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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

EDWARD CORY REARDON, 

 Movant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent. 

Criminal Case No. 15-20137 

Civil Case No. 17-12570 

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

ARTHUR J. TARNOW

 / 

ORDER DENYING MOVANT’S MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT 

SENTENCE [38]; AND DENYING MOVANT A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 On July 11, 2016, Movant Edward Cory Reardon pled guilty to one count of 

coercion and enticement of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and one 

count of production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) [Dkt. 

27]. On January 30, 2017, the Court sentenced Movant to 15 years’ (180 months) 

of imprisonment. 

 Movant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence [38] on 

August 8, 2017. On order of the Court, the Government filed a Response [42] on 

September 25, 2017. Movant filed a Reply [43] on October 18, 2017. 

 For the reasons stated below, Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct Sentence [38] is DENIED. Movant is DENIED a certificate of 

appealability. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In September 2013, the Government issued a criminal complaint charging 

Movant with various child pornography-related activities. In addition, in October 

2013, Movant was charged in Macomb County with sexually abusive activity 

against a child, in violation of M.C.L. § 750.145C2, and using computers to 

commit a crime, in violation of M.C.L. § 750.145D2F. The Government’s motion 

to dismiss the federal criminal complaint without prejudice was granted in 

December 2013. 

On January 8, 2014, the Macomb County Circuit Court sentenced Movant to 

an indeterminate term of incarceration of 6-20 years. 

After further investigation by law enforcement, the Government issued an 

indictment [1] against Movant on March 10, 2015. Movant remained in the 

custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) during the 

pendency of this case, from March 10, 2015 through February 15, 2017. 

 Movant pled guilty on July 11, 2016. The Court sentenced Movant to 15 

years’ imprisonment [36]. That sentence runs concurrent to the MDOC sentence 

that Movant was already serving. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 To succeed on a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, a movant 

must allege “(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed 
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outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental 

as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 

964 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th 

Cir. 2003)). Movant alleges a violation of his constitutional right to the effective 

assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must 

show that his counsel rendered deficient performance and thereby prejudiced 

Movant’s defense so as to render the outcome of the proceedings unreliable. See 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

ANALYSIS

 Movant faults his counsel for failing to obtain credit for the time Movant 

served between September 2013 and January 2017. This does not meet the 

Strickland standard. Movant fails to recognize that his counsel could not have 

rendered deficient performance because, among other reasons, the Court was 

statutorily bound to impose a 15-year sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). Although 

there are certain situations in which a court is permitted to sentence a defendant 

below a mandatory minimum,1

 none of those occurred in this case. 

 

1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which provides that “[u]pon motion of the Government, 

the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by 

statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the 

investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” 
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Movant’s ineffective assistance argument also fails because pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3585(b), the power to award credit for time served lies exclusively with 

the Attorney General of the United States and the Bureau of Prisons. United States 

v. Brown, 417 Fed. Appx. 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2011). The decision to award or deny 

credit for pretrial detention is not made until a defendant enters the custody of the 

Bureau of Prisons. A defendant may seek “[r]eview of the Bureau of Prisons’ 

determination . . . through the administrative process and ultimately, after the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies, in the District Court.” United States v. 

Westmoreland, 974 F.2d 736, 737 (6th Cir. 1992). Movant fails to allege that he 

has exhausted his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons. See United 

States v. Singh, 52 Fed. Appx. 711, 712 (6th Cir. 2002). 

CONCLUSION

Movant has made no showing that his counsel’s failure to ask the Court to 

seek credit for time served constituted deficient performance or prejudiced his 

defense. Furthermore, the Court concludes that Movant has failed to make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Thus, the Court will 

deny Movant a certificate of appealability. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 

282 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000)). Accordingly, 
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IT IS ORDERED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence [38] is DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Movant is DENIED a certificate of 

appealability. 

SO ORDERED. 

s/Arthur J. Tarnow 

 Arthur J. Tarnow 

Dated: November 28, 2017 Senior United States District Judge