alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 October 2012 —
 ara v OHIM

(Case C-611/11 P)**

Appeal – Community trade mark – Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Article 8(1)(b) – International registration designating the European Community – Figurative mark A with two triangular motifs – Earlier national word mark A – Relative grounds for refusal – No likelihood of confusion

1.                     *Appeals – Grounds – Inadequate or contradictory grounds – Admissibility (see para. 35)*

2.                     *Appeals – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of Justice of the
assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1)
TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 41)*

3.                     *Appeals – Grounds – Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court – Error of law relied
on not identified – Inadmissibility (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure
of the Court, Art. 112(1)(c)) (see para. 46)*

4.                     *Appeals – Grounds – Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal – Inadmissibility (Statute of the Court
of Justice, Art. 51) (see para. 58)*

**Re:**

| | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Appeal brought against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 22 September 2011 in Case T-174/10 | ara | v | OHIM — Allrounder (A with two triangular motifs) | , by which the General Court rejected the action brought for the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 26 January 2010 (Case R 481/2009-1), relating to opposition proceedings between ara and Allrounder — Article 8(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1) — Figurative mark A with two triangular motifs — Opposition by the proprietor of the national word mark ‘A’ — Likelihood of confusion between two marks — Erroneous assessment of distinctive character. |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the appeal; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders ara AG to pay the costs. |
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</TABLE>
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 2011

, Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.; and STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES

, Appellee s

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 5861

_____________________________/

Opinion filed September 25, 2017.

An appeal from Florida Public Employees Relations Commission.

Kimberly H. Schultz of Kimberly H. Schultz, P.A., Miami , for Appellant.

Thomas W. Brooks of Meyer, Brooks, Demma & Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee; and G. "Hal" Johnson and Stephanie D. Webster of Florida Police Benevolent Association, Tallahassee, for Appellee Florida Pol ice Benevolent Association, Inc.

No appearance for Appellee State of Florida, Department of Management Services.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROB ERTS

, WETHERELL
, and ROWE

, J J

. , CONCUR.
October 5, 2015

Mr. Jeffrey D. Kyle, Clerk

Third Court of Appeals

P. O. Box 12547

Austin, Texas 78711

Re: Court of Appeals No. 03

- 15

- 00511

- CV

Trial Court Cause No. D

- 1

- GN

- 13

- 004070

Diane V. Wade vs. David’s Landscaping; and David’s Landscaping, Inc.

Dear Mr. Kyle:

This appeal is regarding a No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. There was no record

taken of the hearing. There was an agreement and nonsuit put on the record in this case before

the hearing, although I have not been requested to tra nscribe that for the appeal.

Please contact me if you have any further questions at alicia.racanelli@traviscountytx.gov

.

Warmest regards,

/s/ Alicia Racanelli

Alicia Racanelli

Official Court Reporter

201 st District Court Alicia Racanelli, CSR

Official Court Reporter

201 st Judicial District Court

Room 327

1000 Guadalupe Street

Austin, Texas 78701

Phone: (512) 854

- 4028

Fax: (512) 854

- 2268
[Civ. No. 33342.

First Dist., Div. One.

Mar. 28, 1974.]

#### In re MELISSA H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. HELEN M. HOTELLING, as Chief Probation officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHARON E., Defendant and Appellant.

*174Counsel

Sam T. Chapman for Defendant and Appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Assistant Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, Derald E. Granberg and Thomas P. Dove, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

THE COURT

The mother of a minor appeals from an order of the lower court under subdivision (d) of section 600' of the Welfare and Institutions Code declaring the minor a dependent, placing her under the control and custody of the Director of the Napa County Welfare Department, and placing her in the home of the mother. A special finding was entered to the effect that the home involved was “unfit” solely because of the stepfather’s acts of sexual molestation while in the home.

*175Under subdivision (d) of section 600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends to any person whose home “is” unfit. The use of the present tense verb indicates an intent that the unfitness exist at the time of the hearing; however, past events can aid in a determination of present unfitness. *(In re Morrow*(1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 39, 56 [88 Cal.Rptr. 142]; *In re Zimmerman*(1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 835, 844 [24 Cal.Rptr. 329]; see also *Dupes*v. *Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal.*440, 442 [168 P. 888]; *In re Corrigan*(1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 751, 756-757 [286 P.2d 32]; *In re Van Vlack*(1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 838, 842 [185 P.2d 346].)

Evidence considered by the lower court not only established that the stepfather had sexually molested the minor, but that he hoped to be reunited with his family upon his release from the state hospital. Since all reasonable inferences must be indulged in to support the findings and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the lower court’s ruling *(In re Luwanna S.*(1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114 [107 Cal.Rptr. 62]), the lower court’s determination that the home is unfit must be affirmed. The potential return and resumption of residence in the home by the unfit parent justified the determination that the home was unfit and the best interests of the child were served by making her a ward of the court. (See *In re Van Vlack, supra,*81 Cal.App2d at p. 842.)

The lower court’s order was clearly based upon the stepfather’s past actions and future intentions, and not upon any action or status of the mother. Since the order only “affected” parental custody and control, as opposed to severing the parental relationship completely (see *Adoption of R. R. R. (1971)*18 Cal.App.3d 973, 982-983 [96 Cal.Rptr. 308]; *In re Zimmerman, supra,*206 Cal.App.2d 835, 842-843), the state’s interest in providing for the best interests of the child justified any limited intrusion on the mother’s right to maintain legal custody (see *City of Carmel-By-The-Sea*v. *Young*(1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268 [85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313]).

The order is affirmed.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-13-0003145

28-FEB-2018

10:40 AM
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# C_2015302EN.01004002.xml

| 14.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 302/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 302/40

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 July 2015 — Akzo Nobel and Akcros Chemicals v Commission

(Case T-485/11) (1)

1

((Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European markets for heat stabilisers - Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement - Infringement committed by a jointly-held subsidiary - Fines - Joint and several liability of the subsidiary and the parent companies - Ten-year limitation period applicable to one of the parent companies - Decision readopted - Reduction of the amount of the fine imposed on one of the parent companies - Attribution to the subsidiary and the other parent company of the obligation to pay the reduced fine - Rights of the defence))

(2015/C 302/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Akzo Nobel NV (Amsterdam, Netherlands); and Akcros Chemicals Ltd (Warwickshire, United Kingdom) (represented by C. Swaak and R. Wesseling, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by F. Ronkes Agerbeek and J. Bourke, and subsequently by Mr Ronkes Agerbeek and P. Van Nuffel, acting as Agents, and J. Holmes, Barrister)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of the Commission Decision of 30 June 2011 amending Commission Decision C(2009) 8682 final of 11 November 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.589 — Heat Stabilisers) in so far as it was addressed to Akzo Nobel and Akcros Chemicals or, in the alternative, for a reduction of the amount of the fines imposed.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the Commission Decision of 30 June 2011 amending Commission Decision C(2009) 8682 final of 11 November 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.589 — Heat Stabilisers); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the Commission Decision of 30 June 2011 amending Commission Decision C(2009) 8682 final of 11 November 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.589 — Heat Stabilisers);

| 2. | Orders the European Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 331, 12.11.2011.

1

---
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Patricia F. Russo, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of Lucent Technologies Inc. (the Company) and Frank A. DAmelio, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:


|(1) |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended
September 30, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: December 9, 2003

/s/ Patricia F. Russo Patricia F. Russo Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer

/s/ Frank A. DAmelio Frank A. DAmelio Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer

---
# C_2013336EN.01002103.xml

| 16.11.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 336/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 336/21

---

Order of the General Court of 9 September 2013 — Altadis v Commission

(Case T-400/11) (1)

1

(Action for annulment - State aid - Aid scheme allowing for the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions - Decision declaring the aid scheme to be incompatible with the common market and not ordering the recovery of the aid - Act entailing implementing measures - Lack of individual concern - No obligation to recover - Inadmissibility)

2013/C 336/43

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Altadis, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, M. Muñoz de Juan and R. Calvo Salinero, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal, C. Urraca Caviedes and P. Němečkova, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for partial annulment of Commission Decision 2011/282/EU of 12 January 2011 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions No C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (OJ 2011 L 135, p. 1).

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed; |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed;

| 2. | Altadis, SA is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Altadis, SA is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 282, 24.9.2011.

1

---
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris’s Report and Recommendation. 

(Dkt. 27.) At the conclusion of her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Morris 

notified the parties that they were required to file any objections within fourteen days of service, 

as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Eastern District of Michigan Local 

Rule 72.1(d), and that “[f]ailure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further 

right of appeal.” (Report & Recommendation at 33–34.) No objections were filed. 

In United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit 

established a rule of procedural default, holding that “a party shall file objections with the district 

court or else waive right to appeal” and that “a party shall be informed by the magistrate [judge] 

that objections must be filed within ten days or further appeal is waived.” In Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 144 (1985), the Supreme Court held that this rule violates neither the Federal 

Magistrates Act nor the Federal Constitution. Thus, the Court finds that the parties’ failure to 

object is a procedural default, waiving review of the magistrate judge’s findings by this Court. 

See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149 (explaining that Sixth Circuit’s waiver-of-appellate-review rule 

LARISA NIKOLAEYVNA SPELIC, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 15-cv-11029 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [24], 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19], AND 

DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION [23] 

2:15-cv-11029-LJM-PTM Doc # 28 Filed 12/21/15 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 580
2 

rested on the assumption “that the failure to object may constitute a procedural default waiving 

review even at the district court level”); Garrison v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 10-13990, 

2012 WL 1278044, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2012) (“The Court is not obligated to review the 

portions of the report to which no objection was made.” (citing Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149–52)). 

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has waived further review of the Report and 

accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition. It follows that Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) is GRANTED, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 

19) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion (Dkt. 23) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

 SO ORDERED. 

s/Laurie J. Michelson 

LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 Dated: December 21, 2015 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the attorneys 

and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on December 21, 2015. 

 s/Jane Johnson 

Case Manager to 

 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

2:15-cv-11029-LJM-PTM Doc # 28 Filed 12/21/15 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 581
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2315 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2315

 To prohibit the use of funds to transfer enemy combatants detained at 
   Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to facilities in Ohio or to 
        construct facilities in Ohio for such enemy combatants.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 7, 2009

 Mr. Austria (for himself, Mr. Latta, Mr. Tiberi, Mr. Jordan of Ohio, 
and Mrs. Schmidt) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the use of funds to transfer enemy combatants detained at 
   Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to facilities in Ohio or to 
        construct facilities in Ohio for such enemy combatants.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO TRANSFER ENEMY COMBATANTS 
              DETAINED AT NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO 
              FACILITIES IN OHIO.

    None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to any 
Federal department or agency may be used to transfer any enemy 
combatant detained by the United States at Naval Station, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, to any facility in Ohio or to construct any facility in Ohio 
for any enemy combatant.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


      Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
                   ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of
the Quarterly Report of ComBanc, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the
period ending June 30, 2002 (the "Report"), I, Paul G. Wreede, President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge:

            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
                amended; and

            (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.


/s/ Paul G. Wreede
------------------------------------
Paul G. Wreede, President and Chief Executive Officer

August 12, 2002



                                       16