Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed May 12, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00023-CR

EMMETT JEFFREY BANKS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 207th District Court

Comal County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR 2013-542 (Counts I, II, III, IV)

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

The Texas Legislature clearly and understandably intends to be “tough on 

crime” when it comes to sexual offenses against children. That does not mean, 

however, that the State may unconstitutionally over charge an offender or that this 

court may find waiver where it does not exist. Because the majority permits this 

overreach, I respectfully dissent.
2

Double-Jeopardy

The jury determined that appellant committed four distinct sexual offenses. 

It is undisputed that the actions on which these offenses were predicated occurred 

on the same day and on the same couch and most likely within a 45-minute time 

span. They also all involved appellant using his hand to touch complainant’s 

sexual organ. By any definition, they occurred during the course of one horrible 

episode. The majority concludes that the jury properly found appellant had four 

separately-formulated intents or impulses in committing these acts. I cannot agree 

that the evidence, nor any reasonable inference, supports this conclusion.1

The complainant testified about the incident as follows:

Q: Okay. Can you tell us what you’re talking about?

A: [Appellant] touched me.

Q: Okay. Where?

A: On my private.

. . . .

Q: Okay. Do you remember that day?

A: Yes.

. . . .

Q: Okay. So sitting [on the couch] at 4:00 when you first go sit 

down, what happened after that?

A: I sat down. Me and [appellant] were watching American Idol

. . . .

Q: So when you’re sitting on the couch watching American Idol, 

where is [appellant]?

A: Sitting next to me.

 

1 As will be discussed below, the majority’s holding rests alternatively on waiver and a 

determination that there was no double jeopardy violation in this case. I would hold that there 

was no waiver of the issue and the four convictions violated the prohibition against double 

jeopardy.
3

. . . .

Q: Okay. After that [appellant licked complainant’s neck], what 

happened?

A: He rubbed the top of my jeans.

. . . .

Q: Did he saying [sic] anything else to you?

A: I started backing up and he told me to stop backing up.

. . . .

Q: Okay. Did he say anything else that you remember?

A: No. He—he pulled the blanket down and told me to go change 

into some shorts.

Q: Okay. . . . What happened immediately after you—he said stop 

backing away?

A: I stopped backing away and he rubbed up and down.

Q: Where was his hand at that point?

A: On my private part.

. . . .

Q: [I]n relation to your pants, where was his hand?

A: On top of my jeans.

Q: Okay. Did that change there?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. How?

A: He unbuttoned my jeans and went under.

. . . .

Q: What did he go under?

A: My underwear and my jeans.

Q: And what happened immediately after that?

A: He touched—rubbed up and down.

. . . .

Q: Okay. How long did he rub up and down?
4

A: For about ten to 20 minutes [sic].

Q: How were you able to tell how long it took?

A: Well, because when he told me to go get changed, it was about 

4:30.

Q: Okay. So when was it that you said it had started?

A: Like 4:15.

Q: [W]hen you say he rubbed up and down, was he touching the 

inside or the outside of your part?

A: Both.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: When he told me to get shorts, I put on my shorts and I went 

back.

2

. . . .

Q: Okay. And what happened when you went back?

A: He did it again.

. . . .

Q: What happened first when you got back to the couch?

A: I got back and he put his hand on my shorts; and he put his 

hand under my shorts and touched me.

. . . .

Q: Okay. Where did he touch you . . . ?

A: Right here on my private.

Q: When it first started, was it over the clothes or under the 

clothes?

A: Under.

Q: How did he touch you that second time?

A: He like—like sideways.

. . . .

 

2 As the majority points out, complainant further testified at this point that after she 

changed into shorts at appellant’s direction, she also closed appellant’s son’s door, also as 

instructed by appellant, before returning to the couch. 
5

Q: Okay. Did he touch the inside or outside?

A: Both.

. . . .

Q: What happened to make it stop?

A: [Appellant’s son] walked out [of his room] to get some tea and 

food and asked me if I wanted any. I said yes. So I got up and 

got some and [appellant’s son] went and sat on the couch.

While the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that separate sexual acts 

during one assault can result in separate punishments when evidence demonstrates

that the defendant truly performed multiple, separate, completed acts, the Court has 

also cautioned against the “hypertechnical division of what was essentially a single 

continuous act.” Aekins v. State, 447 S.W.3d 270, 277-79, 281, 283 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014). I believe the majority engages in just such a hypertechnical division 

when it concludes that appellant engaged in four separate and distinct sexual 

offenses occasioned by four separate and distinct intentions. To the contrary, the 

facts in this case indicate that appellant intended to molest complainant by using 

one instrument, his hand, to touch and penetrate one body part, her genitals, all 

while avoiding detection by others in the room. He began by touching her through 

her clothing, escalated his behavior by moving his hand inside her clothing, then 

instructed her to change into shorts before continuing the same conduct. See id. at 

281 (“In short, in Texas, as in many other jurisdictions, a defendant may not be 

convicted for a completed sexual assault by penetration and also for conduct (such 

as exposure or contact) that is demonstrably and inextricably part of that single 

sexual assault.”). In no reasonable sense did appellant complete a sexual act before 

formulating a “fresh impulse” and determining to pursue a new course of conduct, 

much less doing so multiple times. See id. at 282. Although his actions escalated 

during the assault (going from outside her clothes to inside and from touching to 

penetration), his intention remained the same and the entirety of the encounter 
6

constituted but one assault. See id. (“A rape is one act from beginning to end . . . 

.”). Although touching can certainly be a separate offense from penetration, here 

the touching was merged into or subsumed within the ultimate act of penetration as 

they were part of the same escalating conduct. See id. 

The prosecution and the majority appear to divide appellant’s conduct into 

touching complainant outside her jeans, penetrating complainant inside her jeans, 

touching complainant outside her shorts, and penetrating her inside her shorts.3 

However, just because we can intellectually perform such an exercise does not 

mean that we should. We could further imagine that each movement of appellant’s 

hand had a separate intention behind it; he certainly was in control of his hand and 

decided each movement of his fingers. Following the majority’s logic, could each 

of these movements be a separate offense? The Legislature has not manifested an 

 

3 Appellant was indicted and convicted for two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a 

child under Penal Code section 22.021 and two counts of indecency with a child by contact

under Penal Code section 21.11(a)(1). Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.021, 21.11(a)(1). This case 

therefore involves analyzing both whether double jeopardy protections bar convictions for 

violation of both statutes under the facts of this case as well as whether those protections bar 

convictions for two violations of each separate statute. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 

U.S. 299, 301-02, 304 (1932) (considering double jeopardy implications of prosecution under 

separate statutes); Speights v. State, 464 S.W.3d 719, 722-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (discussing 

“units of prosecution” under a single statute); Aekins, 447 S.W.3d at 274-75 (discussing 

Blockburger as well as concepts of “single impulse” and the “doctrine of subsumed acts”).

Arguably, the break in the assault occasioned by complainant changing from jeans to 

shorts could have caused a break in appellant’s intent or impulse such that when the complainant 

returned to the couch, appellant committed a second assault. See Patterson at 434 (affirming 

conviction of two “essentially identical assaults, separated by a short period of time” where 

defendant penetrated complainant’s anus with his penis before she left her bed and went to the 

bathroom and penetrated her anus with his penis again after she returned to her bed from the 

bathroom). However, I think this unlikely as the clothing change occurred at appellant’s 

direction; thus, appellant had not completed any impulse or reached a “fork in the road”

regarding his conduct. Aekins, 447 S.W.3d at 282; see also Spain v. United States, 665 A.2d 

658, 660 (D.C. 1995) (concluding, under similar facts, the issue is whether there was evidence to 

show that the defendant reached a decision point, a “fork in the road” leading to a “new 

impulse,” resulting in a different offense). Regardless, even if this break is viewed as restarting 

the assault, there would still be two convictions too many in this case as the indecency by 

touching offenses were subsumed in the aggravated sexual assault offenses.
7

intent to authorize “stop-action” prosecutions (and therefore multiple punishments) 

for a single complete act of sexual assault. Id. at 281; see also Patterson v. State, 

152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“The [legislative] scheme 

encompasses escalation of abuse; no matter where in the range the perpetrator 

stops, the offense is complete at that point. . . . While it is clear from the plain 

language of the various statutes that the legislature intended harsh penalties for 

sexual abuse of children, there is nothing in the language to suggest that it intended 

to authorize ‘stop-action’ prosecution.”).4

Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has used restrictive language in 

some recent double jeopardy cases, those cases are factually distinguishable from 

the present case. For example, in Maldonado v. State, the Court stated, “An 

offense may be factually subsumed when there is a single act that cannot 

physically occur in the absence of another act.” 461 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2015).5 The Court then held that the two indecency convictions at issue were 

not subsumed within the greater aggravated sexual assault convictions because the 

evidence demonstrated multiple instances of conduct involving different acts over 

a span of many years. Id. As detailed above, the evidence in the present case 

established one incident of about 45 minutes duration, occurring on one couch, and 

involving escalating conduct, not separate incidents involving different completed 

 

4 Certainly the duration of an assault can be considered by the jury in determining the 

appropriate punishment. If tried and convicted for only one of the greater offenses charged in 

this case, aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first degree felony, appellant still could have 

been sentenced to life in prison, the same punishment he ultimately received with four 

convictions and an enhancement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32 (providing punishment 

range for first degree felonies), 22.021(e) (defining aggravated sexual assault of a child as a first 

degree felony). Dividing sexual assault into ever-more-detailed units of prosecution threatens to 

overcomplicate jury charges, distract jurors, and change the focus of victim testimony.

5

I acknowledge that this language can be analyzed in terms of physics or in terms of 

intent. If no “rubbing” precedes penetration, the contact offense is subsumed as a matter of 

physics. If “rubbing” precedes penetration as an inextricable part of the sexual assault, the 

contact offense is subsumed as one continuous act and one continuous intention.
8

acts at different times.

In Speights v. State and Loving v. State, the respective defendants were 

convicted for both indecency by exposure and indecency by contact. Speights, 464 

S.W.3d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Loving, 401 S.W.3d 642, 643 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013). Evidence in the cases supported the conclusion that each 

defendant first exposed himself and masturbated in front of the child victim or 

victims before then causing sexual contact with a child. Speights, 464 S.W.3d at 

721; Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 643. Although the two offenses in each case occurred 

in close temporal proximity, the contact in both cases was not part of the 

masturbation; thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the exposure 

offenses were not subsumed within the contact offenses. Speights, 464 S.W.3d at 

722-24; Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 647-49. Here, however, appellant only used one 

instrument, his hand, to touch and penetrate one body part, complainant’s genitals,

during a relative short period of escalating conduct. Appellant did not engage in 

multiple types of conduct at multiple times and thus should not have been charged 

or convicted of four separate offenses. In holding otherwise, the majority goes 

well beyond the demands of Court of Criminal Appeals’ precedent and unduly 

restricts the Constitutional right of Texans to be free from multiple punishments 

for one offense.

Waiver

I additionally disagree with the majority’s assessment that appellant waived 

his double-jeopardy claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. As the majority 

acknowledges, the lack of a trial objection is not a bar to presenting the issue on 

appeal “when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly 

apparent on the face of the record and when enforcement of usual rules of 

procedural default serves no legitimate state interests.” Gonzalez v. State, 8 
9

S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A double-jeopardy claim is apparent on 

the face of the trial record if resolution of the claim does not require further 

proceedings for the purpose of introducing additional evidence in support of the 

double-jeopardy claim. Ex parte Denton, 399 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Ex parte Knipp, 236 S.W.3d 214, 216, n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); 

Gonzalez, 8 S.W.3d at 643. Here, appellant’s double-jeopardy claim is based on 

the record of the proceedings below; it does not require any new or additional 

proceedings or the creation of a new record. See Gonzalez, 8 S.W.3d at 644 

(analyzing Supreme Court cases United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) and 

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975)); see also Denton, 399 S.W.3d at 544-45.

Moreover, enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default would serve no 

purpose here as the proper remedy for the double jeopardy violations would simply 

be reversal of certain convictions. See Denton, 399 S.W.3d at 547 (“When a 

defendant is convicted of two offenses and those convictions violate doublejeopardy protections, the conviction for the more serious offense is retained, and 

the other conviction is set aside.”); see also Patterson, 152 S.W.3d at 89, 92 

(affirming court of appeal’s reversal of convictions where indecency by exposure 

offense was subsumed by greater aggravated sexual assault offense). Accordingly, 

I would hold that no waiver occurred in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Donovan, and Brown (Brown, J., majority).

Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).