UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 8, 2007

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-23 INADVERTENT DISCHARGE OF HALON 1301

FIRE-SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FROM

INCORRECT AND/OR OUT-OF-DATE

PROCEDURES

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have

permanently ended operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from

the reactor vessel. All holders of licenses for fuel cycle facilities.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of a recent event at a fuel cycle facility that involved the inadvertent discharge of a

Halon 1301 fire-suppression system, as well as deficiencies in fire protection program

elements, procedures, and administrative controls. NRC expects that recipients of this IN will

review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action nor written response is required. 

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The following describes the site condition that existed, and sequence of events that occurred,

which led to inadvertent discharge of a Halon 1301 fire-suppression system at an NRC licensed

fuel cycle facility.

In December 2006, a small fire started on a heat trace for piping that was located outdoors at a

licensed facility. A security station was contacted, the fire was announced, and the fire brigade

was dispatched. The fire was immediately extinguished and power was removed from the

circuit. After the fire was extinguished, supervision at the scene requested the security officer

who was manning the security station to activate a manual fire alarm pull station, since plant fire

protection procedures required the sounding of the plant fire alarm for any fire. As a result of

miscommunication, the security officer activated a manual pull station that was associated with

the Halon 1301 fire-suppression system, intended to protect the security station. Activation of

this pull station resulted in the discharge of Halon into the security station. 

ML071510558 
IN 2007-23

Page 2 of 4

A manual fire alarm pull station had been previously located in the security station, but had

been removed for the installation of a new fire alarm panel and had not yet been re-installed. In

addition, the manual pull station associated with the Halon was in the area.

In this particular instance, the Halon 1301 fire-suppression system located in the security

station is not credited in the licensee’s safety basis to meet the requirements of either Title

10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Sections 70.61 or 70.64 of 10 CFR Part 70,

“Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material”, since neither process equipment nor special

nuclear materials exists in the security station.

After the Halon discharged, a plant supervisor directed that the Halon fire-suppression system

be reset. The facility industrial safety specialist responsible for fire safety attempted to reset the

Halon fire-suppression system. During this procedure, the Halon fire-suppression system was

again actuated and the back-up tank was discharged. The two discharges depleted all Halon,

causing the Halon 1301 fire- suppression system for the security station to be out of service. 

The licensee then implemented a fire-protection system impairment response, using

appropriate compensatory measures. 

The licensee’s root cause evaluation determined that the lack of a manual fire pull station in the

security station was identified as early as July 2006. A letter was sent to the security

department from plant safety, noting the lack of a pull station, and that the security station

operator would simply need to announce the fire and location over the plant paging system. 

This deviation from existing procedures was not communicated to shift operations personnel

and was not incorporated into applicable plant procedures. The lack of up-to-date fire response

procedures, coupled with poor communications, led directly to the inadvertent Halon discharge

and the disabling of the fire-suppression system. As a corrective action, the licensee installed a

fire alarm pull station in the security station.

The licensee also determined that there was no plant procedure for resetting the Halon

fire-suppression system and the reset had been performed via skill-of-the craft, by an Industrial

Safety Specialist who was generally knowledgeable of Halon fire-suppression systems. 

However, the Halon fire-suppression system had been maintained and serviced by an outside

vendor. As a result, there was no specific procedural guidance for resetting the system back to

normal operations. 

Additionally, it was noted that over several years, pressure in the Halon 1301 cylinders was

allowed to decrease approximately 100 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) below the initial

charging pressure (360 to 400 psig). This conflicts with National Fire Protection Association

12A, “Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems,” which indicates refilling or

replacing a Halon 1301 cylinder when the pressure drops by 10 percent or more. Although

monthly tank readings taken by the licensee, as well as an outside contractor, indicated that a

slow system leak was in progress, no corrective action was taken and the deficiency was not

entered into the licensee’s corrective action system. 
IN 2007-23

Page 3 of 4

BACKGROUND

10 CFR 70.61, “Performance Requirements,” requires that certain fuel cycle licensees

authorized to possess a critical mass of special nuclear material meet performance

requirements for all credible high- or intermediate consequence events including radiological or

chemical releases as a result of fires. Licensees and certificate holders regulated under

10 CFR Part 40, “Domestic Licensing of Source Material,” or 10 CFR Part 76, “Certification of

Gaseous Diffusion Plants,” must also meet fire safety requirements that may require an

operable automatic suppression system.

Additionally, 10 CFR 50.48, “Fire Protection,” states that each operating nuclear power plant

must have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3, “Fire Protection,” in Appendix A,

“General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities,” and that this plan must describe specific features

necessary to implement the fire protection program such as automatic and manually operated

fire detection and suppression systems.

Recent NRC Generic Communications Related to Fire Protection

• NRC IN 2007-19, “Faulty Active Fire Protection Equipment,” May 21, 2007;

• NRC IN 2007-17, “Fires at Nuclear Power Plants Involving Inadequate Fire Protection

Administrative and Design Controls,” May 3, 2007;

• NRC IN 2005-32, “Product Alert for Fire Hydrants,” December 23, 2005;

• NRC IN 2005-01, “Halon Fire-Extinguishing System Piping Incorrectly Connected,”

February 4, 2005; and

• NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-07, “Compensatory Measures to Satisfy the Fire

Protection Program Requirements,” April 19, 2005.

DISCUSSION

Fire protection suppression and detection system reliability and performance capabilities are a

primary feature of defense-in-depth and must be maintained to achieve effectiveness in

preventing fire damage to structures, systems, and components important to safety.

In this event, the licensee’s fire protection program failed to provide adequate procedural,

administrative, and design controls to prevent inadvertent Halon 1301 fire-suppression system

actuation. 
IN 2007-23

Page 4 of 4

CONTACTS

This IN does not require any specific action nor written response. Please direct any questions

about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) or Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) project

manager. 

/RA/ /RA by TQuay for/

__________________________ _____________________________

Robert C. Pierson, Director Michael J. Case, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety Division of Policy and Rulemaking

 and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

 and Safeguards

Technical Contacts:

Rex Wescott, NMSS Naeem Iqbal, NRR

301-492-3107 301-415-3346

E-mail: rgw@nrc.gov E-mail: nxi@nrc.gov

Enclosure: List of Recently Issued FSME-NMSS Generic Communications

Note: A full listing of NRC generic communications may be viewed on the NRC public Web Site:

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
IN 2007-23

Page 4 of 4

CONTACTS

This IN does not require any specific action nor written response. Please direct any questions

about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) or Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) project

manager. 

/RA/ /RA by TQuay for/

__________________________ _____________________________

Robert C. Pierson, Director Michael J. Case, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety Division of Policy and Rulemaking

 and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

 and Safeguards

Technical Contacts:

Rex Wescott, NMSS Naeem Iqbal, NRR

301-492-3107 301-415-3346

E-mail: rgw@nrc.gov E-mail: nxi@nrc.gov

Enclosure: List of Recently Issued FSME-NMSS Generic Communications

Note: A full listing of NRC generic communications may be viewed on the NRC public Web Site:

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

Distribution: 

IN r/f FFLD r/f ECB r/f 

ADAMS Accession Number: ML071510558

OFFICE FFLD FFLD FSME Tech Ed FFLD NRR

NAME RWescott LWilliamson AMcIntosh EKraus (via fax) BSmith SWeerakkody

DATE 06/01/07 06/04/07 05/29/07 06/15/07 06/07/07 07/24/07

OFFICE NRR NRR NRR NRR FCSS

NAME CHawes DBeaulieu MMurphy TQuay for MCase RPierson

DATE 07/30/07 07/30/07 08/06/07 08/06/07 08/08/07

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 2007-23

Page 1 of 2

Enclosure

Recently Issued 

Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs/ 

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Generic Communications

Date GC No. Subject Addressees

02/02/07 IN 07-03 Reportable Medical Events

Involving Patients Receiving

Dosages of Sodium Iodide

Iodine-131 less than the

Prescribed Dosage Because

of Capsules Remaining in

Vials after Administration

All NRC medical use licensees

and NRC Master Materials

Licensees. All Agreement State

Radiation Control Program

Directors and State Liaison

Officers.

02/28/07 IN 07-08 Potential Vulnerabilities of

Time-reliant Computer-based

Systems Due to Change in

Daylight Saving Time Dates

All NRC licensees and all

Agreement State Radiation

Control Program Directors and

State Liaison Officers.

03/15/07 IN 07-10 Yttrium-90 Theraspheres®

and Sirspheres® Impurities

All NRC Medical Licensees and

NRC Master Materials Licensees. 

All Agreement State Radiation

Control Program Directors and

State Liaison Officers.

04/04/07 IN 07-13 Use of As-Found Conditions

to Evaluate Criticality-related

Process Upsets at Fuel

Cycle Facilities

All licensees authorized to

possess a critical mass of special

nuclear material.

05/02/07 IN 07-16 Common Violations of the

Increased Controls

Requirements and Related

Guidance Documents

All licensees who are

implementing the NRC Order

Imposing Increased Controls

(EA-05-090), issued

November 14, 2005, and

December 22, 2005.

03/01/07 RIS 07-03 Ionizing Radiation Warning

Symbol

All NRC licensees and certificate

holders. All Radiation Control

Program Directors and State

Liaison Officers
IN 2007-23

Page 2 of 2

Date GC No. Subject Addressees

Enclosure

03/09/07 RIS 07-04 Personally Identifiable

Information Submitted to the

NRC

All holders of operating licenses

for nuclear power reactors and

holders of and applicants for

certificates for reactor designs. 

All licensees, certificate holders,

applicants, and other entities

subject to regulation by the NRC

of the use of source, byproduct,

and special nuclear material. 

03/20/07 RIS 07-05 Status and Plans for

Implementation of NRC

Regulatory Authority for

Certain Naturally-occurring

and Accelerator-produced

Radioactive Material

All NRC materials licensees,

Radiation Control Program

Directors, State Liaison Officers,

and NRC’s Advisory Committee

on the Medical Uses of Isotopes. 

04/05/07 RIS 07-07 Clarification of Increased

Controls for Licensees That

Possess Collocated

Radioactive Material During

Transportation Activities 

All NRC licensees issued NRC’s

Order Imposing Increased

Controls and all Radiation Control

Program Directors and State

Liaison Officers. 

05/04/07 RIS 07-09 Examples of Recurring

Requests for Additional

Information for

10 CFR Part 71 and 72

Applications

All holders of, and applicants for,

a: (1) 10 CFR Part 71 certificate

of compliance (CoC) for a

radioactive material transportation

package; (2) 10 CFR Part 72 CoC

for a spent fuel storage cask; and

(3) 10 CFR Part 72 specific

license for an independent spent

fuel storage installation.

05/15/07 RIS 07-10 Subscriptions To New List

Server For Automatic

Notifications Of

Medical-Related Generic

Communications, Federal

Register Notices And

Newsletters

All NRC medical-use licensees

and NRC Master Materials

licensees. All Radiation Control

Program Directors and State

Liaison Officers.

Note: A full listing of NRC generic communications may be viewed on the NRC public Web Site:

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.