UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

KELLY WILLEY, Personal Representative 

of the Estate of DANIEL PITTS, Deceased, 

 Case No. 2:14-cv-14463 

 Plaintiff, Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds 

v Magistrate Mona K. Majzoub 

LENAWEE COUNTY, a Municipal Corporation, 

JAIL COMMANDER DENNIS STEENROD, 

ASS’T JAIL COMMANDER JAMES CRAIG, 

CORRECTIONS OFFICER JAMES HART, and 

STEPHEN STOCKER, MSW. 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

FIEGER FIEGER KENNEY & HARRINGTON, P.C. 

BY: GEOFFREY N. FIEGER (P30441) 

 JAMES S. CRAIG (P52691) 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

19390 W. Ten Mile Rd. 

Southfield, MI 48075 

248.355.5555 

CUMMINGS, McCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, P.L.C. 

BY: JAMES R. ACHO (P62175) 

 KAREN M. DALEY (P60002) 

Attorneys for Defendants 

33900 Schoolcraft 

Livonia, MI 48150 

734.261.2400 

__________________________________________________________________ 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 NOW COME the Defendants, LENAWEE COUNTY, LIEUTENANT 

JAMES CRAIG, CAPTAIN DENNIS STEENROD, CORRECTIONS OFFICER 

JAMES HART, and STEPHEN STOCKER, MSW, by and through their attorneys, 

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2 

CUMMINGS, McCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, P.L.C., and for their Motion for 

Summary Judgment, rely upon the Brief in Support of the Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a), Defendants certify that they attempted to obtain 

concurrence in the relief sought, but such concurrence was denied. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ James R. Acho 

Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.L.C. 

33900 Schoolcraft Road 

Livonia, MI 48150 

(734) 261-2400 

Attorneys for Defendants 

Email: jacho@cmda-law.com

 (P62175) 

Dated: March 7, 2016 

L:\jar - Jen Richards\Pitts\Renewed MSJ.docx 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

KELLY WILLEY, Personal Representative 

of the Estate of DANIEL PITTS, Deceased, 

 Case No. 2:14-cv-14463 

 Plaintiff, Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds 

v Magistrate Mona K. Majzoub 

LENAWEE COUNTY, a Municipal Corporation, 

JAIL COMMANDER DENNIS STEENROD, 

ASS’T JAIL COMMANDER JAMES CRAIG, 

CORRECTIONS OFFICER JAMES HART, and 

STEPHEN STOCKER, MSW. 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

FIEGER FIEGER KENNEY & HARRINGTON, P.C. 

BY: GEOFFREY N. FIEGER (P30441) 

 JAMES S. CRAIG (P52691) 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

19390 W. Ten Mile Rd. 

Southfield, MI 48075 

248.355.5555 

CUMMINGS, McCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, P.L.C. 

BY: JAMES R. ACHO (P62175) 

 KAREN M. DALEY (P60002) 

Attorneys for Defendants 

33900 Schoolcraft 

Livonia, MI 48150 

734.261.2400 

__________________________________________________________________ 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................................................... vii 

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1 

STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................... 4 

LAW AND ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... 5 

I. DEFENDANTS STEENROD, CRAIG, HART, AND STOCKER ARE 

ENTITLED TO THE DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ...................... 5 

A. Defendants cannot be held liable because they reasonably relied 

upon the medical judgment of Stocker ................................................................ 9 

B. There is no evidence that the individual Defendants acted with 

deliberate indifference ....................................................................................... 11 

C. Daniel Pitts’ suicide threat was conditional and lacked 

immediacy .......................................................................................................... 15 

D. There is no clearly established right to suicide prevention measures ......... 17 

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AGAINST 

LENAWEE COUNTY SHOULD BE DISMISSED ......................................... 19 

A. A determination that the individual Defendants did not violate 

Plaintiff’s rights resolves the claim against the County as well ........................ 19 

B. Plaintiff has failed to allege a valid claim for municipal liability 

against the County ............................................................................................. 19 

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III. PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED 

BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL 

IMMUNITY ....................................................................................................... 20 

A. The claims against the County are barred by the application of 

governmental immunity ..................................................................................... 20 

B. Governmental immunity bars Plaintiff’s state tort claims against 

Defendants Craig, Steenrod, Hart, and Stocker ................................................. 21 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 25 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Cases

Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1991) ..................................................... 9 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) ................................................................17 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) ................................................................. 5 

Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984) ............................................11 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) .................................................. 5 

City & County of San Francisco, Calif v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 

 1776 (2015) ........................................................................................................17 

City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) ........................................19 

Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F. 3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) ...................................... 7 

Costa v. Community Emergency Med Servs, Inc, 475 Mich. 403, 411; 

 716 N.W.2d 236 (2006) .....................................................................................23 

Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989) ............................................ 8 

Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996) .......................20 

Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir.1995) .............................................. 6 

Estate of Novack v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000) .................... 9 

Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002) ............................. 6 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) .......................................................... 7 

Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993) .....................20 

Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991) .........................................11 

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Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) ..................................7, 11

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1990) ................................................. 8 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ....................................................... 6 

Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982) ...............................................12 

Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 343 (8th Cir. 2011) ..............................................10 

Horn v. Madison Cty Fiscal Ct, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) ............................ 8 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) .............................................................. 6 

Isabella Co. v. Michigan, 181 Mich. App. 99, 105; 449 N.W.2d 111 (1989) .........21 

Jackson v. Cty of Saginaw, 458 Mich. 141, 148; 580 N.W.2d 870 (1998) .............21 

Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010–11 (7th Cir. 2006) ...............................10 

Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005) ............................................... 5 

Jones v. Pramstaller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623 (W.D. Mich. 2009) ......................24 

Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 698 (6th Cir. 2006) ..............................................19 

Knott v. Sullivan, 418 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2005) ........................................................13 

Leach v. Shelby Cty Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989) ...........................11 

Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1999) ............................................12 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) .............................................................. 6 

Miller v. Calhoun Cty, 408 F.3d 803, 817 (6th Cir. 2005) .......................................13 

Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 830–34 (7th Cir. 2010) ...................................... 8 

Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ................................20 

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Napier v. Madison County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir.2001) .................................. 5 

Payton v. Detroit, 211 Mich. App. 375, 392; 536 N.W.2d 233 (1995) ...................21 

Rakowski v. Sarb, 269 Mich. App. 619, 635–636; 713 N.W.2d 787 (2006) ...........25 

Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) .................................................17 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) ...............................................................11 

Ronayne v. Ficano, 173 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1999) ..................................................... 9 

Russell v. Dep't of Corrections, 234 Mich. App. 135, 137; 592 

 N.W.2d 125 (1999) ............................................................................................22 

Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir. 1995) ............................................ 9 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) ........................................................................ 6 

Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000) .........................................19 

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) ..............................................12 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017–20 (9th Cir.2010) ................ 8 

Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2009) ..................................................... 9 

Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997) ......................................... 7 

Summers v. Detroit, 206 Mich. App. 46, 48; 520 N.W.2d 356 (1994) ...................21 

Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) ......................................................17 

Vermilya v. Dunham, 195 Mich. App. 79; 489 N.W.2d 496 (1982) .......................22 

Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) ........................... 5 

Xu v. Gay, 257 Mich. App. 263, 271; 668 N.W.2d 166 (2003) ...............................25 

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Statutes

M.C.L. 691.1407(1) .................................................................................................20 

M.C.L. 691.1407(2) .................................................................................................21 

Other Authorities

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1990 .....................................................................22 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)................................................................................................... 4 

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

I. SHOULD THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST 

DEFENDANTS STEENROD, CRAIG, HART, AND STOCKER 

BE DISMISSED WHERE THESE DEFENDANTS ARE 

ENTITLED TO THE DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY? 

Plaintiff says: “No” 

Defendants say: “Yes.” 

II. SHOULD PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR MUNICIPAL 

LIABILITY AGAINST LENAWEE COUNTY BE DISMISSED 

WHERE THE DECEDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 

WERE NOT VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 

AND WHERE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE A VALID 

CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY? 

Plaintiff says: “No” 

Defendants say: “Yes.” 

III. SHOULD PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS BE 

DISMISSED WHERE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO 

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY? 

Plaintiff says: “No” 

Defendants say: “Yes.” 

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INTRODUCTION 

 This case arises out of the suicide of Daniel Pitts while incarcerated in the 

Lenawee County Jail. (Complaint, Ex. 1). As a result of Pitts’ death, Kelly Willey, 

Pitts’ mother and personal representative of his estate, filed a First Amended 

Complaint against Lenawee County, Capt. Steenrod, Lt. Craig, Sgt. Officer Hart, 

and Stocker. (Ex. 1). The First Amended Complaint alleges: Count I – Deliberate 

Indifference Stephen Stocker MSW; Count II – Deliberate Indifference Officers 

Hart, Craig, and Steenrod; Count III – Deliberate Indifference Lenawee County; 

Count IV– Gross Negligence Officers Hart, Steenrod, Craig and Stocker. (Ex. 1). 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Pitts’ Incarceration and Initial Evaluation 

 On January 4, 2013, Pitts was arrested and charged with ten counts of First 

Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, arising out of allegations that he molested his 15-

year-old daughter. (1/3/13 Warrant, Ex. 2).1 Upon arrival at the Jail, Pitts was placed 

on suicide watch and a psychological assessment was requested. (Request, Ex. 4). 

 On January 7, 2013, Defendant Stephen Stocker, Lenawee County’s mental 

health counselor, conducted an evaluation of Pitts to assess his mental status and 

suicidality. (1/7/13 Jail Contact Note, Ex. 5). Stocker concluded that Pitts could be 

removed from suicide watch status, based upon Pitts “denying active suicidal or 

 

1

 On July 20, 2013, Pitts was charged with 16 additional counts of First Degree CSC, 

arising out of the same circumstances. (7/20/13 Warrant, Ex. 3). 

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homicidal ideations, plans or intent,” and because Pitts signed a “Contract for 

Safety,” whereby he acknowledged he was not having any active thoughts of suicide 

and agreed he would immediately contact a mental health worker or corrections 

officer if he began to have any such thoughts. (Ex. 5; Contract for Safety, Ex. 6). 

Additional Charges and Suicide Threat 

 In October of 2013, Detective Dale Sharp was investigating allegations of 

witness intimidation against Pitts.2 During the investigation, Sharp spoke with 

another inmate, Herbert Sanders. It was believed that Pitts approached Sanders to 

have him intimidate the witnesses in Pitts’ CSC case so that it would not go to trial. 

(Dep. of Craig, Ex. 8, pg. 18). Sanders also told Sharp that Pitts said if his case went 

to trial, he would try to harm himself. (Ex. 8, pg. 17). Sharp relayed this information 

to Craig. (Ex. 8, pg. 17). 

 Craig then approached mental health and informed Stocker of Pitts’ alleged 

suicide threat.3 (10/16/13 Jail Contact Note, Ex. 9). As a result, Stocker put together 

a plan for monitoring and treatment of Pitts. (Ex. 9). Stocker’s plan included putting 

Pitts in an isolation cell and monitoring him with at least 30 minute checks starting 

 

2 On October 31, 2013, Pitts was officially charged with three counts of witness 

intimidation in connection with his CSC case. (10/31/13 Warrant, Ex. 7). 

3 Craig testified he received information regarding the threat from Detective Sharp, 

however, Stocker’s report indicates that Craig received the information from a 

family member of Pitts. (Ex. 8, pg. 17; Ex. 9). Such a dispute is immaterial, however, 

since it is admitted that Craig knew about Pitts’ alleged suicide threat. 

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the day before any court appearances, and continuing until a mental health 

evaluation could be completed. (Ex. 9). Therefore, since Pitts’ was scheduled for a 

preliminary exam on November 19, 2013, Stocker’s plan required putting Pitts on 

suicide watch starting November 18, 2013. (Ex. 9). 

Lenawee County Jail’s Razor Policy 

 Prior to Pitts’ incarceration, the razor policy provided that razors would be 

issued to male inmates between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m., Monday through Friday. (9/24/03 

Razor Policy, Ex. 12). However, in 2011, the policy was changed to allow razors to 

be passed Sunday through Thursday night, after lockdown.4 (1/6/13 Lockdown 

Razor Request Sheet, Ex. 13; Dep. of Steenrod, Ex. 14, pg. 16). This change was 

made because mornings are typically a very busy time, so “it just made more sense 

. . . to have it passed at a time that [the Officers] weren’t busy.” (Ex. 14, pg. 17). 

Other than the change from morning to evening for razor distribution, the policy 

remained the same. (Ex. 14, pg. 21). All inmates were entitled to request a razor, 

except those on suicide watch. (Ex. 14, pgs. 18, 24-25). 

Pitts’ Suicide 

 On November 12, 2013, Officers James Hart and Danielle Shillingsford 

passed out razors to those inmates that had made requests, pursuant to jail policy. 

 

4

 Although the amended policy has not been officially adopted, it was verbally 

ordered by Steenrod and has been followed since 2011. (Ex. 14, pgs. 19-21). 

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(11/12/13 Razor Request Sheet, Ex. 15; Dep. of Hart, Ex. 10, pg. 17). Pitts had 

requested a razor. (Ex. 15). At that time, Pitts was not on suicide watch and mental 

health had not suggested that Pitts was a suicide risk or that precautions should be 

taken. (Ex. 9). As such, Hart passed out a razor to Pitts.

 Approximately thirty minutes later, Hart entered A-1 block (where Pitts was 

housed) to retrieve the razor. Upon arriving at Pitts’ cell, Hart noticed a tremendous 

amount of blood on the walls and floor, with Pitts lying face down on the floor. (Ex. 

10, pg. 21). Hart immediately radioed for assistance. (Ex. 10, pg. 21). Hebert, the 

jail nurse and Shillingsford responded. (Ex. 10, pg. 22; Dep. of Hebert, Ex. 11, pgs. 

52-53). When they entered the cell, Pitts was “thrashing about” and saying: “Leave 

me alone, let me go, it’s my time to go.” (Ex. 11, pg. 55). The Officers were finally 

able to restrain Pitts, while the nurse put pressure on his wounds. (Ex. 11, pgs. 55-

57). When the EMTs arrived, the Officers turned control of Pitts over to them. (Ex. 

11, pg. 60). Pitts was pronounced dead at the hospital at 1:10 a.m. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” This standard can be met either by submitting affirmative 

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim, or by 

demonstrating that the nonmovant’s evidence itself is insufficient to establish an 

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essential element of the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an essential element to his claims. Id. To satisfy this 

burden, the nonmovant cannot rest on the pleadings, but must by documentary 

evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

LAW AND ARGUMENT

 As an initial matter, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ actions were in 

violation of the decedent’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment. (Ex 1, ¶¶ 41-42). However, Eighth Amendment rights do not 

apply to pretrial detainees. Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th 

Cir. 2001); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). It is only the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that guarantees pretrial detainees are not 

unnecessarily and wantonly subjected to pain by jail personnel. Napier v. Madison 

County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir.2001). 

I. DEFENDANTS STEENROD, CRAIG, HART, AND STOCKER ARE 

ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. 

 In the specific context of a § 1983 action, the non-moving party “must 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the following ‘two elements: 1) 

the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States 

and 2) [that] the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.’” 

Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005)(quoting Ellison v. Garbarino, 

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6 

48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir.1995)). As there is no dispute that Defendants in this case 

acted under color of state law, this Court’s inquiry must focus on whether there was 

an actionable deprivation of a right. 

 The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that “government officials 

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity ordinarily applies unless 

it is obvious that no reasonably competent official would have concluded that the 

actions taken were unlawful. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th 

Cir. 2002). Qualified immunity “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by 

protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 

341 (1986)). Qualified immunity applies irrespective of whether the official’s error 

was a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of 

law and fact. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009). 

 To assess whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a two-part 

analysis is generally used. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).5

 First, the Court 

 

5 While the Supreme Court has since held that this two-step analysis is no longer 

mandatory, it “continue[s] to recognize that [the Saucier protocol] is often 

beneficial.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

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must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts which, when taken in the light 

most favorable to him, show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Id. at 201. If the violation of a constitutional right cannot be established, “there is no 

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. Second, the Court 

must determine whether the right was clearly established. Id. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Craig, Steenrod, Hart, and Stocker were 

deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s serious medical needs when they failed to 

provide him with adequate medical care. The Fourteenth Amendment gives pre-trial 

detainees a right to adequate medical treatment. Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 

612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005). A constitutional claim for inadequate medical care has 

objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); 

Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 

F. 3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). The objective component requires the existence of a 

“sufficiently serious” medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The subjective 

component requires a plaintiff to show that officials have “a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind in denying medical care,” which is normally defined as “deliberate 

indifference.” Id.

 Deliberate indifference is a very high standard – a showing of simple 

negligence or even heightened negligence is not sufficient. Stemler v. City of 

Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 

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(4th Cir. 1990). The official’s state of mind must evince “deliberateness tantamount 

to intent to punish.” Horn v. Madison Cty Fiscal Ct, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994). 

“Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the 

existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.” Id. Thus, 

“an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but 

did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as 

the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

 Prison and jail officials need only take reasonable precautions to prevent 

inmate suicide; they do not insure or guarantee the life of a prisoner. See Danese v. 

Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[N]either the plaintiffs nor the district 

court cite any cases holding that there exists a clearly established right to . . . suicide 

prevention facilities”). Even if a prison official has perceived a serious suicide risk, 

that official “may still prevail if he responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm 

ultimately was not averted.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 706 (6th Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 

824, 830–34 (7th Cir. 2010) (though inmate committed suicide, it was not shown 

that the medical staff disregarded any subjective knowledge that the inmate would 

kill himself—the inmate had denied suicidal thoughts and appeared alert); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017–20 (9th Cir. 2010)(detainee's suicide 

did not give rise to a claim of deliberate indifference even when detainee did not 

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9 

receive daily evaluations as required by suicide prevention policy, had been allowed 

to collect the gauze he hung himself with, had been downgraded in suicide watch 

status, and had not been checked on every 15 minutes as required under policy); 

Estate of Novack v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000) (no deliberate 

indifference liability where defendants were told that the decedent was a suicide risk 

and, after placing him in an observation cell for a couple of days, defendants placed 

him in the general prison population; defendants took some action, even though it 

was not successful). 

A. Defendants cannot be held liable because they reasonably relied upon 

the professional judgment of the mental health counselor, Stephen Stocker. 

 

 “‘[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or 

safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even 

if the harm ultimately was not averted.’” Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). Non-medical officials, such as the 

County Defendants, act reasonably when they rely on the judgment of the 

correctional facility’s medical and mental health staff. See Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 

249, 255 (6th Cir. 2009)(determining that officer was entitled to rely on jail nurse’s 

medical assessment that plaintiff did not need to be transported to the hospital). See 

also Ronayne v. Ficano, 173 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Supervisory officials are 

entitled to rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for 

prisoner care”); Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1991) (officials were 

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entitled to rely on judgment of prison psychiatrist that attacker did not pose serious 

threat to other inmates because of his mental condition); Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 

336, 343 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that prison officials were entitled to rely upon a 

nurse's medical opinion); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010–11 (7th Cir. 

2006) (finding no deliberate indifference when prison official made sure the medical 

staff was addressing the issue and deferred to their judgment). 

 Here, Defendants reasonably relied on the professional judgment of the Jail’s 

mental health professional, Stephen Stocker. On October 16, 2013, based upon the 

alleged threat by Pitts that he would “kill himself if his case went to trial,” Stocker 

assessed his case and formulated a mental health plan that required Pitts to be put on 

suicide watch the day before and the day after any scheduled court appearances. (Ex. 

9). Based upon Stocker’s conclusion that the threat of suicide was contingent on 

Pitts’ case going to trial, Stocker concluded that Pitts was not suicidal at that time. 

(Dep. of Stocker, Ex. 16, pg. 91). Stocker concluded precautions were necessary 

around any days Pitts was going to court and not just his trial, “[j]ust to be on the 

safe side.” (Ex. 16, pg. 93). There is absolutely no evidence that any of the 

Defendants were aware of any other threats or statements from Pitts regarding 

suicide. As such, Defendants reasonably relied on the assessment of the Jail’s mental 

health professional as to Pitts’ mental health status. Such circumstances are 

insufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference. 

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B. There is no evidence the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. 

 Personal liability on any of the Defendants must be based solely on the 

individual actions of each Defendant in the situation that the Defendant faced. 

Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991). 

Although it may appear from the facts that [plaintiff] was a victim of the 

bureaucracy as a whole and that no person took care to see that her 

situation was dealt with, rather than "passing the buck," this theory cannot 

suffice to affix personal liability on any of the defendants. If any one of 

them is to be held liable, it must be based on the actions of that defendant 

in the situation that the defendant faced, and not based on any problems 

caused by the errors of others, either defendants or non-defendants. 

“[T]he test for deliberate indifference is a subjective test . . . not an objective test for 

collective knowledge.” Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005). 

Therefore, the focus must be on the action of each Defendant in turn. 

 Captain James Steenrod. To establish personal liability in a § 1983 action,

plaintiff must show that the individual defendant was personally responsible for the 

deprivation of a constitutional right. Id. A defendant cannot be personally liable 

under a theory of respondeat superior – officials can only be personally liable for 

their own unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); 

Leach v. Shelby Cty Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989); Bellamy v. Bradley, 

729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 Liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more than merely the 

right to control employees and cannot be based on simple negligence. Bellamy, 729 

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F.2d at 421; Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982). In order for 

liability to attach, Plaintiff must prove that Steenrod did more than play a passive 

role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the alleged misconduct. 

Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. Plaintiff must show that Steenrod “‘either encouraged the 

specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’” 

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)(quoting Hays, supra at 874). 

“At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the [supervisor] at least implicitly 

authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of 

the offending officers.” Id. See also Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 

421. Furthermore, supervisory liability cannot attach where the allegation is based 

upon a mere failure to act. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. Instead, the liability must be 

based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Id. 

 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish any personal involvement of 

Steenrod. To the contrary, Steenrod testified he never had any interaction with Pitts, 

and was not aware of Pitts prior to being notified of his suicide. (Ex. 14, pgs. 25-26). 

Instead, Plaintiff seems to be asserting Steenrod is liable in a supervisory capacity. 

However, this is not the type of personal involvement required for individual liability 

in §1983 cases. See Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1999). 

 Steenrod has been the Lenawee County Jail commander since 1997. (Ex. 14, 

pg. 3). As commander, he has very limited involvement with the jail population; his 

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day-to-day activities usually involve budgetary issues, technological issues and 

contract review. (Ex. 14, pgs. 27-28). Steenrod never had any direct contact with 

Pitts and was not aware of Pitts’ prior mental health evaluations. (Ex. 14, pg. 26). 

These facts alone are enough to defeat the individual capacity claim. See Knott v. 

Sullivan, 418 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Calhoun Cty, 408 F.3d 803, 817 

(6th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show that Steenrod either 

encouraged or participated in the alleged specific acts of misconduct. Plaintiff’s 

allegations of liability are based only on Steenrod’s alleged failure to act, which is 

insufficient. 

 Lieutenant James Craig. Likewise, there is no evidence of deliberate 

indifference on the part of Craig. Craig is the assistant jail commander at the Jail. 

His role consists of day-to-day jail operations, supervising sergeants, and 

supervising the courthouse, bailiffs, deputies and transport officers who work at the 

courthouse. (Ex. 8, pg. 5). Although Craig was aware that Pitts had been put on 

suicide watch in January 2013, he was also aware Pitts had been evaluated by mental 

health at that time and taken off suicide watch thereafter. (Ex. 8, pg. 16). 

 In October of 2013, Craig was informed that an inmate had told Detective 

Sharp that Pitts said he would harm himself if his case went to trial. (Ex. 8, pg. 17). 

As a result, Craig contacted mental health to report the issue and ensure Pitts would 

be evaluated by Stocker. (Ex. 8, pg. 17). Even after Stocker created a plan for Pitts, 

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Craig notified Stocker that there were concerns Pitts should be evaluated more 

immediately due to the suicide threats. (Jail Inmate Activity Log, Ex. 17, pg. 2). 

Such conduct does not support a finding of deliberate indifference. To the contrary, 

Craig exhibited a concern for Pitts’ well-being and made sure steps were being taken 

so that he would be evaluated by mental health personnel. 

Officer James Hart. There is also nothing in the record to suggest that 

Officer Hart acted with the requisite intent to support a claim of deliberate 

indifference. On the night in question, Officer Hart passed out the razor to Pitts 

because his name was on the razor list. (Ex. 10, p. 17-18). At that time, Pitts was not 

placed on suicide watch. (Ex. 9). Officer Hart had absolutely no knowledge that Pitts 

had ever made any suicidal remarks. (Ex. 10, p. 18-19). He also had no knowledge 

that there were any issues regarding Pitts’ mental state. (Ex. 10, p. 31). Officer Hart 

testified in his deposition that he would not hand out a razor to someone that he 

thought was suicidal. (Ex. 10, p. 16). Officer Hart’s actions do not indicate a 

“deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish” and thus fail to rise to the level of 

deliberate indifference. 

 Stephen Stocker, MSW. Stephen Stocker’s conduct also does not rise to the 

level of deliberate indifference. On January 7, 2013, Stocker received a request for 

a psychological assessment on Pitts and set up an evaluation for the same day. (Ex. 

16, pp. 40-41). Stocker interviewed Pitts for about twenty-seven minutes using a 

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standard form that contains a series of questions as a guide for the interview. (Ex. 

16, pp. 63, 73). During this evaluation, Pitts denied any history of psychiatric 

diagnosis, treatment, and any history of psychiatric hospitalization. (Ex. 16, p. 79). 

After this interview, Stocker concluded that Pitts was not suicidal and took him off 

suicide watch status. (Ex. 16, p. 81). 

 On October 16, 2013, Stocker was approached by Lieutenant Craig and 

informed that Pitts’ family members indicated that he had made a threat to commit 

suicide if his case went to trial. (Ex. 16, p. 85). 

C. Daniel Pitts’ suicide threat was conditional and lacked immediacy. 

It is important to highlight the fact that Pitts’ suicide threat was conditional 

and it lacked immediacy. It is vital to draw the distinction between the conditional 

threat and how a jail mental health counselor deals with a conditional threat as 

opposed to an immediate threat. Pitts told another inmate that if his case went to 

trial, he would try to harm himself. (Ex. 8, p. 17). A conditional threat is 

distinguishable from a direct threat. MARY E. O’TOOLE, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A

THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 7 (2000) (FBI distinguished contingent threat 

from direct, indirect, and veiled threats) (Exhibit 19). Specifically, individuals who 

make conditional threats regarding suicide are less likely to actually commit suicide. 

Michael T. Lambert, Seven-Year Outcomes of Patients Evaluated for Suicidality, 53 

PSYCHIATRY Services 92, 93 (2002)(A study of 137 patients who presented with 

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suicidality revealed that the number of serious suicide attempts including completed 

suicides was significantly higher among patients in the non-contingent group than 

among those in the contingent group) (Exhibit 20). Stocker’s understanding of the 

situation was only that Pitts made conditional threats that centered on his case going 

to trial. 

Based on this knowledge and understanding of conditional threats, Stocker 

concluded that Pitts was not immediately suicidal at that time, however, Stocker 

developed a safety plan of action to address Pitts’ contingent suicidal threats 

regarding trial. (Ex. 16, pp. 86, 91). This plan required Pitts to be put on suicide 

watch the day before and the day after any scheduled court appearances. (Ex. 9; Ex. 

16, p. 89). Furthermore, even though Pitts’ contingent threat was made about going 

to trial, Stocker put precautions around any times that Pitts had a court date to be on 

the safe side. (Ex. 16, p. 93). Stocker assessed Pitts and his contingent threats and 

addressed this with a specific plan to protect Pitts. This conduct does not rise to the 

level of deliberate indifference because it is not so deliberate as to be tantamount to 

the intent to punish. 

 The evidence here simply does not show that any of the Defendants 

deliberately, recklessly, or consciously disregarded the health or safety of Pitts. 

Rather, the evidence shows that the Defendants took measures to avoid any risk to 

Pitts’ well-being by seeking an assessment from the mental health professional and 

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by planning to follow the plan put in place for Pitts’ safety. Under the circumstances, 

Defendants’ response does not amount to a conscious disregard for Pitts’ serious 

medical needs and therefore does not violate his constitutional rights. As such, 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

D. There is no clearly established right to suicide prevention measures. 

 “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every 

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015)(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. 

Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing 

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011). The Supreme Court has instructed courts 

“not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” City & County 

of San Francisco, Calif v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015). 

 In Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015), the Supreme Court recently 

held that there was no clearly established right to suicide prevention measures in 

prisons and emphasized the importance of the “clearly established” prong of 

qualified immunity. In that case, Barkes was arrested for violating probation, and 

taken to a Wilmington Delaware Correctional Institution. During intake, a nurse 

conducted a suicide screening. Barkes disclosed that he had a history of psychiatric 

treatment and was on medication and that he had attempted suicide in 2003, but 

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stated that he was not currently thinking about killing himself. Because only two risk 

factors were apparent, the nurse gave Barkes a “routine” referral to mental health 

services and did not initiate special suicide prevention measures. Barkes was placed 

in a cell by himself. The next morning, correctional officers discovered that Barkes 

had hanged himself with a sheet. His wife sued officials, alleging violation of 

Barkes’ constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by failing 

to supervise and monitor the nurse. 

 The Third Circuit held that it was clearly established that an incarcerated 

individual had an Eighth Amendment “right to the proper implementation of 

adequate suicide prevention protocols” and that there were material factual disputes. 

However, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding that the officials were 

entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court explained that, “[n]o decision of 

this Court establishes a right to the proper implementation of adequate suicide 

prevention protocols. No decision of this Court even discusses suicide screening or 

prevention protocols.” Id. at 2044. Therefore, even if the Institution’s suicide 

screening and prevention measures had the alleged shortcomings, no precedent 

would have made clear to the officials that they were overseeing a system that 

violated the Constitution. 

 In the present case, Plaintiff is arguing that Defendants are liable for failing to 

adequately screen the decedent for suicide risks and for failing to implement and/or 

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follow adequate suicide prevention protocols. As the Supreme Court held in Taylor, 

such a right is not clearly established. Accordingly, even if Defendants’ conduct was 

deliberately indifferent, they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AGAINST 

LENAWEE COUNTY SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 

A. A determination that the individual Defendants did not violate the 

decedent’s rights resolves the claim against the County as well. 

 A determination that none of the individual Defendants violated the 

decedent’s constitutional rights resolves any claim against the County as well. See 

City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)(determining that “neither 

[Monell] nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against a 

municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact . . . the 

officer inflicted no constitutional harm”). See also Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 

698 (6th Cir. 2006); Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, 

since no constitutional violation by the individual Defendants has been established, 

Lenawee County cannot be held liable under §1983. 

B. Plaintiff has failed to allege a valid claim of municipal liability against 

the County. 

 Although Plaintiff names Lenawee County in the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to 

assert any allegations specific to the County. It is well-settled that municipalities can 

be held liable under § 1983 only where the action of the municipality itself can be 

said to have caused the harm, as when “the action that is alleged to be 

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unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, 

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell v. 

Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To attach such liability to the 

municipality, a plaintiff must allege “a direct causal link between the custom and the 

constitutional deprivation,” Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th 

Cir. 1996), by injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Garner v. 

Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993). 

 Here, Plaintiff has entirely failed to allege that the decedent’s rights were 

violated due to a policy or custom of Lenawee County, and therefore has failed to 

meet this requirement. The County cannot be sued merely on the theory that it 

employed a person or persons who violated Plaintiff's civil rights. Monell, 436 U.S. 

at 691 (“a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasoror, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 

superior theory.”). Accordingly, any claims against the County should be dismissed. 

III. THE STATE LAW CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 

A. The claims against the County are barred by governmental immunity. 

 The governmental tort liability act (GTLA) provides that “a governmental 

agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the 

exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” M.C.L. 691.1407(1). It is well 

settled that tort actions against a municipality based on the negligence of its officers, 

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occurring while the officer is engaged in a discharge of that function, are barred by 

the doctrine of governmental immunity. Isabella Co. v. Michigan, 181 Mich. App. 

99, 105; 449 N.W.2d 111 (1989). 

 Lenawee County is a municipal corporation entitled to the protection of the 

statute. Summers v. Detroit, 206 Mich. App. 46, 48; 520 N.W.2d 356 (1994). The

operation and maintenance of a jail constitutes a governmental function for which a 

governmental agency is immune from suit. Jackson v. Cty of Saginaw, 458 Mich. 

141, 148; 580 N.W.2d 870 (1998). Plaintiff alleges Defendants were acting within 

the scope of their employment at all times pertinent to the Complaint. Thus, the state 

law claims against the County are barred by governmental immunity. 

B. Governmental immunity bars Plaintiff’s state tort claims against 

Defendants Steenrod, Craig, Hart, and Stocker. 

 Under Michigan law, law enforcement officers who allegedly cause an injury 

during the course of their employment are immune from tort liability if they were 

acting within the scope of their authority, their agency was engaged in a 

governmental function, and they were not grossly negligent. M.C.L. 691.1407(2). 

 In the present case, Defendants were engaged in the detention of the decedent, 

which is a quintessential governmental function. Payton v. Detroit, 211 Mich. App. 

375, 392; 536 N.W.2d 233 (1995). There “are few functions more clearly 

governmental in nature than the arrest, detention, and prosecution, of persons 

suspected of having committed a crime, and the decisions involved in determining 

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which suspects should be prosecuted and which should be released.” Id. at 392. 

Furthermore, governmental immunity embraces all activities that are incidents of 

operating a jail. See Russell v. Dep't of Corrections, 234 Mich. App. 135, 137; 592 

N.W.2d 125 (1999). Because Plaintiff is alleging tort liability arising from the 

decedent’s incarceration, Defendants were engaged in a governmental function. 

 The third element, existence or non-existence of gross negligence, is a 

determination that can be made as a matter of law if the Court finds that reasonable 

minds could not differ as to whether the Defendants’ conduct constituted gross 

negligence. See Vermilya v. Dunham, 195 Mich. App. 79; 489 N.W.2d 496 (1982). 

As employees of the County, Defendants are entitled to immunity from tort liability 

unless Plaintiff can establish that their conduct amounted to “gross negligence,” i.e. 

conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an 

injury results. “Reckless” is defined as: 

The state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its 

probability or possibly injurious consequences, or which, through foreseeing 

such consequences, persists in spite of such knowledge. Recklessness is a 

stronger term than mere ordinary negligence and to be reckless, the 

conduct must be such as to evidence disregard of or indifference to 

consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety to 

others . . . 

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1990 (emphasis added). Therefore, to establish 

gross negligence the evidence must demonstrate that “the contested conduct was 

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substantially more than negligent.” Costa v. Community Emergency Med Servs, Inc, 

475 Mich. 403, 411; 716 N.W.2d 236 (2006). 

 Here, the evidence dispels any notion that the Defendants were grossly 

negligent as defined by the statute. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were grossly 

negligent because they failed to place Pitts on suicide watch and failed to ensure his 

safety. The evidence does not support such a contention. 

 As stated above, Captain Steenrod did not have any personal interaction with 

Pitts. To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a claim for failing to train or supervise, 

there is nothing in the record to support such a claim. Steenrod testified that there is 

a jail policy in place with respect to when someone learns that an inmate may be 

suicidal, and there is a procedure in place for communicating this information to the 

sergeants. (Ex. 14, pgs. 8-11). Furthermore, the record establishes that the Jail’s 

correction officers go through suicide awareness training, both at the corrections 

academy and annually at the Lenawee County Jail. (Ex. 8, pgs. 7-8). 

 Likewise, Lt. Craig was not grossly negligent. When Craig was informed that 

Pitts said he would kill himself if his case went to trial, Craig contacted Stocker, the 

Jail’s mental health counselor. As a result, Stocker created a plan to ensure Pitts’ 

safety. (Ex. 9). Even after the plan was created, Craig notified Stocker there were 

concerns that Pitts should be evaluated more immediately due to the suicide threats. 

(Ex. 9, pg. 2). Stocker, the mental health professional, concluded that Pitts should 

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only be monitored remotely at that time “because no documentation or absolute 

confirmation has been made that [Pitts] made suicide threats, at this time.” (Ex. 9). 

It was not grossly negligent for Defendants to rely upon Stocker’s evaluation and 

professional judgment. See generally Jones v. Pramstaller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623 

(W.D. Mich. 2009)(Just as “supervisory prison officials are entitled to rely on the 

professional judgment of trained medical personnel,” they are also presumptively 

entitled to rely on the judgment and representations of other subordinates in the areas 

in which those subordinates are trained and assigned). 

 The evidence also negates Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim against Offier 

Hart and Stephen Stocker. Officer James Hart passed out a razor to Pitts because his 

name was on the razor list. (Exhibit 10, pp. 17-18). Officer Hart had absolutely no 

knowledge that Pitts had ever made any suicidal remarks and had no knowledge that 

there were any issues regarding Pitts’ mental state. (Ex. 10, pp. 18-19, 31). Stephen 

Stocker developed a specific safety plan of action after he learned of Pitts’ 

conditional suicide threats about going to trial. (ex. 16, p. 86). This plan required 

that Pitts be placed on suicide watch the day before and the day after any scheduled 

court appearances. (Ex. 9; Ex. 16, p. 89). Precautions were placed around any court 

date, even if it was not a trial date to be on the safe side. (Ex. 16, p. 93). None of this 

conduct supports a finding of gross negligence. 

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 To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing the Defendants failed to follow the old 

policy regarding razor distribution, evidence of an actor’s failure to follow proper 

procedures or comply with general standards or policies does not create a question 

of fact regarding gross negligence. See Rakowski v. Sarb, 269 Mich. App. 619, 635–

636; 713 N.W.2d 787 (2006)(upholding grant of summary disposition where 

evidence showing ramp was constructed in violation of construction standards and 

a national building code constituted evidence of ordinary negligence only). See also 

Xu v. Gay, 257 Mich. App. 263, 271; 668 N.W.2d 166 (2003), Maiden, 461 Mich. 

at 125–128. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish gross negligence, and 

Defendants are entitled to governmental immunity. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants, LENAWEE COUNTY, 

LIEUTENANT JAMES CRAIG, CAPTAIN DENNIS STEENROD, OFFICER 

JAMES HART and STEPHEN STOCKER, MSW, respectfully request that this 

Honorable Court grant their Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56, thereby dismissing the Complaint in its entirety. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ James R. Acho 

Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.L.C. 

33900 Schoolcraft Road, Livonia, MI 48150 

(734) 261-2400 Attorneys for Defendants 

Email: jacho@cmda-law.com

Dated: March 7, 2016 (P62175) 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 7, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of 

the Court using the ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record 

via the Court’s e-filing system. 

 /s/ James R. Acho 

Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.L.C. 

33900 Schoolcraft 

Livonia, MI 48150 

 (734) 261-2400 

 E-mail: jacho@cmda-law.com 

 P-62175 

L:\jar - Jen Richards\Pitts\Renewed MSJ.docx 

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