1

Ogle initially filed his claims in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Tennessee, in which he accused the Church of God and its leaders of defaming him. However,

this case was eventually dismissed on jurisdictional issues.

2

 On June 1, 2006, the Court entered an order which denied a motion for reconsideration

by Ogle. Erroneously believing that the Court had entered a summary judgment as to both of his

claims, Ogle appealed this order to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, because the

Court had not ruled on his IIED claim, the Sixth Circuit dismissed Ogle’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TROY D. OGLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICK HOCKER,

Defendant.

Case No. 02-73200

Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.

ORDER

The dispute in this case is based upon allegations by the Plaintiff, Troy D. Ogle, who

contends that the Defendant, Rick Hocker, caused him to suffer damages through several acts of

defamation as well as an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).1 On March 11, 2005,

the Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Hocker with respect to the defamation claim.2

On August 25, 2006, the Court also granted a summary judgment to Hocker as it pertained to

Ogle’s IIED claim. An appeal by Ogle to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Sixth Circuit”)

followed. On May 29, 2008, the Sixth Circuit (1) reinstated Ogle’s claims for defamation and IIED

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 1 of 15 Pg ID 2043
3

According to Hocker, Ogle said to him that “sometimes when he preaches, he gets

erections, and his shorts are wet.” (Hocker Dep. 108:1-3, May 4, 2004.) Hocker also contends

that Ogle “discussed with [him] the thought about men kissing men.” (Id. at 108:8-9.)

2

and (2) remanded this case for further proceedings.

On March 12, 2009, Hocker filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, believing that -

notwithstanding the ruling by the Sixth Circuit - he is entitled to total relief from Ogle’s claims as

a matter of law. On April 17th, Ogle submitted a written response in opposition to Hocker’s motion

which now before the Court for its review.

I.

Ogle is a self-proclaimed international evangelist and bishop who is affiliated with the

Church of God, a religious organization. Hocker, is an ordained bishop in the Church of God, as

well as a senior pastor at the Church of God in Virginia Beach, Virginia, also known as Freedom

Fellowship.

These two parties met for the first time in 1999 during a prayer conference in Virginia.

They met again during the summers of 1999 and 2000 at “camp meetings” where Ogle had been

invited as a guest speaker. Hocker later accepted an invitation by Ogle to join him on a ten day

ministry trip to Belgium. During their flight to Belgium on June 27, 2001, Ogle made certain

remarks that Hocker thought were strange and unusual.3

 

Upon their arrival in Belgium and after checking into the same hotel room, Ogle - after

approaching Hocker and uttering “in the love of Christ my brother”- kissed him on the lips.

Thereafter, Hocker says that he was invited by Ogle to pray on the floor of their hotel room which

involved some physical contact between these two men. Hocker describes this contact as Ogle’s

attempt to pull him into a sexual position. However, Ogle has a different view of the parties’

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 2 of 15 Pg ID 2044
4

Although Hocker had asked that his “involvement” with Ogle be kept confidential, the

Church of God elected to convene a fact finding committee to investigate the matter. Following

this investigation, the Church of God General Trial Board found Ogle guilty of “unbecoming

ministerial conduct” and suspended his license as a bishop for a period of one year. The

Michigan Church of God Council subsequently approved Ogle’s reinstatement. However, the

International Executive Council blocked the reinstatement process.

3

contact, claiming that he had only symbolically embraced Hocker - and not for any improper or

immoral purpose. 

Hocker’s stay in Belgium ended prematurely when he returned to the United States on the

day after their arrival, after assuring Ogle that his decision to leave was not a result of what had

transpired. However, despite his assurances to Ogle, Hocker wrote a letter on August 1, 2001 to his

presiding bishop in which he outlined the alleged misbehavior by his traveling companion.4

During his early morning sermon on August 5, 2001, Hocker referenced the incident in

Belgium by stating: 

And as I get on the plane, he begins to talk to me and I begin to realize that his

doctrine is corrupt . . . . And when I get there [Belgium], he begins to manifest issues

of homosexuality. He wants me to be his really good spiritual friend, quote unquote.

. . . I see how easily the church can be tricked . . . . Now you listen to this - - we must

protect ourselves as the church of the living God. We must protect from heresies and

false doctrines and false prophets who would lead the very elect away.

Several hours later, Hocker spoke once again to his congregation in a sermon during which he

stated the following:

And I began to perceive that his doctrine was corrupt. . . . [H]e also wanted me to

become his very good friend . . . . And I'm waiting on him to come back now from

Belgium to face me, because I plan to face him in a counsel of ordained bishops and

declare the man to be a heretic. . . . Because the enemy tried to take prophesy and the

word of God and mesmerize me and take me out.

This lawsuit by Ogle followed.

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 3 of 15 Pg ID 2045
4

II. 

According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a summary judgment must be granted

where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When considering a motion for the entry of a summary

judgment, district courts must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 

A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the moving party

has met its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact, the non-moving

party cannot merely rest on the allegations made in its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Under

such circumstances, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or

by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party]’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

III.

In support of his request for a summary judgment, Hocker submits that Ogle has failed to

establish a prima facie case of defamation. In order to state a claim of defamation in Michigan, a

plaintiff must proffer “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 4 of 15 Pg ID 2046
5

unprivileged communication to a third party, (3)fault amounting at least to negligence on the part

of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation

per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication.” Mitan v. Campbell, 706 N.W.2d

420, 421 (Mich. 2005) (citations omitted). 

Hocker asserts that Ogle, who bears the burden of proving that the alleged defamatory

statements are false, has failed to satisfy his burden of persuasion. In its opinion of May 29, 2008,

the Sixth Circuit determined that Ogle is a private figure plaintiff. See Ogle v. Hocker, 279 Fed.

Appx. 391, 399 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, the party who bears the burden of establishing falsity of a

challenged statement turns on whether it pertains to a matter of public concern. See J & J Constr.

Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 664 N.W.2d 728, 732 n.11 (Mich. 2003) (citing

Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 398 N.W.2d 245, 256 (Mich. 1986)). 

In those situations in which the plaintiff is a private figure and the alleged defamatory

statement involves an issue of public concern, the law in Michigan declares that an aggrieved party

bears the burden of proving falsity. Id. On the other hand, if the alleged defamatory statement

involves a matter of private concern, the burden of proving its truthfulness lies with the defendant.

Id. 

Over a quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court opined that the issue of whether a

statement “addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and

context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,

147-48 (1983). The Connick Court also explained that the standard to be used in determining if a

statement is a matter of public concern is the same as that which is used to gauge whether a common

law action for invasion of privacy has been established. Id. at 143 n. 5 (citing Restatement (Second)

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 5 of 15 Pg ID 2047
6

of Torts § 652D (1977)). Under the Restatement of Torts, an invasion of privacy exists where a

matter that is publicized is one that “(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b)

is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977); see also

Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (in analyzing claims of invasion of

privacy, Michigan courts generally have embraced the provisions of the Restatement of Torts).

On this issue, Hocker asserts that the challenged statements are matters of public concern

because, in his opinion, they were “disseminated to a large public audience with an interest in

adherence to the tenants of the [Church of God] and an interest in whether a pastor within the church

was violating such tenant[.]” However, his contention would figuratively open the life of every

clergy person up to scrutiny on the basis of an alleged interest by members of the church who seek

to know if their pastor is upholding the tenets of their religion. See Winstead v. Sweeney, 517

N.W.2d 874, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“[t]he fact that [persons] engage in an activity in which

the public can be said to have a general interest does not render every aspect of their lives subject

to public disclosure”). Assuming, arguendo, that the members of the Church of God could be

equated to the “public,” it would be Ogle’s own church in Michigan that would arguably have a

legitimate interest in knowing whether he was personally upholding the ideals of his sermons. By

contrast, the members of The Church of God in Hocker’s church in Virginia cannot be said to have

a legitimate interest in what a virtually unknown bishop (i.e., Ogle) may have done in a hotel room

in Belgium. It should also be noted that even Hocker, a Church of God bishop, had not heard of

Ogle prior to their first meeting at the prayer conference in Virginia.

Hocker’s concern that a pastor within the larger Church of God was not following its tenets

was addressed by this religious institution’s purportedly confidential investigative procedure.

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 6 of 15 Pg ID 2048
7

Despite Hocker’s asserted interest in informing the Church of God members that a bishop had

conducted himself in a manner which was purportedly contrary to their religious ideals, he

acknowledges having spoken of his experiences with Ogle in Belgium to individuals other than

those who were present during the Sunday sermons on August 5, 2001. Thus, the Court concludes

that (1) the allegedly defamatory statements at issue involve matters of private concern and (2)

Hocker will bear the burden of proving that the statements were not false.

However, even if these allegedly defamatory statements were of legitimate public concern,

Ogle has proffered sufficient evidence with which to create a genuine issue of a material fact as to

the falsity of the challenged statements. More to the point, he has provided his own affidavit, in

which he attests that (1) he is not gay and (2) his actions in Belgium were merely acts of “brotherly

love.” Ogle has also provided a letter from his psychologist, Dr. Rick Gillon, who avers that his

patient “does not have repressed feelings of homosexuality and that he poses no threat as a minister

of the gospel.” 

Hocker dismisses this proffered evidence as being irrelevant because he “merely stated that

a person ‘manifested issues of homosexuality’ not that he was a ‘homosexual.’” According to the

Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency to make the existence

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Here, circumstantial evidence of Ogle’s

sexuality could make the veracity of Hocker’s statement (i.e., that a person “manifested issues of

homosexuality”) more or less probable. Thus, the entry of a summary judgment would be

inappropriate on this ground even if the allegedly defamatory statements were of legitimate public

concern.

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 7 of 15 Pg ID 2049
8

IV.

Hocker also contends that his statements were subject to a qualified duty/interest privilege,

citing Bufalino v. Maxon Bros., Inc., 117 N.W.2d 150 (Mich. 1962) as authority. According to

Bufalino, the elements of a duty privilege are “[1] good faith, [2] an interest to be upheld, [3] a

statement limited in its scope to this purpose, [4] a proper occasion, and [5] publication in a proper

manner and to proper parties only.” 117 N.W.2d at 156. However, the Sixth Circuit has already

determined that because “the record is unclear about whether Hocker also disclosed the information

to persons outside the church[,] . . . summary judgment would be improper on this ground.” Ogle,

279 Fed. Appx. at 398 n. 7. Hence, this issue, having been addressed and resolved by the Sixth

Circuit, need not be addressed by this Court.

 V.

Next, Hocker submits that inasmuch as Ogle (1) has failed to show that Hocker published

the statements at issue with actual malice and (2) cannot establish economic damages, the entry of

a summary judgment would be appropriate. Ogle counters by arguing that (1) the contested

statements at issue constitute defamation per se, (2) Hocker acted with malice, and (3) he has

suffered economic damages as a result of Hocker’s actions, for which he is entitled to exemplary and

punitive damages.

The Michigan defamation statute, Michigan Compiled Laws, Section 600.2911, reads, in

pertinent part, as follows:

(1) Words imputing a lack of chastity to any female or male are actionable in

themselves and subject the person who uttered or published them to a civil action for

the slander in the same manner as the uttering or publishing of words imputing the

commission of a criminal offense.

(2) (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), in actions based on libel or slander the

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 8 of 15 Pg ID 2050
9

plaintiff is entitled to recover only for the actual damages which he or she has

suffered in respect to his or her property, business, trade, profession, occupation, or

feelings.

. . . .

(7) An action for libel or slander shall not be brought based upon a communication

involving a private individual unless the defamatory falsehood concerns the private

individual and was published negligently. Recovery under this provision shall be

limited to economic damages including attorney fees.

The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that subsection (1) of the defamation statute

codifies the “common-law principle that words imputing a lack of chastity or the commission of a

crime constitute defamation per se and are actionable even in the absence of an ability to prove

actual or special damages.” Burden v. Elias Bros. Big Boy Restaurants, 613 N.W.2d 378, 382

(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). 

Here, Ogle argues that Hocker’s published statements are defamatory per se because they

fully satisfy the above-cited first element under Burden, noting that his offensive words (1) impute

a lack of chastity to him as a married man, and (2) attribute the commission of a crime to him

inasmuch as sodomy is a criminal offense in Michigan. However, this Court, when ruling on Ogle’s

earlier motion for reconsideration of the order which had granted a summary judgment against him,

held that “Hocker’s contentions that Ogle ‘manifest[s] issues of homosexuality’ or was a ‘false

prophet,’ ‘heretic’, the ‘devil’, or a ‘preach[er of] false doctrine’ cannot be construed to impute a

lack of chastity.” Contrary to Ogle’s argument on this issue, the Sixth Circuit did not address it on

appeal. Thus, the original ruling by this Court will stand. 

Ogle also submits that Hocker, by contending that the prior summary judgment decision by

the Court is the law of this case, is attempting to circumvent the decision of May 29, 2008 by the

Sixth Circuit; namely, that “a phrase like ‘manifested issues of homosexuality,’ which cannot easily

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 9 of 15 Pg ID 2051
5

The Sixth Circuit concluded that the phrase “manifested issues of homosexuality”

implies that a person “engage[d] in homosexual behavior.” It appears that the Sixth Circuit has 

equated the term “homosexual behavior” with a sexual act with a person of the same sex. Hence,

the Court will construe this phrase as such. 

6

 For the most part, Ogle’s authority on this issue does not hold otherwise. See, e.g.

Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 663-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (statements that plaintiff had

sex with a co-worker of the same gender were actionable in themselves); Baskin v. Rogers, 493

S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (defendant’s statements alleging that plaintiff engaged in

10

be reduced to a clear meaning, nevertheless carries implicit factual assertions (i.e., that Ogle wished

to engage in homosexual behavior).” Ogle, 279 Fed. Appx. at 398. However, even when

considering the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of this phrase,5

 these statements by Hocker are not

defamatory per se.

To bolster his contention that Hocker’s statements imputed a lack of chastity upon him, Ogle

cites to Linebaugh v. Sheraton Mich. Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). In Linebaugh,

the Michigan Court of Appeals had been asked to evaluate a defamation lawsuit wherein the plaintiff

complained that she had been depicted with another employee in a “sexually compromising

position” in a cartoon that had been drawn by the defendant. 497 N.W.2d at 586. The Linebaugh

Court held that this cartoon constituted defamation per se because it “could be interpreted as

depicting plaintiff engaged in a sexual act with a male other than her husband,” thus imputing a lack

of chastity to her. Id. at 587. However, Linebaugh, although evaluating the interrelationship

between such issues as chastity and defamation, is inapposite to the instant action inasmuch as there

is no allegation by Hocker that Ogle engaged in a sexual act with him. Even if Hocker’s statements

were construed to mean that Ogle had made sexual advances toward him, this case would be

distinguishable from Linebaugh. A mere desire to engage in a sexual act falls short of its actual

commission which, in turn, does not impute a lack of chastity.6

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 10 of 15 Pg ID 2052
“illicit sexual intercourse” were defamatory per se) (emphasis added). 

11

For similar reasons, Ogle’s contention that the alleged defamatory statements impute the

commission of a crime is not persuasive. Ogle cites to a Michigan statute which criminalizes the

act of sodomy. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.158. However, as Hocker correctly notes, there is no

evidence in this record wherein he has accused Ogle of engaging in the act of sodomy.

Accordingly, because Hocker’s statements are not defamatory per se, Ogle must assume the burden

of proffering evidence of his damages.

VI.

In those situations in which the allegedly defamatory statements are not actionable in

themselves, the plaintiff must prove (1) actual damages including injury to reputation or feelings or

(2) economic damages, depending upon the defendant’s degree of fault. See Glazer v. Lamkin, 506

N.W.2d 570, 572 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 

Subsection (7) of the Michigan defamation statute provides that if a defendant’s publication

of an allegedly defamatory statement is found to be negligent, the “plaintiff must prove economic

damages but cannot recover for injuries to feelings.” Id. at 573. However, subsection 2(a) provides

that “if a private plaintiff proves actual malice, the plaintiff is entitled to, among other things, actual

damages to reputation or feelings.” 

The Sixth Circuit, in holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not bar federal

court review adjudication of this case, nevertheless cautioned:

To the extent Ogle seeks damages based on the [Church of God]'s decision to

suspend him or the loss of his reputation within the [Church of God], Ogle's claims

might be barred by this rule. An inquiry into these damages might require

consideration of whether the defamation caused the [Church of God]'s employment

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 11 of 15 Pg ID 2053
12

actions, thereby inviting an exploration of the church's motives. A secular court

cannot take this step. 

Ogle, 279 Fed. Appx. at 395 n. 3; see also Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference,

978 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1992) (“First Amendment bars civil courts from reviewing decisions of

religious judicatory bodies relating to . . . employment of clergy”). However, that is precisely what

Ogle would have the Court do in this case with respect to his alleged economic damages. He has

failed to proffer a sufficiency of evidence which causally connects Hocker’s allegedly defamatory

statements with the economic damages that he claims to have suffered. In his affidavit, Ogle alleges

that he has experienced a loss of “ministry, livelihood, [and] financial security[.]” However, he

neither explains nor states how this “loss”is attributable to Hocker’s statements, and not the Church

of God’s decision to suspend his license, especially in light of his own acknowledgment that “the

Church of God . . . was the only denomination in which [he] conducted ministry.” Thus, inasmuch

as Ogle has failed to proffer any evidence of economic damages caused by Hocker, he must show

that his adversary in this lawsuit acted with actual malice in order to recover for his stated emotional

damages. See Glazer, 506 N.W.2d at 573.

“To show actual malice, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant made the statement with

knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. This standard is not satisfied

“by showing that the statements were made with preconceived objectives or insufficient

investigation.” Grebner v. Runyon, 347 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted).

Moreover, “ill will, spite or even hatred, standing alone, do not amount to actual malice.” Id.

In the case sub judice, Ogle has not presented any evidence that would create a genuine issue

of a material fact with regard to whether Hocker acted with malice. In his opposition papers, Ogle

points to Hocker’s deposition as evidence that this Defendant was an angry and hostile man who was

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 12 of 15 Pg ID 2054
7

Although Hocker wrote a letter to his presiding bishop in the Church of God which set

forth his version of the incidents in Belgium, Ogle has not contended that this letter was

defamatory.

13

“at war” with him. However, Grebner indicates that neither anger nor hatred amount to actual

malice. More specifically, even if a jury found that Hocker possessed all of these negative

characteristics which have been attributed to him by Ogle when the allegedly defamatory statements

were published by him, this evidence does not show that he (1) knew of the falsity of the statements

or (2) acted with a reckless disregard for the truth. As such, Ogle, who has failed to establish that

Hocker acted with actual malice, is not entitled to actual damages, including emotional harm. 

Finally, Ogle believes that he is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages. The Michigan

Compiled Laws provide, in part:

Exemplary and punitive damages shall not be recovered in actions for libel unless

the plaintiff, before instituting his or her action, gives notice to the defendant to

publish a retraction and allows a reasonable time to do so, and proof of the

publication or correction shall be admissible in evidence under a denial on the

question of the good faith of the defendant, and in mitigation and reduction of

exemplary or punitive damages.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2911(2)(b). However, Hocker has correctly noted that the statute allows

an award of these categories of damages only in libel actions. Libel is defined as “[a] defamatory

statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp[ecially] writing but also a picture, sign, or electronic

broadcast.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). It is noteworthy here that Ogle has not asserted

that Hocker’s publications had occurred through any fixed medium, as defined by Black’s Law

Dictionary.7

Moreover, there is no evidence that Ogle gave notice to Hocker to publish a retraction, as

required by the statute. In addressing this issue, Ogle proffered a letter that had been written by his

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 13 of 15 Pg ID 2055
14

attorney for this purpose. However, this correspondence, which bore the date of June 6, 2002, was

addressed to Dr. R. Lamar Vest, the General Overseer of the Church of God - not to Hocker. Thus,

this letter does not satisfy the minimum requirements of Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2911(2)(b).

Therefore, the Court concludes that Hocker’s statements are not defamatory per se. In

addition, the Court determines that Ogle (1) has not offered proof that he suffered any economic

damages which have been caused by Hocker, (2) cannot establish that Hocker acted with actual

malice, and (3) has failed to establish that he is entitled to any exemplary or punitive damages. As

a consequence, Ogle has not satisfied the fourth element of his prima facie defamation case; namely,

a special harm. See Mitan, 706 N.W.2d at 421 (plaintiff must show “either actionability of the

statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused

by publication”).

VII.

Ogle’s claim of IIED was reinstated by the Sixth Circuit only “to the extent that the trial

court determines that Ogle has set forth a prima facie defamation claim.” Ogle, 279 Fed. Appx. at

400. Hence and in light of the determination by this Court that Ogle has failed to establish a special

harm (i.e., a prima facie defamation claim), the Court must also grant a summary judgment in favor

of Hocker on Ogle’s second count (i.e., IIED). See Andrews v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 160 F.3d

304, 309 (6th Cir. 1998) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in light of

conclusion that “plaintiffs’ defamation claims may not be maintained”).

VIII.

Accordingly, and for the reasons that have been stated above, Hocker’s motion for summary

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 14 of 15 Pg ID 2056
15

judgment is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 22, 2009 S/Julian Abele Cook, Jr. 

Detroit, Michigan JULIAN ABELE COOK, JR.

 United States District Court Judge

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on October 22, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk

of the Court using the ECF system, and I further certify that I mailed a copy to the non-ECF

participant(s).

s/ Kay Doaks 

Courtroom Deputy Clerk

2:02-cv-73200-JAC-MJH Doc # 93 Filed 10/22/09 Pg 15 of 15 Pg ID 2057