UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

VLADIMIR STOJCEVSKI, Individually 

and as Personal Representative of the 

Estate of DAVID STOJCEVSKI, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Case No. 15-11019 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

v. 

COUNTY OF MACOMB, et al. 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

 This action arises from David Stojcevski’s incarceration in the Macomb 

County Jail in June 2014, which tragically led to his death from acute drug 

withdrawal. Defendants fall into two groups which the Court has referred to as the 

“Macomb County Defendants” and the “Correct Care Solutions Defendants” 

(hereafter “CCS Defendants”). Vladimir Stojcevski, as personal representative of 

David’s estate (hereafter “Plaintiff”), alleges constitutional violations under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and “gross negligence, intentional, willful and wanton conduct” 

against all Defendants. Defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

which this Court granted in part and denied in part on November 9, 2015. 

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for reconsideration filed pursuant 

4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG Doc # 50 Filed 05/18/16 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 1138
to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h). The motion has been fully 

briefed. 

 Rule 7.1 provides the following standard for motions for reconsideration: 

Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the 

court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration 

that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court, 

either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must 

not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and 

the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion 

have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will 

result in a different disposition of the case. 

E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear, 

unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. 

Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court 

to grant a motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 

2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010). “[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly 

used as a vehicle to re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that could have 

been argued earlier but were not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. 

Sch., 298 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 

Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)). 

 Defendants seek reconsideration of the Court’s denial of their motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s “gross negligence, intentional, willful and wanton conduct” 

claim (Count III). Specifically, Defendants maintain that the Court was misled by 

a palpable defect-- that the Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity as opposed to 

4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG Doc # 50 Filed 05/18/16 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 1139
original jurisdiction. Defendants contend that this defect caused the Court to err in 

concluding that the procedural requirements for filing a medical malpractice claim 

in Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.2912b do not apply to bar Plaintiff’s claim. 

 As an initial matter, Defendants argument for reconsideration is inapplicable 

to Plaintiff’s claim against the Macomb County Defendants for the Court 

concluded in its November 9, 2015 decision that Plaintiff stated a viable gross 

negligence (as opposed to medical malpractice) claim against them. In any event, 

Defendants are wrong that this Court found its jurisdiction premised on diversity as 

opposed to original jurisdiction. Nowhere in its November 9 decision did the 

Court state the basis for its jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. The Court was well 

aware that it has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and 

supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. Regardless, even if the Court 

made such a palpable defect, it would not result in a different holding with respect 

to whether Michigan’s requirements for malpractice claims apply. 

Whether jurisdiction over a state law claim is premised on diversity or 

supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court must apply state substantive law and 

federal procedural law when adjudicating the claim. See Witzman v. Gross, 148 

F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.1998); Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010) 

(“Where, as here, a federal court proceeds under supplemental jurisdiction, it is 

obliged to apply federal procedural law and state substantive law.”); Doe v. Exxon 

4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG Doc # 50 Filed 05/18/16 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 1140
Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 75, 102 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Super Sulky, Inc. v. 

United States Trotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir.1999) (“A federal court 

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the 

law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity 

jurisdiction.”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (holding that the 

principles of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 54 (1938) apply to state law 

claims in the same manner in pendent jurisdiction cases as they do in diversity 

jurisdiction cases). The Court has concluded that Michigan’s requirements for 

malpractice claims are procedural. Defendants simply are rehashing their 

previously asserted arguments as to why the Court should conclude the 

requirements are substantive. The Court has considered and rejected those 

arguments. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: May 18, 2016 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, May 18, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

4:15-cv-11019-LVP-DRG Doc # 50 Filed 05/18/16 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 1141