UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIA D. McPIKE-McDYESS,

Plaintiff, No. 14-14658

vs. Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF MICHIGAN,

Defendants.

________________________________/

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, IN ITS ENTIRETY

At a session of said Court, held in

the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan

on February 12, 2015

PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen

United States District Chief Judge

On December 9, 2014, Plaintiff Tia D. McPike-McDyess, acting pro se, filed the

instant action against the Regents of the University of Michigan seeking compensatory

and punitive damages arising out of the termination of her parental rights and her

allegedly involuntary hospitalization in the adult psychiatric unit of the University of

Michigan Hospital in May-June 2010.1

 On January 22, 2015, the Court issued an Order

1

 This is not the first suit Ms. McPike-McDyess has filed arising out of the

termination of her parental rights and her hospitalization at the University of Michigan. 

In April 2014, Plaintiff filed two suits in State court, Michigan Ct. of Claims Nos. 14-

00065 and 14-00066 against the Regents and the Michigan Department of Human

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to Show Cause, directing Plaintiff to show cause in writing why this case should not be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or because the action is barred by the applicable

statute of limitations or by application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral

estoppel. Plaintiff timely responded to the Show Cause Order.

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, her response to the Order to Show Cause,

and the entire record of this action, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to

entertain Plaintiff’s suit. 

It is settled that a court may sua sponte raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction

because of the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment. See Estate of Ritter v.

University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Application

of the Eleventh Amendment “partakes in the nature of a jurisdictional bar” that may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings and even sua sponte. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co.

In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of the State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 462,

65 S.Ct. 347, 349 (1985).

Services - Washtenaw County, respectively. See Civil Cover Sheet, p. 2; see also

http://courts.mi.gov/courts/coc/pages/case-inquiry.aspx. In both of these cases, the state

court granted the defendants’ motions for summary disposition. See id. On November

11, 2014, Plaintiff’s appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals was dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. See id. It was following the dismissal of her state court appeal that Plaintiff

filed the instant action in this Court. The Court notes that Plaintiff also initiated a

separate federal court action that same day against the Department of Human Services

See McPike-McDyess v. Washtenaw County Department of Human Services, E.D. Mich.

No. 14-14659, which is currently pending review on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed

Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs. The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed the

identical complaint in both of the federal court actions.

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The Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, bars suits against

a State or its agencies or employees acting in their official capacity, unless Congress has

abrogated its sovereign immunity or the state has expressly waived it. Virginia Office for

Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1637-38, 179 L. Ed. 2d

675 (2011). This sovereign immunity bars not only federal constitutional claims against

state agencies but ancillary state law claims, as well. See Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1983)

(“This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.”). The Board of Regents of

the University of Michigan is an arm of the State of Michigan, and hence is cloaked with

sovereign immunity. Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d at 850-51. That

immunity has not been waived. The Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

Complaint because the Eleventh Amendment constitutes a bar to her action.2

2

 Even if the Court were to conclude that it had jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s

Complaint, or any portion of it, the Court would nonetheless find that Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. First, to the extent that Plaintiff’s

Complaint can be read as attempting to assert a federal constitutional claim under 42

U.S.C. 1983, it is well-established that states, state entities -- such as the University of

Michigan Board of Regents -- and state officials sued in their official capacities are not

“persons” subject to suit for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Dillon-Barber v. University of

Michigan, 51 F. App’x 946, 952 n.6 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, the

limitations period for bringing a Section 1983 action is three years. M.C.L. §

600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir.1986). As for any

possibility that Plaintiff can make out a state law claim for assault, battery, false

imprisonment or for malpractice, the statute of limitations for such a claim is two years, 

see M.C.L. § 600.5805(2), (6), and the limitations period for state law tort claims to

recover damages for injury to a person is three years. M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). Because

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that the actions giving rise to her claims occurred in

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For all of the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be, and hereby is,

DISMISSED, in its entirety.

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: February 12, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on February 12, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5135

May and June 2010, i.e., more than four years before she filed this action, her claims

would be time barred. Finally, under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] final judgment on

the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that

were or could have been raised in that action.” W.J. O’Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bullfinch,

Richardson & Abbott, Inc., 765 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Federated Dep’t

Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981) . 

Similarly, where a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and

determined by a valid and final judgment and the same parties had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue, collateral estoppel applies and the issue may not be

relitigated in a subsequent proceeding. Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills, 578 F.

App’x 516, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2014). As noted above, Plaintiff previously filed actions

arising out of the same events upon which her Complaint in this action is predicated. 

Those actions have all been dismissed, with prejudice, and the dismissals were upheld on

appeal. The final judgments in those actions preclude Plaintiff from relitigating in this

action issues that were or could have been raised in the prior actions.

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