UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DERRICK CAIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

MICHIGAN, RICK SNYDER, KAREN 

JOHNSON, and MICHIGAN STATE 

POLICE, 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 14-12567 

Hon. Patrick J. Duggan 

 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Pro se Plaintiff Derrick Cain instituted this civil rights action against 

Defendants State of Michigan, Governor Rick Snyder, Karen Johnson, and the 

Michigan State Police (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

on June 30, 2014. In his Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of 

Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA” or “Act”), as amended in 

2011, and seeks monetary and equitable relief. Plaintiff claims that the Act’s 

provisions violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the constitutional 

prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws, the Eighth Amendment, 

and also violate state law. 

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 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff declined to respond to 

Defendants’ Motion despite being apprised of the timeframe in which to do so. 

Having determined oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional 

process, the Court dispensed with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of 

Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ Motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory History 

 “In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 

and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, title 17, 108 Stat. 2038, as 

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, which conditions certain federal law enforcement 

funding on the States’ adoption of sex offender registration laws and sets minimum 

standards for state programs.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 

1145 (2003). Although the federal statute gave the states three years from 

September 1, 1994 within which to create registration programs, 42 U.S.C. § 

14071(f)(1) (1994), Michigan first enacted SORA in 1994.1

 Doe v. Snyder, 932 F. 

 1

 By 1996, every State, the District of Colombia, and the Federal 

Government had enacted some variation of Megan’s Law.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 89-

90, 123 S. Ct. at 1145. 

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Supp. 2d 803, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Akella v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 67 F. 

Supp. 2d 716, 720 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 

The SORA 

requires individuals convicted of one of the enumerated criminal 

sexual offenses to register and to update their address within ten days 

of relocation. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.723(a), (b); MICH. COMP. 

LAWS § 28.729. In the event that an individual fails to register, the 

Act provides such conduct constitutes a felony. The Michigan 

Department of State Police is required to maintain a repository of the 

information compiled pursuant to the Act in the form of a 

computerized database. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.728. 

Akella, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 720. The law enforcement database, which is distinct 

from the publically-accessible website, contains a wealth of information about 

individuals required to register. 2 Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1) 

(delineating information required upon registration and kept in a law enforcement 

database) with Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(2) (setting forth the required contents 

for the website. The publically-accessible information kept on the website 

includes:

(a) The individual’s legal name and any aliases, nicknames, ethnic or 

tribal names, or other names by which the individual is or has been 

known. 

 2

 “The SORA, as it was first enacted, was designed as a tool solely for law 

enforcement agencies, and registry records were kept confidential. 1994 Mich. 

Pub. Acts 295 (‘[A] registration is confidential and shall not be open to inspection 

except for law enforcement purposes.’). As of September 1, 1999, however, the 

SORA was amended to create the [State of Michigan’s Public Sex Offender 

Registry], which can be accessed by anyone via the internet.” Doe XIV v. Mich. 

Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007). 

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(b) The individual’s date of birth. 

(c) The address where the individual resides. . . . 

(d) The address of each of the individual’s employers. For purposes of 

this subdivision, “employer” includes a contractor and any individual 

who has agreed to hire or contract with the individual for his or her 

services. . . . 

(e) The address of any school being attended by the individual and 

any school that has accepted the individual as a student that he or she 

plans to attend. . . . 

(f) The license plate number or registration number and description of 

any motor vehicle, aircraft, or vessel owned or regularly operated by 

the individual. 

(g) A brief summary of the individual’s convictions for listed offenses 

regardless of when the conviction occurred. 

(h) A complete physical description of the individual. 

(i) The photograph required under this act. . . . 

(j) The text of the provision of law that defines the criminal offense 

for which the sex offender is registered. 

(k) The individual’s registration status. 

(l) The individual’s tier classification. 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(2). While there is overlap between the contents of 

the database and the website, it suffices to say that the database is far more 

exhaustive, as one would expect from a law enforcement tool. 

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 “Since its adoption [in 1994, the] SORA has undergone numerous 

amendments.” Doe, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 

In 1997, SORA was amended to require law enforcement agencies to 

make registry information available to the public during business 

hours. A 1999 amendment increased the number of offenses for 

which registration was required and mandated that a less-detailed 

version of the registry be made available to the public online. 

SORA was again amended in 2002, 2004, and 2006. These 

amendments, among other things, increased reporting requirements 

for registrants; removed the registration requirement for individuals 

convicted under the HYTA after October 1, 2004; barred registrants 

from working, residing, or loitering within 1,000 feet of a school; and 

created a program whereby members of the public could be notified 

electronically when a sex offender moved into a particular zip code. 

The most recent amendment to SORA came in 2011, which 

significantly altered the statute to comply with the federal Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 

16901, et seq. As amended in 2011, SORA now categorizes 

registrants into three tiers which determine the length of time 

individuals must register and the frequency with which they must 

report. Tier classifications are based solely on a registrant’s offense 

and do not factor in an individualized determination of risk. There is 

no way to reduce one’s tier classification or to remove oneself from 

the list. SORA 2011 extended the length of registration for most 

registrants, and individuals who were assigned to Tier III, Plaintiff[] 

included, are now required to register for life. The 2011 amendment 

also (1) expanded the in-person reporting requirement to require 

registrants to report to the police station within three days of 

establishing any new electronic mail address, instant message address, 

or other designation used in Internet communications or postings; (2) 

expanded registrants’ reporting obligations before traveling; and (3) 

increases the number of times registrants must regularly report inperson each year. 

Id. 

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B. Plaintiff 

 Plaintiff was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree on 

May 16, 1997. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff served a term of incarceration and was 

released from custody on February 15, 2011. (Id.) As the preceding section makes 

clear, SORA was amended several times in the years after Plaintiff’s conviction. 

These amendments impacted Plaintiff in various ways, one of which is that at the 

time of his conviction, Plaintiff was only required to register as a sex offender for 

ten years, whereas now, Plaintiff is classified as a Tier III offender and must, 

therefore, register for the duration of his natural life. 

 As a result of being required to register, Plaintiff lost a job with an employer 

who “was aware of his background[]” but succumbed to pressure from community 

members who “brought complaints based on subjective fears” of Plaintiff’s sexoffender status. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff asserts that the public nature of the sex 

offender registry has rendered him susceptible to other harms as well. For 

instance, “[P]laintiff has been followed, his house was shot up in 2012 while he 

was in it, several breakin [sic] attempts have occurred[.]” (Id.) Moreover, “the 

SORA obligations deprive [P]laintiff of any private life, and are tantamount to 

being displayed in a video zoo, where [P]laintiff can be tracked, hunted[,] . . . 

monitored, harassed, in all of his every day activities, where he works, travels, . . . 

lives” and further deprive Plaintiff of his “ability to hide or be left alone[.]” (Id.) 

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C. Legal Proceedings

 Plaintiff instituted the present action on June 30, 2014 challenging the 2011 

amendments to SORA, naming as defendants the State of Michigan and the 

Michigan State Police, as well as Governor Snyder and Karen Johnson, both of 

whom are named in their individual and official capacities.3

 

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain separate counts, he appears 

to generally claim that the retroactive nature of SORA and its extensive reporting 

requirements violate his constitutional rights. The Court construes Plaintiff’s 

pleading as containing claims arising under: (1) the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 

United States Constitution; (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment; (3) the Eighth Amendment; (4) the substantive component of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and (5) unspecified state laws. 

 On November 12, 2014, Defendants collectively moved to dismiss the entire 

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff declined to 

file a response. 

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows 

the Court to assess whether a plaintiff’s pleadings state a claim upon which relief 

 3

 Defendants have indicated that Karen Johnson “is an employee of the 

Michigan State Police and is the manager of the Sex Offender Registration united 

within the Department of State Police.” (Defs.’ Br. 2 n.1.) 

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may be granted. As articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, “[t]o 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). This facial 

plausibility standard requires claimants to put forth “enough fact[s] to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the requisite 

elements of their claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Even 

though a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its “factual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 

2007) (citation omitted). 

While courts are required to accept the factual allegations in a complaint as 

true, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, the presumption of truth does 

not apply to a claimant’s legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 

1949. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s pleading for relief 

must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 502 

F.3d at 548 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

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Compared to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, a generally less stringent 

standard is applied when construing the allegations pleaded in a pro se 

complaint. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972); see 

also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) 

(reaffirming rule of more liberal construction of pro se complaints less than two 

weeks after issuing Twombly). The leniency with which courts construe pro se 

plaintiffs’ complaints, however, does not abrogate the basic pleading requirements 

designed to ensure that courts do “not have to guess at the nature of the claim 

asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Pro se plaintiffs 

still must provide more than bare assertions of legal conclusions to survive a 

motion to dismiss. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 

1988)). Likewise, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient 

treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338, 

344 (6th Cir. 2006). 

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on several different 

grounds. First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to put them on 

notice of the nature of the claims Plaintiff has brought and the grounds upon which 

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those claims rest.4 Second, Defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment to 

the United States Constitution bars Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Michigan 

and the Michigan State Police, as well as Plaintiff’s claims seeking monetary relief 

against Snyder and Johnson in their official capacities. Next, Defendants argue 

that Snyder and Johnson are shielded from suit in their individual capacities by 

virtue of the doctrine of qualified immunity.5

 Fourth, and lastly, Defendants 

contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that the SORA, or any of its 

subsequent amendments, abridges his constitutional rights, thus rendering him 

incapable of establishing the requisite elements of a claim pursuant to § 1983.6

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

1. The State of Michigan and the Michigan State Police

 4

 The Court does not address this line of argumentation, as it is fairly clear 

what Plaintiff is complaining of. While it is true that “[t]here are no factual 

allegations stating what actions either Governor Snyder or Karen Johnson 

performed[,]” given their respective positions, the Court is able to draw the 

necessary inferences regarding why Plaintiff might have named them as defendants 

in the present action. 

5

 Unlike the Eleventh Amendment, a defendant’s invocation of the defense 

of qualified immunity is not jurisdictional. Because the Court ultimately concludes 

that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable legal claim under any theory he has set 

forth in his pleading, the Court need not address Defendants’ contention that 

Governor Snyder and Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity. 

6

 In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) the 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) 

caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 

606 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

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Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s maintenance of the suit against the State of 

Michigan and the Michigan State Police are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as 

the State’s immunity from suit has been neither abrogated nor waived. 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The 

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 

law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state.” U.S. 

Const. amend. XI. This Amendment has been interpreted as “an explicit limitation 

of the judicial power of the United States.” Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25, 54 

S. Ct. 18, 20 (1993). In the absence of consent or congressional abrogation, a suit 

in which a State or one of its departments or agencies is named as a defendant is 

proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908 (1984) (citing Fla. Dep’t of 

Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S. Ct. 1032 

(1981)); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 

2309-10 (1989). The applicability of the Eleventh Amendment is a question of 

law. Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 104 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Plaintiff has not identified any facts that would support a finding that 

the State has waived its immunity or that Congress has expressly overridden it. As 

such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Michigan and 

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the Michigan State Police are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.7 See, e.g., 

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S. Ct. at 908 (“It is clear, of course, that in the 

absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is 

named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”). “This 

jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Id.; Cory v. 

White, 457 U.S. 85, 91, 102 S. Ct. 2325, 2329 (1982) (“[T]he Eleventh 

Amendment by its very terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a 

remedy available only from equity.”). Further, the Eleventh Amendment applies 

even to state law claims sought to be brought in federal court under pendent 

jurisdiction. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 120, 104 S. Ct. at 919 (“The Eleventh 

Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force to [pendent] 

jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims.”). 

As such, the Court must dismiss the State of Michigan and the Michigan State 

Police from this lawsuit. 

2. Defendants Snyder and Johnson 

 Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages 

against Defendants Snyder and Johnson, arguing that the State is the “real, 

substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity.” 

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1356 (1974) (quotation 

 7

 The Michigan State Police is a principal department of the State of 

Michigan. Mich. Const. art. V, § 2 (1963). 

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omitted). The Court agrees. Accordingly, Defendants Snyder and Johnson are 

dismissed from the action to the extent that Plaintiff seeks retrospective monetary 

relief from them in their individual capacities. 

B. Plaintiff’s Individual Claims 

1. Ex Post Facto Clause 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ex post facto claim fails as a matter of law 

because the SORA, as amended in 2011, is not a criminal statute but rather is a 

civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme designed to protect the public, not punish 

offenders. 

The Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause provides, in pertinent part: “No 

state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 

This clause prohibits legislative enactments constituting retroactive punishment. 

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S. Ct. at 1146. “To fall within the ex post facto 

prohibition, a law must be retrospective--that is it must apply to events occurring 

before its enactment--and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by 

altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the 

crime.” Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lynce v. 

Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S. Ct. 891, 896 (1997) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted)). 

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Judicial inquiry into the underlying purpose of legislative enactments 

challenged as violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause requires an assessment of 

“whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Smith, 

538 U.S. at 92, 123 S. Ct. at 1146-47 (quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court 

explained in Smith: 

If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends 

the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory 

scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine 

whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either in purpose or 

effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’” Ibid. 

(quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 65 L. Ed. 2d 

742, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980)). Because we “ordinarily defer to the 

legislature’s stated intent,” Hendricks, supra, at 361, “‘only the 

clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform 

what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” 

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450, 118 S. 

Ct. 488 (1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 249); see also Hendricks, 

supra, at 361; United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 135 L. Ed. 

2d 549, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996); United States v. One Assortment of 89 

Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365, 79 L. Ed. 2d 361, 104 S. Ct. 1099 

(1984). 

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S. Ct. at 1147. 

Numerous federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have rejected the 

argument that sex offender registration and notification constitutes an ex post facto

punishment forbidden by the Constitutional prohibition against retroactive 

punishment. See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06, 123 S. Ct. at 1154 (holding, in a 

case of first impression, that the State of Alaska’s sex offender act “is nonpunitive, 

and its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause”); 

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Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 477 (“Because the [Tennessee] Act imposes no punishment, 

the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated.”). Indeed, the Honorable Robert H. 

Cleland, another judge in this district, issued an Opinion and Order in March of 

2013 addressing the constitutionality of the 2011 amendments to SORA. Upon 

exhaustively analyzing the plaintiffs’ ex post facto claim under the framework set 

forth in Smith and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 

554, 567-68 (1963), Judge Cleland concluded that the “SORA, as amended in 

2011, is a regulatory, not criminal statute. Accordingly, [the plaintiffs’ ex post 

facto challenge] must be dismissed because SORA does not, as a matter of law, 

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Doe, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 814. 

Having reviewed the considerable case law on the ex post facto implications 

of sex offender registration and notification statutes, the Court finds Judge 

Cleland’s analysis and rationale persuasive.8

 Therefore, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff’s challenge to the 2011 amendments to SORA fails to state a claim under 

the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. 

2. Double Jeopardy Clause

 8

 The Court notes that it has previously rejected an ex post facto challenge to 

the SORA, Akella, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 733-34, and references Judge Cleland’s more 

recent opinion because it addresses the 2011 amendments to the Act. 

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 To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that the Act punishes him twice for the 

same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,9

 the 

Sixth Circuit upheld the State of Tennessee’s sex offender registration act against a 

double jeopardy challenge in Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 473-76 (6th Cir. 

1999). Relying on the seven-factor test articulated in Kennedy, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. 

Ct. 554 – the same test employed in the Ex Post Facto Clause setting – the panel 

concluded “that the Act does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.” 

Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 476. 

 As established in relation to Plaintiff’s ex post facto claim, the SORA’s 

purpose is regulatory, not punitive. As such, it does not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause, which “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal

punishments for the same offense, . . . and then only when such occurs in 

successive proceedings.” Id. at 473 (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). 

3. Eighth Amendment

 Plaintiff alleges that the SORA violates the Eighth Amendment. (Compl. ¶ 

20.) This amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. 

 9

 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant 

part, “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 

jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies to 

the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the 

doctrine known as incorporation. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 

2056 (1969). 

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Const. amend. VIII. The contours of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim are not 

entirely clear, as Plaintiff alleges that enactment of the SORA created “a pervasive 

risk of harm where plaintiff’s house was shot up with plaintiff clinging to the floor 

for his life, loss of plaintiff’s job, attempts to break in his house and him being 

followed have occurred, defendants had actual knowledge of the subjective risk 

and failed to take measures and in fact continue to create greater risk of harm 

where the information plaintiff is obligated to give is given to the public and not 

limited to law enforcement, leaving plaintiff in continuous fear for his safety, 

creating a greater problem instead of solving it.” (Compl. ¶ 20.) 

 To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the Act violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has 

already concluded that the Act is regulatory in nature, not punitive. In other words, 

the Act is not punishment, therefore rendering the Eighth Amendment 

inapplicable. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 477 (“We have already concluded that the Act 

does not impose punishment; it is regulatory in nature. Therefore, it does not 

violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”). 

The Court is mindful of its duty to construe pro se pleadings more liberally 

than those drafted by attorneys. While not required to create arguments on behalf 

of unrepresented litigants, the Court notes that the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint are capable of being construed as alleging a claim arising from the 

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substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.10 

However, to the extent such a construction is possible, the claim fails as a matter of 

law because “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 

State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by 

private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, 

not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.” DeShaney v. 

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 

(1989). 

4. Right to Privacy

 According to Plaintiff, the Act infringes on constitutionally protected 

privacy interests by compiling and disseminating “information that is not a matter 

of public record[.]” (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff complains that the publicallyaccessible registry contains highly-private details of his personal life, such as “[his] 

personal property, private education, medical records, employers, contractors, 

routes he travels, e-mail address, home address, employer address, where he goes, 

cars[] he may own or use, his address, licences [sic], as well as the very right to 

control the use of one’s own name, picture, or likeness [] and to prevent another 

 10 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states 

from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 

law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

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from using it for commercial benefit without plaintiff’s consent.”11 (Id.) 

According to Plaintiff, “[t]his unjustified exploitation an[d] intrusion into one’s 

personal activities impedes the right to just be left alone.” (Id.) 

 As an initial matter, Plaintiff appears to misapprehend the distinction 

between the information contained in the Michigan State Police law enforcement 

database and the information made available to the public on the internet website. 

Michigan Compiled Laws § 28.728, the portion of the SORA describing the 

information sex offenders must provide upon registering under the Act, makes 

clear that the information that the Michigan State Police must maintain in “a 

computerized law enforcement database” is more expansive than the information 

contained on the “public internet website[,]” which, it bears emphasizing, is 

“separate from the law enforcement database[.]” Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.728(1)-

(2). The publically-accessible website does not, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, 

contain Plaintiff’s medical records, email address, or professional licenses, nor 

does it describe the routes Plaintiff often travels or places he frequents. The 

website does, however, provide information regarding Plaintiff’s place of 

residence, employment, and educational institution, as well as the license plate 

number and description of any motor vehicle owned or regularly operated by him. 

The Court must therefore determine whether the information contained on the 

 11 The Court notes that it is entirely unclear from the Complaint how the 

website commercially exploits images of sex offenders. 

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website infringes Plaintiff’s constitutionally-protected privacy rights, rights 

stemming from the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause. 

 “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects 

‘fundamental rights’ that are so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that 

“’neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Doe XIV v. Mich. 

Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 499 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Palko v. 

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937)). Rights qualifying for 

such constitutional protection include “the rights to marry, to have children, to 

direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use 

contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” Id. (quoting Washington v. 

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) (internal citations 

omitted)). While the Supreme Court has intimated that substantive due process 

may protect “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” 

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S. Ct. 869, 876 (1977), the right has been 

construed narrowly, and the Sixth Circuit in Cutshall indicated that the 

constitutional right of privacy “does not provide” sex offenders “with a right to 

keep [their] registry information private,” 193 F.3d at 481. 

 Each federal appellate court considering substantive due process arguments 

against the registration requirement of sex-offender registries has found that the 

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21 

laws mandating the registry are constitutional. Doe XIV, 490 F.3d at 500 (citing 

Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the right to 

refuse under a sex-offender statute is not a fundamental rights); Doe v. Tandeske, 

361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[P]ersons who have been 

convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from . 

. . registration and notification requirements. . . .”); Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 

639, 643 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the sex-offender registration statute does 

not infringe the plaintiff’s fundamental right to a presumption of innocence); Paul 

P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the effects of 

registering under a sex-offender registration statute fail “to fall within the 

penumbra of constitutional privacy protection”)). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has 

“reiterate[d] that ‘not all rights of privacy or interests in nondisclosure of private 

information are of constitutional dimension, so as to require balancing government 

action against individual privacy.’” Id. (quoting Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 

136 F.3d 1055, 1062 (6th Cir. 1998) (analyzing the substantive due process rights 

of undercover police officers in not having their personal identifying information 

disclosed to criminal defendants)). Because no fundamental right is implicated, the 

Court applies rational basis review. Id. at 501. 

 Plaintiff’s claim that widespread dissemination of information concerning 

his conviction of a sex offense is somehow violative of his right to privacy ignores 

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22 

the inescapable fact that this information is already the subject of public record. 

With respect to the other information contained on the website, this Court has 

previously held that “the dissemination of an offender’s address does not violate 

any constitutionally protected privacy interests.” Akella, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 

This is because “the ‘nature and significance’ of the state’s interest justifies the 

intrusion on [Plaintiff’s] interests.” Id. (quotation omitted). The remaining 

information on the website withstands rational basis review because the public’s 

interest in preventing and protecting against future criminal sexual acts by 

convicted sex offenders justifies the collection and dissemination of the website’s 

contents. Doe XIV, 490 F.3d at 501. 

 Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s substantive due process challenge 

to the SORA. 

5. State Law Claims

 Plaintiff raises two claims that appear to rest in state law: a claim that sex 

offender registration “encroaches on the final judgment of the sentencing court,” 

therefore violating separation-of-powers principles, and a claim that requiring his 

signature on registration forms creates some kind of “unconscionable agreement.” 

(Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21.) 

Having dismissed the federal causes of action, the Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims referenced in the Complaint. 

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over 

which it had original jurisdiction.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

constitutional challenges to the SORA fail to state a plausible claim for relief 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and 

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims are 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff’s right to re-file the claims in 

state court. 

Dated: January 20, 2015 

 s/Patrick J. Duggan 

 PATRICK J. DUGGAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Copies to: 

Derrick Cain 

12016 Glastonbury 

Detroit, MI 48228 

Erik A. Grill, AAG

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