1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

IN RE RICHARD J. DOUD 

 Case No. 15-mc-50494 

and 

 Hon. Mark A. Goldsmith 

ANDREW M. FERGUSON Hon. Laurie J. Michelson 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

_______________________________/ 

OPINION & ORDER 

Respondents Richard J. Doud and Andrew M. Ferguson, both principals at pertinent times 

with Davidson, Breen, Doud, Steele & Ferguson, P.C. (the “Firm”), were referred to the 

undersigned three-judge panel for disciplinary proceedings pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 83.22. The 

referral resulted from the filing in this Court of numerous social security appeals under Doud’s 

name, from 2012 to 2015, which were woefully deficient both as to the quality of the briefs and 

the management and monitoring of the appeal process on behalf of clients. The “one-size-fits-all” 

briefs often had very little to do with the facts of the particular case in which they were filed; and, 

except in one case, there was no lawyer review of opposing briefs and magistrate judge rulings in 

the cases. This repeated pattern of derelict performance led several magistrate judges and district 

judges to impose sanctions on Doud. In connection with the imposition of sanctions in one case, 

Doud and Ferguson misled the sanctioning judge regarding their compliance with his order by 

submitting a false affidavit. 

 The questions raised by these revelations in 2015 prompted then-Chief Judge Gerald 

Rosen to convene the Panel to address misconduct that may have been committed by Doud and 

Ferguson. To initiate the proceeding, the Panel issued an order to show cause to both Respondents, 
2 

who appeared by counsel and responded to the show cause order. The Chief Judge also appointed 

the Grievance Administrator of the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission as Prosecuting 

Counsel under E.D. Mich. LR 83.22(e)(6)(a) to conduct the investigation and present evidence to 

the Panel. Prosecuting Counsel did so by conducting depositions of the Respondents and several 

lawyers and a legal secretary who worked at the Firm.1 After receiving proposed findings from 

the Prosecuting Counsel and responses thereto, the Panel conducted a full hearing at which Doud 

and Ferguson testified; the parties later submitted supplemental proposed findings and a 

supplemental response.2

After reviewing all of the evidence, the Panel concludes that both Doud and Ferguson 

engaged in serious violations of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, with Doud’s 

violations being more egregious.3

 These violations warrant suspending Doud from practicing 

before this Court for 90 days and publicly reprimanding Ferguson for his misconduct. 

I. FINDINGS OF FACT 

 A. General Factual Background 

 The Firm’s practice consisted of workers’ compensation, personal injury, and social 

security, with the Firm’s bread and butter being workers’ compensation. During the period in 

 

1 The depositions, also referred to as sworn statements, were filed on the docket. See Doud Tr. (27-

2); Ferguson Tr. (Dkt. 27-3); Steele Tr. (Dkt. 27-5); McHugh Tr. (Dkt. 27-6); Wood Tr. (Dkt. 27-

7); M. Doud Tr. (Dkt. 27-8); Smith Tr. (Dkt. 35-1); Lupisella Tr., at 10, 19-20 (Dkt. 37). 

2

 See Prosecuting Counsel’s Proposed Findings (Dkt. 27); Ferguson Resp. to Proposed Findings 

(Dkt. 29); Doud Resp. to Proposed Findings (Dkt. 30); Prosecuting Counsel’s Supplemental 

Proposed Findings (Dkt. 36); Ferguson Resp. to Supplemental Proposed Findings (Dkt. 38). 

3

 The Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct are applicable to lawyers admitted to this Court. 

See E.D. Mich. LR 83.22(b). 
3 

question, the Firm was managed by three shareholders, Ferguson, Michael Doud,4

 and Floyd 

Steele.5

 There were also two non-equity partners, James Smith and Philip Dellasantina, as well as 

associate attorneys. 

Doud was a shareholder of the Firm from 1977 until January 1, 2012, when a shareholder 

buyback agreement that he had executed on December 31, 2011 became effective. Doud’s full 

level of involvement with the Firm following the execution of the agreement remains unclear. But 

what is clear is that Doud was permitted to manage various aspects of the Firm as he saw fit and 

to practice as much or as little as he wanted even after the agreement went into effect. See 

Ferguson Tr. at 103-104; Steele Tr. at 6, 39-40; McHugh Tr. at 13, 40; M. Doud Tr. at 7, 11, 13-

14. Certain shareholders and other Firm employees were uncertain as to Doud’s actual status visà-vis the Firm. See Ferguson Tr. at 130-131. In fact, Ferguson was unsure of Doud’s status until 

March 2015, when Doud instructed Ferguson to inform the Court that Doud had retired as of 

December 2011. Id.; see also Letter of Referral at 3 (Dkt. 2) (noting that Ferguson, in a letter 

responding to sanctions imposed by Judge Gershwin Drain, informed the Court that Doud had 

retired as of 2011). Notwithstanding the uncertainty of Doud’s exact status within the Firm, the 

Firm did not publicly announce any new status for Doud, because it and Doud sought to conceal 

from clients and adversaries any “reduced” role for him. See Doud Tr. at 30 (describing his 

appearance as a fully active member of the Firm as a “façade,” which the Firm was able to “play” 

for a year or two). 

 

4

 Unless otherwise stated, all references to simply “Doud” refer to Richard Doud. The Court will 

refer to Doud’s son, Michael Doud, by his full name. 

5

 Ferguson noted in a motion (Dkt. 39) that Michael Doud has since left the Firm to start his own 

practice. The current status of the firm is unclear, as it appears to be in the process of dissolution. 

See Davidson, Breen, Doud, Steele & Ferguson P.C. v. Michael P. Doud, et al., No. 16-30525-CB 

(Saginaw Cir. Ct. August 2, 2016). 
4 

Much of the Firm’s social security work was driven by its workers’ compensation practice, 

because claimants often were contractually required to apply for disability benefits with the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”). See Doud Tr. at 7. Doud hired Ruth Wood, a legal secretary, 

to assist with the social security practice and “trained [her] over the years with regard to handling 

Social Security files.” Doud Tr. at 12. It appears that once Doud was comfortable with Wood’s 

competence, he allowed her to file initial applications for social security on her own. See Doud 

Tr. at 12-13. Doud began reducing his social security practice in the mid-1980s, and the 

responsibility for handling the administrative hearings shifted to younger, newer attorneys with 

the Firm. Doud Tr. at 14-16. 

Beginning in 2002 a new associate attorney, Mikel Lupisella, took over the social security 

practice within a month of starting his employment; he was the attorney primarily responsible for 

social security through the end of 2011. Doud Tr. at 23-24; Ferguson Tr. at 89, 134, 143; Lupisella 

Tr., at 10, 19-20.6

 Doud stated that when Lupisella took over the practice, Doud was not involved 

in the social security practice beyond “keeping [an] eye on [his] [w]orkers’ [c]ompensation cases.” 

Doud. at 22-23. When the district court transitioned to electronic filing, Lupisella obtained his 

own electronic filing credentials (CM/ECF username and password); he did not use one associated 

with Doud. Lupisella Tr. at 14-15. Lupisella left the Firm in December 2011. 

After Lupisella’s departure, Doud was concerned about the future and stability of the social 

security practice and attempted to recruit one of the partners to take over the practice. Doud Tr. at 

31; Ferguson Tr. at 22-23. Ferguson agreed to step into the social security practice at the 

administrative level of the social security proceedings, even though he had no prior experience in 

 

6

 Lupisella, who had no prior experience in social security, explained that his training consisted of 

reading books on the subject at the Firm, shadowing, and meeting some of the administrative 

judges. Lupisella Tr. at 10-11. 
5 

that area. Ferguson Tr. at 23, 24 While Doud insists that he told Ferguson to take over the entire 

social security practice, the Panel credits Ferguson’s testimony that Doud asked him to handle only 

the administrative stage, not court appeals.7

 Because Ferguson was never told by Doud to 

supervise the Firm’s social security appeals, he assumed that those cases were being handled by a 

process put into place by Doud and Wood. Ferguson Tr. at 24, 52-53, 108 (“I didn’t know that I 

had to ask [questions about the brief-writing process for appeals in district court] because I 

assumed that [Doud] had set up a good system.”). 

For all intents and purposes, it was legal secretary Wood who ran the Firm’s social security 

practice after Lupisella’s departure. If the initial application for benefits was denied, Wood would 

meet with the clients and prepare the necessary documents for the hearing before an administrative 

law judge. Wood Tr. at 9-10. If the administrative law judge denied the claim, Wood would 

automatically file an appeal of the decision to the SSA Appeals Council. Id. at 16, 19-20; see also 

Ferguson Tr. at 46 (stating that once the administrative hearing was completed, the case was 

essentially done from his perspective); Id. (stating that if a client wanted to pursue an unfavorable 

decision he would direct the client to speak to Wood). If the Appeals Council denied an appeal, 

the client could further appeal the administrative decision in federal court by speaking with Wood 

or the assigned attorney. Wood Tr. at 20-21. 

If the client wanted to proceed to federal court, Wood would instruct either Aaron 

Lemmens or Paul McHugh, two associate attorneys who joined the Firm after Lupisella left, to 

 

7

 As an example of Doud’s lack of credibility, he testified that he first received his CM/ECF login 

nearly two decades ago. Doud Tr. at 21. However, the CM/ECF system was not operational until 

2005, and court records reflect that Doud’s login was not obtained until after Lupisella left in the 

Firm in December 2011. Further, Ferguson is more believable because he consistently expressed 

remorse for his misconduct and attempted to rectify the situation, while Doud tried to provide a 

rationalization for his ethical violations. See Doud Tr. at 36 (noting that he misled the public and 

courts about his role with the Firm “because I wanted to make sure they did well. Hell, I’m sorry, 

my son is in the Firm.”). 
6 

begin writing briefs. Lemmens Tr. at 32-33; McHugh Tr. at 8-9, 10. McHugh testified that he 

was given no training prior to writing the briefs. Id. at 8. Lemmens indicated his “training” was 

limited to sitting in on administrative hearings and speaking with Wood – a non-lawyer – and 

Ferguson, who lacked any experience in the subject area. Lemmens Tr. at 9. Lemmens also 

testified he did not discuss the merits of cases with Ferguson, and that Ferguson never reviewed 

his social security work product or gave any type of formal evaluation. Id. at 30, 55. Nor did 

Ferguson or other senior lawyers give any substantive advice in terms of pointing out appropriate 

case law or statutory authority to assist McHugh or Lemmens. McHugh Tr. at 17. 

When it came to filing cases in district court, Lupisella, while at the Firm, filed both 

complaints and briefs under his name using a CM/ECF username specific to him. Lupisella Tr. at 

14-15, 16. According to Wood, this was not the appropriate procedure, as the filings should have 

been done under Doud’s name; consequently, when Lupisella departed, Wood was instructed by 

Doud to return everything to Doud’s name.8

 Wood Tr. at 22-23. Craig Zanot, then a shareholder 

of the Firm, and Wood together obtained a CM/ECF username for Doud in December 2011. See 

Emails at 5-6 (cm/ecf page) (Dkt. 35-2).9 The purported purpose of placing everything into Doud’s 

name was to prevent departing lawyers from stealing Firm clients; there never was an expectation 

by anyone at the Firm that Doud would be working on the case. Wood Tr. at 46-47. Going 

forward, associates were instructed by Wood to file all briefs in Doud’s name, using Doud’s newly 

 

8

 Doud’s testimony on this point was contradictory. At one point he stated that he assumed 

Lupisella would be filing items under Lupisella’s name, Doud Tr. at 22-23, but elsewhere he stated 

that he presumed some of the brief-writers were filing briefs under his name, Id. at 22. 

9

 Zanot retired in 2015, but for the five years prior, he had ceased practicing law and was 

responsible for some of the Firm’s administrative matters. See Ferguson Tr. at 25. 
7 

obtained CM/ECF username. McHugh Tr. at 11-12; Lemmens Tr. at 33, 34-36, 39-40, 56; Wood 

Tr. at 23.10

Following the filing of a brief, no further work would be done on a social security appeal. 

Lemmens Tr. at 39; McHugh Tr. at 15-16. Attorneys did not see the opposing party’s brief, did 

not submit any type of response, and never saw a report and recommendation (“R&R”) or a final 

decision; nor did they ask to see any of those items. Lemmens Tr. at 38-39; McHugh Tr. at 15-17. 

Lemmens and McHugh saw their jobs as completed once they filed a brief. Lemmens Tr. at 39; 

McHugh Tr. at 15. Wood was responsible for monitoring all electronic filings in the district court, 

but she neither reviewed the filings nor did she inform any of the attorneys that something had 

been filed. Wood Tr. at 26-28. Wood testified that no one reviewed R&Rs to determine whether 

objections should be filed. Id. at 49.11 Wood merely printed off the final judgment and placed it 

in the case file, then sent a letter to the client informing the client of the decision. Id. at 28, 49. 

B. Events Leading to the Referral 

The systemic and structural deficiencies in the Firm’s social security practice resulted in 

numerous filings, in the name of Doud, that suffered from myriad significant defects. Several 

members of this Court have taken note of the Firm’s repeated deficient performance. See, e.g., 

Fielder, No. 13-10325, 2014 WL 1207865 at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2014) (discussing 

magistrate judges who have critiqued Doud and warning that failure to advance properly supported 

arguments could lead to sanctions and disciplinary action); Swadling v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

14-10251, 2015 WL 1511048, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2015) (fining Doud $7,500 and referring 

 

10 Court records confirm that Doud’s ECF login was obtained in December 2011.

11 A review of the district court opinions shows that in one case, Fielder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 13-10325, 2014 WL 1207865 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2014), an objection was filed to the R&R. 

The remaining district court opinions merely adopted the R&Rs with some discussing Doud’s 

deficient performance and some imposing sanctions. 
8 

him for disciplinary action); Leveque v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-10685, 2014 WL 172297, 

at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2014) (adopting R&R that critiqued Doud for failure to substantiate 

arguments); Servantes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-10250, 2015 WL 870255, at *17 (E.D. 

Mich. Feb. 27, 2015) (fining Doud $2,500). 

In one instance, Doud was ordered to take specific remedial action; Doud’s and Ferguson’s 

responses to this order gave rise to additional allegations of misconduct. On March 6, 2015, 

District Judge Robert Cleland issued an Order in Radford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-10831, 

2015 WL 998332 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2015) (“the Radford Order”), adopting an R&R issued in 

that social security case. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge observed that the filing bearing Doud’s 

name was “yet another one-size-fits-all brief, containing virtually the same conclusory allegations 

and absence of developed argument that other courts had found insufficient.” Radford v. Comm’r, 

No. 14-10831, 2015 WL 998338, at *6 (E.D. Mich. December 1, 2014). The Magistrate Judge 

found it significant that the brief had been filed despite prior significant criticism of the briefing 

style leveled by another district judge. Id. In adopting the R&R, Judge Cleland made additional 

findings, concluding that Doud had effectively abandoned his client, and submitted work product 

to the Court that was not only careless, but professionally incompetent. Radford, 2015 WL 998332 

at *1. Consequently, Judge Cleland ordered the following: 

Plaintiff’s attorney, Richard J. Doud, must file a statement by March 

20, 2015, made under oath, that he has personally delivered to 

Plaintiff Kimberly Radford (1) a printed copy of the Magistrate 

Judge’s report and recommendation, (2) a printed copy of this order, 

and (3) a written cover letter or memorandum to Ms. Radford that 

contains the following statement printed in at least 13–point font: 

“Your case has been dismissed. I have been ordered by the 

court to deliver the court orders to you. The court also 

ordered me to tell you that you should carefully read 1) the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and 2) the 

order of the District Court accepting the recommendation 
9 

and commenting on the case that I presented to the court on 

your behalf.” 

A copy of the cover letter or memorandum must be attached to the 

statement he files. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Judge Cleland’s Order, issued on March 6, was ignored by the Firm until March 16, 2015, 

just four days before the statement was due. Smith Tr. at 31-32. James Smith was the first to take 

some action relative the Radford Order; he faxed a copy to Wood’s attention. Smith Tr. at 32.12 

Wood conveyed the Radford Order to Ferguson, who wanted nothing to do with it, and Ferguson 

instructed Wood to call Doud, give Doud the information, and tell Doud the court was directing 

Doud to respond to the order. Ferguson Tr. at 25-26. Wood emailed Doud a document on March 

16, requesting Doud sign and return it as soon as possible. See 3/16/2015 Email at 2 (cm/ecf page) 

(Dkt. 35-4). In response, Doud requested the actual Order, indicating he would write a response. 

Id. Wood sent the Radford Order to Doud on March 18, explaining, “the judge does not want our 

response just the statement signed.” 3/18/2015 Email at 3 (cm/ecf page) (Dkt. 35-4). Doud then 

instructed Wood to “[p]lease have Andrew [Ferguson] draft whatever is necessary. Sign my name 

to it.” Id. 

At some point between learning about the Radford Order and March 18, Wood made an 

appointment for Ms. Radford to come into the office and meet with Ferguson. Ferguson Tr. at 26. 

Wood provided Ferguson with a number of materials and explained that Doud wanted Ferguson 

to handle it, and that the Court needed a response by March 20. Id. Ferguson reviewed the 

materials Wood had sent him, noticing that information needed to be delivered to the client and 

then returned to the Court. Id. at 27. The specific materials included an affidavit, the statement to 

 

12 By happenstance, Smith was informed of the Radford Order by a rival attorney whom he ran 

into at the workers’ compensation agency. See Smith Tr. at 31-32. 
10 

the client, and the court’s decision. Id. at 28. According to Ferguson, because Wood told Ferguson 

he had the authority to sign for Doud, Ferguson thought it was okay. Id. at 27. Ferguson told Ms. 

Radford that he was “stepping in for Richard Doud in this case,” and that he was “going to sign 

for Richard.” Id. at 28. At that time, Ferguson had not personally communicated with Doud. Id. 

at 31.13 

The affidavit in question avers that “Richard Doud” was “duly sworn, deposes and states, 

that pursuant to the [Radford Order], that he has personally delivered to Plaintiff” the required 

materials. See Radford Aff. at 5-6 (cm/ecf pages) (Dkt. 35-4). The signature on the affidavit 

purports to be Doud’s and was notarized. Id. at 6 (cm/ecf page). The statement ordered to be 

provided to Ms. Radford also bears a signature purporting to be Doud’s. See Radford Statement 

at 4 (cm/ecf page) (Dkt. 35-4). There is nothing on either of those two documents to indicate that 

they were signed by someone other than Doud or signed with Doud’s permission. Doud confirmed 

that he had nothing to do with drafting the affidavit, that the signature on the affidavit was not his, 

and that he did not know whose it was. Doud Tr. at 43. However, Doud reiterated that he 

“authorized anything that was necessary to clean up the mess.” Id. 

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

A. Richard Doud 

This recitation of troubling facts establishes that Doud violated Michigan Rule of 

Professional Conduct (MRPC) 5.1 – which requires appropriate supervisory monitoring of 

subordinate attorneys – when he failed to supervise the preparation of briefs that were submitted 

using his signature and CM/ECF login. Doud also violated MRPC 5.1 by failing to supervise the 

 

13 Indeed, after the fact, and because he had not spoken with Doud directly, Ferguson became 

concerned that he may not have had Doud’s permission to sign. Ferguson Tr. at 62-63. Ferguson 

asked Wood how Wood knew that Doud had given Ferguson permission to sign; Wood provided 

Ferguson with the email correspondence between her and Doud. Ferguson Tr. at 62-63. 
11 

appeal after the briefs were filed. The evidence before the Panel shows that once briefs were filed, 

no one in the Firm reviewed the R&R or decided whether to file objections. Further, by authorizing 

the submission of briefs bearing his name – thereby representing that he had properly reviewed or 

monitored their preparation – Doud violated MRPC 3.3, which mandates a lawyer’s candor to 

courts. Doud also violated MRPC 3.3 by authorizing Ferguson to sign and submit an affidavit 

stating that he – Doud – had personally met with Ms. Radford (as Judge Cleland had ordered). In 

light of these violations, the Panel orders that Doud be suspended from practice before this Court 

for 90 days.14 

1. MRPC 5.1 (Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer) 

Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1(b) states that “[a] lawyer having direct 

supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other 

lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” After Lupisella’s departure, Wood 

informed Doud that Lupisella had been filling briefs using his own signature and CM/ECF login. 

Wood Tr. at 23. Doud told Wood that this was not the proper procedure and that all future briefs 

should be filed under his name in order to prevent any departing attorneys from taking Firm clients 

with them. Id. 

Because Doud directed Firm personnel to file social security briefs using his name, he had 

a duty to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the briefs were being prepared in conformity with 

the Rules of Professional Conduct. See MRPC 5.1(b). Testimony from Lemmens and McHugh 

 

14 In his post-hearing supplemental proposed findings, Prosecuting Counsel agrees that “Doud’s 

conduct . . . in allowing his name to be used on briefs in federal court when he knew he was not 

preparing or reviewing the briefs, was a knowing violation of . . . his duty to supervise . . . ” Supp. 

Prop. Find. at 9. Doud did not dispute this, as he did not file any response to the supplemental 

proposed findings. Prosecuting Counsel did not address – either in his initial or supplemental 

proposed findings – Doud’s culpability for aiding and abetting and/or soliciting Ferguson’s 

submission of a false affidavit to Judge Cleland. However, Doud failed to address it, as well, 

although the Panel asked several questions about the issue at the hearing.
12 

makes it clear that Doud made no such efforts. Lemmens testified that he began drafting social 

security briefs within a month or two after starting at the Firm and that his training consisted 

primarily of speaking with Wood, a non-lawyer assistant, and Ferguson, a lawyer with no social 

security experience, who offered no substantive advice about cases. McHugh was similarly 

directed to write briefs without training and without a senior lawyer offering any substantive 

guidance. 

Doud also failed to supervise the appeals process after the briefs were filed. Wood testified 

that once the briefs were filed, the appeals process was essentially over from the Firm’s 

perspective. Wood Tr. at 28, 49. Doud made no effort to read the opposing party’s briefs, review 

the magistrate judge’s R&R, or determine whether filing objections was appropriate. 

This profound dereliction of any oversight of the Firm’s inexperienced lawyers 

demonstrates that Doud violated his duty to supervise pursuant to MRPC 5.1(b). 

2. MRPC 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) 

In addition to violating his duty to supervise, Doud’s conduct surrounding the filing of 

social security briefs also violated his duty of candor toward the tribunal. The Rules of 

Professional conduct state that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material 

fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made 

to the tribunal by the lawyer.” MRPC 3.3(a)(1). 

Doud’s instruction to sign his name to all future briefs after Lupisella’s departure – 

knowing that he would have no involvement in their preparation – violated his duty of candor, 

because it constituted “a false statement of material fact,” MRPC 3.3(a)(1). Doud’s signature on 

the briefs unmistakably conveyed to the judges in this District the untrue assertion that he was 
13 

personally involved in the drafting of the documents or involved in supervising their preparation 

when, in fact, he did nothing in that regard after 2011. 

Doud’s conduct in response to the Radford Order also constituted a violation of MRPC 

3.3(a)(1). In his Order adopting the R&R, Judge Cleland found that Doud submitted work product 

that was both careless and professionally incompetent. Radford, 2015 WL 998338, at *1. As a 

consequence, Judge Cleland ordered that Doud file a statement, made under oath, that he had 

personally delivered to Ms. Radford printed copies of the R&R and the order adopting it, as well 

as a cover letter explaining that the case had been dismissed and that Ms. Radford should read the 

R&R and Order. Id. 

Rather than meeting with Ms. Radford and providing her with the necessary documents as 

ordered by Judge Cleland, Doud told Ferguson to “draft whatever is necessary” and sign his name 

to it. 3/18/2015 Email at 3. By giving this instruction, Doud was aiding and abetting and/or 

soliciting the submission of a “false statement of material fact.” MRPC 3.3(a)(1). Not only did 

Doud fail to actually meet with Ms. Radford, he authorized the submission to the Court of an 

affidavit stating that he had. This lack of candor constitutes a violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1). 

3. Discipline 

Standard 3.0 of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 

states that, “[i]n imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court shoulder 

consider the following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the actual or 

potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or 

mitigating factors.” Standard 7.2 states “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes 

injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” 
14 

The record indicates that Doud knowingly failed to supervise, in contravention of MRPC 

5.1(b). To prevent attorneys from stealing Firm clients, Doud ensured that all appeals to federal 

court were filed in his name. Because these briefs were filed in his name, Doud had a duty to make 

reasonable efforts to ensure that the lawyers drafting the briefs acted in conformity with the Rules 

of Professional Conduct. See MRPC 5.1(b). By his own admission, Doud had abdicated all 

responsibility regarding the social security practice after his purported retirement in December 

2011. Doud Tr. at 32. This demonstrates that he knowingly failed to make any effort to supervise 

the work of McHugh and Lemmens. This violation caused actual injury to the legal system by 

burdening it with deficient social security appeals; this burden could have been avoided had Doud 

exercised his supervisory responsibility. This misconduct also contributed to depriving clients of 

proper representation, thereby potentially depriving them of meritorious claims. 

This conduct also constituted a knowing violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1). Standard 6.1, which 

addresses false statements, fraud, and misrepresentation, states that “[s]uspension is generally 

appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the 

court . . . and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an 

adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.” Standard 6.12. Doud knew that 

briefs were being submitted in his name even though he did not assist in their preparation. This 

misconduct had an adverse effect on the legal proceedings in that it misled judges as to who was 

actually representing parties before them. 

Doud’s misconduct with respect to the submission of the Radford affidavit also constituted 

a knowing violation of MRPC 3.3. Despite being sent a copy of the Radford Order, which required 

Doud to personally meet with Ms. Radford, he told Wood to have Ferguson “draft whatever is 

necessary” and sign his name to it. 3/18/2015 email at 3 (cm/ecf page). By instructing Ferguson 
15 

to sign the affidavit in his place, Doud knowingly aided and abetted the submission of a false 

document. This action had an adverse effect on the legal proceeding because it misled Judge 

Cleland. 

In regard to aggravating factors, Doud had a selfish motive. See Standard 9.22(b).15 By 

ordering the briefs to be filed in his name, he was attempting to retain clients in order to keep the 

Firm profitable. Doud stood to gain from the Firm’s success because, under the shareholder 

buyback agreement, he was receiving a salary and health benefits. Doud’s actions constituted a 

pattern of misconduct by allowing numerous briefs to be submitted in his name without 

supervision. See Standard 9.22(c). As discussed above, Doud’s misconduct included violations 

of multiple ethical rules over a period of years. See Standard 9.22(d). Doud also made a false 

statement during the disciplinary process when he stated that he obtained a CM/ECF login nearly 

20 years ago. See Standard 9.22(f). Finally, Doud had substantial experience in the practice of 

law at the time these violations occurred. See Standard 9.22(i). Doud’s lack of a prior disciplinary 

record serves as a mitigating factor. See Standards 9.32(a). There is no evidence of any other 

mitigating factor. 

Doud’s knowing violations of MRPC 5.1(b) and MRPC 3.3(a)(1) warrant a 90-day 

suspension from practice before this Court. 

 

15 As noted above, courts should consider so-called “aggravating factors” when choosing a 

sanction. ABA Standard 9.2 lists aggravating factors including prior disciplinary record, dishonest 

or selfish motive, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction, submission of false evidence, refusal to 

acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim, substantial experience in 

practicing law, indifference to restitution, and illegal conduct. See Standard 9.22(a)-(k). Courts 

should also consider mitigating factors, including absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence 

of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems, effort to make restitution or to 

rectify misconduct, cooperative attitude, inexperience in practice of law, character or reputation, 

physical or mental disability, delay in the proceedings, imposition of other penalties, remorse, and 

remoteness of prior offenses. See Standard 9.32(a)-(m). The Panel has considered all of these 

factors and sets forth the applicable ones in the text. 
16 

B. Andrew Ferguson 

Ferguson committed violations of MRPC 5.1 and MRPC 5.3 when he failed to properly 

supervise the Firm’s social security practice after Lupisella departed and Doud began to take a 

reduced role. However, unlike Doud, Ferguson’s failure to supervise was committed negligently. 

On the other hand, Ferguson’s actions in response to the Radford Order constituted a knowing 

violation of MRPC 3.3. In light of several mitigating factors, the Panel concludes that Ferguson’s 

conduct warrants a public reprimand. 

1. MRPC 5.1 (Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer); MRPC 5.3 

(Responsibilities Regarding Non-Lawyer Assistants) 

 

Ferguson’s conduct after Doud began his reduced role with the Firm violated multiple 

ethical rules regarding supervision. Specifically, MRPC 5.1(a) states “[a] partner in a law firm 

shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable 

assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Further, 

MRPC 5.3(a) states that “[w]ith respect to a nonlawyer employed by, retained by, or associated 

with a lawyer, a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in 

effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the 

professional obligations of the lawyer.” 

As a managing shareholder of the Firm, Ferguson was required to adhere to these rules. 

The record indicates that Ferguson fell well short of this responsibility. After Lupisella’s departure 

in December 2011, the Firm’s social security practice was essentially run by Wood, a non-lawyer 

assistant. After an application for social security benefits was denied, Wood oversaw each stage 

of the appeal, from the administrative stage through the appeal to federal court. 

Other than contributing occasionally at the administrative level, Ferguson conducted no 

oversight of the Firm’s social security practice. Ferguson “assumed it was being handled the way 
17 

it always was in the past,” because he figured Doud had left a “good system” in place. But that 

was not the reality of how the Firm operated. And Ferguson did nothing to verify – as he should 

have – that proper procedures and practices were being followed. This led to consistently deficient 

work product, an outcome that could have been avoided had Ferguson engaged in proper 

supervision. While Ferguson assumed things were being handled properly, it was his duty, as a 

managing shareholder, to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the social security practice was 

being run in conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. His failure to make such efforts 

constituted a violation of MRPC 5.1(1) and MRPC 5.3(a). 

2. MRPC 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) 

By signing Doud’s name to the Radford affidavit, Ferguson made a “false statement of 

material fact” to the court in violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1). Ferguson, like Doud, knew that Judge 

Cleland had ordered Doud to personally meet with Ms. Radford. Thus, despite knowing that Doud 

was in another state, Ferguson communicated to the court, by his signature, that Doud had met 

with Ms. Radford and had personally delivered to her the required cover letter and copies of the 

R&R and Order adopting it. Furthermore, when he signed the affidavit, Ferguson did not indicate 

that he was signing with Doud’s permission. He simply signed as Doud to give the impression 

that Doud had followed Judge Cleland’s instructions. This conduct violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1). 

3. Discipline 

Regarding the failure to supervise, the Panel observes that “[r]eprimand is generally 

appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 

professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” 

Standard 7.3. 
18 

Ferguson believed that the Firm’s social security practice was being run in accordance with 

a system put into place by Doud, and that his role was limited to contributing at the administrative 

level only. Because he was told by Doud that his help was only needed at the administrative level, 

Ferguson was genuinely unaware that the attorneys preparing the briefs in federal court were not 

being properly supervised. Nonetheless, Ferguson’s conduct caused actual injury to the legal 

system, in the form of burdening the Court, and injury to clients who lost out on potentially 

meritorious claims. 

While Ferguson negligently violated his duty of supervision, he knowingly violated his 

duty of candor. Despite knowing that Doud had not met with Ms. Radford, Ferguson submitted 

an affidavit to Judge Cleland falsely swearing that he did. Not only was Ferguson aware that the 

meeting never took place, he also forged Doud’s signature on the affidavit. Although Ferguson 

had Doud’s permission to sign for him, he failed to indicate that he was signing as Doud’s agent. 

He also did not indicate that he met with Ms. Radford in Doud’s place. This misrepresentation 

was made knowingly and had an adverse effect on the legal system, because it falsely led Judge 

Cleland to believe that his Order had been complied with. 

Regarding aggravating factors, Ferguson’s failure to supervise was not limited to one 

incident. See Standard 9.22(c). His failure to supervise began after Doud’s purported retirement 

in 2011 and continued until the issuance of the Radford Order. Like Doud’s actions, Ferguson’s 

misconduct amounted to a violation of multiple ethical rules over a period of years. See Standard. 

9.22(d). Further, Ferguson had substantial experience practicing law. See Standard 9.22(i). This 

experience should have prepared Ferguson to handle the supervisory responsibilities that came 

with being a managing shareholder at the Firm. Ferguson also should have been aware of how to 

properly discharge his duty of candor to the Court. 
19 

On the other hand, Ferguson’s misconduct is mitigated by several factors. He made 

significant efforts to rectify the situation by urging his Firm to cease all federal court appeals and 

cooperating with Prosecuting Counsel during his investigation. See Standards 9.32(d)-(e). Further, 

he does not have a prior disciplinary record. See Standard 9.32(a). Finally, Ferguson has expressed 

remorse for his conduct, which the Panel concludes is genuine. See Ferguson Tr. at 139; 6/18/2016 

Hr’g Tr. at 13, 33; Standard 9.32(l). 

 In light of these factors, the Panel concludes that a public reprimand is both warranted 

and sufficient to express this Court’s profound disapproval of his misconduct. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Panel orders that Doud be suspended from the practice of 

law before this Court for 90 days; Ferguson is hereby publicly reprimanded for his misconduct. 

Doud is reminded that, by virtue of his suspension, the requirements of E.D. Mich. LR 83.22(e)(8) 

and (9) have been triggered. Doud and Ferguson are also ordered to pay, within 28 days of this 

Opinion and Order, the costs and attorney fees incurred by Prosecuting Counsel. If there is any 

dispute regarding that issue, Prosecuting Counsel shall file a motion within 28 days of this Opinion 

and Order; if that issue is resolved by the parties, Prosecuting Counsel shall file a certificate to that 

effect. 

 Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 83.22(e)(6)(H), this Opinion and Order is made public. The 

remainder of the docket remains under seal. 

SO ORDERED. 

 

Dated: June 23, 2017 s/ Mark A. Goldsmith 

Detroit, MI Mark A. Goldsmith 

United States District Judge 

 Panel Chair 
20 

 

 s/Laurie J. Michelson 

 Laurie J. Michelson 

United States District Judge 

 

 

 s/ Matthew F. Leitman 

 Matthew F. Leitman 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any 

unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail 

addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 23, 2017. 

 s/Karri Sandusky 

 Case Manager