UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

D. SAMUEL GOODELL, 

 Petitioner, 

 CASE NO. 15-11455 

v. HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW 

JOE BARRETT, 

 Respondent. 

____________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER 

SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE HABEAS PETITION, 

DENYING THE REQUEST FOR SERVICE BY U.S. MARSHAL, 

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, 

AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

 Petitioner D. Samuel Goodell, a state prisoner at the Cooper Street 

Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for the writ 

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The habeas petition challenges the 

Michigan Parole Board’s decision not to release Petitioner on parole. Because 

Petitioner has not exhausted any state remedies for his claims and still has an 

available remedy to exhaust, the petition will be dismissed without prejudice. 

I. Background

 Petitioner alleges that, in February of 2006, a jury found him guilty of 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, see Mich. Comp. 

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Laws § 750.84, and carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, see Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 750.226. Petitioner was sentenced to eight years, four months to twenty 

years in prison for the assault conviction and six to ten years in prison for the 

weapon offense. 

 Petitioner alleges that the Michigan Department of Corrections subsequently 

classified him as being a low risk for violence and recidivism and that his parole 

eligibility score was in the high-probability-of-parole category. Nevertheless, in 

2012 and in 2014, a two-member panel of the Michigan Parole Board departed 

from the parole guideline score and declined to release Petitioner on parole. In 

2012, the panel stated that its reason for departing from the parole guidelines was 

that Petitioner needed additional programming to gain insight into his violent 

behavior and that he remained a risk to the community. In 2014, the panel stated 

that Petitioner continued to think like a criminal and that he was still a major threat 

to the community. 

 Petitioner claims that he has finished serving his ten-year maximum 

sentence for carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, but that he continues to serve 

his sentence for the assault conviction. His grounds for habeas relief are: (1) the 

Parole Board’s decision was so irrational as to be arbitrary, capricious, and 

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oppressive; (2) the Parole Board violated his First Amendment rights by denying 

parole because he exercised his right to freedom of speech and to maintain his 

innocence; and (3) the Parole Board violated his equal protection rights by treating 

him differently than another prisoner in similar circumstances. Petitioner seeks a 

declaratory judgment stating that (1) the Parole Board violated his rights to due 

process of law, freedom of speech, and equal protection of the law and (2) under 

Michigan’s parole scheme, prisoners who score in the high-probability-of-parole 

category have a protected liberty interest in parole. 

II. Analysis

 The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies requires state prisoners to fairly 

present all their claims to the state courts before raising their claims in a federal 

habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 

U.S. 838, 842-47 (1999); Nali v. Phillips, 681 F.3d 837, 851 (6th Cir. 2012). 

This exhaustion requirement, long settled, see Ex parte Royall, 117 

U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868 (1886), serves important 

federalism interests by permitting state courts the first opportunity to 

correct alleged violations of their prisoner’s rights, see Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed.2d 438 (1971). 

“[B]cause of the important federal-state comity concerns served by 

the exhaustion doctrine, a state prisoner is required to present the state 

courts with the same claim, or a claim ‘substantially equivalent’ to the 

claim, urged upon the federal courts.” Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 

F.3d 293, 304 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275–78, 92 

S.Ct. 509). “Otherwise, the state courts are not given the opportunity 

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to apply the controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on the 

constitutional claim.” Id. 

King v. Berghuis, 744 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 142 (2014). 

To be properly exhausted, a prisoner must “invok[e] one complete round of the 

State’s established appellate review process,” including a petition for discretionary 

review in the state supreme court, “when that review is part of the ordinary 

appellate review procedure in the State.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845, 

847. Thus, a prisoner must present the factual and legal basis for each claim to the 

state court of appeals and to the state supreme court. Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 

410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 2009). 

 Petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted any state remedies for his 

claims, but he contends that he does not have an available state remedy to exhaust. 

While it is true that prisoners have no right to appeal a Parole Board’s decision to 

deny parole, In re parole of Hill, 298 Mich. App. 404, 411; 827 N.W.2d 407, 412 

(2012), in appropriate circumstances, a prisoner may challenge the decision of the 

Parole Board by filing a state complaint for the writ of habeas corpus or an action 

for mandamus. Morales v. Michigan Parole Bd., 260 Mich. App. 29, 40-41; 

676 N.W.2d 221, 229-30 (2003). Petitioner admittedly has not taken advantage of 

either one of these options. 

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III. Conclusion 

 Petitioner has failed to exhaust any state remedies for his claims, and he has 

an available state remedy to exhaust. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus (ECF No. 1) is dismissed without prejudice, and the request for service by 

the United States Marshal (ECF No. 2) is denied as moot. 

IV. Denial of a Certificate of Appealability and 

Denial of Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal

 “[A] prisoner seeking postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has no 

automatic right to appeal a district court’s denial or dismissal of the petition. 

Instead, [the] petitioner must first seek and obtain a [certificate of appealability.]” 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). A certificate of appealability may 

issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, “the district court 

denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s 

underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when 

the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists 

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

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 Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has “no constitutional or inherent right . . . to be 

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. 

Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), and he has no 

liberty interest in parole under state law, Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th 

Cir. 2011). Thus, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. For these 

reasons, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 Finally, an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. The 

Court therefore denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(3). 

 S/Arthur J. Tarnow 

 Arthur J. Tarnow 

 Senior United States District Judge 

Dated: June 29, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon 

parties/counsel of record on June 29, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

 S/Catherine A. Pickles 

 Judicial Assistant 

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