IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2018-KA-01521-COA SHAWN DOUGLAS MOFFETT A/K/A SHAWN MOFFETT APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/11/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LISA P. DODSON COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: ERIN ELIZABETH BRIGGS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOEL SMITH NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/12/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ. J. WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Following a jury t rial, Shawn Mof f ett was convicted of carjacking and attem pting to leave the scene o f an accident. On appeal, M of f ett does not challenge hi s c a rjacking conviction but argues that the evidence was insuf f i cient to convict him of a ttem p ting to leave the scene. W e hold that the State presented suf f icient ev i d e n ce to convict Mof f ett. Theref ore, we af f irm Mof f ett’s convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On April 22, 2016, Shawn Mof f ett was supposed to go f

i shing with h is m ot h e r , hisstepf

ather, and two o f his si s ter’s f riends. That m orning, Mof f ett learned that he was not going to be able to live with his sister or hi s g r andm other, which apparently upset him

. 1 Nonetheless, he went with the g roup t o g o f i s h i ng. Mof

f ett joined his sister a n d her two f riends in his sister’s car, w hile his m other a n d s t e p f a t h er w ent in their car. Mof f ett apparently

sm oked m arijuana while riding in his sister’s car. ¶3. The group stopped at Sweet Peppers Deli on Highway 49 in Gulf

p ort. W hile in the
restaurant’s parking l ot, Mof f e tt becam e u ncontrollably angry . He kicked or punched out a back window of his sister’s car, c lim bed through the broken window, and assaulted his sister. Mof f ett was bleeding by this point and began angrily running, stum b ling, and rolling through the p a r k i n g l o t

. Mof

f ett then ran out into traf

f ic on Highway 49. He was kicking and swinging at passing cars and f inally lay down in the road. ¶4. Kum i Magee was d riving north on Highway 4 9 when he saw Mof f ett ly ing in the road. Magee stopped his car t o try to help Mof f e tt. Mof f ett r esponded b y threatening to kill Magee. Magee then walked b a ck to his car, but Mof f e tt ru s h e d h i m. Magee, a licensed security guard, then drew h is gun and tried to c alm Mof f ett. However, M of

f ett continued to run at Magee. The two m en tussled brief ly bef ore Mof f ett disengaged. ¶5. Mof

f ett noticed a Volkswagen Passat d riving b y in the slow-m oving t raf f ic. Mof f ett ran up to the Passat and tried to open the driver’s door, but it was locked. He then jum ped

on top of the car and d ove in through t he sunroof

. The startled d

river abandoned her car and

1 M o f f ett h ad b e en d i sch arg ed f

ro m p riso n to p o st-release su p erv isio n j u st tw o d ay s earlier. T h e issu es w ith h is l iv in g arran g em e n ts m ay h av e h ad to d o w ith co n d itio n s o f h is p o st-release su p erv isio n . M o f f ett’s p rio r c o n v ictio n w as f o r statu t o r y r ap e, f o r w h ich h e w as sen ten ced to serv e tw en ty y ears w ith f

if teen y e ars su sp en d ed an d f iv e y ears to serv e. 2ran across the highway in f ear. Mof f ett then began drivi n g t h e P a s s at and struck another vehicle. The Passat stalled, but Mof f ett restarted it and sped north on Highway 49. ¶6. Mof

f ett r an a red light at th e i n t e r s e c t ion of Highway 49 and O’Neal Road. He clipped a Cadillac that was traveling east on O’Neal Road and then slam m ed into t he driver’s side of a N issan Altim a that was also traveling through the intersection. The Passat spun out and cam e t o rest i n a g r a s s y a r e a ninety f eet of f of the roadway

. An accident reconstructionist c oncluded that the Passat was traveling a t l e a s t 8 3 to 87 m iles per hour when it struck the Altim a. The speed lim it at the intersection was 50 m iles per hour. ¶7. Kenny G uidry , an o f f -duty New Orleans police of f i c e r , h ad been f

ollowing behind Mof f ett as he drove north on Highway 49. Af ter Mof f ett slam m ed into the Nissan, Guidry stopped his car and went to check on the driver of t he Nissan, Megan W ilson. W ilson had been knocked into the passenger seat, her head was out of the passenger side window, and Guidry initially f

eared that she was dead. W ilson s urvived but suf f ered lif e -threatening injuries, i ncluding a subarachnoid hem orrhage (bleeding in t he space between her brain and surrounding m em

brane), a f

ractured sternum , a f

ractured neck, and m

ultiple broken ribs. ¶8. As Guidry attended to W ilson, he watched Mof f e tt get o ut of the P assat and walk to

a blue car that w as parked nearby

. Guidry o bserved Mof f e tt pulling on the door h andle of the blue car. Guidry

told others in the area not to allow Mof f ett to get away

. Mof

f ett then
f ell to the ground near the blue car. Crim e scene investigators l ater f ound a t r a i l o f blood
f rom the Passat to the blue c a r , d r i e d blood o n the driver’s door of the blue car, and blood

sm eared across the door handle. Param edics attem pted to help Mof

f ett, b ut he c ontinued to

3try

to get up. The param edics had to tie Mof f ett’s wrists so that they

could treat him

. ¶9. Mof

f ett w as indicted f

or one count of carjacking and one c ount o f leaving the scene of an accident t hat resulted in the m u tilat i o n , disf

igurem e nt, or perm anent disability of another p e r s o n. See Miss. Code A nn. § 63-3-401(1) & (4) (Rev. 2013). P rior to trial, the

court ordered Mof

f ett to undergo a com

p etency exam ination and h eld a com petency hearing. The e xam ining psy chologist f ound that M of

f e tt was com

p etent to stand trial and a ssist in his def ense, and Mof

f ett and h is attorney agreed that h e was com p etent. The court f

ound that Mof f ett was com

p etent to stand trial. ¶10. The case proc e e d e d to a jury trial. A f ter the close o f the State’s c a se-in-chief , the
State m oved to a m e nd the indictm ent to charge Mof f ett with f elonious attem

pt t o leave the

scene of the accident rather than the com pleted of f ense. The trial c ourt granted t he m otion. 2
Mof f ett presented an insanity d ef ense at trial; however, two dif f erent psy chologists testif

ied that Mof f ett had n o history of m ental illness a n d that there was no evidence that at the t im e of the o f f ense h e suf

f ered f rom any m ental def

ect o r disorder that would h ave prevented h im
f rom appreciating the q

uality or wrongf

ulne s s o f h i s actions. T he jury rejected Mof f ett’s insanity d e f

ense and f

ound him guilty on both counts. ¶11. The court sentenced M of f ett to serve f

if teen y ears f

or carjacking. The court sentenced

2 M o f f e t t ’ s trial co u n sel o b

j ected to th e a m en d m en t, b u t th e trial co u rt p ro p erly g ran ted th e m o tio n . In d eed , a f o r m al am en d m e n t to th e i n d ictm en t w as u n n e cessary . “O n an in d ictm en t f

o r an y o f f en se th e j u ry m ay f

in d th e d ef

en d an t g u ilty o f t h e o f

f e n s e as ch arg ed , o r o f an y attem

p t to co m m it th e sam e . . . .” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -1 9

- 5 (1 ) (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ). T h u s, an i n d ictm en t f o r a co m p leted o f f en se p u ts th e d ef

en d a n t “o n n o t ice” th at h e m ay b e co n v icted o f an a ttem p t, an d an am en d m en t t o th e in d ictm en t to ch arg e an attem p t is p ro p er b ecau se it h as “th e sam e resu l t a s a p e r missib le j u ry in stru c tio n o n th e attem p t ch arg e.” P a tto n v. S ta te , 1 0 9 S o . 3 d 6 6 , 8 1 (¶4 5 ) (M i ss. 2 0 1 2 ). 4Mof

f ett to serve twenty y ears f

or attem pting t o leave t he s cene of an accident, with all twenty
y ears suspended, f

ive y ears of

reporting post-release supervision, and f if teen y ears of nonreporting post-release supervi s i o n. Mof f ett s u bsequently f

iled a m otion f

or j udgm ent notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied, and a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS ¶12. On appeal, Mof

f e tt a rgues that the evidence presented a t t r i a l w a s i n s u f f i c ient to sustain a conviction f

or attem pting to leave the scene of an accident. Specif

i cally , Mof

f ett
argues that his act of “pulling o n the door handle” of the blue car is insuf f i cient to prove that he attem pted to leave the scene. ¶13. “W hen this Court reviews the suf f i ciency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict, we view the evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the S tate and decide if r ational jurors could have f ound the State proved each elem ent of the crim e.” Lenoir v. State , 222 So. 3d 273, 279 (¶25) (Miss

. 2 0 1 7). The issue is not “ whether we t hink the State proved the elem ents. Rather, we m

u st decide whether a reasonable juror could rationally s ay that the State did.” Poole v. State , 46 So. 3d 290, 293-94 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). ¶14. Mof

f ett was convicted o f the crim e of attem pting t o l eave the scene of an accident that resulted i n an injury

. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-401(1) & (4). 3 “[ A]n attem pt to c om m i t a crim e consists o f t h r e e elem e nts: (1) an intent to com m i t a particular crim e; (2) a direct inef f ectual act done toward its com m ission; and (3) the f ailure to consum m ate its

3 M o f f e tt w as co n v icted u n d er su b sectio n (4 ) , w h ich p ro v id es f o r g r eater p u n ish m en t if th e accid en t resu lted in , in ter alia, “ th e d eath o f an o th e r o r th e m u tilatio n , d isf

ig u rem en t, [ o r] p erma n e n t d i s ab ility

. . . o f an o th er.” M o f f ett d o es n o t d isp u t e th at Wilso n ’s in j u ries w e re su f f icien tly sev e re to su p p o rt a co n v ictio n u n d er su b sectio n ( 4 ). 5com m ission.” Bucklew v. State , 206 So. 2d 200, 202 (Miss. 1 968); accord M iss. C ode Ann.

§ 97-1-7(1) (Rev. 2014). “ The me r e i n t ention to c om m it a crim e is not p unishable; the intention m

ust t h eref ore be coupled with an overt act.” Green v. State , 269 So. 3 d 75, 82 (¶19) ( Miss. 2018) (quotation m arks om itted) (quoting Croft v. State , 992 S o. 2d 1151,
1159-60 (¶33) (Miss. 2008)). The f irst two elem ents o f an a ttem p t r equire onl y “ t h e intent

to com m it a crim e p lus a ny s light act toward i ts consum m ation.” Ford v. State , 218 So. 2d 731, 7 32 (Miss. 1969). “[ I]n m any cases, the State is not privy to direct evidence of intent because of

the im possibility

of peering inside a def

e ndant’s m ind[ ,]” but the jury is f ree to inf er intent f

r o m t he def

endant’s “acts coupled w ith the surrounding f acts and circum stances.” Thomas v. State , 277 So. 3 d 5 32, 535 (¶14) (Miss. 2019). As to the third elem ent, the State m

ust show that the def

endant’s f a i lure to com

plete the crim e was due to

som e “extraneous cause[ ] and not a voluntary cessation.” Powers v. S tate , 8 83 So. 2d 20, 27 (¶16) (Miss. 2003). The jury is also f ree to inf e r f rom s urrounding f

acts and circum stances that the attem

pt f ailed. Thomas , 277 So. 3d at 535 (¶14). ¶15. The evidence presented in this case was suf f icient f or a rational juror t o have f ound Mof f ett guilty bey ond a reasonable doubt. Testim ony and phy sical evidence sh o wed that Mof f ett tried to get i n the blue car af ter he wrecked the Passat. The jury was f ree to inf er that he did so with the intent to steal the car and then f lee the scene. 4 The f

a c t that Mof

f ett had

4 It m ay w e ll h av e b een im p o ssib le f o r M o f f e t t t o s teal th e car an d leav e th e scen e, eith er b ecau se o f h is o w n p h y sical co n d itio n f o llo w in g th e w reck o r b ecau se h e co u ld n o t h av e started th e b lu e car. H o w e v er, “im p o ssib ility is n o t a d ef

en se” to a ch arg e o f attem p t

“ w h e n th e im

p o ssib ility g ro w s o u t o f ex tran eo u s f acts n o t w ith in th e co n tro l o f th e [ d ef en d an t] .” D u ke v. S ta te , 3 4 0 S o . 2 d 7 2 7 , 7 3 0 ( M iss. 1 9 7 6 ) (citin g S to kes v. S ta te , 9 2 M iss. 4 1 5 , 4 2 8 , 4 6 S o . 6 2 7 , 6 2 9 (1 9 0 8 )). 6just accom

plished one carjacking supports a n inf erence that he intended t o take another car
to get away . In a ddition, Guidry perceived that Mof f ett was still attem

pting to l eave, and he urged by standers to s t op him

. Mof f ett’s a ttem

p t to open the door to the blue car also constitutes an overt act toward the com m ission of the o f f ense. Ford , 2 1 8 S o . 2 d at 732 (holding that the State need only prove “any slight a ct toward [ t h e ] com m ission” of the of f ense). Finally , the jury was f ree to inf er f r om the evidence that Mof

f ett f ailed to or was prevented f

rom com pleting the of

f e n s e . T h e testim ony and phy s i cal evidence support a reasonable inf

erence that his e f

f orts to leave t he scene were f rustrated by a l ocked car door or his own phy sical condition, not a voluntary abandonm ent of purpose. CONCLUSION ¶16. The State presented s u f f i c i e n t e v i dence f

or a rational juror to convict Mof f ett of

attem pting to leave the scene of an accident. Theref ore, M of f e t t’s c onviction and sentence

on that count and his unchallenged conviction and sentence f or carjacking are AFFIRMED

. BARNES , C.J., C ARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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