

environment by preventing environmental pollution. 

Chapter 4, consisting of only four articles, covers 

defense. Emphasis is given to the mission of the armed force

reliant defense, and unity between the military forces and th

Chapter 5 extensively details the fundamental rights and 

citizens. Citizens over the age of 17 may exercise the right to 

be elected to office regardless of gender, race, occupation, 

residency, property status, education, party affiliation, politic

or religion. Citizens serving in the armed forces may vot

elected; insane persons and those deprived by court decisio

right to vote are disenfranchised. According to article 67, citiz

freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, and ass

Citizens also have the right to work, and article 70 stipulates 

work according to their ability and be remunerated accordi

quantity and quality of work performed. Article 71 provides 

tem of working hours, holidays, paid leave, sanatoriums, 

homes funded by the state, as well as for cultural facilities. A
 

accords women equal social status and rights with men. Wom

granted maternity leave and shortened working hours if they 

large families. Marriage and the family are protected by the 

according to the next article. 

Chapter 6, on the structure of the state, has 75 articles in seve

tions. The chapter covers the Supreme People’s Assembly, the Na

Defense Commission, the Central People’s Committee, the 

Administration Council, local people’s assemblies, local people’s 

mittees, the Central Procurators’ Office, and the Central Court. 

Chapter 7 covers the national emblem, flag, and capital. It des

the first two items, designates P’yŏngyang as the national capita

identifies the national anthem as the “Patriotic Song.” In a change 

the 1972 constitution, the 1992 and 1998 revisions mandated tha

sacred mountain of the revolution”—Mount Paektu—be added 

national emblem. It stands above the previously existing symb

hydroelectric power plant, the beaming light of a five-pointed re

ovally framed ears of rice bound with a red band, and the inscr

Chosŏn Minjujuŭi Inmin Konghwaguk (Democratic People’s Re

of Korea). 

With the 1998 constitution, the post of state president, the C

People’s Committee, and the Supreme People’s Assembly Sta

Committee were abolished, giving most of the power shared by 

institutions to the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium. The c

tution’s preamble states that Kim Il Sung is the “eternal preside

North Korea and stipulates that the constitution itself “shall be 

Kim Il Sung’s Constitution.” Under these revisions, the presid

the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium became the de jure h

state, representing North Korea in external affairs, and head 

supreme sovereign institution. Article 100 notes that the Na

Defense Commission is the “highest military leading organ o

power and an organ for general control over national def

Although article 105 states that the commission is “accountable 

Supreme People’s Assembly,” with Kim Jong Il as chairman, the 

mission holds the de facto supreme power of state. 

The Structure of Government 

The Legislature 

According to article 87 of the 1998 constitution, the Supreme 

ple’s Assembly is “the highest organ of state power.” Howeve

not influential and does not initiate legislation independently of 

party and state organs. Invariably, the legislative process is 

motion by executive bodies according to the predetermined polic

the party leadership. The Supreme People’s Assembly is not k

196 
Supreme People’s Assembly, P

Courtesy Tracy W

Hall inside the Supreme People’s 

Courtesy Tracy W
 

 

ever to have criticized, modified, or rejected a bill or a measure p

before it, or to have proposed an alternative bill or measure. 

The constitution provides for the Supreme People’s Assem

be elected every five years by universal suffrage. Article 88 ind

that legislative power is exercised by the Supreme People’s Ass

and its Presidium when the full Supreme People’s Assembly is 

session. Earlier the Standing Committee of the Supreme Pe

Assembly exercised this power, but in 1998 it was abolishe

replaced with the Presidium. Elections to the Eleventh Supreme 

ple’s Assembly were held in August 2003, with 687 deputies el

The KWP approves a single list of candidates who stand for el

without opposition. Deputies usually meet once a year in regula

sions in March or April, but since 1985 they also have met occ

ally in extraordinary sessions in November or December. 

The president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Ass

represents North Korea in relations with foreign countries. Ass

sessions are convened by the Presidium, whose president since 

has been Kim Yong-nam, a former vice premier and former m

of foreign affairs. There are also two vice presidents, two hon

vice presidents, a secretary general, and 12 members of the Presi

Until April 1994, the Supreme People’s Assembly convened 

every year, but after Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994, it did no

vene until the tenth term was held in September 2000. Supreme 

ple’s Assembly Presidium members are elected by the deputies, 

the Supreme People’s Assembly president and vice presidents

Supreme People’s Assembly has three committees: bills, budge

qualifications screening. Before the September 1998 constitu

amendments, the Supreme People’s Assembly also had foreign 

and reunification-policy deliberation committees. 

Article 91 states that the Supreme People’s Assembly ha

authority to adopt, amend, and supplement the constitution and d

mental laws; establish the basic principles of domestic and f

policies; and approve major departmental laws adopted b

Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium in the intervals betwe

sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly. It also may elect or 

fer the chairman and other members (on recommendation of the 

man) of the National Defense Commission; elect or remov

president of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium; elect or 

fer the premier and vice premiers and members of the cabinet; ap

or remove the procurator general; elect or transfer the chief ju

and elect or transfer its own top officials. The Supreme Pe

Assembly is empowered to examine and approve the state plan f

development of the national economy and a report on its fulfill

198 
 

examine and approve a report on the state budget and on its im

tation; receive a report on the work of the cabinet and nation

tions and adopt measures, if necessary; and decide whether to 

abrogate treaties. Assembly decisions are made by a simple 

and signified by a show of hands. Deputies, each representin

stituency of approximately 30,000 persons, are guaranteed in

ity and immunity from arrest. Between assembly sess

Presidium acts for the Supreme People’s Assembly. 

The Executive 

President and Vice Presidents 

Prior to Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994, the president 

head of state and the head of government in his capacity as c

of the Central People’s Committee. The constitution stated 

vice presidents were to “assist” the president, but it did not 

on a mode of succession. Following Kim’s death and the 

tional amendments of 1998, Kim Jong Il as National Defen

mission chairman assumed presidential responsibilities bu

title. The preface to the constitution as amended in 1998 rea

DPRK and the entire Korean people will uphold the gre

Comrade Kim Il Sung as the eternal President of the R

Thus, Kim Il Sung posthumously occupies the presidency; 

tions of vice president remain unfilled. The titles of presi

vice president in North Korea now refer only to the presi

vice presidents of the Supreme People’s Assembly. 

Presidential powers were stated only in generalities. T

executive convened and guided the State Administration C

occasion demanded. Under the 1972 constitution, he was 

supreme commander of the armed forces and chairma

National Defense Commission, although Kim Il Sung appo

son to the former position in December 1991 and to the la

tion in April 1993 (see National Command Authorities, ch

president’s prior assent was required for all laws, decrees, d

and directives, and his edicts commanded the force of l

authoritatively than any other legislation. The president prom

the laws and ordinances of the Supreme People’s Assem

decisions of the Standing Committee of the Supreme 

Assembly (abolished in 1998); and the laws, ordinances, a

sions of the Central People’s Committee. The president also 

pardons, ratified or abrogated treaties, and received foreig

or requested their recall. No one served in top governm

without the president’s recommendation. Even the judiciary 
prosecutors were accountable to Kim Il Sung. In accordance 

article 91 of the 1998 constitution, these presidential function

reside with the Supreme People’s Assembly. 

It was not until 1997 that the younger Kim officially took ov

leadership of the KWP. The following year, the presidency 

reserved for the revered deceased leader. Kim Jong Il consol

his power in the positions left to him. The 1998 constitution de

that the chairman of the National Defense Commission “hol

highest post of the state.” 

Cabinet 

Between 1972 and 1998, the highest administrative arm 

government was the State Administration Council. Before the

cabinet had been the highest level of the executive branch, b

1972 constitution changed its name and function. The counc

directed by the president and the Central People’s Committe

was composed of the premier, vice premiers, ministers, comm

chairmen, and other cabinet-level members of the central agen

The 1998 constitution changed the State Administration Co

into a cabinet and upgraded its status and power. The cabinet 

supreme administrative and executive organ and a general state 

agement organ. Previously the State Administration Counc

been subject to the control of the president and the Central Pe

Committee. Since 1998 the cabinet has had the authority to f

late measures for the implementation of national policies; 

amend, or supplement regulations pertaining to national admin

tion; establish or abolish key administrative economic organ

industrial establishments and formulate plans to improve na

management organizations; and implement inspection and co

ling activities to maintain order in national management. The c

has exclusive responsibility for all economic administrative pro

Under the 1998 constitution, the premier represents the go

ment (article 120) and functions independently. In 2007 the c

was headed by Premier Kim Yong-il. Under him were three vic

miers, 30 ministers, two cabinet-level commission chairme

president of the Academy of Sciences, the president of the C

Bank, the director of the Central Statistics Bureau, and a chief 

tary of the cabinet. Besides the 30 civilian ministries that are p

the cabinet, there is a thirty-first ministry—the Ministry of Pe

Armed Forces—that is not subordinate to the cabinet but r

instead to the National Defense Commission. 

200 
 

The Judiciary 

In the North Korean judicial process, both adjudicative an

cuting bodies function as powerful weapons for the proletari

torship. The constitution states that the Central Court, cou

provincial or special-city level, the people’s courts, and 

courts administer justice. The Central Court, the highest 

appeal, stands at the apex of the court system. The preside

Central Court since September 1998 has been Kim P’yŏng

the case of the one special city (Namp’o) directly unde

authority, provincial or municipal courts serve as the court

instance for civil and criminal cases at the intermediate leve

lowest level are the people’s courts, established in ordina

counties, and urban districts. Special courts exist for th

forces and for railroad workers. The military special cou

jurisdiction over all crimes committed by members of th

forces or the personnel of the Ministry of People’s Security. 

road courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases involving 

water transport workers. In addition, the Korean Maritime 

tion Committee adjudicates maritime legal affairs. 

In theory, the corresponding local people’s assembl

judges and people’s assessors, or lay judges. In practice, 

the KWP generally appoints judges, who do not require leg

tion or practical legal experience for their roles. In ad

administering justice based on criminal and civil codes, th

are in charge of political indoctrination through “re-educati

issue of punishment is not expressly stated in the constituti

criminal code. 

The collective interests of the workers, peasants, sold

working intellectuals are protected by a parallel hierarchy o

controlled at the top by the Central Procurators’ Office (acc

to the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium when the full 

People’s Assembly is in recess). This office acts as the state

rator and checks on the activities of all public organs and c

ensure their compliance with the law and their “active 

against all lawbreakers.” Its authority extends to the courts, 

sions of which (including those of the Central Court) are s

routine scrutiny. A judgment of the Central Court may be 

to the plenary session of the Central Court, of which the sta

procurator is a statutory member. 

The chief prosecutor, known as the procurator ge

appointed by and accountable in theory, although not in fa

Supreme People’s Assembly. There are one procurator gen

three deputy procurator generals. 
 

 

Local Government 

There are three levels of local government: provinces (do

provincial-level municipalities (chikalsi, or jikhalsi); a specia

(t’ŭkpyŏlsi), ordinary cities (si or shi), urban districts (kuyŏk

rural counties (gun, or kun); and traditional villages (ri, or ni). 

are subdivided into wards (gu), and some cities and wards are 

vided into neighborhoods (dong), the lowest level of urban go

ment to have its own office and staff. Towns and townships (m

have not functioned as administrative units in North Korea sin

Korean War (1950–53), but they still exist in South Korea. A

village level, administrative and economic matters are the resp

bility of the chairman of the cooperative farm management co

tee in each village. 

North Korea has nine provinces: Chagang, North Hamgyŏng, 

Hamgyŏng, North Hwanghae, South Hwanghae, Kangwŏn, 

P’yŏngan, South P’yŏngan, and Yanggang. There also are two p

cial-level municipalities—P’yŏngyang and Najin–Sŏnbong—an

special city, Namp’o. Kaesŏng, which was once a chikalsi, had its 

tory incorporated into South Hwanghae Province in 2003. Additio

there are 17 ordinary cities under provincial authority; 36 urba

tricts; more than 200 counties; and some 4,000 villages. Among 

divisions, the counties serve as the intermediate administrativ

between provincial authorities and the grass-roots-level village o

zations. Local organs at the county level provide other forms of 

ance to such basic units as neighborhoods (dong) and workers’ di

(nodongja-ku). 

Three types of local organs elect local officials to carry ou

trally planned policies and programs. These organs are local 

committees, local people’s assemblies, and local administ

committees, with functions such as administrative and urba

rural economic guidance committees. These committees are 

extensions of higher bodies at the national level, namely, the 

the Supreme People’s Assembly, and the cabinet. 

The local people’s assemblies, established at all administ

levels, perform the same symbolic functions as the Supreme 

ple’s Assembly. They provide a façade of popular suppor

involvement and serve as a vehicle through which loyal and m

rious local inhabitants are given visible recognition as deputies 

assemblies. The assemblies meet once or twice a year, for only 

days at each session. Their duties are to approve the plan for 

economic development and the local budget; to elect the offic

other local bodies, including the judges and people’s assessors 

courts within their jurisdictions; and to review the decision

202 
 

 

directives issued by local organs at their corresponding a

levels. The local people’s assemblies have no standing com

Between regular sessions, their duties are performed by 

people’s committees, whose members are elected by assem

corresponding levels and are responsible both to the assem

to the local people’s committees at higher levels. 

The officers and members of the people’s committees are 

tial locally as party functionaries and as senior administrativ

These committees can convene the people’s assemblies; pr

the election of deputies to the local assemblies; implement 

sions of the assemblies at the corresponding level and tho

people’s committees at higher levels; and control and supe

work of administrative bodies, enterprises, and social and 

tive organizations in their respective jurisdictions. 

The day-to-day affairs of local communities are handle

local administrative committees. The chairman, vice chairm

retary, and members of these bodies are elected by the local 

committees at the corresponding levels. 

Political Ideology 

The Role of Chuch’e

Chuch’e ideology is the basic cornerstone of party cons

party works, and government operations. Chuch’e is sanctifi

essence of what has been officially called Kim Il Sung Chu

ilsungism) since April 1974. Chuch’e is also claimed as “the 

day Marxism–Leninism.” North Korean leaders advocate 

ideology as the only correct guiding ideology in their revo

movement. 

Chuch’e also is referred to as “the unitary ideology” o

monolithic ideology of the Party.” It is inseparable from an

intents and purposes, synonymous with Kim Il Sung’s leade

was said to have been “created” or “fathered” by the great 

an original “encyclopedic thought which provides a 

answer to any question that arises in the struggle for nation

tion and class emancipation, in the building of socialism a

munism.” Chuch’e is viewed as the embodiment of revea

attesting to the wisdom of Kim’s leadership as exemplified 

less speeches and “on-the-spot guidance.” 

Chuch’e was proclaimed in December 1955, when Kim 

sized the critical need for a Korea-centered revolution ra

one designed to benefit, in his words, “another country.” C

designed to inspire national pride and identity and to mold 
 

consciousness into a potentially powerful focus for internal so

ity centered on Kim and the KWP. 

According to Kim, chuch’e means “the independent stan

rejecting dependence on others and of using one’s own po

believing in one’s own strength and displaying the revoluti

spirit of self-reliance.” Chuch’e is an ideology geared to 

Korea’s contemporary goals—an independent foreign policy, a 

sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture. Kim Il S

enunciation of chuch’e in 1955 was aimed at developing a m

lithic and effective system of authority under his exclusive l

ship. The invocation of chuch’e was a psychological tool with 

to stigmatize the foreign-oriented dissenters and remove them 

the center of power. Targeted for elimination were groups o

Soviet and pro-Chinese dissenters who opposed Kim. 

The Origins of Chuch’e

There are three major schools of thought regarding the orig

the chuch’e ideology: the instrumental, traditional political cu

and individual original perspectives. The instrumental view

emphasizes both domestic and foreign political factors as the r

the chuch’e ideology. Some believe that Kim’s unstable ho

power during and immediately following the Korean War c

him to deploy ideological purges in order to consolidate his po

position, using the chuch’e principle of national solidarity 

domestic instrument to forge his personality cult. 

The second perspective on chuch’e’s origin takes a longer 

and focuses on the influence of traditional political culture in K

seeing chuch’e as a reflection of a centuries-old tradition of ind

dence from foreign powers. Geographically central to the str

interests of powerful neighbors, Korea has long been a pawn in 

power rivalries, with perhaps more recorded foreign invasion

any other territory in history. 

The third explanation for the origin of the chuch’e ideology 

North Koreans’ broadly accepted view that it is a prime exam

their late supreme leader’s brilliance and originality. This pe

tive insists that chuch’e was the intellectual result of Kim Il S

highly exaggerated and romanticized personal experience as a 

rilla fighting Japanese imperialism in the 1930s. 

Chuch’e did not become a prominent ideology overnight. Duri

first 10 years of North Korea’s existence, Marxism–Leninism 

accepted unquestioningly as the only source of doctrinal auth

Nationalism was toned down in deference to the country’s conne

to the Soviet Union and China. In the mid-1950s, however, ch

204 
Monument in P’yŏngyang to the 

founder of the nation. The 

inscription reads “Comrade Kim 

Il Sung is our eternal sun.” 

Courtesy Korea Today 

(P’yŏngyang), April 1995, 2 

was presented as a “creative” application of Marxism–Leninis

attempt to establish an interrelationship between Marxism–

and chuch’e, Kim contended that although Marxism–Lenin

valid as the fundamental law of revolution, it needed an aut

interpreter to define a new set of practical ideological guidelin

priate to the revolutionary environment in North Korea. 

Application of Chuch’e in the North Korean State 

Kim Il Sung’s practical ideology was given a test of r

from the outset. In the late 1950s, he was able to mobilize 

support when he purged pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese dissen

party ranks. During the first half of the 1960s, Kim faced 

more formidable challenge when he had to endure a series 

situations that had potentially adverse implications fo

Korea’s economic development and national security. Amo

were a sharp decrease in aid from the Soviet Union and Ch

cord between the Soviet Union and China and its disquietin

cations for North Korea’s confrontation with the United S

South Korea; P’yŏngyang’s disagreements with Moscow an

hensions about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally

rise of an authoritarian regime in Seoul under General Park 

hee, in power 1961–79. 
 

These developments emphasized self-reliance—the need t

on domestic resources, heighten vigilance against possible ex

challenges, and strengthen domestic political solidarity. Sac

austerity, unity, and patriotism became dominant themes i

party’s efforts to instill in the people the importance of chuch

collective discipline. By the mid-1960s, however, North Korea 

afford to relax somewhat; its strained relations with the Soviet U

had eased, as reflected, in part, by Moscow’s decision to rush 

nomic and military assistance to P’yŏngyang. 

Beginning in 1965, chuch’e was presented as the essence of K

Sung’s leadership and of party lines and policies for every con

able revolutionary situation. Kim’s past leadership record wa

forward as the “guide and compass” for the present and future a

a source of strength sufficient to propel the faithful throug

adversity. Nonetheless, the linkage of chuch’e to Marxism–Len

remained a creed of the party. The April 1972 issue of Kulloja 

Worker) still referred to the KWP as “a Marxist–Leninist Party

journal pointed out that “the only valid policy for Korean comm

is Marxism–Leninism” and called for “its creative application 

realities.” 

Since 1974, however, it has become increasingly evident th

emphasis is on the glorification of chuch’e as “the only scie

revolutionary thought representing our era of chuch’e and co

nist future and the most effective revolutionary theoretical stru

that leads to the future of communist society along the surest 

cut.” This new emphasis was based on the contention that a dif

historical era, with its unique sociopolitical circumstances, re

an appropriately unique revolutionary ideology. Accordingly, M

ism and Leninism were valid doctrines in their own times bu

outlived their usefulness in the era of chuch’e, which prophesi

downfall of imperialism and the worldwide victory of socialism 

communism. 

As the years have passed, references to Marxism–Lenini

party literature have steadily decreased. By 1980 the terms “M

ism” and “Leninism” had all but disappeared from the pag

Kulloja. An unsigned article in the March 1980 Kulloja procla

“within the Party none but the leader Kim Il Sung’s revoluti

thought, the chuch’e ideology, prevails and there is no room fo

hodgepodge thought contrary to it.” The report Kim Il Sung 

sented to the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980 did not con

single reference to Marxism–Leninism, in marked contrast 

report to the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. In the 

report, Kim declared: “the whole party is rallied rock-firm arou

Central Committee and knit together in ideology and purpose 

206 
 

basis of the chuch’e idea. The Party has no room for any o

than the chuch’e idea, and no force can ever break its u

cohesion based on this idea.” 

Chuch’e is instrumental in providing a consistent and 

framework for commitment and action in the North Korean 

arena. It offers an underpinning for the party’s incessant de

spartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, and dedication. Since 

1970s, however, it appears that chuch’e has become glorif

end in itself. In his annual New Year’s message on January 

Kim Il Sung emphasized the invincibility of chuch’e ideo

take great pride in and highly appreciate the fact that our peo

overcome the ordeals of history and displayed to the full th

mettle of the revolutionary people and the indomitable 

chuch’e Korea, firmly united behind the party.... No diff

insurmountable nor is any fortress impregnable for us w

party leads the people with the ever-victorious chuch’e

strategy and tactics and when all the people turn out as one u

party’s leadership.” 

After Kim Il Sung’s death, Kim Jong Il continued to use 

ideology to consolidate his tight control of his regime. It 

legally embodied in the 1998 constitution, and throughout t

and early 2000s Kim Jong Il espoused chuch’e ideology in 

publications, emphasizing “chuch’e realism,” as a uniquely 

method in North Korean socialist realism, quite different 

existing “socialistic realism.” Such writings presumably 

attempt to explain the necessity of North Korea’s pursuit of 

ideals, despite the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the 

bloc states. 

More recently, a new interpretation of the “self-reliant 

has seen greater emphasis since the declaration of the “New 

ing Initiative” in 2001, which was an attempt at economic re

tion. In the past, “self-reliant revival” was widely underst

phrase used to describe the spirit of the struggle necessar

duce on one’s own things that were lacking or in short sup

resolve problems, no matter what, even if that meant resorti

and antiquated methods. However, Kim Jong Il declared th

reliant revival is not possible apart from science and tech

while talking with party officials in December 2000. And a 

28, 2001, Nodong Shinmun article claimed that “building a 

ant national economy does not mean building an economy 

doors closed,” reminding readers that the country had depar

a closed economy. The article signaled that North Korea is 

the construction of a strong and prosperous nation, and the 

of self-reliant revival is changing with the time and circum
 

Such changes may be a reflection of Kim Jong Il’s decision to p

self-reliant revival as long as it is economically beneficial, alth

it is unclear whether a commensurate relaxation of economi

political control will necessarily result. 

Party Leadership and Elite Recruitment 

Composition 

The party congress, the highest KWP organ, meets infrequ

The most recently held congress was the Sixth Party Congr

October 1980. The official agent of the party congress is the C

Committee. In 2005 the Central Committee had 329 member

full members and 149 alternate members. Nearly 40 percent of 

members—131 individuals—are first-term members. The te

crats—economists, managers, and technicians—predominate a

the membership. The Central Committee is supposed to hold 

num, or plenary session, at least once every six months to d

major issues. However, the Central Committee has not con

since Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994. The plenum also elects the 

eral secretary, members of the Political Bureau (called the Po

Committee until October 1980), and its Standing Committee, o

sidium, established in October 1980. 

Influence and prestige within the party power structur

directly associated with the rank order in which the members 

Central Committee are listed. Key posts in party, governmen

economic organs are assigned; higher-ranking Central Comm

members also are found in the armed forces, educational and cu

institutions, and other social and mass organizations. Many le

concurrently hold multiple positions within the party, the go

ment, and the military. 

The Political Bureau has 14 members. Several central org

tions are subordinate to the Political Bureau Standing Committ

which the only known member is Kim Jong Il). One of the 

important executive organs is the Secretariat of the Central Co

tee, led by General Secretary Kim Jong Il and eight other secre

Each secretary is in charge of one or more departmental party 

tions. Other key bodies include the Central Military Comm

headed by Kim Jong Il; the Central Auditing Committee, the 

watchdog of the party; and the Central Inspection Committee, 

enforces party discipline and acts as a trial and appeals board fo

ciplinary cases. 

The various departments of the Secretariat of the Central 

mittee depend for implementation of party policies and directiv

208 
Kim Il Sung (left) with Kim Jong Il during the Sixth Korean Work

Congress, P’yŏngyang, Octo

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), Septemb

the party committees in the provincial- and county-level ad

tive divisions and in organizations where there are more 

party members—for example, major enterprises, factories

ment offices, military units, and schools. In the countryside

party committees are formed with a minimum of 50 party m

The basic party units are cells to which all party member

and through which they participate in party organizational a

Attendance at cell meetings and party study sessions, held 

once a week, is mandatory. 

Party Members 

The KWP claimed a membership of more than 3 million p

of 1988, a significant increase from the 2 million members an

in 1976. Later information on party membership strength has 

forthcoming from North Korea. This increase may have bee

of the active mobilization drive for the Three Revolutio

Movement. The KWP has three constituencies: industrial 

peasants, and intellectuals, that is, office workers. Since 194

trial workers have constituted the largest percentage of party m

followed by peasants and intellectuals. Beginning in the 197

North Korea’s population reached the 50 percent urban mark, 

position of the groups belonging to the party changed. Mor
 

 

working in state-owned enterprises became party members, an

number of members working in agricultural cooperatives decrea

Party Cadres 

The recruitment and training of party cadres (kanbu) has 

been the primary concern of party leadership. Party cadres are 

officials placed in key positions in party organizations, ranging 

the Political Bureau to the village party committees; in govern

agencies; in economic enterprises; in military and internal se

units; in educational institutions; and in mass organizations

duties of cadres are to educate and lead party and nonparty me

of society and to ensure that party policies and directives are c

out faithfully. The party penetrates all aspects of life. Associ

and guidance committees exist at all levels of society, with a 

party cadre serving as a key member of each committee. 

Some cadres are concerned principally with ideological m

whereas others need to be both ideologically prepared and a

give guidance to the technical or managerial activities of the 

Regardless of specialization, all party cadres must devote two 

a day to the study of chuch’e ideology and Kim Il Sung’s po

and instruction. The party has a number of schools for cadre tra

At the national level, the most prestigious school is the Kim Il 

Higher Party School in P’yŏngyang, administered directly b

Central Committee and attended by high-level party officials. B

the national level, there are communist colleges in each provin

the education of county-level cadres. Village-level cadres are s

county training schools. 

The rules governing cadre selection have undergone subtle ch

in emphasis. Through the early 1970s, “good class origin,” indi

ability, and ideological posture were given more or less equal c

eration in the appointment of cadres. Since the mid-1970s, how

the doctrinally ordained “class principle” has been downgraded 

assumption that the actual social or class status of people should 

judged on the basis of their past family backgrounds but on 

“present class preparation and mental attitudes.” The party in

ingly stresses individual merit and “absolute” loyalty as the crite

acceptance into the elite status of cadre. Merit and competence 

come to mean “a knowledge of the economy and technology.” 

knowledge is considered crucial because, as Kim Il Sung stres

July 1974, “Party organizational work should be intimately link

economic work and intra-party work should be conducted to e

success in socialist construction and backup economic work.” 

210 
An equally important, if not more important, criterion 

selection is political loyalty, inasmuch as not all cadres o

class origin or all highly competent cadres are expected to 

rigorous tests of party life. These tests entail absolute loyalt

Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the party, thorough familia

chuch’e ideology, refusal to temporize in the face of advers

readiness to respond to the party’s call under any condition

all times. 

Although information on the composition of cadre memb

limited, the number of cadres of non-worker and non-peasa

has increased steadily. These cadres generally are clas

“working intellectuals” engaged in occupations ranging fr

and government activities to educational, technical, and art

suits. Another notable trend is the infusion of younger an

educated cadres into the party ranks. An accent on youth and 

tion was very much in evidence after 1973 when Kim 

assumed the leading role in the Three Revolutions Team Mo

The Ruling Elite 

Persons with at least one major position in leading party

ment, and military organs are considered the ruling elite. Th

includes all political leaders who are, at a given time, directly 

in the preparation of major policy decisions and who particip

inner circle of policy making. The ruling elite includes 

Bureau members and secretaries of the KWP, Central Peopl

mittee members, members of the State Administration Cou

members of the Central Military Commission and the 

Defense Commission. Because overlapping membership is 

in public office, top-ranking officeholders number less than 

any event, those having the most influential voice in policy 

tion are members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee

Top leaders share a number of common social charac

There is no clear evidence of regional underrepresentation. N

less, many Hamgyŏng natives are included in the inner circl

Leadership Succession 

Beginning in the fall of 1975, North Koreans used the te

center to refer to Kim Jong Il. However, for a few years aft

tial introduction the term appeared only infrequently, becau

Sung’s efforts to promote his son met some resistance. Kim 

purged many of his son’s opponents, however, and neit

faced any active opposition thereafter. 
 

Kim Il Sung took the rank of grand marshal (taewŏnsu) on 

13, 1992, and on April 20, 1992, Kim Jong Il, as supreme comm

of the armed forces, gained the rank of marshal (wŏnsu). Kim Il 

was the president and chairman of the National Defense Commi

with command and control of the armed forces, until Kim J

assumed the latter position in April 1993. 

There were many scenarios for leadership succession. Some 

prospects derived from a common postulation that arrangement

the death of Kim Il Sung would take at least a few years to c

because of the decades-long preparation of a succession plan. 

Korean scholar Yang Sung-chul labeled this “positive skepticism

called short-term failure, such as a coup d’état or a revolution, “

tive skepticism.” “Negative skepticism” was not to be dismissed

ever, because of Kim Jong Il’s weaknesses—his lack of cha

poor international recognition, and unknown governing skil

well as the sagging domestic economy and external factors, su

inter-Korean, North Korea–Japan, and North Korea–United 

relations (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). 

Kim Jong Il’s appointment as commander of the Korean Pe

Army suggested that the succession issue had finally been s

because the military was once considered his weak point; he al

had full control of the state and the economic administration

Jong Il also manages political affairs and KWP commercial o

tions as a primary authority and handles symbolic roles, su

meeting with foreign leaders and appearing at national celebrat

In addition, Kim Jong Il plays a prominent role in the KWP p

ganda machine—mass media, literature, and art. Many literary 

and performance works—including films, operas, and plays—

been produced under the “revolutionary tradition” of the KW

Kim’s guidance. Kim uses popular culture to broaden his public 

and gain popular support (see Leisure Activities, ch. 2; Japan, thi

Kim Jong Il tried to expedite economic growth and produc

using the Three Revolutions Team Movement, which was des

to inspire the broad masses into actively participating in the 

Revolutions. At the Fifth Party Congress, Kim Il Sung empha

the necessity of pressing ahead more vigorously with the Three 

olutions so as to consolidate the socialist system. In response

Jong Il developed the follow-up slogan, “Let us meet the re

ments of the chuch’e in ideology, technology and culture.” 

units forged ahead with “ideological education” to teach the 

members and other workers to become revolutionaries o

chuch’e idea. In many spheres of the national economy, produc

also is expected to increase as a result of the technology empha

212 
The Tower of Immortality in 

P’yŏngyang; the inscription reads 

“The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il 

Sung Is with Us Forever.” 

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), 

December 1997, 31 

the campaigns. In addition, the “cultural revolution” addre

moting literacy and cultural identity. 

Chuch’e, instrumental in providing a consistent and 

framework for commitment and action in the political arena

foundation for the party’s incessant demand for spartan auste

rifice, discipline, and dedication. It has not yet been determin

ever, whether chuch’e is an asset or a liability for Kim. Non

Kim is likely to continue to emphasize chuch’e as the only sa

answer to all challenging questions in North Korea, pa

because he attributes the collapse of communism in the Sov

and East European countries to their lack of chuch’e ideology

Graduates of the first class of the Man’gyŏngdae Revo

Institute, established in 1947, support Kim Jong Il’s pow

Many of these graduates occupy key positions in governm

the military. For example, O Guk-nyol and General Pa

nim—the latter, the former minister of people’s security—a

bers of the Central Military Commission, the KWP Central 

tee, and the Supreme People’s Assembly; Kim Hwan, 

minister of chemical industry and vice premier, is a membe

the KWP Central Committee and the Supreme People’s A

and Kim Yong-sun, an alternate member of the Political B

the director of the International Affairs Department, KWP 

Committee. 
 

 

 

 

Kim Jong Nam, the eldest of Kim Jong Il’s children, app

likely to be the chosen successor until 2001, when he was arres

Narita International Airport in Japan for traveling on a forged 

port from the Dominican Republic. It is now believed that Kim 

Chul, Kim’s second son, will be the heir. Kim Jong Chul ho

position at the KWP Central Committee Leadership Division, j

Kim Jong Il did when he was trained to succeed his father. 

In May 2005, reports of dissident activities against the r

began to trickle out of the country, including video images purp

to be of defaced Kim Jong Il portraits. Other rumors indicate

official Kim Jong Il portraits were being removed from public 

ings. It is unclear whether these reports were authentic and wh

the incidents were isolated or widespread, but shortly ther

public executions of traitors also were reported. 

Mass Organizations 

All mass organizations are guided and controlled by the KW

number of political and social organizations appear concerned 

the promotion of special-interest groups but actually serve as 

iaries to the party. Many of these organizations were founded 

early years of the KWP to serve as vehicles for the party’s effo

penetrate a broader cross section of the population. 

Mass organizations have another important function: to crea

impression that there are noncommunist social, political, cu

and professional groups that can work with their South Korean 

terparts toward national reunification. Most of these organiz

were established to develop a unified strategy in dealing with th

ing establishment of South Korea and other foreign countrie

organizations. As of 2006, these included the Korean Social D

cratic Party, Chongu Party, Socialist Working Youth League, 

mittee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, K

Democratic Women’s Union, Korean National Peace Comm

Korean Students Committee, General Federation of Trade U

and many others. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunificat

the Fatherland has been actively involved in the two Koreas’ r

ciliation talks since the early 1990s. 

Among auxiliary organizations, one frequently covered i

media is the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League. Directly su

nate to the party Central Committee, it is the only mass organi

expressly mentioned in the KWP constitution. The league 

party’s most important ideological and organizational tr

ground, with branches and cells wherever there are regular 

organizations. Youth league cells exist in the army, factories, co

214 
 

ative farms, schools, cultural institutions, and government 

The organization is hailed as a “militant reserve” of the 

members are described as heirs to the revolution, reliable 

and active assistants of the party. Young people between th

14 and 26 are eligible to join the league regardless of other o

tional affiliations, provided they meet requirements similar 

for party membership. The junior version of the youth leag

Young Pioneer Corps, open to children between the ages of 

about 15. The P’yŏngyang Children’s Palace is maintained b

members for the extracurricular activities of Young Pione

members. 

The principal vehicle for P’yŏngyang’s united front st

dealing with South Korea and foreign counterparts is the De

Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, popularly know

Fatherland Front. The Fatherland Front actually is an umb

various other organizations and thus ostensibly is a non

nongovernmental organization. Choch’ongryŏn (see Gloss

General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, is one o

known of the foreign auxiliary organizations. Its mission is 

the allegiance of the more than 600,000 Korean residents 

At least one-third of these residents, who also are courted 

ously by Seoul, are considered supporters of P’yŏngya

remaining two-thirds of the members are either South Kore

ists or neutral. Those who are friendly toward North K

regarded by P’yŏngyang as its citizens and are educated a

schools in Japan that are financially subsidized by Nort

These Koreans are expected to work for the North Kore

either in Japan or as returnees to North Korea. 

The activities of these mass organizations occasion

reported in the news; however, it is usually difficult to ascer

they actually do. Organizations such as the Korean Socia

cratic Party and the Chongu Party disclose only the offici

lished names of their leaders and do not report anything ab

membership or activities. 

The Media 

Article 67 of the 1998 constitution states that North Ko

zens are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, de

tion, and association. Of course, such activities are permitte

support of government and KWP objectives. Kim Jong Il 

written a handbook for aspiring journalists, entitled Th

Teacher of Journalists. It provides guidelines on portraying 

ership in the most favorable way. Other articles of the con
require citizens to follow the socialist norms of life; for exam

collective spirit takes precedence over individual political or 

liberties. 

Domestic media censorship is strictly enforced, and dev

from the official government line is not tolerated. The regim

hibits listening to foreign media broadcasts, and violators repo

are subject to severe punishment. Senior party cadres, however

good access to the foreign media. No external media are allowe

access to North Korea, but an agreement to share in Japan’s tele

munications satellites was reached in September 1990. 

Newspapers, broadcasting, and other mass media are major 

cles for information dissemination and political propag

Although most households have radios and some have tele

sets, neither radios nor televisions can be tuned to anything 

than official programming. Only some 10 percent of the radio

30 percent of the televisions are in private households (see Tele

munications and the Internet, ch. 3). Government control exte

artistic and academic circles, and visitors report that the pr

function of movies, books, and the performing arts is to contrib

the cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung. 

The media are government controlled. As of 2006, there 

four main television stations, approximately 17 AM stations, 1

stations, 14 domestic shortwave stations, and a powerful in

tional shortwave station. The latter broadcasts in English, F

German, Russian, Spanish, and several Asian languages. K

Central Broadcasting Station and P’yŏngyang Broadcasting S

(Radio P’yŏngyang) are the central radio stations; there are als

eral local stations and stations for overseas broadcasts. “One m

ally positive development in the past couple of years,” accordin

2003 International Press Institute report, “was the decision b

government to scrap radio broadcastings aimed at blaming 

Korea for almost everything.” 

A number of newspapers are published. Nodong Shinmu

news organ of the party Central Committee, has a circulati

approximately 1.5 million. Kulloja, the theoretical organ of the 

Central Committee, claims a circulation of about 300,000 re

Minju Chosŏn (Democratic Korea) is the government news

and Nodong Chŏngnyŏn (Working Youth) is the newspaper 

Socialist Working Youth League. There also are specialized 

papers for teachers, the army, and railway workers. 

The Korean Central News Agency (Chosŏn Chungyang Tŏn

—KCNA) is the primary agency for gathering and disseminating 

KCNA publishes the daily paper Chosŏn Chungyang T’ongsin (K

Central News), Sajin T’ongsin (Photographic News), and C

216 
The Unification of the Fatherland Three-Constitutions Mem

inscription at top, with the unified Korean Peninsula, rea

Cons

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), March 

Chungyang Yŏnbo (Korean Central Yearbook). KCNA iss

press releases in English, French, Spanish, and Russian; new

these and other languages are beamed overseas. The Fore

guages Press Group issues the monthly magazines Korea T

Korea Pictorial, the quarterly Foreign Trade of the Democr

ple’s Republic of Korea, and the weekly newspaper the P’y

Times published in English, French, and Spanish. All of th

publications are available on the Internet from an official Nort

Web site. 

Despite all of these media, information from the outside 

not freely available, nor is information from North Korea 

without censorship. Very few ordinary people in North Ko

access to the Internet. Although in the early twenty-first 

more foreign journalists have been allowed into the countr

earlier years, movement within North Korea is restricted, an

allowed is closely monitored. 

Foreign Policy 

North Korea’s foreign relations are shaped by a mixture o

cal, nationalistic, ideological, and pragmatic considerations

ritorial division of the peninsula looms large in the political 
 

 

 

of North Korean leaders and is a driving force in their manag

of internal and external affairs. Over the centuries, unequal rela

foreign depredation, dependence on foreigners for assorted f

and the emulation of foreign cultures and institutions are le

exception than the rule in Korea’s perceptions of the outside w

These patterns give rise to the widely shared assumption a

Koreans that their capacity to control their national destiny is li

by geopolitical constraints. 

Inter-Korean Affairs 

The reunification of the two Koreas is seen as a difficult go

both the North and South. Although P’yŏngyang and Seoul agr

principle in 1972 that unification should be achieved peacefull

without foreign interference, they continued to differ substan

on the practical methods of attaining reunification; this area o

agreement has not narrowed in subsequent years. Inter-Korea

logue in North Korea is the responsibility of the State Se

Department (see State Security Department, ch. 5). 

North Korea’s goal of unification remains constant, but tactic

changed depending on the perception of opportunities and limit

implicit in shifting domestic and external currents and events. 

the beginning, North Korea has insisted that an inter-Korean po

formula should be based on parity or equality, rather than popu

Because South Korea has more than twice the population of 

Korea, a supreme Korean council set up according to a one-p

one-vote formula would give South Korea a commanding po

Another constant is P’yŏngyang’s insistence that the Korean qu

be settled as an internal Korean affair without foreign interferenc

P’yŏngyang’s position that unification should be achiev

peaceful means was belied by circumstances surrounding the ou

of the Korean War in 1950 and by subsequent infiltrations, the di

of invasion tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ—see 

sary), and other incidents. North Korea’s contention that the co

was started by South Korea and the United States failed to im

South Korea’s population and has been proven false by 

archives. The war, in effect, reinforced the obvious ideologica

systemic incompatibilities that were in place at the time of the di

of the peninsula in 1945. At the 1954 Geneva Conference, 

Korea proposed the formation of an all-Korean commission to ac

unification and a single, elected legislature; the withdrawal of a

eign troops from the Korean Peninsula; and the formal declarati

outside powers of the need for peaceful development and unifi

in Korea. P’yŏngyang also proposed that the armies of both cou

218 
Kim Dae Jung, president of South 

Korea, meets Kim Jong Il, 

P’yŏngyang, June 2000. 

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), 

August 2000, 1 

be reduced to 100,000 persons each within a year, that nei

enter into any military alliance, and that measures be taken to 

economic and cultural exchanges. The sincerity of these pro

at best debatable, but the positions taken by North Korea in 

Cold War years clearly reflected confidence and competitive

South Korea in military, economic, and political terms. 

Inter-Korean affairs became more complex in 1970 and 

part because of the U.S. decision to withdraw some of i

from South Korea and because of moves by the United S

China to improve their relations. In August 1971, amid s

thaw in the Cold War and an uncertain international envi

the Red Cross societies of Seoul and P’yŏngyang agreed 

talks aimed at the eventual reunion of dispersed familie

high-level talks—between Kim Il Sung’s brother and the ch

South Korean Central Intelligence Agency—were held alter

the two capitals and paralleled behind-the-scenes contacts t

political negotiations, reportedly at South Korea’s suggest

talks continued to make progress and resulted in a joint com

issued on July 4, 1972, in which the two countries agreed to 

three principles of unification: to work toward reunifying t

try independently and without foreign interference; to trans

ferences in ideology and political systems; and to unify the p

peacefully without the use of armed force. 
 

 

Despite the various committees set up by the 1972 commun

it quickly became obvious to both sides that they had fundame

divergent approaches. North Korea’s position “front-loaded” a

nificant concessions from the South, including the withdrawal 

foreign troops from South Korea, while the South sought to 

transparency and trust first through confidence-building mea

and “low politics” cooperation. 

At the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, Kim Il Sung pro

the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of K

which would be based on a single unified state, leaving the two sy

intact and federating the two governments. The Supreme Na

Assembly, with an equal number of representatives from Nort

South and an appropriate number of representatives of overseas 

ans, would be formed with a confederal standing committee to “

the regional governments of the North and the South and to adm

all the affairs of the confederal state.” The regional governments 

North and South would have independent policies—within 

its—consistent with the fundamental interests and demands 

whole nation and would strive to narrow their differences in all 

But South Korea rejected the confederation as a propaganda ploy

No significant dialogue occurred between the two countries 

the middle of 1984, when South Korea suffered a devastating 

North Korea proposed to send relief goods to flood victims in 

Korea, and the offer was accepted. This occasion provide

momentum for both sides to resume their suspended dialog

1985 the two countries exchanged performing arts groups, a

members of separated families met. In January 1986, how

North Korea once again suddenly cut off all talks with South K

blaming “Team Spirit,” the annual U.S.–South Korean joint m

exercise. 

In 1988 the South Korean government of Roh Tae-woo purs

new “northern diplomacy” or Nordpolitik (see Glossary) aim

North Korea’s allies. Ostensibly, it was an initiative to prevent 

ogy from trumping national interest as Seoul sought to broaden 

tions in the region, but the strategy’s true payoff was its abi

woo both China and the Soviet Union into diplomatic rela

thereby constituting the ultimate diplomatic coup over the N

South Korea’s efforts in conjunction with the North’s econom

ficulties compelled a basic change in P’yŏngyang’s strategy to

Seoul. 

Five rounds of meetings were held alternately in Seou

P’yŏngyang before the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nona

sion, Exchanges, and Cooperation between the South and the 

220 
 

 

was signed on December 13, 1991. The accord reaffirmed 

principles of peaceful unification, issued a joint declaration 

aggression, and instituted a variety of other confidence

measures (for example, advance warning of troop movem

exercises and the installation of a telephone hot line betw

military commanders). Several joint inter-Korean subco

were established to work out the specifics for implementing 

eral terms of the accord on economic cooperation, travel a

munication, cultural exchanges, political affairs, and militar

Separate from the prime minister-level dialogue, yet closel

ated with it, were talks held between the two Red Cross o

tions about reunification of families. 

The two Koreas also stated in a parallel agreement that t

insula should be “free of nuclear weapons.” The ensuing Jo

laration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, w

signed on January 20, 1992, and took force on February 1

called for the establishment of a Joint Nuclear Control Com

to negotiate a credible and effective bilateral nuclear in

regime. Although negotiations produced substantive progre

drafting of detailed accords to achieve ratification of t

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchang

Cooperation, nothing was implemented. 

The next major watershed in inter-Korean relations revolve

the Sunshine Policy of the South Korean government under 

Jung. Various events led to the formation of this policy. Kim 

entered office in 1998 at the height of South Korea’s financ

and after a period of time in which the lessons of German un

had seeped into all of South Korean society. The focus of 

attention on extricating South Korea from its economic crisis

bination with the liberal ideologies long held by the new p

allowed Kim to put forward a new view of inter-Korean relat

relatively little opposition. Kim called for an open-ended eng

of North Korea in which unreciprocated cooperation was ac

and indeed expected. The Sunshine Policy encouraged all co

engage with the North, in a departure from the position of his p

sor, South Korean president Kim Young-sam, who desired al

ment with the North to be routed through Seoul. This new 

facilitated the North’s normalization of diplomatic relation

number of European countries, including the United King

other European Union nations. By seeking to create a modicum 

and transparency through Seoul’s one-sided generosity, the 

Policy constituted an entirely different stance from the decade

sum diplomatic contention between North and South. The po
resulted in the establishment of a joint-venture scenic sport and to

project, at Mount Kŭmgang, in the North near the DMZ, as well 

reconnection of railroad lines between the two Koreas. 

The Sunshine Policy’s culmination was the historic June 

summit in which Kim Dae Jung went to North Korea to mee

Kim Jong Il. The joint communiqué from the meeting reaffirm

principles of peaceful unification and proposed more f

reunions. But the most long-lasting impact of the summit w

image of the two leaders embracing, broadcast throughout 

Korea. A cathartic moment for many Koreans, this event ha

effect of changing South Korean popular views of the North, 

ally overnight. Images of a demonized North Korean leader 

replaced by an infatuation with him. Views of a North K

“threat” were lost on much of the younger generation of South 

ans, despite the absence of any amelioration of the military situ

on the ground (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, ch. 5). 

In spite of later revelations that the South Korean govern

made unofficial cash payments to facilitate the June 2000 su

the Sunshine Policy continued to gain popularity among the yo

generation in the South and in the government of Roh Moo 

(president of South Korea, 2003–8), although it was rename

Peace and Prosperity Policy. A wave of demonstrations, 

accompanied the electoral victory of Roh in 2002, have led so

believe that the younger generation (that is, under age 50) in 

Korea has aligned itself more with the fate of North Korea than 

the country’s traditional ally, the United States. While not de

that South Koreans are in the midst of a new reconciliation 

with the North in the aftermath of the Sunshine Policy, this m

subject to several constraints. 

First is the sober realization that the U.S. military presence 

critical to South Korean security. Demonstrations protestin

presence died down significantly after Washington initiated pl

reduce its troops on the peninsula as part of a larger realignm

forces in Asia. Second, changes in North Korea’s nuclear p

could result in changes in the public perception. If part of the g

osity toward the North stemmed from an inner confidence in 

that South Korea holds decisive superiority across all nationa

cators of power, the 2006 nuclear test by the North altered 

visions. Third, it remains unclear whether any of the impact 

Sunshine Policy has reached deep into North Korea. Should 

engagement efforts reveal no change in North Korean prefer

over the long term, South Korean supporters of the policy mig

discouraged. 

222 
 

China and the Soviet Union/Russia 

North Korea owes its survival as a separate political 

China and the Soviet Union. Both countries provided criti

tary assistance—personnel and matériel—during the Kor

From then until the early 1990s, China and the Soviet Un

were North Korea’s most important markets and its major 

of oil and other basic necessities. Similarly, China and th

Union were reliable pillars of diplomatic support. 

Moscow and Beijing’s normalization of diplomatic relati

South Korea in 1990 and 1992, respectively, presaged a se

in North Korea’s foreign policy. Despite the professed chuch

ogy, Soviet and Chinese patronage to the North constitut

stays of the economy. When both Cold War patrons termin

support on normalization of relations with Seoul, the North

omy began to register negative growth rates for much of th

the decade (see Collapse in the 1990s, ch. 3). Famine cond

the mid-1990s were also partially a consequence of the No

of aid from its patrons. P’yŏngyang’s relations with the Sovi

and then Russia were permanently damaged. Moscow’s abru

ding of the North as Russia sought to gain access to US$3 

loans from the wealthier South Korea (as part of its 1990 di

normalization with Seoul) greatly offended Kim Il Sun

sought a less draconian break with the North, emphasizing 

for strong relations with both Koreas. 

Close North Korea–China ties continue, but Beijing s

maintain a balance in its relationship with the two Koreas, 

from its previous four decades of dealing solely with P’y

China welcomed the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denucle

of the Korean Peninsula, making clear its preference fo

nuclear Korea. Beijing also urged P’yŏngyang to cooperate 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA—see Glossa

jing clearly views its economic interest on the peninsula 

linked with the South; China has surpassed the United 

South Korea’s largest trading partner. Yet, for strategic and h

reasons, China maintains its policy of keeping the North 

regime afloat. 

Since 2003, talks among six nations (North Korea, Sout

China, Japan, Russia, and the United States)—the so-ca

Party Talks—have offered a forum that enabled China t

larger diplomatic role on the Korean Peninsula. Hosting th

Beijing and taking on the self-proclaimed label of “honest 

China sought to score diplomatic points in the region and en

influence. In the end, however, the equation for Beijing r
peculiar but compelling one. It seeks a nonnuclear North Ko

well as an economically reformed state, but China continues t

vide energy and food assistance to the North even in the absen

progress on denuclearization or reform because of the potential 

of regime collapse. 

The Soviet Union stunned North Korea in September 1990 

it established diplomatic relations with South Korea. Since the

the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991, 

Korea has worked to build a relationship with Russia’s new po

leaders. North Korea’s efforts to recapture some of the pre

closeness and economic benefits of its relationship with the f

Soviet Union are seriously hampered, however, by Russia’s pre

pation with its own political and economic woes. Trade betwe

two nations has dropped dramatically since 1990, as North 

cannot compete with the quality of goods South Korea can 

Whereas in the past the Soviet Union had readily extended cre

North Korea, Russia has demanded hard currency for North K

purchases. Russia also has signaled North Korea that it inten

revise a 1961 defense treaty between North Korea and the S

Union. The revision most likely will mean that Russia will n

obligated to assist North Korea militarily except in the even

North Korea is invaded. 

In large part as a result of changes in its historical relation

with China and the Soviet Union, North Korea faces a foreign p

paradox. Although it arguably has more diplomatic relations 

Western countries than ever before, as a result of the Sunshin

icy, P’yŏngyang is at the same time more diplomatically, polit

and economically isolated. The end of both China’s and the S

Union’s Cold War patronage has much to do with this new situ

The future direction of North Korea–China relations will be a c

indicator of the viability of the North Korean regime. If Beijing 

tinues to view the costs of “muddling through”—a phrase coin

Marcus Noland, a noted economist, and now widely used—

Korea’s economic hardship as better than the costs of collapse

the regime may be capable of subsisting in its current state. If, 

ever, the status quo results in a nuclear North Korea, then the co

Beijing of “muddling through” may grow sufficiently high to 

rant change of the regime itself. 

Japan 

Until the late 1980s, North Korea’s post–World War II p

toward Japan was mainly aimed at minimizing cooperation be

Japan and South Korea and at deterring Japan’s rearmament 

224 
 

Kim Jong Il shaking hands with China’s President Hu Jintao

A

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), Jun

Russia’s President Vladimir V. Putin holds talks with Ki

P’yŏngyang, July 19–

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), Septemb

striving for closer diplomatic and commercial ties with Jap

cial to this position was the fostering within Japan of su

North Korea, especially among the Japanese who suppor

nation’s communist and socialist parties and the ethnic Kor

dents of Japan. Over the years, however, North Korea did 

discredit itself in the eyes of many potential supporters in Ja

cases of missing Japanese citizens attributed to North Kor

nappings went unresolved. And Japanese citizens who had a

nied their spouses to North Korea had endured severe hards

were prevented from communicating with relatives and f

Japan. Japan watched with dismay as, in April 1970, Nor

gave safe haven to elements of the Japanese Red Army, a 

group. North Korea’s inability and refusal to pay its debts 

nese traders also reinforced popular Japanese disdain f

Korea. 

Coincidental with the changing patterns in its relations w

and Russia, North Korea has moved to improve its strained 
with Japan. P’yŏngyang’s primary motives appear to be a que

relief from diplomatic and economic isolation, which has also c

serious shortages of food, energy, and hard currency. Normalizat

relations with Japan also raises the possibility of North Korea’s 

ing monetary compensation for the period of Japan’s colonial oc

tion (1910–45), a precedent set when Japan normalized relation

South Korea. 

The first round of diplomatic normalization talks was h

1991 but quickly broke down over the question of compens

North Korea demanded compensation for damages incurred d

colonial rule as well as for “sufferings and losses” in the period 

World War II. Later rounds of normalization talks in the late 

and early 2000s were stymied by mutual rigidity: the North Ko

demanded colonial reparations and refused to discuss Tokyo’

cerns over P’yŏngyang’s deployment of short-range ballistic 

siles threatening Japan. Tokyo set as preconditions for pro

North Korea’s provision of information regarding nationals abd

from Japan by North Korean agents in the 1970s and a satisfa

resolution to the nuclear weapons issue. 

With talks stalled, an apparent breakthrough materialized in 

tember 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro agreed t

North Korea for a one-day summit with Kim Jong Il. Building 

momentum created by the inter-Korean June 2000 summit, 

were high hopes of a major improvement in relations. Kim Jon

admission at this summit that North Korea had indeed kidn

Japanese nationals, however, resulted in a groundswell of po

anger in Japan. The public backlash at the news that some of 

abductees had died without explanation was so severe that T

pressed harder for additional information on the circumstan

their deaths as a precondition for talks. Bilateral relations wer

ther complicated over this issue when Tokyo refused to retu

abductees and relatives after they had been granted permiss

visit Japan. A second summit between Kim Jong Il and Koizu

May 2004 did not fully resolve this major impediment to norm

ing relations. 

Security tensions between P’yŏngyang and Tokyo augment

political problems over abductees during the same period. In A

1998, the North staged a ballistic missile test over Japan that h

ened concerns immeasurably. This event marked the start of a s

cant augmentation of Japanese security capabilities. In response 

ballistic missile test, Japan launched its first intelligence-gatherin

ellites. During the period 2000–4, moreover, several incidents 

involving North Korean ships and Japan’s Maritime Self-D

226 
Force vessels occurred, with the Japanese shooting at and 

North Korean vessel. Also, in response to the North Korean 

2003–4 Japan undertook a set of legislative reforms that 

Tokyo’s capacity to participate in a multilateral proliferation

initiative as well as to impose bilateral sanctions against Nor

even without a United Nations (UN) Security Council resol

of 2006, Japan had not exercised these capabilities. A militari

tive Japan will be perhaps the most long-lasting legacy 

Korea’s threat. 

The United States 

North Korea’s relationship with the United States since 

been marked by almost continuous confrontation and mistru

Korea views the United States as the strongest imperialist fo

world, the successor to Japanese imperialism, and a malevol

mon in a unipolar world in the post–Cold War period. U.S. 

about North Korea as an international outlaw deri

P’yŏngyang’s activities in nuclear proliferation and weapon

opment, sales of weapons technology, illicit narcotics and co

currency trafficking, human rights violations, and the con

military threat to Washington’s allies in the region. 

The uneasy armistice that halted the intense fightin

Korean War on July 27, 1953, occasionally has been broken

uating the mutual distrust was North Korea’s 1968 seizu

intelligence-gathering ship USS Pueblo, the downing o

reconnaissance plane in 1969, and the 1976 killing of two U

officers at the P’anmunjŏm Joint Security Area in the midd

DMZ. North Korea’s assassination in 1983 of several South 

cabinet officials educated in the United States and the 

bombing of a Baghdad–Seoul South Korean airliner in mida

coast of Burma in 1987 likewise have reinforced U.S. perce

North Korea as unworthy of having diplomatic or economic 

the United States. 

In 1988 the United States launched its own modest diploma

tive to reduce P’yŏngyang’s isolation and to encourage its op

the outside world. Consequently, the U.S. government began 

ing cultural, scholarly, journalistic, athletic, and other exchan

North Korea. After a hesitant start, by the early 1990s almost 

exchanges were occurring in these areas between the two n

halting but significant movement away from total estrangeme

The United States supported the simultaneous admission 

Koreas into the UN in September 1991. That same month, P

George H.W. Bush announced the withdrawal of all U.S
 

nuclear weapons worldwide. In January 1992, after North Kore

publicly committed itself to the signing of a nuclear safeg

agreement with the IAEA and to permitting IAEA inspections 

primary nuclear facility at Yŏngbyŏn, about 50 kilometers no

P’yŏngyang, President Bush and South Korean president Roh 

woo cancelled the 1992 joint annual “Team Spirit” military exe

In February 1992, the U.S. Department of State’s undersec

for political affairs, Arnold Kantor, met with his North Korean 

terpart, the director of the KWP Central Committee’s Interna

Affairs Department, Kim Yong-sun, in New York City. At this 

ing, the United States set forth the steps it wanted North Ko

take prior to normalization of relations. North Korea had to fac

progress in the North–South dialogue; end its export of missi

related technology; renounce terrorism; cooperate in determini

fate of all U.S. Korean War unaccounted-for military perso

demonstrate increasing respect for human rights; and concl

credible and effective North–South nuclear inspection r

designed to complement inspections conducted by the IAEA. O

credible and effective bilateral North–South inspection regim

been implemented, the U.S. Government would initiate a p

level dialogue with North Korea to formulate specifics for reso

other outstanding U.S. concerns. The culmination of this diplo

was the June 1993 North Korea–United States joint statem

which the two sides expressed their hope for relations to be bas

the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and non

ference in each other’s internal affairs. 

The 1993–94 nuclear crisis with North Korea brought to an en

short-lived thaw in relations. North Korea’s refusal to cease an

close nuclear activities at its facilities in Yŏngbyŏn, in defian

IAEA directives and agreements, became the center of a crisi

close to war in June 1994. Last-minute diplomacy by former Pre

Jimmy Carter, just as the United States was considering plans to 

force its military presence in the region, enabled North Korea–U

States bilateral negotiations that led to the October 1994 A

Framework for the denuclearization of North Korea. Negotiat

North Korea’s Kang Sok-ju and U.S. ambassador Robert Gallucc

agreement required P’yŏngyang to freeze, put under interna

monitoring, and ultimately dismantle its nuclear activiti

Yŏngbyŏn. In exchange for these actions, the United States, 

and South Korea were to form the Korean Peninsula Energy Dev

ment Organization consortium to provide two light-water rea

The United States also agreed to provide interim energy supplies 

form of heavy fuel oil to the North for the duration of the project

228 
On October 11, 2000, the first vice chairman of the National Defe

mission, Vice Marshal Cho Myŏng-nok, met with President 

Clinton at the White House, Washin

Courtesy Audio-Visual Division, William J. Clinton Presidentia

Little Rock, 

Given the degree of mutual mistrust, this agreement was i

stages such that each side could demonstrate cooperation at 

of the implementation process. Over the longer term, the 

Framework held out the hope of further improvements in 

between North Korea and its neighbors across a range 

including missiles, conventional military threats, political no

tion, economic aid, and other key issues. 

Concerns about whether the 1994 agreement was bein

mented in good faith began almost immediately after its co

tion. Because of pressure from the U.S. Congress, Washin

behind in the delivery of interim fuel-oil shipments, althou

the termination of these shipments in December 2002, th

States fulfilled every shipment. For its part, North Korea wen

the spirit of the agreement by engaging in provocative act

South Korea and Japan, testing ballistic missiles, and pursu

weapons activities suspected to be in violation of the agreem

The Agreed Framework appeared on the brink of colla

suspected nuclear weapons activities at Kumchangri, about 

meters north of P’yŏngyang, in North P’yŏngan Province, 

After a protracted negotiation process, inspections of Kum

turned up nothing, but mistrust was very high, and skeptici
 

 

North Korean intentions to comply with the 1994 agreement 

palpable in Washington. A policy review conducted by former S

tary of Defense William J. Perry in 1999 laid out two paths 

which U.S.–North Korean relations could proceed. The first wa

tinued implementation of the Agreed Framework as a springboa

cooperation on other issues of concern such as ballistic missile

other path would involve alternative, more coercive actions. A 

of diplomatic activity subsequent to the Perry policy review led 

visit of North Korean envoy Cho Myŏng-nok to the United Sta

October 2000 and a joint statement of no hostile intent. U.S. S

tary of State Madeleine Albright reciprocated with an unpreced

October 2000 visit to P’yŏngyang and meetings with Kim Jo

Discussions about a visit by President Clinton and a potential 

ment on missiles took place but were never concluded. 

In October 2002, the George W. Bush administration state

North Korea was in violation of the 1994 agreement with a cla

tine second nuclear weapons program, using highly enriched 

nium technology. North Korea asserted that it was entitled to 

weapons if the United States maintained its hostile policy and 

proceeded in the winter of 2002 to break out of the 1994 agree

unsealing buildings, disabling monitoring cameras, and exp

IAEA inspectors from the Yŏngbyŏn facility. A new forum fo

cussion was established—the Six-Party Talks—hosted by C

which sought to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear 

ons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. At these 

the United States laid out proposals for nuclear disarmame

offering energy assistance from some of the six parties in return 

North Korean commitment to verifiable nuclear dismantlemen

Prospects: The Significance of Reform 

The most significant twenty-first-century political developm

North Korea relates to the July 2002 market-liberalization ref

generally associated with four measures. The first was a basic m

tization of the economy. The government abolished the co

based public distribution system for food rations and relaxed 

controls, thereby allowing supply and demand to determine p

In order to meet the rise in prices, the government also hiked 

levels, which had been almost uniform across sectors. For som

tors, the rise was as much as fortyfold and for other “special” 

sectors (government officials, soldiers, miners, and farmers) as 

as sixtyfold. Small-scale markets have sprouted up all over 

Korea, and the public ration system has broken down (see Refo

the Public Distribution System, ch. 3). 

230 
 

The second reform measure was adopted in August 200

the government abandoned the artificially high value of t

Korean wŏn (for value of the wŏn, see Glossary), adjusting 

rency exchange rate from 2.15 wŏn per US$1 to 150 wŏn p

This measure was aimed at inducing foreign investment an

ing export incentives for domestic firms. The “unofficial” 

the currency has depreciated much further since the reforms

A third reform measure was the government’s decentrali

economic decisions. Measures entailed cutting government s

allowing farmers’ markets to operate, and devolving manage

sions for industry and agriculture from the central governm

factory party committees) into the hands of local producti

Enterprises now have to cover their own costs. Managers 

meet hard budget constraints. Workers are not evaluated bas

number of days they show up to work, but on productivity a

Farmers are now allowed to plant small private plots of land 

tion to those plots designated for state production. 

The fourth reform measure was the government’s pursu

cial administrative districts and industrial zones in order t

foreign investment. The Sinŭiju Special Administrative R

North P’yŏngan Province on the Yellow Sea (or West Sea

called in North Korea) is an open economic zone for fore

nesses designed to exist completely outside North Korea’

legal strictures. The Kaesŏng Special Industrial Zone is anot

ect designed in particular to attract small and medium-siz

Korean businesses, and the Mount Kŭmgang Tourist Zone 

by Hyundai provides hard currency to the North from tou

three projects sought to avoid the mistakes and failure

Najin–Sŏnbong International Trade Zone, in the northeast n

sia, created by the North in 1991, although these later pro

still hampered by the lack of adequate infrastructure, amo

problems (see Special Economic Zones, ch. 3). 

The July 2002 reforms were unarguably a significant 

ment. They represented the first attempt in the regime’s h

large-scale economic change. In addition, while P’yŏngya

paganda continued to maintain anticapitalist rhetoric and 

market economic principles, unlike the cases of China and 

the regime admitted flaws in the socialist-style economy. Th

icance of these reforms, however, does not make them su

The obstacles to successful reform are numerous. 

First, it is unclear whether the July 2002 measures repr

equivalent of North Korea’s religious “conversion” to ca

Neither the language nor the nature of these initial reforms 

to have the same conviction as those seen in China or 
 

 

 

 

Moreover, many of the reforms arguably may constitute c

mechanisms to deal with immediate problems rather than a w

sale, prescient shift in economic ideology. For example, North 

authorized monetization of the economy and permitted far

markets to buy and sell goods largely because the public distrib

system had broken down. Similarly, local managers were given 

leeway, not because the central government trusted their ent

neurial capabilities, but because plunging outputs and high ab

rates for workers who went searching for food rather than rep

to work required some drastic measures. 

When the reform package initially was announced in 200

government was reluctant to call these measures “reforms,” in

referring to an “economic adjustment policy” that would “so

the nation’s socialist principles and planned economic system.” 

statements contradict earlier pronouncements by P’yŏngyang 

the difficulties of socialism, raising questions about whether an 

logical and systemic conversion has yet occurred. Economist 

Ink-pyo has observed that “market freedom is not the goal” an

the North Korean authorities intend to normalize the planned 

omy by enhancing efficiency and productivity in industry, a

restore the official economic sector so as to absorb or contra

private economic sector. 

The economic reforms will test the government’s ability to 

with the triple problems of inflation, economic losers, and the 

poor created by the monetization of the economy. Low suppl

low output have led to massive increases in prices and further d

uation of the wŏn. By comparison, in 1979 China’s initial 

reforms drove up the price of rice by 25 percent; in North Kore

price has gone up by at least 600 percent, and the wŏn depre

from 150 wŏn (to US$1) in 2002 to 900 wŏn to the dollar in 

with some estimating the black-market values at 3,000 wŏn 

dollar in 2005. The North Korean currency has fallen dramat

against China’s renminbi as well, depreciating from 30 wŏn 

renminbi in August 2002 to 120 wŏn in 2003, to more than 13

in 2004. Despite wage hikes averaging 15 to 20 times the 2002 

these increased wages, if they are truly paid, still cannot keep 

with the skyrocketing retail prices, estimated at more than 27 

the growth in wage rates. 

Although companies in 2006 were allowed greater flexibility i

duction, the basic absence of any capital inputs allows flexibi

name only. The designated “winners” as a result of these re

would probably include farmers. They are now allowed to pr

food for sale on the open market, after meeting state production q

232 
 

 

They benefit from the inflated prices as a result of increased 

The state also attempted to introduce new seeds and fert

increase crop yields. 

Even in a best-case scenario of increased agricultural out

ulated by the reforms, however, the agricultural sector rep

fraction of the economy. The North Korean economy, since 

of the Japanese occupation, has been largely an industrial 

with some 70 percent of the population residing in cities. A

is no internal capacity to increase agricultural output becau

decrepit infrastructure, lack of capital inputs and limited ara

creating many losers across society. The reforms enabled K

Il to gain some control of the economy by hurting those bl

keters who held large amounts of wŏn before the currency 

tion. Fixed-income workers were badly hit by the combin

price hikes and weakening of the North Korean currency. 

tion, many workers were laid off by companies forced to c

Finally, there is fragmentary evidence that even those secto

labor force favored by the wage hikes were discontented. U

tory workers fell into a wage-productivity trap where they 

were given two months’ salary of 3,000 wŏn—which 

enough to support a family of four for one month—but 

beyond that. In order to gain wages, the workers needed to 

but in 2004 factories in North Korea operated at less than 3

capacity. Even among those sectors given the highest wage 

(6,000 wŏn) there was widespread discontent. Refugees cro

border into China complained that the promise of higher w

not been kept, with workers receiving only 800 wŏn and th

ing after October 2003. There is the possibility that “money 

is wearing off in North Korea, giving way to a new class 

poor, potentially numbering in the millions, that could be di

control. 

The ultimate success of the reforms rests on the North’s ca

secure international food supplies until the changes start to 

agricultural output domestically; secure loans to finance sho

cash-flow for managerial enterprises; and obtain technical tr

accounting, fiscal policy, finance and other requisite skills. A 

a U.S. Senate trip to North Korea in 2004 described the basic 

in order for the reforms to succeed, the North must overcom

shortages of electricity, food, timber, coal, capital, technol

trained personnel. Or as a Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 

tion (HSBC) report published in February 2003 explained, the 

of such inputs impedes any chance of sustained economic gro

without such growth there is no way to produce the needed in
 

 

North’s ability to secure this magnitude of assistance depends on 

isfactory resolution of the nuclear crisis. But P’yŏngyang contin

demand these economic inputs from the United States and other

condition of addressing the world’s political concerns about its n

programs. 

* * * 

Sources on North Korea vary considerably in reliability an

ance, so they should be used with care, particularly in the c

information emanating from North Korea. Information from 

Korea also has a political bias. Major articles in Nodong Sh

(Workers’ Daily), Kulloja (The Worker), and other Korean-lan

publications are available in U.S. Open Source Center (former

Foreign Broadcast Information Service) translations of 

Korean broadcasts via the U.S. National Technical Informatio

vice’s World News Connection (http://wnc.fedworld.gov/). 

For in-depth coverage of North Korea, one of the most co

hensive sources is Pukhan Chosŏn (North Korean Handboo

Korean, prepared by South Korea’s Kuktong Munje Yŏn’guso 

tute for East Asian Studies). Pukhan (North Korea), the mo

organ of Pukhan Yŏn’guso, the Research Institute on North Ko

Seoul; and Kita Chōsen Kenkyo (Studies on North Korea), a 

nese-language monthly of the Kokusai Kankei Kyodo Kenk

(Joint Research Institute on International Relations) in Toky

also useful. Vantage Point, an English-language monthly peri

issued by Naewoe Press in Seoul, and East Asian Review, an 

lish-language quarterly published by the Institute for East 

Studies in Seoul, provide in-depth studies of North Korean s

economic, and political developments. 

Other sources include the annual survey articles on North 

in Asian Survey and the Europa World Year Book. Various 

sites at the Library of Congress offer access to selected offici

nongovernmental Web sites. These include North Korean reso

listed in Portals to the World (http://www.loc.gov/rr/internat

asian/northkorea/northkorea.html) and on the Law Library’s N

of the World (http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/northkorea.html). 

Korean official Web sites include the Democratic People’s Rep

of Korea (http://www.korea.dpr.com/) and Naenara Korea Com

Center in the DPRKorea (http://www.kcckp.net/en/). (For f

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

234 
Chapter 5. National Se
 

 

Bas-relief on P’yŏngyang’s Arch of Triumph showing members of the

various branches of the Korean People’s Army celebrating the libera

of their country 

Courtesy Pulmyŏl ŭi t’ap (Tower of Immortality), P’yŏngyang: Muny

Ch’ulpansa, 1985, 283 
AS THE WORLD’S MOST MILITARIZED STATE in prop

population, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D

North Korea, fields a massive combat force that ranks four

world in size behind the armed forces of China, the Unite

and India. North Korea’s major forward deployment of arm

near the demilitarized zone (DMZ—see Glossary) that div

Korean Peninsula puts it in a confrontational relationship 

Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the United States, as o

final legacies of the Cold War. 

The division of Korea originated as a consequence of a 

partition that was imposed by the United States and the form

Union to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces at the end 

War II (1939–45; see National Division in the 1940s, ch. 1). 

to divide the Korean Peninsula into dual occupation zones at t

eighth parallel, the former Soviet Union occupied the North 

United States the South in what was intended as a temporary 

Instead, antithetical political systems and opposing armed for

established in the two areas; all subsequent efforts to reunify 

states have failed. 

Military Heritage 

The origins of North Korea’s modern armed forces, wh

founded on February 8, 1948, as the Korean People’s Army 

Chosŏn Inmin’gun), can be traced through three forging fa

Kapsan (see Glossary) partisan lineage (1932–45), Soviet 

tion (1945–48), and Chinese communist associations (1

These three factors, perhaps more than any others, have co

uniquely to the formation of the KPA leadership, force s

doctrine, and tactics. 

During the 1930s and 1940s, many Koreans and Chine

guerrilla units to oppose Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910) a

churia (1931). According to North Korean historiography, Kim 

(1912–94) organized his Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army (o

Yugyŏtae) on April 25, 1932; it was later renamed the Korean 

Revolutionary Army (KPRA or Chosŏn Inmin Hyŏngmyŏn

1936 the KPRA joined with the Chinese Communist Party

formed Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, which fou

coherent unit until its defeat in battle by the Japanese Imperial 

1941. Remnants of the defeated northeast army, including Kim 
 

 

and many fellow Koreans, escaped to the Soviet Far East, wher

joined the Soviet Eighty-eighth Special Brigade. Many of these K

exiles (the Kapsan faction) were given leadership positions with

brigade, including Kim Il Sung, who commanded the First Battal

At the end of World War II, Koreans repatriated from the S

Union were either Kapsan faction members (Kim Il Sung loy

or long-term Soviet-Korean residents; the former group would 

tually be elevated to positions of government and military auth

There were factional power struggles among the various K

troops. The pro-Chinese Yan’an faction had its origins in the K

nationalist movement in China. Kim Mu-chŏng (1904–51), a v

of the Chinese Communist Party’s Long March (1934–35), 

lished the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA or Chosŏn Ŭiyongg

Yan’an with Chinese communist backing. Under Chinese co

nist protection, the Yan’an faction trained several thousand so

and political cadres and was a political and military force to be 

oned with when it attempted to return to Korea in 1945. 

From August 1945 until December 1948, the Soviet Red 

(later the Soviet Civil Administration) occupied Korea north 

thirty-eighth parallel, where it exercised broad control over adm

tration, including national security. During the Soviet occupatio

North Korean government was fully organized and included the 

istry of Defense and the KPA. In 1948 the KPA had 60,000 pers

assigned to four infantry divisions and a tank battalion tha

equipped with Soviet weapons systems and trained and orga

according to Soviet doctrine and tactics, which were adapt

accommodate North Korea’s infantry-centric force structure. An

40,000 personnel were organized into a border constabulary tha

subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

In the 18 months between the Soviet withdrawal and the K

War (1950–53), the KPA rapidly grew to 160,000 personnel 

nized into 10 infantry divisions, a tank division, an air division

a motorcycle regiment; the extra 40,000 personnel formed the b

constabulary. This rapid expansion was not only facilitated b

steady influx of Soviet matériel and the domestic conscription 

additional 40,000 personnel but also greatly augmented by the 

fer of perhaps as many as 60,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from 

nese communist forces to the KPA in 1949 and 1950. 

National Command Authorities 

National command authority in North Korea is consolidated 

person—Kim Jong Il (officially born in 1942). This solidificat

absolute authority was a carefully arranged process that was in

238 
 

by Kim’s father, the late President Kim Il Sung, and occurred 

several successive appointments (or elections) to various p

including vice chairman of the National Defense Commissio

1990, supreme commander of the KPA in December 1991, m

April 1992, and chairman of the National Defense Comm

April 1993. More than three years after Kim Il Sung’s death, 

ber 1997, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) elected Kim Jon

general secretary, and both the KWP Central Committee and 

tral Military Commission elected him chairman of the party’

Military Commission. 

In accordance with the 1998 revised state constitution, the 

Defense Commission is the highest military leadership body 

power and the organ of overall administration of national 

Constitutionally, the National Defense Commission is accou

the Supreme People’s Assembly (see The Legislature, ch. 

ever, in fact, if not in law, the National Defense Commissi

man, Kim Jong Il, holds the highest position responsible f

Korea’s political, economic, and military resources (see The 

tional Framework; Relationships Among the Government, P

Military, ch. 4). 

National Defense Organizations 

The KWP Central Military Commission and the state 

Defense Commission, both bodies chaired by Kim Jong 

coordinating authority over the armed forces (see fig. 11). T

tral Military Commission of the KWP Central Commit

headed by General Secretary Kim Jong Il) provides broad 

and policy guidance, while the National Defense Commiss

cises command and administrative control over the armed fo

Central Military Commission 

The party Central Military Commission is subordinate to 

Central Committee and, as enumerated in article 27 of the K

stitution, serves as the party’s leading body on all military 

including establishing policies, plans, and defense acquisitio

ties (see The Korean Workers’ Party, ch. 4). The Central 

Commission, and by extension the party Central Committee

nates its work through the party Secretariat’s military, m

industry, operations, civil defense, and organization and 

departments and the party Political Bureau’s chain of co

which extends through the General Political Bureau of lev

military units. 
NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 

GUARD

COMMAND

STATE SECURITY

DEPARTMENT 

MINISTRY OF

PEOPLE’S SECURITY 

MINISTRY OF PEOPLE’S

ARMED FORCES 

SECOND ECONOMIC

COMMITTEE 

GENERAL


POLITICAL


BUREAU
 

GENERAL


REAR SERVICES


BUREAU
 

SECURITY


COMMAND
 

GENERAL


STAFF


DEPARTMENT
 

CADRE


BUREAU
 

MILITARY


PROSECUTIONS


BUREAU
 

MILITARY

JUSTICE

BUREAU 

INFANTRY

CORPS

(9) 

LIGHT

INFANTRY

TRAINING

GUIDANCE

BUREAU 

MECHANIZED

CORPS

(4) 

TANK

CORPS

(1) 

ARTILLERY

CORPS

(1) 

BORDER

SECURITY

COMMAND 

WEST SEA

FLEET

COMMAND 

EAST SEA

FLEET

COMMAND 

AIR

DIVISIONS 

NAVY

COMMAND 

AIR FORCE

COMMAND

MISSILE

GUIDANCE

BUREAU 

P’YONGYANG

DEFENSE

COMMAND 

Coordinated authoritiesGeneral line of controlDirect reporting

Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Kukpang Paesŏ, 2006 [Defense White Paper, 2006], Seoul, 2006, 19.

240 
The members of the party Central Military Commission 

rently hold key defense and military positions. In 2007 the

bers and positions included Kim Il-ch’ŏl, minister of people

forces; Cho Myŏng-nok, director of the General Political B

the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces; Kim Yŏng-chun, ch

General Staff Department; Yi Ha-il, director of the KWP 

Affairs Department; Kim Ik-hyŏn, director of the par

Defense Department; Pak Ki-sŏ, commander of the P’y

Defense Command; Kim Ch’ŏl-man, former chairman of th

Economic Committee; Yi Yong-ch’ŏl, first vice director of 

Organization and Guidance Department; and others. 

National Defense Commission 

In the 1998 constitution, clauses related to national de

arranged in two chapters. Those specifying the roles and mi

the armed forces are in chapter 4, National Defense, ar

through 61. Clauses stipulating the powers of the National 

Commission are located in chapter 6, State Organs, sectio

National Defense Commission, articles 100 through 105. S

empowers the National Defense Commission chairman to d

command the armed forces and to guide overall national 

affairs. This section also establishes the National Defense 

sion as the highest military leadership body of state powe

organ of overall administration of national defense. It also d

organization and specifies its duties and authorities. 

Article 101 specifies that the National Defense Commiss

consist of a chairman, a first vice chairman, one or more o

chairmen, and other members. This body is elected by the 

People’s Assembly and serves a five-year term, which 

extended if an election is not held because of “unavoidable 

stances.” The National Defense Commission includes Mar

Jong Il, chairman; Vice Marshal Cho Myŏng-nok, first vi

man and director of the General Political Bureau; Vice M

Yong-mu, vice chairman; Vice Marshal Kim Yŏng-chun, vi

man and former chief of the General Staff Department; a

members: Vice Marshal Kim Il-ch’ŏl, minister of people

forces; Chŏn Pyŏng-ho, secretary of the KWP; General Hyŏ

hae, former vice director of the General Political Bureau; 

Yang-gŏn, councilor and director of the KWP’s Internationa

Department. 

Article 103 gives the National Defense Commission the 

tional power to direct the armed forces; establish and abolish s

tutions in the defense sector; appoint and dismiss senior 
 

 

officers; enact and confer military titles on senior officers; and mo

for emergencies and declare war. Constitutionally, the Supreme 

ple’s Assembly is charged with oversight of the National D

Commission per articles 105 and 110; however, in practice the Na

Defense Commission is not accountable to any regulatory body. S

dinate to the National Defense Commission are the Ministry o

ple’s Security, State Security Department, Guard Command

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (see Internal Security, this ch

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces 

The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces coordinates admin

tive defense activities and represents the military externally. 

September 1998, the ministry has been led by Vice Marshal K

ch’ŏl. Although a ministry, it is not subordinate to the cabin

answers directly to Kim Jong Il in his role as chairman o

National Defense Commission. Within the ministry, the G

Staff Department, General Political Bureau, and Security Com

form a ruling triumvirate that operates in a construct of check

balances. 

The General Staff Department is led by Chief of the Genera

General Kim Kyuk-sik, who exercises unitary command a

ity—operational responsibility over the KPA ground, air, nava

cial operations, and reserve forces. Subordinate to the Genera

Department are more than 20 bureaus and an elaborate organi

of military schools, academies, and universities. Akin to 

nations’ Joint Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff Departm

directly responsible for all military strategy, planning, opera

and training. These duties specifically fall under the purview 

General Staff Department Operations Bureau and are carried o

its 10 military departments. The First Department is in char

administrative affairs, while the Second Department develops o

tions plans. The Third Department supervises the forward in

corps (I, II, IV, and V Corps), and the Fourth Department supe

all other infantry corps. The Fifth Department oversees the 

Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, the Sixth Department supe

the Air Force Command, and the Seventh Department supervis

Navy Command. The Eighth Department plans operations for s

dinate units of other General Staff Department bureaus, the 

Department conducts corps-level training exercises, and the 

Department (or Information Department) supervises the 

Korean members of the Military Armistice Commission. 

The General Political Bureau is the regime’s political app

for controlling the KPA, and it is led by the eminently pow

242 
A bemedaled Korean People’s Army on parade in P’yŏngyang d

celebration of the ninetieth birthday of Kim Il Sung, also the s

anniversary of the establishment of the Korean Workers’ Party, April 

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), June 2002, fro
director general Vice Marshal Cho Myŏng-nok (second i

national hierarchy behind Kim Jong Il). As the KPA’s political 

ance system, it permeates every organization of the KPA 

through company levels. Operating under the supervision o

party Central Committee, the General Political Bureau is respo

for propaganda, educational, and cultural activities. Moreover, 

on delegation of authority from the National Defense Commi

the bureau also authorizes the movement of military units. Ins

political officers into unit movements is a precautionary me

against unauthorized, possibly regime-threatening moveme

units by commanders. 

The Security Command is an intramilitary surveillance agenc

is responsible for internal affairs and for exposing corrupt and di

elements within the KPA. Commanded by a military officer, C

General Kim Wŏn-hong, and organized under the Ministry of Pe

Armed Forces, the command is directly accountable to the State 

rity Department. Similar to the General Political Bureau, the Se

Command also operates a separate but parallel chain of comman

extends down to the battalion level. Battalion-level security com

officers clandestinely employ six or seven informants per comp

report politically disloyal elements. Those who are accused oft

apprehended, interrogated (routinely tortured for a confession)

by military court, and sentenced, as deemed appropriate. The Se

Command not only conducts surveillance of the military ch

command but also observes and reports on the actions of the po

officers. 

Other bureaus of the General Staff Department include the 

eral Rear Services Bureau, which controls KPA logistical su

activities, and the Cadre Bureau, which oversees officer pers

matters, including promotions, awards, and records. The M

Justice Bureau establishes military judicial policy and supervis

lower military courts, and the Military Prosecutions Bureau p

cutes cases that appear before the Military Justice Bureau and 

sees the activities of subordinate prosecution elements. 

National Security Policy Formulation 

The KWP Central Military Commission and the state Na

Defense Commission hold coordinating authority over the a

forces. Together (and both under the chairmanship of Kim Jon

they represent North Korea’s core national security policy-m

component. 

North Korea’s national security structure has a four-tiered m

operational component. In this structure, orders originate fro

244 
national coordinated authorities and are passed through the m

People’s Armed Forces to the chief of the General Politica

and then to the chief of the General Staff Department. How

head of state, party, and defense and in his role as KPA supre

mander, Kim Jong Il can abbreviate this process by issuing op

orders directly to the chief of the General Staff Departmen

tiered process. During wartime operation, a supreme comma

quarters would be activated to prosecute the war, thereby nor

this two-tiered process. 

Kim Jong Il’s control of the military is further strengthen

appointments of loyalists to state, party, and military p

Among his closest military advisers are Vice Marshal Cho 

nok, director of the General Political Bureau; Vice Mars

Yŏng-chun, former chief of the General Staff Departme

Marshal Kim Il-ch’ŏl, minster of people’s armed forces; 

Hyŏn Ch’ŏl-hae, former vice director of the General 

Bureau; General Pak Chae-kyŏng, vice director of Pro

Department of the General Political Bureau; General Kim 

kuk, director of the Operations Bureau of the General Staf

ment; and Colonel General Kim Wŏn-hong, chief of the 

Command. 

Elements of the administrative-logistical component 

national security structure include the Second Economic Co

which is directly subordinate to the National Defense Com

and controls the defense industry under the guidance of 

Munitions Industry Department; in 2007 the chief of the l

Chŏn Pyŏng-ho (see Defense Industry, this ch.). The Gene

Department and the General Rear Services Bureau of the M

People’s Armed Forces prepare military budgets under the 

of the Political Bureau and Central Military Commission. P

budgets are approved by the Central Military Commis

passed into law by the essentially rubber-stamp legisla

Supreme People’s Assembly. 

Organization and Equipment of the Armed F

General Staff Department 

North Korea has enormous armed forces, numbering m

1.2 million personnel on active duty and an additional 7.7 

personnel in paramilitary and reserve forces (see Reserve 

this ch.). The KPA is a unitary or joint force that is led oper

by the General Staff Department. 
 

 

Boundary representation 

International boundary not necessarily authoritative 

Demarcation line and

 demilitarized zone 

Demarcation line and 

demilitarized zone 

*

*

*

*

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

®

®

VIII 

III 

II 

I 

VII 

V 

IV 

IX 

East Sea Fleet Command 

West Sea 

Fleet Command 

Air Force Command 

Navy Command 

P’yongyang 

Defense Command 

 ̆ 

108th Mechanized C

425th 

Mechanized Corps 

806th Mechanized Corps 

815th Mechanized Corps 

820th Tank Corps 

620th Artillery Corps 

3d Air Combat Division 

1st Air Combat Division 

2d Air 

Combat Division 

8th Air Training Division 

unidentified infantry corps 

Yellow Sea 

(West Sea) 

Sea of 

Japan 

(East Sea

West 

Korea Bay 

P’yongyang 

Seoul Sagot 

Sin’gye 

Pip’a-got 

Ch’o-do Hwangju 

Tasa-ri 

Namp’o 

Wonsan 

Chongju 

Ch’angjon 

Toksandong 

Kaech’on 

Orang 

Songwol-li 

Najin 

Puam-ni 

Ch’aho 

Mayang 

T’oejo-dong 

Oro 

Chunghwa 

Kosandong 

Kobultong 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆ 

 ̆  ̆ 

CHINA 

SOUTH 

KOREA 

0 25 50 75 Kilometers 

0 25 50 75 Miles 

®

 

 

*

VIII 

Corps boundary 

National capital 

Populated place 

Ground forces 

Naval forces 

Air Wings 

Corps 

Figure 12. Deployment of Ground and Naval Forces and Air Wings, 

In early 2007, General Kim Kyuk-sik became chief of the G

Staff Department, replacing Vice Marshal Kim Yŏng-chun

became vice chairman of the National Defense Commission

department is staffed with members from all of its componen

is responsible for manning, training, equipping, administering

supporting the KPA and planning, organizing, and employin

KPA to accomplish its missions. Subordinate to the General 

Department are military commands, bureaus, and institution

perform command and administrative functions, provide warfig

246 
capabilities, and coordinate deployment of the armed 

Broadly defined, the military commands—ground, air, na

special operations forces—are collectively termed the KPA. 

Army 

North Korea has amassed the world’s third largest 

forces—with 1 million personnel—and the world’s largest 

force—with 13,500 pieces. Seventy percent of the ground f

permanently deployed south of P’yŏngyang and Wŏnsan an

about 80 kilometers of the DMZ. The ground forces’ size, o

tion, disposition, and combat readiness provide North Ko

options for either offensive operations to attempt to reunify 

insula forcibly or defensive operations against perceived thr

The ground forces are organized into 19 major command

deployed in echelon by mission and include nine infantry co

mechanized corps, a tank corps, an artillery corps, P’y

Defense Command, Border Security Command, the Missile G

Bureau, and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. Ma

bat formations include some 80 infantry divisions (including 

divisions), 30 artillery brigades, 25 special warfare brigades, 

anized brigades, 10 tank brigades, and seven tank regiments. 

The forward echelon is organized with four infant

deployed abreast (from west to east: IV Corps, II Corps, V 

and I Corps) along the DMZ (see fig. 12). The 620th Artille

also is deployed forward and operates from hardened artill

Some 250 long-range artillery systems (240-millimeter 

rocket launchers and 170-millimeter self-propelled howit

within striking range of Seoul from their current positio

located south of the P’yŏngyang–Wŏnsan line are, from we

the 815th Mechanized Corps within the IV Corps boundar

vicinity of Kobul-tong); the 820th Tank Corps also withi

Corps boundary (near Songwŏl-li); and the 806th Mechaniz

within the V Corps boundary (in the vicinity of Kosan-dong

Two geographically postured infantry corps are organiz

central echelon. They are III Corps in the west and VII Cor

east; in addition, there is an unidentified infantry corps 

within the VII Corps boundary, and the P’yŏngyang Defen

mand is based at the national capital. Organized in the rear 

are two strategically postured infantry corps: VIII Corps in 

and IX (formerly VI) Corps in the east; the 425th Mechaniz

is located in the VIII Corps boundary (in the vicinity of C

and the 108th Mechanized Corps is within the VII Corps b

(near Oro). 
Since 2000 the Missile Guidance Bureau (possibly rename

Artillery Guidance Bureau) was organized or reorganized to 

command and control of North Korean theater missile units, 

are deployed operationally to several locations. The Light In

Training Guidance Bureau is a special operations forces (SOF) 

mand that directly controls assigned forces and might control 

strategic SOF, specifically, the air and naval sniper brigades. 

The major army weapons systems and equipment include 

armored personnel carriers, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and 

ing assets. The army has some 3,700 tanks that are categoriz

either light or medium armaments. Light tanks include the P

T–62, and T–63 light amphibious tank; medium tanks include 

T–55, T–59, and T–62 models. The tanks are organized into m

and light tank companies (10 tanks each), battalions (three tank 

panies), brigades (four medium and one light tank battalions

the tank corps (five tank brigades). 

The armored vehicle inventory has about 2,100 armored pe

nel carriers, including the wheeled BTR series, Type M–1973, 

lesser quantity of the track-mounted BMP. Ground force

armored personnel carriers for multiple roles that include man

reconnaissance, and command and control. Typically, mecha

infantry units organize this equipment into mortar and mecha

infantry companies (often 10 vehicles each), mechanized batt

(three mechanized infantry companies and one mortar comp

mechanized brigades (one mechanized infantry battalion and 

motorized infantry battalions), and mechanized corps (five m

nized infantry brigades). 

With more than 13,500 artillery pieces, the world’s largest 

lery force includes free-rocket-over-ground (FROG) artillery 

tems, 107-millimeter to 240-millimeter multiple rocket laun

and 100-millimeter to 170-millimeter howitzers. Artillery f

tions are organized by type and assigned to regiments, division

corps: regiment assignments include an 18-gun 122-millimeter 

itzer battalion and a nine-launcher 107-millimeter or 140-milli

multiple rocket launcher battery; division assignments includ

12-gun 152-millimeter howitzer battalions, one 18-gun 122-mi

ter howitzer battalion, and one 12-launcher 122-millimeter mu

rocket launcher battalion; and corps assignments include six 1

170-millimeter howitzer battalions and six 18-launcher 240-mi

ter multiple rocket launcher battalions. To support maneuver o

tions, artillery is task-organized into regimental, division, and 

artillery groups, which are routinely augmented with additiona

lery units that are attached from higher echelons. 

248 
The army has amassed more than 15,600 antiaircraft artille

for theater missile-defense and counterair operations. Stra

employed and integrated to defend critical geopolitical assets

to-air (SA) missile systems include several fixed and semifix

SA–3, and SA–5 medium and medium-to-high-altitude mi

tems. Short-range air-defense systems are deployed at the co

sion, and regimental levels and include an organized selection 

millimeter, 37-millimeter, and 57-millimeter antiaircraft 

pieces. Short-range, man-portable SA–7B launchers also con

localized air defense and are employed down to battalion leve

Although the army conducts training exercises at all levels 

mand, most training occurs at the regimental level or below, an

at company and platoon levels. Exercises involving units that 

scarce resources, such as fuel, oil, and lubricants, occur infr

inhibiting the readiness of exploitation forces, which may ca

gration difficulties during division and corps operations. 

On March 7, 2006, the commander of the United Natio

mand, Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forc

mand, and U.S. Forces Korea, General Burwell B. Bell, 

before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee concerni

Korea’s military posture. General Bell assessed that desp

equipment and simplistic methods, North Korean conventio

tary forces pose a continuing threat because of their sheer 

forward positions. 

Special Operations Forces 

The KPA has a mixture of conventional and unconventio

fare units. North Korea’s special operations forces (SOF

world’s largest and have the highest military funding prior

mates of strength range from 87,000 to 92,000 and 10

120,000 personnel, depending on whether or not both strat

lower numbers) and tactical forces (the higher numbers) are 

The uncertainty over the number of forces is derived mai

the varying definitions of what actually constitutes KPA 

operations forces, which include light infantry, airborne, sn

reconnaissance forces. Organized into 25 brigades and nine 

battalions, the special operations forces are believed to be 

trained and to have the highest morale of all North Korea

forces. SOF operations are categorized by the supported 

strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic SOF are emp

reconnaissance, sniper, and agent operations and support na

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces objectives. Operatio
 

support corps operations, and tactical SOF support forward-di

operations. 

The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces controls strategic 

through four commands, the Reconnaissance Bureau, Light In

Training Guidance Bureau, Air Force Command, and Navy 

mand. The Reconnaissance Bureau is subordinate to the Minis

People’s Armed Forces, is responsible for the collection of str

and tactical intelligence, and directly controls one sniper brigad

five reconnaissance battalions. The bureau also exercises opera

control over agents engaged in collecting military intelligence 

the training and dispatch of unconventional warfare teams

Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is a subordinate com

of the General Staff Department and directly controls four 

infantry brigades, three airborne brigades, and a sniper brigade

The Air Force Command has two sniper brigades of 3,500 pe

nel each and up to 300 An–2 biplanes that are used mainly for 

trating SOF assets into South Korea’s rear areas. Because o

ability of the An–2 to fly at low speeds and at very low altitude

otherwise antiquated aircraft provides the KPA with a fairly re

means of infiltration. The Navy Command has two seaborne 

brigades with a combined force of about 7,000 personnel th

capable of being infiltrated rapidly along South Korea’s coast. O

navy’s 260 landing craft, more than 50 percent are of the la

craft air-cushion variety, well suited to traversing large mud 

seasonal frozen coastal waters, and areas of great tidal variance

Operational and tactical SOF units are organized at corps and 

sion levels, respectively. At the operational level, each of the fou

ward infantry corps has a reconnaissance battalion, light in

brigade, and sniper brigade; each of the four mechanized corps 

light infantry brigade. (Rear area infantry corps are organized a

infantry brigades, but because of their geographical separation 

the front line, these units are not considered as SOF.) At the ta

level, each of the 20 or so forward infantry divisions has an ass

light infantry battalion. 

Reconnaissance battalions are employed in rear areas—str

and operational—to collect intelligence and information on 

value targets. Battalions are organized with a headquarters, 

platoon, recruit-training company, training company, and four r

naissance companies of fewer than 100 troops each. Reconnais

companies are organized with four platoons each, including 

five-man teams (basic operating units) that are lightly armed 

rifles and sidearms. 

250 
The KPA in a river-crossing exercise at an undisclose

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), July 

Light infantry units are employed at the strategic, operati

tactical levels; they operate in battalions or companies to 

raids on command and control centers and artillery position

secure choke points along axes of advance. Light infantry 

are robust organizations with a headquarters, signal compan

ment company, transportation company, and six light infant

ions. Light infantry battalions have a recruit-training c

signal company, air defense platoon, and six light infantry 

nies. Light infantry companies have two light infantry plato

with a three-tube, 60-millimeter mortar platoon and four lig

try squads. 

Sniper brigades generally operate in teams to conduct raid

lition, and reconnaissance and to collect intelligence. Sniper 

are organized less robustly than light-infantry sniper brig

have a headquarters, signal company, and six sniper battalio

battalion has a signal platoon and five sniper companies, 

company has a three-tube mortar squad and three sniper plato

KPA special operations forces were developed to meet th

requirements: to breach the flankless fixed defense of South 

create a second front in the enemy rear area, disrupting in-de

forcements and logistical support during a conflict; and to con

tlefield and strategic reconnaissance. Missions to counter 

forces and to conduct internal security were added over time. 
 

Strategic missions require deep insertions either in advan

hostilities or in the initial stages by naval or air platforms. Bas

available insertion platforms, North Korea has a strategic lift 

bility of about 21,000 SOF personnel, which includes about 1

personnel by sea and another 6,000 personnel by air. The majo

SOF elements infiltrate over land to execute operational and ta

missions. 

Air Force 

In 2007 Colonel General O Kŭm-ch’ŏl headed the Korean 

ple’s Air Force Command, which has roots dating back to 1946

Air Force Command has adapted Soviet and Chinese doctrine

tactics to accommodate internal requirements and resources. I

mary mission is air defense; secondary missions include tactic

support to the ground and naval forces, transportation and log

support, and SOF insertion. 

The air force is organized around four air divisions, three air 

bat divisions, and one air training division, with a total of 11

personnel, including 7,000 special operations troops. The Fir

Combat Division is headquartered at Kaech’ŏn, South P’y

Province, and operates in the northwest. The Second Air Co

Division is headquartered at Tŏksan-dong, near Hamhŭng, 

Hamgyŏng Province, and operates in the east. The Third Air Co

Division is headquartered at Hwangju, North Hwanghae Pro

and operates in the south. The Eighth Air Training Division (

designation that is speculative) is headquartered at Ŏrang, 

Hamgyŏng Province, and operates in the northeast. Addi

forces include a helicopter brigade, and support units includ

Fifth and Sixth transport brigades. About 40 percent of air 

fighters are forward deployed. The Air Force Command its

headquartered in P’yŏngyang and controls, operates, and mai

all military and civilian aircraft, airfields, and airports throu

North Korea. 

Significantly smaller than the ground forces, the air forc

about 110,000 airmen and is equipped with an aging fleet of 

than 1,600 aircraft that includes about 780 fighters, 80 bomber

helicopters, 300 An–2 biplanes, and more than 100 support 

About 70 percent of the fixed-wing aircraft are first- and se

generation Soviet-made fighters and bombers, including Mi

–17, –19, and –21 fighters and Il–28 fighter-bombers. The air 

also has many third- and fourth-generation Soviet-made aircraf

as MiG–23 and MiG–29 fighters and Su–25 ground attack ai

252 
Among its rotor-wing fleet are a significant number o

Mi–4s, Mi–8s, Mi–17s, and Hughes–500 multirole he

The air force operates 20 strategic air bases and about an

operational bases and reserve and emergency runways nationw

majority of tactical aircraft are concentrated at air base

P’yŏngyang and in the southern provinces. P’yŏngyang c

almost all its military aircraft in hardened—mostly undergroun

ters. In the early 1990s, North Korea activated four forward 

near the DMZ, which increased its initial southward reach 

versely decreased warning and reaction times for Seoul. 

The air force operates two main flight schools, Kim Ch

Force Academy in Ch’ŏngjin and Kyŏngsŏng Flight Office

in Kyŏngsŏng, both of which are located in North Hamgyŏ

ince. Both institutions are four-year commissioning progr

provide students with about 70 hours of flight training on p

driven Yak–18 or CJ–6 aircraft. Graduating second lieutenan

22 months of advanced flight training, where they receive a

hours of flight instruction on either MiG–15 or MiG–17 

After flight school, new pilots are assigned to an operatio

where they receive another two years of training before they 

as combat pilots. As with other types of military training, fu

ages have required the air force to increase flight-simulator 

time while sharply curtailing actual flying time to little mor

hours a year per pilot, a factor contributing to decreasing op

readiness. 

Navy 

In 2007 Admiral Kim Yun-sim commanded the Korean 

Navy Command. Headquartered since 1946 in P’yŏngyang, 

is subordinate to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. W

personnel than a single forward-infantry corps, the 60,00

“brown-water” navy is primarily a coastal defense force. T

Korean navy does not have naval air or marine components

The navy has 12 squadrons of around 1,000 vessels organ

two fleets, the West (or Yellow) Sea Fleet and the East Sea F

19 naval bases. The fleets do not exchange vessels, and thei

operations and missions determine their organizational s

mutual support is difficult at best. The West Sea Fleet is h

tered at Namp’o and has major bases at Pip’a-got and S

smaller bases at Tasa-ri and Ch’o-do. The East Sea Flee

headquarters at T’oejo-dong, with major bases at Najin and 

and lesser bases at Puam-ni, Ch’aho, Mayang Island, and C
 

near the DMZ. Additionally, there are many smaller bases 

both coasts. 

The smallest of the three services, the navy is equipped w

mismatched fleet of more than 430 surface combatants, near

submarines, 230 support vessels, and 260 landing craft. Abou

of these vessels are not under navy control but instead are ass

to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Coastal Security Bu

Equipped with corvettes, guided-missile patrol boats, torpedo 

and fire-support boats, the navy maintains about 60 percent 

surface combatants forward of the P’yŏngyang–Wŏnsan lin

these relatively small ships, the guided-missile patrol boats, 

are equipped with either two or four tubes of Styx antiship m

each, pose a credible threat against ships of much larger size. 

North Korea’s submarine force is the world’s largest, incl

about 60 submarines of the 1,800-ton Romeo and 300-ton 

classes and as many as 10 Yugo-class submersibles. The Romeo

Sango-class submarines are capable of blocking sea-lanes, atta

surface vessels, emplacing mines, and infiltrating SOF. The 

class submersibles are intended for clandestine SOF insertion

marines are stationed at Ch’aho, Mayang Island, Namp’o, and 

got naval bases. 

North Korea also has a formidable coastal defense system 

includes more than 250 soft and hardened coastal-defense ar

positions and one coastal-defense missile regiment per naval 

Coastal-defense artillery systems are equipped mainly with 122

limeter or 152-millimeter guns; coastal-defense missile regi

are equipped with Silkworm and Seersucker antiship cruise m

that are either truck- or transporter-erector-launcher-mounted. 

coastal-defense positions are located on both coasts and on s

islands. 

The navy is capable of conducting inshore defensive opera

submarine operations against merchant shipping and unsophist

naval combatants, offensive and defensive mining operation

conventional raids. Because of the general imbalance of ship 

the navy has a limited capability to carry out such missions 

control-or-denial and antisubmarine operations. The primary 

sive mission of the navy is to support SOF unit insertions. It al

a limited capability to engage ships and to attack coastal target

Reserve Forces 

As part of its military policy, North Korea has succeeded in a

much of its population (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, thi

Some 9 million people, or more than one-third of the popul

254 
Women of the Korean People’s Navy on parade in Kim Il Sung Square, P’y

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), October 

KPA solider in training 

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), 

April 2004, 11 
serve with either the active or reserve forces. As many as 7.7 m

people between the ages of 14 and 60 are required to serve as re

forces organized into four broad categories: Red Youth G

Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU), Workers and Peasant

Guard, and paramilitary units. 

For many North Koreans, military service begins by joinin

Red Youth Guard, a militia organization that generally resem

Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps program, during the

years of senior middle school (see A Thought-Controlled So

ch. 2; Mass Organizations, ch. 4). Membership is available to 

and female students who are between 14 and 17 years of age

Red Youth Guard, with some 940,000 members, is supervis

local military affairs departments, which report up through 

respective provincial military affairs departments to the party 

tral Military Commission. During the school year, the Red 

Guard receives 450 hours of classroom training and seven day

semester of unit training. The training focus is on pre-induction 

tary familiarization and includes physical training, drill and 

mony, first aid, and weapons familiarization. 

The RMTU is North Korea’s ready reserve and accoun

approximately 620,000 soldiers assigned to some 37 RMTU in

divisions. Typically, 17-year-old students who are graduating 

senior middle school but not joining the active-duty force

assigned to a local RMTU. Additionally, service members who 

plete their active-duty obligation are assigned to an RMTU. Ac

ingly, males between the ages of 17 and 45 and single fe

between the ages of 17 and 30 are eligible for RMTU service. U

the other reserve forces, the Ministry of People’s Armed Force

trols the RMTU, from the General Staff Department throug

corps headquarters to their assigned RMTU divisions. Mobili

of RMTUs is controlled by the Logistics Mobilization Bureau 

General Staff Department. These RMTU divisions annually co

30 days of mobilization training and 10 days of self-defense tra

which prepares them to round out the order of battle of their ass

corps when they serve alongside regular army divisions. Le

reserve service obligations mitigate reduced training opportu

while enhancing unit cohesion, producing an adequately ca

force that in general is as well equipped as active-duty force

with earlier-model equipment. 

The Workers and Peasants Red Guard resembles a civil-d

force, and, with as many as 5.7 million personnel, it is North K

largest reserve component. Typically, at age 46 men are trans

from their RMTU divisions to a Workers and Peasants Red Guar

256 
 

 

where they continue to serve until discharged at age 60, endi

time of military service that began at age 14 and continued 

rupted for 46 years. The Workers and Peasants Red Guard is c

directly by local military affairs departments, which report to 

vincial military affairs departments and on up the chain of com

the party Central Military Commission. Operationally organiz

company level by factories, farms, mines, and villages, the 

and Peasants Red Guard has as its principal mission to prov

defense in the form of local homeland defense, air defense, an

support. As a secondary mission, the Workers and Peasants R

could be mobilized by the party Civil Defense Department to 

troop replacements for RMTU and active-duty forces. The 

and Peasants Red Guard annually conducts 15 days of mo

training and 15 days of self-defense training. This force is ar

individual (AK–47 rifles) and crew-served weapons, such as 

guns, mortars, and antiaircraft artillery pieces. 

Paramilitary units, which number about 420,000 personn

tain a quasimilitary status and wear a military-type unifor

organizations include the Ministry of People’s Security, Gua

mand, College Training Units, and Speed Battle Youth Sh

gades. The Ministry of People’s Security functions as a 

police force (see Ministry of People’s Security, this ch.). Th

Command is an independent, corps-sized organization that i

sible for the protection of Kim Jong Il and other senior-level 

(see Guard Command, this ch.). College students are organ

College Training Units and trained for individual replace

system by which during combat officers and noncommissio

cers (NCOs) are replaced at the unit level on a one-for-o

Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigades, organized in 1975 to “m

orously prepare the youth to become the reliable successo

revolution,” are youth-level militaristic work-group organiz

Strategic Weapons 

Since the 1970s, North Korea has invested significant res

increase its indigenous acquisition of ballistic missiles and 

of mass destruction, which include chemical, biological, an

weapons. These weapons, the development of which has cau

siderable international reaction, include ballistic missiles, 

and biological weapons, and, possibly, nuclear warheads. 

Ballistic Missiles 

In 1976 North Korea, which had been unable to procure su

surface missiles (SSMs) from China or the Soviet Union, c
with Egypt for the transfer of several SCUD–B short-range ballisti

siles (SRBMs). These SRBMs were reverse-engineered and faci

the inauguration of North Korea’s indigenous missile-productio

gram. Successfully test-launched in 1984, the reverse-engin

SCUD–B missile was named the Hwasŏng–5 and shortly ther

placed into full production. Seeking an extended-range cap

beyond the Hwasŏng–5’s 300-kilometer limit, North Korea f

modified this missile to produce the Hwasŏng–6 (or SCUD–C)—

kilometer extended-range SRBM—that in 1990 was test-fired su

fully from Musudan-ni launch facility in North Hamgyŏng Provin

Having achieved the ability to strike targets anywhere in 

Korea with Hwasŏng missiles, North Korea continued pursuin

ability to target Japan, which culminated on May 23, 1993, in 

cessful launch of what commonly has been referred to as the N

medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Whereas the 1993 N

missile test flight yielded a range of only 500 kilometers, in Apri

Pakistan successfully tested a Nodong missile (known in Pakis

the Ghauri) to a reported distance of 1,500 kilometers; then, in 

1998, Iran conducted a test launch of a Nodong missile (known a

hab–3) to a distance of 1,000 kilometers. By May 23, 2006, Ira

conducted its tenth test launch of the Shahab–3, an MRBM th

been designed (or modified) to reach ranges up to 2,000 kilomete

Concurrent with its Nodong missile development, since the 

North Korea has been developing an intermediate-range ballisti

sile (IRBM), the Taepodong–1, and a long-range, intercontinent

listic missile (ICBM), the Taepodong–2. The Taepodong–1 ha

variants: the shorter range, two-stage system that is purported 

able to deliver a 700- to 1,000-kilogram warhead up to 2,000 ki

ters; and the longer range, three-stage, space-launch vehicle 

model which, if configured as a missile, presumably could del

light payload up to 5,000 kilometers. In August 1998, North 

conducted a test launch of a Taepodong–1 SLV, reportedly 

attempt to place its first satellite into orbit. The first two stages 

ently separated properly along the flight trajectory, but the third 

malfunctioned, failing to project the satellite into orbit. 

In September 1999, only 13 months after the Taepodong–

launch, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced 

imposed ballistic missile moratorium that was reaffirmed in 2001 

commitment to extend the moratorium until 2003. With the except

short-range missile launches, including the March 2006 KN–0

upgraded Soviet SS–1 (SCUD) SSM with a firing range of 120 k

ters) test launch, the missile launch moratorium remained in forc

July 5, 2006, when North Korea shocked much of the world with i

258 
 

 

This Chinese-manufactured MiG–19 fighter was flown by a defe

the Korean People’s Air Force to South Korea in 1983. It is now a

at the War Memorial of Korea 

Courtesy Robert L

test launch of a Taepodong–2 missile, which is thought to be 

the Soviet SS submarine-launched ballistic missile. The miss

ently malfunctioned along its trajectory. However, when comm

U.S. Forces Korea General B.B. Bell testified before the U.S. 

March 2006, he said that North Korea’s continued developm

three-stage variant of the Taepodong missile could be operation

the next decade, providing P’yŏngyang with the capability to 

continental United States directly. Experts have surmised th

stage Taepodong–2 could deliver a 700- to 1,000-kilogram war

distance of 10,000 kilometers, and that a three-stage Taepodong

deliver a similar warhead about 15,000 kilometers. 

North Korea’s ballistic missile inventory includes more 

short-range Hwasŏng–5 and Hwasŏng–6 (SCUD) ballistic 

that can deliver conventional or chemical munitions (and p

nuclear warhead) across the Korean Peninsula. North Korea p

as many as 200 Nodong MRBMs that are capable of targeti

with these same payloads. And once made operational, North 

two-stage Taepodong–1 MRBM could easily reach Japan, i

the island of Okinawa; the two-stage Taepodong–2 IRBM co

U.S. military forces stationed in Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska

three-stage Taepodong–2 ICBM would be unrestrained in its 
 

reach targets anywhere in the continental United States. Subor

to the Missile Guidance Bureau, the KPA ballistic missile 

(either division- or corps-sized) are assumed to be organized 

FROG–7 brigade, a Hwasŏng–5/6 brigade (or regiment), a N

brigade (or regiment), and possibly a Taepodong–1/2 battalion. 

Chemical and Biological Weapons 

The U.S. military assesses that North Korea has a signi

inventory of chemicals that could be weaponized on conven

weapons systems (mortars, artillery, rockets, and bombs), mi

and unconventional delivery platforms. In 2004 South Korea 

mated that this chemical stockpile was as large as 2,500 to 

tons of toxicants and included nerve, blister, blood, and vom

agents. According to the South Korean assessment, North Kore

had the independent ability to cultivate and produce biol

weapons, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera. American 

tary analyst Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. posits that North Korea h

chemical agent factories and two chemical weapons factori

Sakchu and Kanggye, which are responsible for filling, pack

and shipping chemical munitions to operational units. 

Nuclear Weapons 

North Korean nuclear-related activities began in 1955, when 

sentatives of the Academy of Sciences participated in an East 

pean conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1956 

Korea signed two agreements with the Soviet Union covering 

nuclear research. Then, in 1959 North Korea signed an intergo

mental atomic energy cooperation agreement—Series 9559 

tract—with the Soviet Union, which included Soviet tec

assistance and funding to conduct a geological site survey to 

mine a suitable location for a nuclear reactor; construct a n

research facility near Yŏngbyŏn; and train North Korean scientis

specialists and establish a nuclear-related curriculum at Kim Il 

University (see Education, ch. 2). Chinese and Soviet assistanc

training of nuclear scientists and technicians historically has 

North Korea’s principal source of nuclear expertise, although in 

it was revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer 

the “father of the Islamic bomb,” had sold nuclear secrets to 

Korea for more than 15 years. 

The Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Scientific Research Center, establish

1962, has more than 100 buildings. From 1965 to 1967, Soviet sp

ists built a two-megawatt thermal research reactor IRT–2000 (I

the Russian acronym for issledovatel’skiy reaktor teplovyy, or th

260 
 

 

research reactor) for nuclear research—known as Yŏngbyŏn

was later upgraded by North Korean scientists, first to a capaci

megawatts and then to its current capacity of eight m

Yŏngbyŏn–1 was brought under International Atomic Energy 

(IAEA—see Glossary) controls in 1974. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea began expa

nuclear infrastructure. In 1980 the country began constructi

indigenously designed, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled fiv

watt electric reactor, known as Yŏngbyŏn–2, which becam

tional in 1986. Four years into this project, North Korea att

more ambitious endeavor by initiating construction of a 5

watt nuclear reactor, called Yŏngbyŏn–3, followed shortly t

by construction of a 200-megawatt reactor at T’aech’ŏn; n

these projects has been completed. In 2006 there reportedly 

many as 22 nuclear-related facilities in North Korea, i

nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, nuclear fuel plants, 

facilities, and uranium mines. 

In December 1985, North Korea signed the 1968 Treat

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) but delayed 

the IAEA Full-scope Safeguards Agreement until January 3

Ten days earlier, North Korea and South Korea had signed 

Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsu

pledged that neither country would “test, manufacture, 

receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or 

nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” M

they agreed to reciprocal verification inspections by a Joint 

Control Commission. 

During the 1992 inspections at Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear 

Research Center, the IAEA discovered that North Korea had 

reprocessed weapons-grade plutonium from its five-megawa

reactor. Surprised by this exposure, North Korea expelled t

inspectors and submitted a 90-day resignation from the NP

eventually was held in abeyance one day before the resigna

effect. In the months that followed, a potential war between th

States and North Korea was averted when the DPRK signed 

ber 1994 Agreed Framework, wherein North Korea agreed 

and eventually dismantle its plutonium-based nuclear weap

gram in exchange for a series of quid pro quo concess

included normalization of diplomatic and economic relations 

the two parties, the transfer to North Korea of two one-gigaw

tric light-water nuclear reactors, and the interim provision 

Korea of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually. 
 

In October 2002, the United States informed North Korea 

was suspected of operating a clandestine highly enriched ur

(HEU)–based nuclear weapons program. What followed was a 

of P’yŏngyang-implemented Agreed Framework reversals 

included evicting IAEA inspectors, removing IAEA moni

equipment, abrogating the NPT, restarting its five-megawatt n

reactor, and reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. In an effort to 

clearize North Korea, six regional players—the United States, 

Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia—agreed to mee

series of negotiations termed Six-Party Talks. As of mid-2007, 

had been six sessions of Six-Party Talks. 

On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it was o

the world’s nuclear-armed states by issuing a Ministry of Fo

Affairs statement declaring possession of nuclear weapons. 

within a week of another Foreign Ministry announcement th

state would prove its nuclear capabilities, North Korea cond

what appears to have been a nuclear test, on October 3, 2006. 

indications, this test was a low-yield detonation. Although the v

ity of its purported nuclear capacity remains unproven, some e

have surmised that North Korea could have as many as eight 

plutonium bombs. These could include one or two weapons 

plutonium produced before 1992; four or five weapons from 

nium produced from the 8,000 reprocessed nuclear fuel rods

three weapons from plutonium that could be produced annua

operating the five-megawatt nuclear reactor that was restar

January 2003. Additionally, in November 2002 the U.S. C

Intelligence Agency postulated that by mid-decade North 

could produce at least two HEU bombs annually. 

Officer Corps Professional Education and Training 

The commissioned officers’ military education and training s

in North Korea is elaborate and includes numerous schools, a

mies, colleges, and universities. Among these institutions are o

candidate schools for each armed service; basic and advanced b

schools for armor, artillery, aviation, rear services, and other bran

mid-career staff colleges; senior war colleges; and specialty sc

such as medical and veterinary service schools. 

The majority of officer candidates are selected from noncom

sioned officers (NCOs) who display exemplary military qualitie

political reliability. Once selected, candidates receive initial b

training and commissioning from service academies and sc

Ground force officer candidates train at branch-specific sc

such as the Combined Artillery Officer School, Armor O

262 
An officers’ military theory class at the Man’gyŏngdae Revo

Institute, P’yŏngy

Courtesy Korea Today (P’yŏngyang), October 

School, and Kang Kŏn General Military Academy (which w

lished in July 1946 as the Central Security Cadre School, re

December 1948 as the First Officer Candidate School, and 

its current name in October 1950). Air force officer candid

at either the Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy or the Ky

Flight Officer School; navy officer candidates train at 

Ch’ŏng-suk Naval Academy. Mid-career command and staf

is offered at all the service academies, various branch sch

the Kim Il Sung Military University. Courses taught at th

academies last six to 12 months, whereas courses that are 

branch schools tend to be limited to six months. 

Two schools are of particular importance: Kim Il Sung 

University and Man’gyŏngdae Revolutionary Institute. Kim 

Military University is the most prestigious military school a

advanced training to officers of all services. Various deg

grams are offered: company and junior field-grade offi

attend a three- to four-year program; senior field-grade and 

officers are eligible to attend a one-year program. Founded 

ber 1948, Man’gyŏngdae Revolutionary Institute is an 11-y

tary boarding school for children of the party elite. Many g

of this prestigious institution go on to serve as party membe
Generally, political officer candidates are selected accord

merit, party loyalty, and political reliability among KPA G

Political Bureau service members. Candidates receive two ye

training at the Political Officers School before commissionin

service in the General Political Bureau or as unit-level politica

cers. Training focuses on politics, economics, party history, ch

(see Glossary) philosophy, and party loyalty. Advanced train

offered at other institutions, such as Kŭmsŏng Political Colleg

Kim Il Sung Political University (which was established in No

ber 1945 as the P’yŏngyang Institute, renamed in January 19

the Second Officer Candidate School, and assumed its current 

in February 1972). 

Political officers for field-grade positions are routinely se

by the political department at the corps level from party memb

the corps headquarters. Supplemental training may include 

month course at a political college. Candidates for positions 

division or higher level are identified by the Organization D

ment of the KPA General Political Bureau. They then are scr

by the party committee and approved by the party Central Co

tee’s Secretariat before appointment as head of a political d

ment at division or higher level. 

Colleges and universities provide most of the training for re

officers; information available about the training does not diffe

ate between the officer-selection process and other reserve m

training. There may be two separate tracks or a selection proc

the end of training. 

Enlisted Conscription and Training 

North Korea enforces universal conscription for males and 

tive conscription for females with significant pre-induction and 

service requirements. In April 1993, North Korea enacted the 

year Service System, which lengthened universal conscription 

an eight- to a 10-year obligation. In October 1996, the Army S

Decree was amended, lengthening (by as much as three years

script service obligations to age 30. 

Initial draft registration is conducted at age 14, pre-indu

physicals are administered at age 16, and graduating senior m

school students typically are drafted at age 17. Eligibility f

draft is based on economic and political factors as well as ph

condition. Some young people are able to postpone military s

through temporary deferments that are offered for continuing e

tion at high school or college. Technicians, skilled workers, 

bers of special government organizations, and children o

264 
 

 

politically influential often are excluded from the draft. Mos

personnel are single, as marriage is prohibited in the milit

age 30, even for commissioned officers. Women are co

selectively at a ratio of about one female to nine males and 

all three services and branches. 

The coordinating national command authorities of the 

Military Commission and National Defense Commission 

annual conscription quotas that are enforced by the pr

municipal, and county military-mobilization departmen

county departments, in turn, levy conscription requirements 

schools for implementation, and the schools select the most 

students. After receiving official notification, inductees are 

to the army, air force, or navy; given a military occupatio

cialty, such as infantry, communications, or medical; and as

a duty unit. The young men or women then go to a serv

branch-specific military training center or training company 

mental or divisional level for basic and occupational specia

ing. Initial training varies by type and lasts approxima

months for ground forces and between two and three mo

naval and air forces. Additional training is provided on th

squad, platoon, and company levels. 

Training, conducted under constant supervision, essentiall

sizes memorization and repetition but also includes a heavy 

on technical skills and vocational training. Lack of a technic

another reason for the emphasis on repetitive training drills. N

training is extensive, and physical and mental conditioning is 

Remedial training for initially substandard performance

uncommon. Such training methods produce soldiers well ver

basics even under adverse conditions. The degree to which 

prepared to respond rapidly to changing circumstances is les

NCO candidates are selected by merit for advanced military t

NCO schools, which are located at both the corps and the 

Training Bureau of the General Staff Department. 

The quality of life of the enlisted soldier is difficult to 

Conditions are harsh; rations are no more than 700 to 850 g

day, depending on branch and service. Leave and passes ar

and strictly controlled. A two-week leave is allowed, althou

granted, only once or twice during an entire enlistment. P

enlisted personnel are even more rare; neither day nor o

passes are granted. During tours of duty, day passes are gr

public affairs duties or KWP-related activities. There is co

information about the frequency of corporal punishment 

harshness of military justice. 
NORTH KOREAN RANK SOWI CHUNGWI SANGWI TAEWI SOJWA CHUNGJWA SANGJWA TAEJWA SOJANG CHUNG­ JANG SANG­ JANG TAEJANG CH’ASU WONSU2  ̆ TAEWONSU2  ̆ ARMY1 U.S. RANK TITLES 2D LIEUTENANT 1ST LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN NO RANK MAJOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL COLONEL NO RANK BRIGADIER GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL GENERAL NO RANK GENERAL OF THE ARMY NO RANK NORTH KOREAN RANK SOWI CHUNGWI SANGWI TAEWI SOJWA CHUNGJWA SANGJWA TAEJWA SOJANG CHUNG­ JANG SANG­ JANG TAEJANG CH’ASU NO RANK NO RANK AIR FORCE1

U.S. RANK

TITLES 

2D

LIEUTENANT 

1ST

LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN NO RANK MAJOR 

LIEUTENANT

COLONEL COLONEL NO RANK

BRIGADIER

GENERAL 

MAJOR

GENERAL 

LIEUTENANT

GENERAL GENERAL 

GENERAL

OF THE

AIR FORCE 

NO RANK NO RANK

NORTH

KOREAN

RANK 

SOWI CHUNGWI SANGWI TAEWI SOJWA CHUNGJWA SANGJWA TAEJWA SOJANG CHUNG­ JANG SANG­ JANG TAEJANG CH’ASU NO RANK NO RANK

NAVY1

U.S. RANK

TITLES ENSIGN LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE LIEUTENANT NO RANK LIEUTENANT COMMANDER COMMANDER CAPTAIN NO RANK REAR ADMIRAL LOWER HALF REAR ADMIRAL UPPER HALF VICE ADMIRAL ADMIRAL FLEET ADMIRAL NO RANK NO RANK 

1All officer insignia have a gold background, but the color of stripes and borders varies by service: army, red; air force, blue; navy, black. Stars are silver.2

266 
 

 

 

A typical daily routine can last from 5:00 AM to 10:00 PM

least 10 hours devoted to training and only three hours of 

uled or rest time, excluding meals. In addition, soldiers 

many duties not related to their basic mission; for example, 

expected to grow crops and to raise livestock or fish to sup

their rations. 

Military Ranks 

The KPA officer rank structure has 15 grades divided i

categories: commissioned officer (junior and senior), genera

and marshal. Across services—army, air force, and navy—

title for each rank is the same; however, it translates differen

broadly associated with the U.S. military rank structure (see 

The North Korean rank names used in this chapter are direc

tions from the Korean titles and in some cases differ from 

military rank equivalents in figures 13 and 14. Junior comm

officer ranks are four-tiered: sowi (army and air force junio

ant and navy ensign), chungwi (army and air force lieute

navy junior lieutenant), sangwi (army and air force senior l

and navy lieutenant), and taewi (army and air force captain 

senior lieutenant). Senior commissioned officer ranks also 

tiered: sojwa (major/lieutenant commander), chungjwa (l

colonel/commander), sangjwa (colonel/captain), and taejw

colonel/senior captain). General officer ranks are four-tiere

(major general/rear admiral), chungjang (lieutenant gen

admiral), sangjang (colonel general/admiral), and taejang 

senior admiral). Marshal ranks are three-tiered: ch’asu (v

shal), wŏnsu (marshal), and taewŏnsu (grand marshal). 

Until December 1991, Kim Il Sung alone held the rank of 

in his position as supreme commander of the KPA. In D

1991, Kim Jong Il was named supreme commander of the 

April 20, 1992, Kim Il Sung was given the title grand mar

Kim Jong Il and Minister of People’s Armed Forces O 

(1917–95) were named marshal. In an effort to solidify his 

the military, Kim Jong Il has in turn bestowed the title of 

and vice marshal on a select group of loyalists. North Korea 

marshals: Kim Jong Il and Yi Ŭl-sŏl, the former command

Guard Command who retired in September 2003. Beyo

advancements to marshal and vice marshal, since 1992 Kim 

also has promoted more than 1,200 general officers. 

Enlisted promotion historically has been a slow process. In 

junior enlisted rank structure expanded from two categories—

(private) and sangdŭngbyŏng (corporal)—to four (see fig. 
NORTH KOREAN RANK CHONSA  ̆ HAGUP ̆ CHUNGGUP ̆ SANGGUP ̆ HASA CHUNGSA SANGSA T’UKMUSANGSA  ̆ ARMY1 U.S. RANK TITLE PRIVATE PRIVATE 1ST CLASS CORPORAL/ SPECIALIST SERGEANT STAFF SERGEANT SERGEANT 1ST CLASS MASTER SERGEANT SERGEANT MAJOR NORTH KOREAN RANK CHONSA  ̆ HAGUP ̆ CHUNGGUP ̆ SANGGUP ̆ HASA CHUNGSA SANGSA T’UKMUSANGSA  ̆ AIR FORCE2

U.S. RANK

TITLE AIRMAN AIRMAN 1ST CLASS SENIOR AIRMAN SERGEANT STAFF SERGEANT TECHNICAL SERGEANT MASTER SERGEANT SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT

NORTH

KOREAN

RANK 

CHONSA

 ̆ HAGUP ̆ CHUNGGUP ̆ SANGGUP ̆ HASA CHUNGSA SANGSA T’UKMUSANGSA  ̆ 

NAVY3

U.S. RANK

TITLE 

SEAMAN

APPRENTICE SEAMAN PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS CHIEF PETTY OFFICER SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

1 2 3 Army enlisted insignia are gold on a red background. Air Force enlisted insignia are gold on a blue background. Navy enlisted insignia are gold on a black background.

268 
 

 

rank structure in 2007 was chŏnsa (private), hagŭp pyŏngsa (j

viceman), chunggŭp pyŏngsa (middle serviceman), and 

pyŏngsa (senior serviceman). Eligible senior servicemen com

admission to the corps-level NCO training school; upon g

they are promoted to the grade of staff sergeant, the first of fo

enlisted or NCO ranks. The NCO ranks are hasa (staff sergean

gsa (sergeant first class), sangsa (master sergeant), and t’ŭkm

(sergeant major). 

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics 

Notwithstanding the inter-Korean engagement policies o

rent and former South Korean administrations, North Kore

ues to embrace its national objective of communizing the 

Peninsula, as articulated in the state constitution and the pa

ter. Specifically, the constitution declares “national reunifi

the nation’s supreme task,” and the KWP constitution state

“ultimate goal of the party is to spread chuch’e ideology 

struct a Communist society throughout the world.” 

To develop the capabilities to realize its national obje

December 1962 the Fifth Plenum of the Fourth KWP Cent

mittee adopted the Four-Point Military Guidelines: to arm 

ple; fortify the nation; create a cadre-based military; and m

the force. These four military guidelines or defense policy p

are codified in article 60 of the 1998 state constitution. 

The KPA has a three-part military strategy: surprise attac

decisive war; and mixed tactics to carry out the national def

icy. Employing these three strategies, the KPA envisions re

the Korean Peninsula by initiating hostilities with large-sca

metric operations including massive conventional and chem

lery, missile attacks, and simultaneous insertion of SOF th

the depths of the battlespace (surprise-attack strategy). Th

first-echelon operational forces (forward corps) woul

through the DMZ, or under it using invasion tunnels, to a

opposing forward forces, establish gaps and maneuver cor

facilitate the rapid passage of second- and third-echelon op

forces (mechanized and armored forces), and complete the 

tion of opposing forces and secure the Korean Peninsula w

days (quick, decisive war strategy). To facilitate these aim

prise attack and quick, decisive war, North Korea plans t

closely coordinated two-front war (mixed-tactics strategy). 

front would be fought by conventional forces and the second 

SOF to maximize disruption and destruction of command
communications, and intelligence facilities; air and sea ports; lo

cal bases; and lines of communications. 

North Korean military strategy defines KPA doctrine, force 

ture (manpower and equipment) requirements, and tactics. KPA 

itary doctrine is based on a synthesis of Soviet operational pr

and Chinese People’s Liberation Army military doctrine adap

conform to the Korean Peninsula’s mountainous terrain an

KPA’s emphasis on light infantry as the key force structure

result of this amalgamation is the KPA’s five fundamental prin

of war: mass and dispersion, surprise attack, increased mane

ability, cunning and personified tactics (such as initiative, leade

and deception), and secure secrets (including reconnaissance, 

terintelligence, and terrain utilization). 

Defense Industry 

The defense industry is controlled by the interrelated efforts 

National Defense Commission, the KWP, and the cabinet thro

hierarchical association. Annually, the Ministry of People’s A

Forces determines defense requirements and submits them 

approval to the National Defense Commission. Thereafte

National Defense Commission, working with the party Central 

tary Commission, establishes defense priorities and issues direc

which are disseminated by the cabinet and the Central Military 

mission. The cabinet forwards these defense requirements to a

priate agencies for action: as an example, the State Pla

Commission uses defense requirements to help inform budget a

priations, which are approved by the Supreme People’s Asse

and administered by the Ministry of Finance; other agencie

directed to supply energy and material resources. The Central 

tary Commission, working through the KWP’s Munitions Ind

Department, establishes defense industry policies, which are t

to the Second Economic Committee for implementation. 

A subordinate organ of the National Defense Commissio

Second Economic Committee, directs the defense industry 

oversight and guidance provided by the party Munitions Ind

Department. In 1989 Kim Ch’ŏl-man succeeded Chŏn Pyŏng

chairman of the Second Economic Committee; and then in Se

ber 2003, the 85-year-old Kim Ch’ŏl-man was replaced by Pae

bong (suspected alias for Kim Jong Chul, second son and po

heir to Kim Jong Il). In his dual capacity as party secretary for 

tions and party director for the Munitions Industry Depart

Chŏn Pyŏng-ho oversees and guides the work of the Second 

nomic Committee and thereby the defense industry. Organize

270 
nine bureaus, the Second Economic Committee exercises 

bility for defense industry plans, finances, production, dis

and foreign military sales. 

At the head of the Second Economic Committee is the 

Bureau, which is responsible for defense industry plans, bud

pilation, and resource procurement and distribution. Defense 

procurement, development, and production are directed b

machine industry bureaus. The First Machine Industry Bure

sees small arms, munitions, and general-purpose equipment. 

ond Machine Industry Bureau commissions tanks, armored p

carriers, and trucks. The Third Machine Industry Bureau is re

for artillery and antiaircraft artillery systems. Missile system

duced by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau while t

Machine Industry Bureau is responsible for nuclear, biolog

chemical weapons. The Sixth Machine Industry Bureau man

naval vessels, and the Seventh Machine Industry Bureau 

communications equipment and aircraft. The machine 

bureaus supervise defense factories and coordinate internally 

Second Natural Science Institute (formerly the Academy of 

Sciences) and with corresponding Ministry of People’s Arme

bureaus and commands. Organized into divisions by spec

Second Natural Science Institute directs all defense-industry 

and development. 

The External Economic Affairs Bureau (also known as 

san Company) is the ninth bureau of the Second Economic 

tee and has primary responsibility for foreign military s

shared responsibility with the machine industry bureaus fo

article procurement. It is suspected that foreign military sa

fund the defense industry or supplement its spending. North 

announced defense spending for 2003 was nearly US$1.8 b

15.7 percent of the state budget, an increase of US$320 mill

2002. However, when coupled with profit estimates from th

Economic Committee’s foreign military sales, it is poss

actual 2003 military spending could have reached as much 

billion, or 44.4 percent of the total budget. 

North Korea’s extensive defense production capability re

commitment to self-reliance and its military-first, or sŏngu

(see Relationships Among the Government, Party, and Milita

As it relates to the defense industry, emphasis on the military

icy has two foci: preferential development of defense art

accomplishment of announced economic priorities execute

revolutionary military spirit. 
North Korea has an impressive, although technologically 

military production capacity. From an aggregate of some 180 

factories, North Korea operates approximately 40 gun factor

varying calibers, 10 armored vehicle factories, 10 naval ship

and 50 munitions factories. Many of these factories are constr

underground in strategic rear areas. Additionally, more tha

nonmilitary factories have a dedicated wartime matériel produ

mission. 

Most of the equipment is of Soviet or Chinese design, but 

Korea has modified the original designs to produce both deriv

and indigenously designed versions of armored personnel ca

self-propelled artillery, tanks, and high-speed landing craft. G

systems production includes a complete line of crew- and indiv

served weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers, rocket la

ers, and missiles. Naval construction includes surface comba

submarines, landing craft air-cushion vehicles, and a wide ran

specialized infiltration craft. Aircraft production includes Mi–2 

copters, Yak–18 trainers, spare parts, and perhaps coproducti

jet fighters. 

Internal Security 

Control System 

Since its founding in 1948, North Korea has meticulously ere

pervasive system of totalitarian control unique even when com

to the communist systems in the former Soviet Union and E

Europe. The North Korean population is rigidly controlled, as in

ual rights are systematically subordinated to state and party de

The regime uses education, mass mobilization, persuasion, iso

coercion, fear, intimidation, and oppression to guarantee politic

social conformity. Invasive propaganda and political indoctrinati

reinforced by an elaborate internal security apparatus. 

The regime’s control mechanisms are quite extensive. Se

ratings or loyalty groups are established for individuals and 

ence access to employment, schools, medical facilities, s

admission to the KWP, and other walks of life. The system 

most elaborate form consists of three loyalty groups: core 

(haeksim kyech’ŭng), wavering class (tongyo kyech’ŭng), and h

class (chŏktae kyech’ŭng), which historically were further di

into 51 categories. Over time, however, the use of subcategori

diminished. 

The core class accounts for about 10 to 15 percent of the po

tion and includes KWP members and those with a revoluti

272 
 

 

A North Korean guard post overlooking the Joint Security Area at 

P’anmunjŏm in the Demilitarized 

Zone 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

(anti-Japanese) lineage. The wavering class or the basic m

workers and peasants make up about 40 to 50 percent of the 

tion. The remaining 40 percent of the population includes 

of the hostile class—descendants of pro-Japanese colla

landowners, relatives of defectors, and prisoners. 

There are five main means of social control: residenc

employment, clothing and food, and family life. Change of r

is possible only with party approval. Those who move witho

mit are not eligible for food rations or housing allotments 

subject to criminal prosecution. Travel is controlled by the 

of People’s Security, and a travel pass is necessary. Travel 

than official business is limited strictly to attending family f

and obtaining approval normally is a long and complicated 

The ration system does not apply to individuals while they 

eling, which further curtails movement. Employment is gov

the party; assignments are made on the basis of political r

and family background. A change in employment is mad

party’s convenience. 

Punishment and the Penal System 

The 1998 state constitution stipulates judicial indep

requires court proceedings to be carried out in accordance 

law; directs court trials to be open to the public (unless o
stipulated by law); and guarantees the accused the right of de

(articles 158–60). North Korea’s penal code was enacted in 195

has since been revised or amended six times, including the Sup

People’s Assembly Presidium’s most recent revision on Apr

2004. Despite significant revisions that include replacing 

political and ideological sections with those presenting a more 

tral tone, the penal code remains a political tool for safegua

national sovereignty and the socialist system. The amended 

penal code contains an additional 14 areas that elaborate and c

constituted crimes, which are divisible into two groups of c

ordinary and political. Of significant note, with this amendme

state adopted the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no 

without a law), which in principle removed power from autho

to criminalize acts not covered by the penal code. The penal 

also addresses a wide range of issues from labor laws and work

safety to torture and capital punishment. 

The penal code classifies punishment into four main categ

capital punishment; lifetime confinement to hard labor; termed 

finement to hard labor (one to 15 years); correctional labor or “

training” (six to 24 months); and a number of less severe pu

ments, including suspension of electoral rights and confiscat

property. The 2004 penal code reduced the number of an

crimes punishable by death from five to four: plots to overthro

state; acts of terrorism; treason, including defection and espio

and suppression of the people’s movement for national liber

Although the penal code prohibits torture and inhumane treat

according to reports by South Korea’s National Intelligence S

in 2005, and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 

in 2006, torture is both routine and severe. 

On May 6, 2004, the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium 

amended the state’s criminal procedure law, which was adopted 

inally in 1950 and amended eight times thereafter. Punishme

criminal behavior is determined by both the type of crime—cri

or political—and the status of the individual. Party influence i

vasive in both criminal and political cases. In criminal case

government assigns lawyers for the defense. In political cases, 

often are dispensed with, and the Ministry of People’s Security 

such cases directly to the State Security Department for the im

tion of punishment. 

As specified in the penal code, criminal proceedings are ac

plished in six stages: investigation, preliminary examination, i

ment, trial, decision, and enforcement. The proceedings begin 

an investigation, during which the accused is identified and de

274 
 

 

(as necessary), and basic evidence is preserved. Preliminar

nation lasts for two months and is the stage where the cas

the accused is built. If the prosecutor assesses that there is s

evidence to try the accused, then an indictment is submitte

the court holding jurisdiction: people’s courts for ordinar

not belonging to provincial courts; provincial-level courts 

nary cases that could result in a death sentence or lifetime i

ment; military courts for crimes by military members; railro

for crimes by railroad employees or rail-related crimes; and 

tral Court for appeals (articles 126 and 133 of the criminal p

law). Lower court trials are divided into two phases: prepar

deliberation phases. Court decisions are determined by a 

ruling of the judge and two people’s assessors; enforcemen

tencing immediately follows guilty verdicts. 

Whereas the aforementioned criminal proceedings are 

scribed process, practice is another matter, according to 

Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights P

for 2006. Although North Korea refuses outside observati

legal system, it is clear that the limited guarantees legally 

often are not well followed. North Korean law limits inca

during investigation and interrogation to a period of up 

months. The period of incarceration, however, can be 

indefinitely with the approval of the Central Procurators’ Of

approval apparently is given quite freely. It is not uncom

individuals to be detained for six months or much longer 

trial. There has been strong evidence that prisoners are rout

tured or ill treated during interrogation. Habeas corpus or it

lent is not recognized in theory or practice. In addition, inf

about detainees is restricted, and it is often very difficu

impossible, for concerned family members to obtain any inf

about someone being detained. 

Criminal procedures are entrusted to four state agenc

courts, procurators’ offices, and the Ministry of People’s 

are responsible for public order, and the State Security De

imposes political order (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). 

Judicial and Prosecutorial Systems 

In accordance with the 1998 constitution, North Korea’

and prosecutorial systems are composed of tiered courts and 

tors’ offices (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). Judicial bodies inc

Central Court, military courts, railroad courts, provincial and 

city courts, and county-level people’s courts. Appointed pros

officials investigate and prosecute those accused of breaking 
and such officials serve in the Central Procurators’ Office, the S

Procurators’ Offices, and lower-level procurators’ offices (

147). 

The highest judicial organ, the Central Court, supervises all 

courts and is accountable to the Supreme People’s Assembly 

the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium when the former 

recess (articles 161 and 162). The Supreme People’s Assemb

the power to appoint or remove the procurator general of the C

Procurators’ Office (article 91). The Central Court appoint

recalls judges of the special courts; people’s jury assessor

elected by a general meeting of concerned soldiers or empl

(article 155). Below the Central Court are the lower courts, w

judges and civilian assessors are elected and recalled by their 

people’s assemblies (article 134). The constitution does not re

legal education as a qualification for being elected as a judge o

ple’s assessor. Over time, however, legal training has received 

emphasis, although political reliability remains the prime cri

for holding office. 

The Central Procurators’ Office parallels the court system an

forms three principal duties. The first is to ensure observance o

by institutions, enterprises, organizations, and citizens. The sec

to ensure that decisions and directives of state organs conform 

state constitution, Supreme People’s Assembly laws and deci

National Defense Commission decisions and orders, Supreme 

ple’s Assembly Presidium decrees, decisions, and directives, and 

net decisions. The third is to protect state sovereignty, the 

system, and state and social cooperative organizations’ propert

to safeguard life, property, and personal rights by instituting and 

ecuting legal proceedings against offenders (article 150). 

In September 2003, the Supreme People’s Assembly ree

Kim Pyŏng-ryul as president of the Central Court. At the same 

Yi Kil-song was appointed as procurator general.

 Ministry of People’s Security 

The Ministry of People’s Security (formerly the Ministry of 

lic Security) is headquartered in P’yŏngyang and since July 

General Chu Sang-sŏng, former IV Corps commander, has be

minister. One of the most powerful organizations in North Kore

ministry has about 130,000 employees and is responsible for 

seeing a national police force responsible for maintaining law 

order; investigating common criminal cases; conducting prelim

examinations; and managing correctional facilities (excluding 

cal prison camps). The police force also conducts background 

276 
 

 

tigations, the census, and civil registrations; manages gov

classified documents; protects government and party offic

patrols government buildings and some government and p

struction activities. 

Vice ministers direct the affairs of the ministry’s 12 bureau

are the Security Bureau for law enforcement; the Investigatio

for criminal investigation; and the Public Safety Bureau for 

tection, traffic control, public health, and customs. The Re

Bureau issues and maintains citizen identification cards an

records on births, deaths, marriages, residence registration, a

ports. The Penal Affairs Bureau is in charge of prisons. T

Defense Bureau oversees preparedness for air raids and nuc

logical, or chemical attacks. The Railroad Security Bureau is 

ble for railroad security. There are several engineer bureaus, w

responsible for design and construction: the Sixth Engineer B

subway systems and underground facilities, the Twenty-six

neer Bureau for large-scale public projects, and the Twenty

Engineer Bureau for nuclear-related facilities. The Twen

Engineer Bureau has responsibility for coal mining, and the 

ninth Engineer Bureau for roads, railroads, and bridges. 

Below the ministry level, there are public security offices 

province, special city, municipality, and county. Although d

on population density, a typical municipality or county with 

lation of about 120,000 people has a public security offic

staffed with about 350 functionaries, organized into directo

sections. A public security office of this level generally 

directorates for politics, security, and resident registration. R

tative sections are responsible for accounting, communicati

fighting, inspections, investigations, law enforcement, ordna

preliminary examinations. 

Interior regions of the country have public security subof

persed among a grouping of between two and three villages; 

border and coastal regions maintain suboffices in each village

suboffices have a head of station and a number of security and 

registration officers. Border and coastal suboffices also have 

officers from the armed forces’ Border Security Command. 

State Security Department 

In 1973 political security responsibilities were transferred 

Ministry of People’s Security to the State Security Departme

ordinate agency of the National Defense Commission that 

more than 30,000 elite agents who ultimately are responsibl

Jong Il in his role as director of the State Security Departme
 

quartered in P’yŏngyang, the State Security Department carries 

wide range of counterintelligence and internal security function

normally are associated with secret police, such as the former 

KGB. The department has several charges. One is searching fo

state criminals, a general category that includes those accused o

government and dissident activities, economic crimes, and slan

the political leadership. Another charge is conducting foreig

domestic intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Fu

more, the department operates political prison camps and mai

surveillance of overseas North Korean embassy personnel and 

and joint-venture employees. 

The State Security Department is organized into 17 bureaus

functions including communications interception, data analysi

intelligence. There are bureaus for research, surveillance, prelim

examinations, investigations, interrogations, and political 

camps. The State Security Department’s responsibility also inc

inter-Korean dialogue and entry and exit management. Moreov

department covers military industrial security, operational se

and protection. There are bureaus for equipment, finance, suppl

logistics. 

Among North Korea’s many societal control systems are the 

cal prison camps (euphemistically referred to by the state as kwa

dŭl or management centers) that are controlled and operated b

Political Prison Camps Bureau. According to South Korea’s Na

Intelligence Service and the U.S. Committee for Human Rig

North Korea, the bureau operates six widely dispersed political 

camps that confine a total of between 150,000 and 200,000 inm

which may include an individual’s family members up to three g

tions as well as the accused. Some of the political prisons are 

vided into two sections: a maximum control zone for lif

detentions and a reeducation zone for limited-term detentions. 

operating extrajudicially, the State Security Department appreh

interrogates, and imprisons the accused (and family members) w

the advantage of legal counsel or due process. 

The Surveillance Bureau operates a pervasive network of a

and informants from national to village levels. Using a py

organizational structure, the State Security Department survei

agents permeate organizations and communities as each agen

reptitiously employs some 50 quasi-agents who, in turn, each 

about 20 base-level informants. This surveillance proces

spawned a national culture of deceit and distrust that intenti

pits one against another for the purpose of subduing the polit

ambitious and the general population alike. 

278 
KPA troops celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the Ko

Courtesy Chosŏn (P’yŏngyang), July 

Guard Command 

Subordinate to the National Defense Commission, th

Command is an independent corps-size organization equip

artillery, aircraft, tanks, and engineers. Loosely analogou

U.S. Secret Service, it has primary responsibility for the p

of Kim Jong Il and other senior-level officials. In Septemb

Marshal Yi Ŭl-sŏl, owing to declining health, retired as com

of this elite organization of between 100,000 and 120,00

agents; the name of his replacement had not been made 

2007. 

Border Security Command and Coastal Security B

Collectively responsible for restricting unauthorized cro

(land and sea) entries and exits, in the early 1990s the 

responsible for border security and coastal security were tr

from the State Security Department to the Ministry of 

Armed Forces. Sometime thereafter, the Border Security Bu

enlarged to corps level and renamed the Border Security Co

Previously headquartered in Chagang Province, the Border 

Command was relocated to P’yŏngyang in 2002. 

Deployed along the northern borders with China and Ru

Border Security Command is organized as four infantry-ty
 

 

The Tenth Border Security Division (which may be a briga

based in North P’yŏngan Province. The Thirty-seventh Border 

rity Brigade is in Chagang Province, the Forty-fourth Border 

rity Brigade in Yanggang Province, and the Thirty-second B

Security Brigade in North Hamgyŏng Province. These brigad

deployed west to east from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan 

Koreans prefer, the West Sea and East Sea, respectively). Resp

ble for staffing checkpoints, guarding border crossing point

conducting patrols, these border security units are estimated to 

as many as 40,000 assigned personnel. The command also em

an operational-level reserve force that is organized aroun

enlarged mechanized brigade and tank brigade, which has a 

bined force structure of about 20,000 personnel. 

The Coastal Security Bureau apparently was disaggregated a

coastal security brigades reassigned to various infantry corps

lectively, the coastal security forces are equipped with abou

patrol craft and organized into six coastal border brigades, whi

deployed with three brigades on each coast. Deployed on the 

coast from north to south are the Eleventh Coastal Security Br

(North P’yŏngan Province), the Thirteenth Coastal Security Br

(South P’yŏngan Province), and the Fifteenth Coastal Securit

gade (South Hwanghae Province). On the east coast from so

north are the Twenty-second Coastal Security Brigade (Kan

Province), Seventeenth Coastal Security Brigade (South Hamg

Province), and Nineteenth Coastal Security Brigade (North 

gyŏng Province). The Coastal Security Bureau is responsib

patrolling the coastlines to prevent illegal entries and exits, mai

ing harbor and port security, and policing and protecting the na

coastal waterways and fishing areas. 

National Security Prospects 

North Korea’s national security is threatened predominan

issues of internal instability resulting from environmental disa

famine, poor governance, failed economic policies, and 

oppression. The failure or inability of the regime to initiate ade

environmental, political, economic, and social reforms exace

an already precarious milieu that perpetuates the continued suf

of North Korea’s populace and burdens the international comm

Despite such national security challenges, the regime see

possess the ability to control internal order and maintains ade

means of self-defense. The massive network of citizen survei

suppresses overt deviation from acceptable behavior, although 

are growing signs that ordinary North Koreans are not putting 

280 
 

 

effort or commitment into their work. Additionally, beyond 

an adequate self-defense capability, North Korea’s massiv

forces present a credible conventional threat, and its growin

gic weapons arsenal frequently has been used as a tool to i

international politics. 

* * * 

For a survey of North Korea, see Yonhap News Agency

Korea Handbook. The origins of North Korea’s armed fo

current military tactics are presented in James M. Minni

North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tac

organization of North Korea’s armed forces is covered in J

Bermudez Jr.’s Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed F

North Korea. North Korea’s modern-day origins are rev

Dae-Sook Suh’s Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leade

Charles K. Armstrong’s The North Korean Revolution: 194

For information on North Korea’s judicial system, Kim S

The North Korean Penal Code, Criminal Procedures, a

Actual Application is useful. For information on North 

nuclear-weapons program, the best sources are James Cla

and Alexandre Y. Mansourov’s The North Korea Nuclear P

Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia and J

Minnich’s The Denuclearization of North Korea: The 

Framework and Alternative Options Analyzed. 

The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense’

Defense White Paper (published in both Korean and Englis

ticularly noteworthy. Asian Survey, Far Eastern Economic 

Korea and World Affairs, and Korean Journal of Defense 

are generally useful and relatively free of bias. South Korean 

gative journalism, particularly monthlies such as Wŏlgan 

(Monthly Chosun), produces valuable insights of defectors 

elers to North Korea. 

The North Korean media monitoring service of the U

Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information 

is an excellent source of English-language translations a

materials on many North Korean issues. The service is 

from the U.S. National Technical Information Service and 

through Dialog’s World News Connection (http://wnc.dialo

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Glo

Agreed Framework—Signed in Geneva, Switzerland, betw

United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, f

talks held between September 23 and October 21, 1994

which the two sides negotiated an overall resolution of th

issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides agreed to four p

cooperate to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated 

and related facilities with light-water nuclear-reacto

plants; to move toward full normalization of polit

economic relations; to work together for peace and secu

nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and to work together to st

the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

cadre(s), or kanbu—Term for responsible party, governm

economic functionaries; also used for key officials 

educational, cultural, and scientific fields. 

Choch’ongryŏn—Abbreviation for Chae Ilbon Chosŏnin Ch

haphoe, literally General Association of Korean Residents 

Members of this Japan-based association tend to be supp

North Korea’s foreign policy and have kinship and financ

North Korea. Known as Zainichi Chōsenjin Sōrengokai, o

Sōren, in Japanese. 

Ch’ŏllima, or Ch’ŏllima Work Team Movement—Intens

campaign to increase economic production inaugurated 

began as Ch’ŏllima Movement (Ch’ŏllima Undong), nam

a legendary flying horse said to have galloped 1,000 li in 

day; a symbolic term for great speed. Farm and factory 

were exhorted to excel in the manner of Ch’ŏllima rid

exemplary individuals and work teams were awarded 

Ch’ŏllima titles. The labor force was organized into wo

and brigades and competed at increasing production. Su

in the early 1960s by the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method (q.v.) 

Taean Work System (q.v.), and then in 1973 by th

Revolutions Team Movement (q.v.). 

Ch’ŏndogyo—Teachings of the Heavenly Way. This in

monotheistic religion was founded in the nineteenth cen

counter to Western influence and Christianity. Its C
 

influenced dogma stresses the equality and unity of man wi

universe. Formerly Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement 

Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method—A personalized, “on-the -spot” manag

method or spirit reputedly developed by Kim Il Sung in Feb

1960 during a visit to the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Cooperative Farm in 

P’yŏngan Province. In addition to important material incentiv

method had three main components: party and gover

functionaries must eschew their bureaucratic tendency of only i

orders and directives; they must mingle with farmers and uncov

solve their problems through comradely guidance; and they s

give solid technological guidance to spur efficient and prod

achievement. The method was largely abandoned in the early tw

first century. 

chuch’e, or juch’e—Political ideology promulgated by Kim Il Sun

application of Marxism–Leninism to the North Korean expe

based on autonomy and self-reliance popularized since 1955 

official guideline for independence in politics, economics, na

defense, and foreign policy. 

Comintern—Short form for Communist International or the 

International, which was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coor

the world communist movement. Officially disbanded in 194

Comintern was revived as the Cominform (Communist Inform

Bureau) from 1947 to 1956. 

Demarcation Line—Established at the thirty-eighth parallel 

the Korean War armistice agreement of 1953; marks the 

cease-fire line between North Korea and South Korea. 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)—The 4,000-meter-wide buffer zon

runs east and west across the waist of the Korean Peninsu

238 kilometers over land and three kilometers over the 

dividing it into North Korea and South Korea. The DMZ 

created by the armistice in 1953. 

exclusionism—Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1910) foreign poli

isolation adopted after the Japanese invasions in the 1590s. 

fiscal year—January 1 through December 31. 

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flo

domestic goods and services produced by an economy o

period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goo

final consumption and intermediate production are assumed 

included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregate

shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and sub

308 
 

 

are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies h

eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The wo

indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical as

not been made. Income arising from investments and po

owned abroad is not included, only domestic production

the use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP fro

national product (q.v.). 

gross national product (GNP)—The gross domestic produ

plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with 

countries, including income received from abroad by 

and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents

the broadest measurement of the output of goods and se

an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which 

indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and 

are only transfer payments, GNP often is calculated at fa

by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

hangul—The Korean phonetic alphabet developed in f

century Chosŏn Korea by scholars in the court of King S

1418–50). This alphabet is used in both North Korea a

Korea; in North Korea, it is called chosŏn’gul and 

exclusively, whereas in South Korea a mixture of the alph

Chinese characters is used. 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—Specialize

of the United Nations established in 1956, which 

effective in 1957, to assist member nations with the deve

and application of atomic energy for peaceful uses and 

and monitor a universal standard of nuclear safeguards. 

on-site inspections and monitoring, the IAEA ensures th

and related nuclear material, equipment, information, and 

are not used to produce nuclear weapons as provide

bilateral nuclear safeguard agreements between the IA

individual member nations of the Nuclear Nonproliferatio

(NPT), formally the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Weapons. In 2007 there were 144 members of the IA

including North Korea. 

Kapsan—Name of a political faction that takes its name from 

in Yanggang Province in the Changbai mountain rang

border of Korea and Northeast China (then called Ma

where Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla army conducted som

militant activities against the Japanese in the 1930s
 

 

 

joined up with the Manchurian-based Northeast Anti-Jap

United Army, surviving partisans from this group fled t

Soviet maritime provinces in 1941. In 1945 this group of S

exiles, Kim Il Sung loyalists—the Kapsan factio

Kapsanists—returned to North Korea, where many even

were elevated to prominence in the national political-m

hierarchy. 

Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League—A branch of the K

Workers’ Party. It was originally known as Korea Demo

Youth from 1946 to 1953. At the end of the Korean 

(1950–53), it was renamed the Socialist Working Youth Le

sometimes given as the Socialist Labor Youth League. In 

after the death of Kim Il Sung, the group was given its c

name. 

national solipsism—Term indicating North Korea’s isolationism 

its sense that it is the center of the world’s attentions. 

Nordpolitik, or pukbang chŏngch’aek—The name given t

foreign policy pursued in various forms by South Korea 

1988 aimed at improving its diplomatic and economic ties 

the former communist nations of Eastern Europe and the S

Union. 

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop

(OECD)—Established in 1960, the OECD took effect in 19

promote economic cooperation and development among me

countries (in 2008, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, C

Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, S

Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turke

United Kingdom, and the United States; one member with s

status is the European Union—EU) by assisting me

governments in the formulation and coordination of policy; 

encourage member-nation support of developing nations. 

sŏngbun—Term for a person’s socioeconomic or class backgr

which determines his or her standing with the state. 

suryŏng—Ancient Koguryŏ term for “leader,” which Kim Il 

took in 1949 as his highest, and usual, title. 

Taean Work System—An industrial management system that 

out of the Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method (q.v.). Introduced in Dece

1961 by Kim Il Sung while on a visit to the Taean Elec

310 
 

Appliance Plant, the Taean Work System applied and 

agricultural management techniques to industry. Hig

functionaries assisted lower-level functionaries and wor

spirit of close consultation and comradery. Party co

controlled the general management of factories and en

and stressed political or ideological work as well as techn

expertise. The system allowed for material incen

production. The system was abandoned in 2002. 

Three Revolutions Team Movement—Inaugurated in Febru

as “a powerful revolutionary method of guidance” for t

Revolutions—ideological, technical, and cultural—stres

the early 1960s. Under this method, the Three Revolutio

were sent to factories, enterprises, and rural and fishing 

for on-the-spot guidance and problem solving i

consultation with local personnel through the 1970s and 

Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement—Refers to an in

religious movement founded by Ch’oe Che-u in the ear

that brought together elements of traditional Korean and 

religious beliefs and was the antecedent of Ch’ŏndogyo (

wŏn—North Korean unit of currency. The North Korean 

divided into 100 chon and has several exchange rates—

official transactions and others for commercial rates in 

trade. As of late October 2008, officially US$1=140 

2,500–3,000 wŏn or more to US$1 on black market. 

yangban—The traditional Korean term for the schola

gentry (literally, the two orders or classes) who 

monopolized all official civil and military position

bureaucracy of the late Koryŏ Dynasty (918–1392) 

Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1910) by competing in a system 

and military service examinations. 

 

Academy of Defense Sciences, 271
 

Academy of Sciences, 200, 260
 

Acheson, Dean, 43, 44
 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS),
 

126–27
 

Agreed Framework (1994), 57, 58, 147, 174,
 

228–30, 261, 262
 

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
 

Exchanges, and Cooperation (1991), 220–21
 

agriculture (see also famine; rice; volunteer
 

labor), xxxi, 46–47, 67, 153–57; arable land 

for, 64, 67, 145, 233; collective farming,
 

46–47, 143, 154, 155–56; early practice of,
 

6, 9; inputs for, 100, 145, 154; irrigation for,
 

154; output of, 64, 145, 153–54, 233; workforce in, 104
 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency syndrome
 

air combat divisions, 252
 

air defense, 249
 

air force aircraft and equipment, 252–53, 272
 

Air Force Academy. See Kim Ch’aek Air 

Force Academy
 

Air Force Command, 240, 242, 250, 252–53
 

Air Koryo, 150
 

air pollution, 65–66
 

airports, 150, 195
 

air training divisions, 252
 

air transport brigades, 252
 

Alaska, 259
 

Albright, Madeleine, 57–58, 93, 230
 

Amnok (Yalu) River, 4, 11, 14–15, 62, 64, 167
 

An Chung-gŭn, 28
 

An Si Fortress, 10
 

Andong, 12
 

Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army (Han il Yugyŏtae), 

237
 

armed forces (see also individual services): 

attitudes to, 103; deployment of, 246–57; 

development of, 237–38; doctrine, strategy,
 

and tactics of, 269–70; mission of, 195,
 

237–38, 241–42, 244–45, 269–70; national 

command structure of, 238–45; strength of,
 

xxxiv, 245, 247, 249, 252, 253, 254, 256,
 

280
 

armistice agreement (see also Military Armistice Commission), xxx, 44–45, 57, 63, 227
 

armored equipment, 248, 272
 

Armor Officer School, 262–63 

arms exports, 47, 228, 271
 

arms imports, 238, 252, 258, 260
 

arms production, 270–72 

arms trafficking, 47
 

Armstrong, Charles K., 79
 

army. See Korean People’s Army 

Army Day (April 25), 85
 

Army Service Decree, 264
 

arrests, political, 276, 278
 

artillery: corps, 247; equipment, 

248, 249, 254, 272
 

Artillery Guidance Bureau, 248
 

artistic expression, freedom of, 21

Asia–Pacific Peace Committee, 1

Australia, 3, 173
 

Austria, 173
 

Babson, Bradley, 161
 

ballistic missiles, 226, 229, 230, 2

atorium on testing, 258–59
 

Banco Delta Asia, xxxv
 

banking sector, 153, 162–63, 195

Bank of Korea (Seoul), 31, 160
 

base classes, 19–20, 79–80 

Bell, Burwell B. (B.B.), 249, 259
 

Berlin Wall, 3
 

Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., 260
 

biological weapons. See chemical 

cal weapons 

birth control, 69
 

birthrate, 67, 99, 105, 130
 

black market, 160–61, 232, 233
 

bonds, 162–63 

bone-rank system, 9
 

Bonner, Nicholas, 161
 

borders, 61–63 

border security brigades, 280
 

Border Security Bureau, 279
 

Border Security Command, 240, 

Border Security Division (Tenth)

Boxer Uprising, 28
 

Britain (see also United Kingdom

British Broadcasting Corporation
 

 

 

Buddhism, xxx, 7, 12, 14, 16, 117, 120; adoption of, 9; and politics, 11
 

budget: defense, 245; local, 152; national, 

152–53, 198–99 

Burma, 53
 

Bush, George H.W., 227–28 

Bush, George W.: administration of, xxxvi,
 

57–58, 230
 

Cabinet of Ministers, 143–45, 164, 200
 

Cadre Bureau, 240, 244
 

cadres, 79, 184, 203, 210–11, 244
 

Cairo Conference (1943), 37–38 

Cambodia, 56
 

Canada, 3, 173
 

capitalism, 173, 178, 231–32
 

Carter, Jimmy, 55–56, 228
 

cease-fire line (1953), 63
 

Ceauşescu, Nikolae, 54
 

celadon porcelain, 13–14 

censorship (see also self-censorship), xxxiii, 151, 

216, 217
 

Central Auditing Committee. See Korean 

Workers’ Party 

Central Bank of the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea, 153, 200
 

Central Committee. See Korean Workers’ 

Party 

Central Court, 201, 275
 

Central Inspection Committee. See Korean 

Workers’ Party 

Central Intelligence Agency (South Korea),
 

55, 219
 

centrally planned economy, 135, 140–41,
 

142–45, 154, 155–56, 157–58, 159–62,
 

163–65, 170–72, 178, 187, 230–34
 

Central Military Commission. See Korean 

Workers’ Party 

Central People’s Committee, 194, 199–200 

Central Procurators’ Office, 201, 275–76 

Central Security Cadre School, 263
 

Central Statistics Bureau, 200
 

Chaeryŏng Plain, 63
 

Chagang Province, 202, 279, 280
 

Ch’aho, 253, 254 

chain of command, military, 238–44 

Changchung Cathedral, 117 

Ch’angjŏn, 253
 

Chang Song-taek, 184
 

chemical and biological weapons, 260
 

chibaejuŭi (“dominationism”), 56
 

child care, 110–12 

children (see also family), 110–13 

China (see also individual dynasties; Ch

ple’s Republic of; Confucianism; Si

nese War): border with, xxix–xxx, 4; 

of, ii, 5, 6, 11, 13–14, 20; relations 

20–21, 42–43
 

China, People’s Republic of: aid an

tance from, xxix, xxxii, 44–45, 47, 

173, 205; air service to, 150; bord

xxx, 4, 233, 279; emigration to, 233

from, xxix, xxxii, 100; influence of, 

itary aid from, 223; military relatio

223–24, 257–58; reforms in, comp

xxix, xxxii, 231–32; relation

42–43, 56–57, 173, 223–24, 233–

tions with South Korea, 56–57, 1

tions with the United States, 55–56

in Six-Party Talks, xxix, xxv, 223, 2

Chinese characters and language, 10

120
 

Chinese civil war (1946–49), 42–43 

Chinese Communist Party, 41, 237, 23

Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 27

Chinhan, 6 

Choch’ongryŏn (General Associa

Korean Residents in Japan), 215
 

Ch’o-do, 253
 

Choe Hong-kyu, 170
 

Ch’oe Ung-sam, 128
 

Ch’oe Yŏng-gŏn, 42 

Chŏlla provinces, 9
 

Ch’ŏllima Movement, 49, 193
 

Ch’ŏllima Work Team Movement, 13

Cho Man-sik, 40
 

Cho Myŏng-nok, 191, 229, 230, 241, 2

Ch’ŏndogyo, 49, 120, 192 

Ch’ŏngch’ŏn River, 5
 

Ch’ŏngjin, 65, 127, 150, 253
 

Ch’ŏngjin Medical College, 128
 

Chŏngju, 247
 

Ch’ŏngsan-ni Method, 143, 154, 194 

Chongu (Friends) Party, 49, 120, 1

215
 

Chŏng Yag-yong, 23 

Chŏnju, 12
 

Chŏn Pyŏng-ho, 191, 245, 270
 

Chosŏn Chungyang Yŏnbo (Korean 

Yearbook), 216–17 

Chosŏn Dynasty, xxx–xxxi, 16–29, 6

dhism under, 16; bureaucracy under

29; class and society under, 18–20

314 
and education under, 17–19, 23–24; foreign 

relations under, 20–21, 25–26, 29; land 

ownership under, 16, 22; neo-Confucianism 

under, 16–17, 21
 

chosŏn’gul (Korean script in North Korea),
 

xxxi, 18, 120
 

Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 161
 

Christianity, 115–19 

chuch’e (self-reliance), xxxii, xxxiii, 41,
 

49–54, 71, 74, 112, 135, 186, 203–8,
 

212–13, 223, 264, 269
 

Chun Doo Hwan, 53, 54, 56
 

Ch’unhyang chŏn (The Tale of Ch’unhyang),
 

24
 

Chu Sang-sŏng, 276
 

cities (si), 202
 

Civil Defense Bureau, 277
 

Civil Defense Department. See Korean Workers’ Party 

civil liberties (see also human rights), 195–96 

civil war, 54
 

class structure, xxxi, 18, 19, 20, 78–82, 210,
 

272–73; in Chosŏn Dynasty, 18–22, 78–82; 

in colonial period, 30–32, 35
 

climate, xxx, 4, 64, 153
 

Clinton, William J., 57, 229, 230
 

coal, 65–66, 147, 233
 

coastal defense system, 254
 

coastal plains, 63–64 

coastal security brigades, 280
 

Coastal Security Bureau, 279–80 

coastline, 63
 

Cold War (1945–89), xxix, xxxiv, 4, 39, 55,
 

56, 139, 140, 219, 223, 237
 

College Training Units, 257
 

Combined Artillery Officer School, 262–63 

command economy. See centrally planned 

economy 

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of
 

the Fatherland, 184, 214
 

communism: rise of, 18, 238
 

Communist International (Comintern), 37
 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 37
 

computers, 151–52 

Confucianism (see also Neo-Confucianism),
 

xxx, xxxi, 10, 75, 120; in Chosŏn Dynasty,
 

16, 20, 61; in Koryŏ, 13; study of, 10, 11, 16 

conscription, 238, 264–65 

constitution, 198, 201; (1948), 194; (1972),
 

42, 194, 199; (1992), 186, 189, 194; (1998),
 

xxxiii, 142, 164, 186, 194, 198, 199, 200,
 

207, 215, 241, 275
 

construction industry, 48, 87–88 

consumer goods and services, 98–

containment policy, 39–40, 44–45 

control systems, xxxi, xxxii, xx

272–73, 278
 

Copyright Law (2001), 164
 

core class (haeksim kyech’ŭng), 5

councils of nobles (hwabaek), 5
 

counterfeit currency trafficking, 5

counties, 202
 

Country Reports on Human Righ

275
 

courts (see also criminal justice 

ciary), 201, 273–75 

crime, 274
 

criminal justice system (see also 

273–75 

criminal law, 165, 274–75 

Cuba, 57
 

cultural development, xxix, xxx, 6

Daesong Bank, 153, 162
 

Daesong Trading Company, 153
 

Dalian (Port Arthur), 28
 

Daoism, 120
 

“Dear Leader.” See Kim Jong Il 

death rate, 67, 130
 

debt, foreign. See foreign debt 

defectors, 72, 79, 116, 119, 172
 

defense industry, xxxiv, 270–72 

defense spending, 102–4, 153, 27

deforestation, 66, 157
 

Delta Asia Financial Group, xxxv

Demarcation Line, 63, 177
 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), xxxi

57, 63, 150, 166, 176–77, 22

253–54, 269
 

Democratic Confederal Republi

192, 220
 

Democratic Front for the Unific

Fatherland (Fatherland Front), 2

Deng Xiaoping, 123
 

Denmark, 173
 

development plans. See economic 

Dharani Sutra, 12
 

diet and nutrition (see also fo

99–100, 126, 130, 154
 

disaster response, 74
 

dissidents, 214
 

division of Korea, xxix, xxxi, 38

136, 217–18, 237
 
 

 

divorce, 106, 109
 

DMZ. See Demilitarized Zone
 

domestic faction, 41–42
 

Dongdaemun (East Gate), 24
 

drainage, 64, 154
 

drought, 64, 67, 154, 156
 

drug trafficking, 227
 

earthquakes, 64
 

Eastern Europe, 54, 57, 137, 272
 

Eastern Zhou. See Yan 

East Germany, 54
 

East Sea. See Sea of Japan 

East Sea Fleet, 253–54 

East Sea Fleet Command, 240
 

economic adjustments. See economic reforms 

economic development (see also economic 

planning), xxxii, 35, 135–41
 

economic growth, xxxi, xxxii, 32, 45–46, 138,
 

145, 233; negative, 47, 223
 

economic planning (see also individual economic plans), xxxii, 45–46, 137–42, 171
 

economic reforms, xxxii, 48–49, 135, 157–61, 

170–72, 187, 230–34 

education, 112, 120–25; abroad, 123, 124, 173; 

college and university, 104, 121, 123–25; 

Confucian, 17; high school, 121, 122; kindergarten, 121; literacy, 120; middle school, 121, 

122–23; nursery school, 111–12, 121–22; 

political, 103–4, 110, 123, 124, 188; primary, 

121–22; technological, 123; vocational, 123; 

women and, 104, 109–10
 

Egypt, 258
 

electric power, 145–47, 177–78; generation 

of, 145, 146–47; hydroelectric, 145, 147; 

shortages of, 146–47, 233
 

elite class (see also class structure; Korean 

Workers Party), xxxii, 78–79, 91–95, 104,
 

211; and access to media, 216; and armed 

forces, 189, 211, 264; education of, 122; in 

Chosŏn Dynasty, 18–19, 78; in Koryŏ
 

Dynasty, 13–14
 

emigration, 35–37, 102, 233
 

energy sector, 47–48, 146–47 

engineer bureaus, 277
 

English language, 124, 216–17 

environment, 65–67; disasters, 280; protection 

of the, 65, 195
 

Ethiopia, 130
 

European Union (EU), 3, 221
 

exports, 48; arms, 47, 228, 271; minerals, 176
 

External Economic Affairs Bureau (

san Company), 271
 

External Economic Legal Advice Offi

family (see also children), 51, 52, 83–

101, 103, 104–10, 196; and Confu

17, 75
 

famine, xxix, xxxii, xxxvii, 3, 67, 69

129, 130, 155–56, 173–74, 223
 

farming. See agriculture 

Fatherland Front. See Democratic F

the Reunification of the Fatherland 

Fatherland Liberation War, 43
 

Federal Reserve Bank (New York), xx

Federation of Korean Industries, 177
 

fertility rate, 130
 

fertilizers, 67, 145, 154, 155, 156, 157

Finnish language, 18
 

First Anglo-Chinese, or Opium, War (1

24
 

First Officer Candidate School, 263
 

fiscal year, 152–53 

fishing industry, 151
 

Five-Year Plan (1957–61), 45–46, 137

floods, xxix, xxxii, xxxvi, 64, 67, 154
 

food (see also agriculture; famine; 

nutrition): aid, xxix, 104, 130, 233–

tribution of, 69, 101, 159–62, 171; 

of, 69, 153; production of, 153–55, 

rationing of, 99–100, 159–60, 17

shortages of, 33, 69, 100, 101, 130, 

Food and Agriculture Organization (

the United Nations, 130, 150–51, 15

foreign debt, 46, 153
 

foreign direct investment, 164, 173
 

foreign exchange, 48, 153, 160, 162
 

Foreign Insurance Company, 162
 

Foreign Languages Press Group, 217
 

foreign relations, xxxvii, 20–21, 47

217–30; with China, 223–24; wit

224–27; with South Korea, 21, 218–

the Soviet Union and Russia, 223–

the United States, xxix, xxxv

227–30 

Foreign Trade of the Democratic 

Republic of Korea, 217
 

forests, 66, 150–51 

Foundation Day (October 3), xxix, 5

anniversary of founding, xxxvi
 

Four-Point Military Guidelines, 269
 

Four-Power Talks, 57
 

316 
 

 

 

Framework Agreement. See Agreed Framework 

France, 28, 34–35 

freedom of assembly (see also civil liberties; 

human rights), 195, 215
 

freedom of association (see also civil liberties; 

human rights), 195, 215
 

freedom of religion (see also civil liberties; 

human rights), 115, 118–19 

freedom of speech (see also civil liberties; 

human rights), 195, 215
 

freedom of the press (see also civil liberties; 

human rights), 195, 215–16 

freedom, personal and political. See civil liberties; human rights; self-censorship 

French language, 216–17 

FROG–7, 260
 

Full-scope Safeguards Agreement. See International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

Gallucci, Robert, 228
 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

General Federation of Trade Unions, 214
 

General League of Writers, Central Committee, 116
 

General Political Bureau, 239, 240, 241,
 

242–44, 245; Organization Department,
 

264; Propaganda Department, 245
 

General Rear Services Bureau, 240, 244, 245
 

General Sherman, 25
 

General Staff Department, 240, 241, 242, 244,
 

245–47, 250, 256; divisions of, 242; Logistics Mobilization Bureau, 256; Military 

Training Bureau, 265; Operations Bureau,
 

242, 245
 

Geneva Conference, 218
 

German language, 216
 

Germany (see also East Germany), 28, 125,
 

150
 

Ghauri missile, 258
 

GNP. See gross national product 

Good Friends, 129
 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 54
 

Government General Headquarters (Seoul), 31
 

Government Hospital (Ponghwa Clinic), 128
 

Graham, Billy, 116, 118–19 

Greece, 39
 

gross domestic product (GDP), 127, 135, 141,
 

142, 153, 173
 

gross national product (GNP), 46, 141, 142
 

ground forces. See Korean People’s Army 

Guam, 259
 

Guard Command, 240, 242, 257, 

guerrilla resistance: Chinese sup

development of myths about, 34

Il Sung, 237–38; Soviet suppo

Japanese, xxxi, 33–34, 38, 40, 

occupation, 39
 

Guyana, 124
 

Haein Temple, 14 

Haeju, 150
 

Haeju Hospital, 128
 

Haiti, 130
 

Hamhŭng, 65, 127, 150, 252
 

Han Chinese, 5
 

Han Dynasty, 5
 

hangul, xxxi, 18, 26, 120
 

Han River, 6
 

Hawaii, 259
 

Hay, Kalb Associates, 165
 

head of state, xxxiii, 196, 198, 19

Health and Recreation Center, 92

health care (see also diet and nut

tals), 71, 126–30; and disease

and medicines, 129; preventive

heavy industry, 35, 45–46, 136, 1

“hegemonism,” 56
 

helicopters. See air force aircraf

ment 

HEU (highly enriched uranium), 

Hideyoshi. See Toyotomi Hideyo

Hill, Christopher R., xxxv
 

HIV. See human immunodeficien

Hŏ Ka-i, 38, 42
 

Hong Ink-pyo, 232
 

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 

(HSBC), 233
 

Honnecker, Erich, 54
 

hospitals and clinics, 127, 128
 

hostile class (chŏktae kyech’ŭng), 

Ho Tam, 184
 

Hŭich’ŏn, 150
 

Hu Jintao, 225
 

human immunodeficiency vi

126–27 

human rights (see also civil liberti

92, 195–96, 215, 227, 228, 275
 

humanitarian aid, xxxv, 69, 174
 

Hungarian language, 18
 

Hungary, 57, 173
 

Hŭngnam, 150
 
 

 

 

Hwang Jang-yop, 75, 119
 

Hwangju, 252
 

Hwasŏng short-range ballistic missile
 

(SRBM), 258, 259–60
 

hydroelectric power, 65, 147
 

Hyŏn Ch’ŏl-hae, 241, 245
 

Hyundai Asan, 167, 176
 

Hyundai Group, 57, 167, 231
 

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy 

Agency
 

ideology (see also chuch’e; Marxism–Leninism), 41, 50, 203–8
 

idu (Korean adaptation of Chinese characters),
 

11
 

imports, 46, 48; of food, 66, 69; of oil, 48, 146
 

Inch’ŏn, 14
 

income (see also wages), 46
 

independence, xxix, xxxi, 37–38
 

Independence Club, 26
 

India, 173
 

industrialization, xxxii, 35, 46
 

industrial sector (see also construction industry; heavy industry; manufacturing), 32, 35,
 

40, 136, 145, 161, 233; development of, 32,
 

35, 46, 137–41; growth of, 46, 145
 

infant mortality rate, 130
 

infantry corps, 242, 247
 

inflation, 159, 171–72, 232
 

informal sector, 161, 162, 171, 233
 

ING, 162
 

Inner Asia, 12
 

intellectuals, 49–50, 79, 120, 184, 194,
 

209–10
 

Interim People’s Committee, 40 

Inter-Korean affairs, xxix, xxxii, xxxvi, xxxvii, 

55, 57–58, 174–78, 218–22, 278
 

internal security (see also security forces),
 

272–80
 

International Affairs Department. See Korean
 

Workers’ Party (KWP)
 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
 

xxxv, xxxvi, 223, 228, 230, 262; Full-scope 

Safeguards Agreement (1992), 261
 

International Friendship Exhibition Hall, 76
 

International Press Institute, 216
 

International Telecommunication Union, 151
 

Internet, 151–52, 217; access, 151–52; cafés,
 

151–52
 

Interrogation Bureau, 277
 

invasions, foreign, xxx, xxxi, 10, 11, 14

23
 

Investigation Bureau, 277
 

Iran, 47, 258
 

Iran–Iraq War, 47
 

Iraq, 124
 

irrigation (see also agriculture), 47, 15

IRT–2000 thermal research reactor, 2

Italy, 25, 173
 

Itō Hirobumi, 28
 

Jaisohn, Phillip (Sŏ Chae-p’il), 26
 

Japan: attitudes to, in Korea, 30, 33; c

tion of Korea by, xxix, xxxi, 25, 26

30–37, 61, 136, 183, 237; defea

World War II, 38, 125; early links 

invasions by, xxxi, 21, 22; language 

in, 124; North Koreans in, 215, 2

tions with, xxix, 25, 125, 224–27; ro

Six-Party Talks , xxix, xxxv, 262; a

258
 

Japanese colonial occupation (1910–4

25, 29–37, 237
 

Japanese Imperial Army, 34, 237
 

Japanese language, 18
 

Japanese Red Army, 225
 

Jehol Diary, 24
 

Jilin Province (China), 61, 175
 

Joint Declaration on the Denucleariz

the Korean Peninsula (1992), 221, 2

Joint Nuclear Control Commission, 22

juch’e. See chuch’e 

judiciary, 201, 275–76 

Junior Reserve Officer Training Corp

Kaech’ŏn, 252
 

Kaesŏng, xxxvi, 12, 24, 57, 150, 

176–78, 202
 

Kaesŏng Special Industrial Zone, 

231; Management Committee, 177
 

Kamakura shogunate, 14 

Kanggye, 260
 

Kanghwa Island, 14
 

Kang Kŏn General Military Academy

Kang Sok-ju, 228
 

Kang Song-san, 140, 184
 

kangsong taeguk (rich nation and 

army), 189
 

Kangwŏn Province, 166, 202, 280
 

Kantor, Arnold, 228
 

318 
 

Kapsan faction, 237, 238
 

Kaya League, 9
 

KCNA. See Korean Central News Agency 

KEDO. See Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 

Khabarovsk, 38
 

Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 260
 

Khubilai Khan, 14
 

kidnapping of foreigners, 124–25, 225–26 

Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy, 253, 263
 

Kim Ch’ŏl-man, 241, 270
 

Kim Chŏng-ch’ŏl. See Kim Jong Chul 

Kim Chŏng-il. See Kim Jong Il 

Kim Ch’ŏng-suk Naval Academy, 263
 

Kim Dae Jung, 57, 135, 174, 221; and 2000 

P’yŏngyang summit, 3, 219, 222
 

Kim Hong-jip, 25
 

Kim Hwan, 213
 

Kim Ik-hyŏn, 241
 

Kim Il, 189
 

Kim Il-ch’ŏl, 191, 241, 242, 245
 

Kim Il Sung: attitudes to, 72, 112; birth of, 34,
 

183; Chinese support for, 38; cult of personality surrounding, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 18, 51,
 

71–78, 115, 117, 183, 186, 204, 216; death 

of, xxix, xxxii, 3, 73–74, 183, 208, 239; 

early years of, 3, 34, 70–71, 183; emergence 

of, as leader, 40–41; influences on, 70–71; in 

guerrilla movement, 33–34, 38, 40, 95, 183,
 

204, 237–38; leadership style of, 51–52,
 

72–73, 203; lifestyle of, 95; on-the-spot 

guidance of, 41, 49, 72, 143, 203; presence 

of, in society, 72, 112; purges by, 205, 211; 

roles of, 183, 192, 267; Soviet support for,
 

183; speeches and writings of, 71, 77, 111,
 

123, 143, 207; succession to, xxxii, 51,
 

74–75, 183, 199; tomb of, 76
 

Kim Il Sung’s birthday (April 15), 85
 

Kim Il Sung’s Constitution, 196
 

Kim Il Sung Chuui. See Kimilsungism 

Kim Il Sung Higher Party School, 210
 

Kimilsungism, 52, 75, 80, 203
 

Kim Il Sung Military University, 263
 

Kim Il Sung Political University, 264
 

Kim Il Sung sanga (Kim Il Sung’s Thoughts),
 

78
 

Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League, 85–91,
 

214
 

Kim Il Sung Square, 165
 

Kim Il Sung University, 79, 94, 120, 123–24
 

Kim Jong Chul (Paek Se-bong), 184, 214, 270
 

Kim Jong Il, 3, 52; assumption 

xxix, xxxii, xxxv, xxxvi, 74–7

birth of, 7, 63, 183, 238; exposu

71; health of, xxxvi, xxxvii; in

53; leadership of, 212; lifestyle 

tection of, 257, 279; purges by, 

with the military, 184, 186, 188

242, 244, 245, 267; role in Nati

Commission, 188–91, 199, 23

of, xxxiii, 183, 192, 199, 208, 2

241, 277–78; succession to, 

184, 214, 270; writings and spee

215
 

Kim Jong Nam, 184, 214
 

Kim Key-hiuk, 21
 

Kim Ku, 33
 

Kim Kyong-hui, 184
 

Kim Kyuk-sik, 242, 246
 

Kim Mu-chŏng, 238
 

Kim Myŏng-kuk, 245
 

Kim Ok-kyun, 25
 

Kim Pyŏng-ho, 270
 

Kim Pyŏng-ryul, 201, 276
 

Kim Song-ae, 183
 

Kim Sŏng-ju. See Kim Il Sung 

Kim Wŏn-hong, 245
 

Kim Yang-gŏn, 191, 241
 

Kim Yŏng-chun, 191, 241, 245, 2

Kim Yong-il, xxxvi, 200
 

Kim Yong-nam, 170, 198
 

Kim Yong-sun, 161, 213, 228
 

Kim Young-sam, 221
 

Kim Yun-sim, 253
 

kindergarten, 121
 

Kissinger, Henry, 55
 

Kitan. See Qidan 

KN–02 missile, 258
 

Kobul-tong, 247
 

Koguryŏ, ii, 7–12 

Koizumi Junichiro, 226
 

Kojong (king), 26, 28
 

kokutai (national polity), 51
 

Korea, Republic of. See South Ko

Korea Electric Power Corporation

Korea Maranatha Enterprise D

Limited, 162
 

Korea Pictorial, 217
 

Korea Resources Corporation, 17

Korea Strait, 9
 

Korea Today, 217
 

Korea Transport Institute, 176
 
 

 

 

 

 

Korean Central Intelligence Agency. See Central Intelligence Agency (South Korea) 

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA;
 

Chosŏn Chungyang Tŏngsinsa), xxxv, 216
 

Korean Communist Party, 33, 184
 

Korean Democratic Women’s Union, Central 

Committee, 184, 214
 

Korean language (see also chosŏn’gul; hangul), 18, 20, 120, 125
 

Korean Maritime Arbitration Committee, 201
 

Korean National Peace Committee, 214
 

Korean Peninsula, xxix, xxx, xxxii, xxxvi, 61; 

balance of forces on, 57–58; division of,
 

xxix, 54–55, 136, 237; early settlement of, 5,
 

10; geography of, 7, 63–64, 270; missile 

launches from, 259; unification of, 12, 269; 

war on, 269–70
 

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 146, 174, 228
 

Korean People’s Air Force Command. See Air 

Force Command 

Korean People’s Army (KPA; Chosŏn 

Inmin’gun) (see also armed forces; army),
 

xxxiii, xxxiv, 42, 183, 212, 238, 244, 247; 

founded, 42, 237; fundamental principles of
 

war of, xxxiv, 270
 

Korean People’s Navy Command. See Navy 

Command 

Korean People’s Revolutionary Army 

(KPRA; Chosŏn Inmin Hyŏngmyŏnggun), 

237–38 

Korean Provisional Government (in Shanghai), 33
 

Korean Social Democratic Party, 192, 215
 

Korean Students’ Committee, 214
 

Korean Volunteer Army (KVA; Chosŏn 

Ŭiyonggun), 238
 

Korean War (1950–53), xxix, xxxi, xxxii, 3,
 

34, 43–45, 202, 223, 238; aftermath of,
 

41–42, 45, 136–37, 204; start of, 43–44, 218
 

Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), xxxi, xxxiii,
 

40, 52, 142, 191–93, 239, 245, 272; cadres,
 

193, 210–11; Central Auditing Committee,
 

191, 208; Central Committee, xxxiii, 183,
 

191–93, 208–9, 239, 244, 269; Central 

Inspection Committee, 191, 208; Central 

Military Commission, xxxiii, 191–92, 208,
 

239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 256, 257, 265, 270; 

Civil Defense Department, 241, 257; constitution, 191, 269; discipline, 188; economic 

work by, 193; International Affairs Department, 228, 241; leadership of, 208–14; 

membership, 104, 184, 193, 209–1

tary Affairs Department, 191, 241

tions Industry Department, 24

National Party Congress, 191; Orga

and Guidance Department, 193, 24

cal Bureau, 184, 191, 208, 239, 245

ium, 191; purges, 192; Secretari

208–9, 234, 264; Standing Commit

208; symbol of, 49
 

Korean Workers’ Party Congress: Fi

206, 208; Sixth, 51, 183, 188, 192, 2

220
 

Koryŏ Dynasty, xxx, 12–16; culture 

13–14
 

Koryo Tours, 161
 

Kosan-dong, 247
 

Kosŏng, 150
 

KPRA. See Korean People’s Revol

Army 

Kulloja (The Worker), 206, 216
 

Kumchangri, 229
 

Kŭmgang Bank, 153
 

Kŭmho, 146
 

Kŭmsŏng Political College, 264
 

Kŭmsusan Assembly Hall, 76
 

Kŭn Ch’ogo (king), 7
 

Kungye, 12
 

kwalliso-dŭl (management centers), 2

Kwanggaet’o (king), 10
 

Kwangmyong-net, 152
 

KWP. See Korean Workers’ Party 

Kyŏngju, 9, 12
 

Kyŏngsŏng, 253
 

Kyŏngsŏng Flight Officer School, 253

Kyŏngŭi Railroad, 176
 

Kyŏnhwŏn, 12
 

Land Corporation, 177
 

land erosion, 67
 

land reform, 16, 17, 32–33, 39, 40, 13

Laney, James, 158
 

Lankov, Andrei, 37
 

Later Koguryŏ, 12
 

Later Paekche, 12
 

Law on the Forest (1999), 66
 

Law on Water Resources (1997), 67
 

Lee Hoi Chang, 174
 

Lee Sang-tae, 116
 

legal system. See human rights; j

penal code 

leisure activities, 113–15 

320 
LG Corporation, 174
 

Liaodong Peninsula, 14, 28
 

Liaoning Province (China), 61 

Liao River, 10
 

life expectancy, 69, 129
 

Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau,
 

240, 242, 248, 250
 

literacy rate, 120
 

literati. See scholar-officials 

LivingArt, 178
 

living standards, 47, 94–97 

local government, xxxiii–xxxiv, 202–3 

Lock Gate Law (2001), 164
 

Logistics Mobilization Bureau. See General 

Staff Department 

Lolang (Nangnang), 6
 

Long March, 238 

MacArthur, Douglas, 38, 44–45 

machine industry bureaus, 271
 

Mahan, 6
 

Main East Sea Road, 177
 

Malaysia, 173
 

Malgal, 12
 

malnutrition. See diet and nutrition 

Manchu: invasions, 21, 22–23 

Manchuria (see also Northeast China), 4, 7,
 

10, 28, 33, 40, 183, 237
 

Man’gyŏngdae, 76
 

Man’gyŏngdae Revolutionary Institute, 213,
 

263
 

Mansurov, Alexandre, 151
 

manufacturing, xxxi, 145
 

Mao Zedong, 49, 50, 70, 72
 

Maranatha Trust of Australia, 162
 

Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japanese), 

226–27 

market forces (see also economic reforms),
 

159, 161, 171, 172, 173
 

markets, 97, 101–2, 160, 162, 171, 230, 232
 

marriage, 69, 83, 105–9
 

Martin, Bradley K., 117
 

Marxism–Leninism, xxxiii, 3, 50, 52, 70, 186,
 

194, 204–6
 

mass organizations, 214–15 

Mayang Island, 253, 254
 

McCloy, John J., 38
 

mechanized corps, 247
 

media, xxxiii, 151–52, 215–17 

medical colleges, 127
 

medical personnel, 126–29 

Meiji Restoration, 25
 

Mexico, 173
 

middle classes, 20, 78, 79
 

MiG fighters. See air force aircra

ment 

Military Armistice Commission (

military budget (see also defens

153, 245, 271
 

military conscription, 264–65 

military doctrine and policy, 254, 

“military first” (sŏngun) politics

187, 189, 271
 

Military Justice Bureau, 240, 244

Military Prosecutions Bureau, 24

military ranks, 266–69 

military role in society, 102–4, 18

military service, 103, 264–65 

military special courts, 201, 275
 

military strategy and tactics, xxxi

military training, 262–65, 266
 

minerals, 145
 

Ming Dynasty, 14, 22–23 

mining, 145
 

Ministry of Culture, 75
 

Ministry of Defense, 238
 

Ministry of Finance, 152, 153, 16

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, xx

262
 

Ministry of Internal Affairs, 238
 

Ministry of People’s Armed Fo

200, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 2

254, 256, 270, 271, 279
 

Ministry of People’s Security, 20

257, 273, 274, 275, 276–77
 

Ministry of Posts and Telecom

151
 

Ministry of Public Security, 276
 

Ministry of Unification (South Ko

Minju Chosŏn (Democratic Korea

Missile Guidance Bureau, 240, 24

missiles, xxxiv, xxxvii, 57, 24

257–60; moratorium on testing, 

Mitsubishi, 31–32 

Mitsui, 32
 

Mokp’o, 22
 

money: role of, in the economy

159, 171, 230, 232
 

Mongols, xxx, 14
 

morale, 81
 

mortality rate, 130
 

mountains, 63–64 
 

Mount Kŭmgang (Mount Diamond), 57, 117,
 

167
 

Mount Kŭmgang Tourist Zone, 167–69,
 

173–74, 176, 231 

Mount Mohyang, 117
 

Mount Paektu (Paektu-san or White Head 

Mountain), 7, 62–63, 115, 196
 

Mu Chŏng, 42, 43
 

mudang (shamans), 16
 

Mun Il-bong, 171
 

Munitions Industry Department. See Korean 

Workers’ Party (KWP) 

Munson, xxxvi
 

Musudan-ni launch facility, 258
 

Naemul (king), 9
 

Najin, 150, 152, 175, 253
 

Najin Business Institute, 167
 

Najin–Sŏnbong, 152, 172, 202; International 

Trade Zone, 164, 165–67, 231
 

Naktong River, 9
 

Namdaemun (South Gate), 24
 

Nam Il, 38
 

Namp’o, 65, 110, 150, 175, 201, 202, 253, 254
 

narcotics trafficking, 54, 227
 

Narita International Airport (Tokyo), 184, 214
 

“nation-first-ism,” 52–53 

National Day (September 9), 85
 

National Defense Commission (see also
 

Guard Command, Second Economic Committee, State Security Department), xxxiii, 

xxxiv, 183, 188–91, 194, 196, 198–200,
 

239, 240, 241–42, 244, 246, 265, 270, 276,
 

277
 

National Intelligence Service (South Korea),
 

274, 278
 

nationalism, 41, 204
 

nationalization, 40, 137
 

National Party Congress. See Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) 

national solipsism, 52
 

natural resources, 144–45, 195
 

Naval Academy. See Kim Ch’ŏng-suk Naval 

Academy 

Navy Command, 240, 242, 250, 253–54
 

navy equipment and ships, 254, 272
 

neighborhoods (dong), 202
 

Neo-Confucianism, xxx–xxxi, 16, 21, 41
 

nepotism, xxxii, 183–84 

Netherlands, 173
 

newspapers. See censorship; media 

“New Thinking Initiative,” 207
 

NGOs. See nongovernmental organiza

Nixon, Richard M., 55
 

Nodong Chŏngnyŏn (Working Youth)

Nodong medium-range ballistic missile (

258, 259–60 

Nodong Shinmun (Workers’ Daily), 

186, 207, 216
 

Noland, Marcus, 172, 224
 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs

Nordpolitik, 220
 

North Hamgyŏng Province, 166, 2

252, 253, 258, 280
 

North Hwanghae Province, 202
 

North Kyŏngsang Province, 9
 

North P’yŏngan Province, 166, 202, 2

280
 

Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

Northeast Asia (see also Manchuria)

8, 35–36, 61, 135
 

Northeast China (see also Manchuria)

nuclear bomb test, xxxiv–xxxv, 262 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NP

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Weapons 

nuclear proliferation, 227 

nuclear weapons (see also missiles)

xxxv, 260–62
 

nuclear weapons issue, xxix, xxxv

xxxvii, 57–58, 187, 222, 223–24, 

227–30, 261–62
 

nullum crimen sine lege (no crime w

law), 274
 

Oberdorfer, Donald, 70
 

O Chin-u, 189, 267
 

O Guk-nyol, 213 

oil (see also energy sector): imports, 

261; shortage of, 65
 

Okinawa, 259 

O Kŭm-ch’ŏl, 252
 

Old Chosŏn, 6
 

Olympic Games, 54, 57
 

Operations Bureau. See General Staff 

ment 

Opium War (1839–42), 24
 

Ŏrang, 252
 

ordinary cities (si or shi), 202
 

Organisation for Economic Co-opera

Development (OECD), 139
 

Oriental Development Company, 30–

322 
Oro, 247
 

Orwellian society, 71, 90, 183
 

Paekche, ii, 6–8, 10
 

paekchŏng (caste-like groups), 20
 

Paek Hak-nim, 213
 

Paek Se-bong. See Kim Jong Chul 

Paektu-san. See Mount Paektu 

Pak Chae-kyŏng, 245
 

Pak Chi-wŏn, 24
 

Pak Hŏn-yŏng, 33, 41, 42 

Pakistan, 47, 258
 

Pak Ki-sŏ, 241
 

Pak Pong-ju, xxxvi
 

Palais, James B., 17
 

Pang Ho-san, 43
 

P’anmunjŏm, 166; Joint Security Area, 227
 

paramilitary units, 257
 

Parhae, 11, 12
 

Park Chung-hee, 54, 142, 205
 

Park Kyung-ae, 173
 

Park Yang-soo, 175
 

“Patriotic Song,” 196
 

Peace and Prosperity Policy, 222
 

peasants, 19–20, 24, 32, 35–36, 39, 45, 194,
 

209; as party members, 184, 209
 

Penal Affairs Bureau, 277
 

penal code, 274
 

penal system, 273–75 

people’s courts, 201, 275
 

People’s Korea (P’yŏngyang), 170
 

Perry, Matthew C., 24–25 

Perry, William J., 230
 

Philippines, 28, 173
 

Pip’a-got, 253, 254
 

plutonium reprocessing, xxxv, 58, 145, 261,
 

262
 

Poland, 57
 

police (see also Ministry of People’s Security), 31, 39, 276–78
 

political elite. See elite class 

Political Officers School, 264
 

Political Prison Camps Bureau, 278
 

political study sessions, 89, 209, 210
 

pollution, 65–67, 195
 

Ponghwa Clinic (Government Hospital), 128
 

Pongsu Church, 118
 

popular protests, 33
 

population, 35–36, 67–69, 209; density, 67; 

growth, 68–69; size, 61, 67
 

ports, 150, 195
 

poverty, 101, 171, 232–33
 

presidency, xxxiii, 183
 

Primorskiy Territory (Russia), 62

prices, 97, 157, 159, 161, 171, 23

printing, xxxi, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19
 

prisoners, 278
 

prison system, 102, 276–77, 278
 

private property, xxxiii, 165, 186, 

private sector, 160–61 

Processing Trade Law (2001), 16

Procurators’ Office. See Central 

Office 

Propaganda Department. See Gen

Bureau 

Protestants, 117–18; missionaries

provinces (do), 202
 

provincial-level municipalities (ch

Puam-ni, 253
 

public distribution system, xxxii, 

Public Safety Bureau, 277
 

public security, 276–77 

Pueblo, USS, 55, 64, 227
 

Pulguksa Temple, 12, 13
 

“Pure Land” Buddhism, 12
 

purges: of literati, 21–22; of oppo

Il Sung, 42, 205; of opponents 

Il, 192, 211; by Stalin, 37
 

Pusan, 9, 22
 

Putin, Vladimir V., 225
 

Puyŏ, 7
 

P’yŏngyang, xxix, 64, 71, 83, 

147–50, 202, 247, 252, 253, 2

279
 

P’yŏngyang Children’s Palace, 92

P’yŏngyang Defense Command

247
 

P’yŏngyang Hospital, 128
 

P’yŏngyang Informatics Center, 1

P’yŏngyang Institute, 264
 

P’yŏngyang Maternity Hospital, 4

P’yŏngyang Medical College Ho

P’yŏngyang Plain, 63
 

P’yŏngyang Revival, 118
 

P’yŏngyang Times, 217
 

P’yŏngyang–Wŏnsan line, 247, 2

Pyŏnhan, 6
 

Qidan (or Kitan), 12
 

Qin Dynasty, 5
 

Qing Dynasty, 23
 
 

 

radio broadcasting, 114, 119, 216
 

railroad courts, 201, 275 

railroads, xxxvi, 35, 57, 147–49, 176, 195
 

Railroad Security Bureau, 277
 

rainfall, xxxvi, 64
 

Rajin. See Najin 

Rangoon, 53
 

Reagan administration, 56
 

Reconnaissance Bureau, 250
 

Record of Concern for the Underprivileged, 23
 

Red Cross, 219, 221
 

Red Cross Hospital, 127–28 

Red Youth Guard, 256
 

refugees, 233
 

Registration Bureau, 277
 

religion (see also under individual religions), 

115–20 

renminbi, 232
 

Republic of Korea. See South Korea 

Republic of Korea–United States Combined 

Forces Command, 249
 

reserve forces, 254, 256–57; training, 264
 

Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU), 

256–57 

restaurants, 113, 161
 

reunification, 214, 218, 269
 

Rhee, Syngman (Yi Sŭngman), 26, 33, 43
 

rice, 100, 171; harvest, 88; production of, 6,
 

24, 47, 64; tax payments in, 32; transplanting, 88
 

rivers, 64, 66–67 

roads, 149–50, 195
 

Roh Moo Hyun, xxxvi, 174
 

Roh Tae-woo, 220, 222, 228
 

Roman Catholicism, 24, 117
 

Romania, 54
 

Romanian Marxists, 50
 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 37–38 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 26
 

rural counties (gun or kun), 202
 

Rusk, Dean, 38
 

Russia (see also Soviet Union), 25, 150; border with, xxx, 279; military aid from, 223; 

relations with, 223–24; role of, in Six-Party 

Talks, xxix, xxxv, 262; trade with, 223
 

Russian language, 124, 216–17 

Russian Orthodox Church, 119
 

Russo–Japanese War (1904–5), xxxi, 28, 37
 

sadae (policy), 20
 

sadaebu (scholar-officials or literati), 14, 16
 

Sagot, 253
 

Sajin T’ongsin (Photographic News), 

Sakchu, 260
 

Sakyamuni Buddha, 12
 

Samsung, 174
 

sanctions, xxxv, 146, 227
 

Sariwŏn, 127
 

Saro, 9
 

Sberbank (Russia), 162
 

scholar-officials or literati (sadaebu)

17, 21–22, 32, 78
 

School of Foreign Languages, 124
 

SCUD–B short-range ballistic 

(SRBMs), 258–59 

SCUD–C. See Hwasŏng short-range 

missile (SRBM)
 

Sea of Japan (East Sea), xxx, 7, 62, 63

Second Economic Committee (National 

Commission), 240, 241, 245, 270–71
 

Second Indochina War (1954–75), 55

Second Natural Science Institute, 271

Second Officer Candidate School, 264

Security Bureau, 277
 

Security Command, 240, 242, 244, 24

security forces (see also internal s

279–80
 

Seersucker antiship cruise missiles, 25

Sejong (king), 18, 19
 

self-censorship, 72, 216
 

self-criticism meetings, 49, 77, 89–91

self-defense, 280–81
 

self-reliance, 206; economic, xxxii, 

139, 154, 204; military, 204
 

Seoul, xxix, 16, 24, 205, 247
 

Seven-Year Plan: First (1961–67), 

138–39; Second (1978–84), 139–4

(1987–93), 140
 

Shahab missile, 258
 

Shanghai, 33
 

Shaplen, Jason, 158
 

shipping, 150
 

shops. See consumer goods and servic

Siberia, 4
 

Sierre Leone, 130
 

sijo (poetry), 24
 

Silkworm antiship cruise missiles, 254

Silla, xxx, 5, 7, 9–12
 

Singapore, 173
 

Sino–Japanese War, 26
 

Sino–Korean script, 18
 

Sino–Soviet dispute, 46, 138
 

324 
Sinŭiju, 167; Special Administrative Region,
 

166, 231
 

Sirhak (Practical Learning), 23
 

Six-Party Talks, xxix, xxxv, xxxv–xxxvi, 223–24,
 

230, 262

 “6–25 War,” 43
 

Six-Year Plan (1971–76), 138–39
 

slavery, 20
 

Sŏbaek Mountains, 7
 

Sŏ Chae-p’il (Philip Jaisohn), 26
 

socialist corporatism, 50–53 

Socialist Working Youth League, 214
 

social structure (see also class structure), xxxi,
 

78–85
 

Sŏkkuram Grotto, 12
 

Sŏnbong, 152, 175
 

Song Dynasty, 13–14
 

Song of Paradise, 116
 

sŏngbun (socioeconomic or class background), 

78–79, 81
 

sŏngun (“military first”), xxxiii, xxxiv, 184,
 

187, 189, 271
 

Songwŏl-li, 247
 

South Hamgyŏng Province, 146, 202, 211,
 

252, 280
 

South Hwanghae Province, 202, 280
 

South Korea (see also inter-Korean affairs; 

Sunshine Policy): attitudes to, 216; Central 

Intelligence Agency of, 55, 219; defense of,
 

251; economy of, xxxii, 18, 142; establishment of, xxix, 40; infiltrations of, 218, 250; 

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of
 

the Korean Peninsula, 261; Joint Nuclear
 

Control Commission, 261; Ministry of Unification, 141; participation in Six-Party 

Talks, xxix, xxxv, 223, 262; relations with,
 

xxxii, 18, 135, 174–78, 192, 218–22, 237; 

trade with Russia and China, 48
 

South Pyŏngan Province, 202, 252, 280
 

Soviet Civil Administration, 238
 

Soviet Eighty-eighth Special Brigade, 238
 

Soviet faction, 41, 42
 

Soviet Far East, 238
 

Soviet–Koreans, 38
 

Soviet Red Army, 238
 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): agreements 

with, 260; aid and advice from, xxix, xxxii,
 

43–46, 47, 54, 137, 140–41, 205, 238,
 

257–58, 270; collapse of, xxix, xxxii, 100,
 

207, 213, 224; defeat of Japan, 237; imports 

from, xxix, xxxii, 100; influence of, 42; military relations with, 54; occupation of North 

Korea, 38, 39–40, 237, 238; re

21, 37, 38, 223–24; relations 

Korea, 141, 205
 

SPA. See Supreme People’s Asse

space-launch vehicle (SLV), 258
 

Spanish language, 216–17 

special city (t’ŭkpyŏlsi), 201, 202

special courts, 201, 275
 

special economic zones, 165–67, 

special operations forces (SOF), 

269
 

Special Procurators’ Offices, 276

Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigad

sports, 95, 113–14, 126, 221–22 

Stalin, Joseph V., 37, 44, 70, 72
 

Stalinism, 4
 

State Administration Council (SA

State Planning Commission, 170, 

State Security Department, 218

244, 274, 275, 277–78, 279
 

Stevens, Durham, 28
 

study sessions. See political study 

submarines. See navy equipment 

subway: in P’yŏngyang, 77, 149
 

succession issue, xxxii–xxxiii, xxxvi

Suh, Dae-Sook, 186
 

Sui Dynasty, 10
 

Sunan International Airport, 150
 

Sungari River, 7
 

Sunjong (king), 28–29 

Sunshine Policy, 57–58, 174–76, 

Sun Yatsen, 28
 

supreme command headquarters, 

Supreme National Assembly, 220

Supreme People’s Assembly (SP

189, 196–200, 245, 270; Eleven

eign Affairs Committee, 184; 

the National Defense Comm

239, 241–42; Presidium, 196, 

274; Standing Committee, 1

198, 199; Tenth, 198
 

surface-to-surface missiles (SSM

Surveillance Bureau, 278
 

suryŏng (leader), 43, 186
 

Sweden, 173
 

Switzerland, 173
 

Syria, 47
 

Taean Work System, 143, 164, 19

T’aebaek Mountains, 7
 

T’aech’ŏn, 261
 
Tae Cho-yŏng, 11
 

Taedong River, 7, 10, 11, 64 

Taepodong intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM), 258, 259–60 

Taepodong intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), 258, 259–60
 

Taewŏn’gun (grand prince), 25
 

Tai Zong, 10 

Tang Dynasty, ii, 10, 11
 

Tan’gun, 5
 

tank corps, 247
 

Tasa-ri, 253
 

taxes, 48–49, 152
 

“Team Spirit” exercises, 56, 220, 228
 

technicians, 120
 

technocrats, 50
 

technology, 139, 146, 233; imports of, 46, 48,
 

49
 

telecommunications, 151–52, 216
 

telephone service, 151–52
 

television broadcasting, 216
 

Ten-year Service System, 264
 

terrorism, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, 53–54, 228
 

Thailand, 150, 173
 

The Great Teacher of Journalists, 215
 

thirty-eighth parallel, 38, 43, 44, 63, 237, 238
 

Three Kingdoms period, 6–12
 

Three Revolutions, 193, 194, 209, 212
 

Three-Year Plan (1949–50), 45, 137
 

Three-Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan 

(1954–56), 45–46, 137
 

ti-yong (essence and practical use), 51
 

T’oejo-dong, 253
 

Tŏksan-dong, 252
 

Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement, 24,
 

26, 120
 

Tongil Market, 161
 

Tongil Tower, 177
 

Tongnae, 24
 

Tongnip Sinmun (The Independent), 26
 

topography, xxx, 63–64
 

towns and townships (myŏn), 202
 

tourist industry, 176, 221–22, 231
 

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 22
 

trade (see also exports; imports), xxxii, 48,
 

139, 173–74, 224
 

traditional villages (ri or ni), 202
 

transportation system, 92, 138, 147–50, 195
 

travel restrictions, 83, 92, 109, 217
 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
 

Weapons (NPT), 261, 262
 

Tree-Planting Day (March 2), 66
 

Tripitaka Koreana, 14, 15
 

Truman, Harry S., 39–40, 44–45
 

Truman Doctrine, 39–40
 

tuberculosis, 126
 

Tumangang. See Tuman River
 

Tuman River, 4, 11, 62, 64
 

Tumen River. See Tuman River
 

Turkey, 39
 

Turkish language, 18
 

“turtle ships,” 22
 

Two-Year Plan (1949–50), 137
 

Ŭiju, 24
 

Ŭlchi Mundŏk, 10
 

Under the Loving Care of the 

Leader: North Korea and the Kim D

117
 

United Kingdom (see also Britain), 17

United Nations (UN), xxix, 40, 44, 18

United Nations Children’s Fund, 156
 

United Nations Command (see also 

Armistice Commission), 249
 

United Nations Development Pro

(UNDP), 151, 167
 

United Nations Environment Pro

(UNEP), 65
 

United Nations Security Council, 227

United States: Agreed Framework wi

Korea, 57, 58, 146–47, 261–62; hum

aid from, xxxv, 174; in Korean War

nuclear inspection issue, xxxv, xxxv

261–62; occupation of southern K

39–40; policy toward South Korea, 

tions with, xxix, 55–58, 146–4

227–30; relations with China, 55–

role of, in Six-Party Talks, xxix, xx

World War II, 125; talks with, 56, 5

from, xxxiv; threat to, 259–60 

universities (see also colleges), 121, 

military, 263–64 

Ural–Altaic group of languages, 18
 

uranium: enrichment of, xxxvi, 57–58, 

urban districts (kuyŏk), 202
 

urbanization, 67, 233
 

urban population, 67–68, 209, 232
 

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C

262
 

U.S. Combined Forces Command, 24

U.S. Committee for Human Rights 

Korea, 274, 278
 

U.S. Congress, 40, 229
 

326 
 

259 

U.S. Department of State, 39–40, 275
 

U.S. Department of the Treasury, xxxv
 

U.S. Forces Korea, xxxiv, 56, 249, 259
 

U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 249,
 

vacations, 83, 84, 96–97, 108, 195
 

Vichy France, 34–35
 

Vietnam, 56, 231
 

vocational colleges, 123
 

Voice of America, 115
 

volunteer labor, 84, 86–89
 

Wa, 9
 

Wada Haruki, 38
 

wages, 96–97, 159, 161, 164, 230, 232, 233
 

walled-town states, xxx, 5, 6
 

Wang Kŏn, 12
 

War Department (U.S.), 38, 40 

wards (gu), 202
 

Warren, Reverend Rick, 118
 

water pollution, 65, 67 

water supply, 66–67
 

wavering class (tongyo kyech’ŭng), 272–73
 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 260–62
 

Web sites, government, 152, 217 

Western Europe, 48
 

Westernization, 26
 

West Sea. See Yellow Sea
 

West Sea Fleet, 253
 

West Sea Fleet Command, 240
 

White Head Mountain. See Mount Paektu
 

Wilson, Woodrow, 33
 

Wiman Chosŏn, 5–6
 

With the Century, 71
 

WMD. See weapons of mass destruction
 

women, 16, 104–10; education of, 104, 109–10; 

in the armed forces, 265; status and rights 

under the constitution, 195–96
 

wŏn, 94, 160–61, 162, 172, 230–32
 

Wŏnsan, 64, 95, 147–48, 149, 150, 247, 253
 

Woori Bank, 178
 

Workers and Peasants Red Guard, 256–57
 

Workers’ Daily. See Nodong Shinmun
 

workers: and the state, 184, 194, 209–10
 

workers’ districts (nodonja-ku), 202
 

workforce, 104, 109–10, 233
 

work unit, 82–85
 

World Festival of Youth and Stud

World Food Programme, 156, 17

World Health Organization, 47
 

World War II, xxix, xxxi, 34, 63, 

237, 238
 

Yalu River. See Amnok River 

Yan (Eastern Zhou), 5
 

Yan’an faction, 42, 238
 

Yanbian Korean Autonomous 

(China), 175
 

yangban (the two orders), 13, 18

32–33
 

Yang Bin, 167
 

Yang Di, 10
 

Yanggang Province, 202
 

Yang Sung-chul, 212
 

Yanji, 175
 

Yellow Sea (West Sea), xxx, xx

62, 63, 64, 166, 231, 280
 

Yi Ha-il, 241
 

Yi Ha-ung, 25
 

Yi Ik, 23
 

Yi Kil-song, 276
 

Yi Sŏng-gye, 14, 16
 

Yi Su-kwang, 23
 

Yi Sŭngman. See Syngman Rhee 

Yi Sun-sin, 22
 

Yi T’oegye, 21
 

Yi Ŭl-sŏl, 267, 279
 

Yi Yong-ch’ŏl, 241
 

Yi Yong-mu, 191, 241
 

Yongaksan Company, 271
 

Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Scientific Re

ter, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvi–xxxv

260–61
 

Yŏsu, 39
 

Young Pioneer Corps, 85–86, 215

youthful warrior (hwarang), 11
 

Yuan Shikai, 26
 

Yugoslavia, 51, 124
 

Yu Hyŏng-wŏn, 23
 

Yu Kil-chun, 25
 

Yun Ch’i-ho, 25
 

zaibatsu (business empires), 31–3

Zhongguo (the Middle Kingdom)

Contrib

Victor D. Cha, is Associate Professor of Government 

Song–Korea Foundation Chair in the Edmund Walsh S

Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC

Bruce Cumings is the Norman and Edna Freehling Pro

History at the University of Chicago. 

Helen-Louise Hunter is a former National Intelligence Offic

Far East and the author of Kim Il-song’s North Korea. 

Balbina Y. Hwang is Visiting Assistant Professor, Depar

Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 

David C. Kang is Associate Professor of Government at D

College, Hanover, New Hampshire. 

James M. Minnich is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United Sta

and Director of Policy, Liaison, Operations, and Traini

United States Military Affairs Group—Korea, Seoul, Sout

Robert L. Worden is the former Chief of the Federal 

Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 

Published Country St

(Area Handbook S

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Albania Coast) 

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Argentina Czechoslovakia 

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and Georgia and Haiti 

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and Uzbekistan Senegal 

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Peru 

332