i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l

s o v i e t u n i o n a l b a n i a

p o l a n d r o m a n i a

h u n g a r y e a s t g e r m a n y

c z e c h o s l o v a k i a b u l g a r i a

Bulgaria

U . S . S . R

Romania

Hungary

slovakia

Poland

East

Germany

CzechoAlbania

Moscow

Black Sea

North

Atlantic

Ocean

North

Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Barents

Sea

Norwegian Sea

Baltic Sea

Caspian

Sea

Boundary representation is

not necessarily authoritative.

0 500 Kilometers

0 500 Miles

UNCLASSIFIED

Warsaw Pact Countries, 1955-91 (U)

793831AI (G00112) 3 -11

Warsaw Pact

Albania*

Bulgaria

Czechoslovakia

East Germany

Hungary

Poland

Romania

U.S.S.R.

*Albania withheld support in 

1961 over the China split and 

officially withdrew in 1968.
table of contents

I. Sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

IV. Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

V. Selected Declassified Intelligence Documents . . . . . . 19

VI. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Electronic Reading Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

VII. Special Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 3

Sponsorship

Historical Review Program

Information Management Services, Historical Collections Division (HCD), in partnership with 

the Directorate Information Review Officers, is responsible for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify and review for declassification collections of 

documents that detail the Agency’s analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics 

and events. HCD’s goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. 

HCD also develops release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible. 

HCD’s mission is to:

•	 Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information that has helped shape major 

US foreign policy decisions.

•	 Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.

•	 Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and 

effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.

•	 Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.

•	 Demonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core 

values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.
4 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s

6 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s

overview

New Evidence on Imposition of the 

1980 “Wartime Statute”

by A. Ross Johnson

Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars

s o v i e t c o n t r o l o f e a s t

e u r o p e a n m i l i t a r y f o r c e s

Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe 

after World War II from the outset harnessed 

East European military capabilities to Soviet 

military purposes and assumed operational 

subordination of East European military formations to higher-level Soviet commands. A 

Polish command-staff exercise in 1950, for 

example, assumed subordination of a Polish 

Army (comprised of five divisions and other 

units) to a Soviet Maritime Front (tasked in the 

exercise with occupying Denmark).1

 Following 

founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization 

(Warsaw Pact) in May 1955, a supreme Warsaw Pact military command was established in 

Moscow, but this institution existed largely on 

paper until the 1960’s. 

It was only in 1969 that the Warsaw Pact adopted 

at Soviet insistence (along with the Committee of 

Defense Ministers and Military Council) a “Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command of the Warsaw Pact Member 

States (for Peacetime)” that created an elaborate 

Warsaw Pact military headquarters in Moscow 

with East European deputy defense ministers 

designated as deputy Warsaw Pact commanders.2

These institutional changes gave the Warsaw Pact 

more semblance of a multinational military alliance and granted to the East European military 

establishments a greater consultative voice in 

Warsaw Pact military matters, while streamlining 

decision-making on training and armaments in a 

manner serving Soviet interests.3

 

Oddly for a military alliance, the 1969 military 

statute was silent on wartime command arrangements and explicitly confined its purview 

to “peacetime,” notwithstanding the greater 

importance that East European armed forces 

assumed in Soviet military planning in the 

1960’s. As in World War II, Soviet coalition 

warfare doctrine of the 1960’s envisaged the 

controlled use of military allies of questionable 

military efficiency and political reliability by 

1

1

 Recollection of Colonel Michael Sadykiewicz, who participated in the exercise, letter to the author, March 8, 2010. In Soviet 

practice, a theater headquarters commanded Fronts, comprised of Armies, which were in turn comprised of divisions and other 

large military units. 

2 CIA document FIR-DB 312/00538-78 dated March 21, 1978 (English translation from original Russian). A full German 

translation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.

ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=21221&navinfo=15697) 

and a partial English text is published in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the 

Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), document 62. The 1969 military 

structures of the Warsaw Pact are described in A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military 

Establishments; The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (New York: Crane Russak, 1980), Appendix A, pp.151-156.
I n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 7

subordinating East European military formations to Soviet operational commands at the 

Front level or below. The respective Soviet 

commands were in turn subordinated not to 

the Warsaw Pact military headquarters but to 

the Soviet General Staff and High Command 

in Moscow. As veteran British observer and 

official Malcolm Macintosh observed at the 

time, the Warsaw Pact Combined Command 

remained a peacetime structure, equivalent 

to a traditional European war office with administrative duties for training, mobilization, 

and armaments, but without responsibility for 

conduct of military operations.4

 In Ryszard 

Kuklinski’s words, “ the banner of the so-called 

Combined Command of the Combined Armed 

Forces masked Soviet control.”5 

In the late 1970’s, the USSR sought to formalize these wartime Warsaw Pact command arrangements in a new “Statute on the Combined 

Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member 

States and Their Command Organs for Wartime,” adopted in March 1980.6

 This effort to 

fill the glaring gap highlighted by the “peacetime 

statute” was delayed by objections from Nicolae 

Ceausescu’s Romania, which viewed it as an 

unacceptable surrender of national sovereignty. 

The Polish General Staff raised questions along 

similar lines. In the end, the Ceausescu regime 

never signed or agreed to abide by the provisions 

of the wartime statute, while Polish Party chief 

Edward Gierek did. Kuklinski argued that the 

Romanian example demonstrated it was possible for an East European country to resist Soviet pressure even within the Soviet-dominated 

Warsaw Pact.7

 While a different Polish leadership might have attempted a more autonomous 

course, Poland was not Romania. Poland, part 

of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier and with the 

largest East European military force, was central 

to Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe; Romania was not. Soviet military forces 

had vacated Romania in 1958. Romania under 

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu had 

for two decades pursued an independent foreign, 

military, and intelligence policy. Poland under 

Wladyslaw Gomulka and Gierek had remained 

closely aligned with Moscow in all these areas. 

Poland was home to the Soviet Northern Group 

of Forces, headquartered in Legnica, which in 

the 1980’s was also the location of the headquarters of the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD), established as the forward Soviet 

1 7

3 Johnson, Dean, Alexiev, op. cit., p. 15.

4 Malcolm Macintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers, No. 58, June 1969, pp. 11-15. 

5

 Interview in Kultura, Paris, April 1987, p. 54.

6

CIA document FIRDB-312/01995-80 dated July 25, 1980 (English translation from the original Russian). A full German 

translation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.

ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=20408&navinfo=15697 ) and a partial English text is published in Mastny and 

Byrne, op. cit, document 86. Detailed comparison of Warsaw Pact peacetime and wartime command structures is provided in 

Michael Sadykiewicz, The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War (Santa Monica: R AND Corporation, 1988), 

Report 3558-RC. 

7

Kuklinski interview, op. cit, pp. 56-57.
8 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s

command for military operations in Europe. 

In 1980-1981, with the emergence of the Solidarity trade union and preparations for Soviet 

intervention and martial law, the Soviet high 

command demonstrated that it could operate 

independently in Poland, ignoring the Polish 

military whenever it wished. 

The Warsaw Pact wartime statute adopted in 

March 1980 formalized Soviet wartime control 

over East European military forces that had been 

assumed since the 1950’s. It demonstrated that 

the Warsaw Pact military Combined Command 

in Moscow was irrelevant for a Soviet Union at 

war in Europe. It made clear that in marshalling 

military forces for imminent conflict as well as 

in conducting combat operations, Soviet generals would bypass East European political and 

military leaders and command East European 

generals directly.

If the Warsaw Pact wartime statute served Soviet 

purposes in formalizing and rationalizing Soviet wartime control over East European military 

forces, it was adopted just as those forces were 

becoming relatively less important in Soviet 

military planning. By the early 1980’s, “coalition 

warfare” terminology had almost disappeared 

from Soviet military writings. This was only one 

of a number of indicators of reduced reliance in 

Soviet military planning on East European forces. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces lacked the 

operational capabilities of Soviet forces for rapid 

advances with high-technology conventional 

weaponry on the modern battlefield under new 

concepts first advocated by Marshal Nikolai 

Ogarkov. In the course of the 1980’s, mounting 

economic problems and social unrest in Eastern 

Europe and weariness of its ruling elites made 

East European armed forces a less attractive 

even junior partner to the Soviet military.8

 The 

paradox of the Warsaw Pact military statute was 

illustrated by the 1988 Warsaw Pact Shchit-88 

pre-war mobilization exercise.9

 That exercise 

assumed subordination of Polish forces (in this 

case the Eighth Army) to a Soviet-dominated 

Front (which would have been subordinated in 

turn to the Western TVD headquarters and 

the Soviet High Command). Yet unlike earlier 

Warsaw Pact exercises through the early 1980’s, 

which assumed rapid offensive operations into 

Western Europe, Shchit-88 utilized an (initially) 

defensive and essentially defeatist scenario that 

can be read as striking acknowledgment of the 

degree of demoralization of Polish forces and 

limitations on Soviet use of the Polish army by 

that time. 

These observations provide context for the 22 

documents on the Warsaw Pact in this CIA 

release. 17 of the documents are English translations of key original Warsaw Pact military 

documents obtained clandestinely at the time 

and now declassified. Three of the documents, 

issued after 1981, offer insightful observations 

by an informed military insider. They cover a 

range of issues discussed publicly by and attributed to Ryszard Kuklinski.10 One document is 

a 1983 CIA Directorate of Intelligence analysis 

that drew on these Warsaw Pact documents, 

1

8

A. Ross Johnson, East European Armed Forces and Soviet Military Planning: Factors of Change (Santa Monica: R AND 

Corporation, 1989), Note N-2856-AF, declassified and released November 2006. 

9 Documentation of and commentary on Shchit-88 are posted on the Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War International 

History Project web site at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_

id=600908&group_id=13349.
I n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 9

and other clandestine materials, to provide a 

detailed picture of “Soviet Control of Warsaw 

Pact Forces.” A final document, released earlier, is the 1983 National Intelligence Estimate 

on East European military reliability. Both the 

CIA analysis and the Estimate stand the test 

of time, indicating that the intelligence reports 

released here, and other materials, allowed U.S. 

officials to accurately appraise Soviet-dominated mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact at the time. 

It is noteworthy how quickly some of these 

highly sensitive Warsaw Pact documents became available in Washington. The final wartime statute and ratification documents were 

dated March 18, 1980 and April 30, 1980; they 

were issued as a translated CIA intelligence report on July 25, 1980. 

Following collapse of Communist regimes 

in Eastern Europe, dissolution of the USSR, 

and abolition of the Warsaw Pact, many original Warsaw Pact and East European military 

documents have become available in a number 

of archives, especially the German Military Archive in Freiburg (incorporating East German 

military archives), the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, and the Czech military 

archive. Many such documents were obtained 

and posted on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/) and some 

were translated for the PHP book, A Cardboard Castle? Some documents related to the 

Warsaw Pact military statute released by CIA 

in English translation can be found in (East) 

German versions on the PHP web site. Other 

documents in the CIA release and all original 

Russian texts have yet to be located in East 

European archives. The documents released by 

CIA serve historians today not only as useful 

translations but as valuable source material. As 

such they complement previous CIA releases of 

classified Military Thought articles, classified 

Soviet military academy course materials, and 

Polish military plans for martial law.11

1

10 Kuklinski interview, op.cit; Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid 

to Save His Country (Public Affairs: New York, 2004); Benjamin B. Fischer, “Entangled in History: The Vilification and Vindication of Colonel Kuklinski,” Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 19-34. Weiser’s book is based in part on interviews 

with Kuklinski and on CIA reports from Kuklinski (“750 pages of notes and raw files”) that have not otherwise been released 

(Weiser, op. cit., pp. xi-xiii).

11 Available in the CIA on-line Special Collections Archive, http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections_archive.asp.
1 0 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s

1 2 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s

essays

Personal Recollections and Comments

by Les Griggs

o r i g i n s a n d s i g n i f i c a n c e

o f t h e w a r s a w p a c t w a r t i m e

s t a t u t e d o c u m e n t s

As a serving intelligence officer and foreign 

area specialist (Poland and Czechoslovakia) in 

the United States Army from 1959 until 1986, 

I was exposed to special human intelligence 

(HUMINT) reporting concerning Eastern 

Europe as required from time to time. In 1974, 

when one of my tasks on the Army Staff in the 

Pentagon was to screen such reporting and brief 

it to my superiors, I noticed reporting from 

what appeared to be new special source(s), Over 

the following years, as an Army General Staff 

officer and in other assignments, I noted the 

wide range of topics reported on by what clearly 

were the same source(s)... information on such 

subjects as current and future weapons systems, 

war plans, exercises, etc. of direct interest and 

value to the Army and other elements of the 

Department of Defense. 

We gradually discerned that the materials 

probably were from one source. As I rose in 

rank and acquired more responsibilities, my exposure to the special reporting from this source 

continued, but were less frequent. For example, 

while commanding a psychological operations 

(PSYOP) battalion at Fort Bragg in the early 

1980’s, I occasionally was called upon by the 

Army Staff to provide my views on some of this 

reporting. From my position at the time, I noted –but was not overly surprised by-- the series 

of reports dealing with the drafting and ratification of a new wartime statute by the Warsaw 

Pact. To me, the reporting served mainly to 

confirm the view that the Soviets dominated 

the Warsaw Pact and could have their way on 

any issue, great or small. 

In 1981 I returned to the Army Staff in the 

Pentagon to work for General Bill Odom in the 

office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. He immediately ordered me to work 

full-time on this source’s materials, and the 

wartime statute issue moved up on my list of 

priorities. I soon discovered that US Army intelligence analysts and Army strategic planners 

found the wartime statute issue to be intriguing, but difficult to apply as actionable intelligence. It was hard to quantify the materials 

in the preferred way –placing a dollar and cents 

savings tag on the information (E.g., this information saved us $XXXXX on the design of 

1

1 Source protection was the prime consideration throughout the HUMINT operation, as it should be in any HUMINT case; 

however, it often limited use of the information. For example, only a handful of principals received the reports from CIA, and 

copying as well as dissemination of the reports beyond the Washington area was prohibited. In particular, these rules handcuffed the US Army Missile Intelligence Agency (Alabama) and US Army Foreign Science and Technology (Charlottesville, 

VA), at the time two of the Army Staff ’s most important intelligence-producing field agencies
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 1 3

our new tank). Even so, the information about 

the statute and its implementing structure 

(new headquarters, communications systems, 

etc.) was of value to war planners, war gamers, 

targeteers and even PSYOP strategists, who 

could hope to take advantage of the surrender 

of national sovereignty issue during crisis or 

war. In fact, some high officials in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense pushed for making 

the statute reporting public immediately as a 

public diplomacy weapon against the USSR; 

however, this notion reportedly was vetoed by 

the DCI for source-protection reasons.1

A few high-level US military and civilian leaders also saw this intelligence as an early “warwinner,” offering NATO an opportunity to 

destroy or disable the Warsaw Pact command 

and control system at the Theater of Military 

Operations (TVD) level almost immediately 

upon the outbreak of hostilities. Accordingly, 

driven largely by the statute reporting, appropriate modifications and reprioritizations reportedly were made to target lists. Thankfully, 

the Warsaw Pact collapsed before target strikes 

became necessary.

The collection of wartime statute documents 

released here by the Central Intelligence Agency and Wilson Center is concise and to the 

topic yet rich with substance, and should be of 

enormous use to historians of the period. The 

documents provided from the Wilson Center 

and elsewhere provide a fulsome background 

and context for the issues, while the finished 

intelligence documents –the national estimate 

and particularly the incisive CIA analytic paper—afford the reader a glimpse of the intelligence cycle and the challenges of “making of 

the intelligence stew.” In my view, however, 

the heart of the collection consists of the operational field reporting by one special human 

intelligence source...the one discussed above. 

His reports are filled with facts and his field 

analysis, even while conveying the frustrations 

and emotions you might expect from this patriotic officer. We owe him a lot for his courage. 
1 4 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s

by Aris Pappas

Retired CIA Officer, Senior Director of the 

Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology 

in Government

a j o u r n e y o f r e d i s c o v e r y

A journey of rediscovery. That’s the feeling I 

have as I review the material that serves as the 

core of this event. While involved daily with 

professional responsibilities, there is very little 

time for quiet retrospectives. Life is evolutionary, and the job of intelligence is focused on the 

future. But now, thanks in no small measure to 

the heroic efforts of the people who combined 

their skills and, literally, risked their lives to 

obtain this mate¬rial, we have the golden opportunity to look back.

It’s not really a pretty sight. These papers document a record of oppression and outright bullying that, although commonly understood, was 

rarely so painfully visible – even in the stark 

reality of the world of intelligence. Clearly, 

the sovereignty of the Soviet Union’s East European “allies,” was a chimera; a status to be 

revered in diplomatic venues, but never allowed 

to interfere with the needs of Soviet security.

Repetition even affected the lazy and gullible 

in the West because public pronouncements, by 

master and servants alike, allowed all-too-easy 

and facile comparisons between the Warsaw Pact 

and NATO. But the reality was far different. 

Indeed, reading through these records, it’s hard 

to avoid pity for the vassals who paid a heavy 

price in terms of their own integrity to protect 

their benefits. They were both beholden to and 

threatened by their Soviet rulers. A friendless 

situation in which power was derived from obeisance to a cruel master, while their ties to their 

own people was characterized by moral capitulation; like the imposition of Polish martial law or 

the slaughter of Czechs and Hungarians.

These documents were not widely distributed, 

but they did provide context to important 

decision-makers who were afforded the opportunity to understand better the nature of their 

opposition. To see the pressures and tensions 

working internally to tear the Warsaw Pact 

apart, but also to recognize the great danger 

represented by such unalloyed power.

Such differences between appearance and reality remain pertinent, and the need for deep understanding by intelligence agencies is no less 

significant today.

Thankfully, the Wartime Statute was never 

invoked. We never had to test the reliability 

of the Soviet “allies.” An essentially unnatural 

and flawed system proved simply too difficult 

to sustain and finally collapsed.

History tends to record great victories by reference to battles won and lost. These documents, 

however, offer a small insight to a Cold War 

victory where measured, though never perfect, 

understanding helped us avoid pitched battle.

I consider myself fortunate to have played even 

a minor role in that great effort.
I n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 1 5
1 61 6 w a r t i m e w a r t i m es t a t u t e s s t a t u t e s
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
1 8 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 1 9
2 0 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 2 1
2 2 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 2 3
2 4 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 2 5
2 6 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 2 7
2 8 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 2 9
3 0 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 3 1
3 2 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 3 3
3 4 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 3 5
freedom of information act (foia)

electronic reading room

The CIA has established this site to provide 

the public with an overview of access to CIA 

information, including electronic access to previously released documents. Because of CIA’s 

need to comply with the national security laws 

of the United States, some documents or parts 

of documents cannot be released to the public. 

In particular, the CIA, like other U.S. intelligence agencies, has the responsibility to protect 

intelligence sources and methods from disclosure. However, a substantial amount of CIA 

information has been and/or can be released 

following review. See “Your Rights” for further 

details on the various methods of obtaining 

this information.

s p e c i a l c o l l e c t i o n s

Additional document collections released by 

the Historical Collection Division can be 

found on the FOIA Electronic Reading Room 

and include:

Strategic Warning and the Role of Intelligence: Lessons Learned From the 1968 Soviet 

Invasion of Czechoslovakia

This collection consists of DI intelligence memorandums, various estimates and memos written 

by the Office of National Estimates (ONE), articles from the Central Intelligence Bulletin (a 

current intelligence daily publication), Weekly 

Summaries, Intelligence Information Cables, 

and Situation Reports, which were published up 

to three times a day during the crisis when tensions flared.

The Warsaw Pact: Treaty of Friendship,

Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance

A collection of sensitive Soviet and Warsaw 

Pact military journals from 1961 to 1984 that 

provide a view into Warsaw Pact military strategy. New information was added to this site in 

January 2010.

Air America: Upholding the Airmen’s Bond

A fascinating assembly of documents revealing 

the role that Air America, the Agency’s proprietary airline, played in the search and rescue of 

pilots and personnel during the Vietnam War. 

The collection has personal accounts by the 

rescued pilots and thank you letters as well as 

commendations from various officials. 

Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes 

of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski

A captivating collection of over 75 documents 

concerning the planning and implementation 

of martial law in Poland from mid-1980 to late 

1981. Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of 

the Polish Army General Staff and the source 

of the documents, provided information and 

personal commentary that gave intelligence 

analysts and US policy makers invaluable insight into the crisis.

Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the

Korean War.

This collection includes more than 1,200 documents consisting of national estimates, intelligence memos, daily updates, and summaries of 

3 6 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 3 7

foreign media concerning developments on the 

Korean Peninsula during 1947-1954. This collection, coinciding with the 60th anniversary 

of the start of the war, is the largest collection 

of CIA documents on this issue ever released. 

HCD and the Harry S. Truman Presidential 

Library co-hosted a conference entitled “New 

Documents and New Histories”: Twenty-first 

Century Perspectives on the Korean War” that 

highlighted the document collection.

Creating Global Intelligence

Discover the back story of the US intelligence 

community by exploring this collection of more 

than 800 documents from the late 1940’s to the 

early 1950’s that pertain to the establishment of 

the Central Intelligence Agency. The collection 

provides perspective on the complex issues that 

senior US government officials grappled with as 

they considered how to establish an enduring 

national intelligence capability. 

The Original Wizards of Langley: Overview 

of the Office of Scientific Intelligence

This overview and collection of documents and 

other material related to the Office of Scientific 

Intelligence (OSI) offer a glimpse of CIA’s contribution to the analysis of Soviet capabilities in 

science and technology during the Cold War. 

A Life in Intelligence—The Richard

Helms Collection

This collection of material by and about Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence 

(DCI) and Ambassador to Iran comprises the 

largest single release of Helms-related information to date. The documents, historical works 

and essays offer an unprecedented, wide-ranging 

look at the man and his career as the United 

States’ top intelligence official and one of its 

most important diplomats during a crucial decade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, when 

he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran, 

Helms dealt directly with numerous events 

whose impact remains evident today and which 

are covered in the release.

A-12 OXCART Reconnaissance 

Aircraft Documentation

This release, containing approximately 1,500 

pages of material, consisting of about 350 documents, maps, diagrams, and photographs will 

provide researchers on aviation and intelligence 

with significant additional detail about the design and development of the A-12. 
a b o u t t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n

Since the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 

1955, the anticipated reliability of Non-Soviet 

Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces in the event of 

a crisis was a topic of intense interest for the 

United States and its NATO allies as well as 

for the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union engaged in successive efforts from the late 1960’s 

onwards to codify its command and control 

arrangements over the armed forces of its East 

European allies—first through a peacetime and 

later a wartime statute—the U.S. Intelligence 

Community’s collection and analytic efforts on 

the subject were ongoing. 

DVD Document Collection—This collection in 

the Warsaw Pact series features a wealth of newly declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents.

Warsaw Pact: Wartime Statutes—Instruments 

of Soviet Control explores evolving U.S. views 

on the relationship between the Soviet Union 

and its Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies.

The companion DVD will work on most computers and the documents are in .PDF format.

DISCLAIMER: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this booklet are those of the authors. They 

do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the 

Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government 

entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be 

construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s statements or interpretations.

3 8 w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s
i n s t r u m e n t s o f s o v i e t c o n t r o l 3 9

The Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, identifies, 

collects and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event and with supporting analysis, essays, video, audio, 

and photographs, are showcased in a booklet and DVD that are available to the academic realm 

and the public.

All of our Historical Collections are available in the Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. Go to w w w.foia.cia.gov and click on Special Collections or contact 

us at HistoricalCollections@UCI A.gov.

special acknowledgements

Thanks to the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) for hosting 

and co-organizing this important event and for contributing images as well as documents from 

their own collection of non-US sources for the publication.
4 04 0 w a r t i m e w a r t i m e s t a t u t e s s t a t u t e s

This page is left intentionally blank.

20010607011