U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

68–297PDF 2011

U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION:

DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

Serial No. 112–62

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 4

Mr. Frank Cilluffo, associate vice president, director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University ............................................. 16

S. Amer Latif, Ph.D., visiting fellow, Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy 

Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies .................................. 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Lisa Curtis: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 6

Mr. Frank Cilluffo: Prepared statement ................................................................ 19

S. Amer Latif, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 33

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

(1)

U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. Today, we will examine U.S.-India counterterrorism 

cooperation. Of course, this hearing comes after our memorial for 

9/11. And it comes right after India has again suffered a terrorist 

attack. Last week, a powerful bomb decimated part of one of New 

Delhi’s high profile courthouses. It killed dozens of people. Scores 

of people were also injured. A few months ago, a coordinated triple 

bombing struck Mumbai, and that attack came during rush hour. 

Indian authorities are still searching for answers. 

July’s coordinated Mumbai attack brought back the horrors of 

26/11 to India. Three years ago, a coordinated rampage rocked this 

great city. It killed 166. And in that total were six Americans who 

were killed. But unlike in 2008, this time India authorities responded more rapidly, though there is still frustration in India. Defending an open country of India’s size is no easy task. Mumbai is 

particularly challenging. It’s got a population of 20 million people. 

Fortunately, there are good opportunities for the United States to 

increase its counterterrorism cooperation with India. I visited 

Mumbai after the 26/11 attacks and had an opportunity at that 

time to not only talk with the Prime Minister about this subject, 

but to talk to the head of the counterterrorism operations in India 

about the necessity of closer cooperation between the United States 

and India. 

I think the two countries have worked together on this for over 

a decade in terms of discussions that I’m cognizant of. But by all 

accounts, this cooperation substantially improved after the 2008 

Mumbai attacks, when investigators from both countries stood 

shoulder-to-shoulder in response. The Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative, Homeland Security Dialogue and other working 

groups plug along. This April, the FBI, working with the Indian 

Home Ministry, hosted 39 senior police executives from across 

India in Los Angeles, where they participated in an exchange on 

counterterrorism, crisis response and megacity policing. They visited the FBI’s Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory in Orange, 

2

California, a city I represent, to be trained in all aspects of digital 

evidence recovery. 

This is good, but I’d like to get to a point where our counterterrorism exchanges are just as high profile, just as numerous, just 

as unprecedented as our combined military exercises with India 

are. I think Secretary Clinton had it right this July when she 

stressed in India ‘‘how important it is that we get results’’ from all 

of our counterterrorism agreements. 

Let’s be clear: This is more than just helping a democratic ally. 

There are real, hard U.S. interests at stake. Simply put, the militants targeting India are also the militants targeting us. Indeed, at 

a subcommittee hearing on the ‘‘Future of al-Qaeda’’ after bin 

Laden’s death, many experts placed just as much importance on 

Pakistan-based LeT as any al-Qaeda affiliate. LeT is India’s mortal 

enemy, and it has gone global, with Western targets in its sights. 

This week Vice President Biden said of Pakistan, ‘‘They have to 

get better. We are demanding it.’’ But are we? Last month, the 

Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. has begun to condition 

security assistance to Pakistan on a ‘‘secret scorecard of U.S. objectives to combat al-Qaeda and its militant allies.’’ Although details 

are classified, from the Journal’s reporting, it does not seem that 

the U.S. has put emphasis on Pakistan making further progress on 

the Mumbai attackers or LeT in this ‘‘scorecard.’’

This would be shortsighted if it’s the case. And I think this has 

to do with tearing down barriers that might be in the way of greater cooperation with India. As one witness will testify, ‘‘The U.S. 

cannot allow its national security to be held hostage by nearly two 

decades of unfulfilled expectations in Pakistan.’’

In the past decade, U.S. relations with India have grown considerably. But we’ve hit a lull. Counterterrorism cooperation is a way 

to reinvigorate this relationship, and it’s a way to better protect 

America. 

I’ll now turn to the ranking member for his opening statement, 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for these important 

hearings today and for that opening statement that I want to associate myself with. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on 

how to further increase our counterterrorism cooperation with an 

important and democratic friend, India. I also note that we are the 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and look forward to our subcommittee focusing on how to expand American exports to India as well. 

As has been noted, the U.S.-India relationship is one of the most 

important bilateral relationships in the world for the 21st century. 

Despite significant improvements since the end of the Cold War, 

there has been significant distrust and bureaucratic impediments 

to better relations. Commercial relations, as I’ve mentioned, are 

often portrayed as a bright spot, but American firms have not benefitted as much as we had hoped from India’s efforts to modernize 

its military equipment and develop civilian nuclear power, and 

that’s just two examples. 

While it was inconceivable just a few years ago for U.S. firms to 

even seriously be considered for such projects as India’s jet fighter 

3

needs, now our jet fighters are considered, but ultimately the U.S. 

firms were not selected earlier this year. 

We see a similar picture in counterterrorism cooperation in other 

areas. Relationships have improved. They have reached new 

heights. The level of cooperation and mutual assistance after the 

2008 Mumbai attacks were remarkable, but old, lingering distrust 

and suspicions continue to hamper needed deeper cooperation. 

Last week a powerful bomb placed in a briefcase exploded in a 

reception area of the Delhi High Court killing 12, wounding 70. 

Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, an al-Qaeda-linked group with bases in 

Pakistan and Bangladesh, appears to be behind that latest attack. 

The groups that target India may not be the same exact groups 

that target the U.S., but they have major contacts and indeed overlap with al-Qaeda and they share a similar pan-Islamic ideology, 

although often the groups that target India have a more local antiIndia focus, rather than a world-wide focus. 

Deeper intelligence sharing has benefitted both countries. Further improvements are needed. Due to its sensitivity and strong 

bureaucratic prerogative this is also one of the most challenging 

areas for greater cooperation. 

I bring up the subject of Pakistan. We should not have our need 

to cooperate with Pakistan hinder our cooperation with India and 

I’ve consistently called the State Department and others in our 

Government to call out Pakistan for its often duplicitous role in the 

struggle against terror. Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, has for 

too long aided violent extremists, several Pakistani groups, including as the chairman mentioned, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—and I apologize to those who are familiar with South Asian languages for my 

pronunciation—Jaish-e-Mohammed, have links to al-Qaeda. These 

groups have launched numerous attacks against the Indian population and government, including the deadly assault against the Indian Parliament in New Dehli in 2001. The hands of Pakistan’s 

Government are also seen in the 26/11 2008 attacks in Mumbai, 

using the Indian way of identifying month and date, that is to say 

the 26th of November 2008. 

Failure to point out the Pakistani connection to this terrorism 

will only serve to perpetuate it. We have to work with those we can 

in Pakistan but we must be more effective in calling out, and in 

the words of Secretary Clinton, ‘‘lean hard on Islamabad.’’

At the same time, the present administration is rightly building 

on efforts of its predecessors to deepen counterterrorism ties with 

India. In July 2010, the U.S. and India signed a Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperative Initiative Memorandum of Understanding. 

This MOU was followed by the creation of a Homeland Security 

Dialogue during President Obama’s visit to India. We only have 

such a dialogue with a handful of our closest allies. Secretary 

Napolitano led a delegation to India earlier this year, holding the 

first dialogue meeting in New Dehli. This high-level focus will 

hopefully play a significant role in efforts to break the patterns of 

bureaucratic lack of communication that we’ve seen in the past. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding these 

hearings. As it happens, as you know, the Financial Services subcommittee is having a hearing of importance to Southern California 

as well, so any part of this hearing that I miss I know will be on 

4

tape and on disk for me to watch over the next couple of days. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. We’re going to 

go to our distinguished panel at this time and we’ll start with Ms. 

Lisa Curtis. She is a senior research fellow for South Asia at The 

Heritage Foundation and before joining Heritage, Lisa served on 

the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She also 

served with the State Department and with the Central Intelligence Agency and has appeared before the House numerous 

times. And we welcome her back. 

Mr. Frank Cilluffo is associate vice president and director of the 

Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University. He served in the White House as Special Assistant to the 

President for homeland security and he’s one of the leading experts 

on terrorism and homeland security. 

We have Dr. Amer Latif with us as well, a visiting fellow for 

U.S.-Indian Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He was director for South Asian Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, responsible for defense relations with India and surrounding countries. 

All of the witnesses have submitted their testimony. It’s already 

part of the written record, so we will ask you all to abbreviate, 

make a 5-minute presentation and then we’ll go to questioning. 

We’ll start with Ms. Curtis. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you very much for inviting me here today to 

testify on U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S. and 

India are under threat from terrorists that seek to disrupt our 

country’s democratic way of life, our economic progress, and indeed, 

to strike terror among our people. And this point was driven home, 

as you both mentioned, last week with the attacks in New Dehli, 

as well as the threat information that came to light that terrorists 

might be preparing to attack New York City and Washington, DC, 

on the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. 

Now India’s failure to identify a specific organization responsible 

for the bombing in New Dehli partly defines the evolving nature of 

the threat that India faces. Analysts there are increasingly focusing 

on networks of individuals and the possibility that small groups of 

Indians may be working with Pakistan-based terrorist groups like 

the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or the Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami. And the reality that India faces a threat from homegrown Islamic terrorists 

was acknowledged by India’s home minister. 

Now India has taken some important steps to improve its counterterrorism capabilities since the 2008 Mumbai attacks such as establishing the National Investigative Agency much like our FBI 

and strengthening it’s antiterrorism laws. But it must do far more 

to cope with persistent threat it faces. And the amount of resources 

that India has invested in bolstering its counterterrorism capabilities has simply failed to meet the challenge at hand. 

Now immediately following the Mumbai attacks, as you mentioned, Chairman Royce, Washington and New Dehli broke down 

many bureaucratic barriers to their counterterrorism cooperation. 

5

But unfortunately, the handling of the David Coleman Headley 

case revived to some extent Indian mistrust of the U.S. and its 

handling of terrorism cases implicating Pakistan. Striking revelations of the LeT’s international reach and connections to Pakistani 

intelligence emerged from the trials of David C. Headley and his 

accomplish Tahawwur Rana. But it took almost 9 months before 

Indian authorities were given direct access to Headley. Moreover, 

the U.S. failure to pressure Pakistan to arrest intelligence officers 

named by Headley as involved in the Mumbai attacks reinforced 

Indian beliefs that the U.S. will gloss over Pakistani involvement 

in attacks on India so long as Pakistan continues to cooperate with 

the U.S. against groups that threaten the U.S. homeland. 

To some extent, India is right. In the past, the U.S. has viewed 

the LeT, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, only through an Indo-Pakistani prism, 

rather than as part of the international terrorist syndicate. Thankfully, opinions within the U.S. administration are beginning to 

change on this issue. And as you know, the dangers of the LeT and 

its link to global terrorism are well known and I won’t spend time 

going over those. 

I think a hesitant U.S. approach to sharing information on Pakistan-based terrorist groups with India does not serve U.S. interests. Indeed, it cripples the U.S. ability to fully get a handle on the 

terrorism threat in South Asia because by choosing to view the activities of al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups 

through a separate lens, U.S. officials have failed to hold Pakistan 

fully accountable for dealing with the terrorists located on its territory. And indeed, Pakistan’s tolerance of groups like the Lashkare-Tayyiba have facilitated al-Qaeda’s ability to operate from Pakistan and Osama bin Laden’s ability to hide in the country as long 

as he did. 

So hopefully, the U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue that 

was launched in May will help overcome some of this mistrust between our two countries and provide fresh opportunities to enhance 

our counterterrorism cooperation and beyond enhancing intelligence sharing, I think the U.S. should also position itself as a resource for India as India seeks to improve it’s own homeland security. For instance, improving the security of cities, large cities like 

Mumbai will require investment from international companies that 

can provide state-of-the-art technology and products that help protect critical infrastructure and here, U.S. companies certainly have 

a role to play. 

The two countries can also look at the issue of deradicalization 

in their counterterrorism dialogue. I think this is an area that merits further exploration. Home Minister Chidambaram’s acknowledge that Indian citizens have been involved in recent acts of terrorism should drive the government to deal with the issue of Muslim alienation. I think because of the history of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India, Indian officials up until now have been 

somewhat reluctant to admit the homegrown Islamic threat. 

Lastly, I think the U.S. can help India with training and equipping its police forces. Ultimately, it is India that must raise its 

budgets for its own homeland security needs. However, the U.S. 

can enhance police exchanges and provide training, to share best 

6

practices and ideas for enhancing community policing and intelligence gathering. 

That concludes my remarks. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]


68297a-1.eps
7


68297a-2.eps
8


68297a-3.eps
9


68297a-4.eps
10


68297a-5.eps
11


68297a-6.eps
12


68297a-7.eps
13


68297a-8.eps
14


68297a-9.eps
15


68297a-10.eps
16

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. We’ll go now to our next witness. 

STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE 

PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member Sherman. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. I will be exceptionally brief, not my strong suit since I’ve 

never had an unspoken thought, but I will try to get this within 

the 5 minutes. 

Obviously, U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation in the face of 

the shared threat both of you have already eloquently laid out has 

not been all that it could be. I would argue this is to the detriment 

of both of our countries. The leadership in this area is to be commended and it should help, I think, bolster the security posture of 

America and India alike. 

As everyone has already mentioned, we share a number of common threats, concerns and tragedies, most notably 9/11 and 26/11. 

And just like we saw in the United States, India, too, is going 

through major efforts and calls for reform, some of which are making some significant progress. It is vital, I think, that the U.S. work 

with the Indian Government to strengthen our security efforts and 

develop common, best practices and intelligence-sharing protocols 

among U.S. and Indian law enforcement and the intelligence community, as well as the security services—those responsible for internal security. 

I don’t make these recommendations lightly and I recognize the 

challenges they pose at both the operational and strategic level, especially in regard to Pakistan. Yet, I am equally cognizant of the 

fact that India is a key democratic ally in an unstable region dominated by extremism from jihadists and Islamic separatists operating in Jammu and Kashmir, to Maoists in the Naxalite belt, to 

the reemergence of Sikh extremism. Simply put, they live in a 

tough neighborhood. 

Furthermore, these threats affect not only Indian public safety, 

but also directly threaten U.S. national security interests and I 

would argue jihadi extremism posing the greatest threat of all. Yes, 

enhanced cooperation with India will complicate U.S. cooperation 

with Pakistan. The truth is, however, that this cooperation has 

been erratic at best and varies based on the political climate and 

bureaucratic interests in Islamabad. While there is some recent 

good news such as the arrest of Younis al-Mauritani, the U.S. cannot allow, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, our national security 

to be held hostage by unfulfilled expectations in Pakistan. 

Just a few words on the current threat environment as I think 

it should predicate U.S. and Indian counterterrorism efforts. We 

have seen that the threat is morphing. It’s metastasized. It comes 

in various shapes, sizes, flavors, and forms, ranging from al-Qaeda 

senior leadership—no, unfortunately, ding dong, the witch is not 

dead after Osama bin Laden was killed. We still have a threat that 

is very significant from al-Qaeda senior leadership and its affiliates, most notably al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, operating 

out of Yemen, but also al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operating 

17

out of North Africa and the Sahel. And I might note, Mr. Chairman, you had an excellent blog post on AQIM’s linkages to Boko 

Haram, as well as, obviously, al-Shabaab in Somalia. So the threat 

itself is morphing and it’s changing and we’ve got to be ready for 

it. 

More regionally, as it pertains to this particular hearing, we’ve 

seen the conflation of Jihadi organizations in Pakistan. This witch’s 

brew of organizations from the Haqqani Network or HQN to 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba from Tehrik-e-Taliban to HuJI, from JEM to 

the Islamic Jihad Union to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 

all these groups to some extent or another are coming together, 

sometimes tactically, sometimes strategically, but they’re all linked 

by an affinity for a Jihadi narrative and ideology. 

I think of unique significance is that many of these groups historically had discrete and narrow objectives. Now they’re ascribing 

and subscribing more and more to al-Qaeda’s goals, visions, and objectives. That is a unique set of issues for the United States. And 

all have found refuge and safe haven in Pakistan. 

I want to highlight just three—the Haqqani Network, Lashkare-Tayyiba, and HuJI—as organizations that pose serious security 

implications for the United States, for India, and yes, even for 

Pakistan. Time prohibits me to get into any specificity here, but 

one thing I wanted to reinforce is it’s critical that we work with 

Pakistan and hold them accountable to take additional action. To 

me, the big litmus test here is whether or not they are willing to 

sever their ties to LeT and HQN and no longer view them as proxies to influence events in Afghanistan and India, respectively. With 

respect to HQN, this has huge implications for the future—to the 

future U.S. role in Afghanistan. So we need to hold them accountable on that front. 

Bottom line, why Yemen, why Somalia, why the Sahel, why 

Waziristan, why FATA? These are un- and under-governed spaces. 

It provides the terrorists the time and the space to move. We need 

to be able to address these issues because the host nations either 

lack the political will or the capacity or a combination of both to 

address these issues. So in short, I think that what we need is a 

combination of intelligence, paramilitary force, conventional force, 

and policing. Now is not the time to ease off the gas pedal. Now 

is the time to push hard. Right now, they are on their heels, they’re 

on their back feet. But the bottom line is to think of it as suppressive fire. The reason they’re on their back feet is because I’d rather 

them looking over their shoulder not knowing when they’re going 

to get hit than having the time to plot, train, and execute attacks. 

So I just caution drones, SOF, way to go, happy to go into that in 

much greater length. 

And I’ll just wrap up very briefly because I agree very much with 

what Lisa has laid out in terms of U.S.-India going forward, but 

two impediments to intelligence sharing. One, the Indians do have 

to take very seriously the endemic corruption within their police 

forces. Two, there are concerns about the Russian and former KGB 

connection to the intelligence security services of India, most notably R&AW. So we need further assurances to be able to make sure 

that that information can be protected. 

18

My bottom line here is law enforcement to law enforcement is 

the way to go, not only federally, and we need to get down to not 

only these strategic conversations, but down to the mid-level to ensure that these become reality. 

I’ll stop at that. I tried to do it within 5 minutes. Mea culpa for 

going over. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]

19


68297b-1.eps
20


68297b-2.eps
21


68297b-3.eps
22


68297b-4.eps
23


68297b-5.eps
24


68297b-6.eps
25


68297b-7.eps
26


68297b-8.eps
27


68297b-9.eps
28


68297b-10.eps
29


68297b-11.eps
30


68297b-12.eps
31

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo. 

Dr. Latif, go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF S. AMER LATIF, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW, 

WADHWANI CHAIR IN U.S.-INDIA POLICY STUDIES, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. LATIF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Sherman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify here today on the issue of the U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation. 

I’d like to mention at the outset that the views that I express 

here during the testimony are my own and do not necessarily represent those of CSIS or the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Chairman, it is timely for this committee to be holding this 

hearing on U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, given the terrorists attacks which you’ve mentioned in your opening statement. 

It is useful at this juncture to be able to evaluate the status of our 

counterterrorism efforts, assess the progress to date, understand 

existing challenges, and propose ways to advance the partnership. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to quickly 

summarize some of the highlights of my written testimony which 

I have already submitted for the record. To begin, it’s important to 

note that the U.S. and India have made notable progress on counterterrorism cooperation since 2000 when the Counterterrorism 

Joint Working Group was established. In July of last year, the U.S. 

and India signed the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative or 

the CCI, which outlined a range of areas for cooperation. And this 

May, of course, we had the Homeland Security Dialogue held in 

New Dehli. Intelligence sharing appears to have deepened after the 

26/11 attacks as well. However, the progress that’s been made over 

the past decade could plateau in the future due to challenges facing 

bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. 

Let me briefly outline three challenges for your consideration. 

Number one, the lack of bureaucratic alignment and optimal communication between the U.S. and India and within their respective 

bureaucracies. The Indian and American bureaucracies are not 

communicating or coordinating as effectively as they might, due to 

markedly different structures and bureaucratic cultures. Within 

the U.S., you have a number of CT-related dialogues that have CTrelated issues and also unclear leads and responsibilities for particular U.S. agencies. On the Indian side, you have limited bureaucratic capacity and also a centralized decision making system 

which makes decisions very, very slow. 

The second challenge I would outline is that each side has a different view of terrorism priorities. While both sides agree on the 

need to fight the scourge of terrorism, there are concerns in New 

Dehli about Washington’s relationship with Pakistan and that the 

U.S. is not doing enough to pressure Pakistan in dismantling 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. 

Third, I would say that India harbors doubts about whether or 

not Washington is going to be fully transparent and forthcoming 

with intelligence in the wake of the David Headley case. 

So Mr. Chairman, let me now briefly outline some ideas of where 

the U.S. and India might advance counterterrorism cooperation. 

32

Number one, streamline the working groups and bureaucratic procedures between both sides. The U.S. and India should agree to 

have the Department of Homeland Security and the Home Ministry 

as the conduits for all CT cooperation. There should also be a bilateral comprehensive review of all dialogues with CT equities to determine which groups could be consolidated into others, left to their 

own, or eliminated outright. 

Second, Washington should continue to apply pressure to Pakistan on completely dismantling all Lashkar-e-Tayyiba infrastructure. 

Third, there ought to be an intensification of the bilateral intelligence dialogue between the U.S. and India on Afghanistan. As the 

U.S. begins to withdrawn from Afghanistan, Indians will have a lot 

of concerns about the nature of stability. Having an intelligence 

dialogue on Afghanistan would be an excellent way to be able to 

build confidence and counterterrorism cooperation between the 

U.S. and India. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer the idea of the 

U.S. and Indian sides working together to harden the Indian periphery. What I mean here is that the U.S. and India should work 

together to build the border security and counterterrorism capacities of India’s bordering countries to include Nepal, Bangladesh, 

Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is a very dynamic organization and has also 

proven its ability to be able to exploit ungoverned or poorly governed spaces in these areas. Having the United States and India 

work together toward building the CT capacities in these countries 

would be able to make India much, much safer. 

Mr. Chairman, while there are challenges to greater CT cooperation, the strategic stakes are too high for both sides to allow their 

efforts to lag. Once again, I would like to thank you for allowing 

me to appear before the committee and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Latif follows:]

33


68297c-1.eps
34


68297c-2.eps
35


68297c-3.eps
36


68297c-4.eps
37


68297c-5.eps
38


68297c-6.eps
39


68297c-7.eps
40


68297c-8.eps
41

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Latif. 

Let me ask Ms. Curtis a question and it goes to a statement that 

Secretary Clinton made in July. She called for Pakistan to prosecute the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, transparently, 

fully, and urgently. On the other hand, the State Department’s recently released Annual Terrorism Report found that Pakistan’s 

antiterrorism courts that have been set up in Pakistan that are 

supposed to work under the rule of law, but the acquittal rate is 

something like 75 percent. There’s a real question that they’re really plagued by a situation where they’re almost incapable of prosecuting suspected suspects or terrorists to date. 

Given that, do we have any hope that the Mumbai attackers will 

face justice? 

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you. I want to go to a comment that you 

made in your opening statement that I completely agree with that 

the LeT should be part of that secret report card that we have developed with Pakistan in terms of benchmarks that they need to 

meet because as I said in my testimony, both written and oral, the 

LeT does have links to al-Qaeda. They are an international danger. 

We should in no way give Pakistan the impression that we will 

give them a pass on the LeT, so long as they take steps on terrorists like al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda leaders. I think we need 

to put a full court press on both issues because they are related 

and they both affect our security as well as India’s. 

In terms of the question will they actually move forward with 

prosecution. They have detained LeT leaders, but they have 

failed—it’s been almost 3 years now and they have not moved forward with prosecuting these individuals. I think it’s completely unacceptable. And where you talk about the challenges in the court 

system and their inability to prosecute individuals, I believe that 

it’s really a lack of political will at the top. And that is a message 

is sent from the top levels of the Pakistani leadership and here I’m 

talking about the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies, to 

move forward I think Pakistan could. So I think we need to keep 

the pressure on, make it clear that if Pakistan doesn’t move forward with these prosecutions, it’s going to increasingly lead to 

Pakistan’s international isolation and ultimately weaken its position in the region. I think this is the message that we need to keep 

driving home to the Pakistanis and it does need to be at the top 

of our priority list and so that comes back to the point that you’re 

absolutely right, it has to be part of that report card. 

Mr. ROYCE. Maybe Mr. Sherman and myself, given our concurrence on the view on this should write the administration on this 

subject. I look forward to work with you on that, Brad. 

Let me ask you also about the Karachi Project. One of the things 

I wanted to get to was the link between LeT and the Indian 

Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of India. 

The Karachi Project, you indicate Pakistani intelligence and LeT 

worked to motivate and equip Indians to attack their own country, 

right? Can you go into a little detail on that? Can you expand on 

it a little bit? 

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, first let me give a little bit of history. The Students Islamic Movement of India, SIMI, that you mentioned, have 

been around for a long time since the early ’90s. And they were 

42

sort of functioning within the country, but it wasn’t until around 

the attacks of 9/11 that they were perceived as a real danger to 

India. And they were outlawed at that time and they had made 

statements supporting al-Qaeda. And there is a belief that the Indian Mujahideen, some of its leaders may have been some of the 

same individuals that were involved with SIMI. So the Indian 

Mujahideen may be an evolution of that SIMI group which, of 

course, then it would be an indigenous group, made up mostly of 

Indians. 

And the interesting thing is there were many attacks in 2007, 

2008, for which the Indian Mujahideen claimed responsibility in 

India and the 2008 Mumbai attacks were different in that it was 

obviously the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the Pakistan-based group that 

was involved. But I think the Karachi Project or the information 

that’s been forthcoming on the so-called Karachi Project begins to 

explain what maybe we have been seeing over India in the last 5, 

6 years. 

And if the information on the Karachi Project is correct, what it 

discusses is a very deliberate effort by the Pakistani intelligence 

working in tandem with groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Harakatul-Jihadi Islami to infiltrate into India, recruit Indians to carry out 

attacks. Equip them with the capabilities to do so. So I think this 

is something that we need to continue to look at and explore, but 

it also shows that India has a two-pronged issue that it needs to 

address. And that is one, how does it deal with getting at the Pakistan-based organizations. I think the U.S. and India have to work 

in tandem on that issue. And second, what can it do to prevent the 

recruitment of Indians? 

And that’s why I brought up the idea of working together on 

countering violent extremism, working with communities to educate about the radicalization process. I think it’s a good sign that 

the Home Minister has actually come forward and said hey, this 

is a problem we have to deal with. Many politicians have been reluctant to do so in the past. 

Mr. ROYCE. We’re running out of time, so I’m going to ask one 

more question here. Some have suggested that the U.S. and Indian 

high-tech companies could collaborate to spur the next generation 

of homeland security technology. How could they better join forces? 

And then Mr. Latif, I’ll ask you to what extent do U.S. restrictions on technology-sharing hamper U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, and what are the dangers of using such restrictions. If 

you could just briefly answer that, we’ll then go to Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I mean, put very briefly and simply, obviously, 

India is home to a number of the more advanced technological companies, certainly from an IT perspective. And when you look at India’s biggest deficits, to me it’s the information sharing challenges 

they have between and among their various police entities and how 

they connect with other police entities and how they, in turn, connect with the Home Ministry. So I think there’s a lot that they can 

do right there and there’s a lot, I think, that the United States can 

do because we have to have similar integration challenges. 

If you really look back to 9/11, the greatest progress has been 

made in the sharing of information vertically and horizontally. So 

I think from an architectural standpoint, we have a lot that we can 

43

share. I know the Indians have visited the fusion centers. I know 

they have examined CJIS and N–DEX, some of our other systems. 

So I think there are opportunities there. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Latif. That last question? 

Mr. LATIF. Yes, sir. On technology transfer with India and the 

United States, there has been a tremendous amount of technology 

that has been transferred to India since the civil nuclear deal was 

actually completed in 2008. So there’s been a paradigm shift, I 

think, within the U.S. Government on transferring technology to 

India and we’ve seen that most recently with a very high percentage of licenses that have been granted. 

Mr. ROYCE. True enough. We’re discussing the down side of risk 

on some of that. 

Mr. LATIF. Right. Some of the risks would entail perhaps a potential that India might reengineer—reverse engineer some of the 

technologies. And also given their long relationship with Russia, 

there is a concern within the government that perhaps maybe some 

sensitive technologies could leak to Russia and be compromised. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Latif. 

Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Cilluffo, you point to police corruption in 

India, used to police departments looking the other way when 

there’s vice. Are there elements in the police in India that would 

cooperate with Islamic terrorism or Maoist terrorism? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. The corruption issue is a significant one and that 

must be addressed as well. As to whether or not you have police 

officers who are sympathetic to Islamic extremists or Maoists, I 

would have to say the likelihood is yes, that is indeed a concern. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So more, not so much corruption in the sense of 

doing it for money, but doing it out of genuine belief in the terrorist 

organization’s objectives? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I don’t see those as either or propositions. I think 

both are issues. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What can we do to make it easier for India to buy 

the technology it needs for its security and have the recent export 

control reforms benefit U.S.-India relations? 

Ms. Curtis? 

Ms. CURTIS. As I mentioned, as we are building this strategic 

partnership and homeland security cooperation being a major part 

of that, U.S. companies will become involved and looking to the opportunities to help India solve some of its homeland security challenges. And protecting ourselves means partnering with others. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand how important it is. Are any of our 

witnesses aware of anything India was kind of interested in buying 

that they would face some problems in buying due to U.S. law? 

Mr. LATIF. Mr. Sherman, I’m not aware of anything. As far as 

I’m aware anything that India has wanted to purchase in terms of 

technology for its counterterrorism or homeland security purposes, 

they have been granted. Unless it has application to missile development or nuclear programs, the Indians are allowed to purchase 

it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So face recognition technology, drones. 

Mr. LATIF. Well, on drones, it depends. I mean if we’re looking 

at Predators, that might be a little bit of a problem. 

44

Mr. SHERMAN. Not so much as armed drones as surveillance 

drones. 

Mr. LATIF. Right, right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Moving to another issue, the Indian Prime Minister has identified the Maoist or Naxalite insurgency as the biggest internal security challenge. How does that insurgency affect 

India and its ability to focus on the Islamic extremist terrorist 

threat? 

Mr. Latif? 

Mr. LATIF. Well, sir, it is a very big problem for the Indians. 

You’ve got a Naxalite insurgency that is spread over 10 states. You 

don’t have a central plan to attack the insurgency. And so as a result within India, because of the way that law enforcement relationships are set up, the state has primacy over the Center. What 

this means in terms of the amount of capacity that they have to 

be able to address the multitude of terrorist threats that they’ve 

got, they’re a bit stretched. You’ve got a Naxalite insurgency. 

You’ve got Islamist terrorists coming up in Kashmir and then, of 

course, in the Northeast. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, thank you. My time in this room hasn’t expired, but my time to get to that room is virtually expired. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Sherman. I want to thank each 

of our witnesses. I very much appreciate your testimony here 

today. We’re going to have to adjourn for final passage on this legislation. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

46

f


68297n.eps
47


68297m-1.eps
48

Æ


68297m-2.eps