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57–328 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 111–582 

AFTER THE DUST SETTLES: EXAMINING 

CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED IN 

TRANSITIONING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 22, 2010 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

LISA M. POWELL, Staff Director 

EVAN W. CASH, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

SEAN M. STIFF, Minority Professional Staff Member 

AARON H. WOOLF, Chief Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Kaufman ............................................................................................. 2 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 26 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010 

Gail T. Lovelace, Chief Human Capital Officer, U.S. General Services Administration ................................................................................................................. 4 

Hon. Clay Johnson III, Former Deputy Director for Management (2003– 

2009), U.S. Office of Management and Budget .................................................. 7 

John D. Podesta, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Center for American Progress Action Fund .................................................................................. 9 

Max Stier, President and Chief Executive Officer, Partnership for Public 

Service ................................................................................................................... 11 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Johnson, Hon. Clay, III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Lovelace, Gail T.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Podesta, John D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Stier, Max: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 60 

APPENDIX 

Background .............................................................................................................. 69 

Copy of S. 3196 submitted by Senator Kaufman .................................................. 78 

Senator Kaufman summary of S. 3196 .................................................................. 90 

‘‘Ready to Govern, Improving the Presidential Transition,’’ January 2010, 

submitted by Mr. Podesta ................................................................................... 92 

‘‘Getting Ready for Day One: Taking Advantage of the Opportunities and 

Minimizing the Hazards iof a Presidential Transition,’’ By Martha Joynt 

Kumar, Professor, Towson University ................................................................ 126 

‘‘The 2008–2009 Presidential Transition Through the Voices of Its Participants,’’ submitted by Martha Joynt Kumar, Professor, Towson University ... 141 


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AFTER THE DUST SETTLES: EXAMINING 

CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED IN 

TRANSITIONING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. 

Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka, Kaufman, and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Good morning. This hearing of the Subcommittee 

on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 

and the District of Columbia is called to order. 

Today’s hearing will take a look at the 2008 and 2009 Presidential transition, its challenges and lessons learned that can improve future transitions. The most recent transition happened during a time of unprecedented economic troubles, heightened national 

security threats, and management challenges across the government. In advance of the 2008 election, this Subcommittee held two 

hearings examining our readiness for the transition. At those hearings, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) discussed their extensive planning and preparations for the transition. 

Today, 15 months after President Barack Obama was sworn into 

office, I am very pleased to say that it appears that this early planning and preparation laid the groundwork for a smooth transition. 

Although some problems were revealed, I believe this was one of 

the most successful transfers of power to date. 

Beginning well before the election, the Bush Administration ordered agencies to identify career individuals to take on leadership 

roles while political appointees left the Administration. This would 

ensure management continuity in critical areas until new people 

were appointed and brought up to speed. In addition, the Obama 

campaign took advantage of provisions in the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act which allowed security clearances for 


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individuals who were to work in the transition or later in the Administration. 

The General Services Administration worked with both campaigns to make sure they would have the administrative and financial support needed for the transition. With that assistance, the 

Obama-Biden Transition Project started immediately after the election. Early on, the transition project deployed teams of subject matter experts to review agencies across the government. Some of 

these experts later filled leadership roles within the agencies. 

Before his inauguration, President-Elect Obama named several 

nominees for high-ranking and national security positions. By January 22, the Senate confirmed 15 of the 36 nominees submitted by 

Inauguration Day. At our Subcommittee hearing in September 

2008, then-OMB Deputy Director for Management, Clay Johnson, 

recommended a goal of confirming 100 nominees by April. While 

we did not get to that number, the Senate did confirm over 50, an 

improvement over the previous transitions. 

I remain concerned about the pace of nominations and confirmations. Strict vetting and high standards for nominees are important, but they do create a slow and complicated process. I believe 

there is still room for improvement in the nomination and confirmation process. 

I have pressed the White House for action on several important 

Veterans Affairs nominations, including the Assistant Secretary for 

Management. Filling management positions must be a high priority across the government. I also hope to receive a nominee to 

lead the Office of Special Counsel, which is in great need of strong 

leadership, in the near future. 

More can be done to encourage more advance planning before 

elections. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of Senator 

Kaufman’s Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act, which would 

encourage planning and provide additional resources for candidates 

before the election. It would also make clear that candidates may 

raise funds to supplement the government allowance for their transition. 

I look forward to hearing from the exceptional group that we 

have assembled here today. As leaders in different aspects of the 

incoming and outgoing transition teams, I think that you all deserve credit for making this a smooth and transparent process. 

With that, I will now ask Senator Kaufman for his opening remarks. Senator Kaufman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAUFMAN 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your foresight 

and leadership in holding this hearing, and a special thank you for 

allowing me to make these opening remarks. 

Before I begin my statement, I am pleased to join with you to 

introduce S. 3196 that would offer certain government services and 

resources to major candidates before election day for the purpose 

of an early transition planning. I also want to thank the Partnership for Public Service for its input. Their recent study, ‘‘Ready to 

Govern: Improving the Presidential Transition,’’ provides an important analysis, and I am pleased that Mr. Stier will be able to share 

some of the Partnership’s findings and recommendations with us. 


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I am glad that we are joined today by these four distinguished 

witnesses, and I really mean distinguished witnesses, who will 

share their expertise on transition activities and how we can make 

transitions more secure and more efficient. 

The peaceful transition of power between administrations is 

often a time of great pride, and should be for all Americans. However, it also presents us with a moment of potential vulnerability. 

As the newly elected leaders prepare to assume control of our political and security institutions, we need to be vigilant against any 

systemic weaknesses that could be exploited by those who would do 

our Nation harm. 

As someone who has served as a member of the Obama Transition Team under the great leadership of our chair, John Podesta, 

I can attest that the transition in the government is very challenging. It is a complex dance involving two partners who need to 

move in step with each other. The President-Elect only has a short 

amount of time between Election Day and the inauguration to fill 

dozens of critical positions and prepare for the first weeks in office. 

The outgoing President has a responsibility to transmit critical institutional knowledge about policy and issues and ongoing potential 

security situations. 

We know from recent studies that the Bush Administration officials and incoming Obama staff met on the morning of the inauguration to coordinate plans in the event of a terrorist attack that 

day, which intelligence sources had suggested was possible. The 

kind of close coordination between the outgoing and incoming officials that morning must be the norm in any transition in our postSeptember 11, 2001, security environment. 

The Bush Administration deserves great credit for making transition activities a priority and for assigning staff and resources to 

the task. The Presidential Transition Coordinating Council, established by President Bush’s Executive Order on October 9, 2008, 

brought together key officials from leading departments and agencies and it liaised with senior staff from both campaigns and eventually President-Elect Obama’s transition team. 

Also crucial to the success of that transition was the Obama campaign had begun to plan for it many months in advance. S. 3196, 

the Pre-Presidential Transition Act, the bill I have introduced with 

my colleagues Senator Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Senator 

Lieberman, aims to formalize this process of pre-election transition 

planning. It will help make transitions smoother on both sides. 

For incoming administrations, early planning is vital. That is 

why my bill extends certain government-provided services and resources to major party nominees and eligible third-party candidates 

to begin transition planning before Election Day. For the outgoing 

Administration, the bill lays out a successful model based on that 

used by the Bush Administration for transferring power responsibly. 

Most importantly, we need to remove the stigma that making 

early plans for a transition is somehow presumptuous. Twelve 

weeks is just too short of time frame for a thorough transition. 

However, if we normalize the Act of early transition planning, we 

will all be better for it. That is the aim of the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act. 


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1The prepared statement of Ms. Lovelace appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

In closing, it is very appropriate that we are here today to discuss this issue. We cannot afford to think about transitioning the 

Federal Government only every 4 years. In 2010, when we are not 

engaged in a Presidential election, having had time to process lessons learned from the previous transition, it is important that we 

look carefully at how to improve upon this process. That way, a 

stronger transition process will be in place before Election Day. 

I hope the witnesses will speak to both types of actions, organizations, and structures providing help—I am confident they will—as 

well as any impediments they encountered in the process. I am also 

interested to learn of whatever additional measures they think 

would be useful to encourage an early start to transition planning 

on the part of Presidential candidates. 

Again, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman. 

It is my pleasure to welcome our witnesses here today. First, we 

will hear from our first panel, which is Gail Lovelace, Chief Human 

Capital Officer at the General Services Administration. 

As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses, so will you please stand, Ms. Lovelace, to be sworn 

in. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you, God? 

Ms. LOVELACE. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let the record note that the witness 

spoke affirmatively. 

Ms. Lovelace, I want you to know that although your remarks 

are limited to 5 minutes, your full statement will be included in the 

record. Will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF GAIL T. LOVELACE,1 CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL 

OFFICER, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. LOVELACE. Yes. Good morning, Chairman Akaka and Senator Kaufman, and thank you for having us here today to talk 

about this important topic of Presidential transition. I am pleased 

to be here on behalf of the General Services Administration, and 

our Administrator Martha Johnson. 

As you may recall, I testified before this Subcommittee on September 10, 2008, on this very topic. I am happy to be here with you 

today and to be able to respond to any questions that you may have 

about what has taken place since then. I am also pleased to be here 

today to share hearing time with some of my transition colleagues, 

Clay Johnson, John Podesta, and Max Stier. 

In my 2008 testimony, I shared with you then that our acting administrator of GSA stated that Presidential transition was our 

highest priority. We were fully committed to a successful and 

smooth transition from one Administration to the next. I am proud 

to be here before you today to say I think that we exceeded all of 

our goals, and yes, we had some fun along the way, as well. We 

have received very positive feedback from both campaigns, the 

transition team, the new Administration, our agency partners, 


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some of our good government groups, transition historians, and 

others. 

I was honored to be a part of an extraordinary team of individuals from inside GSA and across government to ensure a smooth 

transition as envisioned by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963. 

I couldn’t have asked for a better group of team leaders in the General Services Administration, and I would publicly like to thank 

Tim Horne, Mary Costa, George Prochaska, Neil Skidmore, Laura 

Leussing, and all of their team members for their tireless efforts 

to make sure this was a smooth transition. 

I would also like to thank you for keeping Presidential transition 

on the radar screen. Oftentimes, people think the Presidential transition is over after inauguration on January 20. I believe that our 

collective, continuing efforts to focus on transitions of the future is 

vitally important, especially in these changing times in which we 

live. 

During this last transition, GSA focused our attention in many 

areas. This hearing has given me the opportunity to reflect back on 

some of our efforts and I stand in awe of our accomplishments. We 

worked with many groups during this time, including both campaigns, the incoming Administration, the outgoing Administration, 

the inaugural teams, both the Presidential Inaugural Committee 

and the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee, other agencies big 

and small, and across GSA, and we have many stories to tell about 

how we met the needs of many of these groups. I believe 5 minutes 

is just not enough time to help anyone in this room understand the 

magnitude of our efforts, of the collaboration, of the willingness of 

many people just to roll up their sleeves and make this work. 

While GSA is authorized to support Presidential transition by 

the Act of 1963, we really didn’t stay in our swim lanes this time. 

We partnered with many to ensure a smooth transition, and I am 

proud of our efforts. 

Reflecting back, one story I would like to tell is about election 

night. Many of the GSA Presidential transition staff gathered at 

transition headquarters to celebrate what we had accomplished 

thus far and to watch the election results. We had already put in 

many long hours to get to that day of November 4. As the polls 

began to close, there was a lot of tension and excitement in the 

room. Once we knew the outcome of the election, we had our Acting 

Administrator ascertain the apparent winner by signing letters to 

both campaigns. 

Immediately after that, our team pulled out our Obama transition plans and began arranging three floors of office space to meet 

their needs. Our goal was to let them hit the ground running. At 

1 a.m. on the morning of November 5, I watched as our GSA team 

executed that plan, and within a few hours, the Obama transition 

team appeared at transition headquarters and we were ready. 

Meanwhile, on the other side of town that same day of November 

5, I hosted a meeting with members of the Obama transition team 

who were focused on personnel. That meeting included White 

House personnel, the Chief of Staff’s Office, Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM), Office of Government Ethics, and others. We 

rolled up our sleeves and outlined specific next steps to ensure 

smooth hiring of appointees. 


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These are just two examples of the many roles that GSA played. 

I am not sure if this was envisioned when the Presidential Transition Act was written, but we did not let the Act stop us from doing 

what we thought was right to ensure a smooth transition. 

In closing, Chairman Akaka, Senator Kaufman, I want to thank 

you again for the opportunity to address you this morning and for 

keeping Presidential transition on the radar screen. I want to 

thank the many people across government who helped make this 

transition successful. I think we really set the bar high for the next 

transition. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Lovelace, for your 

statement. 

I know that some of the second panel witnesses have tight schedules, so in the interest of time, we would like to hold our questions 

for now and ask the second panel to come forward, please. We can 

then have both panels sit for questioning at the same time. 

Ms. Lovelace, I know that you worked with Mr. Johnson and Mr. 

Podesta on the transition, so it would be very useful to the Subcommittee if you would indulge us by fielding questions with the 

second panel—— 

Ms. LOVELACE. I sure would. 

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. So we can facilitate a good dialogue. 

It is my pleasure this morning to now welcome our second panel. 

I would especially like to acknowledge and thank our former government officials who have agreed to come back to share their 

views. 

Clay Johnson, former Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget from 2003 to 2009. Mr. Johnson 

was the Bush Administration’s lead for planning the most recent 

transition, and he also served as the head of President Bush’s transition into office. 

John Podesta, incoming Staff Secretary during the Clinton transition, former White House Chief of Staff to President Clinton, CoChair of the Obama-Biden Transition Project, and President and 

CEO of the Center for American Progress Action Fund. 

And Max Stier, President and CEO of the Partnership for Public 

Service. 

Again, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so those who have not been sworn in, will you please stand 

and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 

this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do. 

Mr. PODESTA. I do. 

Mr. STIER. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let the record note that 

our witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

As a reminder, although your statements are limited to 5 minutes, all written statements will be included in the record. 

Mr. Johnson, will you please proceed with your statement. 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAY JOHNSON III,1 FORMER DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT (2003–2009), U.S. OFFICE OF 

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman Akaka, Senator Kaufman, thank you for 

calling this hearing and for including us in it. 

There have been a lot of wonderful ideas proposed for how to effect transitions in the future. In fact, I don’t know that I have come 

across a bad idea that has been put out on the table. So I would 

like to make some general comments that apply to the Senate’s and 

the White House’s consideration of all ideas about how to manage 

and organize transitions going forward because I think it will help 

us take these good ideas and put them into effect so that we really 

accomplish what we want to do, which is not to be better, or better 

than ever before, but to be good enough to meet our needs. 

The line was in Mr. Stier’s report, which was an excellent report, 

summary and recommendations from this last transition, which 

was that this past transition, as you all pointed out, was, I think 

by most accounts, the best ever. There was more work done before 

the election and during the transition, particularly by GSA, than 

ever before and I think it paid off. It showed. But I think everybody 

who is involved would admit that a lot more could be done. It was 

not as good as it could have been, or as it can be in the future. 

So what does it mean to focus on a transition that is good 

enough? It means, for instance, when we are talking about putting 

the entire new Administration’s team in place, it means that we 

focus not on putting all 1,000 or 1,200 or 1,800 Presidential Appointments requiring Senate Confirmation (PASs) in place, that we 

understand that some positions are more time sensitive than others. There is probably 100 or 125 positions that are really important to fill really quickly. 

So it is important that the Senate and the White House, the new 

Administration, the transition team, pay particular attention to 

those and make sure they have the super-capacity to identify those 

individuals to put in those positions, vet them appropriately, have 

their way with them, and eventually put them into position very 

early, I would suggest by April 1. 

Then there is probably another tranche of appointees that are 

next most important or time sensitive, and it is probably in the vicinity of 300 positions. Now, what specific positions would be included in this list would depend on the incoming Administration 

and what is going on in the United States, in the world at that 

time, and I think it would probably be pretty easy for the Senate 

and the incoming Administration to agree on that universe of 100, 

125 most important positions, that the next 300 most time sensitive positions, what are they, and maybe special rules apply within the Senate. Maybe special handling, special capacities are created within the transition team to deal with those. 

My suggestion to you is, and I think that the reports on this by 

Mr. Podesta’s and Mr. Stier’s group have both pointed this out, 

that there are 300, 400, 500, maybe, that are really, really important, and that is where, I think, the priority and the capacity building and so forth really needs to be focused. 


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A second point to be made here is regarding capacity. I was visiting with some people in the Obama Administration a couple of 

months ago about this and strictly by chance, we started talking 

about how many people did you have working on this at the beginning, and I started comparing it to how many people we had working on it at the beginning, and it was about the same number. It 

was about five so-called Special Assistants to the President, that 

level of person, that were working on the appointments. And we 

both started laughing. There is nothing in writing that says five is 

the number. That is just what we had the budget to do. 

If instead of dealing with the budget we dealt with what the definition of success is, which is we want 100 appointees in place by 

this date or 400 by this date, both of us would have decided that 

five is not enough, that we need 10 12, or 14, which is a much bigger transition challenge to manage than if you just have five people 

doing it. But that is what it would take to put the number of people in these critical positions by the dates that we are talking 

about. 

So time sensitive capacity is an issue, and it is not only White 

House capacity, it is Senate vetting capacity, it is security clearance capacity. It is just something we haven’t thought about, but 

it makes all the sense in the world. Yes, it is important to begin 

earlier. Yes, it is important to begin with more support for the incoming Administration. But that is not enough. 

You also have to think about how many people you actually have 

doing the work, and I know now that the budgets that are inherited by the incoming White House, are not adequate in that first 

year to fund a large enough Presidential personnel staff to fill the 

kinds of positions that need to be filled by April 1, August 1, etc. 

So budgeting, particularly for Presidential personnel that first 

year, is something that I encourage you to look at. 

And then a third area—I know I am running over, but a third 

area that I encourage you to look at is the data that is gathered 

as part of deciding who to put in these critical positions. A lot of 

data is gathered from the appointees. Thirty percent of it, by most 

measurements, is duplicative. It is data that already has been 

gathered previously. It presents an unnecessary burden on the applicant. It takes unnecessary extra time to collect this data. 

So I think it has been suggested in some of these other reports 

that the duplication of this data gathering be looked at. I also encourage the Senate to look at this, and there are ways to mandate 

it and to call for it and smart forms and other kinds of things can 

be used. But I think that will help not only speed up the process, 

but also lessen the burden on the people that are being considered 

for these very important positions. 

Anyway, I look forward to your questions and helping you all 

sort through the best ways to do this good enough in the transitions ahead. Thank you for having me. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson, for your 

background as well as your wisdom of what you have been doing. 

Mr. Podesta, will you please proceed with your statement. 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Podesta appears in the Appendix on page 49. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN D. PODESTA,1 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN 

PROGRESS ACTION FUND 

Mr. PODESTA. I am happy to, and again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Kaufman, for holding this hearing. I think it is really 

an important topic, and you have my written testimony. Let me 

just make a few key points in summary of that. 

First, President Obama took the transition process extremely seriously and we began extensive planning for the transition even before the Democratic Convention. I would underscore that point. I 

think he was right to do so, given the unprecedented range and 

magnitude of the problems facing the country—two wars, the 

threat of terrorism, and then the economic circumstances that we 

faced, particularly after the Lehman Brothers meltdown in September. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Johnson alluded to, I think 

independent observers have noted that the 2008 transition was one 

of the most successful in history, and the professionalism and cooperation of the outgoing Bush Administration along with the dedicated work of Ms. Lovelace and her great team at GSA and U.S. 

Secret Service and others deserve great credit for making that 2008 

transition exemplary. 

I think, as I said, the President understood the great demands 

that were being placed on his incoming team. We were dealing at 

a time when there was—we had seen in the previous years national security risk heightened during the time of transition, both 

in the U.K. and in Spain, right before the election in the case of 

Spain, right after the transfer from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown 

in the U.K. terrorist incident, so we were well aware of that. We 

got great cooperation, great help. The tabletop exercises that had 

been planned by the Bush Administration were, I think, very important interventions for our team going in. 

And as I noted, in addition to the incoming threats and security 

problems that needed to be addressed in real time, we were facing 

an economic crisis that took extensive coordination between the 

President-Elect and the Vice President-Elect and their teams, as 

well as the outgoing Administration. So I think that the ability to 

plan and get all of that in gear and moving was really critical. 

My second point and observation is we actually need to 

depoliticize the transition process. I think the only risk really to a 

party preparing in the fashion that I described, going back to the 

summer before the election, is the political risk to the campaign 

from being accused of measuring the drapes, tempting fate, disrespecting the voters. We were accused of all that. The Obama 

campaign and President Obama were accused of all of that. I again 

want to commend the Bush White House, Josh Bolton, and Dana 

Perino. They put out public statements knocking that down during 

the course of the campaign when it was probably—they could have 

politically just ignored it, but they decided to get out and say how 

important they believed the need to plan really was. 

I want to make a point on the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act that Senators Kaufman, Voinovich, Akaka, and Lieberman 


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have introduced. I think it is a very important step forward in institutionalizing those pre-election transition activities. In addition 

to providing the additional resources for transition activities, I 

think it will begin to create a new political climate where presidential candidates are rewarded rather than punished for preparing for the challenges that await the Nation after election. The 

new normal should be that we expect candidates to take steps necessary to be thoroughly prepared to govern before the election rather than taking criticism for it. And I think that enactment of this 

statute would help in that regard. 

In terms of the scope of the transition, we can get into this in 

questioning if you would like. It is a massive undertaking. We had 

more than 1,000 people involved after Senator Biden was elected 

as Vice Presidential candidate. Senator Kaufman joined us as the 

co-chair of his efforts. We had more than 500 people working on 

agency review teams. We had 134 people in policy working groups. 

That was critical in terms of getting ready to have that spurt of 

initiatives that were important in stabilizing the economy, particularly the recovery bill, but with Executive Orders, presidential 

memoranda, review of regulations, there is a massive amount of 

work that needs to take place. 

I would say a word about the funding of the transition. We received about $5.2 million in Federal funding through the GSA. We 

ended up having to raise $4.4 million in private donations to pay 

for transition costs through a tax-exempt 501(c)(4) entity, the 

Obama-Biden Transition Project. We put strict limits on who could 

give and how much they could give, didn’t take contributions from 

corporations or lobbyists. Nevertheless, I think it is worth reviewing that on this Subcommittee to decide whether the resources 

would be better spent, rather than raising money, in actually doing 

the movement to transition. I don’t think that is a lot of money to 

be investing in making sure that the President-Elect’s team hits 

the ground running. 

Finally, I would like to add my two cents on the nomination challenge. I think that we did get off to a good start and the Obama 

White House got off to a good start. We surpassed with respect to 

the 100-day mark the previous records in terms of getting people 

confirmed, but that slowed down substantially and I think that is 

a problem for the White House, but it is also a problem for the Senate. I think that you have to consider whether the use, particularly 

the use of the filibuster on Executive Branch nominees is appropriate. I would argue that at this moment and at these times, with 

respect to the complexity of the problems on national security and 

the economy, that if you have a simple majority, the President deserves his nominees. 

I say that as someone who spent many years in the Senate and 

who participated as a staffer in supporting filibusters. I just don’t 

think this is one place where filibusters really make a lot of sense 

and I hope that you could do something to move forward, push 

back on the hold and try to use filibusters more judiciously. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Have you undergone rehabilitation? [Laughter.] 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Podesta, for your 

statement. 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Stier appears in the Appendix on page 60. 

And now we will hear from Mr. Stier. Please proceed with your 

statement. 

TESTIMONY OF MAX STIER,1 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE 

Mr. STIER. Great. Thank you very much, Chairman Akaka and 

Senator Kaufman. This is very important work that you are doing 

here and this Subcommittee has done an extraordinary job putting 

a spotlight on talent issues, which I think have been overlooked for 

a very long period of time. So whether it is hiring reform or the 

Senior Executive Service (SES) transformation or Roosevelt Scholars and now the transition process, this work is extraordinary and 

you have a dream team with the folks that you have here and time 

to do some very important things, I think. 

I would like to make four points. The first is to focus on the legislation that was drafted by Senator Kaufman, and Chairman 

Akaka, you are cosponsoring, which I think is an important step. 

Truly, I just want to reinforce everything that you heard already 

from Ms. Lovelace, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Podesta. They did an incredible job, and I think what you have an opportunity to do is to 

build off of what they do to make sure that we are not relying on 

luck to have three folks of their caliber and the teams that they 

represent in the next go-around. 

As this transition was in terms of what the world looked like, the 

truth is that the world is likely to get scarier and scarier as we go 

on and we need to be able to upgrade our ability to transition 

quickly and effectively. And to Mr. Johnson’s point, it has to be 

good enough. 

The issue that you have focused on in your legislation is vital, 

and that is pre-election preparation. I think it does what Mr. Podesta says, which is to help diminish that concern that candidates 

might have of being attacked for being presumptuous. The only recommendation that we would make in terms of strengthening it 

would be actually to make mandatory some of the great practices 

that the outgoing Administration did with respect to the White 

House Transition Council and the Agency Transition Council. 

I think that one of the real challenges will be for a first-term 

President who may envision that they are coming around for a second term and whether they will get ahead of the process as well 

as the Bush Administration did, and I think for that reason actually requiring it would be very important. 

Second, I want to focus on the question that I think Mr. Johnson 

stated exactly right, which is that while there are a lot of things 

that could be improved, we are best off starting from the proposition of what do we need to see happen. What is our goal? And 

from that goal, if we are clear on that goal, we can decide what it 

is that needs to take place. 

And I would argue that the goal ought to be, and there is no 

magic to the numbers, but that on day one or as close to there as 

possible that the new President has his or her economic and national security teams in place. And whether that is the 50 top people in the key agencies or whatever it might be, that seems to me 


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to be what we ought to be shooting for, whether it is the 100 in 

the next 100 days. But at the end of the mark, by the summer recess, by the August recess, that full team of critical positions, that 

500 folks need to be in place. And if you start with that objective, 

I think a lot of other stuff follows. 

Now, one of the questions is, how do you set that objective out? 

I don’t have a great answer for that. Maybe it is a sense of the Senate resolution, something that states it affirmatively, that you want 

to hold that new team coming in, that you will jointly work with 

them on meeting that mark. I don’t know. There are different variations of what you might consider and we could have a conversation about that. But I think you have to lay that out as a clear objective and then force actions that will allow you to get there. So 

that is the second point. 

The third point is that it would make all of this process easier, 

frankly, if there were fewer political appointees. As Mr. Johnson 

mentioned and as Mr. Podesta knows, there are political appointees 

of different stripes. There are management positions, the Assistant 

Secretaries for Public Affairs or Congressional Affairs. Do they 

really need to be Senate confirmed? And if you actually reduce the 

number, that clears away a lot of the activity that needs to take 

place and will ensure that the new political team coming in actually has some critical positions filled early on when they really 

need them. 

There is legislation that Senators Feingold and McCain have introduced to do this. Clearly, this is a challenge that has been attempted before. It is politically difficult, but incredibly important. 

I think there is a strong case that could be made. 

And then, finally, I wanted to focus on a set of what I would call 

a grab-bag of improvements that are available, and Mr. Johnson, 

I think, addressed a number of them with respect to the actual 

process of security clearance or the forms that people have to fill 

out. We live in an age where technology ought to make this stuff 

a lot easier. There are all kinds of ways that the process is made 

difficult for talent coming in, and I don’t think we even fully understand what the cost is of this system. 

So one of the recommendations we would make to you is to perhaps ask Government Accountability Office (GAO) to take a look at 

what is the cost of the current system. How many talented people 

are we losing, and what are the options for improving the process 

going forward. That includes both looking at the ethics regime, 

which I think could be improved, as well as the entire process of 

making your way through the confirmation. 

So with that, I look forward to answering any questions that you 

might have. I also wanted to point out Katie Malague, who is in 

the audience, because this report is really her baby. She put this 

thing together. She is no longer with the Partnership. We lost her 

to government, and really couldn’t complain, but she is doing great 

work right now at OMB. But she really deserves great kudos for 

what she did with it. So thank you very much. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Stier, for your statement. It was great to hear from all of you. 

Mr. Johnson, I am interested in hearing mor about OMB’s early 

interaction with the Presidential candidates. Early planning by the 


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incoming team is essential. I think it is important that they also 

establish a relationship early on with the outgoing Administration. 

Was there good communication early on between the candidates 

and the Bush Administration? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, Senator. Both candidates were very interested in working with us. They approached it differently, which is 

probably driven by a lot of factors, not the least of which was what 

they thought their chances of winning were at the time, back in 

July and August and September. But both candidates were very 

appreciative of the support we were offering, very interested in 

doing early work, more work before the election than had ever been 

done before. 

The Obama campaign was particularly aggressive about this. 

They, I think, applied more people to this planning effort and this 

pre-election activity than, I would suspect, any previous Presidential candidate had ever applied to it. When the Bush Administration was, myself at the lead, figuring out what we should be 

doing and preparing to do, I think it was me and another person 

or two. Anyway, there was a whole lot more qualified people than 

I involved in Mr. Podesta’s team that were working on that. So 

they really took it very seriously. They would raise questions with 

us. We would raise questions with them. It was something that 

Americans should be and were, I suspect, very proud of, because 

it was the kind of cooperation that you would hope would be taking 

place between an outgoing Administration and an incoming Administration. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Podesta, one of the Partnership’s suggestions for future transitions is that a Transition Director be named publicly, even before 

the election. However, I know there are real concerns that the transition teams need to be able to do their work without the political 

concerns inherent in an election campaign. In your experience, 

what would be the potential benefits and problems with naming 

transition officials before the election? 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that you have almost 

banked it by the way you framed the question. I think that particularly the pre-election effort has to be done with the utmost discretion and discipline. First of all, the work product substantively of 

those deliberations is not vetted by the campaign or by the candidate. It is really preparatory work that needs to be in the can, 

if you will, and ready for the President and Vice President-Elect. 

And the campaign doesn’t want to own any of that before the election, and they shouldn’t own any of that before the election because 

it could be attacked and you could be putting some controversial 

ideas on the table. 

The other side of that is you don’t want a sideshow about who 

is involved in the transition to overwhelm what the important debate before the American public that is going on. So I think that 

the idea that there be a transition, that there be someone—my 

name and Mr. Ball’s were out in public. I don’t think there was any 

public announcement of it, if my recollection is right, but I think 

our names were out in public, that we were interfacing with the 

White House. 


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I would just add to what Mr. Johnson said. We got tremendous 

cooperation at every level. I, of course, had been White House Chief 

of Staff, so I dealt directly with Josh Bolton, who was President 

Bush’s Chief of Staff, and Chris Lu, who was the Executive Director of the transition, dealt with Ms. Lovelace or Blake Gottesman, 

the Deputy Chief of Staff. So we had very good coordination and 

communication. The press had a sense of what was going on, and 

yet we didn’t have to be constantly taking incoming press questions 

or open up essentially to being second-guessed by the press. 

So I think that you have to strike a balance. The idea that there 

is an office, that someone is in charge, that the work is important 

and ongoing and in preparation, I think is fine. But after that, 

there has to be an ability to kind of shut down and work in a highly disciplined and discrete fashion. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Podesta. 

Mr. Stier, can you please follow-up with your views on publicly 

naming transition officials. 

Mr. STIER. Absolutely, and I think that I fully concur with what 

Mr. Podesta said. I mean, you don’t want it to become a sideshow. 

But on the flip side, and I think, again, you identified the need 

here very well, which is that it is absolutely important that candidates be encouraged to make the investment early in that 

planning process. You will get, as in many issues, all things from 

different candidates. So there will be some candidates who understand that need and will make that investment irrespective of political risk. There are going to be some that, however, will not do 

so because they will either not understand its importance or be too 

concerned about the possibility of being attacked for that activity. 

I think the best thing that this Subcommittee could do would be 

to help set the stage so that there are more candidates who are encouraged to make that early planning a real investment and priority for themselves. And I think you do that in some measure by 

ensuring that both candidates have to do it. If the two candidates 

are holding hands, or if there is obviously a third-party candidate, 

the set of candidates, and they are doing the same thing, they inoculate each other from the attacks of being presumptuous. And I 

think that whatever you can do in this legislation to encourage that 

behavior is what we need to see here. 

Beyond that, plainly, this is activity that is fraught with all 

kinds of internal risk for campaigns, as well, because you don’t 

want to distract from, even on the personnel side, your folks from 

thinking about trying to win the election as opposed to be thinking 

about what they will be doing after election day. But all that said, 

I think we, at this point, under-invest in that preparation. 

My understanding from Mr. Johnson’s work is he was at it a 

year before the election, which in some ways makes the Obama effort look late, given how early they got going. You need to do that 

to get the enormous work done. And as I said earlier, we have to 

actually get more done than has previously happened, and I think 

that as the world gets more complicated and cycle times increase, 

we will have less and less of a capacity to absorb those breaks. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Stier. 

Ms. Lovelace, this was the first transition since the Presidential 

Transition Act of 2000 was implemented. One of the new requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:53 Aug 25, 2010 Jkt 057328 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57328.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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ments, as we discussed at our hearing with you in 2008, was orientation from GSA for new political appointees. How effective has 

this orientation been, and at what point will GSA stop providing 

orientations to new appointees during this Administration? 

Ms. LOVELACE. We actually started briefing both campaigns 

about the requirement for appointee orientation when we started 

working with them very early, even before the election, so that 

they understood what was expected or what was anticipated in the 

Presidential Transition Act of 2000. Right after the election, we 

continued that effort to help them understand what that orientation would look like. GSA doesn’t shape that orientation. We provide assistance to the incoming Administration who, in essence, 

shapes what orientation will look like. 

We started working very early in the transition and they have, 

in fact, offered orientation sessions for appointees. They are continuing to do that to date. In fact, I just talked to the White House 

the other day and we are continuing it through this year and probably through next fiscal year. So those efforts are continuing and 

underway and they seem to be very pleased with the results. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Let me finally ask Mr. Stier, your report also says that too little 

attention is paid to preparing and training new political appointees. What more do you think should be provided, and can this 

be done in conjunction with GSA’s training under the 2000 Transition Act? 

Mr. STIER. Thank you for the question. To me, it is pretty basic, 

and I am sure there is some football coach that has said this somewhere, I don’t know who it is, but it is who you pick and how you 

prepare them. There is a lot of attention paid to who you pick, and 

even here, we have 140 or some odd positions out of those top 500 

some odd that are still not filled 15 months into the Administration. 

But preparing them is equally important, and that preparation 

process is being done, I think. There is an investment going on 

right now. But in my view, it hasn’t been done at the level that 

it ultimately needs to be done, and that includes, I think, not only 

the cabinet, but also the subcabinet, and the amount of investment 

that has taken place so far to me is insufficient to garner the real 

team opportunities that any large organization needs to engender 

within its leadership group. 

So what can be done about that? If you don’t have your team in 

place, it is really hard to prepare them. So the slowness of getting 

people in their jobs is clearly one of the challenges. And if you look 

at some of the management functions, the acquisition officers, the 

chief acquisition officer is clearly a big issue, chief financial officers. 

They are not there. So it is really hard to get them together to actually prepare them as a team. 

So solving the first problem of getting people in place earlier will 

enable, I think, better preparation. Ideally, I think you would be 

investing at least the resourcing that we see right now, and then 

some, and I would argue that one of the other places where we see 

very little in the way of effective training and orientation is between the political and the career teams. So you see very few instances in which cabinet departments or cross-agency efforts are 


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designed to bring those political leaders together with the top career people so that they really are melding into one team. I don’t 

think you legislate that, but I think that is something that would 

be better management behavior for this Administration and others. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Stier. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman Akaka, if I might add to that, I know 

when we, the Bush Administration, came in and we were told we 

had a million dollars or something to do some training, orientation, 

we said, well, so what is it supposed to consist of, and they said, 

you decide, but let us suggest some ideas. And the ideas were we 

should teach new subcabinet members what it means to be ethical, 

how to get along with the Congress, etc. 

I want to add a note of caution in this, that be careful about prescribing what it means to successfully orient a new team of people. 

It might be different for each Administration. The primary responsibility for working effectively with Congress should be with the 

legislative affairs person in the department. The primary responsibility for working effectively with the press should be with the communications people working in the department. 

I think one of the scariest thoughts is to take somebody who has 

not had to work effectively with the press before and in an orientation session try to tell them everything they need to know to work 

effectively with the press. That is creating all the wrong incentives 

and all the wrong suggestions that you can be taught how to work 

effectively with the press. That should not be the message that is 

being delivered to a new appointee. 

If you only had one minute to orient somebody about how to 

work effectively with the press or how to work effectively with Congress, the advice to give him is, go meet your legislative affairs person. Go meet your public affairs person and trust them and work 

effectively with them. 

So I caution us all about being too prescriptive and too simplistic 

about what it means to orient a new team of appointees to come 

up here and be effective. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Let me call on Senator Kaufman, and take as much time as you 

need for your questions. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Podesta talked a little about the security problems. Could 

each one of you talk about how the post-September 11, 2001, affects the whole transition process? Ms. Lovelace, can you start? 

Ms. LOVELACE. Well, where do I start? Clearly, in the appointee 

process, it certainly affects what that process looks like, moving 

forward with that. I deal more on the space issue and getting them 

the space that they need as an incoming Administration so that 

they can hit the ground running, and even there, ensuring that the 

space is secure and that they have all the requirements that they 

need, it has been a real challenge for us this past year. It required 

a whole new level of thinking for our team to make sure that they 

had what they need in terms of secure space and having people 

come in and out. 

When you are managing transition, there are a lot of people involved in it, and making sure that we are giving access to people 

who should be in the space, it created some issues for us, but I 


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think we handled them pretty effectively. I think as we foresee it 

in future transitions, I think it is going to become even more complicated in terms of ensuring that not only is the space secure, but 

the technology is secure and all aspects of the transition is in a secure environment and I think we will be challenged even more in 

the future. 

Senator KAUFMAN. That is a good point, because I can remember 

and I know Mr. Podesta remembers how many briefings we had to 

have on when people were going to show up the first day, what 

they needed in terms of background to get started, I mean, just the 

plethora of security things was a real important part of getting 

things started. And then, obviously, having equipment that was secure. 

Ms. LOVELACE. Absolutely. And our goal was to get people to 

their seat in 15 minutes from the time they walked in the door, 

and that created challenges, but we made it through those challenges. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And it is important from a security standpoint to get those people in their place as quickly as possible—— 

Ms. LOVELACE. Absolutely. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. Because you could be faced with 

some serious problem. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it not only impacted the things Ms. Lovelace 

talked about, but all those briefings and tabletop exercises were— 

September 11, 2001 made all those very important. That inaugural 

morning meeting between the Bush outgoing and Obama incoming 

about some potential threat, that would have been something that 

nobody could have forecasted 8 years previously. So just the kinds 

of specific capabilities that have to be developed by 12 noon on January 20 are made multiple times greater than they were previously, prior to September 11, 2001. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Podesta, do you want to say some more 

on that? 

Mr. PODESTA. Yes, a few things. First, from the perspective of 

what Ms. Lovelace was talking about, the building, the equipment, 

etc., people were used to working on the campaign in an unsecure 

environment. All of a sudden now you are in a context in which, 

from the perspective of cyber security, etc., and people listening 

and watching and wanting to know what the incoming Administration was going to do, you had to change habits very quickly. You 

had to be in a secure environment to do it. That all, I think, was 

handled reasonably well. 

We had the additional challenge of actually being in three places, 

in Delaware, in Chicago, and in Washington. The day after the 

election, there was not a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in the Chicago Federal Building that we could use for 

secure briefings. So we had to take the President-Elect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in order to obtain his intelligence briefings, which is a mile or so away from the Federal 

Building in downtown Chicago. I don’t remember whether you were 

there, Senator. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PODESTA. So there is that aspect of trying to operate in a secure environment. But I think the more important aspect is preVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:53 Aug 25, 2010 Jkt 057328 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57328.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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paring the incoming team for the assumption of duties, and in that 

regard, again, I would highlight the ability to get people clearances 

early in the process. The 2004 legislation gave us the ability to 

have, I think, about 150 clearances—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA [continuing]. Done within a week of the election, 

most on the very day of the election. They had people who had gone 

through, been fingerprinted, had their background checks done, 

and so they were ready to go, and that meant that the team could 

start right away in the agencies or in the common pool that dealt 

with sort of as a kind of shadow National Security Council. 

And then I think the other thing that was done on the Obama 

side in conjunction with the Bush people was we tried to exercise 

and really begin to work at the top tier with people in their places. 

I think one of the things we gave a lot of thought to was that you 

had to be able to hand off from the transition to the incoming people who were serving in government and they needed to exercise 

together. So there were virtual National Security Council meetings 

that took place in Chicago under the President’s leadership on a 

range of issues that included Jim Jones, Senator Clinton, Bob 

Gates, Admiral Mullin, and others. They came and they worked 

those issues as a team. So I think it permitted them to hit the 

ground running. 

And I would say, in contrast to my experience in the Clinton 

transition in 1993, the selection of the White House staff early was 

critical to create that smooth handing of the baton from the transition staff, if you will, to the people coming into government. And 

then the work with the Bush Administration seemed to me to be— 

everything can always be improved, but that was—concentrating 

on getting the people in position and really thinking through and 

working these problems as they would be on January 20 was quite 

critical to the success. 

Senator KAUFMAN. You know, there is a thought that I hadn’t 

even thought about, and one of the advantages of having this preElection Day transition is there was no security with the Obama— 

I mean, there was security with the Obama transition before Election Day, but it was just amazing to me how little of the information came out. But if you think about it, there was a dedicated person out there that wanted to get hold of what was going on in the 

pre-election Obama-Biden transition, it wouldn’t have been that 

hard to do. 

Mr. PODESTA. I mean, look, this is a tremendous ongoing for 

those of us who live in this think tank world and in government, 

this is a challenge today—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PODESTA [continuing]. Of people slamming our electronic 

communication systems and our computers, looking for any nugget 

of information that might be useful in terms of—a lot of that, I 

think, comes from our friends in China. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA. But it also comes from across the world. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And, of course, there is an argument we have 

not mentioned in terms of the legislation we are talking about, that 


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really having people into secure areas with secure equipment before Election Day, having the major candidates—— 

Mr. PODESTA. And that was all, of course, prepared by GSA. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right, but we didn’t—the point is, we would 

now be doing that for people right after the nominating conventions—— 

Mr. PODESTA. Right. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. So that we would have, instead 

of meeting in some law firm’s conference room where anybody 

could find out whatever we were doing if they really wanted to, we 

will be in a secure area with secure equipment. 

Mr. STIER. If I could just underscore—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Sure. Go ahead. 

Mr. STIER [continuing]. One point that Mr. Podesta said, the 

2004 legislation allowed early clearance for personnel and I think 

that there was not equivalent use of that authority by the two campaigns, and I think that is quite important in terms of really understanding that. It is not every campaign that is going to understand the need to make these kind of early investments, so all you 

can do to promote that is really important. 

And I think there is continued opportunity to improve that security clearance process. So even to the extent of looking at who really needs the full field investigation and how many positions, and 

increasing the number of positions that are available to allow for 

early clearance. Mr. Johnson has done a ton of work on making the 

security clearance process faster. There are questions about reciprocity, where someone is cleared by one agency and then their 

clearance is not accepted by another, which makes zero sense at all 

and just gums up the system. And then there are questions about 

suitability reviews. So you might have the argument that someone 

has been cleared, but the agency is going to say, but I haven’t 

looked to see whether that clearance actually makes sense. 

To Mr. Podesta’s point, this actually carries over to today. But 

I think you could help in any legislative vehicle rationalize the security clearance process so you have one standard, and if someone 

is cleared, and if they have been cleared as a private citizen and 

they have met the standard, there is no reason why they have to 

go through it again simply because they are going to be a potential 

nominee for an office. They are providing the same material. That 

hasn’t changed at all. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, one thing I remember noticing, and as 

you all fine-tune your bill I encourage you to look at, candidates 

are asked to come forward with people that they want to be cleared 

to talk with the President-Elect about secure matters. That is different than the background check called for to be nominatable. It 

is not a full field background check. It is basically a name check. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you want to challenge candidates for the Presidency to submit names before the election to be given full field 

background checks so that, in fact, they are nominatable, not just 

cleared to be in a secure room with the President to talk about secure matters? Because they are different. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. Mr. Podesta. 


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Mr. PODESTA. I guess I would say, I would stop short of that because I think in the pre-election part of the campaign, you have 

been through full field investigations. Once there are a lot of FBI 

agents running around your high school, the names of those people 

make their way into the press. It is inevitable. And I think no campaign is really going to want to start that process of guessing who 

is going where because they are in the full field phase of the clearance process. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I think, by the way the frustration of when 

we were first starting to pick cabinet secretaries, we had this really 

secure system and everyone very quiet and very few people knew 

about it, but as soon as the FBI background check showed up at 

Attorney General Holder’s high school, you didn’t need a Ph.D. to 

figure out what was going on. 

And I think this goes back to the pre-transition, too. The mechanics of how you handle—and we are not even approaching that 

in this bill, but that is—the key to how many people have to be 

confirmed, how do you deal with it in the pre-transition, how do 

you deal with it in the transition, how do you have an orderly focus 

to everything, and the biggest thing is, because I can remember, 

Mr. Podesta, you and I having a discussion right at the beginning 

where you said we had a great new idea. We are going to get more 

people confirmed. 

And I said, unless we can do something about getting more FBI 

agents to do background checks or getting OPM to start doing 

background checks, it didn’t matter what we did. All the planning 

and everything else didn’t matter because you had this—the real 

kind of choke point was how many background investigations can 

you do and how fast can you get them done, and how fast could 

you get them done and still maintain confidentiality. 

Mr. JOHNSON. One of the interesting things that ties all this together, you were talking about Eric Holder. He had had a clearance 

in his prior life. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The point Mr. Stier made is, evidently, they were 

messing around in his high school. They went back and assumed 

that there was no clearance evidently and started all over again. 

Completely nuts. There was no acceptance of the work done previously. If they were only updating the clearance, they wouldn’t 

have been going to the high school. 

For instance, one of the issues is who says that the FBI is the 

only investigative agency that is to be doing this work? One of the 

things that we have proposed that the Senate was not interested 

in and the Administration was not interested in was bringing in 

OPM’s Investigative Services operation that does the background 

work for every security clearance given by the Federal Government. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Podesta, I think that was what you attempted to get done in the last transition, right? 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, we definitely supported the Bush Administration’s efforts to move that background clearance process to OPM. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Some of it, or all of it, but—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. No, but I think—— 


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Mr. PODESTA. Again, there is sensitivity between certain nominees, but I think the resistance really in large measure was for 

PASs by the Senate. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA. I think that if you went down to the other end of 

Pennsylvania Avenue, there would be a lot of support for saying, 

if these people can clear people for the highest levels, security 

clearances for everyone else in the government, they can do it for 

the PASs, as well. And I think that makes a lot of sense. It would 

be probably cheaper and it would be more efficient and I think they 

could apply more directed resources to it. But I think the resistance 

to that is probably in the Senate because they think, and maybe 

rightfully, although I am not convinced of that, that the gold standard is an FBI full background investigation. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Stier. 

Mr. STIER. Yes. I just want to underscore, again, what Mr. Johnson just said. There is some real low-hanging fruit here. There are 

a fair number of these folks that are going to be considered who 

have already been in government, who are around government, 

who have clearances, and it makes zero sense at all that you start 

from scratch. And you would actually save yourself both the resources and the publicity if you simply accepted at least some 

major part of that clearance, but frankly, it should be the whole 

thing, because they can see the same material. It doesn’t matter. 

So there are some very, I think, straightforward things like that 

that would get you part of the way there and have very little in 

the way of downside costs. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And the thing I would say, Mr. Podesta, is 

the Senate is definitely—the siloing of the different committees and 

the different approaches. But I have talked about this with the Administration’s people and Administrations and they say, well, if you 

are not confirmable, you don’t have as much clout because you are 

not in a confirmable position. Why should legislative affairs people 

be a confirmable position? They say, we have got to be confirmable 

because that is the only way you have the—I mean, I hear that 

time and time and it doesn’t make any sense to me. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is not true. We have some very important positions. The head of all IT policy for the Federal Government is not 

a Senate confirmed position. So some of the legislative affairs people are in Senate confirmed positions. Some of them are not. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And so—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. I am just saying—one of the articles in the 

paper about the 13 czars or 15 czars in the Federal Government 

who don’t have to be Senate confirmed. I am just saying I didn’t 

get that push-back from just one or two. I get that push-back a lot, 

that they are not confirmable. And I think that this is ripe, Mr. 

Chairman, for legislation. This is just ripe for the Senate to get together with the Administration. 

The other thing is, obviously, it all works well until it is the person you want for your administrative position in the government. 

You want to have the President have a say on who that person is 

going to be and that it is confirmed. So I think there is plenty— 


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I am a Senate person. I admit that. But I think there is plenty of 

blame to go around on this. 

And I think in order to solve it, Mr. Stier, which I think your 

organization is uniquely set to do, we have got to sort out—yes, Mr. 

Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I was going to say, when we say there are too 

many political appointees, in my mind, that means there are too 

many PASs, too many—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Exactly. There is nothing—— 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Senate confirmed. You could be a 

Presidential appointee. You are a PA. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Exactly. Right. But the point is, I am telling 

you, and I am sure you have run into it, too, people say, I want 

my post to be confirmable, and it makes no sense—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that is—— 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. As far as from an objective analysis if somebody is—it makes no sense, but it is one of the hurdles 

that we have to figure out how to get over. 

Mr. JOHNSON. One cycle will do away with that. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I think that is exactly right. But, I think, 

look, there is a series of things, and I would like you to—before I 

do that, I would like Ms. Lovelace to talk a little bit about—because one of the things that we do in the bill we are talking about 

is we basically replicate what you did on election day to having to 

duplicate or maybe even more on the day after the nominating convention. Can you talk a little bit about it? Do you see that as a 

problem, the fact that you would have to go back and start on this 

process in August and do it for two complete organizations, or, in 

fact, if a third-party candidate qualified, for a third-party or more? 

Ms. LOVELACE. As you might expect, we are currently reviewing 

the legislation very carefully to determine how we can go about 

doing it, what changes we might suggest to the legislation to make 

sure that we are on solid footing in getting that done. As quietly 

as it was kept, we actually started working with both campaigns 

prior to the conventions—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Ms. LOVELACE [continuing]. And so I think it is important, and 

we would be ready, I believe, to help at an earlier stance because 

we don’t wait until August to start doing the work. We actually 

start doing our work far in advance of that. So I do believe we 

would be prepared to help support that. But we just want to look 

at the legislation—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Sure. 

Ms. LOVELACE [continuing]. To make sure that we can meet its 

requirements. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I am very interested in your feelings on that, 

because just a mechanical problem of having to do the security, 

having to have the space, having to have the equipment, just the 

mechanical problems of doing this, again, for a candidate that has 

not been elected to public office, and to staff and transition staff 

that you need who are not—— 

Ms. LOVELACE. One of our big issues will be the funding of it 

prior to the election—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 


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Ms. LOVELACE [continuing]. And we will have to work through 

some of those issues. But again, I think the foundation of the bill, 

which leads to starting earlier, we absolutely support. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. Mr. Podesta. 

Mr. PODESTA. Yes. I may be a victim of my own experience, but 

as I reviewed the legislation, Senator, it struck me that what you 

were envisioning, and I think what would be appropriate, are two 

smaller—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PODESTA. You wouldn’t need to build out what Ms. Lovelace 

and her team built out for the post-election transition—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Good point. 

Mr. PODESTA [continuing]. But having smaller offices that could 

be available that had secure equipment, etc., it seems to me is a 

different level of challenge than having the complete operation up 

and running. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And I think one of the things, and I would be 

interested in your comments on this, is the whole political problem 

of who is on the transition team and who is not. First off, you put 

some people on the transition, you clear them for security, all the 

rest of that, and people start, like I think you said in your testimony, they start checking them out. What is their position on issue 

X or issue Y, and that would create a nightmare. 

So you are really talking about a transition of the technocrats, 

mechanical folks, the folks that were mostly on your personal staff, 

that were working with you, hopefully writ large, right, but not— 

you are not talking about people who would end up being assistant 

secretaries or under secretaries or secretaries. 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, as Mr. Johnson and I both know well, we live 

in the era of the politics of personal destruction. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Exactly. 

Mr. PODESTA. So I think anybody, whether you are an advisor or 

whether you are on the airplane with the candidate or whether you 

are on the transition team, you open yourself up to scrutiny by the 

outside and by the blogs and by the opposition team and they will 

try to create a storyline about that. 

But I think that, again, just to come back to the importance of 

doing the job, it is so critical in this era, the complexity of the problems, the security challenges, the economic challenges, to be able 

to get that work done, that I think that is manageable politically. 

But to think that it won’t occur just because you pass a bill would 

be naive and—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. No, and so that is another reason to keep it, 

as you said, smaller, not as big, not having as many people involved, and the rest of it. 

I would also like your comments—I mean, there is a mechanical 

side to this and there is a technical side to it. Like the bill says, 

it is putting it all together. But one of the biggest problems, and 

I know that Mr. Podesta has intimate knowledge, is you have a 

campaign going on. You have a candidate and you have a campaign 

staff who are spending 28 hours a day working on that. I find an 

incredible amount of political figures concerned about, in their own 

mind, doing anything that has to make decisions before that. 


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Can you talk a little bit about that, Mr. Podesta, about the difficulty of doing any of the things we are talking about, especially 

personnel, at a time—and policy—when the decision makers who 

are going to be coming in the next day are totally consumed because of the importance of being consumed, but also because of 

their basic mindset, I don’t want to jinx myself by starting to plan 

ahead. 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, I think with regard to my experience with 

Senator Obama, I think I saw as a part of the success of that preelection transition process not burdening him with much of anything—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA [continuing]. But keeping him informed enough 

that he knew that the planning was on track so that come the day 

after the election, things could start to move. We made no personnel decisions in advance of the election. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA. But he was interested in beginning to think 

through and talk through different potential candidates for the different potential positions. As you know, we had a secure conversation with the—I guess he wasn’t the outgoing, with the current 

Secretary of Defense and that had to be—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA [continuing]. Arranged after the election, but in a 

very quiet way. So he was engaged in that, but at a very minimal 

level. I talked to him once a week, I think for about—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA [continuing]. Half an hour or 45 minutes and gave 

him a short memo every week just to keep him abreast. 

But I think everyone who was on the transition knew the most 

important thing was you had to pay—you had to get elected first. 

None of that mattered unless you won the election and the people 

on the campaign, we had an interface with Ms. Jarrett, Mr. Rouse, 

and that worked, I think, relatively smoothly. 

Senator KAUFMAN. But essentially, the personnel decisions started on that Thursday after Election Day. 

Mr. PODESTA. The next day. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, exactly. 

Mr. PODESTA. You sat in the room. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, I know. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The person that makes the decision is one. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And he is not in that transition office. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. The most difficult of all the things that 

is the hardest to keep secure is personnel. So the number of people 

that you have involved in personnel in the transition is small. Can 

you talk a little bit about that, Mr. Podesta, how you approached 

that to keep—and how difficult—I mean, you have to keep this so 

secure because everybody in town wants to know who is the candidate for Secretary of State. 

Mr. PODESTA. Right. Well, again, in the pre-election days, we 

were not passing a lot of information back and forth. We worked 

in, in essence, secure groups or cells. That effort was led by Mike 

Froman, who was in New York, who is now the Deputy National 


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Security Advisor. But he had several different deputies who were 

working in clusters around the individual agencies. 

What their job at that point was to do only public record research, and I think the McCain team did something similar to this, 

begin to develop lists of names, only do public research, research 

through public records, and really just be ready for the day after 

the election to be able to then begin the process of serving that up 

to the President and Vice President-Elect for decision. 

Senator KAUFMAN. So even getting 100 people and picking out 

who the 120 security things would have been an incredible—— 

Mr. PODESTA. I would say we probably, Mr. Johnson’s 120 and 

my 120 might vary by five or 10. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. PODESTA. I found that to be true even when I was dealing 

with the White House. There were posts that we thought were important that they placed less emphasis on. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It was different. 

Mr. PODESTA. But I would say that we probably had a list developed of names for virtually all those posts before the election, but 

only with public record research. 

Senator KAUFMAN. But just going through the process of doing 

120 is not easy, especially at the same time while you are picking 

your cabinet secretaries, to the extent your cabinet secretaries have 

a say in who some of these key people working, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, they are going to want to have a say, 

right? So even with all the things right and even with a total commitment, it is incredibly difficult to do. 

And I think that the more we go through this again and again, 

it just brings back some memories. We really need a major look, 

Mr. Chairman, just at this process. This is not just about less confirmed positions. We have to get less confirmed positions. I totally 

believe that. I am just saying, the push-back that we get both in 

the Senate and the rest of it, we have to have less confirmed positions. 

The idea that you raised today about having different levels of 

background checks—background checks are a big problem. Having 

different levels of background checks would be an important part 

of that process. Having different people be able to do those background checks, taking advantage of security, because the same 

thing happened with me. Every security form now, I had to go back 

to this original form—where were you born? Where did you go to 

elementary school? It is all in OPM somewhere, and it is all in the 

Senate somewhere. But to go back to that, but then to have to deal 

with this. 

And I think one of the big problems is just the President-Elect 

mindset. This all has to be set up, but you are not going to have 

approval until Election Day, and the new President coming in, the 

Vice President and their staff are going to be making decisions 

starting with the cabinet secretaries and working their way 

through that. 

So we really need kind of a hard look at just—and I know, Mr. 

Stier, you have done your report that covers a lot of this, but this 

is a complex nut. It isn’t just if we sat down—because we always— 


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the discussion around here is, we just need the gumption to say 

that we are not going to confirm these things. We just need the 

gumption to come up with a form, one form for everybody. We just 

need the gumption to do it. It is more than just gumption. These 

are extraordinarily complex problems that we need some staff 

work. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The idea of there being fewer President appointed, 

Senate confirmed, is a good idea. But back to a point that Mr. Stier 

and I commented on at the beginning, which was the goal is that 

100-plus—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. And the 400, that is not going to impact the speed of those people getting in there. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That impacts whether the Senate has to, in the 

fall, occupy itself with getting the assistant secretary for something 

you never heard of confirmed. That is—if you can take that off of 

the ‘‘to do’’ list, that is great, but that doesn’t make it easier for 

the Senate to approve the deputy secretary of something or other 

by April 1. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Thank you. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman, and—— 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Kaufman. 

We will have a second round, but before we do that, I would like 

to call on Senator Voinovich for his questions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, I want to apologize for not being 

here, but I am on the Appropriations Committee, and we had National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) before my 

Subcommittee. NASA is a big job creator in Ohio and I am real interested in where they are going with that agency, so I had to be 

there for it. 

I would like to welcome John Podesta here today—my friend— 

and Max Stier, Gail Lovelace—nice to see you again—and Clay 

Johnson. By golly, I thought that we said goodbye, but here you 

are. [Laughter.] 

I just want to say publicly that Mr. Johnson did a wonderful job 

when he was over at OMB to help put the ‘‘M’’ back into OMB. 

The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Report of the Administration Transition Task Force issued in January 2008 recommended that Congress promptly pass appropriation bills to 

‘‘avoid negative impacts on the operation and training that can result from continuing resolutions,’’ during the transition period. I 

was particularly impressed with that recommendation because I 

said publicly that the greatest gift that we could have given the 

President would be to have passed our appropriations bills on time, 

which we haven’t done for I don’t know how long, I mean, rarely 

do we ever get it done on time. Hopefully, we might do it this year. 

So anyway, I would like to know just what your opinion is on how 

important passing appropriations bills on time that is to an incoming Administration. 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, Senator, you bring back memories, because 

I remember sitting in the—after Bush v. Gore in the Oval Office 


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with President Clinton and the five leaders, because I think the 

Majority Leader from the House as well as the Speaker were there 

in 2000, and we hashed out the last appropriations bill. I think it 

was on December 20, or thereabouts. And I think that it probably 

actually helped a little bit to be able to take that piece of business 

off the table so that you didn’t have to come back, and I know that 

after the Recovery bill was passed, the Obama team had to come 

back and clean up the appropriations bills from the previous year. 

So I think that it would be—I think it is smart and useful and I 

would encourage at least acting in the spirit of that 2008 recommendation. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Anyone else want to comment on that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree. It is just whether there is a new Administration coming in or not, when the government has to begin a new 

fiscal year and it is uncertain what money they have or don’t or 

what is the status of new programs, old programs, and so forth. 

There is uncertainty, which makes it more difficult for an agency 

or program to clearly understand what it is that they are trying to 

do. So the more certainty the new Administration can have, the 

more certainty that the Federal agencies can have, the better the 

Federal Government is going to work. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Johnson, the last time we met, the deadlines included in your July 18, 2008 had not passed. Can you discuss how agencies generally fared in meeting those deadlines? I 

was really impressed that you wanted to get started early and 

make a very smooth transition. How many of those agencies made 

your deadlines, and were there any that particularly stood out or 

did a good job that could be a good role model for other agencies 

in this period? 

Mr. JOHNSON. My recollection is that all agencies met those 

goals. One of the reasons they did is because they helped set them. 

We met with agencies starting in late April and said, all right, 

what does it mean for an agency to prepare to accept and get up 

to full ramming speed a new Administration, and we brainstormed 

what all that would constitute and what had to be done by when 

to make that possible, and so what I was doing was summarizing 

the ideas that the different agency operating heads had, and so 

then I put it together and then sent the note back out basically to 

formalize what they had, in effect, put together to be the guidance 

that they thought made sense for the Federal Government. 

And then we didn’t have compliance people going around to see 

if they did it. One of the main things that a Federal agency wants 

to do is to please their new bosses coming in, so they want to be 

really well prepared to receive their new bosses, and what we did 

in this process was help them define what that meant. So the outgoing Administration didn’t need to spend much energy to motivate 

them to do a good job. The fact that there was a new Administration coming in was plenty motivation enough. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Lovelace. 

Ms. LOVELACE. It is good to see you, Senator Voinovich. To follow 

onto what Mr. Johnson is saying, we really didn’t have to push 

anybody to really step up and do what they needed to do. We had 

many meetings with the different agency coordinators, and clearly, 

they were engaged. They wanted to know what they could do. 


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There were a lot of new people in some of those positions. And I 

believe that just the support of the team helping each other understand what they should be doing and how they could move forward, 

I think everybody really stepped up to the plate. I agree with Mr. 

Johnson. They really wanted to get ready for the new Administration coming in and I believe everybody stepped up to meet that 

goal. 

Mr. JOHNSON. One of the things that Ms. Lovelace’s comment reminds me of, is several people that had been through multiple 

transitions previously commented they had all been charged to get 

ready, but it had never been clarified for them what ‘‘get ready’’ 

meant. 

Ms. LOVELACE. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Everybody wanted to be ready and they wanted to 

do as much as everybody else was doing, but they didn’t know what 

everybody else was doing. It was just unclear what ‘‘good enough’’ 

meant. And so that process of getting together and deciding what 

they all felt like ‘‘good enough’’ meant, and then clarifying that and 

then putting that out as a directive filled the bill. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In other words, there wasn’t any kind of 

guidance that agencies could look to saying here are the A, B, C, 

D, E, F, G things that you need to do in order to make this thing 

as effective as—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. No. I mean, it is pretty straightforward, when an 

agency head comes in, what they need to do. There is some guidance about in the first 60 days, what a new cabinet secretary needs 

to do. There are some things that are on fire, they need to be put 

out, and there are some big opportunities, some new things that 

need to get launched or are in the process of being launched. And 

so you need to prepare them to deal with those kinds of issues. 

There are reference materials that you can go to to give you some 

ideas about how to do that, or what needs to be done. But now it 

is just a question of deciding how to do that, prepare to take the 

new cabinet secretary and to help them do that in the first 15, 30, 

45, 60 days of being in charge of the new department. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Podesta, did you ever sit down with your 

folks and say, gee, I wish the Bush Administration had done ‘‘X’’ 

to get prepared for us to come into office? Do you understand what 

I am saying? 

Mr. PODESTA. Yes, and I had different experiences, having come 

into the first day of the Clinton Administration and then leaving. 

I found that it was ad hoc, if you will, when we entered in 1993, 

but with tremendous cooperation, as I noted in my testimony, from 

my Republican counterparts who—I came in as the Staff Secretary 

and they were both completely generous with their ability to brief 

me in the few days that I had to prepare coming into the Administration. But there was no formal plan. It was just they were open 

and I called them up and we sat down, with Jim Cicconi and Phil 

Brady, and they were terrific in helping guide me in terms of the 

needs that I had. 

At the end of the Clinton Administration, we did issue, I think, 

the first Executive Order on Presidential transitions to try to create the Council that was done under the Bush Administration, but 

I think the Bush Administration did that earlier. I think Mr. JohnVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:53 Aug 25, 2010 Jkt 057328 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57328.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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son’s game plan was more detailed. I think we sort of set the 

groundwork for that, but I think they have taken it from that experience and really built on it and I commend them for that. 

And I think that it should become the norm with respect to transitions, and one of the things that Mr. Stier pointed out was that 

when you are at the end of an 8-year Administration, it is easy to 

think about these things. If you are running for reelection, it may 

be a little bit harder to anticipate that you may actually be handing the baton off to someone else. So trying to create institutional 

mechanisms to ensure that this transition works no matter when 

it occurs is, I think, particularly challenging. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am laughing because when the Bush Administration took over, I was pushing them to really look back at 

the transition and say what mistakes were made and so forth and 

other bad experiences that they could have avoided because I felt 

that once they were in the saddle, that they weren’t going to be 

worrying about some of those things. 

Mr. Stier, do you know of any situation where after you had the 

transition, that the folks that were in the previous Administration 

sat down with the next Administration and brainstormed lessons 

learned? It is kind of a quality management type of experience, 

where they kind of shared ideas and kind of wrote them down and 

said, this is the way to get the job done? 

Mr. STIER. I am sure that there are examples of that but there 

is nothing that comes to mind as a best case model. I think one 

interesting example is what happened with DHS. In part again because of legislative requirement, they did focus, I think, a little 

more intensely on that transition process and there was a Coast 

Guard admiral who was responsible for managing that process. 

When he came in, actually, I think he did a very good job and he 

is someone I think is worth talking to in terms of how to do that 

process right. But because it was the first transition that they were 

going through, I think that enabled more attention to be paid to 

that process than I think existed elsewise. 

I would also underscore what both Ms. Lovelace and Mr. Johnson 

had to say about the power of bringing the folks from across government together, because from my vantage point, it was quite uneven in terms of the experience that people had, even the memories 

that people had about going through the transition process. I mean, 

it is obviously a very episodic process, and if it hasn’t happened in 

8 years, there really oftentimes are not that many people that have 

been through it before and it is really an oral tradition. There is 

not much that has really been written down. Martha Kumar has 

come in. She is doing a great job of writing some of this stuff down. 

But I think the advantage of bringing people together early is 

really quite powerful, particularly among the career ranks. And 

again, that was one of the things they did at DHS, was really to 

identify early on who would be the career leaders, because you 

never know, again, how long that process is going to take before 

the actual transition occurs. I think DHS is an interesting example 

for that reason. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have taken more than my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 


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I will begin a second round here. Mr. Johnson, your testimony focuses heavily on the nomination and appointment process. One 

suggestion you make is expediting the most time-sensitive positions. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, there has 

been much more focus on getting national security staff into place 

quickly. Senator Voinovich and I have also advocated for quickly 

filling management positions across the government. 

What type positions do you consider the most time sensitive that 

should be the primary focus in the first few months? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think that list is going to vary from Administration to Administration, just because, for instance, when the 

Obama Administration came in, there was all this financial and 

economic meltdown. That was not the case 8 years previously, and 

so Treasury and Commerce positions were critically important 

when the Obama Administration came in. They were less critically 

important, and there were fewer of them that were super time-sensitive when the Bush 43 Administration came in. 

There are probably 50 positions that are the leadership or the 

deputy leadership of every agency. I think it is very important to 

just be able to run the departments. And then beyond that, there 

are a handful of national security positions and State Department, 

Defense Department, Homeland Security Department, and a few 

other departments, that I think most everybody would agree are 

time sensitive, very time sensitive. 

But it is really not relevant what I think they are. It is what the 

new Administration’s priorities at the time are. And a management 

position at some department over here might be time sensitive, but 

the comparable management position at this other department over 

here may not be a time sensitive position. For instance, a manager 

position at Homeland Security 4 years ago might have been very 

important, time sensitive, whereas at an established agency, that 

management person, comparable management position, may not be 

as time sensitive because the department isn’t trying to create 

itself. 

So there is any number. It doesn’t make any difference what the 

positions are, but I think it is important that the Senate and the 

incoming Administration have a general understanding about what 

those time-sensitive positions are and some general idea about the 

kind of commitments they are going to make. One can’t bind the 

other, but what kind of general commitments they are going to 

make, the kinds of things they are going to try to do, the kind of 

capacities they are going to try to build to, in effect, address those 

positions faster than they are going to be able to address the next 

most time sensitive and the next most time sensitive and the ones 

that aren’t particularly time sensitive. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Podesta, would you want to comment on 

that? 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, I fundamentally agree with what Mr. Johnson just said. As I noted at the outset, I think that our list was 

a little bit different than the Bush team’s list. They had developed 

a list that I think Josh Bolton, the Chief of Staff, shared with me 

in August of the positions that they thought were the most critical 

to be filled. They were highly concentrated in the national security 


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arena. Obviously, as Mr. Johnson noted, we had to fill that out 

with a more substantial economic team as a result of the financial 

crisis, including the head of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission 

(SEC), which I think we named during the transition. That probably hadn’t been done before. But it was necessary in the context 

of that time. I think the first 50 are usually pretty easy. It is the 

next 100 you might quibble about, and then the 100 after that. 

I want to come back to one thing that was noted, again, earlier 

by Mr. Johnson, which is that the White House office is, at least 

in my view, relatively small in terms of personnel. I think it is still 

around 450, 500 people. The President has to divide a lot of stuff 

up, from the National Economic Council to the Domestic Policy 

Council to Presidential personnel, legislative affairs, communications, the press secretary, amongst what is a relatively small office. 

And I think if you have no surge capacity in Presidential personnel, the ability to vet the White House Council, which is involved in the vetting, in the first months, it ends up showing. So 

you build an operation which is the steady state, what you need 

to do in year three and year four and year five, because that is all 

you can allocate to those functions. 

And to the extent that the Subcommittee might consider encouraging or appropriating the monies to have a surge capacity on this 

ability to process nominations at the beginning of an Administration, I think that would be very well received and very worthwhile. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Stier, would you, from your perspective—— 

Mr. STIER. Well, I just wanted to add something that Mr. Podesta shared in an interview with him, which I thought was also a 

good idea, which is that if you enabled the personnel process to 

continue in the transition offices past the inauguration point, that 

might be quite helpful, too, because there is just a dislocation of 

learning a new environment, systems, everything else like that, 

that you really don’t want at a time when it is really essential, 

when you are really going as hard as you can on the personnel 

side. So if you think about your surge capacity, some of it can be 

maintained, frankly, in the transition space. That might be a mechanism to do it. But that is an idea Mr. Podesta had shared, and 

likewise, when asked about where his pain points were, the vetting 

resourcing was clearly one of them. 

But it does strike me that on this issue of critical positions that 

there is sort of a hierarchy of issues here. Those are the key positions, and clearly, as Mr. Podesta and Mr. Johnson say, they are 

going to change a little bit over time, but there are going to be 

some core ones that you know are always going to be the same. 

And then there is the question about how you do that faster, but 

then there is a series of other decisions to be made. If you can reduce the number of political appointees so your assistant secretary 

for public affairs, for legislative affairs, the general counsel, that 

those are political positions, Presidential appointees but not Senate 

confirmed, then presumably you can get those in and the critical 

people are going to have the support that they need to do their job 

right from day one, as well. 

And then the other option that I would put on the table which 

I did not mention earlier is one in which you just simply actually 


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had fewer political appointees around the management positions. 

So query, does your Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and your Chief 

Acquisition Officer and your Chief Human Capital Officer really 

need to be political appointees? Dave Walker’s notion of a Chief 

Operating Officer (COO) having a term appointment. So I think 

that there is real harm done to governance in our government by 

the very fast turnover that you have amongst the leadership, and 

it is particularly acute in those management functions where you 

have to be investing over a long time horizon and these folks aren’t 

around to do it. 

So again, this is a complicated set of issues, as you suggest, Senator Kaufman. I don’t think you are going to find one answer, but 

I think if you start doing triage like that, you might make for a 

much better system. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Podesta, in Martha Joynt Kumar’s transition article, she quoted you saying that there were problems transferring personnel records from the transition system to the White 

House system and that it may have been easier if you were able 

to have used the transition system after Inauguration Day. Can 

you tell us more about this issue and whether there are any legal 

or policy barriers to keeping certain transition resources in place 

after January 20? 

Mr. PODESTA. Well, as I noted to Ms. Kumar and to Mr. Stier, 

this was a problem we actually didn’t anticipate, and it was, in essence, a technical problem of moving a huge data set from computers that existed in the transition to computers that existed in 

the White House office. Maybe we should have anticipated it, but 

we didn’t, and those needed to be—the protocols that the White 

House secure environment required and that the Secret Service required in importing that data from, in essence, GSA computers into 

the White House computers took several weeks to basically move 

those files at a very critical time, which we didn’t experience, I 

would say, in the rest of the policy apparatus. So it was because 

of the volume of the data that was coming in and the movement 

of that data into the system. 

At least we identified it by having encountered that problem, so 

maybe it can be anticipated and worked through. My suggestion, 

again, to the people doing that report was I didn’t see any legal 

barrier to essentially leaving the personnel office up and running 

in the transition. It would have obviously had to been financed separately, but one could have continued to operate out of the transition offices, which were open for an additional month, I think. We 

began to shut down, but there was space available for an additional 

month. We could have kept the system rolling in the transition office until all that data was moved to the White House, and that 

was an off-the-top-of-my-head solution to the problem. There may 

be other technical solutions that could be worked out as long as the 

problem is identified. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Lovelace, let me ask you, and you can comment on this, as well, how long does GSA support for the transition 

continue after the new Administration begins? 

Ms. LOVELACE. I guess it depends on how you define support. In 

terms of the actual spaces, as Mr. Podesta talked about, that space 

is available for an additional 30 days, but I was intrigued by that 


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part of the report from the Partnership for Public Service that actually proposed that perhaps we could extend that—but that, of 

course, for us will require legislation—so that the incoming Administration could stay in the transition space longer to deal just with 

these kinds of issues that Mr. Podesta is talking about. 

In terms of other kinds of support, we are still providing support 

to the incoming Administration on appointee orientation. That will 

continue for a couple of years out. And we also still continue to provide support to what is now the Office of the Former President, and 

we actually do that for the lifetime of that particular President. 

And so our support in transition never really stops. [Laughter.] 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Voinovich, have you any 

questions? 

Senator VOINOVICH. There are so many aspects of this. I can remember that we made a real try in terms of the people that needed 

to receive the approval of the Senate for their nominations. It is a 

great story. Senator Reid and Senator McConnell were co-chairs of 

this effort, and they were working very conscientiously to go 

through the list of people that really we didn’t have to confirm. 

And then they both ran for leadership posts in their respective parties, and the initiative disappeared because so many of the committee chairmen were so jealous of wanting to have these nominees 

come to their attention. 

I would just be interested in your thoughts as to whether we 

ought to reconvene that group and see if there isn’t some way at 

this stage of the game to look at this realistically, because I just 

think there are too many positions that we are having to confirm. 

Then that gets into the other issue, just getting nominees to apply 

today in light of the whole financial disclosure process. I don’t 

know if you mentioned that or not, but the reams of paperwork is 

amazing. One individual who got an ambassadorship, he must have 

had a lot of money, because he claims he spent over $200,000 with 

his accountant going through all of the papers that he had to file 

for financial disclosure. 

And then the other one, of course, that Senator Akaka and I are 

trying to work on is this whole issue of security clearance. It is still 

on the High-Risk List and hopefully we are going to get it off the 

list before I get out of here, right, Senator Akaka? [Laughter.] 

Do you think that mandating in law the formal transition beginning earlier than it currently does, that we should do that? In 

terms of the money, the way that we go about making money available for the transition, is that a sensible process, or should that be 

changed? 

Mr. STIER. I think it is a good start and it is an important piece 

of solving what is, as you suggested, a collection of different problems. It is not going to be a panacea for everything, but again, I 

think it is a clear need and only becoming increasingly so, again, 

as the challenge of taking over a very complicated government increases. 

So I think all that is to the good, and I think the one recommendation we made, frankly, was that you actually require the 

councils be set up rather simply than authorizing, which is as it 

is currently stated. 


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To your question around the number of Senate-confirmed presidential appointees, plainly, that is a challenging question and as 

you suggested, there is a lot of history around this. I wonder, and 

again, I don’t have any perfect answer, but I wonder whether there 

isn’t a mechanism of creating some kind of ad hoc committee of 

chairs and rankings members that would look to the question 

about whether, collectively as a group, that they could give up on 

certain classes of positions, like the assistant secretaries for public 

affairs, the legislative affairs, and general counsels. Individually, 

they may want to hold on to their folks, but if they see that they 

are all, again, willing to hold hands and do this together. 

And in that context, might that group likewise be the group that 

would agree to some kind of goal and time table for the confirmation of the critical set of positions that need to come in by day one 

and by 100 days and by the summer recess, so that you actually 

had a set of folks that were focused on this, that were the necessary parties to doing this. 

As presumptuous as it was, Kristine Simmons, who runs our 

Government Affairs operation at the Partnership—and who came 

to us from an esteemed employer—we had the silly idea of visiting 

with the staff in the key national and economic security committees, both the Majority and Minority, just to ask them, would you 

agree to a time table, that if the incoming Administration provided 

you the names by a date that you set—that you would agree to 

have those critical positions confirmed by or close to the time of inauguration. And what we found was that, in principle, everyone 

was supportive of the notion. They understood why it was important. But we were not obviously in the position to do anything but 

to propose an idea, and I think without the collective action, it is 

not going to happen. 

Mr. PODESTA. Senator, I think with respect to the specific legislation that you have introduced with Senators Kaufman, Akaka, and 

Lieberman, I said I thought it was a good idea in my testimony. 

I think that it creates what I described as a new normal, that the 

expectation is that someone who is running for office would take 

the necessary steps to plan for that critical transition at a time of 

where the problems are so complex and where particularly the security needs of the country are so at stake. So I think that—I encourage you to move that legislation forward. 

On the nomination front, I think there is a host of issues and 

problems. Mr. Johnson is co-chairing a task force that the Aspen 

Institute is doing with a number of former government officials, 

both from the Congress and the Executive Branch, that hopefully 

will produce some good recommendations. I think you can strip the 

number of PASs, both in terms of the category of jobs and perhaps 

some of the part-time jobs that are currently required to be Senate 

confirmed. 

But I think, ultimately, it is going to require the Senate itself deciding whether the slowing down the staffing of the government, 

where the President’s nominees, and I say this respective of party, 

when the President makes a selection, if there is a majority in support of that nomination, shouldn’t they be confirmed and put into 

office? We are not talking about lifetime appointments of judges or 

Supreme Court. We are talking about people who, on average, only 


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serve for 2 years to begin with. And so delaying their entry into 

service, I think, is a real problem for the country. But that really 

is a problem that you are going to have to, I think, confront with 

your colleagues. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I have spent my last year looking at 

the operation of the Senate and even the government is dysfunctional. We are still looking at the process like we did 50 years ago 

and things have changed. I am really concerned that if we don’t 

really start getting at some of the things we are talking about here 

today, the process is not going to work. Plus the fact that a lot of 

folks that we want to get in government aren’t going to want to 

come around. They will just say, I don’t need it. 

There is this idea, David Walker’s idea of an agency Chief Operating Officer that kind of stays with it. We tried to do it in the Department of Homeland Security, to get somebody that would be in 

charge of transformation. We have also been trying to transform 

the Department of Defense (DOD). There are 14 things that are on 

the High-Risk List. Eight of them just deal with the Defense Department. It just doesn’t get done because people come in, they do 

a real good job, and then another group comes in with different 

policies. And transformation just doesn’t happen. 

So maybe when I get out of here, I will get with some lobbying 

groups. I can’t do that until after a year, but maybe I’ll work with 

some do-gooder group, and see if we can reach these goals. I guess 

the Aspen Institute is working on something. You don’t have to tell 

me about it, Mr. Johnson. You can send me something on it. I 

would be interested. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think when you leave the Senate, you would be 

a great candidate to be the first person to be in charge of DOD 

transformation. [Laughter.] 

I would be betting on you to get it done. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. Thank you. [Laughter.] 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today and for your 

service to our country. 

I think that we have heard here today that everyone’s focus and 

emphasis on planning and good management paid off. We have also 

heard about gaps, which we may help bridge. More can be done to 

help the incoming and outgoing teams, and more must be done to 

speed the confirmation process. I look forward to continuing to 

work with my colleagues on this issue. 

Senator Voinovich, I would like to think that our oversight and 

our working so closely together has really contributed to getting 

the message out about management and planning for the transition 

as well as other issues. I realize each time I chair a hearing with 

you, Senator Voinovich, that we don’t have much time left serving 

together. So I hope we can make the most of it. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for 

additional statements or questions other Members may have pertaining to the hearing. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.133
170 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.134
171 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.135
172 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.136
173 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.137
174 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.138
175 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.139
176 

Æ 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER57328.140