UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 A state jury convicted Petitioner Jeremy Caleb Hatfield of first-degree felony murder, 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and carrying a dangerous weapon 

with unlawful intent. In 2013, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Hatfield’s conviction, see 

generally People v. Hatfield, No. 311531, 2013 WL 5629781 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2013),

and, in 2014, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Hatfield leave to appeal further, People v. 

Hatfield, 843 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 2014). Hatfield is currently serving a sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 

 On December 15, 2014, Hatfield signed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254; the Petition was docketed with this Court on January 28, 2015. (Dkt. 1.) In it, 

Hatfield asserts that his felony murder conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, apparently, that his right to confrontation under the 

Sixth Amendment was violated through the admission of statements of a non-testifying codefendant. (See Pet. at 8–9.) 

JEREMY CALEB HATFIELD, 

 Petitioner, 

 

v. 

 

KENNETH T. MCKEE, 

 Respondent. 

Case No. 2:15-cv-10101 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY [6, 7] 

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2 

 On February 21, 2015, Hatfield signed a motion to stay these proceedings; that motion 

was docketed on February 25, 2015. (Dkt. 6, Mot. to Stay; see also Dkt. 7, Erroneous Mot. to 

Stay; Dkt. 8, Notice of Error.) In material part, Hatfield’s motion says: 

3. In the State’s answer, it is argued that Petitioner’s issues are either procedurally 

barred or forfeited due to counsel’s failure to object and/or raise said issues during 

trial court proceedings. 

4. An issue, in which, further illustrates Petitioner’s claims of the ineffectiveness 

of both trial and appellate counsel. 

5. Petitioner, acting In Pro Se, should be granted the opportunity to review the 

trial court record, and make the necessary procedural steps to effectively preserve 

and/or raise additional issue via 6.500 motion to the [state] trial court. 

6. Under the circumstances described above, the undersigned believes that it 

would behoove him to present claims of the ineffectiveness of counsel to the trial 

court by way of motion for relief from judgment, prior to having his defaulted 

habeas corpus issues decided by this Court. 

(Dkt. 6, Mot. to Stay at 1–2.) 

 Hatfield’s factual assertions are not on point. Respondent has not answered. 

Respondent’s answer is due in July 2015. Moreover, a review of Hatfield’s Petition does not 

reveal an “ineffectiveness of counsel” claim. 

 Hatfield’s motion is also problematic because the Court cannot assess the merit of 

Hatfield’s ineffective-assistance claim. As this case does not involve a mixed petition as in 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), “the question for this Court is whether to proceed in 

parallel (on the exhausted claims) with state-court post-conviction proceedings (on the 

unexhausted claim) or to hold off until those state proceedings conclude,” Thomas v. Stoddard, 

— F. Supp. 3d. —, No. 14-13232, 2015 WL 927076, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2015). One 

primary consideration in answering this question is the relative merit of the exhausted and 

unexhausted claims. Id. (“If this Court were to proceed in parallel with state post-conviction 

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proceedings, there is a risk of wasting judicial resources if the state court might grant relief on 

the unexhausted claim. . . . The flip side is also relevant: if the exhausted claims in the petition 

appear to be very clear bases for habeas relief, proceeding to adjudicate those claims would 

likely save state-court resources.”). Yet, Hatfield’s motion to stay does not set forth his 

ineffective-assistance claim in sufficient detail to make this critical determination. 

 For these reasons, Hatfield’s motion to stay (Dkts. 6; see also Dkts. 7, 8) is DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.1

SO ORDERED. 

s/Laurie J. Michelson 

LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: March 17, 2015 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the 

attorneys and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on March 17, 2015. 

 s/Jane Johnson 

Case Manager to 

 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

 

1

 The Court notes that, as of today, it appears that a little over two months of AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations period remains. (The Michigan Supreme Court denied Hatfield 

leave to appeal on February 28, 2014 and the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court expired 90 days later on May 29, 2014.) The Court adds that the one-year 

period will be tolled during the time in which any properly filed post-conviction or collateral 

action is pending in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

219–221 (2002). 

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