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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2010

111–54 

SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA: 

IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, 

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS 

A MINORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 

II. Staff Findings ..................................................................................................... 1 

A. Saudi Arabia ................................................................................................ 1 

1. Substance ............................................................................................... 2 

a. Critical Infrastructure Protection ................................................. 2 

b. Regional Stability ........................................................................... 4 

2. Process ................................................................................................... 6 

B. Syria .............................................................................................................. 7 

1. Ambassadorial Access (or Lack Thereof) . . . ..................................... 7 

2. . . . To Better Advance U.S. Interests ................................................ 8 

a. A Suitable New Embassy Compound ........................................... 8 

b. A Responsible Syrian Role in the Region ..................................... 9 

c. Halting Missile Transfers to Hizballah ........................................ 9 

3. Security and Morale .............................................................................. 10 

III. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 10 

Appendix.—Interlocutors ........................................................................................ 11 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, July 21, 2010. 

DEAR COLLEAGUE: In late May, I directed my senior professional 

staff member for the Middle East, Dorothy Shea, to visit Saudi 

Arabia and Syria to review bilateral relations as well as cooperation on regional issues. Although the circumstances facing Saudi 

Arabia and Syria differ greatly, U.S. foreign policy toward both 

countries warrant continued oversight, given the importance of 

U.S. interests at stake. 

In Saudi Arabia, staff paid particular attention to a relatively 

new bilateral cooperation program on Critical Infrastructure Protection, a partnership that is important not only for stability in the 

Kingdom, but for the protection of energy security more broadly. It 

is too early to judge the success of the relatively new partnership. 

Looking forward, staff recommended the development of rigorous 

metrics to measure progress and ensure transparency. Staff also 

reviewed U.S.-Saudi efforts to promote greater stability in the region, finding a solid basis of shared interests and constructive collaboration to advance those goals. That said, there is room for 

greater cooperation. 

Relations with Syria, meanwhile, remain quite strained. The 

Bush Administration decided to recall its Ambassador to Syria in 

the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, who was then 

Prime Minister of Lebanon. After a five-year hiatus, the Obama 

Administration has nominated a U.S. Ambassador to Syria, making 

the case that a U.S. Ambassador on the ground would not be a reward to the regime in Syria, but rather would represent a tool to 

advance U.S. interests. Against the backdrop of Congressional debate about the nomination of Robert Ford as U.S. Ambassador to 

Syria, staff reviewed Embassy operations in the absence of an Ambassador. Staff found that the lack of an Ambassador in Damascus 

has rendered the Embassy extremely limited in its ability to conduct normal business. The Embassy’s resultant lack of access has 

left it hampered in its ability to press for progress on a range of 

specific issues, some of which are of great importance to U.S. interests, such as obtaining a property for a new, more secure, Embassy 

compound. In addition, recent reports of Syrian transfers of ballistic missiles from Iran to Hizballah in Lebanon underscore the 

importance of ensuring that the U.S. message is heard and understood in Damascus. U.S. Embassy officials told staff that in the 

midst of this missile incident, they had experienced difficulties delivering an urgent demarche to the Syrian Government. 

(V) 

vi 

In the interest of contributing to Congressional deliberations on 

the prospects for advancing U.S. interests in the Middle East, I 

wanted to share with you the staff trip report, which I believe provides useful insight into key issues at play with respect to Saudi 

Arabia and Syria, as well as their respective roles in the region. I 

hope that you will find this information helpful. 

I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues 

and welcome any comments you may have on this report. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1See U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector 

General’s Report of Inspection: Embassy Riyadh and Constituent Posts, Saudi Arabia, Report 

Number ISP–I–10–19A, March 2010; and Report of Inspection: Embassy Damascus, Syria, Report Number ISP–I–10–34A, March 2010. 2See, for example, Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘‘Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ 

(Congressional Research Service RL33533, December 16, 2009); and the Department of State’s 

Background Note on Saudi Arabia (April 5, 2010); http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm. 

SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA: IMPROVING BILATERAL 

RELATIONS, ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS 

I. INTRODUCTION

As part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s oversight of 

the management of U.S. foreign policy, Senior Professional Staff 

Member for the Middle East Dorothy Shea visited Saudi Arabia 

and Syria May 28–June 2, 2010. In both countries, staff reviewed 

the state of bilateral relations as well as cooperation on regional 

issues. Despite the vastly different contexts, U.S. relations with 

both countries warrant continued oversight, albeit for different reasons. In Saudi Arabia, oversight was focused on the broader relationship; whereas in Syria, staff was particularly concerned with 

the question of the merits of having a U.S. Ambassador on the 

ground. Both the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and that 

in Damascus, Syria have recently undergone internal reviews, having been inspected by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG).1 The staff delegation followed up on several of 

the OIG’s findings and recommendations with Embassy staffs in 

the respective countries. 

II. STAFF FINDINGS

A. SAUDI ARABIA

The United States Government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

have long enjoyed strong relations. The relationship is built on mutual interests, including regional stability, energy security, and the 

fight against terrorism. Relations have not been without challenges, however, particularly in the aftermath of the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, in which 15 of the hijackers were Saudi nationals. That said, the trajectory is positive, as the relationship has 

matured and strengthened over time. The purpose of this report is 

not to review the history of those relations—many documents available to the public do an excellent job in this regard.2 Nor is the 

purpose to provide a comprehensive overview of U.S. policy vis-a`- 

vis the Kingdom. Rather, staff looked into a couple of discrete areas 

where there might be opportunities to better advance U.S. interests 

vis-a`-vis the Kingdom. Findings relate to both the substance and 

process of U.S.-Saudi relations. 

2 

3Department of State’s Background Note on Saudi Arabia (April 5, 2010). 

4 As quoted in above cited Congressional Research Service report on Saudi Arabia, RL3533. 

1. Substance 

The U.S. Embassy Country Team has laid out several core objectives with respect to Saudi Arabia. These include working cooperatively to counter the threat of terrorism; working constructively to 

promote regional stability; improving U.S.-Saudi economic ties, including through increased diversification of the Saudi economy; 

building and improving ties between the Saudi and American people; and promoting good governance. The reality is that the United 

States has many, sometimes competing, interests, and staff found 

that the U.S. Embassy was aggressively pursuing progress on these 

fronts. Of paramount concern to U.S. national security interests are 

energy security, which is being addressed in Saudi Arabia, among 

other ways, through a new program on critical infrastructure protection; and regional stability, which the Kingdom is working to 

promote both domestically and abroad, both at the operational 

level, through counter-terrorism programs, and at the societal level, 

through counter-radicalization efforts. Staff focused on U.S.-Saudi 

cooperation on critical infrastructure protection and regional security. 

a. Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Saudi oil reserves are the largest in the world, estimated at 263 

billion barrels, and over one million barrels of Saudi oil are supplied to the U.S. market on a daily basis. As the State Department 

Background Note puts it, ‘‘The continued availability of reliable 

sources of oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia, remains important 

to the prosperity of the United States.’’ 3

Following the May 2006 attempted terrorist attack on the Abqaiq 

oil processing facility, the United States and Saudi Arabia stepped 

up their cooperation on the protection of the Kingdom’s energy resources. In May 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed 

a Technical Cooperation Agreement on critical infrastructure protection. Meetings to set the agenda for the program and review 

progress will be held semi-annually and chaired on the U.S. side 

by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns, and on 

the Saudi side by Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed Bin 

Nayef. 

A key challenge to infrastructure protection is that energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia is dispersed throughout the country. The 

goal of the technical assistance program is to establish and improve 

the Saudis’ capability to protect critical infrastructure via the 

transfer of technical knowledge, advice, and resources. The new bilateral program has begun execution through project-specific agreements, which are fully funded by the Saudi government. The value 

of agreements in place for the next three years is about $800 million. In October 2008, then-U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Ford 

Fraker predicted that the value of contracts associated with the 

program could reach tens of billions of dollars.4 Key components include: 

• The Facilities Security Force. Standing up a 35,000-strong force 

to defend critical sites. The Saudis will do the recruiting; the 

3 

U.S. will help provide basic training, English-language training, and specialized training; 

• Site Assessments. Identification of priority sites, which are then 

visited for assessment of vulnerability; 

• There is agreement in principle for future cooperation on Diplomatic Security; Maritime Security; and Cyber Security. 

Staff had the opportunity to meet with members of the new team 

of U.S. experts in Riyadh, who are funded by the Saudi government. They are contractors employed under the banner of the new 

Office of Program Management—Ministry of Interior. Staff found 

the growing cooperation, of both a policy and technical nature, to 

be promising. While it is still too early to assess progress, the program is working from sound guiding principles, including: 

• The need to be anticipatory and adaptable; 

• The need for continuous planning and adaptation; 

• The need for seamless inter-agency coordination on the part of 

both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Government; and 

• The need for independent evaluation and auditing. 

Given the importance to U.S. interests of protecting critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, staff believes that this area of cooperation will merit continued oversight. Suggested areas of oversight 

include: 

• Measuring success. Ultimately, the success of this program will 

be measured by the extent to which the security of Saudi energy infrastructure sites is enhanced. It is important that precursor metrics be developed, however. One can imagine metrics 

to gauge the effectiveness of the training of the 35,000 new recruits for the new Facilities Security Force, for example. Similarly, the ability of this new force to deter attacks could be 

tested by targeted drills. The point is not for the Legislative 

Branch of the U.S. Government to develop metrics, but to be 

sure that the U.S. Administration and Saudi overseers of this 

program do, and that they are used to make improvements 

where necessary as the program matures. 

• The degree to which seamless inter-agency cooperation is 

achieved and maintained. This pertains to both the U.S. side 

(where the State Department, the Departments of Defense, Energy and Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community 

are all stakeholders), and the Saudi side, which one observer 

described as ‘‘hopelessly stove-piped,’’ particularly in the security sphere. • Transparency in awarding contracts. The prospect that the 

value of contracts that could be associated with this program 

may reach tens of billions of dollars underscores the need for 

vigilance in ensuring that contracts are awarded in a transparent, results-based manner. In addition, both sides must 

take pains to avoid potential perceptions of diplomatic payoff 

to buy American goodwill, and/or greed on the part of U.S. contractors. Under Secretary Burns and Prince Nayef can play an 

important role in this regard by setting a tone of professionalism and accountability in the bilateral oversight meetings. 

4 

b. Regional Stability 

Staff had hoped to follow up on Washington-based discussions 

about regional dynamics, including Saudi views of Iran’s role in the 

region, Saudi Arabia’s role in Yemen, in Syria and Lebanon, as 

well as in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Unfortunately, 

suitable interlocutors were not available in Riyadh to have a meaningful exchange. (See below section on Process issues.) Even so, 

based on conversations with State and Embassy officials in the 

field, staff would recommend continued oversight on the following 

areas: 

• Cooperation on Iran. Saudi Arabia can play an important role 

in bolstering and helping preserve the integrity of the sanctions regime. Saudi views about Iran’s nuclear program are 

also important and should be given serious consideration. 

• Cooperation on Yemen. Saudi Arabia exercises far more leverage in Yemen than does the United States. As the United 

States seeks to prevent state failure in Yemen and to counter 

the threat of terrorism emanating from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, there is potential for improved cooperation. Indeed, considerable international cooperation, including with 

the Kingdom, is already in evidence through the Friends of 

Yemen Group. But to achieve lasting results, a closer alignment of the U.S. and Saudi approaches would be helpful. For 

example, job creation for the 40% of the Yemeni population 

that is estimated to be unemployed—especially youth—is critical. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council member 

states could play an important role in this regard. In addition, 

the distribution of cash payments to Yemeni President Saleh 

and the tribal leaders contributes to a lack of transparency in 

governance and is thus part of the problem, not the solution. 

• Syria/Lebanon. Saudi-Syrian relations became quite strained 

after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 

Hariri in 2005, since Hariri, who had acquired Saudi citizenship, was close to the royal family. October 2009 marked a 

turning point in relations, with a visit by King Abdullah to Damascus. Among other things, his visit is believed to have 

helped break the logjam in the formation of the Lebanese government. Relations have since continued to thaw, as evidenced 

by Syrian President Assad’s reciprocal visit to Riyadh last January. Many observers perceive the King’s overture to Damascus as motivated in part by a desire to displace Iranian influence in Damascus. Although the U.S. Administration shares 

this goal, it has been sensitive to the concern expressed by 

many Lebanese observers, particularly those sympathetic to 

the pro-Western March 14th Coalition, that any Saudi-Syrian 

rapprochement should not come at the expense of Lebanon. Indeed, Syria has been reasserting its influence in Lebanon, evidenced most recently by the visits to Damascus by Prime Minister Saad Hariri both before and after his May 25th visit to 

Washington. The degree to which there is room for closer U.S.- 

Saudi cooperation in Syrian-Lebanese dynamics is unclear but 

should nonetheless be explored. 

5 

5Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2009); http:// 

www.state.gov/documents/organization/120055.pdf. 6See Christopher Boucek, ‘‘Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia’s Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme,’’ (Royal United Services Institute Journal, 

vol. 153, no. 6, pp. 60–65), December 2008. 

• Promoting Middle East Peace. In the face of hard-lined resistance in the Arab League, Saudi Arabia has helped keep alive 

the Arab Peace Initiative, first put forward by then-Crown 

Prince Abdullah and later endorsed by the Arab League at the 

2002 Beirut Summit. Similarly, the Kingdom has played a relatively positive role in the Arab League supporting Palestinian 

participation in Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks. Continued 

oversight can help underscore the importance of continued 

Saudi moderation. • Countering Terrorism. Administration officials with whom staff 

met gave the Saudi government high marks for improved cooperation in countering terrorism. That said, the latest State 

Department report on money laundering noted that Saudi 

Arabia ‘‘continues to be a significant jurisdictional source for 

terrorist financing worldwide.’’ 5 It goes on to state that the 

Kingdom ‘‘could do more to target Saudi-based support for extremism outside of Saudi’s borders’’ by, for example, holding 

terrorist financiers publicly accountable through prosecutions 

and full implementation of United Nations Security Council obligations’’ and establishing a ‘‘charities oversight mechanism.’’ 

Continued oversight in this area may help encourage more rigorous enforcement. 

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia deserves credit for the fatwa that was 

recently issued by Council of Senior Ulema denouncing terrorism, 

which it defines as ‘‘a crime aiming at destabilizing security’’ by attacking people or property, including by ‘‘blowing up dwellings, 

schools, hospitals, factories, bridges, airplanes (including hijacking), 

oil, and pipelines.’’ The fatwa also specifically disallows the financing of terrorism, which it specifies as ‘‘a form of complicity to those 

acts.’’ 

• Countering Radicalization. The Kingdom has developed an 

innovative religious-based rehabilitation program to help deradicalize terrorists by discrediting the ideological and religious underpinnings of violent Islamic extremism. The program uses a combination of religious counseling, psychological 

treatment and family interventions, which, taken together, 

provide a foundation to promote reintegration and prevent recidivism.6 The results of the program are not perfect; there has 

been some recidivism, including on the part of several who 

have then gone on to leadership and membership in al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. Even so, to the extent that the program has had some success, it is worthy of 

further study. Many observers caution, however, that lessons 

learned from the Saudi experience may not be applicable elsewhere, given that the Saudi program relies heavily on sociocultural aspects which are considered sui generis. 

The de-radicalization program has largely focused on returned 

detainees from Guantanamo Bay and convicted terrorists. In addiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:46 Jul 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\STAFF REPORTS\57612.TXT MIKEB
6 

tion, the Kingdom is seeking to do more in the area of pre-emptive 

programs to counter the appeal of extremism to at-risk populations. 

Staff had the opportunity to meet with the leadership of the King 

Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue, along with several youth 

volunteers who have participated in various national and international dialogues to promote tolerance. The Center represents a 

potentially important mechanism to foster religious and cultural 

tolerance. More could be done in this regard, however, including by 

more thoroughly vetting the curricula of Saudi-funded madrassas, 

both within and outside the Kingdom. 

2. Process 

Doing business with the Saudi government is complicated. Power 

is concentrated among a small group of individuals that includes 

the King and several key advisors. Mid-level officials, and even relatively high-level officials outside that circle, are generally not empowered to take independent action or convey official positions. As 

a result, day-to-day diplomacy is often subject to bureaucratic holdups. 

Complicating this process challenge is a long-standing tradition 

whereby the Saudi King prefers to rely on the Saudi Ambassador 

to the United States as his exclusive intermediary with the U.S. 

Government. As a result, the U.S. Ambassador and team are not 

always in a position effectively to perform their proper functions. 

This phenomenon of over reliance on the Washington channel is 

not new; many observers point out that Prince Bandar served such 

a function during his long tenure as Ambassador to the United 

States. The status quo is, nonetheless, frustrating to the U.S. Embassy and to the State Department. The United States has a capable Ambassador and Country Team in Riyadh; they should be empowered with a greater role in the division of labor between the 

Washington and Riyadh channels. 

One of the ideas for changing this dynamic includes the reinvigoration of the U.S.-Saudi strategic dialogue. This dialogue was 

established in 2005 and provided a strategic framework for discussions on issues including counterterrorism, energy, political-military issues, economic and trade issues, consular issues, and education, exchange, and human development. Asked about the merits 

of such a mechanism, some interlocutors underscored the significant potential benefits of the imposition of discipline on official 

interactions, on the one hand, and of having a formal framework 

for resolving differences, on the other. Both Saudi and U.S. diplomats cautioned, however, that an inherent drawback of such strategic dialogue exercises is that they sometimes end up being process-driven without producing sufficient results to justify the outlay 

in effort. 

7 

7See, for example, Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘‘Syria: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ (Congressional 

Research Service RL33487, April 26, 2010); and the Department of State’s Background Note on 

Syria (February 17, 2010); http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm. 

B. SYRIA

Relations with Syria have been strained for many years, reflecting U.S. rejection of Syria’s sponsorship of terrorism, not only 

through hosting and supporting Palestinian rejectionist groups, but 

also by providing materiel and financial assistance to Hizballah in 

Lebanon. Tensions culminated with the recalling of the U.S. Ambassador to Syria five years ago in the aftermath of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. This move sent a 

strong signal of condemnation of Syria’s destabilizing behavior in 

the region and served to further isolate the regime in Damascus. 

The Obama Administration has for the past year changed tack, 

pursuing an engagement track with the Assad regime, including a 

series of visits by high-level delegations to Damascus. The purpose 

of the staff trip was not to review the history of bilateral relations—many public reports provide such background.7 Instead, taking into consideration the pending nomination of Robert Ford as 

U.S. Ambassador to Syria, staff focused primarily on the extent to 

which the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is able to operate effectively 

in the absence of a U.S. Ambassador. Staff also reviewed several 

key U.S. interests that have not been advancing adequately in the 

absence of a U.S. Ambassador. 

1. Ambassadorial Access (or Lack Thereof) . . . 

Against the backdrop of Congressional debate about the nomination of Robert Ford as U.S. Ambassador to Syria, staff reviewed 

Embassy operations in the absence of an Ambassador. Staff found 

that the lack of an Ambassador in Damascus renders the Embassy 

extremely limited in its ability to conduct normal business. For protocol reasons, the Syrian Government will not receive the very capable Charge ́ d’Affaires ad interim at the Ministerial level or 

above. The only exceptions have been the Charge ́’s meeting with 

the Foreign Minister to present the U.S. request for agre ́ment for 

Robert Ford’s nomination, and when he has accompanied delegations of high-level U.S. visitors. The business the Embassy does 

manage to conduct is hardly efficient: all interactions with the Government of Syria must be handled by diplomatic note—the Embassy had logged some 400 in the first five months of 2010. Of 

course, the presence of an Ambassador would not negate the continued need to conduct much day-to-day business via diplomatic 

note, but an empowered Ambassador could be expected to break 

through logjams. 

As a result of its relative lack of access, the Embassy has been 

hampered in its ability to press for progress on a range of specific 

issues, some of which are of great importance to U.S. interests. The 

Embassy is often unable to deliver critical demarches to policy 

makers, as in the aftermath of reports of the transfer of long-range 

missiles via Syria to Hizballah. This has led to an over-reliance on 

the Washington channel. In this context, some critics have expressed doubts about whether the Syrian Ambassador to Washington is a reliable conveyor of U.S. views to his home capital. One 

8 

thing is clear: in the absence of an Ambassador, the U.S. message 

is not adequately heard. 

It should be noted, however, that even in such a non-permissive 

environment, the Embassy has done an admirable job of breaching 

obstacles to engage directly with the Syrian people. In the abovecited report, the OIG credited the Embassy’s Public Affairs Section 

with the ‘‘best practice,’’ now being replicated by other U.S. Missions, of initiating a free text messaging service to improve recipients’ English, offering a weekly example of American idiomatic 

usage. As a result, the Embassy has a growing client base of service subscribers with whom it can engage. The Public Affairs shop 

has also made excellent use of the extremely limited exchange programs available to Syrians. Although the Fulbright exchange program came under serious strain in recent years, the section was 

able to generate 10 Fulbright exchanges and 34 International Visitor Leadership Program participants. Staff had the opportunity to 

make a site visit to a Syrian non-governmental organization that 

provides services to and raises public awareness about autistic and 

hearing-impaired children. The NGO is benefiting from a series of 

U.S. experts provided under the auspices of the Fulbright program. 

This kind of collaboration represents a positive case study in how 

creatively to build bridges through partnerships in difficult environments. 

2. . . . To Better Advance U.S. Interests 

Of course, having a U.S. Ambassador on the ground is not an end 

in itself but should be a means to more effectively pursue U.S. 

goals. Staff made this point directly to Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Miqdad and asked whether it was reasonable to expect that 

with an Ambassador on the ground the United States would be 

able to make progress on issues of key concern. The Deputy Minister emphasized a willingness on the part of the Syrian leadership 

to improve relations with the United States. He said that a U.S. 

Ambassador with the full confidence of the U.S. Administration 

would find ‘‘all doors open to him.’’ He predicted that differences 

would not disappear instantaneously but undertook that such differences could be moved to the margins. He observed that much 

would depend on the instructions given to the U.S. Ambassador, 

however. 

Among the key issues on which a U.S. Ambassador should be 

able to press for progress are the following: 

a. A Suitable New Embassy Compound 

The Embassy compound does not meet U.S. State Department 

security guidelines for setback and the physical space is no longer 

sufficient. The Administration has long been seeking permission 

from the Government of Syria to relocate its Embassy away from 

the busy thoroughfare on which it is situated, to a more secure location and larger facility that can better accommodate the Embassy’s needs. Syrian foot-dragging on this issue probably reflects a 

combination of bureaucratic inertia as well as Syrian pique over 

U.S. sanctions and disengagement. 

In the above-cited report, the OIG found that the security situation faced by the Embassy had not materially changed since the 

9 

8 U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General’s Report of Inspection: Embassy Damascus, Syria, Report Number ISP–I–10–34A, March 

2010, p. 1. 

unsuccessful vehicle-borne attack on the embassy compound in 

2006, meaning that U.S. and Syrian personnel working there continue to be vulnerable. Experts believe that Hizballah and Hamas 

have residences in Damascus and that the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps has a presence as well. Based on staff interviews it 

is quite possible to imagine that these groups, other Palestinian 

rejectionist groups headquartered there, or Islamist extremists 

might wish to target Embassy staff. In light of the potential threat, 

staff shares the OIG’s assessment that, ‘‘Physical security at the 

aging, poorly situated chancery is shocking.’’ 8

During the staff visit, the Charge ́ d’Affaires was granted a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review prospective properties for a New Embassy Compound. This was a promising development, but the presence of an Ambassador on the ground would 

no doubt enhance forward movement for a new property. Staff 

pressed the Foreign Ministry for early progress on identifying suitable land for a New Embassy Compound, emphasizing that the security of U.S. Embassy staff was at stake. 

b. A Responsible Syrian Role in the Region 

There are many ways in which Syrian actions in the region are 

hostile to U.S. interests. It would be naı ̈ve to believe that the regime will alter its policies dramatically in the near term, but a U.S. 

Ambassador in place would be able to make the case that Syria’s 

own interests are not being well served, for example, by its friendly 

relations with Iran, its support for Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups, its meddling in Lebanon, its role as a ‘‘spoiler’’ in the 

Middle East peace process, or by its efforts to encourage continued 

unrest in Iraq. The fact that Syria has tightened controls on the 

Syrian-Iraqi border to stem the flow of foreign fighters is indicative 

that it can be persuaded to take some responsible actions. 

c. Halting Missile Transfers to Hizballah 

In mid-April, reports began to surface that Syria had transferred 

long-range SCUD missiles to Hizballah from Iran. Israeli Government officials reacted strongly to this potentially game-changing 

development, pointing out that missiles with longer range and 

greater accuracy could effectively put the entire State of Israel at 

risk. The Administration has since stated publically that it does 

have information confirming that Syria has transferred ballistic 

missiles to Hizballah. The Administration has demanded an immediate end to arms transfers to Hizballah, pointing out that they are 

in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Staff 

took advantage of meeting with Foreign Ministry officials to underscore strong concern about these destabilizing weapons transfers. 

Syria has denied the accusations, including in exchanges with staff. 

It is unlikely that the presence of a U.S. envoy on the ground alone 

would change the Syrian leadership’s calculus on such weapons 

transfers, but given the stakes involved, it would be irresponsible 

10 

to risk that U.S. warnings about the potential consequences of such 

activities might not be properly heard or interpreted. 

3. Security and Morale 

Given the difficult work environment in Syria, staff made a point 

of sounding out Embassy employees about morale issues. Not surprisingly, safety and security impact staff morale in a significant— 

and negative—manner. Embassy personnel expressed genuine fear 

about the Embassy compound’s lack of a setback. They also pointed 

out that the Embassy in Syria is the longest-operating Embassy located in a designated state-sponsor-of-terrorism where employees 

are not compensated with premium danger pay. The need for a new 

Embassy compound has already been addressed; staff believes the 

issue of danger pay warrants reconsideration by State Department 

authorities. 

III. CONCLUSION

The United States has critical interests at stake in Saudi Arabia 

and Syria. The U.S. Embassies in those countries should be empowered to work to maximum effect to advance those interests. In 

Saudi Arabia, that means the widening of official exchanges beyond 

the Washington channel, including the reinvigoration of the strategic dialogue. In Damascus, that means the presence of an Ambassador at the helm to make sure the U.S. message is heard. Strong 

leadership and open channels are necessary precursors to advance 

U.S. interests, but concerted U.S. diplomacy will be necessary to 

gain traction on the more difficult issues. 

11 

Appendix—Interlocutors 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 

Ambassador James Smith and the Country Team 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of Arab Affairs Department 

Representatives of the American business community 

Office of Program Management-Ministry of the Interior 

Naif Arab University for Security Studies 

Assistant Minister for Petroleum Affairs 

King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue 

Damascus, Syria: 

Charge ́ d’Affaires Charles Hunter and the Country Team 

Vice Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Syrian non-governmental organization AAMAL 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Deputy Country Representative 

Select group of Syrian youth 

Select group of Syrian business people 

UN Relief Works Agency Country Representative 

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