1 

2022 IL App (5th) 210307-U 

NO. 5-21-0307 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re ESTATE OF WILLIAM A. SCHROEDER, ) Appeal from the

Deceased ) Circuit Court of

 ) Jackson County. 

(Carrollton Bank, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 16-P-68 

 ) 

David H. Schroeder, as Independent Administrator ) 

of the Estate of William A. Schroeder, Deceased, ) Honorable 

 ) Ella L. York,

 Respondent-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The order of the circuit court of Jackson County denying Carrollton Bank’s petition 

for citations to recover assets from the beneficiaries of the decedent’s trust is hereby 

affirmed where any recovery is barred under the equitable doctrines of laches and

avoidable consequences. 

¶ 2 This is an appeal from the Jackson County circuit court’s order filed September 27, 2021, 

denying the petition filed by the petitioner, Carrollton Bank (bank), for citations to recover assets. 

The case arises from the administration of the estate of William A. Schroeder, deceased. The bank, 

a creditor of the decedent’s estate, filed the petition seeking the recovery of five trust assets 

distributed to the beneficiaries of the decedent’s trust (Schroeder Trust) in order to satisfy the 

NOTICE

Decision filed 11/02/22. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

outstanding debt of $290,000 owed on two promissory notes that were personally guaranteed by 

the decedent. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The decedent died on August 28, 2016. Prior to his death, he executed his last will and 

testament and a declaration of trust on April 21, 2015. The will named the Schroeder Trust as the 

beneficiary of his residual estate. The trust was amended on February 5, 2016, and June 10, 2016. 

The will was admitted into probate on September 19, 2016. On February 8, 2017, the bank filed 

a claim against the estate for $632,961.05 owed on two promissory notes made by WAAL 

Investments, LLC (WAAL) and personally guaranteed by the decedent. 

¶ 5 The first promissory note, executed on December 17, 2013, loaned WAAL $387,308.10 

and was personally guaranteed by the deceased. The second promissory note, executed on October 

22, 2014, loaned WAAL an additional $375,000 and was also personally guaranteed by the 

decedent. 

¶ 6 On July 10, 2018, the bank filed a motion for entry of order for allowance of claim. On 

August 7, 2018, the trial court entered an order allowing the bank’s claim against the estate. On 

October 23, 2018, an inventory of the decedent’s estate was filed. On November 6, 2018, the court 

granted the bank’s petition for current account. On January 3, 2019, an amendment to the 

inventory was filed. On January 2, 2019, the executor of the decedent’s estate filed an interim 

account, which showed payments made to the bank on September 14, 2017, for $20,714.57; 

October 4, 2017, for $12,661.54; November 15, 2017, for $6330.77; December 19, 2017, for 

$6330.77; January 26, 2018, for $6330.77; March 6, 2018, for $12,660.94; and April 25, 2018, for 

$12,661.68. No other payments are noted through November 30, 2018. The interim account 

showed the estate’s balance to be $11,053.15. 
3 

¶ 7 On April 11, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting the bank’s petition for removal 

of executor and for citation to show cause, which removed Amy Curry as the executor of the 

decedent’s estate for cause pursuant to section 23-2 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/23-2 

(West 2018)). The final account filed on May 2, 2019, showed no additional payments made to 

the bank through April 11, 2019.

¶ 8 On October 14, 2020, the bank filed a petition for citations to recover assets. The petition 

iterated that an unsatisfied claim against the estate remained in the amount of $290,000. The 

petition sought recovery of the following assets by the estate: (1) an undivided one-third interest 

in 100 acres, Wayne County, Illinois, transferred to David Schroeder and Matthew Schroeder on 

October 3, 2017; (2) a residence at 27 Pinewood Drive, Carbondale, Illinois, transferred to David 

Schroeder on February 7, 2018; (3) an undivided one-half interest in 120 acres located in Marion 

County, Illinois, transferred to Elizabeth Patterson in 2017; (4) 60 acres in Marion County, Illinois, 

transferred to Paul Schroeder, trustee of the Schroeder Family Trust (Family Trust); and (5) cash 

in the amount of $485,000 distributed to Paul Schroeder, trustee of the Family Trust. The petition 

noted that a letter was received from David Schroeder, the administrator of the estate, in which he 

refused to seek recovery of assets from the trust to pay the estate’s claims on July 7, 2020, and the 

bank therefore sought an order from the trial court authorizing the issuance of citations to recover 

assets requiring the beneficiaries of the trust to return the aforementioned assets to the estate. 

¶ 9 On May 12, 2021, the respondents, David Schroeder, Matthew Schroeder, Elizabeth 

Patterson, and Paul Schroeder, filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the petition for citations 

to recover assets. The following affirmative defenses were cited as to why the recovery sought by 

the bank should be barred: (1) the claim was filed outside the statute of limitations provided in 

section 505(a)(6) of the Illinois Trust Code (760 ILCS 3/505(a)(6) (West 2020)); (2) the recovery 
4 

sought was barred by the doctrine of laches where the bank waited an unreasonably long time to 

bring the cause of action despite its knowledge of the transfers, which was prejudical to the 

respondents (specifically, that the bank waited until October 14, 2020, to file its petition seeking 

recovery of trust assets—approximately 21⁄2 to 3 years after the transfer of said assets); (3) recovery 

was barred by the doctrine of waiver where delay in seeking recovery resulted in the bank waiving 

its right to bring the cause of action; (4) the bank failed to mitigate its damages in delaying to file 

the cause of action; (5) recovery should be barred where the bank had unclean hands in waiting an 

unreasonably long time in seeking recovery; and (6) recovery would result in the bank being 

unjustly enriched where it was seeking to recover more than it was entitled asit sought the recovery 

of assets worth more than the amount still owed. 

¶ 10 On May 14, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the motion.1

 As to the petition for 

citation to recover assets, David Schroeder, the decedent’s son, testified that he was made executor 

of the decedent’s estate after Amy Curry, the original executor named in the decedent’s will, was 

removed by the trial court. He testified that he received from the Schroeder Trust property in 

Carbondale located at 27 Pinewood Drive, one-sixth interest in a 100-acre farm located in Wayne 

County,2 and one-tenth of the value of coins located in a safe deposit box later sold at auction for 

approximately $600,000. The property on Pinewood was appraised at $210,000; the farm was 

appraised at $3300 per acre, valuing his one-sixth share at $55,000. After the decedent’s death, 

the Family Trust was created. The assets of the Schroeder Trust went to the Family Trust. It was 

his understanding that his four siblings and he shared equally in the Family Trust. He received the 

1

The court also ruled on the motion addressed in case No. 5-21-0163. In this appeal, we will only 

address those portions of the hearing relevant to the issues in this case.

2

David, his brother Matthew, and the decedent each owned a one-third interest in the property prior 

to the decedent’s death, and so David gained one-half of the deceased’s one-third interest at the time of his 

death.
5 

farm on October 3, 2017, and the Pinewood property on January 31, 2018, in accordance with the 

terms of the decedent’s will. The conveyance of the Pinewood property was recorded on February 

21, 2018. An inventory of the estate was filed in 2018, after both conveyances had already 

occurred. 

¶ 11 Paul Schroeder, the decedent’s brother, testified that he was a co-trustee along with Curry 

of the Schroeder Trust. He explained that there were 10 beneficiaries of the trust. In order to 

properly divide the trust, which contained the coin collection and properties, evenly amongst the 

10 beneficiaries, it was decided that the trust would liquidate all assets and then the cash proceeds

from the sale of the assets could be split 10 ways evenly. He was to be responsible for selling the 

coin collection and Curry was responsible for selling the properties. He eventually became aware, 

prior to her removal as trustee, that she had ceased making payments to the bank on the outstanding 

loan and disputes with Curry led to the trust modification, which also created the Family Trust. At 

the time the loan was executed between the bank and WAAL, it was his understanding that there 

was at least $350,000 in equity in WAAL, and the estate had between $150,000 and $200,000 in 

assets. Therefore, he argued that, had the bank been prudent in collecting the loan, there would 

have been sufficient assets to cover the debt. It was his understanding based on correspondence 

with Greg Heggemeier and the bank’s counsel that Curry missed the payments on behalf of WAAL 

in July, August, and September 2017. Curry then used estate assets, rather than WAAL’s assets, 

to pay back the past due amount owed for those three months. He also noted that, under the terms 

of the loan, it was immediately in default upon a change in management. Therefore, the loan was 

in default immediately upon the death of the decedent, and the bank could have, at that time, sought 

foreclosure or additional financial information. 
6 

¶ 12 Paul testified that the 60-acre property located in Marion was transferred to the Family 

Trust and the deed was recorded on June 4, 2018; that property was appraised for approximately 

$186,000. The one-half interest in the 120-acre farm in Marion County was appraised at $192,000, 

it was sold in May 2020, and the deed was recorded on June 5, 2020. The estate assets also 

included two coin collections, one worth between $80,000 and $88,000 and the other worth 

approximately $600,000. Once the specific bequests were distributed, he sold the remaining coins, 

netting approximately $604,000 or $605,000. In May 2018, approximately $485,000 from the 

proceeds of the coin collection was transferred from the Schroeder Trust to the Family Trust, of 

which he was the only trustee. Additionally, the farm located in Jackson County was sold for 

approximately $160,000, which was also transferred to the Family Trust, totaling $664,000 that 

was transferred from the Schroeder Trust to the Family Trust. However, only the proceeds from 

the sale of the coin collection were distributed amongst all five beneficiaries; the proceeds from 

the land sale went directly to two of the decedent’s children as the land had been earmarked for 

them by the decedent. After satisfying the costs associated with the Family Trust, the entire 

principal amount was distributed amongst the five beneficiaries during 2018 and 2019. The only 

remaining asset in the Family Trust was the 60-acre farm in Marion County. 

¶ 13 Paul recounted his observations of Curry’s subpar performance in acting as executor, cotrustee of the Schroeder Trust, and in managing WAAL, which at the time of the decedent’s death 

was valued between $950,000 and $1 million, an excess of approximately $300,000 due on the 

loan. In September 2017, the bank sent Curry a letter warning her that if she did not pay $60,000 

in addition to keeping the loan current, it was going to bring legal action. He expected the bank to 

sue Curry for the amount owed on the loan. The bank did not take legal action and instead allowed 
7 

Curry to renew the loans. Once she again fell behind on the loan payments, the bank finally took 

legal action. 

¶ 14 Matthew Schroeder, the decedent’s son, testified that he received his one-fifth share of the 

$485,000 distributed by the Family Trust, some coins that were held in a safety deposit box 

appraised at approximately $40,000, a portion of an IRA, and a one-sixth interest in land that his 

brother David received. 

¶ 15 Patricia Hoke, attorney for the decedent’s estate and the Schroeder Trust, testified that in 

July 2017, she had a conversation with the bank’s counsel wherein she told him that between 

WAAL’s assets and the estate’s assets, there should be enough assets to pay the bank’s claim. She 

also sent an email with an inventory of WAAL’s assets, showing the decedent’s 99% ownership 

interest valued at $944,000. She denied making any statement that the trust assets would be used 

to pay the loan as there were sufficient funds to pay the loan from WAAL’s assets. 

¶ 16 Heggemeier, the bank’s senior vice president, testified that the bank filed a claim against 

the decedent’s estate in excess of $600,000 for payment of the WAAL promissory notes that were 

personally guaranteed by the decedent. He admitted that, at the time of the decedent’s death, the 

bank’s rights included the right to demand financial information from WAAL, rent rolls, and tax 

returns. Though these things were requested, they were not timely received from Curry. He also 

acknowledged that the bank could have demanded additional security on the loan, which it failed 

do. It was his understanding, based on after-acquired knowledge, that the first default on the loan 

occurred when the decedent transferred his ownership interest in WAAL to the Schroeder Trust 

prior to his death. His death then also triggered a default, and the adverse material change in the 

make up of WAAL also triggered a default. 
8 

¶ 17 Curry made payments on the loan in October, November, and December 2016, and 

January, February, March 2017. He noted that some of the payments were between 15 to 30 days 

late. The bank encouraged Curry early on following the decedent’s death to sell WAAL’s assets 

as she could not manage WAAL. He also admitted that he was aware that WAAL owned 

additional property that was not already secured under the loan, and that the bank could have 

demanded that WAAL provide additional security but failed to do so. Curry never provided 

personal financial information or her tax returns, and she did not look into refinancing the loan 

under her own name. He described Curry as “very elusive,” and that arranging a meeting with her 

was a several-month-long process. He never received the requested financial documents from 

Curry in 2017. 

¶ 18 Heggemeier recalled that he began to sense that things might not be right with Curry’s 

management of WAAL in late 2016. The two individual notes matured after the decedent’s death 

on October 17, 2017, and six-month renewals on each loan were executed on October 22, 2017, 

and November 21, 2017. Following the execution of the renewals, Curry made payments and sold 

property, which brought down the balance owed and reduced the debt. In April 2018, the bank 

again allowed Curry to renew the loans, which would mature in October 2018. Curry stopped 

making payments after August 2018. There was also a property sold for $132,000 in October 2018 

that went toward the loan; however, property sales did not constitute a payment by Curry. 

Following the foreclosure action in Jackson County, the bank sold two of the properties subject to 

that judgment, and WAAL received credit on the loan for the net profits resulting from the sales. 

However, he explained that foreclosure sales reduce the value of the properties and had Curry sold 

those two properties herself, which she told him that she was going to do, the properties would 

have sold for a higher amount and the debt would have reduced that much more. He encouraged 
9 

Curry to sell the properties at every opportunity he had; however, he lost contact with her at some 

point. 

¶ 19 Based on his relationship with the decedent and his family, Heggemeier knew that it was 

the decedent’s intention that WAAL pay the loan and that his personal assets be distributed to his 

children. Heggemeier stated that his goal “was to have WAAL pay the debt, but it didn’t happen 

and it couldn’t happen and [Curry] was the reason why it didn’t happen.” He was not privy to all 

of the estate and trust dealings; however, his conversations with Paul and David tended to focus 

on Curry. They were all in agreement that Curry was a problem, and they needed to get her out. 

Lastly, he explained that his dealings with the decedent were based on a 20-year relationship, and 

he obviously would have sought more collateral in securing the loan had he known that the 

decedent was going to die. 

¶ 20 On September 27, 2021, the trial court entered a written order denying the petitions for 

citations to recover assets from the beneficiaries of the Family Trust. In its recitation of the 

arguments of the parties, the court reiterated the respondents’ argument that the distributions of 

the assets of the Family Trust met the requirement of section 505(a)(6) of the Trust Code, and that 

the bank’s recovery should be barred under the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of avoidable 

consequences, and the doctrine of waiver. The bank now appeals. 

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, the bank argues that, pursuant to Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions, 

2012 IL 112906, the trial court erred in denying its petition for citations to recover trust assets 

where it is owed $335,789.23 on an outstanding debt from two promissory notes that were 

personally guaranteed by the decedent, and where the decedent’s estate is insolvent and lacks 

sufficient assets to satisfy the debt. The respondents argue that the bank’s recovery should be 
10 

barred under the doctrines of laches, avoidable consequences, and waiver. We agree with the 

respondents that equity requires we affirm the order of the trial court. 

¶ 23 A. Rush

¶ 24 The bank first argues that whether the Schroeder Trust is liable for the debts of the estate 

is not at issue where the trial court entered a final and appealable order on January 3, 2020, finding 

the trust liable to the estate’s creditors for unpaid debts, and that decision cannot be overturned by 

this court as it was not appealed by either. Generally, a party who has the opportunity to file an 

appeal of a legal decision but fails to do so renders the decision the law of the case for future stages 

of the same litigation. Liccardi v. Stolt Terminals, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 540, 547 (1997). 

¶ 25 During the January 3, 2020, hearing, the trial court found that the decedent’s will directed 

the estate administrator to the Schroeder Trust upon insolvency to pay insolvent debts of the estate. 

The terms of the trust directed the same of the trustee. Therefore, the court determined that the 

Schroeder Trust was liable to pay claims of the insolvent estate upon demand by the personal 

representative of the estate. The court then stated that this finding was the limit of its ruling on the 

issue. Following this finding by the court, the bank declared its intent to file supplemental 

proceedings to seek payment from the remaining amount owed from the Schroeder Trust. This 

statement, along with the fact that Curry’s counsel withdrew the request for a special finding under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) on the motion to reconsider, demonstrates that 

the court’s finding was not an appealable order. 

¶ 26 The bank’s substantive argument relies on the precedent established by the supreme court 

in Rush, 2012 IL 112906. In Rush, defendant established an irrevocable spendthrift trust in which 

he was the settlor and lifetime beneficiary and named himself as the “trust protector” with the 

power to appoint and remove trustees and change beneficiaries. Id. ¶ 3. He then made a $1.5 
11 

million charitable pledge to Rush University Medical Center to fund new construction. Id. ¶ 4. 

The construction was completed but defendant later became ill and blamed the medical center for 

his illness. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. He thereafter revoked and executed a new will that made no mention of the 

medical center pledge. Id. ¶ 6. The medical center filed suit against the trustees of the trust, 

seeking full payment of the pledge by relying on the common law rule that if a settlor creates a 

self-settled spendthrift trust for his own benefit, it is void as to existing or future creditors. Id. ¶ 9. 

The court, in applying the common law rule, found that “it is not a fraudulent transfer of funds 

that renders the trust void as to creditors under the common law, but rather it is the spendthrift 

provision in the self-settled trust and the settlor’s retention of the benefits that renders the trust 

void as to creditors.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 23. The court ruled that the trust was void as 

to creditors of the estate and awarded plaintiff the full amount of the pledge. Id. ¶ 36.

¶ 27 Here, we first note that both the decedent’s will and trust addressed the issue of insolvency 

and directed that the trust be used to pay the debts of the estate. The language of these documents, 

as the trial court noted, indicate the decedent’s intent that the trust assets be used to pay unresolved 

debts of the estate. This is not a situation where the decedent was attempting to hide assets or 

avoid creditors through the trust. Additionally, the Schroeder Trust, as discussed in Rush, was a 

self-settled spendthrift trust for the decedent’s benefit. The trust would therefore be liable for the 

debts of the estate. However, whether the trust is liable for the debt of the insolvent estate is not 

dispositive in this case. Though we agree with the bank’s recitation of the law, the facts of this 

case require our consideration of equitable doctrines.

¶ 28 B. Laches

¶ 29 Laches is an affirmative defense based in equity and requires the party raising it to show 

that there was an unreasonable delay in bringing an action and that the delay caused prejudice. 
12 

PNC Bank, National Ass’n v. Kusmierz, 2020 IL App (2d) 190521, ¶ 31. Laches “can 

preclude relief in an appropriate case where prejudice is demonstrated.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, 

N.A. v. Robinson, 2020 IL App (2d) 190275, ¶ 30. The defense of laches is dependent on the 

particular facts of the case. Slatin’s Properties, Inc. v. Hassler, 53 Ill. 2d 325, 329-30 (1972). 

Laches is a defense that is asserted against a party who has knowingly slept upon his rights and 

acquiesced for a great length of time, and its existence depends upon whether, under all the 

circumstances of a particular case, a party is chargeable with want of due diligence and failing to 

institute proceedings before he did. La Salle National Bank v. Dubin Residential Communities 

Corp., 337 Ill. App. 3d 345, 350-51 (2003).

¶ 30 Here, both elements to bar relief based on laches are satisfied. First, the record 

demonstrates that the bank’s delay in seeking payment of the decedent’s estate’s outstanding debt 

was unreasonable. The record is replete with missed opportunities by the bank in enforcing 

payment of its claim. The bank’s claim against the estate was entered in 2016, yet it sought no 

full payment on the debt at that time, despite its legal right to do so. The bank then allowed Curry, 

who Heggemeier described as “very elusive,” to execute renewals on the notes in 2017 and again 

in 2018. The bank allowed the renewals without any additional collateral from Curry. There were 

also indications that she was not competent to manage WAAL and the bank encouraged her over 

a course of years to sell WAAL’s assets. The decedent died in 2016, and the bank’s claim was 

entered shortly thereafter, yet the bank failed to exercise any of its legal rights in actually collecting 

payment on the claim until 2020, long after all the assets of the trust had been distributed to the 

beneficiaries.

¶ 31 The bank’s recovery would result in prejudice where it delayed in asserting available legal 

remedies, where the estate was not initially insolvent, and where WAAL’s assets at the time of the 
13 

decedent’s death exceeded the amount owed on the loan by approximately $300,000. The bank 

sat on its rights for so long, that in order to satisfy the debt, the court would now be required to 

undue all of the distributions of the Family Trust, which would result in the decedent’s children 

returning their inheritances in order to pay the debt. However, as Heggemeier noted, the cause of 

this situation and the outstanding debt, is the result of Curry’s actions, not the beneficiaries. The 

beneficiaries would effectively lose a large portion of their inheritance because the bank waited 

too long to go after Curry for payment of the debt with WAAL assets, which were more than 

enough to cover the loan. The bank cannot now, after sleeping on its rights and allowing Curry to 

continue to renew the loans without collateral, turn around and ask this court to take back trust 

assets that were distributed at a time when the loan could have been paid in full by WAAL, and 

cause the beneficiaries to pay the debt even though no action was taken against Curry, despite the 

bank’s recognition that she was the bad actor. Therefore, the relief sought by the bank would result 

in prejudice.

¶ 32 As both elements of laches are satisfied by the particular facts of this case, the trial court 

did not err in denying the bank’s petition for citations for recovery of trust assets.

¶ 33 C. Avoidable Consequences

¶ 34 Another affirmative defense raised by the respondents was the doctrine of avoidable 

consequences. Illinois has long recognized the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which 

prevents a party from recovering damages for consequences which that party could reasonably 

have avoided. The supreme court has explained that the law imposes on a party injured from 

another party’s breach of contract the active duty to make reasonable efforts to minimize the injury. 

A party’s negligence or willfulness cannot allow the damages to be unnecessarily enhanced. Cedar 

Rapids & Iowa City Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Electric Co., 280 Ill. 386, 391 (1917).
14 

¶ 35 The doctrine of avoidable consequences “addresses itself to the equity of the law that a 

plaintiff should not recover for those consequences of defendant’s act which were readily 

avoidable by the plaintiff. Sutherland on Damages, (1844), vol. 1, p. 226, et seq.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Chicago Park District, 409 Ill. 91, 98 (1951). “The general 

rule is that it is the duty of a party injured by a breach of contract or tort to make a reasonable 

effort to avoid damages therefrom, and such damages as might by reasonable diligence on his part 

have been avoided are not to be regarded as the natural and probable result of plaintiff’s acts, and 

therefore there can be no recovery for damages which might have been avoided by reasonable 

effort on the part of the person injured.” Nelson v. Buick Motor Co., 183 Ill. App. 323, 325 (1913); 

see Maere v. Churchill, 116 Ill. App. 3d 939, 946-47 (1983). 

¶ 36 Here, the record establishes several means through which the bank could have reasonably 

avoided its losses. As previously discussed, the bank could have called the loan due at the time of 

the decedent’s death, which could have been paid entirely with assets held by WAAL. The bank 

could have either refused to execute the renewals, calling the debt due sooner, or could have 

required additional collateral in executing the renewals. The bank had legal remedies available to 

it that were not available to the beneficiaries of the trust in ensuring the debt was satisfied. The 

longer the bank waited to use its legal remedies, the greater its damages became, and the fewer 

options it had in receiving payment. Now, approximately four years later, the only realistic way 

for the bank to recover the sum owed is recovery of the trust assets as the estate is insolvent and 

WAAL’s assets diminished to the point that they did not cover the entire amount owed. Therefore, 

we find that the court did not err in denying the petition where the bank’s actions caused avoidable 

consequences. 
15 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 Based on the foregoing, we find that the equitable doctrines of laches and avoidable 

consequences are applicable where the actions of the bank, though legally permissible, would 

result in an inequitable outcome. Therefore, the order of the circuit court of Jackson County 

denying the bank’s petition for citations for recovery of assets is hereby affirmed. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.