NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4487-12T3

JORGE CASAL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________________

Argued April 29, 2014 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner1, Alvarez and Higbee.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. L-0468-12.

Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for 

appellant (The Wolf Law Firm LLC, attorneys; 

Mr. Wolf and Aaron Mizrahi, of counsel and 

on the briefs; Andrew W. Li and Christopher 

J. McGinn, on the briefs).

Jane A. Rigby argued the cause for 

respondent (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & 

Carpenter, LLP, attorneys; Ms. Rigby and 

Stephen F. Payerle, of counsel and on the 

brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

HIGBEE, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

 

1 Judge Reisner did not participate in oral argument, but joins 

in the opinion with the consent of counsel. See R. 2:13-2(b).

July 2, 2014

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

July 2, 2014

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-4487-12T3

Plaintiff Jorge Casal (Casal) and defendant Hyundai Motor 

America (HMA) entered into a settlement agreement concerning an 

action seeking relief under N.J.S.A. 56:12-32(a)(1) (Lemon Law). 

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the issue of the 

appropriate counsel fee award under N.J.S.A. 56:12-42 was 

submitted to the court. The trial judge found that a 

substantial portion of counsel's time was expended in obtaining 

relief from the cost to Casal of optional vehicle protection 

contracts that Casal purchased through the dealer from third 

party vendors. For that reason, the court denied relief, 

concluding that the statute did not include the cost or transfer 

of these contracts. 

We find the Lemon Law does extend this protection to the 

consumer. Hence, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of 

the attorney fee award.

Casal purchased a new Hyundai Santa Fe from Sansone

Hyundai, Inc. (Sansone), a dealer for HMA. Casal financed his 

purchase, including the cost of the optional protection 

packages, through a loan arranged by Sansone with non-party 

Hyundai Capital America.

As set forth in the trial court's memorandum of decision:

At the time of purchase, Casal also 

entered into several contracts for various

"protections." One contract was with nonparty NSD, which provided benefits for three 
3 A-4487-12T3

years after the purchase against any losses 

suffered as a result of the failure of the 

Theft Detection System in the car. The 

Theft Detection System was an etching of an 

identifying mark in the car's window.

A second agreement was with non-party 

Nation Motor Club Inc., [an affiliate of 

NSD] which provided benefits for five years 

after the date of purchase for the 

replacement cost of any key or remote device 

that is lost, stolen or destroyed.

Plaintiff entered into a third 

agreement, also with non-party NSD, for its 

Titanium Protection Plan, which included 

roadside assistance, windshield repair 

protection, tire and rim protection, and 

dent and ding protection. 

Lastly, Casal entered into a contract 

through Sansone, as the dealer and 

authorized representative of the lienholder 

Hyundai Capital America, in which the 

lienholder agreed to waive any gap in the 

difference between actual cash value of the 

vehicle and the loan balance in the event of 

a total loss of the vehicle.

The parties agreed that the car met the criteria of the 

statute as a "lemon." Except for attorney fees, the only 

substantial dispute which remained was the resolution of these

optional third party contracts. The trial judge found HMA had, 

in fact, offered to settle before the complaint was filed, but 

the liability for the optional third party contracts was still

in dispute. He stated:

Thus, a threshold inquiry is whether the 

offers of settlement by HMA, either in 

providing a replacement vehicle or refund, 
4 A-4487-12T3

without including a refund for these nonparty contracts, is violative of the 

statute. If it is not consistent with the 

statute, then the plaintiff has every right 

to insist on asserting his full rights 

thereunder. If, on the other hand, the 

statute does not require such a payment, 

then it is unreasonable to initiate 

litigation solely to seek that redress.

We agree that is a threshold issue, but we find the statute 

does provide this relief to the consumer. N.J.S.A. 56:12-

32(a)(1),(3) reads as follows:

a. If, during the period specified in 

section 3 [C.56:12-31] of this act, the 

manufacturer . . . or its dealer or 

distributor, is unable to repair or 

correct the nonconformity within a 

reasonable time, the manufacturer . . .

shall accept return of the motor vehicle 

from the consumer.

(1) In the case of a motor vehicle . . . 

the manufacturer shall provide the 

consumer with a full refund of the 

purchase price of the original motor 

vehicle including any stated credit or 

allowance for the consumer's used motor 

vehicle, the cost of any options or 

other modifications arranged, installed, 

or made by the manufacturer or its 

dealer within 30 days after the date of 

original delivery, and any other charges 

or fees including, but not limited to, 

sales tax, license and registration fees, 

finance charges, reimbursement for towing 

and reimbursement for actual expenses 

incurred by the consumer for the rental 

of a motor vehicle equivalent to the 

consumer's motor vehicle and limited to 

the period during which the consumer's 

motor vehicle was out of service due to 
5 A-4487-12T3

the nonconformity, less a reasonable 

allowance for vehicle use.

. . . .

(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be 

construed to preclude a manufacturer . 

. . from making an offer to replace the 

vehicle in lieu of a refund; except 

that the consumer may, in any case, 

reject an offer of replacement and 

demand a refund . . . . In the event 

that the consumer accepts an offer to 

replace the motor vehicle in lieu of a 

refund, it shall be the manufacturer's 

. . . responsibility to insure that any 

lien on the returned motor vehicle is 

transferred to the replacement vehicle.

Casal purchased his vehicle on June 10, 2011. The problem 

with the car started two days later. By mid-July the car met 

the criteria for a refund or exchange under the Lemon Law. 

Casal sent three letters to HMA explaining he believed his car 

was a lemon; HMA did not respond until Casal obtained an 

attorney, thus precipitating the need for counsel fees. 

HMA first offered Casal $3,000.00 plus car rental expenses 

after he hired counsel. The offer was declined and immediately 

thereafter, on September 16, 2011, HMA offered to replace the 

vehicle. The dispute over the scope of the statutory language 

became the focus of the parties. 

Casal wanted the dealer to transfer his protection plan 

agreements to the new vehicle at no additional cost to him. 

HMA's response was "HMA cannot make any guarantees as to the 
6 A-4487-12T3

cost of the transfers of these plans as this is a matter between 

Mr. Casal and the dealership." 

Although the manufacturer is the entity responsible to the 

consumer under the Lemon Law, the first release sent to Casal 

with the HMA settlement offer included language releasing HMA 

and the Hyundai dealer Sansone. Casal had paid approximately

$3,000.00 for the protection plans purchased through Sansone and 

added into the finance agreement with Hyundai Capital Inc., the 

lienholder, even though they were with the third party vendor. 

HMA later offered Casal a refund instead of a replacement 

vehicle, but still denied any responsibility for the 

cancellation of the optional contracts. Since the trial judge

found that legal work performed after this offer by Casal's 

counsel was for relief not included in the Lemon Law, he decided

counsel fees were not allowable for work performed after this 

offer to settle.

HMA argues that all Casal had to do was cancel the 

protection plans and he would receive reimbursement from the 

third party vendors. However, it was not as easy as HMA

suggested. The actual process and difficulty in getting these 

protection plans cancelled and transferred from the old car to 

the new car is reflected in counsel's certification and attached 

billing records submitted in support of the application for fees. 
7 A-4487-12T3

At first Casal agreed to handle the transfers himself. His 

attorney's billing record dated December 12, 2011 states that 

when he "[s]poke to client [he] explained the replacement offer 

and his obligation to work with the dealership and loan company 

to initiate the transfers. Also mentioned the process should be 

simple, no cost and without hassle."

Three months later Casal's attorney noted in his billing 

record that "[Casal] told [him] that he is getting the 

runaround; transferred to multiple extensions, no responding to 

e-mails he left; being told certain plans not cancellable." At 

that point, counsel believed his client could not accomplish the 

transfers himself and counsel proceeded to handle the problem. 

Shortly thereafter, the complaint under the Lemon Law was filed 

against HMA.

According to counsel's certification in support of his fee 

application, he received little assistance, in fact, some 

resistance, from the dealer. He directly contacted the thirdparty vendors about the policies and was told the cancellations

had to come from the dealer. In May, plaintiff's counsel was 

still working on assuring the refunds were paid to the 

lienholder on these contracts.

HMA's position is that it is not a party to these contracts 

between vendors and Casal and, therefore, cannot cancel them or 
8 A-4487-12T3

be held responsible under the statute. However, HMA 

acknowledges that reimbursement for the contracts occurred after 

they put pressure on their dealer.

The trial judge agreed with HMA that they had no 

responsibility for these contracts, and interpreted the 

statutory language to refer only to physical alterations or 

additions made to the vehicle. 2 He further found that the 

statutory language requiring reimbursement for "any other 

charges or fees including, but not limited to, sales tax, 

license and registration fees, finance charges" did not include 

the third-party contracts because they were not "direct costs 

imposed on the transaction."

The expressed intent of the Lemon Law is to protect the new 

car consumer. See DiVigenze v. Chrysler Corp., 345 N.J. Super.

314, 322-23 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 442 

(2002); Berrie v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 267 N.J. Super.

152, 155-56 (App. Div. 1993). 

N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 states:

The Legislature finds that the purchase of a 

new motor vehicle is a major high cost 

consumer transaction and the inability to 

correct defects in these vehicles creates a 

major hardship and an unacceptable economic 

 

2 N.J.S.A. 56:12-32(a)(1) states that "the cost of any options or 

other modifications arranged, installed, or made by the 

manufacturer or its dealer . . . ."
9 A-4487-12T3

burden on the consumer . . . . It is the 

further intent of this act to provide 

procedures to expeditiously resolve disputes 

between a consumer and a manufacturer.

It is clear that the Act should be interpreted liberally 

since the expressed general intent of the Lemon Law is to 

protect the new car consumer. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-29; see also

Berrie, supra, 267 N.J. Super. at 155-56. The language of the 

statute in no way excludes optional contracts arranged by the 

dealer. There are no words in the statute that suggest that 

"options or other modifications arranged" by the dealer are 

limited to physical changes to the vehicle. 

The statute lists additional charges such as fees for state 

taxes, registration costs or finance charges. These are all 

costs from third parties, not a party to the contract, but the 

Lemon Law requires reimbursement for them by the manufacturer. 

Although these items are listed in the statute, it also says 

that reimbursement is not limited to these items. It is clear 

from the statute that the consumer is to be made whole for all 

costs associated with the purchase as long as they are arranged 

by the dealer.

HMA has argued that there really is no cost at all from 

these third party contracts since they can be cancelled and 

reimbursements can be obtained. We disagree.
10 A-4487-12T3

HMA imposed the duty of negotiating with these third 

parties, the dealer, and the finance company on Casal, and as a 

result he had to incur counsel fees. The dealer has an ongoing 

business relationship with the manufacturer. The third parties 

involved have ongoing business relationships with the dealer,

and all of these contracts were offered as part of the sale of 

the vehicle. All were negotiated by the manufacturer's dealer 

with the consumer, albeit on behalf of a third party.

HMA may have needed Casal to sign requests for cancellations 

of the contracts, just as they needed him to sign registration 

forms and transfers of title, but there is no question that HMA 

could have handled these transactions in a shorter time than the 

consumer and his attorney were required to expend.

We hold the Lemon Law requires the consumer to be made 

whole and authorizes a counsel fee award, if counsel is needed 

to obtain relief from any options sold through the dealer, as 

part of the purchase transaction. The Legislature specifically 

stated the purpose of the statute is to resolve these disputes 

expeditiously. N.J.S.A. 56:12-29. A consumer should be able to 

resolve his claim with the manufacturer without counsel fees, 

but where counsel is needed, the consumer is entitled to an 

award of reasonable counsel fees to obtain full relief under the 
11 A-4487-12T3

statute. We, therefore, reverse and remand the matter to the 

court for reconsideration of the appropriate counsel fees.

[At the direction of the court, per R. 1:36-

2(a), the discussion of the other issues in 

the appeal has been omitted from the 

published opinion.]

Reversed and remanded.