Filed 8/13/14 In re D.J. CA2/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

In re D.J., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B251615 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK96620) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

BRITTANY K. et al., 

 Respondents. 

 APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert 

Draper, Judge. Reversed. 

 Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent 

Brittany K. 

 Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent 

Derick J. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and 

Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel for Respondent. 
2 

INTRODUCTION 

Brittany K. (“mother”) is the mother of D.J., born in July of 2012. Derick J. 

(“father”) is the minor’s father. D.J. came to the attention of the juvenile court after he 

was hospitalized with severe injuries in various stages of healing. The injuries included 

traumatic brain injuries, several fractured ribs, detached retinas on both eyes, and a 

bruised liver and pancreas. When D.J. was admitted into the hospital on November 12, 

2012, it was not known whether he would survive. He did survive, but he is severely 

disabled, with a very short projected life span, and never will ever be able to live an 

independent life. 

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare & Institutions1

 Code section 300 petition 

pursuant to subdivisions (a), (b) and (e), alleging injuries consistent with inflicted trauma 

that would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of deliberate, unreasonable, 

neglectful acts of the minor’s parents, and further alleging that the parents knew or 

reasonably should have known that the minor was being physically abused and failed to 

take action to protect him. The parents have not appealed from these findings. The court 

also dismissed a count pled pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300, alleging that the 

parents failed to obtain timely medical treatment for the child’s injuries. At the 

disposition hearing, the court, over the objections of the Department of Children and 

Family Services (“DCFS”) ordered the DCFS to provide the parents with reunification 

services. 

The DCFS appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding dismissing 

Count b-2, and the court’s order granting the parents reunification services. We reverse 

the orders of the trial court (a) dismissing the allegations against parents brought under 

subdivision (b) of section 300; and (b) ordering reunification services for the parents. 

 

1

 All code references in this opinion are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated. 
3 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY 

This family first came to the attention of the DCFS after the minor, then almost 

four months old, was admitted to the emergency room (“ER”) of a hospital, where he was 

found to be suffering from severe injuries, including extensive hemorrhage of the 

subarachnoid and subdural part of his brain and multiple rib fractures in different stages 

of healing. Upon admission, the child was placed in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit 

and placed on a ventilator. Because the infant had severe swelling of the brain, a rightside ventriculostomy was performed to drain fluids. The treating physician suspected 

non-accidental trauma. The parents denied any past or present trauma to the minor. 

On November 14, 2012, the DCFS received a referral alleging that the minor was 

the victim of child abuse by an unknown perpetrator. A Children’s Social Worker 

(“CSW”) responded to the hospital. The attending doctor informed the CSW that it 

would be a few days before they would know if the minor would survive. Medical 

records documented that the minor was initially brought to the ER for shortness of breath. 

An examination then determined that the minor had several healing rib fractures that 

were suspicious for non-accidental trauma. The minor also presented with an altered 

level of consciousness, traumatic brain injury, acute respiratory failure, traumatic cerebral 

edema, and subdural hematoma. An opthalmology consult was ordered and it was 

determined that the minor also had multiple acute hermorrhages in both eyes consistent 

with non-accidental trauma. 

The CSW spoke with mother on November 14, 2012. Mother reported that the 

minor had symptoms of a cold for a week. Mother said that father had been sick so she 

thought minor had caught his cold. Mother told the CSW she worked and went to school 

on November 13, 2012, and that at about 9:15 a.m. she received a call from the office at 

her school informing her that minor was sick. Father said the minor was not feeling well 

and that he wanted her to meet him so they could take the minor to the doctor. Mother 

said then when she saw minor he did not seem like himself. He would at times slump 

over while in his stroller. Mother said that when she would push the stroller over cracks 

in the sidewalk, the infant cried. While they were on the way to the doctor, mother told 
4 

father that she thought they should take the minor to the ER because it was closer, 

however, father wanted to take him to Dr. Haman, his pediatrician, because she was 

familiar with the minor. When they arrived at the doctor’s office the minor still seemed 

lethargic, but when Dr. Haman moved the minor’s legs around, he opened his eyes and 

began to appear normal. She examined the minor and diagnosed him with an ear 

infection and the flu, and prescribed amoxicillin, a cough medication and pedialyte. 

Mother watched the minor all night and noticed that he was not breathing right. Mother 

told father at approximately 1:00 a.m. that she believed they should take the minor to the 

ER; however, she could not find anyone to drive them to the hospital. Father told mother 

she was panicking, that everything would be fine, and that they would take the baby to 

the ER later if his condition did not improve. At approximately 4:00 a.m. the infant was 

still having difficulty breathing so the parents took the infant on the train to the ER. 

After medical staff informed mother of the infant’s injuries, she said she did not 

do anything to him and denied knowing that he was hurt. Mother also denied that father 

harmed the infant, stating they loved him too much. Mother said that she and father 

sometimes permitted people they stayed with to watch the infant and that they suspected 

these people harmed him. 

The CSW also interviewed father. He said he watched the infant while mother 

attended school. However, he stated that he started school the prior week and so they had 

been permitting other people to watch the infant. Father said a maternal uncle watched 

the infant for approximately 10 minutes while he went to a store around the corner from 

their residence. He also said that Brittany M. and W.J., both of whom lived at the house 

at which the parents were staying, sometimes watched the infant. Father confirmed 

mother’s statement about their taking the infant to the doctor and later to the ER. 

The CSW spoke with Detectives Sundquist, Gaepa and Tanaka of the Los Angeles 

Police Department Juvenile Division. The detectives reported that there were some 

discrepancies in the parents’ statements. Mother stated that when she first saw the infant 

on November 11, 2012, he appeared lethargic, stiff, and with his eyes rolling back, which 
5 

was consistent with his condition when he was examined by the ER doctor. However, 

father said the infant was fine and only had cold symptoms. 

Belinda R., a “paternal extended non-relative,” informed the CSW that both 

mother and father had tempers and that father once fell on the infant while he and mother 

were fighting. On another occasion, she heard that the infant had been dropped. On 

another occasion, mother and father were fighting while she was in her room, and she sat 

and talked with them about their conduct for approximately two hours. 

On November 15, 2012, the CSW spoke with the hospital social worker, who 

stated that in addition to other injuries the infant had a bruised liver and pancreas. 

Though the infant’s assessment had not yet been completed, the preliminary assessment 

was Shaken Baby Syndrome. The next day a CT scan was performed on the infant and it 

revealed that the child’s lungs were bruised and he was bleeding from the spine. The 

bleeding of the spine was acute. Some of the fractures were as old as four weeks. It was 

reported by the attending physician, Dr. Murray, that the infant would never be able to do 

anything on his own, including eating, and would be blind. 

On November 18, 2012, it was reported to the parents that the infant had serious 

brain damage. 

Father blamed Brittany M. and W.J. for the child abuse. He said that it must have 

occurred on November 9, 2012, when he went to the market and they agreed to watch the 

infant until he returned. He was gone for 20 minutes. He said he suspected they abused 

the child because they had a strained relationship with mother. He denied physically 

abusing the infant or witnessing mother doing so. 

The Department notes in its assessment of the case that although the parents 

strongly believed that the infant was abused by Brittany M. and W.J., the infant was 

found to have several injuries in separate stages of healing, which indicated that the 

infant’s injuries pre-dated November 9, 2012, and occurred before they moved into the 

house with Belinda R. and her family. 

Based on the severity of the infant’s multiple injuries and the parent’s failure to 

provide the DCFS with a reasonable explanation as to how they occurred and the 
6 

conclusion by the medical staff that the infant’s injuries were the result of deliberate/nonaccidental trauma, the DCFS recommended that the court sustain a section 300 petition, 

declare the child a dependent of the court and deny the parents reunification services. 

The recommendation that the juvenile court not offer the parents reunification 

services was based on mother’s admission, during the course of the Los Angeles Police 

Department’s investigation, that she (a) previously witnessed father move the infant back 

and forth and side to side when he was two weeks old, that she heard a popping sound 

and asked father if he was hitting or shaking the infant; (b) previously witnessed the child 

become stiff with his eyes rolled back but she did not disclose these symptoms to the 

pediatrician during her examination of the infant; and (c) reported to the detectives that 

the infant did not cry, while others said the infant “cried more than he slept.” Additional 

evidence supported the recommendation, including (d) reports by non-related “family” 

members that the parents fought, that the infant was primarily in father’s care, and that 

father became easily frustrated with the child and would forcefully bounce him up and 

down stomping and pacing with the infant; (e) a treating doctor at the hospital reported 

that the infant suffered from a bleed to the brain, left frontal lobe subdural hematoma, 

from front to back, which injury would require force and, combined with the rib 

fractures, was consistent with Shaken Baby Syndrome; (f) Dr. Murray, a child abuse 

expert, reviewed the findings and found the case to be suspicious for non-accidental 

trauma; (g) Dr. Rosales, the hospital ophthalmologist, stated that the infant had bilateral 

hemorrhages all the way to the “equator,” the worst she had seen in her 30 years as a 

doctor, which she concluded were the result of the infant being shaken. 

Dr. Murray reported on November 16, 2012 that if the infant survived, he would 

likely be totally dependent on others, unable to see, talk, walk, or eat on his own. She 

stated that the infant could live into his teens or early twenties, but he would have to be 

fed via a feeding tube. Even as a teenager he would have to have his diapers changed, 

and his tracheal tube cleaned. 

Both parents denied during their interviews with the police that there were any 

incidents in which the infant could have been accidentally injured. 
7 

At the conclusion of the interview, the parents were informed that the infant would 

be taken into protective custody. Mother cried and father became visibly upset. The 

detectives subsequently heard loud noises as if someone was banging against a wall. A 

detective went to investigate and observed father punching walls and yelling. The 

detective advised father that if he did not calm down he would be escorted out of the 

hospital. Father responded, “Fuck this! I’m leaving anyway!” The police noted mother’s 

earlier report of father’s demeanor, which stated father “was clearly out of control and 

angry. [Mother] stated to us earlier that she had never seen him los[]e hi[s] temper.” 

M.W. said mother was very protective of the infant and she did not believe she 

would hurt the baby. However, she said that father would become frustrated with the 

infant, and demonstrated that father would hold the infant while he was crying and 

bounce the infant up and down forcefully in his arms while pacing rapidly through the 

house stating, “Come on D[.] J[.]! Come on!” She also said that mother was afraid of 

father and she had witnessed them fighting. She also could hear them fighting and heard 

banging noises from their room, and on one occasion she saw him trying to snatch the 

baby from mother’s arms. 

Belinda R. also stated that father lost his temper all the time. She knew that 

something was wrong with the baby because he cried all the time, sometimes all night 

long. 

Belinda R. said she went to the hospital when she learned the infant was there. 

She talked to father, who accused M.W. and W.J. of harming the infant and then stated: 

“If I get arrest[ed] for this. If the guys in jail think I did this. You know what they will 

do to me in jail.” 

Mother said she suspected W.J., Brittany M., and father of hurting the infant. 

Mother said to the detectives that approximately two weeks after the infant’s birth, she 

woke up and saw father shaking the baby. Mother described the force of the shaking as a 

four to five on a scale of ten. Mother observed the baby’s head move back and forth 

approximately three times and also heard a “popping sound.” Mother said she said to 

father, “Are you shaking my baby?” and “Did you hit my baby?” Mother said father 
8 

responded no, and said he was only bouncing him up and down and trying to get him to 

fall back asleep. 

Mother said that D.J. did not look good when she left for school on November 12, 

2012. When she met father to take the baby to the doctor, she knew something was 

wrong because he was stiff and at one point his eyes rolled back. Mother said that on 

approximately three occasions that night, the infant’s arms and legs would become stiff. 

When a detective told mother that he felt she was minimizing the father’s shaking of the 

infant, mother admitted that in her sleep she kept hearing “popping” sounds, which 

eventually wakened her. 

Dr. Haman, the pediatrician, stated that prior to her examination of the infant on 

November 13, 2012, the parents had informed her that they had brought the infant in to 

see the doctor because he was congested, was scratching his right ear, and was coughing. 

They did not inform her that the child had experienced stiffness, a blank stare, eyes 

rolling back and had been nonresponsive. If they had, she would have immediately 

called 911. 

On May 2, 2013, a supplemental report was filed with the juvenile court which 

indicated that D.J. was residing with Tanya G, who was meeting his needs. The report 

indicated that the infant had “[one-]sided vision loss.” [Tanya G.] thought the infant 

might be able to track shadows, bright lights and colors. The infant was receiving all his 

feedings through a G-tube. 

Tanya G. was closely monitoring the parents’ visits, which were scheduled for 

three times a week for three hours in duration. No problems were reported, though the 

parents were visiting less frequently than they had been. The CSW witnessed the infant 

stop crying on one occasion after mother picked him up, rocked him, and kissed him. 

The infant would cry when the parents left. The parents visits with the infant decreased 

to the point that Tanya G. informed mother that the infant needed longer visits, and that 

he benefited from physical and emotional contact with her. 

The parents indicated they had completed a 10-week parenting program, but they 

had not forwarded their Certificates of Completion to the Department. They also said 
9 

they had enrolled in another parenting class. Mother was attending a program presented 

by COACH for Kids and Cedar Sinai Medical Center addressing child management. On 

March 11, 2013, the court ordered the Department to ensure that the parents received 

proper medical training with respect to the infant’s needs. The record does not reflect 

whether they received that training. It does indicate that father reported that he and 

mother had identified a medical training course, and they would enroll in it when they 

were ready. 

The jurisdictional hearing took place on May 8, 2013. Except for one sentence 

contained in the police report, and no other objections being raised, the court admitted 

into evidence all of the reports and other documentary evidence offered by the 

Department. The court also admitted into evidence mother’s certificate from a therapy 

clinic, and parents’ certificates for attending a parenting class. No witnesses were called, 

and the court immediately proceeded to closing arguments. 

After argument was concluded, the juvenile court made its jurisdictional findings. 

The court struck Count b-2, the count alleging that the parents failed to obtain timely 

medical care for the child, and sustained the remainder of the petition as pled. 

The allegation sustained by the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (a) 

was as follows: “On 11/14/12, 3 month old D[.]J[.] was hospitalized as a result of a 

detrimental and endangering condition and diagnosed with acute and chronic subdural 

hemorrhages with extra-axial hemorrhages over the cerebral hemispheres, and extensive 

bilateral retinal hemorrhages resulting in altered level of consciousness, traumatic brain 

injury, acute respiratory failure, traumatic cerebral edema and subdural hematoma. The 

child was also found to have fractures to the child’s left posterior seventh and eighth ribs 

and fractures of the lateral fourth, fifth and sixth ribs with adjacent pleural thickening. 

The child was found to have bruising to the child’s lungs, and bleeding to the child’s 

spine. The child’s injuries are in different stages of healing. The child also suffered 

seizures. [DJ’s] mother, Brittany R. K[.] and father, Derick [J.], gave no explanation of 

the manner in which their child sustained his injuries. The child’s injuries are consistent 

with inflicted trauma. The child’s injuries are of such a nature that would ordinarily not 
10 

be sustained except as the result of deliberate unreasonable neglectful acts of the mother 

and father who had care, custody and control of the child. The deliberate unreasonable 

neglectful acts of the parents endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places 

the child at risk of physical harm, damage, danger, and death.” Substantially identical 

allegations were sustained under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (e), the latter with the 

additional allegation that the parents knew or reasonably should have known that the 

child was being physically abused and failed to take action to protect the child. 

While it was making the jurisdictional findings, the court indicated that it intended 

to provide both parents with reunification services. The court stated that it believed that 

it was in the infant’s best interests for the parents to receive reunification services. It said 

that the parents had “reacted heroically in visiting the child.” After minor’s counsel 

requested to be heard, the court stated it would deal with this issue during the disposition 

phase of the hearing. 

At the disposition hearing, the DCFS recommended that the court deny both 

parents reunification services, but also stated that if the court had another view, it could 

accept that there might be a reason to treat mother differently than father because there 

were statements in the report to suggest that she was a good mother. Minor’s counsel 

asked the court to deny father reunification services, but to offer them to mother. The 

parents’ counsel submitted on the court’s tentative to offer services. 

Over the DCFS’s objection, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that 

offering both parents reunification services was in the child’s best interests and would 

likely prevent re-abuse or neglect of the child “in part because parents both are visiting 

the child on a daily basis and showing th[at] kind of dedication and commitment.” The 

court further stated that it did not think it was a logical argument “to say that because 

something bad has happened and we have a sustained petition, we shouldn’t provide them 

services to help them along their way.” 

The DCFS then requested a continuance of the disposition hearing so that it could 

make recommendations as to what the case plan should include. The court agreed and 
11 

continued the disposition hearing for the DCFS to meet with the parents to address a case 

plan. 

The case was calendared for a further disposition hearing on July 25, 2013 to 

address the proposed case plan. When the case was called the DCFS was represented by 

a different Deputy County Counsel, its prior attorney being out on medical leave. The 

DCFS asked that the matter be continued for a contested hearing. Mother’s counsel 

objected and stated that the issue of reunification services had already been heard by the 

court, and that the present hearing was solely to address a proposed case plan to be filed 

by the DCFS. Father’s counsel joined. 

After hearing further argument, the court stated, “I am finding best interest of the 

child and finding there are services available to prevent reoccurrence of the event.” The 

court also found that there was bonding between the child and the parents. 

The juvenile court ordered the DCFS to provide the parents with reunification 

services, to include (a) dyadic parenting for a special needs child; (b) individual 

counseling to address case issues, including domestic violence and anger management; 

(c) conjoint counseling; (d) participation in the child’s medical appointments; and (e) 

medical training to meet the child’s needs. 

DISCUSSION 

1. Mother’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 

 Mother asserts that the DCFS’s challenge to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings and dispositional orders was untimely, and consequently maintains that the 

appeal should be dismissed. Specifically, she contends that the court made the findings 

and orders at issue in this appeal on May 8, 2013, but that the DCFS did not file its notice 

of appeal until September 4, 2013, after a subsequent hearing was held to permit the 

DCFS to file a case plan outlining the family reunification services to be provided by the 

DCFS pursuant to the court’s earlier disposition order. The question is thus, did the 

juvenile court order reunification services on May 8, 2013, or rather, did it simply make a 

finding that this was an appropriate case in which to do so and put the matter over for 
12 

further hearing? We turn to the transcript of the May 8, 2013 hearing to answer this 

question. 

 At that hearing, the juvenile court made its intent to order reunification services 

known, and after argument, found this was “an appropriate case to order [DCFS] to 

provide family reunification services to both mother and father.” However, the DCFS 

had failed to file its case plan with the court. Consequently, the court continued the 

hearing in order to permit the DCFS to prepare a case plan, including reunification 

services for the parents. The court did not order services and complete the disposition 

hearing until July 29, 2013. Therefore, because the juvenile court did not order DCFS to 

provide the parents with reunification services or complete the disposition hearing until 

July 29, 2013, DCFS’s notice of appeal was timely filed on September 4, 2013. 

Respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal is therefore denied. 

2. Was there Substantial Evidence to Support the Juvenile Court’s Dismissal of 

Count b-2 of the section 300, subdivision (b) Petition? 

 The DCFS contends the juvenile court erred in dismissing Count b-2 of the 

petition alleging the parents’ failure to provide medical treatment. Section 300, 

subdivision (b), provides in part: “Any child who comes within any of the following 

descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person 

to be a dependent child of the court: . . . (b)(1). The child has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, . . . as a result 

of the negligent failure of the parent, to provide medical treatment.” 

In the present case, in Count b-2 of the section 300 petition, the DCFS alleged that 

the infant suffered various serious physical injuries and that “[t]he child’s mother, 

Brittany R. K[.] and father, Derick J[.], failed to obtain timely necessary medical 

treatment for the child’s injuries. The parents’ severe medical neglect of the child 

endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk of physical 

harm, damage, danger and death.” 
13 

In determining the operative facts, the record on appeal is reviewed in the light 

most favorable to the decision of the trial court. All reasonable inferences to support the 

findings of the juvenile court must be made and the record reviewed in the light most 

favorable to the order of the juvenile court. (In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 

618, 624.) The appellate court is to review the entire record to determine if there is 

substantial evidence to support the findings of the lower court. As long as there is 

substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 

Cal.App.3d 870, 872-873; Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429-430.) With the 

aforesaid guidance in mind, we summarize the evidence presented supporting the trial 

court’s decision to dismiss Count b-2 of the petition, the alleged violation of section 300, 

subdivision (b), based on the parents’ medical neglect. 

The parents clearly failed to obtain timely and necessary medical attention for the 

infant’s very serious and disabling injuries. Although the parents took the infant to the 

pediatrician the day before he was hospitalized with life threatening injuries which have 

left him severely disabled, they failed to disclose key information and symptoms to the 

pediatrician, only reporting that the baby was suffering from an upper respiratory 

infection, thus, rendering her unable to effectively diagnose and treat the child. 

Mother and father reported to the doctor when they brought the baby in for 

diagnosis and treatment that the baby was sneezing and was congested. They failed to 

disclose, however, that (a) the baby cried inconsolably when touched; (b) when the 

parents met to take the baby to the doctor, he did not “look right,” was completely limp, 

was not moving, and looked “blank;” (c) was stiff; (d) his eyes rolled back; and (e) he 

was unresponsive. They did not inform the physician that (a) father had accidentally 

fallen with the baby; (b) father sometimes burped the baby too hard; (c) the baby suffered 

a bloody nose after he was slammed against father’s knee; and (d) on one occasion 

mother awoke to find father shaking the then two-week old baby, that she observed the 

baby’s head moving back and forth and she had heard “popping” sounds while she was 

“asleep.” They also chose to take the baby to the doctor’s office rather than to an 
14 

emergency room despite the fact that his eyes were open, he was not blinking, and his 

legs became stiff. 

The doctor confirmed that the parents failed to inform her of the child’s most 

significant and alarming symptoms, and that had they done so, she would have 

immediately called 911 and ensured that the child was taken to the ER. The failure of the 

parents to provide this information constituted, at a minimum, extreme neglect, and 

delayed his receipt of medical attention he desperately needed. Though the parents 

finally brought the child to the hospital the following morning, this does not excuse their 

prior conduct. 

Based on the evidence summarized above, we hold that the trial court’s decision to 

dismiss Count b-2 of the section 300 petition was not supported by substantial evidence. 

3. Did the Juvenile Court Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Reunification Services 

for Both Parents?

 The DCFS contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering 

reunification services for the parents. It maintains there was no competent testimony that 

services were likely to prevent reabuse; no clear and convincing evidence that 

reunification services were in D.J.’s best interests; and insufficient evidence that failure 

to reunify would be detrimental the child. 

 While offering reunification services is the norm, “[s]ection 361.5, subdivision (b) 

symbolizes the Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification 

services under certain circumstances.” (Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 

Cal.App.4th 741, 750, citing In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 837.) Once 

the court determines that one of the situations set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b) is 

applicable, “the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption 

that offering reunification services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” 

(In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.) Although these circumstances are 

narrow in scope and subject to an enhanced burden of proof, “they demonstrate a 
15 

legislative determination that in certain situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do 

not serve and protect the child’s interest.” (Id. at p. 474.) 

Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c),2

 provide that reunification services 

should not be provided when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 

child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of section 300 

because of the conduct of that parent or guardian. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(5), (c).) Indeed, 

when section 361.5, subdivision (b) applies, a juvenile court is prohibited from providing 

family reunification services “unless it finds, based on competent testimony, that those 

services are likely to prevent reabuse . . . or that failure to try reunification would be 

detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that 

parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c); In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1074-1075, 1077-

1078.) 

Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (c) provide, in pertinent part, that 

reunification services shall not be provided when the child has been adjudicated a 

dependent pursuant to any subdivision of section 300 as a result of severe physical harm 

to the child, unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is 

in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(6), (c), emphasis added.) “Severe 

physical harm” includes, but is not limited to, “deliberate and serious injury inflicted to 

or on a child’s body by an act or omission of the parent or of another individual with the 

consent of the parent. . . .” (§361.5, subd. (b)(6).) 

A finding under section 361.5, subdivision (c), that reunification would be in the 

child’s best interest is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re William B. (2008) 163 

 

2

 Section 361.5, subd. (c) states: “. . . The court shall not order reunification for a 

parent or guardian described in paragraph (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), 

(14), (15), or (16) of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that reunification is in the best interests of the child. [¶] In addition, the court 

shall not order reunification in any situation described in paragraph (5) of subdivision (b) 

unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be 

detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that 

parent.” (Emphasis added.)
16 

Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229.) The Court of Appeal in In re William B., supra, also noted that 

“[a] juvenile court has broad discretion when determining whether further reunification 

services would be in the best interests of the child under section 361.5, subdivision (c). 

[Citation.] An appellate court will only reverse that determination if the juvenile court 

abuses its discretion. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

The reviewing court should interfere only “‘if [it] find[s] that under all of the 

evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could 

reasonably have made the order that [he or she] did.’ [Citations.]” (In re Jasmine D. 

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is 

whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can 

reasonably be deducted from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute 

its decision for that of the trial court.’” [Citation.] (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

295, 318-319.) 

In the present case, it is undisputed that the physical injuries suffered by the child 

were substantial and severe. We will discuss the reunification issue as to mother and 

father separately. 

a. Reunification Services for Mother. 

Based on the legal standard set forth above, the evidence presented to the trial 

court upon which it apparently relied in making its decision to offer mother reunification 

services was as follows: Mother and child appeared to have bonded to some extent. D.J. 

apparently recognizes mother and cries when she leaves him in the care of another 

person. Mother has visited the minor (both in and out of the hospital) on a regular basis. 

It was the opinion among those who knew mother that she would never do anything to 

harm the child. She was very protective of the child and was determined that he not end 

up being institutionalized. She had taken steps to become a better mother including 

completing a parenting class, and during her monitored visits performed tasks associated 

with the child’s ongoing medical care. At the time of the abuse, the minor was herself a 

non-emancipated minor. 
17 

However, we hold none of this evidence, individually or collectively, was 

sufficient to support a finding that (a) reunification services were likely to prevent reabuse; (b) the failure to try reunification would be detrimental to the child due to his close 

and positive attachment to mother; or (c) reunification was in the best interests of the 

child. (§ 361.5. subd. (c).) Furthermore, none of the aforesaid evidence introduced by 

mother was in the form of testimony, let alone competent testimony, as is required by 

section 361.5, subd. (c).) 

b. Reunification Services for Father. 

Unlike mother, in the case of father, there was no evidence that D.J. was bonded 

with father, or that he was a supportive parent to the child. Rather, the evidence 

suggested that father had a low threshold for frustration, was intolerant of the child’s 

crying and responded inappropriately to it by vigorously bouncing the baby up and down, 

and had significant difficulties controlling his anger. Father presented no evidence that 

the failure to provide him with reunification services would in any way be detrimental to 

the child. Because no competent evidence (let alone competent testimony) was presented 

to support a finding by the juvenile court that providing father with reunification services 

would be likely to prevent re-abuse, or that the failure to attempt reunification with father 

would be detrimental to the child, the juvenile court erred in ordering reunification 

services for father. (See In re A.M. supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp.1077-1078.) 
18 

DISPOSITION 

The dismissal of the b-2 count of the petition is reversed. The juvenile court’s 

orders of reunification services for mother and father are also reversed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 MINK, J.

We concur: 

MOSK, ACTING P.J. 

KRIEGLER, J. 

 



 Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.