1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

YOKO TRAPP, 

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-CV-10742 

vs. DISTRICT JUDGE SEAN F. COX 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY 

GENERAL RETIREMENT PLAN, 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and 

MARGARET TRAPP, 

Defendants. 

___________________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Yoko Trapp filed this action against Defendants Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), 

Ford Motor Company General Retirement Plan (the “Plan”) (collectively the “Ford Defendants”), 

and Margaret Trapp asserting that she is entitled to certain funds pursuant to the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and alleging that 

Defendant Margaret Trapp is liable for conversion. (See docket no. 9.) Before the Court are the 

Ford Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 24), Defendant Margaret Trapp’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 26), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 29). The Parties each filed Responses, Replies, and some additional Sur-Replies to 

the various motions. (Docket nos. 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38.) The Motions have been 

referred for consideration. (Docket no. 27.) The undersigned has reviewed the pleadings, 

dispenses with a hearing pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and 

Recommendation. 

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I. Recommendation 

For the reasons stated herein, the Court should: 

 GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment [29] as follows: 

o Plaintiff’s Motion should be GRANTED with regard to the Ford 

Defendants. The Court should award her benefits in accordance with the 

formula set forth in the Divorce Judgment as discussed herein; such 

benefits should be calculated by the Plan’s independent actuary. 

o Plaintiff’s Motion should be DENIED with regard to Defendant Margaret 

Trapp. 

 DENY the Ford Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [24]; and 

 GRANT Defendant Margaret Trapp’s Motion for Summary Judgment [26/33] 

II. Report 

A. Facts 

 The claims in this matter relate to the death of Richard K. Trapp on April 20, 2012, and the 

proceeds accumulated as part of his retirement plan through the Ford Defendants until the time of 

his retirement on October 1, 2008. Richard Trapp married his first wife, Defendant Margaret 

Trapp on November 10, 1962. He started working at Ford on January 1, 1964, at which time he 

joined the Plan. 

 The Plan, which is a defined benefit plan under ERISA, states that “Ford is ‘the sole named 

fiduciary with respect to the Plan and shall have authority to control and manage the operation and 

administration of the Plan.’” (Docket no. 24 at 10 (quoting Plan, p. 111, AR 130).) As 

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Defendant notes, the Plan also states that 

Ford shall appoint a Retirement Committee, which “shall have discretionary 

authority to administer the benefit structure of the Plan, and to this end may 

construe and interpret the Plan, and may correct any defect or supply any omission 

or reconcile any inconsistency in such a manner and to such an extent as it shall 

deem expedient to carry out the purpose of the Plan” [and that] “[b]enefits under 

[the] Plan will be paid only if the Committee decides in its discretion that the 

claimant is entitled to them. Any action of the Committee (within the scope of its 

functions) shall be final and conclusive upon any Member and upon every other 

person entitled to or claiming benefits or membership under the Plan, unless 

arbitrary and capricious. 

(Id. (quoting Plan, p. 91, AR 110).) 

 On April 13, 1988, Richard Trapp and Margaret Trapp divorced. The Wayne County 

Circuit Court entered a Default Judgment of Divorce (the “Divorce Judgment”) (AR 413) and a 

Qualified Domestic Relations Order (the “QDRO”) regarding Margaret Trapp’s entitlement to 

Plan benefits (AR 381-85.) The QDRO states: 

The alternate payee [(defined as Margaret Trapp)] shall be designated as the 

beneficiary of the Contributory and Non-Contributory Death Benefits provided by 

the Plan. The alternate payee shall also be designated as the surviving spouse for 

purposes of the pre-retirement survivor annuity (surviving spouse death benefit) 

provided by the Plan. 

(QDRO ¶ 5(e), AR 383). The QDRO further states: 

The participant shall elect a benefit form that provides a survivor benefit (surviving 

spouse option). The survivor benefit shall be at least fifty (50%) percent of the 

benefit provided to the participant during the participant’s life. The participant 

shall designate the alternate payee as beneficiary of this survivor benefit unless the 

alternate payee elects to receive her benefits in a form which provides a life annuity 

based on her life. 

(QDRO ¶ 5(f), AR 383.) The QDRO also notes, though, that “[i]t is the parties’ intention, and the 

order of this Court, that the alternate payee receive a monthly benefit from the Plan of fifty (50%) 

percent of the participant’s monthly accrued benefit under the Plan as of February 1, 1988.” 

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(QDRO ¶5(a)(i), AR 382.) The QDRO codified the general intent of Margaret and Richard 

Trapp: 

The parties agree that their mutual intent is to provide the alternate payee with a 

retirement payment that fairly represents what they have agreed to be her marital 

share of the participant’s accrued retirement benefit as defined in paragraph 5. 

(ODRO, ¶8, AR 384.) 

 In that light, the Divorce Judgment also sets forth specific provisions regarding Richard 

Trapp’s pension: 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Husband’s pension at Ford 

Motor Company shall be divided equally (50% to each party) between 

Defendant/Counter Plaintiff Husband and the Plaintiff/Counter Defendant Wife as 

of February 1, 1988, pursuant to a [QDRO] filed simultaneously herewith, said 

QDRO incorporated herein (but not merged). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that as part and provision [sic] of 

said [QDRO] the Plaintiff/Counter Defendant Wife shall receive any and all 

benefits of survivorship, early withdrawal, and supplementations to the plan, to 

which the Defendant Counter Plaintiff Husband is now, or may hereafter, be 

entitled to according to the previously mentioned formula. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the said QDRO shall 

specifically provide that Defendant/Counter Plaintiff Husband shall be entitled to 

any retirement earned after February 1, 1988, exclusive of claim on the part of the 

Plaintiff/Counter Defendant Wife. 

(AR 480.) Margaret Trapp admitted that the Divorce Judgment entitled Richard Trapp to “any 

retirement earned after February 1, 1988” and that she agreed to this provision. (See docket no. 

29 at 9 (quoting First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 55-57; Answer to Amended Complaint ¶¶ 55-57).) 

 Approximately one year later, on May 26, 1989, Manufacturer’s Bank (serving as Ford’s 

Trustee for the Plan) sent Richard Trapp a letter confirming its official interpretation of benefits 

under the QDRO. The letter states, in relevant part: 

1. Monthly amount payable to alternate payee during period stated in paragraph 2 

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is . . . 50% of participant’s accrued benefit as of 2-1-88[.] 

. . . 

2. Monthly life income benefit begins when participant begins to receive his/her 

benefit and ends on earlier death of participant or alternate payee. . . . 

. . . 

4. Survivor benefits. Benefits are payable to surviving alternate payee after 

participant dies. If alternate payee is to be treated as a surviving spouse, a 

special calculation by the Plan’s independent actuary may be required, 

particularly if participant remarries. 

(AR 459-60.) Manufacturers Bank sent Richard Trapp a follow-up letter seven years later, in 

November 1996, summarizing benefits payable at that time and noting that “the alternate payee is 

entitled to receive . . . 50% of the accrued pension benefit as of 2/1/88.” (AR 465.) Additionally, 

in response to an inquiry by Margaret Trapp, Ford confirmed in a September 1, 2004, letter that she 

was entitled to “50% of the Participant’s benefit accrued as of 2/1/1988” pursuant to the QDRO. 

(AR 387.) 

 On June 10, 1988, Richard Trapp married Plaintiff Yoko Trapp. On September 2, 2008, 

Richard Trapp completed a Beneficiary Designation Form as a contributing member of the Plan, 

indicating his desire to have Yoko Trapp named as a primary beneficiary with a 100% interest. 

(AR 410 and 477.) He also provided a form confirming that Yoko Trapp was his wife and that he 

intended to retire on October 1, 2008. On this same form, Richard Trapp selected the “Automatic 

65% Surviving Spouse Method” for monthly benefit payments. (AR 473.) 

 Richard Trapp passed away on April 20, 2012. On May 1, 2012, the Trustee of the Plan 

began making payments to Yoko Trapp in the amount of $525.99 per month in accordance with 

the September 2, 2008 designation form. The Trustee made these payments for 11 months, 

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totaling $5117.49. (See AR 404.) Shortly after Mr. Trapp’s death, the Trustee informed 

Margaret Trapp of her benefit adjustment related to her surviving spouse benefits, noting that she 

would receive payments in the amount of $558.68. (AR 574.) It appears that she received 

payments totaling $21,039.72 from May 2012 through April 2013. (See AR 389.) After 

receiving her first payment, though, Margaret Trapp challenged the benefit payment, arguing that 

there was “a $539.71 deficit” compared to the calculation in Ford’s September 1, 2004 letter. 

(AR 386-87.) On April 12, 2013, Ford informed Margaret Trapp that she had been underpaid in 

the amount of $6,311.88 and that the appropriate monthly payment pursuant to the QDRO was 

$2,279.30—the entire surviving spouse benefit under Richard Trapp’s pension plan. (See AR 

389.) Ford also stopped payments to Yoko Trapp, and eventually informed her that she had been 

overpaid in the amount of $5,117.49 and requested that she repay the same. (AR 404.) Yoko 

Trapp challenged Ford’s determination but was told that “[t]he denial of [her] claim [was] based 

on the provisions of the QDRO[,] . . . which provide[d] sole survivorship to Margaret Trapp [and 

which] prevail[] over the Judgment of Divorce.” (Id.) Thus, Ford informer her, she was “not 

entitled to survivor benefits under the Plan.” (Id.) 

 Yoko Trapp began the appeal process in April of 2013, eventually hired counsel, and 

continued to exchange communication with Ford until her appeal was ultimately denied on August 

27, 2014. (See, generally, AR 391-458.) In the interim, though, Margaret Trapp elected to 

receive her benefits in a lump sum payment of $297,786.90. (See AR 580-89.) Thus, Plaintiff 

Yoko Trapp brings this claim against the Ford Defendants under ERISA, arguing that the decision 

to award 100% of the surviving spouse benefits to Margaret Trapp was arbitrary and capricious, 

and against Defendant Margaret Trapp for conversion, arguing that she is not entitled to retain the 

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benefit payments properly belonging to Yoko Trapp. (See docket no. 9.) 

B. Governing Law 

1. ERISA 

In reviewing an administrative decision denying benefits, a district court is 

to look solely to the evidence and material that was contained in the administrative 

record at the time the administrative decision was made. Wilkins v. Baptist 

Healthcare System, Inc., 150 F.3d 609 (6th Cir.1998). See also Miller v. 

Metropolitan Life Ins., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir.1900) (“when reviewing a denial 

of benefits under ERISA, a court may consider only the evidence available to the 

administrator at the time the final decision was made.”). The Wilkins court then 

stated, 

As to the merits of the action, the district court should conduct a de 

novo review based solely upon the administrative record, and render 

findings of fact and conclusions of law accordingly. The district 

court may consider the parties’ arguments concerning the proper 

analysis of the evidentiary materials contained in the administrative 

record, but may not admit or consider any evidence not presented to 

the administrator. 

Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 619. 

In the event the benefit plan gives the administrator discretionary authority 

to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan, an arbitrary 

and capricious standard of review is applied rather than the de novo standard. 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 

L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550 (6th Cir.1998) (en 

banc). 

Galenski v. Ford Motor Co. Pension Plan, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1019 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev’d 

on other grounds, 290 F. App’x 815 (6th Cir. 2008). Here, the Plan gives the administrator 

discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits, so the arbitrary and capricious standard 

applies. (See, generally, AR 110 (stating that “[t]he committee shall have discretionary authority 

to administer the benefit structure of the Plan, and to this end may construe and interpret the Plan, 

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and may correct any defect or supply any omission or reconcile any inconsistency in such manner 

and to such extent as it shall deem expedient to carry out the purpose of the Plan”).) 

 Nevertheless, this matter turns largely on interpretation of the QDRO. And “a plan 

administrator’s construction of an ERISA-qualified QDRO is reviewed de novo because it 

involves issues of contract interpretation.” Guzy v. Ameritech Corp., 50 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 

(E.D. Mich. 1999) (citing Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, 38 F.3d 107, 110 (3d 

Cir.1994).) Thus, as Defendant points out, a two-step standard of review applies in this matter: 

first, the “Court will review de novo the terms of the QDRO;” second, “[a]fter a determination has 

been made as to the correct scope of the terms contained in the QDRO, the Court then will review 

the administrator’s denial of plaintiff’s claim under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard.” Id. at 

711. A plan administrator’s decision on eligibility of benefits is not arbitrary and capricious “if 

they are ‘rational in light of the plan’s provisions.’” Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 

F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1996)(quoting Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th 

Cir. 1991)). When applying this standard, the court should take “into account the entire record 

before the administrator at the time of the determination that [the plaintiff] was not entitled [to the 

requested benefits].” Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1988). In determining 

plan eligibility, the plan administrator must adhere to the plain meaning of its language and a 

decision relating to benefit eligibility must be based on a reasonable interpretation of the plan. 

Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Southern Council of Industrial Workers Health and Welfare 

Trust Fund, 203 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2000). Simply stated, a plan administrator’s determination of 

eligibility must be “rational in light of the Plan’s provisions.” Brooks v. General Motors Corp., 

203 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 

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2. Conversion 

Plaintiff’s state-law conversion claim is adjudicated under the traditional 

summary-judgment standard. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A moving party may meet that burden “by ‘showing’ – 

that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Rule 56 

expressly provides that: 

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the 

assertion by: 

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, 

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Rule also provides the consequences of failing to properly support 

or address a fact: 

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: 

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – including the 

facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it; or 

 (4) issue any other appropriate order. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other 

materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

When the moving party has met its burden under rule 56, “its opponent must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric 

Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Ultimately a district court must 

determine whether the record as a whole presents a genuine issue of material fact, id. at 587, 

drawing “all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Hager v. 

Pike County Bd. Of Education, 286 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). 

C. Analysis 

Although there are ten filings related to the instant motions, they all address two core 

issues: (1) whether the Ford Defendants’ decision to award 100% of the surviving spouse benefits 

to Defendant Margaret Trapp was arbitrary and capricious; and (2) whether Defendant Margaret 

Trapp converted funds belonging to Plaintiff Yoko Trapp contrary to Michigan Law. Thus, the 

undersigned will consider the motions concurrently. 

1. Plaintiff’s ERISA Claim Against the Ford Defendants 

With regard to the QDRO, the parties do not challenge whether the QDRO in this matter 

satisfies the criteria set forth under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), thus excepting the QDRO from ERISA 

preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7). (See, generally, docket no. 24 at 15-16.) Therefore, 

the QDRO supersedes any plan terms and controls the beneficiary designation. Guzy, 50 

F.Supp.2d at 713. And as such, it is interpreted under principles of contract law. 

“[W]hen the terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, the Court need not consider 

any evidence beyond the plain language of the agreement in order to determine the rights and 

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obligations of the parties.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. AmTrust Fin. Corp., No. 1:10 CV 1298, 

2011 WL 334976, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2011), aff'd sub nom. In re AmTrust Fin. Corp., 694 

F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferro Corp. v. Cookston Group, PLC, 585 F.3d 946, 950 (6th 

Cir.2009); Med Billing, Inc. v. Med. Mgmt. Sciences, Inc., 212 F.3d 332, 335 (6th Cir.2000)). 

[T]he terms of an agreement . . . [are] considered ambiguous if their meaning cannot be clearly 

discerned from the four corners of the document in which they are contained, or when the language 

can is (sic) susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (citing Savedoff v. Access 

Group, Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir.2008)). And “if an ambiguity exists, the Court may 

consider extrinsic evidence, and utilize other traditional methods of contract interpretation to 

discern the true terms or meaning of the agreement.” Id. (citing Schachner v. Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield of Ohio, 77 F.3d 889, 893 (6th Cir.1996)). 

Plaintiff argues that the QDRO entitles Margaret Trapp to benefits accrued only through 

February 1, 1988, and that to the extent any ambiguity exists in the QDRO, the Court should 

resolve the ambiguity by reviewing the Divorce Judgment. (Docket no. 29 at 17-29.) The Ford 

Defendants argue that the QDRO is unambiguous in that “although Margaret Trapp was entitled to 

only a portion of the monthly life income benefits under the Plan, . . . she is entitled to all death 

benefits and/or surviving spouse benefits under the Plan.” (Docket no. 24 at 17-18.) Thus, they 

contend, the Court cannot consider extrinsic evidence “to create ambiguity where none exists.” 

(Id. at 18.) 

 Turning specifically to the QDRO, the Court finds that the document itself is neither clear 

nor unambiguous with regard to the amount of surviving spouse benefits to which Margaret Trapp 

is entitled. The central provision in the QDRO related to these benefits is Paragraph 5(f): 

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The participant shall elect a benefit form that provides a survivor benefit (surviving 

spouse option). The survivor benefit shall be at least fifty (50%) percent of the 

benefit provided to the participant during the participant’s life. The participant 

shall designate [Margaret Trapp] as beneficiary of this survivor benefit unless 

[Margaret Trapp] elects to receive her benefits in a form which provides a life 

annuity based on her life. 

(AR 383.) The Ford Defendants accurately juxtapose this provision against the monthly benefit 

provision, which specifically entitles Margaret Trapp to “fifty (50%) percent of the . . . monthly 

accrued benefit . . . as of February 1, 1988,” to note that the surviving-spouse provision does not 

include such a limitation. But the Ford Defendants take their reading of this provision too far in 

arguing that this provision entitles Margaret Trapp to “all death benefits/and or surviving spouse 

benefits.” (See docket no. 24 at 18.) To the contrary, unlike Paragraph 5(a), Paragraph 5(f) does 

not specifically entitle Margaret Trapp to any surviving-spouse benefits; instead, Paragraph 5(f) 

required Richard Trapp to elect a benefit form that would provide Margaret Trapp with a minimum 

of a 50% surviving-spouse benefit. Nothing in this provision sets forth the amount of surviving 

spouse benefits to which Margaret Trapp is entitled. Even read liberally, Paragraph 5(f) entitles 

her to 50% of the surviving-spouse benefits, but any further entitlement is unclear. 

 Moreover, as Plaintiff argues, Paragraph 5(d) contemplates Richard Trapp’s right to 

“designate a beneficiary other than or in addition to [Margaret Trapp]” for his benefits. (AR 383.) 

The Ford Defendants argue that this provision only applies to monthly benefits under the plan 

because Margaret Trapp is the sole beneficiary for surviving spouse benefits. (Docket no. 37 at 

4.) While such a reading of Paragraph 5(d) is plausible, it is not the only reasonable 

interpretation. Nothing in Paragraph 5(d) limits its application to monthly benefits; again, to the 

contrary, Paragraph 5(d) applies to “benefits” in general. Finally, the preamble of the QDRO sets 

forth the parties intent: “the clear intent of the parties [is] to effectuate a transfer, and assignment of 

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award to [Margaret Trapp] one-half of all [of Richard Trapp’s] accrued pension benefits through 

February 1, 1988.” (AR 381.) 

Having found that the QDRO is unclear with regard to the amount of surviving spouse 

benefits to which Margaret Trapp is entitled, the Court can consider the Divorce Judgment as 

extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. When read together, the unmistakable intent of Richard 

Trapp and Margaret Trapp at the time of their divorce was for Margaret Trapp to receive 50% of 

the benefits accrued through the time of their divorce. The Divorce Judgment clarifies this intent 

through the following provisions: 

[Richard Trapp’s] pension . . . shall be divided equally (50% to each party) between 

[Richard Trapp] and [Margaret Trapp] as of February 1, 1988, pursuant to the 

[QDRO] . . . . 

. . . [Margaret Trapp] shall receive any and all benefits of survivorship, early 

withdrawal, and supplementations to the plan, . . . according to the previously 

mentioned formula. 

[T]he [QDRO] shall specifically provide that [Richard Trapp] shall be entitled to 

any retirement earned after February 1, 1988, exclusive of claim on the part of 

[Margaret Trapp]. 

(AR 480.) As such, the Ford Defendants erred when they determined that Margaret Trapp was 

entitled to all of the surviving-spouse benefits under the Plan. Therefore, the Court should grant 

Plaintiff Yoko Trapp’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part with regard to the Ford Defendants 

and should award her benefits in accordance with the formula set forth in the Divorce Judgment. 

The Court should deny the Ford Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. As contemplated 

by Manufacturer’s Bank through its on May 26, 1989, letter to Richard Trapp, Yoko Trapp’s 

benefits should be calculated by the Plan’s independent actuary. (See AR 459-60.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Conversion Claim Against Defendant Margaret Trapp

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 As a preliminary matter, the undersigned notes Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that “if [she] is 

made whole by the Ford Plan, [she] will not seek duplicative damages from Margaret Trapp.” 

(Docket no. 36 at 7.) Thus, having recommended that the Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion with 

regard to the Ford Defendants, the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiff’s Motion in part 

with regard to Margaret Trapp and granting Defendant Margaret Trapp’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Nevertheless, the undersigned will address the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s claims 

against Margaret Trapp in the event the Court rejects the recommendation herein. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Margaret Trapp committed conversion under Michigan 

common law when she took possession of the surviving-spouse benefit proceeds with knowledge 

that Yoko Trapp was the appropriate beneficiary of a substantial portion of those funds. (See

docket no. 29 at 21.) Plaintiff further contends that she is entitled to treble damages under M.C.L. 

§ 600.2919a, Michigan’s statutory conversion rule. “Under Michigan law, the tort of conversion 

differs from statutory conversion in that the ‘tort of conversion is ‘any distinct act of domain 

wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights 

therein.’ ... [while] [s]tatutory conversion, by contrast, consists of knowingly ‘buying, receiving, 

or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property.’’” Gillom v. Ralph 

Thayer Automotive Livonia, 2005 WL 1640273 at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 13, 2005) (citing Head v. 

Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 595, 603 (Mich.App.1999)); Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 600.2919a). 

 To support an action for conversion of money, the defendant must have an 

obligation to return the specific money entrusted to his care. Check Reporting 

Services, Inc. v. Michigan Nat’l Bank–Lansing, 191 Mich.App. 614, 478 N.W.2d 

893, 900 (1991). It is clear that when the dispute is over moneys owed, conversion 

is only applicable in cases involving money that is the property of one party but 

held by another party (e.g., bank accounts, trusts, etc.) which is then wrongfully 

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taken. See Trail Clinic, PC v. Bloch, 114 Mich.App. 700, 319 N.W.2d 638 (1982) 

(allowing a conversion claim when one party appropriated checks payable to 

another party); Rennie v. Pentagon Refining Co., 280 Mich. 1, 273 N.W. 325 

(1937) (conversion found where one party appropriated funds from another party’s 

brokerage account). 

Sudden Serv., Inc. v. Brockman Forklifts, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 

Plaintiff contends that “[t]his is a claim for conversion of a specific fund – the portion of Richard 

Trapp’s surviving spouse pension that rightfully belongs to Yoko Trapp.” (Docket no. 36 at 8.) 

In support of this contention, Plaintiff relies on Citizens Ins. Co. v. Delcamp Truck Center, Inc., 

which held that “[a]n action for conversion lies where an individual cashes a check and retains the 

full amount of the check when he is entitled to only a portion of that amount.” (Id. (quoting 178 

Mich.App. 570, 576 (1989).) Plaintiff asserts that this matter is similar; that is, Margaret Trapp 

received a lump sum from Ford, but she was only entitled to a portion of those funds. 

 Plaintiff’s reliance on Citizen’s Ins. Co. is misplaced. While the undersigned agrees with 

Plaintiff that Defendant Trapp is not entitled to the entire lump sum that she received, these funds 

were not entrusted to Margaret Trapp’s care. The funds paid to Margaret Trapp by Ford were not 

being “held” for any purpose. Although Plaintiff (or the Ford Defendants) may be entitled to 

recover these funds from Defendant Trapp, a claim for conversion is not the appropriate vehicle 

through which to do so. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied 

in part with regard to Defendant Trapp, and Defendant Trapp’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

should be granted.1

 

1

 There is some discussion by Plaintiff with regard to the form of Defendant Margaret 

Trapp’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Margaret Trapp’s 

Motion should be denied because she relies solely on the Ford Defendants’ argument. (See 

docket no. 34 at 13; docket no. 26.) While the undersigned acknowledges the lack of substance in 

Defendant’s motion, the practical effect of denying Defendant’s Motion on these grounds would 

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D. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated herein, the Court should: 

 GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment [29] as follows: 

o Plaintiff’s Motion should be GRANTED with regard to the Ford 

Defendants. The Court should award her benefits in accordance with the 

formula set forth in the Divorce Judgment as discussed herein; such 

benefits should be calculated by the Plan’s independent actuary. 

o Plaintiff’s Motion should be DENIED with regard to Defendant Margaret 

Trapp. 

 DENY the Ford Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [24]; and 

 GRANT Defendant Margaret Trapp’s Motion for Summary Judgment [26/33] 

III. Notice to Parties Regarding Objections 

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Sec=y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing of objections which raise some issues but fail to 

raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report 

 

result in Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Trapp proceeding unnecessarily and without a legal 

basis. Moreover, Defendant Trapp cured this deficiency through a supplemental brief and in her 

response to Plaintiff’s Motion. (See docket nos. 33 and 35.)

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and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec=y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed=n Of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this 

Magistrate Judge. 

Any objections must be labeled as AObjection #1,@ AObjection #2,@ etc. Any objection 

must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. 

Not later than fourteen days after service of an objection, the opposing party must file a concise 

response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. The response must 

specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order and labeled as 

AResponse to Objection #1,@ AResponse to Objection #2,@ etc. 

Dated: May 12, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served on counsel of 

record on this date. 

Dated: May 12, 2016 s/ Lisa Bartlett 

Case Manager 

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