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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

RITA MICHELL NICHOLS, :

 :

 Plaintiff :

v. : Case No. 15-10792

: Hon. John Corbett O’Meara

ROOSEN, VARCHETTI, & OLIVIER, PLLC,

Defendant(s).

__________________________________________/ 

PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) 

Plaintiff, Rita Michell Nichols (“Plaintiff”), by and through her attorney, the Law Offices 

of Nicholas A. Reyna P.C., respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant the Plaintiff’s 

request to deny the Defendants’ request for relief, stating the following in response to the 

Defendants’ above-referenced Motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

LAW OFFICES OF NICHOLAS A. REYNA

Dated: May 21, 2015

/s/ Nicholas A. Reyna 

Nicholas A. Reyna (P68328)

Attorney for Plaintiff

17344 W. 12 Mile Rd., Ste. 106

Southfield, MI 48076

(248) 423-1110

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986)......................................p. 9

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)...........................................................p. 9

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)............................................................p. 9

Browning v. Levy, 

283 F.3d 761, 769 (6th Cir. 2002)...................................................p. 9

Cacace v Lucas,

775 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Conn. 1991).............................................p. 8

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).........................................p. 9

Frey v. Ganwish II,

970 F. 2d 1516, 1518-19 (6th Circ. 1992)..........................................p. 14

Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 

695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2012).....................................................p. 9

Heintz v. Jenkins,

514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995)...............................................................p. 8

Henry v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 

739 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Circ. 2014)....................................................p. 10

In re Banks, 

253 B.R. 25, 30 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000)..........................................p. 11

In re Connecticut Pizza, Inc., 

193 B.R. 217, 228 (Bankrt.D.MD.1996).............................................p. 11

In re Daniels, 

206 B.R. 444, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)........................................p. 13

In re Mitchell, 

66 B.R. 73, 75 (Bankr.S.D. Ohio 1986)...............................................p. 11

In re Printup, 

264 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2001)........................................p. 13

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In re Smith, 

180 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1995)......................................p. 11

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,

559 U.S. 573, 587. 130 S.Ct. 1605, 1615 (2010)..............................p. 7, 14

Kistner v Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 

518 F.3d 433, 433-438 (6th Cir. 2008)...........................................p. 8

O’Connor v. Methodist Hospital of Jonesboro, Inc. 

42 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr.E.D. Ark. 1984).......................................p. 13

Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc.,

953 F.2d 1025, 1034 (6th Cir. 1992)..............................................p. 14

Watkins v. Peterson Enterprises, Inc., 

57 F.Supp.2d 1102 (E.D. Wash. 1999)..........................................p. 7

Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 

605 F. Supp.2d 914, 938-939 (N.D. Ohio 2009)................................p. 11

FEDERAL STATUTE

15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A).........................................................................................p. 7 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)............................................................................................p. 7

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).............................................................................................p. 7

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1).........................................................................................p. 15

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A)....................................................................................p. 15

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).........................................................................................p. 15

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)..............................................................................................p. 14

FEDERAL COURT RULES

Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)..............................................................................................p. 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)...........................................................................................p. 1, 9, 15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)...............................................................................................p. 8

STATE STATUTE

M.C.L. § 339.901....................................................................................................p.4

M.C.L. § 445.251....................................................................................................p.4

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STATE COURT RULES

MCR 2.603(a)(1)...................................................................................................p. 6

MCR 3.101..........................................................................................................p. 7

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brought this action against the Defendant debt collectors, seeking damages 

and equitable relief, to redress the Defendants’ systemic violations of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., violations of the Michigan Collection 

Practices Act (“MCPA”), M.C.L. § 445.251 et seq, and the Michigan Occupational Code, 

M.C.L. § 339.901 (“MOC”). For the reasons to be discussed, the Defendants motion to dismiss 

must be denied.

FACTS

2. On or around August 8, 2002, Automotive Credit Corporation filed a civil lawsuit 

against the Plaintiff in the 22nd Judicial District Court of Michigan (case number 022091GC); 

judgment was ultimately rendered in favor of Automotive Credit Corporation on October 31, 

2002. At all times relevant to the referenced litigation, Automotive Credit Corporation was 

represented by the Defendant in this matter, specifically attorney Lynn Oliver (P39006).

3. The Debt owed to Automotive Credit Corporation was for a vehicle loan, which was 

used for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as that term is defined 

by 15 U.S.C 1692a(5).

4. On March 19, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in the Eastern 

District of Michigan (case number 13-45449-pjs). Both Automotive Credit Corporation and the 

Defendant were separately listed on the Debtor’s Schedule F- List of Creditors, and both entities 

received actual notice of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing by mail as a result around that time.

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5. On April 1, 2013, a Garnishment Release specific to the underlying case was 

processed and mailed to the State of Michigan Department of Treasury, but was not directed to 

the Plaintiff’s employer despite her wages having been previously garnished. 

6. The Plaintiff’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was ultimately discharged on June 25, 

2013. A notice of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge was subsequently mailed to all of the 

Plaintiff’s creditors who had been included on the Plaintiff’s filed creditor matrix, specifically 

including Automotive Credit Corporation and the Defendant. No discernible effort was made by 

the Defendants to ensure the case against the Plaintiff was thereafter closed.

7. Thereafter, the Plaintiff was illicitly garnished by the Defendants on three separate 

occasions in December, 2013 and January, 2014 pursuant to the above-referenced civil 

judgment; after being informed of their violation, the Defendants returned two separate checks 

dated January 9, 2014 for $127.99 and February 5, 2014 for $117.12 to the Plaintiff for the 

amounts it had illegally garnished from her wages. Despite having executed this illicit 

garnishment against the Plaintiff, the Defendants took no action at that time to close out the 

underlying case and/or have a garnishment release issued to prevent further garnishment activity 

in the future.

8. On or around November 20, 2014, the Defendants purposefully executed a Request 

and Writ of Garnishment against a similarly-named party to the Plaintiff (see Exhibit A). This 

garnishment was subsequently forwarded to the payroll department of the Plaintiff, despite the 

Defendants’ knowledge of her prior bankruptcy discharge and the prior instances of illicit 

garnishment executed against the Plaintiff by the Defendants, to say nothing of the fact that the 

Defendants were already in possession of the Plaintiff’s correct payroll information due to the 

previous garnishment. This appears to be part of a “cover all bases” approach whereby the 

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Defendants simply forwards writs of garnishment to the employers for any parties subject to a 

lawsuit with similar names Regardless, any failure on the part of the payroll department of the 

Plaintiff thereafter to not garnish the wages of the Plaintiff as directed would serve as a violation 

of MCR 2.603(a)(1) for which the employer could have ultimately been left responsible for 

repayment in full upon the judgment at issue. The intentional, knowing issuance of this 

garnishment to her payroll and all the subsequent acts taken thereafter to garnish the Plaintiff’s 

wages represented a concerted effort by the Defendants to place undue pressure upon the 

Plaintiff’s employer to garnish her wages, such representing multiple violations of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act as set forth below.

9. Despite the notice of the Plaintiff’s discharge, which it had previously received upon 

its’ issuance and thereafter again after illegally garnishing her wages post-discharge, the 

Defendant nevertheless again allowed a garnishment to proceed against the Plaintiff in

December, 2014, ultimately returning the garnished amount totaling $212.98 via check to the 

Plaintiff only after her bankruptcy counsel sent prompt notice of same to the Defendant with a 

request to cease the garnishment at once as it had been instituted in clear contravention of 11 

U.S.C. § 524. As a result, the Plaintiff was willfully and illegally garnished on three separate 

occasions, the prior notice received by the Defendant and multiple violations committed 

thereafter obviously preventing any implication of unintentional conduct on its’ part.

10. A Register of Actions supplied by the Defendants with their motion confirms that no 

effort was made by the Defendants following the notice they received of both the Plaintiff’s 

bankruptcy filing and subsequent discharge to issue a garnishment release to anyone aside from 

the State of Michigan Department of Treasury or otherwise undo the existing garnishment action 

against the Plaintiff.

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11. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is a consumer protection statute 

that “imposes open-ended prohibitions on false, deceptive, or unfair debt collection practices.” 

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 587. 130 S.Ct. 1605, 

1615 (2010).

12. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act states that it is unlawful for a debt collector to 

use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection 

of any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 

13. The FDCPA states that it is unlawful for a debt collector to make a false 

representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A).

14. The FDCPA states that it is unlawful for a debt collector to use any false 

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(10).

15. The FDCPA states that it is unlawful for a debt collector to use unfair or 

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt, including the collection of any 

amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) 

unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by 

law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

16. By failing to close their case against the Plaintiff and/or release the garnishment 

against (M.C.R. 3.101) her upon learning of her bankruptcy discharge, the Plaintiffs falsely and 

deceptively allowed her payroll department to operate under the impression a garnishment case 

remained against her, a misrepresentation of the legal status of the debt which allowed illicit 

collection against her; as a result. the Defendants violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 

1692e(2)(A), and (10), and 1692f(1). See, e.g., Watkins v. Peterson Enterprises, Inc., 57 

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F.Supp.2d 1102 (E.D. Wash. 1999).

17. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute and thus proof of one violation thereof is 

sufficient to support a finding of summary judgment in favor of a Plaintiff. Cacace v Lucas, 775 

F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Conn. 1991). Moreover, a plaintiff in such instances does not need to 

prove knowledge or intent. McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 

939, 952 (9th Cir. 2011). The Plaintiff also does not have to have suffered actual damages. 

Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008).

18. Courts have established that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage 

in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when the activity consists of litigation. Heintz v. 

Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995).

19. The described acts and omissions of the Defendant were done in connection with 

efforts to collect an alleged debt from the Plaintiff, such having been done intentionally and 

willfully. The Defendants intentionally and willfully violated the FDCPA

20. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s negligence, the Plaintiff suffered 

actual damages in the form of anger, anxiety, emotional distress, frustration, upset, and 

embarrassment.

21. As a further direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s negligence, the Plaintiff 

has sustained consequential damages, including attorney fees and legal expenses.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

22. Summary judgment is to be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “if 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Under this standard, the court is not to “weigh 

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the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine 

issue for trial.” Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 769 (6th Cir. 2002). 

23. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its’ face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court construes the originating complaint in the light most favorable to 

the Plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor. Handy-Clay v. City of 

Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2012).

24. The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 

106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). Only if that burden is met must the nonmoving party then produce 

evidence that would support a finding in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). It is important to highlight that the Defendants to this point 

have made no effort to rebut the majority of arguments put forth in the Plaintiff’s complaint, and 

have instead seemingly decided to rely solely upon the idea that a failure to act on their part is 

inactionable under the FDCPA, an argument this Court must reject for the reasons to be stated 

below.

25. A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a 

court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The plausibility standard is not equivalent to a 

probability requirement. Id at 556.

26. In addition, Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires only a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” By extension, the subsequent analysis 

undertaken by courts in such instances “rests primarily upon the allegations of the complaint, but 

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matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached 

to the complaint also may be taken into account.” Henry v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 739 

F.3d 909, 912 (6th Circ. 2014).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Defendants Have Not Provided a Valid Basis for Dismissal Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) 

as Plaintiff has Clearly Set Forth a Valid Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted Under 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e

27. Much of the Defendants’ motion and the defense put forth therein revolves largely 

around the idea that debt collectors like the Defendants cannot be held liable under the FDCPA 

for a garnishee-defendant’s purported error in responding to an expired writ. The Defendants 

specifically posit that the Plaintiff’s employer in fact randomly withheld money from her 

paycheck pursuant to an expired writ originally executed in favor of the Defendants and their 

client, and that no overt effort was made by the Defendants to collect on the debt at issue. The 

motion goes on to debate semantical positions regarding how terms such as “use” are to be 

defined, a type of clear obfuscation that lends nothing to the proceedings, and otherwise offering 

obvious misstatements of the law such as the idea that “the FDCPA requires ‘active 

involvement’ in order to state a claim for a violation.”

28. The Defendants’ argument as set forth in their Motion to Dismiss fails at an intrinsic 

level given the writ of garnishment issued to the Plaintiff’s payroll department in November, 

2014, such obviously and clearly constituting an overt attempt by the Defendants to collect a 

debt from the Plaintiff which it was not entitled to do given the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge. 

Any confusion evinced within the Plaintiff’s payroll department was wholly the result of this 

illicit action by the Defendants. The subsequent effort to garnish the Plaintiff represented a 

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patently unconscionable, deceptive attempt to collect an amount the Defendants was not legally 

entitled to in direct contravention of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as set forth above. 

29. Aside from the foregoing, it is in addition a fallacy as the Defendants suggest that the 

FDCPA requires overt action in order for a violation to be found, as indeed multiple references 

are made throughout the Act, most specifically when discussing civil liability under 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k, that a violation can occur via either act or omission. Indeed, it is established that to 

establish a prima facie case for a violation of the FDCPA, among the various required elements, 

a Plaintiff must show that a Defendant “has violated by act or omission a provision of the 

FDCPA.” Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 605 F. Supp.2d 914, 938-939 (N.D. Ohio 

2009).

30. “It is incumbent upon creditors to take the necessary steps to halt or reverse any 

pending State Court actions or other collection efforts commenced prior to the filing of a 

bankruptcy petition, including garnishment of wages...and, thereby, maintain or restore the 

status quo as it existed at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.” In re Banks, 253 B.R. 

25, 30 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000). The responsibility in such instances is placed on the creditor 

and not the debtor.” Banks, 253 B.R. at 30. A willful violation can be found from an act of 

omission and does not require an act of commission.” Banks, 253 B.R. at 31. When a creditor 

receives notice of a bankruptcy filing, the burden is then on the creditor to assure that no 

violation occurs. In re Smith 180 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr. ND.Ga 1995). “If one is enjoined from 

continuing a judicial proceeding against the debtor, one is obliged to discontinue it.” In re 

Mitchell, 66 B.R. 73, 35 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1986). In fact, a refusal or even mere unintentional 

failure to take overt action may constitute an FDCPA violation, as courts have found violations 

based on an act of omission when a creditor fails to “restore the status quo.” In re Connecticut 

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Pizza, Inc., 193 B.R. 217, 228 (Bankrt.D.MD.1996).

31. Simply put, the Defendants are either unaware of the legal standard in these situations 

or by way of their motion have sought to mislead this court as to what that legal standard is in 

fact. The Defendants argue they failed to take any overt action to collect upon the Plaintiff after 

receiving multiple notices both of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge, but it is likewise true that 

they also took no action to undo the existing wage garnishment against the Plaintiff, most 

specifically by filing the necessary Release of Garnishment which invariably would have been 

ultimately received by the Plaintiff’s employer and thus likely prevent this situation from 

occurring in the first place, or otherwise ensuring the case against the Plaintiff was closed 

permanently. Any action of the Plaintiff’s payroll department is immaterial given the intentional 

serving of the Writ of Garnishment by Defendants in this regard, which is the only reason the 

garnishment ultimately occurred. Indeed, given the writ of garnishment issued to the Plaintiff’s 

payroll by the Defendants in November 2014, even their argument that no overt action was taken 

is rendered effectively invalid.

32. It is important to again highlight the legal standard here- mere omission (rather than 

the “active involvement” which the Defendants erroneously claim is a necessity) is an actionable 

violation of the FDCPA “when a creditor fails to cure a previous violation of the stay or

otherwise restore the status quo.” Upon receiving notice of both the Plaintiff’s original 

bankruptcy discharge, the Defendants were under an affirmative duty to “restore the status quo” 

by securing a garnishment release and otherwise ensuring any potential action to collect upon the 

Plaintiff specific thereto was ceased immediately and in perpetuity. Their failure to do so, 

however innocent that mistake may have been, constitutes a willful violation under the FDCPA.

33. “At whatever stage the garnishment is, the creditor’s attorney must do everything he 

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can to halt the proceeding.” O’Connor v. Methodist Hospital of Jonesboro, Inc. 42 B.R. 390, 

392 (Bankr.E.D. Ark. 1984). Again, the Defendants in fact did nothing, and this failure along 

with the Defendants’ subsequent acceptance (however temporary) of funds from the Plaintiff’s 

employer violated the discharge injunction in effect against them even if they took no further 

action to enforce the garnishment after learning of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing. 

34. To find an FDCPA violation, “it is sufficient that the creditor knows of the 

bankruptcy and engages in deliberate conduct...moreover, where there is actual notice of the 

bankruptcy it must be presumed that the violation was deliberate or intentional.” In re Daniels, 

206 B.R. 444, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997). The Defendants similarly seem intent on 

suggesting that merely sitting back and doing nothing upon learning of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy 

filing and discharge leaves them thusly immune from liability under the FDCPA, a conclusion 

obviously lacking any sort of legal or even rational basis. Indeed, failing to do something which 

they were required to do and allowing even inadvertent collection to proceed against the Plaintiff 

is as egregious as taking an overt action to collect; the fact is, the Defendants clearly knew of the 

Plaintiff’s filing and then intentionally failed to again return the parties to a position of “status 

quo.” As a collection firm likely responsible for thousands of similar cases, the Defendants were 

clearly aware of what one likely outcome might be if they made no over effort to notify the 

Plaintiff’s employer that the case against her was no longer to be enforced or simply close the 

case against the Plaintiff- she could be garnished, whether purposefully or inadvertently. Their 

omission was a knowing, deliberate failure, and given the strict liability standard in these 

instances, there is nothing more to prove on the part of the Plaintiff other than damages.

35. “A violation is willful if the creditor deliberately carried out the prohibited act with 

knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy case.” In re Printup, 264 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. E.D. 

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Tenn. 2001). There is no doubt in this instance that the Defendants received multiple notices of 

both the Plaintiff’s filing and discharge, and their subsequent failure to restore the “status quo” 

and undo the civil case previously instituted against the Plaintiff constitutes a willful violation of 

the FDCPA.

36. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit is clear- where a “mistake” of this type is “an error in 

legal judgment, it could not be erased by 1692k(c), because the Sixth Circuit treats the FDCPA 

as a strict liability statute. Frey v. Ganwish II, 970 F. 2d 1516, 1518-19 (6th Circ. 1992). 

Further, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly held that the “bona fide error defense applies only to 

clerical errors.” Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1034 (6th Cir. 1992). The 

Supreme Court has additionally held that the bona fide error defense in 1692k(c) does not apply 

to a violation resulting from a debt collector’s mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements 

of the FDCPA. Jerman V. Carlisle, McNellie, rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 

1634-35 (2010). Having first intentionally and purposefully directing the writ of garnishment to 

the Plaintiff’s employer, and thereafter receiving notice of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing and 

discharge, the Defendants were thusly under an affirmative duty to issue a garnishment release 

and otherwise ensure Plaintiff’s employer was made aware that the underlying case against the 

Plaintiff had been dissolved due to her bankruptcy filing and the garnishment released as a result. 

In fact, a return to the Plaintiff’s “status quo” would have required the Defendants take some 

overt measure to close the case against the Plaintiff upon learning of her discharge, which they 

demonstrably failed to do. Any argument that they were simply unaware of this legal 

requirement and that their failure was mere bona fide error necessarily fails as a result of 

established legal precedent. 

37. As a result of the foregoing, the Defendants have failed to adequately defeat the 

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Plaintiff’s valid claim against them for their various and consistent violations of 15 U.S.C. 1692e 

in full, and their request for dismissal pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) must be rejected as a result.

38. As a result of the Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA, the Plaintiff is specifically 

entitled to actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1); statutory damages in an amount 

up to $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) from the Defendants.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this 

Honorable Court reject the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint and otherwise 

grant such other relief as this Court deems appropriate.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

LAW OFFICES OF NICHOLAS A. REYNA

/s/ Nicholas A. Reyna May 21, 2015

Nicholas A. Reyna (P68328)

Attorney for Plaintiff

17344 W. 12 Mile Rd., Ste. 106

Southfield, MI 48076

(248) 423-1110

Nickreyna7@hotmail.com

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

RITA MICHELL NICHOLS, :

 :

 Plaintiff :

v. : Case No. 5:15-cv-10792

: Hon. John Corbett O’Meara

ROOSEN, VARCHETTI, & OLIVIER, PLLC,

Defendant(s).

__________________________________________/ 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Nicholas A. Reyna, being duly sworn, depose and state that on the 21st day of May, 

2015, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Court using the ECF system which will 

send notification to all parties registered to receive electronic filings.

 LAW OFFICES OF NICHOLAS A. REYNA PC

Date: 5/21/2015 /s/ Nicholas A. Reyna

Nicholas A. Reyna, P68328

Attorney for Plaintiff

17344 W. 12 Mile Rd., Ste. 106

Southfield, MI 48076

Nickreyna7@hotmail.com

248-423-1110

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