UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

QIANA QUINN, 

 

 Plaintiffs, Case No. 15-10653 

 Honorable Victoria A. Roberts 

v. 

 

HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM, 

 

 Defendant. 

______________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [Doc. 53] 

 On December 22, 2016, the Court entered an order granting in part Henry Ford 

Health System’s (“HFHS”) motion for summary judgment and denying Qiana Quinn’s 

motion for summary judgment. Quinn’s claims for pregnancy discrimination and 

pregnancy retaliation under Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act 

(“ELCRA”) – Counts 1-4 in the second amended complaint – survived summary 

judgment. HFHS moves for reconsideration, arguing that the Court should dismiss 

these remaining claims. [Doc. 53]. 

Local Rule 7.1(h)(3) provides the Court's standard of review for a motion for 

reconsideration: 

Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the court will not 

grant motions for ... reconsideration that merely present the same issues 

ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication. 

The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the 

court and the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion 

have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a 

different disposition of the case. 

E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear, 

unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 

2:15-cv-10653-VAR-RSW Doc # 71 Filed 01/18/17 Pg 1 of 5 Pg ID 2020
2

731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court to grant a 

motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 2d 759, 780 

(E.D. Mich. 2010). “[A]bsent a significant error that changes the outcome of a ruling on 

a motion, the Court will not provide a party with an opportunity to relitigate issues 

already decided.” Id. 

HFHS says the Court committed two palpable defects: (1) the Court used the 

wrong standard for Quinn’s discrimination claims – i.e., the Court compared Quinn to a 

person whose ability to work or not work was not similar to Quinn’s; and (2) Quinn’s 

action of informing Ruffin she was pregnant did not constitute protected activity for 

purposes of her retaliation claims. 

HFHS’s first alleged defect pertains to Counts 1 and 3, pregnancy discrimination, 

and is baseless. Although Quinn’s counsel compared Quinn to Marsack – whose ability 

to work was not similar to Quinn’s – the Court did not adopt this standard as HFHS 

asserts. The Court found that Quinn’s discrimination claims survived summary 

judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed which would allow a 

reasonable jury to conclude that Ruffin rescinded the promotion because Quinn was 

pregnant in violation of Title VII and the ELCRA. If the jury believes Quinn’s 

presentation of the facts, Marsack and her abilities would not be relevant. 

 HFHS’s second argument pertains to Counts 2 and 4, retaliation, and is correct: 

as a matter of law, simply informing Ruffin she was pregnant does not constitute a 

protected activity under Title VII or the ELCRA. Although HFHS argued generally in its 

motion for summary judgment that Quinn did not engage in protected activity, it did not 

specifically contend that Quinn’s act of informing Ruffin she was pregnant was not a 

2:15-cv-10653-VAR-RSW Doc # 71 Filed 01/18/17 Pg 2 of 5 Pg ID 2021
3

protected activity. Nevertheless, the Court finds it appropriate to address this argument 

at this juncture. To assure Quinn was not prejudiced, the Court allowed her to respond. 

The matter is fully briefed. 

 In order to make a prima facie case of retaliation, Quinn must show that: (1) she 

engaged in protected activity; (2) HFHS knew she exercised her civil rights; (3) HFHS 

took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) there was a causal connection 

between her exercise of protected activity and the adverse employment action. Wasek 

v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2012). 

“Under Title VII, there are two types of protected activity: participation in a 

proceeding with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and 

opposition to an apparent Title VII violation.” Id. at 469. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 

against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 

because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”). Retaliation under the 

ELCRA is materially the same as under Title VII. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2701(a). 

 Quinn’s act of telling Ruffin she was pregnant does not constitute opposing an 

unlawful employment practice, and she did not file an EEOC complaint until well after 

Ruffin made the employment decision. As a matter of law, Quinn did not engage in 

protected activity when she told Ruffin she was pregnant. 

 In response to HFHS’s motion for reconsideration, Quinn says she “opposed Ms. 

Ruffin’s stated predisposition to not promote her, in violation of Title VII and ELCRA 

2:15-cv-10653-VAR-RSW Doc # 71 Filed 01/18/17 Pg 3 of 5 Pg ID 2022
4

because [she] was pregnant, by requesting to be promoted despite being pregnant.” 

[Doc. 70, PgID 2012]. This sets forth an arguable claim of retaliation. Viewing the facts 

and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Quinn, a reasonable jury 

could find that: (1) after Ruffin told Quinn that her pregnancy threw “a little curve in the 

thing,” Quinn contacted or attempted to contact Ruffin multiple times requesting to be 

promoted despite being pregnant (i.e., protected activity); and (2) because Quinn 

requested to be promoted despite being pregnant, Ruffin rescinded the promotion 

and/or did not offer her the position (i.e., adverse action and causal connection). 

Although Quinn did not specifically plead these allegations in her second 

amended complaint, the Court construes Quinn’s response liberally as an amendment 

to her pleading; this is appropriate considering HFHS did not raise this particular 

argument in its motion for summary judgment, and because discovery arguably 

supports this claim of retaliation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“a party may amend its 

pleading . . . with . . . the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice 

so requires.”). See also Rule 15(b)(1) (“If, at trial, a party objects that evidence is not 

within the issues raised in the pleadings, the court may permit the pleadings to be 

amended. The court should freely permit an amendment when doing so will aid in 

presenting the merits and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence 

would prejudice that party's action or defense on the merits.”). 

 The Court DENIES HFHS’s motion for reconsideration [Doc. 53].

IT IS ORDERED.   

 S/Victoria A. Roberts 

 Victoria A. Roberts 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: January 18, 2017 

2:15-cv-10653-VAR-RSW Doc # 71 Filed 01/18/17 Pg 4 of 5 Pg ID 2023
5

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this 

document was served on the attorneys of 

record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on 

January 18, 2017. 

s/Linda Vertriest 

Deputy Clerk 

2:15-cv-10653-VAR-RSW Doc # 71 Filed 01/18/17 Pg 5 of 5 Pg ID 2024