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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

YASIN REEDER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF WAYNE, 

Defendant. 

 /

Case No. 15-cv-10177 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DAVID R. GRAND

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE [30] AND 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE [31] 

I. INTRODUCTION

Yasin Reeder (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on January 16, 2015, 

against his former employer, Wayne County (“Defendant”). See Dkt. No. 1, p. 1 

(Pg. ID No. 1). Plaintiff alleged ten violations of state and federal law, under the 

Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (Counts I and II); Americans with Disabilities 

Amendments Act (ADA) (Counts III and IV); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (“Title VII”) (Counts V and VI); Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil 

Rights Act (PWDCRA) (Counts VII and VIII); and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil 

Rights Act (Counts IX and X). Dkt. No. 3, pp. 10–22 (Pg. ID No. 30–42). In April 

2016, the Court granted Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII 

claims. Dkt. No. 28, p. 43 (Pg. ID No. 570). 

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Plaintiff and Defendant have each filed Motions in Limine in preparation for 

trial. Dkt. No. 30, 31. The Court has reviewed and considered the Motions, 

supporting briefs, and the entire record of this matter. Additionally, the Court 

conducted a hearing on this matter on June 27, 2016, where counsel presented 

arguments on the issues. 

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s 

Motion in Limine [30] and GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s Motion in 

Limine [30]. The Court’s Opinion and Order is set forth in detail below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion in limine refers to “any motion, whether made before or during 

trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually 

offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). The purpose of a 

motion in limine is to eliminate “evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any 

purpose” before trial. Ind. Ins. Co. v. GE, 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 

2004). A district court rules on evidentiary motions in limine “to narrow the issues 

remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.” United States v. Brawner, 

173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999). The guiding principle is to “ensure evenhanded 

and expeditious management of trials.” Ind. Ins., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 

Although neither the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure explicitly authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in 

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limine, the Supreme Court has allowed district courts to rule on motions in limine

“pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” 

See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4. District courts are granted very broad discretion in 

determining whether the probative value of evidence outweighs any danger of 

unfair prejudice. United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1989). 

A district court should grant a motion to exclude evidence in limine “only 

when [that] evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Ind. Ins., 

326 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (emphasis added). In cases where that high standard is not 

met, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of 

foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” 

Id. Denial of a motion to exclude evidence in limine does not necessarily mean that 

the court will admit the evidence at trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. “[E]ven if 

nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of 

sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.” Id. at 41–42. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendant’s Motion in Limine seeks to preclude Plaintiff from introducing 

expert testimony at trial based on his failure to comply with Rule 26(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 30, p. 5 (Pg. ID No. 577). 

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine seeks to exclude evidence in nine different areas: 

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(1) Plaintiff’s work disciplinary history prior to 2013; 

(2) the arbitrator’s determination that Defendant had “just cause” to 

terminate Plaintiff’s employment under the collective bargaining 

agreement (“CBA”); 

(3) evidence challenging whether the content of Plaintiff’s doctor’s 

note constituted sufficient notice under the FMLA to trigger 

Defendant’s responsibility to obtain additional information; 

(4) Plaintiff’s prior litigation; 

(5) evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s 

discharge; 

(6) evidence that Deputy Chief Tonya Guy (“Guy”) requested to see 

Plaintiff’s doctor’s notes; 

(7) character evidence that Wayne County Personnel had a propensity 

to give FMLA paperwork to employees who submitted doctor’s 

notes; 

(8) Plaintiff’s work as a football coach at Wayne State University 

during his employment with Wayne County; and 

(9) the details of the dispute between Plaintiff and his coworker, 

Jessica Winward. 

See Dkt. No. 31, pp. 2–3 (Pg. ID No. 606–07). A discussion of both Motions 

follows. 

A. The Court Will Grant Defendant’s Motion in Limine

In its Motion in Limine, Defendant moves to preclude expert testimony from 

Dr. James Cowley, Dr. Leon Rubenfaer, and Dr. Nagashree Chandrashekar under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c). Dkt. No. 30, pp. 5–6 (Pg. ID No. 577–78). 

The Rule states: 

If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required 

by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or 

witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, 

unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. 

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FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). The Rule further provides that “the court, on motion and 

after giving an opportunity to be heard . . . may impose other appropriate 

sanctions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(C). 

Defendant asserts that although the three doctors were named as potential 

experts in initial pre-trial disclosures, Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with the 

required disclosures for expert witnesses, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26. These disclosures are required to have been made at least 90 days 

before the trial date, and that date has since passed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 

26(a)(2)(D)(i). In his response, Plaintiff argues that he does not intend to use the 

doctors as expert witnesses. Dkt. No. 35, p. 9 (Pg. ID No. 969). Instead, “Plaintiff 

is only calling his treating physicians for the purpose of authenticating documents 

and testifying to Plaintiff’s treatment.” Id. at 10. 

Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion in Limine, to the 

extent that the three doctors were to provide any expert testimony. However, the 

doctors may provide lay witness testimony. They may testify to matters within 

their personal knowledge, such as authenticating documents, and to observations 

made during the course of treatment. The doctors may not testify as to the legal 

requirements of Plaintiff’s claims, such as the governing law or how the law 

applies to the facts of the case, or to the credibility of witnesses. 

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B. The Court Will Grant In Part and Deny In Part Plaintiff’s Motion in 

Limine

1. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Excluding 

Evidence of Plaintiff’s Work Disciplinary History Prior to 2013 

In his Motion in Limine, Plaintiff moves to exclude the “number of 

disciplines” he received while working for Defendant. Dkt. No. 31, p. 18 (Pg. ID 

No. 622). Plaintiff argues that his refusal to work overtime was the sole reason for 

his termination and that his disciplinary history was to be destroyed or removed 

after twenty-four months of satisfactory service, according to the CBA. Id. 

Here, the Court is unable to resolve Plaintiff’s motion because he has not 

identified any particular piece of evidence that should be excluded. As a result, the 

Court cannot assess the likely relevancy or prejudice of the challenged evidence. 

Although Plaintiff’s personnel records, for example, may include extraneous, 

irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial information, the Court is not in a position to rule 

on the admissibility of any such evidence, or related testimony, without reviewing 

the materials in context. There are many types of discipline to which an officer 

may be subject—including disciplines for dishonesty, unapproved sick leaves, 

failure to report for duty—and it would be improper for the Court to make a 

blanket ruling that all disciplines are excluded. The Court will not issue a blanket 

ruling on evidence not fully identified and arguments not yet fully developed. See 

Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975) 

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(“Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be 

employed.”); United States v. Phillips, No. 14-CR-20611, 2015 WL 7008576, at *2 

(E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2015) (stating that a district court should grant a motion in 

limine to exclude evidence only when that evidence is clearly inadmissible on all 

potential grounds); Mitchell v. Cty. of Wayne, No. 05-73698, 2007 WL 850997, at 

*4–5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2007) (deciding not to issue a blanket exclusion of 

disciplinary actions in a FMLA case). 

The Court also notes that the CBA provides that discipline is removed from 

an employee’s personnel record after twenty-four months of satisfactory service. 

At this time, the Court does not have undisputed evidence that establishes Plaintiff 

had a record of satisfactory service in the twenty-four months following August 

2013. More significantly, the CBA does not control the admissibility of evidence 

in this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied, without prejudice to 

renewal in the context of the trial, insofar as it seeks a blanket exclusion of 

disciplines assessed against him. 

2. The Court Will Grant Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to the 

Arbitrator’s Determination that Defendant Had “Just Cause” to 

Terminate Plaintiff Under the CBA 

Next, Plaintiff argues that FRE 401, 402 and 403 operate to bar evidence of 

the arbitrator’s determination and decision that Defendant had “just cause” to 

terminate Plaintiff under the CBA. Dkt. No. 31, p. 20 (Pg. ID No. 624). Plaintiff 

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argues that the arbitration is not relevant because he is pursuing his statutory rights 

instead of his contractual rights under the CBA. Id. 

Although the Court “should defer to the arbitrator’s construction of the 

contract,” the Court is not conclusively bound by an arbitrator’s decision that a 

plaintiff is discharged for just cause. Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consol. 

Freightways, 687 F.2d 140, 142 (6th Cir. 1982) (suing for employment 

discrimination after an arbitrator ruled that the employer discharged the plaintiff 

for “just cause”). In the present case, the arbitrator’s decision involved construction 

of the CBA, which does not have bearing on Plaintiff’s rights under the FMLA and 

ADA. See Mitchell, 2007 WL 850997, at *5; Shaltry v. City of Saginaw, No. 09-

10609-BC, 2011 WL 252518, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2011) (“Both Michigan 

courts and the Sixth Circuit have held that collateral estoppel does not apply to an 

action under anti-discrimination statutes where a previous arbitration addresses 

only contractual issues, such as collective bargaining rights under a collective 

bargaining agreement.”). 

The issues arising in the present case are distinct from the CBA’s grievance 

procedure, and are to be determined by a jury, rather than by deference to an 

arbitrator’s decision. Thus, insofar as Plaintiff’s Motion seeks to exclude evidence 

of the Arbitrator’s decision that Defendants had just cause to terminate Plaintiff, 

the Motion is granted. 

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3. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Whether the 

Content of Plaintiff’s Doctor’s Note Constituted Sufficient Notice 

Under the FMLA 

The third issue Plaintiff seeks to exclude is any evidence challenging 

whether the content of Plaintiff’s doctor’s note constituted sufficient notice under 

the FMLA to trigger Defendant’s responsibility to obtain additional information. 

Dkt. No. 31, p. 21 (Pg. ID No. 625). 

In support of his argument, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the Court’s statement 

in a previous order. Id. (“Based off of the January note alone, the notice that 

Plaintiff provided could be considered sufficient under 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b), 

shifting the burden of obtaining further information and supplying the applicable 

leave forms onto Defendant.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s argument not only 

omits the footnote that took notice of the fact that submission of the notes is a 

disputed fact, to be resolved by the jury, but also misreads the Court’s use of the 

word “could” to mean “would.” See id. at 22 (“This argument should not be 

presented to the jury because the January 27th doctor’s note, if presented to 

Defendant, would have been sufficient to trigger Defendant’s obligations as a 

matter of law.”) (emphasis added). 

It is a matter for the jury to determine if the notes Plaintiff allegedly 

submitted provide sufficient detail about a qualifying position such that he 

provided sufficient notice to shift the burden to his employer. Accordingly, 

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Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as to excluding any evidence that challenges whether 

the content of Plaintiff’s doctor’s notes constituted sufficient notice. 

4. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Plaintiff’s 

Prior Litigation 

Next, Plaintiff argues that any evidence of his prior litigation should be 

excluded. Dkt. No. 31, p. 24 (Pg. ID No. 628). These suits allegedly involved an 

on-the-job motor vehicle accident and an off-the-job “incident.” Id. He argues that 

this evidence is irrelevant, risks misleading the jury, and is otherwise 

impermissible character evidence. Id. at 24–25. 

“The Federal Rules of Evidence set a low bar for relevance.” Cambio Health 

Solutions, LLC v. Reardon, 234 Fed. App’x. 331, 338 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, there 

is not sufficient information provided about the suits for the Court to make a 

decision as to their relevance to the present suit, or the prejudice they might 

engender in a jury. The lawsuits may be relevant to the extent that Defendant’s 

decision to terminate Plaintiff was based in any part on them. Accordingly, the 

Court will deny, without prejudice to renewal in the context of the trial, Plaintiff’s 

request to exclude the lawsuits since they may be conditionally relevant, provided 

Defendant considered them in making decisions at the heart of the present suit.

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5. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as Any Evidence of 

A Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason for Plaintiff’s Discharge 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for 

discharging Plaintiff was mere pretext, and evidence related to it should be 

excluded. Dkt. No. 31, p. 26 (Pg. ID No. 630). 

In its opinion and order on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 

found that Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s right to FMLA 

leave. Dkt. No. 28, p. 18 (Pg. ID No. 545). In viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court found that Plaintiff’s alleged insubordination 

appeared to be based off his refusal to work mandatory overtime. See id. at 17. 

However, the jury is not obliged to view the facts in the light most favorable to the 

Plaintiff. Instead, they may evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses to make their own factual determinations, including whether Defendant 

had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff. Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s Motion to exclude any evidence of Defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff is denied. 

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6. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Any 

Evidence That Deputy Chief Tonya Guy Requested To See Plaintiff’s 

Doctor’s Notes 

 Plaintiff argues that the fact Guy asked to see his doctor’s note is irrelevant, 

and should be excluded, since he was not legally obligated to share the note with 

her. Dkt. No. 31, pp. 27–28 (Pg. ID No. 631–32). 

However, the Guy’s request to see the note does appear relevant to whether 

Defendant had or should have had notice that Plaintiff was requesting leave 

pursuant to his FMLA rights. Additionally, this issue also appears relevant to 

whether Defendant had a honest belief that its adverse employment action against 

Plaintiff was legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., No. 

15-1479, 2016 WL 3443646, at *7 (6th Cir. June 23, 2016) (noting that the Sixth 

Circuit “employ[s] a version of the ‘honest belief’ rule with regard to pretext,” 

such that “as long as the employer honestly believed the reason it gave for its 

employment action, an employee is not able to establish pretext even if the 

employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken.”). 

The Court does not agree that admission of this evidence would result in a 

substantial risk of unfair prejudice to Plaintiff. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Plaintiff is 

welcome to question Guy about her intentions with regard to viewing Plaintiff’s 

doctors’ notes and provide testimony from Plaintiff as to why he refused her 

request. The Court will deny, without prejudice to renewal in the context of the 

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trial, Plaintiff’s Motion as to any evidence that Guy requested to see Plaintiff’s 

doctors’ notes. 

7. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Character 

Evidence That Wayne County Personnel Had A Propensity To Give 

FMLA Paperwork To Employees Who Submitted Doctors’ Notes 

Next, Plaintiff seeks to exclude any evidence that Wayne County Personnel 

have a propensity to give FMLA forms to employees who submit doctors’ notes, 

claiming that such evidence is impermissible character evidence. The Court 

disagrees. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 406 provides that: 

Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice may 

be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or 

organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice. 

The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is 

corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness. 

“Conduct that is admissible under this rule generally satisfies the following three 

elements: (1) it should be of such a nature that it is unlikely that the individual 

instance can be recalled or the person who performed it can be located; (2) it must 

be specific conduct that is engaged in frequently by the group; and (3) the number 

of instances of such behavior must be large enough that doubt about a single 

instance does not destroy the inference that the practice existed.” Martin v. Thrifty 

Rent A Car, 145 F.3d 1332 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Such conduct must have been uniform over an adequate number of 

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instances, such that the conduct in question was semi-automatic in nature. Id. A 

court may find that a government agency has a habit and routine practice of 

providing forms, such that they acted in conformity with that habit and custom. See 

In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 574 (D. 

Colo. 1980). 

 Provided Defendant can satisfy the standard provided by the Sixth Circuit in 

Martin, evidence of the personnel department’s routine practice of providing 

FMLA forms to individuals who submit doctors’ notes may be admissible. This 

request for exclusion is denied without prejudice to renewal in the context of the 

trial. 

8. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Work As A 

Football Coach At Wayne State University During His Employment 

With Wayne County 

Plaintiff would also like the Court to exclude any evidence relating to the 

paid services he performed for Wayne State’s football program. Dkt. No. 31, 

pp. 32–33 (Pg. ID No. 636–37). Plaintiff argues that this evidence is irrelevant and 

would be prejudicial to admit, because it would be onerous for him to rebut such 

testimony. See id. 

Defendant argues that the evidence should be admitted because Guy 

believed that Plaintiff was choosing not to work overtime so he could rest before 

working as a football coach for Wayne State University. Dkt. No. 34, p. 17 (Pg. ID 

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No. 872). Much like the analysis of evidence related to Guy’s request to see 

Plaintiff’s medical note, this issue relates to whether Defendant had knowledge 

that Plaintiff was requesting FMLA leave because of a qualifying disability. 

Accordingly, it is relevant to whether Defendant had notice of Plaintiff’s disability 

and whether Defendant had an honest belief that disciplining Plaintiff for refusing 

to work overtime was legitimate and nondiscriminatory. 

Plaintiff is free to testify about the work he performed for Wayne State, the 

time period in which it took place, and whether it factored into his decision to 

refuse overtime work. The Court does not find that providing such testimony will 

be overly burdensome to him. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion 

in Limine regarding evidence related to the work he performed for Wayne State 

University. 

9. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Details Of 

The Dispute Between Plaintiff And His Coworker 

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to exclude any evidence related to the dispute he had 

with his coworker, Jessica Winward, who accused him of sexual harassment in 

May 2013. Dkt. No. 31, pp. 33–34 (Pg. ID No. 637–38). He argues that this 

evidence is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and that the dispute with Winward 

did not interfere with his ability to perform his job duties. Id. 

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Nevertheless, Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff’s altercation 

with Windward was part of Plaintiff’s motivation to continually refuse direct 

orders to work overtime. Dkt. No. 34, pp. 12–13 (Pg. ID No. 867–88). Plaintiff’s 

supervisor testified in deposition that Plaintiff told him “he was going to refuse 

[mandatory overtime] every time” because “he was upset about a situation that 

happened in Division One and, until the County makes him whole, he is going to 

continue to refuse.” Id. at 13. Since there is evidence that Plaintiff’s decision to 

decline to work mandatory overtime, which began far in advance of his submitted 

doctor’s notes, may be related to his dispute with his coworker, such evidence is 

relevant to the present dispute. 

Nevertheless, the Court has not been provided sufficient information about 

the subject of this dispute, outside of the general allegation of sexual harassment. 

Should additional detail give rise to concern that the topic of the dispute is 

substantially more prejudicial than probative, the Court may opt to allow evidence 

that there was a dispute, generally, without admitting details of the specific topic of 

the dispute. Alternatively, the parties are welcome to stipulate to the fact that a 

dispute occurred between Plaintiff and Winward, without admitting the subject. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s request to exclude evidence of his dispute with his coworker is 

denied without prejudice to renewal in the context of the trial. 

 

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IV. CONCLUSION

These are the preliminary rulings of the Court. The Court emphasizes that 

“[a] ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory, 

opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court . . . the district 

court may change its ruling at trial for whatever reason it deems appropriate,” and 

“where sufficient facts have developed to warrant the change.” United States v. 

Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 

1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983) aff’d, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)). 

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion in Limine [30], to 

exclude any expert witness testimony from the three listed doctors. The Court will 

GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [31]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 30, 2016 

 /s/Gershwin A Drain 

 HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Court Judge

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