UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CORTEZ DEONTE MOULTRIE, 

Petitioner, 

CRIM. CASE NO. 15-20262

v. 

HON. SEAN F. COX 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

________________________________/ 

OPINION & ORDER 

DENYING PETITIONER’S § 2255 MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE AND

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

In Criminal Case No. 15-20262, Petitioner Cortez Deonte Moultrie (“Petitioner”) pleaded

guilty, pursuant to a Rule 11 Plea Agreement, to three counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2113(a); and two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of

violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Doc. # 52, Rule 11 Plea Agreement). This Court

sentenced Petitioner to a total term of 471 months’ imprisonment. (Doc. # 65). 

The matter is now before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. (Doc. # 73, Pet.’s Mo.). Petitioner asserts

several grounds in support of his motion, all of which challenge his conviction or sentence. The

Government has filed a response opposing Petitioner’s motion, (Doc. # 78, Gov’t Resp.), and

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Petitioner has filed a reply (Doc. # 80). In his reply, Petitioner raises an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in addition to the claims raised in his initial petition. 

Because the files and records of the case conclusively establish that Petitioner is not

entitled to relief as to any of the claims set forth in this § 2255 motion, an evidentiary hearing is

not necessary and the decision is therefore ready for a decision by this Court. For the reasons set

forth below, Petitioner’s motion to vacate will be DENIED. Moreover, the Court declines to

issue a certificate of appealability. 

BACKGROUND 

Plea Agreement 

On February 24, 2016, Petitioner pleaded “guilty to Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the First

Superseding Indictment, which charges three counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2113(a); and two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Rule 11 Plea Agreement provided the following factual

basis for Petitioner’s guilty plea: 

Count 1

On or about January 20, 2015, in the Eastern District of Michigan, the defendants,

CHARLES ALBERT WALKER and CORTEZ DEONTE MOULTRIE, while

aiding and abetting each other, by force, violence and intimidation did take from

the person or presence of another, money, namely $42,947.96, belonging to and in

the care, custody, control, management, and possession of the Key Bank, 23116

Telegraph Road, Brownstown, Michigan, a bank whose deposits were then

insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Defendants came into the bank brandishing their handguns. They ordered

everyone to the floor. They located the bank manager and demanded that he open

the vault. After stealing cash, the defendants ordered everyone into the vault, and

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shut the door behind them. 

Counts 3 and 4 

On or about March 25, 2015, in the Eastern District of Michigan, the defendants

CHARLES ALBERT WALKER and CORTEZ DEONTE MOULTRIE, while

aiding and abetting each other, by force, violence, and intimidation did take from

the person or presence of another, money, namely $17,443.00, belonging to and in

the care, custody, control, management, and possession of the Huntington

National Bank, 1821 North Perry, Pontiac, Michigan, a bank whose deposits were

then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Defendants came into the bank brandishing their handguns. They took cash out

of a drawer, then racked their guns, ordering the bank employees to go into the

vault area. They stole cash from the safe, ordered everyone to the floor, and shut

them in the vault, taking the employee’s keys. 

Counts 5 and 6

On or about April 20, 2015, in the Eastern District of Michigan, the defendants

CHARLES ALBERT WALKER and CORTEZ DEONTE MOULTRIE, while

aiding and abetting each other, by force, violence, and intimidation did take from

the person or presence of another, money, namely $132,449.00, belonging to and

in the care, custody, control, management, and possession of the Comerica Bank,

35320 Jefferson Avenue, Harrison Township, Michigan, a bank whose deposits

were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Defendants, wearing security guard jackets, entered the bank, brandishing their

handguns at employees and visitors. They ordered everyone to the ground and

demanded that someone open the vault and warned them not to pull any alarms. 

Walker threatened to kill the manager. 

(Rule 11 Plea Agreement at pgs. 3-5) (emphasis in original). The Plea Agreement further

provided that there were no sentencing disputes1

 and that Petitioner’s guideline range was 121 -

1

 Except to the extent that the parties agreed that Petitioner could contest the application

of U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(A), and let the Court decide whether it applies. 

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151 months’ imprisonment + 505 - 535 months’ imprisonment. Petitioner also agreed to waive

any right he may have to appeal his conviction and sentence (if the sentence imposed did not

exceed the maximum recommendation allowed by the agreement). (Rule 11 Plea Agreement at

p. 12). 

Sentencing 

On June 22, 2016, this Court sentenced Petitioner to: 87 months on Counts 1, 3, and 5, to

be served concurrently; to 84 months on Count 4, to run consecutive to Counts 1, 3, and 5; and to

300 months on Count 6, to run consecutive to Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5. (Doc. # 65). Petitioner did

not file a direct appeal. 

On October 28, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant pro se Motion to Vacate Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Pet.’s Mo.). In it, Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief. 

First, Petitioner argues that his multiple § 924(c) convictions violate the double jeopardy clause

because he used the same firearm in all three bank robberies, i.e., all three robberies constituted a

“single crime” and Petitioner should have only received one § 924(c) conviction. Second,

Petitioner argues that certain enhancements applied to his base offense level no longer apply

because those enhancements only apply to crimes of violence and that bank robbery does not

constitute a crime of violence under Johnson and Beckles. Third, Petitioner seeks relief from his

§ 924(c) convictions based on Johnson and Beckles. Fourth, Petitioner argues that his multiple §

924(c) convictions violate the double jeopardy clause and that § 924(c) is constitutionally vague

in light of Johnson. In his reply, Petitioner asserts for the first time that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed “to object to his sentence under the principles

of Johnson.” 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Petitioner’s motion is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides: 

A prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court established by Act of Congress

claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence imposed was in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was

without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of

the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may

move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the

sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. To prevail on a § 2255 motion, “a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of

an error of constitutional magnitude which has a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the

guilty plea or the jury’s verdict.” Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2005). 

A movant can prevail on a § 2255 motion alleging non-constitutional error only by establishing a

“fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, or an error so

egregious that it amounts to a violation of due process.” Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488

(6th Cir. 1999).

ANALYSIS 

As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted

his instant claims. Assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner has not procedurally defaulted his

claims, he is still not entitled to the relief he seeks for the reasons below. 

A. Petitioner’s Bank Robbery and Firearms Convictions Do Not Violate The Double

Jeopardy Clause 

First, Petitioner argues that because he used the same firearm in each of the three charged

robberies, his actions constitute a “single crime spree.” (Pet.’s Mo. at Pg ID 422). As such,

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Petitioner concludes that “the imposition of consecutive sentence under subsection 924(c) for

using multiple weapons during a single crime of violence would impinge on fundamental double

jeopardy.” (Id.). Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. 

The double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing multiple punishments for the

same offense. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980). “The general test for

compliance with the double jeopardy clause looks to ‘whether each provision requires proof of a

fact which the other does not.’” United States v. Gibbons, 994 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1993)

(quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). However, this test does not

apply “where Congress has authorized punishments which would otherwise be inappropriately

cumulative.” Id. (citing Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688). 

Here, Petitioner essentially argues that because he used the same firearm in the three

armed robberies, he should only be convicted with one § 924(c) charge. Petitioner is wrong. 

As the Government correctly points out, each § 924(c) conviction attached to a separate armed

robbery, and each robbery conviction required proof of different facts (i.e., dates, locations,

circumstances, etc.). The fact that Petitioner allegedly used the same firearm for three separate

robberies is of no import. 

B. Petitioner May Not Rely on Johnson and Beckles to Collaterally Attack his §

2113(a) and § 924(c) convictions

In Ground Two, Petitioner appears to be relying on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct.

2251 (2015) and Beckles v. United States, 197 L.Ed. 2d 145 (2017) to “challenge guidelines

enhancements” he received under U.S.S.G. §2B3.1. Petitioner first argues that bank robbery

under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) does not constitute a crime of violence and that, therefore, certain

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guideline enhancements he received under U.S.S.G. §2B3.1 are no longer applicable.2

Petitioner’s reliance on Johnson and Beckles is misplaced. In Johnson, the Supreme

Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) residual clause for being

unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. At 2257. Here, Petitioner cannot rely on Johnson

for relief because the Court did not sentence Petitioner under the residual clause. Nor was

Petitioner sentenced under the ACCA at all. Petitioner’s reliance on Beckles v. United States,

197 L.Ed. 2d 145 (2017) fares no better because the Supreme Court in Beckles recently clarified

that the void for vagueness doctrine does not apply to the residual clause of the career offender

Sentencing Guidelines. 

C. Petitioner May Not Rely on Johnson to Collaterally Attack § 924(c) Convictions 

In Ground Three, Petitioner appears to be relying on Johnson to collaterally attack his 18

U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions.3

 Presumably, Petitioner’s position is that Johnson reaches §

924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” since § 924(c)(3) includes a residual clause similar to

the ACCA residual clause invalidated in Johnson. 

Under § 924(c), anyone who uses or carries a firearm during or in relation to a “crime of

2

 To provide context, Petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Section 2113(a) states, in pertinent part, that, “[w]hoever, by

force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of

another ... any property or money ... belonging to, or in the care, custody, control ... of any bank

... shall be ... imprisoned not more than twenty years...” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The guideline for

Section 2113 offenses is found in U.S.S.G. §2B3.1. Here, Petitioner received several

enhancements pursuant to §2B3.1. 

3

 Petitioner also cites to Lynch v. Dimaya, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). In Dimaya, the

Ninth Circuit held that the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of “aggravated felony”

was unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson. The immigration and Nationality Act is

irrelevant to the instant case. As such, Petitioner’s reliance on Dimaya is misplaced. 

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violence” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. For purposes of § 924(c), a “crime of

violence” is a felony offense that: 

(A) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person or property of another, or 

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the

person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the

offense.

18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)-(B). “The first clause, 924(c)(3)(A), is commonly referred to as the

‘force’ clause. The second, 924(c)(3)(B), is commonly referred to as the ‘residual’ clause[.]”

United States v. Moore, 2016 WL 2591874, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 5, 2016). 

Here, Petitioner pleaded guilty to brandishing a firearm during or in relation to bank

robbery. Bank robbery, by definition, requires the use of “force, violence, or intimidation.” This

definition fits within the definition of “crime of violence” as set forth in the “force” clause of §

924(c)(3)(A). Thus, there is no need to resort to the “residual” clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) to

determine whether a bank robbery constitutes a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 924(c)

firearm charges. See e.g., Moore v. United States, 2016 WL 5651304, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4,

2016) (collecting cases and noting that “the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the convictions of

criminal defendants for committing (1) armed bank robbery and (2) brandishing a firearm during

and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), without

expressing any reservation about whether armed bank robbery constitutes a crime of violence”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Moreover, even if it were necessary to rely upon the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B),

Petitioner is still not entitled to the relief he seeks. The Sixth Circuit has made clear that

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Johnson did not invalidate the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v.

Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 379 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the petitioner’s “argument that Johnson

effectively invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B)”).

D. Petitioner’s § 924(c) Convictions Do Not Violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and

are Not Otherwise Unconstitutional 

In Ground Four, Defendant argues that his § 924(c) convictions violate the double

jeopardy clause, and he reasserts that § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague. Both of these

arguments are without merit. 

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[t]he general double jeopardy tests cannot be

applied to section 924(c) since a section 924(c) charge is always predicated upon the violation of

another statutory offense . . . . The underlying crime of violence ... [on] which a section 924(c)

conviction is, by definition, based will never require proof of any fact for which section 924(c)

itself does not require proof.” Gibbons, 994 F.2d at 302. Since Congress has expressly provided

that courts may impose punishment for a violation of § 924(c) in addition to the punishment

imposed for the predicate crime of violence, Petitioner’s double jeopardy argument lacks merit. 

United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 229-30 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting double jeopardy

argument where a defendant’s sentence is enhanced under § 924(c) when applied in connection

with the predicate offense of armed robbery). 

Petitioner’s § 924(c) vagueness argument is without merit for the reasons stated above. 

See United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d at 379 (rejecting the petitioner’s “argument that Johnson

effectively invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B)”).

E. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance Claim Fails Because Petitioner Cannot Establish

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Prejudice Resulting From His Trial Attorney’s Alleged Deficiency 

In his Reply, Petitioner summarily argues that he was denied effective assistance at trial

because his attorney failed to object to his sentence on the basis of Johnson. To establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must satisfy the two-part test set forth in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1987). First, Petitioner must establish that his attorney’s

“representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

Second, Petitioner must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s deficiency because

there is “a reasonable probability that, but for [counsel’s acts or omissions], the result of the

proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because he cannot establish the

prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. Even assuming his trial attorney’s failure to object

constituted deficient performance, Petitioner still cannot demonstrate that the result of the

proceedings would have been different had the objection been made. Simply put, Johnson is

inapplicable to the facts of Petitioner’s case. 

F. Certificate of Appealability

A certificate of appealability must issue before a petitioner may appeal the district court’s

denial of his § 2255 Motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 28 U.S.C. 2253

provides that a certificate of appealability may issue only if a petitioner makes a substantial

showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). 

“Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claim on the merits, the showing

required to satisfy 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable

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jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Where a district court denies habeas relief on procedural grounds without reaching the

petitioner’s constitutional claims, a certificate may issue only if the petitioner shows that “jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). 

The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of

Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. As such, the Court declines to issue a certificate of

appealability. 

CONCLUSION & ORDER 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion

is DENIED. Additionally, this Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. This Court

also certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be 

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taken in good faith. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 26, 2017 s/Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

U. S. District Judge

I hereby certify that on May 26, 2017, the foregoing document was served on counsel of record

via electronic means and upon via First Class mail at the address below:

Cortez Deonte Moultrie

50977039 

ALLENWOOD 

U.S. PENITENTIARY 

Inmate Mail/Parcels 

PO BOX 3000 

WHITE DEER, PA 17887 

s/J. McCoy 

Case Manager 

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