alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-81,973-01

EX PARTE JESUS J. RAMIREZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. CR2012-130 IN THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM COMAL COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possession with

intent to deliver a controlled substance and sentenced to nineteen years and ten months’

imprisonment. 

Applicant contends, among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because counsel failed to investigate, failed to file a motion to suppress or object to illegally seized

evidence, and failed to timely file a notice of appeal. 

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington,
2

466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte

Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. 

As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is

the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court shall order counsel to respond to

Applicant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court may use any means set out

in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d).

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant

was denied his right to a meaningful appeal because Applicant’s counsel failed to timely file a notice

of appeal. The trial court shall also make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether trial

counsel’s performance was deficient, and if so, whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

Applicant. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and conclusions of law that it

deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claims for habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall

be obtained from this Court. 

Filed: September 17, 2014

Do not publish
RICHARD E. ZALDIVAR, P.A., 

FORMER COUNSEL FOR 

EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT,

Appellant,

v.

DYKE INDUSTRIES, INC., 

LIBERTY MUTUAL AND 

ALAIN DEBESA,

Appellees.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-1529

_____________________________/

Opinion filed July 8, 2015.

An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.

Charles M. Hill, III, Judge.

Date of Accident: January 13, 2014.

Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, and Albert Marroquin 

of Richard E. Zaldivar, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

Edward C. Duncan, III, of the Law Offices of Amy L. Warpinski, Fort Myers, for 

Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Based on Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 124 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), 

we AFFIRM. In so doing, we certify that our disposition of the instant case passes 
2

upon the same question we certified in Castellanos. Id. at 394. See Jollie v. State,

405 So. 2d 418, 421 n.* (Fla. 1981).

THOMAS, MARSTILLER, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
# C_2011226EN.01002902.xml

| 30.7.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 226/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.7.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 226/29

---

Action brought on 16 June 2011 — Alumina v Council

(Case T-304/11)

2011/C 226/58

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Alumina d.o.o (Zvornik, Bosnia and Herzegovina) (represented by: J.-F. Bellis and B. Servais, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | annul the anti-dumping duty imposed on the applicant by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 464/2011 of 11 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of zeolite A powder originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the anti-dumping duty imposed on the applicant by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 464/2011 of 11 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of zeolite A powder originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

| — | order the Council to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

First, the applicant considers that the anti-dumping duty fixed in the contested regulation is unlawful since the method used to calculate the constructed normal value is in breach of Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic regulation. In the construction of the normal value, the defendant has used a profit margin of 58,89 % calculated on the basis of the applicant’s non-representative domestic sales. Use of such a profit margin is incompatible with Article 2 of the basic regulation. The construction of the normal value is affected by a fundamental contradiction since the method used by the defendant to construct the normal value obtains the same result as if the normal value had been based on the prices of the non-representative domestic sales. Such a method is contrary to the settled practice of the Commission and the Council and to the case-law of the General Court and the Court of Justice. Moreover, the chosen profit margin of 58,89 % is not ‘reasonable’. Lastly, the defendant is wrong to rely on case-law stemming from WTO rulings to apply a profit margin which is not ‘reasonable’ in the construction of the normal value applicable to the applicant’s exports.

Secondly, the applicant also considers that the method used to calculate the constructed normal value is in breach of the provisions of Article 2(6) of the basic regulation in that the applicant’s domestic sales were not made in the ‘ordinary course of trade’ within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 2(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 2(3) of the basic regulation.

---
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1


                          PAYLESS SHOESOURCE, INC.
              COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                       FOR THE LAST THREE FISCAL YEARS




<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                            Jan. 31,    Feb. 1,   Feb. 3,  
(Thousands)                                   1998       1997      1996  
Earnings Available for Fixed Charges:       --------    -------   -------
<S>                                        <C>        <C>        <C>    
Pretax earnings                             $214,348   $179,159   $ 88,932

Fixed Charges (Interest expense plus
  interest component of rent)                 85,345     81,576     88,432
                                            --------   --------   --------
                                            $299,693   $260,735   $177,364
                                            ========   ========   ========

Fixed Charges:

Gross interest expense                      $  1,246   $  1,166   $    979
                                        
Interest factor attributable
  to rent expense                             84,099     80,410     87,453
                                            --------   --------   --------
                                              85,345     81,576     88,432
                                            ========   ========   ========
Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges               3.5        3.2        2.0
                                            ========   ========   ========
</TABLE>


Note: All costs and expenses of the Company relating to special  retention costs
and the special  non-recurring  charge associated with the spin-off are included
in the above calculation. Excluding these costs, the fixed charge coverage would
be 3.6x, 3.4x, and 2.8x, respectively.
# C_2015228EN.01001101.xml

| 13.7.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 228/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.7.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 228/11

---

Order of the General Court of 20 May 2015 — Vinci Energies Schweiz AG v OHIM — Accentro Real Estate (ESTAVIS 1993)

(Case T-327/11) (1)

1

((Community trade mark - Opposition - Withdrawal of the opposition - No need to adjudicate))

(2015/C 228/12)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Vinci Energies Schweiz AG (Zürich, Switzerland) (represented by: M. Graf, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented initially by G. Schneider and subsequently by G. Schneider and D. Botis, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the General Court: Accentro Real Estate AG, previously Estavis AG (Berlin, Germany) (represented initially by T. Weiland and subsequently by T. Weiland and S. Müller, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 31 March 2011 (case R 231/2010-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Vinci Energies Schweiz AG and Estavis AG.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate in the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate in the action.

| 2. | The applicant shall pay its own costs and those incurred by the defendant. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The applicant shall pay its own costs and those incurred by the defendant.

| 3. | The intervener shall pay its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The intervener shall pay its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 269, 10.9.2011.

1

---
January 20, 2012 • ^:z}^)rrr}h^fy,\ 

,- '.r i •-•\ .•,••,-'/"•>• T 

Docket Management Facility ' ' ^ ' U J 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

West Building Ground Floor 

Room W12-140 

Washington, DC 20590 

To Whom It May Concern: 

Inland Helicopters hereby petitions for exemption from Part 120 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 

(14 CFR) to allow Inland Helicopters to cover if s safety sensitive employees under one drug and alcohol 

testing program. 

Inland Helicopters operates under FAR 135 {Cert. «I7HA3431| on demand, and holds a (LOA «12HJKSSF) 

for sightseeing operations. 

Due to the small number of employees, (3 employees) and the fact that all only 2 employees serve in 

both capacities, there would be no reduction in safety involved. 

The public would be benefited by reduction of redundant administrative burden as a whole. 

Similar exemptions have been issued for smail companies such as ours, where many types of functions 

are combined due to small markets. 

Respectfully submitted. 

^^tt^-rryBCe''^— 

Jason Snyder, DER 

Inland Helicopters 

5505 East Rutter Ave 

Spokane WA, 99212 

509-534-9114 

509-534-9161 Fax 

Flight@\nlandhelicopters.com
#### Rammage v. Kendall.

(Decided February 28, 1919.)

Appeal from Livingston Circuit Court.

Appeal and Error — Subsequent Appeal — Law of Case. — The facts being substantially the same, the opinion on a former appeal is the law of the case, and binding alike on the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

MOCQUOT & BERRY for appellant.

CHARLES FERGUSON for appellee.

Opinion of the Court by

William: Rogers Clay, Commissioner

Revérsing.

This is the second appeal of this case. The opinion on the former appeal may be found in 168 Ky. 26, 181 S. W. 631, where the facts are fully set out. The suit was brought by Rammage against Kendall for false imprisonment. ¿Qn the first trial, there was a judgment for Kendall. On appeal, we held that Kendall, as judge of the county court, was without jurisdiction to try Rammage, and reversed the judgment with directions to give a peremptory instruction in favor of the plaintiff, if upon another trial the facts were substantially the same. On the return of the case, another trial was had and a peremptory instruction given in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff again appeals.

We have carefully examined the evidence on the last trial, and so far as the jurisdictional facts are concerned, it is substantially the same as that heard on the first ■trial. That being true, the opinion on the former appeal is the law of the case, and binding alike on the trial court and this court. Carter Coal Co. v. Dozier, 179 Ky. 457, 200 S. W. 917. It follows that the trial court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff instead of defendant.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

PETER H. MILLER, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-70

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

___________________________________)

Opinion filed February 16, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; William H. Burgess, III, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Jean-Jacques A. Darius, Special Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 6, 2019

No. 04-19-00446-CV

Paul WILLIAMS and SACC, Inc.,

Appellants

v.

Barbara GRANT,

Appellee

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CI09043

The Honorable Aaron Haas, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The reporter’s record was due July 29, 2019. On August 2, 2019, the court reporter 

responsible for preparing the reporter’s record filed a notice stating that the reporter’s record has 

not been filed because: (1) appellant has failed to request the record in writing, and (2) appellant 

has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay the reporter’s fee for preparing the record and 

appellant is not entitled to appeal without paying the fee. 

It is therefore ORDERED that appellant provide written proof to this court within ten 

(10) days of the date of this order that appellant has requested the court reporter to prepare the 

reporter’s record, which request must designate the portions of the proceedings and the exhibits 

to be included. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(b)(1). 

It is further ORDERED that appellant provide written proof to this court within ten (10) 

days of the date of this order that either (1) the reporter’s fee has been paid or arrangements 

have been made to pay the reporter’s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the 

reporter’s fee. 

The reporter’s record must be filed no later than ten (10) days after the date appellant’s 

written proofs are filed with this court. 

If appellant fails to respond within the time provided, appellant’s brief will be due within 

thirty (30) days from the date the clerk’s record is filed, and the court will consider only those 
issues or points raised in appellant’s brief that do not require a reporter’s record for a decision. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c).

_________________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of August, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
Form of Agreement for Award of Stock Option to Director


 Exhibit 10.5 
  
 THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES PART OF A PROSPECTUS COVERING SECURITIES 
 THAT HAVE BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. 
  
 TIDEWATER INC. 
 2001 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN 
 OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
 STOCK OPTION
AGREEMENT 
  
 Date:
                         
  
 ____________________                             
 ____________________                             
 ____________________                             
 ____________________                             
  
 Re: Options to purchase
             shares of common stock of Tidewater Inc. at $              per share granted on
                 , 200   
  
 Dear                     : 
  
 You are hereby granted options (the “Options”) for the purchase of
5,000 shares of the Common Stock of Tidewater Inc., $.10 par value per share (the “Common Stock”) under the Tidewater Inc. 2001 Stock Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) subject to all of the terms and conditions set forth in the Plan, a
copy of which will be provided to you. 
  
 The exercise price is
$             per share (100% of the Fair Market Value of a share of Common Stock on the date of grant) payable in full at the time of exercise, either in the form of cash, check,
Common Stock of the Company held for six months and valued at Fair Market Value on the date of exercise, or through a broker-assisted exercise, as described in the Plan. Under the terms of the Plan, your Options become exercisable six months
following the date of grant. Your Options will expire ten years following the date of grant, or earlier in the event of termination of service on the Board, as provided in the Plan. At the time or times when you wish to exercise an Option, in whole
or in part, please refer to the memorandum to participants and the provisions of the Plan dealing with the methods and procedures of exercise of Options. 
  
 The Options granted hereby are non-qualified stock options and shall not be treated as Incentive Stock Options under Section 422 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended. 
  
 All terms used in this agreement and
not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Plan. All Options granted hereby are subject to the provisions of the Plan as adopted, or to the provisions of the Plan as it may be amended. In the event any provision of this
agreement conflicts with the provisions of the Plan, the Plan shall control. 






 Please indicate your acceptance of these Options and your agreement to comply with the provisions of the
Plan by signing and returning the enclosed copy of this agreement to the Company. 
  

			
	 Sincerely,

	
	 TIDEWATER INC.

		
	 	 	  


	 By:
	 	 
	 Title:
	 	 


  
 ACCEPTED this
         day of             , 200  . 
  

			
		
	 	 	

	 	 	Optionee
§ 176.100 When required. ( a ) A vessel to which this subchapter applies may not be operated without having on board a valid U.S. Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection.
( b ) Except as noted in § 176.114 of this part, each vessel inspected and certificated under the provisions of this subchapter must, when any passengers are aboard during the tenure of the certificate, be in full compliance with the terms of the certificate.
( c ) If necessary to prevent delay of the vessel, a temporary Certificate of Inspection may be issued pending the issuance and delivery of the regular Certificate of Inspection. The temporary certificate must be carried in the same manner as the regular certificate and is considered the same as the regular Certificate of Inspection that it represents.
( d ) A vessel on a foreign voyage between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country, whose Certificate of Inspection expires during the voyage, may lawfully complete the voyage without a valid Certificate of Inspection provided the voyage is completed within 30 days of expiration and the certificate did not expire within 15 days of sailing on the foreign voyage from a U.S. port.
[CGD 85-080, 61 FR 953, Jan. 10, 1996; 61 FR 20557, May 7, 1996]
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 63 (Tuesday, April 3, 2007)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Page 16259]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-1677]



[[Page 16257]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Part V





The President





-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Notice of April 3, 2007--Notice of Intention To Enter Into a Free Trade 
Agreement With Korea


                        Presidential Documents 



Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 63 / Tuesday, April 3, 2007 / 
Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--
The President

[[Page 16259]]

                Notice of April 1, 2007

                
Notice of Intention To Enter Into a Free Trade 
                Agreement With Korea

                Consistent with section 2105(a)(1)(A) of the Trade Act 
                of 2002, I have notified the Congress of my intention 
                to enter into a free trade agreement with the Republic 
                of Korea.

                Consistent with section 2105(a)(1)(A) of that Act, this 
                notice shall be published in the Federal Register.
                <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
                
                    (Presidential Sig.)

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                     April 1, 2007.

[FR Doc. 07-1677
Filed 4-2-07; 11:57 am]
Billing code 3195-01-P
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-2968

___________________________

In re: BankAmerica Corporation

------------------------------

Michael B. Minton

Movant Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

 ____________

 Submitted: March 27, 2020

Filed: April 1, 2020

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SHEPHERD, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Michael Minton, the trustee of the Jack W. Minton Living Trust, appeals the

district court’s1 denial of his 2018 motion seeking payment from a 2002 class action

settlement fund. Having carefully reviewed the record and the arguments on appeal,

1The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.
we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion and

declining to reopen litigation in the case. See Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 999

F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1993) (district courts have duty and power to manage their

dockets and this court will not intervene absent abuse of discretion). Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
#### § 116.530 Fire control plan.

A fire control plan must be posted on the vessel in a location that is accessible and visible to all passengers. The plan must show escape routes, areas of refuge, embarkation stations, the location of fire protection/emergency equipment, compartment titles and hazard classification of accommodation and service spaces, and structural fire protection boundaries.