UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case Number 14-20542 

v. Honorable David M. Lawson 

CYNTHIA LONDON-CLAYTON, 

 Defendant. 

_____________________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO MODIFY RESTITUTION ORDER 

 Defendant Cynthia London-Clayton is serving a prison sentence that also has a restitution 

component. She has filed a motion to suspend temporarily her “financial responsibility payments,” 

which the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has been deducting quarterly from her prisoner account to 

cover her restitution obligation. She states that the restrictions on her work assignments the BOP 

has imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic have curtailed her earnings in prison so that she is 

unable to make payments. The government contends that the Court lacks “jurisdiction” to modify 

the sentence. However, the Court has the authority to “adjust the [restitution] payment schedule” 

after finding “a material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances,” under 18 U.S.C. § 

3664(k). Because London-Clayton has made the required showing, the Court will grant relief. 

I. 

 London-Clayton pleaded guilty to charges of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and 

bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On November 9, 2015, she was sentenced to concurrent terms 

of 155 months in prison. The Court also included in the judgment financial penalties including a 

special assessment of $600 and restitution of $2,655. 

 On August 6, 2020, the defendant filed a motion asking the Court to stay the collection of 

payments from her prisoner account under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). 

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She asserts in her motion that prison officials at FCI Hazelton, where she presently is incarcerated, 

have imposed a “modified operations schedule,” under which “most inmate movement has been 

halted.” The defendant asserts that, as a result of the movement restrictions, she has been unable 

to participate in her previously scheduled work assignment, and, therefore, she is not receiving 

enough income to cover the quarterly withdrawals from her prisoner account. The defendant 

indicates in her motion that she submitted a request for a stay of collection withdrawals to prison 

authorities, but that request was denied. 

 The government asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction to modify the sentence under any 

pertinent statute or regulation, including Criminal Rule 35(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3582. However, the 

government concedes that the Court is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) to modify a 

defendant’s restitution payment schedule if the defendant demonstrates a “material change” in her 

financial circumstances after the restitution judgment was issued. Nevertheless, the government 

expresses its belief that the defendant should seek relief from the Bureau of Prisons before 

appealing to the Court for modification of her restitution. 

II. 

 As a general rule, a federal court may not modify a criminal sentence once it has been 

imposed. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020). There are statutorily 

authorized exceptions, such as those allowing “compassionate release.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 

But that exception addresses a court’s authority to “modify a term of imprisonment.” Ibid. 

 However, Congress also has authorized courts to modify restitution orders after they have 

been imposed as part of a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k); United States v. Holley, No. 19-5492, 

2020 WL 2316052, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2020) (“Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 

(‘MVRA’), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, a district court may modify a final order of restitution upon a 

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showing of a material change in the defendant’s circumstances.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k)). 

Section 3664(k) does not authorize modification of the amount of restitution, but it does permit 

the Court to modify any payment schedule for payment of restitution that was imposed by the 

Court. Holley, 2020 WL 2316052, at *2. Section 3664(k) “authorizes courts to ‘adjust the 

payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice require’ in the 

event of a ‘material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the 

defendant’s ability to pay restitution.’” United States v. West, No. 04-171, 2019 WL 3842859, at 

*1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § § 3664(k)). “Though only the payment 

schedule, and not the restitution amount, may be modified through this statute, this may be done 

at any time.” United States v. Holley, No. 12-00065, 2019 WL 1756258, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 

2019), aff’d, No. 19-5492, 2020 WL 2316052 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2020). 

 The judgment in this case addresses the payment of restitution as follows: 

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise in the special instructions above, 

while in custody, the defendant shall participate in the Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program. The Court is aware of the requirements of the program and 

approves of the payment schedule of this program and hereby orders the 

defendant’s compliance. All criminal monetary penalty payments are to be made to 

the Clerk of the Court, except those payments made through the Bureau of Prison’s 

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. 

Judgment, ECF No. 35, PageID.157. The government concedes that the Court has authority under 

18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) to modify a restitution payment schedule that was imposed by the Court. In 

this instance, that authorization plainly extends to deleting the requirement of payments to be made 

according to the schedule of the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. As the government 

correctly points out, section 3664(k) does not extend any authority to modify the operation of the 

IFRP or its payment policies as applied to the defendant. However, it plainly does allow the Court 

to modify the judgment to delete any reference to the IFRP, as that amounts to an “adjust[ment of] 

the payment schedule.” 

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 The curtailment of the defendant’s only income due to her inability to participate in work 

assignments, due to pandemic related movement restrictions, certainly qualifies as a material 

change in her financial circumstances, which post-dates the imposition of the payment schedule 

by the Court. The government expresses its belief that the preferable course would be for the 

defendant to seek the relief she desires through the BOP in the first instance. But she represents 

in her motion that she already did make the request to prison authorities, and it was denied. 

 In light of the government’s essential concession that a modification is warranted and 

authorized, it is not clear why it has not taken action to grant that relief. Its inaction is an invitation 

to the Court to act in its stead, which the Court fully is authorized to do, and the government does 

not contest that authority. Deletion of the specification of the IFRP payment plan, which is the 

only remedy immediately available to the Court, appears to put the government in a weaker 

position with respect to any eventual recovery compared with foreclosing the need for judicial 

intervention by preemptively handling the request for a modification on its own initiative. But it 

is not for the Court to save the government from its own lethargy or lack of compassion. 

III. 

 London-Clayton has demonstrated a material change in her economic circumstances that 

affects her ability to comply with the restitution payment plan during the time that the BOP has 

curtailed her ability to work during the novel coronavirus pandemic. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to suspend financial 

responsibility payments (ECF No. 36) is GRANTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that the judgment (ECF No. 35) is MODIFIED as follows: all 

references to the Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (IFRP) are DELETED. 

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It is further ORDERED that that the defendant is not obligated to make any payments 

against the judgment of restitution until an alternative payment plan is established by further order 

of the Court. 

 s/David M. Lawson 

 DAVID M. LAWSON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: September 16, 2020 

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