UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MONTERREY ARMAND WOODS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 14-14932

 Honorable George Caram Steeh

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 

Defendant. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [R. 15, 18]

Plaintiff Monterrey Woods appeals a final decision of Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications

for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Both parties have filed

summary judgment motions, referred to this Court for a Report and 

Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Court finds 

that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to properly analyze the 

medical opinions of record, resulting in a residual functional capacity 

assessment (“RFC”) not supported by substantial evidence. For these

reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that:

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• the Commissioner’s motion [R. 18] be DENIED; 

• Woods’ motion [R. 15] be GRANTED; and,

• the Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED AND REMANDED for 

further consideration, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Claimant’s Background and Claimed Disabilities

As of the date of the administrative hearing, Woods was thirty-two 

years old, had completed the tenth grade, and had previously worked as a 

car wash attendant, cleaner and inventory clerk. He claimed disability due 

to a personality disorder and anger management issues. [R. 11-6, Tr. 181]. 

B. Procedural History

Woods filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability as of July 

7, 2007. [R. 11-5, Tr. 154-64]. The claims were denied initially, and 

Woods filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, held on July 26, 

2013, at which both he and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. [R. 11-2, 

Tr. 32-60; R. 11-4, Tr. 80-102]. The ALJ found Woods not disabled and the

Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final 

decision of the Commissioner. [R. 11-2, Tr. 1-5, 12-31]. Woods timely filed 

for judicial review.

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C. The ALJ’s Application of the Disability Framework

DIB and SSI are available for those who have a “disability.” See 

Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). A “disability” is the 

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Commissioner determines whether an applicant is disabled by 

analyzing five sequential steps. First, if the applicant is “doing substantial 

gainful activity,” he or she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

1

 Second, if the claimant has 

not had a severe impairment or a combination of such impairments2 for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months, no disability will be found. Id. 

Third, if the claimant’s severe impairments meet or equal the criteria of an 

impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, the 

claimant will be found disabled. Id. If the fourth step is reached, the 

Commissioner considers its assessment of the claimant’s residual 

 1 Sections 1520(a)(4) and 920(a)(4), which pertain to DIB and SSI 

respectively, list the same five-step analysis.

2 A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 1520(c); 920(c).

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functional capacity (“RFC”), and will find the claimant not disabled if he or 

she can still do past relevant work. Id. At the final step, the Commissioner 

reviews the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experiences, and 

determines whether the claimant could adjust to other work. Id. The 

claimant bears the burden of proof throughout the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner if the fifth step is reached. Preslar v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 

Applying this framework, the ALJ concluded that Woods was not 

disabled. At step one, he determined that Woods had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. [R. 11-2, Tr. 17]. 

At step two, he identified severe impairments of “depression, impulse 

control, not otherwise specified/intermittent explosive disorder/personality 

disorder.” [Id.]. At step three, the ALJ determined that none of Woods’

impairments, either alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a 

listed impairment. [Id., Tr. 18-19]. In making this determination, the ALJ 

found that Woods had no more than mild limitations in activities of daily 

living, marked difficulties in social functioning and moderate difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence and pace with no episodes of 

decompensation. [Id., Tr. 19]. 

Next, the ALJ assessed Woods’ RFC, finding him capable of a limited 

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range of medium work with the following non-exertional limitations:

limited to hearing and understanding simple oral instructions 

and limited to communicating simple instructions. He should 

avoid hazards such as[ ] heights or machinery but he is able to 

avoid [sic] ordinary hazards in the workplace, such as boxes on 

the floor, doors ajar or approaching people or vehicles. He 

should never have exposure to extreme heat or extreme cold. 

He is limited to simple, repetitive, routine tasks, but is not able 

to perform at a production pace (for example[,] assembly line 

work) but can perform goal-oriented work (such as an office 

cleaner). He is limited to simple work[-]related decisions. He 

can have frequent interactions with supervisors (such contact 

would be direct and non-confrontational). He is limited to 

occasional contact with coworkers (consisting of a small group 

of individuals with contact that would be casual in nature). He 

cannot have contact with the public. He is limited to tolerating 

few changes in a routine work setting and when said changes 

do occur, they would need to take place gradually and would 

occur infrequently. 

[Id., Tr. 19-20]. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Woods’ RFC 

prevented him from returning to his past relevant work. [Id., Tr. 25]. At 

step five, with the assistance of VE testimony, the ALJ determined that a 

hypothetical claimant matching Woods’ profile could perform a substantial 

number of jobs in the national economy, such that he was not disabled, 

including food preparation worker (174,000 jobs nationally), inspector 

(38,000 jobs) and equipment cleaner (195,000 jobs). [Id., Tr. 26]. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

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and was made in conformity with proper legal standards. Gentry v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the 

evidence in the record below may be considered when determining 

whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bass v. 

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). “If the [Commissioner’s]

decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if 

the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal 

citations omitted). 

The significant deference accorded the Commissioner’s decision is 

conditioned on the ALJ’s adherence to governing standards. “Chief among 

these is the rule that the ALJ must consider all evidence in the record when 

making a determination, including all objective medical evidence, medical 

signs, and laboratory findings.” Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723. See also Rogers, 

486 F.3d at 249. In other words, substantial evidence cannot be based 

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upon fragments of the evidence, and “must take into account whatever in 

the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 

388 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Commissioner must also adhere to its own procedures, but 

failure to do so constitutes only harmless error unless the claimant has 

been prejudiced or deprived of substantial rights. Rabbers v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009). An ALJ’s failure to use an 

“adjudicatory tool” that does not change the outcome of the decision is 

harmless. Id. at 655-56. On the other hand, substantial errors like ignoring 

evidence in the record or failing to follow the treating physician rule are not 

harmless. Id.; Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011); Gentry, 

741 F.3d at 729. An “ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations 

denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the 

ALJ may be justified based upon the record.” Cole, 661 F.3d at 939-40

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

With these standards in mind, this Court finds that the ALJ’s 

determination that Woods is not disabled is not supported by substantial 

evidence.

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III. ANALYSIS

Woods argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze the medical 

opinions of record, and found him less than fully credible for unsupported 

reasons. The Court agrees that the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinions 

lacks substantial evidentiary support and requires remand. 

A.

An ALJ is required to consider all medical opinions, and “[t]he opinion 

of an examining medical source is generally given greater weight than the 

opinion of a non-examining source.” Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 

F. App’x 515, 525 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). “The 

regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions 

as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become 

weaker.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. 

Admin. July 2, 1996). See also Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 

365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013) (same). Thus, opinions from State agency 

physicians “can be given weight only insofar as they are supported by 

evidence in the case record . . . .” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p at 2. When 

weighing any medical opinion, an ALJ is required to consider the factors of 

supportability, consistency with the record and specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c). 

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With regard to supportability, the Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 

1116 (6th Cir. 1989), opinion is instructive when the plaintiff claims 

disability due to mental illness. In Blankenship, the ALJ had discounted the 

opinion of a psychiatrist, reasoning that the psychiatrist had examined the 

plaintiff only once, that there was no clear diagnostic picture and that the 

plaintiff’s complaints were inconsistent with documented clinical findings. 

Id. at 1121. Rejecting this analysis, the court noted that it is not uncommon 

for mental disorders to be diagnosed after one interview. Id. The court 

additionally disputed that medical evidence contradicted the psychiatrist’s 

opinion, and emphasized that the psychiatrist had relied upon the type of 

medical findings that are relevant for diagnosing mental illnesses. Id. at 

1121. 

[W]hen mental illness is the basis of a disability claim, clinical 

and laboratory data may consist of the diagnosis and 

observations of professionals trained in the field of 

psychopathology. The report of a psychiatrist should not be 

rejected simply because of the relative imprecision of the 

psychiatric methodology or the absence of substantial 

documentation, unless there are other reasons to question the 

diagnostic techniques.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

B.

Here, Nathalie Menendes, Psy.D., issued an opinion after she 

examined Woods in September 2012. [R. 11-7, Tr. 224-27]. Her 

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examination included detailed descriptions of Woods’ complaints and 

symptoms, treatment, medication, personal history, daily and social 

functioning, past and present interests, and activities. [Id., Tr. 224-25]. Dr. 

Menendes recorded her general observations and the results of a mental 

status examination. [Id., Tr. 225-27]. She described Woods as being often 

vague but not as exaggerating his symptoms; he may have been 

minimizing them due to lack of insight. [Id., Tr. 226]. She concluded that 

Woods would be “able to perform and remember concrete, repetitive, and 

tangible tasks such as grooming and hygiene activities.” [Id., Tr. 227].

However, his psychological symptoms are severe and will 

interfere with his ability to perform any job duty, simple or 

complex, on a consistent and reliable basis. He does not 

handle frustrating situations well and should not be expected to

be able to cope with stress or difficult situations in the work 

setting. His social skills [are] minimal and he is not able to 

interact appropriately with others, especially when situations 

become conflictual.

[Id., Tr. 227]. Dr. Menendes diagnosed Woods with major depressive 

disorder, recurrent, severe, intermittent explosive disorder and personality 

disorder not otherwise specified, and issued him a guarded prognosis and 

a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 43, which is 

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indicative of severe symptoms. [Id.].

3

 

Reviewing Dr. Menendes’s opinion, the ALJ dismissed the low GAF 

score as being a result of Woods’ “detached and often vague responses,” 

and opined that Dr. Menendes’s failure to immediately refer Woods for 

hospitalized mental health treatment was inconsistent with the finding of 

serious limitations of functioning. [R. 11-2, Tr. 21]. The ALJ then gave Dr. 

Menendes’s opinion little weight, reasoning that that the information that 

Woods relayed to Dr. Menendes was inconsistent with his other statements 

in the record or testimony. [R. 11-2, Tr. 21-22]. The allegedly 

inconsistent statements the ALJ identified were that Woods had denied 

past or present substance abuse to Dr. Menendes, while a record stated 

that he used marijuana daily; that Woods denied ever being arrested 

despite his reports to Dr. Menendes that he had often gotten into fights;

and that he reported to Dr. Menendes that he had attempted suicide three 

times, but had never had mental health treatment. [Id., Tr. 21-22]. The 

ALJ stated that Dr. Menendes found Woods’ responses to be vague and 

not forthcoming, and that Dr. Menendes’s opinion was merely a “snapshot 

 3 “The GAF scale is a method of considering psychological, social, and 

occupational function on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. The 

GAF scale ranges from 0 to 100, with serious impairment in functioning at a 

score of 50 or below.” Norris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-5424, 461 

Fed. Appx. 433, 436 n.1 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

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of the claimant rather than a lengthy history of treatment.” [Id., Tr. 22]. 

Finally, the ALJ cited the opinion of non-examining State agency 

psychologist Wayne Hill, Ph.D.,

4 whose opinion he gave great weight, as 

deeming questionable Woods’ credibility during his examination by Dr. 

Menendes. [Id., Tr. 22]. 

C.

The ALJ’s reasoning for the weight he gave these consultants is not 

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s reliance on the fact that Dr. 

Menendes examined Woods only once is unsustainable, given the rejection

of that reasoning in Blankenship. Blankenship, 874 F. 2d at 1121. In that 

opinion, the Sixth Circuit further emphasized that clinical observations by 

trained professionals constitutes relevant clinical data supporting mental 

illnesses diagnoses. Id. Yet, the ALJ second-guessed the cause of Dr. 

Menendes’s GAF and diagnoses, and assigned his own meaning to 

Woods’ detached and vague responses during the examination; he 

impermissibly played doctor by substituting his own judgment for that of a 

psychologist whose opinions were supported by her mental health 

examination. Simpson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 194 (6th 

Cir. 2009). 

 4 The ALJ’s opinion misidentified Dr. Hill as an “M.D.” and a “State agency 

psychiatrist.” [R. 11-2, Tr. 22]. 

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Further, the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Menendes opinion was built on a 

foundation of dubious assumptions: that someone who often gets into fights 

would necessarily have a record of arrests,5 that someone who has 

attempted suicide would necessarily have sought mental health treatment

afterwards, and that a consulting psychologist who finds a claimant to have 

serious limitations in functioning would refer him for immediate 

hospitalization.6

Moreover, the ALJ failed to consider the consistency of Dr. 

Menendes’s opinion with the treatment notes and conclusions of other 

mental health providers. The month after Dr. Menendes examined Woods, 

he began treatment at Janes Street Academic Community Health Center,

voluntarily submitting to a short period of inpatient treatment followed by 

outpatient treatment that continued up until at least the date of the 

administrative hearing. [R. 11-7, Tr. 241-69, 271-81, 283-85, 331-39, 345-

47]. Woods was issued GAF scores between 31 and 50, was consistently 

noted to have irritability, anger management issues, a depressed mood and 

a flat affect, and tried several different medications that caused unwanted 

 5 Notably, Woods testified that he had previously had police encounters due 

to his anger, but that they had not resulted in arrest. [R. 11-2, Tr. 46]. 

6 Both parties agree that the regulations grant the Commissioner, but not 

consultative examiners, the authority to disclose to treating sources the 

results of consultative examinations. [R. 15, PgID 404 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1519p(c) and 416.919p(c); R. 18, PgID 437 (same)]. 

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side effects or that he later was unable to afford. [Id., Tr. 251, 253, 255, 

260, 262, 265, 268-69, 271-72, 275-76, 280-81, 283-84, 345-48]. Therapy 

notes during this time revealed little progress and reflect that, at one point,

Woods reported that he had not left the house in a month. [Id., Tr. 264-69, 

271-72]. The ALJ was required by § 404.1527(c) to consider whether Dr. 

Menendes’s opinion was consistent with these records, but he failed to do 

so.

D.

The ALJ also erred by relying on Dr. Hill’s opinion to question Woods’

credibility during his examination with Dr. Menendes, and by giving 

significant weight to Dr. Hill’s opinion. Dr. Hill’s opinion was derived from 

his review of Dr. Menendes’s findings and Woods’ reported activities of 

daily living. [R. 11-3, Tr. 63-71]. Despite finding that Woods’ statements 

about his psychological symptoms were “mostly credible” and consistent 

with the medical evidence, and despite giving “great weight” to Dr. 

Menendes’s report, Dr. Hill contradictorily called Woods’ credibility into 

question based upon general tendencies of people with antisocial 

personality disorders. [Id., Tr. 67-69]. According to Dr. Hill, Woods was

moderately limited in his ability to be supervised, get along with co-workers 

and maintain socially appropriate behavior. [Id., Tr. 69]. Given these 

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limitations, Dr. Hill opined that Woods would “perform better in small groups 

or under circumstances in which claimant has limited, (brief and superficial) 

contact with others[,] or[ ] function better alone, under conditions in which 

pressure of employment demands are reduced.” [Id.]. 

The ALJ gave Dr. Hill’s opinion significant weight, claiming that it was 

consistent with unspecified probative evidence, and finding persuasive Dr. 

Hill’s suggestion that Woods was not credible or forthcoming during Dr. 

Menendes’s assessment of him based upon the tendencies of individuals 

with personality disorders. [R. 11-2, Tr. 22]. Although the ALJ gave Dr. 

Hill’s opinion significant weight, he inexplicably found that Woods had 

marked (rather than moderate) limitations in social functioning, and then 

paradoxically concluded that Woods could have frequent interaction with 

supervisors, even though Dr. Hill’s opinion indicated that moderate 

limitations meant that Woods could only have brief and superficial 

interaction with others. [Id., Tr. 19, 22; R. 11-3, Tr. 69]. 

Since Dr. Hill did not examine Woods and did not observe Woods 

during his examination by Dr. Menendes, and since Dr. Menendes based 

her diagnosis in part on her observations, the ALJ’s decision to give more 

credence to Dr. Hill’s credibility assessment was clear error. Keeton, 583 

F. at 525; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1); Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 

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374180, at *2; Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 375; Blankenship, 874 at 1121. 

Examining sources are generally given more weight than non-examining 

sources, as observations by trained psychologists constitutes competent 

evidence of a claimant’s mental health. Id. Indeed, since Dr. Hill’s 

credibility determination was grounded solely in the general tendencies of 

individuals with personality disorders rather his personal observations of 

Woods or other evidence in the record, the ALJ should have given it no 

weight. Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (opinions from 

State agency physicians “can be given weight only insofar as they are 

supported by evidence in the case record . . . .”). The ALJ’s decision to

give significant weight to the credibility opinion of a non-examining source 

is especially specious in light of his rebuff of Dr. Menendes’s opinion based 

on the fact that she examined Woods only once.

Further, Dr. Hill’s opinion lacked supportability, internal consistency, 

and consistency with other evidence in the record. His opinion deemed 

Woods credible and consistent with the medical evidence, but then called 

his credibility into question. Dr. Hill gave Dr. Menendes’s opinion great 

weight, but then disregarded her conclusions that Woods did not appear to 

exaggerate his symptoms, that his psychological symptoms are severe and 

would interfere the performance of job duties, and that he has minimal 

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social skills that render him incapable of interacting appropriately with 

others. The ALJ claimed that Dr. Hill’s opinion was consistent with other 

probative evidence, but did not specify any. For these reasons, the ALJ’s 

analysis of the weight he gave to Dr. Hill’s opinion is not supported by 

substantial evidence.

E.

Ultimately, the ALJ’s bridge between the evidence and his 

conclusions is neither logical nor supported by the evidence of record. See 

Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-14809, 2015 WL 5730024, at *10 

(E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2015) report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-

14809, 2015 WL 5697696 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2015). As such, the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Woods has the RFC to perform medium work with the 

specified limitations is not supported by substantial evidence, and the Court 

recommends that the matter be remanded for further consideration in light 

of this Report and Recommendation. 7

 

F.

The Court further recommends that the ALJ be directed to reconsider 

 7 Notably, although the ALJ claimed to give great weight to Dr. Hill’s 

opinion, he failed to explain the RFC indicating that Woods could engage in 

frequent interaction with supervisors when Dr. Hill’s opinion limited Woods 

to only brief and superficial interaction with others. [R. 11-2, Tr. 19, 22; R. 

11-3, Tr. 69]. 

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his credibility determination on remand, as he omitted or misconstrued 

much of the evidence supporting Woods’ subjective statements, including 

his reasons for not continuing certain medications (due to side effects and 

financial constraints), and the state of his mood when not on medications 

(the ALJ characterized it as “stable” when the treatment records show 

otherwise). [R. 11-2, Tr. 22-25; R. 11-7, Tr. 245-48, 253-63, 267-69, 271, 

280-81, 283-85, 345-47]. 

 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Woods’

Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 15] be GRANTED, the Commissioner’s 

Motion [R. 18] be DENIED and this case be REVERSED AND 

REMANDED.

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: January 7, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 

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72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 7, 2016.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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