Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

International Finance Discussion Papers

Number 1037

November 2011

Are Recoveries from Banking and Financial Crises Really So Different?

Greg Howard

Robert Martin

Beth Anne Wilson

NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate

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Social Science Research Network electronic library at www.ssrn.com.
Are Recoveries from Banking and Financial Crises Really So Different?

Greg Howard

Robert Martin

Beth Anne Wilson*

November 4, 2011

Abstract: This paper studies the behavior of recoveries from recessions across 59 advanced and 

emerging market economies over the past 40 years. Focusing specifically on the performance of 

output after the recession trough, we find little or no difference in the pace of output growth 

across types of recessions. In particular, banking and financial crisis do not affect the strength of 

the economic rebound, although these recessions are more severe, implying a sizable output loss. 

However, recovery does change with some characteristics of recession. Recoveries tend to be 

faster following deeper recessions, especially in emerging markets, and tend to be slower 

following long recessions. Most recessions are associated with a slowing, if not outright decline 

in house prices, but recessions with large declines in house prices also tend to have slower 

recoveries. Long recessions and those associated with poor housing-market outcomes can lead 

to sustained output losses relative to pre-crisis trends. Consistent with microeconomic studies 

showing permanent income loss to job-losing workers during recessions, we find that the 

sustained deviation in output from trend is associated with a reduction in labor input, especially 

linked to declines in employment and labor-force participation following recessions. On net, our 

results imply that the output/employment gap following a severe, long recessions is considerably 

smaller than is typically assumed by standard macro models, which in turn may have substantial 

implications for macroeconomic policy during recoveries. 

JEL Classifications: E32 , E20, F44 

Keywords: International, Business Cycles, Recoveries, Labor Market, Potential Output, United 

States

*The authors are staff economists or research assistants in the Division of International Finance, 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551 U.S.A. We thank 

Benjamin Hopkins and Nicholas Winfrey for their assistance, Andrea Raffo for sharing his 

dataset, and Marcello Estevão, Steve Kamin and participants at workshops within the Federal 

Reserve Board for their comments. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the 

authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System. 

Contact Author: Beth Anne Wilson, bawilson@frb.gov, International Finance Division, 20thand 

C Streets, Washington D.C. 20551.
2

More than two years after the date the NBER set for the end of the U.S. recession, U.S. 

employment growth remains sluggish, the housing market is moribund, and GDP has barely 

exceeded its pre-recession peak. Thus, attention is increasingly focusing on the determinants and 

characteristics of recoveries. Although research on the causes and types of recessions is legion, 

there has been surprisingly little academic work that concentrates on recoveries.1 That said, two 

stylized facts have been frequently cited in the current policy discussion. The first is that 

recoveries from banking and financial crises are typically slow, reflecting impaired financial 

intermediation and the need for structural adjustment (see Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Reinhart 

and Reinhart (2010)). The second is that the rate of growth following deep recessions is

typically faster than average, given pent-up demand and large stocks of underutilized labor and 

capital. As the Great Recession was both a banking and financial crisis and associated with a 

deep decline in output, these stylized facts imply different trajectories for output growth in this 

recovery. 

To address this uncertainty and to gain greater insight into the nature of recoveries, 

defined as output growth following recession troughs, we examine quarterly data on GDP over 

the past 40 years for almost 60 countries, split roughly evenly between the advanced and the 

emerging market economies, resulting in observations on 271 recessions. Classifying recessions 

according to whether or not they included a banking or financial (B&F) crisis we find, in contrast 

to earlier work, that there is little distinction in the pace of recovery across recession types. 

Although recessions associated with B&F crises are typically more severe, the subsequent 

recoveries are not particularly unusual. Earlier work, finding the opposite, does so because it 

characterizes the pace of recoveries by averaging growth starting from the pre-recession cyclical 

peak rather than the recession trough, thus confounding the strength of the recession with the 

behavior of the recovery. 

We do, however, find that, independent of whether a recession is associated with a

banking or financial crisis, the depth and duration of the recession do have some predictive 

power for the pace of recoveries. Deeper recessions are associated with slightly stronger growth 

during the first three years of recovery. Recessions of greater duration are linked to slower post-

 

1 Notable exceptions being Romer and Romer (1994) and Cerra and Saxena (2008).
3

trough performance. Also, recessions with large house price declines—a common but not 

omnipresent feature of long recessions—tend to recover slower than other recessions. 

Because banking and financial crises are often both deep and long, these effects on the 

pace of recovery balance out, leading post-trough growth to be about average and implying that 

output declines during such severe recessions are not made up quickly. We confirm and extend 

earlier work showing that severe recessions are associated with sustained negative gaps in the 

level of output from pre-crisis trend and show that these gaps are attributable to reductions in the 

utilization of labor – particularly through employment and labor force participation rates.

Until recently in the United States, GDP growth was about on pace with the average 

recovery in the advanced economies. However, recently the path of output has veered below the 

average recovery and is well below what would be predicted given the depth and duration of the 

Great Recession. However, once the impact of the severe decline in housing prices is accounted 

for, the recovery becomes less surprising. In addition, the composition of the recovery has been 

unusual.2 Exports and non-residential investment have outperformed the median recovery so far,

but consumption, housing, and employment have languished. Looking more closely at these 

components, we find surprising strength in consumption of goods, in particular large durable 

goods such as cars and household furniture which one might think would be particularly 

restrained in this recovery. On the other hand, services consumption in almost every category is 

weaker than ever before in a post-war U.S. recovery. Likewise, even compared with other 

―jobless‖ recoveries, the weakness in employment is omnipresent and extreme. 

Following this introduction, section II of the paper describes the dataset and recession 

classification system used. Section III presents our results, provides robustness checks, and 

contrasts our work with previous findings. Section IV focuses on characterizing and comparing 

the current U.S. recovery with past U.S. experience. Section V concludes.

II. Data and methodology

For our cross-country comparisons, our database contains an unbalanced panel of

quarterly GDP data for 59 countries – 26 advanced economies (AEs) and 33 emerging market 

economies (EMEs) – from 1970 (or whenever we begin to have quarterly GDP data) to present. 

Most data are from national sources, and a full list of countries can be found in appendix A. For 

 

2 The analysis of the U.S. data goes through the third quarter of 2011.
4

comparability across countries, recessions are classified as two consecutive quarters of negative 

GDP growth. If a single quarter of positive growth occurs surrounded by a recession on either 

side, it is included in the recession. The pre-recession peak is defined as the last quarter before 

the beginning of a recession while the recession trough is the last quarter of the recession. As 

will be discussed further, we check the robustness of our results using a variety of other 

recession-dating methodologies found in the literature including the Bry-Boschen procedure for 

quarterly data (henceforth called the BBQ method) as described by Harding and Pagan (2002).3

Using our definition of recession, our sample contains 271 recessions; 137 occurring in 

the advanced economies and 134 in the emerging market economies (table 1). If the Great 

Recession is excluded, the sample of recessions is reduced to 224 episodes (116 AE and 108 

EME). The greater number of AE recessions reflects the fact that quarterly GDP data are 

available for those countries earlier than for most of the EMEs. (See appendix B for data range 

for each country in our sample.)

In our analysis, we divide our sample by the type of economy – emerging market or 

advanced – and by type of recession. For comparability with earlier work, we match up the list 

of banking and financial crises found in IMF work by Laeven and Valencia (2008) with the list 

of recessions from the above procedure to identify if the downturn coincides with a currency, 

banking, or debt crisis.

4

 Laeven and Valencia identify crises in the year of occurrence. For each 

recession, if a crisis occurred in a year during which the recession began or was ongoing, or if 

the recession began in the first or second quarter of a year immediately following a crisis, it was 

classified as being related to that crisis. Using this method, we identify 8 recessions in the 

advanced economies and 39 recessions in the emerging economies as being related to a crisis. 

We also classify housing price slumps for a smaller sample of OECD countries for which 

we have a long time series of quarterly data on house prices. For these countries, we identify 

cycles in real house prices. Because the housing market is highly cyclical, most recessions are 

associated with periods of real house price decline. We identify periods of severe housing 

market stress as those associated with declines in real house prices above the median. We 

 

3 The BBQ method identifies cyclical peaks and troughs as local maxima in the two quarters preceding and the two 

quarters following. It then eliminates maxima that do not alternate between peaks and troughs or do not have a long 

enough time span, in this case 2 quarters from a peak to trough and five quarters from a trough to peak. Once these 

criteria are met, recessions are defined as the time between a peak and a trough. We did not use this method because 

it requires at least 5 quarters of recovery, which would restrict and potentially bias our sample.

4 This is similar to the methodology used in the IMF WEO analysis on recessions and recoveries (Terrones et al. 

2009).
5

identify 35 recessions associated with severe housing slumps in the advanced economies. A list 

of countries, recession dates, and recession types is found in appendix A. 

As with other work in this area, much of our analysis will be in the form of butterfly 

charts, allowing us to compare the behavior of output around cyclical downturns across 

numerous recessions and countries. In our case, however, instead of indexing the output series 

for each recession to be 100 at the pre-recession peak, we index the level of GDP to 100 at the 

date of the recession trough. This allows us to isolate the trajectory of the recovery, which is the 

key focus of our paper. We typically look at the 12 quarters before and after the trough. 

Because we have observations on so many recessions, it is not informative to chart individual 

recessions for most of our analysis. To summarize the cross-country experience, we calculate 

the mean value of output at each quarter across recession observations to construct the average 

path of GDP before and after the trough. Our results are not qualitatively different if medians are 

constructed. Using means allows us to create standard error bands around our average output 

paths.

III. Results

A. Banking and Financial Crises

As a first look, we construct the average path of GDP around recession troughs for our 

entire sample, excluding the Great Recession (figure 1). On average in a recession in our 

sample, output falls 41⁄2 percent from the pre-recession peak to the trough.

5

 GDP then rises at an 

average annual pace of 33⁄4 percent for the next three years, putting the level of output roughly 

12 percent higher than at the trough. Splitting the sample between advanced economies and 

emerging market economies (figure 2), shows, not surprisingly, that the EMEs have more 

extreme cycles, both in terms of the severity of recessions and the rapidity of recoveries. For the 

average EME recession, output falls 61⁄2 percent from peak to trough, compared to 21⁄2 percent for 

the AEs. And the average annual pace of EME recovery is 5 percent over the three years 

following the trough, almost 2 percentage points faster than that in the AEs, leaving the level of 

output in the EMEs about 6 percentage points higher than that in the advanced economies. 

 

5 This decline is measured as the decline in the average GDP path in our sample. Because recessions are of different 

duration, the average decline from peak to trough across recessions is a different and slightly higher figure. 
6

As mentioned earlier, we have classified recessions by type, depending on whether they 

were associated with banking and financial crises. Over our sample, excluding the current 

recession, 8 advanced economies have experienced B&F crises out of a sample of 116 – or 

roughly 61⁄2 percent of all AE recessions.6 The frequency of banking and financial crises is a 

much higher 36 percent (or 39 out of 108) for the emerging market economies. Because of this, 

and the more pronounced behavior of output around EME recessions, we separate our sample 

into advanced and emerging market economies throughout the paper so country composition 

does not distort our conclusions.

As seen in figures 3 and 4, the pace of output growth upon exiting a recession, shown in 

the region to the right of the recession trough, is remarkably similar for both the advanced and

emerging economies. Recoveries from banking and financial crises appear identical in pace to 

recoveries from other types of recessions. Table 2 presents the results of regressions of the level 

of GDP one, two, and three years after the trough on a constant and a dummy for whether the 

crisis was associated with a banking and financial crisis. For both the advanced economies and 

the emerging markets, the coefficient on banking and financial crises comes in highly

insignificant. There appears to be little evidence that the pace of output differs in recovery 

depending on whether the recession is related to a banking and financial crisis.

This result is surprising given the stylized fact and the standard interpretation of the

previous empirical work (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Claessens et 

al., 2008 and Terrones et al, IMF WEO, 2009) that finds that recoveries from banking crises are 

slow.

7

 A key reason for the divergence in results is that earlier analysis has indexed the level of 

GDP to the pre-recession peak, rather than the trough. As can be seen in figures 3 and 4, there 

are significant differences in the severity of recessions associated with B&F crises. The red lines 

in the region to the left of the trough are all higher and fall more sharply. Indeed, running similar 

regressions on the level of GDP one, two, and three years prior to the trough show that the 

coefficient on banking and financial crises is large and significantly positive in most cases –

indicating a sharper decline during the recession for B&F crises (table 3). Indexing to the peak 

confounds the strength of the recession and the behavior of the recovery, as can be seen when we 

 

6 B&F recessions include Finland (1990), Iceland (1982), Italy (1982), Japan (1997), Norway (1991), Portugal 

(1982), Spain (1978), and Sweden (1990).

7 Complementary to our results, Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010) find that recoveries are not systemically slower in 

the aftermath of financial crises in post-war United States.
7

re-index our data to the pre-recession peak (figures 5 and 6). Our results are consistent with 

findings that banking and financial crises are associated with greater declines in output and 

slower returns to pre-crises levels or trends, but this is because the recessions were deeper rather 

than because of disparities in the pace of recovery. 

To confirm that indexing is central to our differences with the previous literature, we also 

ran robustness tests using the alternative methods of dating recessions and country samples for 

the AEs used in earlier work. Figures 7 and 8, display the output paths around the trough for the 

various samples of AE countries experiencing B&F crises found in Reinhart and Rogoff or 

Terrones et al. for both the two-quarter and the BBQ method of dating recessions. For the 

Reinhart and Rogoff recessions (excluding the Great Depression), the average path of GDP after 

a recession for B&F crises follows closely or is even stronger than our own, while the Terrones 

sample is just a touch weaker. To a first order, differences in recession classification and country 

sampling do not appear to alter our results. Figures 9 and 10 present similar results for the 

emerging economies, though only for Reinhart and Rogoff, as Terrones et al. does not cover 

emerging economies.

8

B. Housing Slowdowns

Given the collapse in housing markets in a number of countries during the recent 

recession, we also looked at historical experiences with recoveries associated with severe slumps

in housing markets. Our analysis is limited to the 18 advanced economies for which we could 

obtain reasonable historical data on housing markets and we define housing slumps simply in 

terms of changes in real house prices using quarterly OECD data starting in 1970. 

The quarterly house price data are volatile, so to define a housing price slump we smooth 

each country’s data using an HP filter with the low parameter of 100 and then look for local 

maxima and minima in the smoothed series. Returning to the unsmoothed data with the dates of 

the local peaks and troughs, we calculate the duration and depth of house price declines across 

the sample. Our methodology identifies 57 periods of house price declines, covering a 

 

8 Reinhart and Rogoff identify five AE recessions as banking crises. By our dating, the troughs of these recessions 

occur in: Finland (1992), Japan (1993), Norway (1991), Sweden (1992), and Spain (1979). Terrones et al. add 

Australia (1991), Denmark (1987), France (1993), Greece (1993), Italy (1993), Japan (1993), New Zealand (1987), 

the United Kingdom (1974), and the United Kingdom (1991), as well as a crisis in Germany around 1980 which 

does not correspond to a recession in our sample. In addition to the AEs, Reinhart and Rogoff also identify eight

crises in the EMEs, fewer than in our sample: Argentina (2002), Colombia (1999), Hong Kong (1998), Indonesia 

(1998), Korea (1998), Malaysia (1998), the Philippines (1998), and Thailand (1998).
8

significant portion of countries and time periods (occasionally across multiple recessions). For

the United States (figure 11), this process identified four periods of real house price decline: the 

mid-1970s, the early 1980s, a brief period around 1990, and the most recent downturn. To 

classify a severe housing slump, we pick only the more sizable declines, those above the median. 

(For the United States, only the current housing slump would be classified as severe.) In these 

cases, the decline in real house prices is greater than 19 percent. They last for an average of 

61⁄2 years and fall an average of 33 percent.

Our paper focuses on the cyclicality of GDP, not real house prices, so our final step is 

matching housing slumps to recessions. We do this simply: if any quarter of the recession 

overlaps with any quarter of the housing slump, we classify the recession as associated with a

severe housing slump. There are 35 such recessions.

Dividing the OECD sample into recessions associated with severe housing slumps and 

those without reveals some interesting patterns. In particular, as shown in figure 12, housingslump recessions tend to be longer and deeper and recoveries from these recessions are 

significantly slower. Table 4 runs a simple regression showing similar results. 

C. Depth and Duration

Our result that the pace of growth after the trough of recessions associated with financial

crises are similar to other recessions is somewhat surprising and leads to questions about what 

we know about recoveries following severe recessions more generally. In particular, how 

accurate is the second stylized fact that deep recessions are associated with faster bouncebacks? 

To address the questions, we characterize all recessions in terms of their depth – the decline in 

the level of GDP from peak to trough – and duration – the number of quarters from peak to 

trough. Figures 13 and 14 present histograms of the depth of the recessions in our sample for the 

advanced and emerging market economies, along with selected summary statistics, excluding the 

Great Recession. As mentioned above, the average decline in output for the AEs is 2.6 percent,

with 12 percent of recessions associated with declines of more than 5 percent. The right tail is 

even more elongated for the EMEs, with the average decline being 6.4 percent, but 17 percent of 

the sample seeing output loss of 10 percent or greater. Figures 15 and 16 present the same 

analysis for recession duration. Not surprisingly, for both sets of countries, there is a mass of 

recessions lasting 2 quarters (the duration of output decline that defines a recession in our work). 
9

For the advanced economies, the average recession length is about 3 quarters with almost 

30 percent of the sample experiencing output declines for a year or more. For the EMEs, the 

duration is more extreme. The average EME recession lasts a year, and 45 percent of recessions 

last more than a year with one, that for post-Soviet Russia, of almost 6 years. 

In Figures 17 through 20, we construct butterfly charts around the trough for recessions 

that are above the top 25th percentile in depth and duration and below the bottom 25th percentile

for the AFEs and EMEs. In terms of recession depth, the charts certainly suggest that deeper 

recessions are associated with sharper bouncebacks than shallower recessions for both types of 

countries. The average level of output is 5 percent higher three years after a deep recession in 

the AEs and the EMEs. The results are different for long recessions. Here the average recovery 

appears slightly weaker following long recessions in the advanced economies, especially in the 

first few years. For the EMEs, there appears little difference between recoveries following long 

recessions than those following short recessions.

To provide a bit more rigorous look at this, table 5 presents the results of regressions of 

the level of GDP in the advanced economies one, two, and three years following a recession 

trough on the depth and duration of the recession, a dummy for whether the recession is 

associated with a banking or financial crisis, and a constant. Unlike with banking and financial 

crises, both depth and duration significantly affect the path of recovery, particularly in the first 

year. For example, for every 1 percentage point increase in recession depth, the level of output 

one year after the trough is a little over 1⁄2 percentage point greater. In contrast, a recession that 

is 1 quarter longer is associated with a similar-sized reduction in the pace of recovery. Over 

time, the drag from a longer recession appears to dissipate while the level of output is still 

roughly 1⁄2 percentage point higher following deep recessions. The results are even stronger for 

regressions on EME recessions (table 6). For these economies, a quarter longer recession is 

associated with a 1 percentage point lower level in output a year after the trough and 

11⁄2 percentage point lower level in output three years later. In contrast, a 1 percentage point 

greater decline in the level of output during the recession is associated with a 1⁄2 percentage point 

higher level of output rising to 3⁄4 percentage point greater level by year three of the recovery. In 

all three versions, the coefficients on length and depth come in statistically significantly and with 

opposite signs.
10

In the previous literature, financial and banking crises have been linked to severe 

recessions – implying both deeper and longer downturns – which may explain why we are failing 

to get statistically significant effects of banking and financial crises – these impacts may be 

cancelling each other out. To check this, we take a closer look at the relationship between 

banking and financial crises and severity of recessions. Figures 21 and 22 present scatterplots of 

the depth and duration of recessions, again dividing countries by whether they are considered

advanced or emerging market economies. Individual banking and financial crises are 

represented by the yellow dots and all other recessions are captured by the black dots. The 

vertical and horizontal lines represent the average duration and depth of recessions, 

respectively—yellow lines capturing the averages for banking and financial crises and black 

lines the average duration and depth for all other recessions. What was somewhat surprising to 

us is that banking and financial crises are not universally longer and deeper. Judging by the 

distance between the yellow and black lines, for the AEs, B&F crises tend to be longer but not 

much deeper than all other types of recessions. The reverse is true for the EMEs. For these 

economies, B&F recessions are associated with deeper but not much longer recessions. Table 7 

details the summary statistics behind these charts. Prior to the Great Recession, the correlation 

between length and depth was .36 for the AEs and a much stronger .67 for EMEs.

D. Implications

What do our results imply should be the pace of the current recovery? To show this, we 

use the coefficients from our three regressions above to predict the pace of recovery at 4, 8, and 

12 quarters past the trough based on observed depth and duration in the current recession9. 

Figures 23 through 24 illustrate the results of this exercise. The solid black line represents the 

pace of recovery predicted for all AEs and EMEs, respectively, given the average depth and 

duration of the Great Recession and the red line represents the path of actual average AE or EME 

GDP in the current recovery. The pace of recovery in the AEs appears to be underperforming 

while that in the EMEs seems right on track. 

Turning to the United States, figure 25 compares the current U.S. recovery to past 

recoveries in the advanced economies. Although the U.S. Great Recession was longer and 

 

9 Housing declines were common but not universal in the most recent recession, so are not included in this part of 

the analysis. Including the severe housing downturn as an explanatory variable for the pace of the U.S. recovery, the 

current recovery is still underperforming the model’s expectation but by only one percent.
11

deeper than almost all previous U.S. and advanced economy recessions and was accompanied by 

extreme financial disruptions, the U.S. recovery aligned well with average AE recoveries until 

the first half of 2011 when the pace of recovery slowed sharply. However, figure 26 shows that 

the actual path of recovery is well below what would be predicted by our simple model of depth 

and duration, suggesting other factors, possibly related to the financial crisis, may be at play this 

time around.10 One could ask if generalization from overall AE experience to the U.S. economy 

is appropriate given its relatively high average growth rate and greater flexibility. In simple 

tests, however, we were unable to find compelling evidence that U.S. recoveries are typically 

faster than AE recoveries in general (tables 8 and 9). 

E. Permanent versus Transitory, or Does the Economy Ever Actually “Recover”

Despite the differences in recovery rates we have highlighted above for recessions that 

are long or deep, recovery rates across recessions are still quite similar. This implies that long 

and deep recessions are associated with large and sustained losses to output. In particular, the 

economy will not return to its long-term trend, implying a persistent gap between the pre-crisis 

trend and the post-crisis level of output. This result is consistent with Cerra and Saxena (2008)

which finds that large output losses associated with financial crises are highly persistent. 

Our work also suggests that large declines in output over long periods of time can have 

more permanent effects on the level of output. For example, using the regression results for the 

advanced economies, the pace of recovery is the same after a recession of 2 quarters duration 

that results in a 2 percent decline in output and one of twice that length and duration – suggesting 

a greater potential permanent loss in output from the more severe recession.

To press this result further, we conduct a series of exercises to test whether output returns 

to pre-recession trend levels. To do this, we face both a conceptual and a practical challenge. 

Often, macroeconomic data are detrended using HP or Kalman filters. Both of these techniques 

are two-sided moving average filters. This implies that the view of the past changes as the data 

evolves. In particular, and of great importance here, these detrending tools cannot accommodate 

a permanent deviation from trend. For this reason, we choose to use a simple exponential trend 

which can accommodate such long-lasting deviations. Even with this methodology, determining 

 

10 Prior to the annual revision in July, the actual path of the U.S. recovery was very close to what would be predicted 

by the depth and duration regressions.
12

the appropriate pre-recession trend is somewhat tricky, to the extent that banking and financial 

crises are associated with bubbles or positive deviations from trend prior to the crisis. To avoid 

including the bubble in our trend, we calculate the four-year average growth rate for each 

country, two years prior to the peak, thus excluding the often rapid period of growth before the 

crisis. (The results are similar using average growth calculated over different pre-peak 

intervals.) 

Having calculated a pre-recession trend, we then examine GDP as a percentage of this

trend (figures 27 and 28) for the average recession and from particularly mild and severe 

recessions. Average GDP in the advanced economies never recovers to trend, even for short and 

shallow recessions. However, the average recession in the emerging economies does return to 

trend, and exceeds trend for short and shallow recessions. But, as for the AE recessions, for deep 

and long EME receesions, GDP does not drift back toward 100 percent of the pre-crisis trend, 

even after 10 years. For both AEs and EMEs, deep and long recessions lead to a sustained loss 

from pre-recession trend of about 8 to 10 percent after 10 years. While varying the specification 

of our regressions or the definition of pre-crisis trend can modify these loss estimates, these 

exercises all suggest a more sustained hit to output from severe recessions. 

Another way of testing if GDP returns to its pre-crisis trend is to evaluate whether growth 

rates immediately after recessions differ from long-run average growth. We have examined this, 

first, by constructing scatterplots for the AE and EME countries of average growth over the 

sample for each country and average pace of growth three years after a recession trough (figures 

29 and 30). If growth in recoveries proceeds at about average pace, then the points should line 

up close to the 45 degree line, indicating no quick return to pre-recession trend levels. In these 

charts, average growth seems very close to the pace of growth during recoveries. We also

include a variable in our depth and duration regression to capture average pre-recession growth. 

It is possible that countries with faster trend growth experience faster growth coming out of 

recoveries. If these countries are also associated with greater propensity (or less) to experience 

banking and financial crises, then our estimates of post-trough growth may be biased. As seen in 

in table 10, pre-crises growth rates come in statistically insignificant – suggesting the average 

pace of growth prior to the recession does not affect the post-recession recovery rate. 

Shifting back to our comparison with Cerra and Saxena, they find that B&F crises lead to 

permanent losses in output. Given our results on depth and duration, one might ask whether their 
13

result is purely a reflection of the depth and duration of the downturns associated with financial 

crises or is there something special about financial crises above and beyond the contour of the 

downturn which leads to permanently lower output? There are differences in methodology and 

data between the two studies – Cerra and Saxena restrict their analysis to the initial shock 

stemming from the first year of a banking crisis, focus solely on banking crises (treating currency 

and debt crises as separate), use simulations from VAR analysis to estimate the impact of 

banking crises, and compare banking crises to non-crisis growth performance whereas we draw 

comparisons to other recessions. Despite these differences, we can shed some light on this 

question. 

Using the sample of non-crisis recessions, we regress the level of post-trough GDP on the 

depth and duration of the crisis, similar to table 5, but with a sample restricted to non-crisis 

recessions and of course without the B&F crisis explanatory variable. This gives us a prediction 

for the recovery given a recession of a certain depth and duration. We use the model to create a 

prediction for a recovery after a non-B&F related recession that has the same depth and duration 

of an average B&F crisis. Finally, we compare the prediction to the average of actual outcomes 

of B&F crises. Figures 31 and 32 show that the average recovery and the prediction are almost 

identical. There appears to be nothing inherently special about banking and financial crises that 

creates more of an output loss than similarly sized recessions unassociated with crises. 

Combining this simple experiment with our earlier results, we conclude that any recession of 

similar magnitude to a B&F crisis may lead to sustained losses in the level of output. 

F. A simple look at what doesn’t recover

Our work above suggests that the level of GDP, particularly after long and deep 

recessions, does not recover to its pre-crisis trend even five years after the start of a recession, 

thus it is important to understand what is driving this sustained output loss. In general, even for 

the advanced economies, it is a challenge to get comparable quarterly time series data across 

countries to allow a more granular look at post-recession behavior. One exception is a dataset 

developed by and detailed in Ohanian and Raffo (2011) which contains quarterly information on 

total hours, labor-force participation, employment, and average weekly hours for 15 OECD 
14

countries from 1960 to the 2010.11 With these data we can examine the broad supply-side 

components of output – total hours and output per hour – to see where the weakness in overall 

GDP lies following a recession. Figure 33 shows, for the smaller sample used here, the average 

behavior of the level of GDP as a percentage of pre-recession trend – divided into those that 

were particularly severe (in the top 25th percentile of depth and duration) and all others. In both 

cases, the level of output fails to return to the pre-recession trend, with the gap being particularly 

sizable (about 71⁄2 percent) for severe recessions. Figures 34 and 35 break output down into total 

hours and output per hour for both sets of recessions. Interestingly, for typical recessions, the 

loss in output is a reflection of declines in both productivity and labor input. In contrast, for 

severe recessions, the sustained deviation in the level of output from trend is more than entirely 

accounted for by a loss in total hours – productivity actually increases relative to trend. 

We next decompose total hours into labor-force participation, the employment rate, and 

average weekly hours (figure 36 through 38). Interestingly, whereas the workweek returns and 

even exceeds its pre-recession trend relatively quickly, employment and labor-force participation 

rates remain depressed – particularly after long and deep recessions. These results suggest the 

decline in output relative to pre-crisis trend, especially after severe recessions, is importantly 

concentrated in a reduction in the utilization of labor. For particularly bad recessions, the 

reduction in the employment and labor force participation rates is sustained even five years after 

the pre-recession peak.

IV. The Current U.S. Recovery in More Detail

With the general knowledge of the features of recoveries in hand, we can now turn to 

characterizing the current U.S. recovery in more detail. The butterfly chart in figure 39 shows 

the evolution of U.S. GDP around the trough of every recession since 1947, separating the 1980s 

downturn into two recession periods.

12

 The thick black line denotes the current recession. Only 

the downturn in 1980 had a more sluggish pace of recovery two years after the trough. 

This anemic post-recession performance is not a reflection of weak outcomes in the 

manufacturing sector. After falling dramatically in the recent recession industrial production

 

11 The countries included are Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 

Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.

12 This section of the paper uses recession dating by the NBER in order to include the 2001 recession. The only 

other notable change is that NBER classifies the pre-recession peak of the Great Recession as 2007 Q3 instead of 

2008 Q1.
15

(figure 40) has since climbed at an about-average pace and real exports (figure 41) have surged 

nearly 25 percent. Non-residential investment (shown in figure 42) tells a similar story. The fall 

in investment was larger than in any previous recession, leaving a tremendous gap between the 

current level and the peak, but the pace of investment growth during the recovery has been on the 

high end of the more recent historical experiences. 

On the other hand, unusually poor recovery is evident in consumption and housing. The 

level of real private consumption (figure 43) has fallen behind every recession except the 1980 

double dip. Residential investment remains below its level at the trough of the recession (figure 

44) and house prices have underperformed all previous recoveries (figure 45).

A number of factors appear to be contributing to these areas. Credit growth, even outside 

of mortgage lending, has fallen further since the recession trough (figure 46) – undoubtedly 

reflecting tighter lending conditions but also weak demand. Consumer sentiment has also 

improved little over the past two years (figure 47) as income growth has been particularly slow 

(figure 48) and employment has languished (figure 49). Consumption performance has shown 

some variation – with goods consumption, especially for durables and motor vehicles, picking up 

at about on average pace (figures 50 to 52) but services consumption is markedly weaker than in 

previous recoveries (figure 53). Employment growth has been weak across the board but like 

consumption, relatively worse in in the services industries than the goods industries (figure 54

and 55). Also of note is the unusual behavior of state and local employment which was rising at 

a relatively slow pace prior to the recession and has shown declines matched only by the 

recession in 1980, with little hope of improvement going forward (figure 56). 

The policy response in this recovery has been mixed. Monetary policy, even excluding 

long-term asset purchases and other non-traditional programs, has been larger than in most 

previous recoveries with the real federal funds rate (figure 57) remaining in negative territory 

two years after the recession trough. In contrast, government expenditures (figure 58), which 

had risen sharply during the recession, has leveled off noticeably since then especially compared 

with earlier recoveries. Further, although revenue fell more than in other recessions, the revenue 

growth following the recession is on the high end of previous recoveries (figure 59). 
16

Finally, we apply similar supply-side analysis to the United States as above to the OECD 

countries.

13

 Re-indexing to the peak and taking deviations from a simple exponential prerecession trend, shows that 21⁄2 years after the recession trough the level of output in the United 

States is strikingly below trend (figure 60). This gap is driven entirely by a lack of hours (figure 

61), as labor productivity has returned to trend (figure 62). As with the OECD results more 

generally, this hours gap reflects a downshift in labor force participation and employment rather 

than the workweek (figure 63 to 65).

V. Conclusion

We take away several key points from our work on recoveries. First, whether a recession

is associated with a banking or financial crisis does not have a statistically significant effect on 

the pace of growth following recession troughs. This result surprised us and raises questions for 

future research about the exact channels through which banking and financial crises affect

growth. In comparison, as might be expected, recoveries from recessions associated with severe

housing downturns are found to be slower.

Second, the depth and duration of a recession does matter for recovery speed. Deeper 

recessions are associated with faster post-trough recoveries, in line with the view that pent-up 

demand and underutilized resources can contribute to a sharp snapback. In contrast, longer 

recessions are associated with slower post-trough growth, possibly reflecting skill and capital 

deterioration as recessions drag on. Banking and financial crises are associated with more severe 

recessions – deeper in the case of emerging market economies and longer in the case of the 

advanced economies – but do not appear to impose additional restraint to recoveries beyond the 

depth and duration. Currently, the emerging market economies are recovering as would be 

predicted given the depth and duration of their Great Recession experiences, but the advanced 

economies, including the United States, are lagging. 

Third, we expand on earlier work in the literature that finds evidence that recessions, 

especially severe recessions, are associated with persistent negative deviations in the level of 

GDP from pre-crisis trend. This deviation appears to importantly reflect the lower utilization of 

labor, particularly a decline in employment and labor force participation rates from earlier trend 

 

13 For individual recessions, we use the trend based on the average growth in the five years prior to the pre-recession 

peak because the four-year average two years prior to the peak introduces too much noise. Without the benefit of an 

average over a large sample, the results are much more difficult to interpret.
17

levels. Going forward, it will be important to examine these results in line with what we know 

from the micro labor literature about skill deterioration, hysteresis, and long-term 

unemployment. Finally, we may need to reexamine the assumptions in many of our macro 

models that output levels eventually return to trend or reevaluate the concept of trend.

For the United States, the current recovery has been weaker than would have predicted 

based on the depth and duration of the recession alone. Without question, the labor market has 

performed particularly weakly – with especially tepid employment growth and a sharp decline in 

labor force participation. These developments raise questions about the financial and fiscal 

channels that affect labor demand and about the role of policy in the face of long and deep 

recessions.
18

Bibliography

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Recovery,‖ American Economic Review, 2008, 98:1, p. 439-457.

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Crunches, and Busts?‖ IMF Working Paper, WP/08/274, December 2008.

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of Monetary Economics, 2002, vol 49, p 365-381.

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Paper, 08/224, November 2008.

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in the United States,‖ mimeo, 2010.

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OECD Countries, 1960-2010,‖ mimeo, 2011.

Romer, Christina and David Romer, ―What Ends Recessions?‖ NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 

1994, vol. 9, p13-80.

Reinhart, Carmen M. and Vincent R. Reinhart, ―After the Fall‖ NBER Working Paper Series, 

Nuxmber 16334, September 2010.

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Working Paper Series, Number 14656, January 2009.

Terrones, Marco E., Alasdair Scott, Prakash Kannan, ―From Recession to Recovery: How soon 

and how strong?‖ International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, April 2009, Chapter 

3.
19

Table 1

Total

Advanced 

Economies

Emerging Market

Economies

All 

Recessions 271 137 134

Excluding Great Recession 224 118 104

of which...

Banking or Financial Crisis 47 8 39

Housing Related --- 35 ---

Table 2

Advanced One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

B&F -1.05 1.23 -0.28 1.57 1.30 1.78

Constant 103.99 106.48 108.75

R-squared 0.00 -0.01 0.00

Emerging One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

B&F 0.17 1.09 0.20 1.85 1.25 2.58

Constant 106.78 110.90 114.51

R-squared -0.01 -0.01 -0.01

Table 2 is based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

where x is one, two, or three years, and is a dummy variable for whether the recession was 

associated with a banking or financial crisis.

A * indicates confidence at the 95 percent level, and a ** indicates confidence at a 99 percent level.
20

Table 3

Advanced One year prior Two years prior Three years prior

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

B&F 0.84 1.11 3.20 * 1.30 3.98 * 1.67

Constant 101.28 98.76 95.67

R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.04

Emerging One year prior Two years prior Three years prior

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

B&F 4.96 ** 1.25 8.30 ** 1.94 7.84 ** 2.72

Constant 102.96 98.67 96.05

R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.05

Table 3 is based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

 

Table 4

Advanced One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

Housing -1.57 * 0.71 -1.98 * 0.83 -1.32 0.95

Constant 104.52 107.15 109.20

R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.01

Table 4 is based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

 

where is a dummy variable for whether the recession was associated with a housing slump.

Table 5

Advanced One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

Depth 0.64 ** 0.11 0.61 ** 0.15 0.42 ** 0.18

Duration -0.62 ** 0.20 -0.52 * 0.27 -0.19 0.32

B&F -0.40 1.17 0.18 1.58 1.27 1.87

Constant 104.20 106.45 108.23

R-squared 0.20 0.10 0.02

Tables 5 and 6 are based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

 

where Depth is a positive number measuring the fall in GDP during the recession as a percentage of peak 

GDP and Duration is the number of quarter from peak to trough.
21

Table 6

Emerging One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

Depth 0.57 ** 0.09 0.62 ** 0.17 0.85 ** 0.24

Duration -1.07 ** 0.21 -1.30 ** 0.39 -1.61 ** 0.55

B&F -1.59 0.98 -1.60 1.85 -1.34 2.61

Constant 107.95 112.68 116.31

R-squared 0.19 0.11 0.07

Table 7

Advanced Depth Duration

Economies Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev

B&F 3.66 4.07 5.13 2.75

Others 2.58 2.49 2.97 1.36

p=.26 p=.00

Emerging Depth Duration

Economies Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev

B&F 9.41 7.31 4.47 2.71

Others 4.92 5.94 3.71 2.80

p=.00 p=.20

Table 8

Advanced One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

U.S. Dummy -0.24 1.72 0.37 2.18 2.80 2.46

Constant 103.93 106.45 108.74

R-squared -0.01 -0.01 0.00

Table 8 is based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

 

where is a dummy variable for whether the recession occurred in the United States.
22

Table 9

Advanced One year after Two years after Three years after

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

Depth 0.64 ** 0.11 0.61 ** 0.15 0.42 ** 0.18

Duration -0.65 ** 0.19 -0.51 * 0.26 -0.11 0.30

U.S. Dummy -0.32 1.52 0.34 2.06 2.87 2.42

Constant 104.25 106.41 107.95

R-squared 0.20 0.10 0.03

Table 9 is based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

 

Table 10

Advanced One year later Two years later Three years later

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

Depth 0.50 ** 0.13 0.45 * 0.20 0.27 0.24

Duration -0.49 ** 0.19 -0.41 0.28 -0.11 0.34

Pre-crisis

Growth -0.05 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.24

B&F 0.04 1.02 0.55 1.51 1.70 1.85

Constant 103.77 105.46 106.95

Emerging One year later Two years later Three years later

Economies Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error

Depth 0.56 ** 0.09 0.64 ** 0.17 0.83 ** 0.26

Duration -1.11 ** 0.21 -1.36 ** 0.39 -1.71 ** 0.58

Pre-crisis

Growth 0.06 0.12 0.36 0.23 0.52 0.34

B&F -0.15 1.01 1.78 1.91 2.56 2.84

Constant 106.96 110.00 112.77

Tables 5 and 6 are based on a simple linear regression of the form

 

 

 

 

where Trend is the 4 year average annual growth in the two years prior to the peak.
23

Figure 1. Recoveries in the entire sample Figure 2. Recoveries

Figure 3. Recoveries in the Advanced Economies Figure 4. Recoveries in the Emerging Economies

Figure 5. Recessions in the AEs, indexed to peak Figure 6. Recessions in the EMEs, indexed to peak
24

Figure 7. Two-quarter method of dating AE recessions Figure 8. BBQ Method of dating AE recessions

Figure 9. Two-quarter method of dating EME recessions Figure 10. BBQ Method of dating EME recessions

Figure 11. U.S. House Prices Figure 12. GDP in Select Advanced Economies
25

Figure 13. Recessions in the Advanced Economies Figure 14. Recessions in the Emerging Economies

Figure 15. Recessions in the Advanced Economies Figure 16. Recessions in the Emerging Economies

Figure 17. Recoveries in the Advanced Economies Figure 18. Recoveries in the Emerging Economies
26

Figure 19. Recoveries in the Advanced Economies Figure 20. Recoveries in the Emerging Economies

Figure 21. Recessions in the Advanced Economies Figure 22. Recessions in the Emerging Economies

Figure 23. The Current AE recovery Figure 24. The Current EME Recovery
27

Figure 25. Recoveries in the Advanced Economies Figure 26. The Current U.S. recovery

Figure 27. Recoveries in the Advanced Economies Figure 28. Recoveries in the Emerging Economies
28

Figure 29. Growth Rates in the Advanced Economies Figure 30. Growth Rates in the Emerging Economies

Figure 31. B&F crises in the Advanced Economies Figure 32. B&F crises in the Emerging Economies
29

Figure 33. GDP in Select Advanced Economies Figure 34. Total Hours in Select Advanced Economies

Figure 35. Output per Hour in Select AEs Figure 36. Labor Force Participation in Select AEs

Figure 37. Employment Rate in Select AEs Figure 38. Average Weekly Hours in Select AEs
30

Figure 39. GDP During U.S. Recessions Figure 40. Industrial Production 

Figure 41. Real Exports Figure 42. Non-residential Investment

Figure 43. Private Consumption Figure 44. Residential Investment
31

Figure 45. Housing Prices Figure 46. Consumer Credit

Figure 47. Consumer Sentiment (Michigan Index) Figure 48. Personal Income

Figure 49. Employment Figure 50. Goods consumption
32

Figure 51. Household Durable Consumption Figure 52. Motor Vehicle Consumption

Figure 53. Service Consumption Figure 55. Private Service Providing Employment

Figure 54. Goods-Producing Employment Figure 56. State and Local Government Employment
33

Figure 57. Real Federal Funds Rate Figure 58. Government Expenditures

Figure 59. Government Revenue
34

Figure 60. Gross Domestic Product Figure 61. Total Hours

Figure 62. Output per Hour Figure 63. Labor Force Participation

Figure 64. Employment Rate Figure 65. Average Work Week
35

Appendix A. Data by Episode

Duration measured in quarters, Depth as a percentage of GDP. Recessions after 2007 are not categorized.

Country Peak Trough IMF Housing AE/EME Duration Depth

Argentina 1974 Q4 1976 Q1 Currency EME 5 3.6

Argentina 1977 Q2 1978 Q3 EME 5 4.9

Argentina 1980 Q3 1981 Q4 Banking, Currency EME 5 9.8

Argentina 1984 Q4 1985 Q3 EME 3 10.7

Argentina 1986 Q3 1987 Q1 Currency EME 2 2.7

Argentina 1988 Q1 1989 Q3 Banking EME 6 15.6

Argentina 1992 Q3 1993 Q1 EME 2 3.9

Argentina 1994 Q4 1995 Q3 Banking, Currency, Debt EME 3 5.7

Argentina 1998 Q2 2002 Q1 Banking EME 15 20

Argentina 2008 Q3 2009 Q1 EME 2 1.5

Australia 1971 Q3 1972 Q1 AE 2 1.3

Australia 1975 Q2 1975 Q4 AE 2 2.4

Australia 1977 Q2 1977 Q4 AE 2 0.7

Australia 1981 Q3 1983 Q2 AE 7 3.7

Australia 1990 Q4 1991 Q2 AE 2 1.4

Australia 2000 Q2 2000 Q4 AE 2 0.6

Austria 1974 Q3 1975 Q2 AE 3 2

Austria 1981 Q2 1981 Q4 AE 2 0.8

Austria 1982 Q2 1982 Q4 AE 2 0.4

Austria 1983 Q4 1984 Q2 AE 2 2

Austria 1992 Q3 1993 Q1 AE 2 0.8

Austria 2000 Q4 2001 Q3 AE 3 0.8

Austria 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 AE 4 4.8

Belgium 1974 Q2 1975 Q2 AE 4 2.8

Belgium 1976 Q3 1977 Q2 AE 3 0.8

Belgium 1979 Q4 1980 Q4 Housing AE 4 2

Belgium 1982 Q3 1983 Q1 Housing AE 2 0.7

Belgium 1992 Q3 1993 Q1 AE 2 1.9

Belgium 2001 Q2 2001 Q4 AE 2 0.5

Belgium 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 AE 4 4.1

Brazil 1980 Q4 1981 Q4 EME 4 7.8

Brazil 1982 Q3 1983 Q1 Currency, Debt EME 2 5.5

Brazil 1987 Q1 1987 Q3 Currency EME 2 3.1

Brazil 1988 Q1 1988 Q4 EME 3 3.5

Brazil 1989 Q4 1991 Q1 Banking EME 5 8.9

Brazil 1991 Q3 1992 Q3 Currency EME 4 4.7

Brazil 1995 Q1 1995 Q3 Banking EME 2 2.9

Brazil 1998 Q2 1999 Q1 Currency EME 3 1.6

Brazil 2001 Q1 2001 Q4 EME 3 1.2

Brazil 2008 Q3 2009 Q1 EME 2 5.6

Canada 1981 Q2 1982 Q4 Housing AE 6 4.4

Canada 1990 Q1 1991 Q1 Housing AE 4 3.3

Canada 2008 Q3 2009 Q2 AE 3 3.6

Chile 1971 Q4 1973 Q2 Currency EME 6 8.6

Chile 1974 Q2 1975 Q4 EME 6 16.8

Chile 1981 Q2 1982 Q4 Banking, Currency EME 6 19.2

Chile 1990 Q1 1990 Q3 EME 2 1.2

Chile 1998 Q2 1999 Q1 EME 3 4.1

Chile 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 EME 4 4.3

China 1971 Q2 1971 Q4 EME 2 0.2

China 1973 Q3 1974 Q2 EME 3 1.4

China 1975 Q3 1976 Q3 EME 4 4.7

Colombia 1982 Q2 1982 Q4 Banking EME 2 1.2

Colombia 1998 Q1 1999 Q2 Banking EME 5 6.7

Costa Rica 1995 Q3 1996 Q1 EME 2 2.7

Costa Rica 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 EME 4 3.6

Czech Republic 1996 Q4 1997 Q3 Banking EME 3 2.4

Czech Republic 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 EME 4 4.8

Denmark 1973 Q3 1975 Q2 AE 7 4.2

Denmark 1976 Q4 1977 Q2 AE 2 0.3

Denmark 1979 Q4 1981 Q2 Housing AE 6 3.3

Denmark 1986 Q3 1987 Q2 Housing AE 3 0.6

Denmark 1992 Q3 1993 Q2 Housing AE 3 1.9

Denmark 1997 Q2 1997 Q4 AE 2 1

Denmark 2000 Q4 2002 Q4 AE 8 -0.1
36

Appendix A. Data by Episode

Duration measured in quarters, Depth as a percentage of GDP. Recessions after 2007 are not categorized.

Country Peak Trough IMF Housing AE/EME Duration Depth

Denmark 2008 Q2 2009 Q3 AE 5 7.3

Estonia 1998 Q3 1999 Q2 EME 3 2.4

Estonia 2007 Q4 2009 Q3 EME 7 20.2

Finland 1971 Q2 1971 Q4 AE 2 0.3

Finland 1975 Q1 1975 Q4 Housing AE 3 2.2

Finland 1980 Q3 1981 Q1 AE 2 2.7

Finland 1990 Q1 1992 Q3 Banking Housing AE 10 12.8

Finland 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 AE 5 10.3

France 1974 Q3 1975 Q2 AE 3 2.8

France 1980 Q1 1980 Q3 AE 2 0.3

France 1992 Q1 1993 Q1 AE 4 1.1

France 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 AE 5 3.9

Germany 1974 Q3 1975 Q1 AE 2 3.4

Germany 1981 Q3 1982 Q4 AE 5 2.2

Germany 1985 Q3 1986 Q1 AE 2 1.2

Germany 1992 Q3 1993 Q1 AE 2 2

Germany 1995 Q3 1996 Q1 Housing AE 2 0.7

Germany 2002 Q3 2003 Q2 Housing AE 3 0.9

Germany 2004 Q1 2004 Q3 Housing AE 2 0.2

Germany 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 AE 4 6.6

Greece 1973 Q3 1974 Q3 AE 4 12.4

Greece 1976 Q4 1977 Q2 AE 2 3

Greece 1979 Q2 1979 Q4 AE 2 3.1

Greece 1980 Q2 1981 Q1 AE 3 5.6

Greece 1981 Q3 1982 Q4 AE 5 4.6

Greece 1984 Q3 1985 Q1 AE 2 2.3

Greece 1990 Q1 1990 Q3 AE 2 7.1

Greece 1992 Q3 1993 Q1 AE 2 3.6

Greece 2000 Q1 2000 Q3 AE 2 1.1

Hong Kong 1973 Q4 1975 Q1 EME 5 4.9

Hong Kong 1981 Q4 1982 Q2 EME 2 2.9

Hong Kong 1984 Q2 1985 Q3 EME 5 4.1

Hong Kong 1988 Q4 1989 Q2 EME 2 1.3

Hong Kong 1995 Q1 1995 Q3 EME 2 0.4

Hong Kong 1997 Q3 1998 Q4 EME 5 8.8

Hong Kong 2000 Q4 2001 Q4 EME 4 2

Hong Kong 2002 Q4 2003 Q2 EME 2 2.5

Hong Kong 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 EME 4 7.6

Hungary 1995 Q1 1995 Q4 EME 3 1.2

Hungary 2008 Q1 2009 Q3 EME 6 8.3

Iceland 1982 Q2 1983 Q2 Currency AE 4 3

Iceland 1987 Q4 1988 Q3 AE 3 1.3

Iceland 1991 Q1 1992 Q3 AE 6 4.4

Iceland 1997 Q3 1998 Q1 AE 2 1.4

Iceland 2003 Q1 2003 Q3 AE 2 4.3

Iceland 2008 Q1 2010 Q2 AE 9 12

India 1975 Q2 1976 Q1 EME 3 1.6

India 1978 Q1 1979 Q2 EME 5 8.6

India 1981 Q2 1981 Q4 EME 2 0.2

India 1983 Q4 1984 Q2 EME 2 1.3

Indonesia 1997 Q3 1998 Q4 EME 5 18.2

Ireland 1982 Q3 1983 Q2 Housing AE 3 1

Ireland 1985 Q3 1986 Q2 Housing AE 3 1.3

Ireland 2007 Q1 2009 Q4 AE 11 11.4

Israel 2000 Q4 2001 Q4 EME 4 3.9

Israel 2008 Q3 2009 Q1 EME 2 1.3

Italy 1974 Q2 1975 Q2 AE 4 3.7

Italy 1977 Q1 1977 Q3 AE 2 1.4

Italy 1982 Q1 1982 Q4 Currency Housing AE 3 0.9

Italy 1992 Q1 1993 Q1 Housing AE 4 1.5

Italy 2001 Q1 2001 Q4 AE 3 0.6

Italy 2002 Q4 2003 Q2 AE 2 0.5

Italy 2004 Q3 2005 Q1 AE 2 0.1

Italy 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 AE 5 7

Japan 1974 Q3 1975 Q1 Housing AE 2 0.3
37

Appendix A. Data by Episode

Duration measured in quarters, Depth as a percentage of GDP. Recessions after 2007 are not categorized.

Country Peak Trough IMF Housing AE/EME Duration Depth

Japan 1997 Q1 1998 Q2 Banking Housing AE 5 3.2

Japan 2001 Q1 2001 Q4 Housing AE 3 2.1

Japan 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 AE 4 9.9

Jordan 1998 Q1 1998 Q3 EME 2 1.2

Latvia 1992 Q1 1993 Q4 Currency EME 7 29.9

Latvia 1994 Q3 1995 Q1 EME 2 3.1

Latvia 2007 Q4 2009 Q4 EME 8 25.4

Lithuania 2008 Q2 2009 Q4 EME 6 17.3

Luxembourg 1974 Q2 1975 Q3 AE 5 8.3

Luxembourg 1980 Q2 1981 Q2 AE 4 0.7

Luxembourg 2008 Q1 2008 Q4 AE 3 5.7

Malaysia 1974 Q3 1975 Q2 EME 3 1.3

Malaysia 1984 Q3 1985 Q3 EME 4 2

Malaysia 1997 Q4 1998 Q4 Banking, Currency EME 4 11.1

Malaysia 2000 Q4 2001 Q2 EME 2 1.1

Malaysia 2008 Q2 2009 Q1 EME 3 6.5

Mexico 1982 Q2 1983 Q2 Banking, Currency, Debt EME 4 5.5

Mexico 1985 Q3 1986 Q4 EME 5 4.6

Mexico 1987 Q4 1988 Q2 EME 2 1.3

Mexico 1994 Q4 1995 Q2 Banking, Currency EME 2 9.4

Mexico 2000 Q3 2002 Q1 EME 6 2.6

Mexico 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 EME 5 8.5

Netherlands 1974 Q3 1975 Q2 AE 3 0.8

Netherlands 1980 Q1 1980 Q3 Housing AE 2 2.5

Netherlands 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 AE 5 4.6

New Zealand 1970 Q1 1970 Q3 AE 2 4

New Zealand 1971 Q3 1972 Q1 AE 2 6.5

New Zealand 1973 Q1 1973 Q3 AE 2 7.8

New Zealand 1974 Q3 1975 Q2 Housing AE 3 9.9

New Zealand 1977 Q2 1978 Q1 Housing AE 3 13.1

New Zealand 1982 Q3 1983 Q1 AE 2 4.6

New Zealand 1984 Q1 1984 Q3 AE 2 3.2

New Zealand 1985 Q1 1985 Q3 AE 2 3.1

New Zealand 1986 Q3 1987 Q1 AE 2 7

New Zealand 1990 Q4 1991 Q2 AE 2 3.8

New Zealand 1997 Q3 1998 Q1 AE 2 1.4

New Zealand 2007 Q4 2009 Q1 AE 5 2.4

Norway 1977 Q3 1978 Q1 AE 2 5.9

Norway 1978 Q3 1979 Q2 AE 3 1.2

Norway 1980 Q1 1980 Q3 AE 2 2.5

Norway 1991 Q2 1991 Q4 Banking Housing AE 2 0.6

Norway 1992 Q3 1993 Q1 Housing AE 2 1.4

Norway 2005 Q3 2006 Q1 AE 2 0.9

Norway 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 AE 4 2.5

Peru 1982 Q1 1983 Q4 Banking, Currency EME 7 18.3

Peru 1985 Q1 1985 Q3 EME 2 7

Peru 1987 Q3 1989 Q2 EME 7 26.2

Peru 1990 Q1 1990 Q3 EME 2 21.5

Peru 1992 Q1 1992 Q3 EME 2 5.2

Peru 1997 Q4 1999 Q1 EME 5 3.1

Peru 2000 Q1 2000 Q4 EME 3 5

Peru 2003 Q2 2003 Q4 EME 2 0.2

Peru 2008 Q3 2009 Q1 EME 2 2.6

Philippines 1983 Q2 1985 Q3 Banking, Currency, Debt EME 9 16.9

Philippines 1990 Q3 1991 Q1 EME 2 1.4

Philippines 1997 Q4 1998 Q2 Banking, Currency EME 2 2.8

Poland 2000 Q4 2001 Q2 EME 2 0.6

Portugal 1974 Q1 1975 Q2 AE 5 6

Portugal 1982 Q4 1984 Q2 Banking, Currency AE 6 2.7

Portugal 1992 Q2 1993 Q3 AE 5 2.6

Portugal 2001 Q4 2003 Q2 AE 6 2.1

Portugal 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 AE 2 0.2

Portugal 2007 Q4 2009 Q1 AE 5 4

Russia 1989 Q2 1995 Q1 EME 23 39.1

Russia 1995 Q3 1996 Q3 EME 4 5.4
38

Appendix A. Data by Episode

Duration measured in quarters, Depth as a percentage of GDP. Recessions after 2007 are not categorized.

Country Peak Trough IMF Housing AE/EME Duration Depth

Russia 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 EME 4 10.9

Singapore 1984 Q4 1985 Q4 EME 4 2

Singapore 1997 Q4 1998 Q3 EME 3 1.3

Singapore 2000 Q4 2001 Q3 EME 3 1.7

Singapore 2008 Q1 2008 Q4 EME 3 2.6

Slovakia 1998 Q4 1999 Q4 Banking EME 4 6.7

Slovakia 2008 Q3 2009 Q1 EME 2 6.4

Slovenia 2008 Q2 2009 Q3 EME 5 9.8

South Africa 1974 Q3 1975 Q1 EME 2 1.3

South Africa 1976 Q3 1977 Q2 EME 3 1.3

South Africa 1981 Q4 1983 Q1 EME 5 5.1

South Africa 1984 Q2 1985 Q3 Currency, Debt EME 5 2.8

South Africa 1990 Q1 1992 Q4 EME 11 4.6

South Africa 1998 Q1 1998 Q3 EME 2 0.1

South Africa 2008 Q3 2009 Q2 EME 3 2.6

South Korea 1979 Q2 1980 Q2 EME 4 3.9

South Korea 1997 Q3 1998 Q2 Banking, Currency EME 3 8.1

South Korea 2008 Q2 2008 Q4 EME 2 4.1

Spain 1974 Q4 1975 Q2 AE 2 0.6

Spain 1978 Q2 1979 Q1 Banking Housing AE 3 0.4

Spain 1980 Q3 1981 Q2 Housing AE 3 0.3

Spain 1992 Q2 1993 Q2 AE 4 1.8

Spain 2008 Q1 2009 Q4 AE 7 4.9

Sweden 1973 Q1 1973 Q3 AE 2 2.1

Sweden 1976 Q4 1977 Q2 AE 2 3

Sweden 1982 Q2 1983 Q1 Housing AE 3 0.9

Sweden 1990 Q4 1992 Q4 Banking Housing AE 8 5.6

Sweden 2007 Q4 2009 Q3 AE 7 7.8

Switzerland 1974 Q2 1975 Q3 Housing AE 5 10.3

Switzerland 1977 Q3 1978 Q1 AE 2 0.6

Switzerland 1981 Q2 1982 Q2 AE 4 1.7

Switzerland 1986 Q2 1986 Q4 AE 2 0.2

Switzerland 1990 Q3 1991 Q2 Housing AE 3 1.4

Switzerland 1992 Q1 1993 Q1 Housing AE 4 1.5

Switzerland 2002 Q2 2003 Q1 AE 3 0.9

Switzerland 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 AE 4 3.2

Taiwan 1974 Q1 1974 Q3 EME 2 2.3

Taiwan 2000 Q3 2001 Q3 EME 4 4.4

Taiwan 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 EME 4 9.5

Thailand 1996 Q3 1998 Q3 Banking, Currency EME 8 14.9

Thailand 2008 Q2 2009 Q1 EME 3 7.6

Turkey 1987 Q4 1989 Q2 EME 6 4.3

Turkey 1993 Q4 1994 Q2 EME 2 11.6

Turkey 2000 Q4 2001 Q2 EME 2 7.5

Turkey 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 EME 4 13.3

United Kingdom 1973 Q1 1974 Q1 Housing AE 4 3.3

United Kingdom 1975 Q1 1975 Q3 Housing AE 2 1.5

United Kingdom 1979 Q4 1981 Q1 AE 5 4.4

United Kingdom 1990 Q2 1991 Q3 Housing AE 5 2.5

United Kingdom 2008 Q1 2009 Q3 AE 6 6.6

United States 1973 Q4 1975 Q1 AE 5 3.3

United States 1980 Q1 1980 Q3 AE 2 2.2

United States 1981 Q3 1982 Q1 AE 2 2.8

United States 1990 Q3 1991 Q1 AE 2 1.2

United States 2008 Q2 2009 Q2 AE 4 5.3

Uruguay 1988 Q1 1988 Q4 EME 3 0.1

Uruguay 1994 Q3 1995 Q1 EME 2 2.2

Uruguay 1998 Q3 1999 Q4 EME 5 5.7

Uruguay 2001 Q1 2002 Q4 Banking, Currency, Debt EME 7 19.6

Venezuela 1979 Q2 1981 Q1 EME 7 3.1

Venezuela 1982 Q2 1983 Q4 Debt EME 6 7.6

Venezuela 1984 Q2 1985 Q1 Currency EME 3 1.2

Venezuela 1988 Q2 1989 Q3 Currency EME 5 11.7

Venezuela 1992 Q4 1994 Q1 Banking, Currency EME 5 2.8

Venezuela 1995 Q4 1996 Q2 EME 2 2.6
39

Appendix A. Data by Episode

Duration measured in quarters, Depth as a percentage of GDP. Recessions after 2007 are not categorized.

Country Peak Trough IMF Housing AE/EME Duration Depth

Venezuela 2000 Q1 2000 Q3 EME 2 1.6

Venezuela 2001 Q4 2003 Q1 Currency EME 5 28.6

Venezuela 2008 Q4 2010 Q1 EME 5 6.4
40

Appendix B. Sample Countries

Country First Value

Argentina 1970 Q1

Australia 1970 Q1

Austria 1970 Q1

Belgium 1970 Q1

Brazil 1970 Q1

Canada 1970 Q1

Chile 1970 Q1

China 1970 Q1

Colombia 1970 Q1

Costa Rica 1991 Q1

Czech 1996 Q1

Denmark 1970 Q1

Estonia 1995 Q1

Finland 1970 Q1

France 1970 Q1

Germany 1970 Q1

Greece 1970 Q1

Hong Kong 1970 Q1

Hungary 1995 Q1

Iceland 1970 Q1

India 1970 Q1

Indonesia 1970 Q1

Ireland 1970 Q1

Israel 1970 Q1

Italy 1970 Q1

Japan 1970 Q1

Jordan 1992 Q1

Latvia 1992 Q1

Lithuania 1995 Q1

Luxembourg 1970 Q1

Malaysia 1970 Q1

Mexico 1970 Q1

Netherland 1970 Q1

New 1970 Q1

Norway 1970 Q1

Peru 1980 Q1

Philippine 1970 Q1

Poland 1995 Q1

Portugal 1970 Q1

Russia 1970 Q1

Singapore 1970 Q1

Slovakia 1993 Q1

Slovenia 1995 Q1

South Africa 1970 Q1

South Korea 1970 Q1

Spain 1970 Q1

Sweden 1970 Q1

Switzerland 1970 Q1

Taiwan 1970 Q1

Thailand 1970 Q1

Turkey 1987 Q1

United Kingdom 1970 Q1

United States 1970 Q1

Uruguay 1988 Q1

Venezuela 1970 Q1