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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

SHERYL EMERY, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 15-11467 

vs. HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH 

 

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT 

OF CIVIL RIGHTS, MATTHEW 

WESAW, and LORI VINSON, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 32) 

 Plaintiff Sheryl Emery alleges that defendant the Michigan 

Department of Civil Rights, her former employer, and its employees, 

defendants Matthew Wesaw and Lori Vinson, violated the Americans with 

Disabilities Act and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. This matter is 

presently before the Court on Wesaw’s and Vinson’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. 32). Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), the Court shall rule 

without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion is 

GRANTED. 

 
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I. Background 

Plaintiff, born in 1959, is a deaf, African American women. She 

served as the Director of the Division on Deaf and Hard of Hearing from 

November 16, 2008, to September 9, 2014. The Director position has been 

filled by a deaf or hard of hearing individual since the Division’s inception. 

The Division’s staff is comprised of deaf and hearing individuals; some of 

whom are not fluent in American Sign Language. For several years, the 

Division included a staff member who served as an interpreter. As director, 

plaintiff was required to follow rules governing the MDCR’s authority, her 

own legal authority, and ethical standards including Civil Service rules and 

the State Ethics Act. 

Amanda Niven worked as a Rights Representative at the Division 

with plaintiff. Niven’s responsibilities included some duties as a staff 

interpreter. Niven made several accusations against plaintiff between April 

and May 2013. The MDCR investigated and, in July 2013, concluded that, 

contrary to Niven’s complaints, plaintiff had not created a hostile work 

environment. 

Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint against Niven with the Registry of 

Interpreters for the Deaf. As a result, Niven’s certification was suspended 

and she ceased performing interpreter duties. Plaintiff complained about 
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her inability to complete her responsibilities without an interpreter on staff. 

She eventually filed an EEOC charge, alleging failure to accommodate, on 

this matter on July 29, 2013. 

Niven and Karlee Rose Gruetzner, another Rights Representative, 

raised new complaints against plaintiff in February 2014. The MDCR 

thereafter began investigating plaintiff for creating a hostile work 

environment, harassment, workplace bullying, interpreter issues, and 

breach of confidentiality. (Doc. 32-3 at PageID 297). Plaintiff was placed 

on administration suspension with pay pending the results of this 

investigation. In May 2014, Vinson discovered that plaintiff had created 

and distributed Alternative Pathways Certification/Board Evaluation of 

Interpreters applications. (Doc. 32-12 at PageID 383). This activity was 

unauthorized. The investigation concluded in September 2014. The 

MDCR found that plaintiff subjected her staff to harassment, created a 

hostile work environment, retaliated against her subordinate, and 

implemented certification without legal authorization. (Doc. 32-3 at PageID 

325). Plaintiff’s actions violated the MDCR’s authority, her own legal 

authority under Public Act 204, Civil Service rule 2-8 and the State Ethics 

Act. Plaintiff was terminated on September 9, 2014. 
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Plaintiff filed a grievance to challenge her termination. (Doc. 32-6). 

She alleged that she was terminated without just cause, as she had not 

violated the Civil Service rules as the MDCR claimed. She further argued 

that she was terminated in retaliation for filing her EEOC charge. The 

MDCR denied plaintiff’s allegations and asserted that she was terminated 

for violating the Civil Service rules. (Doc. 32-7). Plaintiff appealed the 

MDCR’s answer. (Doc. 32-8). 

A grievance appeal hearing was held by Hearing Officer Matthew C. 

Wyman on April 27, 28 and June 24, 2015. (Doc. 32-9). Wesaw testified 

that plaintiff’s issues with harassment, a hostile work environment, and 

retaliation, in isolation could have been corrected through lesser discipline. 

(Doc. 32-9 at PageID 350). But Wesaw found plaintiff’s APC violation to be 

far more serious and believed that this matter alone justified termination, as 

plaintiff had deceived the MDCR while knowingly disregarding the law. (Id.). 

On October 1, 2015, Wyman issued an opinion concluding that the MDCR 

had just cause to terminate plaintiff following her mistreatment of Niven and 

Gruetzner as well as violating the MDCR’s authority, Public Act 204, the 

State Ethics Act, and Civil Service rule 2-8. (Doc. 32-9). 

Plaintiff appealed. The Employment Relations Board issued a 

recommended grievance decision affirming Wyman’s findings on January 
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27, 2016. (Doc. 32-10). The Civil Service Commission adopted the Board’s 

recommendation as their final decision on February 26, 2016. (Doc. 32-11). 

Plaintiff appealed to Oakland County Circuit Court. On October 3, 2016, the 

Honorable Martha D. Anderson issued an opinion affirming the final 

decision of the Commission. (Doc. 32-12). Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit 

alleging her termination on April 22, 2015. 

II. Legal Standard 

Rule 56(c) empowers a court to render summary judgment “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1999) (en 

banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The standard for determining whether 

summary judgment is appropriate is “‘whether the evidence presents a 

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Amway Distrib. 

Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). 

Mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this 

burden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving 
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party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 252. There must instead be evidence 

from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. McLean, 224 

F.3d at 800 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).The evidence and all 

reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th 

Cir. 2001). 

III. Analysis 

A. Prospective Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Young claim against state officials acting in their 

official capacity may “seek prospective relief to end a continuing violation of 

law.” Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants assert that the only prospective injunctive relief available to 

plaintiff is an “order requiring the State to provide her a reasonable 

accommodation.” (Doc. 32 at PageID 267-68). Plaintiff no longer works for 

the Michigan Civil Rights Department. Defendants thus conclude that her 

claim for prospective relief is moot. Defendant’s argument fails. “[C]laims 

for reinstatement are prospective in nature and appropriate subjects to Ex 

parte Young actions.” Id. at 396. 

 
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B. Collateral Estoppel 

Defendants argue that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating 

issues that she raised and lost during her administrative grievance and 

appeals. Defendants seem to assert that these issues include plaintiff’s 

entire retaliation claim under the ADA, (Doc. 32 at PageID 270-75), as well 

as findings of fact regarding just cause for plaintiff’s termination, (Doc. 32 at 

PageID 281-85). 

 Defendants rely on Nummer v. Treasury Dept., 448 Mich. 534 (1995). 

Nummer states that, “[g]enerally, for collateral estoppel to apply, a question 

of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and 

determined by a valid and final judgment. In addition the same parties 

must have had a full opportunity to litigate the issue, and there must be 

mutuality of estoppel.” Id. 448 Mich. at 542 (internal citations omitted). 

“[T]hree additional requirements must be satisfied” when a defendant seeks 

“to preclude relitigation on the basis of an administrative decision.” Id. 

“The administrative determination must have been adjudicatory in nature 

and provide a right to appeal, and the Legislature must have intended to 

make the decision final absent an appeal.” Id.

In Nummer, the Supreme Court of Michigan determined “whether a 

formal and final decision by the Civil Service Commission rejecting a 
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discrimination claim precludes relitigation of that issue in a subsequently 

filed action in circuit court.” Id. at 539. The plaintiff filed a grievance 

alleging “discrimination on the basis of race and gender in violation of the 

civil service provisions set forth in art. 11, § 5, of the Michigan Constitution.” 

Id. at 540. This provision “states that the Civil Service Commission shall 

have the power to ‘regulate all conditions of employment in the classified 

service,’ and that ‘[n]o appointments, promotions, demotions or removals in 

the classified service shall be made for religious, racial or partisan 

considerations.” Id. at 540, n.1. “In addressing the plaintiff’s discrimination 

allegation, the commission assessed whether the Department of Treasury 

violated Civil Service Rule 1-2.1, which in pertinent part states: No person 

shall be discriminated against in . . . any condition of employment . . . 

because of race, color . . . or sex.” Id. 

The Nummer court noted that the civil service rule at issue in the 

administrative decision addressed the same race and sex based 

discrimination that, in the instant case, allegedly violated the Michigan Civil 

Rights Act. Id. at 542. The court recognized “a similar factual issue as that 

which was actually litigated and decided in the Civil Service Commission,” 

and, therefore, determined that “[i]t is not seriously contested that the 

general requirements of collateral estoppel are met.” Id. 
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Defendants argue that, here, as in Nummer, “it cannot seriously be 

contested that the general requirements of collateral estoppel are met.” 

(Doc. 32 at PageID 274). It is not clear whether defendants assume that 

this case addresses all of the same issues actually litigated in the 

administrative decision or if defendants distort the first element of collateral 

estoppel to require merely an “attempt[] to argue.” (Doc. 32 at PageID 272-

73). 

Collateral estoppel is not determined based on what a party attempts 

to argue, but rather, issues that are “actually litigated and determined.” 

Nummer, 448 Mich. at 542. The language used in Nummer paraphrases 

more detailed statements of Michigan collateral estoppel law. For example, 

N.A.A.C.P., Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Ass’n (DPOA), 821 

F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1987) states that “[b]efore collateral estoppel may be 

applied. . . the precise issue raised in the present case must have been 

raised and actually litigated in the prior proceeding.” Id. at 330 (emphasis 

added). Stated differently, “the issue must be identical to that determined 

in the prior action.” Litteral v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., No. 01-74905, 

2003 WL 345366, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2003) (citing N.A.A.C.P., 

Detroit Branch, 821 F.2d at 330) (emphasis added). The Court, therefore, 

must consider whether the issue of alleged retaliation in violation of the 
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ADA was raised and actually litigated before the Civil Service Commission 

or identical to the issue(s) determined in the administrative decision. 

This element was satisfied in Nummer because the race and sex 

based discrimination alleged in the subsequent lawsuit was actually 

litigated and determined in an administrative decision addressing a 

challenge to a Civil Service rule regarding the same race and sex based 

discrimination. Nummer, 448 Mich. at 542. This case, however, presents a 

more difficult question because the Civil Service rule plaintiff initially 

challenged concerns just cause as opposed to a prohibition on 

discrimination that parallels the ADA. 

 Plaintiff’s September 9, 2014 grievance, raised pursuant to Civil 

Service rule 8-1.3(a)(3), states that she “is aggrieved by having been 

terminated without just cause.” (Doc. 32-6 at PageID 336). Plaintiff denied 

the truth of the alleged violations of Civil Service rules 2-6 (2) and 2-8 (4) 

as well as PA 204. (Id.). Plaintiff asserted that the allegations were raised 

as pretext for retaliation of her EEOC and RID complaints. (Id.). In 

response, the Michigan Department of Civil Rights denied that the 

termination was based on retaliation. (Doc. 32-7 at PageID 340). This 

response does not constitute the decision of the Civil Service Board, and 
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therefore, does not illustrate that the question of fact regarding retaliation 

was actually litigated and determined in a final judgment. 

 Plaintiff’s appeal from the step two grievance answer again states 

that the charges against her are solely pretext. (Doc. 32-8 at PageID 343). 

The grievance decision by Hearing Officer Matthew Wyman addresses 

“whether the grievant was dismissed for just cause.” (Doc. 32-9 at PageID 

347). This decision states: 

[t]he initial burden of proof in a disciplinary 

grievance appeal is on the employer to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it had just 

cause for discipline. Implied in this burden is that a 

preponderance of the evidence also shows that the 

grievant did in fact commit the actions alleged of her 

and, if so, the actions constitutes a violation under 

the language of the rules. If proven, the burden 

then shifts to the grievant to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the discipline 

violated a Civil Service rule or regulation, an agency 

work rule, or was arbitrary and capricious. The 

hearing officer cannot alter the discipline if the 

grievant does not sustain its burden. 

(Doc. 32-9 at PageID 351). 

Hearing Officer Wyman’s grievance decision includes a three page 

analysis of the MDRC’s claims. (Doc. 32-9 at PageID 351-53). Wyman 

evaluates evidence and determines that the Michigan Department of Civil 

Rights met its burden to prove that plaintiff mistreated Niven and Gruetzner 

and violated department authority and PA 204. (Id.). The analysis section 
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ends without any mention of plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation. The 

grievance decision proceeds to a conclusion section, which states that the 

MDCR had just cause for disciplining plaintiff. (Doc. 32-9 at PageID 353). 

It thereafter states that plaintiff “failed to sustain her burden to prove 

dismissal violated the article 11, section 5 of the Michigan constitution, civil 

service law, or was arbitrary or capricious.” (Id.). The grievance decision’s 

conclusion also lacks any reference to plaintiff’s retaliation allegations. 

Thus, despite the fact that “[t]he parties were given full opportunity to 

present testimonial and documentary evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses, and present oral argument,” (Doc. 32-9 at PageID 

347), it is not clear plaintiff argued that her termination violated the ADA. 

Plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Employment Relations Board. 

Neither party filed a record of plaintiff’s argument before the Board. The 

Board’s Recommended Grievance Decision, (Doc. 32-10), however, 

includes a one page summary of plaintiff’s argument. (Doc. 32-10 at 

PageID 366). The Board recounts arguments regarding just cause, per 

plaintiff’s argument that her termination violated Civil Service rule 8-

1.3(a)(3) as well as an argument that her termination was arbitrary and 

capricious because the MDCR did not consider lesser discipline. (Id.). But 

the decision does not discuss plaintiff’s allegations that she was fired in 
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retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. The Civil Service Commission 

approved this recommendation and adopted it as the final decision of the 

civil service commission. (Doc. 32-11 at PageID 378). 

The Oakland County Circuit Court opinion relayed this history in the 

facts section of its opinion. (Doc. 32-12 at PageID 380-88). It likewise 

noted references to plaintiff’s retaliation allegations in her initial grievance 

and the MDRC’s response. (Doc. 32-12 at PageID 385). The opinion 

analyzes many of plaintiff’s arguments including: 

 the MDRC ignored less drastic discipline; 

 the MDRC’s allegations were unsubstantiated, not supported, and 

untrue; and 

 plaintiff was discharged for filing the RID complaint, which violated 

her First Amendment right to free speech. 

(Doc. 32-12 at PageID 388-90). But the court did not opine on plaintiff’s 

allegations regarding retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. 

 After reviewing the record, the Court cannot rule that the issue of 

retaliation in violation of the ADA was raised and actually litigated before 

the Civil Service Commission or identical to the issues determined in the 

administrative order. Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply to this issue 

and the Court cannot grant summary judgment on this ground. The Court 

can, however, recognize that the administrative decision did actually 

litigated and find violations of Civil Service rules 2-6.2(2) and 2-8.2(a)(4) by 
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a valid and final judgment. The Court further finds that the remaining 

elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied. Plaintiff is precluded from 

relitigating questions of fact regarding the violations of Civil Service rules 2-

6.2(2) and 2-8.2(a)(4). 

C. Failure to Accommodate Claim 

 “In order to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, 

a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; 

(2) she is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable 

accommodation; (3) her employer knew or had reason to know about her 

disability; (4) she requested an accommodation; and (5) the employer failed 

to provide the necessary accommodation.” Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. 

Dist., 443 F. App'x 974, 982–83 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to prove that her employer 

failed to provide a necessary accommodation. Following Niven’s removal, 

the MDRC did not hire a full time interpreter or another rights 

representative who could also serve as a staff interpreter. Instead, the 

MDCR arranged for interpreters to be assigned to plaintiff. Plaintiff was 

responsible for requesting interpreting services. Defendants maintain that 

this was a reasonable accommodation. They argue that, while plaintiff may 

have preferred her own personal interpreter, her employer was not required 
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to provide to provide this exact accommodation. Defendants further argue 

that the MDCR was not required to restructure the duties of a rights 

representative to require interpretation services. 

Plaintiff argues that she could not manage her staff or communicate 

with other officers of the State or the general public without a staff member 

that was fluent in sign language. Plaintiff acknowledges that interpretation 

services were available, but states her dissatisfaction. Plaintiff would prefer 

to select the interpreter herself, as opposed to using the Department of 

Technology, Management, and Budget (DTMB) to bid for interpreters. 

(Doc. 35-2 at PageID 431). Plaintiff complains that the DTMB hired 

interpreters with the lowest costs instead of interpreters that she believed to 

be qualified or effective. (Doc. 35-2 at PageID 432). Plaintiff further 

complains that it was difficult to schedule interpreters, specifying that she 

had to rearrange multiple schedules to fit meetings around interpreter 

availability. (Id.). 

 Much as plaintiff may have preferred her own interpreter on staff, an 

employer is not required to “create new jobs [or] displace existing 

employees from their positions . . . in order to accommodate a disabled 

individual.” Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 

2000). And while plaintiff complains that working with contract interpreters 
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was misaligned with her preferences, she does not put forth evidence to 

illustrate that this accommodation was unreasonable. Plaintiff has, 

therefore, failed to prove a prima facie case of failure to accommodate 

under the ADA. 

D. ADA Retaliation Claim (PFC) 

The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any 

individual because such individual . . . has made a charge . . . under this 

chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “Discrimination here means retaliation – 

that ‘but for’ an employee’s statutorily protected activity the employer would 

not have taken the ‘adverse employment action.’” E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor 

Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Courts 

use the Mc-Donnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework to assess 

retaliation claims. Id. A plaintiff “must first establish, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, her prima facie case.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “If a 

plaintiff does so, the defendant has a burden of production to articulate a 

nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 767 

(emphasis in original). “If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must 

prove the given reason is pretext for retaliation.” Id. “To demonstrate 

pretext, a plaintiff must show both that the employer’s proffered reason was 
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not the real reason for its action, and that the employer’s real reason was 

unlawful.” 

To avoid summary judgment, then, plaintiff must present evidence 

from which a reasonable jury could find that violating Civil Service rules 

was not the real reason that the MDRC terminated plaintiff, and that 

unlawful retaliation was. No reasonable jury could find that the MDRC 

terminated plaintiff for a reason other than plaintiff’s numerous violations of 

the Civil Service rules. The facts underlying these violations are well 

documented in the record and numerous administrative decision makers, 

as well as an Oakland County Circuit Court judge, determined that plaintiff 

violated these rules and, as such, the MDRC had just cause to discipline 

her. 

Plaintiff argues that she was terminated, not because of these 

violations, but as a result of filing her own EEOC complaint. Plaintiff 

asserts that she was suspended less than seven months after filing a 

complaint with the EEOC. But “temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis 

for finding pretext.” Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 

2012). Plaintiff further asserts that she was not disciplined prior to filing the 

charge and had a previously unblemished career. While this appears to be 

true, as described below, the record justifies the MDRC’s actions. 
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Plaintiff was not disciplined prior to filing her EEOC charge because 

the MDCR determined that, as of July 2013, plaintiff had not created a 

hostile work environment. Moreover, Wesaw’s testimony regarding the 

severity of the unauthorized Alternative Pathways Certification applications 

illustrates why she was terminated despite her prior positive performance. 

Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

find that the real reason behind her termination was retaliation and not 

violations of the Civil Service rules. Defendants are entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law because plaintiff created at most “a weak issue of fact as to 

whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there [is] abundant and 

uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” 

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Protects, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). 

“Lacking evidence that creates a genuine dispute of fact, [plaintiff’s] 

retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.” Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 769-

70. 

Defendants are further entitled to summary judgment because 

plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie case. “A prima facie case of 

retaliation has four elements: 1) the plaintiff engaged in legally protected 

activity; 2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff's exercise of this right; 3) 

the defendant then took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and 
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4) the protected activity and the adverse employment action are causally 

connected.” Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff asserts that her EEOC complaint was a legally protected activity, 

defendants were aware of this activity, plaintiff was terminated, and the 

EEOC complaint and her termination are related. But, for the reasons 

stated in the preceding discussion regarding pretext, plaintiff has failed to 

present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the MDCR 

would not have fired her if she had not made her charge. 

E. ELCRA Claim (PFC) 

Plaintiff also asserts that her termination was a result of age and race 

discrimination in violation of the ELCRA. She does not offer any direct 

evidence and instead relies on the McDonald-Douglas framework 

described above. 

To prove a prima facie case of age and race based discrimination, a 

plaintiff must establish that they were “(1) a member of a protected class, 

(2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, 

and that (4) others, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were 

unaffected by the employer’s adverse conduct.” Town v. Michigan Bell Tel. 

Co., 455 Mich. 688, 695 (1997). 
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Defendants argue that plaintiff has not shown other similarly situated 

employees outside the protected class who were treated differently. 

Plaintiff argues that she fulfills this element by demonstrating that she was 

replaced by a younger white man. She further argues that she was treated 

differently than her predecessor, a white male, who always had a certified 

interpreter on staff. Finally, plaintiff asserts that she was treated differently 

than employees outside these protected classes who alleged that she 

created a hostile work environment. This allegation seems to refer to 

Nivens and Gruetzner. Plaintiff claims that, although department rules 

required written complaints, unnamed subordinate co-workers were able to 

make verbal complaints. Plaintiff’s arguments fail. 

For purposes of establishing a prima facie case, 

“similarly situated” employees must be similarlysituated in all respects. Thus, to be deemed 

“similarly-situated,” the individuals with whom the 

plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must 

have dealt with the same supervisor, have been 

subject to the same standards and have engaged in 

the same conduct without such differentiating or 

mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their 

conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it. 

Gibbs v. Voith Indus. Servs., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 780, 795 (E.D. Mich. 

2014) (internal citations omitted). 
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Plaintiff’s arguments fail because she has not met this standard. She 

does not allege that her predecessor, successor, or subordinates have 

“engaged in the same conduct,” namely, violating Civil Service rules 2-

6.2(2) and 2-8.2(a)(4). Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to establish a prima 

facie case. The Court also notes that plaintiff’s pretext arguments, 

discussed above, fail as well. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

on both grounds. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 28, 2017 

 s/George Caram Steeh 

 GEORGE CARAM STEEH 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on 

September 28, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

s/Marcia Beauchemin 

Deputy Clerk