UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Petitioner Jeanne Herrington, currently incarcerated at the Livingston County Jail 

in Howell, Michigan, filed a petition for the “Great Writ of Habeas Corpus,” which this 

Court construes as a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In her pro se 

application, Petitioner claims that she is being unconstitutionally detained by the United 

States Marshals Service for an unspecified charge or conviction. Petitioner has also filed 

a Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 6) and a Motion to Expunge “All State of Michigan 

and United States of America Case/Item in the Strawman Name JEANNE 

HERRINGTON aka JEANNE MARIE HERRINGTON” (Dkt. 7.) For the reasons stated 

below, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is summarily denied and the Motion for 

Default Judgment and Motion to Expunge will also be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner claims that she is being unlawfully detained by the United States 

Marshals Service at the Livingston County Jail. But she does not specify on what charges 

JEANNE HERRINGTON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

ROBERT BEZOTTE, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-13395 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING, PETITION FOR HABEAS 

CORPUS [1], DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [6], AND 

DENYING MOTION TO EXPUNGE [7] 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 1 of 11 Pg ID 23
2 

or conviction. This Court has searched the records for the United States District Courts 

for the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan and has been unable to locate any 

pending federal criminal charges or convictions involving Petitioner. The Court searched 

PACER records more broadly and located a criminal case out of the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in which Petitioner was convicted on 

November 14, 2008, for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371, and interference with administration of the Internal Revenue Service, in violation 

of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). See United States v. Herrington, No. 06-CV-00426 (N.D. Ohio 

Nov. 14, 2008). Petitioner was sentenced to ninety-six months imprisonment, with the 

court ordering that twenty-four months of the sentence be served concurrently with a 

state sentence petitioner was serving and the remaining seventy-two months of the 

sentence would be consecutive to this sentence. 

While Petitioner’s appeal was pending, she filed a motion to vacate sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied without prejudice. United States v. 

Herrington, No. 06-CV-00426 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2009). The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed petitioner’s conviction. United States v. 

Herrington, No. 09-3733 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 2010) (unpublished). Petitioner filed a motion 

for default judgment, which was construed as a motion to vacate sentence and denied. 

United States v. Herrington, No. 06-CV-00426 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2012).1

 

 

1

 This Court obtained this information from the PACER system, www.pacer.gov, which 

this Court is entitled to take judicial notice of. See Graham v. Smith, 292 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155, n. 

2 (D. Me. 2003). A district court is also permitted to take judicial notice of its own files and 

records in a habeas proceeding. See Van Woudenberg ex. rel. Foor v. Gibson, 211 F. 3d 560, 568 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 2 of 11 Pg ID 24
3 

Again, Petitioner does not specifically indicate whether she is challenging her 

2008 conviction or some other detention.2

 In any event, Petitioner claims that she is a 

secured party creditor under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in a fictitious 

person or “strawman” known as “Jeanne Marie Herrington.” She claims to have obtained 

this secured interest in herself by filing the appropriate paperwork with the Michigan 

Secretary of State. Petitioner claims that as a result of this security interest, her birth 

certificate, her name, and her person are her property. Petitioner argues that the United 

States Marshals Service does not have the power to detain her because they failed to 

acquire a security interest in her person, as required by the UCC, and that she, as the 

secured creditor, has a superior interest over her own person. Petitioner therefore claims 

that she is being unlawfully detained and asks to be released from custody. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Petition for Habeas Corpus 

The petition for writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed because Petitioner fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

As an initial matter, Petitioner labels her filing as a petition for the “Great Writ of 

Habeas Corpus.” A petition for the “great writ of habeas corpus” is merely another name 

 

(10th Cir. 2000); see also Irving v. Bouchard, 04-cv-73861-DT, 2005 WL 1802122, at * 1 (E.D. 

Mich. July 25, 2005). 

2

 The Court is also aware, based on its examination of the PACER records, that in 2010, 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising claims of error regarding her Jackson 

County Circuit Court convictions for false pretenses and absconding on bond in a criminal 

proceeding. Herrington v. Warren, No. 11-12253 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2010). This Court 

dismissed the Petition without prejudice because Petitioner had not yet exhausted her state court 

appeals. Herrington v. Warren, No. 11-12253, ECF No. 4, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2010). 

Petitioner does not plead that she has since exhausted her claims of error for these convictions, 

nor does she mention these convictions anywhere in her petition. 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 3 of 11 Pg ID 25
4 

for the common law writ formerly used to inquire into the cause of a person’s restraint. 

See Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 614–15 (1961). This common law writ, 

however, was codified into the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Stantini v. United 

States, 986 F. Supp. 736, 739–40 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Accordingly, this Court construes 

petitioner’s application as being brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Walls v. U.S., No. 

2:06-cv-12441; 2006 WL 1851184, at * 1 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2006). 

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must set forth facts that give rise to a cause 

of action under federal law or it may be summarily dismissed. See Perez v. Hemingway, 

157 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Federal courts are also authorized to dismiss 

any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face. McFarland v. Scott, 512 

U.S. 849, 856 (1994). Summary dismissal is also available if it plainly appears from the 

face of the petition or the exhibits attached to it that the petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief. See Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1999); Rules Governing § 

2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. In fact, the Sixth Circuit long ago indicated 

its “disapprov[al of] the practice of issuing a show cause order [to the respondent] until 

after the District Court first has made a careful examination of the petition.” Allen v. 

Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 140 (6th Cir. 1970). 

A district court therefore has the duty to screen out any habeas corpus petition 

which lacks merit on its face. Id. at 141. No response to a habeas petition is necessary 

when the petition is frivolous, or obviously lacks merit, or where the necessary facts can 

be determined from the petition itself without consideration of a response by the state. Id. 

Courts have used Rule 4 of the habeas corpus rules to summarily dismiss facially 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 4 of 11 Pg ID 26
5 

insufficient habeas petitions brought under § 2241. See e.g. Perez, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 

796. Here, Petitioner fails to specify the charge or conviction she is challenging, whether 

the 2008 Northern District of Ohio conviction or some other charge. This raises two 

procedural issues. 

First, to the extent there are any pending federal criminal charges against 

Petitioner, it would not be appropriate for her to challenge them in a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. It is well established that a criminal defendant cannot use a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus to raise defenses to a pending federal criminal prosecution. See 

Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of 

exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be 

followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Riggins v. 

United States, 199 U.S. 547 (1905); Horning v. Seifart, 107 F.3d 11 (Table), No. 1997 

WL 58620, * 1 (6th Cir. February 11, 1997) (unpublished); Ferguson v. Gilliam, 946 F. 

2d 894 (Table), No. 1991 WL 206516, * 1 (6th Cir. October 11, 1991) (unpublished). 

Petitioner could not challenge any pending federal prosecution in her current habeas 

petition. Moreover, if petitioner is challenging a pre-trial detention order, the appropriate 

vehicle for such a challenge is an expedited appeal pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, 18 

U.S.C. § 3145(b)–(c), and not a habeas corpus petition. See Whitmer v. Levi, 276 F. 

App’x 217, 219 (3rd Cir. 2008). 

Second, Petitioner cannot challenge her 2008 Northern District of Ohio conviction 

through a petition for habeas corpus. Indeed, a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by 

a federal inmate under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is proper where the inmate is challenging the 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 5 of 11 Pg ID 27
6 

manner in which his sentence is being executed. Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 

1123 (6th Cir. 1998). In contrast, where a federal inmate claims that her sentence was 

imposed in violation of the federal constitution or laws, a motion to vacate sentence 

under § 2255 is the proper avenue for relief. Id. In examining these statutory sections, the 

Court finds that a remedy under § 2241 is not appropriate. 

A federal prisoner may challenge his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 

2241 only if it appears that the remedy afforded under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective 

to test the legality of the defendant’s detention. See Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 

(6th Cir. 2012). Habeas corpus is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy 

to the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. See Charles v. Chandler, 180 

F.3d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1999). The burden of showing that the remedy afforded under § 

2255 is inadequate or ineffective rests with the petitioner and the mere fact that a prior 

motion to vacate sentence may have proven unsuccessful does not necessarily meet that 

burden. In re Gregory, 181 F.3d 713, 714 (6th Cir. 1999). The remedy afforded under § 

2255 is not considered inadequate or ineffective simply because § 2255 relief has already 

been denied, or because the petitioner has been procedurally barred from pursuing relief 

under § 2255, or because the petitioner has been denied permission to file a second or 

successive motion to vacate sentence. Wooten, 677 F.3d at 303; Charles, 180 F.3d at 756; 

Hervey v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Similarly, a habeas 

petitioner’s § 2255 remedy is not inadequate merely because the petitioner permitted the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) one year statute of 

limitations to expire. Charles, 180 F.3d at 758. 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 6 of 11 Pg ID 28
7 

The circumstances under which a motion to vacate sentence brought pursuant to § 

2255 might be deemed inadequate and ineffective so as to permit relief via a writ of 

habeas corpus under § 2241 are narrow, as the “liberal allowance” of the writ would 

defeat the restrictions placed on successive petitions or motions for collateral relief 

imposed by the AEDPA. United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001). 

To date, no federal circuit court has permitted a post-AEDPA petitioner who was not 

effectively making a claim of “actual innocence” to use § 2241 (via § 2255’s savings 

clause) as a way of circumventing § 2255’s restriction on the filing of a second or 

successive motion to vacate sentence. Charles, 180 F.3d at 757. 

Petitioner does not allege that her remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate 

for her to bring a post-conviction challenge to her federal conviction, nor does she claim 

actual innocence (with respect to the Northern District of Ohio conviction or any other 

conviction.) Without any allegation that her remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or 

ineffective, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief from her criminal conviction and 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moreover, this Court cannot construe this petition 

as a motion to vacate sentence brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See In re Shelton, 

295 F. 3d 620, 622 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Lastly, habeas relief is not warranted because Petitioner fails to show that her 

alleged detention is unlawful. Petitioner claims that the Marshals Service cannot detain 

her because they lack any security interest in her person, and do not have any contract 

with her or in admiralty to grant them jurisdiction over her case. This claim is frivolous. 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 7 of 11 Pg ID 29
8 

Not surprisingly, Petitioner cites no support for the proposition that the federal 

government needs a security interest in someone in order to prosecute or detain them. 

Nor can she prevent these actions by declaring a security interest in herself pursuant to 

the UCC. See Van Hazel v. Luoma, No. 05–cv–73401–DT, 2005 WL 2837356, at *2 

(E.D. Mich. October 27, 2005) (“Petitioner cannot divest the State of Michigan of 

jurisdiction to prosecute him of a criminal offense simply by declaring a security interest 

in himself pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code or having another person do so.”); 

see also Kerr v. Hedrick, 89 F. App’x 962, 963 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting petitioner’s 

claim that he was exempt from punishment for his federal crimes because his rights 

derived exclusively from the Moorish Science Temple of America); United States v. 

Studley, 783 F. 2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that despite defendant’s contention 

that she was an absolute, freeborn and natural individual, she was a “person” under the 

Internal Revenue code and thus subject to prosecution for willful failure to file tax 

returns); State v. Arnold, 379 N.W. 2d 322, 323 (S.D. 1986) (holding that the trial court 

had jurisdiction over criminal defendant, even though defendant had declared natural 

individual sovereignty and declared the revocation of his marriage license, birth 

certificate, limited liability for perpetual succession of debt and credit, and social security 

indentures); United States v. Williams, 532 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D. N.J. 1981) (rejecting 

claim that federal government lacked jurisdiction to prosecute defendant who claimed to 

be a citizen of the “Republic of New Afrika,” finding that this was not a sovereign nation 

recognized by the United States, but was, at most, a separatist movement). 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 8 of 11 Pg ID 30
9 

In addition, the Uniform Commercial Code is inapplicable to criminal proceedings 

and cannot bar jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. See United States v. Humphrey, 

287 F. 3d 422, 435 (6th Cir. 2002); overruled on other grounds by, United States v. 

Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Holloway, 11 F. App’x 398, 

400 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Chandler, 2005 WL 1640083, at * 2 . 

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the Petition is facially insufficient to enable a 

grant of habeas relief and will summarily dismiss it. 

B. Motion for Default Judgment 

On October 16, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 55. (Dkt. 6.) Petitioner claims that because no response to her Petition 

has been filed, she is entitled to an immediate release from custody. This argument is unavailing 

because default judgments are not available in habeas corpus proceedings. Allen v. Perini, 424 

F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1970) (“Rule 55(a) has no application in habeas corpus cases . . . .”), 

superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Cobb v. Perini, 832 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.1987). 

C. Motion to Expunge 

Petitioner also filed a “Motion to Expunge due to Fraud all State of Michigan and United 

States of America Case/Item in the Strawman Name Jeanne Herrington.” (Dkt. 7.) Petitioner 

asserts that the government has acted with “unclean hands” with respect to her arrests and 

convictions. 

This Court’s jurisdiction to hear motions to expunge convictions or arrests is “limited” in 

the absence of an enabling federal statute. United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 915 (6th Cir. 

2014). The Sixth Circuit stated in Field that in such a circumstance, “federal courts lack ancillary 

jurisdiction over motions for expungement based on purely equitable considerations, yet retain 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 9 of 11 Pg ID 31
10 

ancillary jurisdiction over motions challenging an unconstitutional conviction.” Id.; see also

United States v. Robinson, 79 F.3d 1149, at *2 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (“[F]ederal courts 

have most readily invoked the expungement power with respect to illegal convictions, 

convictions under statutes later deemed unconstitutional, and convictions obtained through 

governmental misconduct.”). And “even where a motion for expungement not only raises 

equitable grounds but also challenges an unconstitutional conviction or illegal arrest, the 

assertion of ancillary jurisdiction must enable the court ‘to manage its proceedings, vindicate its 

authority, and effectuate its decrees.’” Id.

The Court is unaware of any statutory authority that would enable it to expunge 

Petitioner’s known federal and state convictions. Petitioner does not allege that her past 

convictions were unconstitutional; instead, she asserts that unspecified government officials have 

acted with “unclean hands” with respect to her convictions. This unsupported allegation is 

insufficient to invoke this Court’s ancillary jurisdiction. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Expunge will be denied. 

III.CONCLUSION 

Based upon the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 is SUMMARILY DENIED and Petitioner’s Motions for Default Judgment and 

to Expunge are DENIED. Because a certificate of appealability is not needed to appeal the 

denial of a habeas petition filed under § 2241, Witham v. United States, 355 F. 3d 501, 504 (6th 

Cir. 2004), petitioner need not apply for one with this Court or with the Sixth Circuit before 

filing an appeal from the denial of her habeas petition. 

s/Laurie J. Michelson 

LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: January 21, 2015 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 10 of 11 Pg ID 32
11 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the 

attorneys and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on January 21, 2015. 

 s/Jane Johnson 

Case Manager to 

 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

2:14-cv-13395-LJM-PJK Doc # 8 Filed 01/21/15 Pg 11 of 11 Pg ID 33