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i 

55–127 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–14] 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 3, 2009 
(II) 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

BILL NATTER, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 3, 2009, U.S. Special Operations Command: Challenges and 

Opportunities ........................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 3, 2009 .......................................................................................... 25 

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2009 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: CHALLENGES AND 

OPPORTUNITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Shuster, Hon. Bill, a Representative from Pennsylvania, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ........................................... 2 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Carstens, Roger D., Lt. Col. (Ret.) U.S. Army Special Forces, Non-Resident 

Fellow, Center for a New American Security .................................................... 6 

Martinage, Robert, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ..................................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carstens, Roger D. ........................................................................................... 66 

Martinage, Robert ............................................................................................ 31 

Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ............ 30 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: CHALLENGES 

AND OPPORTUNITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. Welcome. We will go ahead and get started with our 

hearing. 

We are going to get interrupted, as seems to happen frequently. 

But we will get started and at least have the witnesses give their 

testimony and take the votes and come back. It shouldn’t be that 

long. Should be, I think, three suspension votes, which takes about 

20 minutes longer than it should, but we will take about 45 minutes probably. We will have that break and come back and try and 

do that. 

And hopefully we will be able to draw up some more members. 

I think the weather yesterday disrupted some schedules. 

But we appreciate our witnesses being here with us today. We 

have Robert Martinage, who is a senior fellow for the Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Mr. Roger Carstens, 

who is a non-resident fellow at the Center for a New American Security. And we have asked them here to give us their perspectives 

on where the Special Operations Command is at, where it needs to 

go, what it does well, what it can do better—something that is of 

particular interest to this subcommittee. 

We are very, very focused on what the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is doing. They are growing, as we know, as the demands on their talents have grown. We are trying to grow the 

force, so one of our big concerns is how can we do that process and 

do it in a way to make sure we maintain the quality. Because you 

don’t find Special Operations Forces (SOF) people just walking 

around the streets. There is a special set of talents, and we want 

to make sure we maintain that very, very high level of quality. 

And then, also, they have been the lead organization in the 

counterterrorism effort throughout the world. This subcommittee 

has had the opportunity to travel to the Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, a whole bunch of different places where SOCOM forces are 
2 

taking the lead in combating violent extremism in a variety of 

ways, certainly with kinetic action, identifying high-value targets 

and disrupting terrorist networks, but also with nonkinetic actions, 

indirect action that focuses on classic counterinsurgency of training 

local communities to fight off insurgencies before they can take root 

and providing for those local communities in a way that discourages insurgency. 

So, I think there is a lot to learn from what SOCOM is up to. 

And we are, you know, just amazed at what they are doing 

throughout the world. They are making a difference in being highly 

successful in many, many places, some of which are in the news 

and some of which aren’t. But their talents, I think, have really 

been a major, major factor in our successes thus far against the 

violent extremist networks, like al Qaeda, that challenge us. 

With that, Mr. Miller has not joined us yet, the ranking member—he is on his way—but I will yield to Mr. Shuster for whatever 

opening comments he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL SHUSTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM PENNSYLVANIA, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SHUSTER. In light of the fact that they just called a vote, I 

am going to be extremely brief so we can get their statements in, 

and just echo much of what Mr. Smith said. It is so important we 

do this right and we hear from other folks that are knowledgeable 

on this subject and learn from them. 

Also, I would like to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Miller, who 

has a statement for the record, to be submitted in its entirety. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. And, with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Great. Thanks. 

And I think we will try to get Mr. Martinage in. If we can keep 

it in the 5- to 10-minute realm, we will hear your opening statement, and then we will break and come back. 

You are on. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Great. Well, first off, I want to thank you and 

the committee for the opportunity to appear here today to share my 

thoughts on the challenges and opportunities facing U.S. Special 

Operations Forces. I would just like to emphasize a few points that 

I have raised in my written statement, which, I guess, is part of 

the record, and allow time for follow-on discussion. 

As I think everyone here is aware, SOF have really figured 

prominently in U.S. military operations since 2001 and have become central to the implementation of the U.S. national defense 

strategy. Reflecting that reality, the operation tempo currently 

being sustained by SOF is the highest in its history. 

Looking ahead, the future security environment, we believe, will 

likely be characterized by three trends: one, the continuation and 
3 

intensification of violent Islamic radicalism; the potential uprise of 

China or other authoritarian states as more aggressive politicalmilitary competitors; and the increased proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. 

Of course, SOCOM will need to be shaped, sized, and postured 

for all three of these challenges. But this afternoon I really want 

to focus on the continuation of war against violent Islamic extremism and irregular warfare more broadly. If you want to talk 

about those other two topics, I would be happy to do so. 

So I have organized my thoughts really into three conceptual 

bins: first, what are some of the institutional or policy changes 

within Special Operations Command, or SOCOM; second, what are 

some high-priority investments for SOCOM’s subordinate commands; and, third, what are some steps that the general purpose 

forces—the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps—might take 

to contribute to the irregular warfare mission or enable SOF. 

So, using that to set the stage, I will start from the top. I would 

like to suggest two potential institutional changes for SOCOM. The 

first is, consideration should be given to the establishment of a 

joint irregular warfare command. I mean, although that is a contentious idea, I think a strong argument can be made that the indirect warfare part of SOCOM’s portfolio—meaning unconventional 

warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and psychological operations—are underrepresented bureaucratically. As a reflection of 

that, over the past two decades, SOCOM has never been commanded by a Special Forces officer, and, conversely, every SOCOM 

commander has climbed the direct action ladder, and most have 

held at least one senior-level command in Joint Special Operations 

Command, or JSOC. 

So, in addition to centralizing the management of irregular warfare-related doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and career 

path, a joint irregular warfare command would also be better able 

to compete for resources and advocate indirect warfare strategies 

within SOCOM and the broader Department of Defense (DOD). 

This type of organization would also serve as a needed counterbalance to JSOC within SOCOM, and could also be a proponent for 

Special Operations approaches to irregular warfare within the conventional joint force, which, as you know, is dominated by general 

purpose forces. So it would be an opportunity, really, to give SOF 

a louder voice in debates about irregular warfare strategy. 

The second SOCOM-wide change that I think merits some consideration are options for forging a closer, two-way relationship 

with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At its core, the war 

against Islamic terrorist groups is an intelligence and Special Operations-intensive war. Making full use of special authorities to wage 

this indirect, clandestine, and covert war is essential. 

This should entail not only integrating CIA capabilities with 

those of both Black and White SOF, but regularly leveraging the 

CIA’s Title 50 foreign intelligence authorities for SOF operations 

through the flexible and routine detailing of SOF personnel to the 

Agency. Ideally, personnel should not only be able to move back 

and forth from CIA stations and SOF ground units, but also to 

compete for selected mid- and senior-level leadership positions in 

either organization. 
4 

All right, now I would like to shift quickly to some high-priority 

investments for SOCOM subordinate commands. I would like to 

quickly make six points. 

First, consideration should be given to changing the regional orientation of the five active Special Forces groups. The present configuration is really a legacy of the Cold War and is poorly aligned 

with current and emerging strategic challenges. For example, responsibility for Africa, a key region in the war against violent Islamic radicalism, is divided among three Special Forces groups. 

Conversely, the Fifth Special Forces Group not only has responsibility for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, which arguably is 

a pretty big area of responsibility currently, but also Central Asia 

and the Horn of Africa. So, really, this regional orientation needs 

to be relooked at, and I have some thoughts about that. 

Second, serious consideration should be given to expanding Special Operations rotary-wing aviation capability, Special Operations 

helicopters. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) did a lot 

of important, very good things in terms of preparing SOF for the 

future, including, most notably, a one-third expansion of SOF 

ground forces. The problem, however, was there was no proportional increase in the fixed- and rotary-wing aviation required to 

support those ground forces. And this shortfall really is something 

that needs to be addressed as soon as possible. In Iraq and Afghanistan, conventional Army aviation units are relied upon to provide 

lift support for about two-thirds of SOF grounds units. In Afghanistan, nearly 50 percent of the lift request to support Joint Special 

Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, or JSOTF–A, are routinely 

unmet. 

So, simply put, more SOCOM-controlled helicopters are needed to 

move and support a busy and expanding SOF ground force. I suggest in the paper that creation of at least two additional Special 

Operations helicopter battalions, hopefully over the next five years. 

Given the altitude challenges in Afghanistan, the need to operate 

at high altitude with relatively heavy payloads, the top priority 

should be standing up a new MH–47 Chinook battalion to support 

White SOF. 

To accomplish this in a timely manner, it is going to be necessary 

to redouble ongoing efforts to recruit, assess, and train helicopter 

crews. That really is the pacing factor in terms of this. And, more 

specifically, additional funding will be needed to increase the number of instructors and expand the limited training infrastructure 

currently available to the Special Operations Aviation Training 

Company in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Options should also be explored for having the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps contribute to 

the Special Operations aviation lift requirement. 

The third point is, for the same reasons I discussed a minute ago, 

it is also necessary to recapitalize and expand the fixed-wing aviation fleet under Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). 

This should entail both additional C–130 variants, as well as smaller aircraft like the C–27J Spartan and single- or dual-engine aircraft in some numbers similar to the U–28s. 

Fourth, given the importance of winning over the hearts and 

minds of local populations in a future security environment that is 

likely to be characterized by persistent irregular warfare, serious 
5 

consideration should be given to further expanding active-duty civil 

affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) force structure. 

Fifth, Air Force Special Operations Command clearly needs additional unmanned combat air systems, or UCAS, capacity to provide 

persistent airborne reconnaissance and strike coverage globally. 

While SOCOM is in the process of expanding AFSOC’s fleet so that 

it can provide 10 combat air patrols with a mix of Predator and 

Reaper systems, it still falls far short of the 30 orbits that is the 

stated requirement just for the Central Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR). 

Now, of course, the conventional Air Force should also provide 

some of that capacity for persistent surveillance and strike coverage. The question is, what is the appropriate balance? But I 

think, clearly, additional organic capacity within Air Force Special 

Operations Command is needed. 

Sixth, and finally, Air Force Special Operations Command’s combat aviation advisor, or Aviation FID, Foreign Internal Defense, capacity needs to be further expanded. At the direction of the 2006 

QDR, the Sixth Special Operations Squadron, where this capability 

resides in SOCOM, is doubling its capacity from 110 to 230 authorized advisors. That expansion is still insufficient. And to close that 

gap between available capacity and demand, SOCOM should consider creating an irregular warfare wing that would have two core 

missions: providing specialized air power necessary to support U.S.- 

led irregular warfare operations globally, and training and enabling partner nations to develop, sustain, and employ air power in 

combating internal threats. 

Now I would just like to briefly wrap up with a few comments 

about how the general purpose forces might better support the irregular warfare mission and enable SOF. 

Basically, the Army and the Marine Corps must develop the capabilities and capacities needed to train and advise foreign security 

forces in multiple, widely dispersed countries simultaneously. What 

does this mean? For the Army, it means a significant shift away 

from heavy or future combat system brigade combat teams (BCTs) 

toward infantry or security cooperation BCTs and, preferably, a 

much smaller security force assistance or other specialized irregular warfare units. A similar shift needs to occur in the Marine 

Corps. 

It would also be helpful if Army took steps to better support SOF 

ground forces, especially with respect to rotary-wing aviation and 

logistics support. Currently, the structure of the brigade combat 

team and supporting brigades, like the combat aviation brigades, 

significantly constrains their ability to support or enable SOF. 

The Navy really needs to take on the steady-state maritime foreign internal defense and security force assistance mission. I can 

share some details with you later on, if you are interested in what 

that might entail, and the Air Force—— 

Mr. SMITH. I will think we will probably have to wrap up on your 

Air Force point, because we are getting close to time and the members need to run over and vote. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Okay. The Air Force really—just like the Sixth 

Special Operations Squadron (SOS) needs additional capacity, the 

regular Air Force should stand up dedicated irregular warfare and 
6 

aviation advisor squadrons. And that would have a number of implications for the Air Force. But it would be good to have that capacity both in the regular Air Force and AFSOC. 

And, with that, I will wrap up. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinage can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. SMITH. You raised a lot of issues, most of which I think we 

all want to talk about further. So we will sprint over and vote, 

hopefully quickly. Best estimation, based on previous experience, is 

that we will be back at 4:30. So we will try to get back sooner than 

then, but, for planning purposes, that is the most likely outcome. 

We will be back. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. I think we will go ahead and dive back in. The goal 

is still to be done no later than 5:30. So we will hear from Mr. 

Carstens, then open it up for questions. 

STATEMENT OF ROGER D. CARSTENS, LT. COL. (RET.) U.S. 

ARMY SPECIAL FORCES, NON-RESIDENT FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. CARSTENS. Chairman Smith and distinguished members of 

the committee, I am honored to appear before you today, and I 

thank you for your invitation to discuss the challenges and opportunities that will face U.S. Special Operations Forces. 

As a 20-year veteran of Ranger battalions and Special Forces 

units, I was given the opportunity to conduct a year-long study to 

catalog how SOF has changed since 9/11 and where SOF should go 

in the future. My study took me to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn 

of Africa, as well as 13 military locations, ranging from the National Training Center in California to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

My findings and recommendations emanate from those visits, and 

I look forward to sharing them with you today. 

With the chairman’s approval, I would like to submit for the 

record a more comprehensive review of my findings and summarize 

verbally. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files 

and can be viewed upon request.] 

Mr. CARSTENS. Special Operations Forces have spearheaded the 

war on terror from the very first days of the campaign in Afghanistan to the current battlefields of Iraq. Some of their missions and 

successes are well-known; others, such as the quiet battle being 

waged against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, less so. But one thing 

seems certain: The demand for SOF in the near and long term is 

likely to increase. As conventional forces depart Iraq, SOF is projected to stay. As United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) 

grows, so will SOF participation in Africa. And, as pressure on the 

defense budget grows, policymakers will increasingly look to SOF 

as an efficient and effective return on investment. 

To that end, senior leaders must be aware of the issues that face 

SOF and of the choices that they will have to make to best position 

this capable force for the future. This study has identified some of 

those key issues and has derived a set of findings as a result. And 

I will go through them quickly. 
7 

Number one, SOF must ‘‘right-size’’ growth to support QDR 2006 

increases. The 2006 QDR dictated substantial growth in personnel 

and equipment for SOCOM. These increases, however, have not 

been right-sized to meet the current and future demands of SOF. 

As a result, the 2010 QDR needs to focus heavily on right-sizing 

growth to support 2006 gains, as well as growing SOF across the 

spectrum to meet emerging missions. 

Number two, SOF must strike a balance between the indirect 

and the direct approaches. Conventional wisdom holds that the 

Special Operations community has not struck an effective or an appropriate balance between the direct and the indirect approaches. 

While the case for imbalance may be overstated, the need to address this issue is not. 

Number three, SOF and general purpose forces, GPF, must seek 

a division of labor. As SOF responsibilities grow, policymakers and 

military leaders will need to determine where GPF can take on 

SOF roles and where SOF has a comparative advantage. SOCOM 

and GPF must find the right balance. 

Number four, SOCOM must evaluate roles and missions to address duplication and better balance resources. Seven years into 

the global war on terror, SOCOM tactical units are heavily engaged 

in direct and indirect actions around the world. However, there is 

still some confusion as to who should be doing what. 

Number five, SOF must conduct acquisition at the speed of war. 

SOF has traditionally been the lead in rapidly taking equipment 

and putting it into the hands of its operators. A lack of acquisition 

executives at SOCOM with Special Operations experience, combined with the risk-averse approach to bringing in new soldier systems, have dramatically slowed the procurement process. SOCOM 

needs to reverse this trend and bring back the days of soft primacy 

in the arena of combat development and acquisition. 

Six, DOD must ensure enabler and logistical support to SOF remaining in Iraq as the conventional force withdraws. It is clear 

that the conventional military forces that are now in Iraq will draw 

down in the near future. It is likely that SOF will not be drawing 

down. SOF, however, does not have the logistics architecture to 

support such prolonged deployments. Basing, messing, fuel, motor 

pools, medical facilities, ammunition resupply, and base security, to 

name a few areas of concern, reside within the conventional force. 

Civilian and military leaders alike will have to make value judgments as to what the conventional military leaves behind. 

Number seven, SOCOM must receive more authority to manage 

and recruit personnel. The 2006 QDR was generous to SOCOM, 

adding over 13,000 people to its rolls. The services, however, retain 

a strong voice in the management of these Special Operators. 

SOCOM should have more of a say in how they are managed, and 

that may require revising Title 10. 

Recommendations that follow from these findings, there are five: 

Number one, encourage SOCOM to re-evaluate component roles 

and missions. In a time of decreasing budgets, the demise of the 

wartime supplemental, and the confusion in the field as to who 

should be doing what, it is necessary for SOCOM to re-evaluate the 

mission it expects its components to execute. 
8 

Two, increase interagency participation in Special Operations. In 

the early days of the fight in Afghanistan, Army Special Forces and 

CIA officers used their unique talents and congressional authorities 

to great effect. Such efforts in bringing these two elements together, as well as other members of the interagency, will allow for 

the meldings of Titles 10, 22, and 50 during the conduct of operations. 

Three, dramatically increase SOF to meet future demands. 

SOCOM must match the missions that they expect SOF to conduct 

with the forces and enablers that are required. SOF will have an 

increased role in a future that will likely include a persistent presence, persistent engagement, and shaping operations. Such steps as 

dramatically increasing the size of the Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment, formalizing the creation of a Special Operations aviation 

training battalion, adding another Ranger battalion, increasing 

more Special Operations Command (SOC) personnel authorization, 

bolstering civil affairs, and growing more in-house enablers, like 

unmanned aerial systems and intelligence analysts, are prudent 

choices for the Defense Department to make in this environment. 

Number four, establish a permanent position on the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff for a Special Operations flag officer. All the services currently have elements organized under SOCOM. While SOCOM sits 

as a combatant command, it is not adequately represented at the 

JCS level in the Pentagon, where uniformed services conduct strategy, planning, and resourcing decisions. 

There have been discussions in the past of creating a completely 

separate service of SOF to address this shortfall in representation. 

While this has some appeal to address the current and future military challenges, it is not appealing in an environment of constrained resources. The services have significant organization, support, and logistics scales, which SOF would have to recreate at significant cost in terms of both resources and time. A more timely effect could be achieved by having a SOF representative sit on the 

JCS as an equal partner. 

Lastly, restructure the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity and Interdependent Capabilities to 

report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The ASD SO/LIC & IC 

is currently organized under the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy. At a time when ASD SO/LIC & IC is functioning as the Secretary of Defense’s primary advisor on SOF and 

countering extremists, this is ineffective. This advice and oversight 

extends across all the services and agencies of the Department. As 

such, ASD SO/LIC & IC should be elevated to a level where oversight and coordination can more effectively include all aspects of 

the Department. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will conclude by 

thanking you for giving me the opportunity to come and share my 

thoughts with you. I hope that you found this testimony useful. I 

will be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carstens can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

We will get to questions, and we will stick to the five-minute 

rule. Typically, on the subcommittee level, we have time to get 
9 

around to a second round, but I find it moves efficiently if we stick 

to the five-minute rule for everybody, including me. 

The first question I have, really for both of you: There are a lot 

of items here, and I very much agree with where you are going on 

this, particularly the idea of elevating SOCOM in a variety of different places. They have such a vastly more important role now 

than they did seven, eight years ago. Giving them greater status 

on the Joint Chiefs, increasing their acquisition ability, increasing 

cooperation, I think all of that is very good. And as you also list 

through the areas where they could use more resources, I can’t disagree with any of them. 

I am also mindful of the fact that there is simply no way—particularly in going through Mr. Martinage’s list, they are not going 

to get all of that. I guess the question I would have: What is the 

most important? What are the one or two things in that list? 

You mentioned more fixed-wing, more helicopters, more personnel in general, more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)—a 

bunch of different issues. I am not sure if you had a chance to talk 

about that in your actual remarks, but in your statement you talk 

about on the Navy side more Sea Air Land (SEAL) delivery systems, more for the boat teams. There is a lot of ‘‘more’’ in here. 

So I have already asked the question. If you said, here are the 

two things that, if you gave this to SOCOM, this is what would 

really give them the greater operational capacity to the maximum 

extent, most bang for the buck, if you will. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Number one for me would be the rotary-wing 

aviation piece. I think increasing the capacity of the 160th Special 

Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) is probably job one. 

Beyond that, I am really torn. I have five that I was going to suggest. But I think probably number two—— 

Mr. SMITH. That is the thing about being in a think tank. You 

guys figure it out. I understand. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I will tell you what the second one is. I think 

I would go with probably the combat aviation advisors, the Sixth 

Special Operations Squadron, just because I see a big demand for 

that down the road. That is really running very close with the 

PSYOPS and civil affairs capacity. So I snuck three in on you. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And the same question, Mr. Carstens, actually, 

from your perspective. 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, I have to agree with Bob. I think we need to 

get dedicated SOF Air. That can be done in numerous ways, but 

one would be to increase the size of the Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment and formalize the creation of a Special Operations aviation training battalion to better prepare their crews and their aviators, because right now they are taking everything out of hide. 

The second thing would not really cost much. It would have hidden costs. But I really think we need to take a look at Title 10 

again and take a look at trying to give the SOCOM commander 

more control over personnel. We can go into great depth on that, 

but I will throw out one example. 

If a Navy intel analyst swings by a SEAL unit, goes to Iraq, gets 

numerous combat deployments under his belt, becomes an expert 

after two or three years of manhunting and dealing with special operations, what he might find is that in his next assignment he is 
10 

going out to sea to serve a shipborne duty and he may never rotate 

back to the Special Operations community. We need to somehow fix 

that in either closing the loop or giving them a skill identifier, 

which gives the Navy a chance and also the Army and the Air 

Force and Marines Special Operations a chance to get some of 

these people back. 

That is one example; there are many. But we need to get more 

personnel control back to Admiral Olson. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Can I throw in one more thing? Two of the 

other areas that I would have suggested are the fixed-wing aviation 

and then the UCAS, or unmanned combat air systems. 

But, really, the question is, what is the appropriate balance between SOCOM and, in this case, AFSOC and the big Air Force? So 

if the Air Force steps up to provide more of that capacity, it is a 

less urgent demand for AFSOC. If they don’t, that increases the 

priority of those things. 

Mr. SMITH. That is a major concern of the committee, is on the 

air wing side, because the Air Force has so many demands on them 

right now, so many programs that are a little bit behind in terms 

of the acquisition need, certainly with airlift, with the C–17—and 

those folks from the Northwest are familiar with the tanker issue— 

that we fear that, because of the dependency that SOCOM and 

AFSOC, in particular, has on the big Air Force, the Air Force doing 

all this stuff, what is left over? Not enough. And I think that is a 

big problem. 

I have a couple other question areas, but I will suspend those 

until later and yield back the balance of my time and call on Mr. 

Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. You are starting to sound like an appropriator: ‘‘Just one more thing, one more thing.’’ 

My question is concerning the personnel. I think a lot of people 

on the committee have expressed concern that, as we start to increase the force number, that we don’t degrade the quality. I spent 

time at Coronado last year, and General Kernan was getting, he 

told us, a lot of pressure from his bosses in the Navy to make sure 

the washout rate was reduced. And he was very concerned about 

that, as well as folks in the Army I have talked to. They are concerned about decreasing their criteria and letting people through 

that aren’t combat-ready. I have read some information that 

schools seem to be turning out people on shorter timelines. 

And I just wondered what your thoughts were on that picture of 

more people and making sure the quality is there. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Certainly, that is a clear priority. That is what 

makes SOF special, is the training of the personnel. 

As you know, the goal right now is to send up five new Special 

Forces (SF) battalions by the 2013. Two have been created, leaving 

three to go. And the big challenges right now, as you suggested, 

were the limited size of the recruiting pool; the high proportion of 

washouts, as you mentioned; and, sort of, retention, competition 

from the private sector, as well as family pressures. 

I think SOCOM has taken pretty good steps to try to address the 

challenge of increasing capacity without reducing quality through 

the 18X, or 18 X-Ray Program. That has worked out pretty well. 

We can argue about the training pipeline and whether the expan-
11 

sion of that from, like, 400 to 700 has actually had an effect on 

quality. People have vastly varying views on that. And retention 

bonuses for senior operators have also been important. 

I think, going ahead, the question is, if this is really important— 

and I think it is—to achieve the SF battalion growth that has been 

directed, what else might be done? And I think one thing is retention incentives for mid-career personnel, extending some operator 

benefits like education reimbursement to their families. 

For you, this is kind of getting in the weeds, but section 517 of 

the U.S. Code Title 10 restricts the number of E–8s and E–9s in 

each service. That has already been waived for JSOC. That same 

thing could be waived for SOF across the board, which would prevent some very seasoned operators from being pushed out the door 

because of that. 

And then lastly, if possible, to open up the Qualification Course 

(Q-Course) to other folks by making it easier for Marines, Navy, or 

Air Force guys to transfer into the Army to go into the Q-Course. 

But it is a challenge. I think it is important to get the growth, 

but, as you suggest, it is important to keep the quality up. I think 

those types of steps would be helpful. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Colonel. 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, what is painful is you all are searching for 

the same guy. You all want that intelligent athlete that is comfortable in the chaotic and ambiguous environment. So whether it 

is Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) or the SEALs 

or Green Berets, you are all looking for that same guy. 

Right now, they are too experienced. The Army Special Forces 

School is actually doing quite well. I talked to a pretty mean, grizzled SF battalion commander, and I said, ‘‘Tell me about the 18 XRay Program.’’ I used to run the Q-Course. I expected him to tell 

me it was an abysmal failure. Instead, he looked me right in the 

eye and said, ‘‘They are the best soldiers I have ever had. They are 

10 times better than you and I were in our youth.’’ And he gave 

me a few vignettes to show me how good these young kids are. So 

I think the SF course is doing quite well. 

The SEAL course is a little more challenging. No matter what 

they do, it seems they still get the same failure rate. It is a very 

tough course, very demanding. Even if they get more people going 

into the course, they are still getting the same numbers coming 

out. The Navy is working hard. I had a chance to visit Coronado. 

They are trying to get more guys through the pipeline. 

Mr. SMITH. I think it is the whole water thing. That adds a layer 

to it. It just isn’t there. I talk to people about it and they say that 

is what makes it very difficult, because all these skills are hard to 

find, and you throw into it, ‘‘Oh, by the way, you have to hang out 

in freezing cold water for a few hours several times a day.’’ How 

you get around that, I don’t know. But you are right—go ahead. 

Mr. CARSTENS. That had an effect on me. I thought it would be 

much easier to be a Green Beret than a SEAL. 

I am sure Dave Silverman is around. He is a tough little guy. 

There are a few things that we need to take a look at, and one 

is recruiting from different backgrounds. I know SOCOM right now 

is trying to look at perhaps recruiting from legal aliens. And that 

has a benefit for a few different reasons. It increases our pool. And 
12 

wouldn’t you want to have a guy who is a legal alien in the United 

States who came from the Sudan, who speaks local dialects, who 

can get through our program, culturally aware, and can go and do 

the missions and become a full-fledged member of the Special Operations community? There is a thought. 

Another thought is making sure we target the right high school 

and collegiate areas. For some reason, some of our recruiting programs are not quite hitting that college athlete who is bored of 

going to college or that high school wrestler who wants another 

challenge and doesn’t necessarily want to go on to higher education. We have to do a little better job of targeted recruiting and 

maybe open up the aperture of who we are recruiting from. 

Lastly, you get the pipeline problems of just increasing the capacity of the schools. I know with the Q-Course, we didn’t want to 

have non-Green Berets in the course because you want to have 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority over your students. Maybe it is time to go into the contracting world and give 

up that UCMJ authority just to make sure we have the right number of instructors to keep the pipeline functioning properly. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

Are we going to have another round? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, certainly. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this today. 

Two quick questions, Lieutenant Colonel Carstens: With Fort 

Bragg and Lejeune being on either end of my district, I read with 

great admiration for the work you have done and wanted to ask 

you, you mentioned on page three of your testimony that DOD 

must ensure enabler and logistic support for SOF remaining in 

Iraq as well as conventional forces withdrawal, yet you did not list 

it as one of your top two priorities. 

I am concerned, since we know the President was at Camp 

Lejeune when we were there with him just this past Friday, that 

day is coming now. We do have a certain date after all the debate 

and discussions. And so, how critical is it for us to get them logistic 

support? Because this is on the horizon now. 

I want to know if you think, well, they can make it a couple of 

years; or they can only make it six months; or they can make it 

four or five years. How urgent do you think this is, on the logistics 

support question? 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, I think it is incredibly important. I don’t 

think they can make it a few days. When the conventional military 

leaves, when the unit takes off, it is going to take with it a lot of 

the enablers and a lot of the support that would have afforded Special Forces an operating base. 

So if you go to either Iraq or Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bagram, if 

there are Green Berets and SEALs sitting in the Combined Joint 

Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs), if the conventional 

force leaves, they suddenly take with them their aviation support, 

their basing support, the people who run the dining facility, the 

contractors. And it is going to be much harder. Something as simple as putting fuel in vehicles, be they rotary-wing or be they 
13 

Humvees and Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMVs), they are going to 

have a critical problem. 

The one thing I can say is, no matter where I went, if I went 

anywhere in the United States, or if I went to Coronado to talk to 

the SEALs, or Lejeune to talk to the Marines, I would ask that 

question that we all love to ask: What keeps you awake at night? 

And every single officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) I 

talked to said, ‘‘We are stressed out that, if we fold up in Iraq, we 

are not going to have logistics support to keep operations up and 

going.’’ So while it did not make my list of the top two, I know that 

it would probably make the top one of everyone in the Special Operations community right now. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. That is the urgency that I wanted to hear in 

terms of what we need to focus on. 

Mr. SMITH. I wanted to follow up on that. Is the 30,000 to 50,000 

that the President talked about, is that the right number? Does 

that calm some of those concerns? Or is there still a concern that 

there is going to be too much pulled out? 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, that is a great question. Some of the guys I 

talked to in the Fort Bragg area—and I didn’t pulse the Navy 

SEAL community on this, sadly—but they feel the number seems 

a little more right. And yet the question is, again, what is left behind? 

Bob and I had a chance to go to SOCOM just this past week, and 

what they are worried about, even with big numbers being thrown 

about, with troops staying in Iraq, are you going to be able to break 

down the conventional military unit to leave behind what SOF 

needs? 

A good example, rotary-wing aviation assets. When an infantry 

BCT rotates back to the United States, it pretty much has to take 

everything with it, because if it doesn’t, it becomes combat-ineffective. And on the report manning requirements that filter up 

through the highest levels of the Pentagon, that is not a good 

thing. So, trying to convince a BCT to leave behind an enabler is 

going to be hard to do. 

What SOCOM would like to do, in working with the GPF, it gets 

into the regular warfare directive. What can you do to help us? Can 

you disaggregate the BCT and just leave us something? Can you 

disaggregate a corps and leave the aviation to the mess hall facilities? 

If the GPF can work with SOCOM under the rubric of irregular 

warfare and break down the BCT to extend and disaggregate its 

capabilities, we will have a fighting chance to answer that question 

in the affirmative, that it be done. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. That is a perfect follow-up, my point exactly. Is 

there a particular ratio generally where you can say, like, for every 

special operator is it 1:1 or 1:1.5, 1:2, in terms of logistic support, 

typically? 

Mr. CARSTENS. My answer would be that I am not sure. I wish 

I could say I was a little smarter on that. I am probably not the 

brightest lightbulb in this room, sadly. 

I think it comes down to more like packages. Whether the ratio 

might not be right, but SOFs want to make sure, when someone 

leaves, they have X number of intel analysts, X number of Signals 
14 

Intelligence (SIGINT) people to make radio communication right, 

and X number of dedicated rotary-wing air, and probably another 

list. So it might not be the ratio; it might be whatever package they 

show up with. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Right. That is logical. 

And one last quick question in the few seconds I have left. Where 

do you see the strongest resistance to elevating SOF to a Joint 

Chiefs of Staff level? Is it certain personalities, or is it a certain 

branch of the services, or is it just the tradition that that has not 

occurred? Can you identify where you think the resistance to that 

idea would come from? 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, it hasn’t been floated around much, and I believe the actual chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the service representatives would probably have some heartburn with that. 

But I guess my thought is, why shouldn’t United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) be there, why shouldn’t U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) be there, why shouldn’t SOCOM? 

Right now, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has service 

representatives that basically argue for what they want. As the 

Army four-star, I am really not worried about the joint force, I am 

worried about the U.S. Army. We need to break that down and 

take these cross-pollenating entities like SOCOM, STRATCOM, 

and TRANSCOM and give them a voice on the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, because right now they have none. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. That is an excellent idea. 

Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have kind of a comment first, and then a question, just because 

I missed part of the presentation I am interested in hearing. You 

talk about the UCMJ, and you talked about Special Operation 

Forces sort of having their own flag as part of the Joint Chiefs possibly someday. 

One of the concerns that sort of just popped in my head when 

you said that—and then you brought up the idea of independent 

contractors, like Blackwater or whatever, over there. And I don’t 

know what the logistics of this—but it is just something that concerns me, as a former judge advocate in the Army, is that the line 

between an independent Special Operations Forces with its own 

member of the Joint Chiefs, not subject to the Army or Navy or 

whatever, and how they are sort of perceived by this sort of changing international community with regard to—bottom line, if one of 

our guys gets in trouble, we have to make sure that they are subject to UCMJ and not some other jurisdiction that we can’t control 

because they are sort of out there on their own. As of now, you 

know, if the guy is a Green Beret, he’s part of the Army, obviously. 

So there is not a question there, but that is just something that 

popped into my head when you were discussing that. I just want 

to make sure that we are very careful, if that actually comes to fruition, that there is a clear distinction between those guys and guys 

that are independent contractors. 

But my question is with regard to something that I didn’t get to 

hear you talk about, and that was the resurrection potentially of 
15 

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and how that could actually 

play out in this day and age. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. You know, the OSS had a lot composed within 

it: research and analysis, which now has really been the Intelligence Community writ large, of which there is a number of different entities; secret intelligence and activities, which is now absorbed mostly by SOF and JSOC in particular, and divided with 

the CIA and their special activities division; and the counterespionage role that OSS had is now sort of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI). 

So what does that mean? I think what that means is to create 

a new OSS would really require essentially blowing up the entire 

national security bureaucracy and starting over, to some degree. 

Mr. SMITH. So you are thinking that might be a little difficult. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I am thinking that it might be a little difficult, 

and I am not sure if the disruption would really be worth it, especially because individual elements like CIA’s Special Activities Division and Special Operations Group and Black SOF are very effective. Now, that is not to say that there isn’t room for improvement. 

And that is why I would stress, I think, three things, but sort of 

a middle course between keeping everything the same and blowing 

everything up: 

One, I would say increased institutionalized cooperation between 

the CIA and SOCOM, including hybrid career paths so people can 

go back and forth between the two. 

Two, regional interagency task forces that bring together the 

CIA, SOCOM, DOD, and other relevant agencies to solve a common 

problem. We have done that already in some areas of the world, 

and they have been terrifically effective. 

Third, expanded SOCOM authorities, perhaps closer to Title 50. 

That gets into very contentious ground, but if we can’t make some 

of those other things work, that might be the direction where 

things need to go. 

That would be my response to that. 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, quickly, that would be a dream of mine. I 

would love to serve in that unit. And if I could go back in a time 

machine and be in the OSS and do feats of daring and—well, you 

know what I am saying. But I don’t think, in this era of constrained resources, that that may be possible. I think that will be 

just a bridge too far. So I would recommend a few things. 

Number one, JSOC has actually done a pretty good job of taking 

the interagency and bringing it into the military realm. We need 

to take that capability that we have learned from in the last seven 

years and migrate that down to the CJSOTFs level for white-side 

Special Forces and SEALs. There is no reason it shouldn’t have 

people from the State Department, Department of the Treasury, 

and the Central Intelligence Agency all working together in, say, 

Bagram or Balad. 

Secondly, migrate Special Forces over to the CIA. And I am not 

just talking about onesies and twosies. Why not take a Special 

Forces company, just plop them down in Virginia and say, when 

you go to that company you are spending a three-year-long tour 

working for the Agency? And what that would do is give ground 
16 

branch a resident capability in foreign internal defense, which is 

not a bad thing. 

Thirdly, joint interagency Operational Detachment Alphas 

(ODAs). Let’s have it go the other direction. Let’s take people from 

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Treasury, Department of State and, if they meet the right criteria, let them 

serve on a 12-man ODA. Maybe it becomes a 14-man ODA. But 

how wonderful would that be to be in a foreign country and have 

all the authorities right there. You want Title 50? Well, you have 

John right over there. You want Title 22? You have Al right over 

here. But bring the interagency down to the 12-man ODA, bring it 

to the Central Intelligence Agency and, by all means, put it in the 

CJSOTFs. 

Lastly, if we can’t win by creating an OSS, that also argues for 

taking that four-star officer and putting him on the chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and making ASD SO/LIC a direct report 

to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Because, really, the overarching issue is making sure that SOF has a bigger voice and making sure that the interagency is brought into the fold. 

So we can do it all sorts of levels, from the 12-man ODA and a 

line of continuity that goes right up to the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today. 

Mr. Carstens, in your testimony today, you mentioned that—and 

this may be have been covered, I came in late, so if it was covered, 

you can let me know. But, for my own edification, I would like to 

know. In your testimony you said, ‘‘It is likely that, with the withdrawal of conventional forces in Iraq, the Special Operations Forces 

will see even greater demand.’’ And what do you believe their primary mission should be, training and support or combat operations? 

The second part of it is you noted that, in the early days in Afghanistan, they were a model for interagency cooperation among 

the SOF community and the Intelligence Community. And I was 

wondering if you could expand on this and offer your assessment 

as to what other interagency missions Special Operations Forces 

could be involved with, especially your comments you just made to 

the prior question. 

But are there any lessons to be learned from this success that 

could be applied to other interagency missions? It is kind of a follow-on to the previous discussion. 

Mr. CARSTENS. Yes, sir. 

Sir, to answer your first question, do they train or do they go on 

combat? And the great answer is: Both. The thing that people do 

right now is called combat FID, and that is foreign internal defense. But you work with your host nation element, you train them, 

you take them through tactics, techniques, and procedures, and 

then you actually get on the helicopter and go out and fight with 

them. 

Now, we don’t do that everywhere. We don’t do that in the Philippines, and we don’t do that in Colombia. That is more like direct 
17 

FID. You train the members of the Filipino army or the special ops, 

and then you stay in the base camp and they actually leave to conduct the combat operation. 

But in Iraq I think it would be appropriate to keep conducting 

combat-level FID. Right there you get into the great question of, 

what does the GPF do and what does SOF do? It would probably 

be preferable than, when it comes to basic rifle marksmanship and 

basic soldiering, that maybe general purpose forces conduct that 

level of training for Iraqi forces, be they police, military or such. 

But when it gets into the creation of high-end finishing forces, I 

think SOF has a role in conducting that. 

By the way, I hope I answered that question, sir? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is fine. 

Mr. CARSTENS. Okay. And they could be very busy doing that, by 

the way. I had a chance to serve with the Iraqi National CounterTerror Force when I was in Iraq, and I think that is a model for 

how you can take a unit and just keep elevating it and elevating 

it to make it a high-end finishing force. 

Secondly, on the interagency side, if Special Forces were to work 

with the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that would give them 

a better training capability in conducting foreign internal defense 

and unconventional warfare at either the classified level, to where, 

if the CIA has a mission in country X, if it brings along an ODA, 

a resident capability in foreign internal defense, they might actually have a more powerful entity downrange trying to complete that 

mission. 

In working with the State Department, there are places in Africa 

where it is hard for a military unit to go to a village and build a 

well, to build positive relationships with a village, because we don’t 

have the proper authorities. And you have probably been here for 

all the battles between 1208 funding, 1207 funding, and 1206 funding. If you are working with the State Department, you suddenly 

have a positive melding of authorities. That well does get dug because you are working with people with Title 22 authorities and 

Title 22 money. 

And I hope I answered that question, too, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yes. And can either of you expand on the issue 

of, perhaps do we need clearer ties between Special Operations 

Forces and our intelligence communities? Maybe we can look at 

that. Is there sufficient coordination now? Can that be a greater 

force multiplier? 

Mr. CARSTENS. I think we have made great strides. In fact, there 

is someone in the audience who actually did that in Afghanistan. 

He was there during the early days. And I will have a chance to 

introduce him to you afterwards. 

But the point being, I think we have made incredible strides in 

taking the Special Operations community and melding it together 

with the intelligence agencies. There is more work to be done. And 

I would say, based on the people I have talked to, that people are 

seeking that closer cooperation. So I think we are trending in the 

right direction. We still have a ways to go. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What about—probably in the not-too-distant future, I am hoping even before 2011 when there is more of a drawdown of U.S. forces, we are still going to have to have, I am sure, 
18 

a presence in the area to make sure that we don’t have to go back 

there in five years. And I expect that Special Operations Forces 

will be playing a very effective role, being stationed outside of Iraq 

and going in and out when necessary to back up Iraqi security 

forces. 

Can you maybe expand on that vision? And how will they be limited, and how will they function the same way if they are not per 

se in-country? 

Mr. CARSTENS. I brought that up when I was in Iraq. And every 

time I brought that up to a Special Forces officer, they would kind 

of push that to the side, because, to them, it just didn’t make sense. 

Their argument was, why would I want to be outside the country 

when I can be inside the country, eating the same food with my 

Iraqi counterparts, training with them, living with them, spending 

my time with them, building positive relations, training them, and 

then fighting together in combat FID? 

Right now, all Special Forces units that are conducting missions 

in Iraq or Afghanistan are partnered with a like unit, an Iraqi or 

an Afghan unit. And I think that is kind of where everyone wants 

to keep that. When you talk to folks, they don’t necessarily want 

to be outside the theater of operations, flying in unilaterally to conduct a mission. They would rather make sure that they are with 

their partners and that they are fighting that way. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I have a couple more questions, but I know Mr. Shuster had 

some as well. So I will yield to Mr. Shuster for five minutes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

Mine are back to the personnel situation. We started talking 

about a little bit on the recruitment piece of it. I know that when 

we were in Coronado, the admiral brought in a college coach, I 

don’t remember what college, a football coach. He had a whole 

group of people trying to figure out how to better to recruit SEALs. 

How has that worked? Is that something you have looked at? 

And what is going on on the Army side? You mentioned a little bit 

of that recruitment. Are they looking at different ways? 

Mr. CARSTENS. When I was in Coronado—and it was, gosh, probably about eight or nine months ago—they were still struggling 

through that. They had done a few interesting things, I thought. 

They were trying to target these audiences, as you just mentioned. 

And I think they had also hired a contracting firm to conduct some 

pre-Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training to make 

sure that when a prospective candidate went into that environment, they had more of a fighting chance to succeed. And what was 

confounding them is they still had the same failure rate. They are 

increasing the numbers, they are recruiting, they believe, the right 

guy, they are providing them with some training that would make 

them physically and mentally harder before they go into the training environment, and yet the failure rate is the same. 

They may have made some different gains in the last eight to 

nine months, but when I was there, they were still struggling 

through that, and it was frustrating to them. They want more 

numbers, and that gets into a whole other conversation. More numbers are going to allow them to fill the requirements they have at 
19 

the higher levels of, say, 2003, 2004, and 2005. The trick is getting 

people into the pipeline and then out. 

On the Army side, they have had great success with the 18 XRay Program. And the Army is also doing a training environment 

to allow a prospective candidate to show up at the start of the Special Forces Qualification Course having already received some land 

navigation, some military physical training and such. 

So we are trying to give everyone a chance to just show up and 

be as best as they possibly can. Because, at the end of the day, it 

is not about how physically fit you are. We are working on someone’s ability to thrive in an ambiguous environment. It is more 

mental than physical. But the physical portion many times is what 

we use to test the mental. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What about diversity? Are we trying to go into different people with different backgrounds? I know they talked about 

that. I don’t know what kind of success rate they are having with 

people from culturally different backgrounds. 

And that goes into the next question of talking about foreign nationals. What are the thoughts of recruiting foreign nationals to 

come into our Special Forces and being able to operate in those 

parts of the world that we will never be able to, as Americans, be 

able to fully understand and appreciate? 

Mr. CARSTENS. I appreciate that question. I can tell you from the 

Q-Course side and the BUD/S side, I don’t know the answer to 

that. 

I can tell you that SOCOM writ large and SOCOM in Tampa has 

put a major effort into trying to work through that with the Pentagon. They have been talking to OSD Personnel and Readiness, 

they have been talking to the Department of the Navy and the 

Army and the Air Force and such. They have kind of spread out 

a broad attack to find out what they need to do that would legally 

allow them to recruit legal aliens. They have even wrestled with 

the idea of perhaps coming to you at one point and asking for another Lodge Act. 

Mr. SMITH. The regular forces—there are legal aliens in the regular forces, are there not? Or am I wrong about that? 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, you can join the Army. But what SOCOM 

wants to do is fast-track people. You know, if they want to recruit 

into that population, as opposed to having someone just join the 

Army, they want to focus that spotlight on them. 

Mr. SMITH. I see. Focus on their recruitment, not just take them 

if they come. 

Mr. CARSTENS. I can tell you they are pushing the edges. Right 

now, they are talking about legal aliens. They have considered 

maybe, as I said, another Lodge Act. 

SOCOM is actively trying to seek to really answer your question, 

how do we get into a diversified recruitment? How do we find that 

guy from Botswana? How do we find that guy who just left Syria? 

How do we bring them into our culture and train them and have 

them become full-fledged SEALs and Green Berets and MARSOC 

employees? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. One of the constraints has been the ability or 

inability of those people to get a security clearance; and the Secretary of Defense, I think, recently made some changes to make it 
20 

possible for some of those naturalized citizens to get the expedited 

security clearance for this exact reason. 

The only thing I throw into the mix on this topic is that, well, 

increasing recruitment and expanding the training pipeline are essential. If that just continues without any improvement on the 

back end, the maturity of your force is going to go down. It is going 

to be diluted over time as more and more of these young folks come 

into the teams. So that is why retention is really, really important. 

Because you need to keep the retention to balance the overall experience level and maturity of these units. So you can’t focus just on 

the recruitment end. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I know that we have talked to some SEALs and 

E–8s and E–9s, and there aren’t enough spots. And it comes down 

to, I think, the question we asked after we talked to the folks who 

wanted to stay in, who wanted to serve longer? Is it is a matter 

of money? We only funded so many slots, but it seems to me that 

it is not wise from our side to not keep these guys in that want 

to continue to be active and serve. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I agree, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. And we continue to work on that issue with the Personnel Committee. That is something we should definitely, definitely take a look at. 

Just a couple more questions. One quick follow-up on that in 

terms of whether the SEALs are out with their numbers. How big 

is the problem in terms of them meeting whatever the expanded 

requirements are for them in the next five, six years? I am trying 

to get an idea of how short the current process is going to leave 

them in terms of being able to meet the numbers they want. 

Mr. CARSTENS. Sir, I wish I could give you a good percentage. I 

can’t. 

I can say that I think they are going to have to—they are challenged. They are challenged in trying to get, again, people to graduate in the right amount. They are getting about 130 to 150 graduates every year. They would love to elevate that, but they just 

can’t seem to break into the 200, 250 realm no matter what they 

are doing. 

I know they are working on it. They are smart guys. I am sure 

they will figure it out here any day now. 

But another problem I will just throw out there, though, is even 

if they increased the capacity of the school, and let us say that they 

suddenly started generating 200 to 250 people, where they are currently, they are going to have problems putting people in slots. 

There are only so many SEAL platoons. And if you suddenly push 

250 through, you are going to be almost double-slotting people in 

basic SEAL platoons; and yet you have to do your time in a SEAL 

platoon before you can rise. So it is almost—you want them to create more SEALs, and it is almost like you have to create more force 

structure to create more SEAL platoons to get to the right force 

structure you want as you progress through the rank structure 

through time. 

Mr. SMITH. I wanted to follow up on the irregular warfare piece 

of this. You had suggested setting up an irregular warfare command, and I think that speaks to the larger issue of how we sort 

of get the SOF to cooperate and work more closely with the broader 
21 

force on the demands that are so disproportionately placed on 

SOCOM. Because a lot of the type of stuff we are talking about, 

counterinsurgency, certainly the indirect action piece but also the 

direct action piece that SOCOM has done so much of, is really sort 

of the future face of the war we are going to be fighting and where 

we are going to be fighting it. 

One of the ways to sort of get past some of our number problems 

would be to leverage the larger military into that. And certainly 

having an irregular warfare command having focus on that, having 

a cooperation—I have heard some other people suggest, just as you 

had suggested on the ODAs, bringing in CIA and Treasury to sort 

of get that cooperation, that you do the same thing with the regular military, that you start slotting some of those people out into 

the force with an ODA or with a SEAL team or with the CJSOTF 

in different places. I just wanted you to play out for us a little bit 

how you envision that happening. 

And, also, specifically, I know the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has looked at how to expand and place more importance on irregular warfare (IW). We put some language in our bill 

last year to try to push them in that direction. How is that effort 

going and where does it need to go to get the level of focus on IW 

force-wide that you think we need? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Well, when I was talking about the Joint Irregular Warfare Commander, that I envisioned would be under 

SOCOM. It was really intended to be sort of the indirect approach 

counterpart to JSOC to direct action; and the reason for that, sir, 

is really a combination of things. One is to centralize the—sort of 

the material development, the organization, the training, the caring and feeding career paths of folks who are in that sort of career 

specialty. Because there is some concerns certainly within the Special Forces community that they—the indirect warfare approach 

folks don’t get the same opportunity, the same training opportunities as the direct action (DA) folks do. 

The second reason to consider doing it is to create a more powerful advocate for the special operations approach to irregular warfare within the broader joint force. So, you know, you are out there 

either within SOCOM or within DOD trying to push the case for 

the Special Operations answer to this irregular warfare challenge. 

It would be nice to have some more senior folks in that position. 

I am not sure if Roger wants to talk about the idea of trying to 

integrate conventional forces into that. That, to me, gets into some 

really sticky areas between SOCOM and the other commands. 

Mr. SMITH. Just quickly, how open do you think OSD is to the 

idea you just described? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I am not sure. OSD I think might be reasonably 

open to the idea. I think the question more is SOCOM. I think 

SOCOM and the Center for Special Operations in particular would 

be very opposed to this idea. So there we are. 

But, as I said earlier, it is not a coincidence that there has really 

never been a Special Forces officer commanding SOCOM and that 

all the SOCOM commanders have come from the direct action community. And the question, as you said, if the world we are looking 

at over time is really more of this persistent irregular warfare 
22 

where the indirect and clandestine approach is really central, 

should we do something to build up those guys? 

Mr. SMITH. I want to drill down this—I am over time, but I am 

in charge, so I am going to cheat. I will get to Mr. Langevin in just 

a second. 

First of all, I don’t know that you can draw such a neat line and 

say that there has never been an indirect action person in charge 

of SOCOM. Certainly they have all had that experience. 

That aside, a lot of these folks have done a lot of different things. 

So I would be leery of drawing such a bright-line distinction. 

I doubt outside of certainly the Rangers, you know, most people 

who served, certainly in the last four or five years, in SOCOM have 

had occasion to do both in one place or another. So I think it blends 

over a little bit. 

And, also, in talking with Admiral Olson and in talking with 

General Brown before him and a lot of different folks, I mean, 

there seems to be a lot more emphasis on indirect action right now 

within SOCOM, you know, for the importance of this piece. Just in 

traveling around and talking with people about it, that is my perception. My perception could be wrong. Don’t you see SOCOM sort 

of moving at least a little bit in that direction on their own now? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. Sure. And just going back to your previous 

point, I wouldn’t make the distinction between direct and indirect 

so much as between Special Forces and nonspecial forces or some 

other career path to be the direct action community. Anyway, that 

is sort of a minor issue. 

But I think—yes, I think SOCOM recognizes and I think they 

are putting more resources into that area. But I still think you 

have this perennial institutional tension between sort of the two 

sides. And, as mentioned earlier, you know, okay, what explains, 

for instance, the fact that White SOF in Afghanistan don’t get the 

lift they require 50 percent of the time and the special mission 

units get whatever they want? That to me suggests that there 

is—— 

Mr. SMITH. I don’t question the validity of your overall point. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. I think they are moving in the direction. I just 

think there is probably more that could be done to balance it. 

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. 

Jim, do you have any more? 

Bill, this is unfair at the moment, but do you have anything else. 

Mr. SHUSTER. No. 

Mr. SMITH. One other issue area. As far as the theater Special 

Operations commanders are concerned, how do you see their role 

in all of these issues we have raised in terms of interagency, in 

terms of working with the intelligence side, in terms of working 

with the broader military? Do you think that that is effective right 

now? And how would you—what makes sense in terms of enhancing it and making those things work better, focusing on the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? 

Mr. MARTINAGE. That is a great question. I have a couple of 

quick comments. 

One is, I think there is a question about what is the TSOCs’ role. 

Is it really supporting the global combatant commander or is it 
23 

being the instrument through which SOCOM coordinates and synchronizes global operations? 

Mr. SMITH. It is kind of both. 

Mr. MARTINAGE. In theory. I think right now it is more about 

supporting the global combatant commander. And the sense I certainly got when we were at SOCOM is SOCOM is much more interested in how can we help you Geographic Combatant Commands 

(GCCs), and the TSOCs are a part of that. And someone suggested 

that, you know, SOCOM should use the TSOCs as a more powerful 

instrument for coordinating and synchronizing global activities and 

for getting the Special Operations approach attention within the regional combatant commands. And as part of that, you know, certainly the TSOCs could serve in an interagency task force at the 

regional level within each of the global combatant commands. 

But I think the question is again coming back to would it be appropriate to give the TSOCs a louder voice in the global combatant 

commands. Because, you know, we face this irregular warfare dominant world where Special Operations are really central and they 

are intensive. So in making the points with the very much GPFdominated staffs, would it be helpful to, say, to increase the rank 

structure or the staffs of the TSOCs? 

So, for instance, in a place like U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM), which is clearly a major area for this irregular warfare indirect and clandestine fight against terrorist groups, should 

that TSOC commander be a three-star, just to give again a stronger voice to the Special Operations community? 

Mr. CARSTENS. My sense is that the TSOC has a lot of unused 

potential. If you were to go down to Djibouti and ask the CJSOTF 

there or SOC, however you want to refer to it, it is a rather small 

element, if you were to ask them about the role that TSOC right 

there, Special Operations Command-Forward (SOC–F), they would 

say they would like them to step up a little more. Right now, they 

feel like that are part of CJTF, the conventional military’s special 

staff with regards to Special Operations. They don’t feel that TSOC 

is taking an appropriately aggressive role in providing them support and giving them a voice. 

So in Djibouti they would say, we would like the TSOC to step 

up to the plate a little more. I think in Afghanistan they felt the 

same way. They felt that there is such a convoluted approval process for fires and for increasing troops—and I will especially go to 

fires. They would like the TSOC to have a stronger, more aggressive role in providing them top cover and for giving them a voice. 

Iraq, I really didn’t probably delve into that as much as I needed 

to. I will at least say from two of the three places I visited overseas, they would like the TSOC to step up to the plate and give 

them more of a voice. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, thank you. 

That is all the questions I have. I really—I think the issues you 

have raised here have been very important, and one of our main 

focuses on this committee is to try to expand the number of people 

who are paying attention to this and to try to get certainly Congress but also OSD to really focus on this. There are a lot of issues 

clearly surrounding our military right now. But as you go forward, 

as you look at the most important battles that we are going to 
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fight, they are against insurgencies, insurgencies attached primarily to the violent extremist ideology that al Qaeda and others 

are promulgating. And it is Africa, it is Southeast Asia, it is Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and a bunch of other places. 

The lead on this, in my view, in the decades ahead is going to 

be much more an irregular warfare piece, which is what SOCOM 

is uniquely qualified to do and has been doing an outstanding job. 

But how is not just the military but how is our entire government 

apparatus, including the intelligence pieces and the State Department piece, how is it structured to fight that counterinsurgency 

fight? 

Right now, I think too much is focused on more Cold-War-era 

issues. And I understand if that is sort of where you came of age 

and where the skill sets are or where the weapon systems are that 

there is this natural tendency to try to say, no, but this is perfect 

for the new fight, too. Just flop it around here and make it fit. 

But really, if we are going to effectively fight this, we need to 

make some shifts. I think you guys have some great suggestions 

here; and it is the intention of this committee to push the envelope 

on that in our authorizing bill, to push for some of these changes 

that you have talked about, which ones we think we are most likely 

to be successful on with the full committee and the full House. But 

we definitely want to see some of these changes. 

I just think you have given us some outstanding ideas, and we 

want to keep up the dialogue and continue to work with you as we 

go about trying to push and implement some of these ideas into the 

administration and into OSD. So thank you for your excellent 

work, and we look forward to working with you. 

We will also probably submit some questions for the record that 

we will then get written responses from you as more ideas occur 

to us after this. 

So thank you very much for your work and your testimony, and 

we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 3, 2009 

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