UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JULIE BARLIA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-10243

v.

HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD

MWI VETERINARY SUPPLY, INC.,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO SEAL HER CASE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Julia Barlia’s request to seal her

case, civil action case no. 15-10243, Barlia v. MWI Veterinary Supply, Inc., previously

assigned to now retired District Judge Gerald E. Rosen. Barlia claims that she has

been unable to find employment and that by sealing her entire case, she will be able

to find employment. MWI filed a response.

Barlia filed a Complaint against her then-employer MWI, on January 21, 2015,

alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §

12100 et seq. (ECF No. 1) On January 24, 2017, an Opinion and Order was entered

granting MWI’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Barlia’s Complaint. 

(ECF No. 45) The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s

judgment. (ECF No. 51) The mandate was issued on January 31, 2018. (ECF No. 52)
Barlia does not cite any legal authority for sealing her entire case. The Sixth

Circuit set forth standards governing sealing Court records. In Shane Group, Inc. v.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth Circuit

explained,

By way of background, there is a stark difference

between so-called “protective orders” entered pursuant to

the discovery provisions of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 26, on the one hand, and orders to seal court

records, on the other. Discovery concerns the parties’

exchange of information that might or might not be relevant

to their case. “Secrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before

the material enters the judicial record.” Baxter Int'l, Inc. v.

Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, a

district court may enter a protective order limiting the use

or disclosure of discovery materials upon a mere showing

of “good cause[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). These orders

are often blanket in nature, and allow the parties to

determine in the first instance whether particular materials

fall within the order's protection. The district court entered

several such orders here.

“At the adjudication stage, however, very different

considerations apply.” Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d

Cir. 1982). The line between these two stages, discovery

and adjudicative, is crossed when the parties place material

in the court record. Baxter, 297 F.3d at 545. Unlike

information merely exchanged between the parties, “[t]he

public has a strong interest in obtaining the information

contained in the court record.” Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir.

1983). That interest rests on several grounds. Sometimes,

the public's interest is focused primarily upon the

litigation's result—whether a right does or does not exist, or

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a statute is or is not constitutional. In other

cases—including “antitrust” cases, id. at 1179—the public's

interest is focused not only on the result, but also on the

conduct giving rise to the case. In those cases, “secrecy

insulates the participants, masking impropriety, obscuring

incompetence, and concealing corruption.” Id. And in any

of these cases, the public is entitled to assess for itself the

merits of judicial decisions. Thus, “[t]he public has an

interest in ascertaining what evidence and records the

District Court and this Court have relied upon in reaching

our decisions.” Id. at 1181; see also, e.g., Baxter, 297 F.3d

at 546.

The courts have long recognized, therefore a “strong

presumption in favor of openness” as to court records.

Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179. The burden of

overcoming that presumption is borne by the party that

seeks to seal them. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194

(3d Cir. 2001). The burden is a heavy one: “Only the most

compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial

records.” In re Knoxville News–Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470,

476 (6th Cir. 1983). Moreover, the greater the public

interest in the litigation's subject matter, the greater the

showing necessary to overcome the presumption of access.

See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179. For example,

in class actions—where by definition “some members of

the public are also parties to the [case]”—the standards for

denying public access to the record “should be applied ...

with particular strictness.” Cendant, 260 F.3d at 194. And

even where a party can show a compelling reason why

certain documents or portions thereof should be sealed, the

seal itself must be narrowly tailored to serve that reason.

See, e.g., Press–Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California,

Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 509-11, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78

L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). The proponent of sealing therefore

must “analyze in detail, document by document, the

propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.” 

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Baxter, 297 F.3d at 548.

Shane Group, 825 F.3d at 305–06.

In her request, Barlia, as the proponent of sealing the Court’s records, has not

set forth “in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing

reasons and legal citations,” to support her request to seal her entire case. The public

is entitled to assess the merits of the judicial decisions made in any case. Barlia’s case

has been fully adjudicated. As noted above, there is a “strong presumption” in favor

of openness to court records. Barlia has not overcome the strong presumption to keep

her case open to the public.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Julie Barlia’s Rquest to Seal her Case (ECF No.

53) is DENIED.

S/Denise Page Hood 

Denise Page Hood

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: July 27, 2018

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of

record on July 27, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry 

Case Manager

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