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PAUL IPPOLITO ET AL. v. OLYMPIC

CONSTRUCTION, LLC

(AC 37437)

Alvord, Sheldon and Mullins, Js.

Argued December 9, 2015—officially released March 1, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Hon. David R. Tobin, judge trial
referee.)

Joseph DaSilva, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was

Marc J. Grenier, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Thomas M. Cassone, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. The plaintiff homeowners, Paul Ippolito and Lisa Ippolito, appeal from the judgment of the

trial court, Hon. David R. Tobin, judge trial referee,

denying their motion to vacate an arbitration award in

favor of their home improvement contractor, defendant

Olympic Construction, LLC, and granting the defendant’s motion to confirm that award. The arbitration

involved a claim by the defendant for lost profits for

work repairing water damage to the plaintiffs’ home,

which it was not permitted to complete under the terms

of their home improvement contract due to the plaintiffs’ alleged termination of that contract without just

cause. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in

confirming the arbitrator’s award of lost profit damages

to the defendant because the contract did not comply

with certain provisions of the Home Improvement Act

(HIA), General Statutes § 20-418 et seq. In particular,

the plaintiffs argue that the contract did not comply

with General Statutes § 20-429 (a) (6), which requires

that every home improvement contract contain a notice

of the homeowner’s right to cancel the contract in

accordance with the provisions ofthe Home Solicitation

Sales Act (HSSA), General Statutes §§ 42-134 through

42-143, or with § 20-429 (a) (7), which requires that each

such contract contain a starting date and completion

date.1 The plaintiffs claim that the arbitrator’s award of

damages to a contractor for work he agreed to perform

under a home improvement contract that is noncompliant with the HIA violated the clear public policy of this

state and demonstrated a manifest disregard of the law.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court confirming

the arbitration award.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The

plaintiffs, owners of a residential property located at

131 Pequot Lane in New Canaan, suffered water damage

at their home following a storm. As a result, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant to repair

the damage. That contract, dated May 26, 2011, consisted of an American Institute of Architects (AIA) Standard Form A133–2009 and several other documents,

which were incorporated therein by reference, including AIA Document A201–2007, General Conditions of

the Contract for Construction. The contract provides

that all disputes between them arising out of or related

to the contract will be subject to arbitration before an

arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association

in accordance with the association’s Construction

Industry Arbitration Rules.

During the course of repairs, another storm caused

more water damage to the plaintiffs’ home, prompting

Paul Ippolito to terminate the parties’ contract before

the defendant could complete the agreed upon work.

The defendant then filed a claim for arbitration, seeking

to recover lost profits for work it had agreed to perform
under the contract but had not been allowed to

complete.

The plaintiffs defended themselves in the arbitration

by arguing that the contract was void for noncompliance with the HIA, and thus that it was unenforceable

against them by the defendant, because it failed to give

them proper statutory notice of their cancellation rights

under the contract, and failed to include a starting date

and completion date forthe work to be performed thereunder. The arbitrator rejected the plaintiffs’ defense,

found that Paul Ippolito’s termination of the contract

had not been for cause, and thus awarded the defendant

$46,448.19 in lost profits for the plaintiffs’ breach of

contract.

After the arbitration, the plaintiffs moved to vacate

the arbitration award in the Stamford Superior Court

pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a),2 and the

defendant moved to confirm the award pursuant to

General Statutes § 52-417.3 The plaintiffs claimed that

the award violated the clear public policy of this state

because it contravened the previously described provisions of the HIA, and that the arbitrator, by not strictly

enforcing those statutory provisions, had manifestly

disregarded the law. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, and thus denied their motion to vacate and

granted the defendant’s motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award. This appeal followed.

‘‘Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. . . . When the parties agree to arbitration and

establish the authority of the arbitrator through the

terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial

review of the award is delineated by the scope of the

parties’ agreement. . . . When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject

to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the

award conforms to the submission. . . . Because we

favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes,

we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in

a manner designed to minimize interference with an

efficient and economical system of alternative dispute

resolution. . . .

‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the

arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal

questions and an award cannot be vacated on the

grounds that . . . the interpretation of the agreement

by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will notreview

the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted,

will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal

questions involved. . . . In other words, [u]nder an

unrestricted submission, the arbitrators’ decision is

considered final and binding; thus the courts will not

review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor

will they review the award for errors of law or fact. . . .

‘‘Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we
have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an

award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of

a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy

. . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of

the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52-

418.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Economos v.

Liljedahl Bros., Inc., 279 Conn. 300, 305–306, 901 A.2d

1198 (2006). The plaintiffs challenge the award for violation of public policy and for contravention of § 52-418

on the ground that, in issuing the award, the arbitrator

manifestly disregarded the law.

I

We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that the arbitrator’s award violates the clear public policy of this state

because it enforces against a homeowner, on a claim for

damages by a contractor, a home improvement contract

that does not comply with the HIA. The plaintiffs argue,

more particularly, that the location of the cancellation

notice within the contract does not comply with § 20-

429 (a) (6), and that the contract does not contain a

starting date and completion date, as required by § 20-

429 (a) (7).

We begin by setting forth our standard of review.

‘‘[W]e favor arbitration as a means of settling private

disputes, [thus] we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of

alternative dispute resolution. . . . We will, however,

submit to higher scrutiny an arbitration award that is

claimed to be in contravention of public policy. . . .

[P]arties cannot expect an arbitration award approving

conduct which is . . . contrary to public policy to

receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can

expect a court to enforce such a contract between them.

. . . When a challenge to the arbitrator’s authority is

made on public policy grounds, however, the court is

not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s

decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the

award. . . .

‘‘Thus, when a party challenges a consensual arbitral

award on the ground that it violates public policy, and

where that challenge has a legitimate, colorable basis,

de novo review of the award is appropriate in order to

determine whether the award does in fact violate public

policy. . . . As this court maintained in [State v.

AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, 309 Conn. 519, 528, 69

A.3d 927 (2013)], we defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreements regarding the scope of the [contract] provision . . . . We conclude only that as a

reviewing court, we must determine, pursuant to our

plenary authority and giving appropriate deference to

the arbitrator’s factual conclusions, whether the contract provision in question violates those policies. . . .

‘‘To determine whether an arbitration award must be
vacated for violating public policy, we employ a twopronged analysis. . . . First, we must determine

whetherthe award implicates any explicit, well-defined,

and dominant public policy. . . . To identify the existence of a public policy, we look to statutes,regulations,

administrative decisions, and case law. . . . Second, if

the decision of the arbitrator does implicate a clearly

defined public policy, we then determine whether the

contract, as construed by the arbitration award, violates

that policy.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Burr Road

Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care

Employees Union, District 1199, 316 Conn. 618, 629–

31, 114 A.3d 144 (2015) (Burr Road). ‘‘Our case law

. . . has emphasized, however, that a reviewing court

still is bound by the arbitrator’s factual findings in making such a determination.’’ AFSCME, Council 4, Local

1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 298 Conn. 824, 837, 6 A.3d

1142 (2010).

The plaintiffs claim that the arbitrator’s award violates public policy because the contract is noncompliant

with two sections of the HIA: (1) § 20-429 (a) (6), which

requires that home improvement contracts include a

notice of the homeowner’s cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of the HSSA; and (2) § 20-

429 (a) (7), which requires that a home improvement

contract contain a starting date and completion date.

The plaintiffs argue that, ‘‘[t]o enforce a noncompliant

home improvement contract is contrary to the public

policy of the state of Connecticut, and thus, said noncompliance compels the concomitant conclusion that

the award itself violates the public policy of the state

of Connecticut and it must therefore be vacated.’’ The

defendant responds that strict enforcement of the HIA

is not a well-defined, explicit, and dominant public policy of this state.

A

We first turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that the contract

violates public policy because it does not comply with

the notice of cancellation requirements ofthe HIAunder

§ 20-429 (a) (6), which requires that a home improvement contract include notice of the homeowner’s cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of

the HSSA. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the parties’

contract contains a notice of their cancellation rights,

nor do they argue that the language or typeface of that

cancellation notice is in any way deficient. Instead, they

argue that the location of the notice within the contract

documents does not comply with General Statutes § 42-

135a (1) and (2) of the HSSA.

Section 42-135a (1) of the HSSA requires, inter alia,

that the seller include a cancellation notice ‘‘in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for

the signature of the buyer . . . .’’4 Section 42-135a (2)

of the HSSA, in turn, requires that the seller provide the
buyer with ‘‘a completed form in duplicate, captioned

‘NOTICE OF CANCELLATION’, which shall be attached

to the contract . . . and easily detachable . . . .’’5 The

plaintiffs argue that the cancellation notice in the contract here at issue does not comply with the foregoing

requirements because it is ‘‘buried’’ on pages thirtyeight and thirty-nine of a thirty-nine page document

separate from the contract, entitled AIA Document

A201–2007, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction.

The plaintiffs initially argued before the arbitrator

that the contract did not contain any notice of cancellation rights, but the arbitrator disagreed, finding as follows: ‘‘The [plaintiffs] claim . . . that the contract

failed to contain a notice of cancellation rights. This

claim does not hold up. The contract, in section 12.2,

directly above Mr. Ippolito’s signature, states that the

contract includes AIA document A201–2007, General

Conditions of the Contract for Construction. On pages

38–39 of that document is the notice of cancellation,

which states explicitly that the Owner may cancel the

contract ‘without any penalty or obligation’. The effectiveness of this inclusion is not affected by the fact that

the date of the notice was changed from June 6 to June

10 and the date of the notice limit was changed from

June 9 to June 13. The contract clearly does contain

the notice of cancellation rights required by the [HIA].’’

The plaintiffs argued in the trial court, however, as

they do before this court, that even if the contract did

contain a cancellation notice, its location in the contract

was improper. The trial court concluded that the award

did not violate a clear public policy because the plaintiffs were unable to produce any case law holding that

a defect in the location of the notice of cancellation,

absent any other defect, was fatal.

Although the plaintiffs argued in the trial court that

the contract violated § 42-135a (2), the trial court’s decision did not reference that claim and was based solely

on the portion of § 42-135a (1) that requires a seller to

include a cancellation notice ‘‘in immediate proximity

to the space reserved in the contract for the signature

of the buyer.’’ The plaintiffs never filed a request for

articulation to receive a ruling on their claim under

§ 42-135a (2). Moreover, the plaintiffs have failed to

adequately brief their claim as to § 42-135a (2) by failing

to set forth how the contract here at issue violates that

subdivision. Thus, we decline to review the plaintiffs’

claim to the extent that it asserts a violation of that subdivision.6

Our first step is to ‘‘determine whether the award

implicates any explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.’’ Burr Road, supra, 316 Conn. 630. We conclude that the arbitration award, insofar as it rejects

the plaintiffs’ challenge to the contract’s notice of cancellation, does not ‘‘[implicate] any explicit, well-
defined, and dominant public policy.’’ Id. Although our

Supreme Court has recognized that compliance with

§ 20-429 (a) is mandatory, it has not required perfect

compliance. Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Dowling,

247 Conn. 218, 230–31, 720 A.2d 235 (1998). ‘‘The HIA

is a remedial statute that was enacted forthe purpose of

providing the public with a form of consumer protection

against unscrupulous home improvement contractors.

. . . The aim of the statute is to promote understanding

on the part of consumers with respect to the terms of

home improvement contracts and their right to cancel

such contracts so as to allow them to make informed

decisions when purchasing home improvement services. . . . While the purposes of the statute are

advanced by an interpretation that makes compliance

with the requirements of § 20-429 (a) mandatory, it does

not necessarily follow that advancement of the purposes also requires that the mandatory compliance with

each subsection be technically perfect.’’ (Citations

omitted.) Id., 231.

In Dowling, our Supreme Court concluded that it

would be inappropriate to require ‘‘technically perfect

compliance’’ with § 20-429 (a), and instead required ‘‘an

interpretation of that section that acknowledges and

furthers the remedial purposes of the statute . . . .’’

Id. The plaintiff contractor in that case sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien afterthe defendant homeowners

had failed to submit complete payment for renovations

that the plaintiff had completed on their home. Id.,

223–24. The defendants claimed that their contract did

not comply with the HIA because the plaintiff: (1) had

not attached two copies of the notice of cancellation

to it, in violation of § 42-135a (2); see footnote 5 of

this opinion; and (2) had not entered the date of the

transaction or the date by which the transaction could

be cancelled on the notice of cancellation, in violation of

§ 42-135a (3).7

Id., 226. The court in Dowling disagreed,

noting first that, although the plaintiff had supplied only

one copy of the cancellation notice to the homeowner,

it had supplied another copy to the homeowner’s husband, who was then acting as her agent. Id., 232. Second,

it noted that, even though there were no dates on the

cancellation notice, ‘‘[t]he missing information . . .

easily could have been gleaned from even the most

cursory review of the contract.’’ Id., 233. Therefore, the

court concluded that ‘‘the alleged deviations . . . were

of a minor and highly technical nature, and did not

result in a lack of notice to the defendants that they

had a right to cancel the contract within three days of

the contract’s signing.’’ Id., 232. Accordingly, when a

minor or technical defect in the cancellation notice of

a home improvement contract does not result in a lack

of notice to the homeowners of their right to cancel

the contract within three days of the contract’s signing,

an arbitrator’s award enforcing the contract against the

homeowners cannot be found to violate an ‘‘explicit,
well-defined, and dominant public policy’’; Burr Road,

supra, 316 Conn. 630; of this state.

The arbitrator in this case found that the cancellation

notice complied in substance with the requirements of

the HIA, because, even though it was set forth on pages

thirty-eight and thirty-nine of a separate document that

had been incorporated into the contract by reference,

the incorporated document itself was referenced in

close proximity to the signature line on the contract.

Here, then, because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the cancellation notice was missing from

the contract, or that the language or typeface or any

other aspect of the cancellation notice was deficient

in such a way as to deprive them of notice of their

cancellation rights under the HIA, we cannot conclude

that enforcement of the contract against the homeowners violated an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy of this state.

B

We turn next to the plaintiffs’ claim regarding § 20-429

(a) (7), which provides that: ‘‘No home improvement

contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner

unless it . . . (7) contains a starting date and completion date . . . .’’ The plaintiffs claim that the contract

does not comply with that provision because it does

not contain specific calendar dates for starting and completing work under the contract.

The arbitrator made the following findings as to the

starting date and completion date of work to be performed under the parties’ contract: ‘‘The . . . claim

. . . that the contract does not include a start date and

a completion date . . . fails. The General Conditions

state in section 8.1.2: ‘[t]he date of commencement of

the Work is the date established in the agreement.’

Section 2.3.1.1 of the agreement states: ‘For purposes

of Section 8.1.2 of A201–2007, the date of commencement of the Work shall mean the date of commencement

of the Construction Phase.’ In the following section

2.3.1.2, it states, ‘The Construction Phase shall commence upon the Owner’s acceptance of the Construction Manager’s Guaranteed Maximum Price proposal or

the Owner’s issuance of a Notice to Proceed, whichever

occurs earlier.’ The completion date for the contract is

defined in Section 9.8 of the General Conditions.8

In

this matter, the start dates and the completion date can

be readily adduced by looking at the entire contract

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added.)

The trial court thus rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that

the contract violated the starting date and completion

date requirement of the HIA, and with it the claim that

enforcement of that contract against them violated an

explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy of

this state. On that score, the court expressly noted that

the plaintiffs could not provide any case law that held
that‘‘the starting date and/or completion date need to be

fixed calendar dates rather than dates to be determined

upon the occurrence of certain events. (E.g., the completion of plans; issuance of a building permit; notification of closing on construction financing.)’’

The plaintiffs again claim on appeal that enforcement

against them of a home improvement contract that is

noncompliant with the starting date and completion

date requirement of the HIA violates public policy. We

are bound by the arbitrator’s factual findings; AFSCME,

Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, supra,

298 Conn. 837; including the finding that ‘‘the start date

and the completion date can be readily adduced by

looking at the entire contract.’’ On the basis of those

findings, the arbitrator concluded that the parties’ contract was compliant with the HIA requirement that it

contain a starting date and completion date. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim on appeal fails, for even if

strict enforcement of the starting date and completion

date requirement of the statute were an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy of this state, the

contract here at issue does not violate that requirement

or the public policy it is designed to promote.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the arbitrator’s enforcement of a contract that is noncompliant with § 20-429

(a) (6) and (7) of the HIA demonstrates a manifest

disregard of the law, and thus that the award should

be set aside pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4).

‘‘[Section] 52-418 (a) (4) provides that an arbitration

award shall be vacated if the arbitrators have exceeded

their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter

submitted was not made. . . . [A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of

the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant

to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator has exceeded

[his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter

submitted was not made. We emphasize, however, that

the manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating

an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved

for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordinary lack

of fidelity to established legal principles.

‘‘So delimited, the principle of vacating an award

because of a manifest disregard of the law is an

important safeguard of the integrity of alternate dispute

resolution mechanisms. Judicial approval of arbitration

decisions that so egregiously depart from established

law that they border on the irrational would undermine

society’s confidence in the legitimacy of the arbitration

process. . . . Furthermore, although the discretion

conferred on the arbitrator by the contracting parties

is exceedingly broad, modern contract principles of
good faith and fair dealing recognize that even contractual discretion must be exercised for purposes reasonably within the contemplation of the contracting

parties. . . .

‘‘In Garrity [v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 9, 612 A.2d 742

(1992)], we adopted the test enunciated by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in interpreting the federal equivalent of § 52-418 (a) (4). . . .

The test consists of the following three elements, all

of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate

an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration

panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was

obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an

arbitrator;(2)the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided

to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have

been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined,

explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc., supra, 279 Conn.

306–307.

The plaintiffs argue that the contract does not comply

strictly with the HIA and the HSSA, and that mandatory

strict compliance with the HIA and the HSSA is a welldefined, explicit, and clearly applicable law. Moreover,

the plaintiffs argue that the arbitrator recognized the

existence of the requirements of § 20-429 (a) (6) and

(7), but ignored those provisions.

The arbitrator found that the notice of cancellation

in the contract here at issue deviated from the strict

requirements of the HIA in only a minor and technical

manner, and concluded that the contract complied fully

with the HIA’s requirement that the contract contain a

starting date and completion date. As for the latter

determination, it completely undermines the plaintiffs’

claim that by enforcing a contract that failed to contain

a starting and completion date, the arbitrator issued

his award in manifest disregard of the law. The relevant

provisions of the HIA simply were not violated at all.

As for the former determination, although the court

determined that the location of the cancellation notice

in the parties’ contract constituted a minor and technical deviation from the requirements of the HIA, we

already have determined that no such deviation

required the nonenforcement of the contract unless it

was shown to have deprived the plaintiffs of notice of

their statutory cancellation rights under the contract.

By failing to plead and prove such a deprivation of

notice of their statutory cancellation rights as a result

of the minor and technical deviation here at issue, the

plaintiffs have failed to prove that the arbitratorignored

the requirements of a well-defined, explicit, and clearly

applicable law, or that he thereby demonstrated an

‘‘extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal prin-
ciples’’; (internal quotation marks omitted.) id., 306; as

required to establish a manifest disregard of the law

within the meaning of § 52-418 (a) (4).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 20-429 (a) provides: ‘‘No home improvement contract

shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it: (1) Is in writing, (2)

is signed by the owner and the contractor, (3) contains the entire agreement

between the owner and the contractor, (4) contains the date of the transaction,(5) contains the name and address of the contractor and the contractor’s

registration number, (6) contains a notice of the owner’s cancellation rights

in accordance with the provisions of chapter 740, (7) contains a starting

date and completion date, (8) is entered into by a registered salesman or

registered contractor, and (9) includes a provision disclosing each corporation, limited liability company, partnership, sole proprietorship or other

legal entity, which is or has been a home improvement contractor pursuant

to the provisions of this chapter or a new home construction contractor

pursuant to the provisions of chapter 399a, in which the owner or owners of

the home improvement contractor are or have been a shareholder, member,

partner, or owner during the previous five years. Each change in the terms

and conditions of a contract shall be in writing and shall be signed by the

owner and contractor, except that the commissioner may, by regulation,

dispense with the necessity for complying with the requirement that each

change in a home improvement contract shall be in writing and signed by

the owner and contractor.’’

2 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides: ‘‘Upon the application of any

party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which

one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the

judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in

session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it

finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by

corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality

or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been

guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient

cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the

controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have

been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so

imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the

subject matter submitted was not made.’’

3 General Statutes § 52-417 provides: ‘‘At any time within one year after

an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified

thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior

court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a

controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is

situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof, for an

order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order

confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected

as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.’’

4 General Statutes § 42-135a provides: ‘‘No agreement in a home solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer if it is not signed and dated by

the buyer or if the seller shall: (1) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully

completed receipt or copy of all contracts and documents pertaining to

such sale at the time of its execution, which contract shall be in the same

language as that principally used in the oral sales presentation and which

shall show the date of the transaction and shall contain the name and address

of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract

for the signature of the buyer, or on the front page of the receipt if a contract

is not used, and in boldface type of a minimum size of ten points, a statement

in substantially the following form:

‘YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION AT ANY TIME

PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE DATE

OF THIS TRANSACTION. SEE THE ATTACHED NOTICE OF CANCELLATION FORM FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THIS RIGHT.’ ’’

5 General Statutes § 42-135a provides: ‘‘No agreement in a home solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer if it is not signed and dated by

the buyer or if the seller shall (2) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time

such buyer signs the home solicitation sales contract or otherwise agrees

to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form in
duplicate, captioned ‘NOTICE OF CANCELLATION’, which shall be attached

to the contract or receipt and easily detachable, and which shall contain in

ten-point boldface type the following information and statements in the

same language as that used in the contract:

‘NOTICE OF CANCELLATION

. . . . (Date of Transaction)

YOU MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, WITHOUT ANY PENALTY OR

OBLIGATION, WITHIN THREEBUSINESS DAYS FROM THEABOVE DATE.

IF YOU CANCEL, ANY PROPERTY TRADED IN, ANY PAYMENTS MADE

BY YOU UNDER THE CONTRACT OR SALE, AND ANY NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENT EXECUTED BY YOU WILL BE RETURNED WITHIN TEN

BUSINESS DAYS FOLLOWING RECEIPT BY THE SELLER OF YOUR CANCELLATION NOTICE, AND ANY SECURITY INTEREST ARISING OUT OF

THE TRANSACTION WILL BE CANCELLED.

IF YOU CANCEL, YOU MUST MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AT

YOUR RESIDENCE, IN SUBSTANTIALLY AS GOOD CONDITION AS WHEN

RECEIVED, ANY GOODS DELIVERED TO YOU UNDER THIS CONTRACT

OR SALE; OR YOU MAY, IF YOU WISH, COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELLER REGARDING THE RETURN SHIPMENT OF THE

GOODS AT THE SELLER’S EXPENSE AND RISK.

IF YOU DO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AND THE

SELLER DOES NOT PICK THEM UP WITHIN TWENTY DAYS OF THE

DATE OF CANCELLATION, YOU MAY RETAIN OR DISPOSE OF THE

GOODS WITHOUT ANY FURTHER OBLIGATION. IF YOU FAIL TO MAKE

THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER, OR IF YOU AGREE TO

RETURN THE GOODS TO THE SELLER AND FAIL TO DO SO, THEN YOU

REMAIN LIABLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER

THE CONTRACT.

TO CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, MAIL OR DELIVER A SIGNED AND

DATED COPY OF THIS CANCELLATION NOTICE OR ANY OTHER WRITTEN NOTICE, OR SEND A TELEGRAM TO . . . . (Name of Seller) AT

. . . . (Address of Seller’s Place of Business) NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT

OF . . . . (Date)

I HEREBY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION

. . . . (Date)

. . . . (Buyer’s Signature)’ ’’

6 We are aware that Practice Book § 61-10 was recently amended to include

subsection (b), which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he failure of any

party on appeal to seek articulation pursuant to Section 66-5 shall not be

the sole ground upon which the court declines to review any issue or claim

on appeal. . . .’’ The commentary for § 61-10 provides, however, that ‘‘[t]he

adoption of subsection (b) is not intended to preclude the court from declining to review an issue where the record is inadequate for reasons other

than solely the failure to seek an articulation . . . .’’

7 General Statutes § 42-135a provides in relevant part: ‘‘No agreement in

a home solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer if it is not signed

and dated by the buyer or if the seller shall . . . (3) Fail, before furnishing

copies of the ‘Notice of Cancellation’ to the buyer, to complete both copies

by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller’s place of

business, the date of the transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third

business day following the date of the transaction, by which the buyer may

give notice of cancellation.’’

8 Section 9.8.1 of the General Conditions of the contract states: ‘‘Substantial Completion is the stage in the process of the Work when the Work or

designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the

Contract Documents so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for

its intended use.’’